


3L


MS. 56. N30

N30.22

69496



The
POLITICAL QUARTERLY
 VOL. XXII. No. 1



CONTENTS

Notes and Comments		
Reflections on the Cold War	By R. H. S. CROSSMAN, M.P.	7
The Communist Ideology	By JOHN PLAMENATZ	16
Germany and the Cold War	By ERNST REUTER	27
Russia and Western Europe	By R. G. HAWTREY	33
The Policy of the U.S.A.	By HANS J. MORGENTHAU	43
France in the Cold War	By RAYMOND ARON	57
The Cold War in the East	By MICHAEL LINDSAY	67
Geography and the Cold War	By E. M. HUGH-JONES	74
The Cold War in the Balkans	By K. ZILLIACUS	85
BOOK REVIEWS	Reviewed by	
The Rise of Russia in Asia (Dallin); The Russo-German Alliance, 1939-1941 (Rossi); The Coming Defeat of Communism (Burnham)	H. R. G. GREAVES	95
Trade Unions in the New Society (Laski); Soviet Trade Unions (Deutscher)	DONALD G. MACRAE	97
The Proper Study of Mankind (Chase)	JUDITH HENDERSON	99
A Primer of Public Administration (Finer); Portrait of a Profession (Bridges); Bureaucracy in a Democracy (Hyneman)	W. A. ROBSON	103
The State of Europe (Smith)	LEONARD WOOLF	108
Private Corporations and their Control (Levy)	L. G. B. GOWER	112
Citizenship and Social Class (Marshall)	MARK BENNEY	115

EDITORS: Leonard Woolf and William A. Robson.

EDITORIAL BOARD: H. L. Beales, G. D. H. Cole, R. H. S. Crossman, M.P., Kingsley Martin, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur Salter, Lord Simon of Wythenshawe.

MSS., Books for Review, etc., should be addressed to the Editor at MONK'S HOUSE, RODMELL, near LEWES, SUSSEX. MSS. must be accompanied by stamped addressed envelopes (or International Reply Coupons).

PRICE Five Shillings per issue. POSTAGE SUBSCRIPTIONS to any address or through any newsagent £1 p.a. Postage on this issue, 2d.

Correspondence relating to subscriptions, advertisements, etc., should be addressed to the Publisher, TURNSTILE PRESS, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W.C.1 HOLBORN 8471

69496

1136122

DEFENCE IN THE COLD WAR

A Report by a Chatham House Study Group

This report closely examines the nature of the Cold War, the aims of Russian policy, and the forces, both moral and material, required by the free world to combat the spread of Communism. It is the work of a Chatham House Study Group which met under the chairmanship of Major General Sir Ian Jacob.

In a leading article the *Observer* said of the Report: 'We know of no statement more appropriate for a moment of great national decision. . . . It should be read by everyone who wants to take an intelligent part in the national debate.'

Price 5s. net

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE · ST JAMES'S SQUARE · SW1

Revolution in Eastern Europe

By DOREEN WARRINER. A political and economic analysis, with special chapters on the East European Plans, by a leading economist who is also an authority on peasant farming.
New maps, tables, index. 12s. 6d.

New China: Three Views

By OTTO VAN DER SPRENKEL (Ed.), ROBERT GUILLAIN and MICHAEL LINDSAY. Introduction by KINGSLEY MARTIN. Studies of China under Communism by independent observers with an important documentary section containing speeches by Mao Tse-tung, the texts of the New Constitution, The Organic Law, etc.
Index. 9s. 6d.

The Face of Spain

By GERALD BRENNAN, author of *The Spanish Labyrinth*. A vivid picture of Spain today.
16 plates. 15s.

TURNSTILE PRESS

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE Editors have decided to devote the January issue to a single subject, the Cold War. Both the politics and the economics of every state in the world are to-day dominated by this phenomenon or "situation" which we all refer to in these two capital-lettered monosyllables. At the moment all other world or domestic problems lose their importance in face of the question posed by this situation: Can the Cold War be gently melted and resolved in peace or is it the prelude to a third world war? It is, of course, impossible to deal exhaustively with so vast a subject, which ramifies all over the globe into every country and every national problem, in a single issue of a quarterly journal. We have, therefore, made no attempt to cover all its aspects, but have dealt with it in two different ways. Most of the articles consider it geographically, examining the impact of the situation upon those places where the tension and danger are greatest. The other way in which we have approached the subject is to deal with certain general aspects of it; for instance, Mr. Crossman deals with the relation of the Cold War to unconditional surrender, Mr. Hugh-Jones with its relation to geography, and Mr. Plamenatz with the important question of Russian communist ideology.

* * *

Mr. Crossman's article shows the vital importance of being absolutely clear in one's own mind as to what is meant by the Cold War. This kind of picturesque phrase, usually invented by a nimble-minded journalist to strike the imagination of the ordinary man, has its dangers when used to describe a very complicated political situation. The objective nature of the Cold War is in itself clear and comparatively simple. It is an "international political situation" determined by the relations or policies of two groups of governments. On the one side is the Soviet government at the head of a group of states in eastern Europe and Asia, ruled by totalitarian, communist governments which to a very large extent pursue a foreign policy determined for them in Moscow. On the other side is the government of the U.S.A. in a kind of loose alliance with a large number of states in western Europe, South America, and Asia which, in varying degrees profess the principles and possess the institutions of western democracy: these states or governments attempt to work

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

out a more or less common policy in various international organizations provided for the purpose, e.g. U.N.O., the Atlantic Union, and Western Union, and the American government, by the use of economic aid and the expectation of its military support, has the major influence in determining what that common policy shall be.

* * *

Cold War describes the relations which have developed between these two groups of governments since the breakdown of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1947. It is "war" because the policies of each side are based upon conscious and calculated hostility and upon the possibility, if not probability, of armed attack of the one upon the other. It is "cold" because it just stops short of becoming a regular, old-fashioned war, a war of battle, murder, and sudden death. The main object and hope of everyone, at least in the western democracies, is to keep the war cold and gradually resolve it, first, into a cool armistice and then perhaps into a tepid peace. In other words, our first consideration, as members of the western group, must be to prevent, if possible, a resort to force by either side. In such a situation, the splitting of the world into two groups of hostile, armed and arming states, the first thing to do, if we are to work out the policy most likely to prevent war, is to be absolutely clear in our own minds where the root cause of the hostility lies. All our contributors, except Mr. Zilliacus, agree in their diagnosis of the ultimate cause of the Cold War. Mr. Zilliacus is of opinion that most of the responsibility "rests on the shoulders of the defenders of capitalism". The statement is unsupported by evidence and we agree with the diagnosis of all the other writers. The Cold War has not been caused by defenders of capitalism or by defenders of communism, whoever these indeterminate people may be; it is caused by the policy and actions of governments, and governments are composed of specific individuals.

* * *

The root cause of the Cold War is the policy and actions of Stalin and the Soviet government. The policy of a government is determined by the objects which it wishes to attain and the means which it is prepared to use in order to attain them. The objects of the Soviet government are not in doubt; they have been stated again and again by Stalin and other Soviet leaders

NOTES AND COMMENTS

and all the actions of the government during the last thirty years confirm their statements. The objects are "security" for the communist government, régime, and system in Russia and the spread of communism to other countries. It is at this point that communist ideology comes in. The Russian government is in the hands of men who believe in what they call the Marxist or communist ideology. They believe the world to be divided between two irreconcilable social or economic systems, the communist and the capitalist, and they identify the capitalist system with western democracy. They regard the Soviet state, and indeed every communist state, as being in a condition of chronic hostility with all states which have "capitalist" or western democratic governments. They believe that the victory of communism and the collapse of capitalism are ultimately "inevitable" throughout the world. Meanwhile, their policy is determined by two axioms. First, the existence of any state with a capitalist or non-communist government on the borders of Russia is a threat to Soviet security. Second, the irreconcilable hostility, thus created between communism and capitalist democracy, between the east and the west, requires that the Soviet government should cause revolution and disruption, wherever and whenever possible, in capitalist or democratic states.

* * *

Mr. Crossman is right in pointing out that, in the Marxist sense and in Soviet policy, the Soviet government has been waging Cold War on the west ever since the Bolshevik revolution. It may be colder at one moment and hotter at another, but the object and policy remain the same. The initiative to hostility comes, therefore, from the east and so does the danger of real war, since the policy of the eastern group is aggressive by its very nature, for its object is to weaken or disrupt "capitalist" or democratic governments and states. So much for the ultimate object of Soviet policy. But the ultimate objective of a government's policy is not the same thing as the means which it is prepared to adopt in an attempt to gain its object. We habitually apply the word "policy" to both indiscriminately, and the confusion of one with the other often leads to muddled political thinking and to disastrous mistakes in strategic statesmanship. It is essential that the western statesman should never forget the long-term objects of the Soviet government, but it is no less—

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

perhaps it is even more—important that he should be clear as to the means which that government is likely to use in pursuit of its policy.

* * *

At the moment this is the crucial question; for the prevention of a third war depends largely upon the ability of western statesmen to interpret correctly the mind and intentions of Stalin and his government in this respect and to shape their own policy accordingly. In a pamphlet, *Defence in the Cold War*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs,* the authors write: "It is thought that the cold war may be defined as the policy of making mischief by all methods short of war—that is to say, short of war involving the Soviet Union in open hostilities." This is a good definition, and the interpretation of the mind of the Soviet government with regard to means is shared by every contributor to this number. We agree with it, for the evidence of the actions of that government during the last three years points to the conclusion that Stalin is prepared to go to any lengths, short of a general war, in his aim of disrupting "capitalist" governments, but that he is not now, and probably will not for some years be, prepared deliberately to use war against the U.S.A. as an instrument of his policy. This, then, is the assumption upon which the west should base its policy, but not complacently for two reasons. First, we should never forget that it may be based upon wishful thinking, and we must, therefore, know what we mean to do if war or unconditional surrender is offered as a choice not by us to the east, but by the east to us. Many of the demi-semi-fellow-travellers, who talk so much about the fire-eating Americans, never face this question. Secondly, we should remember, what we nearly always forget, the gross stupidity of powerful men, particularly "great statesmen". Stalin may not want to involve himself in a war with the U.S.A., but he may at any moment take some step—in Korea or China, for instance—which will land him in a position from which he cannot extricate himself without a world war. The policy of western statesmen should try to help Stalin not to get into such a position. The wise driver of a car on most British roads drives round all corners on the assumption that he

* *Defence in the Cold War*, by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (123pp., 5s.). The pamphlet deserves careful study; it is a very good examination from the British angle, of military and other measures of defence against Russia which are available to the western democracies.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

is on the point of meeting a suicidal lunatic driving on the opposite side of the road. In the Cold War the wise western statesman should pursue a similar policy.

* * *

From these reflections, certain important corollaries follow, which we can in these notes state only summarily. The most important is stated explicitly in several of the articles which follow, particularly by Mr. Crossman and by Professor Morgenthau in his examination of American policy. The Cold War is a struggle for power between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A., initiated by the Soviet government. It is a struggle between governments, not between ideologies. The west is not defending itself against communism, but against the threat of force by the Soviet government. Stalin uses ideology as a weapon by which he may weaken the defences of the west, but for us to treat communism everywhere and anywhere as the enemy is to fall into the communist trap. Communism may, indeed, be an ally of the west, as Mr. Zilliacus's article shows in respect of Yugoslavia, if it ceases anywhere to be an instrument of aggression in the hands of the Soviet government. The arming of the U.S.A. and western Europe can only be justified if it is used as a weapon of defence, not against communism, but against aggression by the Soviet government. It is justified only on the assumption that Stalin will be less aggressive, more "reasonable", more likely to negotiate a cold armistice or even a tepid peace, if he is faced by the strong and united, rather than by an unarmed and divided, west. And, though in our times optimism is a proof of either political imbecility or ulterior purpose, the facts so far, in Korea and elsewhere, support the assumption.

* * *

It follows that the west should show itself as "tough" as possible to the Soviet government, and yet prepared always to negotiate an agreement to differ. If we do not want a world war, we must be prepared for a world peace or at least a world armistice. That is what we should aim at and perpetually try to get, the cold armistice, some kind of agreement with Russia about Austria, Germany, Korea, etc. The Soviet government will, of course, not regard any such agreements as permanent, and the western statesman who signs them must continue to keep his eyes open. But that kind of uneasy armistice would

give the world a breathing space, and that, after all, is the best we can hope for. On the other side, we must deal with communism realistically as the ideological weapon which the Soviet government uses against the U.S.A. and the west. It is here that the west hitherto has displayed its greatest weakness. Mr. Michael Lindsay's article and the last part of Professor Morgenthau's article deserve the most careful consideration from this point of view. Wherever the governing economic classes misuse their power or social and economic conditions are bad, communism has a great appeal and it is used skilfully and without scruple by the Soviet government. This is particularly true of Asia. The west therefore finds itself too often forced into an alliance with the most reactionary classes or governments when it attempts to resist Soviet aggression. Here two drastic alterations in western policy are urgently required. Where we intervene, as we do in such places as Greece and Korea, the pretence that it is not "intervention" should be abandoned. We do intervene and in support of a Greek or Korean government. And we have the right and duty to make the terms of our intervention that that government should comply with its professions of "democracy". We should, for instance, insist that such governments pursue an active internal policy of social and economic reform. Lastly the western governments should abandon—and insist that their representatives, particularly their military officers, abandon—the policy of treating "communism" and all so-called communist governments as the enemy. By doing this, we have hitherto done precisely what the Soviet government wanted us to do, to prove that all communist governments must take their orders from Moscow. On the contrary, it should be our business to show that we are prepared to work on lines of friendship and co-operation with any communist government which is unwilling to become an instrument of the Soviet government and willing to live at peace with the rest of the world.

REFLECTIONS ON THE COLD WAR

By R. H. S. CROSSMAN, M.P.

I. The Definition of Cold War

WHAT exactly do we mean by the Cold War? To ask the question is not merely a piece of academic pedantry. Since 1946 this concept has increasingly dominated the policies of the western democracies and moulded the lives of their inhabitants. We have gradually come to take the Cold War for granted, without any precise understanding of what we mean by it or— even more important—what difference it makes to our other political preconceptions.

Superficially, the definition of Cold War seems obvious enough. It describes the fact that we are neither at war nor at peace with the Soviet Union, but in a state of undeclared hostility. So far the statesmen have failed to find not merely an agreed solution of a host of particular problems, like Germany and Japan, but any basis on which communist and non-communist states can agree to exist alongside each other.

A moment's reflection, however, will reveal that this is not a complete account of what we mean by Cold War. After all, ever since 1917 communist and non-communist states have been existing side by side, and the Kremlin has been framing its policies, and the policies of communist parties all over the world, on the Leninist assumption of inherent conflict between capitalism and communism. On this definition, Russia has been waging Cold War or Hot War ever since the Bolsheviks seized power, and nothing has happened inside the Soviet Union since 1945 to change the situation. If Cold War is used to define the objective relations between communist and non-communist states, then we must admit that it has been going on for thirty-three years and not, as most of us tend to assume, only since the Foreign Ministers' Conference broke down in the winter of 1947. There may have been tactical reasons why the Bolsheviks allied themselves now with the Weimar Republic against France and Britain, now with the League of Nations against Nazi Germany, now with Nazi Germany against the western powers, and now with the western powers against Nazi Germany. But these were merely actions of expediency, manoeuvres, which did not change the basic struggle between communists and non-communists. If the Cold War, therefore, describes merely an

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

inherent incompatibility of the two systems, Stalin must have been waging it at the conference table at Yalta against Roosevelt and Churchill.

But to say this is to make nonsense of plain English. What we mean by the Cold War is something which began since the end of the war, a new phenomenon which distinguishes the decade we live in from the war years and from the 1930's. This new element can have nothing to do with the Soviet Union, since it has not modified the principles of its policy one iota. It must be something which has happened outside Russia, in the western world.

Directly we state this, we can see what was wrong with our first definition. Though only one is needed to make a Hot War, it takes two to make a cold one. What is new since 1947 is the acceptance by the western powers of the Russian challenge, and their determination to reciprocate in kind. The Russians have not changed their attitude to us; it is our attitude to them which creates the new condition of Cold War. Instead of pushing Marxism aside as irrelevant, and treating Russia as though she were merely another nation state or empire, we are now inclined to accept the Russian account of the relationship between communism and capitalism at its face value. Reacting against Russian methods of power politics, we are beginning to base our own policy on the Leninist assumption that peace is only war prosecuted by other means; that the aim of negotiation is not to reach a genuine agreement (in our democratic sense of the words "genuine" and "agreement"), but to achieve a tactical advantage over the enemy, or to make a tactical detente for short-term purposes. Up to 1917, the Russians waged ideological war against us, while we continued to treat them as though we were not doing so. Now both sides are active, and it is this fact which we describe as the Cold War.

II. *The Fallacies of Anti-Marxism*

It is not surprising that the philosophy of Cold War has been most fully worked out by ex-communists, such as Arthur Koestler and James Burnham. Trained for many years in the Marxist school, they have no difficulty in elaborating a doctrine of anti-Marxism as coherent and as total as that of the Stalinites. Mr. Burnham's recent book, *The Coming Defeat of Communism*, is a very fair sample of this approach, and has the unusual advantage of a brilliant lucidity of style. Just as the Stalinites portra-

REFLECTIONS ON THE COLD WAR

the capitalist enemy, in bold, over-simplified lines, as a vast conspiracy, relentless in its constant offensive for world domination, so Mr. Burnham permits no fine distinctions in his description of Stalinite aggression. In scores of pages he describes the complex power, the ruthless cunning, the implacable hostility of the communist enemy, and prophesies the inevitable world clash between this monstrous demon and an almost defenceless free world. Constantly he warns us that only a picture painted in these blacks and whites can rouse the democracies; and those who prefer the sober greys, daring, for instance, to suggest that the Chinese communists may possibly be different from the Russian communists, are written off as fellow-travellers. Mr. Burnham states bluntly that, in order to win, we must believe that the third world war has already begun and that the issue whether we should start the actual shooting or not must be treated, not as a matter of morality, but in terms of strict expediency. There is no basis for a settlement between democracy and communism other than a surrender whose terms, as he outlines them, are so severe that it would in fact be unconditional.

The value of Mr. Burnham's book is that it is a logical extrapolation of a good deal of our present policy. Many of its practical suggestions for a gigantic political warfare offensive by an American-organized anti-Cominform are plainly absurd, but this fact should not make us overlook the importance of what he has done. If we reject his practical conclusions for the obvious reason that to adopt them would transform the western world into a totalitarian state, we must at least be willing to ask ourselves whether, in accepting Cold War and waging it, we are in fact accepting a denial of democracy. Once we admit that there is a real incompatibility between the communist and non-communist world, are we not guilty of the cowardice (of which Mr. Koestler accuses us even more fiercely than Mr. Burnham) if we flinch from the practical consequences? Once we borrow the Russian dogma of permanent war, must we not scrap our belief in international law and the sanctity of treaties, and our opposition to preventive war, as antiquated and positively subversive notions? Must we not agree with the ex-communists that the communist parties, to which we grant political freedom, are really a fifth column organized by an enemy power, and deserving only of liquidation? Wars and conflicts between old-fashioned nation states could end in peace treaties and even in enduring alliances between the belligerents. But a Cold War, arising out of an

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

inherent contradiction, can never be ended by a peace treaty. It must be total, in the sense not merely that any and every means to victory will be employed, but also that it can only have two possible ends: either the total destruction of one system or the total exhaustion of both. There is no third possibility in Cold War, when it is defined in these anti-Marxist terms.

III. *The Hegelian Fallacy*

The Burnhamite view suffers from two defects, the first theoretical and the second practical. Mr. Burnham talks freely of inherent contradictions and inevitable conflicts. But if the history of the last hundred years has shown anything, it is the futility of this Hegelian logic when applied to human history. Most of Marx's prophecies have failed to come true because he tried to force facts into a system of dialectic. We can now see that, although the abstract capitalism which Marx described was inherently contradictory, the contradictions did not produce the results he expected, because reality diverged further and further from the abstract system. Instead of behaving as puppets on Marx's stage, the capitalists often saw the contradictions and took steps to smooth them out, under pressure from the labour movements. Instead of ruthlessly following their class interests, they were stirred sometimes by morality, sometimes by patriotism, sometimes by a shrewd self-preservation instinct, and their economic ideas and motives in the western world were deeply influenced by a public opinion which soon came to feel that *laissez-faire* was wicked. British socialism and the American Fair Deal are now emerging out of the capitalism which Marx dogmatically described as a closed, self-contradictory system. There is no scientific validity in the phrases "inherent contradiction" and "inevitable conflict". In so far as they are not just untrue, they merely express a pessimistic conviction that human beings will always fail to find a sensible method of resolving a dangerous situation.

If this is a fair criticism of the Marxist justification for Cold War, it can also be applied to the anti-Marxism which the ex-communists are now trying to foist on the western democracies. To borrow from the communists precisely that apocalyptic philosophy of history which falsified the brilliant social analysis of Marx is surely a very queer way of combating totalitarianism. In order to frame a sensible defence against communism, it is

REFLECTIONS ON THE COLD WAR

essential to realize that Russian policy is based on this gross distortion of history; that Stalin will always see the western world through Marxist glasses, which prevent him from ever understanding it; and that we are facing men in Russia whose choice of political instruments is inhibited by no moral scruples. We must accept the brutal fact that Stalinites believe in Cold War and that their whole policy stems from this belief. But there is no reason whatsoever to conclude from this correct analysis of Stalinism that we must adopt every communist intellectual error and moral vice in order to combat them. But this is just what Burnham and Koestler seem to want us to do.

In the second place, the anti-Marxist theory of Cold War is impossible to apply in any western democracy. Because the ex-communists, in changing sides, have brought with them the materialism and determinism which are the chief heresies of communist theory, they completely fail to understand the working of democracy. True to their instinctive totalitarianism, they think of it as something which can be engineered and manipulated from above by an elite imbued with the philosophy of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor; and they are eager to organize the anti-Cominform on the same principles of democratic centralism which brought the Bolsheviks to power. At one point in his argument, Mr. Burnham observes that in the U.S.A. it is the military mind which really understands the communist menace. Of course it is true that the soldier, who thinks in terms of war, and sees diplomacy as nothing but power politics, to that extent resembles a communist. But surely it is the communist transformation of diplomacy into warfare and of planning into a militaristic managerial society to which we, as democrats, are opposed. If President Truman permitted the American Chiefs of Staff to usurp the functions of the State Department in order to organize an anti-Cominform in Europe, or to smash communism in China, the case for European neutrality would become unanswerable. By waging the Cold War according to Mr. Burnham's strategy, America would soon transform the Atlantic Pact from an alliance of free nations into an instrument of American imperialism, and Europe would have every reason to renounce it. Moreover, any American bid for world domination, under cover of waging the Cold War, would fail much more speedily than the communist crusade, because it would not have even the dynamic of a social gospel. An anti-communist world state, dominated by a United States which had accepted

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

anti-Marxism as its philosophy, would be as repellent and probably less efficient than a communist world state.

IV. *The Fallacy of Unconditional Surrender*

If we reject the Burnhamite theory of Cold War, what are we left with? Is it possible to fight totalitarianism without becoming ourselves totalitarian? One approach to an answer is to study the lessons of the second world war. Whatever the effects of unconditional surrender upon the Germans themselves, it is certain that this policy was wholly harmful to the interests of western democracy. By exacting total defeat, Roosevelt and Churchill prolonged the war and permitted the Russians to advance deep into Europe. Even worse, they postponed any consideration of peace-making until it could only be made on Russian terms. By 1944 war had become an end in itself, and not an instrument of policy, with the result that we found ourselves committed to such monstrous proposals as the Morgenthau Plan and to the totalitarian idea that one can impose democracy from above on a defeated, partitioned, and occupied nation. All this suited Russia admirably. A People's Democracy must always be imposed from above by a trained elite, but for us to copy the Russians involved a violation of every human instinct and every democratic principle. Instead of teaching the Germans democracy, we merely taught them that Englishmen and Americans—for a few months until the policy began to change—could behave like German *Herrenvolk* or Russian Commissars. During and after the war a few voices were raised to protest against the adoption of Nazi methods in order to defeat Nazism. Those who spoke up against strategic bombing, the Yalta decision to expel millions of Germans from their homes, the Morgenthau Plan, and non-fraternization were denounced as appeasers who favoured a "soft" policy. But history is proving the "appeasers" right, and it would have paid us both to fight the German war and to organize the occupation according to our own code and not that of the totalitarians.

The lesson of Germany has a direct bearing on our conduct of the Cold War against Stalinite Russia. I accept the view that it will probably last as long as the Stalin régime, if not longer. There may be partial agreements and periodic detentes, but peace is not likely in our time. I also believe that it was essential to rid ourselves of the illusion that European socialists can

REFLECTIONS ON THE COLD WAR

ever co-operate safely with Stalinite communists in Popular Front governments. We have all got to accept the enduring reality of the Cold War. Even if, for tactical reasons, the Russians become reasonable about Austria or Japan, or any other particular problem, we shall have to remain on our guard, we shall have to remain armed, and we shall have to realize that Stalinism, the cruellest form of the managerial society, will remain a menace to world peace as long as it dominates Russia. But this does not mean either that war is inevitable or that we are justified in using any and every means to defeat communism. To-day the only inherent reason for war is the Russian belief that war is inherent; the only inevitability is the dogma of inevitability, whether promulgated by Marxists or anti-Marxists. I can see no reason why, over a long period of time, the Russian menace should not be overcome peacefully—on one condition. That condition is that, by our own approximation to Russian methods, we do not justify the apocalyptic belief in Armageddon. If the world were to be divided, as the anti-Marxists would like it to be, into two blocs, both believing in an inherent Cold War, then the conflict would indeed be inevitable.

V. *The Dynamic of Cold War*

Fortunately, this is not the case. Despite every provocation, the western world has not adopted *vis-à-vis* Russia the policy of unconditional surrender which it imposed on Germany. On the contrary, the Cold War is in fact providing a new dynamic for western democracy. Despite the confident anticipations of the chronic anti-Americans, the response to Russian aggression has not been atom bombardment, but Marshall Aid in Europe and United Nations action in Korea. Both of these are enormously encouraging experiments in collective democratic action, and neither would have been possible without the Cold War. Of course, there are powerful forces in the U.S.A. which regard Marshall Aid and the refusal to use the atom bomb as appeasement, and call for a tough policy and a preventive war. But so far we can say that since 1947 the Cold War, by and large, has been a creative force, forcing the western world to put its house in order and to attend to evils which otherwise would have been left to fester. It is only thanks to Russian pressure that we are organizing collective security on a world basis, and it might well be that the main instrument for building the foundations of a World Fair Deal will not be Truman's Fourth Point, but the

common defence plans of the west. Those plans will have to include not merely integrated commands and a common strategy, but joint boards to allocate food, raw materials, and labour, and to control both production and prices. During the second world war, such combined boards went a very long way towards the development of a planned economy over a large part of the world. The Cold War, if we use the opportunity aright, may enable us to reconstitute those boards to-day, just as it may enable the Fair Dealers to switch the U.S.A. back from free enterprise to a controlled economy. If we can move in this direction, we could, in the process of building our military and social defences against communism, evolve a balanced economy in the non-communist world and at long last begin to tackle the problem of the backward peoples.

This concept of Cold War strategy is consistent with the tradition of British socialism. In our own country, our aim has been to subject power to a free public conscience and to civilize the conflicts of capitalism through the development of public ownership and democratic planning. At home we are on the way to completing the task of civilizing class conflict, so that it ceases to be conflict. Now we are faced with the grander and infinitely more dangerous job of civilizing a world struggle for power so that it does not end in total war. If we accept this challenge in the spirit in which the pioneers of socialism accepted the capitalist challenge a hundred years ago, I can see no reason why we should fail. We have already disproved the Marxist thesis that violence was inherent in the capitalist system and that it could only be transformed by the imposition of a ruthless dictatorship. We must now disprove the thesis of the communists—and the ex-communists—that violence is inherent in the Cold War and unconditional surrender its only logical climax.

To achieve this, however, demands a considerable revision in our thinking. Far too many socialists still believe that the choice is between accepting Fultonism or seeking an accommodation with the Soviet Union: we should either be as tough as Mr. Churchill or as soft as Mr. Nehru. So long as controversy continues in this sterile rut, it will be barren, and the practical result will be annihilating defeats of the Left and a steady drift towards reaction throughout the western world. If the Left is to revive and to fulfil its radical and civilizing function inside the labour movement, it must rid itself of its "Russia" and "America" complexes. British socialism is neither a mediator nor a halfway

house between American capitalism and Russian communism; and socialist righteousness will not be achieved by a disdainful attitude of equidistant neutrality. In 1950 the main enemy of freedom, and in particular of free labour movements, is the Stalinite managerial society, and the strongest potential ally which British socialism possesses is the American labour movement and the Fair Dealers in Washington.

It is true enough that reactionary forces are still immensely more powerful in the U.S.A.—and indeed in Western Europe—than they are in Britain. But to treat General MacArthur or Senator McCarthy as the main enemy, or even to think of them as a threat to peace as dangerous as Soviet policy, is to neglect everything which has happened both in the U.S.A. and in the U.S.S.R. since 1930. In the U.S.S.R. we have seen the elimination of the last trace of revolutionary communism, and the development of a managerial state run by a privileged and despotic elite: in the U.S.A. we have seen the steady growth of the labour movement under New Deal and Fair Deal governments, defeated only once at the polls in twenty years.

To achieve a genuine socialist policy, therefore, we must accept two hard facts: (1) that Anglo-Russian collaboration (in any sense of those words which have meaning for a British socialist) is impossible; and (2) that the best hope of world peace lies in a constructive alliance between American welfare capitalism and British welfare socialism. The Anglo-American alliance can only too easily be used for reactionary purposes which endanger world peace—for instance, to compel the French to accept the rearmament of Germany or to prop up Chiang-Kai-shek. But because there are powerful popular forces in the U.S.A. which share our ideals there is no reason to believe that we cannot defeat such reactionary tendencies. The Russian alliance, on the other hand, is a mere form of words, because Stalinism is far more fundamentally opposed to our democratic socialism than it is to monopoly capitalism, with whose managerial structure it has a good deal in common. If we treat the Cold War as an unnecessary quarrel between potential allies, and the Anglo-American alliance as an unnatural marriage of convenience, we can achieve nothing. Accept the Cold War as the challenge of this century and the Fair Deal as a potential ally, and you have the beginnings of a socialist foreign policy which can achieve that "agreement to disagree" between East and West which is the only alternative to war.

THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

By JOHN PLAMENATZ

THERE is a philosophy called *dialectical materialism* from which the communists think they derive their political and social theories. They often say that, unless a man has a proper idea of it, he cannot understand what they are trying to do in the world. For my part, I do not believe them. It is just one of the many illusions they have about themselves. If any doctrine inspires their actions, it is social and political merely; it is not what they think it is, a general philosophy.

Men like to pretend they derive their political and social theories from an all-embracing philosophy, from principles so wide that there is nothing they cannot be used to explain. When the pretenders lived, as Plato and Aristotle, in the early days of science and philosophy, the result was impressive. It was already much less so by the nineteenth century. The general philosophy supposed to lie behind Marxist communism has in fact no logical connection with it. Marx, Engels, and Lenin, like other vigorous and clever men, took an interest in subjects they were not trained to understand. They were not philosophers and they were not scientists; they were only three men passionately interested in politics and social theory who somehow persuaded themselves that the phenomena studied by the natural scientists obey a general law similar to the one they thought Marx had discovered about society. They honestly believed that their theory of society, which is *historical materialism*, is an application to social phenomena of a more general philosophy called *dialectical materialism*. The truth is that they derived dialectical philosophy from historical materialism, that they hastily put together a philosophy to suit their social theory. They were all three revolutionary socialists convinced of the inevitable victory of the cause they espoused; and what really mattered to them was the theory that conviction rested on. Historical materialism is about as intelligible as most theories of society. The man who invented it spent the greater part of his life studying social and political phenomena. Though he was not impartial, he was intelligent and hard-working. His theory about these phenomena is therefore interesting. But his conclusions, when he applied similar ideas to phenomena he never studied or understood, are not interesting. They have nothing to do with political or social theory or with serious enquiry of any kind. The connection

THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

between dialectical and historical materialism exists only in the minds of Marx and his disciples. It is important, no doubt, in one sense, because some of his disciples have great power and can punish scientists who reach conclusions they do not like. But it is not important in the sense that anything about society or politics follows from dialectical materialism.

I must say these simple things because almost no one attends to them. The Marxists, we know, are atheists and materialists. They believe that matter is prior to mind, that mental are dependent on physical phenomena in some way in which the latter are not dependent on them. They also believe that men's economic activities determine all their other social activities in some way in which they are not determined by them. Both these doctrines are called "materialism" by the Marxists, and there is certainly a formal similarity between them. But the truth of one of them in no way depends on the truth of the other. Matter may be "prior" to mind, though men's economic activities are not "fundamental" in any intelligible sense of the word. Conversely, there may be a sense in which men's economic activities are "fundamental" though it should turn out that mind is prior to matter, or that the question of priority between them should never have been put. All men's social activities are both mental and physical; and the causal relations between them have nothing whatever to do with the connection of matter with mind. This is a fact so obvious that only German philosophy could hide it.

We must distinguish between the efficient part of communist theory and the rest of it, between the doctrines that really affect policy and the others. Everything said by Marx, Engels, or Lenin is treated in the Soviet Union with the greatest respect. It is dangerous to criticize any part of it. That, however, does not mean that all their doctrines are guides to policy. We may compare communist orthodoxy with an armoury of carefully tended weapons, all greatly prized by their owner, though he uses only a few of them. The efficient part of communist theory is not large. It mostly consists of two things: a vulgarized version of historical materialism and a selection from the political writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

Historical materialism, as Marx and Engels understood it, is a rather complicated theory, and parts of it can be understood in several different ways. But the simple and rather crude version of it now current in communist countries may be stated quite briefly. Marxists believe that the tools and methods men use to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

produce goods and services determine the social relations in which they stand to one another. Wherever certain tools and methods are used there will exist a system of property appropriate to them. But men do not always use the same tools and methods; they continually improve them and so increase their powers of production. On the other hand, they do not adjust the system of property to meet each change in the system of production. They do not do so for a very simple reason. The system of property does not give equal advantages to everyone. Those whom it favours will want it to remain unchanged. But just because it favours them, they will be wealthy and powerful the rulers of society, and they will therefore have the power to prevent the changes they dislike. The system of property will become gradually but inevitably unsuited to the prevailing system of production, so that men will become less and less able to make efficient use of the tools and methods at their disposal. This is what Marxists mean by the "fetters on the forces of production" and the "contradictions", which, according to them, must arise in every society prior to the socialist one.

These "contradictions" cannot last for ever. They must be resolved. The system of property, and with it the political structure of society, must in the end be adjusted to the change in the system of production. But the time-lag will be great, and the adjustment will therefore be rapid and violent. It will take the form of a social and political revolution. This revolution may take some time and it need not involve much bloodshed, but it will be a change essentially different, because it is rapid and violent, from the steady development of the system of production.

The system of production, as it develops, brings into existence, multiplies, and strengthens a class whose interest it is to alter the system of property. This is the revolutionary class whose historic function is to challenge the power of the rulers and to make the revolution that will adjust the system of property to the system of production. Since the economic development of society strengthens them and weakens their enemies, their final victory is assured.

The classes that come into conflict with one another need not (and mostly do not) understand the causes that have brought them into conflict. They merely follow their own interests. The conflict therefore takes a form that appears to belie Marxist theory. But in fact it does not do so, for what they quarrel about

is not the cause, but only the pretext of the quarrel. Both the ruling and the revolutionary classes evolve a moral and political philosophy suited to their positions in society. And so there is always an ideological quarrel appropriate to the conflict of classes that has given rise to it. The revolutionary class, anxious to get what support they can, will seek the alliance of other classes whose interests are also not those of their rulers. They will therefore evolve principles and slogans of apparently universal application. But once they have supplanted the ruling class, they will set about exploiting and oppressing their recent allies. A real equality of rights is impossible while society consists of classes. There never were and never can be equal classes.

The number of classes, however, is not infinite. The succession of revolutions will at last come to an end. Marx and Engels believed that in the Western Europe of their day only one class, the proletariat, would survive to challenge and overthrow the ruling capitalist class. All other classes except these two would, they thought, eventually disappear as the capitalist system developed. In the end, an enormous, highly organized, disciplined and politically educated proletariat would face a small and isolated class of super-capitalists. The victory of the proletariat would therefore make society classless; and the repressive organs of the state would quickly be abolished as soon as the proletariat had used them to destroy the last pernicious traces of the old system. Since Marx and Engels died, it has become clear that there are as many and as vigorous classes in capitalist society as there ever were. But the old doctrine still remains, that the industrial workers are *par excellence* the revolutionary class, and that their revolution—or, to speak more accurately, the revolution made in their name—must lead to the classless society.

There are two things to notice about this simple version of historical materialism. In the first place, the parties to a class conflict are not people with different interests that can be reconciled by discussion. One party to the conflict is progressive, and the other is reactionary. The conflict is necessary because it is the product of a fundamental social process, and nothing but the complete victory of the progressive class can put an end to it. The reactionary class are doomed to annihilation: not, of course, to physical extermination as individuals, but to the irrevocable loss of their status in society. Marxists believe that a ruling class will never voluntarily surrender their privileges. It may, of course, be possible to win a bloodless victory over them, just

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to raise further funds in 1933 to ensure that *The Political Quarterly* would weather the economic blizzard then raging.

It must have been in the latter part of that year that I again approached G.B.S., though I have no copy of my letter. He took the correspondence with him on his world cruise and in the spring of 1934 I received the following reply:

24th February, 1934.

"R.M.S. Rangitane, outward bound London to New Zealand, at present roasting near the Equator.

DEAR ROBSON,

At last I have a moment's leisure to write to you about the P.Q., and to give more than a glance at the figures you supplied me with. They seem to me quite conclusive: the experiment has failed. The receipts are dwindling; the advertisements are dwindling; the sales are dwindling. I shall not throw the handle after the hatchet by pensioning it: I cannot afford such games (the popular impression that my settled income is boundless is a delusion: I can finance an experiment occasionally out of the windfalls that occasionally happen in the theatre even to me; but I cannot keep lame ducks from year to year; and my last two plays have flopped just as badly as the P.Q. and for much the same causes).

Derelict magazines are hard to kill; or rather they are hard to bury. Their ghosts keep walking often for years and years. I think it is shocking to bleed Cripps personally to keep the wreck afloat; but if I were the editor I should offer to make the paper the organ of all the dictators: of Kemal, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Pilsudski, Doumergue, De Valera, Mosley, and of Cripps too, if he cares to give a final kick to "the putrefying corpse of Democracy". The blazing fact that nobody mentions is that of late years every political adventurer who promises to suppress or sidetrack parliament instantly gets an overwhelming vote of confidence from his nation. If the P.Q. were to make itself the mouthpiece of this movement, a modest subvention from each of these heroes, accompanied by an occasional article from their pens, might keep the rag afloat; but if it sticks to the Labor Party, or to any parliamentary party whatever, it will succumb to the general nausea which the words parliament, liberty,

generally, and in the colonies and dependencies of the great capitalist powers must make use of every struggle for national independence. Not because national independence is a thing desirable for its own sake, not because the peasants and the other poorer classes are to achieve their class aspirations after the revolution, but because these alliances are useful to the workers. In a communist world there would be neither national dependence nor independence, and there would be no classes. Even the proletariat must eventually disappear as a class. If then they use other classes to achieve the classless society, they are not therefore making victims of them, but are preparing all mankind for the best that men are capable of.

In 1936 Stalin said to the American journalist, Roy Howard, that "we Marxists believe that a revolution will also take place in other countries. But it will take place only when the revolutionaries in these countries think it possible or necessary. The export of revolution is nonsense". This statement is not a repudiation of historical materialism, nor is it a simple lie told to a visiting journalist. There is a good Marxist sense in which revolutions are not for export, and an equally good sense in which they are. You cannot have a revolution where the social conditions for it do not exist. Revolutionary situations arise not because some men decide that it would be a good thing to change society; they arise, according to the Marxists, because society has reached a certain stage in an inevitable and predictable process. When they do arise, it is the business of Marxists to take advantage of them. It may be that the Marxists on the spot are the best judges of the local situation, but the movement they belong to is international. Their first duty is to the proletariat. The Marxist who would not interfere in the politics of another country merely because it is not his own is no true Marxist. But the interference must (so the theory goes) be intelligent and discreet; it must take notice of local conditions and susceptibilities. If it is clumsy, it may do more harm than good.

Clausewitz treated war as only one of several alternative means to the same end, the imposition of the state's will on other states. The communists think of revolution in much the same way; and nowadays, because one great state is Marxist, they think every victory gained by that state over the others a victory of the revolutionary proletariat. Just as war may be the best policy at one time, so revolution may be the best at another, and at still other times there are alternatives to be preferred to either.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of their activities, the Economic and Social Council created the Technical Assistance Board consisting of the Executive Heads of the participating organizations and presided over by the Secretary-General or his representative. In addition, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Refugee Organization, and the International Telecommunications Union, although not members of the Board, are represented at its meetings. The Board, which meets at frequent intervals, is notified of all requests for technical assistance made to its member organizations. It reviews programmes, arranges for joint action, as in the case of expert missions representing several organizations, approves major projects, and determines responsibility for action. The Board also acts on behalf of its members, especially by maintaining overall liaison with outside organizations which operate regional or other technical assistance schemes and by negotiating with governments. Without the Board a smoothly integrated international programme would be impossible. Its success has been due mainly to the spirit of enthusiasm and co-operation of its members.

A large part of the work involved in operating the programme consists in finding suitable experts and in placing persons to whom fellowships and scholarships have been granted in appropriate training institutions. To facilitate this many of the more developed countries able to provide such experts and training facilities have established special liaison units or committees within their administrations to co-operate with the international organizations. The practical advantages of having such a single point of reference are obvious. Particularly important is the fact that the international organizations can, where such machinery exists, feel every confidence in the recommendations made since these derive from a knowledge, which they cannot possess, of the entire resources of the government.

The under-developed countries requesting technical assistance are on their side confronted with a not dissimilar problem arising from the multiplicity of sources from which assistance may now be had. There are, in addition to the several United Nations agencies, other international programmes such as that of the Organization of American States, the facilities of the Colombo Plan, and the numerous and extensive services available under bilateral arrangements offered by governments. Under-developed

THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

other proletarian political organizations, or that they should compel the workers to do what they had not first persuaded them to want.

Lenin, in a number of pamphlets and articles written before the Bolshevik revolution, of which perhaps the most important is *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, made rather more of Marx's doctrine than Marx ever meant. "We are the party of a class, and therefore almost the whole class . . . should act under the direction of our party. . . . But it would be . . . smug complacency to think that at any time under capitalism the whole class, or almost the whole class, could rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its vanguard. . . . To forget the distinction between the vanguard and the masses that gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the vanguard to *raise* ever wider strata to this most advanced level, is merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks." Lenin wrote these words in 1904, and he had in mind the relations that ought to subsist in a capitalist country between the "party of the proletariat" and the class in whose name it acts. He was not preaching an undemocratic doctrine, he was not suggesting that the party should not be responsible to the workers, that it should drive them for their own good without caring for what they in their ignorance might want. And yet the passage I have quoted has a special flavour about it; it was quite obviously written by Lenin and not by Marx. Lenin's party is *the* party of a class. We are not told that the class must have no other party, and yet only one party is spoken of. What is more, we are not to expect that at *any* time under capitalism will the whole class or almost the whole of it rise to the level of the party. The distinction between the party and the class must never be forgotten.

Lenin's party never in fact became what he wanted it to be. In his anxiety to improve it, he broke it in two; and it was with the smaller part that he made the Bolshevik revolution. The "party of the proletariat" never achieved internal discipline until after the revolution for whose sake that discipline was preached. Though Russia, according to every Marxian test, was then not "ripe" for a proletarian revolution, Lenin took his opportunity in the autumn of 1917 and seized power in the name of the proletariat. Had he not expected proletarian revolutions in the industrial countries of the west, he might not have taken his chance. But he was bold and hopeful, and so he took it. Though the expected revolutions never happened, his weak hold on an

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

countries frequently lack the internal co-ordinating machinery necessary to ensure the proper selection of priorities, the best phasing of development projects and the mobilizing of technical assistance to secure the best results. The multiplicity of technical assistance sources could, if care were not exercised, lead to confusion. To assist governments whose own machinery in this respect may still be rudimentary, the device of a resident technical assistance representative has been adopted, and United Nations agencies have come together in the appointment of such a representative in several countries where substantial technical assistance activities are under way. In most cases the principal functions given the representative are to advise the government with respect to the preparation and co-ordination of its requests for assistance, to advise it with respect to its general development programme and the priorities to be given to different projects, and to maintain close contact with all technical experts sent to the country.

Thus, the co-ordination of technical assistance which is indispensable for an orderly development of the economy of the country concerned is safeguarded by the resident representative in the country receiving assistance. At the centre it is one of the duties of the Technical Assistance Board to encourage governments to co-ordinate the assistance which they receive from various sources so as to avoid overlapping and to ensure that the collective efforts achieve the best results. At the same time the Board is making every effort to establish and improve co-operative arrangements with other regional or national organizations. At present there exists a continuous exchange of information and consultation with agencies operating under the United States Point IV Programme. Similar arrangements have been completed with the Organization of American States and the Board has been invited to appoint a liaison officer at the headquarters of the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South East Asia.

The co-existence of the several programmes of assistance as they are now constituted undoubtedly presents a problem of continuous adjustment and co-ordination. The task is clearly a continuous one for, in the face of the great and pressing needs of the under-developed countries, the most effective use of resources and the elimination of any waste and confusion is imperative.

THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

no quicker because there are older trees around them. Marx said that ideologies are not born before their time; they have their proper places in the order of history. Marxism, the theory of society put together by Marx and Engels, is the product of industrial capitalism. Like everything else, it has its place and its time in the history of the world. But industrial capitalism is, as Marx and Engels also said, by nature expansive. The countries where it predominates, because they are powerful and rich, make the rest of the world dependent on them. They introduce capitalist production into more primitive societies where, but for them, it would not have appeared, perhaps, for centuries. Or else the native rulers of these societies, seeing the power of the industrial west, themselves introduce it. All these countries that make contact with the west are liable to infection by western ideologies. Where there is an industrial proletariat or any sort of victims of industrialism, there are people ready to accept Marxism. Where there are schools teaching western science and history, there are intellectuals who can easily become ardent communists, all the more ardent, perhaps, because the capitalism introduced into more primitive societies is often far more brutal than in the west.

These more primitive societies to which an alien capitalism is suddenly brought are thereby shaken to their foundations. They are liable to shocks and strains unknown to countries whose social evolution has been more gradual. Capitalism is therefore likely to be weakest where it is most recent. To use an image made popular by Lenin and Stalin, international capitalism is liable to break at its "weakest link". That link in 1917 was in Russia. Fortunately for the Bolsheviks and (so they say) for the workers all over the world, the great industrial powers of the west did not succeed in putting down the proletarian revolution in Russia. The Bolsheviks, taking full advantage of their great opportunities, have made the Soviet Union one of the two most powerful countries in the world. What they could do can now be done more easily by other backward countries. Everywhere outside the people's democracies there is some trace of capitalism, and therefore some opportunities for communists. And these opportunities may well be greatest where capitalism is the least well established, for then there are not only the "contradictions" of capitalism to be exploited, but all the antagonisms, strains, and bewilderment caused by the bringing of capitalist production to societies unable to adjust themselves quickly to it.

This doctrine of the "weakest link of capitalism", though it

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

responsibility than one man can bear. If he is weak he is corrupted by his power; if he is strong he is demented by it, and, like Alexander, Hitler and Napoleon, tries to add the world to his dominions, thus becoming at worst a scourge and a tyrant and at best an explorer and adventurer like Julius Caesar or William the Conqueror . . . The brooms sweep clean when they are new; but when they are spoiled or worn-out the place becomes an Augean stable" (p. 34).

His other objection to Great Man rule was that it is "too totalitarian to be really possible". The dictator must delegate most of his power, and in practice he tends to leave the local work to his most subservient followers rather than to his ablest rivals. There is, he concluded, "no hope for civilization in government by idolized single individuals. Councils of tested qualified persons, subject to the sternest possible public criticism, and to periodical (in pressing cases even summary) removal and replacement, is our safest aim" (p. 341).

The election and re-election of rulers for sufficiently short periods to keep them conscious of their dependence on the approval of the citizens he conceived to be the principal safeguard against these evils. Far from abolishing Parliament, he wrote, we must reform our old parliament and establish new ones. "Political decisions must not be the whims or phobias of men demented by absolute authority . . . with no remedy short of their assassination by their bodyguards or courtiers. Such decisions must be made in council with competent assessors in the light of the best advice and widest information available. We shall need regional councils, vocational councils, industrial councils, co-operative consumers' councils, financial councils, educational councils, planning and co-ordinating councils, councils for supernational affairs, as well as parliamentary congresses (at not too frequent intervals) to ventilate national grievances and contribute any political suggestions Mr. Everyman may be capable of" (p. 35).

While a representative popular parliament of men and women in equal numbers is necessary for ventilating grievances, questioning ministers, criticizing the Cabinet, suggesting remedies, moving resolutions and votes of confidence, and generally for keeping the government in touch with the people, such a House of Commons should not have any direct power to legislate "because legislative capacity is not common" (p. 352). "Legislation must be by 'the quality' not by the mob" (p. 30). There

GERMANY AND THE COLD WAR

By ERNST REUTER, *Mayor of Berlin*

WHEN the terrors of the second world war had come to an end in 1945 all nations hoped that a period of understanding and peaceful co-operation would begin. The devastations caused by the war, the cruel destruction of life to an extent unknown before, the almost inconceivable effect of newly invented machines of destruction—all that, they believed, had produced so profound an impression on the peoples and statesmen that a peaceful co-operation of all peoples ought to be the natural consequence.

These hopes and expectations were quickly and thoroughly defeated by facts. The flowering dream that the co-operation between the allies of the world war would be continued in peace time was a short one, it was never brought to maturity. Hardly had the common enemy been defeated and the menace been removed that had linked the powers of the east and the west in the same front line, the integration so far shown under the pressure of the war was past and gone. We Germans had many an opportunity to see that at close hand, and nowhere better and more distinctly than in Berlin, which under the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam was to be jointly occupied and administered by the four big powers. Co-operation soon proved to be an impossibility and developed into open antagonism. Thus Berlin, like a miniature, reflected the conditions prevailing throughout the world.

We Berliners happened to have experienced this development ourselves, and right from the beginning we therefore did not delude ourselves about peaceful co-operation with the Soviets. Besides, we remember in Berlin and in Germany only too well, from the bitter years of the Nazi era, Hitler propaganda, and Goebbels' lies, how dictatorships bury the truth under mountains of lies. It was Hitler who triumphantly said that even a black lie, if repeated often and loud enough, would at last be taken as truth. The black lie was successfully used by the Nazis. To-day it is used in a modified way as a weapon by the Soviets and communists, whose methods are the same.

Even the biggest lie is short-winged unless it is supported by force and suppression of the truth. That is why a propaganda of lies can only be successful if and as long as it is backed by

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

violence and if the voice of truth is silenced. Here in Berlin the first stage of the so-called Cold War was fought in a rather confined space. The Soviets promised freedom and independence, and at the same time all those who refused to become pros were threatened with violence and danger. The Soviets tried to gain the masses with slogans of unity and freedom; they promised them a bright future, but at the same time they preached peace and democracy, but used violence and oppression. When all attempts failed to bring the Berliners over to their own camp, either by promise or compulsion, when love of freedom and the common sense of the Berliners prevailed over all temptations, the Soviets tried to attain their end by the blockade by bringing pressure to bear on the Berliners, by the threat of use starvation and cold!

Even this attack was beaten off by the Berlin people, due to their steadfastness and thanks to the help which they were given by the western nations of the world, who for the first time realized here in Berlin that the improbable had become reality: that the will to freedom and the unwavering steadiness of the people held their own victoriously against all threats of dictatorship and military power.

It was here in Berlin that it became evident for the first time after the war that the Cold War used an outrage as an ally. But even then it was veiled by phrases, such as "peace" and "love of freedom". The act by which organized and armed gangs intruded in an elected parliament was called the "people's will" authorities appointed by the Soviet occupation power were called the "people's government", and the struggle for freedom of the overwhelming majority of the Berlin people was misrepresented by propaganda as an enforced enslavement to "western capitalism".

The Soviets have lived on the country which they have occupied; they have ransacked the city and the East Zone, but nevertheless, they boasted of the help which, they alleged, they were going to bring the starving people from the East. They call themselves "liberators", although they disallow self-administration and democratic elections and rule the people with an iron hand by the instrument of a political, so-called "people's police". A puppet government will always be a wire-puller's government, however high-sounding its name, "Demo-

GERMANY AND THE COLD WAR

cratic People's Government", may be. Phrases like "peoples' solidarity" or "workers' solidarity" cannot control the fact that materials and foodstuffs of all kinds were taken from the population, sent to the east, and used up for provisioning the occupying power.

This contrast between propagandist lies and real facts becomes clearer the nearer one is to the Soviet rulers. Berlin is surrounded by the Soviet zone, a small free island of democracy within a territory lying behind the iron curtain. Part of Germany is Soviet occupied territory. But the mere fact of Berlin's existence has been sufficient to render the barring of east Germany from west Germany impossible and delusive. Nothing prevents you from travelling from the East Zone of Germany to west Berlin, and here under the wing of freedom you may recognize the true nature of the tyrannical oppression. Berlin is not only the show-window of freedom and western civilization; it is a flaming torch, a bright light which illuminates the night of Soviet suppression.

The fact that there is such an independent, minute world within the Soviet tyranny is a steady challenge to the oppressors and refutes all pretences of the Cold War. How can they succeed in convincing the other nations by their propaganda, by shattering the nerves and the will of democratic, freedom-loving peoples to offer resistance, if there is such an island in the red sea that proves day by day and hour by hour anew that a people's moral force will and can triumph over outrage?

Right from the beginning the Berlin people felt and recognized the importance of their resistance, more intensely than western Germany and much more intensely than the western world. The Soviet dictators knew full well about Berlin's importance; they knew what was at stake, and they were willing to play for high stakes. For this is a mirror that is reflecting an undistorted picture and rendering an exact comparison between the east and the west possible. It reveals to everybody who wants to see the difference between the east, a world of force and oppression, and the west, a world of freedom!

The initiators of the Cold War, the war of nerves, in Moscow are not particular in their choice of means. The Soviets pretend to fight against imperialism and capitalism and to protect the peoples from such evils only to subjugate them the more easily to their own, new and far more dreadful, imperialism.

They claim to be leading people to free themselves from

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

sweating by American capitalism, and thus want to hide the fact that the reckless sweating of their satellites is done in a much more primitive and cruel way. Their theory is simple. The U.S.A. are an imperialistic and aggressive state, for all capitalistic nations are imperialistic and aggressive. This primitive slogan has been employed to justify the advance of their armies into Europe, into the core of western civilization. The satellite governments which they appoint without respecting the will of the people are "people's governments", governments of the "peasants and workers" who for the sake of a so-called "better future in the interest of all" force the peoples to bear ever-increasing burdens of work under an ever-lowering standard of life.

Korea is only one example of well-prepared propaganda and a war of nerves as a preliminary to destroy a régime in order to substitute for it an oppressive tyranny under the flag of "freedom", and thus to incorporate in this sphere another country as satellite state under the pretence of "national independence". Conquest and expansion are the associates of terror. In Korea, however, the Soviets were wrong in their calculations, because they failed to take into account the determination of the United States and the United Nations to offer resistance. Will was opposed to will and power set against violence, and it was striking how speedily the world became aware that the cause of freedom and self-determination was by far stronger than that of lies and conquest.

The successful defence against this attack of a dictatorial system, which sought to incorporate new territories in its sphere of power, has had and will have world-wide reactions. Even to-day it is hardly possible to foresee the consequences. There is, however, one conclusion that may be drawn from the history of this war for Europe and Germany, and that is the strongest: the will to oppose an attack, the earlier it will be possible to face threats and violence! The will alone, of course, is not sufficient; it must be backed by action, and to be able to take action the instrument must be available, or it must be created.

Korea is another example that proves that the invincibility and irresistibility of the eastern dictatorship are only phantom of fear in the imagination of weak and wavering nations and peoples. Korea was the second defeat of the expansionist policy of the Eastern world conquerors, just as Berlin was the first one. Moreover, it has become clearer to-day than it ever was

GERMANY AND THE COLD WAR

before that the Kremlin shrinks from the decided will of the freedom-loving peoples of the world. For the aim of the Cold war is to shatter the nerves by intimidation and propaganda in order to impose submission and expansion and to use all means short of a world-wide and uncertain war against the powers of the west, whose intellectual, technical, and material superiority is well-known to the dictators of the Kremlin.

It is up to Germany and to Europe to draw the conclusions from the experiences of these last years in Berlin and Korea. Germany is divided in two, one half being subjugated. She is striving for reunification and freedom, recovery and incorporation in the western world, whose culture and civilization are also her own. Some time ago a good many Germans of the western part of Germany indulged in ill-founded hopes that the long and tiring way to Germany's economic and political recovery might be shortened by pitting the east against the west. The adherents of this idea have been otherwise advised by Berlin's struggle and the war of Korea. In the huge struggle between the east and the west there cannot be any half-heartedness or compromise. There is no longer room for any indifference; everybody must confess himself *pro* or *con*. The fact that in this struggle victories and territories may be won without a bloody war has filled the hearts of many a man with new hope, courage, and strength. Even to-day the word must prove true that in the end spirit is stronger than arms. It lies with the nations and peoples to recognize what must be done, and they must be willing unswervingly to do with all their might what they are expected to do.

Last, not least, two world wars have demonstrated to the Germans that war and invasion are not worth while. I trust that once for all the Germans have given up their desire for glory and conquest by armed force, however tempting war and warfare were once depicted to the people. The Germans have learnt from the ruins of this war that peaceful work and peaceful competition in a federation of all nations will be the sole guarantee for the life and prosperity of every individual. Europe, which some decades ago was only a geographical or cultural conception, has become, and that through Germany, the symbol of people's desire for a better and higher form of political and economic community life. The German people are now on a fair way to think as Europeans, to act as Europeans, and to become Europeans. To-day, they will no longer be led astray

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

end if the workers lose their sense of owning the Union as distinct from merely belonging to it.

Some of the causes of unrest are, no doubt, growing pains. Casual labour, for example, was reduced between 1948 and 1949 in almost all port areas, and the development of welfare services is obviously being pushed ahead. The suggestion that some other authority should replace the N.D.L.B. seems to have little to commend it at present: indeed, once confidence in the Union leadership has been restored, it may be desirable for the N.D.L.B. to be "given its head" rather more in disciplinary matters. As for the agitators, it is clear that they would lose power in proportion as the Unions regained it. There is nothing to show that the Communists are numerically strong in the docks; they have been allowed to take the lead only by default.

[NOTE. The period discussed above ends in June 1950. Since then there has been a further chain of strikes in the early part of this year; but nothing in these strikes has seemed to contradict the pattern indicated. When this article was in proof, the Committee of Inquiry into Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks issued its report. As it is impossible to appraise so careful a study in a short note, only a few general comments can be made. The Report appears to confirm, in considerable detail but with reference to London only, many of the points made above; and there are several useful recommendations. It is, however, difficult to see how the present Scheme can evolve into "a form of organization which will provide more direct and stable relations between employers and workers". The discussion of the disciplinary provisions of the Dock Labour Scheme is valuable, although it seems doubtful whether the suggested expedient of transferring disciplinary powers to the joint industrial machinery would be satisfactory. On the general question of the desirability of direct Trade Union participation in managerial functions, the Report is unfortunately silent.]

A table showing the principal dock disputes between July 1945 and July 1950 is given on the following page.

RUSSIA AND WESTERN EUROPE

By PROFESSOR R. G. HAWTREY

WHEN Stalin agreed at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, to "democratic" settlements of the countries to be liberated by the pending victory over Germany, the way appeared to be open to a politically stable and peaceful post-war Europe. Each country would decide for itself, through a freely elected constituent assembly or parliament, what its future institutions should be, and in particular whether its economic system would be based on private enterprise, on collectivism, or on any socialistic compromise between them.

Even before the defeat of Germany, this prospect was clouded over with doubt. In every case there was bound to be an interval of at least many months between liberation and an election, and meanwhile a government had to function. The Declaration agreed upon at Yalta promised to "assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe . . . to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population, and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people". The only material available for forming such a government would be the existing party leaders. A coalition government comprising all important parties could be presumed to command an overwhelming majority of the electorate. All parties ought to be able to co-operate in the immediately urgent post-war issues, and it was reasonable to expect that, by the time party controversy had taken shape, preparations for an election would have been completed.

On the whole, events may be said to have conformed to this plan in western Europe. All-party governments were formed, excluding only those tainted with collaboration with the Nazis. The *Fronts Populaires* of the nineteen-thirties furnished precedents for co-operation with the communists. The continuance of democratic parliamentary government was taken for granted.

In eastern Europe the course of events was different. Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary had been in alliance with Germany, and their future as defeated enemies was to be determined by treaties of peace. Poland, however, had been a victim of German aggression, and a Polish government had maintained

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

a continuous existence in exile in London since 1939. The Soviet Union repudiated the exiled government, and insisted on recognition of a government created at Lublin by its own invading forces. The Yalta Conference had recorded the "common desire to see established a strong, free, independent, and democratic Poland". But attempts by the western powers to stipulate for a balance of parties in the government failed; it became only too clearly a communist body under Russian domination. The participation of other parties was merely nominal. Their representatives were not listened to, and their supporters were intimidated.

Poland became a model for the rest of Eastern Europe. By 1947 the chain of satellite states was almost complete. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where genuine elections had been held, communist domination was not long postponed. Elsewhere elections were a farce, with no opposition candidates.

In July, 1947, the reality of Russian domination was revealed, when the satellite states were forbidden to accept Mr. Marshall's offer of American Aid. Poland and Czechoslovakia were actually compelled to withdraw their acceptance. Coinciding as it did with the failure of the great powers to reach agreement on a treaty of peace and the unification of Germany, the incident made manifest the cleavage which had been developing in Europe during the preceding two years.

Ostensibly, the purpose of militant communism was the establishment in one country after another of a collectivist economic system. The merits and demerits of collectivism are a matter of controversy. If the people of any country choose to adopt it, that is their affair, and other countries have no warrant for interfering.

But militant communism was not content to leave the decision to a constitutional vote of the people of the country. It insisted that the change must be made by way of a revolution; that there must be set up a totalitarian government, a dictatorship of the Communist Party which would suppress all other parties; and that this dictatorship must accept the overriding authority of the Soviet Union—that is, of the Russian Communist Party.

It was these objects that made militant communism an international menace. The revolutionary movements which had established communist governments in the satellite states of Eastern Europe had been effected under the shadow of Russian military force. They had been bloodless conquests, like Hitler

seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia. No end to them was in sight. There was every prospect of the countries of Europe succumbing one after another, as they had succumbed to Hitler, and extending to the whole Continent and its dependencies, not only an authoritarian rule by terror and espionage, but the accession of its resources to the already formidable war potential of the Soviet Union.

On the merits and demerits of a collectivist economic system, there is room for a difference of opinion. But that is only a minor part of the consequences of a spread of militant communism. More serious than the economic consequences are the political: the extinction of the struggling ideals of democracy by a brazen tyranny; the military aggrandisement of a single dominant power.

The threat of domination by a single power in Europe is a situation with which history has made us familiar. To an independent state, great or small, foreign rule is odious. The foreign ruler may be expected to adopt policies and methods of administration which suit his own interests, and to reserve positions of power and privilege for his own people. In the past the emergence of a would-be conqueror has repeatedly provoked resistance in the shape of an alliance or coalition of the nations threatened. Sometimes the conqueror is actuated by a desire to impose on the rest of the world some cause to which he is devoted, and the coalition against him is formed of those opposed to the cause. The Saracens and after them the Turks met with coalitions of Christendom. In the Wars of Religion, Catholic rulers rallied against Protestants, and Protestant rulers united to resist Catholics.

Hitler was devoted to no cause other than the pursuit of naked power. The encroachments of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are identified with a cause which appeals to communist parties all over the world. In each of the satellite states there has been an existing Communist Party ready to man a government and to provide candidates for election to the legislature, officials, police, and party agents and organizers. That once done, the party commands the resources of the nation, and they are at the disposal of the cause. One cause makes one party, and it is one and the same Communist Party that governs the satellite states and the Soviet Union. Each new satellite becomes a threat to the next victims.

There are powerful communist parties in Western Europe,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and under continual pressure for concessions and changes of government policy.

The difficulties and problems involved in this situation made us anxious to launch the review as soon as possible. On 4th July, 1929, I wrote to Shaw as follows:

"In view of the changed political situation the Executive Committee feel that we must get a move on in regard to the proposed Quarterly Review and we hope to bring out the first number in January of next year.

We are forming a small private company and the constitution of this will be broadly as follows:

[There followed details of the proposed arrangements.]

I shall be glad to know if this arrangement meets with your approval and if so it would be of the greatest assistance if you could let us have the cheque for the £1,000 which you have agreed to contribute. A banking account has been opened in the three joint names of Gregory, Lloyd & Robson, at the Westminster Bank, Temple Bar branch. Financial contributions are being paid into this account to be held for a Company which will take over the fund on formation.

The draft Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company have been drawn and are now being circulated to the various members of the Committee. If you would like to see a copy I would have it forwarded to you but I don't suppose you wish to be bothered with this.

The Members of the Executive Committee consist of:

J. L. Hammond	A. M. Carr-Saunders
H. J. Laski	T. E. Gregory
J. M. Keynes	Kingsley Martin
Leonard Woolf	Myself.

All these persons are showing considerable interest in the enterprise and are likely to make a very strong Board.

As regards the editorship, I think I mentioned to you that J. L. Hammond has unfortunately not been able to take on the job for various reasons, although he strongly supports the whole project. What we have decided to do in default of an editor of equal standing and maturity to him, is to have an editorial Board consisting of the members of the Committee above mentioned, together possibly with one or two other similar individuals. These names will be presented to

RUSSIA AND WESTERN EUROPE

June 5th, 1947, offering aid to Europe. The offer had no direct reference to defence. He declared its purpose to be "the revival of a working economy in the world, so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist". And his insistence on a "joint programme" pointed the way to a wider co-operation. Economic weakness involves weakness in defence. The vulnerability of Western Europe to communist encroachment was mainly due to the economic prostration which had supervened upon the war. Economic weakness and discontent sprang from the same cause, and combined to produce the same effect.

Even before the Act of Congress authorizing American aid to Europe and requiring economic co-operation among the participating countries was passed, the first step towards co-operation in defence was taken. The Brussels Treaty of March 17th, 1948, bound Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to afford one another military aid and assistance in case of attack, and set up an organization to provide for joint action.

The experience of 1940 had shown the helplessness of allies plunged into war without any preconcerted plans. The Brussels Treaty was intended to ensure the necessary combined staff work. The Treaty of Dunkirk, made between France and Great Britain in the preceding year, had been confined to the contingency of an attack by Germany, and it failed to remedy the fatal defect revealed in 1914 and again in 1940 of the exclusion of Belgium and the Netherlands from Anglo-French staff plans. The Brussels Treaty brought together five of the seventeen countries receiving Marshall Aid. What of the rest? Italy and Western Germany had been disarmed. Switzerland and Sweden were wedded to neutrality. Austria was still under military occupation and awaiting a treaty. Portugal, Iceland, and Ireland were remote from the immediate military problem. Greece and Turkey belonged to a different sphere. Any extension of the nucleus provided by the Brussels Treaty evidently involved complications.

The impulse to Western European co-operation had come from the United States, and at a very early stage of the European Recovery Plan American influence turned in the direction of defence. In July, 1948, conversations began between the Brussels Treaty Powers and the United States and Canada, and there resulted the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. To this Norway,

RECENT FRENCH BOOKS

EACH generation writes its own history. Six French historians, all specialists in their respective fields, have joined together to produce a *Histoire de la France pour tous les Français* in two volumes (Hachette). As in all collective works of this nature, the contributions are uneven. Outstanding is M. Doucet's treatment of the sixteenth century, from 1492 to 1610. Wars, economic and social movements, religious and political ideas are all blended together in a perfect canvas. M. Georges Lefebvre deals in the second volume with France before the Revolution until the fall of Napoleon. It is a condensed, masterly account of a great period, a convenient summary of his previous books. M. Charles H. Pouthas continues the story to 1874. Though this essay adequately accentuates the decisive periods of French historic development during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, it would seem that the author attempted too much: the accumulation of names, for example in the fields of ideas, art, and literature, is occasionally too overwhelming; a more selective treatment might have enabled the reader to learn more about the depth and the background of those who made and lived the historic process. M. Baumont's contribution, covering the period from 1878 to the Fourth Republic, is certainly the weakest. He writes "political" history in the old-fashioned sense without entering into the economic and social complexities of the period under discussion. It is regrettable that none of the authors of this symposium gives any bibliographical references. It might have been helpful to the student to have a few essential references for further reading, particularly as all contributors are experts in their fields.

M. Maxime Leroy has now published the second volume of his impressive *Histoire des Idées sociales en France: De Babeuf à Tocqueville* (Gallimard). I had already occasion in one of my previous surveys of drawing attention to the preceding volume which interpreted the history of French social ideas from Montesquieu to Babeuf. The present volume is not less suggestive. In his Preface, M. Leroy gives a most illuminating account of his method. It is sceptical and empirical, like that of his great master, Sainte-Beuve. "Les humains," M. Leroy writes, "oscillent entre le scepticisme ou l'indifférence et le fanatisme; le fanatisme, qui de religieux est devenu idéologique à la fin du XVIII^e siècle. Pour prévenir l'un et l'autre, surtout le fanatisme idéologique qui, né de la philosophie des lumières, pendant la Révolution, a pris de nos jours des formes atroces, on voudrait proposer, sans se faire trop d'illusion pourtant proposer très modestement deux ou trois leçons dictées, semble-t-il par l'histoire. . . ." Which are the lessons M. Leroy suggests? "Le mot vérité ne convient pas aux conceptions politiques et sociales. . . . Aucune de ces doctrines n'a jamais pu être l'objet d'une démonstration présente itself to the student of political and social ideas: "à distance, on voit les unes des autres jusque dans leurs plus excessives négations. Toutes ont de tels liens; ces liens, les contemporains les nient." M. Leroy is seeking the veiled and

limits as will permit of its being diplomatically denied. An avowed rearmament of the Western Zones would bring the cleavage into the open.

But the western powers themselves are not in agreement. France, in fact, is more genuinely opposed to German rearmament than the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union the issue is the creation of a communist Germany. If Germany could be united under the irremovable rule of the Communist Party, the Russians would welcome German rearmament. A communist Germany might overshadow even Moscow, but they would take the risk of that.

The French, on the other hand, are still obsessed by their ancient feud with Germany. The feud is sometimes supposed to be deeply rooted in history and geography and the German character, and is traced back to Jena or to Frederick the Great or even to the break-up of the Carolingian Empire. In reality, however, there was no feud before 1870. The feud arose out of crude power politics. Napoleon III had been exercising something like a hegemony in Europe, and saw his position threatened by the rise of a united Germany.

France no longer claims a hegemony. In the present century the aspiration has been Germany's, and France has been only one of several powers combined to resist it. The French fear is that Germany, if allowed to rearm, would once again seek to dominate Europe, and that France, though no longer a rival in that ambition, would be the country most exposed to exploitation by Germany—to say nothing of some paying off of old scores.

One way round the danger, which is favoured by the present French Government, would be the development of the co-operation of Western Europe into a real federation. M. Schuman's plan for entrusting the coal and steel industries to a supra-national authority would be a step in that direction. In so far as the Franco-German feud has been something more than a Montagu-Capulet affair, the economic bone of contention has been the frontier which separates the ore of Lorraine from the coal of the Saar and the Ruhr. The heavy industries which have grown up on both sides of the frontier form a vital part of the war potential of the two countries, and M. Schuman recommended his plan as calculated to make war between the two countries impossible. He invited other countries to join, and Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy are partici-

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

pating in the discussions which are to give the plan practical shape.

A more far-reaching French proposal is that for setting a single West European army under a single Minister of Defence. A merger of armaments would surely be tantamount to federation. No doubt the French supporters of it hope that, France, Germany, and other countries of Western Europe thus tied together, the danger of the German military organization finding an outlet in an exclusively German military organization would be removed. German generals would find themselves with colleagues and subordinates of other nations.

Whether that hope is well-founded, it is hardly necessary to inquire. There are likely to be formidable obstacles in the way of any plan of federation. And, even if it were achieved, German influence in the federal organization could not fail to be powerful. Probably the French advocates of the proposal would maintain that Great Britain must be included in the federation as counterpoise to Germany. But there seems little prospect of British policy accepting it.

The fact is that an essential condition of an effective West European co-operation in defence will be mutual trust of nations participating. The Franco-German feud and the suspicion it engenders must be terminated, not by political or constitutional devices, but by goodwill and a recognition of common interests.

Combination in defence is necessary to preserve the nations of Western Europe from being overawed by the Soviet Union and having communist rule in its totalitarian form forced upon them. But that is not the end of the matter. The threat of foreign has established communist governments in the satellite states but a communist revolution is only too possible without a threat of force in a country like France or Italy with a communist movement represented by a powerful party in the legislature. In such a situation the stability of government depends on parties other than communist being able to act together consistently enough to ensure a reliable majority. It was the inability of socialists and Catholic democrats to act together in Italy in 1922 that gave Mussolini his opportunity.

A deadlock might have to be solved by a return of the communists to a coalition government, and once installed they would certainly endeavour to secure their position by totalitarian methods and eventually to suppress all rival parties.

RUSSIA AND WESTERN EUROPE

communist parties in France and Italy, it is true, have suffered a setback in the past three years. But it is impossible to be certain that their decline will continue. And their power is felt in another way. They have great influence in the trade unions, and even dominate some of them. Organized labour has a very dangerous power; by calling a strike in a key industry it can cause such a dislocation in economic life as to inflict serious inconvenience or even distress on the public. So long as industrial disputes are genuinely designed to put pressure on employers to make concessions to the work-people which cannot be settled otherwise, and the damage to the public is only incidental, the vexation has to be accepted. But a strike of which the primary purpose is to use the damage caused to the public to force the government to take action in favour of the work-people, is only not to be called rebellion or civil war because the injury is inflicted without recourse to violence or to any palpable breach of the law.

To the communist element in organized labour a strike on the grand scale may be an opportunity not merely to put pressure on the government to impose concessions on the employers, but actually to involve industry in a breakdown. In 1947 when France was preparing to receive American aid, the communist trade unionists precipitated widespread strikes for this purpose.


Subversive strikes are the very negation of democracy. And they are not the exclusive preserve of communists. Organized labour, conscious of its power, is tempted to show it. The rather vague and ill-defined movement called syndicalism is a manifestation of this spirit. Syndicalism is sometimes clothed with academic respectability as a kind of socialism which would govern through trade unions. But it has never attained the standing of a theory of government. It is rather a revolutionary sentiment of the kind that seeks by making trouble to show that the established institutions will not work. It offers a vent to discontent without formulating a programme which would be exposed to criticism. Syndicalism of this type is not confined to the continent of Europe. Its manifestations are only too familiar to the English-speaking countries.

Thus democracy is exposed to attack from within. Nor does it command, in the democratically governed countries, the unquestioning faith claimed for it in the rhetoric of the platform. Democracy calls upon every citizen to be a statesman, and it is only too obvious that that cannot be. There are many fastidious people who see no good in it. They fail to appreciate the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

vital service that democracy with all its imperfections has rendered and continues to render in checking the far greater abuses to which authoritarian governments are prone. The present century has shown over and over again that democracy may break down and may be transformed into authoritarian government by the ostensibly normal working of the democratic institutions themselves.

Co-operation in defence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the preservation of democracy and liberty in Western Europe. It is necessary, because without it there would be a counterpoise to Russian military power and the west of Europe might succumb to the same intimidation as the east. It is not sufficient, because democracy is threatened from within. It is in the peoples in whose hands the future of democracy lies to show that they have the requisite wisdom and public spirit to work



There is not a more precise instrument for the serious study of current affairs, nor any better contrivance for answering promptly some casual query on national or international Politics, Economics, Social Questions, than KEESENG'S—the weekly diary of world events—now in its 20th year of continuous publication.

Designed for rapid reference, it is equipped with a living Index which is renewed 26 times a year, and a lateral 'follow-back' Index which cuts right across the whole work, linking each entry with the previous one on the same or cognate subject.

Many readers of The Political Quarterly are already subscribers to our Service and if you still lack KEESENG'S, please write for full details to

KEESENG'S • Keynsham • Somerset

The Whig Interpretation of History

by **HERBERT BUTTERFIELD**

*Professor of Modern History
University of Cambridge*

A reissue of an important book, long out of print and much in demand. On first publication, Harold Nicholson said of it: 'I should like to feel that all teachers and pupils of history would purchase and ponder upon this intelligent essay. For within its 130 pages are more home truths than in most of Acton, J. R. Green, or Macaulay.' 7s. 6d. net

G. BELL AND SONS, LTD

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.A.

By **HANS J. MORGENTHAU**, *Professor of Political Science, Director of the Centre for the Study of American Foreign Policy, the University of Chicago*

THE foreign policy of the United States is the composite of three basic factors: the concern of the United States for its traditional interests in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia; the three great revolutions of our age and their impact upon the traditional interests of the United States in Europe and Asia; the painful struggle of the American mind to come to grips, in thought and action, with these revolutions and their impact upon the interests of the United States.

The foreign policy of the United States has invariably pursued three great objectives: the protection of the preponderant position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe and its maintenance in Asia.

In the Western Hemisphere the United States has always endeavoured to preserve its unique position as a predominant power without rival. The United States has not been slow in recognizing that that predominance was not likely to be effectively threatened by any one American nation or combination of them, acting without support from outside the Western Hemisphere. It was, then, imperative for the United States to isolate the Western Hemisphere from the political and military policies of non-American nations. The interference of non-American nations in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, especially through the acquisition of territory, was the only way in which the predominance of the United States could have been challenged from within the Western Hemisphere itself. The Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it express that permanent national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Since a threat to the national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere can only come from outside it—that is, historically from Europe—the United States has always striven to prevent the development of conditions in Europe which would be conducive to a European nation's interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere or to a direct attack upon the United States. Such conditions would be most likely

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

obtaining the necessary co-operation between the authority exporting population and the authority at the receiving end.* Further, although this was not stressed in the Commons debate, the creation of a new town must entail the expenditure of large sums from the national revenue, and it is usual for a government to wish to control the use of money it is itself providing. The introduction of direct local government influence might have made this control more difficult to achieve without friction.

The Minister of Town and Country Planning and the Secretary of State for Scotland were thus the sole sponsors of the new towns. The procedure followed in the nomination of any development area for a new town is similar to that under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, relating to the designation of heavily blitzed areas for the purposes of compulsory acquisition. A draft order is issued, objections are invited, and if any are forthcoming a local inquiry is held. The Minister considers the report of the inquiry, and unless on considering the evidence the Minister decides to modify or abandon the project, he confirms the draft order. The Minister then appoints the members of the development corporation, comprising a chairman, vice-chairman, and up to seven other members. Membership is a part-time paid appointment, and persons chosen are drawn from varied occupations, but experience of local government affairs, or some aspect of constructional industry, are leading qualifications. It is possible for membership of the corporations to overlap, for the same people serve as members of Hatfield and Welwyn Garden City Corporations; Lord Beveridge is Chairman of both Aycliffe and Peterlee, and Sir Lancelot Keay is Chairman of Basildon and Bracknell. Members are appointed for varying periods up to three years, and may be re-appointed, but in May, 1950, the Minister did not re-appoint three members of the Harlow Corporation, including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Other changes have been caused by death or resignation, sometimes with undesirable frequency; Stevenage had four Chairmen in its first three years, and by March, 1950, only one of the original members remained who had enjoyed an uninterrupted spell of office.

The corporations have wide powers to engage in activities necessary for the development of the new towns, but these powers are subject to ministerial control, and it is intended that local authorities and statutory undertakers shall provide services

* *H.C. Debates*, May 8th, 1946, col. 1085 (Mr. Silkin).

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.A.

pretended to cover the territorial integrity and political independence of China not for commercial, but political reasons. However unsure of itself the Asiatic policy of the United States has been, it has always assumed that the domination of China by another nation would create so great an accumulation of power as to threaten the security of the United States.

The three great revolutions of our age, which threaten two of these three perennial objectives of the foreign policy of the United States are political, technological, and moral in character.

The political revolution has destroyed the European state system, composed as it was for four centuries of a multiplicity of nations of approximately equal strength which kept each other in check through the instrumentality of the balance of power. This state system has been replaced by a bi-polar system in which the strength of the two super-powers is unchallengeable by that of any other nation or combination of nations.

The technological revolution has in the last century brought about changes in transportation, communications, and warfare more far-reaching than any which have occurred in all of previous history. Modern communications have brought Moscow as close to New York as was Philadelphia a hundred and fifty years ago. Modern communications have for all practical purposes eliminated the element of time altogether. The modern weapons have increased the destructiveness of war enormously.

The moral revolution has destroyed the moral unity of the western world and has transformed the political philosophies of old into political religions. The common "system of arts, and laws, and manners", to which Gibbon could refer with assurance and pride, has been replaced by two rival and mutually incompatible systems of political morality and ways of life, which compete with each other for the dominance of the world. That moral revolution has taken on in Asia the peculiar aspect of a revolt against the west, carried on in the name of national self-determination and social justice, principles which the west itself had brought to Asia.

For the foreign policy of the United States these three great revolutions of our age are epitomized in the rise of the Soviet Union to the position of the other leading world power. Wherever the power of the United States is challenged to-day, it is to Moscow that that challenge can be traced. Wherever the moral ideals of the United States are doubted, that doubt finds in

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Moscow's creed its justification. It is by virtue of the break of the modern state system that the European balance of power has been destroyed and that the Soviet Union stands to-day in the heart of Europe, unchallenged and unchallenged by the forces of western Europe alone. It is by virtue of the same political revolution which has emancipated the people of Asia from European domination that the balance of power in Asia, symbolized for the United States in the principle of the Open Door in China, does no longer exist and that the door to China is to-day closed to the west and wide open to the Soviet Union. This political rise of the Soviet Union is primarily the result of Lenin's and Stalin's equation of bolshevization with industrialization. Communism in Russia has meant first of all transformation of society by means of the technological revolution. It was Lenin who said that "Bolshevism means electrification", and it was Stalin who has subordinated all other considerations to the introduction of modern technology into Russian industry and agriculture. Finally, the threat to the western world emanating from the Soviet Union, as well as its attraction for millions of people outside its borders, must be understood in the light of the revolutionary force which from Moscow promises salvation for all the world.

How has the United States endeavoured to meet the challenge to its national interests emanating from the Soviet Union and its allies? There are three ways in which a nation can try to obtain its international objectives: it can go to war, it can bring overwhelming power to bear upon its opponent, or it can negotiate a settlement.

Spokesmen for the government of the United States from time to time set forth the notion that there is a fourth way to the Cold War, with a minimum of relations between east and west and with the issue of peace or war hanging uneasily in balance, lasting perhaps for a generation. It must be said away that this possibility is so extremely unlikely to materialize as to be no real possibility at all. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union had the psychological and material resources necessary to withstand for decades the pressures of open hostilities, short of war, two factors would be bound sooner or later to bring the Cold War to an end. One is the threat of ever more potent weapons of mass destruction, which while it makes caution makes also for desperation. The other is the extreme instability in those regions, such as western Germany and

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.A.

south-east Asia, which are not firmly controlled by either side, but are contested for such control. In those regions fundamental changes in the *status quo*, affecting the power relations between east and west, will inevitably occur. Under the conditions of the Cold War only superhuman wisdom, foresight, and self-restraint would be able to localize revolutions, civil wars, and international wars likely to take place in those regions and to prevent them from igniting a general conflagration. As Mr. Churchill put it in his survey of the prospects of the Cold War in the House of Commons on January 23rd, 1948: "We may be absolutely sure that the present situation cannot last." It will either get better or it will get worse.

One of the logical alternatives to the Cold War is no longer practical to-day: overwhelming power on the side of the United States. Overwhelming power is no longer at the disposal of the United States and will not be at its disposal in the foreseeable future. There was a time when it was conceivable that the United States and the Soviet Union might be able to negotiate a settlement of the issues outstanding between them on the basis of the supremacy of United States power. When President Truman announced on September 23rd, 1949, that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union, that possibility was gone and, in view of western weakness on land and in the air, it is gone for the foreseeable future. There remain, then, only two choices before the United States: a negotiated settlement or war.

This alternative is for obvious reasons highly unpopular with the people of the United States and, more particularly, with their government. War is no longer, as it once was, a rational instrument of foreign policy, the continuation of diplomacy with other means. In centuries past, resort to war could be defended as a means to an end. The ends sought by war, such as national independence, security, power, or glory, could justify the evils which war entailed. For comparing the value of the end with the repulsiveness of the means, people could rationally find that the stakes of independence, security, power, and glory were worth the price of a limited war predominantly fought by mercenaries against mercenaries. The total war of our age has fundamentally altered this traditional relationship between political ends and military means. To-day war has become an instrument of universal destruction, an instrument which destroys the victor with the vanquished. None of the traditional

The 7,000 London stevedores, for example, "have closed their ranks more tightly than any other section of workers in Britain. They recruit only the sons of stevedores, and with them tradition is almost a mania".* The stevedores have been in the vanguard of most of the big strikes of latter years; and here it is not only a left-wing leadership but an anxiety to maintain their independence against the massive T. & G.W.U. that has made them receptive to strike agitation. (There has been tension between these Unions ever since 1923, when a number of T. & G.W.U. members in London broke away and joined the stevedores.)

Many strikes with apparently trivial causes occur where the customs of particular groups of dockers are infringed or outdated by the national Scheme. The Middlesbrough dockers, for example, went on strike for several weeks in the early part of 1949 against the time of their call being altered from 3 p.m. to 12 noon, since this involved their being thrown into a common pool with the wharf men. Moreover, the focus of such strikes may easily be switched from the original cause to the Scheme itself; indeed, the National Dock Labour Board's Report pointed out that this was, in fact, a common feature of the big strikes of 1948-9.

In these strikes it was the disciplinary clauses of the Scheme that came under fire, for sensitiveness to "victimization" has always been strong in the docks. But even if the appropriateness of particular disciplinary provisions is disputed, it is indisputable that tighter discipline is the price dockers have to pay for decasualization. This, however, does not make it more palatable. True, absenteeism is low; even the nominal rate was only 2.1 per cent. in the last six months of 1947 (or about one-sixth to one-seventh of the miners' rate), and fell to 1.7 and 1.4 per cent. in 1948 and 1949. But late starts, early finishes, morning and afternoon breaks, "spelling", waiting for ships of particular shipping companies to come in so as to be ready to unload them, and so on, have been part of the docker's tradition and are not all lightly given up. Moreover, during the war, when labour was freely transferred and the men often had to work in air raids, discipline was inevitably relaxed. Unforeseen delays made strict timekeeping seem pointless, and since piecework was general men could take time off with a clearer conscience in that they were penalizing themselves; master stevedores competing for the best gangs were unwilling to alienate their workers

* *Economist*, May 31st, 1950.

with the Soviet Union on an equal footing—that is, with a chance for success.

The all-out national effort, then, is required for war as well as for peace. The question of peace or war, however, hinges upon the prospects of a negotiated settlement. Here is indeed the crux of United States foreign policy. That policy has thus far proceeded on the assumption that a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union is in the immediate future impossible and has defended that negative attitude with four basic arguments. First, the Soviet Union does not keep agreements. There is no use in negotiating agreements which will not be kept by the other side. Second, the United States has always maintained that it will not enter into bilateral negotiations in which the interests of third nations are at stake. Third—and this is the gist of Mr. Acheson's California speeches of the beginning of 1950—one can negotiate only from strength. There must be a "situation of fact" which lends itself to a negotiated settlement. Only when and where such objective conditions of strength exist is a negotiated settlement possible. They do not exist at present anywhere in the world and, hence, no negotiated settlement is presently possible. Finally the Soviet Union would negotiate with us only with the aim of dividing the world into spheres of influence, an objective unacceptable to the United States.

None of these four arguments supports the contention that a negotiated settlement is *a priori* impossible. The first argument is correct as far as it goes. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has violated many of its international agreements. The official count puts the number of agreements violated by the Soviet Union since 1945 at more than forty. Yet in order to understand the relationship between foreign policy and faithfulness to international agreements it is necessary to go back beyond 1945 and to view the history of great nations as a whole. The path which great nations have travelled throughout their history is strewn with the fragments of broken agreements and of dishonoured promises. It is one of the principles of statesmanship to keep those agreements which seem to be advantageous to one's national interest and to discard the others. Nobody will dispute the point that such an attitude toward treaty obligations and solemn promises is cynical and immoral. But what is important for our argument here is to face the fact that it is well-nigh universal in the relations among nations. What distinguishes, in this respect, the Russian attitude from the practice of other

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of their peoples, not semi-literate demagogues. This immensely difficult task faces not only the education officers of the colonial Powers but also the leaders of the independent Asiatic states. The experience of each can be useful to the other. Both in colonies and in independent states there are many devoted educational workers. Their efforts in the cause of all humanity do not receive sufficient recognition or sufficient material aid. Their own governments' resources are slender and their other tasks are many and urgent. The United Nations, which should be a force of progress in this field, is little but a forum for irresponsible demagoguery. The representatives of the oppressive pashas of Egypt, or the corrupt rulers of the Philippines, have little right to blame the British administrators of Tanganyika for failing to create a social and cultural utopia. But their declamations are treated more seriously than they deserve even by enlightened citizens of countries friendly to Britain. If the free nations mean anything by their statements that they are united in defence against Muscovite totalitarianism, they should help, not harm each other in this most vital task of education. If revolutions can be prevented by strength, the spread of revolutionary movements can be prevented by sound education. There is no task more urgent than to prevent the frustration and mental distortion of the educated youth of southern Europe, Asia and Africa.

The third conclusion is that economic action against revolution is not in itself enough, and should be used with care. It is a delusion to suppose that the mere expenditure of some billions of dollars will make it possible to present to the thousand million people of non-Communist Asia, Africa and Latin America a magic, ready-made "social justice". The poverty of these regions is deeply rooted, and pressure of population is making it worse. It will be very long before the standard of living of the whole of these regions can be appreciably raised. This the governments of Western Europe and America no doubt know. But public opinion does not know it. Well-meaning talk of "solving" the economic problems of Asia and Africa by some sort of new Marshall Aid creates illusions among the western peoples, and rouses hopes that cannot be satisfied among the peoples of Asia and Africa. This does not mean that economic aid is not essential. Without it, Asia and Africa would certainly be lost. But economic aid cannot create universal prosperity. It can only reduce misery, remove the most glaring contrasts in wealth and the most horrifying injustices, and create at least in certain naturally favoured

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.A.

future it will be strong enough to do so. This attitude of waiting—or rather of drifting, for there is nothing very specific the United States is preparing or waiting for—is defensible only under the assumption that there is a reasonable expectation that in the foreseeable future it will be stronger in relation to the Soviet Union than it is now, that, in fact, time is on its side.

To consider past experience first, the very same argument was advanced in the late 40's. It was said then that this was not the time for negotiations because the United States was not strong enough. Perhaps in 1952, when the United States will still have the monopoly of the atomic bomb and when Europe has regained its economic and military strength, then it will negotiate; for then it will still be superior to the Soviet Union on the sea and in atomic weapons and will equal it on land and in the air. In retrospect, it is obvious that this was an erroneous calculation and that actually the United States was stronger then in relation to the Soviet Union than it is now. Yet there is nothing in the power potential of the United States and the Soviet Union which could make one believe that in the foreseeable future the United States can regain that preponderance of power which it once had. Quite the contrary, there is every reason to believe that for the immediately foreseeable future the balance of power will continue to shift in favour of the Soviet Union.

According to the best estimates, about 1952 the Soviet Union will have a stockpile of atomic bombs sufficient for a devastating attack upon the western world. It is true that by then the United States will have considerably more atomic bombs than the Soviet Union. Yet, in contrast to conventional weapons, it is a matter of indifference that one nation has, say, a hundred atomic bombs while its enemy has a thousand, as long as a fraction of a hundred atomic bombs is all that is needed to destroy the industrial and population centres of the enemy. A few years hence the United States will have lost that one element of undeniable superiority over the Soviet Union: the monopoly of a stockpile of atomic bombs. While the United States will in all probability retain its naval superiority, it is hard to see how it can develop land and air forces even approximately comparable to those which the Soviet Union possesses already to-day, within the few years remaining before the Soviet Union has a stockpile of atomic bombs. Once these few years have passed, the Soviet

TWENTIETH CENTURY REVOLUTIONS

regions the means of rapid further development. Clearly industrialization is desirable where the conditions favour it. But it should be treated as a practical measure, not as a matter of dogma. There is no need to emulate the Stalinist *mystique* of vast heavy industries built by armies of conscripted labourers. It is also utopian to imagine that a large part of the funds allotted to the economic development of backward countries will not be wasted. Corruption of officials is the result of excessive numbers and insufficient pay. Until officials can be secured tolerable living conditions, and until the flow of educated young people can be directed to other employment than the bureaucracy, corruption will continue. Improvement depends on the creation of large numbers of engineers, doctors, scientific workers and industrial technicians. Here economic development and the improvement of education are inseparable.

Great financial sacrifices will have to be made by all the western nations for the development of the backward countries. The aim should be to reduce both poverty and corruption, the means should be to create the right industries, the right technicians and the right education. None of these tasks can be achieved unless the military power of the free world deters aggression. Nothing can be done in any direction unless the western governments not only make their plans but explain them to their own peoples and to that section of the backward peoples which is accessible to information—that is, to the educated section. None of these tasks will be completely achieved even in the most favourable conditions. But partial success is enough to save the free world. Neither the Communist nor any other revolutionary movements are invincible. The history of their seizure of power shows that their claims to scientific infallibility and predestined victory lack any serious foundation.

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.A.

emanates from the Soviet Union. It is the threat of Russian imperialism which for almost two centuries has menaced the western world in Europe and Asia. That Russian imperialism has to-day at its disposal a world-wide revolutionary movement adds to it a new tactical dimension, but does not alter the fundamental military and political problem which confronts the western world. The alliance between Russian imperialism and universal Bolshevism makes it necessary for the west to forge new weapons of defence and makes its task more difficult. It does not affect the basic task of the west which is resistance everywhere and accommodation where possible.

From Hamilton and Jefferson onward the United States has always considered the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe as being an essential precondition of its own security. That is to say, the United States has from the beginning of its history opposed whichever nation threatened to gain undisputed mastery over the European continent. For this reason it went twice to war with Germany, and it is for the same reason that it finds itself now in conflict with the Soviet Union. In this task of containing the expansion of Russian might the United States has succeeded into the role which Great Britain performed throughout the nineteenth century. When after the Napoleonic Wars the armies of Alexander I threatened to engulf the Continent, Castlereagh marshalled British might to oppose them even though they advanced in the name of the principles of Christianity. And when Russia threatened to swallow all of the Balkans and to gain a foothold on the shores of the Mediterranean, Disraeli did not hesitate to send in 1877 the British fleet into Turkish waters in order to protect the Turks, who were in the habit of murdering Bulgarian Christians, at the risk of war with Russia. If the Russian armies standing now somewhat more than 100 miles east of the Rhine were not the armies of Stalin, but the armies of the Czar, is anyone bold enough to say that the United States would not react to this threat to its vital interests as it reacted to the threat to the European balance of power emanating from William II and Hitler?

The overall character of the conflict between east and west, in so far as it concerns the foreign policy of the United States, must be understood in terms of power politics rather than of ideology. This interpretation of the east-west conflict does, however, not imply that the problems which confront the United States in Europe and the measures which are able to meet

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

them are identical with the problems confronting the States in Asia and with the measures adequate to their solution. Perhaps the most fateful error, which is the result of the conflict by the United States on the ideological aspects of the conflict to the detriment of the power political ones, is to equate the so-called revolutions in Europe with the revolutions in Asia and to treat them both alike, that is, containing them by military means. It is this mistake about others which has obscured the thinking of the American foreign policy and which has made it impossible to steer a clear, intelligent course in the troubled waters of Asia. What confronts the States in Europe is Russian imperialism pure and simple, pursuing the traditional objectives of Russian foreign policy ineffectively supported by fifth columns in the countries of western Europe. In no country of Europe, east or west, has the Bolshevik revolution succeeded except as a by-product of Russian imperialism. What we call the Bolshevik revolutions in Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, were not genuine revolutions at all. They were the techniques through which the Red Army endeavoured to establish a permanent foothold for Russian power. Bolshevism has succeeded in no European country which had not been first conquered by the Russian Army. It has succeeded in all those countries of Europe which were conquered by it.

In this respect the situation in Asia is fundamentally different from, and in a sense diametrically opposed to, that in Europe. Even if Bolshevism had never been heard of and even if Russian power had never pressed toward the accesses to the Persian Gulf and the Pacific, revolutions would have occurred in China and all through south-east Asia. The two main objectives of Asiatic revolutions, freedom from colonialism and from imperial exploitation, are the result of the objective changes which have occurred in Asia since the turn of the century. The Soviet Union has used these revolutionary movements by giving them ideological and human leadership, but it has not created them. Particularly in the cases of China and Indo-China the west has done its best to drive those revolutionary movements into the arms of Moscow by trying to suppress them with military force. It is here that the United States has made its decisive mistake. To suppress and contain revolution in Europe is both desirable

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.A.

and possible; for here no objective revolutionary situation exists, and what goes by the name of revolutionary movements is nothing but the prolonged arm of Russian imperialism. To suppress revolution in Asia is, even if desirable, impossible.

The choices with which the revolutions in Asia confront the western world are not revolution *v. status quo*, but revolution at the service of the Soviet Union *v. revolution* which remains for the time being uncommitted. It is an error, with which Bolshevism has infected the United States, to assume that all contemporary revolutions, especially when they go by the name of communism, will necessarily be subservient to Moscow. The case of Yugoslavia has already demonstrated the error of that identification. As time goes on, the United States will have to reconcile itself to the existence of communist governments which adhere at least in theory to the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Whether or not they will also be the allies of Russia in their foreign policies will depend primarily on the United States understanding of the nature of these revolutions and upon its policies concerning them. The fiasco of the China policy of the United States provides a classic example of how to misunderstand the revolution in Asia and how to make inevitable the subservience of that revolution to the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, a subservience which otherwise would only be one of several possibilities. Yet the past mistakes of United States policy, however disastrous their consequences have been, cannot forever prevent the national interests of China and of the other countries of Asia from reasserting themselves against the ideological affinities with Moscow. To deny that possibility is really tantamount to dancing to the tune of Moscow, for it is Bolshevist dogma which asserts that capitalism creates national conflicts and that among communist governments harmony and peace will necessarily reign. To foresee that possibility and to help to bring it about is wise foreign policy.

One would underestimate the intelligence and sense of responsibility present in the United States Government were one to assume that the leading officials of the State Department were unaware of these aspects of the foreign policy of the United States or even of the validity of much of our criticism. But the government of the United States has become the prisoner of its own propaganda. It has embarked upon an ideological crusade—the easy road to popular support—and now that bogey has been turned against it. For if it is true that the struggle between east

and west is not primarily a struggle for power, but a crusade good against evil, then the character of that struggle as a crusade as all crusades, precludes a negotiated settlement; there can be no accommodation between hostile and incompatible principles. Under the conditions of modern warfare a crusade waged by east against west, and *vice versa*, is bound at once to issue in the universal destruction of a third world war, and best to leave the ideological conflict unresolved. The history of all religious wars bears out that prognosis.

This inclination to see the conflict with the Soviet Union in ideological rather than power political terms is due as much to short-term considerations of propaganda as to deeply ingrained qualities of United States political philosophy. Almost from the beginning the history of the United States has witnessed a struggle of two opposing principles for control over the conduct of foreign policy: political realism and universal idealism derived from moral abstractions. In the Federalist period, represented most eminently by Washington and Hamilton, realism triumphed over idealism. Throughout the nineteenth century the moral abstractions in which the United States conceived of its foreign policy by and large coincided with the national interests of the United States. The twentieth century has witnessed a divorce of moral principles from national interests. The ambiguities, hesitations, and failures of the foreign policy of the United States from the end of the first world war to the present are the main result of that divorce and of the ascendancy of moral abstractions over the national interest. We have at the beginning that the public mind of the United States is engaged in a painful struggle to come to grips, in thought and actions, with a new political world in which the United States must live and act. We can say now in conclusion that the political mind of the United States is undergoing a process of forgetting and remembering: of forgetting the idealistic illusions of the last two generations and of remembering the great principles of realistic statecraft of the Founding Fathers. Upon the thoroughness and speed of that intellectual and political regeneration the fate of the United States and of all of the western world will depend.

FRANCE IN THE COLD WAR

By RAYMOND ARON

TO make it quite clear with what the present article sets out to deal, it is first necessary that we should define the term Cold War which indiscriminate use has rendered obscure. Fundamentally, a Cold War arises from the generalized application throughout the world of those methods whereby a revolutionary party combats an established form of government. Thus, the Bolshevik Party, in full possession of the Russian state, is waging war, either directly or through the agency of the various communist parties, on all so-called capitalist states (and as such are considered all those governed by non-communists). But it is waging only a limited war, employing every means of aggression short of actual war—though, indeed, as is seen now in Korea, it will resort also to war so long as it is not general war.

It happens at the same time that both in Asia and in Europe the old order of things has come tumbling down and there are left in the world but two great powers. Thus, in the view of many observers, the Cold War assumes the character of a contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. Up to a certain point such interpretation is correct, if we understand thereby that on the one side the U.S.A. and on the other the U.S.S.R. are the directing elements; it is false if we picture the Cold War as the clash between two imperialisms, whereas, in fact, the Soviet determination to conquer and convert is directed at all countries and not the United States alone. The United States are Moscow's enemy No. 1 because they offer the sole obstacle to Stalinian ambition for world dominion.

The theme "France in the Cold War" therefore presents two aspects. On the one hand, we must enquire what course Soviet aggression is following in France and how it affects French internal politics; on the other hand, we must enquire what attitude the French government is adopting in international politics and what line its diplomacy is pursuing in a world torn by dissension.

The French Communist Party is completely subject to the orders of the Kremlin, just as are communist parties all the world over. Of this the facts supply glaring evidence. Until 1934 the

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

one or more of her children in boarding schools. One mother at work may have two children cared for in a day nursery while another in the same position is told there are no vacancies for her children. There are families of three and four children receiving subsidies of several hundreds of pounds a year under the Education Acts alone. Many persons living in local authority flats and houses are just as well off as neighbours who must not only pay an economic rent for their own houses but contribute also to the artificially low rent of the council dwellings. One man may have his old mother cared for in a local authority's Home while another old lady, perhaps on her own, is refused admittance on the grounds that everybody cannot be helped. This, of course, is true: it is impossible for everybody, or the majority, to take more from the pool of rates and taxes than they put into it. The expansion of the welfare state has to be halted somewhere; and when that point is reached some remain within the charmed circle of assistance whilst others equally deserving must stay outside. But this is an age of democratic envy. What Tom gets Dick wants; and when Harry hears about it he wants it too. When Dick and Harry are refused, as they must be, they are envious and resentful. Not only therefore does the welfare state create a new privileged class: it generates new social jealousies as well.

Moreover, the competitive struggle for benefits introduces a new and corrupting element into the relations of public men with their supporters and constituents. Politically speaking, the welfare state is a "winner", and any partizan who wishes to stay in the favour of the electorate and his party will be rash to make a critical examination of our social services in public. Instead, he must speak of them with discreet enthusiasm and be prepared, if elected, to spend much of his time dealing with complaints from constituents who have not got what they wanted from the social services. Later, he will perhaps make a virtue of this task by boasting in his election leaflets of the number of grievances he has taken up with Authority during his previous term of office. The ordinary citizen certainly needs some protection against government departments and local authorities whose officials are sometimes lazy, stupid, and careless. The elected representative will therefore hear of wrongs that need righting; but his correspondents are more likely to be those who intend to make a nuisance of themselves until they get some benefit to which they are no more entitled

FRANCE IN THE COLD WAR

enlists the votes of the discontented, the rebellious, and those who, in accordance with French tradition, see no hope of salvation save in a continuous slide to the left.

Judging from the partial elections, the number of communist votes cast will not noticeably fall off at the next general elections, though the number of communists elected is capable of varying considerably by reason of the system of ballot. However much can be attributed to illusion and propaganda, the fact remains that millions of Frenchmen believe more or less vaguely that the Soviet régime would satisfy the aspirations of the masses and humanist values. This belief, absurd as it may appear to us, is a fact, and a fact of the gravest importance.

In the present phase of the Cold War, it is not, however, this fact that is decisive. The millions of communist voters, whether fanatical or deluded, do not represent and, as long as elections remain free, never will represent a majority. The Communist Party will not attain power by legal process, nor will it seize it by a *coup d'état*, failing some incredible blundering on the part of those now ruling. But this, as far as we can judge, is not the present function of the Communist Party within the framework of Stalinian strategy. Its function is to perpetuate a state of chaos, so that Western Europe may remain a vacuum and one day out of fear or from despair yield to Soviet pressure. At the same time, it is the business of the Communist Party, should war supervene, to reduce the country to impotence; to put it briefly, it is an instrument of moral disintegration in time of peace, and, when the explosion comes, an instrument of civil war.

In the case of international tension, to what extent might the Communist Party succeed in paralysing the national defence? This is a question that no one can answer precisely, but which cannot but cause the most serious anxiety. Behind its public activities the party conceals an underground organization counting several tens of thousands, and possibly hundreds of thousands militants, or rather combatants. This organization is quasi-military in character and embraces a large number of professional revolutionaries, often foreigners. A plan for sabotage must have been prepared beforehand; it is to be feared that even partial mobilization would not be carried through without disturbances.

For the time being at all events we are justified in asserting that the action of the Communist Party has profoundly modified the conditions of political life. For the first time since the Revolution, it seems that a definite cleavage has occurred in the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

than to lack of material goods or to inequalities of wealth. A country where larger numbers of people are educated and sensible enough to prefer a simple standard of life (not the same things as a low standard of life), and where they seek and value fresh air, sunlight, cleanliness, peace, quiet, and beauty in their surroundings is more likely, given the same effort and material resources, to get rid of its poverty and squalor than one where the government and people, caught alike in the net of international politics and industrial rivalry, are individually and collectively pursuing power and prosperity. In the latter case, as in England, energy is fruitlessly wasted on ventures abroad, and on quixotic schemes for developing Backward Areas overseas when such Areas lie all around us at home; new industrial slums are created while old ones continue to rot; paper plans for improvement are torn up on the plea of necessity, mostly the necessity due to unchecked numbers and to the lack of a population policy; people are taxed harder and perpetually told to work harder and save more to overcome some crisis; and real poverty and the mentality of poverty tend to spread, not diminish. Massed squalor may be the goal towards which present ideas and policies are leading the welfare state.

5

Besides leaving uncured such social diseases of feudalism and commercialism as poverty and property the welfare state is adding to them some as yet undiagnosed ones of its own. We have always had with us an owning class taking a large slice from the national income and giving nothing, or next to nothing, in return. Industry and commerce have added to it another class of people used to an easy going life and expecting to hand their advantages on to their children. We also have today a larger number of pensioners of various kinds. As if these were not enough at a time when we perhaps can less afford to keep them in the ways to which they are accustomed welfare legislation has added to them a new and growing class, mostly wage earners, receiving subsidies from public funds sometimes to the tune of hundreds of pounds a year, apart from what they get from the ordinary services provided out of rates and taxes. A member of this new privileged class may, for example, be a widow drawing pension and allowances, and living perhaps in a rate subsidised flat, who has persuaded the local education authority to place

FRANCE IN THE COLD WAR

(which was feeding the people and the factories of France), support for the People's Democracy of Eastern Germany, approval of all the trials and confessions, invectives against the war in Indo-China, all these slogans launched by the Cominform, the Communist Party no longer takes even the trouble to attune to French feelings, simply rehearsing them word for word and amplifying them beyond all measure.

This servility has not appreciably affected the rank and file of the party, but among non-communists it has roused a hostility that nothing can appease. Taught by the example of their brethren in all the countries beyond the iron curtain, the socialists, who still in 1946 refused to envisage a government without communist participants, have now realized the fate awaiting them in the event of a Stalinist victory. Electors and parties, from the socialists to the extreme right, are at once regrouping now that the communist menace is apparent.

The conversion of the extreme left into a Stalinist party has profoundly modified the working of political forces. Where and when a political party that has managed to secure only from 25 to 28 per cent. of the votes withdraws, so to speak, from the national community, the majority within the non-communist block belongs to what was formerly termed the right. That this is so is not yet clearly evident in the present Assembly, which is due for renewal next year. The present Assembly was in fact elected before the cleavage between communists and anti-communists had occurred (at what has been called the three-party period). The R.P.F. (*Rassemblement du Peuple français*) formed by General de Gaulle did not as yet exist. The M.R.P. (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*) directed by a staff drawn from the Christian Democrats and inclining towards a sort of Christian socialism, secured, in 1946, a large number of votes from the traditional right. At the present moment the axis of the non-communist majority lies in the left centre. After the forthcoming elections it will shift towards the right. The representation of the M.R.P. will decline to the advantage of the R.P.F. and the independents. It remains to be seen whether this will have consequences for the constitution of the government, whether the R.P.F. will persist in an attitude of absolute opposition.

The result of the action of Stalinism in France has been to restore to the French right a majority that it had lost and which, immediately after the Liberation, it appeared to have little chance of recovering. At the same time it has brought about a

BOOK REVIEWS

ment to take this step, then considerations of legality will not prevent serious strife. The most powerful safeguard against the recurrence of a general strike lies not so much in the law as in the consolidation of the voluntary co-operation of trade unions with industry and the state, at all levels of policy making and administration, that has gradually developed during the past ten years.

If sometimes Mr. Citrine's choice of words reflects his sympathies and gives the historical section the faintest of tendentious flavours, and they might possibly be construed in that way by the sensitive, his scrupulous care to be as objective as humanly possible is evident throughout the book, which is a fine piece of scholarship.

B. C. ROBERTS.

HUMAN NEEDS. By MICHAEL GRAHAM. (Cresset Press. 252 pp. 15s.)

MR. GRAHAM belongs to the naturalistic school of ethics, and has added one more to the attempts to find the recipe for the good society by the inspection and analysis of human experience. He brings to his task gusto and self-confidence, a lively jargon-free style, a naturalist's special knowledge of animal behaviour, and a wide acquaintance with history and anthropology. Although discussing well-worn questions, Mr. Graham does not allow his argument to be clogged by continual reference to other authorities, whether by way of deference or disagreement. His personal viewpoint stands clear, and it is only in an appendix that we find stated his strong sympathies with Kropotkin, Trotter, Mead, and Mumford, and his antipathy to Freud.

His thesis and the methods used to establish it may be considered together. Men, he observes, can be happy in groups which are fairly small and run as teams or joint enterprises. They are ill at ease in herd-like groups where there is a rigid pattern of dominance and subordination, or where competition and individualism allow the weakest to go to the wall. These two contrasted types of organization are constantly recurring, but in civilization the latter prevails in spite of its incapacity to satisfy human needs. To the question why man should be possessed of these contradictory tendencies Mr. Graham finds what may be called the naturalist's answer. That is, he collects patterns of animal behaviour analogous to the human "joint enterprise" and "herd" patterns and explains them in terms of food-supply and other biological conditions of survival. He goes on to a reconstruction of human prehistory in the same terms. From this biologist's viewpoint he is able to adopt a rigid formula of the economic determination of social organization, which he uses in explanation of the historical record as of the pre-historical reconstruction. Hunting, herding, and cultivating each demand and produce a particular culture pattern, the characteristic of the first being altruism and joint enterprise, of the second rigid discipline of the group under a patriarchal leader, of the third individualism and private property with weak remnants of altruism. The individualism of the cultivators invites conquest by the herders, and so civilizations arise. Civilization, however, is a way of life producing a surplus of goods over bare subsistence needs, and there is no longer an unequivocal determination of the culture pattern by the economic requirements of survival. Moreover, the conflict of group

state and a minimum of military strength without modifying the constitution?

The spokesmen of the R.P.F. declare that in order to govern against the Communist Party in a time of Cold War other methods are requisite than those of the Fourth Republic. It is easier to instil doubts as to the efficacy of the R.P.F. if in power than to rebut the Gaullist criticism of present practice.

On the morrow of the collapse of Germany, French official diplomacy remained true to the watchword of unity between the Grand Allies, displaying an out-and-out anti-German attitude and insisting more or less categorically on the separation from Germany of the Rhine provinces, international control of the Ruhr, not to mention the economic annexation of the Sarre to France. In other words, the anti-German obsession lived on. A new fact was unnoticed: Stalin had stepped into Hitler's shoes.

When the first difficulties arose between the Allies, the representatives of France generally found themselves by force of circumstances ranged with the westerners. It was they, indeed, who insisted that France should participate *pari passu* with the three great powers in all deliberations concerning treaties with the satellites, whilst the Soviet representatives did their utmost to prevent or limit French participation. Nevertheless, French diplomacy put off as long as it was possible the moment when a choice would have to be made. Up till the time of the Moscow Conference, in 1947, the spokesmen of the Quai d'Orsay insisted upon all occasions that France had taken upon herself the task of drawing together the countries that had fought side by side. The breach with Moscow came at the conference on Germany at the beginning of 1947 in the Russian capital. M. Molotov refused to accede to the French demands respecting the Sarre to which British and Americans consented, and France found herself in the western camp. A few months later, the rejection of the Marshall Plan by the U.S.S.R. widened the rift. France was now involved in the Cold War by the side of Great Britain and the U.S.A.

She was not at first wholly committed. At the outset the Quai d'Orsay did not invariably readjust its views to comply with the new situation. French diplomacy with regard to Germany evolved slowly. The London Agreements, which led up to the creation of the Bonn régime, were only grudgingly accepted

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

TRADE UNION LAW. By NORMAN A. CITRINE. (Stevens. 700 pp. £2 5s.)

THIS is the book on trade union law for which members and officials of trade unions, the interested lay public, and members of the legal profession have long been waiting. The last edition of Slessor and Baker's standard work on this subject appeared in 1927—immediately after the Trades Disputes Act had fundamentally abridged the legal rights of the trade unions. The Trades Disputes Act has since been repealed and many other important legal changes have occurred in the interim between these two books. When Mr. Norman Citrine set out to write his book it was merely to bring the work of Slessor and Baker up to date, but in the process of revision he found himself writing what was essentially a completely new book; one that is far more extensive in its scope and treatment of the subject than that of his predecessors.

Mr. Citrine, who is head of the legal department of the Trades Union Congress, was in a unique position to carry out his research and obtain an unusual insight into this branch of the law, which every year extends its ramifications and grows in importance as the trade union movement extends its size, power, and responsibilities. The treatment of the subject matter not only displays a thorough acquaintance with it, but brings to bear a lucidity of thought and expression which is not always found in legal text books. Part one of the book is a model exposition of the history of trade union law and the two legal doctrines of restraint of trade and conspiracy which are fundamental to it; parts two and three deal exhaustively with the statutes and judicial interpretations; while part four is an invaluable series of appendices, bringing together in full or relevant parts the details of the main statutes, orders, and regulations made since 1871. Included in the appendices are examples of the many forms required to be used by registered trade unions; political fund instructions, rules, and forms; Rules of Court; and a summary of the matters which ought to be covered by the rules of any trade union. In addition the book is equipped with excellent indices to the statutes, cases, and decisions of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, etc.; and for the benefit of the layman a glossary of legal terms and abbreviations that will be highly appreciated by those who have previously suffered from authors in the legal profession disdaining to make any concession to the man without Latin. Altogether this is a complete work that will have an invaluable place as a standard of reference for many years to come.

No one could write a book of this kind, dealing with many matters that are legally and politically controversial, without incurring disagreements as to emphasis and interpretation. For example, Mr. Citrine's analysis of the legality of the general strike and the present state of the law since the repeal of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act will not satisfy those who lean to the point of view—ably supported a few years ago by Mr. Henry Strauss, M.P., in his pamphlet, *Trade Unions and the Law*—that the weight of legal argument was in favour of the opinions of Astbury, J., and Sir John Simon, that the general strike was illegal. In the opinion of this reviewer the most cogent of the arguments of those who defended the 1927 Act against repeal was that it made the law relating to general strikes more specific. Nevertheless, the Act was a bad one to achieve this end and was rightly repealed. Moreover, it is doubtful if a general strike can be prevented by legislation, for if social relations have become so strained as to lead the trade union move-

FRANCE IN THE COLD WAR

ments must be given their independence and their resistance must be given support.

French opinion is not in principle hostile to this policy, but fails to see in it a universally valid dogma. India has so far stood the test of independence, but Burma has not escaped civil war. The whole question is whether there exist men and parties, a ruling class, capable of taking over the new state. It has been said, here and on the spot, that it cannot be required of the French army that it should fight in Indo-China merely in order to evacuate the country. I am not convinced that this argument is decisive. Those at the head of affairs in France could be satisfied with an independent Indo-China within the framework of the French Union (whatever the exact interpretation of that formula may be) provided there existed in Indo-China a government capable by itself of guaranteeing orderly development. They doubt, however, whether at the present juncture such a government is forthcoming. It is possible that with a different policy between 1945 and 1947 the present war might have been avoided. Now the choice lies between the triumph of Ho Chi Minh and the maintenance of the French army in Indo-China.

In Africa the facts are different. In North Africa there is no pressing communist menace. In West Africa communist infiltration has become more marked, but not to the extent of constituting an immediate threat or paralysing reform.

British diplomacy through its Arab policy and the United States by reason of their anti-colonialism seem in the view of French statesmen to encourage movements of protest and revolt. This conflict of opinion, more or less camouflaged, is not one that can be disposed of with a few words. It can be maintained that liberal reforms would offer the best method of avoiding a crisis and easing the transitional stages. Let it suffice to remark here that Great Britain did not experience in the Near East difficulties similar to that confronting France in North Africa, viz. the vast number of French nationals established in the country as officials or colonists. In Tunisia, in Morocco, and in Algeria there are a million French citizens. What would be the fate of these if the claims to independence were conceded?

Even apart from these virtual disagreements in Africa and Asia, it cannot be said that France has fallen into line with the American behaviour in the Cold War. On all occasions France endeavours not to identify herself completely with the attitude of the United States. In international organizations she frequently

aims at preserving the last links with the universe behind the iron curtain. She has given up hope of serving as intermediary or playing the role of peace-maker, but she has not abandoned the hope of contributing her share not so much to the carrying on of the Cold War as to its appeasement. It remains to be seen what effect the decision just reached to re-arm will have upon the action of the Quai d'Orsay.

The strength of the Communist Party is a fact, a regrettable fact indeed, but none the less a fact. The parties in power at present are not resolved to break that strength. As a result the underground resistance is a mortgage upon all efforts towards rearmament. Communists have been eliminated from most positions of control in the police, in the army, and in the administration, or at least from positions in which their presence endangered the security of the state. In order to carry the purge further there would have to be recourse to other methods which would overstep the bounds of what is at present legal. The governments hesitate to make the first move in this direction.

Opinion in the western world, even when persuaded, is yet irresolute. If three out of every four Frenchmen are anti-communist, they are far from being uniformly pro-American. Insidious propaganda paints the Cold War as the clash between two imperialisms. Inevitably there are more than a few who have dreams of neutrality; there are others who dream of a European force capable of holding the two giants apart and of re-establishing equilibrium and peace. None of these theories will stand up to scrutiny. How can present-day Europe, divided, disarmed as it is, and itself one of the essential stakes in the struggle, remain neutral? What possibility is there for the Europe outside the iron curtain to form a Third Force, seeing that the Kremlin recognizes only enemies and slaves and manifestly aims at conquering the Bonn Republic which would have for sequel the collapse of the entire old continent.

These theories are symptoms. For my own part, I do not think there is a way out. But the peoples are finding it hard to live for years in what, to borrow a name from M. Sartre, we may call the *Huis Clos* of the Cold War.

THE COLD WAR IN THE EAST

By MICHAEL LINDSAY

THE most obvious feature of the cold war in the East is that it has been anything but *cold*. In Europe actual fighting has been confined to guerrilla warfare in Greece, but in the east there has been fighting of varying intensity and duration between communist and anti-communist forces in most countries, in some cases large-scale regular warfare.

The character of the opposing forces is also different from Europe. The anti-communist governments are not democracies of the west European or American type. (The countries nearest to western democratic government tend to have the weakest communist movements.) Communism in the east is opposed by colonial régimes or by independent governments run by comparatively small ruling cliques with low standards of administration. On the other side, communism in the east has been greatly influenced by developments in China and tends to base its power on the peasants rather than on the city workers and to use the methods of guerrilla warfare rather than insurrection or political action.

Finally, the dependence of communism on direct Russian assistance has been much smaller in the east than in Europe. In the east it is only the government of North Korea which was established under Russian military occupation and which contains former Soviet citizens in important positions. Elsewhere in the east, the successes of communism have owed little or nothing to direct Russian assistance.*

By far the most spectacular development of the cold war in the east has been the loss of China to the American sphere of influence. The Americans started with everything in their favour. American reputation in China stood very high, even among the communists. The predominant foreign influence in Chinese universities was American, and American returned students held many important positions. This moral influence was backed by

* This statement has been disputed in the case of China. Both right-wing propaganda, interested in justifying American assistance to the Kuomintang, and Chinese communist propaganda, interested in justifying the extreme pro-Russian policy adopted in 1949, have played up the importance of Russian action in Manchuria from August, 1945, to April, 1946. The subject is too large to discuss here, but there is very strong evidence for asserting that any Russian assistance to the communists in Manchuria was not on a scale whose absence would have altered the outcome of the civil war.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

very great material power through the almost complete dependence of the Chinese Government on American military and economic assistance. The American Government attached enough importance to China to send General Marshall on a special mission. Several thousand million dollars were spent on military and economic assistance after VJ Day. But within less than four years the forces supported by America had been driven from the Chinese mainland and Chinese public opinion had become strongly anti-American.

Many Americans realized that this might happen. In October, 1944, one of the best-informed State Department officials wrote: "Unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years." And earlier: "If we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms . . . Both China and ourselves would only be gaining a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning" (*U.S. White Paper on China*, pp. 572-3). The deductions from this analysis, which subsequent events very fully substantiated, were that the alternatives for American policy, not necessarily exclusive, were democratization of the Kuomintang or coming to terms with the communists, who, it was hoped, might be led to take an independent position friendly to America.

This sort of view seems to have prevailed in the State Department and formed the official basis of American policy during the Marshall mission. It has been widely criticized on the grounds that no communist party can ever be trusted to co-operate with non-communists, and that the Chinese communists, once admitted to a coalition government, would have eliminated their associates like the communist parties of Eastern Europe. In fact, however, it is probable that if this policy had ever been effectively implemented it would have completely altered the course of events, especially as the Americans could have benefited from serious Russian mistakes.

The Chinese communists have been exceptionally successful because they have combined the normal discipline and enthusiasm of communism with a leadership sufficiently skilful and sufficiently independent to adjust policy to meet the demands of the Chinese people and the needs of the Chinese situation. On several important occasions Mao Tse-tung showed his readi-

THE COLD WAR IN THE EAST

ness to reject bad advice from Moscow. This independence seems to have led the Russians to start with a serious underestimate of Chinese communism. According to General Hurley, Molotov told him that he did not consider the Chinese communists to be communists at all (*U.S. White Paper*, p. 93). While General Hurley is a very unreliable witness, articles in *Izvestia* and Mr. Byrnes's account of Molotov's remarks at the Moscow Conference indicate that the Russians were very badly informed about China, and Russian actions in Manchuria can very plausibly be explained on the hypothesis that they hoped to weaken a hostile Kuomintang Government rather than to help a communist rise to power.

Suppose that General Marshall had been able to implement official American policy; that a coalition government had been established; that the military reorganization agreements were in process of realization; that American influence had been used to strengthen the natural supporters of American democratic ideas and to eliminate from power those whom General Marshall called the "irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their feudal control of China". Suppose, then, that America had expressed her readiness to support China in protests against the Russian removal of Manchurian industrial equipment and the behaviour of Russian troops in Manchuria. The communists would have faced a clear choice between loyalty to China and loyalty to Russia. If they had gone into opposition on this issue and resumed the civil war against a government rendered more democratic and efficient by the previous removal of the extreme right, their chances of success would have been very small. It is much more likely that the majority of the communists would have come out against Russia and that the break with Russia would have been followed, as in the case of Yugoslavia, by increasing rejection of the Byzantine and Mongolian influences in Russian communism in favour of the liberal and scientific elements in the Marxian tradition. Such tendencies were already strong; "objective" was a term of abuse for Zhdanov, but a term of praise for Mao Tse-tung.

In fact, the issue of Russian action in Manchuria was largely discredited through its use by the right-wing Kuomintang in their campaign against the implementation of the agreements reached in January and February, 1946.

But what might be called the "State Department" policy was

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

always in conflict with a rival policy of unqualified support for the Kuomintang. Very influential sections of American opinion were ready to back any opponent of communism, and managed to persuade themselves that Chiang Kai-shek was a great democratic leader, aided by publicity which was the only thing the Kuomintang did efficiently. General Marshall's efforts at mediation were nullified by General Wedemeyer, who saw the Chinese problem simply as a question of how to help the Kuomintang defeat the communists. The official account of American policy leaves out the episodes in General Wedemeyer's command hardest to reconcile with official American policy, such as his long delays in disarming the Japanese. But even so, it shows that the communists were given very good reasons to suspect the honesty of American mediation long before negotiations finally broke down.

The dominant impression is of the helplessness of those Americans who understood the situation. Chiang Kai-shek, confident of American support so long as he fights communism and refusing to the end to admit the dangers of the situation, drags both his party and American influence in China towards disaster. The Americans who see where they are going can only plead with him with steadily diminishing hopes that their advice will be taken.

If the American reactionaries had been anything like as intelligent and as unscrupulous as communist propaganda represents them, they would have organized a *coup d'état* to replace the right-wing Kuomintang by a government capable of reaching an essential minimum of efficiency. In fact, the dominant mental quality of reactionaries appears to be a vast power of self-deception. Chiang Kai-shek remained confident of victory till the summer of 1948. In face of overwhelming evidence from American advisers and officials in China that the Kuomintang defeat was caused by hopeless incompetence and corruption in both army and government, Senator Taft continues to maintain that "the proper kind of sincere aid to the Nationalist Government a few years ago could have stopped communism in China".

The case of China is an excellent illustration of the basic dilemma involved in the decision to support an inefficient and reactionary government because it is anti-communist. What is needed is immediate assistance combined with reforms and democratization which can produce a government which can

remain stable without outside assistance. But reforms touch on the vested interests of the ruling groups, and once the government has outside assistance the incentive to make reforms disappears. The strength of the communist forces depends on their ability to offer leadership in securing essential reforms which their opponents are unwilling or unable to make. The assisting power, therefore, finds itself committed to the support of a degenerating government against a growing communist movement. A simple policy of anti-communism, while it may seem effective in the short run, inevitably leads to this type of vicious circle. Positive support for democracy is much harder in the short run and involves fighting both the extreme right and the extreme left, but it is the only policy which can lead to permanent success.

In Korea the element of pure confusion in American policy was much larger than in China. Occupation started with no definite policy at all, and the normal prejudice of regular soldiers that "maintenance of order" is the supreme objective led to incidents in which Japanese police under American orders fired on Korean demonstrations to welcome the Americans. Subsequent policy was crippled by false economies. The occupation authorities never had the personnel to replace, or to train Koreans to replace, the Japanese who had held all responsible positions in all branches of administration. The limitation of salaries to regular civil service scales produced a rapid turn-over of American officials, who were forced to rely on the small minority of English-speaking Koreans whose politics and social background were usually conservative. Improvements were made after a very slow start, and fairly effective measures of land reform were commenced before the American withdrawal. The level of competence in South Korean administration fell even lower after the American withdrawal, but the elections, despite many abuses, were free enough to allow many opposition candidates to be elected.

The rival administration set up by the Russians in North Korea had the advantage of being able to draw on trained personnel from the Korean population of Eastern Siberia, and was much more drastic in land reform and in elimination of the Japanese. But it is not at all certain that it has any better claims to represent the Korean people. All the negotiations for the unification of Korea broke down because the Russians refused to accept any solution which would have forced the communists

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to compete with non-communist parties for popular support in free elections. The North Korean Government has always refused to allow its claims to enjoy popular support to be examined by the U.N. Commission or by other observers likely to diverge from the communist line. Even stronger evidence is provided by refugee movements. One quarter of the entire population of North Korea ran away to the South, while the reverse movement from the South was on a much smaller scale. Such movements indicate very strong preferences for one régime rather than the other. The unfortunate Koreans may quite possibly feel that they have only had the choice between King Log in the South and King Stork in the North. The resort of the North to long-prepared military action may well be an admission that the Soviet satellite type of communism cannot stand peaceful competition even with a government like that of South Korea.

Indo-China is the other area of large-scale conflict. There are obvious similarities with the Chinese situation. Viet Minh has an administration functioning over large parts of the countryside, while their opponents hold the cities. Like the Chinese communists, Viet Minh has managed to win very general popular support. Negotiations which might have settled the conflict in 1946 broke down, with Admiral d'Argenlieu playing the rôle of Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer. The additional complication is the colonial relationship with France. French concessions to nationalist feeling have nearly always been made too late. On the one hand, there was a reluctance to admit how bad colonial rule in Indo-China had been and how unpopular it had become, and on the other there has been a desire for precise definition of the future status of Indo-China which has prevented such gestures as the British withdrawal from India. An agreement with Ho Chi Minh would have been perfectly possible for less than has now been conceded to Bao Dai. The French now seem to have reached a settlement in Laos and Cambodia, where the local population are afraid of Annamite domination, but there seems little prospect of a settlement elsewhere. The establishment of the Bao Dai Government was based on the sound principle that it is more effective to compete with a revolutionary movement than simply to fight it. But it is very doubtful whether such French-sponsored competition can prove effective after feelings have been embittered by several years of very brutal fighting. So long as Viet Minh can only draw on internal

THE COLD WAR IN THE EAST

resources, the French army may be able to maintain their present holdings. But the position will remain unstable, and at any time Chinese assistance to Viet Minh could cause a rapid collapse of the French position.

The Malayan communists seem to have tried to repeat the strategy of the Chinese communist party without having the basis of mass support which would have made this possible. The continued resort to terrorist tactics has been made possible partly by the geography of Malaya and still more by the failure of the government to conciliate the Chinese population, who, while not particularly pro-communist, have disliked the government too much to assist it against the terrorists. The basic problem of the government is how to implement policies which could win popular support while handicapped by an administration whose traditions include an authoritarian outlook, an anti-Chinese bias, and ideas of racial superiority.

Communist forces have also been fighting in the Philippines and Burma, but the Huk movement does not seem to be strong enough to be a serious threat even to the weak government at Manila, while Burmese communism seems to be part of the general struggle between armed factions rather than a normal communist movement.

In India and Japan the cold war has been cold except for a few small guerrilla areas in Hyderabad. In both countries communism might easily become strong if government by other parties became too incompetent or too oppressive. The recent Russian criticism of the Japanese communist leadership seems to be another instance of the tendency to sacrifice local communist strength in the interests of Russian international strategy. It is not likely that either the Japanese or the Indian communist parties will be able to win general mass support under present conditions until they are able to assert the right to independent judgment on the policies demanded by the Japanese and Indian people.

To sum up: communism in the east has been successful where, and in so far as, it could take the leadership in popular demands which its opponents were unwilling or unable to meet. The west has been defeated and Russia has won at no cost where, and in so far as, the forces of the west have been committed, not to the support of democracy, but to a blind opposition to communism.

GEOGRAPHY AND THE COLD WAR: A SURVEY

By E. M. HUGH-JONES

ONE of the consequences of using the phrase "cold war" to describe the present world situation is to give to the situation itself the appearance of novelty. Yet there is little new either about a state of diplomatic tension or this mode of describing it. Long before Clausewitz inverted the sequence of thought, it was recognized that diplomacy was war waged by other means. Nor is this the first time we have found ourselves at war, by one means or the other, either with Russia or with the object of outmanœuvring her. Just over a century ago we were engaged in a war in Afghanistan to prevent Russia moving south-east into India; later we fought in the Crimea and diplomatically in Berlin to prevent her moving south into the Balkans; while her attempt to extend her influence due eastward through China was thwarted by the Japanese.

In the light of these failures towards the south or east, the success of Russian expansion towards the west is curious and interesting. At Vienna in 1815, by securing a portion of Poland, she became one of the Powers who did succeed in extending their boundaries. Even the losses of 1917 were very quickly recovered, while the situation in 1945 sees her western boundary extended effectively further than at any time in her history.

Are there permanent factors to be found that may explain the persistence of Russian pressure? I believe that there are, and that they are to be found in the facts of geography and demography—of the distribution of land and people over the surface of the globe. There is nothing new in this suggestion either. It is the view put forward, notably, by the American Admiral Mahan, by Sir Holford Mackinder, and developed by the German Haushofer, writers whom the Russians have indubitably read. The excuse for this article is that their ideas are so unfamiliar to people in this country that we are in grave danger of overlooking a line of argument which, though vulnerable at certain points, is still illuminating.

The argument may well begin by drawing attention to another misconception about the "cold war"—namely, that it is being waged between two hemispheres, an eastern and a western, with Great Britain occupying a decisive position in the centre. But

GEOGRAPHY AND THE COLD WAR

a division into two large land masses is not the way in which the world would present itself to a visitor arriving from outer space. He would rather see it as a globe of whose surface about three-quarters is, in fact, water, on which floats one large land mass with some smaller masses disposed around it. A "Great Circle" described round this solid mass would include Europe, Asia, India, and North Africa, and the north-eastern part of North America. This mass, which readers of Mackinder will recognize as his "World Island", contains some two-thirds of the total land on the globe and about seven-eighths of the world's population.

But—and this is the second point—this population is not equally distributed over it. It is, in fact, situated in three main blocks: Europe west of the Volga contains some 500 million persons at a density of just under 200 to the square mile, India holds about 400 million at 400 to the square mile, and China perhaps 500 million at about 300 to the square mile. Of the rest about 120 million are in south-east Asia, 100 million in Korea, the Philippines and Japan; the 130 million in North America appear positively sparse when one considers that they are only about fifty-two persons per square mile.

Now, there are three things to note about this land mass and the distribution of people upon it. First, that just outside the boundary of the Great Circle mentioned above lies the main mass of Africa, an area about whose possibilities very little even now is known. Yet one thing at least should be tolerably clear—namely, that, with the possible exceptions of Central Europe and Western Russia it is an area more easy to exploit than any other at present available. Certainly it should be easier to develop the riches of Africa than those of Siberia, for men have learnt how to live in the tropics but not yet how to live, or at least not how to work, in the Arctic. Africa, then, is definitely a "glittering prize".

Second, note that these blocks of population are separated from Africa and from one another by geographical features that are fairly difficult to penetrate—the Sahara, the Gobi Desert, the Himalayas. Nevertheless, there are a few gaps in this geographical curtain—corridors, as it were, running through Palestine and Egypt, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Mongolia.

But, third, these corridors not only act as the connecting links between centres of population, but they also serve as means of

egress from Mackinder's "Heartland"—the hard core of the World Island that is impervious by sea-borne forces from without because its rivers run into seas that are either ice-bound, as the Arctic, or landlocked, as the Caspian. This Heartland comprises about half Asia and the eastern quarter of Europe, including the Volga basin; its scope could be extended if the Baltic and Black Seas could be "closed", as, for example, by any power capable of dominating the southern fringe of the Baltic and the Balkans; to control it is to hold the key to dominance of the whole world mass.

If the idea of the Heartland be once accepted, it is clear that Russia is exceptionally well-placed to secure such control, and her policy for the last century becomes intelligible as a series of attempts to press outwards from her naturally central position through the various corridors. The wars of the twentieth century appear as fundamentally for control of the Heartland, wars in which more success has accrued to the Slavs than to the western Europeans. How permanent such success may prove is obviously matter for debate, but that it is at present very considerable cannot be gainsaid.

At this point it will be well to meet some obvious comments on this reading of the world situation, of which the four most important may be summarized in a single sentence: what about communism, air power, the U.S.A., and the economic strength of Russia herself?

Communism does not enter the picture at all—at least, not as a motive force in Russian policy. It is true that the existence of communists in countries lying on Russia's designed path provides her with an invaluable weapon and that the progress of communism may measure the success of her policy. But there is no reason to regard that policy as being specifically "communist"—whatever that adjective might mean in this connection—nor to suppose that its underlying assumption is that of a Marxian and inevitable collapse of western capitalism for which Russia is merely waiting in order to apply the final and decisive push. It might equally well be moved by a nervous apprehension that western capitalism is obstinately refusing to die and is, indeed, showing a most reprehensible strength.

The theory of the Heartland is based on the postulate that only those areas that are inaccessible from the sea may be deemed genuinely invulnerable. Does the development of air power alter this construction by making every area accessible, and therefore

none invulnerable? This is a technical question to which perhaps even the expert cannot provide an answer. But the inexpert, rushing in, may venture the belief that there are still areas in Russia inaccessible, in effect, to even the largest aeroplanes at present available in numbers. Even the secret of the atomic or hydrogen bombs, now that they are no longer in the sole possession of one Power, and that a friendly one, may be regarded as only adding equal strength to either side. Russian success in producing the bomb has neither increased nor diminished the deadlock over international control of atomic energy which was already complete. Moreover, it is to be remembered that however violent the strength of air attack, in the end it is the poor bloody infantry who must come in to hold the territory so dominated, and that hitherto, at least, they cannot be brought in by air in so large numbers as by sea. It is then, perhaps, a safe conclusion at present that the emergence of the aeroplane as a rival to the warship has not yet fundamentally changed the concept of the Heartland.

The position of the United States with reference to the whole World Island is strictly similar to that of Britain in relation to Europe; it is itself an island just off a larger continent. Despite the relative smallness of her population density, her position is therefore one of great significance, and she has exactly the same interest in maintaining the freedom of the world coastline as Britain has had, in the past, in maintaining the freedom of the European coastline, and for the same reasons. Thus her participation in the last war was, in the final analysis, inevitable, although the precise time of that participation was not left entirely to her own choice. Let us note also that when such a power seeks to intervene on the neighbouring continent she is greatly assisted by the existence of a peninsula, where a greater choice of coastline is available and where she may expect to have more time for effective consolidation of her position. Now in relation to the United States, is there a world peninsula? The answer surely is, yes, Africa. And Africa, let us repeat, is one of the most readily exploitable areas at the present time. So we should expect that a part at least of the cold-war pattern of American intervention should take the form of a proposed economic landing, so to say, on the peninsula of Africa, President Truman's Point Four. It may be urged that the pure Mackinder analysis gives insufficient emphasis to economic considerations, and thus under-rates the significance of the U.S.A. There is some force in this.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

At the same time, it is not necessary to change the terms of the analysis in order to include the United States.

How strong, though, is Russia's own economy? The Second World War undoubtedly disrupted the course of Russian industrialization which had been proceeding, on the whole, with considerable rapidity, from 1928 to 1941. But terrific destruction in the west was balanced by very high expansion in the east. By 1945 industries in the east had been built up to a level of almost half the pre-war output of all Russia, and the arable area had increased by an amount greater than the annual peace-time growth for the whole Soviet Union. She has now a fourth Five-Year Plan for 1946-51, designed to restore pre-war production and to go on with a major programme of industrialization.

It is impossible to prove that the Soviet confidence of fulfilling the 1951 targets in time, or even ahead of time, is not misplaced. All the same, the economic resources of the eastern area—say, between the Volga and Lake Baikal, are in many ways not very satisfactory, particularly the agricultural and mineral resources. They are certainly not capable of supporting any very considerable population, for agricultural fertility is relatively low. The Russians themselves are so conscious of the danger of draining away the water resources of the region—for the level of the Caspian is reported to be falling—that they are contemplating a vast project for diverting southward into the Caspian some of the rivers at present flowing into the Arctic, with consequential benefits to the irrigation on which much of the agriculture of the region depends. Nor are the mineral resources conveniently situated. By contrast with the position in southwestern Russia, on which the old Russian economy was based, the main coal and iron deposits are a thousand miles apart. Finally, and this is of extreme importance strategically, the chief oil-bearing regions of the U.S.S.R. lie on the perimeter of the Heartland. The more northerly oil resources of the Upper Volga, while important, cannot compare with those further south. While therefore they have made enormous efforts to build up industries in this region the cost in human and material resources must have been very considerable, and from the point of view of creating a really powerful economy, comparable, say, with that of the United States, the position is not entirely encouraging.

It is in western Europe alone—except at the unfortunately named Lake Success—that the principals in the "cold war" come into direct contact. This may not be surprising, geographically,

GEOGRAPHY AND THE COLD WAR

but it is none the less important. For in Europe two special factors increase the inevitable complexities of diplomatic conflict—that the economic revival of Germany is essential to that of Europe itself and that the present political frontier also approximates to the cultural frontier. The former point perhaps hardly needs elaboration, but the latter does.

The fundamental division in Europe is between those countries which came under the influence of the Roman Empire and those which did not. For with the Romans came certain conceptions of order, of individual freedom, and, finally, of religion which are the foundations of what is loosely called "western civilization". The boundary of their influence ran along the Rhine and upper Danube, and this line forms the cultural division between west and east. Germany, even as a mere geographical expression, has never been deeply impregnated with Roman influence, and politically has never been disposed to see her future as more clearly linked with the west than with the east. Rather the contrary is the case. The great German hero is that Hermann who repulsed the legions of Varus and thus ensured the survival in central Europe of elements of tribal barbarism which elsewhere yielded before the influence of the *Pax Romana*. During the nineteenth century other countries did little to discourage this reverence for Hermann, but rather played up to it; paganism and celebration of the *Hermannschlacht* were marked features of the Nazi epoch which closed with the 1939 Soviet Pact. It is not surprising, therefore, that many regard Germany as a natural delinquent with poor heredity and, may one say, lack of parental control, for whom corporal punishment may be inappropriate, but who at least needs a long period of probation—that what the *Pax Romana* never had a chance to achieve must be attempted now.

Ultimately, therefore, in western Europe the rivalry between Russia and the other powers is a struggle to take up the civilizing role in Germany which Rome failed to play—"civilizing" being variously interpreted from the western or eastern point of view. The incorporation of Germany in the Council of Europe is obviously a tricky business, for it implies giving her not only economic recovery, but also a measure of political and perhaps even military importance, for which she is not yet ready. Or perhaps one should say for which other European countries are not yet ready, for the admission of some 60 million Germans to membership of the Western Europe club must be a source of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

apprehension to those others who have already twice or thrice in their lifetime suffered physical violence from this same member. Yet if Germany is absorbed into the eastern orbit the domination of Russia in Europe is assured.

Such an absorption would be powerfully assisted if Russia could establish her influence on the western edge of Germany—say, by sharing in the administration of the Ruhr. The Russians cannot have failed to see how much a similar move in 1815 contributed to the ultimate domination of Germany by Prussia. The possession of Berlin is not important strategically. Its importance lies in the fact that although in the past it was Vienna rather than Berlin which among the German capitals represented western civilization, now, by a paradox, it is Berlin whose independence is a symbol of that very civilization. It is for this reason and not for any strategic advantages—for there are none—that the western powers have insisted on maintaining their position in the city. Berlin might be regarded as a staging post on Russia's march to the Atlantic—for it lies just halfway between Kazan, on the Volga, east of which the density of Russia's population drops from 130 to under three per square mile, and Cape St. Vincent. But Russia does not want to march to the Atlantic, for she has no need to. A line from Lubeck to Trieste, so long as it holds, and prolonged to Salonika, can block off entrance to the Baltic and Black Seas, and this, for the time being, is enough for her purpose. At present, in Europe, her strength is to sit still, so long as the Iron Curtain remains iron and her satellites remain faithful. Not that she would have the least compunction in making a (temporary) withdrawal if it suited her book. It is possible to conceive that she might abandon Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to create a vacuum which might serve to draw Germany into the Russian system. It would be at least interesting if the western powers were to anticipate such a move by announcing that the time had now come to consider the permanence of the Oder-Niesse line, which indeed they have always said they regard as merely temporary. This might put Russia in an awkward dilemma; for to refuse would fix Germany in opposition for as long as thought can reach, while to agree would appear to Russian satellites as evidence of weakness and a loss of diplomatic initiative. It might well produce a rift in the curtain of some magnitude. But unless the western powers take some such initiative, the European position will remain static.

GEOGRAPHY AND THE COLD WAR

From the economic point of view, the present division of Germany and the structure which Russia is trying to build up behind the Iron Curtain represent a major, and perhaps a permanent, change in the balance of Europe. Before the war there was an enormous trade between western Germany and the rest of pre-war Germany, particularly with the German parts of western Poland, where there were large estates producing exportable surpluses of basic crops, such as grain. Now these territories have been depopulated and the large estates have been replaced by small farms producing mixed crops at a level of efficiency not rising much, if at all, above subsistence. To some extent this change is taking place all over eastern Europe, and it is probable that the grain surpluses that used to be produced there will never return.

For the supply of manufactures behind the Iron Curtain Russia intends Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, Poland and Hungary to take the place of western Germany. The change over is not complete, but there is no doubt that they are being groomed for this part. The economic integration of this area is an important part of the Russian aim to establish an eastern Europe "Monroe Doctrine" which will exclude non-easterners from establishing economic "colonies" and provide a protected market for the interchange of materials and finished goods. Although Russia supplies some manufactured goods, her more important role is as supplier of raw materials, such as cotton and minerals, vital to that swift industrialization which is the general ambition of the countries of east and south-east Europe.

This ambition is one, though not by any means the only one, of the causes of the development of tension between Russia and her satellites. For the products which Russia supplies might also be supplied, and more easily, by the western powers if they could open up direct dealings with them. Moreover, unless loans can be obtained, the current import surpluses characteristic of these countries can only be met by maintaining a continuance of agricultural exports and thus a higher proportion of agriculture in their economy than is compatible with rapid industrialization. While the defection of Yugoslavia is not to be explained wholly on grounds of economic tension, the possibility that this strongly contributed to it cannot be overlooked.

This situation suggests that the development of every possible economic contact with eastern Europe and the Balkans is the best line for the western powers to take. It is true that it would

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

be possible for them to require Russia's satellites to accept to the full the implications of their dependence and reduce trade and loans to a minimum. The trouble about this is that their totalitarian governments might accept the situation, confident that they will be able to retain their authority no matter how low may fall the local standard of living, a fall which would be credibly attributed to the machinations of capitalist imperialism. If communism thrives on poverty, then the creation of poverty is no way to fight it. Thus the alternative appears preferable: to trade as much as possible and make what loans we can to Yugoslavia and the rest; demonstrate that western capitalism does in fact work and can deliver the goods.

But the Balkans are not only important for their economic implications for Europe; they are also on the route that leads into the Mediterranean, of which Greece and Turkey are the doorposts. One of the most significant developments of the post-war years has been the growth of the United States' interest in the eastern Mediterranean, an area very far from that with which she is normally concerned. This interest has been manifested in various ways: in the so-called Truman Doctrine, offering aid to Turkey and Greece; in the securing of strategic airfields; in the remarkable example of the value of routine which produced, by the merest chance, an American naval detachment in the Adriatic on the eve of the Italian elections.

The oft-expressed explanation of this interest in terms of Middle East oil is only partially satisfactory. In terms of world geography, what has happened is that the United States has become aware—even if unconsciously—of the significance for her of the African peninsula and the danger to that peninsula if an unfriendly power were to penetrate to and through a Palestine whose attitude is uncertain, or an Egypt where a vehement nationalism combined with considerable poverty creates a fruitful field for the growth of pro-Russian sympathies. British policy has been concerned with the Mediterranean for centuries, but places such as Malta, Cyprus, and Cyrenaica are now less significant as guarding the route through the Suez Canal to India and the east than as potential road blocks on the way through the Levant or Persia into Africa. Cairo has always been an important traffic junction, but now it is the north-south traffic rather than that running east-west that is of primary importance.

To say this is not to belittle the importance of the east. Far from it, indeed, for the eastern theatre of the cold war is a vital one.

Of the three main centres of population mentioned at the outset of this article one, China, must for the time being be reckoned as won to communism. Korea, indeed, may eventually prove to be Stalin's "Spanish Ulcer" for there is a certain analogy between the British position during the Napoleonic War in an island off the Iberian peninsula and the present disposition of anti-communist forces off the peninsula of Korea in the Japanese islands and Formosa. The desire to prevent such an outcome by smoothing out, as it were, the Chinese coastline was doubtless one of the reasons for the attack on S. Korea. But the temptation to press the analogy should be resisted, because the Americans cannot indefinitely occupy Japan nor the United Nations Korea and the position of Formosa is doubtful. So that it would be safe to assume that, for the present, the main line of defence has slipped back to India, south-east Asia and the Malay Peninsula. It is here that the destiny of the world for the next few generations is being decided. For if the 500 million of China, together with, perhaps, half the 500 in Europe, are to be reckoned as lost to the west, the balance lies in the hands of the 400 million in India and Pakistan, plus another 120 million in south-east Asia. Here are new national governments struggling with poverty and backwardness and under immense communist pressure from within and from without, so long as their standard of living remains low. The advance of Russian influence down the China coast threatens the main rice-producing areas on which these races depend. Because more people in the world eat rice than eat wheat, it is more important, in the immediate crisis, to safeguard rice-growing countries from communism by helping to raise their standard of living than to wean South American wheat- and meat-growing countries from fascism. Our exportable surplus should go to India, Pakistan, and Burma, where it is needed, rather than to the United States, where it is not, because the dollar gap is not nearly so serious as the political gap which would open if we should stop "unrequited exports" and turn their previous recipients towards Russia to make good their deficiencies. It is here and not in Europe that the cold war can be lost.

For the dollar gap isn't something new. Before the war only Asia and South America earned surpluses in commodity trade with the United States. Western Europe, then as now, had a deficit which, moreover, she never expected to fill by direct trade.

With the gap for Europe as a whole running at something

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

like four times its pre-war size, it becomes more important than ever to restore the old textbook triangle—America, Britain, Asia—and even to find other countries to help constitute the third angle in the triangle. Here President Truman's Point IV is of importance; the economic development of hitherto underdeveloped territories would provide such a reinforcement to the triangle, and Africa, for reasons given earlier, is the obvious place for such development if quick returns are to be expected.

It is time to summarize the argument as rapidly as possible. Russia has no need to press further westward into Europe, where, with the possibility of blocking off the Baltic and Black Seas, her position, if not impregnable, is very secure. She is now, therefore, concerned to push through the various geographical corridors leading from the Heartland to the other areas of mass population. This policy is not the offspring of communism, though helped by it, but is determined by the shape of the land mass of the world and the disposition of people on it. Its secondary objective is to secure control of Africa. At present, in addition to being in a favourable static position in Europe, Russia is in a favourable and dynamic position in the Far East, where the communist success in China has shifted the western defensive line into south-east Asia.

In the Balkans, the possibilities of economic tension might be exploited to weaken her European system of control and therewith to promote security in the eastern Mediterranean against a southward thrust into and through Egypt. It is clearly important also that no action should be taken which would detach Africa itself from the western powers or let in communist and Russian influence anywhere along the Cape-to-Cairo route. A diplomatic offensive concerning Germany's eastern frontier might embarrass Russia sufficiently to weaken her control of the Baltic.

But the vital areas are the lands surrounding the Indian Ocean. Because communism thrives on poverty, their standard of living must be built up, and this means the working out of an economic grand design for that area. In present circumstances, it is likely to get more help from the Commonwealth and western Europe than from America, granted the natural temper of the American private investor and the very recent development of American governmental interest here as compared with China or Europe itself. Any proposal, therefore, that Britain should scale down her repayment of sterling balances and divert exports from India

GEOGRAPHY AND THE COLD WAR

to America in order to close the dollar gap, whatever its merits from the standpoint of economic orthodoxy, would be a political and strategic catastrophe of the first magnitude for Britain and the U.S.A. alike, because it would risk opening India, and thus all Asia, to communism.

Indeed, the point may be pressed further, for the eastern position would be far stronger if western Europe as a whole, and not Britain only, were sending "unrequited exports" to south Asia and were running a corresponding deficit with America. And meanwhile there is Africa also to be thought of, where again massive international investment is needed, not only to reinforce the traditional (but not therefore mistaken) triangle of trade, but to occupy an area into which communism might otherwise leapfrog over the lines being drawn in the Levant.* Here, too, undue concentration on the balancing of accounts between America and Europe might lose the cold war.

Russia, as before in her history, believing that the door to success is marked "Push", is on the move. At various points on her route the western powers stand, like rather embarrassed traffic policemen, uncertain which coloured lights to switch on. At the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam they tried the green with results that they now regret. None of them, nor probably even Russia, wants to see the red light of war. Amber, for caution, seems their present choice, and if there is no early expectation that we can make the red one green, perhaps the best hope of the world is that it should remain for ever amber.

* Tass Agency has recently announced a big Russian programme of studies in Swahili. Whether true or false, the report is significant.

THE COLD WAR IN THE BALKAN

By K. ZILLIACUS

THE Cold War to-day is the idiot child, flourishing at bombs, of anti-communist intervention and pro-fascist appeasement between the wars. These things in turn are aspects of the struggle, which entered an acute phase after the first world war and the Russian revolution, between the defenders of capitalism and those who want a new social order.

In that long confused and complex struggle the capital classes and their governments have been pretty consistently

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

panic-stricken aggressors, or, at any rate, have put their faith in physical weapons to fight ideas subversive of the existing social and colonial order, and have held the Soviet Government and state responsible for the existence and spread of such ideas.

But although most of the responsibility for the return to the statecraft of the balance of power, the arms race, and the cold war rests on the shoulders of the defenders of capitalism, the Soviet Government has again and again played into their hands and done much to justify their fear and hostility. Soviet policy has been short-sightedly hard-boiled and opportunist, reckoning only with the governments and Foreign Offices of great powers and treating small states, public opinion, and even the working-class and communist parties in other countries as negligible quantities.

Certain dangerous features, inherent in the Communist Party organization, discipline, and tactics developed by Lenin, have been aggravated by the backwardness of Russia and still further by the bad faith, hostility, and ferocity of the capitalist powers, with an interlude more apparent than real during the second world war, throughout the thirty-two years' existence of the Soviet Union. These features have in the last few years developed along ugly and frightening lines under the stimulus of fear and the search for security.

To-day we have on the one side the United States identifying any serious colonial and social unrest with communism and equating communism with Soviet aggression and expansion. United States policy further assumes that Providence has conferred on Uncle Sam the sacred duty to deliver humanity from the danger of communism and to make the world safe for Wall Street in the name of democracy and freedom by diplomatic, economic, and military intervention and, if necessary, by poisoning, starving, blasting, burning, destroying, and smashing most of mankind and civilization with mass-produced weapons of mass destruction.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders identify "proletarian internationalism" with devotion to the Soviet Union, and devotion to the Soviet Union with subservience to the Politbureau of the C.P.S.U. They appear seriously to believe that it is impossible for the workers in any country to build socialism unless they enjoy Soviet help and accept Soviet leadership. They treat any attempt at independence by a communist party or régime as treason and aggression, and think in terms of defensive power politics against the outside world.

The more the western powers interfered in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe and developed their policy of pro-fascist and anti-resistance movement intervention in Greece, the harsher, tougher, and more suspicious and militantly communist grew the "Popular Front" régimes in the Balkan states and eastern Europe, which at first had been broadly based, grateful to their great western allies and anxious to serve as bridges between them and the Soviet Union.

The founding of the Cominform in October, 1947, was the *riposte* to the proclamation of the Truman doctrine and its application to Greece in March, 1947, and to western Europe in the Marshall Plan. It represented a drawing together of the communist parties of the nine countries (France, Italy, east Europe, the Balkans, and the Soviet Union) who felt they were directly menaced by American anti-communist intervention. This again provoked a further stepping up of the cold war, the arms race and war hysteria in the west, more counter-measures in the east and so on. The vicious circle began to revolve in earnest.

The next development of the cold war in the Balkans was a bombshell. It took the form of a quarrel and final breach between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

The conflict began when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union disagreed with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on how the latter was conducting its domestic and foreign policies and managing its internal party affairs. The break came when the Soviet leaders turned down the Yugoslav proposal that they should send a delegation to Yugoslavia to examine the situation on the spot, and the Yugoslav leaders turned down the Soviet counter-proposal that they should appear before a specially summoned meeting of the Cominform Bureau.

The final and decisive letter, dated May 4th, 1948, from the C.C. of the C.P.S.U., in the correspondence that preceded the break, contains strong criticisms of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership, not only on matters affecting the relations between the two countries, but on their domestic policy and the management of their internal party affairs.

What is important in this correspondence is not the validity or otherwise of Soviet criticisms, but the assumption of the Soviet leaders that it was their right to make such criticisms and the duty of the Yugoslav Communist Party to accept them in a spirit of proper humility. The Soviet letter of May 4th, 1948,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

rejected the Yugoslav proposal that the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. should send a representative to Yugoslavia for discussion and investigation into the situation on the spot, on the ground that "it is not a matter of verifying single facts, but of differences of view on issues of principle", and went on to suggest that "this question be discussed at the next meeting of the Informbureau". At the same time it admitted that "the Communist Parties in the countries of People's Democracies have declared themselves solidly with the letter of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U." and had "condemned the errors made by their Yugoslav comrades".

In other words, the Yugoslavs were bidden to present themselves at a meeting of the Cominform, although the other parties who were to be present at that meeting had already received the Soviet charges against the Yugoslavs and had passed resolutions adopting them and condemning the Yugoslavs without waiting to hear what they had to say. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that Tito and Kardelj, replying for the C.C. of the C.P.Y. in a letter to Stalin and Molotov dated May 17th, 1948, wrote:

"We do not try to avoid criticism on any question of principle. But we feel that in this case we are denied the right to equality, and therefore we are not able to accede to the suggestion that this matter be decided by the Cominform Bureau. Nine parties have received your first letter and we had not been informed of this before. These nine parties have taken a stand in resolutions."

Not satisfied with summoning the Yugoslavs to appear before a tribunal that had already condemned them without ever hearing their case, the Soviet letter of May 4th accused the Yugoslavs of "not wanting to admit their errors". This charge was rubbed in by quoting two statements of Lenin's condemning communist parties who failed to acknowledge "their own mistakes" and feared to "discuss their own weaknesses".

After these quotations from Lenin came solemn admonitions to the leaders of the C.P.Y., who were accused of having "rudely flouted" Lenin's recommendation and of refusing "honestly to admit their mistakes and conscientiously to correct them" because of their "excessive conceit . . . their successes have caused them to lose their heads, and to get above themselves. They are blown up with conceit and they preach conceit to the masses. They do not grasp that their conceit could easily ruin the Yugoslav leaders".

What is interesting about this arrogant tirade is that through-

THE COLD WAR IN THE BALKANS

out the Soviet leaders assume that the Yugoslav Party were guilty of refusing to recognize "their own" mistakes—because they had refused to accept the *Soviet* view of their mistakes. The Soviet leaders talk as though the Yugoslav Communist Party were not a separate entity, but a body which they lead and in which their word is law.

Not only did the Soviet leaders assume that the Yugoslav leaders, because they would not bow down to Soviet authority, were guilty of conceit and of refusal to admit their own mistakes. They proceeded to mobilize the power of the Soviet and Cominform states in order to coerce and intimidate Yugoslavia into capitulating.

A boycott was applied that deprived Yugoslavia of £350,000,000 worth of investment credits and 90 per cent. of her sources of machinery and equipment for the Five Year Plan. The treaties of friendship and alliance between Yugoslavia and the other communist states were denounced. There was a partial rupture of diplomatic relations and threatening notes. Yugoslav diplomatic representatives, citizens and national minorities in the Cominform countries were abominably maltreated. Frontier zones were cleared of "unreliable elements". There were troop movements, frontier incidents, the stockpiling of arms and munitions at points handy to the frontier. All this was accompanied and its ugly meaning stressed by propaganda of almost unbelievable violence and mendacity, pouring ceaselessly over Yugoslavia by day and by night from sixteen wireless stations all around that country. The object of these measures was to wreck the Five Year Plan—that is, to smash the building of socialism in Yugoslavia and to cause such distress, alarm, and despondency as to turn the Yugoslav people against the régime and beat them to their knees.

Apologists for Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia argue that in the present state of tension, with the capitalist world mobilized by the United States constantly threatening socialist states and communist parties everywhere with intervention and war, the Soviet Union is entitled to take any measures it thinks necessary to prevent a socialist state seceding and to put down any challenge to its leadership of the socialist bloc.

This is a straight security and military necessity argument, appealing to realism, not morality. The fatal objection to it as a "realist" policy is that it has not worked. It has driven Yugoslavia out of the Soviet bloc. It has weakened not only the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

military but the political, economic, and moral position of the whole Soviet group. It has dismayed their friends and put fresh weapons into the hands of their enemies. It has created a fresh danger of war.

The Moscow *Pravda* of December 21st, 1949, justified Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia as follows:

"Loyalty to the great cause of Lenin-Stalin, to the cause of internationalism, is determined and tested by the attitude towards the Soviet Union, which stands at the head of all the forces of democracy and socialism. Betrayal of the Soviet Union, betrayal of proletarian internationalism, inevitably leads to the camp of nationalism, of fascism, the camp of imperialist reaction. An example of this is the Tito-Rankovic gang of murderers and spies, which has completed the transition from nationalism to fascism, which has turned into a direct agent of imperialism and become its tool in the fight against socialism and democracy."

This argument was elaborated by an eminent British communist, Mr. Derek Kartun, the Foreign Editor of the *Daily Worker*, in his political thriller, *Tito's Plot against Europe*:

"It should be clearly understood that there is no such thing as this middle way of Tito's. Either states are based upon an existing or developing socialist system, or they are based upon a capitalist system. If the former, they must form part of the peace bloc with the Soviet Union at its head, because without the power and assistance of the Soviet Union they will inevitably be gobbled up by the ever-watchful imperialist powers. If the latter, they are bound by the logic of political and economic facts to be drawn into the orbit of the most powerful capitalist state in the world—the United States. . . . For the progressive movement everywhere the choice to-day can only be between the front of socialism and peace led by the Soviet Union and the front of imperialism and war."

This argument amounts to saying: "If you don't want to be run by the Americans, you must submit to being run by the Russians. They have the performing rights of socialism in the world. Anyone who tries to run his own show whilst building socialism is bound to fail, to become a tool of American capitalism and aggression and to turn fascist."

The mortal sin and heresy of the Yugoslav communists in Soviet and Cominform eyes is that they have refused to accept that proposition, and if they succeed in building socialism while remaining independent will prove it untrue. At all costs that danger must be defeated and the Yugoslav rebellion crushed and punished, or else other communist parties might be irresistibly tempted in their turn to try independence.

The Yugoslavs have paid a stiff price for resisting Soviet

THE COLD WAR IN THE BALKANS

domination and attempts at coercion. At the same time, Yugoslav society is being squeezed into new shapes and evolving along novel lines under heavy pressure of Cominform hostility.

Having taken their stand on the right of private judgment against the principle of authority, the Yugoslav régime are being driven by the logic of their position to invoke liberal and humanist values. Part of the reason for this evolution no doubt is also the deep desire of most Yugoslavs to gain the friendship and support of the western working class and western progressive opinion. Finally, the fact should not be underrated that the Yugoslav communists have a far more European background and tradition than latter-day Russian communists, and that the party is, so to speak, assuming its natural shape now, after escaping from the Soviet strait-jacket.

From the beginning the Yugoslav leaders took the party and the people into their confidence. The first act was to hold a congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Their next was to publish the whole controversy, giving the Soviet letters as well as their own in a good Serbo-Croat translation, and to sell it as a penny pamphlet at news-stands and street corners all over the country. At the same time they decided, after some hesitation, that they would not attempt to jam the Cominform wireless propaganda, nor to prevent people from listening to it. They now say that this propaganda is really working on their side, because it is so violent and extravagant as to confirm waverers in their belief that the other side has no real case and that their own government is right. There is a flood of newspaper articles, pamphlets, books, and a nation-wide discussion on the issues raised by this controversy. Yugoslavia is the only country to-day, as an astute British observer remarked, where fundamental issues of social organization and political principle are being freely and hotly discussed by the people. There are no "directives" of any kind to writers and artists.

The Yugoslavs show an equal faith in the desire for truth and sense of justice of public opinion abroad. They have thrown open their country to foreigners, for they believe that the more people who come to see the facts for themselves the better for their case. Students, workers, trade unionists, and M.Ps. visiting the country, the National Peace Council delegation and the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party have all testified to the warm friendliness of their reception and to the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

frankness—nay, eagerness—with which their demands for information have been met. Nothing has been held back and everything can be discussed.

The powers of the local and regional governmental authorities (people's committees) have been emphasized and developed and their working has been democratized and freed from bureaucracy. Major industries have been put into the hands of the separate republics as part of a policy of economic and administrative decentralization. The new experiment in workers' management in industry, trade, and transport has aroused great interest in this country. A reform of the lower courts is being prepared, designed to free them from political influences, to enhance their authority, and to ensure their impartiality and efficiency. The question of decentralizing the police force so as to put it into the hands of the different republics, instead of running it from Belgrade, is under consideration.

This does not alter the fact that Yugoslavia is still a revolutionary régime barely six years old, living internationally, not only isolated, but in a state of siege, with irreconcilable domestic enemies on the right, some of them supported by the Catholic Church, as well as on the left, supported by the Soviet Union. In these circumstances the only political opposition that exists to the present coalition embodied in the People's Front are enemies of the régime, whom the Yugoslavs do not propose to give a chance to try again. But to anyone who has seen the country year by year since 1945, as I have, or can compare it with the state of affairs in the other people's democracies, as I was able to do until the summer of last year, there is no doubt at all that Yugoslavia is moving in the direction of a socialist society where democracy and freedom will be realities enjoyed by all and that she already has more democracy and political freedom than the Cominform states.

The Soviet boycott dealt the Five Year Plan a terrific blow, of which the effects are only now being felt. During the first three years, the plan called mainly for laying the foundations for Yugoslavia's industrialization—that is, erecting the buildings, developing the grids, raising the dams, digging the tunnels, etc., for factories and power plants. In 1950-1 most of the machinery was to have been installed and the new installations should have commenced production on a large scale.

But the whole programme is being delayed because vital heavy machinery, such as turbines, blast furnaces, generators,

THE COLD WAR IN THE BALKANS

and similar equipment, have not been delivered by the Cominform states, even where it had already been paid for by the Yugoslavs.

For the last two years the Yugoslavs have tried to meet this difficulty, first, by husbanding their resources, ingenuity, and improvisation; second, by making some of the missing machinery themselves; third, by buying it from the west in exchange for their own exports; and, fourth, by getting credits, also from the west, for buying machinery, that would be repaid out of the resulting increase in production.

A great deal has been done under the first two headings. The progress of the plan and the increase of production in all fields, agricultural as well as industrial, has been remarkable. But the third and fourth are nevertheless the most important sources of machinery for the Five Year Plan.

Up to now the west has given only just enough credits to enable Yugoslavia to scratch along, but not enough to make up for what they lost by insisting on their right to run their own country. And this summer Yugoslavia has been visited by the worst drought in seventy years, which has pretty well wiped out her sugar-beet, vegetable, and fruit crop (except grapes), has reduced maize by 40 per cent. and wheat by 20 per cent., and has thereby wrecked this year's export programme, which was bitterly needed to pay for urgent and vital imports of machinery.

Soviet and Cominform propaganda are, of course, going to town on this situation and rubbing in the idea that this proves that it is impossible for a socialist state to do without Soviet help and advice. "Sack your leaders, return to the fold and all will be well. If not, you will go down and the western capitalists will get you," is the theme of floods of Cominform propaganda.

If the facts disprove this propaganda, if the west can work out a decent self-respecting relationship on a live-and-let-live basis, and shows enough faith in the integrity and future of the Yugoslav people and Government to give them generous and prompt aid, and to grant them credits without attempting to attach political strings, they will have gone far to winning the cold war on the only plane it can be won—on the social and economic plane and the plane of ideas. If the west can prove by deeds and not words that the capitalist democracies are really prepared to respect the right to run its own affairs of a communist régime that does not try to interfere in their internal affairs, that they are willing to be friends and to co-operate with

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

such a régime, and that that relationship is successful mutually advantageous, they can turn round to the other communist states and say: "Do as the Yugoslavs and both of them troubles and the cold war will be over." Better still, they find a basis for agreement with the Soviet Union, provided the latter were prepared to abandon their claim to direct communist parties in return for the United States dropping the policy of intervention to fight communism.

That is why the goodwill mission to Yugoslavia of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party was of great potential importance. It should lead to powerful Labour support for the policy of food and credits for Yugoslavia with political strings. It should help the Labour Party to make overdue and necessary distinction between communism and Cominformism. It might even sow the seed of something that could grow into a kind of British social democratic Titoism, taking a line of our own in foreign affairs based on a rational instead of a hysterical and fanatical attitude to world communism.

THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTION

By HUGH SETON-WATSON

"Here will be found, as nowhere else, the encyclopædic mosaic of the past few years. As a work of reference this book is indispensable to anyone who wishes to follow East European affairs."—*Time and Tide*. 22s. 6d.

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

By AITCHEN K. WU, Ph.D. (London)

Aitchen K. Wu, whose *Turkistan Tumult* published in 1949 described exciting events in Sinkiang, has now written a detailed and authoritative account of Sino-Soviet relations. This is a fascinating story told by a Chinese diplomat who was often "the man on the spot." 25s.

METHUEN

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RISE OF RUSSIA IN ASIA. By DAVID J. DALLIN. (Hollis and Carter. 293 pp. 18s.)

THE RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1939-1941. By A. ROSSI. (Chapman and Hall. 218 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THE COMING DEFEAT OF COMMUNISM. By JAMES BURNHAM. (Cape. 286 pp. 12s. 6d.)

WHAT foundation was there for the assertion that there was room in the world for Soviet communism and social or capitalist democracy to live peacefully together? Many believed it. If few do so to-day the reasons are pretty clear. For while it was coupled with the principle of non-interference by one allied great power in the domestic affairs of another, it seems also to have been based on an assumption—which was never so explicit—that the frontiers of the two systems were already determined. These frontiers, moreover, because they lay far outside those of the great powers themselves, included a no-man's-land where non-interference did not apply or could be differently interpreted. The Russians may well have believed, if the others did not, that much of that land was ripe for communism and could be safely helped to achieve it. Thus what was assumed when the assertion was made differed between one side and the other. The successive shocks which destroyed belief in it were administered by what happened in this no-man's-land, particularly in Czechoslovakia, which provided the chief turning-point in opinion, but also by a score of other things, such as the "free elections" in the satellites, the Cominform, the nature of Russian propaganda by means of radio, press, conference speeches and communist parties, developments in the Far East. Finally, there is communist-directed strike action within the territories of the powers themselves. And living peacefully together turns out to be the cold war in the west, with active war in areas of the Far East. So the world is left uneasily to wonder whether there is any truth, or ever can be any truth, and if so by what means it can be secured, in that original optimistic assertion.

Mr. Burnham, at least, does not wonder. He is assailed by no doubts, because he is convinced that we are already in a war which began indeed a year or more before the war with Germany and Japan was won. If we fail to recognize it, this is only because we have not adapted ourselves to the changed character of modern warfare, in which the political, psychological, and industrial weapons may often be more important and effective than, and not need to be supplemented by, the military weapons. In this current war the conquest of China was an overwhelming defeat for social democracy, the defection of Tito a minor victory. We should be less on the defensive. We should be using the non-military weapons with much more energy. Our propaganda ought to use, seek out, and organize our friends among the refugees and exiles from the satellite countries as well as within those subjected states themselves; it should not shrink from a similar approach to the Ukraine and to Russia itself. For the communist régime, even in its homeland, is troubled by economic difficulties, ideological doubts, and such political problems as that of succession to the dictatorship. Above all, we should not give the peoples of the subjected territories the impression that

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The 7,000 London stevedores, for example, "have closed their ranks more tightly than any other section of workers in Britain. They recruit only the sons of stevedores, and with them tradition is almost a mania".* The stevedores have been in the vanguard of most of the big strikes of latter years; and here it is not only a left-wing leadership but an anxiety to maintain their independence against the massive T. & G.W.U. that has made them receptive to strike agitation. (There has been tension between these Unions ever since 1923, when a number of T. & G.W.U. members in London broke away and joined the stevedores.)

Many strikes with apparently trivial causes occur where the customs of particular groups of dockers are infringed or outdated by the national Scheme. The Middlesbrough dockers, for example, went on strike for several weeks in the early part of 1949 against the time of their call being altered from 3 p.m. to 12 noon, since this involved their being thrown into a common pool with the wharf men. Moreover, the focus of such strikes may easily be switched from the original cause to the Scheme itself; indeed, the National Dock Labour Board's Report pointed out that this was, in fact, a common feature of the big strikes of 1948-9.

In these strikes it was the disciplinary clauses of the Scheme that came under fire, for sensitiveness to "victimization" has always been strong in the docks. But even if the appropriateness of particular disciplinary provisions is disputed, it is indisputable that tighter discipline is the price dockers have to pay for decasualization. This, however, does not make it more palatable. True, absenteeism is low; even the nominal rate was only 2.1 per cent. in the last six months of 1947 (or about one-sixth to one-seventh of the miners' rate), and fell to 1.7 and 1.4 per cent. in 1948 and 1949. But late starts, early finishes, morning and afternoon breaks, "spelling", waiting for ships of particular shipping companies to come in so as to be ready to unload them, and so on, have been part of the docker's tradition and are not all lightly given up. Moreover, during the war, when labour was freely transferred and the men often had to work in air raids, discipline was inevitably relaxed. Unforeseen delays made strict timekeeping seem pointless, and since piecework was general men could take time off with a clearer conscience in that they were penalizing themselves; master stevedores competing for the best gangs were unwilling to alienate their workers

* *Economist*, May 31st, 1950.

BOOK REVIEWS

aggressor away from its own homeland by no means unknown in the western capitals.

What determines the Russian outlook upon the world by which its decisions of policy are quite clearly dictated? Mr. Rossi speaks of "illusions, in so far as they ever had any, existing in August and September, 1939". Thus he does not carry us much further, and, as has been said, his facts do not establish the existence of any illusions at all. If one thing is patent both from his book and from Mr. Dallin's important and interesting account of Russian expansion in the east, it is the relentless pursuit of objectives once analysis has dictated them. That analysis seems to vary between the extremes of romantic unreality and of hard-headed realism and practicality. What produced Stalin's belief in the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek and a consequent policy fought bitterly by Trotsky? What, still more, explains his long-held conviction that if there was one thing certain in the world of power politics it was war between England and the United States?

There is room here for a book that has not yet been written, an analysis of the working of the mind of Moscow and the instruments through which its intelligence is brought to bear. This might go far to explain the sometimes inexplicable peculiarities of Russian diplomatic behaviour. It might even do something towards answering the question whether there ever can be room in a peaceful world for both Soviet communism and social democracy.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

TRADE UNIONS IN THE NEW SOCIETY. By HAROLD J. LASKI. (*Allen & Unwin*. 182 pp. 10s.)

SOVIET TRADE UNIONS. By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 156 pp. 7s. 6d.)

It is at once sad and gratifying that Harold Laski's last book should show a return in vigour and power to his best days. Some of his wartime writings had been tired, and that rotundity of style, for which one quite normally felt only affection, had become tiresome and even obscure. The underrated, but enormous, achievement of his *American Democracy* had sometimes disappointed, particularly in its chapter on American labour: this new book goes far to make good that momentary failure.

But it does a great deal more than that. A certain curious mealy-mouthedness has crept into Anglo-American communication. Increasingly it has been regarded as ill-mannered not to approach all American institutions with an appropriate deference, or to suggest that the New World could possibly have lessons to learn from the practice and achievement of the Old. There is a deprecation of the last five years in Britain, a failure to take proper pride in what is, in fact, both remarkable and heartening in domestic success. Again, to admit that one has learnt from Marx has been regarded more and more as a proof that one is tinted with the dye of bolshevism. There is abundant evidence in *Trade Unions in the New Society* that Harold Laski had at last, and perhaps almost alone, mastered the problems of Marxism, taken from them what was of value and rejected the rest without any submission

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of his own honesty and sanity. What is more, there is a revival, argued, of that pluralism which was Laski's first political creed, his escape to the decadent Hegelianism of English political thought. As always, there is evident his delight and mastery of the process of law as a clue to the most profound workings of political society.

In considering the problems of trade unionism in societies increasingly moving more towards planning, Laski is particularly concerned to apply the case to American labour that trade union politics, to be successful, must be more than those of a mere pressure group, must accept certain developments of the Marxist analysis of the capitalist state, and must, whatever development the growth of the economy may bring, be ready to defend their associative autonomy from governmental authority. In other words, American labour has the need, the right, and the duty directly to control American politics. The exposition of this theme involved Laski in a commentary on trade unionism in Britain and America and with considerable reference to Russia; it provides easily the best summation of world trade union problems available.

Mr. Deutscher's book follows on admirably from Laski's and is far more than merely the best account—indeed, almost the only one—of the Soviet trade unions available in English. Inevitably Mr. Deutscher is dealing with the same sort of problem as concerned Laski, and he is providing for it an admirably clear and detailed case study of the corruption of trade unions by the state—even by a state which had no such initial intention. That it was in some way a contingent consequence of Russian circumstances is not an argument against the planning of the economy is the rational theme of Mr. Deutscher's last chapter.

Most of Mr. Deutscher's space is devoted to the debates of the early years of the revolution and of tracing their consequences down to the modern régime of forced labour. Russian unionism had always been subordinate to Russian politics. It was this that made easy after the revolution the transformation of the unions to a recruiting agency for the expropriated peasantry, and an instrument which broke working-class solidarity between the *udarniki* better served the purposes of the party of the state. There is evidence, Mr. Deutscher tells us, that in the modern Soviets the unions have ever acted even as a pressure group in their members' interests, but it is significant that Shvernik announced in 1939 "the composition of the trade union committees in factories . . . was changed to the extent of 70-80 per cent., and the central committees to the extent of 96 per cent.," during the purges.

Mr. Deutscher's book is important not only as a complementary volume to Harold Laski's, nor yet simply as a first-rate study of its subject. It stands along with Wolfe's *Three Who made a Revolution* and Trotsky's *Revolution Betrayed* as a document of the decay of bolshevism. And it is more objective than either of these others. Indeed, despite the limitations of its subject, it is probably a more helpful book for understanding Russia than even Mr. Deutscher's, in some ways unsatisfactory, life of Stalin.

DONALD G. MACRAE

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONS. By STUART CHASE. (Phoenix House. 16s.)

THERE is a lesson here for social engineers. If a trend cannot be changed radically, it is better to accept it and adjust your programme to it. If you are determined to change it, prepare to see the shift take place very slowly. To plan a programme *against* a trend is a perfect formula for frustration. One of the first things a reformer should do—besides examining the Cross-cultural Index at Yale—is to get a competent social scientist to work out some trend curves, so that he can see if he has a fighting chance." Would indeed that we were all so objective and so knowledgeable, that social scientists were as happily in command of the situation as Mr. Chase seems here to imply. Yet, elsewhere, he correctly draws attention to the present immaturity of the social sciences. He remarks that "we have as yet no Newtons to give us great summary laws". We are, in fact, still engaged in a search for categories, for basic units of description, for profitable ways of organizing and thinking about our material. In particular, as he mentions, but does not stress, we need a broadly-based and dependable psychology—a theory which could describe adequately the structure of the human personality and outline its development, absorbing the scattered mass of data and theory gathered by the many and widely separated investigators in the field.

The purpose of the book is to draw attention to the extensive and various work being carried out by social scientists, a term that is used to include cultural anthropologists, social psychologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists. Examples are given of recent activities in each of these fields. It aims to "sell" the uses of social science to the public at large, and specially to those members of the Government and others who have the responsibility of administering research funds. It aims also to enlighten specialists in one of the branches of social science as to the nature of work being done in the others. Finally, it presents a list of untackled problems in the present combined research programme which are relevant to the pursuit of world peace and the resolution of international tension. It includes also the free issue of considerable quantities of good advice, where opportunity occurs, of which a sample has already been given.

The impact of all this is necessarily confusing. It is made more so by the method of presentation. We switch breathlessly from a thumbnail outline of the culture concept and of the laws of social change to relatively detailed accounts of particular work projects. The focus is constantly changing and the systematization erratic. As one might expect from someone who is, so to speak, a professional amateur in respect of much of the ground covered, Mr. Chase is much better value when dealing with practice than with the underlying theory. To end with, he piles up a terminal moraine of questions and problems covering the "approaches to one world". I, for one, found this very unrewarding reading—too many lists, too many suggestions, too many complicated projects put forward with no opportunity to assess or analyse them.

But by reason of the intrinsic interest and importance of the material, this is a book that many will want to read at least in part. Elton Mayo's work on factory labour-management relations and production incentives

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

must be of absorbing interest to very many people. So must the research of Lloyd Warner, published in his *Yankee City* studies. Many non-specialists will have heard or even read about Middletown; fewer will know *Yankee City*, and very few the number of similar community research projects undertaken in the U.S. in recent years—projects which are almost without parallel in this country. Alexander Leighton's work (described in his book, *Governing of Men*), undertaken in a Japanese-American internment camp in Arizona, is again likely to arouse interest. So, in a very different sphere, an account of methods of polling and the measurement of public opinion. The section summarizing modern views on racial theory and the management of race-relations is adequately carried out. Other material includes a description of the pilot-selection methods employed by the U.S. Army Air Force in the last war; the Cross Cultural Index; the development of certain theoretical concepts such as the "culture concept" itself and "cultural lag"; recent inquiries by economists into, among other things, the conditions of economic progress, and the statistics relating to the activities of large American business corporations.

Thus, there is quite a lot of interesting reading to be had. But for one who, like myself, was looking for a systematic inquiry which should sum up the main present-day trends and preoccupations, in each of the social sciences, with an indication as to the next steps under consideration, the book is a sad disappointment. In reading it, I had always the sense that I was being offered tit-bits, never a solid meal; a series of close-ups, not the panoramic view one had been promised.

In the circumstances, however, this may have been the best line to pursue. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chase's grasp of theory does not appear equal his powers of exposition and condensation. I found particularly unsatisfactory the section on "common patterns of mankind". He gives a list of ten needs and functions for which he claims universality. Admittedly it is not easy to produce such a list which is acceptable in fact and logical consistency, but this one does strike me as a singularly inept specimen, particularly as he makes no attempt to define any of his terms. The same trouble occurs in connection with his list of thirty-three universal characteristics of human societies (from which much might have been hoped), which turn out on closer inspection neither to be universal nor clearly differentiated from each other.

But criticism of the book itself by no means implies criticism of its general thesis, and before going any further I should like to come out solidly in support. This is, namely, that the development of the social sciences is of crucial importance in improving our capacity to deal with the situation that our own recent advances in the physical sciences have brought about. Particularly in the political and economic field we need a far greater recognition of the part which it has to play in formulating workable rules that may enable us to live, in a shrinking world, in such a way that individual interests are safeguarded, and the growth is checked of mutually destructive antagonisms.

To advance on this front requires the cultivation of a very high degree of detachment and objectivity. Mr. Chase rightly contends that the great need is for "world men who can rise above their culture and see the planetary shape of things". This being so, it is somewhat disconcerting

BOOK REVIEWS

find him quoting, with marked approval, the statement by Dr. Louis Wirth, of Chicago University, which follows:

"The great unanswered questions of the social sciences are the great unanswered questions of mankind. How can we get peace, freedom, order, prosperity, and progress under different conditions of existence? How can we establish the conditions of human well-being that have been attained in some parts of the world, or by certain groups, so that they will apply to other groups and to other parts of the world? How can we achieve consensus in a mass democracy? How can we get the advantages of a rapidly developing technology without destroying the other values which we cherish?"

"I know these are general and cosmic questions, but until social scientists make a usable answer to the ways and means of achieving such ends, they will be playing a game which may be interesting enough to themselves, but one which they have no right to expect society to support."

In other words, we want results; and no results—no pay. And the criterion of a result is that it should be usable. I cannot believe that Mr. Chase or the author of the paragraph would really endorse its implications. As things are at present in the social sciences we should be unrealistic in the extreme to expect far-reaching and comprehensive theories on the points suggested; we are rather in the position of making whatever use we can of whatever leads we may have caught on to, and concentrating as much on securing the application of existing knowledge, as on extending it further.

But the more important criticism of this statement, I think, lies in the culturally limited outlook it reveals—an outlook which I feel that Mr. Chase shares. Am I wrong to suspect a depth of complacency in the desire to spread the conditions of human well-being that have been attained in some parts of the world or by certain groups? Is it possible that the author may hope to find his own group happily in a position to act as model? If so, the last thing I should wish to do would be to join competitive issue on this point. I would merely raise a doubt as to whether the "world men" whom we seek will find in any extant culture a suitable prototype for the culture of humanity as a whole. And in these days when the civilized nations are only too anxious to export their customs and their outlook to whoever can be induced to receive them, it is perhaps as well to remember this doubt.

To end, I should like to question the suitability of this type of book for the English market, written as it is in a highly colloquial style by an author who seems determined to remain just one of the boys, for all that he finds himself leader of a tour round the "storehouse of knowledge" to which he frequently refers.

One of Mr. Chase's many points is the responsibility of communication failure in increasing tensions between international groups. Unfortunately, his own approach calls up the depressing (and like all such abstractions thoroughly unreliable) stereotype of the brash, over-confident American, slangy in his phrasing and sloppy in his thinking—a mixture of sophistication and disconcerting naïveté (as witness the latter: "It might be a good idea for every big executive whether in a Government department or in business to have a semanticist within reach, to make sure that all major characteristics are accounted for before the boss makes a Big Decision";

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

semantics is one of the author's pet enthusiasms). I do not know whether his style goes down well at home; but I assume that it does, since Mr. Chase was invited by the American Social Science Research Council to compile this account of their recent work for the intelligent lay public. Presumably they knew what they were doing. But, for the English reader, it is bound I think to result in a sense of mounting irritation, mingled with suspicion as to the *bona fides* of any one so careless with words. It is because I do not think this is a fair picture of American social scientists that I deplore the colour lent to it by Mr. Chase's manner. I have recently heard similar criticism made in connection with books by other American social scientists; and to my mind the issue is often one of approach rather than of content. Hence it may be that such books should—in the interests of promoting international understanding—be recast into a style suited to the susceptibility of English audiences, before being made available to them.

JUDITH HENDERSON.

Currency and Credit

R. G. HAWTREY

The author has attempted to build up monetary theory on the concepts of consumers' income and outlay and money of account, and on the credit structure. In this new edition, its principal aim has remained the same, to bring out the underlying unity of problems of inflation and deflation, of full employment, of credit regulation and of foreign exchange.

"Those who read the earlier editions will find much that is new in this volume to challenge and instruct."—INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

25s. net.

A Discussion of Money

W. A. L. COULBORN

This book discusses the realities of monetary policy and of international monetary relationships. It shows what alterations have been brought about in our system by the Second World War, considers what changes have been favourable and what unfavourable, and states the case for what the author believes to be the wise economic policy to meet these changes and the vital problems they have raised.

18s. net.

LONGMANS

BOOK REVIEWS

A PRIMER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. By S. E. FINER. (Muller. 160 + vii pp. 6s.)

PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION. By SIR EDWARD BRIDGES. (Cambridge University Press. 33 pp. 1s. 6d.)

BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY. By CHARLES S. HYNEMAN. (Harper. 586 pp. \$4.50.)

THERE are some excellent elementary books on Parliament and the British Constitution, but there is not a satisfactory introduction to public administration. There is need of a good, simple textbook for the student or the citizen who wants to know something about our system of public administration and the way it works. Professor Finer's primer goes part of the way towards filling this gap.

It opens with a brief summary of the immense expansion of public administration which has produced the modern welfare state, and shows the effect of that revolutionary change on the separation of powers and the system of cabinet government. The author then examines the structure of the executive in terms of its departmental organization. He explains the special position occupied by the Treasury and the ways in which departments co-operate for common purposes. This is followed by a discussion of the conflicting tendencies towards centralization and decentralization. Then come chapters on local government, the questions of areas and authorities, and the relations between central and local government. The next part of the book deals with the personnel engaged in public administration, both central and local. The final portion is concerned with public accountability, and the part played in enforcing it by Parliament on the one hand and the courts on the other.

It can be seen that Professor Finer has covered a great deal of ground in a small space. The book is lively and well written, and the author has read widely on almost every topic with which he deals. The work is, if anything, somewhat too bookish, for it lacks those illuminating touches which come from personal experiences in particular situations.

There is an unduly large number of factual errors which should not be found in a book of this kind. It is scarcely true that each cabinet minister ranks equally with his colleagues (p. 37); there was never a Ministry of Economics (p. 42); an under secretary is not in charge of a division; the rank of principal assistant secretary has not been assimilated to that of under secretary (p. 44); assistant secretaries are not placed at the head of branches (p. 79); the Home Affairs Committee does not consider the technical aspects of government bills (p. 48); there is not an administrative grade but an administrative class (p. 117); the Ministry of Health does not organize medical benefits on behalf of the Ministry of National Insurance, nor does the National Assistance Board pay out unemployment benefits for it at the Labour Exchanges (p. 69); the regional level is not the lowest stage in the administrative process (p. 73); the hospital regions do not bear a close resemblance to the standard regions (p. 80); a civil servant is not necessarily without legal authority to act merely because he is not under a duty to do so (p. 151). These are only some of the many errors which have been allowed to creep into the text, and which detract from its usefulness.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

One turns to Sir Edward Bridges's Rede lecture with a sense of pleasurable anticipation, which is fully justified by the event. *Portrait of a Professional* deals with the tradition of the civil service. There undoubtedly is a civil service tradition as distinct as that of the bar or of the medical profession, and the more one studies the civil services of other countries, the more acutely one becomes aware of the special tone and temper of our own, and the more conscious of its value.

The tradition of the service has, in the author's view, been largely created by the system of open competitive examination which provides a common method of entry to most departments: this has created among officials "the bond of having entered by the same gate". The sense of unity in the service has been enhanced by increasing the interchange of staff between departments. Complete unity has not yet been achieved, but there is far more to-day than at any time in the past; and it gives civil servants a corporate sense which does much to maintain their morale, to promote vocational fraternity, and to uphold the ethics of the service. The civil service is an extremely civilized institution: the normal standard of conduct among its members is very high.

Sir Edward Bridges discusses also the nature of a civil servant's work at the higher levels of administration. He shows how, by the accumulation of knowledge and the interpretation of experience, a department becomes a storehouse of information and wisdom about its field of work. By drawing on this storehouse, by moulding its contents into a practical philosophy, the civil servant is at once the author and the instrument of what may be called the departmental point of view, which persists beneath the shifting sands of party politics. The author insists that it is the duty of a civil servant to give his minister the quintessence of departmental experience on those large issues of policy which he must decide; and thus "to let the waves of the practical philosophy wash against ideas put forward by his ministerial master".

The formulation and application of these departmental philosophies Sir Edward Bridges regards as of the essence of a civil servant's work. He might perhaps have given more weight to the historical forces, sometimes the men, accidents of history, which often determine the orientation of a department towards its sphere of responsibility. The attitude of the Ministry of Health towards public assistance could only be explained in terms of the poor law of 1834 and its sequelæ. The special qualities of the Factory Inspectorate can only be understood in terms of a historical development which was not shared by some of the more recently established inspectorates. One could give many other examples.

Sir Edward Bridges concluded by indicating the skills or qualities which go to the making of a higher civil servant. He must be a practical man of business, yet share the disinterested pursuit of truth of an academic scholar. He must combine a long term vision with limited day-to-day responsibilities. He must observe carefully the trends of public opinion and yet eschew party politics.

It has been said that life is a struggle between poets and administrators. We are fortunate that in the present head of the civil service we have a man who, as the son of a poet laureate and by virtue of his chosen career, can see both sides of that struggle better than most of us. His Rede lecture

The Life of John Maynard Keynes

R. F. HARROD

This personal biography of the great economist reveals the many-sided interests of this gifted man, both as a financier and patron of the fine arts. 25s.

Keynes's "General Theory"

PROFESSOR A. C. PIGOU

In these two lectures given to Cambridge students of Politics and Economics, an attempt is made to assess Keynes's contribution to economic theory. 6s.

An Introduction to the Procedure of the House of Commons

SIR GILBERT CAMPION, G.C.B.

This reprint of an authoritative work takes into account revision of procedure completed in 1948. 18s.

Essays in Social Theory

G. D. H. COLE

"There is no better introduction to the work of G. D. H. Cole than this book of essays, and their present relevance is evidence that his work is not yet done."—*Manchester Guardian*. 15s.

Modern Capitalism and Economic Progress

THOMAS WILSON

"If, as is sincerely hoped, the book is widely read by the man in the street, for whom it was written, it will strike a powerful blow for that freedom intelligent people wish to preserve."—*The Statist*. 12s. 6d.

Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

offers occasional glimpses of distant horizons which give it charm and distinction.

Bureaucracy in a Democracy is not a text-book in the usual sense, although it comes from the land of text-books. It is a monograph dealing with the place of bureaucracy in a democratic government. The argument is addressed specifically to American readers, and the peculiar features of the U.S. constitution therefore figure largely in the work. But readers of the book on this side of the Atlantic will not only gain much valuable knowledge about the American system of government; they will also come into contact with a forthright, powerful, and stimulating mind which throws out many ideas of general application. Professor Hyneman has written one of the most interesting and mature works on public administration the present reviewer has encountered for some time. And even when one disagrees with his conclusions one is grateful to him for having stated his point of view in such challenging terms.

The author starts from a fourfold conviction that bureaucracy must be judged by the way it uses its power, not by its size and cost; that everyone who exercises governmental authority should exercise their power within limits that are acceptable to the American people as a whole; that the great powers wielded by a modern bureaucracy may be turned towards ends which are not acceptable to the people as a whole unless we provide proper direction and control over administration; and that we must rely primarily on the elective element for directing and controlling the bureaucracy. Professor Hyneman frequently refers to the idea or ideal that what the government does should be acceptable to the people "as a whole". He never explains what this means in practice nor how far it is possible to reconcile general acceptability with a two-party system of government. I greatly doubt whether it is reasonable to expect that everything a government does shall be acceptable to their political opponents. It is, however, possible for a government to be solicitous of riding roughshod over minority interests and thus ensure that the national unity is not undermined by groups of personally embittered men whose venomous hatreds override all other feelings towards the government and the community.

The book is mainly occupied by a lengthy disquisition of what direction and control over bureaucracy should mean, and how it can and should be effected. Professor Hyneman takes his stand firmly in favour of political control. He thinks that Congress should play a major part in formulating the tasks of government and in specifying the conditions to be observed in achieving them; in establishing the departments and agencies to carry out these tasks; in appropriating money for the purpose; in enunciating rules and standards to regulate the manner in which the government shall do its work; in expressing approval and disapproval of administrative acts and policies; and finally, in participating in the selection and removal of officials. He considers that the legislature is fully entitled to determine by statute the precise character of any administrative undertaking in as much detail as it wishes, provided it knows its own mind and does not neglect other demands on its time and energy. The only exception he makes is that since the executive are obliged to see that the laws are faithfully executed they must have a voice in determining the administrative organization

CHATTO

SIR REGINALD LEEPER

WHEN GREEK MEETS GREEK 12s. 6d.

The author writes of the time he spent as Ambassador to Greece during the turbulent years 1943-46. His book is not only a unique historical document, it is also essential to an understanding of the present situation.

'His book is a straightforward narrative of events which have occasioned much confusion.' *Observer*

ALDOUS HUXLEY: *THEMES & VARIATIONS*

With enviable lucidity and grace the author discusses a diversity of topics; æsthetic, such as that of El Greco; sociological, such as *The Double Crisis* — in which he examines the prospect of famine through overpopulation.

'Consummate table-talk . . .' *Raymond Mortimer*

'A most sensitive recorder of æsthetic emotion and one of the most accomplished writers of the century.'

Spectator Illustrated 12s. 6d.

JULIAN HUXLEY

SOVIET GENETICS 8s. 6d.

This important book concerns the much publicised Lysenko controversy, a subject on which Dr. Huxley writes with exceptional authority.

'A brilliant, convincing piece of work.' *News Review*

'It can be recommended as an accurate, fair and sympathetic account of the melancholy history of Genetics in Soviet Russia since August, 1948.' *Times Lit. Supp.*

MAN IN THE MODERN WORLD 10s. 6d.

Eugenics, biology, sociology, education and the British colonies are a few of the subjects discussed in one of Dr. Huxley's most interesting books.

& WINDUS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The president should, therefore, be permitted to transfer functions and reshape the administrative organization whenever the need arises. In general, Professor Hyneman takes the view that political element in American government has failed to keep pace with the development of administrative power. He is concerned to rectify this disparity in growth by up-grading the powers and responsibilities of Congress.

The president has been invested with a vast mass of powers far beyond the ability of any human being to exercise. The conferring of power on the chief executive, the author argues, has not proceeded on the basis of logic, or practical experience, or consistency, or even expediency. The result is that the president is unable to do some important things which he ought to be able to do. Much power which nominally belongs to him has passed into the hands of his entourage in the executive office of the president or elsewhere; and the bureaucracy is free from direction and control in certain important respects. In order to increase and extend political leadership in the governmental machine, Mr. Hyneman advocates "a wide distribution throughout the public service of men who, by their political loyalty to date, have proven their loyalty to the party that is in charge of the government" (p. 283). This, he says, will provide the best assurance that the president and of the government will carry out the policies desired by the president and the leaders of his political party. He is fully aware that there is an overwhelming body of opinion among political scientists and others that political convictions and party services should play no part in the appointment of bureau chiefs; but his considered opinion is that the nation would gain rather than lose if many of the leading positions were filled by local adherents of the party in power.

Our first reaction is a feeling that this betokens a return to the spoils system with all the corruption and inefficiency which it involves. But the author's intention is far removed from that. He is seeking, in a régime which affords far less political consistency and unity than ours, in which the distinction between ministerial and civil service appointments is much less clearly drawn, to find a way to bridge the gap which still often yawns between politics and administration. Although there is much to be said for his point of view, there is also much to be said against it. Professor Hyneman would strengthen his argument if he were to dispose of serious objections such as these.

Bureaucracy in a Democracy is an attractive book and is not by no means stodgy. Its author has a vigorous and lucid style and writes well.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE STATE OF EUROPE. By HOWARD K. SMITH. (Cresset. 416 pp. 15s.)

AN extraordinarily interesting book could be written, after prolonged research, on the leading "foreign correspondents" of great newspapers and it would now have to include the class to which Mr. Howard Smith belongs, the distinguished commentators on and interpreters of world events employed by the great broadcasting systems. These men form a small, highly specialized class of their own. When they reach the top of their particular trees, especially in Britain and the United States, their knowledge of history,

Crisis in Britain

ROBERT A. BRADY

An account of the aims and achievements of the British Labour Party during their first five years in power. (University of California Press publication.) 37s. 6d. net

Wealth of Colonies

W. K. HANCOCK

Two Lectures on the economic foundations of colonial policy in relation to recent and future developments in the British Commonwealth. 7s. 6d. net

Planning in Practice

ELY DEVONS

An explanation of the system of planning in force at the Ministry of Aircraft Production during the war. 15s. net

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Commonwealth in Asia

by SIR IVOR JENNINGS, K.C.
10s. 6d. net (shortly)

This book contains the text of seven lectures describing the social and political divisions of the peoples of India, Pakistan and Ceylon—race, religion, education, language and class—which create difficulties in the process of democratic government. It then discusses how far the system of responsible government, which is in operation in all three countries, is capable of adaptation to meet the needs of heterogeneous peoples.

The Chinese in South-East Asia

by VICTOR PURCELL
50s. net (shortly)

The author sees the present turn of events in the Far East as the beginnings of a basic transformation of Chinese Society with the aim, conscious or unconscious, of adopting Western technology and industrialization.

Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy

Volume 1. 1917-1924

edited by JANE DEGRAS
35s. net (shortly)

The whole of this work will consist of three volumes. The one now to be issued contains about 250 documents, a great many of which have not appeared before in English.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS


THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

politics, countries, and persons is often colossal. They live perpetually at the exact centre of every world crisis; they are always taking the last train from Berlin before and the first to it after the great catastrophe; they are more to get all the inside information which ever gets outside, and they are more discreet in the use of that information than the most confidential of confidential secretaries; they know intimately all the greater international fleas and most of the lesser fleas that bite them. This class, to which Mr. Howard Smith lends great distinction, has produced very remarkable men both in the past and in the present—for instance, the extraordinary dynasty of *The Times*, beginning with Wallace and passing through de Blowitz and Chinese Morrison to Bouchier and Wickham Steed, and now in more recent times the dynasty of the Columbia Broadcasting System, which includes Mr. Ed. Morrow and Mr. Howard Smith. These men, of high intelligence and wide historical knowledge, with their finger always on the pulse of world history, are perpetually interpreting to us day-by-day events in terms of each case. The book which I have in mind would investigate what in each case the interpretation of contemporary events by these famous "correspondents" really was, how it stood up to the inexorable test of what happened afterwards, and what, if any, was their direct influence upon those events and upon the statesmen who imagined that they were controlling them.

These remarks are relevant to Mr. Howard Smith's book. It is a survey of contemporary Europe in the classical form and manner first developed, I think, by the great *Times* foreign correspondents. Each country of Europe is surveyed in turn. Its social, economic, and political condition is analysed. Its present is traced historically to its past and its future hypothetically from its present. Though the book is written with that brilliant simplicity characteristic of the first-class American columnist or broadcast commentator, there is nothing superficial about it. Almost any man who turns the knob on his wireless set can understand every word which Mr. Smith writes, and he writes in a manner to interest a very large number of them. But he is more interested himself in the long-term, deep, obscure causes moulding the present and future of Europe than in the surface of our political and economic life. His book is therefore informed and moulded by his historical thesis or theories. He believes Europe to be passing through one of the great crises of history, of which our two wars are merely symptoms, the crisis caused by our failure to readjust an economic system, developed to suit the kind of life which Europeans lived in 1850, to the quite different kind of lives which they live in 1950. Most of what he says is directly related to this theory, whether it is the decline of Britain from the status of a great power, "the over-population" of nearly every country in western Europe, or the ominous phenomenon of iron curtain and cold war.

The book repays very careful reading, if only because Mr. Smith's lucidity, knowledge, and categorical brilliance force one to face the implications of one's own political and economic beliefs. The result may quite often be that one finds that some of one's beliefs turn out, in the light of his analysis, to be prejudices, or worse. He seems to me to be, in most important matters, 75 per cent. right—a very high percentage for any political writer.

LEONARD WOOLF.



IN HIS LATEST BOOK

GREAT MISTAKES OF THE WAR HANSON W BALDWIN

(Military Editor, New York Times)

Reveals all the
facts that led
up to the
COLD WAR

Crown 8vo

Cloth 6/- net

Acclaimed by the Press:

A. J. Cummings, News Chronicle: "I was particularly impressed by his shrewd and detailed analysis of the colossal blunders that led up to the isolation of Berlin."

Manchester Evening News: "A far-sighted and shrewd analysis of why the Western allies lost the peace."

Edinburgh Evening News: "This well-argued book is urgently topical."

Sunday Mail: "Has the true historian's intellectual honesty and he exemplifies it to the full."

Liverpool Echo: "A concise, effectively argued book."

ALVIN REDMAN

SEEDS OF TREASON

by
R. DE TOLEDANO
and V. LASKY

This account of the Trials of Alger Hiss and of the events leading up to them has been the subject of violent attacks mainly on the ground that it makes the case for Whittaker Chambers, Hiss' chief adversary. We suggest that everyone who wants to understand the full implications of this momentous case should read SEEDS OF TREASON and judge for themselves how far these attacks are justified.

12s. 6d. net

SECKER & WARBURG

Background to the
Far East

FOR FEAR OF WEEPING

by

Patrick
O'Donovan

12s. 6d. net

A book on China and the Far East by the *Observer* correspondent whose dispatches have won him a reputation for astuteness and humanity.



MACGIBBON & KEE

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CONTROL. By A. B. LEVY. (Routledge)
x+916 pp. 2 vols. £3 the set.)

THIS book is a most welcome addition to the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction and to legal literature. Its title and the fact that it is listed by the International Library under the heading of "Economic Planning" are perhaps slightly misleading. By "private corporations" Dr. Levy means the type of corporate enterprise represented by the English limited company, as opposed to the public corporation such as that formed to take over a nationalized industry, and he is concerned with the public rather than private company in the technical English law sense. His aim, as stated in his Introduction, was "to show, by an unprejudiced investigation, that whereas corporations are indispensable if economic progress is to be maintained, a number of legislative reforms are required in order to reinforce public control and to give better protection for shareholders' rights". This statement certainly suggests that he proposed to treat the subject as much as an economist as a lawyer, but this, as it seems to the reviewer (who is a mere lawyer), he has not done. For an economist's iconoclastic attack on our rules of company law or analysis of the concept of control the reader will look in vain. Indeed, the learned author is rarely more critical than the most conservative lawyer would be, and his approach throughout seemed to at least one lawyer to be almost excessively legalistic.

What Dr. Levy has in fact done (and its value can hardly be exaggerated) is to produce, as few men would have been qualified to do, an elaborate comparative study of company law both in the old world and the new. The first part consists of a sketch of the historical and economic background (mainly the former) in which the course of evolution of corporate enterprise is sketched. The second part (entitled "Legal Problems of Private Corporations") deals with most of the topics discussed in a work on company law, but treats them comparatively in relation, mainly (but by no means exclusively) to the rules of English, French, German, and Swiss laws and those of the various states of America. In general, the author contented himself with a factual summary of the legal rules of these countries occasionally pointing the lesson by criticisms which are always sensible and constructive, if rarely sensational. The effect of recent nationalization legislation is summarized in an appendix. The result is a work which will be indispensable to any serious student of company law and invaluable to practitioners who want a handy guide to the salient points of other countries' company legislation and indications of where to look for more detailed information. Its value to the economic planner is not so much because of the reforms which it occasionally recommends (some of which are referred to below) but because it collects, as no one has previously collected, the data on which reforms must be based. Its summaries of the voluminous American literature will be particularly useful, for much of this literature is infinitely superior to the English, a superiority accounted for in part because recent English writers have tended to treat a work on company law as requiring simply a commentary on the Companies Acts (a temptation from which the absence of a Federal company law frees our American colleagues), and partly, perhaps, because the (sometimes misplaced) ingenuity of American company promoters has raised problems which have not yet come to the fore in England.

A Supplement to

HARRAP'S FRENCH AND ENGLISH STANDARD DICTIONARY

Compiled by R. P. L. LEDÉSERT, L-ès-L.

Mr. J. E. Mansion's great work, *Harra's Standard French and English Dictionary*—"The finest French and English Dictionary ever published anywhere"—is being kept up to date by the collection of new words and idioms entering either language. This one useful book, with its two parts, acts as a supplement to both volumes of the Standard Dictionary, and it contains not only fresh material but also additional meanings and usages of words already listed in the original work. 7/6 net

The two famous volumes of the Standard Dictionary are:

Vol. I French-English	45/- net.
Vol. II English-French	66/- net.

GEORGE G. HARRAP & CO. LTD

A full account of the official reporting of the
debates in the House of Commons

Our Hansard

By William Law

With a Foreword by

The Rt. Hon. W. Glenvil Hall, M.P.

This is the first book ever written about the Hansard reporting of the House of Commons. The author relates in detail the story of the origin and development of Hansard and gives a graphic description of the Hansard reporters at work and of the process of transcription, editing, printing, etc. A fascinating book and one which gives a useful knowledge of this important aspect of Parliamentary activities. Illustrated. Price 8/6 net

A Pitman Book

Parker St. · Kingsway · London, W.C.2



The TRUTH about KOREA

Could the Korean War have been avoided? In this controversial analysis ROBERT T. OLIVER blames Western negligence and selfishness. He draws the background of Korean history and makes suggestions for the future. Ready January 29. 10s. 6d.

The CURTAIN isn't IRON

JOSEPH HARSCH, famous journalist and commentator, describes his impression from a recent tour of Russia's European satellites that Russian domination is far from complete. 8s. 6d.

Putnam

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

It will be apparent from the foregoing that Dr. Levy covers an immense amount of ground, necessitating great compression of the statement. This occasionally forces him into obscurity or into oversimplifications to which purists might object. In general, however, the book is well and clearly written and, so far as the reviewer is able to judge, most accurate. The following criticisms are intended solely as suggestions which the learned author might consider when a new edition is called for.

The bulk of the work was obviously written before the Companies Act, 1948, and references to this subsequently inserted. A reader using the work for reference purposes must therefore be on his guard, for statements of the pre-1948 law habitually appear in the present tense, notwithstanding that the rules in question may now be different; a particularly misleading example of this occurs at p. 771, in which the first paragraph states the present law and refers to the 1948 Act, whereas the second paragraph reverts without warning to the old law. At p. 124 it is, of course, incorrect to state that the Companies Act, 1907, forced companies which did not issue a prospectus to "invite the public to take part in the issue"; and the last sentence on this page is ambiguously worded. At p. 159 the statement of what the public can find on searching at the Companies Registry ignores the Register of Charges, which gives perhaps the most valuable information of all. At pp. 324 *et seq.* the whole of the English unit trust movement is unaccountably ignored. The author's criticisms (at pp. 344-5) of the unfettered discretion given to the Registrar to object to the name of any proposed company seem to the reviewer to have little practical weight; the present practice of writing in advance to the Registrar and obtaining from him a statement (admittedly not legally binding) of availability of a name works well. The sections on the issue and placing of shares (pp. 380 *et seq.*) and, to a lesser extent, on bonds and debentures (pp. 542 *et seq.*) are rendered somewhat unrealistic, so far as the English position is concerned, by the fact that the author limits consideration to what is law in the strictest sense and ignores the Stock Exchange Regulations, which, from a practical viewpoint, are at least equally important. The question of shareholders' conflicting interests, touched on at pp. 661-2, deserves, it is suggested, more extended treatment. Finally, it must be said that the proof-reading seems to have been perfunctory, particularly in the matter of proper names; among many examples of error the worst appears to be at p. 285, where the name of Professor Friedmann is misspelt and the year and volume number of the review in which his article appeared is omitted, and the most disarming at p. 703, where a Lord Justice is converted into a Greek poet (for *Homer* read *Romer*).

These, however, are small criticisms compared with the praise which can be unreservedly given to the immense research which Dr. Levy must have put into the collation of his material. Some indication of its scope is apparent from the selected bibliography, and from the statement of sources which appears at the end of each section of Part I, and the reviewer can only express his humble and envious admiration for the erudition of one able to find his way about so many different legal systems expressed in so many different tongues.

Among the particular reforms recommended are: the abolition of bearer shares, the introduction of a minimum share capital and share unit (in

suggests £500 and 10s. shares), recognition of the right of a stated minority of shareholders to demand explanations and information, insistence that voting rights should depend on the amount paid up on the share, the making of minutes of general meetings open to the public, the giving to companies of a right to recover from their directors any profits made by them on speculations in their companies' shares, and the personal liability of shareholders in "one-man companies". Dr. Levy considers, probably rightly, that the recommendations of the Cohen Committee were unduly conservative, but, as already suggested, his own recommendations appear to be liable to the same criticism. However desirable they may be, they hardly touch the fringe of what he recognizes as the major problem (as did the Cohen Committee), that of affording proper protection to minority shareholders. The only solution that he can offer to this problem is that major changes to the company's structure should not be possible unless two-thirds of the capital are represented at a meeting called on four weeks' notice, that the resolution should be passed by a three-fourths' majority, and that the dissenting minority should have a right of appeal to the courts. The recent case of *Re Chatterley-Whitfield Collieries*, [1949] A.C. 512 strongly suggests that all these requirements (which might be unduly burdensome) could be complied with without effectively safeguarding minority interests. Moreover, they fail to obviate the difficulty that, under the modern system of proxy voting, decision precedes discussion instead of following it. It is suggested that what is really needed is some regulation whereby shareholders receive two-way proxies after, not before, full discussion of the directors' proposals has taken place at the meeting and in the financial Press.

Rather surprisingly, Dr. Levy supports the English *ultra vires* doctrine and is against the Cohen Committee's proposal (not, in fact, carried out) that it should be abolished. Although the doctrine is of less importance since the alternative provisions in the 1948 Act facilitating the alteration of objects clauses, it is still more of a nuisance than a safeguard, and support for the recommendation of the Committee was by no means confined, as Dr. Levy implies, to lawyers "imbued with German legal traditions". In practice, the doctrine does not cause difficulties in the case, such as he postulates, where a company formed to manufacture rayon wishes to make jam instead (strangely enough, under a Memorandum drafted in the usual wide form, this would almost certainly be *intra vires*), but where it wants to enter into a pensions scheme or the like perfectly legitimate project.

L. G. B. GOWER.

CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By T. H. MARSHALL.
(Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.)

IN the essay that gives its title to this small volume, Professor Marshall is concerned with the conflict of principles between citizenship, which implies a basic social equality, and social class, which is a systematization of inequality. It is a field of enquiry where the interests of the jurist and the sociologist meet, to the confusion of all concerned, and only an author as austere and elegant as Marshall could hope to leave the subject tidier than he found it. This essay, certainly, has all the neatness and clarity of a Hillyarde miniature. In fewer

THE POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

By KENNETH KNOWLES

"Their boast is that they strike first and only ask why when the strike is over."—*Economist*, May 13th, 1950.

I. Introductory

IN the last five pre-war years, 1935 to 1939, out of nearly ten million man-days lost in strikes, the miners—traditionally the readiest of all workers to resort to direct action—accounted for more than half, and the transport workers for about a tenth. But in the first five post-war years (July, 1945, to June, 1950), the miners' loss had fallen by nearly half and the transport workers' had increased by more than three times: thus, out of nearly eleven million man-days lost, miners accounted for little over a quarter and transport workers for nearer 30 per cent.—notably in big-scale dock strikes. Man for man, the dockers lost nearly seven times as much working time as the miners. Now, when margins are narrow, dock strikes rank second only to coal strikes in economic importance, since dockers largely regulate the pulse of external trade on the steadiness of which the country's health, in terms of competitive power and living standards, so much depends. While estimates of the various kinds of loss due to strikes can never claim to be complete or accurate, the Minister of Transport reckoned that the dock strikes of 1948 and the first half of 1949 meant a loss of about £800,000 solely in non-production costs borne by idle ships*—despite the fact that troops have been regularly employed for unloading during strikes and the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, which had rusted unused since the General Strike of 1926, has been invoked more than once in the attempt to minimize the effect of the strikes.

It is hard to give an adequate statistical picture of these outbreaks; indeed, until recently, dock strikes have not been separately classified in strike statistics. Some idea of their extent in relation to the strikes of other workers may however be gained from the monthly lists of "Principal Disputes"† in the *Ministry*

* See *The Times*, July 4th, 1949. However, the Minister had estimated, after the strike of June, 1948, that that strike alone had "represented a delayed turn-round of 890,000 tons of British shipping, at a cost of £880,000" (*The Times*, July 1st, 1948).

† The classification of these strikes as "principal" is partly qualitative, and does not mean that they conform to any precise criteria of magnitude or duration.

The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. XXII, No. 2

APRIL-JUNE, 1951

CONTENTS	PAGE
Notes and Comments	117
Some Considerations on the New South Asia By LAURENS VAN DER POST	121
British Government since 1918 By SIR ARTHUR SALTER, G.B.E., K.C.B.	137
Prospects for the Council of Europe By ANTHONY CROSLAND, M.P.	142
Civil Servants and the Civil Service: 1850-1950 By O. R. MCGREGOR	154
Unesco and the Achievement of Peace By WALTER H. C. LAVES	163
Italy: East or West? By NINETTA S. JUCKER	175
Split Nation By TOM DRIBERG, M.P.	186
The Forestry Commission By J. A. G. GRIFFITH	194
BOOK REVIEWS	
The Constitution of Ceylon (Jennings); The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (Crisp); Burma (Hall) S. R. DAVIS	198
The British Overseas (Carrington) MARJORIE NICHOLSON	201
The British General Election of 1950 (Nicholas) A. C. HOBSON	203
Testament for Social Service (Wootton) LEONARD WOOLF	205
Canada (Graham) R. T. MCKENZIE	206
The General Election in Glasgow, 1950 (Chrimes) D. G. MACRAE	208
The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923. Vol 1 (Carr) LEONARD WOOLF	209
Roosevelt in Retrospect (Gunther) DAVID C WILLIAMS	210
While Memory Serves (Tucker) W. H. MORRIS JONES	214

EDITORS: Leonard Woolf and William A. Robson.

EDITORIAL BOARD: H. L. Beales, G. D. H. Cole, R. H. S. Crossman, M.P., Kingsley Martin, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur Salter, Lord Simon of Wythenshawe.

MSS., Books for Review, etc., should be addressed to the Editor at MONK'S HOUSE, RODMELL, near LEWES, SUSSEX. MSS. must be accompanied by stamped addressed envelopes (or International Reply Coupons).

PRICE Five Shillings per issue. POSTAGE SUBSCRIPTIONS to any address or through any newsagent £1 p.a. Postage on this issue, 2d. Correspondence relating to subscriptions, advertisements, etc., should be addressed to the Publisher, TURNSTILE PRESS, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W.C.1 HOLBORN 8471

**The Life of
Joseph Chamberlain**

Volume IV, 1901-1903

JULIAN AMERY

Volume IV of the great *Life* commenced by Mr. J. L. Garvin. The first of the two concluding volumes, it covers the period 1901-1903, the years of Chamberlain's supremacy in our domestic, imperial and foreign affairs. Illustrated. 30s.

**The British General Election
of 1950**

H. G. NICHOLAS

"To his account of the campaign, the party organisations, the manifestos, broadcasts, election addresses and the reactions of the Press at home and in the rest of the world, he brings an impartial liveliness that is all the better for not being over-reverent." ALAN HODGE (*Financial Times*). 21s.

Wells of Power

The Oilfields of South-western Asia

SIR OLAF CAROE

"*Wells of Power* must rank with the best, not only as a clear and up-to-date history of the region's development, useful as a work of reference, but also as a scholarly and important contribution to current political thinking on the world's oil problems." *Sunday Times*. 15s.

**An Introduction to
World Politics**

PROFESSOR W. G. FRIEDMANN

The contemporary international scene presents to the layman a complex and formidable field of study. These clear and concise individual analyses will prove useful to students and the general reader alike. With maps. 10s. 6d.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE Broadcasting Committee of which Lord Beveridge was Chairman and which laboured through mountains of evidence for eighteen months has produced a mouse-like report. Considering the immense importance of the subject, it has received scant attention and has provoked surprisingly little controversy. This, one must suppose, is due partly to the menace of so many other events which fill the front pages of newspapers, and partly to the timidity of the mouse. It is a tepid and timid report. We are not surprised at this, and we are not disposed *a priori* to blame the Committee for producing a document to which these two adjectives are appropriate. In volume it is a formidable mouse. Lord Beveridge and his colleagues, having produced nearly two million words of evidence and their own report in two volumes and nearly 1,000 pages, in effect do little more than say: "Leave well alone." Only two innovations of any importance are recommended, and even they, if adopted, will leave the B.B.C. essentially as it is to-day. The first is the establishment of three regional commissions for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, to which certain powers would be delegated. The second is the creation of a public representation service, the head of which would be a member of the board of management: its functions would appear to be a roving commission to consider outside criticisms and suggestions, to criticize programmes, and to examine charges of injustice or favouritism in the choice of performers or of partiality in the organization of talks and discussions.

* * *

In deciding to leave well alone, the Committee may, of course, be right. The B.B.C. certainly has great merits, and the merits are eminently British. It exhibits the decency and incorruptibility of the British Civil Service and the punctuality and efficiency of the British railways. It has its own peculiar brand of vulgarity, but has completely escaped the commercialized vulgarity of many foreign broadcasting systems—and what it has escaped is a good deal worse than the infection which it has caught. The Governors and staff generally have exhibited a high sense of mission and public service. These are real merits. They are, as we said, eminently British, but it should be noted that Lord Reith, whose good and bad qualities as a man and an

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

administrator were profoundly British, was largely responsible for impressing them so indelibly upon Broadcasting House. The aura of that masterful man still permeates every nook and cranny of the B.B.C. and dominates the microphone.

* * *

The defects of the B.B.C. are also largely a heritage from Lord Reith and the British bourgeoisie of which he was a typical representative. It is incorrigibly middle middle class. It is like the report, tepid and timid, for it is complacently respectable. The complacency and respectability, which are the hallmark of the British bourgeoisie, cling to the second-rate and the commonplace and dislike and fear anything which is first-rate or original. This fog of respectability permeates the B.B.C. from the intonation of announcers to the flatulent heartiness of Music Hall and "Twenty Questions, the muted "controversies", and the "safe first" in talks and talkers. Except in the Third Programme, it is rare for anything first-rate to get through the mesh which Lord Reith and his successors have woven over the microphone, and the Third Programme is a *lusus naturæ*, a contradiction in terms which again is characteristically British. It is worth noting that "a habitual listener to the Third Programme" is in the popular Press becoming a term of abuse, like "intellectual" or "Bloombury".

* * *

The main problem concerning the B.B.C. considered by the Committee is monopoly. Is what is wrong with it—if anything is wrong with it—due to its having a monopoly of broadcasting and, if so, is the remedy to be found in the blessed word "competition"? The Committee recognizes the danger of complacency, apathy, and exclusiveness in the monopolist position of the B.B.C., but they seem to regard it as a future danger and acquiesce in the Corporation of past or present vices of absolute power. The proposal for greater regional independence is intended partly as a future safeguard, since it might introduce an element of attenuated competition. The proposal for a public representation officer aims at the same object by other means; he would be expected to ginger up the impartiality of the air. But there are obviously minor safeguards, which would not materially affect the centralized dictatorship of Broadcasting House.

* * *

NOTES AND COMMENTS

There are two proposals for breaking down the monopoly and introducing competition. The first would allow sponsored programmes and commercial advertising. A majority of the Committee was against this. Only one member was in favour of sponsored programmes, although three thought that the B.B.C. might have "a controlled and limited" advertisement hour. We think that the majority are right. Sponsored programmes would not introduce the kind of competition to improve the standards or the impartiality of the B.B.C., and it is one merit of our respectability that we have avoided the domination of tooth-paste and lipstick. The second is a more interesting idea—namely, to charter two or more public corporations. The Committee was against this innovation on the ground that a single corporation can ensure "regional and functional devolution", and that it is easier to see that impartiality and fair treatment of minorities are observed if there is only one corporation. Neither of these objections seems particularly cogent, and the second has very little validity. There is every thing to be said for keeping broadcasting a public service and there is a good deal to be said for avoiding some of the dangers of a monopolist organization by chartering more than one autonomous corporation to perform the service.

* * *

We should have liked to see an experiment of this sort tried, although we do not believe that it would really touch the worst defects of British broadcasting. If we had two or three corporations instead of one, we should almost certainly have two or three B.B.C.s., identical twins or triplets, scarcely distinguishable from the Corporation which we enjoy to-day. The nature of the B.B.C.'s monopoly is not always fully realized. It is, no doubt, a monopolist organization of the ordinary kind, because it has no competitors and is controlled by a few men over whom neither Parliament nor a Minister nor the public have any effective control. The power exercised in this way is very great, and in practice it is in the hands of the staff rather than the Governors. The danger here is of the ordinary vices of an all-powerful bureaucracy: complacency, exclusiveness, conservatism, playing for safety. These vices already exist in the B.B.C. and are very real; but it is by no means easy to find any remedy for the vices and diseases of a monopolist bureaucracy. In the B.B.C. to mitigate them depends on three things: the kind of person appointed

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to be Governor; the kind of control exercised by the Governor over the programme-making staff; and the kind of person appointed to higher posts in the programme-making staff.

* * *

This brings us to the other side of the monopoly, which is not generally recognized and is due to the kind of person selected for the higher posts which control the making of programmes. They exercise enormous power; and it is the monopoly and power of a class. For, like nearly all posts of power in this country, the B.B.C. posts are always in the hands of the middle middle class or of persons who, outwardly at any rate, accept the standards of that class. These standards derive ultimately from the public school and prescribe gentility and respectability, distrust of the intellect, the middle of the way, the second class, safety first. They are not really the standards by nature or tradition of all classes in Britain, e.g. of the working classes (compare, for instance, the old music hall with the B.B.C.'s emasculated imitation); but the control of press, publishing, the B.B.C., and education by the middle class has gradually stamped these depressing standards upon the whole nation. The communists and their fellow-travellers chatter about a classless state in Russia and how beautifully proletarian it is. In this country we too are developing a classless state of the kind; but it is not proletarian, it is a middle middle-class state. The B.B.C. is a potent instrument in the process of making us all respectable and middle middle class, for it prevents anything but broadcast which does not conform to these standards of future respectability. We think that this is dangerous for our future because the battle for the democratic way of life, which lies before us, is not going to be won on the playing fields of Eton or by the half-truths beloved by suburbia. The Committee do not recognize this aspect of the monopoly and would probably not agree with our diagnosis. The way of life and the standards of the middle middle class have their merits which are reflected in our broadcasting system, and the Committee was therefore probably wise, from its own point of view, to decide to leave well alone. From our point of view, it is difficult to suggest any way of remedying the serious defects in the B.B.C. For the only remedy could come from the acceptance of different standards and aims by the Director or from the imposition of these standards and aims on the staff by the Governors. Both alternatives are probably utopian.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

By LAURENS VAN DER POST

OBVIOUSLY this subject is urgent and here, culled from one brief publishing season, are five books* dealing with it, all trying in their several ways to describe and explain the present situation, to define the role, and to predict the future of South Asia in the confused and desperate world of to-day. It is not an easy task. Many others have attempted it. If I added to this relatively modest list the books and pamphlets already written and being written on the same subject in English, Dutch, French, Malay, Hindustani, and Chinese, I would have the makings of a good-sized library. Yet I doubt whether the subject is any the better or the confusion in the mind of the western world is any the less confounded for it.

One half of the trouble is that most of this writing has been done by persons themselves deeply involved in the events they have attempted to analyse—individuals who have irretrievably forfeited the vision of the great wide wood about them in their concern for the trees in their own pet thicket. The other half of the trouble is the nature of the wood itself. There has never been a wood quite like it in history. There is nothing obvious about it except its density and size, for its dimensions extend into a future standing on the far threshold of our urgent time, veiled like an eastern bride. Even its mere geographic dimensions are not fixed and certain. For instance, the authors of by far the ablest contributions on my list, *South Asia in the World To-day*, define it as that part of Asia comprising Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Siam (now again Thailand), Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I do not think that covers it by any means. You could no more leave China out of any vital assessment of South Asia than you could India or Pakistan, for it not only extends well into the southern and sub-tropical areas of the continent, but also is racially, economically, and politically so woven into the texture and design of the south that I have not hesitated to

* *Indonesia*, by Professor Gerbrandy (Hutchinson, 224 pp., 18s.). *The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia*, by H. J. van Mook (Allen and Unwin, 312 pp., 15s.). *South Asia in the World To-day*, edited by Phillips Talbot (University of Chicago and Cambridge University Press, 254 pp., 30s.). *The Government and Politics of China*, by Ch'ien Tuan-sheng (Harvard University and Oxford University Press, 526 pp., 48s.). *New China: Friend or Foe?*, by Alun Falconer (Naldrett Press, 128 pp., 3s. 6d.).

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

by insisting on discipline, and employers working on cost-plus contracts had less interest in maintaining it. With the introduction of the Scheme in 1947, employers generally ceased to have any direct responsibility either for the imposition of penalties or for dismissal, and the bipartite Boards which replaced them have had to win the consent which is the basis of authority. In these circumstances the insistence on regularity of attendance and the control of pilfering (which, also, was unusually prevalent during and immediately after the war) may, in so far as both absenteeism and pilfering indicate unrest, tend to drive dissatisfied workers to find their outlet in strikes.

Again, as far as his physical environment is concerned, to a large extent the docker is still, literally, "living in the past". Because employers had traditionally little sense of responsibility towards casual workers, the wave of "welfare" which was the backwash of the First World War never reached the docks. Surroundings were squalid, and even the most elementary "amenities" (drinking and washing facilities and lavatories) were virtually non-existent or grossly insanitary. Neither the war nor—so far—the peace has changed this very much. It is significant that the lack of "amenities", seldom a direct cause of strikes, became fully explicit during the "ineffectives" strike of 1949; and, following the presentation of a detailed report and recommendations to the Minister of Labour, the N.D.L.B. was able to report "some improvement in some ports" during that year.

Thus many of the pinprick causes of recent strikes derive from the impact of the past on the present. The dockers' Unions, particularly the T. & G.W.U.,* have struggled hard in the past to achieve the present; yet one of the features of the big post-war strikes which has attracted most attention is the readiness of dockers to criticize and defy their Union. What underlies this?

(2) *The Strikers and the T. & G.W.U.*

Criticism of the T. & G.W.U., in the Press and elsewhere, has been free and easy during the past five years, and Mr. Deakin's impatience with "ill-informed", "ill-considered", "mischievous", and "ridiculous" views is understandable.† Moreover,

* The following Unions cover the dockers: the T. & G.W.U., which includes the great majority of dock workers; the Scottish T. & G.W.U.; the N.U.G. & M.W. (mainly on the Humber and in North-Eastern ports); and the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers (in London). The Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen and Bargemen's Union covers a category quite distinct from other dock workers.

† *Record*, June, 1950.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

real and of permanent value to life. Except for the odd moments when some rare spirit illuminates its processes with a ray of inspired understanding, it is history whose implications we recognize, unfortunately, more easily when looking back than when straining forward. To use a military analogy, it is the history of the ultimate strategy of life and the universe. But below and underneath it, inexplicably part of it, and often in conflict with it, is the history of diurnal tactics, of our bread-and-butter days, which has no fixed and sure relation to truth, which is not substance so much as its sunset shadow on a faded wall. Yet because human beings believe this lesser history to be true, it influences their immediate little day far more than the great and unsolicited truth without. The whole ambivalent process is so poignantly symbolized in *Don Quixote* that in considering the South Asian scene there is no symbol or allegory which the western world should take more to heart. The Knight of La Mancha rides in all of us, and although we all agree it is an excellent thing to slay giants, the danger is always present that we shall continue to blow up windmills and kill sheep believing they are tyrants and robbers. Already world understanding is largely imprisoned in a monstrous simplification that divides mankind into communist knights and capitalist giants or the other way round. We could easily lose the true significance of the new Asia in this vision that would reduce all to the work of some bald-headed gentleman, sitting in an unheated basement of the Kremlin with snow on his boots, industriously plotting our Occidental doom.

What, then, is the real picture? I must answer my question mainly in terms of what I know of the transformation of the Netherlands East Indies of March, 1942, into the Sovereign Indonesian Republic of to-day. It will by no means be the complete answer, but I submit it not altogether without confidence, because, despite differences of background, race, history, and all the other divergencies that leap to the eye on the colourful surface of Asian things, I believe that what holds true for Indonesia is true, fundamentally, also for its colonial neighbours. Unfortunately, I have to begin by stating what it is not, for in no part of the South Asian scene has the negative approach to history which I have just tried to define been more active than in Indonesia's regard.

One of the books on my list, *Indonesia*, by Professor P. S. Gerbrandy, is a very good example of this approach and its

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

interests in a civilized society makes a single culture pattern impossible. Civilizations have constantly failed through this internal weakness, but as constantly new ones have arisen, though doomed from the start because of their excessive reliance on herd patterns of behaviour, and because of their lack of a single strongly-held culture pattern. This process of renewal can only continue so long as uncivilized peoples exist to make the new experiments. Its end is in sight now because contemporary civilization has brought all peoples within its influence, and left no source from which a successful external assault could be launched. The process of internal frustration and decay must go more or less blindly on, unless we can consciously rebuild our society to give a greater measure of satisfaction to human needs.

At this point Mr. Graham switches his ground from an attempt at universal history to psychology. Instead of inferring instincts, herd or altruistic, from cultural data, we are asked to join in the search for human needs by looking at types of individual behaviour which are widely distributed among different cultures, or which may be considered free from cultural determination. In effect, Mr. Graham relies on children's behaviour as relatively "culture-free", and draws conclusions therefrom which are illustrated rather than proved by numerous references to adult behaviour. This method suffices him for the establishment of four personal needs; dignity, adventure, gaiety, exercise, and five social needs; family, code, tenets, defence, and goodwill. It is claimed that though the list may not be complete, it is certain as far as it goes. In this excursion into psychology by a rather happy-go-lucky form of comparative method, Mr. Graham lays himself open to all sorts of comment and criticism, which can hardly be disarmed by his remark in an appendix that "their [the psychologists'] science is young, and proceeding from one uncertain theory to the next, and none but a competent psychologist knows enough to make critical selection in this field". This does not seem sufficient justification for such a completely *ad hoc* psychology as Mr. Graham's.

A striking omission in this part of the book is any serious discussion of the relation of personal to social needs. A single page of argument invoking the magic word harmony, and the truism that the individual needs society, lead to the conclusion that "in this chapter on social needs, we shall step freely on to the ground of society's need and back again to the ground of individual need: they are one and the same". A further point of criticism is the different level of analysis of the different needs. One looks in vain for any interpretation of such needs as code or family in terms, say, of the needs for security and love, which would be of the same order as the postulated personal needs of dignity, adventure, and the rest. In the sketch of utopia which ends the book, as in the casual treatment of the relation of individual and social need, one is struck by the optimistic attitude to the possibility of realizing all the nine needs within one culture-pattern.

The sketch of the ideal society with which Mr. Graham is bold enough to end his study repels as much as it attracts, but that is the common fate of utopias, and should at least not weaken Mr. Graham's case for moving towards a society where his nine needs are more fully met. Mr. Graham knows enough about human needs to be an excellent parent, schoolmaster, or ship's captain, but his contribution as a theoretician of the good society is slight.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

serious because the British consented to parley with its leaders and then began pressing the Dutch to negotiate with them. Throughout the British occupation of the islands this "unwarranted pressure and interference" in a purely Dutch issue was continued, as witness the negotiations of March, 1946, under the ægis of Lord Inverchapel and the reappearance, in a similar role, of the Baron Killearn at the time of Linggadjati. Although it is taken for granted that the British troops should daily have been killed holding those island bridgeheads, it now becomes a betrayal of an allied trust for their leaders to attempt to influence the issue for which they happened to be dying. When, finally, they leave in November, 1946, the mantle of villain-in-the-piece is draped round the square but grossly overburdened shoulders of the Lieutenant-Governor-General, Dr. van Mook. But not for long. After the intervention of U.N.O. in the first Dutch police action in July, 1947, Dr. van Mook, until his going, is once more made to share this mantle with Britain, America, and U.N.O., and Professor Gerbrandy makes quite certain that it is wide enough for the purpose. Round about this time Indonesian nationalism becomes a communist menace again. It is, for the Professor, never itself.

That, in brief, is the outline of Professor Gerbrandy's case: I say "case" deliberately, for this is no more history than a barrister's plea for the defence is objective. Politicians and advocates have a licence which enables them to choose the evidence they like and to ignore the rest without loss of their technical integrity. But historians and lesser mortals who want to get on with their neighbours, even if they cannot love them, are forced to cherish some regard for the evidence as a whole. In fact, the historian who wants to be prejudiced can be so only provided he is prepared to be prejudiced on both sides. And what is the other side?

To begin with it is not true that nationalism in the East Indies was negligible before the war. It is not true that nationalism is largely the creation of Japanese and Japanese collaborators. As Raden Abdul Kadir Widjoyoatmodjo, a very fine and upright Javanese nobleman, who broke his heart trying to be loyal to the Netherlands and his own people simultaneously, told Professor Schermerhorn in my presence one day: "The Japanese may have helped as midwives of nationalism, but make no mistake about it, the baby is a pure Indonesian." It is typical of Professor Gerbrandy's approach that almost the only Indonesian

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

leaders he mentions are Sukarno and Hatta, "the Japanese laborators". It has always seemed to me rather unfair apply this Qusiling-tainted epithet to those two, putting them on a par with the odd 60,000 people charged with collaboration in Holland after the war. When the invasion of Indonesia came, both Sukarno and Hatta had been condemned and had suffered long years of punishment at the hands of the Dutch for their nationalism. Both in fact were still in exile, Sukarno in Sumatra and Hatta on a remote island in the east of the archipelago. Just before the Japanese landed, Hatta, Soetan Sjahrir and the two little children Sjahrir had adopted to humanize his exile were brought by American Catalina and dumped in Java. To whom and what were Sukarno and Hatta being disloyal when they took the hand of a conqueror who promised their country independence? However much one may disapprove of the handshake and prefer Sjahrir's way (he resolutely refused to co-operate with the Japanese), surely it was not collaboration in the European sense of the term? Besides, has Professor Gerbrandy not heard their own account, particularly Hatta's, of their association with the Japanese? Sjahrir, whose record during the long years of the Japanese occupation is above even the Professor's vigilante reproach, and whose mature stamp is permanently impressed on Indonesian nationalism, is hardly mentioned in his book. The unfortunate Amir Sjarifudin, a brilliant, gifted, and devoutly Christian Sumatran, shot recently as a communist, who was left behind in Java by the Dutch to organize underground activities against the Japanese, who was imprisoned, tortured, and nearly beheaded for his pains, and half a dozen others who led the nationalist movement and whose Japanese records are as pure as are not even mentioned or allowed for in the Professor's brief.

However, the main question remains: when, how, and where did Indonesian nationalism begin? I have no hesitation in saying it began the very first moment the first Dutch traders set foot in Batavia, as it began in all our Empires, British, French, Spanish or Portuguese; or, to revert to our first metaphor, just as the avalanche of spring starts with the first snowflake of winter. In the history of the wider plan teaches us anything it is this: it is a natural law that colonization, as we practised it, no matter how good—and the Dutch version was very good—becomes not good enough from the point of view of the colonized. I believe that in the first shock of meeting the advance guards of the west this law was set in motion deep in the subconscious

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

of Asia. "But if this is so, surely it would not have taken so long to work its way out?" a Dutch diplomat remarked to me one day. I could only reply that I knew a woman who realized on her wedding night that her marriage was wrong and yet only divorced her husband twenty-two years later. I realize, however, that the complete answer requires something more tangible, and I can point to all sorts of concrete indications in the nineteenth century that the avalanche was massing, that the collective subconscious of the islands was slowly moving to active awareness. There is, for instance, the Java War of 1825-30, which broke out not long after the termination of Stamford Raffle's liberal administration and enlightened reforms in the first British occupation of Java and Sumatra. It is significant that this revolt should have occurred early in a century which was just beginning to digest the mixed spiritual diet fed to it by the French Revolution and was to whip itself up, later on, into ecstatic adulation of the rights of self-determination of suppressed people.

For me, personally, more significant still is the appearance, halfway through the century, of a remarkable novel called *Max Havelaar*, written under the pen-name of Multatuli ("I have suffered much") by one Douwes Dekker.* As so often happens to the worthwhile artist, Dekker experienced as a lonely, self-tortured, and isolated individual in his own day what his fellow-men became aware of only on the morrow. In his novel he introduces among other things an unforgettable parable of a Javanese peasant, his sweetheart, his buffalo, and his Dutch District Commissioner, which is the ultimate human argument against European colonialism. The liberal kindly Dutch public was horrified by his exposures and insisted on admirable reforms in the Indies, but the system in those islands, "slung," as Dekker put it, "like a girdle of emerald along the Equator", remained foreign, colonial, and remote. It took close on ninety years before what was humanly so obvious in *Max Havelaar* received its full economic orchestration in J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands Indies: A Study in Plural Economy*. It is typical of Professor Gerbrandy's method that he quotes Furnivall in his own support without indicating that the whole of this remarkable sociologist's intuitive analysis leads to the prophetic conclusion that nationalism is an inevitable product of economy as practised by the Dutch in Indonesia. The enormous profits the Dutch were taking out of the

* *Max Havelaar* was published in the twenties in England with an introduction by D. H. Lawrence which I always thought one of the best he ever wrote.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

islands trapped them into a blind and fatal smugness about the excellences of their colonial economy. Furnivall, whose sensitive nose for this kind of fallacy had been stimulated to an unusual degree by years of contact with our own fatal system in Burma, is very clear on this point. Justus van der Kroeff's essay on the subject is not so exhaustive, but even more conclusive.

Comparatively isolated as the surface indications of nationalism were in the nineteenth century, by the turn of the twentieth there is no longer any excuse for ignoring them. Japan's defeat of Russia, like its victories against the allies in the last war, had the most profound effect on the Asiatic mind. Great as the political consequences of the Japanese victories were, they are not comparable to the act of psychic liberation which they performed in the collective mind of Asia. The east seemed suddenly and dynamically released from a psychological bondage so deep that it had amounted to a kind of spiritual paralysis. Few Europeans realize to this day the automatic, almost hypnotic power they had over people in the east, the fear and awe they had inspired by their great and incalculable power over material things. To the average Asiatic they were more like gods or devils than human beings. But these defeats reinvested the European with his common, fallible, and humble humanity which he should never have exceeded. Our accomplishments, so glittering and desirable to peasants forced to live on less than a penny a day as they had to in Java, were no longer magical and uniquely reserved for Europeans, but open to all flesh and blood that would hazard the way.

Two years after the Russo-Japanese war the first acknowledgment of an organized national movement appears in the official records of Java. In 1908 the first native trade union was formed. Thereafter the history of the Indies is of mounting labour, and social unrest, and increased nationalist agitation. Every Indonesian who returned from a university in Holland was an active or potential nationalist. He was only trying to practise the values which his professors had preached, and why the Dutch, who have such a proud fight for independence behind them, should have found this growing Indonesian appetite for managing their own affairs so reprehensible passes comprehension. Yet they did. The Governor-General of the Indies had the power before the war of banishing without trial or explanation anyone whom he thought a menace to law and order. The number of nationalists banished on this score increased steadily. Sjahrir, for instance

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

was sent into exile and torn for years from his family, without a trial and without a specific charge having been made against him. In one camp in New Guinea alone, the Australians during the war liberated 1,200 Indonesian political prisoners. By 1942, if not long before, it was clear that the Dutch had failed, as we had failed in India and Burma, to give the intellectuals, the new élite of the indigenous peoples in the colonies, the social and cultural content which alone could have contained them. Though I do not want to exaggerate these things and I have no space for nuances, even the Dutch born in Indonesia were increasingly restive under the centralized and remote control from Holland. People like Professor Gerbrandy, for instance, never forgave Dr. van Mook for the part he played in Die Stuw, a separatist movement formed by Europeans in Java in the early thirties. When the Japanese attacked, the avalanche was fully mounted, having given more warning than avalanches usually do. I have never forgotten Sunday, March 1st, 1942, when the Japanese landed on the Sunda coast of Java. As I moved up to the front, I was painfully struck by the fact that many natives had thrown away their colourful, traditional headdress overnight and were wearing the sober, new-fangled black hats of their nationalist movement. They wore nothing else three and a half years later when I came out of prison.

I am not going to analyse the role the Japanese played in Java beyond joining Abdul Kadir in saying it was the role of a highly objectionable and wicked midwife. But here are two instances to show that the Javanese youth had not fallen hook, line, and sinker for Japanese methods and propaganda. In April, 1945, Hei-Hos, Javanese youth undergoing Japanese military training, rebelled in Blitar in East Java. Though the revolt was organized with great skill, the Japanese put it down ruthlessly and beheaded eighteen of the ringleaders, but the real organizer escaped, and, despite the efficient Japanese secret police, found safe asylum among peasants in the hills. Again, when the news of the Japanese capitulation became known, the people in the interior turned on the invaders. At Wonósobo, in Central Java, where the Japanese were building a minor Gibraltar for themselves, a Javanese schoolmaster named Soedirman—afterwards nationalist C.-in-C.—organized an armed force and attacked the Japanese so stubbornly that they were forced to surrender with all their arms. My own clear impression was that the Japanese, far from surveying the flame-like spread of nationalism with the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

proud air of Machiavellian progenitors, regarded it more as people who found that what they had mounted as mules and donkeys had suddenly turned into outsize tigers. They were frankly terrified, not merely for themselves, but also for the thousands of prisoners-of-war and internees for whom they were about to be called to account. While we waited on Lord Mountbatten's forces to come to our rescue, I spent a desperate three weeks going round the interior of Java trying to persuade the sorely tried prisoners to stay in their concentrations, in which alone they could be protected. The whole country had been swept into this tide of nationalism. The ancient princedom of the Sultans of Djockjakarta and Solo, the Pakoe Alim, the powerful aristocracy with their rolling Sanskrit names, like the Djajadiningrats, the students and intellectuals, the peasants and the rag-and-tatter, undernourished coolie youth of the occupation were all deeply in it. For the first time in 350 years they were painting their own new pictures again, writing their own music, creating their own poetry, and, as they rallied in their thousands up and down the country round all sorts of mushroom leaders with stolen Japanese swords, rusty Dutch carbines, shining new Japanese rifles, and, above all, with improvised bamboo spears, they were singing songs of their own making. The avalanche of three and a half centuries was well on its way down the mountain, and all the horses and all the men of our own King and the Dutch Queen (had they been prepared to kill another million people with so bloody a war behind them) could not have put it back on the mountain-top again.

This was the reality waiting for Lord Mountbatten and his forces, and they, alas! had no inkling of it. Lord Mountbatten had inherited this part of his vast command—almost the whole of the third largest empire in the world—from General MacArthur only a fortnight before the Japanese capitulation. He had also inherited, as a matter of course, the General's Intelligence that went with it. Seldom before in history has a great command been worse served by information vital to his plans. The body entrusted with the collection and interpretation of Indonesian Intelligence was an essentially Dutch organization under Colonel afterwards General, Spoor. There may have been good reasons—and Dr. van Mook in his book says there were—why the results were so poor. The fact remains that the Supreme Commander, on the strength of information as little use to him as a pre-war K.L.M. tourist pamphlet, was led to believe that

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

his forces had to do was to get themselves to Java and Sumatra, accept the Japanese surrender, release the internees, and then hand over to a Dutch civil affairs organization. The Dutch have bitterly reproached us for not adhering to the strict letter of provisional agreements and instructions based on the faulty information which they had supplied to Supreme Commander. There would have been a major disaster if Lord Mountbatten and his commanders had not quickly sized up the real situation and introduced appropriate variations in the original plan. I can only say for myself that, as I listened, while we waited on relief, to the Dutch radio broadcasts from Australia, I was filled with profound misgivings. These broadcasts, with their blustering, revengeful tone and their dreary negative theme of "We are coming to hang Sukarno and all other traitors!" might have come from the moon for all their correspondence to the reality and necessities of the situation.

I wish I had space to dwell at length on what followed, but I have used almost all of it in trying to establish clearly the solid and inevitable character of the nationalism that met our forces in Indonesia, which seemed more important to me than describing in detail how that nationalism gained its recognition. Indonesia as a colony in the pre-war sense was lost to the Netherlands before the allies set foot in it again. All that happened subsequently was rooted in that fact. It was the inadequate and unimaginative appreciation and acceptance of the fundamental necessity of this situation which caused the differences of approach between the British and the Dutch. I do not pretend that the choice before the Dutch was an easy one, or that the Indonesians were all angels and easy to deal with. To be confronted suddenly, as the Dutch were, with the bill for centuries is a cruel and bitter predicament. I lived with the Dutch through their grim internment by the unbelievable Japanese, and I know that to be faced at the very moment of deliverance with a national revolution wherein they stood to lose the livelihood and work of generations seemed an ironic and gratuitous betrayal by Fate. There was not a family in Holland which was not in some way dependent or connected with the East Indies, and it was only natural that the tide of popular feeling ran deep and strong. History will have no reproaches for the people of Holland, the Europeans and Eurasians of the Indies on that score. It will be far less tolerant about the people who had to lead them in their cruel predicament.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

We have in the British Empire an unequalled experience of nationalism of all kinds. We have lost more through mishandling nationalist forces than any other country in the world. Our record from the time of the Boston Tea Party to Ireland, South Africa, India, Burma, and Ceylon is not an enviable one. It is redeemed only by the fact that we have learnt something from our experience. Even if we do not to-day know clearly what to do on these occasions until we have done it, it is now part of our national intuition to sense immediately what not to do. Through all those long, thankless, often bloody months of our occupation of Indonesia, pressure on us to do silly, destructive useless things was continuous and heavy; but more by intuition even than by good sense or knowledge, the Supreme Commander and his subordinates in the Indies avoided irreparable blunders. Throughout those months our main task was to try and pass on our own experience to our allies. We tried hard to save the Dutch from themselves, and how thankless a task was Professor Gerbrandy's book clearly shows.

We had ultimately only two alternatives. We either had to fight a bloody colonial war for our allies or try to get this new nationalism and its former masters to make friends. I have no doubt we would have won the colonial war in the bitter end but to what purpose when our own history demonstrates so clearly the futility of settling nationalist issues with gunfire? A victory in the field would only have been the end of the beginning of a far graver problem, for it would have driven the whole of Indonesia into that bleak underworld of the desperate and despairing that we call communism. We firmly rejected this solution, and in rejecting it earned the unforgiving hostility of people like Professor Gerbrandy, however disguised and rationalized its appearance. In doing this, no one could tax us with the reproach that it was easy for us to be philosophic in someone else's trouble, for it was precisely this philosophy that we were applying to our own vast difficulties in Asia. We had to choose the second alternative.

Our greatest difficulty at this time was to find in the Dutch tradition of empire, in the national and social philosophy of the Netherlands, some central concept in which Indonesian nationalism could be convinced that it could merge without reduction of its legitimate stature. It was astonishing how ill-prepared was the idea of nationhood as extended to those islands. For the Dutch themselves it has been sufficient to centre themselves

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

their Crown, in the unique and remarkable House of Orange, which is to them an almost mystical point where all men, all creeds, and all opinions of the nation ultimately meet. They had succeeded in communicating their national mystique even to the Christian Ambonese and the Menadonese, but they, unfortunately, formed not 1 per cent. of the total population of the islands. For the seventy odd millions of Indonesia this rallying point had no meaning. And besides, the whole of their submerged symbolism was starved and empty with the hunger of centuries, with the desire for someone of their own kind and idiom to lead them. It is true there was the Queen's broadcast of 1943, admirably liberal though vague in its sentiment, but what was the use to hungry people of its promise of a conference to consider their wants in some years' time? There was nothing in Dutch history, no precedent like the Statute of Westminster to which all could turn. For all their productiveness and efficiency in administration, these teeming islands seemed to have remained the spiritual heirs and successors of John Company, trading outposts and sources of revenue rather than culturally and socially integrated into an imperial family. Whatever was going to be the answer had to be created from scratch—and created quickly.

In those days it seemed that the Lieutenant-Governor-General, Dr. van Mook, alone might be capable of a true appraisal of the new reality. He has written an account of his stormy stewardship which I have not read, but, judging by his new book, he had not only the advantage of being born in Java, but also more than an average sense of the history and demands of the wider plan of life. Reading these pages written without personal bitterness when he had cause for so much, free of the past and forward in his vision, it is more difficult than ever to understand why he failed in Indonesia. It may be that the task was beyond the grasp of any one man. Certainly, whatever it was that he tried to do, I do believe Dr. van Mook was singularly alone. He had powerful enemies at home. The Hague, quickly reverting to its pre-war snobbishness, tended to sniff at him as an *Indische Jongen*. For the first two years of his office the disloyalty, the intrigue, the lack of discipline, and rank disobedience among leaders of the community and services round him had to be experienced to be believed. Professor Gerbrandy unwittingly illustrates the manner in which the Lieutenant-Governor-General could be treated and judged by The Hague. Here are two instances: The Hague,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

alarmed by the reported trend of the Linggadjati negotiation decided peremptorily to reinforce its original delegation with two extra commissioners—two political detectives, as it were. These two gentlemen arrived in Java, listened in for some days to the negotiations, hardly spoke to a soul or asked a question, made no effort to meet or talk to representative Indonesian and then suddenly disappeared from Java without as much as a "Goodbye" or "By your leave" to the Chairman of their delegation or their host, the Governor. The first Dr. van Mook heard of their flight was in the report of an astonished newspaper man who ran into them in Karachi. Professor Gerbrandt finds this Gilbert and Sullivan behaviour most praiseworthy, fit in this manner, he says, they preserved the purity of their view from being polluted by the Lieutenant-General. Again, when the U.N.O. intervened in the first Dutch police action and offered a cease-fire, Dr. van Mook, on instructions from The Hague, complied. Professor Gerbrandt, who has all along upbraided him for his disobedience to The Hague, now finds him to be obedient, and with his curious ethic judges that he should have gone on fighting.

I myself do not pretend ever to have understood Dr. van Mook or his policies. How, for instance, could one understand a Governor who, having just accomplished a difficult agreement like Linggadjati and, while waiting on its ratification, dissipates the goodwill on which it is dependent by allowing his armed forces steadily and stealthily to widen the agreed perimeters in Java and Sumatra? Or who, at the same time, even if he does not actively encourage, does not prevent his agents and subordinate military commanders from organizing the most active separatist movement from the Nationalist Republic in the Sunda lands of Java? I do not pretend to know a decent answer to these things, and yet I do not want to risk, even in my own obscure way, adding one more injustice to someone who has had so many done to him. This much I do believe true: Dr. van Mook need not have failed.

Had he possessed the faith and the courage as he had the vision and knowledge of his native land, I believe he could have succeeded. Had he seized, for instance, with both hands the opportunity which the Inverchapel agreement of March, 1946, offered him, if he had then refused resolutely to compromise and declared that he would resign rather than return to Indonesia from Holland with the agreement unratified, I believe

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

would have carried the day—not only in his own country, but in Indonesia as well. Even if his resignation had been accepted, I am sure he would have been sent for again in the end, and his services and great qualities would not have been lost to-day to the land of his birth, which could ill afford the loss. I suspect, however, that he was tired, and through tiredness courage failed the knowledge and the instincts of the van Mook of Die Stuw. He allowed himself to be persuaded that there were other, cheaper, quicker, cleverer solutions to this grave problem. He hesitated, he chopped and changed, and inevitably lost.

By that time the British had long left the islands and the Indonesian issue had passed on to increasingly wider and higher levels. But when we left Java in 1946, much of the bitterness, hatred, and distrust had gone out of the nationalist cause. The change of heart and scene in the interior—and I knew it better than any other European at the time—was remarkable. The Japanese were out of the islands, and, except for a few hundreds, all the original internees had been released. That we were not so far wrong in our approach is shown by the fact that the solution we proposed and made possible in March, 1946, has never been improved upon—in fact, there must be many hearts in Holland to-day who look back at it with longing. At each subsequent fit and start of fresh negotiations for a solution between the Dutch and the nationalists, the Inverchapel principles have been at the heart of the discussion. Always they have had to be accepted, plus some complex and more onerous additions. And this, too, we had foreseen.

In October, 1945, Lord Mountbatten had sent me to London to report to the War Cabinet on Indonesia. I had also been to The Hague on the Prime Minister's instructions to explain the situation to the Dutch Government. On the night before my return to Java, I went to say goodbye to General Archie Nye, then Vice-Chief of the Imperial Staff. I told him then, among other things, what we hoped the Dutch would do in Indonesia, and I have never forgotten his reply: "Do not bank on it too much. It is a sad thing, but I do not believe we can ever pass on our own experience to others. Human beings seem to insist on learning the hard way. I fear from what I know of history that nations always give too late and never give handsomely enough. When they give they give in little bits, which, though they amount in the end to much more than was originally necessary, are still not enough because they were not given as one

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and at once. But don't let that stop you all from having a damned good try." That, I think, is precisely what the British did in Indonesia, and I for my part am convinced that history one day will be amazed, not so much at the manner in which we managed Indonesia for the Dutch, but that, after all we have just been through and what was facing us in the post-war world we should have taken it on at all.

As for China, I must be brief. Like the new India, it has rapidly taken shape as one of the most vital factors in South Asia. Its role in the future will be greater even than that of India. China, of course, has never been a colony of the west. It has experienced only a sort of *hors-d'œuvres* of colonialism in the form of extra-territorialism; yet mentally and spiritually it has been more deeply invaded and, in a sense, more annexed by Europe than any other country in the east. It is a measure of the great and ancient quality of the Chinese people that they have felt the spiritual consequences of contact with the west far more than the material ones. Japan, for instance, could simulate the appearance of the western civilization infinitely more successfully than China and yet, as the last war showed, remain fundamentally untouched by it, if not entirely indifferent. China, however, seems to have accepted from the start that this impact from the west demanded the most profound changes in its way of living, and has tried to make a new reintegration within its of the deepest kind. The struggle to find this integration for a people logically translated itself before 1914 into one of the grimmest civil wars in history. The Japanese invasion and the last war, interrupted the struggle and brought the main contestants temporarily together, but it was inevitable that the logical processes of Chinese history would be resumed soon as the war was over. The books on this list throw light on those immense processes and show how silly it is to lump in China with the rest of our communist simplification. There is in regard to China just as much necessity for understanding, patience, tolerance, and perhaps imaginative firmness as there was in Indonesia. The feeling of an undefined but no less real regional oneness and identity of interests is a dynamic element in South Asia. However unpleasant it is for us who have largely outlived the uses of our own nationalism for whom "nation" to-day is not so much a spiritual drive force as a rather confined interest, an interim and twilight concept waiting anxiously on consummation in something greater.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIA

it would be fatal to be superior about the rediscovered nationalisms of Asia. Like adolescence in the individual, they appear a necessary evil in the way of peoples to maturity, and the sooner we help the world over this retarded development the better. We have had a long and profitable innings as lords and masters in Asia; as lords and masters we have had to go; but a much more creative role awaits us there as friends and equals. Without our knowledge, without our search for objective and demonstrable truth and our love of reason, Asia would be blind and shackled to the passion of its own awakening; without many of its great intuitive values our own civilization would be poorer in meaning. Our need of one another is great and a new synthesis of east and west is overdue. To quote a sundial, "In the life of our Time it is always later than we think", and, who knows that east and west may not soon be summoned to join in colonizing the stars?

BRITISH GOVERNMENT SINCE 1918

By SIR ARTHUR SALTER, G.B.E., K.C.B.

IN a country with an unwritten constitution, it is both more difficult and more necessary to analyse carefully from time to time the changes that are taking place in the machinery of government. Profound differences, requiring no formal enactment, may come gradually and invisibly. They are reflected in small successive changes in procedure, or in unwritten customs and traditions, or result from a new balance in the political forces which are outside the machine itself but control its operation. No one who has been in close contact with the British machine of government through the thirty years which followed the first world war can fail to be conscious that it has been profoundly altered in that period. But it requires a conscious effort of recollection to assess the extent of the change, the forms in which it finds expression and the significant stages of development.

The Institute of Public Administration has therefore performed a real public service in arranging and publishing six essays by acknowledged authorities and experts on different parts of the machine of government.* The general plan of this

* *British Government Since 1918*, by Sir Gilbert Campion, etc. Allen and Unwin. 232 pp. 16s.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

composite book has been well devised; and the contributors have been well chosen. Lord Campion, who was Clerk to the House of Commons, describes the changes of thirty years in the Parliamentary system. Mr. D. N. Chester, Professor Mackenzie and Professor Robson, who teach administration in the universities, write respectively of the development of the Cabinet, of the central bureaucracy in Whitehall, and of administrative law. Sir Arthur Street, who helped to create the pre-war agricultural marketing boards and to organize the Air Ministry and was Deputy Chairman of the National Coal Board, writes of quasi-Government bodies; and Mr. J. H. Warren, the General Secretary of Nalgo, deals with local government.

The book as a whole is addressed to the teacher and student rather than the general public. The reader will find much valuable material to help him in constructing a picture of government as it now is in this country; but for a complete picture he will need to add a good deal that he will not find here. It would I think, have been useful if a further chapter could have been added giving, as a background to the special studies, a general description of the main developments outside the machine of government itself which have impinged upon and caused the changes within it (for Sir John Anderson's brief Foreword does not attempt to serve this purpose). Dominating everything, of course, has been the immense extension of the tasks of government, in the development of the social services, of nationalization, and of the public control of the economy. Simultaneous with the growth of party organizations, the tightening of party discipline, the semi-professionalizing of the Commons, and the elaboration of party programmes (which the party successfully regards as a "mandate" in a sense hitherto unfamiliar in the British system) have profoundly changed the balance of power between Parliament as such and the Executive; and between the formal structure of government as a whole and organizations outside it. Power has passed from Parliament to the Executive (and to the Executive in a sense that Parliament is regarded as a body of representative persons who make personal contributions to make) to the Executive; and within the Executive a larger share of effective influence is wielded by the permanent bureaucracy. At the same time, party organizations and conferences play a larger part in determining the policies of cabinets. This line of development, which began before the first war, has of course been accelerated since the first advent to power of Labour, with a controlling majority, in 1945. It

BRITISH GOVERNMENT SINCE 1918

against some such background, here only indicated rather than described, that I suggest that the reader will do well to study the six essays here presented to him.

Lord Campion deals principally in procedural changes within the thirty years. But he includes also a few very valuable pages in which he goes outside both this period and his special subject. The great change in the personal complexion of the House began in 1906 rather than 1945. In spite of the fact that the town artisan had acquired the vote in 1867 and the agricultural labourer in 1884, the composition of the House remained for many years "predominantly aristocratic", members of the "governing classes" still finding in it the "best club in London". All this was changed in 1906. Many of the new members were poor men. The kitchen provided cheap meals; the House met earlier and rose before the last trains to the suburbs had gone; and during the 1906 Parliament salaries were instituted and "the seriousness of parliamentary life was emphasized when the traditional adjournment over Derby Day was discontinued". He usefully recalls an earlier change which has had great consequences: "until well past the middle of the last century, Ministers often left questions of policy to the free vote of the House. Up to about 1865 a majority of the House often ventured to differ from the Government and the Government would then reshape its policy. Even Palmerston, at the height of his authority from 1839 to 1865, accepted defeat on an average twelve times a session with perfect complacency. . . . Now the Whips are 'put on' whenever Government policy is concerned, so as to show their supporters that they are expected to follow obediently." Here, with the increase in party discipline, is the clue to the change in the status of Members as Members. Their collective power to dismiss a Government on any issue of Government policy means in practice that they cannot, to anything like the same extent, amend or reshape that policy; the individual is subordinated and such influence as he continues to exert is through the party and not in the House. Lord Campion usefully reminds us too (as G.B.S. did in one of his prefaces) how rare is the "normal". In the interwar period of twenty-one years "less than six were occupied by governments of the normal type to which the House of Commons is primarily adapted—namely, the single-party administration with a working majority; for there were twelve years of Coalitions and over three of minority Governments". On his special subject, Lord Campion describes

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the procedural changes made as the volume of business increased—the removal of committee discussions from the floor of House to standing committees upstairs; the institution of guillotine; the delegation of power (even over taxation) to administrative authorities; the progressive weakening of the House of Lords; the reduction of the rights of private members. All these changes, it is well to be reminded, had begun before the advent of the Labour Government of 1929, though all have gone so much further since then. What has been preserved is a minimum basis of a free parliamentary system, i.e. the right of criticism by an Opposition party. "That the Government of the day (Conservative or Labour) should find itself bound to resign itself for its own business to 43 per cent. of the whole time of session, while surrendering over 30 per cent. to the Opposition for choosing subjects to criticize . . . these facts seem to afford proof not only of the fairness of the rules and conventions, but also of the persistence of the parliamentary spirit which established them and which remains the best check on the domination of a single party." Well, so much has indeed been preserved, and so much at least is essential if there is to be in any reality a parliamentary government. Many will, however, perhaps doubt whether this is enough: and whether the "persistence of parliamentary spirit" will suffice to prevent a change which has gone so far from going further.

The other papers are for the most part too technical for discussion and only a few comments are now possible. Chester in describing the development of the Cabinet system discusses Mr. Amery's proposal for a small Cabinet of half a dozen, all entirely free from ordinary departmental duties, and would determine general policy and deal with current administrative questions by bringing into the discussions the departmental Ministers directly affected. I agree with him in doubting the feasibility of this proposal. I do not think that, except in wartime when all policy is subordinated to one main object, Ministers without the support of strong ministries can effectively control departmental ministries who have no advantage. The line of progress is, I think, the development of standing Cabinet committees, each presided over by the most important Minister on the committee—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for example, presiding over all the Ministers dealing with economic questions. The chairmen of these committees could perhaps become the "Cabinet", each of them be-

BRITISH GOVERNMENT SINCE 1918

assisted in his own department by the appointment of "Ministers of State".

Professor Mackenzie deals with the "Structure of Central Administration", i.e. the allocation of tasks as between the different departments. Starting with the Haldane Report, with its principle that "the functions of government should be organized according to the service to be rendered not according to the clients to be served", he describes the subsequent changes with illuminating comments. Professor Robson discusses at length and with a wealth of illustrative detail the growth of administrative law and revives the proposal which he made to the Committee on Ministers' Powers of 1929 to establish a system of administrative courts. Sir Arthur Street describes the growth of "quasi-government bodies", ranging from the B.B.C. to the boards of the newly nationalized industries. He has the advantage of his exceptional official experience, and his description is complete and, of course, accurate. In a sphere, however, which bristles with urgent questions, his suggestions for reforms are limited and tentative; he was perhaps inhibited by his office as Deputy Chairman of the National Coal Board from really grappling with the most difficult new administrative problems posed by nationalization. Lastly, Mr. Warren discusses the "dwindled scope and importance of local self-government", as centralization and control of policy by Whitehall has increased. It is a highly regrettable tendency, for the distinctive form of British liberty developed in Great Britain has depended essentially upon a sharing and dispersal of power between the Executive, Parliament, the judiciary, voluntary organizations, and local authorities. The crucial development of this century has been the absorption by the first of many of the real powers and responsibilities of all the others.

Composite authorship rarely results in a good book; for a changing point of view, unequal treatment, and an alternation of gaps and overlapping often confuse the reader. But for the purpose which the present one was designed to serve it was unavoidable; and a skilful allocation of the subjects and a wise choice of the writers has reduced these defects to a minimum. The result is a rich treasury of fact and recorded experience, available for all who are concerned with the problems of government whether as students or practitioners.

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

By ANTHONY CROSLAND, M.P.

THE Council of Europe is now two years old. It has not, many hoped, created a united Europe; nor has it, as others fear, collapsed. It has come to stay, but its future is uncertain; Britain, having for two years veered uneasily between maternal affection and a barely repressed instinct towards infanticide, must now decide, in more long-run terms than hitherto, what view it holds about the Council's future.

I

The history of the past two years can be quickly recapitulated. The Council's aim was "to achieve a greater unity between its members . . . by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action"; its organs are a Consultative Assembly and a Committee of Ministers, the latter bound by the unanimity rule. But from the start there appeared the contradiction which has bedevilled the Council's work throughout. The Statute talks only of discussion, agreement and common action; it imposes no surrender of sovereignty, and sets up no federal government. But the pressure which led to the Council's formation was almost entirely federal in character. It came largely from the unofficial but powerful European Movement, whose Hague Congress had been a focus for all the despairing feeling in continental Europe that economic crisis and military dangers could only be surmounted by a united federal Europe.

Thus, where the Governments had conceded only a forum for debate, the leaders of continental opinion wanted a fully-fledged political authority. And it was they who set the tone at the Assembly's first meeting at Strasbourg in August, 1949, with their generous but utopian enthusiasm for the immediate creation of a United Europe.

The inevitable rift was quick to appear. The British Labour, Scandinavian, and Irish delegates made it clear that they were not for federation: that the existing Statute represented the furthest limit of their advance: and that they had joined the Council only on the strict understanding that its role was to

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

be consultative. If further progress was to be made, they argued, it should be on practical functional lines, towards a set of empirically derived solutions to specific problems, and not in the direction of new political forms. Thus was born the split between functionalists and federalists.

The functional approach had only minority support in the Assembly. To the majority, it came as a disagreeable shock, and seemed a terrible betrayal of their high hopes of building Europe. Their hostility was concentrated on Labour Britain, which from that date became the official whipping-boy of all enthusiasts for Europe.

It was at its second session in August, 1950, that the Assembly reached its point of maximum bitterness and disagreement. It appeared on the continent that the British position had hardened still further during the intervening year, and that the Labour Government was now coldly hostile to any moves whatever towards greater European unity. Not merely had it maintained its firmly anti-federal attitude; but it had in addition rejected an initiative (the Schuman Plan) which seemed on the surface to be purely functional in character: it had (through Mr. Bevin's veto on the Committee of Ministers) rejected a number of innocuous Assembly proposals with no taint of federation in them: and moreover, it was associated in the public mind with the critical and astringent Labour Party pamphlet on *European Unity*.

Frustrated and angry, the Assembly heaped abuse on Britain and the Committee of Ministers; and feeling was so high, and the divergence so wide, that it seemed that the Council must collapse. Yet by the end of the session a compromise agreement was in sight.

This surprising result was due to a split in the federalist ranks. The Anglo-Scandinavian refusal to federate was now so clear that only two courses were open to the federalists: either to go on, with such countries as were willing, to the formation of a "Little Federation" without Britain or Scandinavia: or to give up for the present all talk of federation, and settle down to a pace and direction of advance dictated by the functionalists. The "Little Federation" school embraced some of the French and Germans, and almost all the Italians. It was opposed by most continental socialists, over half of the French, and the majority of Benelux delegates. The opposition argued that a "Little Federation" would disastrously sub-divide an already divided Europe: that, since it would in practice only include France,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Germany, and Italy, unpleasant consequences would follow the French (because it would be dominated by Germany), for all the socialists (because the balance of power would be far towards the Catholic Right); and in any case that continental Europe could not afford thus to turn itself away from Britain and Scandinavia.

On a vote, the "Little Federation" was defeated by 68 to 52. Since over half the federalists voted against it, it followed that a large majority of the Assembly was now committed to rejection of federation as an immediate aim, and to the pursuit of the functional approach.

The particular functional approach which found favour was the creation of specialised authorities (of which the Schuman Plan was the prototype) to deal with specific subjects (e.g. transport, agriculture, defence), and open to individual nations to join or not to join as they wished.

By the time the Assembly met again in November, the way ahead seemed clear. The principle of specialised authorities had been accepted meanwhile by the Committee of Ministers, with no veto by Mr. Bevin; it could now no longer be said that Britain was barring the road to further advance. The atmosphere was further sweetened by a number of other concessions by the Committee of Ministers, and the position of the Labour delegation in particular was eased by the belated recognition that British Conservatives too shared their Government's attitude. The fact that European union was not even mentioned at the annual Conference, and recent categorical anti-federal speeches by their leaders in Parliament, had opened the eyes of many continentals who had been deceived by Mr. Churchill's speech in 1949, by the association of many prominent Conservatives with the European Movement, and by their speeches on the Schuman Plan.

Thus the November session showed the highest degree of unity so far. A compromise method of advance seemed to have been found, the federal issue was dead, and the Council committed to moving along practical functional lines.

II

Outwardly, then, all is amity and agreement. But how does this unity really go? Certainly not very deep. The disagreement still exists. For the moment a split is averted,

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

a majority of continental federalists now recognize that the British attitude is, for the present, adamant. But they firmly believe that this attitude, in time, will change. Indeed, it is precisely our best friends, who hotly opposed the idea of federation without Britain, who are most firmly committed to a belief in eventual British participation. It is therefore urgently necessary, if we are to avoid a great wave of bitterness and disillusionment in the future, that we should make clear, what is in fact the case, that there is no chance, within any foreseeable period, of any British Government merging its sovereignty in a supra-national Council of Europe.

The reasons for this should, by now, be sufficiently well-known. First, there is the deep psychological gulf between the Continent and Britain. Britain was not invaded or defeated in either of the two world wars, and so has avoided the despairing disillusionment with the nation-state that such experiences induce. Since the war, she had kept full employment and a high degree of social peace; and no communist Member sits in the House of Commons. It is not surprising that she fears to jeopardise this social and economic stability by surrendering sovereignty to a federal government in which the majority would be held by countries not similarly successful, and with internal policies most different from our own.

On top of this comes the familiar point of our close links with the overseas world, both the Commonwealth countries and the United States. We do not regard ourselves solely as part of Europe, nor western Europe by itself as a significant grouping in the modern world. The British attitude to a European government, therefore, will (quite apart from other arguments) remain one of hostility until and unless there is clear proof that such a government would have organic and contractual links with America, Canada, and the Commonwealth. Of this there is no sign.

It is, for these reasons, an almost unanimous view in this country that great sacrifices would be entailed by any large-scale surrender of sovereignty to a European political authority. No doubt if there were impressive countervailing advantages which the federalist could point to, the view would be different. But this is not the case.

The federalist uses three arguments. First, on the military plane, it is said that defence against communism is impossible without a united Europe. This is clearly not the case. The last

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Nature long ago gave up the attempt to improve individual man. That is the meaning—the most significant meaning—of the careful researches into man's past made in our generation. Primitive man has become almost as well known to us as our contemporaries. He was so like ourselves that differences in his behaviour are only to be accounted for by differences in his circumstances. It has sometimes been concluded from this that there is no hope of improvement. Why, it is asked, would another 50,000 years bring about more changes than did the last 50,000? The answer to this is that the last 50,000 years did make most enormous changes—not in man's nature but in his behaviour. This was because the new circumstances called out hitherto unused responses from an original equipment which was far more varied than was apparent from the simple social behaviour of primitive groups. What can now be seen is that nature long ago found a more satisfactory method than biological change for the improvement of the human species. That, of course, was social evolution. What man cannot do alone, because of his limited abilities, he succeeds in doing with the collaboration of his fellows. There is no theoretical limit to the effectiveness which may be achieved by his joint effort. It is, in fact, one of nature's infinities. Our civilization is the product of such complementary jointures, and what we shall have will be the product of further jointures. It is no torturing of terms to call this collaborative mechanism a collective mind, and to think of its embodiment in government as the instrument *par excellence* of future progress.

There is dissent to this. There is indeed a most ardent and widespread belief that collectivism is an impossible, and even if possible, a dangerous, sea for humanity to embark on. The opposite of collectivism is, of course, individualism, which recognizes society only as loose associations of essentially independent individuals, each guiding his conduct by his own conception of self-interest. The theory involves the belief that these self-interests will add up somehow to social good.

The projection of this kind of belief would, I think, yield a system of government less advanced than that embodied in the American Constitution. It would confer theoretical rights on everyone which no one could actually have. Such a system was not so fantastic a conception when the population of the world was about one-quarter its present size, when there were wholly unutilized continents and unexploited resources, when

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

large scale; and in any case it is certainly not clear that most firms in Europe which are less than the optimum size are being held back from expansion by a restricted export market.

It may be that some modest benefits might result from a further measure of trade liberalization—though this must be contingent on the prior acceptance of strict conditions about internal economic stability. But this can be achieved by inter-governmental negotiation, and it is quite wrong to think that spectacular gains would result from grandiose schemes for complete economic union. The disadvantages of such schemes are clear (high social cost and dislocation), the advantages are highly problematic.

Such are the general reasons why the British attitude is anti-federal. But there are in addition certain particular reasons why Britain is unwilling, even if it were prepared to surrender some of its sovereignty, to do so to the Council of Europe.

First, there is still a strong suspicion of the way the Assembly works, and a reluctance to treat it seriously. Last August, no fewer than fifty resolutions were passed, most of them in one frantic late-night sitting. The Committees work all hours of the night and day, and have an endless stream of drafts, supposedly of great importance for the future of Europe, thrust at them, to be voted on after a few minutes' perusal and discussion. The famous and important resolution on a European army was voted after a bare day's debate. This sort of procedure is intensely shocking to British delegates trained in a tradition of efficient bureaucracy, careful drafting, lengthy research, and detailed discussion in Committee. It is hardly surprising that they prefer the expert atmosphere of intergovernmental bodies.

A second reason for the prevalent suspicion of Strasbourg lies in the contrast between speeches at Strasbourg and actions elsewhere. In the Assembly, it is always Britain who is "dragging her feet," and the continental countries who are the good Europeans. But on the level of action and policy, a very different picture emerges. It is France who, by her stubborn addiction to high tariffs, holds back attempts to liberalize trade. Italy, with high and at least partly avoidable unemployment, is the perpetual problem child of European economics. Germany has run a trade deficit so large that it nearly wrecked the E.P.U. Belgium, by her deflationary policy, has consistently restricted the level of European trade. Moreover, for all the fine orations at Strasbourg, Benelux still exists only on paper, and the Franco-Italian

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Customs Union proves a farce. Britain, by contrast, has a rate record of economic co-operation and good-neighbourliness. Her words and deeds do match; and her suspicions of Strasbourg will remain until this is true of other countries also.

And, lastly, the British feel that most of the important matters being discussed at Strasbourg are already being acted on elsewhere. Either at O.E.E.C. or at N.A.T.O., in E.P.U. or General Eisenhower's H.Q., the work of economic and military coordination is actually going on. It is going on with the support of governments and the help of experts. And above all it is going on with American and Canadian participation. It is not surprising that Britain is reluctant to duplicate this work at Strasbourg, or set up rival organizations cut off from American participation. Our orientation still remains Atlantic; and it is not a European-cum-Atlantic body, and not a purely European one, that any surrenders of sovereignty will be made.

III

These are the deep-seated reasons why Britain will not engage herself to the goal of a European Government at Strasbourg. It appeared in November that their existence was accepted continental opinion as a fact, in consequence of which federalism was shelved in favour of the functional advance.

Yet—and herein lies the danger—this acceptance even now is only partial. Many federalists were reconciled to the abandonment of their hopes only in the conviction that it would at least be temporary, and that Britain would eventually see the light. One must fear great anger, and threats to the Council's unity when they see that they were wrong.

Moreover, many continental policies assume either that the British do not mean what they say, or at least that they are being pulled part-way along the road to federation. In any instance, a new interpretation is now being put on the agreement over specialized authorities. They are now being envisaged by the federalists in a way never originally intended, as a series of supranational agencies, each crowned by a European Minister, and developing quickly and naturally into a European supragovernment. The road may be functional, but the goal is still federal. (This shows, what the Schuman Plan controversy had already made clear, that the federal-functional distinction can be seriously misleading; the real issue is over sovereignty

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

supranational versus intergovernmental.) There is a real danger of future conflict here; and a strong responsibility certainly lies on the British to adumbrate plans for functional co-operation which do not have these federal tendencies.

Again, constant attempts are still made in the Assembly to reform the Statute. The position here is quite plain. Britain is unwilling to advance beyond the present Statute; in particular, the Assembly must remain consultative, and the Committee of Ministers tied to the unanimity rule. Every attempt at amendment, therefore, inevitably leads to friction. Yet the November Assembly voted several proposed amendments (including a drastic modification of the unanimity rule) against British-Scandinavian opposition. This is typical of the alternate refusal to believe that the British mean what they say, and determination to drag them along whether they like it or not: typical of the constant pressure on us to accept things which are known to go against our settled policy. This pressure still continues, unhappily, despite the acceptance of the functional advance by majority vote—and it comes not merely from continental delegates, but from the officials also. M. Spaak's federal views are well-known and often stated; and even the Secretary-General, supposedly an impartial official, gives vent in public statements to strong expressions of the federal view. It is hardly surprising that the British delegates find the atmosphere at Strasbourg a trifle hostile.

The most spectacular proposal for amending the Statute, and one which, if pressed, threatens to dominate the 1951 Assembly by reopening all the quarrels of the last two years, is that proposed by Mr. Mackay. This received in November the presidential blessing of M. Spaak, and the strong support of most of the federalists; and it has now been approved by an Assembly Committee.

Briefly, the proposal is to convert the Consultative Assembly into a legislative Lower Chamber, with power to initiate and pass Bills. These would then go to the Committee of Ministers (renamed the Upper Chamber) for rejection or acceptance, the unanimity rule being retained. Once passed by both Chambers, they would become supranational laws, binding on every Member State. An Executive Council is to be set up, drawn from the Assembly, and consisting of a number of Heads of Departments.

It is argued that this scheme provides an acceptable compromise between the two opposing points of view: it will please

BEYOND NATIONALISM

even the steam engine was unknown, and when the journey from Mt. Vernon to New York required something like two weeks. It must be insisted that to-day it is wholly fantastic.

The forces and resources which are obviously to be utilized in future productive operations are of a sort which no individual, however gifted, will be capable of mastering; only complementary groups, functioning for society somewhat as the brain functions for the human organization, bringing to decisions concerning direction an increasing objectivity and reflectiveness, will be capable of understanding and utilizing them. The sheer voltage of technological energy now being applied to social machinery would destroy any one individual through whom it sought to pass. Man has the choice of rejecting its potential power for good or of organizing the collectivity which can utilize it. This is perhaps not quite accurate. Matters have gone so far that choice is really foreclosed: that is, rejection would amount to suicide since these forces are just as potentially destructive as they are constructive. Perhaps the only real choice now, as I have intimated, is whether the new world will be entered on eagerly or reluctantly. And reluctance, if it leads to as much compromise as was necessary in 1787, might result in a narrow escape from destruction and perhaps a long period of painful adjustment to the new circumstances of human life.

The new constitution, it will be seen, will need to be less a constitution in the classical sense, marking out what government may or may not do, and establishing firm relationships among its parts, than a flexible operating mechanism for an expanding society, oriented to co-operation rather than to individualism. It must at least embody a mechanism for envisaging and preparing for the visible future and for shaping the forces now rushing at mankind out of the great and little spaces of the universe. Government itself will, in fact, need to be understood in different terms than it has been in the past. The constitution of the United States, because of intense concentration on liberty, became an excellent instrument for protecting men and their corporate bodies from the controls of government. The same effort made it a relatively poor instrument for protecting government from exploitation by private interests. Little attention, really, was given to saying what government might do; and a great deal was given to saying what it might not do. That negativism was the product of eighteenth-century individualism and was good for what it was; but it cannot be pretended that

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

exists on the continent a strong *mystique* in respect of the Council of Europe; high hopes have been set on it, and it fulfils an important psychological need amongst peoples who have lost faith in the nation state. Its collapse might cause an alarming crisis of confidence on the continent, which Britain must exert herself to avoid. The Assembly can, moreover, in its consultative role, play a most useful part in the affairs of Europe, and it would be tragic to lose a body where French and German politicians sit side by side, with all that that implies.

Four things are needed if British policy is to be helpful and constructive. First, we must give a strong lead in practical and effective co-operation within O.E.E.C. and N.A.T.O., and show, by our military dispositions and economic policies, that, whatever our attitude to federation, we are heart and soul of Europe and in it, and willing to make genuine sacrifices for unity within the framework of governmental action.

Secondly, we must do everything in our power to urge the politicians of the continent finally to accept our position, and base their policy on it. (It is to be hoped that the Conservatives will do the same, and not revert to their former role of misleading Europe by pronouncements at Strasbourg which bear no relation to the actions they would take if in office; but from the association of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe with the Mackay plan it seems as if not much help can be expected from this quarter.) This means that they must come to a final decision: either to federate without Britain, or at least to create a series of supra-national agencies for the most part without Britain; or else to accept that all should move together, and recognize the British-Scandinavian viewpoint as the highest common factor of agreement. If they adopt this latter course, they must give up the continuous efforts to drag us along their road against our will; and in particular they must cease constantly trying to amend the Statute, since that is to choose the one sphere which most divides, instead of uniting, the countries in the Council. But in view of the eager reception given to the Mackay proposals, little is to be hoped for in this direction.

Thirdly, and despite this, Britain must seriously and sincerely try to strengthen the Council within the limits of her antifederal policy. This means, primarily, that we must seek to strengthen the useful consultative role that the Assembly can play. And it is a genuinely useful role. The Assembly has held important debates, which have influenced public and governmental

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Labour and Secondary Education

THE publication of the Labour Party's pamphlet *A Policy for Secondary Education* raises issues of supreme importance to the future of the British people. This pamphlet is issued in furtherance of a resolution passed by the annual conference of the party in October, 1950, which called upon the Government to implement Labour's declared policy of the comprehensive school in secondary education. After the conference a sub-committee was appointed by the National Executive Committee to prepare a report on secondary education. The pamphlet consists of the Committee's report.

The report attacks the present system of dividing children into three main categories destined respectively for grammar schools, secondary technical schools, and secondary modern schools, on two grounds. First, that the age of 11 at which this process takes place is too young to make a final decision affecting a child's educational prospects. Second, that the separation of schools into these types was based originally on class distinctions, and "the three types of school are bound to inherit the old traditions of class segregation". In consequence, the pamphlet contends, children who do not succeed in entering the grammar school draw resentful conclusions about their inferiority, while on the other hand the grammar school boy assumes that he is superior to the others. These objections will persist even in a tri-partite system where selection is based on special qualifications and not on wealth.

The pamphlet does not believe that mistakes of classification can be rectified by subsequent transfer from one type of school to another, because in practice grammar schools are reluctant to accept pupils from secondary modern or technical high schools, while parents object strenuously to their children being sent from a grammar school to one of these other types of school.

In consequence, the report declares, all three types of school must be swept away and be replaced by comprehensive schools to which all children will go for their secondary education. No attempt is made to examine the scholastic aspects of the question, or to consider the problems involved in attempting to educate a mass of children of widely differing abilities, aptitudes, and tastes, who are destined for widely different

PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

O.E.E.C. would need reinforcement by a body of professional diplomats. And it would be a necessary prior condition that the secretariat of the Assembly should be clearly separate from that of the Committee of Ministers, since no body of civil servants can be expected to serve at once their governments and an all-party Parliamentary Assembly.

None of these difficulties is insuperable, and the advantages would be great. The change would go far to remove the present frustration in the Assembly, due to the knowledge that its economic debates are already being duplicated by more thorough study in Paris, where the experts with the slide-rules live, and where Ministers take the serious decisions. It would remove the legitimate criticism against the Committee of Ministers, that they were intended to be, but have not been, the initiators of subjects for the Assembly to debate; the O.E.E.C. is always alive with new plans which could be most usefully referred to the Assembly.

Further, the fusion would smooth the path for the functional advance to which the Assembly is now formally committed; specialized agencies for specific purposes are far more likely to be accepted by governments if the proposals for them have first passed through the mill of detailed expert study at the inter-governmental level. And, finally, it would be beneficial to O.E.E.C. itself that its various proposals should have to undergo critical comment by the politicians of the Assembly, and that they in turn should make recommendations back.

It is to be hoped that Britain will press for this change. It is the only way out of the impasse in which the Council threatens to become involved. It would preserve the purely consultative role of the Assembly, and the emphasis on intergovernmental co-operation. Yet it would greatly enhance the Council's prestige, and would convert it from being a body of somewhat academic interest into a real European council with proper functions to perform. It would, in fact, fulfil the declared and official aim which the Assembly has set itself, to create an authority with "limited functions but real powers". And we do well to remember that this aim, if not achieved by this method, will be sought by grandiose and unacceptable schemes for the complete reform of the Statute. Britain must therefore make a serious effort, while still maintaining a primary Atlantic alignment, to buttress the Council of Europe on some such lines as these.

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: 1850-1950

By O. R. MCGREGOR

A MONTH before his death in 1836, the Secretary of the Post Office, Sir Francis Freeling, who had recently nominated Anthony Trollope to a junior clerkship and so appears benignly in *The Three Clerks* as Mr. Oldeschole, bemoaned the rising tide of parliamentary criticism of his expensive and inefficient administration. "Cheap postage! What is this men are talking about? Can it be that all my life I have been in error? . . . What! You, Freeling, brought up and educated as you have been, are you going to lend yourself to these extravagant schemes?" Freeling had ruled over the posts for nearly forty years. His nominal salary of £500 a year had grown by the addition of allowances and compensations to £4,500; he lived in Bryanston Square and received £1,000 a year in lieu of a residence in St. Martin's-le-Grand, the Secretary's official quarters there being occupied by his son, who, in addition, drew an official salary of £800. This régime, regulated by some 125 Acts of Parliament, was as incompetent as it was expensive and is representative of the administrative arrangements inherited by the Reform Parliament. Attacked from the mid-thirties with the demand for free trade in the transmission of letters, the initiatives of Robert Wallace and Rowland Hill reduced the Post Office in a few years to a service providing the cheap and speedy interchange of commercial intelligence essential for a rapidly expanding trade and industry. Hill's career typifies the methods by which necessary *ad hoc* reforms of the older departments were accomplished before "civil service reform" became an issue in the fifties and the circumstances in which many of the distinguished senior officials of the mid-nineteenth century were recruited. An original member of Charles Knight's Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, Hill saw its effectiveness limited by the difficulties and expense of the postal distribution of its publications. Thus stimulated, his pamphlet on postal reform followed. Its detailed plans and careful financial estimates gave immediate substance to the current demands, and the adoption of his plan provided him with a temporary Treasury appointment, leading finally, in 1854, to the secretaryship of the Post Office.

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: 1850-1950

The new pressures of industry on the postal service raised relatively simple issues; an administrative organization existed, and had only to be rendered cheap and efficient. More difficult and, for the future character of central administration and its servants, more important was the pressing necessity for administrative inventiveness to cushion the social consequences of technological change. Industrial towns, which sucked in, decade by decade, an ever-increasing proportion of the population, were filthy, brutalizing, dormitory annexes to machines that exacted a massive toll of poverty and sickness from their attendants. Working people's refusal docilely to enter into their Malthusian inheritance invoked repressive fear from rulers accustomed to conduct domestic policy in terms only of the simplicities of a misconceived, paternal poor law and the severities of the game laws. Fear and the wish to repress—an effective machinery of repression did not exist had the need for it arisen—were not, fortunately, the only responses. Thoughtful, vigorous middle-class people, lawyers, and dissenting ministers, bankers, doctors, and the like, sensitive to the intolerable economic costs and political implications of unchecked industrialism, were aware of the irrelevance of voluntary philanthropy and the need of a governmental substitute for it. Their first step was to equip themselves with a knowledge of social pathology. They had to reduce a much manifested evil to defined proportions before remedial action could flow through Benthamite administrative devices. Their tool was political arithmetic. "The spirit of the present age", affirmed the first volume of the *Journal of the Statistical Society*, "has an evident tendency to confront the figures of speech with the figures of arithmetic; it being impossible not to observe a growing distrust of mere hypothetical theory and a priori assumption, and the appearance of a general conviction that, in the business of social science, principles are valid for application only inasmuch as they are legitimate induction from facts accurately observed and methodically classified."

The efflorescence of middle class agencies for the investigation, definition, and evaluation of disease and illiteracy, of poverty and crime, and of all the social ills to which industrial society had fallen heir, was the dominant characteristic of the decades before 1850. Statistical societies, national and local, inquiries, public and private, disclosed an immensity of preventable human wastage. As the weight of evidence mounted and special fields

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

were defined, the compilers of facts accurately observed — methodically classified worried and pushed themselves and their administrative preventatives on to timid, bewildered politicians and hostile parliaments. A statistical department was added to the Board of Trade in 1832. Factory inspectors in 1833, poor law commissioners in 1834, a Registrar-General and 600 superintendent registrars in 1837, a Committee of the Privy Council on Education and inspectors of schools in 1839, a Board of Health in 1848 followed. Nor were the poor the only recipients of these grandmotherly attentions. Railways, joint stock companies, merchant shipping and a government school of design were thrust upon the Board of Trade. Thus old departments acquired new duties, and new offices were created as the business of government grew in the heyday of *laissez faire*.

The trivial executive powers entrusted to this additional machinery of central government were administered, in large part, by those whose investigations and agitations had secured their establishment. Accordingly, mid-nineteenth-century governments were served by a range of abilities never since seen in Whitehall, save, perhaps, in wartime. Chadwick's stormy career and indefatigable reporting had taken him from the poor law to the Board of Health, where his blundering enthusiasm left a wreckage to be salvaged by John Simon's persuasive genius. Major Graham and William Farr at the General Register Office and George Porter at the Board of Trade were building a system of continuous statistical intelligence. Kay-Shuttleworth and Seymour Tremeneere had laid the foundations for elementary schools in the teeth of public indifference, Anglican bigotry, and twisted Nonconformist consciences. Lyon Playfair's efforts to bring science into a fruitful relation with government turned him into a full-time civil servant; Leonard Horner and his colleagues devised an effective factory inspectorate, and so one might continue. Nor was ability confined to the painfully slow elaboration of the administrative instruments of social policy. Charles Trevelyan at the Treasury; Herman Merivale and Henry Taylor at the Colonial Office; Shaw Lefevre and Henry Cole; and the now forgotten Panizzi who annexed the British Museum to the civil service, catalogued its library, and opened the reading room—all were men of conspicuous distinction.

The conventional picture of civil servants at the time of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the fifties as indolent aristocrats and time-servers playing in their offices, as Palmerston put

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: 1850-1950

it, like the fountains in Trafalgar Square from ten o'clock till four, is only a partial truth. But departments were small and retrenchment a constant curb to efficiency. In 1850 the Treasury had a staff of less than 100, whilst four inspectors, fifteen sub-inspectors, one clerk, a messenger, and a housekeeper contrived to enforce the factory acts in over 4,000 mills scattered throughout Britain and Ireland.

Ability in some high places was matched by an equally striking incompetence in low; some departments, as the Crimean War demonstrated, had altogether escaped the early, tentative reforms and still luxuriated in aristocratic fatuity. In 1848 there was a political clamour for retrenchment. "A general impression seems to prevail", wrote Romilly, Chairman of the Board of Audit at the time, "that in order to meet a deficient revenue our civil establishments ought to be reduced; and as, in the present state of European politics, the army and the navy are considered sacred, the Civil Service is to be made the scapegoat, and consolidation and reductions are in every one's mouth. But is it so certain that public offices are paid too much? May not the real evil be that they do too little? . . . If the present staff be inadequate from incompetency to carry on the public business, will half that same incompetent staff succeed better? The truth is that we are beginning at the wrong end. Our establishments should first be made efficient, and then they may be reduced."

The expansion of government business, the reforms of Oxford and Cambridge, pressure from middle-class parents and schoolmasters, the experience of Indian administration and the disquieting lessons of 1848—all combined to drive home the need for searching reform. "The revolutionary period of 1848 gave us all a shake", explained Sir Charles Trevelyan to the Playfair Commission on the Civil Service, "and one of the consequences was a remarkable series of investigations into public offices." These extended over five years and culminated in the 1853 Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service, a twenty-page document which projected, with remarkable foresight, the lines of future development; inter alia, a unified service under Treasury control, the substitution of open, competitive examinations for patronage, the grading of work and entrants, and the setting up of an independent Civil Service Commission. This report surveyed an almost insignificantly small group by present-day standards, though

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

contemporaries spoke of it as a sprawling octopus. The Census of 1851 disclosed nearly 18,000 officials, some 17,500 postmen, inferior revenue officers and the like, and 14,500 artificers and labourers in crown employment. Not more than 5,000 of them earned over £100 a year. Appointment to central offices was by patronage exercised either by ministers or heads of departments, with a strong tradition that members of parliament should influence the allocation of local posts. By this time, patronage had outlived its usefulness as an aristocratic privilege and had become a tiresome burden on politicians and civil servants. In the first weeks of office as Prime Minister, Peel had spent six hours of every day writing to applicants for government posts. Addington, a past under-secretary at the Foreign Office, thought the time had come to shelter members of parliament and departmental heads from "the almost irresistible attacks of constituents and supporters with which they often unwillingly and from necessity comply".

This system, qualified, indeed, in most offices by a cursory examination of the nominee's handwriting and a nominal three months' probation, had filled the public service with "those whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed in the open professions . . . those whom indolence of temperament or physical infirmities unfit for active exertions. . . . The comparative lightness of the work, and the certainty of provision in case of retirement owing to bodily incapacity, furnish strong inducements to the parents and friends of sickly youths to endeavour to obtain for them employment in the service of the government." Sir James Stephen, a distinguished under-secretary for the Colonial Department whose thirty-five years of experience of Whitehall had earned him the title of Mr. Mothercountry, described the character of the majority of civil servants: "With an occasional exception, they all had the manners, the feelings, and the characteristic principles of gentlemen." Nevertheless, two-thirds of them were "persons of whose official character nothing but obligation would induce me to speak at all. [They] possessed only in a low degree, and some of them in a degree almost indescribably low, . . . the talents . . . required for the effective performance of their appropriate functions." They "usually entered the office at the age of eighteen or nineteen, coming directly from school, and bringing with them no greater store of information, or maturity of mind, than usually belongs to a boy in the fifth form at Eton,

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: 1850-1950

Winchester, or Rugby. What they so brought they never afterwards increased. . . ." "How comes it that such persons are appointed at all?" asked the despairing chairman of a board. "I have been twelve years the member of a board, and during that period not one candidate has ever been rejected; and only one, who was wholly incapable, was, with difficulty, induced to resign, after a still greater difficulty on the part of the board to say that they would reject him if he did not." It was impossible to run an office with, or to discipline "men who have been appointed to gratify the political, the domestic, or the personal feelings of their patrons". The most senior posts went to outsiders. There were not more than half a dozen appointments to under-secretaryships with from £1,750 to £2,500, from within the service in fifteen years. The most an aspiring nominee could expect was an average of £250 a year for his first quarter of a century, £550 in his fifties and the remote possibility of £1,000 a year if his luck held and his superiors died in time. Adequate, even princely to some, the rewards did not attract competence and ability. Efficient, and therefore cheap, government demanded a new type of official.

The solution advanced by Trevelyan and Northcote, and finally accepted in 1855, though not fully operated until later, was to relate the expanding and differentiated needs of official business to the realities of the contemporary social and educational structure. Patronage warred with efficiency; for it they substituted open, competitive examinations. Departmental work was to be separated into mechanical and intellectual duties and a different class of official recruited for each. For the superior posts, the examination was to be "on a level with the highest education in the country"; for the inferior, correspondingly lower attainments. Middle-class schoolmasters and dons were delighted to find another use for their methods and a wider market for their products. Contemporary discussion immediately fastened on the consequences of reform for the social composition of the Civil Service. Would the filter of examinations be sufficiently sensitive to extract the social dross from the flow of applicants? "One apprehension expressed as an objection against the proposed measures", wrote Chadwick in a judicious comment, "is, that those who will succeed best in competition, will be persons not of the higher, but of the lower conditions of life. . . . It is also objected that, although more ability may be obtained, this elevation of the Service in ability will have the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

"It was Mr. Attlee's broadcast, rather than the declaration of a 'state of emergency', . . . which did the trick.

"The inner council of the strike committee came to the conclusion that Mr. Attlee's appeal to the loyalties of the port workers would be almost certain to create a split in the ranks. . . .

"By taking the decision we did to-day we avoided a trap set for us in Mr. Attlee's speech. By avoiding it we have taken the men back on our own initiative as we brought them out, and the committee will be prepared, should the emergency arise again, to take further action."

Of a piece with this is the presentation of strikes, where possible, as lockouts, as well as the use of other tactical devices to which counter-argument, however reasonable, is never a convincing answer.

How far have the Communists come to dominate or control the unofficial organization? By the time of the zinc-oxide strike the Communist "line" had shifted decisively into opposition to the leadership of organized labour, and political influence on this and subsequent strikes was the more confidently alleged. Mr. Attlee referred, in the broadcast already mentioned,* to the activities of a group—"not people of great influence but just a small nucleus who have been instructed for political reasons to take advantage of every little disturbance that takes place to cause the disruption of British economy"—but it is not clear how strong their influence was. More than one "nucleus" seems to have been interested: the Trotskyites "joined in with a provocative pamphlet",† and according to the *Economist*‡ there had been several rumours that backing for the strike leaders had not all come from Communist sources.

The Times, while making clear that the strike had not been started by Communists, said that "extremists have been steadily strengthening their hold upon the *ad hoc* organization that has been set up".§ There were certainly some changes in the composition of the strike committee; two members who left it declared that "it was now almost entirely dominated by Communists and fellow-travellers", but were in turn accused by the committee of having left "because they were not allowed to pursue political ends" (allegations which are not incompatible). In answer to a similar accusation by Mr. Deakin that the original

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: 1850-1950

for good relations between Whitehall and the provinces. It took a generation to discover that specialist knowledge inhibited general administrative ability. But the professionalization of the service had begun. Henceforth all civil servants are patterned to a likeness and become, with doctors, lawyers and others, members of a recognizable professional group. The measure of the change is easily seen in a comparison between the army, till the twentieth century a jealously guarded object of royal patronage, and the Civil Service: the former, until recent years, supporting in its organization a crude Marxian view of English society split between gentlefolk and the great unwashed; the other, firmly linked to an hierarchical educational system, reflecting in miniature the subtle divisions and delicate balance of an increasingly complex social structure.

The many changes since the Trevelyan-Northcote Report have not altered this fundamental characteristic. Mr. Dale, himself once a senior official, has sketched the Civil Service journey to work in the years immediately before the war of 1939. Standing in Whitehall between 9.45 and 10.45 a.m., an observer would see "the gradations of the official hierarchy exhibited in a curious combination of persons and times. For the first quarter of an hour or twenty minutes the streets are crowded with men and women, mostly young, on the whole healthy and intelligent in appearance, neatly but not as a rule smartly dressed—a picked sample of the great class loosely known as the 'lower middle class', solid, decent, kindly, trustworthy. . . . They represent almost entirely the lower ranks of the civil service—typist, junior executive and clerical officers, assistant accountants, junior technicians, and so forth. . . . For the following ten minutes or so there will be visible a much smaller, less hurried, and predominately masculine procession. These are the N.C.Os. and junior commissioned officers of the civilian army—higher clerical and executive officers, assistant principals and principals, and men holding fairly responsible technical appointments. The half-hour from 10.15 to 10.45 a.m. is the time when the potentates of the service may usually be seen walking briskly, but without undignified haste, to the places of power. They are practically all men of mature age, from forty to sixty or sixty-five, of good and sometimes fine physique (far better on the whole than the ten o'clock crowd, allowance being made for difference in age), well dressed in a quiet style. To an eye used to distinguish the grades of English

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

society, most of them will appear at once for what they are able, cultivated men of the upper middle class."

War has altered the picture merely in inessentials, and a Victorian would be surprised only by the presence of women. He would be familiar with the social gradings of civil servants and would have difficulty in recognizing a new century until it passed from Whitehall to Parliament Square. The widening gap between the social backgrounds and experience of cabinet ministers and senior officials emphasizes and results from the rapidity of change in politics and the conservative pressure of professionalization in administration. Open competitive examinations have all but limited entry into the administrative grade to those whose status has enabled them to pass from a narrow range of schools into the universities. They established, in effect, a new and more highly selective form of patronage. Doubtless this is partially mitigated by a limited number of promotions from the lower grades and by widening educational opportunities that, on present showing, may provide equal access in a remote future. Must the working-class boy or girl wait until the educational millennium for an equal chance with middle-class children to become administrators of policies initiated by a working-class movement? The question has more than rhetorical significance. Seen in the perspective of a hundred years, the problems of recruitment and promotion again have assumed decisive importance. Just as the undermining of aristocratic England gave point and urgency to the reforms of the fifties, so now, whether we wish to recognize it or not, the passing of middle-class England raises analogous issues. The structure of the Civil Service of Mr. Dale's description was designed to carry out the policies of governments whose maximum was that government is best that governs least. The scope of government has not merely increased; it has altogether changed in character. We have moved from the negative to the positive state; we measure our freedoms by the range of collective provision and action. The term "public servant" is no longer a synonym for "civil servant". We have our central and local government services, and we are breeding a new race of administrators in the public corporations. Our problem is to co-ordinate the public services, to establish mobility of personnel between them and thus widen the experience behind administrative action. Sir Edward Bridges, in his recent Rede Lecture, sees in the acceptance and slow adaptation of what he calls departmental

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: 1850-1950

philosophies, themselves "the expression of the long continuity of experience which can be one of the strongest qualities of an institution", the essence of a civil servant's work. Distilled experience that is relevant to real problems is clearly valuable. To make adherence to it the essence of administrative function may well prevent the vital task of fresh and vigorous thinking.

UNESCO AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE

By WALTER H. C. LAVES*

IN the light of the deepening world crisis and the continuing danger of war, the unresolved question of Unesco's proper role in United Nations affairs becomes an urgent and crucial issue which should be resolved once for all by the General Conference of Unesco meeting in Paris in June, 1951. As the one agency of the United Nations created for the specific purpose of contributing to peace and security through education, science, and culture, it should play a central role in the total effort of the United Nations to achieve and maintain peace.

Actually, Unesco has thus far played only a minor part in this task, although it has undertaken a wide variety of activities in the fields of education, science, and culture that are in themselves interesting and valuable. The degree to which the coming Paris Conference can succeed in focusing the work of Unesco directly upon the task of contributing to peace and security will not only affect the prospects for achieving and maintaining peace; it will also determine whether the people of the United Nations must find some other agency to perform the highly important function set forth in Unesco's constitution.

The question of Unesco's relation to the achievement and maintenance of peace has from the start been a source of confusion and disagreement in the General Conference, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat. It has even been argued by responsible members of these bodies that it is not Unesco's task at all to contribute to the achievement of peace, as the constitution explicitly provides, but rather to enrich the peace, if

* Mr. Laves was the former Deputy Director-General of Unesco, 1947-50. He is now Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and when it comes. Indeed, an examination of Unesco's programme will reveal how deep-seated and effective this belief has become.

To citizens concerned that means be found for achieving and maintaining peace within the United Nations framework, as well as to students of politics interested in the working of the United Nations system, the reasons for Unesco's uncertain position and inadequate action are particularly important. The first reason is that Unesco's purpose has been obscured and confused by the constitution itself, which declares that the organization exists to contribute to peace and security through education, science, and culture, but then gives plausible (though not in my judgment adequate) justification for activities that merely promote education, science, and culture for their own sake. The second reason is that member governments in the General Conference have further confused the situation by new interpretations that go beyond the constitution, and have voted programmes consisting of a mass of activities generally unrelated to the achievement of peace and security.

One must read the full text of Article I of the constitution, which defines Unesco's purpose, to understand how the organization could have been deflected so far from its constitutional purpose.

"Article I. Purposes and Functions"

"1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

"2. To realize this purpose the Organization will:

- "(a) collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image;
 - "(b) give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture, by collaborating with Members, at their request, in the development of educational activities;
 - "(c) maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge, by assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions;
- by encouraging co-operation among the nations in all branches of

UNESCO AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE

intellectual activity, including the international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information;

by initiating methods of international co-operation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them.

"3. With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of this Organization, the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction."

The meaning of Article I is clearly that Unesco has *one* purpose (that stated in Section 1) that shall be pursued *by means of* the activities listed in Section 2, but only insofar as these activities do in fact contribute to peace and security. (Note the opening clause of Section 2: "To realize this purpose [singular] the Organization will".) It has been claimed, however, that it is the intention of Article I to identify as intrinsic contributions to peace and security all the activities enumerated in Section 2, and thus to authorize the Organization to pursue these activities without questioning their relative effectiveness in terms of the stated purpose.

It will immediately be seen in what totally different directions these two interpretations carry the Organization. Not only are different types of programme called for under the two interpretations, but also basically different kinds of structure and personnel for the Secretariat. Criteria to be applied in programme building according to the one approach are hardly applicable according to the other, and appraisals of the Organization's effectiveness call for completely different standards of evaluation.

To date the governments of member states have permitted the second interpretation to have wide influence in the formulation of the policy and programme of Unesco. Indeed, the annual General Conference of government delegates has regularly voted programmes that reflect considerable uncertainty as to the intention of the constitution. The last General Conference, held in Florence in June, 1950, illustrated most dramatically the confusion that has resulted from this uncertainty. The Conference had before it a series of pleas from the Director-General (at one point dramatized by his resignation) and from some delegations to achieve greater concentration in the programme and to relate

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Unesco's work more closely to that of the United Nations. Its response was to attempt to redefine the purpose of the Organization by vastly increasing Unesco's task to include the "advancing . . . of the common welfare of mankind"* and by asserting that according to the constitution all Unesco activities "must be directed towards the peace and prosperity of mankind, within the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".† In fact, Article I, "Purposes and Functions", of the constitution does not mention the general welfare or prosperity, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not signed until long after Unesco's constitution had been adopted.

The General Conference then proceeded to identify "three main fields of work",‡ ten "main tasks",§ and seven "main ideas"|| to guide Unesco and voted a programme consisting of a Basic Programme, a Programme for 1951, a programme of activities in Germany and Japan, a Resolution on Technical Assistance for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries, a Statement of Methods, and a number of general Resolutions including one on a World Friendship Flag for children and a friendship postage stamp.

Although it instructed the Director-General and the Executive Board to carry out the programme of 1950 and 1951 "in the most effective and concentrated manner possible", the Conference still voted the 1951 programme as a series of separate programmes in education, natural sciences, social sciences, cultural activities, exchange of persons, mass communication, and relief services. This compartmentalization naturally precludes focusing upon objectives designed to contribute to peace and security. It even prevents directing work toward the main "tasks" and "ideas" which the Conference spelled out in such detail to explain the programme to the public.

Given the obscurity of the constitution that has provided plausible ground for evading the central responsibility and given the uncertainty and lack of direction of the General Conference, it is not surprising that Unesco's programme has consisted of a vast number of activities lacking in precise orientation toward making a calculated contribution to the attainment of peace in the foreseeable future.

A fair description of the present programme emerges from the recent analysis by the first Director-General, Julian Huxley, of

* *Records of the General Conference, Fifth Session, Florence, 1950*, p. 15. † *Ibid.*, p. 61.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 15. § *Ibid.*, p. 65. || *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 23.

UNESCO AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE

the internal conflict that has plagued Unesco since the days of the Preparatory Commission meeting in London.

" . . . One school of thought wished to judge Unesco's programme by its direct and immediate contribution to peace in the present, the other laid stress on the indirect but indispensable contribution of education, science, and culture to the peaceful one world of the future.

"The former accordingly believed that Unesco could and should play a certain political role, and be concerned with peace in the essentially negative sense of preventing the outbreak of wars. The latter felt that this task could only properly be undertaken by a primarily political organization—in this case the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular—and that the peace which Unesco could promote was what Archibald MacLeish called positive peace: the business of fuller living in a world from which the threat of war has been banished. However, in doing this, they went on to argue, Unesco might be making an indirect contribution to political peace—for instance, by aiding in the removal of the inequalities of opportunity which are among the tensions leading to unrest and war." (*Manchester Guardian*, August 10th, 1950.)

Under the influence of this second conception, the Unesco programme has been divided almost in the manner of a university curriculum into areas of knowledge: education, natural science, social science, philosophy and humanistic studies, arts and letters, museums, historical monuments, libraries and documentation, copyright (the last seven combined under the title of "cultural activities"), exchange of persons, mass communications, relief assistance, and technical assistance. Under each of these Unesco seeks to promote professional co-operation and the increased development and diffusion of knowledge. Only in the social sciences programmes and in a portion of the education and mass communications programme is there a deliberate and calculated effort to contribute to peace and security except in the very remote future and by the most indirect means.

Without in any way underestimating the intrinsic value of the kinds of educational, scientific, and cultural activities Unesco has largely promoted to date, it is highly questionable whether these do in fact contribute to peace and security in the sense in which the constitution defines Unesco's single purpose. There is grave doubt whether the general maintenance, development, or diffusion of knowledge is likely to affect favourably the prospects for peace and security in this world.

The seriousness of the world crisis and the magnitude of the educational task to be done to provide the foundation for a

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

peaceful United Nations community demand that Unesco concentrate now upon activities that can increase the prospect for achieving and maintaining peace.

A programme so oriented would include some of the present activities, but it would be completely different in emphasis and tempo as well as in scope. It should include four principal areas of work. A positive programme that would contribute directly to peace and security requires first of all considerably more knowledge than is now available concerning the causes of war and the conditions required for peace. So great is the lack of real facts that almost any action undertaken now by Unesco proceeds more or less blindly upon untested assumptions, and may or may not actually contribute to peace.

The research programme would seek to mobilize the resources of education, science, and culture insofar as they can throw light upon (1) the causes of war and the conditions required for peace, and (2) the methods whereby the causes of war can be removed and the conditions for peace established. Research of this kind is not altogether new to Unesco. The so-called Tensions Project, which seeks to find out more about the nature and significance, as causes of war, of a wide range of social tensions, and the project on studies of international co-operation, which seeks to find ways of strengthening the institutions of the United Nations, provide a solid basis upon which to proceed.

More needs to be known concerning the basic knowledge and the attitudes required by men and women in all countries for making decisions that will contribute to peace and security. What are the rational understandings needed, both by ordinary citizens and by officials, if the policies they support and the decisions they take on public questions are to carry us toward the desired goal of peace? We also need more knowledge about the unconscious or non-rational influences that affect decisions related to peace. We need to know more about the ways in which both the rational and the non-rational factors can be influenced by activities that fall within Unesco's orbit.

Research can also help evaluate or measure the effect of Unesco's activities. Objective evaluations of this kind, for which techniques have been developed by social scientists, have been successfully employed by governments and by private industry where they are increasingly regarded as an essential element in the development of programmes undertaken with a view to producing specific results. For Unesco, such evaluation studies are

UNESCO AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE

not only desirable to insure the effectiveness of its work; they are indispensable in view of the small budget within which it must work.

While research is under way, Unesco can proceed with three kinds of activities which are aimed precisely to influence the prospects for peace and security in the foreseeable future. The *first* would aim to reach the people who to-day have a part in the making of political decisions that can affect the course of world events toward the maintenance of peace. The people to be reached first of all are those in countries that are most influential in world affairs, and within these countries they are the people in positions of power or in a position to influence those with power. The objective would be to give these people the knowledge and attitudes required for making intelligent decisions. The *second* would aim to raise the educational levels of those countries whose present educational institutions and facilities are inadequate to insure a high enough level of literacy to support effective democratic systems of government. In these countries literacy campaigns must precede efforts to provide people with the understandings and attitudes conducive to peace. The *third* would aim to increase the international flow of information, since this is a prerequisite to the exercise of intelligent influence and to the raising of educational standards.

The general scope of the programmes in these three parts is indicated in the following paragraphs:

1. The objective of the programme intended to reach those who can influence decisions should be to ensure that they have the required knowledge of world affairs to act in a manner consistent with peace, and to encourage action that will in fact promote peace. Instead of promoting what is vaguely called "international understanding", Unesco should promote knowledge of certain elementary facts that public opinion needs for making intelligent decisions on public policy. Five understandings may be suggested here as illustrative.

(a) War anywhere endangers everyone.

People must understand that peace cannot be assured to any part of the world if war or the threat of war exists anywhere else. For this reason, citizens of every nation should learn to view with concern any use or threatened use of force for national purposes, even though it takes place in some remote corner of the world. The revolution in time and space relations between nations, caused by modern technology as applied to all forms of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

It is due to the memory of Bernard Shaw to reveal the part which he played in founding *The Political Quarterly*. Without his generous financial assistance and encouragement it might not have been possible to start the review at all. At any rate it could not have been launched in January, 1930, when the first number actually appeared.

The story of Shaw's relations with this review must be told as a personal narrative, since so far as I am aware I was the only person who had any dealings with him on the matter. I would add that in 1949 I obtained his permission to publish the correspondence, the intention then being to print an article describing the founding of *The Political Quarterly* as an introduction to a consolidated index of the issues from 1930 to 1950—a project which unfortunately had to be abandoned owing to the high cost of printing.

I

Some time in 1927 a few of the younger and more active Fabians began to entertain the idea of starting a serious political review in which to discuss progressive ideas at adequate length. We felt the lack of a review concentrating on the political field; all the existing monthly or quarterly reviews were either quite general in their interests or Conservative in outlook, with the possible exception of the *Contemporary Review*, which reflected right-wing Liberal opinion. We wanted an organ to serve as a forum for the evolution of a philosophy and a programme for the Socialist movement, which was then stumbling and fumbling along with growing strength but devoid of any coherent body of ideas. Above all, we wanted to build a bridge between the world of thought and the world of action: in particular, between the universities and those engaged in politics or government.

I discovered quite soon that Kingsley Martin, then an assistant lecturer in political science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, had arrived at the same conclusions as I had on the need for a political review, and was prepared to

• policies and action of the United Nations. Although the adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been achieved, no member of the United Nations has a record of observing all the rights to which it subscribes. This is not surprising, and the main value of the Declaration lies still in the standard and goal it sets. But the achievement of the goal requires a positive campaign for the education of public opinion in all countries that are members of the United Nations.

(e) The U.N. is indispensable to-day.

Finally, an understanding of the indispensability of the United Nations and its specialized agencies is a requisite for intelligent citizenship. Unless this is understood, people may yet fail to see how much is at stake when its authority—that is, the common will of its members—is challenged. But it is also necessary to understand that successful action by the United Nations requires of its members methods of conduct that are different from those of the days of independent national diplomacy. No nation can carry out its foreign policies without consulting others. All national policies affecting the welfare and security of other peoples must continually be examined in terms of their consistency with membership in the United Nations. All nations must be prepared to support with all their resources, the common will expressed in U.N. decisions, even to the point of military action.

Although the above formulations are offered merely by way of illustration, some such body of ideas should form the substance of Unesco's programme addressed to those whose attitudes can affect the prospects for world peace. The promotion of these ideas will call for the use of all the means and media at Unesco's disposal, and they should form the constant frame of reference for all the activities in this part of Unesco's programme. Beginning with the pre-school influences upon children, educational programmes should be developed to reach every level of education, including the universities. By all available means, Unesco should attempt to reach teachers, curricula, textbooks, and research activities, and, through these, the minds of students.

Outside the formal educational system, the several media designed to reach mass audiences, primarily of adults, should be used in the most imaginative and purposeful manner possible. Press, film, radio, television, libraries, museums and theatres, all are means through which to promote the ideas and attitudes that Unesco believes are important prerequisites to the kind of action

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

that will further the prospects for peace. The campaign must reflect a deliberately adopted tempo and strategy, both for the purpose of bringing about changes in the attitudes and actions of specific and selected people as quickly as possible, and to ensure the most efficient use of Unesco's small financial resources.

2. The *second* would aim to raise the educational levels of those countries whose present educational facilities are inadequate to support effective democratic systems of government. In these countries, literacy campaigns are a pre-requisite to providing people with the understandings and attitudes conducive to peace, but such campaigns must comprise also positive programmes to further *political* literacy.

Though the raising of educational levels must, in some cases, precede the programmes by which Unesco wishes to provide knowledge and attitudes outlined above, the two objectives should not be rigidly separated. Even the most elementary programmes to combat illiteracy should include from the beginning the objective of providing the newly literate with the attitudes and understandings that will help them in the making of decisions that will contribute to peace. It would be short-sighted to promote extensive literacy campaigns without careful attention to the uses to be made of the newly gained freedom from illiteracy and ignorance. Without an orientation of the newly literate to the assumption of civic responsibilities, their new freedom may become more a liability than an asset to peace, since they may succumb to various kinds of propaganda that lead in the opposite direction. In short, their literacy programmes are to no avail unless aimed at achieving *political* literacy.

Unesco has made a beginning toward raising educational levels in its so-called fundamental education programme, as is evident from the plans for 1951. In this programme, however, neither tempo nor the strategy are of a kind to produce the results of increasing political literacy, although the teacher training institute located in Mexico appears to be conceived in terms broad enough to effect a reduction in illiteracy.

3. The *third* part of the programme should be concerned with increasing the flow of information across all international boundaries. Its objective should be first of all to remove the obstacles to this flow. This can be done by some of the methods already contained in the mass communications programme, but efforts should be more concentrated and adequate resources allotted so that objectives are reached quickly and visible results attained.

UNESCO AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE

For example, the so-called Technical Needs Surveys, through which basic information is collected on the availability of equipment and resources for press, radio, and films, should have been completed in one year so that the data collected from various countries would be comparable and so that the next steps could be taken—the improvement of facilities on the basis of up-to-date information. In fact, the surveys have been spread out over five years.

Unesco should also concern itself, within the framework of a world campaign, with the inadequacy of the present mechanism and content of international news dissemination. Most of the world's population receives only the most fragmentary news from outside their own countries, and as a consequence are lacking in the basic information for making intelligent judgments or decisions. The absence of adequate channels and services constitutes an important barrier also to that part of Unesco's own programme of education that relies upon the mass media.

The purpose of the suggested programme outlined above is to make the most direct contribution possible to peace and security. It begins with a basic research programme to ensure that what is done will indeed make such a contribution. It proposes an action programme with a limited focus and always subject to reorientation if this seems indicated on the basis of further research and evaluation. The action programme has precise objectives that permit the achievement and measurement of results.

Unesco has to date very largely failed to reach the people of its member states. A number of factors have contributed to this failure, but the principal reason has been the absence of a sense of urgency in the Conference resolutions and consequently a lack of preoccupation with the techniques needed to reach people. The mailing of questionnaires and results of expert meetings to governments and to special interest groups has been considered too often as an adequate discharge of responsibility. The printing of pamphlets on a wide variety of interesting subjects, but distributed only to the extent of perhaps 5,000 to 20,000 copies to governments, has been substituted for discovering ingenious ways of reaching the masses of people in whose hands rests ultimate political power. Even carefully conceived and well planned undertakings such as teachers' training seminars have hardly reached, in their effect, beyond the few hundred who may have attended personally.

Many activities now being carried on, notably in natural

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

sciences, cultural activities, and relief assistance, do not seem to have any direct relation to the purpose of Unesco as here described. One may regret that certain activities whose inherent or abstract value arouses interest, should be eliminated. Yet the choice that is now required in Unesco does not permit the retention of items unrelated to Unesco's purpose. To retain them would endanger Unesco's performance of its main task.

The suggestions made here do not imply that Unesco should attempt to replace the U.N. as the organization to deal with current crises. It does, however, mean that Unesco should change its focus from the dim, distant and uncertain future to making whatever contribution it can at the earliest possible moment. If Unesco will make a clear decision that its function is to make direct contributions to peace and security, and if this decision is reflected in the Secretariat's execution as well as in the Conference's planning of its programme, the organization can still play its proper and important role as a positive force for peace within the United Nations system. The decision that is now required can be taken only in the General Conference of government delegates. It was the governments who drafted and adopted the constitution. It has been the governments who have voted the programme at each General Conference. Only the governments can clarify Unesco's role to-day, and this they will do only if they see the potential significance of Unesco in the U.N. system. Once the importance of its potential role is understood, it will be apparent that full support of the U.N. requires full mobilization of the resources of Unesco for the achievement and maintenance of peace.

ITALY: EAST OR WEST?

By NINETTA S. JUCKER

THE post-war story of Italy could be divided into two periods, the first characterized by British, the second by American domination. The years of Allied Military Government and of the Armistice Control Commission saw a far greater number of American than British personnel in Italy, but for various reasons political initiative was kept principally in British hands and it was the British who set the tone of the occupation. There is a literature on this period in the United States, many of whose war correspondents were moved, on their return, to write books on Italy. Most of these writers are critical, not altogether without cause, of British intentions and behaviour in Italy, but they also pass strictures on the lack of foresight and decision in the policies and methods of their own government. Few of them, however, were able at such close range to perceive that joint Allied action was creating a crisis in Italian orientation, the consequences of which are still unpredictable. Still less did they realize that the twin Italian problems of poverty and corruption will never be solved by the simple process of restoring the apparatus of democratic government and ministering economic relief.

If Americans have written much and sharply about British influence in Italy, on the period of their own economic domination it is not easy to find anything critical published in the United States. (By that time the war correspondents had been transferred to other zones; their successors do not seem to belong to the same class of journalism.) Official publications on the functioning of the Marshall Plan are plentiful, but these are naturally self-congratulatory and reassuring, even when, as sometimes happens, the conclusions reached are not supported by the evidence of the many complicated sets of statistics which the American commissions have published. Local E.C.A. officials, with salaries grotesquely out of proportion to the cost of living in Italy, have no interest in being critical or pessimistic, but American political personalities visiting the country, including the various E.C.A. chiefs, have often been dismayed at the discovery of an economic and social set-up which they had imagined E.R.P. and the restoration of democracy must already have reversed.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

In England the impression received of social and economic conditions and of the political situation varies according to the colour of the press. Conservative and "independent" papers praise the progress made, under the leadership of Einaudi and de Gaspari, towards economic recovery and political stability. A note of ironic doubt sometimes penetrates from the liberal press. The left-wing papers interpret the land seizures in the south and centre and the industrial agitation in the north as symptoms of a growing state of general, spontaneous, and homogeneous exasperation at social injustice, so acute that it cannot much longer be kept in check. Faced with such contrasting pictures, it is easy for the Englishman, used to the play of party rhetoric on domestic issues, to assume that truth probably lies about halfway between the two extremes, that things in Italy are neither so hopeful nor so desperate as they are painted, and that the gradual return of the country to normal international status will be accompanied by a corresponding recovery of internal equilibrium.

Actually the economic, social, and political situation in Italy represents an artificial and precarious balance which, in the event of war or of the cessation of American aid, must, unless a radical change in the policies of the Italian, the United States, and the British governments takes place, swing heavily to the left, or rather to the east, for the attraction in this case is geographic, i.e. military and economic, rather than ideological.

From the memoirs and official documents which have been published since the end of the war, it is now clear that up to the very moment of invasion, and indeed even after the Italian campaign had begun, the Allies had not decided what line they were to take in Italy either from a military, or, much less, from a political point of view. The Americans in particular were inhibited by Roosevelt's promises to the Italo-American minority that the Italian people should not be treated as an enemy nation. It has been said that the Allies could not decide whether to disarm the Italians or make use of them in the prosecution of the war. In the Cold War a similar equivocation persists, but whereas in the years 1943-5 the Allies made a serious psychological error in distrusting the Italians, to-day they would be equally mistaken to take for granted that the non-communist part of Italy is on their side.

It might be argued that in 1943-5 Italian action and Italian sympathies made little difference to the ultimate fortunes of war

ITALY: EAST OR WEST ?

To-day, however, it is by no means certain that the same would be the case. Italy's geographical position in a conflict between East and West might be more significant than it was during the last war. There is also an important political factor to bear in mind—namely, the presence of the Vatican on Italian territory. Even should the Atlantic Powers decide not to defend the country, it is clear that no occupation of Italy from the east could take place without profoundly affecting the rest of Catholic Western Europe. Unlike Spain, Italy is not on the margin of Europe.

Although British and American official attitudes towards Italy appear to be based primarily on strategic considerations, neither of these powers has made it plain—presumably because, as in 1943, they have not yet decided—whether Italy is to be included or left outside their lines of defence, whose strategic centre appears to be located elsewhere. To put it bluntly, as it has been put here by the press (the liberal-Catholic press, not the communist), the Italians do not know whether they are to be defended or liberated, and General Eisenhower's confabulations with Pacciardi and the Italian High Command have served rather to increase than to dissipate the doubt. Is Italy, in the event of war, to be left to a fate like that of Czechoslovakia in 1939, or do the western powers intend to defend all or part of her national territory?

The Italians do not suppose that they are expected to defend this themselves with the quarter of a million troops allowed them by the peace treaty (and not at present complete). From a purely military point of view nothing could be more absurd than the Italian Government's *empressement* to join the Atlantic Pact while the treaty is still in force. Not only are the Italians unable to prepare adequately, but the treaty, by handing over to Yugoslavia the old strategic defence points on the Carso, above Gorizia, and in the Julian Alps, now become potential bases of attack, has opened the gateway to the Po Valley to the Slavs. Italians make no fine distinctions between Tito and Stalin in this matter, for they greatly fear that Italy might well be the point over which these two could come to terms. (Still less do they believe in the possibility of Yugoslav resistance to Russia.) As for defending the access to the plains of the Po, which extend from the mouth of the Isonzo almost to the French frontier, a few American divisions, unused to mountain warfare, will hardly be able to do so, while for the Italians the battle of the Piave was a

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

miracle which has about as much chance of being repeated to-day as the miracle of the Marne had in 1940.

Italian adherence to the Atlantic Pact signifies therefore mere political speculation on the part of groups or individuals who have decided to play the card of national or personal prestige. It has been suggested in this connection that de Gaspari, in order to get Italy admitted to the United Nations, may try to imitate Cavour's famous gesture of sending Piedmontese troops to fight in the Crimean War. The man in the street in Italy does not easily see the connection between Atlantic Pact and Mediterranean, and fears that Italy's role in a new conflict might well be very similar to what it was in the last war—namely, a place in which the contending parties may wear each other out indefinitely while preparing the real issue elsewhere.

The effect of this situation on Italian psychology is disastrous. The conviction that war, if not inevitable, is at least possible, and the fear of being once again exposed to the same sequence of events as in the past—what the French have called the infernal cycle: invasion, occupation, bombing, landing, liberation—makes the price of American aid seem heavy and renders Italians sceptical of the good intentions behind it. In consequence, they tend to view the situation cynically and with the determination to make all possible profit from it, personal and collective, while the going is good; a determination reinforced by the perception that the Marshall Plan has done nothing, and indeed contemplates no serious attempt to make Italy an integral part of western economy.

While strategy is undoubtedly the mainspring of British and American policies in Italy, it is obvious that the country itself has not been assigned a place of first importance in western plans. But Soviet policy in Italy has also a strategic basis. It has not been sufficiently observed outside the country that the strikes and disorders in the industrial areas in the north last winter, particularly the disturbances at Modena and Turin, did not merely represent organized reaction to the Atlantic Pact, but had also a purely military significance as experiments or rehearsals for a rising in the event of invasion from the north-east.

A too optimistic belief in the possibility of playing off Tito against Stalin may be one of the reasons which prevent London and Washington from fully appreciating the political-strategic possibilities of Italy in an eventual conflict between east and

ITALY: EAST OR WEST?

west. Another reason would seem to be an unwarranted confidence in the inflexibility of the Vatican on the anti-communist side. It is not easy to appreciate correctly either the nature, the extent, or the limitations of Vatican influence in Italian politics. To do so requires experience of Catholicism at its centre. One of the most caustic wits in Italy, Gaetano Salvemini, once said that so long as there is a Protestant in the world the Pope will have some one to defend him. To believe that the Vatican is putting all its eggs into the anti-communist basket betrays an essentially absolutist or puritanical turn of mind. It also denotes misunderstanding of the position of the Vatican in Italy and of the ties which bind it, at all events in its present form, inalienably to Italian soil.

One of the most remarkable historical phenomena of our time is the recovery and consolidation of the political influence of Catholicism in Europe and the Americas. It has been said that Catholicism is the religion of aristocrats and of the proletariat. The bourgeois with his optimistic progressive philosophy is out of place in the economy of the faith which knows only rich and poor. At least it is certain that Protestantism has lost somewhat of its ascendancy with the moral and intellectual decline of the middle classes, though cause and effect in this matter are probably inextricably involved. With regard to the Catholic revival, there are two points to be observed. First there has been a new political affirmation of Catholic minorities in non-Catholic countries, and, secondly, in the traditionally Catholic countries France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, etc.—the pro-clerical or Catholic interest has been greatly reinforced, with results which are not always happy for the democratic idea. This is not the place to discuss the influence of the Catholic vote on American policies, nor yet to determine how much of American action in Italy may be interpreted as the return of the boomerang from St. Peter's. What matters is that to-day in Italy the Papacy is at last on the point of reaping the fruits of a long and patient policy aimed at the reversal to its own advantage of the original separation between church and state. The Vatican, through its hold over the present government, its control of education, and its great economic influence, practically directs Italy. In no other country has it achieved so large a part of its programme. At the same time there is a historical necessity which makes it impossible for the Papacy and the Curia Romana, as at present constituted, to exist in any other country. It follows therefore that if Italy is

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to be left outside the defence lines of the Atlantic powers, if she is likely to be invaded from the east, and if there is uncertainty as to the ultimate victory of the west, the Vatican will seek to come to terms with Moscow. The conviction that these two, the Kremlin and the Vatican, can never come to terms is surely one of the fundamental errors which is being made to-day by the western Protestant powers.

It was Mussolini who invented the antithesis, Rome or Moscow. In fact, the conflict between these two is more artificial than fundamental and their principal tilting ground is not, as is usually supposed, in the Catholic zones behind the Iron Curtain, but in Rome itself, where the Italian Assemblies furnish an experimental arena. The conflict is not ideological. The sophistry about materialism could be cleared up in a moment if either side so wished. The church had prepared the ground for this at the time of the liberation, but thought better of it after the overwhelming victory of the Christian Democrats in the 1948 elections. It is political in the lowest and narrowest sense of the word; a question of manoeuvre and counter-move. Each side has everything to gain from the existence of this Cold War, for it is from the supposed strength of the other that each draws its own force.

No doubt the Vatican would prefer to remain in the western orbit, consolidating its enormous gains towards the creation of a church-state in Italy, and with the hope of extending the system to other countries. But the alliance between the church and the reactionary forces in Italy and in Europe, though natural, is not irrevocable. In Italy by a too blatant pursuit of political aims she is already in danger of losing her spiritual hold over part of the masses. In the face of superior necessity, she might well change her line of attack and drop the Christian Democrats as she dropped Don Sturzo and the Popular Party in 1925 and the fascists in the course of the war. Two things are certain where the Catholic Church is concerned: first, that for her no door is ever permanently closed, and, second, that the Vatican will never leave Italy unless it is driven out. And why should the Kremlin do that? Except very briefly in Spain, in circumstances which can hardly be taken as a precedent, communism has not yet been tried out in a Latin Catholic country. If it is to come to the west, it will hardly be in the same form as in the east.

The first weak point in Allied policies in Italy was the fail-

ITALY: EAST OR WEST?

either to assume or refute any clear military obligation towards her. The second was the failure to make her an integral part of western economy. The ostensible objects of E.R.P. are to increase productivity, to stabilize money, and to promote international exchanges. In Italy the second of these objects has been achieved, thanks to American help, in great measure at the expense of the first, since the fictitious value of the lira keeps cost prices too high for selling. The third object is hardly in the power of the western Allies to accomplish. Except to a very limited extent, Great Britain and the United States are not markets for Italian produce. These two saturated powers have an internal economy which is capable of little further expansion, and their first concern is necessarily the protection of their own industries. The same is true of France. Italy's natural markets are north and east of the Adriatic, in Germany and along the old trade routes of the Italian maritime republics. To-day Italy has little to sell in the west and small chance of getting a share of western markets. In the east, particularly in the Soviet Union, the population is increasing at a very different ratio from the west, and the standard of living is going up. There is an expanding market which is still far from saturation point and which is a potential pole of attraction for Italian trade.

Had Marshall Aid in Italy been accompanied by even a merely symbolic attempt to open up western markets to Italian produce and above all to facilitate emigration, it would not have looked to the Italians so much like a one-way street. Instead, the sending here of so many finished products has given the Plan an appearance of dumping and has suggested to the Italians, who are naturally suspicious of gifts, that its main object is to stave off an industrial crisis in the United States. The same suspicions are attached to the Atlantic Pact, and Italians fear that a government which is obliged to put its economy on a war footing in order to create artificial needs to keep up production and employment, will be driven by the "dynamics of war" to find a use for the arms it is producing. Whether or not this is a correct or an adequate appraisal of American policies, it is certainly the view which prevails in Italy (and elsewhere) and which determines the psychology of the Italian reaction to American aid.

By assuming the sole aspect of relief, instead of becoming an effective stimulus to trade, the Marshall Plan and its derivatives in Italy are condemned to be sterile. They are also condemned to be perpetual, for as soon as they stop Italy must necessarily turn

east. For this reason, in the hands of the political parties there they have inevitably become a weapon of blackmail to be levied both on the Italian Government and on that of the United States. They have also become the means to consolidate pre-established positions, industrial, commercial, and political.

Obsessed by the idea of returning to "normalcy", the Americans and the British overlooked the fact that the year 1938, which they took as their norm, represented something quite different for Italy than it did for themselves. "Normalcy" itself signified something different for all the parties concerned. To the British it meant the recovery of commercial supremacy (with socialism at home and order on the Continent). To the Americans it meant free enterprise for all, with America producing faster and cheaper than any one else. For Italy, if it has any meaning, it must be the return to the conditions which gave rise to and were exploited by fascism. In 1938 the "autarchic" economy of the fascist state had reached an advanced stage of bankruptcy with industrial production grossly over-protected and over-subsidised. Any attempt to "freeze" Italian economy at the pre-war level would therefore amount to the perpetuation of a gigantic bluff and the protection of interests which were constituted or consolidated under fascism and which are all too often in antithesis to the wellbeing of the country as a whole. In fact, Allied action in Italy from the very beginning tended to reinforce the same interests which had produced the phenomena of the last thirty years.

Perhaps the gravest mistake which the western powers made was the failure to realize that Italy could only become an active and efficient element in a system of western democracies if her social structure were substantially changed. In a country whose economy is partly retrograde the institutions of democracy, unless they are carefully supervised, are all too easily deflected from their proper functions to serve the pre-established interests of groups and individuals whose aims are invariably shortsighted, selfish, and anti-progressive. This is not the first time in the course of a century that Italians have had democracy "thrust upon 'em". In the eighteen-sixties and seventies, the period of the so-called Conquista Reggia, the Piedmontese bureaucracy sent its officials into central and southern Italy to plant there the machinery of modern constitutional government according to the nineteenth-century liberal model imported from England and France. The almost total absence in southern Italy of a

prosperous middle class with a high cultural and moral tradition caused this machinery very swiftly to become the monopoly and the instrument of local groups and individuals, who used it for the basest personal ends. So far from diminishing the power of the reactionary ruling classes, as its liberal supporters expected, representative government supplied them with new and more subtle ways of perpetuating their influence.

Something very similar has happened in Italy since the war. The introduction of a hybrid Anglo-American formula of democracy, often unrelated to local needs, has had the disappointing effect of consolidating the same interests as were dominant in the period whose traditions the legislators wished to efface. The result has been the re-emergence of two powerful groups, the one clerical, the other revolutionary, each the vehicle of a foreign influence, and between them the almost total crushing of democratic forces. This is so close a repetition of the pattern of political evolution in Italy from the unification to the coming of fascism that Italians, finding themselves once more in such a familiar situation, and discouraged by the turn of events at home and lack of comprehension abroad, have readily slipped back into the psychological grooves from which, at their liberation, they had momentarily succeeded in escaping.

Two facts principally determined the frustration of the *élan* with which they came forward to meet their liberation. These were the insistence of the Allies, under British direction, on the retention of the monarchy, and the failure of the National Liberation Committees in the north to set up at once a National Assembly of the Resistance. The retention of the monarchy while the war was still in progress meant that democracy in liberated Italy set off on the wrong foot. Under its covering protection, the reactionary elements were given time to entrench themselves in positions of defence from which they could no longer be ousted when the first elections were eventually held.

The ostensible British motive for maintaining the monarchy was the belief that the presence of the king would guarantee the loyalty of the army which might be useful to the Allies in the prosecution of the war. In fact, however, no use, or hardly any, was made of Italian regular forces, and though a number of battalions went over to the Allies, the partisan war was in no sense an expression of the army which remained on the whole, at all events in its cadres, predominantly fascist and anti-British. The Italian navy, on the other hand, had a tradition of British

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

many of the big strikes have been touched off by the stevedores, and T. & G.W.U. members have not been initially responsible. Yet if the T. & G.W.U. had been in control of its members, the strikes would not have meant much.

This seems particularly true of the Liverpool area, where the 1945 strike—which involved more than two-thirds of the national labour force—was complete, and where feeling against the Union developed rapidly. The strike had started in London (where a weeding-out of the register had already caused unrest) with a go-slow movement in the Surrey Docks in support of “a reasonable demand of no more than sixty men for a reasonable rate of pay for unloading pitprops”.* The settlement of this comparatively trivial question had been achieved before the strike assumed large proportions, but not before it had got under way. General anxiety about the future of decasualization, objections to anomalies of payment, the discharging and replacement of 500 men, the “withholding of books” from Liverpool dockers, added momentum to the strike, and it spread rapidly. Demands were put forward for a 40-hour week, for holidays with pay, for the abolition of piecework, and for a national day wage of 25s.; but it was not long before “the men’s grievances appear to have crystallized more against the union than the employers”.†

The Liverpool reports of the *Manchester Guardian* were eloquent of this:

“The vast majority of the dockers do not want to hear Mr. Donovan [the national secretary of the dockers’ section of the T. & G.W.U.], and the more radical of them make no secret of their intention to howl him down. This antagonism towards their own union . . . is no sudden development. . . . Indeed, a list of union ‘failures’ has been compiled. One striker said ‘Because their hands are tied is always their explanation for their own inaction. They have become our masters instead of our servants’ ” (October 5th, 1945).

The chairman of the Liverpool strike committee, after denying that the strikers had been influenced by any political body, added:

“We are not prepared to listen to the dictates of the Transport and General Workers’ Union. For twenty years we have been dictated to by them. We know that the union has been arbitrating on our behalf, but I challenge the union to state the dockers’ case” (October 6th, 1945).

Two days later the strikers passed a “vociferous” resolution of no confidence in Mr. Donovan. Behind this attitude lay a sense of impotence:

* *Economist*, October 13th, 1945.

† *Economist*, October 20th, 1945.

ITALY: EAST OR WEST?

interests, at one end, of the American export trade, and, at the other, of the protected Italian industries (and industrialists), which continue to work unproductively. Indignation over this situation, at least as regards Italian industry, has sometimes been expressed by American politicians and press men, and by E.C.A. chiefs, but the United States Government, with several million unemployed on its hands, cannot sincerely desire to encourage competitive production abroad. In Italy it is felt that there is a contradiction between American faith in free enterprise and the exigencies of American economy.

Another obstacle to the proper functioning of democracy in Italy, as decisive as British support of the monarchy at the liberation, was American intervention in favour of the Christian Democrats in the 1948 elections. In many small places in Italy where remittances and parcels from America are an essential resource of practically every family, the issue in favour of the Christian Democrats was actually decided by the pressure put on the voters by their relations in the States. In their turn, the Italo-Americans were acting in obedience to psychological and other pressures put upon them by various official and non-official bodies in the United States. The Catholic Church, the trades unions, and the press are but the most obvious of these.

By these two acts of direct and indirect intervention in Italian internal affairs, Britain and the United States, perhaps without altogether foreseeing the consequences, have assumed a share of responsibility for Italy’s subsequent constitutional development. By neither governing Italy nor allowing the Italians to govern themselves, they have set in motion the machinery of anti-democracy, under the impression that they were doing useful work in the battle against communism. Paradoxically, in both cases their intervention seems to have had the opposite effect from that desired. It may well have been British support of the monarchy which in the last analysis turned the scales in favour of the republic, while the overweening strength of the Christian Democrats in the 1948 elections is one of the principal factors in the subsequent consolidation of communist influence.

Shortsightedness, which in politics is generally the result of a combination of prejudice and mental laziness, and a blind fear of communism have led the British and Americans in Italy to follow the line of least resistance without realizing that they were being deftly piloted in this direction by the higher Catholic clergy and the industrial magnates both in Italy and in the States.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

They might have worked on a long-term policy aiming at the resurrection and the strengthening of those democratic forces in Italy which are independent both of the communists and of the Vatican. Instead they have forced the Italians to sell their future for a mess of pottage. Time will show whether this policy is as foolish as it is morally void.

SPLIT NATION

By TOM DRIBERG, M.P.

UNTIL last summer, Korea was, to 99 per cent. of us, what Chamberlain called Czechoslovakia: a far-off country of which we knew nothing. Such ignorance is dangerous: the history of the last five years in Korea provides a classic miniature of the Cold War; despite some secondary confusions and contradictions, there is the clearest contemporary picture of the general clash of ideologies and interests—of forces stronger, it seems, than the well-meaning and ill-meaning men who are their conscious or unconscious agents.

Almost everybody meeting one lately returned from Korea seems to expect a one-sentence answer to the question, "What's it like there?"—"it" being landscape, people, warring armies, the political and economic set-up generally. Such inquirers could get much information from the book by Professor McCune which has just been published.* It was completed, after his death in 1948, by his assistant and his widow. The title is slightly misleading in so far as it may suggest immediate topicality: it stops shortly before the outbreak of the present war. The virtue of this defect, however, is that the book cannot be accused of being wise after the event; its ominous record of polarisation and mutual provocation is the more impressive because it seems to have gone to press without retouching.

Professor McCune (who was born and lived nearly half his life in Korea) was an American, and his book was printed in America and is published under the auspices of the American-based International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a plain, factual survey, furnished with ample documentation and statistics; the implications of its data and most of

* *Korea To-day*, by George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey (Allen and Unwin, 372 pp. 25s.).

SPLIT NATION

its subjective judgments are between the lines rather than explicit. It is, therefore, not quite the thing to hand to the casual enquirer (who might better be referred to Mr C. P. Fitzgerald's recent Bureau of Current Affairs pamphlet). But it is a major, honest, and authoritative contribution to the history that is now being made.

One of the few things that everyone now knows about Korea—Mr. Bevin keeps on saying it—is that the 38th Parallel is an "artificial" frontier, with no logical economic or ethnical justification for its existence. This is true; yet it is interesting to learn that there has been a north-south struggle at various earlier periods in Korean history—for instance, between 1560 and 1725, when the rival partisans wore distinguishing colours and dress, or even as far back as the Three Kingdom Period (57 B.C. to A.D. 668), when North Korea was under the domination of one kingdom and South Korea under two others. Moreover, most of the mineral wealth and heavy industries are concentrated in the north, and most of the rice is grown in the south.

"It is a commonplace in Korea," says Professor McCune, "for a 'southerner' to characterize the northern Korean as uncouth, uneducated, and a troublemaker. The 'northerner', on the other hand, is often contemptuous of his southern neighbour, whom he believes to be lazy, effete, lacking ambition and a scheming rascal. The northern area has a revolutionary reputation also. Under the old Korean monarchy frequent revolts originated in the north. . . ."

Strange how this pattern of rivalry between troublemaking industrial north and sleepy agricultural south repeats itself in different societies! I heard a Texan G.I. in Korea refer scornfully to "these damned North Korean Yankees".

There was, therefore, more natural predisposition than is sometimes thought to the Korean "vivisection". Indeed, wise Occupation administrators, studying this history, might have been specially on guard against the dangers implicit in it. They would also have known that Korean nationalism, with its hatred of external domination intense and powerful enough to have survived thirty-five years of Japanese despotism, is stronger than such internal dissensions; and they would have realized that the economies of the two zones are complementary and that Korea is economically viable only if united.

Unfortunately, wisdom does not seem to have been characteristic of the American Occupation as a whole and the Army Commander, Lieut-General John R. Hodge. There were in the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

American administration a number of disinterested and enlightened individuals, some of them former New Dealers who had, no doubt, been shipped as far as possible from Washington. The reconstruction of the educational system was praiseworthy:

"Military Government distributed fifteen million textbooks written in the native *Onmun* alphabet for use in the elementary schools . . . a spectacular achievement, since the Chinese characters, which were infinitely more difficult to master, had a persistent popularity among the influential educated class."

But in all major economic policy, the Occupation betrayed fatal indecision, punctuated only by decisions which were usually the wrong ones—such as the egregious decontrol of almost all commodity prices, most notably that of rice, as early as October, 1945, which contributed inevitably to a rocketing inflation. An income-and-expenditure survey conducted by Military Government in March, 1948, showed that earnings provided only 28 per cent. of the average household expenditure; the rest was largely met by borrowing (27 per cent.) and by sale of possessions (31 per cent.) "It seems unlikely," says Professor McCune, temperately enough, "that working-class families could sustain such deficits in income through borrowing and the sale of possessions month after month." In May, 1948, there were 889,169 registered unemployed in South Korea, and probably twice as many in fact—out of a population of 10 millions.

Land reform, too, which was constantly mooted, was constantly delayed. This was an issue between the Left and the Right in Korean politics. (Though it comes as a shock now to realize it, there was an active Left in South Korea in the earlier Occupation years.) The Americans earned some unpopularity with the extreme Right by seeking to expedite this reform, in response to popular and informed criticisms of the delays; but their insistence that it was a matter for the Koreans to settle themselves was, in effect if not in intention, a stalling device, and they did explicitly take sides with the Right on the question of compensation, which the Left were against paying on the grounds that the Korean absentee landlords were a parasitic and usurious class who had willingly collaborated with the Japanese.

It is the story of the political development of the Occupation years in South Korea that is most complex and most tragic. Until all the secret documents of the State Department are

SPLIT NATION

published, we shall not know how conscious and deliberate the process was that led to the ultimate domination of Dr. Syngman Rhee and such even more extreme Rightists as the dubious General Lee Bumsuk. More often it looks as if General Hodge and his staff were out of their depth in dealing with political matters at all, but with a natural bias in favour of "law and order" and against communism which contributed to the inexorable Rightward momentum. But the details of the story are by no means simple. At one stage, in 1947, "repeated but ineffective efforts were made under American initiative", says Professor McCune, "to build up a middle-of-the-road or coalition group." Earlier, General Hodge had rebuked Syngman Rhee for claiming American backing, and Right-wing terrorist organisations had been dissolved. In February, 1948, Dr. Rhee himself outlined a programme of extensive nationalization, including all heavy industry, mines, forests, water, fisheries, public utilities, and transport. Occasionally "national" issues united Left and Right against the Occupation. South Korean politics have been, indeed, "hectic and unstable". In 1947 Mr. Roger Baldwin wrote in the *New York Nation*, after a visit to Korea: "We have offered no constructive demonstration of democracy for its own sake as a counter-lure to communism . . . by nurturing the police state we drive moderates into the communist camp."

It was certainly a police state that emerged. The police shootings of civilians, the brutalities that have shocked British soldiers in Korea lately are a continuation of conduct which, in 1946 and 1947, Military Government did little to check. In the autumn of 1948 there was a military and civil rebellion at Yösu, in the course of which many police were killed. Among the rebels were members of the American-trained constabulary, which Rightist leaders regarded (rightly, from their point of view) as less reliable than the carefully-screened, Japanese-style national police force of 30,185 men, 53 per cent. of whose officers had served as police under the Japanese.

In view of the events of last summer, it is interesting to note that on December 1st, 1948, the Chief of Police in Seoul issued a proclamation stating: "The North Korean People's Army has already begun its invasion of South Korea." The official posters declared: "The police will, without hesitation, shoot anybody who scatters handbills or in any way incites people to riot. Citizens are requested not to stand too near these dangerous

elements." Rumours of impending or actual invasion from the north were common. "Rightist sources", says Professor McCune, "lost little opportunity to play up and exaggerate the danger. The threat of invasion and provisions for security became pretexts for exerting pressure on many who were critical of the government." So, in the first week of November, 1947 alone, 700 people were arrested for political reasons, "including many prominent figures of very varied political affiliations." On December 1st the Communist Party was outlawed; other Left-wing organizations went underground.

Simultaneously, Military Government was exercising "strongly paternalistic control" over trade unions, encouraging only what it called "healthy" union activity. Professor McCune in one of his rare explicit judgments, remarks: "While purporting to inculcate the principles of American trade unionism, Military Government at the same time sometimes deprived Korean workers of many legitimate and fundamental rights exercised by American labour. It was prone to take a conservative or oppressive stand in the increasing labour difficulties generated by the inflation. . . ." Two members of a delegation from W.F.T.U. who visited Korea in 1947 (when many non-Communist union organizations were still affiliated to W.F.T.U.) reported that the workers' conditions were "incredible in this twentieth century of civilization".

In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that elections were "undemocratic and superficial". The elections of November, 1946, gave an overwhelming victory to the Right. General Hodge even redressed the balance somewhat by including Left-wingers among those whom he appointed to the Interim Legislative Assembly to supplement the elected members; the extreme Right were furious with Hodge and boycotted the first session. This Assembly produced a franchise law containing some peculiar features: "voters were required to write the name of the candidate on the ballot (it was believed that this restriction might disfranchise a large group of illiterates)", and "the Act specified that the term of office 'shall continue until such time as the Provisional Government of united Korea is established' which appeared highly unrealistic".

In May, 1948, elections were held under the supervision of the newly-arrived U.N. Commission, which included representatives of China, El Salvador, the Philippines, Syria, and other democratic powers. Leftists and moderates opposed the holding

of definitive separate elections in South Korea, urging that adequate efforts had not been made to reach agreement with North Korea and that separate elections would tend to divide the country permanently. There was considerable tension and disorder: in the six weeks before the election, 589 people (including 63 policemen and 330 "rioters") were killed. Some 10,000 "rioters" were "processed" in police stations. The Americans authorized special strong-arm bands of "loyal citizens", called Community Protective Associations, to keep order: 75 per cent. of eligible voters voted. Since almost all the candidates were of the Right, the election naturally resulted in a Right-wing victory. The U.N. Commission's supervision can hardly have been comprehensive: whereas in the Saar Plebiscite of 1935 and the Nicaraguan elections of 1930, the ratio of neutral observers to voters was 1 to 500, in South Korea in 1948 the behaviour of 8 million electors was "observed" by a team consisting altogether of thirty persons. When these thirty had brooded for six weeks over what they had seen, their Chairman, Mr. Valle of San Salvador, informed the Korean National Assembly that the election had been "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commissions."

There was a curious sequel. Dr. Syngman Rhee seems to have "jumped the gun". For the U.N. Commission gave no ruling on the claim of the newly-elected Assembly to form what would be, in theory, the national government of all Korea: the Commission had first to report to the U.N. General Assembly, due to meet in September, and it was presumably for the General Assembly to accept or reject the Commission's report and to decide on the future government of Korea. The Koreans did not wait for this event; and their impetuous *fait accompli* was endorsed by the Americans. "Under Rhee's leadership", says Professor McCune, "the National Assembly acted with the co-operation of the American command to assume full responsibility for the organization of government. . . ." On August 12th, the State Department "released a statement which amounted to giving *de facto* recognition to the new government. . . . Thus the establishment of a government based upon the elections of May 10th was an accomplished fact well before the General Assembly was scheduled to meet in Paris." On December 12th the General Assembly approved the new régime.

Meanwhile, after "perfunctory" debate, the Korean Assembly

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

had drafted and adopted a Constitution. The "most significant feature" of this was "the power of the presidential office." The President was to select not only the Prime Minister, but all members of the Cabinet. "The President, not the Prime Minister, was the real head of the Government." The President, moreover, was to have sweeping emergency powers. Dr. Rhee was elected President on July 20th.

For obvious reasons, Professor McCune's survey of North Korea and the Soviet occupation is less exhaustive than his survey of South Korea; but he has made a careful attempt to weigh and to summarize fairly his necessarily second-hand material. In any case, many of the facts about North Korea are indisputable: there was a drastic, and popular, redistribution of land; an eight-hour working day was decreed, and a comprehensive compulsory social insurance system introduced. In the summer of 1947, Professor McCune quotes from Anne Louise Strong, "the social insurance agency was operating eighty-five hostels with 1,400 beds, largely former private Japanese summer villas, and was expected to offer during the season free vacations to 25,000 workers.") Equal pay for women was the rule. There was no unemployment: 380,000 out of a total of 430,000 wage-earning workers belonged to trade unions. (The rest of the working population were mostly small farmers and fishermen.) There is some doubt about the extent of Russian "stripping" of industrial plants: Mr. Edwin W. Pauley, U.N. Reparations Commissioner, who inspected most of the North Korean industrial areas personally in 1946, found that there was less than refugee rumour had indicated. The Assembly was younger and, in some respects, more broadly based than that of South Korea: it contained thirty-five women and seven Methodist ministers. Here, too, "it could be assumed that a certain degree of terrorism was practised to keep the opposition in line".

Professor McCune was a cautious and impartial onlooker. The object of his comparative judgments on North and South Korea are the

"The mass of the Korean people in the north reacted favourably toward the Russian régime, especially when it was accompanied by many of the revolutionary benefits of a socialist society. In South Korea . . . the social fundamental freedoms of democratic society were not much appreciated . . . in view of the lack of social reform and because of the irregularity which democracy was applied."

"The Russians avoided much criticism by hiding behind the Korean

SPLIT NATION

régime, even though Russian control was only thinly veiled. But there was also considerable evidence to indicate that the Russians actually did permit the Koreans of their choice to exercise real authority, whereas in the American zone the Korean employees of Military Government were allowed little power and no authority."

Was the perpetuation of the Korean division inevitable? Given the characters of the occupying powers, it probably was. It is easy to criticize retrospectively; but one of the crucial errors of American policy was surely the discouragement of the consultations between South and North Korean political leaders which were initiated—not by Left-wingers only—at the end of 1947. A "coalition conference" actually took place in April, 1948; it was attended by 545 delegates from both halves of the country, including prominent Right-wing and liberal Southerners. General Hodge denounced them as "blind men".

From then on, relations got steadily worse. On May 14th, 1948, four days after the South Korean elections and a fortnight after the adoption of a "national" constitution in North Korea, the "last vestige of economic relations" between North and South was ended: the North Koreans cut off the South Koreans' electricity. This action had been preceded by a long-drawn-out squabble—ludicrous if it were not so deplorable—arising out of the Americans' tardiness in paying the electricity bill.

The only people likely to cavil at Professor McCune's indispensable study will be the extreme communist and anti-communist partisans, particularly, perhaps, the latter; and, it may be added, those old-fashioned eccentrics who still prefer even a serious book to be written in passable English prose. Objectivity need not be so flat and colourless as this; nor need it involve the constant use of so hideous a jargon. Here is a typical McCune sentence: "As a consequence of these factors there was a great deal of inconsistency in such policies as did materialize." On the next page we learn that "increasingly occupation policy seemed to acquiesce in favour of the extreme Rightist groups". The word "very" occurs three times in one sentence, and none of the three uses would feel comfortable to a good writer: *very inferior, very paralysing, very depressed*. A minor solecism (perhaps a shorthand slip) is "inauspicious" for "inconspicuous" (p. 45).

It is extraordinarily difficult to read such stuff. Only the book's contemporary interest and encyclopaedic thoroughness redeem it. Readable or not, it ought to be read.

THE FORESTRY COMMISSION

By J. A. G. GRIFFITH

THE history of the Forestry Commission throughout the first thirty years of its existence falls into two periods. The first extends from the setting up of the Commission in 1919 to the passing of the Forestry Act, 1945; the second is the period since that Act. The Forestry Commission was originally constituted as a result of the report in 1917 of the Acland Committee. The dangers of timber shortage, like the deficiencies in electricity supply and in the railways system, were only revealed, sharply enough for official action to follow, by the additional stresses of the European war. Forestry had not been wholly ignored previously, and the various committees had sat. But no state policy had emerged.

The total area under woodland in the United Kingdom before the 1914-18 war was estimated by the Acland Committee at three million acres. During the five years preceding that war, home production was less than 8 per cent. of consumption. The Acland Committee recommended the afforestation of 1,770,000 acres, of which two-thirds should be planted within forty years; in the first ten years the Committee recommended the planting of 200,000 acres, of which 150,000 acres should be planted by the state and 50,000 acres by public bodies and private individuals assisted by grants.

In accordance with these recommendations, the Forestry Act, 1919, was passed and the Commission established. Its powers were fairly extensive. It could purchase land—compulsorily, if necessary; it could buy standing timber and sell timber in its ownership; it could make advances by way of grant or loan to others for afforestation; it could undertake training and education schemes. But financially it was dependent on the Government and on parliament. The income which the Commission derived from the sale of timber and in other ways was inevitably only a fraction of what was needed for the implementation of its long-term plans. The first Commissioners received a grant of £3½ million for the first decade. This honeymoon period was shortlived. In 1922, the Geddes Committee recommended the abolition of the Commission and its work. The Cabinet compromised by cutting the expenditure. This, as the Commission said, "effected a small postponement in expenditure without any eventual saving." These changes, to quote the Commission again, "completely dislocated the work". At the same time, funds were placed at the disposal of the Commission for work to relieve unemployment. In 1924, the Cabinet approved a return to the Acland Programme. "Instability of purpose", reported the Commission in 1925, "is the bane of an undertaking which depends more than any other on timely preparation." By the end of the first decade, the position had been to some extent recovered and of the 150,000 acres which the Acland Committee had recommended, 92 per cent. had been planted. The full amount of £3½ million was granted, of which £430,000 was voted for the relief of unemployment. In 1930, the Commission returned to their theme: "Uncertainty is the worst enemy of the Commissioners' work, and they have therefore noted with satisfaction that successive Chancellors of the Exchequer have come more and more to appreciate that point of view." Their satisfaction was to be short-lived. For the second decade, the programme was to provide for the afforestation of 330,000 acres and the estab-

THE FORESTRY COMMISSION

lishment of 3,000 forest workers' holdings at an agreed cost to the Government of £9 million. However, the May Committee in 1931 recommended that no more land should be acquired and that afforestation should for the time being proceed at the rate of 20,000 acres a year. Although these recommendations were not fully adopted, the Chancellor cut his grant to a total of £2½ million for the following five years. In 1935, the scale of grants was increased and the Commission was to acquire 200,000 acres of land for planting in and about the Special Areas. Again, much damage had already been done; in 1931-32, fifty million seedlings and transplants had to be destroyed. In the second decade 230,630 acres were planted; this represented 67 per cent. of the proposals of the Acland Committee and nearly 70 per cent. of the Government programme of 1929. The total Government grant for this period was a little over £6½ million.

In the first twenty years, the Commission acquired 655,000 acres of plantable land and planted 368,900 acres; these figures represent respectively 88 per cent. and 75 per cent. of the proposals of the Acland Committee. The total Government grant was £10,126,800; forestry operations yielded £2,673,336.

During the war years 1940-6, the normal forestry operations of the Commission were reduced. The land acquired totalled 150,709 acres, and the land planted totalled 110,476 acres. The Government grant was, for the period 1940-5, nearly £3½ million, while forestry operations yielded over £3½ million.

In 1945, the Commission was reconstituted and brought under closer ministerial control. The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretary of State for Scotland are now empowered to give directions to the Commission. The number of Commissioners, including the chairman, is not to exceed ten, three of whom are to have special knowledge and experience of forestry, while at least one Commissioner must have scientific attainments and a technical knowledge of forestry. No Commissioner may be a member of the House of Commons (previously one Commissioner was an M.P. to answer questions). The power of the Commission to acquire land is transferred to the Ministers. The number of paid Commissioners is no longer, as before, limited to three with total salaries not exceeding £4,500 per annum. The Ministers, with Treasury approval, now determine how many Commissioners shall be paid and at what salary. There is no statutory limit on the number of years for which a Commissioner may be appointed (previously the limit was five years, subject to re-appointment). The Commissioners are required to appoint Committees for England, Scotland, and Wales respectively consisting partly of Commissioners and their officers and partly of other persons (not more than three for each Committee); the Commissioners may devolve functions to these Committees as they think fit. The financial arrangements remain basically unchanged, payments being made into and out of the Forestry Fund.

At present, each of the three National Committees consists of three or four Forestry Commissioners, one of whom acts as Chairman, and three non-official members. The functions devolved relate to acquisition of land, cultural operations, estate management including housing, private forestry, and National Forest Parks. At the Headquarters of the Commission the posts of Director-General and Deputy Director-General have been created.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

There is also a Director in charge of Research, Education, and Publications, a Controller of Finance and an Information Officer. In charge of the Commission's operations in each of the three countries is a Director of Forestry. In England and Wales, each Director of Forestry has three officers of Conservator rank responsible for State Forests, for Private Forestry and Acquisitions and for Estate Management, including Housing; there is also a Directorate Engineer and other officers. In Wales there is one headquarters Conservator and a Directorate Engineer. The whole area of the Commission's operations is divided into eleven Conservancies each headed by a Conservator of Forests. Under him are two Divisional Officers, in charge of State Forestry and Private Forestry, and an Engineer. In the field and under the Conservators are District Officers over Foresters and Foremen.

In 1943, the Forestry Commission submitted a Report on Post-War Forest Policy to the Government. The Labour Government in 1945 announced that they had decided that the Commission should proceed on the basis of these recommendations as regards the first five years of the scheme, and that £20 million would be provided for the five-year period beginning in April, 1946. In fact, £18½ million has already been granted for the first four of these years. Forestry operations have yielded over £3½ million in addition.

The new scheme was not fully launched until 1947, and during the first three years the anticipated acreage of plantable land has not been acquired. Instead of 551,000 acres as planned, only 100,800 acres have been acquired. The Commission point in particular to the demand for home food production and consider that such measures as the sheep subsidies and the Hill Farming Act, 1946, have kept much land under agricultural use which would otherwise have been offered to the Commission. So far the compulsory powers have not been used. Progress in planting has been more satisfactory. The Report hoped for 131,000 acres; the actual figure is 106,700 acres. Inevitably the effect of a high proportion of planting to acquisition has meant that reserves of land have been considerably reduced.

From the time of the Acland Committee Report, private forestry has been recognized as an integral and necessary part of the whole programme. That Report expected most of the work involved in reconstituting devastated areas to be carried out by private forestry undertaken both by local authorities and private owners. Planting was encouraged, in part by proceeds-sharing schemes but mostly by direct grants on an acreage basis. In the first decade, 73,000 acres were actually planted; this represented 66 per cent. of the Acland Committee recommendation. In the second decade, some 53,000 acres were planted. In the years 1940-46, 27,700 acres were planted. Grants for the period 1920-45 totalled less than £500,000. The post-war proposals centred in the Dedication Scheme. The principle of the scheme is that woodland owners who will dedicate their land for the purpose of timber production and who provide adequate assurances for subsequent good management should receive state assistance. The framing of Dedication deeds has been a very lengthy process. By the end of September, 1947, 821 owners holding a total area of 436,000 acres of woodland indicated that they would be willing to consider the scheme; subsequently, most of these decided not to dedicate at that time. The Commission reported in 1950: "The general economic condition of the country, coupled with maximum price control

THE FORESTRY COMMISSION

on standing timber and a lack of confidence in the attitude of the Government towards forestry as an industry, was partly responsible for the hesitant attitude of woodland owners, but certain clauses of the deeds were also considered unduly onerous." In 1949, the Government increased the planting grant from £10 to £12 an acre and made other concessions. It seems likely that more owners will dedicate their lands, but at the end of September, 1949, only 13,273 acres had been dedicated.


The future of the Forestry Commission lies where it has always lain—in the hands of the Government. When the axe has fallen in the past on public expenditure, the Forestry Commission has not been spared. Yet it seems impossible that the folly of 1922 and 1931 could be repeated. Much of the argument in the past for building up timber reserves has been based on the crisis which the shortage can so easily precipitate if a war or other economic disaster makes importation impossible for a period of years. The present economic crisis is caused by preparation to meet the contingency of war. So, perhaps, on this occasion the Forestry Commission will be spared the catastrophe which a partial cut in its expenditure has effected in the past.

HEFFER'S

The Bookshop
known the world over.
New and secondhand,
English, American,
European and Oriental
Books. Learned, rare
and standard works
bought; lists invited.

W. HEFFER & SONS LTD
Petty Cury, Cambridge

The Recording Angel:



It's a news bulletin to-day, a book to-morrow, a documentation of our time the day after. And all the while KEESING'S is a most efficient service, indispensable to those concerned with national and international affairs of the present and the recent past—right back to 1931. This unique reference tool records the important events, agreements, speeches, communications, statistics, etc., in the spheres of Politics, Economics, Social Questions all over the world. KEESING'S has no party affiliations, expresses no opinion; it just contains the facts. It's your Domesday Book of the World, always brought up to date and constantly indexed for rapid reference.

Please write for full details

Keesing's • Keynsham • Somerset

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CONSTITUTION OF CEYLON. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (Oxford University Press. 252 pp. With Index. Rs. 10.)

THE PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. By L. F. CRISP. (Longmans, Green & Co. 336 pp. With Index. 21s.)

BURMA. By D. G. E. HALL. (Hutchinson's University Library. 180 pp. With Index. 7s. 6d.)

THERE can be little doubt of the great service which Sir Ivor Jennings has rendered to Ceylon. First, through his outstanding assistance to Mr. Senanayake in laying the foundations of the new constitution for Ceylon; and now in giving its students an invaluable commentary on it. The Ceylon constitution is an amalgam of two sets of documents: the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, which confers dominion status on the former colony, and the Ceylon (Constitution and Independence) Orders in Council, 1947, which provide the formal constitutional structure. Its pattern is clear: it envisages a system of cabinet government, lubricated by the principal usages and conventions of the British parliamentary system, and set in the traditional institutional framework of dominion government—namely, His Majesty the King in the person of the Governor-General, a bicameral legislature (House of Representatives and Senate), an independent judiciary, and an impartial public service. Some modifications have been introduced to suit the peculiar historical, racial, and religious factors in the new dominion; none, however, disturb its dominant British character. The deviations from the British parliamentary system are few, and chiefly consist of a partial limitation of parliamentary sovereignty through the protection given to religious communities; an unique provision for a limited “nominated” representation in the House of Representatives where “after any general election the Governor-General is satisfied that any important interest in the Island is not represented or is inadequately represented”; the tortuous provisions relating to the composition of the Senate; and the unified control of the public service.

Sir Ivor Jennings' object was to provide a commentary on the “ideas which underlie the constitution and how those ideas have been carried out”. To this end, the text is divided into two parts; the first and principal part deals with “the history of the constitution, an analysis of the new status of the island, a description of the machinery set up, and an explanation of the manner in which it is expected to function”. Part two is devoted to an extremely useful annotation of the relevant constitutional documents. In the first part, the distinguished author of *Cabinet Government* and *Parliament* has distilled the insight and authority of these two classic studies to give an excellent account of the genesis, function, and expected operation of the cardinal principles embodied in the constitution. Here the basic assumptions and critical mainsprings of the British constitution are clearly restated and underlined. Nowhere is the author more stimulating and instructive than in his treatment of cabinet leadership, the primacy and responsibility of the Prime Minister, the management of the House, the vital function and status of an Opposition, and the importance of an impartial public service. The need for lucid and authoritative guidance in these principles is obvious. The dangers of transplanting a highly sophisticated political system to an

BOOK REVIEWS

Asiatic community are patent—the possible tendency towards authoritarianism in an electorate of substantial illiteracy; the absence of any influential body of constitutional tradition; the sharp religious and racial cleavages, and so on. Clearly an enlightened parliamentary representation, and, above all, its leadership is of crucial importance to Ceylon in this period. Few can be more conscious of this than the author. In lending his vast constitutional experience to the Government of Ceylon, and in introducing its citizens to “the ideas which underlie the constitution” Sir Ivor Jennings has made a magnificent contribution to this end.

In the second book of this group, Professor Crisp of the Canberra University College has made an exceptionally interesting and spirited analysis of the “Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia”. The outstanding merit of Professor Crisp's study is clear: he has drawn heavily on the available published sources, mixed his product with the experience of direct participation in the federal administrative service, with the result that considerable fresh light has been thrown on the machinery of the Commonwealth Government. For this, the student of Australian political institutions is in debt to the author. The weaknesses of this text, however, are equally patent: first, the author's unwarranted dogmatism on many issues where his material invites only the most tentative conclusions; his periodic relapse into undisguised political pamphleteering; and his enslavement to an oversimplified version of the “class” theory to guide his interpretation of Commonwealth politics. The latter fault, which sometimes amounts to a surprising *naïveté*, is perhaps the most provocative feature of this study. From the first chapter on the formative influences in the making of federation to his analysis of the existing political parties the author embraces a near Marxist model of class differentiation. For Professor Crisp there is no ideological spectrum; only a sharp black-and-white division between the “good” and the “bad”; between the solid phalanx of trade union members and the combined interests of “town and country capital”. The result may be easily anticipated. The author is led to an interpretation which allows for little shade or light; to omit or gloss over the vast paradoxes in the history of the Labour and non-Labour parties in Australia; to overlook the collectivist pressure of geographic and historical factors on Australian governments; to under-estimate the significance of the ease with which key political personnel moved from Labour to non-Labour leadership, and so on. Professor Crisp's chapter on the Labour Party is, without doubt, an act of faith and a brilliant piece of political pamphleteering. Even here, however, he is much too much enamoured of his ideological “mistress” to see her faults. For him the problem of democratizing the relationship between the leadership and the rank and file of the party is scarcely important. In his view, there is a live and responsive contact throughout the political and non-political hierarchy of the party. The periodic strain between the political wing of the party and the Federal Executive Council, or between the political wing and the A.C.T.U., the crippling internecine conflicts, or the special weaknesses of a “socialist” party dispersed through a federal electorate are glossed over. Again, his explanation of that fascinating phenomenon, the massive Roman Catholic affiliation with the Labour Party, is more a product of intuition than field research. For Professor Crisp, the answer may be found in the Roman Catholic reconciliation of Labour policy with the progressive

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

papal concessions to social change. The level of political sophistication required of the rank-and-file Catholic members by this thesis—quite apart from the Catholic Labour leaders—is, to say the least, quite unreal. The most cursory questionnaire suggests that the day-to-day reconciliation of papal encyclicals and Labour policy takes place in less informed, cruder, and more complex terms. Then in dealing with the non-Labour parties in Australia—the parties of “town and country capital”—the author’s obvious distaste for his political opposition reduces this chapter to extreme poverty. The selection of material is *ex parte*, the interpretation melodramatic, accusatory, and provides no answer for their periodic attraction to the Australian elector. Away from the emotive influence of party politics and class ideology, however, Professor Crisp turns to the machinery of the Commonwealth Government with more balance. His description of the House of Representatives, Senate, Cabinet, and Governor-General is highly informative, lucid, and written with great verve. It is doubtful whether the degeneration of the Senate into an indifferent reflection of political cleavages in the popular House has been given a more authoritative exposition. His account of the development and structure of the Cabinet secretariat is invaluable. The relations between the senior administrative staff and their political masters are illuminated for the first time. Professor Crisp knows his “machinery” well, and writes with authority. The blemishes are few. One may quarrel, for example, with his tendentious reference to the incompatibility of the federal principle with responsible government—a traditional viewpoint which rests on an entirely artificial concept of the federal principle; or his decision to ignore the general organization the Commonwealth public service in order to deal with the more exciting issues arising out of the relations between its senior personnel and the political executive; or his violent and rhetorical treatment of the High Court. With all this, however, it remains true that here is a text which makes a distinct and important contribution to the all too scarce volume of literature on Australian political institutions.

The last book of this group, Professor Hall’s history of Burma, is a remarkable feat of compression. In the space of some 180 pages, the author provides a highly detailed and concentrated account of Burma’s little-known history through nine centuries of warring “kinglets”, the rise of Burmese nationalism, the origin of European interest, British imperialism, the Japanese conquest, and the struggle for independence. So tightly packed is this short history that for most people unfamiliar with the racial and religious factors in this area much of the earlier account is difficult reading. One wonders whether Professor Hall could not have helped the reader by using small charts in the early portions of his work, where so much of Burma’s history is devoted to an account of dynastic wars, plunder, and assassination. This apart, the difficulties created by the intense congestion of the early chapters are more than counterbalanced by the later treatment of the European contact with Burma. The planting of British administration; the intimate relationship between commerce and conquest, bureaucracy and exploitation; and the brief account of dyarchy in Burma, its contradictions, frustrations, and administrative techniques are admirably done. The need for an introduction to this increasingly vital region is self-evident. Here then are the essential introductory facts, clearly, succinctly, and authoritatively presented.

S. R. DAVIS.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BRITISH OVERSEAS. By C. E. CARRINGTON. (Cambridge University Press. 1,092 pp. Illustrated, with Index. 42s.)

MR. CARRINGTON has written a book which, as the Christmas catalogues say, will delight small boys of all ages. From the moment when “certain tribes known somewhat indiscriminately as Saxons or Angles” migrated to Britain to the point at which the author, giving thanks for the rule of law, lays down his pen, the reader is borne along on wave after wave of romance, adventure, and dogged perseverance. What a story! And how wonderfully told! Breathes there the man with soul so dead that he won’t sit up with it till dawn?

But by next morning, a number of questions will have forced themselves to the surface of the reader’s mind. Is this the best kind of story to write in 1950, mellowed though it is with the author’s tolerant breadth of mind? Has Mr. Carrington in fact written the tale he intended to tell? Above all, why tell it now? Can it be that the story is ended? The last question the author himself answers in the Preface. He has written of the “Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers”—the exploits of a people who, until the year of the Statute of Westminster, sent out to the Dominions more migrants than they took back in return. In 1931, “the British race . . . ceased to expand”. That phase is ended, and can therefore be examined. Mr. Carrington can seek in its story for “the motive force of Empire”, not in Whitehall, but in the work of the men “at the circumference”.

The motive forces are, however, not clearly discerned. The English, who “first appear in history as colonizers”, are “land-bound for a thousand years”. Then, from fishing in the North Sea and frequenting the shores of the Portuguese, they turn their eyes from their “First Empire” of Jersey and Ireland to the African coast and the Atlantic. Robert Machin of Bristol, and John Cabot to land in America in 1497, and to receive from Henry VII a gratuity—“to him that found the new isle, £10”. By 1700, all the problems of empire except that of organized nationalism had been met with in one form or another. Queen Elizabeth had asserted the freedom of the seas; the Muscovy Company in 1553 and Lloyd’s had established the joint-stock and insurance patterns on which trade was to be built; the seventeenth-century Navigation Laws had been passed to protect the British mercantile marine; settlements had failed in Darien and succeeded in New England and the West Indies; pioneers had returned to the foundations of civil society and produced the *Mayflower’s* social contract and Virginia’s prototype of colonial constitutions; planters had solved their labour problems with African slaves; the institutions of daughter cultures had taken birth from John Harvard’s £1,000 legacy; while in Boston in 1663 the appearance of the Reverend John Eliot’s Algonquin Bible had marked the technical success of early American printing simultaneously with the first major British attempt to civilize the savage through the medium of the Gospel. By 1700, also, every continent except Australia had been visited; William Towerson had delighted a West African potentate with the prowess of English longbowmen; Father John Stevens in Goa had become proficient enough in Indian languages to write poems in them; Raleigh had searched for the Golden City between the Orinoco and the Amazon; Drake had circled the world.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY •

Why did they do it? Why did their successors go out to make farms in the prairies, build bridges and railways in the jungles, and rule millions of men at all stages of culture from the Blackfellow to the Brahmin? So detailed is the story of action that Mr. Carrington tells that he has not enough space to analyse the political and economic—much less the biological or psychological—urges which drove men abroad. He deals briefly with trade and defence and the nineteenth-century growth of population and unemployment, and provides valuable tables and diagrams to show the trends of migration, both European and Asiatic. But he cannot go deeply enough to provide more than the raw material for the anthropologists who in future generations may turn their attention to the amazing story of the British people.

Nor does Mr. Carrington make many suggestions for the consideration of the philosopher. What is the explanation of the most extraordinary phenomenon of all, the peculiarly English attitude to colonies which Mr. Carrington characterizes as "not tyranny, but neglect and condescension"? His book gives ample documentation for his view. The subject of India (which, as the late Edward Thompson constantly reminded us, was sufficient to empty the smallest lecture-room in Oxford) was in Macaulay's time already "positively distasteful". "Shouts of laughter" greeted Joseph Hume's suggestion during the Reform Bill debates that the colonies should send representatives to Westminster. Palmerston, at a loss for a Colonial Secretary, said to a colleague, "I suppose I must take the thing myself. Come upstairs with me. . . . We will look at the maps and you shall show me where these places are." Indifference in governments was matched by downright hostility in oppositions. Cobden regarded the colonies, along with the Army, the Navy, the Church, and the Corn Laws, as "merely accessories of our aristocratic government", just as modern socialists have regarded them as an integral part of the capitalist system. But with the reasons for these attitudes, and the conclusions to be drawn from them, Mr. Carrington does not help us.

Perhaps the major reason is that the English are genuinely interested only in the English, and this to an extraordinary degree. Even Mr. Carrington, one feels, is not much concerned with the peoples who became the objects of policy of his "English overseas". He records surprisingly little of what they thought of the managing adventurers who so suddenly irrupted into their midst, and surprisingly little of what the English thought of them. Clearly, he is hampered by lack of space, but the lack leads to some strange perspectives. The section on India before the British advent is particularly inadequate; and if space is to be given to Indian nationalism, surely more than five lines might have been given to the Vedanta revival, and, perhaps, a mention of Rabindranath Tagore? No, one feels that Mr. Carrington is not much moved by non-European cultures, and that in this he is like the majority of the men whose story he has so brilliantly told.

They are men worth writing about, and most of them are there. It is good to find a number of pages devoted to Durham and to Kipling, and to learn that Governor Eyre had loved the Australian aborigines before he fell foul of the Jamaicans, or that Edward Gibbon Wakefield abducted a girl of sixteen whom he had not previously seen. They acted, and somehow or other they made new nations and evolved a system of law and a conception of commonwealth which had practical and moral value even in the days

BOOK REVIEWS

When "the Colonial Office sent no experts to the colonies" because "it had none to send". *The British Overseas*, complete with thirty-two pages of their portraits, is a tribute to their exertions and a less conscious monument to their limitations. Of course, they had some skeletons in the cupboard: the presence of the most ghastly of them, Ireland, is acknowledged in the Preface.

MARJORIE NICHOLSON.

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1950. By H. G. NICHOLAS. (Macmillan. 353 pp. 21s.)

THIS book sponsored by Nuffield College is an excellent piece of co-operative research into the conduct and results of the 1950 election. All those who took part in the campaign will be able to draw with profit upon the vast amount of material that has been assembled. The first three chapters deal with the legal aspects of the election, the party organization, and the candidates. The 1948 law made considerable changes in election practice by abolishing plural votes, restricting the use of cars, providing more polling booths, reducing expenses, and arranging for postal voting. In addition, there was the first redistribution of seats since 1918. It is pointed out that the Boundary Commissioners aimed at an equal population in each constituency, but felt that this could not be achieved in county areas—the county electorate averaging 16,500 as against 56,500 in the towns. This favoured the Conservatives and the Celtic areas, and it is claimed that Labour lost up to forty seats by the boundary changes.

The Conservatives paid careful attention to the postal vote, and Labour might have gained another ten seats by its more effective use. The law concerning cars could not be enforced; it is impossible to assess its effect. Parties found it difficult to keep within their expenses, 61 per cent. of which were for printing, and the Conservatives spent up to 93 per cent. of their permitted expenses, while Labour spent 83 per cent. The Conservatives, although against planning, took particular care to plan the campaign with 527 paid agents in England and Wales. Labour had only 279 paid agents but used them more effectively and had a large number of volunteer helpers from the trade unions. However, a good organization did not always produce results.

The chapter on candidates is full of titbits, but reads rather scrappily. The most popular ages for candidates are 40 to 49, and 1,868 (a record) were nominated, of whom only 125 were women. The Conservatives had 364 public school men (223 successful) as compared with 108 for Labour (61 successful). Among many other items were 111 in education, 183 manual workers, and T.U. agents and 111 in the forces. While the Conservatives included 12 in law and 12 in the forces.

The next six chapters are devoted to the campaign, which is treated very fully by analysing the preliminary manoeuvres, the manifestoes, the broad-casts, the press reports, the election addresses, and the campaign in the constituencies. These chapters give the impression of repetition, but this could be avoided if justice was to be done to these aspects of the campaign itself was in the nature of a set piece—candidates

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

following the party line and introducing two new topics only, petrol and Russia. The chapter on the press, the longest in the book, goes through the national dailies day by day, topic by topic, and paper by paper. The press seldom seemed to arouse enthusiasm, and to a large extent took its cue from the broadcasts. The provincial press comes out better than might have been expected.

A winter campaign was not a prospect that the constituencies viewed with favour—it was thought that it would weaken the canvass, which is to-day purely mechanical. There was a widespread dislike of displaying window cards, but there were few cases of intimidation. Large meetings have been killed by the radio and the normal audience was smallish—up to 200—and was usually described as “thoughtful”. It is emphasized that few speakers could put over economic arguments in a simple and appealing way, and in effect a new type of politician is needed. There is a frightening list of pressure groups that operated on a single candidate.

There is a very good chapter on the splinter parties and independents which serves to underline their sad fate. The chapter on the world’s press emphasizes the shockingly misleading accounts of the campaign that appeared in the Russian press. The book ends by analysing the results. There was a general feeling of disappointment at their closeness, and there was a ready assumption that there would be a halt to nationalization and that another election would soon take place.

For my part, I should have liked more discussion on the results and less on the conduct of the campaign. The few comments on the results do not, I think, come up to the level of those on the conduct of the campaign. There is an attempt to correlate Labour’s successes with areas of high unemployment in the 1930s. This does not explain Labour’s success in the Midlands and London—areas which had low unemployment rates. There is also an attempt to argue that the result showed a demand for moderation; it is surely valid to argue that the reverse is the case, and that both sides have now “dug in their toes”. The statistical appendix must have entailed considerable work, but I found it difficult to draw any practical conclusions from many of the figures. Many who read this book will wish to apply their new knowledge so as to pierce the weak spots in their opponents’ armour, and the Appendix throws no light on these weak spots. The estimates of “swing” are misleading, and the method of calculation greatly exaggerates the numbers who changed their mind. The histograms are not strictly accurate: there should be no vertical scale in a histogram.

This, however, does not detract from the value of the book’s information on the conduct of the election, and it is to be hoped that the election survey will become a permanent feature of the social scientist’s equipment. A wider knowledge of the facts in this book will go a long way towards seeing that politicians do not get away with so great an emphasis on “escapism” as was made in 1950.

A. C. HOBSON.

BOOK REVIEWS

TESTAMENT FOR SOCIAL SERVICE: AN ESSAY IN THE APPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD TO HUMAN PROBLEMS. By BARBARA WOOTTON. (*Allen and Unwin*. 197 pp. 15s.)

THIS is a book which one had long hoped that some one of Mrs. Wootton’s intellectual powers and technical equipment would undertake. Its main theme is the relation of the social sciences to science. That such a question needs to be asked and that the answering of it is so lengthy and so difficult shows the muddle into which our social theory and practice have got themselves. One part of the lives (and minds) of modern men is determined and directed by science and the scientific method. The method of science is simple: it is “to acquire knowledge of general laws directly or indirectly by experience, by the use of our five senses”; it proceeds by three stages: accurate observation, the formulation of hypothesis, ruthless testing of the hypothesis by controlled experiment or other forms of verification which leads to the rejection or acceptance of the hypothesis as a general law. The use of this method, particularly in the last 200 years, has revolutionized human life. It has given us immense control over things and our material environment and a stupendous body of knowledge about the fantastic universe from the atom and the digestive processes of an amoeba to the galaxy and the physiology of the human brain. It is science which has enabled us to know or to do almost anything, from the antics of the atom to the properties of genes, from opening a tin of dehydrated milk to dying because some one 30,000 feet above our heads has dropped a small bomb out of an aeroplane.

The other half of our minds and lives is almost completely divorced from science. In our relations with other people, in our organization of human society, in politics, economics, law, and education, we rely for knowledge and guidance of conduct upon the fantastic myths of our most primitive ancestors, the experiments of political witch-hunters and rainmakers, the obiter dicta of ancient gods, the promises of quacks, and the tyranny of our own prejudices and passions. Through this social and psychological chaos human reason has, from the times of the ancient Greeks, fitfully and feebly tried to penetrate and impose upon the human mind and human relations some respect for truth, order, and decency. Out of this effort have emerged the modern social sciences of politics, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology.

Mrs. Wootton investigates the possibility of uniting the two halves of life by applying to the social sciences the method used with such amazing success by the natural sciences. She has written an admirable book. She has the rare merit, which was so remarkable in Graham Wallas, for instance, of seeing a problem in depth so that she does not merely hand out a statement or an opinion, or even a bit of knowledge, but leaves the reader with new paths of thought for him to pursue. The book is not easy to read, though the writing is fine and edged by wit, because, while it covers a wide area of ground, it is also very closely argued. The argument is always clear and scrupulously honest.

Mrs. Wootton believes that “the scientific method is entitled to rank as the only method by which we ever learn anything: by which, that is to say, we make solid additions to the growing heap of definitely established knowledge”. She shows us how and why (and with what strange results) these

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

methods have not been applied to the social sciences, to metaphysics, morals, and the arts. In all these cases there are peculiar difficulties in using scientific techniques in order to obtain "solid" knowledge, and Mrs. Wootton does not pretend that they are not formidable. She faces her fences and subjects these difficulties to careful scrutiny. In the process she destroys a good many myths, fallacies, and prejudices, the most remarkable achievement in this part of her book being a concentrated and devastating analysis of modern Marxism. But her object and whole outlook are constructive rather than destructive. She is convinced that science can be applied to the social sciences and even to the arts, and that it can give us in those spheres, as it has in the material world, the solid knowledge which alone can give us some mastery over our fates. She gives her reasons and they are nearly always convincing, while, even if occasionally they do not convince, they illuminate. The book opens new vistas for thought and action; it should be studied, not only by the academic social scientist, but by the professional politician and indeed all his amateur victims.

LEONARD WOOLF.

CANADA. By G. S. GRAHAM. (*Hutchinson's University Library*. 187 pp. 7s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR GRAHAM explains in his introduction that his purpose is to write "not so much a history of Canada, as an interpretation of Canadian history; it is an attempt to approach Canadian history from outside rather than from within North America". As Canada's most distinguished expatriate historian (he is now Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in the University of London), the author is well equipped for his task. On the whole, he succeeds admirably. His review of pre-Confederation Canadian history is certainly one of the best brief accounts available. The work is intended primarily no doubt for the non-Canadian reader, yet it should serve also to remind Canadians of the extent which the history of their country particularly before 1867 is a by-product of larger events which occurred elsewhere.

The book is not without some exasperating shortcomings, although most of these are no doubt inevitable in any attempt to review the whole story of Canadian development in 175 pages. Still, one might have wished that Professor Graham had not allowed his enthusiasm for (and enormous knowledge of) naval and military history to betray him into devoting disproportionate space to the details of the early Anglo-French struggle for Canada (several of the political and military leaders of the colonial period are referred to a score or more times; the name of Mr. MacKenzie King, the principal architect of contemporary Canada, appears only three times in the Index). Professor Graham does, however, come to grips with the fascinating central problem of Canadian history: how a tiny population deeply divided along racial, religious and regional lines has managed to maintain its separate identity and to hold half a continent in the shadow of a powerful and sometimes land-hungry neighbour. As the author reminds us, even as late as the administration of President Grant, an American Secretary of State could promise to "kiss or kick" Canada into the American Union.

BOOK REVIEWS

Perhaps the best section of the book is its brilliant summary and reinterpretation of the French period beginning with early sixteenth-century exploration and culminating with the fall of New France in the mid-eighteenth century. Professor Graham shows how the French with their "unique sense of continental strategy . . . estimated instinctively the strategic advantage of holding a great circle of river and lake stretching from the Great Lakes of New Orleans which would shut out the British and eventually perhaps give them the continent". He then shows that this grand design was bound to fail because of the inability of the French to maintain control of their North Atlantic sea communications. The chapter on the Institution of New France is provocative and stimulating. In it the author explains how the French colonies were maintained in fragile health only by "superb bureaucratic organization". Under Louis XIV France was, of course, served by a first-class group of administrators who enabled her to fight almost alone in Europe and to retain, despite tremendous difficulties, her foothold in North America.

The review of British rule from 1763 till the Durham Report emphasizes the casual almost accidental development of British policy toward Canada. One has the constant impression that no first-class mind in London ever devoted more than a few consecutive hours to a consideration of the baffling and perplexing problems of this strange new colonial acquisition. But fortunately, as so often occurred elsewhere, the British were "saved from disastrous error by the wisdom of their early governors". And so a most uneasy but not totally unworkable relationship between victorious English and conquered French was gradually evolved in Canada. Similarly, the British, many of them in a mood of "irritated disillusionment" with white colonies of settlement, accepted the startling challenge of the Durham Report, that "the Empire should advance on a new basis of self-government for individual parts." Almost by accident, Britain discovered (in Professor Hancock's phrase) that "Liberty is the cement of Empire".

Professor Graham deals competently but much too briefly with the struggles which preceded Confederation and with the evolution of the Canadian nation since 1867. He is concerned almost exclusively with the evolving status of Canada within the Empire and in the wider world community. In excellent passages, he examines the paradox of the nation which insisted vehemently on full independence within the Commonwealth, yet hesitated so timidly to accept her full share of military responsibilities in peacetime. The book's most serious shortcoming is its failure to examine and to explain the strange pattern of domestic politics in modern Canada. It might be argued that this is unnecessary in a book which attempts "to approach Canadian history from outside", but it would nevertheless be of very real interest to relate the development of Canadian political and social policy in recent decades to that which occurred in the same period elsewhere in the western world.

R. T. MCKENZIE.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

THE GENERAL ELECTION IN GLASGOW, 1950. *Essays by members of the Staff of Glasgow. With a Foreword by SIR HECTOR HETHERINGTON, K.B.E.; General Editor, S. B. CHRIMES.* (Jackson, Glasgow. 189 pp. 15s.)

THIS book is probably the most detailed survey of any section of a General Election which has been produced in this country. The only possible rival is the simultaneous work of Benney and Geiss at Greenwich (*British Journal of Sociology*, December, 1950), where in a single constituency all the field apparatus of contemporary sociology and the interviewers of the British Institute of Public Information were brought to bear. The present study is much broader, but the area is a genuine community of an intense local life, and its fifteen constituencies combine to form a political microcosm of their own. The treatment is essentially impressionistic rather than one based on the techniques of attitude research and statistical analysis. It is not necessarily the worse for that. What one does feel very strongly, however, is the social distance between the authors of the various chapters and the actual life of the city which they study. This may well be a fault which results from an excess of caution, but it does result in some of the chapters reading curiously thinly. This is most true of Chapters 1 and 2, which give a survey, which must be a little incomprehensible to all but Glaswegians, of the fifteen constituencies and an account of the candidates. Really, as so many of the authors are historians, a sympathetic—which is not necessarily approving—historical account of the development of Glasgow politics and of Glasgow's social and economic structure in the last thirty years might have been included. It would have rendered much comprehensible which is at present untouched or unexplained. I do not know if Mr. Oakley, who has written so recently of Glasgow's history, was available, but if so I cannot but regret that he was not used.

Nevertheless, these first two chapters do set the stage well for what follows, and on the whole one's feeling of admiration is greatly increased when one reads the lucid and sensible analysis of *The Issues* in Chapter 3. This is well done and leads one in to the quite exciting account of the campaign as seen by its academic "mass" observers. The chapter on the press, which follows, seems excellent in content, but a little devoid of form; its appendix, which I will not spoil by summary, should become a *locus classicus* of its kind. It is followed, alas! by an extremely weak account of the propaganda of the election, which contains such facetiae as this comment on a poster on child welfare: "The appeal of this poster is, of course, limited to those who like babies." This is followed by a summary mainly in statistical terms of the results and by an interesting conclusion by the editor, Dr. Chrimes, which is remarkably judicious.

The book, therefore, is of first-rate value to anyone who wants to understand the democratic process in Great Britain; its maps and statistical tables are not merely interesting in themselves, but can be used most informatively by anyone who is interested in electoral sociology. There is a certain lack of life about the whole thing—it would not act as a guide to a prospective candidate!—but its tone is cool and sane, the information is enormous, and the result is an interesting vindication of the study of social phenomena in terms, not merely of statistical virtuosity as at Greenwich, but of trained

BOOK REVIEWS

common sense. The Principal of Glasgow University commends the work to "all students of the British Electoral System". The reviewer can only do the same.

D. G. MACRAE.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1923. By EDWARD HALLET CARR. Volume 1. (Macmillan. 430 pp. 25s.)

THIS is the first volume in a great undertaking, *A History of Soviet Russia*. Like so many great undertakings, particularly of writers on history, it has grown in the process of writing. What was planned as an introductory chapter, analysing the structure of Soviet society in the form which it had assumed when Lenin died in 1923, has grown into three volumes, of which this is the first. This volume contains Parts I, II, and III. Part I deals with the history of the forging of the Bolshevik party by Lenin to be an instrument of revolution and of his use of it in 1917. The second part deals with the constitution of state and party as they evolved in the first period after the revolution. The third deals with the evolution of the Soviet state into a federation and with the theory and practice of self-determination in the Soviet Union. Professor Carr tells us that he hopes to publish next year Volumes II and III, which are to contain Part IV, "The Economic Order", and Part V, "Soviet Russia and the World". Then there is still to come "the second instalment of the whole project, *The Struggle for Power, 1923-1928*".

It is difficult to see this first isolated volume in the perspective of so large a work, and therefore to judge it fairly or criticize it adequately. We must wait until next year, at the least for final judgement. The interim, provisional impression is admiration laced with disappointment, which Professor Carr's work so often arouses in us. Our admiration is for his knowledge and intelligence and for the skill and clarity with which he marshals and presents his facts and arguments. This book is, from this point of view, as good as anything which he has written. It is full of information, particularly in Part III with regard to the treatment of what were the subject peoples of Asia, and it is documented information practically unobtainable elsewhere by the English reader.

The disappointment is the direct result of Professor Carr's curious attitude to history and to human affairs. He seems to regard power as the only important *causa causans* in history and the successful use of power as an explanation and justification of anything and everything which has happened. Nothing succeeds like success and nothing else is relevant. Events seen through these spectacles assume a Macchiavelian simplicity and inevitability which are very impressive; but it is the dangerous vision of a short-sighted man who recognizes the outlines of large objects, but never sees the details. In 399 B.C. the power and success were with Meletos and Socrates was the failure and some 400 years later there was another failure of a more spectacular kind. But Socrates and Christ have had more effect upon the history than Meletos and the Pharisees. Professor Carr tells us in his Preface that he is writing the history not of the events of the Revolution, but of the political, social, and economical order which emerged from it. But it is not really possible to separate the two and the emerging of the order is itself

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

an event of the revolution. Professor Carr's vision makes it impossible him to see these events except through the eyes of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party, for theirs is the kingdom, the power, and the glory, and nothing else counts. The picture is hopelessly lopsided, and the reader feels that he has been given an admirable account of the political, social, and economic order, not as it has in fact emerged as an event from events, but as it is represented by those in power and in the official documents of an allpowerful party.

LEONARD WOOLF.

ROOSEVELT IN RETROSPECT. By JOHN GUNTHER. (Hamilton. 441 pp. 21s.)

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT has been the subject of a number of memoirs by leaders in his Administration—memoirs which have been all the more useful because their authors have taken full advantage of the non-existence of an Official Secrets Act in the United States. But Mr. John Gunther is the first to attempt something like a biography, and his swallow will certainly be the prelude to a long and fruitful summer.

It is easier to voyage "inside" a country than the mind and character of a man, and it is hardly surprising that the technique which Mr. Gunther has so profitably applied to Europe and America often fails him in his new and harder task. Indeed, it seems that all Roosevelt biographers are likely to have difficulty probing under the glittering surface. To add to their troubles, the late President appears, squid-like, to be eluding his pursuers in a cloud of ink. Mr. Gunther frankly confesses his dismay at the millions of documents preserved in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, which will make the preparation of scholarly monographs easy while overwhelming a full-length portrait with irrelevant detail. Characteristically, he himself has found more of value by interviewing all sorts of people who knew Roosevelt. To set down their observations, before memories become enveloped in myth, is his most worthwhile service.

Though Mr. Gunther frankly writes as an admirer of Mr. Roosevelt, his book seems to mark the beginning in that decline which the reputations of great men generally suffer immediately after their death. The President, he admits, was devious, garrulous, an untidy administrator, and often given to acting upon inadequate information. Very little of his immense output of scissors-and-paste speeches survives a second reading. Mr. Gunther willingly quotes witnesses against his hero. "What do you think you would find if you cut Roosevelt open?" an ambassador asked one of his acquaintances. The reply was: "What would you find if you cut open a paper doll? Nothing."

The better similes, perhaps, come from the world of the theatre. The more complex the role of a President becomes, the harder it is to distinguish between the man and the part he has to play. President Roosevelt had the advantage of entering the White House at one of the lowest periods in America's national morale, and of dying dramatically at the very moment of its military triumph. To many he seemed the very architect of the national

The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945—1950

by J. P. NETTL

(ready shortly) 21s. net
This book deals with the dark, post-war period in Germany, when the lifeless remains of the National-Socialist State were being replaced by a new structure, the underlying principles of which were imported from Russia. The author discusses three inter-connected problems: Soviet Policy, the post-war German problem, and the internal situation in the Eastern Zone.

Survey of International Affairs 1938

Volume II

The Crisis over Czechoslovakia:
January-September

by R. G. D. LAFFAN assisted
by V. M. TOYNBEE and
P. E. BAKER

with an Introduction by
ARNOLD TOYNBEE

(ready shortly) 30s. net
Between the two World Wars Professor Toynbee's "Survey" established itself as a recurring contribution of importance to the understanding of International politics. It will be good news to many that the series is to be continued from the point where it left off in 1939.

Pioneers of Russian Social Thought

Studies of the Non-Marxian
Tradition of Nineteenth-Century
Russia, and of its Partial Revival
in the Soviet Union

by RICHARD HARE

(ready shortly) 21s. net

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Clarendon

Politics, History and
Religion 1640-1660

B. H. G. WORMALD

A full study of Clarendon as politician and historian—the first for many years. Mr Wormald's interpretation reverses some accepted ideas and forms a notable contribution to modern historical writing.
25s. net

Natural Law and the Theory of Society

OTTO GIERKE

Sir Ernest Barker's translation from Gierke, first published in 1934 is now available in one volume.
63s. net

Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome

C. H. WIRSZUBSKI

A study of the changes in the meaning of libertas as a political concept during the late Republic and early Principate.
15s. net

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

resurgence, but it now seems more likely that he himself was carried forward on the crest of the wave. Many (perhaps he himself, in his later years) regarded him as the indispensable man. Yet, with all his limitations, President Truman has carried through the European Recovery Programme, no less an achievement than Lend-Lease. Even in a critical area of domestic discord, the colour question, more has been accomplished in President Truman's five years than in Roosevelt's twelve. Roosevelt had a talent for statements on this subject which convinced his liberal Northern supporters that his heart was in the right place, while suggesting to Southern Democrats that he didn't intend to do much about it. Is it that his successor is more enlightened or less skilful in evasion, or is it (more likely) that circumstances, such as a much more militant and politically-conscious Negro community, make resounding words no longer adequate?

How much, indeed, is the man and how much the Presidential masque? Mr. Gunther's evidence suggests that the masque prevailed more and more as the years of power went by. Beginning as a not too impressive individual, Roosevelt died as something very like a demi-god to the adoring millions of America and the rest of the world. But the difficulties of biography are much reduced if one treats the Roosevelt story as that of one of history's greatest actors, whose stage was not a few square feet of boards, but a nation and a world.

His best role, it now appears, came at the very beginning of his White House engagement. With the tune of "Happy Days are Here Again" as an overture, his spirited words and confident bearing convinced a discouraged nation that it had "nothing to fear but fear itself". As the superman of Teheran and Yalta, he was less happy. Churchill played up to him, superbly but Stalin lacked the actor's temperament; Mr. R. H. S. Crossman is probably right in suggesting that Woodrow Wilson could have dealt more effectively with him.

It is Roosevelt the actor whom Mr. Gunther has best comprehended and the profusion of bric-a-brac with which his meandering narrative is strewn remind one of the costumes and the stage props of some vanished matinée idol. It is no fault of his that, as in the case of other superb performers in this evanescent medium, much of the magic has departed. It remains for some future biographer with heavier artillery than Mr. Gunther deploys to bring the man and the masque together.

DAVID C. WILLIAMS.

Three New Books

Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice

The 15th edition of this famous treatise is edited by Lord Campion, assisted by T. G. B. Cocks, a Clerk to the House of Commons. Price £4 4s., by post 1s. 6d. extra.

"An immortal volume . . . which every Member ought to know from the first page to the last." *The Spectator*.

The Iron and Steel Act, 1949

To be really well informed on steel nationalisation this book is essential. It contains the full text of the Act, with explanations and references, and a useful Introduction, describing the background of the new legislation, and summarising its provisions. The authors, Walter Gumbel, LL.B., and Kenneth Potter M.A., are both barristers, and the Consulting Editor is Colin Pearson, C.B.E., K.C. The work is reprinted from Butterworths' Annotated Legislation Service and costs 25s., by post 9d. extra.

Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration

A book of great interest and value to all interested in the problems of Colonial Administration. The contributors explain the methods and principles applied by their respective countries, and deal with common problems with refreshing frankness. Contributions are in French or English, with summaries in the alternative language. The Editor is Professor C. M. MacInnes, M.A. Price 30s., by post 1s. 3d. extra.

BUTTERWORTH & CO. (Publishers) LTD., Bell Yard, Temple Bar, London, W.C.2

FREEDOM POWER AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

Here is the long-awaited proposal for a new Free Society which is planned, yet democratic, allowing for the maximum development of the individual. New light is thrown on a wide yet closely interlinked variety of topics, such as the sociology of power, social and political controls, education as groundwork, the relationship of work and leisure and the discipline of freedom.

by

KARL MANNHEIM

In the International Library of Sociology

25s. net

ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

WHILE MEMORY SERVES. By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS TUKER. (Cassell 25s.)

SMOOTH government always requires an act of imagination on the part of both rulers and ruled; each must be able to some extent and some of the time to get a glimpse of what it feels like to be in the place of the other. This act is never easy even in compact territories inhabited by more or less homogeneous people; it becomes something strange and wonderful when it happens in far-flung empires. The saddest aspect of the British connection with India is that this seemed to occur more rarely as time went on, while the brightest aspect is that it could still occur, albeit patchily, right up to the end.

The year 1947 marked the end of a type of British relation with India and made possible the start of a new kind. Whether the latter can be realized depends in large measure on the ability of Britishers and Indians to perform now that act of imagination which was so difficult during the days of empire. It is, from this point of view, important to ask of any serious book on the British in India what contribution it makes to this end.

While Memory Serves is a serious book. As an account of 1946 and 1947 written by the last British G.O.C.-in-C. of the vast and vital Eastern Command, it deals with that fascinating field where military and political history meet. General Toker is concerned with the role of the Army, but the Army was concerned with disturbances which expressed political struggles. The carefully protected "non-political" nature of the Army—part myth, part reality—had already received a shock under the impact of wartime recruitment; it broke down still further when troops had to be given lessons in Indian politics and senior officers found themselves urging that Army and defence considerations demanded certain political conditions. (It is revealed that as the transfer of power approached Army circles argued insistently that the preservation of order required, first, the retention for some time of a portion of the armed forces in impartial, British hands, and, second, resistance to the splitting of the Sikh community by the partition of the Punjab. Both demands make some sense in view of subsequent events, but both were politically unthinkable at the time.)

General Toker closely connects Hinduism and Indian nationalism and has little sympathy for either. He tends to see them as silly and ugly by turns. The portion of truth which his criticisms contain needs to be learnt by those to whom they refer. But, for the present at least, they will be accepted only if they come from among themselves. General Toker will be rejected for the job of instructor to the new India, partly for the good reason that his view is certainly partial, partly for the bad reason that he belongs to the old order. And if it is true that their own leaders can more easily help Indians to see themselves and their weaknesses, it is equally true that only thus will they see the Britisher and his qualities. General Toker's portrayal of his own countrymen in India carries much truth, but it will not yet carry that truth to India.

English readers will not have the same difficulty to overcome. The value of the book for them lies in a number of directions. While they can obtain little by way of guidance as to the feelings of Indian nationalists or the outlook of Hinduism (the Appendix devoted to the latter is gleefully entitled

The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. XXII, No. 3 JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1951

CONTENTS		PAGE
Notes and Comments		217
Bernard Shaw and <i>The Political Quarterly</i>	By WILLIAM A. ROBSON	221
The New Towns	By PETER G. RICHARDS	240
Twentieth Century Revolutions	By HUGH SETON-WATSON	251
The Post-War Dock Strikes	By KENNETH KNOWLES	266
The Interpreter's House	By LIONEL CURTIS	291
BOOK REVIEWS	Reviewed by	
Recent French Books	J. P. MAYER	296
An Introduction to Politics (Soltau)	JOHN PLAMENATZ	298
Wealth of Colonies (Hancock); Modern Colonization (Harrison Church); Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration (A Symposium); Men Against the Desert (Calder); The British Group (Key);	E. G. FARMER	300
Freedom and Catholic Power (Blanshard); Roman Catholicism (Corbishley);	LEONARD WOOLF	302
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (Degras) Volume I, 1917-1924; Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development (Numbers 1 to 4);	H. R. G. GREAVES	304
The British Police (Hart)	C. H. ROLPH	308
The Nationalized Industries (Chester)	J. A. G. GRIFFITH	312
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in Great Britain (Sharp)	O. KAHN-FREUND	314
Shorter Notices		316

EDITORS: Leonard Woolf and William A. Robson.

EDITORIAL BOARD: Noel Annan, H. L. Beales, G. D. H. Cole, R. H. S. Crossman, M.P., Kingsley Martin, Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, Barbara Wootton.

MSS., Books for Review, etc., should be addressed to the Editor at MONK'S HOUSE, RODMELL, near LEWES, SUSSEX. MSS. must be accompanied by stamped addressed envelopes (or International Reply Coupons).

PRICE Five Shillings per issue. POSTAGE SUBSCRIPTIONS to any address or through any newsagent £1 p.a. Postage on this issue, 2d.

Correspondence relating to subscriptions, advertisements, etc., should be addressed to the Publisher, TURNSTILE PRESS, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W.C.1 HOLBORN 6471

"Whither Socialism?"

VALUES IN

A CHANGING CIVILISATION"

Five pamphlets concerned with a present-day re-statement of Socialist principles

1. Democratic Values, by Rt. Hon. Aneurin Bevan, M.P. 6d.
2. Socialism and the Study of Man, by Austen Albu, M.P. 1s.
3. Does Socialism Need Religion? by Rev. St. John Groser. 1s.
4. The Lessons of Science, by Dr. J. Bronowski. 6d.
5. Socialist Values in a Changing Civilisation, by R. H. S. Crossman, M.P. 6d.

from

THE FABIAN SOCIETY

11 Dartmouth Street · London, S.W.1
the organisation which continues, as ever, to devote itself to thinking ahead about Socialist principles and policy.

Send for details of membership and publications.

NCSS are publishing this month

*NEW TOWNS: Challenge and Opportunity, by L. E. White, whose **SMALL TOWNS: Their Social and Community Problems was reviewed in 38 papers in this country alone. His earlier study ***COMMUNITY OR CHAOS: Housing Estates and their Social Problems, was described in the News Chronicle as "a clear and factual analysis."

*NEW TOWNS 4s. 6d.

**SMALL TOWNS 3s. 6d.

***COMMUNITY OR CHAOS 2s. 6d.

A limited number of cloth bound volumes containing all three will be available shortly.

Order through booksellers

or

The National Council of Social Service

(Incorporated)

26 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE dismissal of General MacArthur has had such widespread ramifications that it demands the fullest consideration in the light of the proper relationship between the civil and military powers.

The conception that the civil power should be supreme over the armed forces has for centuries been a corner-stone of democratic belief in England and France. How comes it that in a country which prides itself as being not only a democracy but *the* democracy, a commanding general should not have been called home for consultation with either the President, the State Department, or the Chiefs of Staffs for a period of nearly 15 years? How is it that apparently no President dared to instruct this particular general to report in person to the White House? How is it that General MacArthur was able to build up a position for himself which, as *The Times* newspaper remarked, seemed to belong more to Roman times than our own? How is it that he was invested with complete political as well as military power in Japan, so that his policies there prevailed over those of the State Department and of all the other countries which participated in the war against Japan? How is it that only strong and persistent protests by allied governments who are contributing to the U.N. forces in Korea, reinforced by openly expressed dissatisfaction and lack of confidence in General MacArthur's intentions, sufficed to eliminate this headstrong and dangerous man from his position of entrenched power in the Orient?

The answer is certainly not to be found in the military prowess of General MacArthur. One of the most astonishing features of this astonishing affair is the way in which MacArthur's military reputation has been inflated. His achievement in the second world war, after the early disastrous defeats in the Philippines, consisted almost entirely of "island hopping": a relatively simple task to a commander possessing overwhelming naval, air, and ground forces, as MacArthur did when he began to advance. He fought no action on a mainland; and Japan capitulated not to MacArthur but to the atomic bomb.

In Northern Korea General MacArthur suffered a major reverse last autumn, not because he was vastly outnumbered by Chinese communist forces, but because he was outmanoeuvred. The story was put out in the press that vast hordes of Chinese

SHAW and a Soviet magazine

"... splendid illustrated magazines... the pictures are in colour, in folio size, on sumptuous paper: veritable editions de luxe, produced regardless of expense and dirt cheap."

"Nobody who sees these publications will ever believe our tales of a half-starved population dwelling in Belsen Camps under the lash of a ruthless tyranny."

No wonder GBS was impressed
—look at the size of the magazine now called "Soviet Union"



SEND
OFF THIS
COUPON TODAY

See for yourself!

You don't have to take our word for it (or Shaw's for that matter!). See by taking out a subscription to

SOVIET UNION

One of the world's best illustrated magazines.
Subscriptions: 7/6 for 6 issues, 15/- for 12 issues.

To COLLET'S SUBSCRIPTION DEPT.,
40 GT. RUSSELL STREET, LONDON, W.C.1.

I enclose..... for..... months' subscription to "Soviet Union".

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

soldiers were besieging a handful of American G.I.'s and bearing them down by sheer weight of numbers. Actually the contending forces were at that time about equal in numbers, but the allied front was split in two by the Chinese column owing to defective intelligence, a wrong estimate of Chinese intentions, and poor generalship. This gradually leaked out in the American press. It was known months ago in United Nations circles in New York.

* * *

On what, then, did General MacArthur rely to maintain his power and status? The answer is both simple and complex: on political support. The simple part is the undisguised association of the general with the Republican party in Congress. Such an association, demonstrated in many crude and unmistakable ways, is itself a thoroughly unhealthy sign. Commanding officers may have their private political opinions, like all other citizens. Officially, they should have no political opinions other than those of the government of the day: in this respect they resemble civil servants. General MacArthur was to blame for openly consorting with the Republican party; but the blame must be shared with the Republicans who were willing to encourage the general in his defiance of President Truman and the State Department.

The Republicans who support MacArthur are essentially isolationist. The modern version of American isolationism is to recognize and emphasize U.S. interests and responsibilities in the Pacific and the Far East; and to denounce and oppose as irrelevant any American military effort or diplomatic association elsewhere. Hence all the Senators and Congressmen who are against United States participation in N.A.T.O. have been fanatical adherents of MacArthur. Yet strangely enough, they do not really believe in MacArthur's provocative policy against China, and they would be utterly dismayed at the prospect of an interminable and futile war with China. In short, they are associated with MacArthurism in order to embarrass and weaken the President and the Democratic party.

General MacArthur, like all political generals, had to present himself as a simple soldier, standing quite apart from politics and intent only on the national interest. In addressing the Congress he accordingly declared that he was not an advocate "for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan considerations". And during the long years of his reign in the Far East the predominantly

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Republican press of the U.S. has presented MacArthur in similar guise as a non-political figure.

The fiction has at last been exposed. MacArthur stands out quite clearly as a commander who was unwilling and unable to carry out the President's policy or the wishes of America's allies; and who has brought the world to the edge of an abyss from whose depths no recovery would be possible. He stated explicitly to the joint meeting of Congress that he thought it necessary to intensify the economic blockade of China and to impose a naval blockade of the China coast; to conduct full air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; to remove "restrictions" on the Nationalist forces on Formosa, and to supply them with whatever arms, stores, and equipment they might require. He was ready to pursue these policies regardless of the attitude of America's western allies, regardless of the danger of promoting war with China, regardless of breaking up the allied coalition, and regardless of the effect of such a diversion of United States efforts on the Soviet Union.

* * *

General MacArthur's policy is regarded as both reckless and stupid throughout Western Europe, and also, we believe, by a substantial section of the American people. We are here concerned in the main, however, to point out the unwisdom and danger to the American nation, and indeed to the whole world, of allowing military commanders to become associated with political parties for the sake of internal political issues. Long centuries of struggle to secure the ascendancy of the civil over the military power have made it abundantly clear that only by the subordination of the generals, admirals, and air marshals to the governments which appoint them can democracy survive and militarism be avoided. It is no accident that in Japan the Cabinet had no control over the heads of the Army and Navy, who were responsible only to the Emperor; nor that in Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II the military chiefs enjoyed a quite exceptional position of power in relation to the civil government.

France has had a long and bitter experience of the struggle to control the military chiefs. A recent book by Professor Jere C. King, of the University of California, entitled *Generals and Politicians*,* contains a detailed and interesting account of the struggle which took place between the French Government and

* Cambridge University Press. 26s. net.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the commanders of the French armies during the First World War. Professor King shows how France went into the 1914 war virtually under the "dictatorship" of Joffre, but emerged in 1918 under the rigorous rule of Clemenceau, who not only embodied the will to victory, but was known as the champion of civilian primacy over the military.

Yet how temporary was the ascendancy established by Clemenceau is shown by a passage in Mr. Churchill's memoirs of the second world war. Mr. Churchill relates how, as First Lord of the Admiralty, he paid a visit with Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord, to France in November, 1939, for a conference on joint operations with the French naval authorities. Before the conference Admiral Darlan explained to Mr. Churchill how Admiralty matters were managed in France. He did not allow the Minister of Marine, M. Campinchi, to be present when operational matters were under discussion. These he regarded as falling entirely within the professional sphere, and therefore as outside the authority of the Minister. Mr. Churchill said that he and the First Sea Lord were one. Darlan said he recognized this, "but in France it was different. However," he said, "Monsieur le Ministre will arrive for luncheon." And surely enough, the Minister turned up two hours later, after the naval business had been discussed and agreed. "He knew his place," adds Mr. Churchill, "and now presided affably over the meal."*

It can be seen how ever-present is the danger of the civil power losing control of the military. The satisfactory position which obtained in this respect in Britain during the second world war was largely due to Mr. Churchill's unchallengable political position and formidable personality, added to his immense knowledge and experience of military affairs of all kinds. But still we must remain permanently on our guard and aware of the problem. The possibility of military autonomy or autocracy is facilitated when a military commander is responsible not to a single government, but to a coalition of allies. The structure of the defence organization and command recently approved for N.A.T.O. is complex enough from the purely military standpoint. It offers some difficult problems and dangerous possibilities concerning the relations between the military and the civil power, for the *locus* of ultimate authority in matters concerning policy and arms is by no means clear.

* Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. I, p.392.

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

IT is due to the memory of Bernard Shaw to reveal the part which he played in founding *The Political Quarterly*. Without his generous financial assistance and encouragement it might not have been possible to start the review at all. At any rate it could not have been launched in January, 1930, when the first number actually appeared.

The story of Shaw's relations with this review must be told as a personal narrative, since so far as I am aware I was the only person who had any dealings with him on the matter. I would add that in 1949 I obtained his permission to publish the correspondence, the intention then being to print an article describing the founding of *The Political Quarterly* as an introduction to a consolidated index of the issues from 1930 to 1950—a project which unfortunately had to be abandoned owing to the high cost of printing.

I

Some time in 1927 a few of the younger and more active Fabians began to entertain the idea of starting a serious political review in which to discuss progressive ideas at adequate length. We felt the lack of a review concentrating on the political field; all the existing monthly or quarterly reviews were either quite general in their interests or Conservative in outlook, with the possible exception of the *Contemporary Review*, which reflected right-wing Liberal opinion. We wanted an organ to serve as a forum for the evolution of a philosophy and a programme for the Socialist movement, which was then stumbling and fumbling along with growing strength but devoid of any coherent body of ideas. Above all, we wanted to build a bridge between the world of thought and the world of action: in particular, between the universities and those engaged in politics or government.

I discovered quite soon that Kingsley Martin, then an assistant lecturer in political science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, had arrived at the same conclusions as I had on the need for a political review, and was prepared to

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

devote his energies to the task of getting it established. Thereafter we joined forces; and although many other persons of greater reputation and influence became actively interested, such as R. H. Tawney, Harold Laski, J. A. Hobson, Leonard Woolf, J. L. Hammond, and G. Lowes Dickinson, Kingsley Martin and I did most of the initial spadework which laid the foundations.

At quite an early stage we realized the need to widen the circle of supporters on as catholic a basis as possible. A private meeting was held at the London School of Economics and Political Science, to which 40 or 50 persons of intellectual standing were invited to discuss the project. It received very strong support, and soon afterwards we printed a prospectus. This ran as follows:

"A POLITICAL QUARTERLY"

"It is proposed to establish a Quarterly Review, which will have as its special object the discussion of social policy, public administration and questions of industrial and political organization, primarily in Great Britain, but also, from time to time, in other countries. Its aim should be to do for these matters what the *Round Table* has attempted to do for imperial politics. While treating them in a scientific spirit, it would have as its subject current political and social problems, not political science in the abstract. It would differ from the existing reviews, partly because the space at its command would enable it to aim at a standard of thoroughness impossible in a short article, and partly because it would be planned by a group of writers holding certain general political ideas in common.

While its intellectual basis would be an acceptance of the view of the necessity of industrial and social reconstruction it will not be mortgaged to any one political party, nor be committed in advance to any particular programme. To discover truth and promote social well-being will be its only definite loyalties: and as a journal it will know no other allegiance. Thus it would welcome contributions from persons of different political connections, provided that they were of the necessary quality. It should be realistic and critical in spirit, and should attempt to handle its subject with sufficient authority to attract the attention of all persons seriously interested in political and social questions, whatever their political views. While it would

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

naturally be mainly concerned with questions of topical interest, it should endeavour to treat them in a broad and philosophical manner, and should aim at diffusing knowledge and stimulating thought, rather than at presenting a case. It should draw on the experience of the Continent, the U.S.A., and the British Dominions, as freely as on that of this country, and should appeal not only to English readers but to all serious students of political, economic and social questions.

The reasons for thinking that such a journal would meet a demand are as follows:

1. There is no journal in England to-day which attempts to deal authoritatively with questions of social policy and political organization. The whole tenour of political discussion in England is at the present time in a profoundly unsatisfactory condition. The national daily newspapers, with scarcely more than one exception, are either controlled by a handful of millionaires who definitely prevent the effective expression of opinions from which they differ, or else are harnessed to the yoke of a particular political party. The weekly sixpenny journals, excellent though they are as commentaries on current events, are unable to devote the necessary space required for the adequate discussion of the larger political and social questions; while the monthly reviews, attempting, as they do, to cover every field of human activity, necessarily do so in a superficial manner. It is a serious matter at the present juncture, obviously a critical period in English history, that there should be no recognized avenue through which new ideas on social and political affairs can emerge for intelligent printed discussion.

2. Political and social questions are occupying an ever-increasing amount of public attention and will continue to do so more and more in the future. Apart from pamphlets and books, the great development of experience and thought in these fields, both in Great Britain and in other countries, has never been made accessible to the man in the street. He will not read a Quarterly Journal, but he will read the daily Press, and the Journal would influence him by supplying the materials upon which the more reputable newspapers could draw.

3. The discussion of all political and economic questions suffers because there is no organ in which they are treated

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

thoroughly, with reasoned arguments and a candid presentation of the available evidence. The result is that the general public is at the mercy of catch-words. There is also a growing number of persons who are not committed to any programme but who are nevertheless interested in a serious discussion of social and economic policy. Consider, in the light of these demands, the almost entire absence of any serious discussion in the Press of the real nature of the coal problem, or of unemployment, or of the problems of combinations and monopolies, or of trade unionism, or of the experience of our own and other countries regarding the possible methods of organizing industries under public ownership and of their advantages and defects. There has probably never been a period in which so many political and economic experiments have been made in Europe as in the last ten years. Yet hardly any serious attempt has been made to estimate their significance and value.

Whatever views may be held as to questions of policy, in the sphere of political or economic organization, it will be agreed that the first condition of a sane treatment of difficult questions is that the relevant facts should be known and should be discussed with candour and impartiality. A Quarterly, such as is suggested, would do valuable work in helping to spread an understanding of the real nature of the problems with which the country is confronted. The probability that within five or ten years a Government will be returned which is pledged to large measures of economic and social reconstruction makes the diffusion of such an understanding all the more important.

The size and format of the proposed Journal would be so arranged as to include, among other regular features, reviews of current English and foreign literature and relevant official publications, and a digest of judicial and administrative decisions of public significance. But the main value of its contents will lie in its special articles.

We believe that it will be possible to form a group of contributors sufficient to ensure a continuous supply of matter of adequate quality, and it is believed that the Editor contemplated is one who will command general and cordial approval.

The main difficulty to be overcome is the question of finance. It is estimated that an initial guaranteed sum of

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

£2,000 will secure the Journal for a period of at least two years. It is hoped that afterwards it may become self-supporting."
(signed)

P. J. NOEL BAKER	F. LAVINGTON
ERNEST BARKER	A. D. LINDSAY
C. DELISLE BURNS	C. M. LLOYD
A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS	J. J. MALLON
HENRY CLAY	T. H. MARSHALL
G. D. H. COLE	KINGSLEY MARTIN
G. LOWES DICKINSON	C. S. MYERS
P. SARGANT FLORENCE	PERCY NUNN
MARGERY FRY	OLIVIER
T. E. GREGORY	W. A. ROBSON
LYNDA GRIER	C. P. SCOTT
FREDA HAWTREY	R. H. TAWNEY
L. T. HOBHOUSE	BEATRICE WEBB
J. A. HOBSON	SIDNEY WEBB
EVA HUBBACK	LEONARD WOOLF
H. J. LASKI	BARBARA WOOTTON.

It will be noted that the prospectus expressly avoided any specific party bias and stated that it would welcome contributions of high quality regardless of their authors' political connections. The signatories included adherents of both the Labour and the Liberal parties, and persons unattached to any party.

II

The next and most difficult step was to raise money. We estimated that at least £2,000 was required to ensure a reasonable trial period for the quarterly, and we anticipated heavy losses for the first 2 or 3 years.

It now became necessary to approach a wide variety of people who might be able to provide funds for a project of this kind. We made no pretence that the political review was a commercial proposition likely to be attractive as an investment. On the other hand, it could scarcely be regarded as a philanthropic activity in the ordinary sense. The very fact that the review had progressive political aims ruled out a large number of possible sources of financial support; and those whom it ruled in seldom had any spare money to give away.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The process of raising money in this country for a socially useful purpose is one of the most exhausting tasks known to man. I had never attempted it before and hope never to do so again; but it is well worth trying once. It teaches one a lot about other people, and something about oneself.

The response was by no means discouraging. Many well-known people in public life contributed towards the funds required to launch the review. Most of the financial support consisted of promises of quite small sums; and the total only amounted to a few hundred pounds.

I approached Bernard Shaw at an early stage of the proceedings. I had known him for many years and had received much kindness and encouragement from him. My relations had been purely personal and entirely non-financial. I was on sufficiently friendly terms to feel able to ask him to assist the new venture, particularly as I had not the slightest intention of being actively concerned with the editing; I was therefore entirely disinterested.

It must have been at the end of 1927 that I first broached the matter to G.B.S. in writing. In January, 1928, I went to his flat in Whitehall Court and had a long talk with him about the proposed review. G.B.S. showed a lively interest in the project. He made several suggestions about the title and scope of the review; emphasized the need for strictly businesslike arrangements; and said he would consider whether he could give any help.

On 18th January, 1928, I wrote to him saying that he had told me at Kingsway Hall (where the big Fabian lectures in which he usually participated were held) that he meant to do something about the Political Quarterly; that we were anxious to get on with the proposition and now had £600 or £700 promised by persons of imagination and public spirit. I offered to arrange a meeting between himself and Laski, Leonard Woolf, Tawney, and the Webbs, if he would care to discuss the proposition with them. I concluded by saying that if he already felt inclined to do something generous in the matter, I would like to know what we might expect to receive.

On 28th January, 1928, he wrote me a postcard to say:

"Generosity is not a septuagenarian quality; and my recent compulsory munificence in the matter of supertax has left me the meanest of men.

Come! how much have you got; and what is the lowest

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

additional contribution which would enable you to try for a year?

G.B.S."

On 8th February, 1928, I sent the following reply:

"Many thanks for your card. In regard to the Quarterly what we feel is that a serious enterprise of this kind ought not to be started without there being sufficient financial stability to ensure that the Journal shall have a life of three years. It would in our estimation take three years to get such a paper started on its own financial legs. Furthermore, if we were to stop after a year such a result would discredit the idea of a serious political paper for years to come, besides casting a reflection on the capabilities of those responsible for starting it. Furthermore, we could hardly ask a person of standing to act as Editor unless we could guarantee a longer period than a single year.

All this will, I hope, convince you that we hope to launch the enterprise in a competent manner and not merely scramble into publication at the earliest possible moment.

In reply to your question, we have a small committee which will meet shortly and get out definite figures as to future expenses, present contributions or promises, and further requirements. I will then let you have the exact detailed information. I am very anxious not to mislead you with careless figures so please excuse the delay of a week or two which may be involved. In the meantime please forget the collector [of taxes] and foster your most generous instincts preparatory to making a contribution."

On 11th March, 1928, another card came:

"I think I'll wait and see what happens the first year. Do you realize what a stupendously obsolete thing a quarterly is? It suggests that the Fabian Society, which began 50 years ahead of its time is going to end 50 years behind it. This enthusiasm of young men for old things is ghastly. Are you surprised at my not sharing it?

G.B.S."

The Committee referred to in my letter consisted of Leonard Woolf, A. M. Carr-Saunders, Harold Laski, J. M. Keynes, T. E. Gregory, Kingsley Martin and myself. R. H. Tawney and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

G. Lowes Dickinson were also extremely helpful. We were a more or less self-appointed body, but it was essential at this stage to have a definite group to make the scheme look serious and responsible. The distinguished men who served on this committee were greatly interested in the project and personally did much to help in establishing the journal.

It had been agreed privately among us at an early stage that J. L. Hammond should be invited to be editor. His eminence as a social historian, his brilliance and experience as a journalist, and the moral purpose of his outlook, all marked him out as the ideal man to adorn the editorial chair. We ruthlessly exploited his name as the person "we hoped to get" as editor, regardless of the fact that he had not finally agreed to act. In a letter to Laski dated 4th July, 1927, he wrote "It is a great honour to be considered in such a light [for the editorship] and you may be sure that if the project comes off I should not turn it down unless I really thought I should not do it satisfactorily". Despite this non-committal reply, we made great play with his name, which was certainly one of our intellectual assets.

Notwithstanding an outward show of resistance, I could see that G.B.S. was interested in the scheme, and I believed he would be ready to help it at the right time. I suspected that he wanted to be sure we were serious and sufficiently energetic not merely to rely on him. It was part of his method to attempt to discourage us. I therefore persisted in my efforts; and at some time between March 1928 and March 1929—I have no record of the date—he capitulated and told me he would give us £1,000 if we could find the rest. He insisted that his name must not appear among the donors.

On 5th March, 1929, I wrote telling him that matters were still progressing slowly but surely. I explained that we had secured a certain amount of additional money for the review and that there was no doubt that the balance would eventually be obtained. I continued:

"I really think that in the interests of the Review I ought to relieve you of the £1,000 which you have generously agreed to contribute. It is true that we do not actually require the money at this moment because we are still involved in the preparatory stages. But in the first place the money might be on deposit at the bank usefully earning interest for the Review, and in the second place, if you were unfortunately

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to be run over by one of those super-silent cat motor cars which now steal along the streets, as very nearly occurred when I was walking with you down Kingsway last year, it would be extraordinarily difficult to persuade your executors that I had managed to extract a promise for the sum in question from you."

He replied by return with a characteristic insistence on businesslike arrangements:

7 March, 1929.

"DEAR ROBSON

You must open a banking account in the name of trustees so that cheques can be made payable to it. Otherwise there will be nobody to pay the money to but you personally; and though this would not worry me it might deter strangers, and in any case would be a very unwise arrangement for you.

I have my doubts about the whole affair: it seems to me that quarterlies are very ancient superstitions. And this one will soon become a nest of reactionaries.

However, get the constitution settled and the account open. You can then offer me shares or debentures or what not. I shall certainly not give you the money as a gift: it must be an investment of some sort. Always keep the control in the hands of friends.

Faithfully

G. BERNARD SHAW."

We now felt able to go ahead and form a small company to own and carry on the political review; and to make the necessary arrangements for printing and publishing. Hammond had definitely refused the editorship in November, 1928, but he offered to serve on the committee.

III

In June, 1929, a General Election took place. The results gave no party an absolute majority, but Labour was the largest with 287 members, compared with 260 Conservative and 59 Liberals. Ramsay MacDonald became Prime Minister of the second Labour Government, again enjoying office but not power, and again dependent on Liberal support which was given reluctantly

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and under continual pressure for concessions and changes of government policy.

The difficulties and problems involved in this situation made us anxious to launch the review as soon as possible. On 4th July, 1929, I wrote to Shaw as follows:

"In view of the changed political situation the Executive Committee feel that we must get a move on in regard to the proposed Quarterly Review and we hope to bring out the first number in January of next year.

We are forming a small private company and the constitution of this will be broadly as follows:

[There followed details of the proposed arrangements.]

I shall be glad to know if this arrangement meets with your approval and if so it would be of the greatest assistance if you could let us have the cheque for the £1,000 which you have agreed to contribute. A banking account has been opened in the three joint names of Gregory, Lloyd & Robson, at the Westminster Bank, Temple Bar branch. Financial contributions are being paid into this account to be held for a Company which will take over the fund on formation.

The draft Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company have been drawn and are now being circulated to the various members of the Committee. If you would like to see a copy I would have it forwarded to you but I don't suppose you wish to be bothered with this.

The Members of the Executive Committee consist of:

J. L. Hammond	A. M. Carr-Saunders
H. J. Laski	T. E. Gregory
J. M. Keynes	Kingsley Martin
Leonard Woolf	Myself.

All these persons are showing considerable interest in the enterprise and are likely to make a very strong Board.

As regards the editorship, I think I mentioned to you that J. L. Hammond has unfortunately not been able to take on the job for various reasons, although he strongly supports the whole project. What we have decided to do in default of an editor of equal standing and maturity to him, is to have an editorial Board consisting of the members of the Committee above mentioned, together possibly with one or two other similar individuals. These names will be presented to

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the world on the cover of the Quarterly and the actual work of editing will be done jointly by Kingsley Martin and myself. Kingsley Martin, whom you met when you dined with me at Princes Gate, is a very able and energetic young man who is now one of the chief leader writers on the Manchester Guardian, where he was called to replace C. E. Montague. Prior to that he was on the staff of the School of Economics. He has written two or three books including one on Lord Palmerston, "The British Public and the General Strike" and a recent volume on "French Political Thought in the Eighteenth Century". As far as I am concerned, I did not at all desire to have any share in the editorship but the Committee unanimously insisted on my lending a hand, mainly on the score, I imagine, that there is no one else to cover the field of Local Government, Labour Legislation, Administrative Law, and Law Reform generally with which I am more or less familiar. I don't think that the choice is a good one but it was difficult for me to refuse.

If you would like any further information on anything connected with the Quarterly I would be very glad to give it to you if you could let me know soon. I am getting married on Friday of next week and am going away after that for about two months. I would therefore very much like to know that you approve the arrangements and that you will give us your contribution on the terms mentioned above. If you could send a cheque made out to the joint account mentioned above it would be a very great assistance as we are now collecting money from all the financial supporters of whom you are the most important."

On the day of my wedding, I received the following postcard:

11th July, 1929.

"Cheque goes to the bank by this post. Let somebody see that it is placed on deposit until it is wanted.

I could not get to the Portman Rooms.* I had to go to an enormous reception of delegates in St. James's Square and make myself agreeable until I retired exhausted after 11.

Buck up. The ceremony is soon over; and one survives it somehow.

G.B.S."

* The reference to the Portman Rooms was to a reception given there the previous evening.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

On 1st January, 1930, the first number of *The Political Quarterly* made its appearance. It was published by Macmillan and contained 160 pages. The Editorial Board consisted of: A. M. Carr-Saunders, G. Lowes Dickinson, T. E. Gregory, J. L. Hammond, H. J. Laski, J. M. Keynes, Kingsley Martin, myself and Leonard Woolf. The actual editing was done jointly by Martin and myself. This continued until Martin became editor of *The New Statesman* in 1931, when Leonard Woolf succeeded him as joint editor of *The Political Quarterly*.

One interesting feature of the first number was an article on *The Disappearance of the Governing Class* by a Political Correspondent. This "Political Correspondent" was none other than Beatrice Webb. The article contained much which was highly prophetic of subsequent events.

Apart from signing the original statement, the Webbs did not take any part in the foundation of the review. They had already retired to the country and were no longer active in practical and political affairs. Mrs. Webb pointed out in a letter to Kingsley Martin, dated 7th January, 1927, that she considered the quarterly review outmoded as a form of publication; and that there was also the difficulty of raising funds. "I am quite sure", she wrote, "that Bernard Shaw would not advance any money for the purpose, and I do not know of anyone else who is likely to do so." After the review was launched, she and Sidney Webb were very well disposed towards it; and Sidney Webb became a frequent contributor.

In order to bring out the full importance of Bernard Shaw's contribution to the founding of this review I should explain that none of us who were concerned with launching it knew of any other person or persons who were able and willing to put down even a tenth of the sum he provided. Apart from those who had already promised us financial support, neither I nor any other member of the Committee had in view any other considerable sources of money. It is therefore true to say that Shaw's generous help played a decisive and dominant part in launching *The Political Quarterly*.

G.B.S. also gave us valuable literary aid. He contributed to the symposium on the political crisis of 1931, published in the issue of October-December 1931 (Vol. II, No. 4); he gave us the text of his address to the Academy of Political Science in New York on "The Future of Political Science in America" which appeared in the issue of July-September, 1933 (Vol. IV,

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

No. 3); and he wrote an article entitled "The Telltale Microphone" for the special number devoted to the future of the B.B.C. which we published in October-December 1935 (Vol. VI, No. 4).

IV

From a political and journalistic point of view, *The Political Quarterly* started publication at an excellent moment. The futility and lack of direction of the second Labour Government of 1929; the foolish and suicidal policy pursued by the Liberal Party in Parliament, where it acted in the role of "a balancing power" which it still aspires to play; the disastrous disruption of the Labour Party by the defection of MacDonald, Thomas, and Snowden in 1931; the hopelessly misguided and negative attitude towards unemployment and the great depression taken up by the Government, the Treasury, the Bank of England and official circles generally; the plight of several of our major industries; and the threatening international situation: all these causes had produced a widespread state of frustration and dissatisfaction. The political intelligentsia with a progressive outlook to which we hoped to appeal was very willing to listen to any voices and views which might help to raise the country from the slough of despond into which it had fallen.

From an economic standpoint, however, the beginning of 1930 was far from a propitious time in which to launch a new periodical. The Quarterly had scarcely been published for a year before the so-called financial crisis of 1931 caused a general curtailment of expenditure. Public libraries cut down their subscriptions, and private subscribers followed suit in the pathetic belief that the patriotic duty of every good citizen in the economic blizzard was to reduce his personal expenditure to the greatest possible extent. The remoteness of the British public from Keynesian economics in those days would need to be measured in astronomical terms.

The inevitable result was that our losses in the early years exceeded expectations. We did not exhaust our modest capital but we made heavy inroads in it during 1930, 1931 and 1932. Maynard Keynes (who remained a member of the editorial board until his death), speaking from his great experience of building up *The Economic Journal*, had warned us that we must be prepared to go on for a long time in order to become a self-supporting review. With this in mind, the Board decided to try

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to raise further funds in 1933 to ensure that *The Political Quarterly* would weather the economic blizzard then raging.

It must have been in the latter part of that year that I again approached G.B.S., though I have no copy of my letter. He took the correspondence with him on his world cruise and in the spring of 1934 I received the following reply:

24th February, 1934.

"R.M.S. Rangitane, outward bound London to New Zealand,
at present roasting near the Equator.

DEAR ROBSON,

At last I have a moment's leisure to write to you about the P.Q., and to give more than a glance at the figures you supplied me with. They seem to me quite conclusive: the experiment has failed. The receipts are dwindling; the advertisements are dwindling; the sales are dwindling. I shall not throw the handle after the hatchet by pensioning it: I cannot afford such games (the popular impression that my settled income is boundless is a delusion: I can finance an experiment occasionally out of the windfalls that occasionally happen in the theatre even to me; but I cannot keep lame ducks from year to year; and my last two plays have flopped just as badly as the P.Q. and for much the same causes).

Derelict magazines are hard to kill; or rather they are hard to bury. Their ghosts keep walking often for years and years. I think it is shocking to bleed Cripps personally to keep the wreck afloat; but if I were the editor I should offer to make the paper the organ of all the dictators: of Kemal, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Pilsudski, Doumergue, De Valera, Mosley, and of Cripps too, if he cares to give a final kick to "the putrefying corpse of Democracy". The blazing fact that nobody mentions is that of late years every political adventurer who promises to suppress or sidetrack parliament instantly gets an overwhelming vote of confidence from his nation. If the P.Q. were to make itself the mouthpiece of this movement, a modest subvention from each of these heroes, accompanied by an occasional article from their pens, might keep the rag afloat; but if it sticks to the Labor Party, or to any parliamentary party whatever, it will succumb to the general nausea which the words parliament, liberty,

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

democracy, etc., etc. now set up. The nausea may not be intelligent; but it is a reaction that must be catered for; and one of its symptoms is a curious appetite for bad language. But as blackguardism without artistry is mere commonness, all the political notes should be written by Virginia Woolf. The old politico-literary stodge is no use now.

I return the balance sheet, etc., as you may want it to persuade some millionaire who doesn't understand figures that the P.Q. offers him the chance of a lifetime.

Faithfully

G. BERNARD SHAW."

The reference to Cripps arose from my having explained to Shaw that Sir Stafford Cripps had recently given some financial support to assist the review through this difficult initial period, and in doing so had expressed to me his warm appreciation of *The Political Quarterly*.

Shaw's blistering letter was more than I could swallow. I had for some time regarded with apprehension and regret his growing acceptance of dictatorship and his readiness to reject and destroy democratic institutions. I sent the following answer:

9th June, 1934.

"DEAR G.B.S.

I waited to answer your letter of February 26th until you had time to get off the Equator and to return to a more temperate zone.

Your letter raises two quite separate matters. One relates to the financial position of *The Political Quarterly*, and perhaps I should deal with that first.

It is quite true that we had a falling off in sales, and therefore in revenue, during the last six months of 1932 and the first half of 1933; but this was scarcely a matter for surprise in view of the financial stringency which had occurred the preceding year, and which invariably hits an enterprise such as *The Political Quarterly* about a year later. Why you should suggest that the paper should throw up the sponge because of a temporary set back I cannot imagine. It would be as reasonable to suggest that you should stop writing plays because (as you tell me) your last two have flopped. As a matter of fact, the really important thing about *The Political*

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Quarterly is that although we raised the price last April to 5s. the circulation has scarcely fallen at all, and we have as a result a very large increase in revenue. In consequence, the financial position has enormously improved, and I have every reason to believe that the stability of the paper will be assured.

I come now to the quite separate matter, namely, your statement that any journal which stands for Parliamentary methods is completely doomed, and that the only hope is to sell out to the dictators. Incidentally, I note with interest that the eight whom you mention does not include the name of Stalin, the only Socialist among the lot. I am amazed—and so is everyone else—at the way in which you seem to be willing to be led astray by the nonsense which is talked by all these anti-Parliamentary gentlemen. If they were Socialists I could understand and forgive your delusions, but in view of the fact that they are one and all violent anti-Socialists and therefore opposed to all the doctrines which you have advocated for the past fifty years, I cannot imagine why you should expect those of us who are still Socialists to follow their cries. Do you seriously imagine that Italy, Germany, Turkey, or Poland are one atom nearer a socialistic regime to-day than they were ten years ago before they had these Dictatorships, or than we in this country are under representative institutions? If I may say so without disrespect, it is you who have been deceived by talk—despite all your contempt for the endless talking of the Parliamentary regime. The only difference is that you have been deceived by the ridiculous pretensions of the Dictators. Personally, if I am to be deceived by talk, I prefer it to be the talk of someone whom I have elected or can at least throw out without being myself chucked into a concentration camp. There is just one question I want to ask you in conclusion: how much of your work do you think you would have been allowed to do if instead of living in this country under these despised institutions you had been born under one of the dictatorships? If I remember correctly, you made an enormous fight even against the Censor of Plays.

Of course, I and every other intelligent person knows that the Parliamentary machine is absolutely archaic, but I prefer to follow Cripps, who wants to reform it and make it effective, rather than you, who want to abolish it. In any case, I do not intend to desert Socialism merely because reactionary dictatorships happen to be popular at the moment."

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Shaw did not resent in the slightest degree my spirited reply to his onslaught: his good temper in controversy was one of his most amiable traits. A few days later I received a laconic postcard from him:

16th June, 1934.

"I have received a letter signed W.A.R., but evidently written by the Duchess of Atholl.

Anyhow I have done my share for the P.Q., and will waste no more money on it. You had better get somebody to review my last two prefaces for it seriously, especially the reply to Chesterton.

G.B.S."

V

I reviewed the collected volume of his prefaces in the issue of *The Political Quarterly* for October–December, 1934.

In the course of the review I examined Shaw's attitude towards democracy and dictatorship, and remarked that "in spite of all his scepticism and raillery Mr. Shaw is philosophically a democrat . . . For him the fundamental problem is how to make the machinery of democratic government fool-proof". He had advocated in turn anthropometric tests, the formation of panels of tested persons, and finally vocational election, as methods of discovering the persons qualified by nature to be rulers. The impracticability of all these methods was obvious; and, as I pointed out, the essential weakness of Shaw's position was that he wanted to make the democratic process foolproof instead of eliminating the danger by educating people out of their political foolishness. He recognized that we are "dangerously uneducated" but did not seem to realize that if we want people to be sufficiently enlightened to be able to select intelligently leaders freely, we must use the educational machine to enlighten and instruct them in their functions as citizens—a task now in part achieved through the efforts of the Council for Education in Citizenship.

Further reflection led Bernard Shaw to modify considerably the adulation of dictatorship he had shown in the 1930's; and he must have been influenced by the suicidal madness, wickedness and folly of Hitler and Mussolini. For his final position we may turn to "*Everybody's Political What's What*", published in 1944.

Here he explicitly declared we must reject the Hitler plan of government because ". . . it gives one man more authority and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

responsibility than one man can bear. If he is weak he is corrupted by his power; if he is strong he is demented by it, and, like Alexander, Hitler and Napoleon, tries to add the world to his dominions, thus becoming at worst a scourge and a tyrant and at best an explorer and adventurer like Julius Caesar or William the Conqueror . . . The brooms sweep clean when they are new; but when they are spoiled or worn-out the place becomes an Augean stable" (p. 34).

His other objection to Great Man rule was that it is "too totalitarian to be really possible". The dictator must delegate most of his power, and in practice he tends to leave the local work to his most subservient followers rather than to his ablest rivals. There is, he concluded, "no hope for civilization in government by idolized single individuals. Councils of tested qualified persons, subject to the sternest possible public criticism, and to periodical (in pressing cases even summary) removal and replacement, is our safest aim" (p. 341).

The election and re-election of rulers for sufficiently short periods to keep them conscious of their dependence on the approval of the citizens he conceived to be the principal safeguard against these evils. Far from abolishing Parliament, he wrote, we must reform our old parliament and establish new ones. "Political decisions must not be the whims or phobias of men demented by absolute authority . . . with no remedy short of their assassination by their bodyguards or courtiers. Such decisions must be made in council with competent assessors in the light of the best advice and widest information available. We shall need regional councils, vocational councils, industrial councils, co-operative consumers' councils, financial councils, educational councils, planning and co-ordinating councils, councils for supernational affairs, as well as parliamentary congresses (at not too frequent intervals) to ventilate national grievances and contribute any political suggestions Mr. Everyman may be capable of" (p. 35).

While a representative popular parliament of men and women in equal numbers is necessary for ventilating grievances, questioning ministers, criticizing the Cabinet, suggesting remedies, moving resolutions and votes of confidence, and generally for keeping the government in touch with the people, such a House of Commons should not have any direct power to legislate "because legislative capacity is not common" (p. 352). "Legislation must be by 'the quality' not by the mob" (p. 30). There

BERNARD SHAW AND THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

are, however, a sufficiently large number of persons with the special natural abilities required for legislation to provide plenty of scope for choice between them.

The political system which Shaw envisaged was one in which legislation and administration would be entrusted to persons selected from panels. The persons on the panels would possess recognized qualifications like those of doctors, lawyers and clergyman, so "making government in this respect a profession like any other professions" (p. 352). The unempanelled politician or agitator would be free to sit in the House of Commons, but he could not become a legislator, a minister or administrator unless he could pass the qualifying tests or obtain exemption on specified grounds.

Shaw's political system is the very converse of Jeffersonian democracy. It contains aristocratic, professional, Webbian, and pseudo-scientific biological elements. The Shavian compound may be regarded as a curious expression of 20th century democracy, with its emphasis on professional qualifications for everybody. It may also be considered as a Shavian version of *élitism*. Its author was deeply impressed by the need for special knowledge and genuine natural ability in modern government; and horrified at the ease with which quacks, nonentities, mediocrities and demagogues can find their way to the highest positions of power, provided they have the spellbinder's secret. In both of these matters he was unquestionably right, whatever one may think of his proposed remedies.

Shaw's explicit rejection of dictatorship in 1944 makes it clear that some of his earlier statements were temporary aberrations of which too much account need not be taken. He, the lifelong talker and writer, was momentarily dazzled and misled by the theatrical posturings of Hitler and Mussolini, who claimed to despise talk and to be only men of action. But compared with the long years he devoted to the democratic socialist movement and the final position outlined above, this period of delusion was of short duration. He was, however, never a whole-hearted believer in democracy.

Bernard Shaw was a man of genius to whom the world owes an immense debt. As G.B.S., who gave me friendship and encouragement, and who by his help enabled *The Political Quarterly* to be started, I look back upon him with deep affection and gratitude.

THE NEW TOWNS

By PETER G. RICHARDS

I

THE New Towns Act, 1946, has been one of the least controversial of the reconstruction measures of the Labour Government, and this absence of controversy serves in part to explain the lack of public discussion about the new towns. It is difficult to obtain a general picture of the work of the development corporations, for their locations are scattered, their problems are diverse, and the officially published information lags far behind the pace of events. The difficulties of critical enquiry into public administration are common to many fields, and it is often true that the public official is in the best position to evaluate the progress of a particular scheme. But inevitably his lips are sealed.

The town planning movement has long urged the creation of new communities in which new social standards may develop in an environment of modern design. Besides embodying this ideal the new towns play a part in the housing programme and are sited in relation to industrial growth. The distribution of the industrial population was considered by the Barlow Commission which reported in 1939, and in 1944 the Greater London plan envisaged a number of new towns planned in the outer ring round London. Mr. Silkin (now Lord Silkin), the Labour Minister of Town and Country Planning, lost no time in taking up this suggestion, and the Reith Committee was appointed in October, 1945, "to consider the general questions of the establishment, development, organization and administration that will arise in the promotion of New Towns." The Reith Committee issued three reports in the period up to July, 1946, and some aspects of their work had to be accelerated as the Government decided to introduce the New Towns Bill some months earlier than had been initially anticipated.* The Committee proposed that the agency needed to create a new town should take the form of a public corporation to be sponsored either by the Government or by local authorities. The idea of the local authority corporation was rejected by the Government, on the grounds that the creation of a new town was a matter of national concern, and that if local authorities sponsored a new town there might be extreme difficulty in

* Cf. *Second Interim Report, New Towns Committee* (Cmd. 6794), para. 3.

THE NEW TOWNS

obtaining the necessary co-operation between the authority exporting population and the authority at the receiving end.* Further, although this was not stressed in the Commons debate, the creation of a new town must entail the expenditure of large sums from the national revenue, and it is usual for a government to wish to control the use of money it is itself providing. The introduction of direct local government influence might have made this control more difficult to achieve without friction.

The Minister of Town and Country Planning and the Secretary of State for Scotland were thus the sole sponsors of the new towns. The procedure followed in the nomination of any development area for a new town is similar to that under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, relating to the designation of heavily blitzed areas for the purposes of compulsory acquisition. A draft order is issued, objections are invited, and if any are forthcoming a local inquiry is held. The Minister considers the report of the inquiry, and unless on considering the evidence the Minister decides to modify or abandon the project, he confirms the draft order. The Minister then appoints the members of the development corporation, comprising a chairman, vice-chairman, and up to seven other members. Membership is a part-time paid appointment, and persons chosen are drawn from varied occupations, but experience of local government affairs, or some aspect of constructional industry, are leading qualifications. It is possible for membership of the corporations to overlap, for the same people serve as members of Hatfield and Welwyn Garden City Corporations; Lord Beveridge is Chairman of both Aycliffe and Peterlee, and Sir Lancelot Keay is Chairman of Basildon and Bracknell. Members are appointed for varying periods up to three years, and may be re-appointed, but in May, 1950, the Minister did not re-appoint three members of the Harlow Corporation, including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Other changes have been caused by death or resignation, sometimes with undesirable frequency; Stevenage had four Chairmen in its first three years, and by March, 1950, only one of the original members remained who had enjoyed an uninterrupted spell of office.

The corporations have wide powers to engage in activities necessary for the development of the new towns, but these powers are subject to ministerial control, and it is intended that local authorities and statutory undertakers shall provide services

* *H.C. Debates*, May 8th, 1946, col. 1085 (Mr. Silkin).

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

for any new town that happens to come into their area. The corporations have power to acquire the freehold of all land within the designated area, either by agreement or compulsion, and they may also dispose of land on a lease normally limited to ninety-nine years. The owner of any land in the area not acquired by the corporation within seven years of its formation may require the corporation to purchase his interest, and persons carrying on a business or profession on land compulsorily acquired have the option of rehabilitation on other land owned by the corporation. The acquisition and disposal of land is closely controlled by the Minister, and whether the whole of the designated area will be taken over in every case is not yet clear, but in some new towns the threat of compulsory purchase at prices to be determined by the District Valuer inhibits the free sale of property. This problem has become acute at Basildon, where 25,000 people, many of them owner-occupiers, are already living within the designated area in scattered properties, many of which are of poor quality and lacking main services. The disquiet felt by these inhabitants was ventilated in the Commons by Mr. Braine in May, 1950, but the reply from the Parliamentary Secretary was lacking in sympathy.* The Government's view was that the acquisition of the freehold was in many cases essential to secure satisfactory replanning, that the development of a new town would enhance local property values, and that private owners should not gain profit from an enterprise financed by the community. It is possible to agree with these sentiments and yet to feel that the owners at Basildon are suffering injustice. The property values determined by the District Valuer will be lower than the prices that could have been obtained in a free market, granted vacant possession, even if the new town had never appeared upon the scene. Freeholders who wish to sell because of family or economic circumstances are faced with genuine hardship, as the Basildon Corporation themselves recognize.

The capital needed to develop a new town is advanced by the Ministry of Local Government and Planning, and is repayable with interest at 3 per cent. over a period of sixty years, although interest payments may be waived for an initial period of not more than five years. The Ministry also makes outright grants towards the deficit on current account, the remainder of

* *H.C. Debates*, May 15th, 1950, cols. 957 *et seq.* In November, 1950, Mr. Braine gave notice that he would raise this matter again on a motion in private Members' time on December 8th, but his motion was not reached.

THE NEW TOWNS

the deficit being capitalized. The rate of grant has been 50 per cent. for the first two years, 25 per cent. the following year, and nothing thereafter, but this formula has recently been changed, and the younger corporations will have the grant cut to 25 per cent. in their second full year, and no grant afterwards. Peterlee, in their Second Report, announce that they have asked for an increased grant because of the delay, and consequent accumulation of unproductive administrative expenditure, caused by negotiations with the National Coal Board about the exploitation of coal measures under the designated area. Apart from these grants to current account, the new towns, in the long run, are expected to pay their way. The corporations have to submit annual reports* which are presented to Parliament, and the New Towns Act also contains provisions for the winding-up of the corporations, as it is envisaged that their assets will ultimately be transferred to the appropriate local authorities or statutory undertakers.

The new towns fall into two categories. There are eight in the Home Counties due to receive their population from overcrowded London boroughs, and six others, including two in Scotland, sited in accordance with major industrial needs. Corby, Northants, is due to grow, under the ægis of the Development Corporation, from a population of 14,000 to 40,000, in order to accommodate workers brought into the area by the expansion of Stewart and Lloyd's steel works; Aycliffe, Durham, will house workers at the Aycliffe Trading Estate, which was constructed before the last war. Peterlee, also in Durham, aims to concentrate the inhabitants of a number of scattered mining communities, and is essentially a vast rehousing project urged forward by the Easington Rural District Council. Three of the new towns, Bracknell, Corby, and Cwmbran, have been established only just over twelve months, and have not yet issued any reports on their work.

II

The birth of a new town is followed, at first, by a slow rate of physical change. A vast amount of paper planning must take place before the work of construction can begin, and the unromantic tasks of site-preparation and the provision of essen-

* So far three sets of reports have been published: H.C.113 of 1948-9, H.C.236 of 1948-9 and H.C.7 of 1950-51. The accounts are issued separately, H.C.146 of 1948-9 and H.C. 329 of 1948-9. The reports vary in quality; those from Crawley are the most informative.

tial services must precede the erection of houses, shops, and factories. After four years, the traveller through Crawley can now see evidence of something more than just another housing estate; but progress at Crawley has been more rapid than elsewhere.

The master plans for the original new towns created in 1947 had all been completed and approved by 1950, and elsewhere various stages in the development of the plan had been reached. The only serious delay was at Peterlee, which had been caused, as mentioned above, by lengthy negotiations with the National Coal Board. Once the plan is settled, the corporations are free to go forward, and are limited only by the availability of building labour and materials. In the autumn of 1947 restrictions were placed on capital development in the economic crisis that followed the attempt to secure the convertibility of sterling, and the four new towns around London, Crawley, Harlow, Hemel Hempstead, and Stevenage, were each limited to a building labour force of seventy-five men, to be employed on the provision of essential services. This put an early brake on the new towns, but the restrictions were eased in 1948, and since then there has been a steady increase in the building resources employed. But national planning decisions determine the distribution of capital development, and the letting of building contracts by the corporations are subject to ministerial control.

The progress of the first corporations to be established was also impeded while they awaited the result of litigation which sought to challenge the validity of the Ministerial Orders which set up the corporations. These cases are of interest to students of administrative law and critics of the expanding powers of government departments, but had the plaintiffs succeeded it is possible that the New Towns Act would have become a dead letter.* It was argued that the selected sites were unsuitable for various reasons, and that the Minister had paid insufficient attention to the objections that had been raised. The criteria by which the Ministry judged the suitability of sites cannot be precisely estimated, but six places which had been canvassed as possibilities were rejected for various reasons. Stapleford was held to be too near to Hertford and Crowhurst too near to Crawley, while Margaretting might have become a dormitory of Chelmsford; Ongar was rejected because of transport difficulties; White Waltham would have absorbed rich agricultural land; and the

* The leading case is *Franklin and others v. Minister of Town and Country Planning* (1947), 63 T.L.R. 446. Cf. B. Schwartz, *Law and the Executive in Britain*, pp. 269 et seq., and W. A. Robson in *British Government since 1918*, p. 139.

Ministry decided against Holmwood in order to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside. The decision to develop at Basildon was preceded by much hesitation, and certainly the task of marrying this new town to the existing scattered population of 25,000 must be a planner's nightmare.

The new towns around London represent only part of the programme to disperse the population of the metropolis. The L.C.C. is proceeding with a number of housing estates outside its boundaries, and most of these are, unfortunately, in the Green Belt. The Ministry also envisage the expansion of other towns in the Home Counties to absorb about a further 130,000. This dispersal will be of little benefit if the new estates become vast dormitories for workers who have to travel into the central area each day. The provision of employment near the new residential areas is therefore of the utmost importance. Local employment not only saves time and traffic congestion, it also strengthens that loyalty to the local community which is needed to establish thriving social activities. So jobs must be decentralized as well as people. All the new towns around London are making provision for industrial development within the designated area, but Harlow, at least, has found it difficult to attract industrialists. Elsewhere—for example, at Hatfield—the problem is less urgent, as opportunities for local employment already exist. Only at Crawley has considerable progress been made towards the introduction of industry, and there five firms have already agreed to build factories on the Corporation's industrial estate. The first of these factories, that of W. C. Youngman Ltd., has by now commenced production, while others are in course of construction. A further thirteen firms have taken leases of standard factories erected by the Corporation, and at the time of writing work has started in four of these factories. The industrial area at Crawley is most favourably sited for both road and rail transport, and progress in industrial development is showing a tendency to outstrip the housing programme.

The provision of industry is linked with the problem of selecting tenants for the new houses, and on this matter the new towns pursue different policies. Some new towns are linked to a group of authorities near central London and expect to receive immigrants from their housing lists. In this way Hemel Hempstead is associated with a number of boroughs in west Middlesex and Basildon is linked to a group of authorities in east London. Elsewhere, new entrants are to be chosen in

relation to local employment requirements. Hatfield propose to allocate many of their first houses and flats to employees of De Havillands, who are at present scattered throughout north London, and the new tenants at Crawley are largely the staffs of the industrialists moving into the Crawley factory estate. Crawley is, therefore, much less likely to become a dormitory town than, for example, Hemel Hempstead, for, with the old job and workmates near the new home, it should be easier for the immigrants to grow new roots quickly. This distinction is admittedly a matter of degree. London will always be a magnet for shopping and entertainment, and even if the chief breadwinner has his work and interests in Crawley, younger members of the family may gravitate to employment in the central London area, which can offer a wider range of opportunities.

The new towns are likely to attract a high proportion of skilled labour, for the rents will be relatively high. As mentioned above, apart from some initial grants, the development corporations are expected to pay their way, and there are various categories of expenditure incurred in building a new town of an extraordinary nature. There is, for example, the cost of surveying and planning the designated area, and the expense of attracting building labour from afar to work on the site. The corporations have to use capital to provide main services, which are normally a liability on the local rates. The houses built in the new towns attract the same rate of subsidy as houses built by local authorities, but the local authorities have two ways of reducing the rent of post-war houses which are not open to the development corporations. In the first place, the local authority may raise the rents of pre-war houses, constructed when costs were lower, and use the increased revenue to reduce the rents of post-war houses. Secondly, the local authority may incur a deficit on its housing revenue account which is met by a grant from the rate fund in addition to the statutory rate contribution. Further, the local authorities are not subject to the Rent Restriction Acts, but the development corporations are, and once the standard rent of a house in the new town has been fixed, it cannot be raised. Some of the corporations have been urging the Minister to amend the law on this matter, but meanwhile prudence would seem to demand the inclusion of a contingency element in the rents charged in the new towns. Where considerable provision for industry has been made, as at Crawley, it is possible in a period of full employment to ensure that industry pays a fair

share of the additional cost, but the rent of a house in a new town will be several shillings higher than that charged by a local authority for comparable accommodation. And that is not the end of the high-cost story. The provision of social and community services will be very expensive, and where a new local authority is to be created new administrative headquarters will be an immediate necessity. Rates in the new towns will therefore be at a high level, even if the development corporations make some contribution towards these heavy capital costs.

It is not possible in a short article to assess fully the impact of a new town upon the local government of its area. In general, the development corporation does not take over any of the functions of the elected local bodies; instead, it increases the population that the local authorities are called upon to serve. In some cases, the corporation does provide essential services if local conditions make this course appropriate: Aycliffe and Crawley, for example, have been appointed sewerage authorities by the Minister of Health, and Crawley and Stevenage have become water authorities. Individual applications for permission to develop within a designated area are determined by the local planning authority in association with the development corporation, and this procedure appears to work harmoniously. District councils can build houses within the new town on sites allocated by the corporation, and thus continue to cater for the housing needs of local residents. But the major task is that which faces the local education authority, for the new town will need thousands of extra school places as well as further education and library facilities. To complicate the problem, the first generation of dwellers in a new town is likely to have an abnormal age-structure, with relatively few elderly people and a high birth-rate.* In this way the school population may be nearly 20 per cent. of the total population instead of a more normal figure around 15 per cent. School-building may fall in arrears of requirements, as already threatens to occur at Crawley. Roughly 700 new houses will have been completed at Crawley before the first new school built by the West Sussex education authority is ready for use, and I suspect that emergency measures may be used to educate some of the children of the immigrants for the next fifteen years. No progress has yet been made in the provision of community facilities in any of the new towns,

* Cf. *Willesden and the New Towns*, a publication showing the results of a survey made in Willesden in 1947 on behalf of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. The survey examined social conditions and attitudes of people likely to move to a new town.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

because of restrictions on the use of building resources, but the need for them will become increasingly urgent as the new population moves in.

Relations with local authorities are, in most cases, aggravated by the fact that the area of the new town overlaps the existing local government boundaries. This problem has varying degrees of complexity. Aycliffe is situated in parts of three district councils within Durham County; Harlow overlaps the county boundary between Hertfordshire and Essex; Crawley is distributed between three counties, West Sussex, East Sussex, and Surrey. The need is to bring the new town under the ægis of a single authority. At Hemel Hempstead and Stevenage this could be a relatively simple matter of extending the area of the Borough Council and the Urban District Council respectively. Elsewhere, as at Crawley and Harlow, a new urban authority is required, and it is here that the need for change is most urgent. This matter was under review by the Local Government Boundary Commission, but since its dissolution nothing has been done, and local boundaries are apparently to be frozen until the Ministry of Health* produces its own national plan for their reconstruction. The delay is unlikely to be short, and some of the new towns will suffer from it in a serious way.

The staff of the development corporations have to spend much time and effort in negotiating with other public authorities. In a valuable appendix to their second report, the Crawley Corporation gave two lists, one of the "consultations and approvals required for the execution of plans" and the other of "authorities whose plans and projects have to be co-ordinated with those of the Corporation". There are twenty-eight items in the first catalogue and eleven in the second. No doubt it is possible to show that each stage of negotiation is of importance, but the total effect is to create an excessive administrative machine which consumes both time and money. The number of technical, administrative and clerical staff employed by the corporations varies with the extent of their activities; the highest published figure is 120 at Hemel Hempstead, and the numbers engaged tend to rise steadily. The Harlow Corporation, in its third report, complained almost bitterly about the extent of the controls to which it was subjected, and in particular exception was taken to the delays incurred in obtaining the approval of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning for the schemes of the

* Or now the Ministry of Local Government and Planning.

THE NEW TOWNS

corporation. The corporations are, indeed, in a difficult position, for they cannot as a quasi-Government body voice their grievances publicly, as can a local authority.* The only channel of expression available to them is the annual report to the Minister, and criticism in the report may lead to changes in the membership of the recalcitrant corporation. The friction with the Ministry at Harlow may have had some connection with the changes in the personnel of the Corporation in May, 1950.

III

The future of the new towns cannot be considered in isolation. They form part of the Government's long-term programme of social reconstruction and economic development, and the rate and manner of their progress depends wholly on future policy decisions. If, for any reason, the amount of capital expenditure on civil projects is reduced, the new towns will suffer as they did in 1947. It is sad but true that the fate of the new towns will be determined by the result of the annual inter-departmental tussle for capital resources.

As preliminary work is completed, the new towns will demand an increasing amount of building labour. At Crawley it is planned to complete the new town in fifteen years, and a slower rate of progress would increase overhead costs, and damage the sense of mission and achievement amongst those working to create the new community. It is proposed to build 101,900 houses in the dozen new towns in England and Wales, but the allocation of houses for new towns agreed between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning for the year ending 31st March, 1951, was only 2,260.† If the new towns are to be completed within fifteen years—and this is too long for some of the smaller projects—the annual rate of house building must go up to 7,000, or 4 per cent. of the present housing programme in England and Wales. In the Home Counties the new towns will need far more than 4 per cent. of the housing quota for the area. The Chairman of the Crawley Corporation, Sir Thomas Bennett, announced in December, 1950, that the building labour force then employed at Crawley was approximately 1,100, and that the number required to implement the programme for the coming year would be between 2,200 and

* Members of development corporations may engage in political activities outside the new town with which they are connected, but they must avoid commenting upon matters connected with new towns. Cf. *H.C. Debates*, May 23rd, 1950, col. 1830.

† *H.C. Debates*. Written answers, May 4th, 1950, and June 13th, 1950.

2,500. Sir Thomas went on to forecast "active recruitment to ensure adequate manning of the full building programme". The additional workers are expected to come from London and the coastal areas of Sussex, and these places will suffer from this drain of precious labour. In sum, the new towns will need roughly 30,000 building workers if they are to keep up to schedule.

It is important that there should be wider appreciation and support for the work of the development corporations, which are at present in a weak position in the struggle for resources. The concentration of responsibility for housing in the Ministry of Local Government and Planning should be of assistance to the new towns, for their parent Ministry now controls local authority building, but the economic implications of the rearmament programme overshadow the whole of their future. There is a danger that a combination of political and administrative pressures will deprive the corporations of the opportunity to carry out their task with adequate momentum, for a cut in the new towns programme would cause a minimum of public fuss. The present inhabitants would view further delay with indifference or pleasure, the potential dwellers in new towns are not an organized body, and the corporations themselves cannot protest effectively. A number of Metropolitan boroughs which had hoped to export surplus population would be grieved, but the volume of objection would be insignificant compared with that caused by an enforced reduction of local housing quotas. The public and the local authorities in the Home Counties must be willing to accept the fact that a considerable proportion of the building resources of the region is to be devoted to the new towns.

If the Ministry feel, on a sober consideration of future prospects, that they will be unable to fulfil the implied commitments of the present new towns programme, they should drop entirely those new towns which have advanced least far, rather than let work in all of them drag along in a dispiriting way. Over-pessimism can be adjusted in the future by the commencement of new schemes, but there is no subsequent remedy for an over-optimistic judgment.

TWENTIETH CENTURY REVOLUTIONS

By HUGH SETON-WATSON

THE first half of the twentieth century is richer than any previous period of human history in the activities of revolutionary movements. Some have failed, others are still engaged in the struggle. A few have achieved revolutions of historic importance. But there is one important feature of the twentieth century revolutionary movements which distinguishes them from those of the nineteenth century. The earlier movements arose in culturally and economically advanced countries, while those of the present century have for the most part affected backward regions and peoples.

These movements are much discussed at present by journalists and politicians, but have received little attention from historians. In current discussions the main emphasis is usually placed on the mass aspect of the movements and on economic factors. It is assumed that their strength comes mainly from the unrest of subject nations, industrial proletariats and impoverished peasants. The victories which they have won are usually attributed to mass support. The conclusion is that revolutions can best be averted if the wealthier nations invest large sums in the development of backward economies. Better food crops, new jobs in industry and more extensive trade will reduce the mass poverty and deprive the revolutionaries of their opportunity.

It would be absurd to deny that revolutionary movements thrive on mass poverty and mass discontent, or that improvement in the standard of living of the masses makes for political stability. But two further factors deserve consideration. The first is the origin and the nature of revolutionary leadership. The second is the political framework within which revolutionary movements develop. Both these factors have of course been minutely studied by historians of the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe and North America. They have, however, been somewhat neglected in connection with the twentieth century movements in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Such attempts as have been made are too often the work of uncritical admirers or passionate adversaries. Yet even a brief examination of these two factors may

make possible some significant conclusions about the twentieth century revolutionary movements of backward peoples.

West European and American political commentators and economists are too inclined to consider world problems from the point of view of the economics and political traditions of Western Europe and North America. But the "western society" on which their ideas are based is not the typical society of the world. It exists only in Scandinavia, north-west Europe, North America, and the British Dominions of the Pacific. If northern Italy and Germany are added, the whole area has a population of less than 400 million out of a world population of more than 2,000 million.

The society of this "north-western corner" of the world, which has grown up since the end of the Middle Ages, has certain specific features. The class structure is balanced. The level of skill and the standard of living of workers and farmers are on the whole high. There is a numerous and influential middle class, in which the three subdivisions of business, free professions and administration play their parts. Education is widespread and long established. The tradition of representative institutions, both national and local, is deeply rooted. Though there are great differences in wealth, all citizens belong to the same century. Class structure, education and constitutional forms vary considerably within different regions and countries of the north-west corner, but all share these general characteristics, in contrast to the lands outside the corner.

If the typical classes of the north-west corner are skilled workers, educated farmers and business men, the typical classes of the outside world are unskilled labourers, uneducated peasants and bureaucrats. In southern and eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America the great majority of the population are primitive and poverty-stricken peasants. In the last decades the rapid industrialization of certain regions has reduced the number of peasants and increased the number of unskilled workers in mines or factories, little if at all less primitive or poor. One reason for the poverty of the peasants has been the survival of great landed estates and of various semi-feudal legal forms. This was the case in Russia before 1917 and in Hungary until 1945. It is still the case in southern Italy, Spain, Egypt and large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But experience has shown that the distribution of landlords' estates among the peasants—which was done in parts of Eastern Europe after 1918, in other parts

after 1945, and in Japan, Korea and China after the Second World War—is not the end of the peasants' poverty. A more basic cause of poverty is rural overpopulation. The numbers of people in the villages have grown more rapidly than the output of the soil has been increased or than new jobs in industry have been created. Overpopulation means underemployment for the peasants, and a reserve of half-employed peasants keeps down the level of wages for all but the skilled minority among the urban workers.

For those sons of peasants who are able by ability or good fortune to rise in the social scale the best opportunities have usually lain in the state service. But the growing influx of recruits from below inflates the bureaucracy intolerably. As the numbers of bureaucrats grow faster than the national wealth, their material conditions deteriorate. An enormous underpaid civil service breeds corruption: only by bribery can the poor official feed his family. To corruption must be added a tradition of arrogance and brutality. The official is accustomed to despise and bully the human cattle whom it is his duty to push, pull or drive whither his masters bid. This has certainly long been the practice in Spain, Hungary, Poland, the Balkans and Russia. It is still more so in Turkey, Persia, China or Japan. In colonial countries the situation has been somewhat different. The West European administrators have tried, with varying success, to bring to their colonies the more civilized methods of administration prevalent in their own countries, and have also resisted the pressure to inflate the numbers of officials. But the lower ranks of their administration have been filled with local people who have imperfectly acquired the higher standards, while the limitation of numbers has contributed above all to the frustration of the subject nations. As soon as they attain independence the colonial peoples rapidly expand their civil services. The world must be shown that they are not "unfit to govern", and jobs must be found for the boys. Corruption increases faster than ever, and the new bureaucrats feel even more strongly than the old how distinct and superior a caste they are.

In this type of society, which until recently was typical of most of the world outside the north-west corner, the masses were too inert and the bureaucrats too powerful. If there was to be radical change, leadership must be found. The source of such leadership has been the small educated class—the "intelligentsia".

The intelligentsia is a product of western influence. Already in the eighteenth century western ideas and ways of life were known to the aristocracies of Poland, Hungary and Russia. During the nineteenth century schools and universities developed in these countries, slowly it is true, but with important effects. The professional class was formed from two directions, from the children of the landed gentry for whom there was no place on the family estate, and from the children of small officials, merchants and village shopkeepers who had just enough money, ability or "connections" to mount the educational ladder. Even the reactionary but incompetent Ministers of Education of mid-nineteenth-century Russia were unable either to reserve higher education to members of the nobility or to purge it of progressive ideas. In the Balkan countries liberated from Turkish rule no social hierarchy barred the way to education. The Balkan governments were keen to extend education: the obstacle was the meagre wealth of the states. Though the intention was education for all, the more prosperous families were in fact privileged. The children of the army officers, officials, inn-keepers, pig-merchants and village usurers from whom the ruling class of the new states was formed, had better chances than the children of peasant smallholders, miners, railwaymen or factory workers. In Asia the process started later. In the Middle East the Islamic system of education was open to comparatively poor children, but it was more or less unrelated to the needs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The same was true of the Confucian system in China. The introduction of western ideas and influences was largely the work of such institutions as the French schools in the Levant, the American Robert College at Constantinople, the American University of Beirut, and European and American missions in China. Japan alone among Asiatic countries systematically copied European education and diffused it among her subjects. In Latin America considerable efforts had been made in education ever since the Spanish and Portuguese conquests.

The best education available at the most modern schools and universities in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America has been little inferior to that available at the same time anywhere in the western world. Some institutions in Africa have recently approached or attained the same standard. The best scientists, writers, doctors or engineers produced by this education have been as good at their jobs as their western counterparts. They have entered the twentieth century, while their peoples, suffering

from social injustice and political oppression, have remained in the eighteenth, or fifteenth, or tenth century.

Many, probably most, members of the East European and Asian intelligentsias accepted this fact. Some believed that by becoming twentieth-century people, and doing twentieth-century jobs, they were working for their own nations' good, and would help to raise their nations to their level. Others were so engrossed in their special skill that the wider issues did not occur to them. Others simply enjoyed the life of a French lawyer or an American engineer, rather than that of a Hungarian worker, a Lebanese peasant or a Chinese coolie. Their lives were more agreeable than those of their compatriots: let the latter fend for themselves.

But a minority, and in some countries a very numerous minority, rebelled. They were horrified by the contrast between themselves and their peoples, between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. The social injustices were intolerable, and the political factors which perpetuated them—the dominance of a privileged class or a privileged nation—must be swept away. There were young Slovaks who were not content, by learning the Magyar language and so reaching a Magyar university, to merge themselves in the Hungarian ruling class, but insisted on fighting for the national and social liberation of the submerged Slovak nation. There were Russian or Chinese intellectuals, of both distinguished and humble birth, who could not ignore the land-hunger in the villages, the maltreatment of peasants by landlords or police, the dead weight of a bureaucracy suspicious of every generous initiative.

To these idealist motives must be added personal motives for revolt. Semi-feudal legal survivals of foreign rule were not only socially or nationally unjust: they were also obstacles to the ambitions of the local intellectuals. Poles, Ukrainians, Balts and Caucasians in the Russian Empire; South Slavs, Slovaks and Roumanians in Hungary; the Asiatic and African subjects of European colonial empires found their way to power and wealth barred by members of the dominant nations. In Hungary, Roumania and Poland between the world wars many of the best posts in business and the free professions were held by Jews. University graduates who found no jobs attributed their difficulties to a sinister Jewish conspiracy. Idealism and interest alike led them to anti-semitic fascism. Chinese in Siam and Malaya, Indians in East Africa, Greeks in the Middle East, and Europeans throughout Asia, form a host of "Jewish problems", seem to

the young intellectuals of each country to have robbed them of their birthright, and drive them to revolutionary nationalism. Balkan university students denounced their professors as "reactionary" because they failed in their examinations. Egyptian or Indian students have beaten or murdered invigilators who objected to their bringing cribs into the examination hall. To join an extremist party—fascist, nationalist or communist—was emotionally satisfying and required less sustained mental effort than plain hard work. For most of the revolutionary intellectuals of the backward countries the broader and the personal motives existed side by side. The personal motive is perhaps more powerful in colonial countries, where the presence of the foreign Power is a constant irritant, and where the level of education is lower than in Eastern Europe, Japan or even the Middle East. The half-educated are perhaps more frustrated, and more inclined to revolutionary short-cuts, than the fully educated.

It was through the intelligentsia, created by the development of western types of education, that the modern political ideas of Western Europe reached the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. It should be noted that the ideas reached the backward countries ready-made, before the economic social and political conditions to which they were related had arisen. Examples are Russia in the 1870s, Bulgaria in the 1890s and China in the 1920s. Even nationalism was preached by the intelligentsia when national consciousness hardly existed among the masses. Examples from Europe are the Slovaks and the Ukrainians. In Asia and Africa this has been still more the case.

The relationship between the ideas of the intelligentsia and the social condition and consciousness of the masses has varied according to the stage of general economic and cultural development. This is well illustrated by the case of Russia. In the Russia of the 1870s, when the intelligentsia was separated by a chasm from the masses, the intelligentsia's best hope of victory for their ideas was to organize a secret conspiracy of professional revolutionaries. In the Russia of 1913, in which a middle class and a skilled working class were becoming important factors, the peasants were becoming educated, and even the intellectuals were beginning to find a legal outlet for their energies and abilities, political action by mass parties, as in Western Europe, was becoming possible. This was what the Menshevik faction of Russian socialism advocated, and every year after 1905 seemed

to strengthen their case. Lenin, who clung to the older conspiratorial type of party, seemed a reactionary utopian. But in the Russia of 1917, when the Russian state collapsed and the europeanizing work of 50 years was undone, Lenin was the realist and the Mensheviks the utopians.

Between the world wars Hungary, Poland and Japan to some extent resembled the Russia of 1913. Large-scale industry was fairly well developed. Skilled workers, technicians and business men were numerous. Political power, however, did not belong to these classes, not even to a very large extent to the business men. It was held to some extent by landowning families, and to an increasing extent by a bureaucracy whose higher officials were descendants of landowners, who had succeeded in impressing even on its lower ranks—recruited from the poorer classes—the traditional outlook of the landowning class—gentry, szlachta or samurai. The peasants were still economically backward, had too little land, and were in many cases victims of exploitation.

The Balkan countries between the world wars had some points of resemblance to the Russia of the '70s. Industry was still backward, skilled workers were few and the middle class was weak. When dictatorships were installed in the 1920s the police were no less powerful, and probably more cruel, than the police of Tsar Alexander II. On the other hand, the Balkan nations had no landowning aristocracy or semi-feudal survivals; their education was making great progress; and they had far more experience of self-government than the Russians.

In Asia and Africa development was of course slower. The most modern provinces of Egypt, India and China bear some resemblance to the Russia of 1913, but in the backward provinces conditions remained as primitive as in the Europe of the Middle Ages. In large parts of Africa things are very much more primitive still. In these countries the local man who has received a twentieth-century education is cut off from his people by a deeper gulf even than were the Russian intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century.

The impact of ready-made West European political ideas on these various types of backward societies had effects at least as far-reaching as the impact of West European trade and technique. The political ideas were reflected in political movements, in which inevitably the leadership came from the intelligentsia. In Russia, China, the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states the

radical intellectuals were forced by the repressive policy of dictatorial governments to resort to more or less revolutionary and conspiratorial methods. In Austria-Hungary, Japan and the British and French empires they enjoyed greater freedom of action, though this fell short of "western democracy" as understood in Britain and France. In general, the radicalism of the intellectuals and their importance in the revolutionary movements varied in inverse proportion to the economic and cultural development of their peoples. As the masses became more prosperous, more skilled and more educated, broadly based mass movements became more possible, the leadership of intellectuals became less essential, and it became more reasonable to hope for improvement by comparatively peaceful means. It is the combination of backward masses, extremist intellectuals and despotic bureaucrats which creates the most conspiratorial movements.

These movements may be, in European terminology, "extreme left" or "extreme right".

The earliest example of a "left" type were the Russian Populists of the 1870s. They held unrealistic views about the revolutionary potentialities of the Russian peasants, and about the possibility of transforming the traditional organs of village self-government into organs of a socialist society. But as conspirators they were efficient, at any rate judged by the technical standards of the time. They created a small but well disciplined organization, which assassinated several high officials and finally killed the Tsar himself. Their technique was later copied and improved by Lenin, whose Bolshevik party was from the first intended to be an organization of "professional revolutionaries". The Bolshevik technique of conspiracy has in turn served as the model for the Communist parties in all countries. Some of these have been forced by police persecution to operate "underground" during most of their existence. But even those which have enjoyed the political liberties of a democratic state were obliged by the Twenty-One Conditions of the Second Comintern Congress of 1920, to maintain, parallel with their "legal" organization, an "illegal" apparatus. The efficiency of Communist conspirators has varied greatly in the last 30 years. Among the more efficient were the illegal parties of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia between the world wars. In both countries the intellectual youth was strongly attracted to Communism. Students and graduates of Belgrade and Sofia universities succeeded in popularizing

Communism and the Soviet Union and built up cadres which were to prove valuable during the resistance movements in the Second World War. Another country in which Communism made a most powerful appeal to young intellectuals was of course China.

An interesting example of a "right" type of revolutionary movement in a backward country is the Roumanian Iron Guard. Led by university students and graduates, it was able during the slump of the early 1930s to exploit the misery of the peasants and the idealism of the intelligentsia. It promised vague social reforms, including a further distribution of land. Oppression was identified with the Jews, liberation and justice with the German Nazis. Like the Russian Populists, the Iron Guardists "went to the people", studying their living conditions more honestly and more thoroughly than the elder generation of liberal politicians had done, and at the same time propagating their ideas. Like the Communists, they infiltrated themselves into official organizations and into oppositional parties. Like the Communists, they were savagely repressed by the police. Parallels with the Roumanian Iron Guardists can be found among the nationalist movements of Asia and Africa. One example is the conspiratorial groups of young officers in Japan, who had more or less anti-fascist ideas, wished to regenerate their country, were anti-parliamentarian and anti-capitalist, and whose policy was a mixture of modernization and anti-western traditionalism. Another is the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, a combination of modern nationalism and Islamic conservatism. Like the Roumanian Iron Guardists and the Japanese secret societies, the Moslem Brothers make use of assassination as a political weapon.

Communism is to-day the most important of the revolutionary movements among the backward peoples, but it is not and will not necessarily be the only one. Communism, as developed by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, is only the most important example of a wider phenomenon, the revolt of the backward peoples, led by a section of their intelligentsia, against the West.

II

The obstacle to the seizure of power by the revolutionary movements has been the bureaucratic state machine. Communist theory has paid much attention to this problem. But in fact no Communist movement in this century has, solely by its own

efforts, captured or destroyed the state machine. In three cases only Communists have seized power—in Russia, Yugoslavia and China. But in all three cases the state machine was smashed not by the revolutionaries but by a foreign invading Power.

In the chaos of the collapse of Tsardom the Bolsheviks were more clear-headed, better disciplined and less scrupulous than their rivals. They were also more efficient demagogues. By promising the people at once the things they most needed, and which in fact they knew that they would not be able to give them, they won considerable popular support. Lenin, who for more than a decade had devoted himself to the study of power, built a new army and a new police machine. He made good use of the quarrels between his Russian rivals and between his foreign enemies. He was also able to some extent to exploit Russian patriotism against Poles and Japanese. His skill in all these matters gave him the victory, but he would not have had a chance to begin if Ludendorff had not crushed the armies of the Tsar. Nor would all his skill have availed him had not Russia possessed the advantages of geographical remoteness. The British, French and American publics were not convinced that it mattered to them what happened in distant Russia. Their governments, dependent on their votes at election time, soon abandoned their very small attempts at intervention. In Hungary, where the collapse of the old régime gave the Communists a similar opportunity, they were crushed. This was no doubt partly due to the fact that Bela Kun was not so good a leader as Lenin. But it was still more due to the geographical accessibility of Hungary to the armies of the victorious Allies and of their smaller protégés.

In Yugoslavia the old police régime which had kept down the Communists was destroyed by the German and satellite invaders. In China the same thing was done by the conquering Japanese. In both countries the Communists assumed the leadership of national resistance. The Chinese Communists had already acquired valuable experience of guerrilla warfare in their struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. The Yugoslav Communists had no guerrilla experience in their own country, but they possessed cadres of brave and disciplined underground organizers, and some of their leaders had learned the art of warfare as volunteers in the Spanish civil war. In both countries the Communist-led resistance forces liberated considerable areas, in which they set up a civil administration and conscripted the population into

their armies. Thus by the time the Germans and Japanese were defeated by the Allied Great Powers, both the Chinese and Yugoslav Communists possessed disciplined military and civil bureaucracies, ready to take over power in the rest of their country. The factor of geographical remoteness also operated in their favour. If either the Germans or the Japanese had sent over-powering forces into the fastnesses of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists, they could no doubt have crushed them. But the commitments on the main war fronts and the difficulty of the Communist-held terrain made it not worth their while to do so. After the defeat of the invaders, the two countries were outside the area of the western armies, which might have been expected to be unsympathetic to the Communists. Belgrade and Manchuria were "liberated" by the Soviet armies. The supply of American arms to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek was even less effective than the supply of arms from France and Britain to the Russian Whites in 1919-20.

In other areas also Communist-led resistance forces gained experience of military leadership and civil administration, but were not able to seize power. The European example is Greece, where a large "liberated area" was held in 1943-4 and again in 1947-9. In Asia there were similar areas in Malaya, Burma and Indo-China. These areas were not, however, geographically remote enough. British forces defeated the Greek Communists in 1944, and American aid enabled the Greek National Army to defeat them again in 1949. In Burma the Communists and nationalists came to blows, and the government of Burma, granted independence by Britain, gradually gained control of most of the country. In Malaya Communist guerrillas are still a very serious nuisance, but there is no prospect of their obtaining power over the country unless they are supported by an invading army. In Indo-China the outlook is uncertain, but hitherto the Viet-Min rebels have not been able to conquer the most populous and wealthy provinces.

There have of course been numerous occasions when Communist régimes have been installed by the military intervention of Soviet Russian forces. This was done in Georgia in 1921, in Outer Mongolia in 1922 and in the Baltic states in 1940. An unsuccessful attempt was made in Finland in 1939. The "democratic government" set up in Terijoki under the Comintern veteran Otto Willi Kuusinen merely made itself and its patrons ridiculous. It was abandoned when peace was made with Fin-

land, and it was not revived after the defeat of Finland in the war of 1941-4. Another failure took place in 1946 in Persian Azerbaijan, where a puppet administration was created under the "Democrat" Pishvari, who had played the same role more than twenty years earlier. The Soviet government yielded because the Powers which it then still nominally regarded as its Allies were strongly opposed. But Pishvari, who with true Bolshevik self-criticism had publicly analysed the mistakes he had committed in 1920, repeated the performance in almost identical terms in 1946. These failures, however, seem small in comparison with the successes achieved in Eastern Europe after 1944. In Poland and Roumania the Russians put in their puppets by open display of force. In Bulgaria and Hungary they forced the removal from public life of political leaders whose courage and popularity were an obstacle to Communist victory. In Czechoslovakia the presence of Russian forces in 1945 made possible the seizure by the Communists of the key posts which enabled them to seize power three years later. In 1948 the signal for action was given by Moscow, and the presence of Russian troops round four-fifths of Czechoslovakia's frontiers was a decisive factor. Gottwald's "February revolution" was made by the police. It can be compared with Mussolini's march on Rome by sleeping-car in 1922, and still more closely with Hitler's elevation to the German Chancellorship and subsequent elimination of his opponents in 1933. The roles of the ailing President Hindenburg and the ailing President Benes are strongly similar.

The establishment of Communist régimes in Eastern Europe has historic importance, for it has brought 100 million people under Moscow's control. If the Chinese Communist aggressors were to establish similar régimes in Korea and parts of South-East Asia, that too would be an important victory. But neither can tell us anything of the technique of revolution, for these régimes were not created by revolution. The imposition of puppet governments by imperialist Powers is nothing new in history, even if some of the details of its execution by Moscow's agents are original.

Certain tentative conclusions may perhaps be drawn from this survey.

The first is that few revolutionary movements of the twentieth century have attained power solely by their own efforts. Two

exceptions are the triumph of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and of the Kuomintang in China in 1927. At least in the second case there can be doubt as to how complete was the triumph and how revolutionary the movement. The three most impressive revolutionary triumphs of the century (Russia, 1917-20, Yugoslavia, 1941-4, and China, 1945-9) were won only because a foreign enemy had smashed the state machine which the revolutionaries had previously been too weak to destroy or to capture. The triumphs of Asian nationalism (India, Burma, Indonesia) were won by the willing or reluctant surrender of the colonial Powers. Other Communist successes were won by Soviet or Chinese conquest. Fascism was set up in Italy and Germany, and Communism in Czechoslovakia, by consent of the civil and military authorities. The various violent changes of power that have from time to time taken place in the Balkans, Latin America and the Middle East have been *coups d'état*, not revolutions. If Communist and other revolutionary movements have won through Russian conquest, through defeat of their enemies in war, or through the surrender of the legal rulers, then their intended victims in the free world must make sure that they are not defeated in war and that they do not yield positions of power. This is a question of military strength, national unity and the enlightenment of the free peoples. It is the first priority, and seems at last to be recognized as such by the governments concerned. Even so, much remains to be done in revealing to the free nations the true nature and the urgency of the danger.

The second conclusion is that the leadership of revolutionary movements comes principally from the intelligentsia. No good is done by denouncing intellectuals or screaming about *la trahison des clercs*. The western nations must win the friendship of the young intellectuals of the backward nations. Immense harm is done by personal affronts. Nothing has done so much to make possible the monstrously distorted picture of the United States which is believed in good faith by thousands of Asiatic and African educated men and women, as the knowledge of the inferior status of American Negroes. Every London landlady who refuses to let a room to a "coloured" student is worth a platoon of troops to Stalin. Dr. Malan and his *apartheid* are worth a division or two. But the avoidance of insults and injustices is not enough. More attention should be given to the education of the backward peoples. Education should be so devised as to produce experts devoted to the practical service

of their peoples, not semi-literate demagogues. This immensely difficult task faces not only the education officers of the colonial Powers but also the leaders of the independent Asiatic states. The experience of each can be useful to the other. Both in colonies and in independent states there are many devoted educational workers. Their efforts in the cause of all humanity do not receive sufficient recognition or sufficient material aid. Their own governments' resources are slender and their other tasks are many and urgent. The United Nations, which should be a force of progress in this field, is little but a forum for irresponsible demagoguery. The representatives of the oppressive pashas of Egypt, or the corrupt rulers of the Philippines, have little right to blame the British administrators of Tanganyika for failing to create a social and cultural utopia. But their declamations are treated more seriously than they deserve even by enlightened citizens of countries friendly to Britain. If the free nations mean anything by their statements that they are united in defence against Muscovite totalitarianism, they should help, not harm each other in this most vital task of education. If revolutions can be prevented by strength, the spread of revolutionary movements can be prevented by sound education. There is no task more urgent than to prevent the frustration and mental distortion of the educated youth of southern Europe, Asia and Africa.

The third conclusion is that economic action against revolution is not in itself enough, and should be used with care. It is a delusion to suppose that the mere expenditure of some billions of dollars will make it possible to present to the thousand million people of non-Communist Asia, Africa and Latin America a magic, ready-made "social justice". The poverty of these regions is deeply rooted, and pressure of population is making it worse. It will be very long before the standard of living of the whole of these regions can be appreciably raised. This the governments of Western Europe and America no doubt know. But public opinion does not know it. Well-meaning talk of "solving" the economic problems of Asia and Africa by some sort of new Marshall Aid creates illusions among the western peoples, and rouses hopes that cannot be satisfied among the peoples of Asia and Africa. This does not mean that economic aid is not essential. Without it, Asia and Africa would certainly be lost. But economic aid cannot create universal prosperity. It can only reduce misery, remove the most glaring contrasts in wealth and the most horrifying injustices, and create at least in certain naturally favoured

regions the means of rapid further development. Clearly industrialization is desirable where the conditions favour it. But it should be treated as a practical measure, not as a matter of dogma. There is no need to emulate the Stalinist *mystique* of vast heavy industries built by armies of conscripted labourers. It is also utopian to imagine that a large part of the funds allotted to the economic development of backward countries will not be wasted. Corruption of officials is the result of excessive numbers and insufficient pay. Until officials can be secured tolerable living conditions, and until the flow of educated young people can be directed to other employment than the bureaucracy, corruption will continue. Improvement depends on the creation of large numbers of engineers, doctors, scientific workers and industrial technicians. Here economic development and the improvement of education are inseparable.

Great financial sacrifices will have to be made by all the western nations for the development of the backward countries. The aim should be to reduce both poverty and corruption, the means should be to create the right industries, the right technicians and the right education. None of these tasks can be achieved unless the military power of the free world deters aggression. Nothing can be done in any direction unless the western governments not only make their plans but explain them to their own peoples and to that section of the backward peoples which is accessible to information—that is, to the educated section. None of these tasks will be completely achieved even in the most favourable conditions. But partial success is enough to save the free world. Neither the Communist nor any other revolutionary movements are invincible. The history of their seizure of power shows that their claims to scientific infallibility and predestined victory lack any serious foundation.

THE POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

By KENNETH KNOWLES

"Their boast is that they strike first and only ask why when the strike is over."—*Economist*, May 13th, 1950.

I. Introductory

IN the last five pre-war years, 1935 to 1939, out of nearly ten million man-days lost in strikes, the miners—traditionally the readiest of all workers to resort to direct action—accounted for more than half, and the transport workers for about a tenth. But in the first five post-war years (July, 1945, to June, 1950), the miners' loss had fallen by nearly half and the transport workers' had increased by more than three times: thus, out of nearly eleven million man-days lost, miners accounted for little over a quarter and transport workers for nearer 30 per cent.—notably in big-scale dock strikes. Man for man, the dockers lost nearly seven times as much working time as the miners. Now, when margins are narrow, dock strikes rank second only to coal strikes in economic importance, since dockers largely regulate the pulse of external trade on the steadiness of which the country's health, in terms of competitive power and living standards, so much depends. While estimates of the various kinds of loss due to strikes can never claim to be complete or accurate, the Minister of Transport reckoned that the dock strikes of 1948 and the first half of 1949 meant a loss of about £800,000 solely in non-production costs borne by idle ships*—despite the fact that troops have been regularly employed for unloading during strikes and the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, which had rusted unused since the General Strike of 1926, has been invoked more than once in the attempt to minimize the effect of the strikes.

It is hard to give an adequate statistical picture of these outbreaks; indeed, until recently, dock strikes have not been separately classified in strike statistics. Some idea of their extent in relation to the strikes of other workers may however be gained from the monthly lists of "Principal Disputes"† in the *Ministry*

* See *The Times*, July 4th, 1949. However, the Minister had estimated, after the strike of June, 1948, that that strike alone had "represented a delayed turn-round of 890,000 tons of British shipping, at a cost of £880,000" (*The Times*, July 1st, 1948).

† The classification of these strikes as "principal" is partly qualitative, and does not mean that they conform to any precise criteria of magnitude or duration.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

of *Labour Gazette*. Workers involved in these so-called "principal" strikes have amounted, in the last five years and over industry as a whole, to about half the workers involved in all recorded strikes, although the proportion of "principal" strikers is naturally not the same for each separate industry.* In the following table, average numbers of workers per year involved

Workers Involved in Strikes (per year), July, 1945, to June, 1950

Industry	In "principal" strikes		In all strikes	
	No. (000)	as per cent. of workers employed	No. (000)	as per cent. of workers employed
Mining and quarrying:	89.7	11.1	227.0	28.2
Coal mining	89.7	12.3	226.4	31.0
Other mining and quarrying	nil	nil	0.6	0.8
Textiles	3.1	0.4	7.2	0.9
Metal, engineering, shipbuilding, etc.:	51.4	1.5	103.0	3.0
Iron and steel and other metal	5.5	0.4	25.5	1.9
Engineering	27.9	1.4	50.1	2.6
Shipbuilding and ship-repairing	18.0	8.4	27.4	12.9
Transport:	74.3	5.4	95.9	7.0
Railways	3.5	0.5	n.a.	n.a.
Road passenger	23.8	8.4	n.a.	n.a.
Road haulage	9.3	5.3	n.a.	n.a.
Docks	36.5	49.1	n.a.	n.a.
Other transport	1.2	0.6	n.a.	n.a.
Building, decorating, public works contracting, etc.	3.2	0.3	8.3	0.8
Clothing	2.3	0.4	6.5	1.3
Other industries and services	18.4	0.3	36.7	0.5
ALL INDUSTRIES	242.4	1.6	484.6	3.1

(a) in "principal" strikes and (b) in all recorded strikes are given for the different industries. These figures are also taken as

* It seems to be high for dockers: in 1949, strikers in "principal" dock strikes amounted to 87.5 per cent. of strikers in all dock strikes.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

percentages of totals of workers employed,* since the proportion of an industry's labour force which is involved in strikes provides some measure of the importance of the strikes in relation to those occurring in other industries.

Thus, on the average, nearly half the dock labour force appears to have been involved in important strikes each year, as against about one-eighth of the coal miners. But the gross total of "workers involved" in strikes really represents the total of separate "strike-acts" of workers involved in strikes, since a man who strikes, say, three times in a single year is counted three times over. Most of the big dock strikes have centred in London,† which gives work to more than one-third of the country's dockers, and there is therefore likely to have been a good deal of repetitive striking.

The industry most prone to repetitive striking has been coal mining—the only separate industry for which the *Gazette* has hitherto given net figures of workers involved as well as gross figures. But, significantly, net figures were given for dockers also for 1949.

Repetitive Striking, 1949			
Industry	Workers involved in strikes (000)		Average number of strikes per striker ($a \div b$)
	(a)	(b)	
	Gross	Net	
Docks.	54.8	35.0	1.57
Coal mining	247.8	200.0	1.24
All other industries	131.4	115.0	1.14

While the repetitiveness of dockers' strikes has no doubt been rising since the war, that of miners' strikes has been declining sharply. For some time after 1934, when details began to be given regularly, the average number of strikes per striking miner rose fairly steadily, reaching a peak of no less than 2.02 in 1945;

* Employment figures for certain industries, though based on official sources, can be no more than rough estimates. Moreover, the figures of workers involved in strikes include figures for Northern Ireland; but, except perhaps in shipbuilding, this should not materially affect the picture.

† 15 of the 26 "principal" dock strikes in these five years involved London workers. However, small strikes are widespread: the 85 dock strikes of 1948 affected no fewer than 26 ports, and the 58 strikes of 1949 affected 21 ports. (Indeed, in relation to numbers employed, there have probably been no more strikes in London than in some other ports. Thus the recent official enquiry, since it is confined to the London strikes, does not seem fully adequate.)

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

but in 1946 it fell to 1.66, in 1947 to 1.54, and in 1948 to 1.35. In the docks, however, repetitive strikes are to be expected because the industry is concentrated in an area inevitably affected by most big strikes. But the industry has also been characterized by a high proportion of very short strikes, which, since they impose little economic strain on workers, again suggest repeated action. In 1948-9 the proportion of strikes lasting not more than one day was 69 per cent. for the docks* and 43 per cent. for all other industries.

The accounts given in the lists of "Principal Disputes" throw some light on their immediate causes. True, the causes of strikes, like those of all human actions, are complicated, and the immediate issues which occasion the outbreak may reveal very little of the real causes—particularly in a series of strikes such as this, where general dissatisfactions may be canalized into specific grievances almost at random. But—taking the multiple causes listed as a guide—questions of payment arose in one form or another in 9 of these 26 principal strikes,† questions of discipline in 10, other working conditions in 4, redundancy in 3, and sentiments of solidarity or sympathy in 6. Stevedores‡ were involved in 8 of the strikes, usually in the lead.

So much for the bare facts. How are they to be interpreted?

II. Background of the Strikes

Unless one adopts the view that dockers are more unscrupulous than other workers in exploiting their bargaining strength under a full employment, these strikes are at first sight something of a paradox. The dockers have what is described by their biggest Union as "the best machinery in the country for dealing speedily with disputes".§ Casual labour, the bane of dock life, has been largely eliminated. Wages are assured (the 5d.-an-hour-worked of 1889 has become a guaranteed wage of £4 8s. a week), and actual earnings are high (the average for the whole country in the last quarter of 1949 was £8 13s. a week). There is 100 per cent. Trade Unionism, and the struggle for organization is over. Dockers have little contact, and therefore little chance of

* See *Review of the Work of the National Dock Labour Board, 1947-1949*, p. 21.

† A summary table is appended to this article.

‡ Originally, stevedores worked solely on ships, for purposes of loading; dockers worked on the quayside, except for purposes of unloading. But this distinction has been blurred, and "stevedore" now generally means a member of the Stevedores' Section of the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers.

§ *T. & G.W.U. Record*, April, 1949. Many local disputes can be dealt with by a Port Conciliation Committee or Sub-committee on the day they arise.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

cent. of the labour force were said to be casuals.* In such circumstances, only complete strikes seemed likely to succeed: "one out, all out". (In effect, strikes actually benefit casual workers if they can be assured of strike pay while the strike is on and fuller employment, to cope with arrears, when it is over.) Such a tradition is hard to unlearn overnight. True, the waste of manpower through casual working was intolerable while the war was going on, but after it ended there was renewed anxiety in the docks over the prospects of permanent decasualization, particularly since the two sides of the industry were unable to agree on this. Moreover, even since the introduction of the Scheme, the docker is still in degree a casual worker; in degree he is likely to remain so; and, although he is now paid for attendance on a much more generous scale than that of unemployment benefit, his guaranteed wage is far short of his possible earnings. In general, of course, high average earnings may be thought of as compensating for irregularity of employment; but it is not clear how far such an average conceals chronically "bad spots". (Piece rates for dock work are notoriously anomalous, and while some dockers are underemployed, others consistently work overtime.) The table of average labour surpluses gives some indication of the incidence of underemployment in the different port areas, although again as yet there is no information on the extent to which it is spread over the whole labour force.

It is clear that progress is being made: all but two port areas have been able to reduce the size of their labour force, and all but four have reduced their proportion of surplus labour. As might be expected, it is in some of the smaller units, where the flow of shipping is less even, that the demand for labour is most irregular. But this need not mean that irregularity of employment in the big ports is without significance as a background to unrest: in London there were, on the average, more than two thousand surplus dockers a day during 1948-1949, and the maximum rose to about three times that figure.

These fluctuations in employment are of course mainly short-term: in more than half the port areas in 1949 the men were fully employed at certain times, and there were sometimes actual shortages of labour. But we are looking at the end of a chapter of far more violent and longer-term fluctuations due to war-time dislocation of port traffic, and this dislocation must be illustrated by a summary table.

* See *Economist*, August 1st, 1945.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

Arrivals with Cargo (thousand tons net)
Figures in italics are percentages

	1938	1942	1944	1945	1946	1949
Thames Area . . .	22,600 (26.0)	1,128 (4.9)	3,605 (9.6)	5,069 (16.5)	8,460 (23.3)	15,871 (24.8)
Channel ports . . .	20,294 (23.4)	428 (1.8)	1,074 (2.9)	2,657 (8.7)	6,005 (16.5)	11,112 (17.4)
Mersey and N.W. coast	15,183 (17.5)	9,096 (39.7)	13,495 (36.2)	10,064 (32.8)	8,888 (24.5)	13,686 (21.4)
W. coast of Scotland .	5,342 (6.2)	4,607 (20.1)	7,538 (20.2)	3,894 (12.7)	2,222 (6.1)	3,413 (5.3)
Other ports . . .	23,372 (26.9)	7,685 (33.5)	11,598 (31.1)	8,986 (29.3)	10,764 (29.6)	19,896 (31.1)
All ports . . .	86,791 (100.0)	22,944 (100.0)	37,310 (100.0)	30,670 (100.0)	36,339 (100.0)	63,978 (100.0)

Source: *Shipping Movement at United Kingdom Ports from 1938 to 1945* (H.M.S.O., 1946); *Board of Trade Journal*.

The wartime diversion and concentration of traffic in Liverpool and Glasgow meant a corresponding collapse when the pre-war pattern began to be resumed. In 1946 it was feared that Scottish ports might suffer permanently both because of the need to save shipping time and because of the absence of coal exports; and in 1947 it was reported that "a considerable part of the swollen war-time dock labour force on the West Coast of Scotland and especially in Glasgow was rendered surplus".* Against such a background the dockers' renewed fear of redundancy is understandable: it was expressed in a "pledge" of resistance in October, 1945; it caused the Glasgow strike of March, 1947, and the sympathetic strike of the following month which spread to London, as well as the big "ineffectives" strike of April, 1949; it has caused resistance to temporary registers or unregistered work at most ports; and it has also caused resistance to mechanization.†

But dockers have links with the past other than their fear of unemployment. Closely-knit groups of workers cling tenaciously to the traditional practices and customs which give them their cohesion. While all dockers are "clannish" (over half the recruits to the industry in 1948-9 were dockers' sons, despite a waiting list of other applicants), particular groups are exceptionally so.

* *Industry and Employment in Scotland* (Cmd. 7125), 1947.

† See *The Times*, November 4th and 9th, 1948, March 10th, 1950.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The 7,000 London stevedores, for example, "have closed their ranks more tightly than any other section of workers in Britain. They recruit only the sons of stevedores, and with them tradition is almost a mania".* The stevedores have been in the vanguard of most of the big strikes of latter years; and here it is not only a left-wing leadership but an anxiety to maintain their independence against the massive T. & G.W.U. that has made them receptive to strike agitation. (There has been tension between these Unions ever since 1923, when a number of T. & G.W.U. members in London broke away and joined the stevedores.)

Many strikes with apparently trivial causes occur where the customs of particular groups of dockers are infringed or outdated by the national Scheme. The Middlesbrough dockers, for example, went on strike for several weeks in the early part of 1949 against the time of their call being altered from 3 p.m. to 12 noon, since this involved their being thrown into a common pool with the wharf men. Moreover, the focus of such strikes may easily be switched from the original cause to the Scheme itself; indeed, the National Dock Labour Board's Report pointed out that this was, in fact, a common feature of the big strikes of 1948-9.

In these strikes it was the disciplinary clauses of the Scheme that came under fire, for sensitiveness to "victimization" has always been strong in the docks. But even if the appropriateness of particular disciplinary provisions is disputed, it is indisputable that tighter discipline is the price dockers have to pay for decasualization. This, however, does not make it more palatable. True, absenteeism is low; even the nominal rate was only 2.1 per cent. in the last six months of 1947 (or about one-sixth to one-seventh of the miners' rate), and fell to 1.7 and 1.4 per cent. in 1948 and 1949. But late starts, early finishes, morning and afternoon breaks, "spelling", waiting for ships of particular shipping companies to come in so as to be ready to unload them, and so on, have been part of the docker's tradition and are not all lightly given up. Moreover, during the war, when labour was freely transferred and the men often had to work in air raids, discipline was inevitably relaxed. Unforeseen delays made strict timekeeping seem pointless, and since piecework was general men could take time off with a clearer conscience in that they were penalizing themselves; master stevedores competing for the best gangs were unwilling to alienate their workers

* *Economist*, May 31st, 1950.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

by insisting on discipline, and employers working on cost-plus contracts had less interest in maintaining it. With the introduction of the Scheme in 1947, employers generally ceased to have any direct responsibility either for the imposition of penalties or for dismissal, and the bipartite Boards which replaced them have had to win the consent which is the basis of authority. In these circumstances the insistence on regularity of attendance and the control of pilfering (which, also, was unusually prevalent during and immediately after the war) may, in so far as both absenteeism and pilfering indicate unrest, tend to drive dissatisfied workers to find their outlet in strikes.

Again, as far as his physical environment is concerned, to a large extent the docker is still, literally, "living in the past". Because employers had traditionally little sense of responsibility towards casual workers, the wave of "welfare" which was the backwash of the First World War never reached the docks. Surroundings were squalid, and even the most elementary "amenities" (drinking and washing facilities and lavatories) were virtually non-existent or grossly insanitary. Neither the war nor—so far—the peace has changed this very much. It is significant that the lack of "amenities", seldom a direct cause of strikes, became fully explicit during the "ineffectives" strike of 1949; and, following the presentation of a detailed report and recommendations to the Minister of Labour, the N.D.L.B. was able to report "some improvement in some ports" during that year.

Thus many of the pinprick causes of recent strikes derive from the impact of the past on the present. The dockers' Unions, particularly the T. & G.W.U.,* have struggled hard in the past to achieve the present; yet one of the features of the big post-war strikes which has attracted most attention is the readiness of dockers to criticize and defy their Union. What underlies this?

(2) *The Strikers and the T. & G.W.U.*

Criticism of the T. & G.W.U., in the Press and elsewhere, has been free and easy during the past five years, and Mr. Deakin's impatience with "ill-informed", "ill-considered", "mischievous", and "ridiculous" views is understandable.† Moreover,

* The following Unions cover the dockers: the T. & G.W.U., which includes the great majority of dock workers; the Scottish T. & G.W.U.; the N.U.G. & M.W. (mainly on the Humber and in North-Eastern ports); and the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers (in London). The Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen and Bargemen's Union covers a category quite distinct from other dock workers.

† *Record*, June, 1950.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

many of the big strikes have been touched off by the stevedores, and T. & G.W.U. members have not been initially responsible. Yet if the T. & G.W.U. had been in control of its members, the strikes would not have meant much.

This seems particularly true of the Liverpool area, where the 1945 strike—which involved more than two-thirds of the national labour force—was complete, and where feeling against the Union developed rapidly. The strike had started in London (where a weeding-out of the register had already caused unrest) with a go-slow movement in the Surrey Docks in support of “a reasonable demand of no more than sixty men for a reasonable rate of pay for unloading pitprops”.* The settlement of this comparatively trivial question had been achieved before the strike assumed large proportions, but not before it had got under way. General anxiety about the future of decasualization, objections to anomalies of payment, the discharging and replacement of 500 men, the “withholding of books” from Liverpool dockers, added momentum to the strike, and it spread rapidly. Demands were put forward for a 40-hour week, for holidays with pay, for the abolition of piecework, and for a national day wage of 25s.; but it was not long before “the men’s grievances appear to have crystallized more against the union than the employers”.†

The Liverpool reports of the *Manchester Guardian* were eloquent of this:

“The vast majority of the dockers do not want to hear Mr. Donovan [the national secretary of the dockers’ section of the T. & G.W.U.], and the more radical of them make no secret of their intention to howl him down. This antagonism towards their own union . . . is no sudden development. . . . Indeed, a list of union ‘failures’ has been compiled. One striker said ‘Because their hands are tied is always their explanation for their own inaction. They have become our masters instead of our servants’ ” (October 5th, 1945).

The chairman of the Liverpool strike committee, after denying that the strikers had been influenced by any political body, added:

“We are not prepared to listen to the dictates of the Transport and General Workers’ Union. For twenty years we have been dictated to by them. We know that the union has been arbitrating on our behalf, but I challenge the union to state the dockers’ case” (October 6th, 1945).

Two days later the strikers passed a “vociferous” resolution of no confidence in Mr. Donovan. Behind this attitude lay a sense of impotence:

* *Economist*, October 13th, 1945.

† *Economist*, October 20th, 1945.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

“They have a feeling of helplessness in their unions, particularly the Transport and General Workers’. Their members, they said, had lost interest in the union and no longer attended branch meetings. . . . If they wanted to change the officials in the Transport and General Workers’ Union it would take them two years to bring it about, one of them estimated. And in any case, if all dockers wanted a change they would be outvoted by those in other sections who supported the present officials” (October 16th, 1945).

A T. & G.W.U. meeting called at Birkenhead on this day had to be cancelled because no striker attended it. In the words of a dockers’ leaflet:

“The Unions have pledged us that they are going forward, that the official machinery has been set in motion. It has been set in motion round and round, getting nowhere, nothing happening. This has been going on for years” (October 31st, 1945).

Finally, the Rector of Liverpool, in his statement on the strike, held that it had revealed that “a good deal of the machinery of the docks section of the union is outmoded and requires to be completely overhauled” (October 2nd, 1945).

The Union’s retort to this spontaneous and widespread revolt seemed somewhat inadequate:

“Our reply is that we were nine months ahead of the unofficial committees in making our plans and pursuing them, and any delay that took place in the final settlement was due solely to the interference of bungling amateurs who have never made any contribution to the improvement of the conditions of dockers, and who on this occasion, undermined the power of the unions in the negotiations and made our task far more difficult.”*

It is certainly true that if a Union loses control of its members it is likely to be handicapped in negotiation; but how did the “amateurs” win the trust of the men from the “professionals”, and why were the men so ready to dissociate themselves from their official representatives? The question seems not to have been faced; and five years later *The Times*† was reporting that “a remarkable sign of the dissociation of the workers from their own union is the fact that the committee elected by the Liverpool men to run their benevolent fund insisted, against the advice of the board officials, that their union must officially have nothing to do with it”.

Yet no breakaways took place, nor do they seem to have been seriously attempted. “We certainly could form another union”, said the chairman of the Liverpool strike committee in 1945:

* *Record*, January, 1946.

† March 11th, 1950.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

"we are strong enough. But we don't intend to do so."* The original Port Workers' Defence Committee set up at the time proposed to act as a "shadow" Trade Union: to take up victimization cases, to keep in touch with Union negotiations and intervene if necessary, and eventually to get control of the Union machinery and to "clean it up".†

A year later the T. & G.W.U. were nervous that a breakaway was being attempted, and they issued a special leaflet on the subject, but found, on enquiry, no real evidence that it was likely to happen.‡ In 1949 the *Economist*§ imputed to the then strike committee "the ambition . . . to wrest the leadership of the dockers from the official unions and to carve out a new union of dockers", but it seems doubtful whether such an objective would have had much following. Yet although in general the loyalty of the dockers to their Union seems beyond question, at particular times they have flatly opposed it.

One of the stock accusations against the T. & G.W.U. has been that it is unwieldy and that the officials are out of touch with the members. How, it is asked, can a Union of over 1¼ million members guarantee satisfaction to the odd 5 or 6 per cent. who are dockers? Yet (apart from some groups of busmen and the Smithfield meat porters) most of the rest of the membership have been well satisfied enough to be quiescent. Moreover, the dockers comprise a separate section and have their own officials. Again, it is difficult to insist that the officials are inaccessible (except to strikers' deputations); on the contrary, "one of the troubles seems to be not that the union officials are too far removed from the dockers . . . but that they are too close to them. There is commonly a union office within a few minutes' walk of every dock, and dockers naturally take their troubles directly to the union official, instead of working through their branches."||

This raises an important question: the virtual breakdown of dockers' branch life. (This is true of other Unions than the dockers', though there are perhaps special reasons in their case.)

* *Manchester Guardian*, October 17th, 1945.

† See *Manchester Guardian*, November 3rd and 5th, 1945. The National Port Workers' Defence Committee had a chairman, secretary, and organiser; under it were 5 regional committees with similar officers; and under each regional committee there were similar organizations in the ports—including ports which had not participated in the strike.

‡ *Record*, October, 1946.

§ August 13th, 1949.

|| *The Times*, March 11th, 1950.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

Branches are sometimes so big that no available local hall can house a full branch meeting; even the payment of dues may be undertaken on the job or by dockers' wives and children on their behalf; there has been transference of dock labour during and since the war; and dockers' homes have been dispersed (partly owing to bomb damage). "Only a tiny fraction of the men play a part in the life of the union, and as their officials, even though all must have worked at least five years in the docks, are not elected but appointed from the top, they feel it somehow outside themselves."* Again, the T. & G.W.U. is no longer crusading: its main battles have been won; and this, with Union membership at saturation point, tends to transmute enthusiasm into routine. The less men's emotions are involved in their Union activities the less they will want to attend branch meetings and the more readily they are stirred by the old slogans. In all the big strikes of recent years "the appeal is to the sentiment of the dock workers", to his 'solidarity'. . . . The unofficial leaders showed no little skill in exploiting these sentiments. This they were able to do because the Unions, having progressed from the open-air militancy of the early days to the practice of securing improvements by negotiation, is necessarily somewhat vulnerable to the tactics of mob rule."†

But most Unions have come to settle their disputes by negotiation, and yet few have proved as vulnerable as the dockers'. There is, however, a further factor in the relations of dockers with their Unions which is better discussed under the next heading.

(3) *The Strikers and the Authorities*

There is a multiplicity of "authorities" in the docks. The Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Labour (in particular the Chief Industrial Commissioner), the Docks and Inland Waterways Executive of the British Transport Commission (for the ports previously operated by the railways), the National Joint Council and its local associations, the National Dock Labour Board and its subsidiary local Boards, the National Association of Port Employers, the port authorities, and the various ship-owners', master stevedores', and Trade Union bodies, are directly concerned. The Cabinet itself has intervened over the heads of all of them.

Government intervention apart, the National Joint Council

**The Times*, March 11th, 1950. †*Review of the Work of the N.D.L.B., 1947-1949*, p. 27.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

(a body composed of employers and Trade Unionists in equal proportions, and to which all major agreements must be submitted) is the supreme body—outside the Railway Operated Docks—and the final arbiter of all disputes. Although it is not formally responsible for discipline, the National Dock Labour Board is technically subordinate to it and it can theoretically affect N.D.L.B. decisions on disciplinary questions. But the N.D.L.B. is the most obvious “boss”, since it (and its subordinate bodies) has the task of administering the Scheme: it is responsible for the registration, recruitment and dismissal of labour, payment (of the ordinary wage as well as the guaranteed minimum), welfare and discipline.

The complication of responsibilities has afflicted the prestige of the N.D.L.B. and its capacity to maintain discipline. A frank chapter of the 1947–1949 *Review* complained that the disciplinary clauses of the Scheme are “vague where precision would have been valuable”; “once a strike is afoot, the obligations under the Scheme are forgotten or ignored; the industrial organization seeks to negotiate on the national issue—often with the minimum or maybe, indeed, without any consultation with the Board”; when a strike is settled, “it appears to be assumed that penal action by the Board would be inappropriate and unreasonable”; if penalties are imposed, they may be appealed against by “a tedious process often resembling a negotiation”. The Board has also been ignored, and one of its pronouncements has even been repudiated, by the Government (during the strike of July, 1949). But these may be growing pains; as far as the docker is concerned, he “tends to regard the Board more and more as his employer”, and his alleged confusion over who is his real “boss” has probably been exaggerated. However, this is not all.

The N.D.L.B. and the local Boards each have equal proportions of employers and trade unionists; but whereas the national Board has, in addition, an independent chairman and vice-chairman, the local Boards do not. Direct Union representation on these managerial bodies sometimes results in the dilemma that if the two sides of the Board are divided action is delayed, and if they are united (in an unpopular decision) the Union side tends to lose the men’s confidence. As Mr. T. Macpherson, Labour M.P. and member of the Port of London Authority, wrote in a letter to *The Times*:*

* August 6th, 1949.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

“The trade union leader duly arrives on the scene and he turns out to be one of the employers—a paid member of the Dock Labour Board. Can you wonder that the docker does not understand it? He finds himself in dispute—rightly or wrongly—with his employer, he pays a trade union official to represent his case, and, lo and behold, when it comes to a fight his trade union leader is defending the bosses’ point of view.”

“We go to see the boss,” a docker said,* “and we find our trade union leader. We go to see our own trade union official, and we find the Government. We don’t know where we are.”

This confusion is not, of course, confined to the dock industry† now that the Unions have come to accept wider responsibilities; but it has become most marked in the industry where the Unions have undertaken specific managerial functions. For this reason, and because this confusion is a windfall to agitators, the wisdom of the Unions in insisting on participation in management has sometimes been called in question. It is of course by no means certain that, as things are, the men would desire the Unions to abandon their position; the dockers may owe their material gains to the Unions’ participation, and the gains might be endangered and the men consequently demoralized if the Unions were to withdraw. If this could be demonstrated, then no doubt internal tension in the Unions would be recognized as the price to be paid and, although high, it could be judged worth paying.

But direct Union participation on the one hand and total withdrawal on the other are not the only possibilities. The short experience of nationalized industry has already provided more than one method by which the workers’ voice may be heard in managerial counsels—for example, the participation of trade unionists from other industries, or of workers from the industry concerned who have divested themselves of their Union responsibilities so that the Unions as such may not be committed to management policy. If the committal of the Unions seems to jeopardize their protective function, it is surely worth reconsidering.

(4) *The Influence of “Agitators”*

Agitators—Radical, Chartist, Socialist, Syndicalist, or Communist—have always been blamed for fomenting strikes; it is

* Quoted in an article by the Rt. Hon. Malcolm McCordale, *Sunday Times*, January 29th, 1950.

† Cf. Port and Crombie, *Closed Shop*, *Pilot Papers*, September, 1947, p. 54.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

natural, in time of trouble, to look for trouble-makers. However, mere agitation—i.e. intervention by parties not directly concerned with a view to encouraging workers to view their grievances in a wider setting and to fight their battles more keenly on this account—could not fairly be condemned categorically by the Trade Union movement, since before now “agitators” have given inspiration and, despite accusations of “disruption”, power to the movement. But agitation by the Communist Party, if only because the focus of its loyalty is outside this country, may be considered in a class apart; and in the present state of tension, domestic as well as international, when the nationalized industries are constantly under fire and industrial peace has become an electoral asset, the temptation for overworked Trade Union officials to explain every big strike by reference to a plot to disrupt the T. & G.W.U. or the Marshall Plan or western civilization generally is particularly strong. How far is such an explanation justified, and how far is it “an astonishing confusion of symptom with cause”?*

Hitherto the agitators seem, in almost every case, to have been accessories after the fact. This does not absolve them from guilt, but it does absolve them from initial responsibility. “Agitation is remarkably absent from this strangest of strikes”, commented the *Manchester Guardian* in 1945;† “whatever outsiders may feel about the influence of the [Liverpool] strike committee, one has only to attend a meeting to realize how careful the committee is to gauge the general opinion on the principal points at issue.” When the strike reached its height, an official T. & G.W.U. statement alleged that the opportunity had been seized by “people connected with certain political organizations who had ready prepared machinery for encouraging and maintaining strike action”, which seems to have meant either “elements among certain sections of the employers and shipowners of Liverpool and Hull”, or the Revolutionary Communist Party (Trotskyites)—presumably the latter.‡ The chairman of the Liverpool strike committee had already warmly denied collaboration with political bodies: “We are ordinary Liverpool dockers fighting a straight fight for a square deal . . . we do not want Communism or political propaganda of any kind to enter this conflict.”§ As for

* *The Times*, March 11th, 1950.

† October 11th and 13th, 1945.

‡ See *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, October 13th, 1945.

§ *Manchester Guardian*, October 6th, 1945.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

the Communist Party, they had been urging a return to work,* and the reporting of the strike in the *Daily Worker* was unemotional.

However, the strike ended with the setting-up of a permanent National Port Workers' Defence Committee, and this—or at least a body with the same name—has cropped up in all major strikes since. In June, 1947, after the big strikes, the T. & G.W.U. warned the dockers of this organization while denying its real existence:

“Once again . . . a certain small clique in London, who take to themselves the title of Port Workers' Defence Committee, have distributed leaflets intended to undermine the confidence of the men and to try to provoke strike action.

“We want to assure the dock workers in the country that there is no such organization as a National Port Workers' Defence Committee, neither is there any such organization in London known as a Port Workers' Defence Committee.”†

The N.D.L.B., however, while noting that the same organization appeared in every strike, emphasized that there was no evidence that it “created” or “provoked” the strikes:

“Its leaders do not appear to have had anything to do with the original zinc-oxide claim; they were certainly not involved in the dismissal of the 32 ineffectives; and they did not plan the Canadian Seamen's Union strike against the Canadian employers. Between the strikes there is continued a skeleton organization with, at the moment, two rival news sheets. Once a suitable set of circumstances occurs, this organization moves into action; the same names occur with different prominence‡ as strike leaders, and out-riders travel to other ports to ‘establish contact’ and prepare for further extension of the strike.”§

But while the unofficial organization does not—it is tempting to say, cannot—provoke strikes, it has, implies the N.D.L.B., a keen tactical sense: it tries to keep the initiative by calling meetings at the same time or just ahead of official Union meetings, and when a strike has lost impetus, it orders a resumption on its own terms regardless of whether the industry accepts the terms or not. Its technique in retreat (in the zinc-oxide strike of 1948) was described to the *Daily Worker*|| by one of its members:

* *Manchester Guardian*, October 10th and 16th, 1945.

† *Record*, June, 1947.

‡ This tactic, of course, not only trains strike leaders but also suggests that the leadership is “thrown up” by the strike. *The Times* (July 27th, 1949) had the impression that there were generally different leaders in each strike.

§ *Review of the Work of the N.D.L.B.*, 1947–1949, pp. 27–28.

|| June 30th, 1948.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

"It was Mr. Attlee's broadcast, rather than the declaration of a 'state of emergency', . . . which did the trick.
 "The inner council of the strike committee came to the conclusion that Mr. Attlee's appeal to the loyalties of the port workers would be almost certain to create a split in the ranks. . . .
 "By taking the decision we did to-day we avoided a trap set for us in Mr. Attlee's speech. By avoiding it we have taken the men back on our own initiative as we brought them out, and the committee will be prepared, should the emergency arise again, to take further action."

Of a piece with this is the presentation of strikes, where possible, as lockouts, as well as the use of other tactical devices to which counter-argument, however reasonable, is never a convincing answer.

How far have the Communists come to dominate or control the unofficial organization? By the time of the zinc-oxide strike the Communist "line" had shifted decisively into opposition to the leadership of organized labour, and political influence on this and subsequent strikes was the more confidently alleged. Mr. Attlee referred, in the broadcast already mentioned,* to the activities of a group—"not people of great influence but just a small nucleus who have been instructed for political reasons to take advantage of every little disturbance that takes place to cause the disruption of British economy"—but it is not clear how strong their influence was. More than one "nucleus" seems to have been interested: the Trotskyites "joined in with a provocative pamphlet",† and according to the *Economist*‡ there had been several rumours that backing for the strike leaders had not all come from Communist sources.

The Times, while making clear that the strike had not been started by Communists, said that "extremists have been steadily strengthening their hold upon the *ad hoc* organization that has been set up".§ There were certainly some changes in the composition of the strike committee; two members who left it declared that "it was now almost entirely dominated by Communists and fellow-travellers", but were in turn accused by the committee of having left "because they were not allowed to pursue political ends" (allegations which are not incompatible). In answer to a similar accusation by Mr. Deakin that the original

* June 28th, 1948.

† *Review of the Work of the N.D.L.B., 1947-1949*, p. 23.

‡ August 28th, 1948.

§ See *The Times*, June 25th and 26th, 1948.

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

committee of 48 members had contained no less than 37 Communists and fellow-travellers, the committee asserted that it consisted of 27 "non-politicals", 10 "Labour" men, and 5 Communists. Yet even if Mr. Deakin's definition of "fellow-traveller" was unduly broad, and the strike committee did hold only a small minority of Communists and sympathizers, their influence may have been dominant on the "inner council" which seems to have taken the main decisions.

After the "ineffectives" strike of 1949, all the big strikes were connected in one way or another with the dispute of the Canadian Seamen's Union: those of May and June, 1949, were in direct support of the C.S.U. strike, while that of April, 1950, was in protest against the upholding by the T. & G.W.U. Appeals Committee of the expulsion of some of the supporters of the previous strikes. If only because the C.S.U. was Communist-controlled, the Communists had an interest in maintaining these strikes, and their influence could have been inferred. The tone of the *Daily Worker* became perceptibly sharper; and the Ministry of Labour's *Review of the British Docks Strikes, 1949*,* describes some of the facilities put at the disposal of the C.S.U. agitators and strikers by Communists. Since then, the complicity of the Communists in maintaining and trying to extend dock strikes has been asserted with increasing assurance and probably with substantial truth.

The *Review*, however, treats the 1949 strikes as nothing but a Communist plot. No explanation is attempted why dockers without Communist sympathies continued to defy the authorities after the exposures that were made; it would appear that they were unusually gullible. The same air of unreality pervades the many references in the Press and elsewhere to "a few defiant men", "a small clique", "a few agitators" on the one hand and "stupid and irresponsible" dockers on the other; we have even been left to deplore the possibility that "the mental quality and the moral courage of the mass of dock workers have, if anything, deteriorated while their economic and social conditions have so greatly advanced".† Admittedly this is the small change of strike reporting, but at best it is too facile and at worst it serves to annoy men who are probably no more fools or dupes than the rest of us. "The men don't like the newspapers. All those lies they print, it's making them stick together more."‡

* *Cmd. 7851*, paras. 42 & 44.

† *Sunday Times*, July 17th, 1949.

‡ *Mass-Observation Bulletin* No. 31, January, 1950.

No doubt the fact that public opinion seems still to be tinged with a low estimate of dockers' social status* enhances their feeling of isolation and therefore of solidarity at critical times.

Grievances, whether well based or not, are likely to weigh more with strikers than their apathy or distrust towards particular brands of agitators; and it has been the persistence of general dissatisfactions that has allowed the agitators to win and retain some control over the big strikes. In these circumstances to confine one's efforts to attempting to isolate the Communists in mid-strike, however desirable this may be, tends to defeat its own end; witness the *Manchester Guardian's* report† of one of Mr. Deakin's meetings in 1948:

"It was interesting that there was no outcry at this attack on Communism. The crowd did not seem to resent it, which suggests that it was not a Communist crowd: the hostility to Mr. Deakin seemed to derive from lack of confidence rather than political hostility. 'He is just an agent of the Government, that's all he is. That's all the union is nowadays,' commented one docker to another during the meeting."

The same journal reported‡ a Bristol strike leader's comment on Mr. Isaacs' broadcast in 1949:

"I have come to the conclusion that at the present time any man who stands up for his rights is regarded as a Communist. If I thought there was a Communist in my crowd I should appeal to you to 'chuck him in the float'."

At worst, mere heresy-hunting may, as so often, strengthen the hold of the heretics; at best, as the N.D.L.B. put it, there is "no assurance that the same cycle of events will not recur in the future." "Wolf!" has been cried too often: "For the last 25 years every bleeding strike we've 'ad' as been called a political strike."§

III. Conclusion

"No impartial student of strikes", wrote a research worker in this field in 1948,|| "can fail to be impressed by the lack of

* Dockers were graded 29th out of 30 occupational groups in a recent survey of social gradings (*British Journal of Sociology*, March, 1950).

† June 26th, 1948.

‡ June 13th, 1949.

§ *Mass-Observation Bulletin* No. 31, January, 1950.

|| Meredith, *The Psychological Aspect of Strikes*, Penguin Parade Second Series, No. II, p. 43.

correlation between the precipitating cause of a strike and the amount of feeling necessary to lead to such drastic action. . . . The choice of a bone of contention, whether in industrial life or in personal relations or anywhere else in society, may often be almost accidental." Of course there are always and everywhere in industry countless petty frictions which could lead to strikes, but whether they do so or not depends on the presence or absence of deeper-seated grievances which may not become fully explicit. This is particularly true of major strike waves, such as those before and after the First World War, when a long-term fall in real wages, contrasted with Edwardian luxury and ostentatious class-distinction and then with war profiteering, produced an exasperation which found its outlet in strikes led by men who advocated "workers' control" as the only means of raising the worker's economic and social status. That the mass of workers were little affected by Syndicalist and Guild Socialist ideas was immaterial; they were ready to strike and there were "agitators" ready to lead them.

After the war, the bitter experience of the General Strike and the chronic depression tended to turn the Labour Movement from industrial to political action. Moreover, real wages rose for those in work, and the "good old days" never returned for the upper classes. The strike wave subsided; "workers' control" in the Syndicalist sense was gradually forgotten. The worker's status was to be raised by a Labour Government which would guarantee full employment and massive social services: Keynes, and later Beveridge, showed that this was possible without making a clean sweep of capitalism. During the second war there was a greater Labour participation in government, a more genuine community of danger, and more equitable rationing and price control—all of which helped to prevent serious strikes; after the war Labour attained full power, the social services were expanded, and with full employment and the nationalization of the main industries the Unions found themselves in a stronger position than ever before. There were fewer fundamental grievances in industry; there was no general strike wave as after 1918.

Yet in the docks (where, significantly, joint "control" came nearest to being achieved), and to a less extent elsewhere, a new source of uneasiness emerged: the men apparently began to feel that they were losing control over their own Union. It is easy for outsiders to blame the Unions for this; but it must be remembered that they have had to face the formidable triple problem

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of adjusting themselves to altered conditions (a problem for all Unions since 1945, and especially for those in nationalized industries), of maintaining contact with a membership unsettled by the war, and also of participating in the actual operation of the Scheme for which they had struggled so hard. Once again men were ready to strike, and there were "agitators" ready to lead them; and now the main problem facing the T. & G.W.U.—the Union chiefly concerned—is to prove to the men that it is neither in league with the employers nor "just an agent of the Government".

This is not necessarily, of course, a question of the Unions withdrawing from the N.D.L.B. Yet if the policy of Union participation in management is to work, the men have to be convinced that the assumption of a share in managerial responsibility in no way weakens the Union's protective capacity. This dilemma of protective *versus* managerial responsibilities has, in every other case, made the Unions very wary of participating in management. Probably very few people could decide at present whether in this case the men's material advantage would really be sacrificed if the Unions were less fully implicated; yet circumstances surely call for the question to be reviewed, and answered to the satisfaction of the men.

It is, however, partly a question of Union organization, for the dockers' branches must somehow be resuscitated if the men are to be kept adequately informed of the achievements of the Union in protecting its members and if unofficial influence is to be effectively combated. Moreover, the value of publicity cannot be ignored, and it may be asked whether a single Union journal is adequate to cover the needs of so large a membership. When the unofficial organization runs two news sheets, a formal article in the *Record* seems hardly enough. Again, when strikes come up for review the main concern should not be so much to pin the blame on agitators (it is by that time too late for this to have much effect), as to expose the grievances which they have been able to exploit so as to forestall future agitation.

Obviously the Unions have the experience and resources to recover the ground lost; more important, they retain the fundamental loyalty of their members. It is, however, necessary to stress their responsibility, not of course in order to tell them their job, but because external pressure—such as a rigorous insistence on discipline by the authorities—is likely to defeat its own

POST-WAR DOCK STRIKES

end if the workers lose their sense of owning the Union as distinct from merely belonging to it.

Some of the causes of unrest are, no doubt, growing pains. Casual labour, for example, was reduced between 1948 and 1949 in almost all port areas, and the development of welfare services is obviously being pushed ahead. The suggestion that some other authority should replace the N.D.L.B. seems to have little to commend it at present: indeed, once confidence in the Union leadership has been restored, it may be desirable for the N.D.L.B. to be "given its head" rather more in disciplinary matters. As for the agitators, it is clear that they would lose power in proportion as the Unions regained it. There is nothing to show that the Communists are numerically strong in the docks; they have been allowed to take the lead only by default.

[NOTE. The period discussed above ends in June 1950. Since then there has been a further chain of strikes in the early part of this year; but nothing in these strikes has seemed to contradict the pattern indicated. When this article was in proof, the Committee of Inquiry into Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks issued its report. As it is impossible to appraise so careful a study in a short note, only a few general comments can be made. The Report appears to confirm, in considerable detail but with reference to London only, many of the points made above; and there are several useful recommendations. It is, however, difficult to see how the present Scheme can evolve into "a form of organization which will provide more direct and stable relations between employers and workers". The discussion of the disciplinary provisions of the Dock Labour Scheme is valuable, although it seems doubtful whether the suggested expedient of transferring disciplinary powers to the joint industrial machinery would be satisfactory. On the general question of the desirability of direct Trade Union participation in managerial functions, the Report is unfortunately silent.]

A table showing the principal dock disputes between July 1945 and July 1950 is given on the following page.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

APPENDIX

"Principal Disputes" in the Docks, July, 1945, to June, 1950

Year: Month when strike began	Maximum* numbers involved	Localities affected	Maximum* duration in calendar days
1945 July .	4,500	Glasgow	4
	1,500	Glasgow	1
	1,090	Swansea	15
	1,200	Cardiff	23
September	50,000	Liverpool, Birkenhead, London, Glasgow, Hull, and other ports	40
1946 February .	2,900	London	1
May .	2,160	London	3
July .	1,500	Southampton	4
1947 February .	1,920	London	2
March .	3,450	Glasgow	40
April .	10,780	London, Glasgow	9
1948 February .	475	London	5
April .	5,630	London	1
June† .	14,500	London	15
	13,200	London, Merseyside	11
October .	430	Glasgow	1
	2,000	Belfast	4
1949 February .	410	London	3
	1,740	London	1
	350	Middlesbrough	38
April‡ .	16,700	London	3
May§ .	12,250	Avonmouth, Bristol, Portishead, Liverpool	29
	15,650	London	30
July .	800	Belfast	3
1950 April .	14,440	London	10
May .	1,030	London	35

Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette.

Strikes extended sympathetically or otherwise are linked to the original strikes by brackets.

* I.e. not all the workers were necessarily on strike for the whole of the period specified.

† The "zinc oxide" strike—the immediate issue being rates for loading zinc oxide.

‡ The "ineffectives" strike—originating in the dismissal of 33 men considered physically incapable of dock work.

§ The "Canadian seamen" strike.

THE INTERPRETER'S HOUSE

By LIONEL CURTIS

A MAN engaged on political research should keep himself free to follow the course of his studies. For this reason I have never belonged to any political party. After more than forty years of such work I have come to the conclusion that all our attempts to recover from two devastating wars or to effect the social reforms we need can lead to no lasting result until the fear of a third world war is ended once for all. It is that fear which paralyses efforts at recovery. War, should it break out, will lay civilization in ruins, and in this atomic age might put an end to human existence.

From this it follows that the first duty of any government is to find out how to remove the danger of war once and for all. With this object in view they must look for cases in which measures taken in time have averted war, and must see what the nature of those measures has been. They must also examine the cases in which wars have broken out because no measures were taken in time, or because the measures taken were not based on realities.

In 1789 a civil war between the American states was averted by the constitution drafted at Philadelphia under the leadership of Washington. In 1848 the Swiss Cantons ended five hundred years of civil war by discarding their confederate system and adopting the federal principle embodied in the Constitution of the U.S.A. In 1910, wars between Boers and British in South Africa were ended by uniting the four colonies in one South African union, an achievement rendered possible by the superb leadership of General Botha and Dr. Jameson. The peace established in these three countries led to a prosperity they had never known so long as they lived in fear of war.

Let us now turn to some cases in which measures to prevent war were either not taken in time; or were not based on realities. In the famous words of Voltaire, "The Holy Roman Empire was neither Holy, Roman, nor an Empire". In theory the nations of Western Europe were subject to one Emperor. In fact these nations were ruled by Princes who claimed to be sovereigns entitled to obey the Emperor or not as they chose. The result was continuous war, in which the stronger states conquered the weaker, so that after the Middle Ages Europe was parcelled out

into sovereign nations governed by independent rulers. Between them was a state of anarchy which led to constant wars. Napoleon attempted to end these wars by conquering Europe and establishing himself as the Emperor who commanded all the forces of all Europe. His attempt was defeated by British sea power, by the strength of Russia, and by the nationalism which Napoleon's autocracy provoked.

When this first great war was closed in 1815 by the Treaty of Vienna, Europe reverted to a system of national sovereignties. From the wars which resulted Germany emerged as the dominant power of Europe. But the German Emperors found that so long as the British fleet controlled the oceans they could not send their armies across the sea. The result was that there was no second world war till 1914, when Germans thought that the internal combustion engine had changed the situation.

Thus from 1815 till 1914 world war was prevented by British sea power, which in 1918 defeated the German attempt to conquer the world, with the aid of the free nations, including the U.S.A. The fact remains that the British Commonwealth, which had prevented world wars for ninety-nine years, in 1914 failed to avert a war which quickly involved almost all the free nations, at the cost of millions of lives and widespread destruction of material resources.

In 1919 provision was made for preventing another war by a covenant which purported to unite them in a League of Nations. It failed. Another and more destructive war overtook them in 1939, because the sovereign governments in the League were unable to agree in time on measures to prevent war.

Once more, in 1945, the second world war was won by the sea power of the free nations, by the vast armies of Russia, and the blunders of Hitler. When victory was in sight the Allied governments met at San Francisco and drafted a charter which affirmed in terms their inviolable sovereignty and created the United Nations Organization. In 1951 we are now living in fear of another world war, this time with our ally Russia, a founder member of U.N.O., which has given one more example of chartered impotence.

The essential defect of confederation is that no constitution will enable a number of governments to agree on measures to prevent war, so long as they retain their sovereignty. Field-Marshal Montgomery found this, and it is not rash to prophesy that General Eisenhower will find it in turn. To prevent war

a Commander-in-Chief must be responsible to one government which can give him the decisions he needs in time.

As I wrote these words on the 6th May I paused to read *The Sunday Times* and found a letter headed *Atlantic Union* by Frederick L. Schuman (Woodrow Wilson, Professor of Government, Williams College), Massachusetts, U.S.A., in which he describes himself as an American "innocent abroad" come to study the various movements and policies looking toward World Government or Western Union. In the course of this letter he says: "A North Atlantic Army, Navy and Airforce cannot be effectively controlled by a dozen civil governments, but only by one. Common policies, moreover, presuppose common agencies of policy-making, different in kind from mere machinery of diplomatic consultation."

I then turned to *The Observer* to find that its leading article opened with the words: "The general aim of Western policy is being lost in a mixture of diplomatic tedium and Allied altercation."

It is time to consider why we now live in mortal fear of another war. Some light on this question is thrown by an article on the Council of Europe in the current number of *The Political Quarterly*, April-June, 1951, by Anthony Crosland, M.P., who was teaching economics at Oxford until he was elected to Parliament as a Labour member. In this article he says "the most important matters being discussed at Strasbourg are already being acted on elsewhere. Either at O.E.E.C. or at N.A.T.O., in E.P.U. or General Eisenhower's H.Q. the work of economic or military co-ordination is actually going on." He goes on to say that "The last war and the Atlantic Treaty Organization show that a quite sufficient degree of co-ordination and effectiveness can be achieved by full sovereign states." Such a statement is directly opposite to the fact. While states are fighting for their very existence they can co-operate enough to survive, though always at the cost of prolonged and dangerous extension of the struggle. But when the war is won and their governments no longer face the imminent danger of destruction, they fall apart and are even in danger, as we now are, of going to war with each other. This is why parties in war are able to combine to form a national government. The moment that the danger is over the national government falls apart as we saw in 1945.

This article makes it clear that the present government is opposed to an Atlantic Union in any form which would suffice

to end the fear of war. "The British attitude to a European government will (quite apart from other arguments) remain one of hostility until and unless there is clear proof that such a government would have organic and contractual links with America, Canada and the Commonwealth. Of this there is no sign."

Mr. Crosland cannot have listened to the debate of the 28th July, 1950, in the House of Commons on the motion moved by a member of his own party, Mr. Osborne. The motion was supported by several Conservatives, one, Mr. Tilney, another, Mr. Leather, a Canadian, who said: "I want to make one quotation. . . . It was made in the American Senate on the 29th of last month, when Senator Kefauver reported to the President what had happened on the same day in the Canadian Senate, showing that the administration has undergone a complete revolution of opinion which has not even been mentioned here. The senator said:

"Mr. President, I have just received news from Canada which I hope will be a guide for all the free peoples of the world in the present critical situation. Particularly I hope that the Senate of the United States will give pause to consider this development. Just a few minutes ago the Canadian Senate took action which I venture to predict will dwarf in history the aggression of the Communist puppets in Korea. The Canadian Senate, with only one lone dissenting voice, adopted a resolution calling for an exploratory federal convention to investigate the great benefits of Atlantic federation. The resolution was introduced by Senator Euler, and support came from Senator Robertson, the Senate leader for the Canadian government."

Mr. Leather went on to say that "already some forty American senators have put their signatures to the same resolution". (This number is over a third of the Senators, enough to prevent the rejection by the Senate of the resolution.)

If anyone should ask why the nations which won the second world war in 1945 are still, in 1951, living in dread of a third, a dread which is paralysing economic reform, and keeping the whole world in suffering and want, which has led to a war in Korea, that has cost thousands of lives and will cost thousands more, he will find the answer in the article I have quoted. Rulers who share the indifference and ignorance of a writer like this are answerable for the death of thousands of our finest young men in the British and American commonwealth. If, through their indifference the cold war is left to develop into a shooting war, they will also be responsible for the death of millions, enough to end our civilization.

This extract from Hansard will enable readers to gauge the value of the statement made by Mr. Crosland that the present British Government will take no part in creating a government for Western Europe, without proof that such a government would have organic and contractual links with America, Canada and the Commonwealth, "of which there is no sign".

Never in history have statesmen had such an opportunity as they now have of ending war once for all, and conferring on mankind the happiness and welfare which unbreakable peace would bring. As Americans found in 1789 and South Africans in 1910, there are no difficulties which cannot be surmounted by leaders with initiative. If one such leader did what Washington did in 1789 or Botha and Jameson did in 1910, a wave of enthusiasm would sweep through the whole British and American commonwealths, as well as through Western Europe. It is strange but true that as in America and South Africa, so now, the men who fought have laboured to establish a lasting peace, while politicians were proclaiming that nothing must be done to impair the national sovereignty which to them is the ark of the covenant. From 1942 to 1945 3,000 men in uniform from all the United Nations were using their leave to study in groups at Oxford what steps were needed to end war once for all. The conclusions reached by these groups were put into print by the Oxford University Press in 1945. More work has been done on them since by groups in the British dominions and the United States. The policy resulting from all these studies has now been reduced to extreme simplicity by Professor Hanbury. The short constitution he has drafted for an international commonwealth shows how easy it would be to create one, if a leader were found to follow the initiative taken by the Canadian Senate. The world will remember the statesman who gives that lead with the kind of gratitude and devotion which the people of America bestow on Washington.

When we are losing our sense of values a visit to the house of the Interpreter will help us to recover it. The Interpreter takes the pilgrims "into a room where was a man that could look no way but downwards, with a muck rake in his hand. There stood, also, one over his head with a celestial crown in his hand, and preferred him that crown for his muck rake; but the man did neither look up nor regard, but raked to himself the straws, the small sticks, and the dust of the floor."

BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT FRENCH BOOKS

EACH generation writes its own history. Six French historians, all specialists in their respective fields, have joined together to produce a *Histoire de la France pour tous les Français* in two volumes (Hachette). As in all collective works of this nature, the contributions are uneven. Outstanding is M. Doucet's treatment of the sixteenth century, from 1492 to 1610. Wars, economic and social movements, religious and political ideas are all blended together in a perfect canvas. M. Georges Lefebvre deals in the second volume with France before the Revolution until the fall of Napoleon. It is a condensed, masterly account of a great period, a convenient summary of his previous books. M. Charles H. Pouthas continues the story to 1874. Though this essay adequately accentuates the decisive periods of French historic development during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, it would seem that the author attempted too much: the accumulation of names, for example in the fields of ideas, art, and literature, is occasionally too overwhelming; a more selective treatment might have enabled the reader to learn more about the depth and the background of those who made and lived the historic process. M. Baumont's contribution, covering the period from 1878 to the Fourth Republic, is certainly the weakest. He writes "political" history in the old-fashioned sense without entering into the economic and social complexities of the period under discussion. It is regrettable that none of the authors of this symposium gives any bibliographical references. It might have been helpful to the student to have a few essential references for further reading, particularly as all contributors are experts in their fields.

M. Maxime Leroy has now published the second volume of his impressive *Histoire des Idées sociales en France: De Babeuf à Tocqueville* (Gallimard). I had already occasion in one of my previous surveys of drawing attention to the preceding volume which interpreted the history of French social ideas from Montesquieu to Babeuf. The present volume is not less suggestive. In his Preface, M. Leroy gives a most illuminating account of his method. It is sceptical and empirical, like that of his great master, Sainte-Beuve. "Les humains," M. Leroy writes, "oscillent entre le scepticisme ou l'indifférence et le fanatisme; le fanatisme, qui de religieux est devenu idéologique à la fin du XVIII^e siècle. Pour prévenir l'un et l'autre, surtout le fanatisme idéologique qui, né de la philosophie des lumières, pendant la Révolution, a pris de nos jours des formes atroces, on voudrait proposer, sans se faire trop d'illusion pourtant proposer très modestement deux ou trois leçons dictées, semble-t-il par l'histoire. . . ." Which are the lessons M. Leroy suggests? "Le mot vérité ne convient pas aux conceptions politiques et sociales. . . . Aucune de ces doctrines n'a jamais pu être l'objet d'une démonstration que l'on soit en droit légitimement de déclarer scientifique. . . ." Another suggestion presents itself to the student of political and social ideas: "à distance, on voit que les doctrines dans un même temps et de temps en temps se complètent, proches les unes des autres jusque dans leurs plus excessives négations. Toutes ont de tels liens; ces liens, les contemporains les nient." M. Leroy is seeking the veiled and

BOOK REVIEWS

mysterious unity of the historic process. This is, I believe, the moral aim of his great work: "Certes," we read, "le jour où l'on enseignera (il ne semble pas que ce jour soit prochain) qu'il n'y a pas de certitude dans l'ordre politique et social, partout que chacun a le droit d'errer sans mériter le mépris; qu'il n'y a que des à peu près dans cet ordre, que les systèmes et les hommes sont toujours plus voisins qu'ils n'en veulent convenir, alors on pourra espérer que deviendront réalisables de grands progrès enfin scientifiques dans l'art de gouverner et d'administrer; partant que pourra bénéficier de sérieuses améliorations la misérable condition des hommes, qui sont séparés par tant de pauvres erreurs d'appréciation sans véritable portée, et aussi par tant de mensonges cyniquement conscients." One must read M. Leroy's volume in the light of these fine observations. Under his pen the history of political and social ideas becomes alive; we participate in a great and an apparently unending discussion.

I do not agree with all his valuations; thus, for instance, I believe he regards Tocqueville too much as a liberal of the pre-1848 type which he was not. Had he paid more attention to the third volume of the *Democracy in America*, he might have realized that Tocqueville was not a party man. Like his great contemporaries—Comte and Marx—he was essentially a political sociologist who analysed the socio-historical process as a whole. Yet there can be no doubt that M. Leroy's two books are a most original and valuable contribution towards a full analysis of modern French political ideas. We are looking forward to reading the final volume of his work.

Until this volume is available, the student is advised to consult M. J.-B. Duroselle's work on *Les Débuts du Catholicisme social en France* (1822-1870); Presses Universitaires, published in the fourth series of a new *Bibliothèque de la Science Politique*. M. Duroselle's work is the first really exhaustive analysis of French social Catholicism which is unfortunately too little known in this country, at least outside the British Catholic camp. The volume is not a rehash of previous studies; it is a penetrating interpretation of the original sources, for which all students of politics must be most grateful. Richly documented bibliographies will replace for the reader whole libraries.

Another volume, also published in the *Bibliothèque de la Science Politique*, should be mentioned: *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Science Politique de son temps*, by Robert Derathé. Since Vaughan's *Political Writings of Rousseau*, no study of Rousseau has been more important. Rousseau's political doctrine is set within the framework of his predecessors and his contemporaries. One might wish similar studies would be made on Bodin or Montesquieu, not to mention Hobbes and others. Here, too, the bibliographical material, attached to the volume, is most remarkable for its width and learning.

The French classics in political science are not only reinterpreted in France, they are also in process of being re-edited. M. Caillois is responsible for a new edition of Montesquieu's works of which Volume I has appeared in Gallimard's *Bibliothèque de la Pléiade*. The volume, brilliantly introduced by M. Caillois, contains the full text of Montesquieu's *Cabiers*, which are still waiting for an English translator. Every interested reader can now study the *Esprit des Lois in statu nascendi*. For thirty years Montesquieu observed his contemporary world in the light of his profound and extensive historical studies. He observed his contemporaries not only in France; his travels led him to Italy, Hungary, Germany, Holland, and England, where he stayed for nearly two years. The raw materials out of which he formed

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

his great books are now before us. It is a fascinating experience to read Montesquieu's notes on England and things English and compare these with the well-known chapters of the *Esprit des Lois*. M. Caillois's introduction is concise and extremely suggestive. He rightly regards Montesquieu as a pioneer and classic in political sociology. A short bibliography, which takes full account of British and American research on Montesquieu, and adequate notes make the volume a first-rate textbook.

I conclude with a remarkable new study on Bakunin, published by Marcel Rivière: Benoit-P. Hepner: *Bakounine et le Panslavisme révolutionnaire*. This work shows how French, German, and Russian political and social ideas are intimately linked together in affirmation and negation. The personality of Bakunin is the focal point of M. Hepner's four studies. There is a particularly revealing essay on the reception of Hegel's dialectics in Russia and on the revolt against it, which throws light on Lenin's relation to Marx's Hegelianism. M. Hepner has discovered an astonishing passage of Kireivski's which deserves to be noted here: "*L'Italie, l'Espagne, l'Allemagne (au temps de la Réforme) et la France ont tour à tour dirigé la marche de la civilisation européenne; l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne sont aujourd'hui [these lines were written in 1830] au sommet de la civilisation, mais leur influence ne peut plus vivifier le corps de l'humanité, car leur vie intérieure a déjà achevé le cycle de son évolution, elle a vieilli et a reçu le caractère de maturité unilatérale qui fait que leur civilisation ne convient qu'à elles seules. Voilà pourquoi l'Europe offre de nos jours le spectacle d'un engourdissement. Dans tout l'humanité civilisée deux peuples seulement ne partagent point cet engourdissement général, deux peuples jeunes et frais, respirant l'espérance: ce sont les Etats-Unis et la Russie.*" It was five years later when Tocqueville predicted that in a hundred years from then two countries were to have in their hands the fates of half the world: The United States of America and Russia.

J. P. MAYER.

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS. By R. H. SOLTAN. (Longmans. 16s.)

WHAT qualities should a book called *An Introduction to Politics* possess? It should be readable, lucid, easily understood and yet provocative of thought, reasonably comprehensive (leaving out nothing of primary importance) and yet not too detailed; it should be carefully put together, so that the student understands how one part of the subject is related to the others; and it should awaken curiosity rather than satisfy it. Professor Soltan's book possesses most of these qualities, but not all.

It is a well-written book, easy to read, full of information and good ideas, and embellished with a variety of well-chosen quotations. The student, when he has read it, will have learned a great deal and have learned it agreeably. But I am not sure that he will be asking himself the most profitable questions; and he may even be tempted to believe that he knows the answers when he doesn't.

Professor Soltan's book may appear to be even in quality because all its chapters are pleasantly written, informative, and sensible. And yet some of them are really much better than others. He is at his best when he is dis-

BOOK REVIEWS

cussing political institutions, their present condition and their origins. He does not go into too much detail, he is lucid and fair, and he allows himself to be guided by good authorities. He really does what a man writing an introduction to politics should do: he warns his readers against many of the simpler fallacies, he gives them the gist of some of the most important authoritative opinions, and he puts them in the way of discovering by further study more than he has time to tell them. Very rightly, he avoids difficulties that he hasn't time to deal with, and yet does not put into his readers' minds the sort of ideas that will mislead them when they come to face those difficulties. His accounts of historical origins, though sometimes too brief to be enlightening, are mostly well done. But his anecdotes are not always accurate: what Marshal Bazaine tried to excuse when he was court-martialled was not the surrender at Sedan but the capitulation at Metz (see p. 106).

In matters of theory Professor Soltan is a less certain guide. For instance, he says (on p. 43) that "society remains primary in origin and importance and the state is its creation and agent and therefore its subordinate". What exactly is this society whose agent the state is? There are many societies and associations within the state, and there are others that transcend the frontiers of states. But to what society other than the state do all the members of the state belong? Did the people of England or of France constitute a society before the English or French state was born, and did they then create the state to be their agent? It is, no doubt, worth while insisting that there are many societies other than the state, some of which are older than the state, and that governments have obligations to them. We can also speak of governments responsible to the people; we can even say that every government, however tyrannical, is to some extent responsible to the governed; but we add nothing to our understanding of politics by saying that the state is an agent of society. I do not say that Professor Soltan ought to have gone more particularly into what he meant by "society" and "agency". There are difficulties best not raised in an *Introduction to Politics*. But he ought, I think, not to have said what is misleading, what does not avoid difficulties but rather creates them.

Again, Professor Soltan says, on the authority of a philosopher of mathematics, Mr. Bertrand Russell, that power is "the fundamental concept in social science", and that it is "to social science what energy is to physics". I do not know what energy is to physics; but I can see nothing gained by calling power the fundamental concept of social science. The statement has a fine air of realism about it; it thrusts aside all the "nonsense" of the idealists about the primacy of the will. And yet the truth is that power, the sort of power that interests the student of politics, presupposes habits of obedience. Obedience is not more the effect of power than power is the effect of obedience. Are we able to say what the fundamental concept of politics is? And need there be just one?

I could mention other faults (or what seem to me to be such), but I shall not do so; and my motive is not charity but justice. Professor Soltan has written a sensible, informative and pleasant book; and these are qualities which much more than compensate for certain weaknesses in matters of theory.

JOHN PLAMENATZ.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

- WEALTH OF COLONIES. By W. K. HANCOCK. (*Cambridge University Press*. 81 pp. 7s. 6d.)
 MODERN COLONIZATION. By R. J. HARRISON CHURCH. (*Hutchinson's University Library*. 161 pp. 7s. 6d.)
 PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION. (*University of Bristol*. 252 pp. 30s.)
 MEN AGAINST THE DESERT. By RITCHIE CALDER. (*Allen and Unwin*. 186 pp. 12s. 6d.)
 THE BRITISH GROUP. By C. E. KEY. (*Harrop*. 256 pp. 12s. 6d.)

SINCE the war a great deal of publicity has been given to the need for development in the under-developed regions of the world. In Britain the Colonial Development and Welfare schemes, the Colonial Development Corporation, the Overseas Food Corporation, and the Colombo Plan for the development of South East Asia has each had its share of attention from the politicians and the Press and, in the United States, President Truman's "Fourth Point" appeal for a "bold new programme" of aid to backward territories has been followed up with a spate of publicity both official and unofficial, to which has been added publicity about the "expanded programme of technical aid" sponsored by the United Nations. On the whole the effect of all this has been to encourage an over-optimistic view of the possibilities. The vastness of the technical problems, the scarcity of skilled personnel, the social barriers to new techniques, the shortages of capital goods, and many other difficulties which will inevitably prevent spectacular results have tended to be pushed into the background.

Professor Hancock approaches these problems as an historian. The central theme of his two lectures is the relation between the free play of economic forces and deliberate planning by the state in the promotion of development and welfare in the British Colonies. The first is devoted to historical analysis starting from an examination of Lenin's theory of imperialism which is found to be inconsistent with the facts, and passing on to an examination of the experience of Tasmania, West Africa, Burma, and Japan, in their relations with advanced nations. The conclusion reached from these historical examples is that, "there are some teachings of old-fashioned economics which the apostles of colonial development and welfare will ignore at their peril: a society which cannot by its own savings finance the progress it desires must strive to make itself credit-worthy and is most likely to succeed if it follows market opportunity along the path of comparative costs". It must seek profitable export industries and offer prospects of gain to domestic and foreign enterprises. State action is also needed, however, to provide the groundwork of the economy, to stabilise the level of economic activity, and to mitigate class inequalities, for in the dependent territories money income and public revenue fluctuate violently with the prices of a few exports, the social fabric is vulnerable to individualistic aggressions, and public services, taken for granted in developed countries, are still lacking.

The second lecture deals with the policies of to-day. Trade policy since the war—exchange control, bulk purchase, and public marketing arrangements—is reviewed and we are warned of the danger that, with the possible

BOOK REVIEWS

expansion of German and Japanese competition in colonial markets, a British government might be tempted to adopt a policy of imperial preference which would restrict earning power and living standards in the colonies. Turning to colonial development, Professor Hancock estimates that the total British investment in the period 1945-55 is unlikely to be more than £1 per head per annum for the population of the whole colonial empire. The colonies have not received the large influx of capital "which the orators have encouraged them to expect". He discusses the main questions of colonial economic strategy, the rival claims of primary and secondary industry, of export production and home food supply, and the relative merits of peasant and plantation agriculture. The real need is to find the particular combination of methods which suits the circumstances of a particular territory, but peasant participation is essential and should be made an immediate object of policy. Super-scale plantation enterprises requiring large capital investment are out of tune with the basic requirements of British economy.

In *Modern Colonisation* Dr. Church covers much of the same ground from a geographical point of view. He argues that "the fullest possible knowledge of the physical environment and of human and economic conditions illustrated by maps must plainly precede all economic and social advance", and supports this argument with a detailed analysis of such problems as soil erosion and fertility, the distribution and mobility of population, the influence of markets and transport, the place of industrialisation, and the difficulties that arise throughout the tropical dependencies from artificial political boundaries. Throughout the book, he emphasises the inadequacy of the available geographical information. "The study of land forms is almost untouched, whilst the need to survey regions of soil degradation and erosion, classify soil fertility and land use is obvious. Forest surveys are needed to ensure a proper balance between arable and forest land. Provision of adequate water supplies and the development of mineral production require constant geological surveys." Greater information is needed also on climatic conditions in tropical colonies both for increasing air safety and for agricultural planning. There is little accurate information on these subjects especially in map form. Maps are also needed of malaria and tsetse infested areas, on the distribution of diseases, on population density, population movements and labour routes, on the siting and pattern of settlements. For the production of these kinds of maps and material Dr. Church recommends the appointment of a geographical adviser to the Colonial Office. He points out that in the use made of the geographical approach in the colonial field Britain is still behind the other metropolitan powers.

Dr. Church's whole approach to colonial problems underlines the need for understanding and co-operation between colonial powers, especially in Africa. Since the war a great deal of co-operation has been achieved at the technical level, but little has been done at the administrative and political levels. Problems such as transport, health, agricultural improvement, and education have been the subjects of international discussion and through O.E.E.C. there has been some collaboration in colonial development. On the Caribbean Commission and the Commission for the Southern Pacific the colonial powers have been brought together to tackle some of the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

problems they have in common. In areas where political frontiers cut across ethnical boundaries there is a danger that the progress of the colonial peoples will be retarded by the divergencies in administrative systems and policies. If this is to be avoided the metropolitan powers must overcome their reluctance to collaborate in the political field. *Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration* which brings together papers contributed to a Symposium, promoted by the Colston Research Society, by distinguished authorities from Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and America, gives an account of the various aims and methods of these colonial powers and the obstacles to political co-operation. The book contains valuable contributions from such eminent British authorities as Professor Margaret Read, Dr. Lucy Mair, Professor Simey, and Mr. E. W. Evans.

Many of the under-developed territories have hot dry deserts, which might, in the future, contribute to the maintenance of an expanding population. *Men Against the Desert* is a popular account of the efforts of scientists to reclaim the arid wastes in North Africa and the Middle East, as seen by the author, in a tour sponsored by U.N.E.S.C.O. It should never be forgotten that the purpose of development plans and colonial policies is to promote the welfare of human beings. Mr. Ritchie Calder makes vivid the experience of people working together to raise their living standards.

The British Group is not, as its publishers suggest, a book for students, but it should prove useful as an introduction to the study of the Commonwealth. It contains a brief account of the history, geography, and peoples of each of the Commonwealth nations and of the dependent territories. The style is interesting and the book is well illustrated with maps and photographs.

E. G. FARMER.

FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER. By PAUL BLANSHARD. (*Secker and Warburg*. 318 pp. 16s.)

ROMAN CATHOLICISM. By THOMAS CORBISHLEY, S.J. (*Hutchinson*. 141 pp. 7s. 6d.)

It is an illuminating and amusing experience to read these two books consecutively. It is illuminating for any one who is not a Catholic, because he will almost certainly learn a great deal about the Catholic Church, its dogmas and practice, of which he had no knowledge and which will surprise him. It is amusing, because, unless one had had the experience, one could scarcely have believed that two honest men ("so are they all, all honourable men") could have written two such contradictory accounts of the same human institution.

Mr. Blanshard is an American, and his book is mainly concerned with the attitude of the Roman hierarchy in the United States to politics in the widest sense, e.g. to freedom, education, the family, culture, science, and to American institutions generally. It should be said at once that this does not invalidate its importance and interest for non-Americans. The facts are fascinating and as relevant in Britain as in the U.S.A. Everyone who values liberty and tolerance should read the book. Mr. Blanshard is extremely critical of the Roman Church as a political machine and his object is to draw attention to the dangerous way in which it uses its great political

BOOK REVIEWS

power against what the liberal considers the elements of a free, tolerant, and intelligent society. The power of the Church in America is due to the large number of Roman Catholics. It is said to number 26,000,000 members. This is, of course, a minority of the population, but the priests have a tremendous hold over the laity, and the hierarchy in Rome enforces political action upon individuals in America by religious sanctions much in the way in which the Soviet rulers in Moscow determine the political beliefs and actions of American or British communists. The result is that the priests are able to organize their flock politically as a tremendously effective "pressure group".

The way in which the priests use this weapon in American society and politics is revealed by Mr. Blanshard in great detail. It is a sinister picture, and he is quite candid in acknowledging his antipathy to the methods and objects of the Roman Catholic political machine. But he is scrupulously fair, and practically every important statement about Catholic dogma or practice is fully documented and the evidence which he gives to the reader is almost invariably from Catholic sources. Where this is not the case, he states the fact clearly and gives the reasons for his opinion. I have never read a polemical book which was fairer, better documented, and more convincing than Mr. Blanshard's.

The difficulty confronting the Church and its hierarchy is that it insists that Roman Catholics shall accept as eternally true the beliefs which Europeans had 1,000 years ago about society, politics, morals, and science, and that they shall act in accordance with those beliefs in the America of the twentieth century. This is in many respects quite impossible unless somehow or other the Americans who are not Roman Catholics can be compelled or induced to believe and act in the same way. The hierarchy is therefore continually having to use the machine against freedom of thought and speech, against state schools, divorce, birth control, and humane medical treatment where it conflicts with mediæval metaphysical dogmas. Anyone who thinks this statement too strong should read in Mr. Blanshard's book the directions, quoted by him, which are given to Roman Catholic doctors and nurses—in particular, the directions given to nurses for baptizing embryos in cases of miscarriage. He should also study the methods employed by the Catholic political machine for attaining its social objects. For instance, a San Francisco newspaper refused the request of the Roman Catholic Archbishop that the paper should suppress the fact that a priest had been arrested and fined for drunken driving with a woman companion. The Archbishop then directed his clergy to tell the parishioners of the "antagonistic and bigoted" attitude of the paper, and Catholic advertising was temporarily withdrawn from it. When portions of Mr. Blanshard's book appeared in the *American Nation*, the hierarchy attacked the paper, warned newsagents not to handle it, and got it banned from libraries in localities where Catholics controlled the school boards. Ten large publishers refused the book, and several of them admitted that the rejection was due to fear of Catholic reprisals. Only seven daily newspapers ventured to review it. Yet 120,000 copies of the book have been sold.

Father Corbishley, who is a Jesuit, sets out to explain to non-Catholics the nature and function of the Catholic Church. With considerable skill he contrives to present a picture which is almost the exact opposite of Mr.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Blanshard's. He succeeds in doing this mainly by not mentioning any of the facts recorded by Mr. Blanshard. The result is an amusing study in the ecclesiastical art of skating on very thin ice.

LEONARD WOOLF.

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY. *Selected and edited by JANE DEGRAS.* Volume I, 1917-1924. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press. 501 pp. 42s.)

BULLETINS 1-4 ON SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, University of Birmingham, May, 1949-September, 1950.

IN its position as part of the power-complex of Europe the weak Russian Republic, struggling for survival, at the beginning of the period covered by these *Soviet Documents*, seems as remote from the U.S.S.R. of to-day as from the imperial Russia of Alexander I, whose "steam-roller" army of a million men so much daunted post-Napoleonic Europe.

This Russia is negotiating from extreme weakness for peace with Germany. Albeit, at the same moment it is appropriating money for the international revolutionary movement. It is proposing an armistice on all fronts to the Allied powers, suggesting support for this move to the neutral states, appealing similarly to "the toiling, oppressed, and exhausted peoples of Europe". It is beset on all sides. Protests issue from it, mainly ineffectual, against British action at Archangel, German-Ukrainian invasion of the Crimea, Japanese landings at Vladivostok, Rumanian incorporation of Bessarabia, French support for Czech military action in the heart of its territory, German-Turkish advances on Baku. This Russia appears naturally more concerned with its own survival, at first militarily against foreign intervention and against counter-revolution with external aid, then economically from the effects of the internal collapse and the cutting off of trade, than with its measures for promoting revolution elsewhere. It is on the defensive. Indeed, for the first four or five years it is striving for political recognition, seeking at least *de facto* acknowledgment as an effective government, protesting against its exclusion from international conferences. Its diplomatic behaviour conforms more than now with the conventions, even when accompanied, as it frequently is, by propaganda. There is much cogency in its arguments, for, if its power-position is weak its legal case is strong. This position continues so long as it refrains from promoting subversive activity within the territories of the governments whose recognition it seeks. And since there is always present in its doctrine that strand of theory which predicts the collapse of capitalism of its own internal decay, there is always a basis for non-intervention and for the development of friendly relations with bourgeois states.

The twin policy, however, of revolutionary propaganda springs naturally from the conspiratorial past of Russia's new masters, and belongs equally to the theory on which the new state is built. But there is certainly every attempt to carry on at the same time the policy of securing Russia's position as a state, and much to suggest that propaganda is subordinated, if not always effectively, to this purpose. Nor is it unfair to regard these propagandist activities as the counterpart to Allied intervention and general

CHATTO

ASIA AND THE WEST

Maurice Zinkin

The author, an economist now working in India, has made a study of the breakdown of the peasant economy of Asia, of the failure of Independence to bring automatic prosperity, and of Communism which disillusionment engenders. That his book is published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific relations is an earnest of its value. *Large Cr. 8vo. 15s.*

THE INHUMAN LAND

Joseph Czapski

In 1939 Joseph Czapski, a Polish artist, left Paris for his threatened country; in a few weeks he was in a Russian prison camp. With the German invasion the Poles became potential allies and he found himself helping to organize a Polish army in Russia. In this situation he was ideally situated to study the Russian regime, his account of which is not only detached and measured but also of urgent topical importance today. With an Introduction by Edward Crankshaw. *Ill. Large Cr. 8vo. 16s.* Recommended by the Book Society.

A GUIDE TO THE PREHISTORIC AND ROMAN MONUMENTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Jacquetta Hawkes

Many of the enthusiastic reviews of *Prehistoric Britain* commented on the brief 'archæological guide' in it, and said how valuable an extended and detailed version would prove. The author presents her information so that the layman can find the most interesting sites wherever he may be, and will understand the importance of what he sees when he gets there. To aid him there is a Glossary, a Chronological table, and an index to sites which includes their National Grid references. In addition there are maps and illustrations. *Large Cr. 8vo. 18s.*

& WINDUS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Allied hostility to the new régime, to the Allied refusal to admit it at first to European councils and the evident hope that it may collapse. Clearly these activities were encouraged by such hostility and the path of the Comintern made easier by the evidence of foreign enmity thus supplied.

Whether there would have been any different attitude on the part of revolutionary Russia had this hostility to it been earlier replaced by friendly reception into the comity of nations, is not simply a profitless speculation, since the answer to it may supply guidance on the possibilities of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the west to-day. Certainly antagonism to the new Russia secured no advantages to anyone. Had this policy—if it can be called a policy and not an emotional and self-interested reaction—been sooner and more completely modified by conciliatory and more far-sighted influences nothing would have been lost. Much might have been gained had the influences represented by Lloyd George and the Labour Party been more powerful than those represented by Churchill and Clemenceau. That this is so of the immediate consequences is pretty clear; it may be true of the more distant ones. At the time of the peace conference Lenin expressed willingness to recognize responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire, provided that the economic blockade was raised and Russian gold seized by the Germans put into the balance. The time limit for the offer was allowed to expire and the debt question to become a continuing source of later antagonism, until it gradually faded out of the picture, the western countries having gained nothing from their efforts. It took 15 years for Russia to be admitted to the League of Nations. Had it been invited at the start, as was in fact demanded by the Labour Party—or even to Paris at the time of the peace conference, as for a moment Lloyd George contemplated—would anything have been lost, and might not much have been gained?

When in January, 1922, Russia was accorded the recognition of invitation to the Genoa Conference, it is instructive to read Chicherin's report to the Central Executive Committee of Soviet Russia recommending acceptance. "On the banks of the Thames", he said, "the entire political wisdom of the capitalist world is concentrated. The statesmen there can see far and have a subtle instinct for distinguishing the rise of new historical forces. To come to an agreement with a new historical force in order to make it harmless—that is the triumph of traditional English statesmanship, reprobated at the present time by Prime Minister Lloyd George, with his flexibility, his sensitiveness to all the political and social forces by which he is surrounded, with his capacity for compromise. . . . Lloyd George's constant refrain was that trade with the Bolsheviks was the best way of making them harmless and of lessening the danger which they represented. Lloyd George's plan and our prognosis of historical development are diametrically opposed, but our practical policy coincides in the desire to restore completely peaceful relations and to collaborate in economic matters. Of course we interpret this collaboration differently, but both of us equally want to pull down the barriers hindering this collaboration."

If it be necessary to seek such collaboration now, which few contest, it must have been right to seek it for the last thirty years. For there is nothing in these documents to suggest that the possibility or the desirability of collaboration was less then, or that the attitude of Moscow has changed

Duckworth Books

Psychoanalysis and Politics

R. E. MONEY-KYRLE

A new, pioneer work of applied psychology in the field of morals, ethics, politics and statecraft. At the close of World War Two the author joined the official group charged with selecting suitable Germans to return to Germany to positions of trust and responsibility. From this practical work on the distinction between the humanist and the authoritarian conscience, he interested himself further in the reasons why some people seek political power, and the manner in which those who do not can be induced to wield it for the good of all.

The argument is addressed to politicians, historians and the general public, as well as to professional psychologists. The author performs a valuable public service in laying bare to the light of day the various unconscious processes which influence our political desires and beliefs. *gs. net*

A HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT

By K. B. SMELLIE, Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics. New, revised edition 1950. *25s.*

SURVEY OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

By B. H. SUMNER. A cheap edition is now available of this standard work, "the safest guide to the meaning of contemporary events in Soviet Russia." (*Times*). Maps and 16 plates. *10s. 6d.*

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

By IVOR BROWN. New, revised edition (1949) of a famous exposition of the fundamentals of British and American political doctrine. *7s. 6d.*

THE SHIP OF STATE

By EDWARD JENKS. A concise exposition of the nature and limitations of the state, including a new chapter by Frances Boyd on U.N.O. *8s. 6d.*

MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY

By J. C. FLUGEL. A well-known psychoanalytical study, now available in cheap edition. *10s. 6d.*

GERALD DUCKWORTH & CO. LTD.

3 Henrietta Street, London, W.O.2

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

for the better. There has either been no change at all—and indeed, the most striking fact is this continuity of aims—or there has been a change in the opposite direction, i.e. an increase in suspicion, hostility, and pugnacity on the part of the Russians.

Looking back one is tempted by this first volume of the documents to say both that the western countries shew more realism to-day than then, and that Russia shews considerably less. Does not Molotov seem more suited to the era of Lord Curzon, and Chicherin to that of Morrison or Bevin? At any rate this well selected collection of documents furnishes some of the material helpful for answering that question.

But perhaps the only real change lies in the economic bases of power. Really useful light on these can be thrown by the kind of work being done in the University of Birmingham by its department of Russian studies with their Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development. We need so badly to escape from propaganda into such scientific appraisal, from whichever side the propagandist picture comes.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

THE BRITISH POLICE. By J. M. HART. (*Allen and Unwin*. 189 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THERE are respected authorities who say that the "right" of the police in this country to refrain from prosecuting offenders has become part of the constitution. If enough of our constitutional theorists go on saying so long enough, that is what it may well become—much of the constitution already being an anthology of rationalizations which, by winning more general acceptance than the law itself, have survived the stage of speciousness and forced the law into new forms.

Mrs. Hart has written a lively, informed, and impertinent book, in which one typically provocative theme is that "the police are popular because they are not too efficient". She means, I think (and it is generous of her), that they let large numbers of offenders off, rather than that they never discover who large numbers of the offenders are; and she clearly does not need to be told that thoroughly efficient police systems are to-day making life thoroughly miserable for people in many parts of the world. She has indeed little to say about police efficiency in detection, pursuit, and law enforcement, addressing herself mainly to questions of administration, control (central and local), recruitment, training, promotion, and public relations. But her book has already called down upon her the wrath of people to whom our police are indisputably wonderful; and she made sure of this by saying on her first page that "a certain historical sentimentality attributing almost magical powers to the unarmed British constable has blurred some accounts of the British police", and that we must not, in contrasting our police with "that of Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia", fail to criticize what we should. In this respect she has not failed; and because she worked for eleven years in the Home Office (five of them in the Police Department), and writes cogently, fearlessly, wittily, and well, her criticisms must attract respect.

Yet in one important matter her book does not fulfil the promise of its title. "At the outset", she says in Chapter I, "it is important to grasp that the service is constituted of three parties: police forces, police authorities,

—2—

FAMOUS LIVES

GEORGE WYNDHAM

(1863 – 1913)

A Study in Toryism—and of the great
days at the turn of the Century

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

With Portrait

18/- net

A LIFE IN REUTERS

SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.

This book, appearing in July, 1951 on the Centenary of Reuters, describes the spell which Reuters cast upon a young man, who, starting from scratch as an assistant-correspondent in South Africa, became in less than twenty years, at the age of thirty-seven, Head of the greatest international news system in the world.

Illustrated

25/- net

The Publishers are
HODDER & STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C.4

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and the central authority." There is so little evidence of the conventionally bureaucratic mind in what is, after all, a bureaucrat's account of the police, that her omission of the fourth party—the policeman himself—is the more surprising. Her nearest approaches to a consideration of the individual policeman are in her dissatisfaction with the present machinery for investigating complaints against policemen ("chief constables are sometimes too anxious to defend the reputation of the force and whitewash individual police officers"—p. 106), her belief that some chief constables, when selecting recruits, "prefer brawn to brain and distrust a man who has had a good education" (p. 152), and her opinion that the training given at the Home Office regional training schools is "so interesting that it encourages recruits to have too high an expectation of what they will have to do in the police" (p. 158). I believe that in all these matters she is right, or so nearly right as to give her book an importance greatly exceeding that of any comparable work published in this century. (There have been soberly factual accounts, sensational attacks, and inspired panegyrics, but of informed criticism there has been strangely little.) For the rest, however, the policeman to Mrs. Hart is an administrative pawn, his claim to our attention resting on the means employed for moving him about—on the fact that his duties are so often prescribed, for example, by direct communication from the Home Office to the Chief Constable without recourse to the local police authority (except that they get a copy of the communication).

It is to this book that students of local government should turn for an account of the much-misunderstood relationship between the Home Office and the local police force. "The police is not a local service", said an angry member of a local Watch Committee in 1946; "every force in the country is controlled from beginning to end by the Home Office. It is a local service in that we are permitted to pay half the cost of it." The half that they do not pay, the annual "Exchequer Grant", is at once the means by which the Home Secretary encourages them to do his bidding and the reason why the local electors (with an eye on the rates) eventually see to it that they do. Mrs. Hart discusses this machinery in a way that throws a new and revealing light upon it, amply justifying her view (it is one of her characteristic understatements) that the contacts between chief constables and Whitehall are "rather closer than the usual contacts between local government officers and the central department". There is some self-deception, even in Home Office circles, about the extent of local autonomy in this matter; the question whether we should fare better with one national police force than with 120 local ones (Mrs. Hart thinks we should not) becomes daily more academic. And it is here that Mrs. Hart, though her analysis of the system is otherwise as penetrating as one would expect from an observer with her independent mind and unusual experience, fails to carry conviction. She naturally finds "important differences between this country and a police state": but one of them, she says, is that a state police is "at the beck and call of the Executive Government". This is not so, she finds, "for five-sixths of the population of this country" (i.e. outside the Metropolitan area) "and could not be without a fundamental change in our system of police organization". That fundamental change, in fact, is taking place as part of the slow eclipse of local government in this country. Power in the modern state resides in treasuries.

RULERS OF MECCA

GERALD DE GAURY

This is the first full-length account of the Meccan rulership available in the English language. Aided by his great personal knowledge and extensive scholarship of its history Col. de Gaury provides a fascinating story for both student and layman.

Fully illustrated. 22s. 6d. net

EDUCATION & LEADERSHIP

ERIC JAMES, M.A.

The author of the highly successful work *An Essay on the Content of Education* now examines the problems of leadership in a democratic society, particularly in relation to the type of education required for potential leaders at all levels.

9s. 6d. net

N.B. Also available; a new edition of Prof. G. Sabine's famous work *A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY*.

30s. net

GEORGE G. HARRAP & CO. LTD

THE MAHDIYA

A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN
SUDAN, 1881-1899

A. B. THEOBALD

To-day, when Britain's relationship with the Middle East is in a state of change and development, it is particularly timely that a book should be published which tells how she came to be responsible for the administration of one of the largest countries in that area, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

21s. net

LONGMANS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

There is at present no other book to compare with this original and intelligent study of the present police system of Great Britain; I do not hesitate to describe it as brilliant. I am still not sure whether this is because of, or in spite of, its undertone of salty iconoclasm.

C. H. ROLPH.

THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS. By D. N. CHESTER, C.B.E. (*Institute of Public Administration*. 2nd Edition. 1951. 93 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THIS is a useful time-saving analysis already familiar to students, comprising a summary of the principal statutory provisions establishing those new public corporations which govern nationalised industries, with an additional section on some of the corporations established before 1939.

The analysis is primarily horizontal under the headings of Constitution, Area Boards and Executives, Advisory and Consumers' Councils, Ministerial Control, Accounts and Audit, Annual Reports and Labour Relations; the provisions of the Cable and Wireless Act, 1946, and the Iron and Steel Act, 1949, are, however, considered separately. There is a re-printed article by the author on the price policy indicated by the post-1945 statutes; a table of legislative dates, and a "select" but comprehensive bibliography.

The book does not pretend to cover all the statutory provisions. The most obvious and justifiable omissions are those relating to compensation. The absence of the provisions which determine the extent of legal control is perhaps less excusable. In particular the general powers sections are not set out and so the peculiar position of the transport corporations in this respect is not revealed. By confining himself, moreover, to statutory provisions, the author has presented a very incomplete picture of the various types of control exercised over the corporations; this is no doubt criticising the book for not doing what it avowedly does not set out to do, but if the author is prepared to interpolate a special section on price policy he might also be persuaded, in future editions, to draw together in one chapter an examination of the parliamentary, Ministerial, judicial, and other forms of control.

A number of small points may be mentioned. First, the alleged trend of tightening up the wording of legislation in later Acts (p. 17, use of "national security" instead of "national interest") is not supported by the re-enacting Air Corporations Act, 1949 (see section 23 (3)). Secondly, the Coal Industry Act, 1949 (Section 1 (2)) has amended the qualifications of members section of the Act of 1946 (p. 20). Thirdly, the citation of S.R. and O.s and S.I.s is not always correct. Thus "S.R. and O. 2233 of 1948" (p. 23) should be "S.I. 1948, No. 2233". Fourthly, the change in the name of the Road Transport Executive to Road Haulage Executive and the creation of the new Road Passenger Executive (S.I. 1949, No. 1130) are overlooked (p. 31). Fifthly, the comparable financial provision (Section 3 (1)) of the Air Corporations Act, 1949, is not set out on p. 43, and there are references to the three corporations on p. 33.

J. A. G. GRIFFITH.

The Government of Sicily Under Philip II of Spain

H. G. KOENIGSBERGER
PH.D.

Lecturer in Economic History at The Queen's University, Belfast

The government of Sicily by Philip II is perhaps the best example history offers of government of Empire. The problem of balance of power in Empire government, which the Spaniards and Sicilians attempted, is one which has profound significance in contemporary politics.

Just published 30s net

The Relationships Among the Principal Organs of the United Nations

HOSSEIN FAKHER

*M.A. (Univer. California)
Dr. Sc. Pol. (Genève)*

This book, the product of intensive research, shows how the main functions of the U.N. Organisation are divided among its six main organs and underlines the importance of the relationships between them. It is of the utmost interest to all students of international affairs.

Just published 17s 6d net

Twilight of the Mughuls

T. G. P. SPEAR

A study of the Mughul Kings in Delhi during the 150 years from the time when it ceased to be the capital of India until it became a completely British city after the Mutiny of 1858. The author tells the story for the first time from the point of view of the Delhi citizen. 18s. net

Social & Political Doctrines

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

This collection of documents setting out the essence of the main social and political theories current in the modern world was first published in 1939 and has been in continuous demand ever since. A reprint of the American edition is now available. 15s. net

Cabinet Government

SIR IVOR JENNINGS

The second edition, extensively revised in detail and brought up to date, of the standard work on the working of the British cabinet system. Second edition. 30s. net

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN. By
IAN G. SHARP. (*Allen and Unwin*. 466 pp. 25s.)

THIS book was badly needed and it fills a very real gap. It consists of two parts. In the first, the author examines the history and present structure of voluntary conciliation and arbitration machinery in seven of the most important British industries: coal mining, iron and steel, engineering and shipbuilding, cotton, building, boot and shoe manufacture, and railway transport. In the second part he gives an account of state action in the field of industrial disputes. This analysis is useful to lawyers and sociologists, but the real importance of the book lies in the pioneer work Dr. Sharp has done in collating an immense amount of scattered material on the voluntary processes of the industries he considers and in giving a succinct and intelligible description of the institutions developed by the industries themselves. Here the author had to break new ground, and the fact that he had to do so is not a little astonishing. It would be difficult to find at any period of history or in any country a more impressive body of autonomous law-making than the codes of procedure evolved in British industry in the course of the last hundred years. Yet it has received but scant attention from legal scholars and sociologists. One cannot help reflecting that if Dr. Sharp had devoted his attention to the manorial customs of the 13th century or to the settlement of disputes among Polynesians he would have been able to build upon foundations laid by others. But the evolution of institutional patterns and customs *praeter legem*, i.e. backed by purely social sanctions and not by the state, seems to arouse less interest when it occurs in our own midst than when the evidence has to be gathered from medieval documents or the observation of primitive peoples.

The facts concerning each industry are of course well known to those who live within it, but they rarely look beyond the confines of the agreements and rules they have to apply themselves. Not the least merit of Dr. Sharp's work is that it enables the scholar as well as the practitioner to compare the institutions of various industries and to draw some conclusions regarding their advantages and disadvantages. Perhaps the author would have enhanced the value of his work if he himself had embarked upon this comparison. What one misses is the kind of comparative evaluation of different types of machinery which the Webbs gave in their *Industrial Democracy* for the period about which they wrote. Dr. Sharp gives us, as it were, the anatomy but not the physiology of a number of industries. A chapter of comparative anatomy would have been highly welcome. It would then have been possible to give some explanation of the rudimentary character of the machinery existing in the engineering industry as compared with that of the coal mining industry (the establishment of which preceded nationalisation); or the reasons why the building industry has been more successful than most others in codifying its norms. However, this omission does not detract from the great merits of the book. If it does not answer many questions of industrial legislative policy, it enables the reader to ask them intelligently, and, for this reason, it is likely to become an indispensable tool not only for teachers and students but also for the practitioners on both sides of industry.

O. KAHN-FREUND.

The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. XXII, No. 4

OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1951

CONTENTS

PAGE

Notes and Comments: Labour and Secondary Education	317
The Technical Assistance Programme of the United Nations	By A. D. K. OWEN 323
The Revived International	By W. PICKLES 335
Beyond Nationalism	By R. G. TUGWELL 346
Re-sale Price Maintenance and Monopoly: A study of the Government's Proposals	By G. D. H. COLE 359
Theory and Practice of the Welfare State	By N. A. SMITH 369
Morocco, Yesterday and To-day	By NEVILL BARBOUR 382

BOOK REVIEWS

Reviewed by

The Life of Joseph Chamberlain. Vol. IV: 1901-1903 (Amery);	LEONARD WOOLF	396
With Milner in South Africa (Curtis)	B. C. ROBERTS	398
Trade Union Law (Citrine)	B. R. HINCHLIFF	309
Human Needs (Graham)	W. MANSFIELD COOPER	401
Security, Loyalty and Science (Gellhorn)	HARRY STREET	403
Justice and Administrative Law (Robson)	J. P. MAYER	404
John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (Hayek)		
English Life and Leisure (Rowntree and Lavers)	BARBARA WOOTTON	406
	W. A. ROBSON	408
Reflections on the Constitution (Laski)	E. N. CORBYN	410
The Mahdiya (Theobald)		414
A History of the Political Philosophers (Catlin)		415
Shorter Notices		

EDITORS: Leonard Woolf and William A. Robson.

EDITORIAL BOARD: Noel Annan, H. L. Beales, G. D. H. Cole, R. H. S. Crossman, M.P., Kingsley Martin, Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, Barbara Wootton. MSS., Books for Review, etc., should be addressed to the Editor at MONK'S HOUSE, RODMELL, near LEWES, SUSSEX. MSS. must be accompanied by stamped addressed envelopes (or International Reply Coupons).
PRICE Five Shillings per issue. POSTAGE SUBSCRIPTIONS to any address or through any newsagent £1 p.a. Postage on this issue, 2d.
Correspondence relating to subscriptions, advertisements, etc., should be addressed to the Publisher, TURNSTILE PRESS, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W.C.1. HOLBORN 8471

UNITED NATIONS

A Selection of Current Publications

Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries

108 pp. 5s. (5s. 3d. including postage)
Since its publication in May 1951 this report has become the subject of world-wide comment and debate. It was prepared by five independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General and contains a number of recommendations for national and international action for the development of economically under-developed areas.

The Price of Peace

53 pp. 1s. 9d. (1s. 10½d. including postage)
The texts of the 14 talks delivered recently by various United Nations delegates and by the Secretary-General over the United Nations Radio. The speakers discussed the current world situation and ways of reaching peaceful settlement of international disputes.

World Economic Report, 1949-50

260 pp. 17s. 6d. (18s. 3d. including postage)
A comprehensive analysis of the major changes and developments in domestic economies and in international economic relations during 1949 and 1950. Special attention is given to the problem of the dollar deficit and to the effect of the currency devaluations of 1949 on subsequent developments in international trade.

Review of Economic Conditions in Africa

128 pp. 9s. (9s. 4d. including postage)
The first survey of the African economy to be prepared by the United Nations Secretariat.

Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East

84 pp. 7s. 6d. (7s. 9d. including postage)
A report on the basic characteristics of the economy of the Middle East and a review of current economic trends. A full section of this study is devoted to a discussion of the importance of oil in the economy of the area.

Economic Survey of Europe in 1950

275 pp. 17s. 6d. (18s. 3d. including postage)
Prepared annually by the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, this Survey has gained an international reputation both for the accuracy of its data and the independence of its conclusions.

United Nations Publications are available from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE, P.O. BOX 569, LONDON, S.E.1
or through any bookseller

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Labour and Secondary Education

THE publication of the Labour Party's pamphlet *A Policy for Secondary Education* raises issues of supreme importance to the future of the British people. This pamphlet is issued in furtherance of a resolution passed by the annual conference of the party in October, 1950, which called upon the Government to implement Labour's declared policy of the comprehensive school in secondary education. After the conference a sub-committee was appointed by the National Executive Committee to prepare a report on secondary education. The pamphlet consists of the Committee's report.

The report attacks the present system of dividing children into three main categories destined respectively for grammar schools, secondary technical schools, and secondary modern schools, on two grounds. First, that the age of 11 at which this process takes place is too young to make a final decision affecting a child's educational prospects. Second, that the separation of schools into these types was based originally on class distinctions, and "the three types of school are bound to inherit the old traditions of class segregation". In consequence, the pamphlet contends, children who do not succeed in entering the grammar school draw resentful conclusions about their inferiority, while on the other hand the grammar school boy assumes that he is superior to the others. These objections will persist even in a tri-partite system where selection is based on special qualifications and not on wealth.

The pamphlet does not believe that mistakes of classification can be rectified by subsequent transfer from one type of school to another, because in practice grammar schools are reluctant to accept pupils from secondary modern or technical high schools, while parents object strenuously to their children being sent from a grammar school to one of these other types of school.

In consequence, the report declares, all three types of school must be swept away and be replaced by comprehensive schools to which all children will go for their secondary education. No attempt is made to examine the scholastic aspects of the question, or to consider the problems involved in attempting to educate a mass of children of widely differing abilities, aptitudes, and tastes, who are destined for widely different

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

careers. The matter is argued and decided almost entirely on social grounds, in terms of a doctrinaire egalitarianism quite unrelated to genuine equality of educational opportunity.

The comprehensive school which the report envisages will cater for all children by means of "a central core of subjects common to all"; from this central core there will develop classes in specialized subjects. The first 2 years of the new system will be "diagnostic years" in which the curriculum will be a mere continuation of the primary school with the possible addition of a foreign language. When the diagnosis has at last been made—presumably with careful safeguards to prevent any pupil from being earmarked as cleverer than his fellows—pupils will be allocated among various curriculum patterns according to their interests and abilities, or catered for by other ill-defined and obscure methods. If, in the result, there are insufficient pupils of high calibre to constitute a sixth form, several schools will be used as gathering grounds for this purpose.

A Policy for Secondary Education is, we regret to say, a shallow and superficial document which can only injure the Labour Party among persons who take a serious interest in education. It makes no attempt to assess the contribution of the grammar schools to our national life, nor to consider the function performed by specialized schools at the secondary stage of education. It does not consider either the ultimate consequences of the policy it proposes or alternative courses of action. It stumbles blindly and blandly forward, intent upon one objective only: to obliterate the prestige and status which at present attach to the grammar school.

The Aims of Secondary Education

The first question of principle which should be decided, before a policy for secondary education can properly be adopted, is whether we intend to make the most of the community's intellectual powers. If so, we must accept the idea of an intellectual élite, an aristocracy of brains, based entirely on ability and without regard to wealth, social standing, or other forms of privilege. We have, in this small island, few natural advantages. Our principal assets are coal and ourselves. Hitherto, the educational system of Britain has been grossly restricted by poverty and privilege. Yet despite a vast and continuous suppression and waste of ability through lack of educational opportunity, the British people have made massive and outstanding contributions

NOTES AND COMMENTS

to civilization: in science, industry, engineering, colonization, navigation, politics and public administration, literature, medicine, and many other fields.

There is general agreement that educational privilege must be abolished; but there is much less understanding of the need for developing the exceptionally gifted boy or girl to the highest possible degree. Nor is there wide appreciation of the extent to which a society such as our own depends for its leadership in all spheres on the intellectual powers of its ablest men and women. The subject is admirably discussed in a recent book *Education and Leadership** by Eric James, high master of the Manchester Grammar School. Mr. James points out that the idea of leadership as a function which should be exercised by certain individuals is regarded to-day with suspicion. This is partly due to the utterly false conceptions of leadership displayed in the Fascist régimes, and partly to the egalitarian ideas which underlie the social democratic movement of our age. "A philosophy that emphasizes the likeness of all men," he writes, "will be averse from recognizing those exceptional qualities in any individual which place him so clearly above his fellows that he may justly claim to lead and influence them." There is no doubt, he observes, that a democratic community feels a strong repugnance for the idea of special schools of leadership, and a deep distrust of the separate and explicit education of an élite (p. 29). This arises largely from the "confusion in the minds of the more extreme egalitarians between an élite recruited from a very limited social background and one which draws its members from every kind of home, and whose members will, in a very large number of cases, have been educated in ordinary primary schools" (p. 105). A system of selective secondary education, Mr. James declares, so far from creating class barriers is actually the most powerful solvent of those that still exist. He is convinced, moreover, that if we abolish the grammar schools in favour of comprehensive schools we shall certainly not create a homogeneous social structure which is the supposed objective of that policy. On the contrary, we shall consolidate the privileged position of those classes who can afford to send their children to the public schools. "One sometimes wonders," he remarks acidly, "whether this is not realized by those vocal defenders of the comprehensive principle who send their own children to public schools."

* Harrap & Co. (1951) 6s.

The Grammar Schools' Achievement

The grammar schools, as Mr. James points out, have been the spearhead of a social revolution. "Every child from Bricktown Secondary School who secures a commission, or a position in the administrative civil service, or a controlling place in industry or commerce, is a portent of an immense social change, the slow creation of an élite of merit, a transfer of power to those whose qualification for wielding it is neither birth nor wealth, but talent" (p. 38).

By and large, the grammar schools are the most excellent component of our educational system. They are much better, in their own sphere, than either the municipal primary schools or the private preparatory schools. They compare favourably with the great majority of public schools—leaving aside a dozen or so outstanding schools like Eton and Winchester. They are also, be it noted, generally superior in their own sphere to both the secondary modern schools and the technical high schools in their respective spheres. That, indeed, is one of the real difficulties which the Labour Party pamphlet is seeking to overcome by the mistaken methods of abolishing the grammar schools.

In introducing the policy of secondary education for all, the Education Act, 1944, treats all post-primary schools as different species of the secondary school genus. But the grammar school enjoys a prestige not shared by the modern and technical secondary schools, partly because of its superior academic merits; partly because it now attracts the most intelligent and gifted children; partly because it catered in the past for a select minority of pupils recruited either by the ability of their parents to pay fees or by special capacity shown by success in the examination for special places; and partly because it is the gateway to the university. This distinction could be reduced, and ultimately eliminated, by making the secondary modern school and the technical high school as good in their own ways, and enjoying the same prestige, as the grammar school. Shortage of trained teachers of high calibre, restrictions on building, and other post-war difficulties, have so far militated against any substantial progress towards these objectives save in a few areas such as Hertfordshire. The Labour Party has therefore adopted an all-out policy for comprehensive schools without regard to the implications and dangers of casting away grammar schools, which in some instances (the St. Marylebone Grammar

School is a case in point), are based on old foundations with fine record of educational achievement to their credit.

It is by no means certain that the ease of transfer from one stream to another, which is the strongest argument for the comprehensive school, will in practice produce the egalitarian results desired. It may merely create class divisions within schools, instead of between them. To group three schools together under one administrative head, or even to merge them entirely, does not solve the crucial problem of making "modern" or a "technical" secondary education as good, on its own lines, as a grammar school education. Whether the modern secondary school and its technical counterpart remain separate entities, or become part of a comprehensive school that problem remains.

Everyone who wishes to improve our educational system is ready to support experimentation with different types of schools and there is clearly a case for testing the comprehensive school idea with different types of institution and varying programmes of instruction. But it is scandalously irresponsible for the largest education authority in the country to adopt a whole-hogging policy in favour of giant comprehensive schools, in the absence of any precise knowledge of the results which such a drastic change will produce. Mr. McKinnon Wood, the Chairman of the Education Committee of the L.C.C., has scarcely even attempted to reply to the many important points of criticism and inquiry which were made in the correspondence columns of *The Times* during July. The most pertinent questions were those asked by Mr. M. L. Jacks, Director of the Education Department of Oxford University. How, he enquired, would the levelling process, which is a principal objective of the comprehensive ideal, be a levelling up and not a levelling down? How would the educational opportunity of the modern school boy, who usually leaves at 15, be made equal with those of his brother in the grammar school stream? How would social distinctions be kept out of the school, where they might be more dangerous than in separate schools? How will the educational mass-production be avoided? How will the educational influence of a headmaster who knows all his pupils be made good? How will transfer from one stream to another be made more acceptable to parents than transfer from one school to another? How would the modern school stream be safeguarded from becoming a convenient dump for the less gifted

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

children? How would the intellectual requirements of the able grammar school boy be met?

Mr. McKinnon Wood cannot answer these questions for the simple reason that neither he nor anyone else has the knowledge of how the new system will work. Where Mr. Wood and his Labour colleagues at County Hall are to blame is that they treat the matter as though the case for comprehensive schools were proved, and as though any objection to them can only be inspired by Conservative opposition to socialist ideals in education. We believe that the Labour Party, whether in London or elsewhere, will suffer severe electoral setbacks if they try to proceed on the lines of the L.C.C. Education Committee, by introducing sweeping and irrevocable changes in our secondary school system without a firm basis of knowledge by which to justify their policy. Analogies from the United States and Scotland are interesting, but inconclusive in view of the different sociological background.

An Alternative Policy

The right policy for progressive local education authorities to adopt is in our opinion clear. First, they should speed up improvements in the secondary modern schools and the technical high schools. In particular, they should prevent the secondary modern school from being regarded as a dumping ground for mediocre and socially inferior children. Such schools should be developed as an educationally distinct category, as good in their own way as any others. Second, they should embark on carefully devised experiments in different types of comprehensive schools. Both these lines of advance should be pursued simultaneously.

In conclusion, two points should be borne in mind. One is that the high attainments of the grammar school exert a fertilizing influence over the whole realm of education, and its loss would mean a general decline of standards throughout the educational system. The other is that the conception of the secondary modern school has much to commend it, especially from the socialist standpoint. For it is here that the child of good intelligence can be educated in a way which will develop his general ability to understand the world in which we live, to enjoy a fuller life, and to appreciate cultural activities, without being forced to pursue intellectual or technical achievements beyond his capacity.

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By A. D. K. OWEN

Assistant Secretary-general, Department of Economic Affairs, United Nations

THE difference between standards of living in the economically developed countries and the economically under-developed countries is recognized to be tremendous, but despite all their efforts the under-developed countries are not succeeding in narrowing this difference. With all their handicaps they are faced, as the United Nations World Economic Report 1949-50 points out, "with the task of attaining a rate of economic development very much more rapid than is characteristic of the industrially more developed countries". In this effort the international organizations are providing a new and important service to the under-developed countries—the provision, through the contributions of all their members, of technical assistance.

The United Nations programme of technical assistance derives from a recommendation of the Economic and Social Council taken in August, 1949, which briefly states in its preamble that the Council makes its recommendation "Being impressed with the significant contribution to economic development that can be made by an expansion of the international interchange of technical knowledge through international co-operation among countries".

On the basis of this conviction and the experience of recent years there has been developed a very substantial international exchange of services. In defining the purposes to be sought the Economic and Social Council laid it down that "the services envisaged should aim at increased productivity of material and human resources and a wide and equitable distribution of the benefits of such increased productivity, so as to contribute to the realization of higher standards of living for the entire populations. Due attention and respect should be paid to the national sovereignty and national legislation of the under-developed countries and to the social conditions which directly affect their economic development."

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The expanded programme thus inaugurated now brings together into a co-operative enterprise the resources of the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Health Organization. Utilizing voluntary contributions made by more than fifty governments which, during the first operational period from July, 1950 to December, 1950, pledged a total amount in national currencies equivalent to \$U.S.20,048,018,* the international organizations have been operating on an ever-increasing scale. The important activities within their respective fields of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund are not, however, financed from this source but from the regular budgets of those organizations.

Purposes and Methods of Technical Assistance

Technical assistance is not a substitute for government initiative. Its purpose is simply to assist the under-developed countries to obtain the best possible advice and technical information to solve their own development problems.

To ensure that the assistance achieves this object the Economic and Social Council laid down certain guiding principles for the operation of the programme: technical assistance must be rendered by the participating organizations only in agreement with the governments concerned and on the basis of specific requests from them; assistance may be furnished only to or through governments and must be designed to meet the needs of the country concerned; the assistance must not be a means of foreign economic or political interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned; and the experts provided must be chosen not only for their professional competence but for their sympathetic understanding of the cultural background and specific needs of the country where they are to work.

The forms of the assistance furnished depend upon the particular needs of the country concerned. The basic form is

* The fifty countries pledged sums in varying amounts. The largest contributions were as follows: United States, \$U.S.12,007,500; United Kingdom, £760,000 (equivalent to \$U.S.2,128,255); France, 422,625,000 francs (equivalent to \$U.S.1,207,500); Canada, \$C.850,000 (equivalent to \$U.S.772,727); Brazil, 8,500,000 cruzeiros (equivalent to \$U.S.459,460); Australia, equivalent of \$U.S.400,000; India, equivalent of \$U.S.250,000; Netherlands 1,520,000 florins (equivalent to \$U.S.400,000); Belgium, 13,500,000 francs (equivalent to \$U.S.270,000); Switzerland, 1,000,000 francs (equivalent to \$U.S.233,645); Argentina, 1,000,000 pesos (equivalent to \$U.S.200,000).

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

the visiting expert or team of experts sent to perform specific tasks which may vary from simple short-range ones to extremely complex and long-range ones. For the most part the functions of such missions have in the past been advisory rather than operational.

Complementary to such expert missions is the advanced training of technicians from the under-developed countries either at home or abroad. The combination of both forms of assistance by having visiting advisers undertake specific training work during their mission has been successfully adopted. Such an arrangement is, of course, particularly desirable where a specific project is set up by the visiting experts and needs to be continued by local personnel upon the conclusion of the mission.

Still another form of technical assistance consists in providing under-developed countries with information on the latest techniques and assisting in discovering the most suitable machinery and equipment. Here the international organizations are in a unique position to serve as a clearing house for such an exchange of information. Not only do they have experts on their staffs trained in the very problems which concern the under-developed countries but they have the pledged co-operation of their Member Governments and are in contact with governments and private technical institutions throughout the world.

Organizational Machinery

While the international organizations participating in the programme have adopted the principles governing the expanded programme and in day-to-day matters collaborate closely in every way, they are nevertheless independent entities responsible to different governing bodies. Each has its own budget* in respect of the programme. To ensure proper co-ordination

* Of the total contributions to the expanded programme equalling \$U.S.20,048,016 for the period July, 1950, to December, 1951, the first \$10 million and 70 per cent. of the second \$10 million are distributed among the participating organizations in the following proportions:

	<i>Per cent.</i>
United Nations	23
International Labour Organization	11
Food and Agriculture Organization	29
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization	14
International Civil Aviation Organization	1
World Health Organization	22
Total	100

The remainder is placed at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board to be allocated among participating organizations at its discretion.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of their activities, the Economic and Social Council created the Technical Assistance Board consisting of the Executive Heads of the participating organizations and presided over by the Secretary-General or his representative. In addition, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Refugee Organization, and the International Telecommunications Union, although not members of the Board, are represented at its meetings. The Board, which meets at frequent intervals, is notified of all requests for technical assistance made to its member organizations. It reviews programmes, arranges for joint action, as in the case of expert missions representing several organizations, approves major projects, and determines responsibility for action. The Board also acts on behalf of its members, especially by maintaining overall liaison with outside organizations which operate regional or other technical assistance schemes and by negotiating with governments. Without the Board a smoothly integrated international programme would be impossible. Its success has been due mainly to the spirit of enthusiasm and co-operation of its members.

A large part of the work involved in operating the programme consists in finding suitable experts and in placing persons to whom fellowships and scholarships have been granted in appropriate training institutions. To facilitate this many of the more developed countries able to provide such experts and training facilities have established special liaison units or committees within their administrations to co-operate with the international organizations. The practical advantages of having such a single point of reference are obvious. Particularly important is the fact that the international organizations can, where such machinery exists, feel every confidence in the recommendations made since these derive from a knowledge, which they cannot possess, of the entire resources of the government.

The under-developed countries requesting technical assistance are on their side confronted with a not dissimilar problem arising from the multiplicity of sources from which assistance may now be had. There are, in addition to the several United Nations agencies, other international programmes such as that of the Organization of American States, the facilities of the Colombo Plan, and the numerous and extensive services available under bilateral arrangements offered by governments. Under-developed

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

countries frequently lack the internal co-ordinating machinery necessary to ensure the proper selection of priorities, the best phasing of development projects and the mobilizing of technical assistance to secure the best results. The multiplicity of technical assistance sources could, if care were not exercised, lead to confusion. To assist governments whose own machinery in this respect may still be rudimentary, the device of a resident technical assistance representative has been adopted, and United Nations agencies have come together in the appointment of such a representative in several countries where substantial technical assistance activities are under way. In most cases the principal functions given the representative are to advise the government with respect to the preparation and co-ordination of its requests for assistance, to advise it with respect to its general development programme and the priorities to be given to different projects, and to maintain close contact with all technical experts sent to the country.

Thus, the co-ordination of technical assistance which is indispensable for an orderly development of the economy of the country concerned is safeguarded by the resident representative in the country receiving assistance. At the centre it is one of the duties of the Technical Assistance Board to encourage governments to co-ordinate the assistance which they receive from various sources so as to avoid overlapping and to ensure that the collective efforts achieve the best results. At the same time the Board is making every effort to establish and improve co-operative arrangements with other regional or national organizations. At present there exists a continuous exchange of information and consultation with agencies operating under the United States Point IV Programme. Similar arrangements have been completed with the Organization of American States and the Board has been invited to appoint a liaison officer at the headquarters of the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South East Asia.

The co-existence of the several programmes of assistance as they are now constituted undoubtedly presents a problem of continuous adjustment and co-ordination. The task is clearly a continuous one for, in the face of the great and pressing needs of the under-developed countries, the most effective use of resources and the elimination of any waste and confusion is imperative.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Examples of Technical Assistance

At the end of the first year of the operation of the expanded programme in June, 1951, 152 agreements have been signed with 45 governments, providing for them to be assisted by a total of 741 experts and 551 fellowships. 449 experts from 54 different nationalities, had already been employed. This is, of course, excessive of the technical assistance rendered by most of the United Nations agencies under their own budgets. For example, in 1950 the United Nations itself under other programmes undertook 48 projects involving 84 experts and granted 291 fellowships, of which 184 were for study of social problems and 101 were for training in the field of economic development or public administration. Similarly, assistance is rendered independently of the expanded programme by the I.L.O., F.A.O., U.N.E.S.C.O., W.H.O., the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund. An incomplete listing shows that during 1950 more than 70 countries received technical assistance in one form or another from United Nations agencies. All this, however, is unfortunately but a fraction of the total assistance requested.

The nature of the assistance provided ranges over the whole of economic and social development from nation-wide economic surveys, organisation of central and local government services, or the construction of electric power plants to the training of teachers or the development of cottage industries. These activities may be illustrated by a few selected projects.

As the starting point for a new programme of economic development, the comprehensive mission, organized jointly by several agencies, for the purpose of investigating and reporting on a variety of problems within a country, of preparing a general plan for economic development or of assisting in carrying out a co-operative scheme, has been adopted in a number of cases. A typical survey mission was that sent to Haiti in 1949. Since then survey missions have been sent to many countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, and Bolivia. With the exception of the last whose report is anticipated, all these countries are now receiving substantial assistance following the adoption by their governments of the missions' recommendations. A similar survey mission has recently arrived in Iraq which has requested substantial assistance in the fields of scientific education, nutrition and health, and the development of agriculture. In Peru, where the ancient city of Cuzco suffered

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

serious damage from an earthquake last year, it is planned to supplement the work of reconstruction by a long-range programme for the economic development of the whole Cuzco Valley. A mission to prepare the programme will shortly be constituted.

The majority of economically under-developed countries are handicapped by the deficiencies of their administrative machinery, a handicap which is very acutely felt when the government decides upon any extended programme of development. Mention has been made of the resident technical assistance representative whose services are designed to promote co-ordination. Another aspect of this overall problem is the inadequate presentation to international agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of projects of economic development requiring financing. In the preparation of such requests technical and economic judgment of a high order are indispensable and they have often to be made on the basis of inadequate evidence. The best use has to be made of the evidence available and the appraisal of the project must of necessity be sound and convincing. Too few of the under-developed countries can command such services from within their own administration. The United Nations joined the F.A.O. and the International Bank in organizing the Asian Centre on Agricultural and Allied Projects at Lahore which, towards the end of 1950, provided a three months' course of intensive training in the planning and appraisal of economic development projects for officials from eight Far Eastern countries. This was specifically directed toward the training of the officials of these governments in the preparation of co-ordinated development programmes and the establishment of projects which would merit the financial support of national and international organizations. As a result of the experience gained, several governments have expressed a desire to establish national centres of a similar character to train their own employees. The agencies which participated were equally satisfied that by this means a most useful service to governments had been rendered and plans are being made to meet the similar requests being received.

Other training centres or seminars dealing mostly with specific aspects of economic and social development have been, and are being, organized in many parts of the world. For example, two regional seminars for the exchange of information among social welfare officials from Arab States have been held in

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Beirut and Cairo. The second of these, which was chiefly devoted to community organization, covered such specific items as education, village planning, rural development, health and hygiene, and the organization of co-operatives in rural areas. Towards the end of 1950 a regional seminar for Latin American countries was held in Chile to provide training and the interchange of technical knowledge in the fields of vital and health statistics. In connection with the conduct of national censuses in 1950, centres providing training in census methods were established in Cairo, New Delhi, Paris, and Costa Rica and were attended by students from a large number of countries.

The bulk of the technical assistance given naturally involves the provision of advice by individual experts with regard to developmental projects. As an illustration of the breadth of these activities in a single country, the case of Libya is striking. As that country is preparing for its independence, it requires assistance on a substantial scale. In mid-1950 an exploratory mission was sent to Libya to survey the country's needs. Although only a few months have elapsed since the mission's report was published, agreements have already been made with the British and French Administering Authorities in Libya for United Nations agencies to supply a total of 14 experts and 14 technicians most of whom are already in the field. The services being rendered cover the survey of the country's economic potentialities, the development of social welfare services, a study of Libya's public finances, and a number of specific industrial and administrative projects. True, Libya properly has a privileged position as regards the urgent provision of technical assistance owing to the United Nations' responsibility for its political future, but other countries have requested, and may soon be receiving, assistance on an even larger scale.

The two fields of greatest activity are probably those of agriculture and health. In fact, the whole work of the World Health Organization is largely concerned with technical assistance of one kind or another.

In the field of agriculture a large part of the assistance provided is in connection with projects for the conservation and development of land and water resources, including control of flooding and soil erosion, the eradication of animal diseases and the improvement of livestock breeds. Typical of such assistance is that currently being given to Syria, where it is hoped by better management of grazing, reseeded, and irrigation, and by other

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

means, to overcome serious problems of pasture deterioration and to reclaim some three million hectares of cultivable land.

Projects aimed at combatting animal diseases are under way or proposed in a number of countries including Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Ethiopia, Irak and Pakistan. For both Afghanistan and Ethiopia rinderpest constitutes a major problem. In both countries laboratories have been established for the production of improved vaccines and biologics and the vaccination of animals is proceeding at a very rapid rate. In Ethiopia alone, more than half a million animals have so far been treated.

In the health field, assistance is being given under one programme or another in widespread campaigns against disease and in the improvement of national health services. One of these programmes includes an anti-tuberculosis campaign which aims at testing and vaccinating 30 million young people throughout the world. Another is aimed at the control of malaria. Still others are directed against venereal diseases and the somewhat similar diseases of yaws and bejel. These programmes, which include the establishment of laboratories and training centres, cover a large proportion of the world's under-developed areas. Other assistance is being provided in various forms. In Israel, for example, advice has been given on the integration of existing health agencies into a national health organization. In Chile negotiations are under way to establish two public health demonstration projects in the areas of Concepcion and Santiago. In Yugoslavia, where some five hundred thousand men, women and children are physically handicapped owing to the ravages of war, disease and poverty, efforts are being made to improve facilities for rehabilitation.

Educational and social welfare assistance are necessary adjuncts of economic development projects and the services being rendered cover a wide range of projects including fundamental education, vocational training, community planning and the organization of national employment and social welfare services.

To give any impression of the range of current technical assistance activities would require an enumeration of the diverse projects now under way, which limitation of space precludes. In each of the large fields covered by the United Nations specialized agencies, the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the United

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Health Organization, a great number of projects are now being developed in response to the requests of governments. The two agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, while not participating financially in the programme themselves, also undertake a substantial range of activities. The United Nations provides a considerable volume of assistance in the economic and social fields where it has responsibilities covering such fields as fiscal and statistical services, social welfare services, and the broader fields of economic development policy. This volume of assistance, based as it is upon requests by governments, and covering practically every aspect of the under-developed countries' economies, is clear evidence of the strength of the demand in the under-developed areas of the world for an accelerated rate of progress.

Conclusion

However real the demand for economic progress, the rendering of technical assistance encounters many difficulties. Some of these are inherent in the very conditions of economic under-development which technical assistance is designed to remedy. There is also sometimes an imperfect appreciation in the under-developed countries of the character of their total needs and a consequent misunderstanding as to the proper priorities to be assigned to projects of economic development. At the same time, the transference of the knowledge, skill, and experience of the developed countries is a far from simple operation and more experience will be needed to ensure the success of every operation undertaken.

Such difficulties can be overcome; it is necessary that the assistance rendered should meet the needs of the recipient and those responsible for the work should possess, in addition to high technical competence, an understanding of the cultural backgrounds, national aspirations, and specific problems of the peoples with whom they deal. The release by universities, by research institutions and by other employers, and the seconding by government services, of men and women of this character to undertake such work is one of the conditions of the programme's continuing success.

The fact should also be stressed that in many cases what is

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

needed is a vigorous attack covering many different phases of economic and social activity simultaneously if substantial results are to be achieved within a relatively short period of time. Such an effort could, given the effective mobilization of all domestic resources, raise the rate of economic development sufficiently for the process to become to some extent self-generating, and in an expanding and developing economy technical assistance can be more readily accepted and utilized.

The full mobilization of domestic resources, however, is difficult and in many instances yields extremely limited results initially. The idea has gained ground during the continuing international review of the progress of the economically less-developed countries that it may be necessary to arrange through international machinery for the availability of grants for under-developed countries. This need arises particularly where productivity is still so low that little or no capital formation occurs or is retained for domestic development, and where the assumption of any significant debt burden, i.e. of financing development by loans, is not possible, especially where necessary projects only show a financial return over a very long period although contributing substantially both to the well-being of the inhabitants and to the strengthening of the economy. The President of the International Bank, Mr. Eugene R. Black, at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council in February, 1951, said in this connection: "Some countries have sufficient resources and credit to enable them to carry out development on the basis of borrowing from abroad. I think we should frankly face the fact that others do not; they cannot adequately accelerate the rate of their development if the only capital which they receive is in the form of loans which they have a reasonable prospect of repaying." Out of the consideration of this aspect of the problem of economic development has come the recommendation by several national and international bodies that a new step forward is necessary. Thus, in a report just issued by the United Nations on *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*, prepared by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General, a major recommendation is that "the United Nations should establish an International Development Authority to assist the under-developed countries in preparing, co-ordinating and implementing their programmes of economic development; to distribute to under-developed countries grants-in-aid for specific purposes; to verify the proper utilization of

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

such grants; and to study and report on the progress of development programmes."

The appropriate combination of fully utilized domestic resources, grants of such a character, and loans having their interest rates and their duration adjusted to the capacities of each country would greatly accelerate the pace of economic development and so raise standards of living in the under-developed countries to a rate nearer to that of the developed countries.

The consideration by governments of proposals having as their object this powerful addition to the resources of international organizations is due to the greater understanding promoted by technical assistance activities of the need for economic development and the obstacles encountered. If the economic development of under-developed countries is today among the major economic problems confronting the world, the contribution both direct and indirect made by technical assistance to its understanding and its hoped-for solution is of the greatest importance.

AN INTERESTING NEW SERIES

LIFE, LITERATURE & THOUGHT LIBRARY

Edited by Prof. Vivian de Sola Pinto

The aim of this important new series is to present in an attractive form English texts which have not only intrinsic literary merit, but which are also valuable as manifestations of the ages in which they were written. First titles to be published in October are: **ENGLISH BIOGRAPHY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY**, edited by Prof. V. de S. Pinto and **THREE ELIZABETHAN PAMPHLETS** edited by G. R. Hibbard. They will be followed in November by **A CHAUCER SELECTION, TASTE AND CRITICISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY** and **BRITISH POPULAR BALLADS**. Each volume has a substantial introduction and notes.

Each 10/6 net.

GEORGE G. HARRAP & CO. LTD

THE REVIVED INTERNATIONAL

By W. PICKLES

ON Saturday, June 30th, 1951, six years after the end of the second world war and twenty years after the last effective meeting of its predecessor, the Socialist International was reconstituted, at a meeting held in Frankfurt-am-Main. It was the fourth occasion in less than 100 years on which a Socialist International has been founded—or the fifth, if one counts the "two and a half" Vienna International, or the sixth if one throws in the pre-International of 1854—and the longest-lived of these ancestors, the Second International of 1889, survived for only 25 years. It was, more than anything else, the memory of these earlier failures that had induced the hesitations of the second post-war period and postponed the reconstitution for seven years after the subject was first discussed.

It is true that the founders of the Labour and Socialist International of 1923 had also waited for some time after the 1918 armistice, but their hesitations were attributable almost entirely to two reasons. In the first place, relations between the Socialist parties of France and Germany, which had provided the two biggest contingents of the Second International, were slow to recover from the shock of the first world war. A more important reason for the delay was, however, the existence of the Communist International and the desire to avoid any action that might prevent the formation of a united Socialist International, so it was only when long efforts at negotiation had made it clear to all but a minority of parties that unity was impossible that the Hamburg meeting was held and the Second International formally set up.

Neither of these obstacles existed after the second world war, though there was, in the minds of some of the potential members of an International, and until the creation of the Cominform, a desire not to form what might have looked like an anti-communist league. It is true that there had been high hopes of a change of attitude by Moscow—hopes expressed in ideas like Léon Blum's* suggestion of a Concordat between the Communist Church of Moscow and the democratic states—but none went so far as to hope again for a united international. Nor were Franco-German feelings an obstacle this time; the International had survived without a German contingent from

* *A l'Echelle humaine*, pp. 152 sqq.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the beginning of the Hitler régime until 1939 and it could be reconstituted without them. In any case, relations between German and French *émigrés* in London were not wholly bad, though it had been necessary to organize wartime meetings in London in two separate groups, from one of which the Germans, were excluded. When, later on, the question of bringing German socialists into the International Socialist Conferences arose, the French were far from being the most hostile group.

If, however, the reasons that had counselled delay in the early 1920's were absent, others were present. The working of the earlier Internationals has been a source of deep disappointment. The mass of socialist members and voters, especially on the continent, had been allowed to expect far too much of them and the Internationals had expected too much of themselves. The Second International's famous anti-war resolution, voted amid scenes of delirious enthusiasm at Stuttgart in 1907 and reaffirmed at Copenhagen in 1910, in fact did no more than instruct and pledge socialists to "use all their efforts to prevent war, by whatever means appear most appropriate". It meant nothing; nothing could have come of it and nothing did. The allusion to the "most appropriate" means was a recognition that national differences made a common line impossible, a point which had been much stressed in debate. But the recollection of this failure did not prevent the L.S.I. from trying again to impose a common line, its constitution specifically providing that its decisions on all international questions should be binding on all its affiliated bodies. In practice, the only way of getting decisions by which everybody was willing to be bound proved to be to make all resolutions equivocal. Indeed, there was something worse than equivocation in the basic statement of doctrine, which in its French and German versions described the class struggle as "the means of emancipating the working-class", while the English version saw it only as "*a* means"—a vital difference, which may or may not have been the result of deliberate dishonesty.

When the two preliminary meetings from which the present International ultimately emerged met in London, in 1945, the national differences that had stultified the work of the previous International were still there. Indeed, the second meeting, at which liberated French, Italian and Belgian socialists were present, revealed the existence of a new division, between the parties that had known enemy occupation and those that had not.

THE REVIVED INTERNATIONAL

But the Labour Party pressed on with the exploratory work in which it had taken the initiative and called a more representative Conference in Clacton in May, 1946. Here, the socialist parties of Austria, Argentine, Belgium, Canada (C.C.F.) Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Holland, Hungary, Italy (P.S.I.U.P.) Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and Great Britain were represented, along with the Jewish socialist organization, which later became the biggest party in Israel. An uninvited Rumanian delegation was also present. Most of the European delegations were made up partly of war-time exiles from London and partly of those who had spent the war in their own countries. The delegations from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Sweden were from governmental parties, and their delegates were in many cases themselves members of governments.

It rapidly became clear that four kinds of party were represented. Britain, Norway, Sweden and New Zealand had homogeneous socialist governments. The Belgian, Danish, French, Luxembourg and Dutch parties were either participating in democratic governments, or were willing and likely to do so. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish parties were involved in coalitions with communist governments and the remainder were opposition parties. The pro-communist and the governmental parties represented new complications, which had not existed for the second International. The former disappeared, either voluntarily or through expulsion, within two years, but as they were replaced by the representatives of exiled groups, whose problems were no less different from those of the governmental parties, the clash of interests remained intact. The special attitudes of the Finnish, Swedish, Swiss and Jewish socialist parties on international problems added further complications which were set out when each party reported on the political situation and its own position in its own country. It should be noted, too, that Germany was not yet represented.

When the reconstitution of the International was discussed, the conference fell into three main groups. The Austrians, French, and (more especially) the Belgians wanted reconstitution at the earliest possible moment. The British and Scandinavians had the keenest memories of the failure of the Labour and Socialist International and were in any case anxious to develop their own experiments in socialist government without

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

interference from outside. They therefore asked for delay and so, with even greater emphasis, did the Eastern Europeans, whose partners back home would have resented any organic connection with democratic socialist parties. The Conference therefore decided to make arrangements for periodic further conferences, without formal rules of procedure, at which views could be exchanged, current topics examined and resolutions passed, if necessary, but only when unanimity could be achieved. It was also decided to exclude *émigré* parties and to admit only one party from each country. This latter decision proved to be one of some importance, since it was later used with great effect as a stimulus to unity among rival democratic socialist parties. In order to organize future meetings and circulate information, the Conference also set up a Socialist Information and Liaison Office in London—a dignified title which concealed a minute organization.

Despite—or because of—the decision not to recreate the International, there followed a period of international socialist activity more intense than any in history. After Clacton, seven full conferences were held, at Bournemouth (November, 1946), Zürich (June, 1947), Antwerp (December, 1947), Vienna (June, 1948), Baarn, near Amsterdam (May, 1949), Copenhagen (May, 1950), and Frankfurt (June–July, 1951). The Antwerp conference set up a Committee of the International Socialist Conferences (abbreviated by tacit agreement among the world's journalists to "Comisco") as a compromise between those who continued at every conference to press for a new International and those who still pleaded for delay. Comisco met, in principle, twice a year between conferences and included representatives of every member party. It was authorized to discuss political as well as organizational problems and invariably did so. In addition, special conferences, organized in two cases by the French Socialist Party and in two others by the Labour Party brought roughly the same groups and individuals together to discuss Spain (Paris, August, 1946), European Unity (London, March, 1948 and Paris April, 1948) and the Schuman Plan (London, June, 1950). The Vienna Conference decided to call conferences of socialist experts, of which six have now been held (in England, Holland, Sweden, Germany, France, and Switzerland) to discuss the administration of nationalized industries, economic cooperation, workers' participation in industrial management, international control of basic industries,

THE REVIVED INTERNATIONAL

the integration of agriculture and similar subjects; in 1950, Comisco called a conference on election and propaganda techniques. There have also been meetings of the Socialist Parties of the Brussels Pact powers (January, 1949) and of the Commonwealth Socialist Parties (September, 1947), to say nothing of the regional conferences held by the Eastern European socialists before their liquidation.

Compared with this intense activity, the triennial meetings of the pre-war Internationals, though each was of course in itself a much bigger affair, make a poor showing. Apart from a profusion of current topics, the most important subjects discussed were the admission of Germany (at Zürich and Antwerp), economic cooperation, democratic socialism, the Ruhr, and—a perennial—European unity. But the vital work of the conferences at this stage lay in the field of credentials. Membership of the conference conferred a much-desired cachet, especially in countries with rival socialist parties and this fact was used to enable Comisco to choose between them, to promote unity or to influence policy. Its biggest successes were in Italy, where prolonged negotiations led to the unification (after many setbacks) of the three democratic socialist groups, and in Greece, where Professor Svolos' E.L.D. Socialist Party almost certainly owed its nine deputies to its selection by Comisco from among five or six claimants to the title of "socialist". It is a fair guess, too, that E.L.D.'s denunciation of communism, in January, 1949, owed something to the immediately preceding visit of the Comisco mission. Comisco was also called upon to decide between rival Spanish groups and between rival unions of Eastern European socialist exiles. It has failed, to date, to reconcile the three equally diminutive Rumanian groups, but, *en revanche*, its administrative secretary was able to announce, just before the end of the Frankfurt Conference, that the two American socialist parties had formed a common organization, apparently for the sole purpose of qualifying for membership of the International.

It was the amount and the success of these activities which was one of the factors in bringing forward the date of the revival of the International. Agreement had been reached, it is true, on very few things, except opposition to communism, but where there was not agreement, there was at least understanding. Since most parties send to these conferences members of their international committees or equivalent bodies, and

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

since attendance at some creates a familiarity with problems and procedure which is itself a qualification for attendance at others, it follows that the personnel of all these meetings is always in large measure the same. A body of thirty to fifty prominent figures in their home parties—prime ministers, ministers, party chairmen, party secretaries, chairmen of parliamentary groups—have met twenty or thirty times, mostly in private (the first occasion on which part of the conference was opened to the public was in Copenhagen) to thrash out problems on which all felt deeply. Some of the questions have been argued half a dozen times, and always in an atmosphere that had a cordiality of its own—a cordiality at once compulsory and genuine and that grows as big political figures reveal amiable human weaknesses. In some cases, notably in Austria, there have been contacts, sometimes deeply moving, with wider circles of the local parties and the realization of what international socialism means to these people helps to foster a sense of responsibility and a desire to understand their problems. The result has been at worst to soften what might have been bitter conflicts and at best to bring real *rapprochement*. The drawing together of socialist opinions on European unity, for instance, was certainly in part the work of Comisco. It was, of course, something like this that was hoped for from the delay, and it is significant that it was a Belgian socialist who, at Frankfurt, paid tribute to the service rendered by those who had sometimes appeared to put obstacles in the way of the revival of the International.

Two other factors helped. The Antwerp Conference came shortly after the formation of the O.E.E.C., whose work it attempted to discuss. The result was a long battle between East and West, ending by the passing of a resolution so cynically equivocal as to recall those of the 2nd International and the L.S.I. It looked like a return to the bad old days, but it was, in fact, the beginning of better things. The Dutch, the most consciously anti-Marxist of all the parties, were ready to expel the Easterners and their Italian allies there and then, and the Belgians and Norwegians were almost equally outspoken. But this proved unnecessary. The Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian Socialist Parties were absorbed by the communists, the Poles excluded themselves by refusing to reply to an appeal sent to them by Comisco in January, 1948. Six months later, in Vienna, the Czech party was expelled and the P.S.I.U.P. was given a month in which to mend its ways. The result was that the

THE REVIVED INTERNATIONAL

Vienna conference became the first to pass an unequivocal resolution on a serious subject: it affirmed that socialism is unseparable from political democracy and that régimes which try to separate the two invariably develop into dictatorships; it appended a list of the political liberties without which socialism is meaningless. One of the big obstacles to the formation of an international had gone. It is perhaps worth adding that almost all the Eastern European socialists who had defended the idea of cooperation with communism with such energy and apparent conviction are now disgraced, imprisoned, exiled or dead. One or two, like Anton Ban of Hungary, are members of the union of exiled parties which is collectively affiliated to the International.

The Vienna resolution on socialism and democracy led to a further step, which was to become the decisive factor in the reconstitution. The Copenhagen conference discussed a long draft statement of the principles of democratic socialism. The conference was not able to agree on the precise formulation of every point, but it was clear that agreement *could* be reached. This was surprising. The First International had died of internal doctrinal convulsions and the second, though it had often been able to agree on problems of immediate policy, because none of its affiliates had any share of governmental responsibility for translating resolutions into action, had none the less managed to quarrel wordily about doctrine. The outlook after the second world war seemed at first sight even less promising. French socialism continues to affirm its acceptance of a Marxism which for thirty years it has neither practised nor genuinely believed in. The Belgians are only a little less doctrinaire and Austria has a brand of Marxism all its own. In Germany, revisionism was born only a year after the party had accepted a full Marxist programme and the German party before the first world war had been one of the least Marxist in its political habits and one of the most in its public statements: what its doctrinal position was after the second world war, nobody quite knew. The British and Commonwealth parties had always blandly ignored Marxism, though the C.C.F. has leftish leanings, and the Scandinavians, though they have more respect for doctrine as such, are fundamentally in the same position as Britain. In the same way, some parties, like those of Britain and the Commonwealth (and again with the partial exception of Canada) have an ethical basis and no organized enemies among religious bodies.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

But Belgium and in a lesser degree Italy do face real clerical problems and French socialists are unwilling to admit that Catholicism is no longer a serious enemy. The Dutch have abandoned Marxism and made peace with both the Churches.*

There are newer differences, too. The French, Dutch, Italian, and some of the Belgians have (or rather had) federalist hankerings, which the British and Scandinavians reject. All have revised their views on state ownership of industry, but the revision has not always run along the same lines and gone as far in some cases as in others. Some parties have closer connections than others with their trade union movements, some more reason to worry about the rivalry of a communist party and so on and so forth. In short, the material for conflict over doctrine and policy seemed to be more abundant than ever.

These differences did, in fact, have some effect. At Frankfurt, the French *rapporteur* presented the Declaration of Principles with a lack of enthusiasm that provoked much criticism, and it was in deference to French views that its title was amended to make it a declaration of "Aims and Tasks". But it was passed in a form surprisingly free, as we shall see in a moment, from deliberate ambiguity, and it was the evident possibility of its passing, together with the general willingness to accept an International whose decisions should be based on mutual consent, that made it possible for the Comisco meeting of March, 1951, to decide to turn its next full conference into the constituent conference of a revived International.

The statute of the new body specifies that it is "an association of parties which seek to establish democratic socialism" and that its purpose is "to strengthen relations between the affiliated parties and co-ordinate their political attitudes and action by consent". The final draft had said "co-ordinate, so far as possible", but this was thought too defeatist. Its organs are a congress, a council (in which every member party is represented), a bureau of ten members (including a chairman and two vice-chairmen), and a secretariat, at present woefully inadequate. Provision is made for admission of parties with "consultative" or "observer" status only; representatives of the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe, the Women's International Socialist Secretariat, and the International Union of Socialist Youth are restricted to this status. Regional conferences may be

* For a more subtle analysis of these differences, see R. Lowenthal, "The Principles of Socialism", in *Twentieth Century*, August, 1951.

THE REVIVED INTERNATIONAL

held. The most important change as compared with the earlier Internationals is that, instead of the complicated, weighted voting power which was necessitated by the existence of a theoretical power of decision, each party is to have only one vote. The possibilities of domination by big parties like the Labour Party, the S.P.D., and the Swedish party is thus excluded, though it should be added that, if the experience of the interim period is any guide, the Labour Party (and to a lesser extent the Scandinavians) will continue to enjoy a moral authority derived from their conduct of living socialist experiments.

The Declaration of Aims and Tasks is the first document of its kind. Marx's Inaugural Address to the first International contained only two phrases vaguely descriptive of principle and policy, while the succeeding bodies limited themselves respectively to an explicit and a qualified declaration of belief in the class war. It is a significant and a hopeful sign that the present International should combine a more modest estimate of its own powers with a much more solid basis of initial agreement. The Declaration, unlike Marx's hall-marked Address, is a genuinely international product. Each of its five sections was originally drafted in a different country and all contributed to the 18 months of argument which went to its production. The direction of the discussion and the supervision of the final drafting was the work, first of Guy Mollet and then of Salomon Grumbach, both of France.

The document* is more than 2,500 words long, parts of it are already very concise, while others reveal meticulously careful drafting, intended to express a precise measure of agreement. It is therefore not easily summarized, but its main points may be said to be:

1. a critique of capitalism which differs from earlier ones only in emphasis;
2. a statement of the scope of socialism, which, "originally a movement of the wage-earners" who suffered most from capitalism, now "appeals to all men who believe that the exploitation of man by man must be abolished";
3. an affirmation that "the foundations of a socialist society have already been laid" in some countries, (the implication being that revolution is not a necessary prelude);
4. an attack on communism, which has "set back the realization of socialism", "distorted the [socialist] tradition

* *International Socialist Information*, Vol. I, Nos. 27-28, July, 1951.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

- beyond recognition", and "built up a rigid theology, which is incompatible with the critical spirit of Marxism". It has sharpened class divisions "in order to establish the dictatorship of a single party" and made of international communism "the instrument of a new imperialism", based on "militarist bureaucracy", "a new class society" and forced labour;
5. a recognition that international socialism "does not demand a rigid uniformity of approach" and that its achievement is not inevitable, but "demands a personal contribution from all its followers";
 6. a statement of the basic freedoms of political democracy, including the right of opposition;
 7. a summary description of the ultimate goal—"a system in which the public interest takes precedence over the interest of private profit" and of immediate economic aims—"full employment, higher production, a rising standard of life, social security, and a fair distribution of incomes and property";
 8. an insistence that "socialist planning can be achieved by various means" and that public ownership itself can take different forms, while "socialist planning does not presuppose the public ownership of all the means of production";
 9. an equal insistence that planning must be democratic, with a vague reference to decentralization and an equivocal statement on workers' participation in industry (on which, in fact, real disagreement persists);
 10. an admission of the importance of incentive;
 11. a brief summary of social rights;
 12. an insistence on the spiritual aspects of socialism, whose adherents oppose capitalism "... above all because it revolts their sense of justice";
 13. a description of socialism as "international, because it aims at liberating all men from every form of economic, spiritual and political bondage" (i.e. not because the workers have no fatherland, etc., etc.);
 14. a declaration that "absolute national sovereignty must be transcended," followed by the qualification that "the new world society . . . can develop fruitfully in peace only if it is based on voluntary cooperation between nations", under an international rule of law;

THE REVIVED INTERNATIONAL

15. a statement of "positive" anti-imperialism: "democratic socialism must inspire the economic, social and cultural development of these [under-developed] areas, unless they are to fall victims to new forms of oppression".

The declaration ends with the proclamation that "Socialists work for a world of peace and freedom, for a world in which the exploitation and enslavement of men by men and peoples is unknown, for a world in which the development of the individual personality is the basis for the fruitful development of mankind. They appeal to the solidarity of all working men in the struggle for this great aim."

It must again be emphasized that, despite its length, the above is not either a full or an entirely fair summary. It should however bring out the fact that there is here a range of agreement on detailed statements of aims which is in itself enough to justify the creation of an international socialist forum in which the discussion can be pursued further, experiments compared, and consistent policies worked out wherever this is possible. That, at any rate, is the purpose of the new organization. It starts with a great fund of real enthusiasm and goodwill, and has behind it five years of unexpectedly fruitful co-operation. By seeking—as it does—to bring in socialist parties from Asia, South America and Africa, whose interests, problems and stages of development are vastly different from those of Europe, it cheerfully faces, on a bigger scale, the kind of problem that defeated its predecessors and delayed its own creation. It is for socialists themselves, by their own understanding, energy, tolerance and will to learn, to prove that both the old problems and the new can be surmounted.

BEYOND NATIONALISM

By R. G. TUGWELL

IT would be expected that the most remarkable achievements of applied social science would be found in economics and politics rather than in sociology, say, or in planning. The getting and using of goods has always occupied men's minds; and so have the arts of politics. They have been considered to be "practical" in the sense that they go on every day and so require continuous attention. Men could hardly practise such arts for thousands of generations without improving them. Their progress, like that of the natural sciences, has run the familiar course of being slow at first, then accelerating as knowledge accumulated and new generations could move on from lower to higher levels. But they have had a severe handicap, so far as improvement is concerned; they usually involve interests whose resistance can be formidable. They therefore are apt to be treated only infrequently as pure sciences. Indeed most representations of purity come under suspicion for one or another reason of interest, and sometimes purity is seriously adulterated by compromise even in the theoretical stages. Economic and political scientists are most reluctant to put forward any suggestion, however well conceived and firmly supported, which can be thought to be "impractical." So it has not been made clear that attainable ends and the means to their achievements have basically altered.*

If we look with a magnifying eye at any of the crises in progress we can understand better the conditions for achievements in our era whose chief characteristic is an unfolding worldism. What part political science, for instance, both pure and applied, had in the formation of the city-state of antiquity is fairly well known to us. Perhaps our familiarity with it is partly owed to its retreat into a relatively far past so that the main issues stand

* For reasons not too difficult to understand, progress in the techniques flowing from the natural sciences has been in different directions and at a different pace from that originating in the social sciences. The reasons may be sought in differences in both objectives and incentives. The natural sciences have had the purpose of uncovering the laws governing the materials and forces of nature. The scientists had a brush with fundamental religion in the mid-nineteenth century; but those who have made use of scientific discoveries have always been able to do so with public approbation and at a profit. And natural science not only survived but was strengthened by its difficulties. The social sciences take up where the natural sciences leave off and have the purpose of discovering the nature of human behaviour in association. But those who have made use of such discoveries have done so usually in an atmosphere of disapproval and often at a personal sacrifice.

BEYOND NATIONALISM

out away from confusing and irrelevant minor ones. We are less familiar and far less detached and clear in our view of the scientific discoveries, the inventions, the engineering devices and even the political ideas, out of which there issued the era of nationalism and representative government. That, again, is perhaps because we have not yet emerged from that era and because for us it has emotional, even ceremonial values which we tend to set above examination.

Yet as we look back at the beginnings of nationalism and self-determination we can see that formidable obstacles had to be overcome before the some sixty nations which exist to-day could come into being; and that these obstacles were roughly similar to those which oppose the greater consolidation which now must be carried through. Indeed the nation-making process has been such a reluctant one that it is still going on. In the very recent past India and Pakistan have become recognized nations, not to mention Korea, Israel, Syria and Malaya. More than one-fifth of the world's population had to wait a hundred and fifty years longer than the United States of America to become nations; and almost the whole continent of Africa has, presumably, yet to go through the process.

The early causes for this delay were to be found in opposition from ecclesiastics and nobles who were doing very well under the feudal system, so that the consolidating drives of kings and people were much retarded; but the later causes have lain more in the backwardness of peoples themselves who were reluctant to come into the social relations which were being forced by modern technology. China and Japan, for instance, made formidable attempts to shut out "foreign" culture, and India was so enamoured of the values in her feudal system that she consented, however reluctantly, to several hundred years of substantial control from without on condition of tenderness for her ceremonial.

One of the most fortunate cases was that of the United States where, in a relatively unpopulated and fertile land, an immigrant people of vigour and intelligence, rejected the domination of an overseas power and, through a series of lucky circumstances, was recognized to be independent. Independence did not guarantee national union. Britain had held the colonies carefully apart, each tied separately to her at home, and separatism was an active sentiment even when independence had been achieved. There was, in the case of the United States, a complex problem,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

as we can see by looking back; not only had union to be sought and dissidents from it to be placated; but there had to be set up a government of union which would gain a nice balance of order with liberty.

The way in which the applied political scientists of 1787 worked out their problem is one of the most revealing illustrations we possess of the processes which always, in one way or another, take place. Americans need to make a small effort of detachment, to see in it the lessons they need to learn; others are able to profit from it with less admixture of sentiment. For it was not wholly successful. The constitution makers of 1787 knew how to create a better government than issued from their deliberations in Philadelphia, and no doubt a number of them could have predicted not only a civil war to settle certain of the compromised issues, but a long and difficult struggle, short of civil war, to settle certain others.*

The wisest† men of the constitutional group saw that their first business was to perfect the union. There were others who, even if they saw it, were determined to prevent it, and if they could not prevent it, to emasculate its institutions. The mandate of nationalism was strong on the trained and realistic minds of Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, Washington and King. There were others who hated and feared it for one reason or another and who were determined to prevent it with a kind of intolerant opposition which showed itself again and again to be rooted in prejudice, in self-interest or in political expediency. These last

* I need not perhaps be so tentative in suggesting the apprehensions of those unionists who felt that the compromise at Philadelphia would lead to serious trouble. The apprehensions have been obscured by the argumentative encomiums heaped upon the new constitution by the Federalists in the course of the debates concerning its ratification. They were nevertheless very active in the minds of the founders. There is, for instance, the statement of young Gouverneur Morris in the midst of the Convention (July 5th, 1787) "This country must be united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. . . . The scenes of horror attending civil commotion cannot be described, and the conclusion of them will be worse than the term of their continuence. The stronger party will then make traitors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter will finish the work of the sword" (Ferrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, 530). Again and again James Wilson spoke out during the losing battle for the abolition of the states and for a government of national union. And there is the classic statement of Washington (recalled after his death by Gouverneur Morris): "Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair. . . ." And the constitution was decidedly not what he regarded as such a standard, though he made the best of it and shaped it toward union by administration. Later on J. Q. Adams (according to his grandson, Brooks Adams) saw that the compromise had to be reviewed and the union strengthened if civil war was to be averted. There were others as well.

† In the sense of understanding the sweep of forces, of seeing to what conditions government must find accommodation, of being willing to go along with the revolutionary trend rather than of being determined to turn it back.

BEYOND NATIONALISM

were men of local allegiance, of vested interest, or of sentimental attachment of pre-nationalist philosophies which centred in what was called "states' rights". The others, the wiser and more realistic group, understood also that liberty with order involved a strong executive, a small and therefore efficient legislature, and a means in the judiciary for resolving conflict. They also said that the government, however compromised, must bear directly on its citizens and rest directly on their support. These were all nationalist ideas. None was original; for the men at Philadelphia were not pure scientists, but only applied scientists or engineers. The pure science was to be found in Locke and Montesquieu, for instance, and even further back in all those forerunners who had sought for political adjustment to the oncoming industrial revolution.

The compromises at Philadelphia between the modern men, the men of nationalism and union, and those others who still clung to localism, individual liberty without check, and weakness at the centre, were serious. They resulted in an executive so essentially weak that only a half-dozen presidents in a hundred and fifty years were able to exercise the genuine national leadership so necessary in the American system; they resulted also in a bicameral legislature whose upper house, even to-day the only unreformed upper chamber in any legislature in the world, has acted as a frequent protector of vested interests, and a persistent competitor of presidents. Checks and balances, intended to secure individual rights even against government, and yet to maintain order and security, thus became a source of weakness and division.

The lesson which emerges most conspicuously from the American constitutional experience is this: that when there are known to be delicately systematized institutions which will gain accepted philosophic ends, it is not a virtue but a vice to tinker and compromise in order to placate unscientific minds, backward-looking sentiments or vested interests. The resulting confusions and the unsettled issues will only have to be resolved in more violent ways later on. A further lesson is that the substantial achievement at Philadelphia was not the invention of Federalism, but the creation of the national state which was required by the full flowing trend of the times. Federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances, the Senate—all these are the exceptions which prove the rule. They prove it because they were compromises necessary to acceptance and because eventually they

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

had to be paid for so heavily. The nation needed to be recognized for what it was.

It was given an imperfect government for the purpose, because of the concession to reaction; but that merely hampered, it did not stop, the nation-building. The constitutional convention of 1787 was adjourned to a century-long struggle which included a Civil War, but the coming of nationhood was inevitable. It was growing in the womb of destiny and it had inevitably to be born.*

This illustration seems to me to have the sharpest and most vital lessons for us to-day.† For now we face another crisis. We have a new body of science whose applications are forcing social accommodations; nationalism is being made quite as obsolete as colonial separatism was in 1787. Sooner or later there will have to be a world-Philadelphia. What kind of institutions will worldism require? And will a compromise such as was arrived at in 1787 precipitate either another Civil War like that of 1861, or long and tormenting struggles short of Civil War to overcome the obvious deficiencies and compromises in the world constitution of 1960—or later?

As there were in Philadelphia in 1787, in the coming world convention there are likely to be two issues, separate yet concurrent, to be settled. One of these will be: how far will the worldism into which we are advancing be allowed to have its way in the constitution makers' minds? Will there be those who will hold on to nationalism as Patterson, Sherman and Ellsworth did to states' rights? Of course there will; and we can predict their arguments. They will say that the world is too big for mere men to manage; they will say that there is an advantage to be gained from experimenting with different national forms of governments; they will say that especially communism and capitalism must be allowed their own systems of economic and political control. And there will be, as there were in 1787, much

* One of America's greatest jurists, Justice Holmes, perhaps finally reinforced the nationalist theory in 1919 (in *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), p. 433): "When we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they (the framers) have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope, that they had created an organism: it has taken a century and cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation." And see also "Our Federal Union Reconsidered", by A. T. Mason, in *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXV, pp. 302 ff., in which attention is called to the opinion of Chief Justice Chase, nine years after Lincoln's adoption of Patrick Henry's "perpetual union", in which Lincoln was amply confirmed—and almost in his very words.

† We could find others equally sharp in the creation of British, French, German, Italian or other national states. But they would be no better for the purpose here.

in the arguments of those who are thus opposed to worldism. Some of the arguments will be covering ones for special privilege; some will be political ones for home consumption (which, by the way, is why, as again, at Philadelphia, there must be a convention of people's delegates apart from such ambassadorial delegates as are accredited to the United Nations); but others will be sincere. Justice Brandeis was always sincere enough about the paramountcy of states rights and about the essential sinfulness of bigness. He thought the United States too big to be a real union, even in the twentieth century; and there will be those who will, just as sincerely, think the world too big for union in the twenty-first century.

That question will, we must conclude from the Philadelphia experience, be settled for the world, in the convention we can now foresee, by a compromise; the government, like that which was given the United States, is very likely to be a Federation of nation-states—those now existing. If that happens we have further to conclude that thereupon the peoples of the world will enter upon a century of tormented struggle to define the spheres of national as against world power. The differences may cause a Civil War and, if they do, and if the rebel nation or group of nations does not blow up the earth with atomic weapons, there is still no guarantee that the side of the Union will win in the first struggle. There may have to be others. This is the prospect—that is, unless that people learn from the Philadelphia lesson and others like it that genuine Union is necessary; and unless they send delegates to the forthcoming convention instructed without reservation to accomplish it. World union is what is dictated now by the developments of technology; any departure from it will be compromise with unreality, with backward-looking sentiment, with dangerous divisive forces which may well turn destructive.

The other great issue, besides that of genuine union, will be: What kind of government for the world? Part of that, but only part, will be settled in the struggle over the weakness or strength of the Union. There will still remain issues of enormous importance. They will have their roots in old desires as well as in new necessities. They will have to do with liberty, with security, with individual opportunity, as well as with the wholly new operating problems of the great collectivity, that is, with the attempt to establish institutions which will gain and ensure progress.

If, at the world convention which will correspond with that at

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Philadelphia in 1787, there will almost certainly be those who will oppose, sincerely or insincerely, the genuine Union dictated by the scientific imperative, there will be others, much more numerous, who will be present to argue against the required governmental institutions. And even when mistaken, they will be equally sincere; often, indeed they will have a missionary zeal. Their appeal will be to sentiments more intense, because more primitive, than those to which the modernists and realists can appeal. Their arguments may be superficial, but they will be long and loud and they will echo in many a tired mind among the electorate. They will say that liberty is not being gained but stifled; that initiative is being strangled and that progress will consequently be stopped; that long held, even natural, rights are being infringed; that those who have created civilization are being penalized rather than rewarded; that the world will be overwhelmed by its most irresponsible breeders and that consequently starvation, misery and regress are certain to set in.*

This will happen because those who will know the modern world for what it is will be present and will be compelled out of their knowledge, by sheer integrity, to press for a government shaped to gain the combined objectives of liberty, equality, security and progress. These were not the objectives of any constitutional convention of the past. They were sometimes said to be; and there were usually, among the drafters those to whom these objectives were real. But no constitution ever issued which was not weighted to favour a class, a locality, a ruling group; and which was not shaped more to the issues of the past than to

* That these are very nearly the same indictments which were brought against the Constitution of the United States in 1788-9 no American needs to be reminded. Even after the severe compromises in the Convention there were many dissidents whose themes were similar. Perhaps typical among them was "Cato", now supposed to be George Clinton, who had then been for eleven years Governor of New York. "Cato's" polemics were published in the *New York Journal* between September, 1787, and January, 1788. It was these letters to the *Journal* which drew the replies from Hamilton, Madison and Jay which we know as *The Federalist Papers*. "Cato" said that the terms of reference had been exceeded; but that, even if they had not, the proposed government was too big to be operated. Not even the promised domestic tranquillity could be guaranteed; nevertheless the army it would maintain for this purpose would make it tyrannous. The aristocratic South would dominate the frugal and industrious North; and the states would be improperly subject to Federal regulation. Furthermore the hodge-podge of checks and balances made such an impossible mix-up that dictatorship would presently supervene and all would be lost. Clinton being a governor, perhaps his real objection was that ratification was entrusted not to state legislatures in which governors had a veto, but to people's conventions. Or perhaps it was that the States were obviously now to be of less importance than they had formerly been, even New York, the Empire State. It seems somewhat ironic that, after all this, Clinton should have served as Vice-President under two Presidents, thus making his transition to the New State he had fought so bitterly more profitable in many ways than that of his contemporaries.

BEYOND NATIONALISM

those of the future. Those who had prospered as things were always managed to be present, and were always reluctant midwives to new institutions. The past has always had a heavy hand in the drafting of new charters; and for obvious reasons: those who drafted them were usually men of the past, many of whom were more regardful of their own interests and preferences than of the general good, or what amounted to the same thing, thought their own interests identical with the general good.

Liberty, equality, security, progress: these, in the approaching age of syncopated time and space, and of equal and cheap access to universal forces, will require, for their attainment and protection, institutional conceptions beyond any known to the nineteenth century. A world constitution which came out of the past, modelled on that of the United States, which was an imperfect realization of eighteenth-century political desires, or on that of any other nation, would be utterly incapable of attaining these objectives, or, indeed, of containing and utilizing the forces now at large in the world.

The question at issue in the great series of debates on which mankind is now entering is not whether there will be world government; there will be one unless, before humanity gets around to it, all life is destroyed. The real question is whether the government shall be designed for the past or for the future. And this is a more momentous issue in our time than it has ever been before because of that incredible technological acceleration of which I have spoken. The constitution of the United States was shaped to gain the approval of typical eighteenth-century men; its reshaping to meet the requirements of the nineteenth century was accomplished by slow and tortuous means. Each issue as it came up—individual rights, states' rights, corporate rights, and finally social rights—had to be fought out in long campaigns, one of which became a costly Civil War, and others of which barely escaped resort to force. It required a century and a half to arrive at the tolerably workable instrument for American nationalism of the mid-twentieth century. There are still clauses in the constitution to which vested interests, opponents of centralization, and those who stand to gain from governmental chaos, appeal with at least a show of righteousness and legality. But there is still a little time for final concurrences.

There are those who believe that there is no other way than this to create a governmental instrument, because no other kind

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

can gain majority acceptance. They may be right, not only for that reason, but for others. For instance, constitution-making is seldom entrusted to others than those safe men who represent the approved ideas of their time—ideas which have had time to mature and to spread, to be fought over and finally to gain wide consent. By the time this spreading process is completed it is almost a certainty that they will be, except as to basic intent, obsolete. Liberty will be defined as a kind of freedom from restriction which cannot possibly be allowed in our time without endangering others; security will very likely be defined as insurance against risks which are not the really dangerous ones in our modern world; individual rights will almost certainly infringe on social ones; and so on. And there will be lacking the necessary delegations of power to control the dangers, reduce the risks, and secure the initiatives which will be more and more essential in the future.

It is pleasant to think of a kind of homestead or country town existence where every man can be a small king, where there are wide spaces to which the disgruntled can emigrate, and in which social authority is not demanding. It is pleasant to assume that time will be allowed for the slow and argumentative settlement of issues. It is pleasant but it is not realistic. In the dead world where these pleasures were allowed it was not required of man that he impose upon himself rigorous rules for social conduct, that his initiative be guided by the requirements of a great functioning *Gestalt* from which there could be no exception and no escape; and that he act with exactness and promptitude. But these will be required in the century upon which we are entering and during which the constitution we now contemplate will be expected to function.

The constitution for the future must be written expressly for the containment and utilization of the techniques now being engineered into utilization. One decade, two decades from now, the prime movers for industry will be others than those now in use; and, let us face it, they will be unsuitable for private exploitation. In that short time, also, many important sources of man's clothing, his shelter and his food may well be ones heretofore not even thought of. Our goods may come from the sea and the air, as much as from the earth, synthesized with the aid of the newly-unlocked atomic energy. Shall we make a constitution to govern men labouring in the factories and fields of the present only to find, after a little, that the factories have been

BEYOND NATIONALISM

transformed, that the fields have become of minor importance, and that the great issues of economics and politics were not conceived at all by the constitution-makers.

Does a transition to such a new world seem fantastic? Perhaps. But imagine how a forecasting of the wireless and the aeroplane, to say nothing of atomic fire, would have appeared even to the far-sighted Franklin, the practical Washington, or the methodical Madison, if predictions about them had been injected into the proceedings at Philadelphia in 1787. In those meetings, even the freeing of interstate commerce which had initiated the convention, because it was necessary to national union, was very little discussed. Mostly the discussion centred on already fading issues, held there by those who looked backward into the past rather than forward into the future. States' rights held the central interest while men like Washington and Wilson, who thought that the states were vestigial survivors from the past, despaired of gaining the nationalist objectives they knew to be necessary. Except for a few expositions by James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, the future seldom appeared in Philadelphia, and when it was cautiously and apologetically put forward, it was invariably shouted at and trampled on by Martin, Gerry, Ellsworth, Patterson, and others of the "local views". No, it was not a forthright meeting. What had to be done could not be pushed into the open and discussed with frankness and reason. It had to be contrived, inserted into fugitive clauses, made cryptic and sometimes confused. The past was, at Philadelphia, on the offensive; the future was shrinking, reluctant and on the whole unsuccessful in finding its way into the constitution.

The technological probabilities must not be allowed, in the coming world convention, to seem fantastic; and the nationalists must not be allowed, as the states' righters were at Philadelphia, to centre discussion on issues which no longer have real importance. Man is coming into possession of unimaginable potential riches. They can only be prevented from materializing by his own failure to exploit the opportunities offered by science. This failure will be registered most effectively by omitting its facilitating mechanisms from government. The future world constitution ought to provide for the planning devices and the operating organizations required for these tasks. Omission of these would be as costly in the long run as were the fatal concessions of the nationalists at Philadelphia.

Nature long ago gave up the attempt to improve individual man. That is the meaning—the most significant meaning—of the careful researches into man's past made in our generation. Primitive man has become almost as well known to us as our contemporaries. He was so like ourselves that differences in his behaviour are only to be accounted for by differences in his circumstances. It has sometimes been concluded from this that there is no hope of improvement. Why, it is asked, would another 50,000 years bring about more changes than did the last 50,000? The answer to this is that the last 50,000 years did make most enormous changes—not in man's nature but in his behaviour. This was because the new circumstances called out hitherto unused responses from an original equipment which was far more varied than was apparent from the simple social behaviour of primitive groups. What can now be seen is that nature long ago found a more satisfactory method than biological change for the improvement of the human species. That, of course, was social evolution. What man cannot do alone, because of his limited abilities, he succeeds in doing with the collaboration of his fellows. There is no theoretical limit to the effectiveness which may be achieved by his joint effort. It is, in fact, one of nature's infinities. Our civilization is the product of such complementary jointures, and what we shall have will be the product of further jointures. It is no torturing of terms to call this collaborative mechanism a collective mind, and to think of its embodiment in government as the instrument *par excellence* of future progress.

There is dissent to this. There is indeed a most ardent and widespread belief that collectivism is an impossible, and even if possible, a dangerous, sea for humanity to embark on. The opposite of collectivism is, of course, individualism, which recognizes society only as loose associations of essentially independent individuals, each guiding his conduct by his own conception of self-interest. The theory involves the belief that these self-interests will add up somehow to social good.

The projection of this kind of belief would, I think, yield a system of government less advanced than that embodied in the American Constitution. It would confer theoretical rights on everyone which no one could actually have. Such a system was not so fantastic a conception when the population of the world was about one-quarter its present size, when there were wholly unutilized continents and unexploited resources, when

even the steam engine was unknown, and when the journey from Mt. Vernon to New York required something like two weeks. It must be insisted that to-day it is wholly fantastic.

The forces and resources which are obviously to be utilized in future productive operations are of a sort which no individual, however gifted, will be capable of mastering; only complementary groups, functioning for society somewhat as the brain functions for the human organization, bringing to decisions concerning direction an increasing objectivity and reflectiveness, will be capable of understanding and utilizing them. The sheer voltage of technological energy now being applied to social machinery would destroy any one individual through whom it sought to pass. Man has the choice of rejecting its potential power for good or of organizing the collectivity which can utilize it. This is perhaps not quite accurate. Matters have gone so far that choice is really foreclosed: that is, rejection would amount to suicide since these forces are just as potentially destructive as they are constructive. Perhaps the only real choice now, as I have intimated, is whether the new world will be entered on eagerly or reluctantly. And reluctance, if it leads to as much compromise as was necessary in 1787, might result in a narrow escape from destruction and perhaps a long period of painful adjustment to the new circumstances of human life.

The new constitution, it will be seen, will need to be less a constitution in the classical sense, marking out what government may or may not do, and establishing firm relationships among its parts, than a flexible operating mechanism for an expanding society, oriented to co-operation rather than to individualism. It must at least embody a mechanism for envisaging and preparing for the visible future and for shaping the forces now rushing at mankind out of the great and little spaces of the universe. Government itself will, in fact, need to be understood in different terms than it has been in the past. The constitution of the United States, because of intense concentration on liberty, became an excellent instrument for protecting men and their corporate bodies from the controls of government. The same effort made it a relatively poor instrument for protecting government from exploitation by private interests. Little attention, really, was given to saying what government might do; and a great deal was given to saying what it might not do. That negativism was the product of eighteenth-century individualism and was good for what it was; but it cannot be pretended that

it contemplated one single positive duty for government other than those essential to the preservation of national existence. This was the superlative good. The superlative bad, on the other hand, was oppression of its citizens by a state grown strong in defending its existence. Between the attempts to attain the good and to avoid the bad, the clauses of the constitution are divided. Sometimes there is conflict and then the compromise is unintelligible; but on the whole the intent is clear.

Neither of these will be the central issues in shaping the world constitution of the future. The nationalist sentiment (which is so likely to dictate a weak federal union) will be most dangerous because it is likely to establish the conditions of imminent civil war; the demand for individual rights, which will be so strong because so many of the world's people still have not secured them, may cause a kind of delayed controversy, although there is not likely to be formidable dissent from a clear statement of such obligations. The danger is that even so obsolete an issue may divert attention from positivist necessities, and so be dangerous in this sense. That all men, not only Americans, are coming into an age in which they must find civil rights and economic justice in a controlled sharing of what combined men and a released nature can produce, may very well not be an easy injunction for the constitution-makers to accept. It will be, nevertheless, the ruling necessity of the future. Collective man cannot have more than is produced, and men's rights cannot run beyond those which are inherent in the collectivity to which all of them will belong. They may still hope to take something away from others or to maintain rights which others do not have. They will not succeed for long even if it requires violence to establish the principle. It will be a good time for man to be wise before the fact lest there be no afterward; and for him to embody the contributory principle in a constitution which may be expected to be the fundamental law of the twenty-first century.

RE-SALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS

By G. D. H. COLE

THE Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act was passed only three years ago; but it is already clear—if it was not clear from the outset—that very little is to be expected from it as it stands. The entire approach to the problem in the Act was wrong: the Monopolies Commission established under it was limited to the investigation of particular cases referred to it by the Government, with or without a request to recommend action as well as to report on the facts. If action was recommended, the appropriate Ministry had then to take the responsibility of deciding what to propose, and any draft order drawn up required the confirmation of both Houses of Parliament before it could come into force. Such a procedure might have worked if there had been, to begin with, either a list of prohibited practices included in the Act itself or a general instruction to the Commission to draw up such a list as its first duty, for inclusion in a further Act of Parliament or in a general Statutory Order to be laid before Parliament for approval. In the absence of any such general set of principles defining the permissible limits of monopoly practices, the whole affair was bound to be a farce. The methods of restriction employed over a wide range of products differ from product to product mainly in inessentials: their broad nature is in almost all cases the same. Accordingly, any proposal to take action against a particular group found guilty by the Commission and by the Government of restrictive practices contrary to the public interest would have been widely denounced as unfair discrimination unless it had been applied to many others who were doing the same thing. In fact, when the Commission did find conclusive evidence of the existence of a restrictive combination governing the terms of sale of the great majority of dental goods, the Government could not see what to do about it—especially because the Commission held that the manufacturers and traders concerned had been making only a moderate use of the immense power which their virtual monopoly conferred on them.

The reason why the problem was approached in this piecemeal fashion was that the Government had not in 1948 really

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

made up its mind to what extent it disapproved of monopoly practices, or even positively approved of them in certain aspects. The inter-war years had been full of complaints, above all in the cotton industry, about the bad effects of what was called "weak selling"—that is, cutting of prices by firms which would otherwise have had to close down altogether for lack of orders, but could keep going by selling at a loss in relation to total costs in the hope of a return of better times. Such practices undermined wage-standards, as well as spoilt the market for more efficient producers; and, over a much wider field, trade unions found it easier to strike satisfactory collective bargains with monopolists and highly organized trade groups which were in a position to maintain prices than with firms or associations in highly competitive trades, except where demand for a particular type of product was expanding fast. Trade unions, themselves aiming at a "monopoly of labour" as a means of strengthening their bargaining powers, were not disposed to look unfavourably on employers' monopolies which resulted in a margin of profit that could be eaten into by demanding higher wages or improved conditions of employment.

Moreover, socialists—or at any rate those socialists who thought of socialization of the means of production as the main part of socialism—had no such objection to monopoly as those who believed that the benefits of *laissez-faire* and unlimited competition are favourable to consumers' interests. Socialization, at any rate over a large area of industry, was envisaged as involving *public* monopoly; and though those who favoured socialization objected to *private* monopoly as exploitation, the force of their opposition was weakened because they tended to think of organized as better than unorganized industry, and of state regulation as a desirable halfway house between private capitalism and public ownership. "Rationalization" came to be a convenient term for monopolists to shelter under; and in the conditions of persistent unemployment and threat to wage-standards between the wars, the "planners" tended on the whole to prefer the monopolists to the apostles of cut-throat competition. The monopolists and the trade associations which followed policies of price-maintenance and output regulation continually asserted that their practices steadied trade and employment, made possible fair wages and conditions, and did not result in higher average prices to the consumers because they facilitated investment and thus fostered the cheapening of

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND MONOPOLY

production. It was also argued that the organized industries were in the best position for following policies of standardization and specialization and thus achieving the full economies of large-scale production.

These contentions were manifestly untrue in some cases, where the effect of organization was to keep high-cost producers in the market by sharing out the trade, or where a well-entrenched group was in a position to bar a trade to new entrants. But there were other cases in which there was evidently some truth in them—for example, Imperial Chemicals or even, despite much that has been said to the contrary, cement. Most, however, of the arguments in favour of restrictive policies lost their force as soon as the economy began to operate under conditions of full employment. "Weak selling" disappeared: in face of a general scarcity of goods, every firm became in some degree a monopolist, with an assured market. New investments being limited, it became impossible in any event to drive obsolescent plant out of use, because it could not be replaced by more efficient instruments. The price-raising, as distinct from the price-equalising, effects of monopolies and trade associations became much more evident; and the wages-stop, itself the consequence of a sheer shortage of consumers' goods, made the trade unions look askance at the mounting profits of the monopolists, even if a large part of them was being taxed away and a further large part set aside for capital renewals and developments. This affected the trade union attitude.

Throughout, the co-operative movement had been pressing the Government for action against monopoly practices, partly because it was the biggest organized body standing mainly for the consumers' interest, but also because it was particularly a victim of one large set of restrictionists, headed by the organized producers of proprietary articles. The practice of re-sale price maintenance, whether by single large producing firms or by trade associations or rings of manufacturers, or of manufacturers and dealers combined, was especially objectionable to co-operators—above all in those cases in which the payment of co-operative dividend on purchases was treated as an infringement of the price-regulation rules laid down as a condition of supply. The co-operators were deeply dissatisfied with the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948, and pressed the Government hard for further legislation designed completely to outlaw this particular type of restriction; and this

leading manufacturers of this commodity have a reputation for a sense of the public interest that would make it surprising if they were found to be playing the part of irresponsible monopolists. Yet they have a system of re-sale price maintenance which, though a good deal less rigid than those already referred to, covers a large part of the trade in the established brands. In this instance, only a small part of the total sales is made by shops which sell only confectionery, and the total number of retail outlets is very large and is made up of many different kinds of "sales-points". The main pressure seems, however, to have come from regular confectioners: these found their trade threatened by price-cutting rivals who stocked a few leading brands for sale at cut prices and made their profits on the sale of non-branded confectionery bought outside the main suppliers, or of other kinds of goods. The manufacturers agreed to introduce re-sale price maintenance chiefly on the ground that the price-cutters were an unstable element in the trade, constantly coming and going and tending on the whole to encourage the sale of sub-standard products. In this case, I should say that the argument in favour of fixed re-sale prices is weak, though plausible: once admitted, it opens the door much too wide.

At this point, we had better come back to the general question. I do not propose, in this brief article, to attempt any discussion of the broad issue of the effects of monopoly upon output and prices at the manufacturing stage. That is a most important question; but it cannot be dealt with in an incidental paragraph. I must limit what I have to say to re-sale price maintenance as a particular form of restriction. This practice may enable a monopolist, or a ring, to charge higher prices *at the factory* than could be charged without it, as far as it limits competition among producers or wholesalers or at the retail end. But its main effect, as distinct from what a monopolist or a ring could achieve without it, will be to make the consumer pay for what he buys a price unaffected by the actual costs of distributing the article. If he lives near the source of supply, he will pay as much as if he lives far away: whether he carries his purchase home or has it expensively delivered to him will not affect the price: nor will he be able to achieve any economy by seeking out the most efficient dealer, or that one whose costs are for any reasons lowest. He will pay a standard price for a service of which the cost varies greatly from dealer to dealer.

Undoubtedly this system, as the White Paper points out,

encourages the entry of firms into those branches of distribution in which it flourishes; for it results in guaranteed margins and favours especially the small trader who is looking for a safe minimum of profitable turnover. It also tends to foster extravagant service on the part of low-cost traders who are precluded from reducing prices and therefore try to compete in quality of service. Most people will agree that at present a tendency exists towards over-employment in the distributive trades, in relation to what the economy can properly spare from other occupations; and in these circumstances keen competition might well have the double effect of shutting down marginal high-cost traders and of promoting economies in man-power through the speedier development of self-service methods. These results, however, would hardly be great, merely from the removal of re-sale price maintenance: nor, evidently, does the Government expect its proposals to have any considerable effect on the cost of living—indeed, Sir Hartley Shawcross has explicitly disclaimed such hopes. The main case in favour of outlawing re-sale price maintenance is that it puts undue power into the hands of irresponsible monopolists or monopolistic groups, and that such a situation is intolerable when every penny has, for reasons of national economy, to be looked at more closely than ever.

The maintenance of re-sale prices cannot, however, be properly considered in isolation, apart from a practice which commonly, though not universally, goes with it—exclusive dealing, or at the least preferential dealing with traders who are parties to the bargain. Most of the substantial schemes of re-sale price maintenance are embodied in agreements to which both manufacturers and distributors are parties, and include clauses which either restrict traders to stocking only goods derived from the manufacturers in the group, or manufacturers to supplying only "authorized" traders (or of course both), or, at the least, give traders in the group better terms than traders outside it. Such clauses evoke the ancient, but by no means dead, idea of the "right to a trade"—which goes back to the medieval guilds and lives on in the practices both of the recognized higher professions, such as doctors and lawyers and accountants, and of the trade unions of skilled workers. The establishment, or at least the attempt to establish, such an exclusive right has been characteristic of the development of the newer professions; and the sentiment behind it—which is also a matter of hard business—finds a ready echo in any assembly of retail traders.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

It is clearly in the consumers' interest, except when some very strong reason can be shown to the contrary, that any trader should be free to sell whatever he pleases to stock. Such an arrangement is convenient, and tends to make the trader responsive to the customer's wants. Anything which confines dealing to an exclusive body of specialist traders is bad, unless a very special case can be made out; and so is anything which discriminates in respect of what the dealer pays between "legitimate" traders and "interlopers". It has, however, been found in not a few cases that price-maintenance is very difficult to enforce without some element of exclusive dealing, or at least price-discrimination between dealers: so that, quite largely, the two practices have to be judged together.

Although the Government has now come down on the side of a general measure forbidding re-sale price maintenance and the practices chiefly associated with it, there are clear signs in the White Paper that exceptions are contemplated, where a good enough case can be made out. The Lloyd-Jacob Committee, which went less far than the White Paper, recommended the Government, as a preliminary to action, to engage in discussions with the principal associations of manufacturers and traders concerning the best means of ensuring that consumers should be allowed to get the benefit of price-reductions which low-cost distributors could afford to make, and the proposals put forward in the White Paper follow on the failure of these discussions to bring to light any willingness on the part of the trades concerned to modify their practices. The Government, in effect, having failed to persuade the restrictionists to agree that there is anything amiss with their behaviour, decided to put them in a position in which each of them would have either to justify its conduct from the standpoint of its consistency with the public interest, or to give it up. Of what this would mean in practice, if the Government's proposals were to become law, it is not easy to form any idea. Many, or few, of the firms and groups affected might make out a good, or a plausible, enough case to be treated as exceptions; and, in such decisions, a great deal might depend on the trend of government policy at the time—and still more on the party complexion of the government in office.

If the present proposals become law, and if a Labour Government remains in power to carry them into effect, the possession of the authority to allow forms of price-maintenance as ex-

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND MONOPOLY

ceptions to a general prohibition will obviously strengthen the Government's hand in developing price-controls and the supply of reasonably priced goods over a fairly extensive field. The prices prescribed under government control arrangements are, of course, normally maximum or standard rather than minimum prices; but under conditions of scarcity the maximum and the minimum will always tend to become the same, as they have done under schemes of "utility" production. Within the Government's present powers there have been serious difficulties in the way of enforcing a sufficient output of "utility" lines. These would not of course be removed if the Government were in a position to attach conditions to permission to fix re-sale prices for particular classes of goods; but the existence of the power might make some difference. The White Paper underlines the point that it is not prepared to take any action limiting the freedom of manufacturers to fix *maximum* re-sale prices; and there is much to be said for a large extension of the practice of labelling packaged goods in this way, as well as of widening the range of goods sold under "utility" conditions. In these matters, however, nothing that it is proposed to do about re-sale price maintenance can be expected to play more than a minor part.

The White Paper has had what most people would call a favourable reception. Hardly anyone, except the bodies whose practices it is proposed to outlaw, has attacked it for what it positively puts forward. It has been criticized by some Conservatives—and also by some Liberals—for exempting socialized enterprises from its scope, and by others for making no parallel attack on the restrictive policies of certain kinds of trade union. As against these sins of omission, it has been welcomed enthusiastically by a number of *laissez-faire* economists, who profess to see in it a recognition by the Government of the error of its price-fixing ways and the promise of a re-invocation of the holy principle of cut-throat competition. On the first of these points, it is difficult to see what the critics would be at, unless they really mean that we ought to vary the price of postage according to the different costs of delivery in near or remote areas, or to charge consumers of gas or electricity, or even water, according to the costs involved in supplying each individual dwelling. There is a great deal to be said in favour of standard prices for standard goods, whenever they do not involve the exaction of monopoly profits based on the costs of the highest-

cost producers. On the second point, no one seriously supposes that trade union practices can be dealt with in the same way as those of trade associations—an attempt which has broken down even in the United States. Labour emphatically is not a commodity in the same sense as a bar of chocolate or a motor-car: collective bargaining about human rights is a very different thing from fixing a minimum price for an article of commerce. If trade union restrictive practices need to be dealt with at all by legislation, and can be with good effect, they will require an Act of their own, quite distinct from any measure regulating ordinary business monopolies.

Finally, as for the plaudits of the friends of *laissez-faire*, let them take what comfort they can. There is nothing at all inconsistent in forbidding irresponsible private monopolists to fix *minimum* re-sale prices and continuing to fix *maximum* prices for utility and other controlled goods. Indeed, if the Government wishes to make any real impact on living costs by means of price-regulation, it will have to do this mainly by re-erecting the controls which have been so largely swept away during the past few years and by insisting on a much larger proportion of supplies of consumers' goods for the home market being produced and sold under "utility" conditions.

The White Paper, in effect, though it strikes at the roots of a practice which extends over a considerable range of consumer products, can of itself make no major difference to the trend of living costs. Even if nearly a third of the supply of consumers' goods sold in shops is subject to some form of retail price maintenance (or rather was in 1938—the date to which the estimate refers) it is unlikely that in most cases the abolition of the practice would in the event make more than a fractional difference to prices, unless it were accompanied by measures designed to improve the efficiency of distribution. This is no good reason against carrying the proposals of the White Paper into effect, or against strengthening the powers of the Monopolies Commission in other ways; but it remains true that the White Paper is more important as a gesture and a warning than as a positive contribution towards cheaper living, which is in the last resort mainly a matter dependent on international factors or, in its domestic aspects, on cutting out the high-cost producer and tidying up the wasteful chaos of the existing distributive system.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

By N. A. SMITH

I

OUT of social conditions such as those described in the pages of Dickens, Mayhew, and Booth there arose in the closing decades of the last century a new working class movement of revolt that was both helped and subdued by an insurgent wing of the middle class ready to voice its claims and to give them a theoretical framework. In 1945 this movement culminated in a government of working class leaders and middle class intellectuals; and from that year we date the welfare state many features of which, however, were begun by earlier legislation.

So far the welfare state has been little criticized. Its principal beneficiaries are the electorally powerful wage earning classes. Public men of all parties are therefore careful to pay lip service both to Demos and to the welfare state. Heavy taxation is disliked by the owning classes, but this taxation has not as yet fundamentally impaired their privileged position. As to the middle class, those members of it who have spent much of their lives advocating the welfare state are naturally disinclined to criticize their own creation. Besides, the organization and administration of the welfare state has become a middle class vested interest. In children's welfare alone there are now many different kinds of professional and semi-professional jobs non-existent half a century ago. From middle class quarters, therefore, as well as from working class politicians and the working classes themselves there is constant pressure to increase the scope and functions of the welfare state; and for the present it seems to be agreed on all sides that the social services are good and that we can do with more of them.

2

We can distinguish four ideas or aspirations underlying the welfare state.

First—mutual aid. Few people can rely on their neighbours for help nowadays: industrialism and the impersonal nature of urban life have almost extinguished neighbourliness. Members

of families still help out one another as before, but families now tend to be smaller, more scattered, and less cohesive. Above all, those living in the big towns are for the most part helplessly dependent on the efficiency and goodwill of large organizations for their livelihood and comfort. When things go wrong and they can get no work, nor food, nor houseroom, they can only turn for help to those other large organizations, the state and the local authorities. We have only to read Victorian social history or to look at those countries where communally organized mutual aid does not exist, or is only rudimentarily organized, to see how much more horrible modern civilization can be without it.

Second—social welfare. The purpose here is to improve conditions, not by striking at the root causes of our social problems but by palliative and reformatory measures undertaken when the troubles shew themselves in individuals and families. A family is poverty stricken, perhaps because the father drinks or gambles: therefore give the children free school meals and “necessitous” clothing. A woman deserts her husband and child: therefore put the child into a boarding school. A boy picks up bad companions on the streets and is caught with a stolen bicycle: therefore refer him to a child guidance clinic or put him into an approved school. Or you may have a family of three girls where the parents are uncertified mental defectives. The father, found guilty of incest, goes to prison; two girls are taken into care by the local authority; the third goes into a home to await an illegitimate baby; and the mother goes on public assistance.

Such cases are endless; and the question arises whether the social problem can ever be solved by welfare methods. The answer is that it can never be so solved. The flooding river of social mischance and evil simply cannot be dried up by plugging some of the worst leaks. Social welfare, badly needed as it is, can never be a substitute for more fundamental reform. Nevertheless, it has come to be regarded by many as such a substitute.

Third—social justice. What is sought here is greater equality, chiefly through the wider diffusion of those privileges hitherto reserved for the more well-to-do. We narrow the gap by bringing down the rich and at their expense raising up the poor. Thus the poor are given nominal equality with the rich as regards education and medical treatment, and houses and flats are built for their occupation whilst those better off are left to solve their own housing problems.

The quest for social justice brings us face to face with the *fourth* aspiration behind the welfare state. This may be described, perhaps not too unfairly, as the hope that society may be reformed without really changing anything. Many people approve of redistributive taxation because it takes money from those who can afford it and gives it to the poor as grants and subsidies. But it may be asked—Why go to all this trouble to *redistribute* income: why not distribute it properly in the first place? Instead of giving free legal aid to poor persons why not simplify and cheapen the law and reform the legal profession? Instead of trying to give all children some sort of old school tie why not bring the education system into line with modern thought and modern needs? Instead of increasing and diversifying the number of first aid therapies in the welfare state why not take steps to build up social health and thus gradually get rid of the need for so much first aid?

Part of the answer is that we do not agree how these things should be done even where we want them done. It is certain that reform would be slow, difficult, and politically dangerous; and it would be opposed not only by the interests involved, and by the millions of simple conservatives in the welfare state (many of whom vote labour or liberal), but by much of progressive opinion also. For example, though the heavy taxation of unearned incomes, which would have been regarded as wicked a century ago, is now accepted as part of the order of things even by those who pay most in such taxes, the legal extinction of the rentier and landowner as such would find few supporters anywhere—certainly not among wage earners. When the latter, in their millions, fill up their weekly football coupons they do so in the hope that they will win a prize big enough to enable them to join the ranks of the receivers of unearned incomes. They see nothing wrong in a man living in comfort without having to work for his living: *that* is their ambition; and those who succeed are envied, not condemned. Successful gamblers are allowed to withdraw themselves from productive work and live thereafter on the work of others because inheritance does the same thing every day among the propertied classes. The fact is that when we raise a democratic welfare state on the foundations of the unreformed old social order we must expect some of the vices of that order to spread from the minority to the majority in the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

name of social justice and equality. In particular, the paradisiacal dream of the rentier is not only unextinguished in the welfare state but spreading to classes that once had no hopes of an unearned income and a cushioned existence. It is possible for the minority to be carried on the backs of the majority but not for the majority itself to be so carried. Accordingly, it would be wiser to equalize by abolishing indefensible privilege altogether, not to spread it more widely and to help or allow those below to imitate the parasitism of those above. Such a step, however, would mean a change in ideas and beliefs and in public policy far more revolutionary than anything yet contemplated in the welfare state or by its upholders.

Education is a good example of the sort of muddle we get into when we try to change things while leaving them much as before. Our schools are ranged in a hierarchy in which some schools have much more "parity of esteem" than others. Now, parents do not want the school system reformed; they want their children to have a privileged education or, as they call it, a good education; and they seek places for them in the schools most esteemed. But it is impossible to please everybody in this matter and so, as a first step, all secondary schools are declared equal. This leaves the situation as before. Next, as places in the grammar schools are sought most of all (largely because of the prestige of the independent schools, all of them grammar schools of one kind or another, and because of the preferred jobs to which the grammar schools have hitherto led) educational reformers try to get round the difficulty by declaring all secondary "streams" equal and in some areas combine them together in comprehensive schools on one site so that there shall be no doubt about it. Also, the school certificate, formerly taken only by those children in grammar schools, is put into the grasp of all who stay on at whatever school up to the requisite age. This equalising down has the effect of enhancing the prestige of the grammar schools that remain, especially those outside the state system, and of making parents ever more wishful of sending their children to them. But only those who can afford it will be able to get the privileged education they seek. The next stage therefore is to advocate that fees in independent schools be done away with and that entry into them be by "merit". Reformers have no wish to abolish the independent schools for they concede their superiority and, in fact, usually send their own children to them.

Behind all this controversy lies the assumption that the main

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

purpose of a school is to improve social status and to open up favoured careers. No deeper understanding of the role of education in a complicated civilization is shown either by those who press for educational "reform", or by those opposing it.

4

Public spirited men and women actively supporting the policies and practices of the welfare state find it hard to believe that all may not be as well in it as they like to think. Conscious of their good intentions they are apt to assume that no harm can come of their efforts if they put aside private interests and pursue what they believe to be the good of society with disinterested zeal. This is by no means the case as may be seen if we try to assess the gains and losses of the welfare state.

It is often said that poverty has practically disappeared in the welfare state. Certainly a nation that aims to get rid of poverty is more likely to do so than one where the governing classes think nothing of it and are preoccupied with other ends. So much can be put to the credit of the welfare state as compared with, say, Victorian England or Franco's Spain. But to have a nominal aim is one thing, to feel it as a vital purpose is another. Something has been done in post war England to take the edge off poverty, especially where children are concerned; beggars are at present less numerous; and some classes of workers are better off than before. Yet the kind of poverty that is just above subsistence level is still widespread and sowing and reaping daily its harvest of bad health, premature death, pinched lives, mean minds, and crime. Even now the problem of poverty is not put where it belongs in social policy, at the top of the list after national defence. We tend to be misled, too, by American ideas of what constitutes prosperity. An English docker may now own a television set and spend more on drink, tobacco, and gambling while his wife has a fur coat and his children go to the cinema several times a week and consume innumerable ice creams; but he still lives in the same squalid environment near the docks and the background and psychology of poverty are as before. Much of the increased prosperity of the working classes in recent years is of this kind—a semi-luxury gloss on a fundamental poverty below. The welfare state is just as prone as other industrial societies to misdirection of effort and to the kind of poverty that is due more to wrong ideas and to waste

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

than to lack of material goods or to inequalities of wealth. A country where larger numbers of people are educated and sensible enough to prefer a simple standard of life (not the same things as a low standard of life), and where they seek and value fresh air, sunlight, cleanliness, peace, quiet, and beauty in their surroundings is more likely, given the same effort and material resources, to get rid of its poverty and squalor than one where the government and people, caught alike in the net of international politics and industrial rivalry, are individually and collectively pursuing power and prosperity. In the latter case, as in England, energy is fruitlessly wasted on ventures abroad, and on quixotic schemes for developing Backward Areas overseas when such Areas lie all around us at home; new industrial slums are created while old ones continue to rot; paper plans for improvement are torn up on the plea of necessity, mostly the necessity due to unchecked numbers and to the lack of a population policy; people are taxed harder and perpetually told to work harder and save more to overcome some crisis; and real poverty and the mentality of poverty tend to spread, not diminish. Massed squalor may be the goal towards which present ideas and policies are leading the welfare state.

5

Besides leaving uncured such social diseases of feudalism and commercialism as poverty and property the welfare state is adding to them some as yet undiagnosed ones of its own. We have always had with us an owning class taking a large slice from the national income and giving nothing, or next to nothing, in return. Industry and commerce have added to it another class of people used to an easy going life and expecting to hand their advantages on to their children. We also have today a larger number of pensioners of various kinds. As if these were not enough at a time when we perhaps can less afford to keep them in the ways to which they are accustomed welfare legislation has added to them a new and growing class, mostly wage earners, receiving subsidies from public funds sometimes to the tune of hundreds of pounds a year, apart from what they get from the ordinary services provided out of rates and taxes. A member of this new privileged class may, for example, be a widow drawing pension and allowances, and living perhaps in a rate subsidised flat, who has persuaded the local education authority to place

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

one or more of her children in boarding schools. One mother at work may have two children cared for in a day nursery while another in the same position is told there are no vacancies for her children. There are families of three and four children receiving subsidies of several hundreds of pounds a year under the Education Acts alone. Many persons living in local authority flats and houses are just as well off as neighbours who must not only pay an economic rent for their own houses but contribute also to the artificially low rent of the council dwellings. One man may have his old mother cared for in a local authority's Home while another old lady, perhaps on her own, is refused admittance on the grounds that everybody cannot be helped. This, of course, is true: it is impossible for everybody, or the majority, to take more from the pool of rates and taxes than they put into it. The expansion of the welfare state has to be halted somewhere; and when that point is reached some remain within the charmed circle of assistance whilst others equally deserving must stay outside. But this is an age of democratic envy. What Tom gets Dick wants; and when Harry hears about it he wants it too. When Dick and Harry are refused, as they must be, they are envious and resentful. Not only therefore does the welfare state create a new privileged class: it generates new social jealousies as well.

Moreover, the competitive struggle for benefits introduces a new and corrupting element into the relations of public men with their supporters and constituents. Politically speaking, the welfare state is a "winner", and any partizan who wishes to stay in the favour of the electorate and his party will be rash to make a critical examination of our social services in public. Instead, he must speak of them with discreet enthusiasm and be prepared, if elected, to spend much of his time dealing with complaints from constituents who have not got what they wanted from the social services. Later, he will perhaps make a virtue of this task by boasting in his election leaflets of the number of grievances he has taken up with Authority during his previous term of office. The ordinary citizen certainly needs some protection against government departments and local authorities whose officials are sometimes lazy, stupid, and careless. The elected representative will therefore hear of wrongs that need righting; but his correspondents are more likely to be those who intend to make a nuisance of themselves until they get some benefit to which they are no more entitled

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

than others, or those who think that paying rates and taxes gives them the right to any benefits going. All the same, his popularity will partly depend on the results he is able to show, and on the zeal and energy with which he follows up complaints made to him.

6

A general deterioration of standards in many quarters seems to have taken place since the floodgates of democracy and equality were opened, and quantity at the expense of quality and lowered standards all round are among the characteristics of the welfare state as we know it at present. There are signs that the welfare state may not lead to that healthier, happier, more cultivated and leisured middle class society of spacious homes and towns as was once thought possible but more probably to a future of tatterdemalion squalor and garish splendours, queues and crowdedness, weariness and "copious low grade living" (H. G. Wells' phrase), flat and cultureless. Judged by the very low standards of Victorian life there has, of course, been an improvement, not a falling off. Children now sit 40-50 a class in secondary modern schools and learn French whereas in the old senior elementary schools they only learnt to read and write English. A poor man may crowd with others into a doctor's waiting room and get such advice and treatment, without payment, as the somewhat harassed and overworked practitioner can give him. Most workers are now entitled to one week or more paid holiday every year and these holidays they can spend, if they so wish, in camps carefully organized so as to ensure that they miss none of the crowds and noises to which the city streets and workplaces have accustomed them. Such changes may be called gains when put against the legacy of evil surroundings and the mass tradition of degraded living we have inherited. The question is whether the curve of endeavour and achievement is going to flatten out at the present level, or fall again, or whether it will rise if present shortages are overcome and the pressure against existing resources eased.

Let us suppose that the world becomes more peaceful and that the welfare state in England continues much as at present for another 20 years under successive Labour administrations. If we are on the right lines now some real progress should be discernible after a quarter-century of welfare legislation and

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

practice. Yet when we survey the field of welfare policy and of the social services have we really good reason to believe that any of our great social problems will have begun to be brought under control at the end of the period?

The distribution of the national income would probably change still more in favour of wage earners as compared with salary earners and drawers of rents, interest, and profits, but this change would need to go a good deal further than is now thought desirable or possible before it began seriously to disturb the English class system.

In education, a completed school building programme and the raising of the school leaving age to 16 would leave things much as now; and is it likely that another generation through such schools would emerge better educated or instructed than at present? One effect of each increment of popular education so far has been to increase by another million the circulation of that part of the daily press that specializes in exploiting vulgarity and sensationalism. And while educational opportunity has opened the doors of learning and of skill to some young people of talent, it has also put into grammar schools many children who are quite unsuited to academic courses, and into the universities others who really have no business there.

Again, great hopes have been pinned on town and country planning. A recent Progress Report* is little more than a survey of difficulties and an enumeration of paper plans. The difficulties are very great; but can we hope that a start will be made in overcoming them in the years ahead unless, among other measures, there is a correlative population policy with a Minister of Population to work it? Moreover, just as we are now reconciled to a lengthening list of road deaths and to an increasing number of maimed cripples as the price we must pay for a prosperous motor industry that can be turned over to war production, so we must accept the typical environment of industrialism if we continue to pursue industrial wealth and power as our chief aim. We cannot have it both ways, at least not in these islands. So, while the blitzed commercial and civic centres of some towns may be rebuilt under the auspices of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, some new roads laid down to ease the traffic problems of such towns as Oxford, and the more remote parts of the designated National Parks perhaps left unspoilt, the problem of the big cities is unlikely

* *Town and Country Planning*, 1943-51 (Cmd. 8,204).

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

to be any more tractable a generation hence, nor may the New Towns become so distinguishable from the old once they have started to give way to the pressure of population and of development both within and without.

In the health services, the supply of new hospitals, clinics, health centres, and convalescent homes, competently staffed and adequately equipped, will depend on the resources and manpower that can be found for them. We may or may not get them in the coming years. If we do, sick people should get prompter and better attention than they get now in many cases. Yet, while it is important to have skilled medical attention ready when it is needed, should we be right in regarding an expanded health service and two or three times as many hospital beds filled with injured and ailing people as signs of social progress when it might be possible by other means to secure a reduction in the numbers of those requiring the services of the doctor, surgeon, and psychiatrist? A bandage, after all, is not an indication of healthy, unwounded flesh nor a crutch of physical normality. But in the health services, as in other aspects of the welfare state, we think much of cures but little of prevention, for we are reluctant to face the difficult problems of social reconstruction and the changes in mind and habits that a policy of prevention would entail.

Similarly, we might scatter the land more abundantly with children's officers, child guidance clinics, juvenile courts and probation officers, homes for the maladjusted, clubs for boys and girls, and so forth only to find at the end of another generation of such activities that juvenile troubles are running at as high a level as before whereas appropriate action by a Minister of Population—e.g. some sort of qualification bar for marriage and measures to ensure that parents understand their responsibilities better and are held more to them—might save a few homes from being broken and begin to stop the trouble at one of its sources.

7

Such is the best we could perhaps expect in a more peaceful world where the government could turn over to the social services some of the money now given to war preparation. But, in the end, the inexhaustible appetite for privilege and benefits would still be unsatisfied while a more prolonged attempt to

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

cope with our social problems by trying to undo mischief already done would leave the physical and mental sources of these problems untouched.

What in fact is more likely to happen, apart from the break up of the welfare state through economic pressure or in war, is its capture by a government oriented more towards the interests of property than those of the wage earners so that the benefits of the social services are increasingly diverted into maintaining the status and position of those classes at whose expense some wage earners have hitherto improved their lot. Of this there are signs already. A scheme of graded family allowances was put up to the Population Commission, and there is steady propaganda for giving to the parents of children in fee charging schools the whole or part of the cost of the tuition fees. Also, it would not be difficult, for instance, to arrange for better free medical services for some classes than for others, or to subsidize middle class housing more and working class housing less.

8

Knowledge of the unfavourable facts and trends in the welfare state seems at present mostly confined to those who work the various welfare schemes. But in time the facts will speak more generally for themselves; and the sort of mental and moral crisis will then arise that always arises when millennial hopes begin to dwindle. No fresh thought or honest facing of facts is to be expected from our politicians who are not only committed to the welfare state as it has become but, as a class, deeply frustrated by party mass politics and the struggle for office. Nor will it be easy for less partizan-minded progressives to abandon or revise some of the assumptions of the liberal-Fabian circle of ideas that has dominated their minds during the past half-century. This system of thought has now largely run its course, but nothing so good or hopeful as it once seemed to be, or as was utilitarianism in its hey-day, has yet appeared to take its place.

Meanwhile, we may take note of certain weaknesses in the prevailing mentality that recent English experience has made more obvious. There is first the unsolved question of privilege. In a mass democracy privilege is far more pervasively corrupting than in *ancien regime* conditions where class distinctions are rigidly drawn and accepted, for propaganda on behalf of social

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

justice leads on millions of people to believe that they too can have something for nothing, or at least a good deal more for a great deal less, and that some political and financial legerdemain is going to arrange for everybody to take more out of the pool than they put into it. No stable and progressive society can be built on such fool's paradise notions, nor on conditions where a large and influential minority has the right to exempt itself from the natural need for work and effort, and the state of permitted idleness becomes by example the private ambition and day dream of all and sundry.

Then there is the problem of freedom and discipline. It is a truism that industrialism knits together the community and makes men more closely dependent on one another and on the government. When the welfare state is added to industrialism the need for social discipline and a stronger and more developed sense of individual responsibility is even greater since indiscipline and irresponsibility create public expenditure in all directions. But we still talk emptily of freedom as if England was a virgin land where settlers were pushing forward and fending for themselves like Lincoln's father. As, in fact, our destinies are closely linked and become more so every day whether we like it or not (the fact is much disliked by some people), earlier and simpler ideas of freedom no longer fit the facts and must be replaced by more complex and disciplined codes of conduct and social obligation.

So far the welfare state has helped to spread irresponsibility. Thousands of men who have deserted their wives and families walk the streets knowing that their dependants will be provided for out of public funds and not left to starve as formerly, or put into the workhouse. Workers can strike with the same knowledge. The many ready made schemes for helping children in and out of school undoubtedly weaken the sense of parental responsibility in many cases and rob parents of the readiness to make efforts and sacrifices themselves. The mother who goes to work, not necessarily because she must but because she finds little to do whilst her children are provided for elsewhere in the daytime, gets used to the cigarettes and outings and semi-luxuries these extra earnings give, and is then usually ready to ask for her children to be taken off her hands more and more. We need a truthful study of this aspect of the welfare state and of the ways welfare schemes are affecting popular and parental psychology.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE WELFARE STATE

Thirdly, we need to study with fresh minds the prevailing concepts of social justice and equality. Equality has been carried to its logical absurdity in the suffrage, and the fool and the sage now stand equal before the ballot box. Equality in practice usually means levelling down, or attempts to secure equality of privilege. In education, the sphere of quality not equality, harm has already been done in this way. The equalitarian reaction against indefensible privilege was necessary but it has gone too far. What needs now to be emphasized is natural inequality, and the superiority of merit and proved capacity. Social justice can only be achieved in the justly unequal society.

It is perhaps in education that the weakness and traditionalism of prevailing social thought are seen most plainly. The dead hand of the Renaissance lies heavily on English education. Almost nothing is being done in our schools, state or independent, to give the child an inkling into the sort of society in which he finds himself, and some knowledge of social cause and effect, though he mostly lives piled up with others in a congested and intricately organized environment in which the ordinary citizen needs to acquire new and unaccustomed kinds of feeling, thought, and behaviour if he is not to become a potential liability and nuisance.

Though education is no panacea there is perhaps less Dead Sea fruit to be had from a better system of education under teachers having modern minds, moral courage, and a sense of vocation than from intensified governmental activity on the political and economic lines congenial to most progressives, and to those who wield power in the welfare state. Here, in what may be termed the "mechanist error", lies one of the fundamental reasons for the failure of much welfare state policy.

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

By NEVILL BARBOUR

IN 1905, the Kaiser Wilhelm II landed at Tangier and announced his support for the independence of the Moorish Empire. His purpose was to keep the French out of Morocco or, if this could not be achieved, to ensure that Germany, a late-comer on the scene, should not remain without a share of the spoils which other Powers were acquiring. For the third of the four great divisions of Arab territory amongst the European states was impending, and it was not yet quite clear how the distribution would be made.*

Unlike other states with Arab governments, the Moorish Empire had never been subject to the Turks. It differed from them also in geographical situation, in the nature of the government, in the size of the Berber-speaking population and in the existence of powerful feudal nobles. In spite of this, Morocco passed through the same historical stages as the other Arab-governed states outside Arabia: invasion by Arabs, conversion to Islam, adoption of Arabic for all purposes of culture and administration, grandeur, decadence, subjection to a European power and finally the growth of Arab nationalism.

Never having come under Turkish rule, the Moorish Empire retained a purely Arab and medieval character right up to the Franco-Spanish occupation of 1912. The Sultan and his Ministers continued to wear the traditional simple and elegant white robes, which made a pleasant and democratic contrast with the uniforms favoured in the nineteenth century at the courts of Constantinople, Tunis, and Algiers. In the towns, the arts of building and decoration were highly developed; Fez, the artistic and intellectual as well as political capital, contained a water system, introduced in the twelfth century, by which every house was supplied with running water; the city was well furnished with bath houses and ingenious hydraulic mills; the handicrafts were extremely artistic and the workers organized in a system of guilds; the art of cooking had reached a high degree of perfection—in short, the country possessed all the

* 1827 Algeria to France; 1881 Egypt to England, 1882 Tunisia to France; 1911 Libya to Italy, 1912 Morocco to France; 1922 Syria and Lebanon to France, Iraq and Palestine (including Trans-Jordan) to England.

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

elements of a refined urban civilization. But this was completely mediaeval in character; the attempt of the last really independent Sultan, Mulai Hassan (1873-1894) to send students abroad and to reform the Makhzen, as the Moorish administrative machine was called, proved completely abortive.

As late as 1912, there were no railways and virtually no roads in the country. The Islamic penalty of amputation for theft was still enforced and the heads of rebels and other executed persons were displayed over the city gates. There were no doctors or engineers; and there was no printing press. The foreign diplomats lived in Tangier and few Europeans ventured into the interior. Certain specialists were, however, employed at the court in Fez; notably, a Scot, commanding the bodyguard; an English physician; a Spanish dentist; and an Italian who was engaged to manufacture arms but is remembered chiefly as the maker of the iron cage in which a captured rebel leader, Bu Hamara, was exhibited in 1909. Administrative and cultural standards had actually fallen far below those of earlier centuries; where in the Middle Ages there had been a hundred booksellers, there were now ten. The intense religious faith of the people was marred by fanaticism, ignorance, and superstition. Towns-men and tribesmen alike had no doubt that the Almighty would, in case of need, intervene miraculously in their defence; in the meanwhile, they made no effort to prepare themselves for the shock of contact with the modern world. After the death of Mulai Hassan, in 1894, the last resources of the Empire were squandered on an unbelievable assortment of expensive toys such as diamond-studded cameras and golden bicycles and on firework displays and circuses, by which ministers sought to keep the young prince Mulai Abdul Aziz amused, while they managed affairs as they wished. The tribes began to escape control; and when Christians were attacked in coastal areas, the Makhzen's difficulties were increased by the exaggerated demands for compensation made by European powers seeking for territorial or economic advantage. By the beginning of the century it was obvious that the "persistent impotence"* of the Makhzen was certain to lead to foreign occupation.

Geographically, Morocco is unique among Arab states in having an Atlantic seaboard, facing the New World. Cut off from black Africa by the Atlas mountains, as Spain and Portugal are from France by the Pyrenees, it forms with the Iberian

* Franco-Spanish Accord, 1904.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Peninsula an intermediate zone neither wholly European nor wholly African. The Arabic name of the country, al Maghrib al Aqsa, or "Far West" denotes that it is the most westerly of the countries composing the "Maghrib" or western Arab world. This was considered by Arab historians to consist of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania, as well as Morocco, while Muslim Spain was generally regarded as a separate entity. However this may be, Andalusia was the centre in which western Arab civilization reached its highest point and the principal source from which it passed to Morocco. "North Africa . . ." wrote an Arab historian, "derived its present (eleventh century A.D.) wealth, importance, and commerce from Andalusians settling in it. After the last disastrous war, thousands of all classes and professions sought refuge in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Workmen and peasants . . . mixed with the inhabitants, helped in agriculture, discovered sources of water, used them for irrigation, planted trees, and introduced water-mills, and other inventions. . . . Townsmen being well-educated soon made themselves known at court and in the main cities where they filled posts of distinction and became viziers, secretaries, governors of provinces, district officers, tax-collectors and so forth, so that there was no region where some of the principal authorities were not Andalusians. . . . Before the arrival of the Andalusians, many now flourishing trades were hardly known in North Africa."*

Until 1912, the Moroccan state was known to English writers as the "Moorish Empire". It was called an Empire because it was not a homogeneous nation, in the modern sense, but consisted on the one hand of a number of cities which were centres of Arabic civilization and on the other of a multitude of tribes and country-people held together by the power and religious prestige of the monarch. The word "Moorish" had more than a geographical significance. A Moor meant any Muslim of the western Arab world and, at a period when the Moors were the Muslim people most familiar to Europeans, was even applied to Muslims in other parts of the world, as in the case of the "Moors" of Ceylon or of the Philippines. The Moorish Empire, in fact, was a Muslim state, based on Morocco, with a governing class composed of Arabic-speaking officials who were for the most part of mixed Arab, Berber, and Spanish descent. Its traditions resembled those of the medieval

* Al Maqqari, *Nafh at Tib* (quoting Ibn Ghalib).

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

Emirates of Cordoba and Granada and the maintenance of Islam and the spread of the Arabic language and culture were the constant objects of its care.

The original inhabitants of Morocco, as of the rest of North Africa, were Berbers. They accepted Islam after the Arab invasions and the use of Arabic soon became the rule in the cities and along the main lines of communication. The great Berber dynasties, moreover, the Almoravids, the Almohads, and the Beni Merin were not only fanatically Muslim, but used Arabic for all governmental and cultural purposes. Nevertheless, in the mountains, the tribesmen, to the extent probably of half the total population, continued to talk Berber; many of them, escaping the control of the Sultan, retained the use of their customary law, instead of the Sharia of Islam. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, indeed, it was usual to refer to the North African Governments as the Barbary States; and the local colour of Morocco, with the anarchic independence of the tribes and the abundance of strong personalities, is largely Berber. This non-Arab basis of the population, however, does not in itself distinguish Morocco from other "Arab" states outside Arabia. Syria, Iraq, and particularly Egypt had all possessed non-Arab populations; like Morocco, they became Arab states by adopting the language of their conquerors and developing with them a new, Islamic civilization.

Until to-day there exist in Morocco great nobles, exercising absolute power in their own territories. Some of these, like the Sheriffs of Wazzan, one of whom *The Times* in 1892 accused the French Government of setting up as a rival to the Sultan Mulai Hassan, are Arab and derive their position mainly from religious prestige. Others, particularly the Berber chieftains of the Atlas, are real territorial feudal lords, whose headquarters are in enormous castles in the mountains. Like Plantagenet nobles, these chiefs do not hesitate to oppose the monarch if his government is weak, or they have a personal grievance against him. Before the occupation of 1912, a great part of the Moorish art of government consisted in the management of these great persons and the followers whom they controlled. The country was in fact spoken of as "Bilad al Makhzen", the area under central control, and "Bilad es Siba", the area of dissidence; these areas expanded or contracted respectively as the power of the Sultan increased or diminished. In this sense it was still possible to say of the Moorish Empire in the twentieth century,

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

after a thousand years of independent existence, that it had never become a "political unity" genuinely subject to a single central government;* it was still a medieval empire, not a modern centralized state.

In 1912, France succeeded in rounding off her Empire in North-West Africa by inducing the Sultan to sign a document known as the Treaty of Fez. This was brief but comprehensive; it gave the French Government authority to occupy the country militarily, in so far as was necessary to establish order and assure the security of commerce, and to introduce whatever reforms it thought desirable. These were to include the renovation of the Makhzen itself. Decrees would be issued in the Sultan's name and must bear his signature. A French Resident-General would be appointed to act as the Sultan's Foreign Minister and conduct his relations with foreign Governments. The maintenance of the prestige and position of the Sultan and his successors was guaranteed. His person and his estates would be protected against any menace which might threaten them. The city of Tangier, in which the foreign diplomats had acquired various privileges, was to have a special status. The French Government was to give Spain a position corresponding to its geographical position and its possessions on the coast of Morocco.

In accordance with a previous Franco-Spanish Agreement (1904), the Spanish Government was in fact given in the Riff Zone a position similar to that of France in the remaining nine-tenths of the country. A viceroy (*khalifa*) from the royal family was appointed for the zone, so that the Spanish authorities could be entirely independent of the Sultan and the French Resident-General, and the integrity of the Empire be yet nominally maintained.

In order to secure European sanction for this operation, France had had to negotiate with a number of powers. English acquiescence had been secured (1904) by an undertaking that France would not interfere in Egyptian affairs and that Tangier would be neutralized; Italy's by an undertaking that France would not interfere in Libya (1900); and Germany's (1911) by a cession of French territory in the Congo. In addition, the Moroccan question had, owing to the German intervention, been discussed at a full-dress international conference held at Algeciras in 1906. This had solemnly declared that reforms were necessary in the Moorish Empire, but that they must be based

* *Foreign Office Peace Handbooks*, Morocco, 1919.

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

on the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and equality of economic opportunity in Morocco for all states.

The immediate occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Fez was the restoration of order around Fez by French troops. The Sultan had been virtually besieged there by tribes who were in dissidence as a result of his government's weakness and the extent to which he was under foreign influence. The signature of the Treaty was followed by a rising of the townspeople; this was suppressed after sixty-six French lives had been lost. The Sultan, Mulai Hafid, deeply humiliated, was shortly afterwards persuaded to abdicate in consideration of a monetary compensation. The Protectorate authorities induced the Ulama to nominate in his place his brother Mulai Yusuf, known for his piety and his "placid and accommodating"* disposition.

Profiting from long experience in Algeria and Tunisia, the French authorities, under an administrator of genius, Marshall Lyautey, set to work with great energy. A rising in the south was soon suppressed and though it took twenty-two years to subject the wilder tribes, order was rapidly established in most of the country. Roads and railways were built, a fine port constructed at Casablanca and modern cities developed. Hospitals, schools, and other amenities were introduced and their benefits began to be appreciated by the Moroccans. Very soon Morocco became known as an outstanding example of colonizing skill and as a romantic country where the traveller, while enjoying the amenities of modern life, could at any moment step aside, in all security, into the fantastic and mysterious world of the Arabian Nights. For Marshall Lyautey was an aesthete as well as an administrator, and by his instructions the old cities were left intact and the new cities built beside them. For the moment this principle facilitated the task of government. The Sherifian officials and the generality of the people, having realized that God was not going to intervene to destroy the infidel, were like men in a dream. It was easiest to leave them in their own world, where Sultan and Makhzen seemed to still exist, while the twentieth-century government functioned in newly created organizations behind or beside them. It was only later that the disadvantages of keeping the Makhzen unreformed began to appear. The Moroccan people became a sort of living museum; the Makhzen, which should have afforded them a

* H. Benazet, *L'Afrique française en Danger*, 1947.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

means of political expression, had become a strait-jacket within which the bursting new life surged and heaved and searched in vain for the appropriate outlet.

The first serious shock to the régime occurred in 1925 when the Riff leader Abdelkrim after inflicting a series of defeats on the Spanish turned his arms against the French. For a moment it appeared that he would compel the evacuation of the interior. The well-to-do classes might be a little apprehensive of their fate under Riff rule, but this victory of Moroccan and Muslim over foreigner and Christian provoked an emotional response throughout the country. When Abdelkrim had been defeated and deported, the Moors muttered more loudly than before that they supposed the Protectorate would not last for ever. For by now two grievances were deeply felt. One was the privileged position and increasing number of the settlers, French and South European, and the amount of fertile land which they had acquired and were brilliantly developing. The other was the complete control of French officials over policy in every matter, except the purely personal affairs of the Moroccans, and their employment in the humblest official posts. Morocco might have been a Sleeping Beauty restored to the waking world by a French Prince Charming. But the Prince was not of her race or religion and it appeared that his relatives were to be advanced and her property to be developed for their advantage.

The first real manifestation of political feeling in the modern sense was caused by the issue of the so-called Berber Decree in 1930. This made it obligatory for all Berber tribes to use Berber customary law and in criminal cases made them subject to the French penal code. The Moorish Government had never completed the process of making the country Arab and Islamic, but legislation designed to prevent this was contrary to the tradition of a thousand years. Nor did the French authorities conceal the fact that this measure was intended to introduce communalism and perpetuate French rule. Marshall Lyautey himself stated that "our [French] interest demands that we should make the Berbers develop outside the framework of Islam".* For this purpose, special schools were to be established. The ensuing protest echoed in the eastern Arab world and throughout Islam, and the decree was somewhat modified in the following year.

Meanwhile, a politically conscious generation was growing

* P. Marty, *Le Maroc de Demain*, 1925, pp. 228, 252.

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

up. In 1930, the first political party, the Action Marocaine, came into being. The leaders, then little more than students—Allal al Fasi, from the Qarawiyyin Mosque-University; Ahmed Balafrej, graduate of the Sorbonne, and Mohammed ibn Hassan al Wazzani, graduate of Geneva University—took their stand on the 1912 Treaty. They asked for the suppression of direct administration, equality between French and Moroccans, a higher percentage of Moroccan officials and the creation of elected municipalities. Seven years later (1937), they added to their demands liberty of the press, the reorganization of justice, the application of French social legislation to Moroccans and the cessation of official colonization. In 1936 and 1937, disorders occurred and a good many Moroccans were killed by police action; a state of siege was declared; the Action Marocaine was ordered to dissolve and Al Fasi was exiled from Morocco.

In 1927, on the death of the Sultan Mulai Yusuf, his third son, Sidi Muhammad, had been raised to the throne at the age of sixteen. As the years passed, it became clear that he possessed character and resolution. Of irreproachable private life, he gave his children an excellent upbringing, both European and Arabic. Active in promoting education and other social developments among his people, his popularity was such that his visits to the old capital, Fez, evoked patriotic demonstrations which were ill-viewed by the Residency, which therefore restricted his movements. For his subjects, the war-period was an occasion of intellectual ferment. The declaration of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms aroused fervent hopes. A violent radio campaign in Arabic from Berlin attacking the Allies as oppressors of the Arabs and enemies of Arab unity was followed with malicious joy. In 1941, Britain countered by proclaiming her sympathy for the idea of Arab unity and, though this concerned the East only, the implications for the Maghrib were obvious. In 1942, Morocco was brought directly into contact with the Anglo-Saxon world by the landing of American and British troops; these, whether they wished it or not, could not help becoming the missionaries of Anglo-Saxon ideas. Later in the war, Syria and the Lebanon became independent states free of all French control. Foreign leaders, including President Roosevelt, visited Morocco and made direct contact with the Sultan, whose reputation abroad had been enhanced by his refusal to allow the Residency during the Vichy period to introduce anti-Jewish legislation into Morocco. Meanwhile the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

medieval and moribund Makhzen was still presided over by the nonagenarian Vizier who had held the same office for the whole period of the Protectorate, as he still does to-day when he is approaching his hundredth year. Policy and executive control, apart from a limited sphere of purely native affairs, remained in French hands.

In 1944, a new organization, Hizb al Istiqlal, the Independence Party, was formed. Declaring that it was hopeless to expect reforms from the existing régime, it presented a Manifesto to the Sultan, asking that the independence of Morocco should be recognized and a constitutional monarchy established, "comparable to that of the oriental Muslim states". The subsequent arrest of the Secretary-General, Balafrej, was followed by disorders in various cities. Two Europeans lost their lives in Rabat and many Moroccans were killed in the police action.

Two years later, a new Resident-General, M. Eirik Labonne, having released Allal al Fasi from his nine years' exile and given permission for the reappearance of opposition papers in Arabic and French, announced (July 22nd, 1946) long-awaited new proposals. These envisaged rapid industrialization, a great extension of education (in French) for Moroccans, permission for Moroccan industrial (but not agricultural) workers to join trade unions, and the formation of elected assemblies, municipal, regional and central, culminating in a Franco-Moroccan Council of Government. These proposals were violently attacked by the French settlers and big industrialists who dreaded any possible access of Moroccans to political and trade union life and any extension of education which would increase their claim to a vote. Nor did the Istiqlal welcome them. Industrialization would, they thought, mean more foreign exploitation; local assemblies would accentuate communalism and feudal regionalism, and legalize the settlers' claim to exercise political rights in Morocco while retaining French nationality; and they wanted education in Arabic, not French. In August, therefore, they countered by proposing the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez and the institution of a Moroccan Government, guaranteed by a treaty with France which would at the same time secure the "legitimate" rights of the settlers. The final blow to M. Labonne's régime arose from a royal progress which the Sultan made through the zone of Spanish influence, where the Viceroy from Tetuan did homage to him, to the city of Tangier. The

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

journey, unprecedented under the Protectorate, evoked great nationalist enthusiasm. This reached a climax when the Sultan, in the multi-nationally administered Tangier, delivered, on April 10th, 1947, a speech in honour of Moroccan unity, the Arab future, and the Arab League, but failed to include an agreed sentence, actually issued to the press, inviting Moroccans to look to friendly states, and particularly to France, for inspiration and technical assistance. Possibly the Sultan's action was due to indignation at a slaughter of Moroccans, on the eve of his journey, when Senegalese troops ran amok at Casablanca; but whether this was so or not, the omission was an obvious slight to the Resident-General and could not fail to antagonize French opinion and so render concessions to the nationalist point of view less likely. On returning to Rabat, moreover, the Sultan refused to sign some of the decrees submitted to him. In May (1947) therefore, the civilian Resident-General, M. Labonne, was replaced by General Juin. The latter came of Algerian settler stock and had a reputation for ability and determination. He made it clear that he believed he had a mission to fulfil and it was said that the French Government had promised him a free hand, including as a last resort the right to reproduce the "inspired abdication" of Mulai Hafid.* An earlier initiative of his, however, had not proved fortunate. As chief of the French defence staff, he had urged M. Labonne to approve the transfer of the ageing Abdelkrim from his twenty years' exile in Réunion to France. The gesture would appear magnanimous and it was apparently thought that Abdelkrim would serve as a figure-head whose prestige could be opposed to that of the Sultan.† However, on his way to France he yielded to the appeal of compatriots who visited the ship on which he was travelling and took refuge in Egypt. Here he immediately became head of a "Maghrib Office", campaigning for a united North Africa to be associated with the Arab League and outside the French Union.

General Juin's policy differed from his predecessor's in firmness rather than aim. He wished to replace French officials by Moroccans, at least in the lower ranks, and at higher levels to create a link between the Makhzen and the French-controlled Departments, by attaching to the latter Moroccan Under-Secretaries of State representing the Grand Vizier. The three Moroccan Viziers would moreover meet the French Directors

* H. Benazet, *L'Afrique française en Danger*, 1947, p. 234.

† *Ibid.*, p. 237.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

monthly, under the presidency of the Grand Vizier. An Imperial Cabinet consisting of Moroccans would be formed to advise the Sultan. The ultimate objective appeared to be a Morocco composed of four communities, Arabs, Berbers, Europeans, and Jews, whose political life would be built up from local councils. Under the Resident-General's firm control the new system began to work, if uneasily.

In November, 1950, the Sultan, whose sympathy for the Istiqlal view had long been clear, took the opportunity of a state visit to France to propose officially the negotiation of a new Treaty. Though unsuccessful in this, he received a great popular welcome on his return to Morocco. Feeling rose, and in December, a wealthy merchant Si Laghzawi, at the meeting of the Consultative Council—the only national body containing elected Moroccan members—began to deliver an analysis of the Public Works Budget which was in fact a political discourse designed to show that the Moroccan inhabitants were being exploited for the benefit of the European settlers. Ordered from the room by General Juin, he was followed by the remaining ten elected members.

Meanwhile, the greatest of the feudal lords, Tihami al Glawi, and other Caids who supported the Protectorate government and had therefore been attacked by the Istiqlal for their arbitrary and allegedly oppressive rule, began to be seriously alarmed. The Glawi himself reproached the Sultan to his face for showing favour to a Party which, he claimed, was the ally of the communists and the enemy of Islam. He also complained that the Sultan was listening to the grievances of the Glawi's dependants. At the end of the tirade, which was lengthy, Sidi Muhammad is believed to have replied that the first subject was a matter of national policy which did not concern the Glawi. As regards the second, the rulers of Morocco had always listened to the complaints of their subjects and, before the Protectorate, there had actually been a Minister of Grievances. However, if the Pasha respected the rights of his dependants, there would be no reason for them to complain. Thereupon the Glawi declared that Sidi Muhammad was the Sultan of the Istiqlal, not of Morocco. At this, the Sultan ordered his chamberlain to dismiss the Pasha (it is said, he used the phrase "this dog") and to forbid him to enter his presence again.

These events decided the Resident-General that the time had come to clarify the situation. On January 26th, 1951, before

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

leaving the country for a few days, he delivered what was virtually an ultimatum, calling upon the Sultan to disavow the Istiqlal. Reports in the French press to the effect that the Resident-General was proposing to force the Sultan to abdicate led the Foreign Minister (M. Schumann), who had come into power since General Juin took office, to make it clear that this measure would not have the approval of the existing French Government. On February 12th, General Juin returned to Morocco and nine days later announced that negotiations had broken down. Immediately after this, large numbers of armed tribesmen led by their Caids, obviously with the approval of the French authorities, appeared at Fez and on the outskirts of Rabat, while warnings were sent to the Sultan from the Residency that public feeling was now such that his throne would be in danger if he did not at once disown the Istiqlal. The Sultan appealed to President Auriol; the latter gave the Sultan certain assurances concerning the future, but made it clear at the same time that General Juin would not be disavowed. Sidi Muhammad therefore consented to the dismissal of those members of the Imperial Cabinet who supported the Istiqlal, and to the issue of two proclamations. The first, in his own name, repudiated communism and foreign ideologies; the second, signed by the Grand Vizier, stated that order was being imperilled by the activities of "a certain party". This solution, which was clearly a compromise, was denounced by the Glawi as a victory for the Istiqlal; the Sultan for his part informed an Egyptian journalist that he had acted under the compulsion of the Residency. Nevertheless a detente resulted, and the Sultan eventually signed some, though not all, of the decrees presented to him. This quieter atmosphere was not seriously disturbed by an astonishingly violent anti-French outburst in the press of Egypt, the Arab countries, and Pakistan, accusing the Protectorate authorities of bombarding Fez and of other imaginary outrages.

The future of Morocco, the largest of the Barbary States, cannot be treated in isolation from that of Algeria and Tunisia, or without regard to the French position in North Africa in general. It is, however, obvious that 8,500,000 Moroccans, active, intelligent, and increasingly educated, cannot be much longer deprived of all political rights; they must in some way be associated with the government of their country. The present uneasy balance is in fact only preserved by means of what a French writer has called the "preventive hygiene of an

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

implacable police".* The aim of the Istiqlal is a Moroccan Government, associated with the Arab League, though possibly in alliance with France, in which the European settlers have the same rights as Muslim Moroccans, but no more. The Residency, on the other hand, desires a Franco-Moroccan Government within the French Union, in which the European settlers retain a special and privileged status. The French Government is liberally inclined, but has to reckon with the complete intransigence of the settlers.

Hitherto, Moroccans who are not townsmen—and they form the overwhelming majority—have been little accessible to nationalist propaganda, owing to close supervision of the Istiqlal's emissaries, who have not been allowed to travel freely in the country areas; though the Glawi's protest to the Sultan appears to show a growing anxiety in this respect. It was thus possible for the recent tribal demonstration to be organized and to some extent to reproduce circumstances which led to the signing of the Treaty of Fez nearly forty years earlier. It is, however, very doubtful whether the operation could be carried out a third time. Three tribes in the Tadla region, when they realized the purpose for which they had been assembled, demanded that their supposed protest against the Sultan should be withdrawn.† And though many vested interests are opposed to the nationalists, it is doubtful whether such opposition possesses any greater solidity than did the Princely régimes in India in 1948.

In the towns, the Istiqlal appear already to possess a strong majority; in the only elected municipality, Fez, all elected members belong to the Party, though their candidates were far from having official encouragement; and the same is true of the Consultative Council, the only national body containing elected members. All classes of the population are represented in the Party and it enjoys the sympathy of the Sultan. It is well-organized, disposes of considerable funds and has founded many Arab schools in Morocco; these, like the Berber schools of the French, no doubt have a political as well as a pedagogic purpose; and it carries on propaganda in Paris, Cairo, and Washington. Unlike the Communist Party, it is not legally recognized; it was therefore led to a degree of cooperation with the communists in order to utilize the facilities which they

* H. de Montety, *Le Monde*, July 26th, 1951.

† *Le Monde*, April 3rd, 1951.

MOROCCO, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

enjoy for propaganda in trade union and other circles; but this no more showed ideological sympathy than U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union did in the War. The Istiqlal leaders profess a faith which is nearer to that of the British Labour Party than to communism, and they claim to stand for constitutional monarchy, democracy and social reform. If they enjoyed equal political rights with the communists, they would almost certainly terminate all relations with them as soon as they could form trade unions and other organizations of their own. Of course, the nationalists have had no experience of the practical difficulties of government or of the strain which the attempt would place on their relations with the Sultan and on the sincerity of their own professions; and they lack technicians of every sort. While there are more than 3,000 Arab doctors in Egypt, there are less than a dozen in Morocco. Nothing near the present standards of administration could be maintained without a long period of French assistance, as the Istiqlal verbally at least recognize. The leaders would no doubt also have great difficulty in managing the tribes from whom they have been isolated and of whose language and customs they have little knowledge. Association with the Arab League affords them encouragement and helps them to put their case before the world. The League, however, has its hands full of unsolved problems of its own and is far from inspiring in the French that confidence which would enable it to act as a mediator. The British approach to the problem would perhaps be a declaration accepting the principle of independence, while laying down stages for its achievement. This would, however, hardly be possible without a previous understanding with the nationalists; and hitherto their leader, Allal al Fasi, at present in Tangier, though his personality inspires the respect of those who meet him, has given the impression of excessive intransigence in this respect. In any case, French tradition is different from British; and the presence of European settlers, who have increased from 51,000 in 1921 to 330,000 in 1950, while the Muslim population has risen from 3,500,000 to 8,500,000, has created a problem which recalls South Africa or Kenya rather than Egypt or India. French intelligence, magnanimity, and resolution will be tested to the full in seeking to bring to a successful conclusion an experiment which has in many respects been quite outstanding.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LIFE OF JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Vol. IV: 1901-1903. By JULIAN AMERY. (Macmillan. 533 pp. 30s.)

WITH MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA. By LIONEL CURTIS. (Blackwell. 354 pp. 15s.)

THE first three volumes of this gargantuan biography were by the late Mr. Garvin, and Mr. Amery has inherited from him a very difficult task. Garvin was a highly successful journalist, but, as the years passed, he suffered badly from the occupational disease of his trade—a hardening of the brain centre which produces thought and a loosening of the centre which produces and controls words. This makes for successful journalism, but it is not a good equipment for the writer of a serious book. The brilliant verbosity of Garvin, which kept him in the front rank of British journalists for many years, and which was closely connected with his inability for hard and concise thinking, led him to adopt a wrong scale for this biography. Chamberlain was a considerable politician and an interesting character; circumstances enabled him to occupy a key position during a period when politically the fate of western man was in the balance, and the main interest of his career is the fatal way in which he became, unconsciously and unwillingly, a powerful force tipping the balance to disaster. But the vision of his mind, his soul, and his imagination was limited, and outside the narrow circle of politics upon which he concentrated all his powers and his ambitions he was blind, deaf and dumb. The biographer should, therefore, have concentrated upon this fascinating aspect of Chamberlain's career, his historical place in one of the most crucial transition periods of European history. The task would have required concentrated thought and concise writing, and everything of importance in Chamberlain's life could have been given in two volumes. Unfortunately Garvin took the opposite course; he meandered profusely through the infinitely unimportant as well as the important facts so that, when he died, he had already produced three fat, flat volumes, but we were still fighting the Boer war and Queen Victoria was still alive.

Mr. Amery, naturally, has had to continue on Garvin's lines; Vol. IV gives a highly detailed account of Chamberlain's doings in 1901 and 1902, and we are to have another volume dealing with the Tariff Reform campaign and Chamberlain's end. Mr. Amery has done his job competently and, on the lines adopted, has produced as good and as interesting a volume as was possible. It gives us many interesting facts and often makes valuable comments on them, but the mass of trivial facts and incidents blurs the vision of historical perspective and is rather wearisome.


In our review of the previous volumes we put forward the view that Chamberlain's break with the Liberals over Home Rule was a disaster, because it took out of the Liberal Party the only man who might have led it to adopt a programme of great social, socialist, and international reforms which alone could have brought peace and prosperity to Britain and Europe. This volume confirms that reading of history. The jaws of the imperialist and conservative trap had closed firmly over the former radical non-conformist and he was now a prisoner of the Church, the ruling classes, and the Tories. We see him bring the Boer war to "a successful conclusion"

BOOK REVIEWS

and lay the foundations of the modern form of British imperialism. But in the sphere of social reform his Tory masters held him in a vice. By his aid the essential reforms were, with disastrous results, postponed for 10 or 20 years, and were left for the tortuous opportunist Lloyd George to initiate. One of the chief reasons for Chamberlain's failure becomes apparent in this volume. His political principles were crude, parochial, and derived from the world of business. Politics were merely what he called "The Common Sense of Business". But that, as events proved, is an inadequate basis for a statesman dealing with one of the greatest social and international crises of history.

Mr. Curtis's book covers the same period as Volume IV of Chamberlain's life and is intimately connected with the subject-matter. Towards the end of 1899 he enlisted in the Inns of Court Volunteers and fought in the Boer war until the middle of 1900. In October, 1900, he became a member of Milner's famous "Kindergarten" and served under him in very responsible political posts, ending his career in South Africa as Assistant Colonial Secretary to the Transvaal. The book consists in part of letters to his family describing his experiences in the war and of a diary covering the period 1900 to 1902. The book is intrinsically interesting, because Mr. Curtis has a lively and an enquiring mind which tries to see beneath the surface of political things or events. It throws light, not upon Chamberlain, but upon that strange figure, who plays so prominent a part in Mr. Amery's volume, Alfred Milner.

LEONARD WOOLF.



THOSE WHO MAKE HISTORY

and those who follow it in the making—no matter what their political views and interests—turn to KEESING'S unbiased documentation for reliable and rapid reference on current affairs all over the world.

Every week KEESING'S subscribers receive by post a bulletin recording the important events, statements, speeches, etc., in the spheres of Politics, Economics, Social Questions, covered by a cumulative alphabetical Index which makes reference to every entry in the diary simplicity itself.

Keesing's • Keynsham • Somerset

HEFFER'S

The Bookshop
known the world over.
New and secondhand,
English, American,
European and Oriental
Books. Learned, rare
and standard works
bought; lists invited.

W. HEFFER & SONS LTD
Petty Cury, Cambridge

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

TRADE UNION LAW. By NORMAN A. CITRINE. (Stevens. 700 pp. £2 5s.)

THIS is the book on trade union law for which members and officials of trade unions, the interested lay public, and members of the legal profession have long been waiting. The last edition of Slessor and Baker's standard work on this subject appeared in 1927—immediately after the Trades Disputes Act had fundamentally abridged the legal rights of the trade unions. The Trades Disputes Act has since been repealed and many other important legal changes have occurred in the interim between these two books. When Mr. Norman Citrine set out to write his book it was merely to bring the work of Slessor and Baker up to date, but in the process of revision he found himself writing what was essentially a completely new book; one that is far more extensive in its scope and treatment of the subject than that of his predecessors.

Mr. Citrine, who is head of the legal department of the Trades Union Congress, was in a unique position to carry out his research and obtain an unusual insight into this branch of the law, which every year extends its ramifications and grows in importance as the trade union movement extends its size, power, and responsibilities. The treatment of the subject matter not only displays a thorough acquaintance with it, but brings to bear a lucidity of thought and expression which is not always found in legal text books. Part one of the book is a model exposition of the history of trade union law and the two legal doctrines of restraint of trade and conspiracy which are fundamental to it; parts two and three deal exhaustively with the statutes and judicial interpretations; while part four is an invaluable series of appendices, bringing together in full or relevant parts the details of the main statutes, orders, and regulations made since 1871. Included in the appendices are examples of the many forms required to be used by registered trade unions; political fund instructions, rules, and forms; Rules of Court; and a summary of the matters which ought to be covered by the rules of any trade union. In addition the book is equipped with excellent indices to the statutes, cases, and decisions of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, etc.; and for the benefit of the layman a glossary of legal terms and abbreviations that will be highly appreciated by those who have previously suffered from authors in the legal profession disdaining to make any concession to the man without Latin. Altogether this is a complete work that will have an invaluable place as a standard of reference for many years to come.

No one could write a book of this kind, dealing with many matters that are legally and politically controversial, without incurring disagreements as to emphasis and interpretation. For example, Mr. Citrine's analysis of the legality of the general strike and the present state of the law since the repeal of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act will not satisfy those who lean to the point of view—ably supported a few years ago by Mr. Henry Strauss, M.P., in his pamphlet, *Trade Unions and the Law*—that the weight of legal argument was in favour of the opinions of Astbury, J., and Sir John Simon, that the general strike was illegal. In the opinion of this reviewer the most cogent of the arguments of those who defended the 1927 Act against repeal was that it made the law relating to general strikes more specific. Nevertheless, the Act was a bad one to achieve this end and was rightly repealed. Moreover, it is doubtful if a general strike can be prevented by legislation, for if social relations have become so strained as to lead the trade union move-

BOOK REVIEWS

ment to take this step, then considerations of legality will not prevent serious strife. The most powerful safeguard against the recurrence of a general strike lies not so much in the law as in the consolidation of the voluntary co-operation of trade unions with industry and the state, at all levels of policy making and administration, that has gradually developed during the past ten years.

If sometimes Mr. Citrine's choice of words reflects his sympathies and gives the historical section the faintest of tendentious flavours, and they might possibly be construed in that way by the sensitive, his scrupulous care to be as objective as humanly possible is evident throughout the book, which is a fine piece of scholarship.

B. C. ROBERTS.

HUMAN NEEDS. By MICHAEL GRAHAM. (Cresset Press. 252 pp. 15s.)

MR. GRAHAM belongs to the naturalistic school of ethics, and has added one more to the attempts to find the recipe for the good society by the inspection and analysis of human experience. He brings to his task gusto and self-confidence, a lively jargon-free style, a naturalist's special knowledge of animal behaviour, and a wide acquaintance with history and anthropology. Although discussing well-worn questions, Mr. Graham does not allow his argument to be clogged by continual reference to other authorities, whether by way of deference or disagreement. His personal viewpoint stands clear, and it is only in an appendix that we find stated his strong sympathies with Kropotkin, Trotter, Mead, and Mumford, and his antipathy to Freud.

His thesis and the methods used to establish it may be considered together. Men, he observes, can be happy in groups which are fairly small and run as teams or joint enterprises. They are ill at ease in herd-like groups where there is a rigid pattern of dominance and subordination, or where competition and individualism allow the weakest to go to the wall. These two contrasted types of organization are constantly recurring, but in civilization the latter prevails in spite of its incapacity to satisfy human needs. To the question why man should be possessed of these contradictory tendencies Mr. Graham finds what may be called the naturalist's answer. That is, he collects patterns of animal behaviour analogous to the human "joint enterprise" and "herd" patterns and explains them in terms of food-supply and other biological conditions of survival. He goes on to a reconstruction of human prehistory in the same terms. From this biologist's viewpoint he is able to adopt a rigid formula of the economic determination of social organization, which he uses in explanation of the historical record as of the pre-historical reconstruction. Hunting, herding, and cultivating each demand and produce a particular culture pattern, the characteristic of the first being altruism and joint enterprise, of the second rigid discipline of the group under a patriarchal leader, of the third individualism and private property with weak remnants of altruism. The individualism of the cultivators invites conquest by the herders, and so civilizations arise. Civilization, however, is a way of life producing a surplus of goods over bare subsistence needs, and there is no longer an unequivocal determination of the culture pattern by the economic requirements of survival. Moreover, the conflict of group

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

interests in a civilized society makes a single culture pattern impossible. Civilizations have constantly failed through this internal weakness, but as constantly new ones have arisen, though doomed from the start because of their excessive reliance on herd patterns of behaviour, and because of their lack of a single strongly-held culture pattern. This process of renewal can only continue so long as uncivilized peoples exist to make the new experiments. Its end is in sight now because contemporary civilization has brought all peoples within its influence, and left no source from which a successful external assault could be launched. The process of internal frustration and decay must go more or less blindly on, unless we can consciously rebuild our society to give a greater measure of satisfaction to human needs.

At this point Mr. Graham switches his ground from an attempt at universal history to psychology. Instead of inferring instincts, herd or altruistic, from cultural data, we are asked to join in the search for human needs by looking at types of individual behaviour which are widely distributed among different cultures, or which may be considered free from cultural determination. In effect, Mr. Graham relies on children's behaviour as relatively "culture-free", and draws conclusions therefrom which are illustrated rather than proved by numerous references to adult behaviour. This method suffices him for the establishment of four personal needs; dignity, adventure, gaiety, exercise, and five social needs; family, code, tenets, defence, and goodwill. It is claimed that though the list may not be complete, it is certain as far as it goes. In this excursion into psychology by a rather happy-go-lucky form of comparative method, Mr. Graham lays himself open to all sorts of comment and criticism, which can hardly be disarmed by his remark in an appendix that "their [the psychologists'] science is young, and proceeding from one uncertain theory to the next, and none but a competent psychologist knows enough to make critical selection in this field". This does not seem sufficient justification for such a completely *ad hoc* psychology as Mr. Graham's.

A striking omission in this part of the book is any serious discussion of the relation of personal to social needs. A single page of argument invoking the magic word harmony, and the truism that the individual needs society, lead to the conclusion that "in this chapter on social needs, we shall step freely on to the ground of society's need and back again to the ground of individual need: they are one and the same". A further point of criticism is the different level of analysis of the different needs. One looks in vain for any interpretation of such needs as code or family in terms, say, of the needs for security and love, which would be of the same order as the postulated personal needs of dignity, adventure, and the rest. In the sketch of utopia which ends the book, as in the casual treatment of the relation of individual and social need, one is struck by the optimistic attitude to the possibility of realizing all the nine needs within one culture-pattern.

The sketch of the ideal society with which Mr. Graham is bold enough to end his study repels as much as it attracts, but that is the common fate of utopias, and should at least not weaken Mr. Graham's case for moving towards a society where his nine needs are more fully met. Mr. Graham knows enough about human needs to be an excellent parent, schoolmaster, or ship's captain, but his contribution as a theoretician of the good society is slight.

B. R. HINCHLIFF.

BOOK REVIEWS

SECURITY, LOYALTY AND SCIENCE. By WALTER GELLHORN. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. 1950. \$3.)

PROFESSOR Gellhorn's book is one of a series made possible by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and produced by scholars working independently but under the general direction of Professor R. E. Cushing. Their task is to diagnose the strains to which, in America, civil liberty is exposed as a consequence of world conditions; their method is both expository and critical. The series has concerned itself with legislation which has for its object the preservation of internal security and the exposure and control of disloyalty. Within this field, Professor Gellhorn is concerned with the effect upon science and scientists of such legislation, and it should be said at once that his book is a sensitive and informed study of the great problems which arise when science becomes a weapon of war. Englishmen are already aware of the growing dependence of scientific research on government resources, but it is a revelation that the process has gone so far in the United States, where over one half of the total research carried on is financed by the federal government using the familiar devices of grants, the placing of contracts and the like. Much of this research is connected with war and defence, so that it is conducted behind closed doors and in an atmosphere of secrecy.

In America the need for security has produced two extremely significant effects. The first has been to prevent men talking *generally* about scientific matters. Although there is nothing to prevent them fully discussing "non-classified" scientific matters they fear that, maybe unconsciously, they may convey information. This effect has been so striking that official encouragement was needed to persuade attendance at scientific conferences and the like lest the general scientific competence of the research worker should be impaired. Taking part in discussion was, nevertheless, frowned upon. One imagines that this arises from the same type of reasoning as prevented the visit of certain British scientists to Russia during the war. The second effect has been a reluctance on the part of scientists to undertake secret work. The phenomenon is observable in this country; intellectual isolation appeals only to the very few. In America, despite ideal scientific conditions so far as funds, facilities and equipment are concerned, it is impossible to attract a sufficient number of high-grade men into the establishments. Professor Gellhorn is careful not to give over-much weight to "security" as a cause of this failure of recruitment, but one recalls the eagerness with which so many young Englishmen left government service—civil and scientific—after the war as being corroborative of American experience and as revealing a problem to which a socialized community should devote special attention. That there is a real problem here is shown by the failure of the highly ingenious Brookhaven experiment to solve the difficulty. This laboratory is financed by the Atomic Energy Commission, but is administered by nine Eastern Universities. Much of the work is free, but some is restricted. Yet despite conditions in which scientists from different universities may work alongside each other and therefore, one supposes, of peculiar stimulation, and despite the absence, presumably, of the cruder forms of interference, so great is the antipathy to secrecy that "research of large importance in the classified area is being neglected in favour of less interesting subjects that can be discussed without restrictions". Similarly some American teachers are refusing classified research because it constitutes a barrier between

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

themselves and their students. Thus, if intellectual commerce amongst scientists is the first victim of the search for security the second is the scientist himself, for his chance of employment and of following certain lines of research may well be dependent on what Authority knows, or thinks it knows, not only of his acts but also of his states of mind.

Professor Gellhorn's thesis, supported by many examples of contemporaneous but independent scientific discovery, is that a fact in nature, a scientific fact, cannot permanently be kept secret. It follows that unless some nation or group of nations acquires the monopoly of scientific competence, the effort to prevent foreign scientists from making discoveries is bound to fail and so, in the end, must the efforts which Authority makes to ensure that only "dependable" scientists have access to restricted data. Such efforts may be justified as impeding others' rates of scientific progress, but some general impoverishment is bound to ensue. Scientists, in the past, have, of course, used their own discretion as to publication, but the trend is to replace such personal discretion either by legislation or by a régime based upon fear, as, e.g. in Nazi Germany. One cannot read this book without a depressing feeling that the ultimate results may be the same in either case; that such security as is achieved is won at the expense of scientific progress; that secrecy in the keeping of scientific facts may result in there being no secrets to keep.

Professor Gellhorn carefully studies the relative needs of security and of science, and after considering such questions as the security clearance of men and documents (i.e. their derestriction from further obligations of secrecy), the loyalty of federal scientists, the need for fair procedures and the impact of security legislation on the universities, he attempts a general conclusion. "Secrecy", he writes, "ought not to be readily attached to scientific or technological matters merely because in some aspects they have military significance. It should be attached unhesitatingly if their sole significance is a military one." These are wise words, and meet all that the most devoted supporter of civil liberty can ask. Would they offer the State sufficient security? Can the claims of liberty ever be reconciled with the demand for security? Is not the cause of individual liberty dependent on world peace and order? All the old questions are revived and their application to new problems suggested by Professor Gellhorn's book.

It is to be hoped that the book will find a wide public in this country. The present writer, whose interest derives not from any knowledge of science but from having met some of these problems in university administration, has found it fascinating and has laid it down with an increased faith in the American people. And it is a measure of Professor Gellhorn's achievement that, criticizing certain practices in his own country, he yet induces in a foreigner a greater respect for it. Almost every page contains some evidence of unwisdom in the use of power, but every page shows also how widespread throughout the United States are generosity of impulse and liberality of spirit. The future of the world may well turn on whether there are, in America, sufficient men and women who look, not to the next war, but to the far future, not to national but to world security. And one reader, at least, has more hope than he had, for the book shows with sharp clarity just how wide, deep and persistent, in the face of all objections, is the tradition of American liberalism.

W. MANSFIELD COOPER.

BOOK REVIEWS

JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By PROFESSOR W. A. ROBSON. Third edition. (Stevens. xxxiii+674 pp. 30s.)

TWENTY-THREE years have elapsed since Professor Robson wrote the first edition of his work on administrative justice. At that time the atmosphere was heavy with threats (at least in the minds of some judges) of officials depriving courts of their rightful powers and subjecting citizens to oppressive and tyrannical control. In this third edition he shows that the thunder clouds have disappeared. The administrative tribunal is now accepted as part of the constitution: no longer do the judges approach all legislative conferment of judicial power on administrative bodies with the assumption that Parliament must be presumed not to have taken away the citizen's right of access to the ordinary courts or his freedom to do as he likes with his property. Moreover, to Professor Robson is due much of the credit for this change; so compelling has been his logic. He has achieved the unusual feat of writing a book which is readily understood by the layman, is a law student's standard text book, and has influenced the development of public administration.

This new edition presents a bird's eye view of the range of administrative justice. We see a steady increase in the field of application of administrative adjudication: since the end of the war the need for cheapness, speed, and a sympathetic execution of governmental policy has led to the setting up of these administrative tribunals (among others): industrial injuries tribunals now replace the workmen's compensation jurisdiction of the courts; rent tribunals determine the rents of furnished and recently-let unfurnished houses; the Lands Tribunal values property for various compensation and rating purposes; Agricultural Land Tribunals determine whether the farmers are maintaining their holdings in conformity with the standards of good husbandry; anyone aggrieved by the refusal of the Home Secretary to register a voluntary home for deprived children may appeal to a tribunal.

But he is not content that administrative tribunals should be accepted within the framework of government: they must function efficiently and with procedures calculated to serve the ends of justice. The present position here is less satisfactory: many tribunals do not sit in public, or give reasons for their decisions; the fact-finding is often of poor quality—sometimes because the personnel of the tribunals are untrained or because no oral hearing is given; an allied problem is how to allow an expert tribunal, say, of doctors, to utilize their professional skills and yet to make sure that they act only on evidence presented to them which the parties have had the chance to rebut. A further unsolved problem is how best to review decisions of tribunals of first instance. At present there is chaos; the courts have general powers to prevent jurisdictional excesses and quash errors which are obvious on the face of the record of the tribunal (powers originally developed to control justices of the peace and little altered since), and in some cases are given appellate functions on questions of law or fact; in other cases there is a right of appeal to another administrative tribunal or to the Minister (this will not usually exclude the ordinary court's power of review). Professor Robson prefers a replacement of the courts' power to review by the establishment of an administrative appeals tribunal.

One problem which may perhaps have been worth considering more

fully is when should administrative decisions be judicialized. One is entitled to a hearing when applying for a passenger transport licence, but not for an export or building licence. A teacher may be dismissed by the local education authority without a judicial decision; a civil servant has no legal right to an administrative adjudication of a claim for superannuation; yet a local government official or a servant of a public corporation may have his dispute about superannuation determined by a tribunal; an alien may be deported without trial. What principles determine the division between summary administration and administrative adjudication?

One of the main obstacles to the improvement of administrative justice seems to be a lack of interest in, or at least a want of awareness of, procedural and organizational problems on the part of practising lawyers. Books on the subject are few, administrative law is a separate subject for law degrees at only three English universities (and even then only an optional one); it is not a subject in the professional examinations of the Bar and the Law Society. By contrast, in the United States it is an important subject in law school courses and authoritative text books abound. Another difficulty is the secretive attitude of public officials: this is reflected in their unwillingness to produce in litigation official material, in a tendency to vest adjudicative powers in the Minister when it is obvious that someone lower in the departmental hierarchy will decide, in the refusal to disclose reports which are made by officers conducting local enquiries prior to departmental decision and in the casting of powers in a "subjective" form, e.g. "if the Minister is satisfied", whereupon grounds for his satisfaction are not stated. Books like this under review will do much to make possible the evolution of a satisfactory system of administrative law in this country.

HARRY STREET.

JOHN STUART MILL AND HARRIET TAYLOR. By F. A. HAYEK. (Routledge. 320 pp. 18s.)

JOHN STUART MILL met Harriet Taylor in 1830. They were at once deeply attracted to each other. When the pair met, Harriet Taylor had already been married for four years, had two children, and was expecting a third. Her husband, John Taylor, was a junior partner in a flourishing firm of wholesale druggists whom Mill describes in his *Autobiography* as "a most upright, brave, honourable man, but without the intellectual or artistic tastes which would have made him a companion" for his wife.

The relationship between Mill and Harriet Taylor which Professor Hayek analyses in the present work with penetrating care and tact is perhaps less interesting as a human or literary phenomenon than as a sociological example of the Victorian moral code, so strangely remote from us now. There can be hardly any doubt that as long as John Taylor lived—he died in 1849—Mrs. Taylor's relation to both men must be defined as a *Seelenfreundschaft*. All the same, Mill and the married lady met and travelled together, of course with the consent of the husband. In spite of the idealistic and romantic norms which seem to have prevailed in this friendship, Mill's

family, his friends, and acquaintances were unable to see the bond between the two human beings in the same light in which they saw it themselves. Carlyle's reaction is perhaps typical. He writes to John Sterling on October 3rd, 1836: "Mill, they say, writes from Nice: he is not going into Italy . . . his health is little, and but a little improved. Mrs. Taylor, it is whispered, is with him, or near him. Is it not strange, this pining away into desiccation and nonentity, of our poor Mill, if it be so, as his friends all say, that his charmer is the cause of it? I have not seen any riddle of human life which I could so ill form a theory of. They are innocent, says Charity: they are guilty, says Scandal: then why in the name of wonder are they dying broken-hearted? One thing only is painfully clear to me, that poor Mill is in a bad way. Alas, tho' he speaks not, perhaps his tragedy is more tragical than that of any of us: this very item that he does not speak, that he never could speak, but was to sit imprisoned as in the thick ribbed ice, voiceless, uncommunicating, is it not the most tragical circumstance of all?" Carlyle knew the depth of the human heart.

The letters and documents exchanged between Mill and Mrs. Taylor which Professor Hayek has selected for publication give a full picture of this strange relationship. Though Harriet Taylor had undoubtedly helped Mill while he was creating his *Principles of Political Economy* or his essay on *Liberty*, it seems, judging from the correspondence, that her impact on the over-rationalized product of Benthamism was more emotional than intellectual. Many letters of both correspondents reveal very often an almost unbearable sentimentalism. Harriet Taylor cannot claim to have been Mill's *Beatrice*, for the letters of both are without poetical power; a touch of permanent adolescence prevails in nearly all of them.

Two notes from Mrs. Taylor to Mill are of particular psychological interest. Early in June, 1849—John Taylor is nearing death—Harriet writes to her lover: "You talk of my writing to you 'at some odd time when a change of subject of thought may be rather a relief than otherwise'! *odd time!* indeed you must be ignorant profoundly of all that *friendship* or *anxiety* means when you can use such pitiful narrow hearted expressions. The sentence appears to have come from the pen of one of the Miss Taylors. It is the puerility of thought and feeling of any utterless headless or heartless pattern of propriety old maid." Mrs. Taylor certainly did not mince her words; pondering over these lines, one is inclined to conclude that she was the stronger of the two.

The other passage is not less revealing. "Tocqueville", Mrs. Taylor writes, "is a notable specimen of the class which includes such people as the Sterlings Romilys Carlyles Austins—the gentility class—weak in moral, narrow in intellect, timid, infinitely conceited and gossiping. There are very few men in this country who can seem other than more or less respectable puppets to us." Their isolation made the pair unjust. Both overrated their significance. They lacked humility. Perhaps Mrs. Taylor has instilled some of her exaggerated moral pride into the soul of her weaker companion? A future biographer will owe a great deal to Professor Hayek. He will be able to explain one of the dominant influences on the mind and character of John Stuart Mill.

J. P. MAYER.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ENGLISH LIFE AND LEISURE. By B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE and G. P. LAVERS.
(Longmans. x+482 pp. 15s.)

WHICHEVER way you look at it, this is a melancholy book. If you could persuade yourself that it gives a fair picture of the life and leisure of contemporary English men, women and children, then it would be melancholy to discover that the simple pleasures of family life, of visiting friends and neighbours in their homes, as well as all outdoor activities, such as sport, hiking and gardening, are so unimportant that they only crop up incidentally in a few "case histories", and are not thought worthy of discussion in their own right in a book which has a chapter each devoted to commercialized gambling, drink, smoking and sexual promiscuity. Alternatively, if you find the picture quite unconvincing, it is melancholy that Mr. Seebohm Rowntree, who is so justly esteemed for his earlier social investigations, should have allowed his name to appear on a piece of work, the scientific standards of which are so far below what he has taught us to expect of him.

For social scientists must, alas! disown *English Life and Leisure*: their reputation will be grievously damaged if it passes for an example of their work. Much of the data upon which Messrs. Rowntree and Lavers base their conclusions is second-hand, borrowed chiefly from Hulton Research Services Ltd. and similar sources. But the new material which the book contains has been gathered for the most part (the evidence about church attendance is an exception) in complete disregard of that primary canon of scientific investigation, which requires that methods should be set out in sufficient detail to enable anyone interested to evaluate them, and indeed to check the results by repeating the enquiry by the same, or improved, techniques. All we are told about the 220 case histories—miniature biographies occupying half a page or less—with which the book opens is that they were collected in a number of named cities and unnamed rural areas. How these individuals were chosen from the whole available population, or even how the 220 that are printed were picked from the total of 975 "persons who revealed their philosophy of life without realizing that they were doing so" is undisclosed. As for interviewing method, we learn that the procedure was to strike up acquaintance, on excuses which are "immaterial", gain the subject's confidence, and elicit the information required without the informant "knowing that any specific information was being sought". One cannot but suspect that there must have been some bias in a selection thus made, especially when it led to these chance acquaintances making such disclosures as the one who said: "I have one steady lover and it doesn't hurt him if I have an occasional fellow besides"; or another who "goes to bed with any man that pleases her"; or another who "changes women every few months". Indeed one wonders how people with such strict ethical standards as the authors found it in their conscience, having wormed out these details, to publish them, even anonymously, with such comments as "her present sexual habits are undoubtedly irreproachable (in any case she isn't attractive enough to tempt even the most ardent male!)" or "she dyes her hair a horrible shade of red, but she is really quite a nice woman, though naïve and a bit vulgar": or, more simply, "a nasty piece of work".

The case histories occupy about a quarter of the book, and do not appear to have much to do with the rest of it. From them we pass to more general studies of gambling, drink, smoking, sexual promiscuity, honesty and

BOOK REVIEWS

dishonesty, cinema and theatre-going, radio listening, reading habits, adult education and religion, rounded off by outline sketches of what goes on in High Wycombe, and what Mr. Rowntree learned, on a brief (high-level) visit, about the leisure habits of the Scandinavian countries. The authors appear to explain the increase of organized gambling in recent years as the result of the working classes having acquired a lot more free money without the "cultural training" to realize that there are better ways of spending their leisure. But the cases which they actually quote support the quite different theory that people gamble because they have too little money, and hope that a win in the pools will bring them more to spend, often on such admirable purposes as buying a house or educating their children. Messrs. Rowntree and Lavers, however, believe that gambling is immoral because "the true ethical basis for the acquisition of property is effort followed by satisfaction". That may well be, but it does not explain how, on current working-class incomes, people are to acquire any substantial property otherwise than by a lucky win. However, some appreciation of this issue does soften our authors' strictures on football pools as compared with other forms of gambling.

While gambling increases, honesty, we are told, has declined in private, but happily not in public life; but as no data (except other people's opinions) are given for the past, this judgment lacks any supporting evidence. About "sexual promiscuity" the authors are (wisely) more guarded, though disturbed. Incidentally, the term "promiscuity" is apparently used as synonymous with any extra-marital intercourse, the only exception being the established "unmarried wife", as recognized by the Service departments.

And so on. In short, this book is not a scientist's survey: it is a moral appraisal based on very sketchy data. The authors are fond of the word "objectionable" and its opposite, "wholesome", and often their only remedy for the "objectionable" is to suppress it. They would like to prohibit the import of objectionable American magazines, to forbid (*sic*) jokes about drink on the radio, to persuade the young never to become smokers. Naturally, Mr. Rowntree and Mr. Lavers have every right to make their own moral judgments, and, if they think fit, to publish them. But equally the rest of us will assess these judgments against the background of the personalities who make them. In the course of the book, the authors disclose a considerable number of facts about themselves (but not quite as many as they extracted from their informants). We learn that neither has any desire to gamble; that Mr. Rowntree is in practice, though not on principle, a teetotaler, but that Mr. Lavers, though not a "connoisseur of beer", certainly took some half-pints in the course of his investigations; that, until the enquiry began in 1946, "neither of us knew much about the cinema"; that the world of the theatre was largely "*terra incognita*", but that during the enquiry Mr. Lavers paid 15 visits to variety shows, on the strength of which he announces that "the basis of a variety show is usually the dancing team of highly trained and attractive girls". One cannot help wondering if both investigators might not have found things less distressing if they had not set out from a point so immensely remote from the world of their explorations.

But what a gold-mine the case histories could be for writers of fiction—220 characters in search of a novelist!

BARBARA WOOTTON.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION. By HAROLD J. LASKI. (*Manchester University Press.* 220 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS posthumous volume comprises the Simon lectures delivered by Professor Laski in the University of Manchester early in February, 1950. During the subsequent fortnight he took an active part in the General Election, addressing a large number of Labour meetings in various parts of the country. On 25th March he died. The concluding words of the last lecture printed in this book have a melancholy and prophetic ring: "We are concerned with the short run, and not the long; for as Keynes said in perhaps the best of all his aphorisms, in the long run we shall all be dead."

In these "Reflections" Harold Laski discussed at length the House of Commons, the Cabinet, and the Civil Service. He was, on the whole, well satisfied with them, although he advocated a number of minor changes and one or two major ones. In general, Laski took a traditional view of institutions, which contrasted strongly with his passionate belief in the need for profound alterations in the power structure of the state. The explanation is that he considered the existing institutions would work well provided that those in power held the right political views and that the right men were appointed both at the ministerial and official levels.

There are exceptions to this statement of his views. He was in favour of advisory committees of the House of Commons to work with the various Departments. He particularly urged an advisory committee of the Commons on foreign affairs, with power to summon before it not only the Foreign Secretary but also ambassadors, permanent officials, and even Commanders-in-Chief of overseas commands. This committee would have access to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence; the former would even have a duty to circulate its reports to the Cabinet. A Standing Committee of the Commons would also be set up for each of the nationalized industries, with power to summon before them the Minister and the Chairman of the governing board.

In regard to the Cabinet, the author rejected Mr. Amery's plea for a small group of Ministers without heavy Departmental duties "thinking firmly and imaginatively about the future", on the ground that this would result in a divorce between theory and practice. "I am not arguing", he remarked, "that a Minister who reflects upon the future must bury himself in his departmental papers; but I do not think that the best way to prevent that burial is mainly to make of him a brooding omnipresence in the sky who darts, two or three times a week, down to earth, and then flies back to whatever special area of the stars the Prime Minister may have allocated to him as his special residence." It was quips of this kind, expressed with pungent imagery, which made Harold Laski a highly successful lecturer who appealed to audiences of many different kinds.

In discussing the Cabinet he gave full weight to the great increase in the power of the executive. He accepted as inevitable both the increased powers of the Cabinet relatively to Parliament, and of the Prime Minister in relation to the Cabinet. The only restraint he sought to impose on the premier was to require him to obtain Cabinet assent before requesting the King to dissolve Parliament.

The Cabinet, declared Laski, should consist of the Ministers in charge of

The Works & Correspondence of David Ricardo

EDITED BY
PIERO SRAFFA

The Cambridge University Press is to issue for the Royal Economic Society a complete edition of David Ricardo in eleven volumes, of which the first two *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* and *Notes on Malthus*, are now ready. A prospectus giving details of the whole project is available. *Volumes I and II 24s. net each.*

Hitler's Strategy

F. H. HINSLEY

The first authoritative analysis of Hitler's war strategy based on a study of all the documents, including the German naval archives, which were captured intact. *18s. net*

The Economic Development of France & Germany 1815-1914

SIR JOHN CLAPHAM

The fourth printing of the fourth edition of the late Sir John Clapham's survey of the economic history of France and Germany in the hundred years before the First World War. *20s. net*

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Principles of Social and Political Theory

by SIR ERNEST BARKER

25s. net

This book contains an enquiry into the principles which lie behind the existence and action of National Society and the National State.

Lloyd George

by THOMAS JONES, C.H.

Illustrated. 21s. net

Years must pass before a definitive biography of Lloyd George can be published, and it was therefore desirable that Dr. Thomas Jones should set down his interim, unofficial contribution, a great deal of which is based upon his experiences as a civil servant working in close contact with Lloyd George.

Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914

by A. F. PRIBRAM

Translated by

IAN F. D. MORROW

25s. net

With an Introductory chapter on the Diplomatic Relations between Austria and England up to 1908.

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

the principal departments, together with the Lord President and the Lord Privy Seal. He specified a Cabinet of 14 Ministers, which would not include either the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State for Scotland. This part of the book contains an excellent account of the role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in deciding important matters of policy, and a stimulating description of the qualities required of a good Minister.

Laski's reflections on the civil service are less interesting than those on Parliament and the Cabinet. This was due to the fact that while he had spent nearly 30 years in close association with politicians of all kinds, as the confidante and friend of many Ministers, Members of Parliament, candidates, and party officials, and had been a dominant influence in the Labour movement for most of that time, he knew little at first hand about administration and officials. His acquaintance with the civil service was mainly derived from membership of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal, which deals with wage claims and conditions of service. His condemnation of the Masterman report would scarcely have been so arbitrary if he had been familiar with the actual processes of administration.

The value of these lectures is that they indicate in a suggestive manner the interactions of men, measures, and governmental institutions. In Laski's ability to draw out the full significance of a particular event or a particular individual lay no small part of his genius as a teacher. Sometimes he went too far and overstressed an occasional incident as though it represented the normal practice. And not infrequently he founded a generalization on far too slender a basis of facts. But these were the defects of his qualities.

There are signs in this book that its author was a sick man who had certainly passed his zenith; but it would be mean and ungenerous to dwell on them. As one reads these lively pages, and senses anew the wide sweep of his intellect, and the provocative moral passion of his attitude, the magnitude of our loss becomes all too apparent.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE MAHDIYA. By A. B. THEOBALD. (Longmans. 273 pp. 21s.)

THE "Mahdiya" (to follow the author's transliteration of Arabic words) was the period in the history of the Sudan during which a Sudanese leader, born near Dongola about 1844, named Muhammad Ahmad al-Saiyid 'Abd Allah, first, in the summer of 1881, announced himself to be the Mahdi ("the Expected Guide"), and then, by successive defeats of forces sent against him by the Turko-Egyptian Government in Khartoum, so enlarged the number of those who believed in him and joined him that, by 1885, he had not only conquered the Sudan, but had established a locally accepted new religious dispensation. The Mahdi died then, however, at the height of his success, in June, 1885, leaving the theocratic state which he had founded to the rule of his Khalifa ("successor") 'Abd Allah al-Saiyid Muhammad, whose régime lasted until the Battle of Omdurman on 2nd September, 1898. The Khalifa's subsequent further defeat and death on 24th November, 1899, ended the period.

It will be seen that the Mahdi's personal control of his new dispensation was a short one, from mid-1881 to mid-1885, though it sufficed him to carry out his religious revolution, and to clear the ground for his secular

DIZZY:

*The Life and Nature of
Benjamin Disraeli,
Earl of Beaconsfield*

HESKETH PEARSON

A biography of the most colourful personality in the history of politics the story of whose rise to power is stranger than anything in fiction. Mr. Hesketh Pearson has sought to discover the human being behind the statesman and novelist. *Illustrated. 21s.*

IRISH NATIONALISM AND BRITISH DEMOCRACY

E. STRAUSS

An account of the remarkable influence of the Irish question on the political development of Great Britain. *21s.*

UNESCO:

Peace in the Minds of Men

THEODORE BESTERMAN

"Affords a remarkably lucid exposition of the organisation's aims, methods and achievements." *Evening News 10s. 6d.*

METHUEN

Hutchinson's

Coming Shortly:—

A SHORT HISTORY OF IRELAND

J. C. BECKETT

During the past 10 or 15 years there has been a great stimulation of interest in Irish history and much valuable research work has been done. Some of this has been published in historical journals and specialist monographs; but the present book is the first attempt to incorporate the fruit of this research in a short general history of Ireland. *8s. 6d.*

Endpaper Maps

THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Its Historical Setting

C. M. WOODHOUSE, O.B.E., D.S.O.

The story of the Greeks' rising against Turkish rule in 1821 has usually been told as an isolated episode, without relation to any wider historical scheme. The aim of the present work is to correct that representation in two respects: firstly, by relating the Greek War of Independence to the general history of Europe contemporary with it; secondly, by relating it to the chronological continuity of the whole history of the Greek people. *8s. 6d.*

Endpaper Maps

Still Available:—

LABOUR

Professor P. SARGANT FLORENCE

"Informative, thorough and well-arranged."

JOURNAL, ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY

"A real mine of information . . . highly readable."

MANAGEMENT REVIEW (New York)

"Excellent little volume."

POLITICAL QUARTERLY

SOCIOLOGY

Professor W. J. H. SPROTT

"Has admirable balance and perspective. The author gives a clear, if brief, account of the major issues and contributions. His formulations are pithy and succinct, and at times he achieves the neat summation of a doctrine that is rarely so well stated in so few words."

BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

7s. 6d. each

University
Library

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

one by overthrowing whatever rule existed in the Sudan. Had the Mahdi survived to preside over the establishment of his new state, in accordance with his own ideas, by means of the personal rule of a man claiming the authority of prophetic inspiration from God, it might well have been a more merciful and a more advanced structure than that conceived and built by his Khalifa. All that the latter's statecraft was capable of initiating was a summary despotism, of which the agents were "Emirs" appointed almost wholly from his fellow-tribesmen of the western Sudan. Thus the reputation of the "Mahdiyya" suffered by what was done under its name, long after the death of the founder who gave the name to it.

There was room for an accurate and impartial new study of the "Mahdiyya" and the author has achieved remarkable success in writing what deserves to be for long a standard work on the subject. Mr. Theobald is the Vice-Principal of the Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum, the senior unit of the new University College of Khartoum, and has been resident in the Sudan since 1929, during which time, in historical teaching, he has had much opportunity of discussing with Sudanese their own history. There are sons and grandsons in the Sudan of most of the principal actors in the events of the "Mahdiyya", including the Mahdi and the Khalifa. There are, among students and ex-students of the Gordon College, Sudanese who now themselves write theses on aspects of the history of their country for post-graduate degrees of English Universities. Perhaps the next new account of the "Mahdiyya" will be written in due course by a Sudanese. In the meantime Mr. Theobald's book can be recommended wholeheartedly, both to the outside world and to Sudanese themselves, who will find in its account of the actions and hesitations of remote British Cabinets keys to events not otherwise intelligible to their fathers, who saw only the results that unfolded themselves in the Sudan.

Into the twenty-six pages of Chapter I the author has compressed a remarkably concise and accurate description of the Sudan, and of its history from early times up to 1880, the chief relevant event in which was the occupation of the country in 1821 by the armies sent by Muhammad 'Ali, who had established himself as Pasha of Egypt, under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey. The chequered record of the Turko-Egyptian occupation and the rise and increase of the slave-trade is admirably described. The state of misgovernment and oppression under which the country lay before the beginning of the Mahdist rising is well brought out from contemporary accounts. With Chapter II the story of the Mahdi's movement commences. In Chapter XIII the death of his Khalifa brings it and the book to an end.

The Turko-Egyptian occupation initiated by Muhammad 'Ali, the Albanian Mameluke who seized the mastery of Egypt, lasted from 1821 to 1885. On this, and on the immigration into Sudanese towns during it of a moderate number of Egyptians who, with their families, were mostly spared from massacre in the Mahdist rising by temporarily accepting the Mahdist creed, and whose descendants still remain, are based the present-day Egyptian claims to kinship with the Sudanese and to political unity of the whole Nile Valley. The main part of this book shows, to very contrary effect, how the real Sudanese, thirsting for relief from oppression, threw off the Egyptian rule of those days. That they spared civilian Egyptians, whose sons and grandsons now threaten them with a return of a new sole Egyptian

A Book you must read

COMMUNISM IN GREAT BRITAIN

BY H. A. TAYLOR

*A Short History of the
British Communist Party*

PRICE NINEPENCE
CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL
CENTRE

6 Victoria Street, London, S.W.1

THE REVOLT

MENACHEM BEGIN

This sensational inside story of the war in Palestine, written by the mysterious leader of the underground, is a documentary of great historical importance. It will appeal to all who served in the area, to all who are interested in Israel and to those who desire the truth about Middle East affairs.

Certain to be highly controversial

409 PAGES MAPS 18/- NET

W. H. ALLEN

Publishers for over a century

THE STRUGGLE FOR TRANSCAUCASIA

by

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH, Ph.D.

The border regions of the former Russian Empire have been somewhat neglected by historians since the Revolution. Dr. Kazemzadeh remedies the oversight, so far as Transcaucasia is concerned. His book is an excellent history of the period from the fall of the Imperial power up to 1921. The research and writing were done at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, and gained the author his Ph.D. at Harvard. Professor Karpovich, Professor of History at Harvard, has written the Introduction.

The author has exceptional qualifications for such a work. He was born in Moscow of Persian parentage, acquired both languages and received a Western education. His book is scholarly, highly readable, well documented and, we believe, the only authentic work on the subject. Ready October 11th.

Demy 8vo

Maps and Index

25s. net

2 Alfred Street

GEORGE RONALD

Oxford

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

sovereignty, was to their credit, and should not be allowed to turn to their detriment.

Many of the older generation in this country, to whom Gordon's name was a household word, and whose recollections remain of the days when Britain waited in suspense to see if he could be rescued from the Mahdi, will like to live over again, in the pages of this book, the thrilling story of what he tried to do, and what was attempted to bring him aid. By those the younger generations too the tale will be found full of human interest. They could not have a better guide than Mr. Theobald. At whatever point his narrative is tested, he will be found to have studied all that happened and most of what has been written about it, and to have arrived at well-judged and sane and balanced views. Particularly novel and welcome to the general reader will be the three chapters devoted to the régime established by the Khalifa, his methods of administration, and the events that chequered the years of his rule. "The Khalifa 'Abd Allahi," the author sums up, "was not a lovable man; but he was certainly a formidable one."

Of the Mahdi, who gave the title which he had assumed for himself in this brief epoch, so packed with religious exaltation and emotion of a nation while pointing out that his early death relieved him of the test of administering what he had won, the author writes: "He left behind an almost unblemished record. His fame was secure for posterity. In four years he had risen from nothing; defeated two powers whose combined resources were immeasurably superior to his own; laid the foundations of a new state; reformed the religion of his people; united them; changed their whole way of life; given them a new faith in themselves; led them to freedom, and in doing all this, he had retained their unquestioning obedience and reverence. There are few heroes in history who can claim to have done as much."

E. N. CORBYN.

A HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS. By GEORGE CATLIN. (Allen and Unwin. 802 pp. 30s.)

MR. CATLIN'S book has now been published in this country substantially in the form in which it appeared in the United States in 1939 and ran there into several editions. It is apparently a popular book which does not claim original scholarship; a few, rather arbitrarily selected references, attached to each chapter, do not take into account what has been written in the vast fields of the history of Political Science since that date.

A popularization of the history of political thought is a worthwhile aim. The question to be examined is whether this execution is valid? Mr. Catlin has attempted to compress into a single volume the history of political ideas from Confucius to John Strachey, our present Minister of War. Naturally enough the stresses in a work of such scope must be according to the author's choice, yet it would seem that some contemporaries deserve a less exhaustive treatment than Bodin or Montesquieu who are amongst the classics of Political Science. Indeed, it would be impossible for any uninitiated reader of Mr. Catlin's volume fully to assess the significance of Bodin and Montesquieu within the framework of their time or for posterity. Mr. Catlin expresses himself thus on Bodin: "Bodin's notions are theoretically monstrous, but they will prove dominant for several centuries." Such a judgment is highly misleading. If the student reads Mr. Catlin's summary

BOOK REVIEWS

of Bodin's political ideas, he may know less of Bodin than if he had never heard of his name. Nor is Mr. Catlin's analysis of Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois* more revealing. He writes: "The comment upon the *Esprit des Lois* by Madame du Deffand that it would more appropriately have been entitled *De L'Esprit sur les Lois* seems to do a somewhat dull and prolix production undue honour." Mr. Catlin cannot be blamed for lack of courage. He says what he means. Only all other people who have studied Montesquieu's work agree that it belongs to the great and rare masterpieces the human mind has produced.

I give another example of Mr. Catlin's method and peculiar insight. On p. 751 of his volume we read: "The same over-concrete historical or anecdotal (*sic!*) method of study of cultures and abhorrence of scientific hypotheses and generalizations—which nevertheless permitted in this case a study of 'types'—characterized the work of Professor Max Weber. . . . His major work lay in his balancing . . . of the Marxist theory of the materialist determination of cultures by expounding the complementary and cultural determination of social order and economic drives. The hen of idealism was sent by Professor Weber through history after the egg of materialism." I am afraid that our students cannot yet dispense with reading Max Weber's works themselves. Mr. Catlin offers them no short cut.

The author does not seem to differentiate between Politics and Sociology. (See p. 3.) This is more, so it seems to me, than a question of definition. It is a question of scientific logic, for politics and the study of politics are certainly entirely different. Had the author grasped this difference, he might have written a more concise book. His "Conclusion and Prospect" in which we might perhaps seek for his own political philosophy is remarkable for its thinness and generality. Mr. Catlin has written a bulky book, but it may be doubted whether he has helped the younger generation to serve and further the political traditions which have shaped us all.

SHORTER NOTICES

METHODS OF SOCIAL WELFARE ADMINISTRATION. United Nations: Department of Social Affairs. (H. M. Stationery Office. 299 pp. 17s. 6d.)

THIS is a study of the methods of social welfare administration in 30 countries, ranging from Switzerland to Saudi Arabia. The purpose is to assemble the background information required in a long term international social welfare programme of assistance to Governments. The aspects dealt with include the field administration of social services by governmental organizations; relations between the central and the field organs; administrative specialization and co-ordination; finance; personnel; and voluntary or philanthropic social welfare organizations.

The studies are so brief and flat that they need to be supplemented by considerable political, administrative, economic, and sociological knowledge of the countries concerned in order to obtain a living picture of the social welfare services. Nevertheless, the collection is a useful starting point for further inquiries. Studies of this kind should aid in the selection of countries of observation under the fellowship programme sponsored by U.N. and in the appointment of social welfare experts for technical assistance projects.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

EDUCATION, 1900-1950. Being the Report of the Ministry of Education and the statistics of public education for England and Wales for 1950. Cmd. 8244. (H. M. Stationery Office. 250 pp. 7s. 6d.)

It was a brilliant idea of the Ministry of Education to present its annual report for 1950 in the form of a survey of public education during the past half-century. The Board of Education, as the Department was called until 1944, was established in 1900, and two years later Parliament enacted the Education Act, 1902, which Sidney Webb drafted for Balfour. Immense progress has been made in the 50 years which have elapsed since then, and this survey reviews in a succinct and informative manner the main lines on which development has taken place. There are chapters on administration; on the welding of private and public enterprise when the religious schools were brought into the system of municipal education; on finance (the net expenditure of local education authorities has risen from £22 millions in 1905-6 to £237 millions in 1949-50); on primary and secondary schools; on further education of many different kinds; on the school health service, school meals, physical education, and special schools for handicapped children; on teachers; on scholarships; and on the wider frontiers of education in the international sphere, the exchange of teachers, U.N.E.S.C.O., and so forth; and on those museums for which the Minister of Education is responsible. The report possesses great merits. It is written in a lively and interesting manner; and it avoids complacency.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING, 1943-1951. Cmd. 8204. (H. M. Stationery Office. 215 pp. 5s.)

This is the first report—and the last—of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. It covers the 8 years from February, 1943, when the Department was created, to January, 1951, when it was merged in the present Ministry of Local Government and Planning. The period was one of intense legislative and organizational activity. Five major statutes dealing with town and country planning were passed. New planning authorities were established at the national, regional and local levels. Fundamental policies were adopted by the Government. A series of important outline plans relating to particular areas were drawn up and published. In short everything was put in train for a vigorous and significant programme of physical planning, of which so far very little has actually been carried out.

The present report deals with all these important preparatory developments. It is divided into 4 parts. Part I describes the background to the present position and explains the organization for planning. Part II is devoted to local and regional planning. It discusses how the present system works in the localities. It also explains the problems which confront each of the regions into which the country is divided. Part III is entitled "Planning Problems of National Importance". These problems relate mainly to the conflicts and difficulties arising from rival claims for the use of a very limited amount of land. This part contains chapters on minerals, new towns, amenities, national parks and access to the countryside. The report is an essential document for everyone interested in the planning movement.

69495

Made and printed in Great Britain for The Turnstile Press Limited,
by The Camelot Press Ltd., London and Southampton

WM 56, N30
N2A-27