

THE
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CENTURY
AND AFTER



A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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UNEMPLOYMENT

It is a common habit of political speakers and writers to assert that 'the present is a critical period in the history of the country.' With other expressions which are common form, it has become almost meaningless. But there is no doubt of the truth of the description as applied to the next twenty years of British history. For the first time in human experience a highly industrialised country possesses an electorate practically as wide as its whole adult population. That electorate is thoroughly interested in public questions and prepared to pronounce its own opinions upon them. Yet at the same time, through no fault of its own, its power of criticism, of distinguishing good coin from base, is not nearly so developed as is its interest. On the other hand, the questions upon which it will be asked to pronounce are among the most complex and confusing.

In past years public discussion has in turn centred upon theological, constitutional, educational questions, each in their turn. To-day economic problems are the centre of controversy.

They are the very questions on which superficial judgments are most likely to be wrong. At the same time, the fallacious view is easy to grasp; the exposure needs deeper thought and more penetration. But if the risk of error is great, the result of making a serious mistake may be peculiarly disastrous for a country in the position of Great Britain. We are the first in the voyage of exploration through a new North-West Passage, with reefs and winds and currents which have never been charted. Germany, the country nearest to us in this evolution, is still a decade behind and will be able to use our successes or mistakes for her guidance. Our ship, moreover, has no watertight compartments. In a new country, only partially developed, the natural growth may repair and make good the effects of mistakes. Again, a country rich and self-sufficing in natural products and an exporter of raw materials need not be so apprehensive about the possible loss of oversea markets. But we are an old and settled and highly industrialised nation dependent on our export of manufactures for obtaining our necessary supplies of food and raw materials. A serious mistake may mean a disaster from which we shall find it hard to recover. Is it wrong, then, to regard the next twenty years as critical—until democracy has gained a knowledge and an experience equal to its power and its interest? This is a reason for care, not for pessimism. We possess one invaluable asset in an innate moderation and a real kindliness which showed itself even in a moment of aberration, like the General Strike. Can the parties to industry work together and face the trials before them with common forbearance and understanding? Can the people have the issues in great questions so placed before them that instinctive good sense can play its part without being overborne by sentimentalism or prejudice? If so, the long channel can be navigated with safety to its further end. Then, and only then, will there be for the first time a complete democracy based on security which will endure.

An early and significant test of the ability of the new democracy to deal with difficult economic questions will be its treatment of the present problem of unemployment. Those who disagreed with other views propounded by Sir Oswald Mosley in the debate in the House of Commons immediately after his resignation can agree with one of them. He put forward a plea—as the present writer had done some time ago—for a careful and authoritative examination of the problem of unemployment, so that the issues involved should be made as widely known as possible. Indeed, the question deserves such consideration for its own intrinsic importance. There can be few who are interested in public affairs to whom it does not cause anxiety. For nine

years—that is, ever since the country emerged from the great slump of 1921 which followed the cessation of the war—the average annual total of the Live Register of Unemployment has been in the neighbourhood of 1,200,000. The figures have been affected by crises such as the General Strike; they have also shown a seasonal fluctuation, rising in the winter and falling in the summer, but never appreciably below the 1,000,000 mark. Public imagination has, however, recently been much impressed by the fact that in the last eight months they have risen steadily until they reached the abnormally high figure of 1,775,000 in the first week in June—a time of year when the figure has generally been at its lowest.

Optimists tell us that the country is 'played out.' Pessimists tell us that the country is 'played out.' Optimists argue that the unemployment figures convey a grossly exaggerated impression of the state of affairs. Praise or blame is bestowed on successive Governments—with greater or lesser justice. What would be more valuable would be a full analysis of the problem itself. What do the figures really mean? How serious are they? So far as the trouble is serious, what are the causes of it? If the causes are ascertainable, what are the remedies? Of proposals which have already been made, which are good and which are bad? An attempt is made in the following pages to give answers in general outline to these questions. Of those who have dealt officially with the problem of unemployment the writer was the first to endeavour to analyse its causes, and this may give some value to the opinions given. No one, however, who is charged with the burden of unemployment administration can hope to make an adequate examination or one free from great risk of error. Concentrated investigation is badly needed.

The recent great increase in the figures of unemployment is a striking phenomenon. It would not be so remarkable or important but for the fact that it is superadded to the continuance of so high a level of unemployment during the last nine years. It is the difference between a sharp peak with a steep ascent and descent to sea level and one that rises from a high, bleak, broad tableland. The two phenomena possess different characteristics, and therefore should be considered separately. As regards the former, it is wrong to regard the figure of 1,200,000 as denoting a 'standing army' of that number of idle men and women. Of course, it denotes nothing of the sort. The vast majority of those who receive benefit in the course of a year only do so for a few weeks. Apart from workmen in the depressed trades, those who have been unemployed for a year or more form a very small proportion of the whole. Again, it is wrong in itself, and also a disservice to the country, to concentrate attention on the fact that 10 or 11 is a high percentage of unemployed and 1,200,000 a

formidable total, and not to remember that 80 or 90 per cent. of insured people are at work. The exposure of such misconceptions, however, does not justify any easy optimism. Employment is much worse than it has been for fifty years and more before the war. No such complete statistics exist for pre-war years as are provided by the unemployment insurance records to-day, but it is pretty clear that for the twenty years before the war the average amount of unemployment was about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in the occupations covered by the present unemployment insurance system. The same percentage in the last few years would have meant an unemployment figure of only 550,000 to 600,000—over 600,000 less than the normal post-war figure up to the autumn of last year.

The condition of the nation which is reflected in these figures is no ground for despair. There is no reason for pessimism or exaggeration. But there is no room for complacency. It is an occasion for searchings of heart and still more for searchings for causes. The 'malaise' from which the country suffers is severe, whether judged from the human aspect, the business point of view, or the financial position. Six hundred thousand more unemployed means that five or six times that number live in uncertainty. A man loses his job; he becomes unemployed, and his neighbour may well exclaim, 'So, but for the Grace of God, were I!' A longish spell of unemployment weakens self-reliance in men and women who, in normal conditions, are anxious to work. From the business point of view 600,000 more unemployed means that those businesses which still give employment are working at a small margin of profit, or even at a loss, in order to keep going. In other words, reserves are depleted just when they most need to be increased to provide for improvements and replacements during an era of peculiarly rapid development in method and machinery. From the point of view of finance, whether of individuals or of the country, 600,000 more unemployed is equally serious. It means a reduction of more than 5 per cent. in the production of the country, since it is the productive industries which have borne the brunt of unemployment and the distributive trades which have escaped more lightly. The Exchequer loses to the extent of more than 5 per cent. and the taxpayer has to make good this loss.

Comparisons between nations are always liable to be misleading because of the difference in natural conditions. In considering the state of unemployment the risk is greater because of abnormal occurrences peculiar to one or more countries which are the aftermath of the war. The course of employment in France and in Belgium has been affected by the restoration of ravaged territories. Depreciation of currency has occurred in different

European countries at different times, and stabilisation has been effected at varying levels. The payment of indemnities has been, and will continue to be, a disturbing factor, affecting countries differently as regards employment. Even so, it is very significant that no industrialised country provides any parallel to our post-war unemployment. Here and there, now and then, there has been some lesser peak of unemployment, as in the United States in 1926, but nothing like the continuing severity of our own experience. It was this fact that led the writer to think that there might be one or more causes of trouble, the incidence of which was either confined to this country or affected it with peculiar force. This has proved to be the case. The falling off in the volume of our overseas trade had already attracted attention.¹ It was due to a number of different causes. They all had their origin in the war. They were cumulative in their effect. They affected international trade generally. But as they were all present and operative in the case of British overseas trade it suffered with a peculiar severity. In the first place, overseas trade, except in articles of necessity, had practically ceased during the war. The machinery had been dislocated and the scramble to execute orders at inflated prices in 1919 and 1920 had done little to restore normal connexions.

Meanwhile, the cessation of our exports during the war had led a number of countries which were formerly important markets for British goods to manufacture for themselves. The usual result followed in the shape of protection to local industries when once established, and this tendency to a rise in tariffs was intensified by the growth in nationalistic spirit, which was also a result of the war. Other markets, again, which were among our most important have been greatly restricted through poverty caused by the war, or, as in the case of China, through internal disorder and civil strife. To these causes which affected the willingness or the capacity of importing countries to take supplies has been added the intensified competition of our rivals among industrialised countries doing an export trade. The depreciation of the currency in France, Italy, and Belgium was tantamount, while it continued, to a reduction in wages which helped manufacturers to undersell our own exporters. These currencies have now been stabilised, but under conditions which have resulted in wages starting at very low level. In Germany the fall in the value of the mark facilitated the re-equipment of factories at an exceedingly low capital cost. In this country the restoration of the gold standard, with the pound sterling at its old value, had a contrary effect. It is not necessary, or indeed possible, to repeat here the reasons for and against that much debated step. It is sufficient

¹ See first Report of the Committee on Trade and Industry.

to state an opinion that the advantages of taking the final steps outweighed the disadvantages. At the same time, the disadvantage to industry was serious, since it added something like 10 per cent. to the wages cost of British exports.² It has been necessary to draw attention to the difficulties which the British export trade has had to face, as the view taken of them affects the determination of future policy. In considering the question of employment in particular it will be remembered that external trade has for many years formed a much greater part of our national economy than has been the case with any other of the great nations. A decrease in the volume of that trade, therefore, even if our proportion of the world's international commerce remained the same, would affect us with peculiar severity. Expressed in terms of work, it might well account for the greater part, if not the whole, of the excess of unemployment in the last eight years. This has proved to be the case. The amount of unemployment due to this cause has been variously estimated at between 450,000 and 700,000 insured persons. Even at the lower figure it will be seen that the greater part of our high rate of unemployment is thus explained.

A factor which has also contributed to the increase in unemployment since 1921—although not to the extent caused by the decrease in our export trade—is the decrease in emigration. Our national economy had become accustomed to a very considerable annual efflux of emigrants. Rapid developments in the United States and Canada, combined with easy conditions of entry, had caused it to reach an average of 270,000 in the five years before the war. During the war the population actually increased more through the cessation of emigration than it lost through the deaths caused by the war. Since then increasingly stringent regulations have been imposed on immigrants both into the United States and into the British Dominions. The eye of a needle was not a more effective bar to the rich man than some of the immigration

² With the restoration of the gold standard the pound sterling regained its old value as measured in terms of gold. This means an appreciation in value of about 10 per cent. above what it had been a short time before. Obviously, therefore, if the same nominal rates of wages continued to be paid, the exported British article would cost the same amount to manufacture in pounds, shillings and pence, but a higher price in foreign currencies would have to be asked for it. Of course the same rise in the value of the pound sterling meant a corresponding fall in wholesale prices of imported commodities, including the principal foods and raw materials. Had this fall been passed on rapidly to the consumer in the shape of proportionately lower retail prices and cost of living, it would have not passed on rapidly to the full extent. The result, *inter alia*, has been that where reductions in rates of wages have taken place this has occurred principally in industries subject to the full force of foreign competition, and has resulted in a discrepancy between the conditions obtaining in sheltered and unsheltered trades.

regulations to an intending British emigrant. As an inevitable result British emigration has been greatly reduced. The effect of this reduction has been offset to some extent by a fall in the birth rate, but the net result is still considerable, and may be said to account for the British labour market to-day being asked to absorb between 200,000 and 300,000 more persons than would have been the case had emigration been as unhampered as before the war.

So much for the continuous high level of unemployment during the past few years. The peak of this summer confronts us with a different problem. A seasonal improvement generally takes place between January and June. This year, however, the figure has increased steadily from 1,300,000 at Christmas last to 1,775,000 at the beginning of June—a considerably higher figure than at any time during the General Strike or the long coal stoppage.³ A primary cause of this great increase is undoubtedly the fall in wholesale prices, which became pronounced towards the end of 1929 and has continued throughout the spring of this year. The fall has extended to nearly all commodities, and, while accentuated by the increase in the world's supply of some natural products, is largely due to deflationary influences which are natural after the high money rates of last autumn. Unemployment naturally resulted. Merchants are not going to show confidence in the buying, or manufacturers in the making, of cotton goods when the raw material may be substantially cheaper a month hence than it is to-day. As with cotton, so with other materials which have fallen in price—foodstuffs like wheat, sugar, and tea or coffee; metals like copper, tin or zinc; textile materials like wool or silk; or other commodities in large use, such as rubber. Everybody lives from hand to mouth in such times and stocks are reduced to the minimum. Unemployment is inevitable until a halt is called in the downward process. The incidence of the increased unemployment has also, as is natural, been distributed throughout most of the productive industries, although it has fallen with special severity on the textile trades.

Moreover, it is not only this country which has suffered. In other great industrial nations unemployment has increased. Many attribute the whole of the present depression in England to this fact. In this they are not justified. Socialists who at the General Election freely and unreservedly promised a great and early improvement in employment are naturally anxious to point out that America and Germany have been affected as well as ourselves. Few, however, have the hardihood of Mr. MacDonald

³ The miners affected by the dispute in 1926 were not included in the figures of the live register, but for industries other than mining the present figures are higher than at any time during the long coal stoppage.

to overstate the case so boldly as to lead his hearers to believe that a year ago there were no unemployed in the United States, whereas there are between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 to-day. The fall in prices has been the most potent cause, but its effect has been powerfully reinforced by the ill-advised activities of the Government. When a pendulum has already begun to swing, a push will send it much further than it would otherwise go. So it has been recently with the economic policy of the Government. When trade is depressed and industrialists and business men have an anxious time, it is the duty of the Government of the day not to add to their burdens or their apprehensions. Yet this is the moment chosen for passing a Coal Bill which threatens the consumer with dearer coal; for passing an Unemployment Insurance Act which devotes millions annually to a relaxation in the conditions for benefit which Government spokesmen had previously declared unjustifiable. An Education Bill looms before us which will involve enormous expenditure to pay for a step which, as is admitted by educationists, is at the least premature. Perhaps the most serious effect, however, was produced by the debates upon the Budget. More important than the new taxation, heavy as it is, was the manner of its imposition. As was remarked to the writer by a very shrewd and successful business man in the City, British citizens would not lose confidence if they were asked to pay taxation, although heavy, as a contribution to a national need. An entirely different psychological effect is created when the same taxation is imposed to an *obligato* of vindictive and malicious comments, and with the menace that it is the first of a series of 'doses' of like nature. The fall in prices will come to an end. Quite how soon this will occur it is impossible to say, but it is not likely to be very long delayed. Low Bank rates and cheap credit will begin to have their effect. Orders will be given more freely and stocks replenished. Once more a trade revival will start in America and Germany. But what of this country? We shall undoubtedly feel the beneficial effects of the turn of the tide, and unemployment figures will begin at last to fall. The degree, however, to which we shall take advantage of the turn and the extent of the improvement in employment will depend largely on the confidence of the business world in the future.

The fall in prices is also of significance for other reasons. It has been the occasion for the first time of the appearance of new features in international trade, in the shape of unified selling agencies of natural products. It may also cause some trouble for a year or two to come in our export trade. Apart from this, its principal importance lies in the danger that the temporary intensity of the employment situation may cause the Government to be stampeded into some foolish action at the instance of ex-

tremists. In other words, it is the first great test of democracy. The recent great increase in unemployment causes more intense hardship for the time being, but, if properly faced, it is not intrinsically so great a menace for the future as the high continuing level of worklessness that seems to have become endemic in the last few years. What are the prospects as regards this less dramatic but more indurated trouble? The excess of the normal amount of unemployment in recent years up to 1929 over that which existed before the war is not so great as the amount of worklessness which can reasonably be attributed to the loss of oversea trade and the decrease in emigration. In other words, we have already made up part of the leeway. In addition, we have absorbed the annual increase—albeit the rate is not rapid—in the adult population. Moreover, the results would have been better but for the lamentable history of coal and the folly of the long stoppage in 1926. Apparently, therefore, absorption is taking place, though slowly. The country is gradually adjusting its economy to allow for a smaller proportion of oversea trade just as formerly it expanded that proportion. In any case, however, the process is very slow. Meanwhile, the normal rate of unemployment is still twice as high as the pre-war rate, and the gravity of the problem is universally admitted.

The question now emerges of policies to be pursued and of remedies to be applied. Here, subject to the corrective influence of the business community, the country is at the mercy of its economists and its politicians. Of economists King Magnus in *The Apple Cart* says: 'Even political science, the science by which civilisation must live or die, is busy exploring the past while we have to grapple with the present. It leaves the ground before us full of black darkness while it lights up every corner of the landscape behind us.' Of politicians the dictum of another critic is that they are 'a genus divided into two species—the people who leap without looking and the people who look without leaping.' But, whoever may be the adviser who prescribes the physic, the view taken of the prospects of oversea trade constitutes an essential and perhaps decisive factor in determining the line of policy to be pursued. Those whose views were voiced by Sir Oswald Mosley in the House of Commons recently take one extreme view: 'This hope of recovering our position through an expansion of our export trade is an illusion, and a dangerous illusion. The sooner the fallacy is realised the quicker can we devote ourselves to a search for the real remedy.' That there should be a search was no doubt a polite *façon de parler* due to the dictates of modesty. The remedies had already been found—'rationalisation' as the ultimate and permanent remedy and so-called 'public works' to bridge the interval. No explana-

tion was given as to how rationalisation will fill the bill as the permanent remedy unless it increases our volume of export trade. Our immediate interest, however, is in the doctrine of public works, for there is no need to look beyond the interval if the bridge collapses by which it is to be spanned.

A policy of public works is superficially attractive. It has been so since the days of Queen Elizabeth, when statutes were passed under which the 'sturdy and valiant beggars' were to be set to work. It is, indeed, rightly exasperating to know that mankind is short of many useful articles when at the same time there are men and women short of work. The times are somehow out of joint. That is why the kind of proposals sponsored first by Mr. Lloyd George and now by some of the Socialists make a natural appeal to many people. The danger is lest the pressure prove strong enough or the Government weak enough to give way to it against their better judgment. Disagreement with such proposals does not denote lack of sympathy with the unemployed. The objection to them is that, like other inviting short cuts across boggy country, the wayfarer who is tempted to take them will never reach his destination. Such a policy possesses three drawbacks. Only a small proportion of the schemes proposed can be justified on business grounds. The greater part are not wholly economic. They contain an element of usefulness varying in amount, but for the most part they are thinly disguised relief schemes which would never have been put forward but for the subsidy from the Government. This subsidy is to be paid for out of loan. Loan money, however, does not come like manna from heaven, and it needs much faith to believe that the country will be rendered so prosperous that it can make light of the payments for interest and amortisation when they fall due. This leads to the second objection. If loans are raised on a grandiose scale to finance schemes of this nature, legitimate productive industry will go short of credit. As a result of giving men work on unnecessary roads other men will be deprived of employment at their own trade in some factory or workshop.

Considerable controversy has centred upon this question of the sufficiency of the supply of credit. The most reasonable view seems to be (it being assumed that the gold standard must be maintained) that there is a certain elasticity in the amount of credit that can be made available without prejudicing the supply to industry; also that, if other conditions are favourable, its use upon public works may give a slight fillip to trade. On the other hand, that fillip would not be sufficient to counteract such lack of confidence as at present exists, and so large a use of credit as is suggested either by Mr. Lloyd George or by Sir Oswald Mosley would in fact cramp industry so soon as either a revival

of trade in this country or a fresh bout of speculation in America caused a demand for credit and began to send the Bank rate up once more. The third objection to a grandiose policy of public works is perhaps the most cogent of all. It is, in fact, insuperable. It would be a physical impossibility to put to work upon the schemes the very persons for whom they are intended. By far the greater part of the employment which would be provided is heavy navvying labour. The 300,000 unemployed women are at once barred from consideration. So are all those men who have any physical weakness. Not only so. At the request of the writer a contractor in London ascertained through his foremen the proportion of applicants who were judged to be really suitable for heavy work. It was found to be about one in six. If this is the proportion in the case of those who applied on their own initiative, what of the general body of unemployed? In fact very few men over fifty years of age could stand the physical strain; nor could men of a much younger age whose regular occupations had been in the lighter trades. A return has been asked for by the writer showing the composition of the 115,000 persons claimed by Mr. Thomas to be set to work on his own much more modest list of public undertakings. If this is given, the results should be illuminating. It is almost certain that if employment exchanges delivered up their secrets it would be found that much of the supposed delay and 'red tape' in getting existing schemes started is due to the difficulty of obtaining labour. In other words, the whole policy of relief works, specious as it sounds, breaks down when brought to the test of fact. If it be adopted, the last state of the country will be worse than the first.

What then? Is the only answer to be an admission of helplessness? The answer is No. A great scheme of public works would be something palpable and indeed ostentatious, like Naaman setting out to bathe in Abana or Pharpar, the rivers of Damascus, but an examination of the prospects of oversea trade opens up a line of progress that is sounder if less dramatic. Some of the causes that have injured our trade are likely to be permanent. It needs a touching belief in the power of innocent persuasion to expect a general and early reduction of tariffs by foreign countries as a result of the recent speeches of the President of the Board of Trade at Geneva. So far the direct result of the negotiations has been an increase in tariffs in two countries! Other influences, however, that have handicapped our trade are temporary in character. Currencies in European countries have now been stabilised and the effect of our return to the gold standard has been gradually adjusted. The costs, therefore, of some of our chief competitors are likely to rise as compared with

our own. Moreover, as the world slowly recovers from the impoverishment of the war, new developments will in all probability cause a re-expansion in international trade of which we should obtain our share. How large that share may be will depend largely on the degree to which confidence is restored and the extent to which a reduction in costs is achieved in British industry by a resolute policy of rationalisation. Such a truth is now so well-worn a platitude that hesitation is felt in repeating it. But from the days of the Sermon on the Mount until now it may well be said that the greater the truth the greater the platitude and the more it needs emphasis. To-day the need for confidence, and for the reorganisation which cannot be wholeheartedly pursued without confidence, is a truth which it is vital that the country should take for its working creed.

There is one all-important distinction in our oversea trade—that between exports to foreign countries and to countries within the British Empire. Two observations alone are sufficient to indicate the fundamental importance of this difference. The shrinkage in our exports would have been much more serious had not the unfavourable course of our trade with foreign countries been offset by the much more favourable course of inter-Imperial trade due to the preferences awarded to British goods. The value of such preferences will be further advanced if the action recently followed by Canada is followed by other Dominions. Again, the possibility of development within the British Empire is immense, and with it the opportunities of benefit to our own industries in taking an important share in that development. The subject is too lengthy for discussion here, and a separate article will be devoted to its detailed consideration.

Is there no stimulus, however, which can afford immediate help to trade and employment, and which will also promote, and not prejudice, permanent recovery? The imposition of duties upon imported manufactures has been a subject of controversy for so long that it is seldom impartially considered. Post-war economic and industrial conditions, however, are in many ways wholly different from those of twenty years ago. It is not that general principles which were true twenty years ago have less validity to-day. Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε καχθὲς ἀλλ' ἀεὶ πότε ἤ ταῦτα is as true of economics as of morals. But though principles remain the same, if the conditions in which they are applied are different the practical inferences may be different also. It is as true to-day as it was before the war that in a country which depends upon its export trade in manufactures it is of cardinal importance to avoid raising the cost of production, either directly, or indirectly through the enhancement of the cost of living. The question to-day, however, is whether the cost of

production would in fact be raised by such a system of duties. In this as in other respects any analysis is inadequate and misleading which runs along pre-war lines and does not take full account of the change in conditions as they exist to-day. There is no Free Trader of the old school who would not approve of our being able to make artificial silk synthetically in this country to replace silk previously imported from abroad, provided that it was not protected by an import duty. He would not deny that its manufacture provided employment, and he would be thankful for it. If the same were true of fabric gloves he would also rejoice. But if the imposition of a low duty were necessary, but at the same time sufficient to cause the gloves to be manufactured in this country, would the imposition of the duty be harmful? Would it merely 'divert production from unprotected into protected channels'? Would it, in however microscopic a degree, raise the cost of living or production in this country? Let anyone analyse the possible increase in price and set it against the contribution to our high cost of government which is made directly or indirectly by any industry at work in this country. The analysis will show that the gain to the country through increased revenue will be greater than the harm through increase in prices. Production will not be diverted from unprotected to protected channels. In the present state of the country it will be created in the protected industries and promoted in those which are unprotected. There are, of course, fairly definite limits within which alone this result would follow. If these are transgressed, the balance of advantage will be converted into a disadvantage.

Is this contention unsound? Then let it be put to the test. *Humanum est errare*. But any examination into this and other aspects of the unemployment question should take into account new conditions and avoid the bias of old prejudices. Contributions have been made to the subject, as, for instance, by Professor Clay in his book on *Post-War Unemployment*. But what is needed is to obtain as wide a consensus of opinion as possible on the main points involved and to make it available for general information. Otherwise a sound reform may be rejected through prejudice or the Government may be driven to take action which will only aggravate the evil. The late Government was criticised. But they were better aware of the inherent difficulties of the problem than were the majority of their critics. It was more studied and better understood than had previously been the case. The restriction of road-making and other public works to those which were economically justifiable was based on a reasoned view of the use of credit. The causes of unemployment were taken into account in framing legislation. Doubtless there were lapses

from grace, but the troubles of the General Strike and the long coal stoppage were great, and their effect continued long after the stoppage ceased. The difficulty with the present Government is that the members of it, with few exceptions, came to office with an ignorance of the problem that was amazing in its naïveté and completeness. It is difficult to imagine any other explanation of the promises to improve employment which were made by them at the General Election. They really thought they had but to introduce their ready-made schemes and, hey presto! the long frosts of unemployment would dissolve and the spring of prosperity begin. It is to the great credit of Mr. Thomas (who before the General Election was as picturesque and as Boanergic as any in his misstatements) that he has appreciated the facts quickly and been outspoken and courageous in his new views. He is like a modern St. Paul suddenly smitten with light. The importance of our foreign trade and the need for rationalisation were his new vision to which he has been faithful under great difficulties.

But the rank and file of the Socialist Party have not had the advantage of such an apocalypse or of the advice of skilled civil servants and experienced City opinion to draw aside the curtains that veil the truth. So they are restive. They cling to the old beliefs and distrust the new 'mysteries.' The danger, therefore, is very real. The Government have already shown in the case of their Unemployment Insurance Act that they can capitulate to a demand that they have publicly stated to be wrong. They may do so again. Indeed, in the volume of public works already undertaken they have made some compromise with views which they know to be unsound. The great and urgent need is for public opinion to be guided on as wide a scale and in as authoritative a manner as possible in order to help the new democracy to pass its first great test successfully.

ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND.

THE REVOLUTION IN FLEET STREET

IN the course of an address to the Imperial Press Conference, on June 2, the Prime Minister said:

In my time the Press, as an organisation, has been completely revolutionised. I remember the old days when the Press was a personal possession, held by individuals competing with each other, each showing the stamp of a strong and special individuality.

In the march of progress, Mr. MacDonald added, we have had to recognise that we must make the best of the new conditions under which the Press has become a great centrally controlled machine. Undoubtedly: combinations and mass production, syndicated news, inflated advertising, huge circulations, the enormous costs of printing and distribution—these and kindred forces have swept away the old English daily paper. The Prime Minister implies that a period of about thirty years must be regarded as the era of mechanical revolution in journalism. That is so. But the London event which, in the present summer, has brought a shock to every journalist in the country comes as the culmination of a process that did not actually begin until the end of the war. 'In my day,' said Lord Morley, recalling the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 'eighties to Kennedy Jones, 'a million readers were undreamed of.' 'You must remember,' was the reply of Lord Northcliffe's chief lieutenant, 'that you left journalism a profession. We have made it a branch of commerce.' The sudden killing of the *Daily Chronicle* was a resounding revelation to the world of the extent to which the daily newspaper has been sucked into the vortex of financial speculation.

The *Daily Chronicle* had been in existence since 1877 as a Liberal morning paper. Three remarkable editors—A. E. Fletcher, H. W. Massingham, and Sir Robert Donald—had given it a distinction which was maintained over a quarter of a century until 1918, when, a few weeks before the Armistice, Frank Lloyd, head of the great Kentish paper concern, relinquished the ownership. The circulation at that time was the second largest in England. The purchase was negotiated by Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Dalziel, acting on behalf of Mr. Lloyd George, then, of

course, Prime Minister. The price for the *Chronicle* and *Lloyd's Sunday News* was something over 1,000,000*l.*, paid partly in cash and partly in debentures to be discharged in instalments. The new syndicate consisted of three sections: (1) the Lloyd George Political Fund; (2) a group represented by Lord Inverforth, holding just over half the shares, and so controlling all except the politics; and (3) a group headed by Lord Bute. The retiring owner stipulated that his family name should be dropped from the title of *Lloyd's*, which had been the first Sunday paper to claim 1,000,000 readers before the close of the nineteenth century. The property was required to pay 10 per cent. on its very large capital, besides meeting the heavy charge of debenture instalments. It was able to do this. The circulation was over 1,000,000; the price of newsprint had fallen, and during the post-war boom advertisement revenues were high. The device of newspaper insurance brought further prosperity, and in 1923 the circulation rose to 1,300,000. Two years later there came a second reorganisation. The Bute interest was bought out, and most of the Inverforth interest; the Lloyd George Fund held five-sixths of the ordinary shares. But it is evident that, although after more than four years the proprietors could look with satisfaction upon their financial returns, they had no intention of maintaining the paper as a permanent property. Plans were made for yet another change, which was effected in November 1926, when the paper was sold to Sir David Yule and Sir Thomas Catto, two wealthy representatives of the jute industry of Bengal. Their ownership was destined to be very short-lived. The first died, the second retired; and in the summer of 1928 the paper was acquired by Mr. William Harrison, of the Inveresk Paper Company, who had begun his career in newspaper ownership with a spectacular deal in weekly illustrated journalism. By this time the end was near, although to all appearance the *Daily Chronicle* was not only flourishing, but was entering upon a stage of expansion. New machinery costing not less than 250,000*l.* was installed; the paper, which had been handicapped by a rather mean-looking sheet, underwent a change of form, and the staff was enlarged. These activities, however, could have meant what they seemed to mean only if it had been possible for Mr. Harrison to make a successful new flotation. In 1927 the *Daily Chronicle* Investment Trust had taken over the United Newspapers, Limited, with a capital of more than 3,000,000*l.*, of which 800,000*l.* was in 7 per cent. first cumulative preference shares. At the end of 1929, after the Hatry and New York disasters, Mr. Harrison was manifestly unable to attempt a fresh enterprise in the stock market. Newspaper advertising showed a heavy decline in the early months of 1930, and at the end of the winter

there came the striking success of the new *Daily Herald*, marking the arrival of a Labour daily into the field of the 1,000,000 circulations. The *Daily Chronicle* had fallen into the hands of Lloyds Bank, and the great banks, when holding property such as newspapers, cannot wait for long-distance results. An accountant was put in charge, and on June 2, without a preliminary announcement of any kind, the paper was submerged in the *Daily News*.

The incident is without parallel in the annals of British journalism, and the calamity is the greatest ever known in Fleet Street. No outsider can understand how it happens that a great daily paper, which had a circulation of some 960,000, and was able until last year to show a profit notwithstanding its swollen finance and repeated upheavals, can be closed down without warning or preparation. The secret of the merger, carried out under the direction of Sir Walter Layton, editor of the *Economist*, was astonishingly well kept. Until the fateful week-end the *Chronicle* reporters were doing their turns without misgiving, and hence the shock was all the more shattering. A modern daily paper is a very large and complicated organisation. The news and literary staffs are far larger than they were ten years ago, while the business and mechanical departments employ a total of men, women, and boys for which there was no equivalent in the first decade of the century, when the old *Standard* was destroyed by Sir Arthur Pearson and the *Tribune* was brought to an end in the manner described by Sir Philip Gibbs in his novel, *The Street of Adventure*. More than one writer, telling the story of the ruin of the *Daily Chronicle*, has been careful to point out that in the tragedy there are no villains and villainies. From the first sale in 1918 to the attempt at reorganisation by Mr. Harrison ten years later, it is contended, nothing was done that in any way violated the accepted code. That, presumably, is the fact, but, as Sir Robert Donald has pointed out, immense sums were taken out of the *Daily Chronicle*, 'not in dividends, but in deals, sales, and resales, compensations and fees.' Modern newspaper management must, to be successful, make adequate provision for reserves, for reconstruction, and the meeting of new competition, to say nothing of allowances for employees displaced by reorganisation or due for retirement. But what provision of this kind is possible in the case of a daily paper, sold or reorganised four times within ten years, and on three occasions out of the four made the play of speculative forces such as, until well on in the twentieth century, were altogether unknown in the province of newspaper ownership? It is believed that more than 1000 employees, including sixty members of the National Union of Journalists, are affected by the stoppage of the *Daily Chronicle*. The understanding is that the merger was based upon an arrange-

ment involving a loss or change for two-thirds of the *Chronicle* people and one-third of the *Daily News*; and it is recognised that, however the adjustment may be worked out, a grave amount of distress may prove to be unavoidable. One can see no reason for contradicting the statement, made repeatedly since the first week of June, that the ending of the *Chronicle* is the worst disaster of the kind from which the world of London journalism has ever suffered. No little comment has been aroused in Fleet Street by the statement that the employees were urged by the management to purchase preference shares in United Newspapers, Limited, and that many of them did so. The investment in some cases would appear to have reached several hundreds of pounds, and it would not be an unwarranted inference that not a few members of the establishment had entrusted their life savings to a concern which they had good reason to believe was exceptionally secure.

I have remarked that the event occurs at the end of a decade which has been signalised by developments in newspaper ownership and management that were unknown during the earlier stage of the transition from the old journalism to the new. The first great fortune, as fortunes are now reckoned, made out of newspapers and periodicals was that of Lord Northcliffe, and he was no speculator. He was a journalist-proprietor. His great successes were achieved by a union of intuition and planning, a complete understanding of the mass mind combined with an exceptional power of creating and directing a great machine. His triumphs were his own. He built up dozens of journals and magazines, and fitted them into the departments of his multiple organisation. He did not part with his properties. He would destroy at a word a weekly or monthly which had disappointed him, which did not pay or had no recognisable use. But I never heard of his selling a paper or a magazine. He would have been shocked beyond expression by the developments that began to take shape within a few months of his death. Lord Rothermere's dealings with the Hulton group in Manchester, for example, were certainly not Northcliffian. The transfer to the brothers Berry of the immense agglomeration of the Amalgamated Press, with its scores of periodicals, each one precisely adjusted to a definite section of the multitudinous public he had discovered and manipulated, would, I think, have appeared as a deep sort of treachery to the founder of the house of Harmsworth. Lord Rothermere has seemed to be aware of this, for a few years ago he explained to a company of New York journalists the main difference between his brother and himself. The one was a journalist-director-owner; the other was, by his own admission, what in America would be known as a newspaper broker.

This article is not much concerned with newspaper properties or finance, but before passing to matters of more immediate interest to the practising journalist we may note a few salient facts in relation to the movement towards great consolidations since the death of Northcliffe eight years ago. When towards the end of his life the master of them all published a brochure into which he condensed his expert criticism of the newer millionaire owners, a good many people who had no knowledge of what was happening in Fleet Street jumped to the conclusion that here was a ludicrous example of Satan rebuking sin. Certainly it was not. Northcliffe, of course, was himself a millionaire owner, but he was the polar opposite of an absentee. He knew, or wished to know, all his publications. His eye was upon everything. There was no editor in any corner of his immense concern who was allowed to forget that he was liable to be reprimanded by a chief who could tell every man how his job was to be done. But Northcliffe realised, during the short and harassed evening which was all that was left to him after the Peace, that the type of ownership for which he stood had, with startling suddenness, become almost as rare as the independent editor and editor-proprietor whom he and his kind had displaced twenty years before. The Hultons and Berrys, Beaverbrooks and Riddells, Starmers and Harrisons, were as different as could be from the little band of brothers and their admirers who, with supernatural luck, had caught the marvellous tide in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Northcliffe doubtless saw in some degree what was coming. He had ended one epoch of journalism. He had established the method of treating news as a marketable commodity—that, and nothing more. But the newspaper in his mind was still a family concern. He could not endure the prospect of the news-shop becoming a bucket-shop. The thought of a time when, as now, nearly a score of newspaper properties are listed daily on the Stock Exchange would have been intolerable to the man who, perhaps more than any contemporary, was responsible for the development he abhorred.

Northcliffe's partner and successor gave the first great impetus to the flotation of newspaper combines. The Associated Newspapers, Limited, is so far the supreme example of a newspaper group—kindred in character, strongly based, and so organised that from beginning to end, so far as an outsider can tell, the shareholders have been satisfied, while many beneficiaries have become rich or very wealthy. This group comprises the *Daily Mail*, *Evening News*, *Sunday Dispatch*, and *Overseas Mail*, with a capital of nearly 3,500,000*l.* Add to this the two picture papers, the *Daily Mirror* and *Sunday Pictorial* (which have been all along the special preserve of Lord Rothermere), with their

combined capital of 2,500,000*l.*, and we have the compact central structure of the Northcliffe-Rothermere Press. The past two years have witnessed a much advertised and bitterly opposed extension—Lord Rothermere's attempt to command, by means of Northcliffe Newspapers, Limited, closely linked with the *Daily Mirror* Company, a chain of provincial newspapers stretching from the south-west of England to the north of Scotland. Needless to say, it is in this field that the architects of consolidation encounter the most stubborn resistance—in the characteristic British trinity of regional patriotism, local independence, and family tradition. It is, I suppose, impossible at present to make a forecast as to the result of this movement, which involves the fiercest competition with the largest consolidation so far created, the Allied Newspapers, Limited, of the brothers Berry. Such competition may or may not be good for the rival concerns. It is bad alike for the public and the profession, since it leads inevitably to regional treaties of abstention. Up to the time of writing the two sides have agreed to respect one another's territory in at least four cities; and meanwhile the wider struggle continues. There will, undoubtedly, be some notable permanent successes to be recorded on the Northcliffe side; but the general issue between London and the provincial centres may well remain undecided for several years.

There is a widespread belief that Lord Rothermere controls the largest of the newspaper consolidations. It is possible that he would do so if his ambitious designs upon the provincial Press were to succeed. But at present he is excelled, both in respect of numbers and of capital value, by the organisation built up by Lord Camrose and his brother Sir Gomer Berry. Their success is, after the initial triumph of Alfred Harmsworth, the most extraordinary phenomenon of its kind ever recorded. After acquiring several important journals in South Wales they made their entrance into the metropolitan field by the purchase of the *Sunday Times*, and achieved a dramatic *succès d'estime* by acquiring, with Sir Edward Iliffe, the control of the *Daily Telegraph*. In the interval their conquests had included the greater part of the Hulton newspapers in Manchester, with the *Daily Sketch* and *Sunday Graphic*, the *Financial Times*, Kelly's Directories, Weldon's fashion papers, the old publishing house of Cassell, the Edward Lloyd Paper Company, and—perhaps most surprising of all—the immense congeries of weeklies, monthlies, and miscellaneous publications gathered under the wing of the Amalgamated Press, once looked upon as a concern not conceivable under any other direction than that of Northcliffe. In this massive financial structure, the Allied Newspapers, Limited, accounts for a capital of 8,250,000*l.* and the Amalgamated Press for

9,250,000*l.*, while their six main companies are represented by a total capital of about 32,000,000*l.* By the side of this stupendous consolidation the largest group of provincial journals—that organised by Sir Charles Starmer with the Rowntrees prominent in its ownership and control—seems of modest dimensions. But it comprises more than thirty daily and weekly papers, chiefly in the north of England, and may perhaps be counted the most clearly defined of the newspaper chains in the matter of political opinion and general influence. Lord Beaverbrook, with his three papers—the *Daily Express*, *Sunday Express*, and *Evening Standard*—is an owner and a portent by himself. Lord Rothermere may at times exert himself for a particular object in home affairs, or devote space in his papers year after year to the grievances of a European country. But such activities amount relatively to very little. His rival has a different attitude and method. He is capable of concentrating upon a political mission, and it is not impossible that in the near future Lord Beaverbrook may be the central figure in a combat to decide a momentous issue of British policy—the question, namely, whether one of the great political parties is to have its policy shaped and its leadership determined by a newspaper owner with no political experience, no understanding of party traditions, and no contact with the House of Commons.

And now, in order to complete this necessarily rough catalogue, let us take note of the amazing growth of the *Sunday* newspaper, with its peculiar characteristics and its flooding of the 8,000,000 households of England on the Sabbath Day with standardised printed matter. Lord Rothermere's *Pictorial* and the Berrys' *Graphic* have a combined sale of not much less than 5,000,000. Lord Riddell, proprietor of the unique and indescribable *News of the World*, has, I believe, completely failed in his efforts to prevent his sales from coming within sight of 4,000,000, and the remaining popular Sunday papers must together account for something like 4,000,000. That is to say, there is at the week-end a cataract of Sunday papers pouring from the presses of London and Manchester to the extent of many more than 12,000,000 copies. They are produced upon a plan which, until a short time ago, we associated with the American Press, and not with our own. That is, they fall into two or three plainly defined types, which reproduce one another's features with a staggering mutual servility; they treat of public affairs, as a rule, only in so far as they can be brought under the heads of personal gossip or entertaining incident; they collect bucketsful of what journalists call 'slop' from successful Churchmen and politicians, aviators and film stars, about marriage, the Americans, the younger generation, the right length for a skirt, Mr. George Lans-

bury's London Lido, or Where are the dead? Sport, crime, and the Young Girl make for the Sunday editors an inexhaustible provision; and the paper which commands the world's largest circulation has worked out a technique for dealing with police-court records which has long been a jest among the reporters who profit by it, and a wonder to that by no means inconsiderable public which knows little or nothing of a modern nation's hidden depths. And I believe it is true that, among the papers dispatched everywhere to our people in the Dominions and all over the world, to keep fresh their memories of England, home, and beauty, not far from the largest portion belongs to the class of Sunday journal typified by the *News of the World*. Truly, the resistant qualities of the British race are a marvellous heritage.

In the speech from which I quoted at the beginning of this article the Prime Minister was recalling the days of his own early adventures in Fleet Street. At the time of his entry into politics (which we may connect with his joining the Independent Labour Party in 1894), and for long afterwards, Mr. MacDonald was a free-lance journalist, a good deal more inclined, if I am not mistaken, to literary than to political journalism. Like many another member of the craft who later rose to eminence, he gained no small part of his experience by working for that eccentric representative of late-Victorian Radicalism and philanthropy, John Passmore Edwards, owner-editor of the *Echo*. When writing for him, or, as he told the Imperial Press Conference, failing to qualify as a leader-writer on the *Daily Telegraph*, Mr. MacDonald was playing a part in the last stage of the old journalism. My own memories, as it happens, go back almost as far. It was in 1897 that I made a start in Fleet Street, and the journalist who was young at the second Victorian Jubilee may claim to have witnessed virtually the whole of the revolution in the Press to which the Prime Minister referred. In 1897 the *Daily Mail* was one year old; and although Alfred Harmsworth was not of the pioneer band which made the first breach in the old newspaper tradition, the founding of his morning paper was the definite beginning of a new epoch. In 1894, after six years of breathless success as a producer of snippet papers, he had entered daily journalism in the purchase of the *Evening News*. He handed it over to Kennedy Jones, and for two years he looked on at an experiment which he was too ignorant to have undertaken for himself. He developed an absorbing interest in the technique of editing and production. He was, as Massingham said in an obituary article, a wonderful workman. There was nothing in the mechanics of journalism that escaped his eye. He started with a conviction that the people who bought the old sort of English newspaper did so because they had no choice.

It was impossible that they could like it. They wanted the news, and that they could not get. This was Alfred Harmsworth's first discovery. His second was that the old notion as to the newspaper value of political speeches was a ridiculous superstition. Very few men could speak as well as almost any reporter can write; and it might at least be taken for granted that not a single man or woman of the new literate multitude could be induced to read six columns of the Prime Minister in Edinburgh or the leader of the Opposition in the Free Trade Hall. Harmsworth in these things was entirely right. But it may be well to point out, for the benefit of those who are persuaded that journalism was completely reborn in 1896, that the creative pioneers were already in the field. The new journalism, like its name, was initiated by W. T. Stead, who succeeded John Morley at the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1883. In 1888 T. P. O'Connor had founded the *Star*, and H. W. Massingham was his assistant editor; Bernard Shaw and A. B. Walkley were members of the most brilliant young staff in London, and its presentation of the news had a startling freshness. Moreover, the first Harmsworth invasion came after Fletcher and Massingham had transformed the *Daily Chronicle* by throwing over the established belief that the substance of a morning paper must be unequally distributed between finance, politics, and crime.

It would be difficult to think of any profession or branch of commerce that has changed its conditions and methods more completely within a working lifetime than journalism has done. It is to-day an occupation almost totally different from the calling that was known to those editors who in the 'nineties had to meet the challenge of the young and confident news merchants. I will venture the statement that nearly every journalist, with twenty years or more of experience, would find himself in cordial agreement with Mr. J. A. Spender's measured review of the transition in the concluding chapters of *Life, Journalism, and Politics*. In respect of many very important matters these thirty years make a dismal story; but it has, of course, to be recognised that in some departments the gains balance or outweigh the losses. The best newspaper of 1930 is an incalculable advance upon the best Victorian product. If it is news we have in mind, the morning paper as a mirror of the world's doings, then the reader of 1880, or even 1900, had nothing to compare, in merit and interest, with to-day's *Times* or *Observer*, *Manchester Guardian* or *Glasgow Herald*. And—notwithstanding the fact that the men who make them are violating almost every Northcliffean rule of the page as regards balance and display—our papers for the million fulfil a large part of their function remarkably well.

But what of the other side? Twenty years ago one could have

named a dozen English editors occupying positions of national importance, men of high distinction—publicists to whom the most powerful statesmen were and had to be respectful. It is the newspaper magnate, not the editor, before whom Prime Ministers tremble now, and upon whom as a matter of course they bestow titles. The ranking of the manager, and even the advertisement manager, above the editor is to be counted a major tragedy of journalism as governed by circulation. And when, on behalf of the millionaire owner, or the financial syndicate, it is argued that large-scale management has meant higher rates of pay for newspaper men and women of nearly all grades, the journalist must answer that the new system has brought into Fleet Street a terror of speculative change which means for him and his family a desolating sense of insecurity. And moreover, as the Prime Minister lately reminded us in another connexion, the principle of Gresham's Law, with its fixing of the relation between the good currency and the bad, applies to the newspaper no less inexorably than to other institutions of the public life.

S. K. RATCLIFFE

AFTER THE LONDON CONFERENCE—A FRENCH VIEW

HE who has not dreamed on the quay of Cronstadt, at the foot of the old dwellings of Toulon which stand out above the Mediterranean, who has not seen within this famous bay the chaplet of islands which seem to form an escort to Provence, or the sea fighting against the land for possession beyond the moors of Brittany by the 'Pointe des Pois,' or the sweeping curves of the Basque country, where the Pyrenees overshadow the Gulf of Gascony, or the white cliffs of Normandy coming down into the Channel like a cascade—does not know France, nor does he realise that half her frontiers are washed by the sea. Henceforward for the Frenchman of 1930 the sea is a new country. On the threshold of this era he sees in the horizons of oceans the hope of a wider, a more decisive and more modern existence. My compatriots love the sea. These are the observations of a Frenchman who studies international problems, not as a naval expert, but with the common sense of an economist. Lovers of the sea should study our history closely. The Normans went to conquer Sicily, Greece and the Holy Land. The Bretons and the youth of Honfleur emigrated to America. We find the Gascons settled all round the coast of Africa. The people of Provence sought adventure in Africa and in Asia. The Frenchman of to-day asks more of the sea than adventure; he takes more than a pleasure-loving interest in it—he appreciates it as one of the practical elements in life. French public opinion, moreover, is becoming increasingly conscious of the naval problem because the sea is a link between colonial countries.

France is a colonial Power: she has interests everywhere, on all continents. She needed the war, however, to make her appreciate further the services which this new inheritance could render her. She pays a tribute to the devotion of the coloured peoples of her colonies who came to fight in defence of her metropolis in the regions of the Somme, the Artois, and Lorraine. She recognises the active nature of the economic competition in manufactured goods, raw materials, plant and equipment, as well as foodstuffs, in which she has become involved. Since

the war Frenchmen have been drawn to their colonies both for interest and for pleasure. It is no longer true to say that the Frenchman is an individual who likes bread and does not know geography. If you grant him a taste for bread, you must now recognise his sense of geography. My compatriots are now sensitive to the mystic lure of Fez, to the somewhat feudal majesty of Marrakech. Only this year the centenary of Algeria has reminded everyone of great achievements. All the newspapers, the magazines and the reviews have celebrated in their turn the activities of marshals, soldiers, administrators, and colonials. The taking of Algiers has been shown in a romantic light. Just as everyone wanted to know the stages of the physical conquest, so they wanted to know the stages of another conquest—the conquest of hearts. There has arisen a whole literature of the sea; we have the captivating Morand, the enchanting Tharaud, and the delightful Pierre Mille. These are not caprices of fashion, but rather centres of thought. In economic circles there are no longer any Frenchmen who do not know that colonial trade represents 32 milliards of the commerce of the metropolis, nor any who are not aware that our sea routes of communication are 58,000 kilometres long, a figure which must be compared with 32,000 for the United States, 10,000 for Japan, and 7800 for Italy. France has 11,000,000 square kilometres of colonial possessions containing 52,000,000 inhabitants. These are the bare facts that M. Tardieu gave us with his customary clearness and frankness at the Naval Conference in London.

These facts show the position of France. Our country has rights, obligations, and duties concerning the populations entrusted to her. They count on her for the defence of their interests and for their intellectual, moral, and spiritual development. This is a sacred duty, a difficult but cherished mission, which cannot be neglected. One cannot be indifferent to the great naval issue about which the world is divided at this very moment. Nobody has any illusions about it. It is not so much naval disarmament, but the division of spheres of influence, which raises anxiety in the minds of the public as it follows the rather technical debates which occurred during last winter in the capital of the British Empire. The problems which came under discussion concern the people, not only in their national economy (because of the markets to be secured, maintained, gained or lost for their foreign trade), but also, more especially, because of the intellectual influence and the opportunity for propagating its culture, of which each nation is particularly jealous.

During the hundred years between the battle of Trafalgar and the battle of Tsushima England has benefited by an undoubted

superiority. Everyone has paid homage to her rule of the waves during a period of unprecedented economic prosperity. Then the horizon was darkened by the development of Germany as a naval Power. We have only to consider the two main principles which dominated naval rivalries before the war—the two-Power standard by which the English fleet must be equal to the sum of the two next biggest fleets and the maxim ‘two keels to one,’ according to which England answered every German enterprise by repeating it twice over in her own Navy.

After the war American imperialism appeared on the scene. In 1914 the American navy was hardly equal to the French, but in 1920 it had nearly exceeded the British. The Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1921, sanctioned the equality between England and the United States in the capital ship and reduced the status of Japan, France and Italy. France attended this Conference under particularly unfavourable conditions owing to financial difficulties, due principally to the fall of her currency. Her load of heavy debts, gloriously contracted during the war, had seriously affected her foreign exchanges. Competent observers feel that her influence and prestige were severely compromised. It is also noticeable that the two nations that made the greatest sacrifices for an America which, though certainly pacific, still appeared to claim to take advantage of the Washington Conference by making her superiority recognised, were France and England. The percentage of the world's fighting ships owned by the United States, as compared with 1914, increased from 18.4 to 30.6, while that of England decreased from 45.5 to 30.6 and that of France from 15.8 to 10.2.

After the Washington Agreement the Powers continued their negotiations aiming at naval disarmament. Consequently it seemed logical that Geneva, which is the centre of international affairs, should remain the point of contact between the different countries desirous of working for the peace of the seas. Indeed, many sensible people think that Geneva should remain the centre of conversations on disarmament, and that it is within the framework of the Geneva agreements that these conversations should be continued. All those who read without bias the French Memorandum of December 20, 1929, were struck by the correctness of its views and the exactness of its conceptions. We ourselves are too much concerned with international economic life not to wish the problem of disarmament to be studied internationally. Conversations at little tables between two, four, or five Powers certainly have their advantages, but those who are not invited to these conversations have the feeling that some designs are being hatched against them. But when the members of the League meet together illusions and the appear-

ance of mystery are avoided. Hence the big green tablecloth is preferable. Moreover, we are all bound together by the Covenant of the League, which has imposed upon all of us member States the obligation to study problems in common. All those involved in the Covenant are under serious obligations; they must carry out a binding agreement which they have signed. The problems of disarmament can but gain by such a collective study, and their solution will thus command an authority which will impose that consent without which even the best treaties fall to pieces.

Now exactly at the psychological moment an important new fact appears on the scene—the construction of a new German cruiser, the *Admiral Scheer*. It is not the construction of a cruiser that has upset the world. Neither the admiralties nor the Press would be disturbed by one cruiser more or less. It is first and foremost the circumstances of its construction which have given food for thought to all impartial observers. The *Admiral Scheer* can attain a higher speed than any existing battleship. All cruisers must flee before it. This new invention should engage the attention of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Washington.

The whole world was in sympathy with the generous spirit that prompted Mr. MacDonald to go to Washington to visit President Hoover, and thus by this friendly gesture to hasten a disarmament which all nations considered necessary. The burdens which weigh on the taxpayer on account of fresh naval construction are among those which everyone agrees should be lightened as soon as possible. The Powers invited accordingly at once agreed to answer the call given to them. On January 21, 1930, at the Conference which was opened from the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords, the King of England and Mr. MacDonald made speeches in favour of peace—speeches which found a sincere echo in all our hearts.

Two methods could have been adopted at the London Conference. A limit could have been fixed to naval budgets. In this case every citizen would know that while the agreement lasted naval expenditure could not exceed a certain maximum. Some people, seeing certain advantages which it possesses, favour this method. Its simplicity is at once apparent. The other method consists in establishing limits and maximum tonnages either for the global tonnage of a fleet as a whole or for the different categories of vessels. But one cannot help noticing that the system of limitation, as formulated by the Washington Conference, even if it has suppressed competition in quantity of ships, has nevertheless served as a pretext for competition in quality. A new art has been born called 'naval construction'

which has found a successful expression in types like the *Admiral Scheer*.

An observer cannot help recognising that the technical or military value of a unit is no longer expressed by gross figures of displacement, gun calibre, hull specification, thickness of armour plates, dead weight, engine power, or fuel capacity. In vain do we multiply indices and discover new methods of expressing the military value of a unit, when human ingenuity is continuously discovering methods of falsifying these symbols. Henceforward we must recognise the importance of 'unitary weight,' *i.e.*, weight per unit of energy or power. What we are witnessing to-day is a veritable competition in getting the maximum efficiency per unit of weight in fighting ships. Some go so far as to ask whether these conferences which employ the intellectual activity of a whole corps of expensive experts for months on end are not mere vanity, and even whether they are not moving in a direction contrary to the goal aimed at. One might even say that the conferences merely stimulate the ingenuity of experts whose imagination busies itself with finding new formulas which permit the military value of naval units to be developed excessively. Whatever the limitations provided for, the fact remains that in the case of the *Admiral Scheer*, for example, the substitution of electric welding for riveting and the systematic use of light alloys both constitute an incontestable advance. As a result of these inventions every kilogramme of the new German vessel costs three times as much as that of a normal cruiser, and as, in consequence, a kind of levelling-up is bound to occur, the French, English, or American unit will inevitably be brought to the same degree of perfection as the German. One is inclined to wonder whether these limitations will not result in producing a real inflation of costs. Whether we wish it or not, the effect of the limitations prescribed by the Treaties of Washington and London will mean an increase in naval budgets. Hitherto we have only spoken of hulls, but progress has also been made in engine construction by the continual increase in the thermal efficiency of liquid fuels. In other words, the economy in weight thus realised might be devoted either to giving increased armour protection or to increasing motive power—that is to say, speed and range of action.

Thus the prescribed limitation of tonnage would result in making the limited vessels much more destructive than those which existed before the Conference. These conversations on disarmament might thus induce admiralties to construct ships which were much more dangerous than those which were launched before people started talking of peace. It is true that frequent international revision would allow of a more strict control, but

one cannot get away from the fact that to talk too often of disarmament stimulates intelligent people to get round the text of agreements with remarkable ingenuity. The difficulties of the system of limitation are numerous. With regard to battleships, for example, limitation should be accompanied by a reduction in the maximum calibre of torpedoes or of guns, but the naval gunnery expert will compensate this by an increase in muzzle velocity. Is it a question of fixing the number and the tonnage of cruisers? We must take into account the length of sea routes, the importance of maritime commerce, and the development of coastal facilities. Then we all find ourselves in a different position. The United States, having only few naval bases, needs cruisers with a greater radius of action, while England and France, possessing many naval bases, need very fast cruisers with a relatively small radius of action. In fact there are a thousand ways of getting round the text of an agreement. We have the case of liners. It is known at the present time that there is nothing easier than camouflaging a big liner, and that certain nations are suspected of preparing this camouflage. Certain fine high-speed merchant ships could be transformed into vessels of war having a very appreciable speed and a very wide radius of action.

The problem of trade routes introduces the question of submarines. We are all agreed in deploring the part played by the submarine during the war. The whole of humanity has been moved by the uncivilised acts perpetrated on the merchant ships sunk without warning. Moreover, all the nations have agreed to draw up rules about the conduct of submarines towards merchant vessels. But, after all, the submarine is only a ship that makes use of the same weapons as its fellow-ships. For example, nobody has dreamt of prohibiting a torpedo-boat from using torpedoes. The submarine can only be condemned on account of the way in which it is misused; but that holds good of all armaments. A French note presented by M. Leygues has submitted our theory on this subject, and has indicated in measured terms what is the essential rôle of the submarine. France, finding that she has a great length of sea routes to protect, on account of the distance and dispersion of her colonial possessions, considers it a very economical method of defence to make use of these extra light units, which are specially suited to keep watch over long trade routes. Particularly vast colonial possessions scattered all over the world compel the French to have units specially adapted for this service. It is quite certain that, given a multitude of outposts to watch over, France cannot use cruisers which would perform their service of defence in too heavy and too burdensome a fashion.

France, conscious of the part she plays overseas, learnt with

genuine surprise that by the allotment of the co-efficient of 1.75 the principle of equality with Italy was being evolved at Washington. Of course there can be no comparison between the French colonial empire and the overseas possessions of Italy. While Italy has the task of watching over the route to Tripoli, we have in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, in Africa, Asia and Oceania a number of posts which count solely on us for their defence. This principle of equality has been a great shock to us, not only to our national feeling—for France is essentially a pacific nation—but it has also touched our sense of justice. The average Frenchman believes in equality above everything; he has a clear sense of what is just and of what is logical. It is glaringly obvious to everyone that if Italy has a fleet in the Mediterranean we are in the presence of a dilemma. The first assumption is that we should concentrate all our forces in the Mediterranean to face Italy: that would mean removing our defences from our Channel and Atlantic coasts; and we remember that during the last war these coasts were the objects of numerous attacks, and that to keep in contact with our glorious allies the English our navy had to work ceaselessly. Moreover, it would mean that we left our colonial routes undefended—a course of action which no one would attempt to justify. Civilised nations, members of the League, would be the first to demand that we should take every step to avoid an attack on our colonial possessions—this task of humanity being among the most important of all the preoccupations of the civilised world.

The second assumption is that we divide our fleet between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with half our forces opposite Italy; and this would prevent us holding our communications with Algeria. But Algeria consists of three French departments which form part of the mother country to such an extent that they are actually within the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior. Algeria is not a colony, but an integral part of metropolitan France. We could not accept the idea of separating ourselves from compatriots who belong to us in the same sense as the people of the northern coast or those of Meurthe and Moselle. North Africa comprises also Tunis and Morocco, which are inhabited by people who have asked for our protectorate, and are materially and morally our *protégés*, united to us by bonds of the greatest affection. North Africa is the meeting-point of new lines which safeguard our communications with French West Africa and French equatorial Africa. We feel that in the part of North Africa entrusted to us we have an important task sanctioned no less legally than that of England, who safeguards her communication between Cairo and the Cape, and we do not think that we have a right to refuse it.

We understand the position taken up by Italy so much the less now that our Roman friends since the war have been liberated by the common action of our soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian menace. We know that the problem of naval disarmament is no longer quite what it was, seeing that ratios were established for certain categories of ships at Washington. We must note, however, that then the question was, above all, one of offensive vessels, and that it was for these that ratios were established. But it is a far cry from the admission of equality in a particular category of ships to a general parity. One cannot go from the particular to the general. Anyhow, the French, who are essentially a pacific nation, know that Italy, whose first ambition is to be just, will consider these problems calmly.

Anglo-American parity cannot be compared with any other ratio. The solution of the long rivalry between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations was ripe. In order that a diplomatic agreement may be successful, a problem must have reached a certain degree of readiness politically and socially. Public opinion must be unanimous and must declare itself in favour of a formal agreement. Those who follow foreign affairs, and especially the relations between England and the United States, know how these have developed during the last few years. Mr. MacDonald's visit to the United States was, so to speak, a finishing touch. The warm welcome that he received was thus in harmony with popular feeling.

The Franco-Italian problem must be expressed in quite different terms. A new situation has arisen among our neighbours. France on her side has always had the same friendly feeling for the large Latin heart of her neighbour. But, as a matter of fact, there are two conceptions of equality. Equality either proceeds from a common effort, or else it implies the reduction of the units of one side and the increase of those of the other. But then the equality is, in fact, an inequality. And under the pretext of equality an act of international expansion is being sanctioned—which is contrary to any philosophic idea of equality. Hence the London agreements have led to very interesting results, which, when considered in all their manifold relations to human affairs, will have their consequences.

Here we must pay a tribute to the English Delegation. There has been, as far as we know, no disagreement in principle between our two theories. Discussions bearing on the greatness of sacrifices do not in any way concern fundamental principles and their validity. The Anglo-French problem, which had been the subject of previous agreements, has thus been adjusted by goodwill. Its further discussion will be pursued in a spirit of mutual understanding, not merely of irreducible needs expressed

in figures which have not, in fact, officially been questioned, but also of moral necessities.

What nations are hoping for is a progressive disarmament and a reduction of naval expenditure. Nobody can maintain that under the guise of reduction nations ought to consent to certain principles which would endanger themselves and their colonial possessions. What we ask is that everybody should consider together, quite calmly, common questions with due regard to the consequences of new inventions. This century is a subtle one and has a love for the unexpected. Floating islands, for instance, will no doubt be created which will serve as bases for aeroplanes and seaplanes. This will be a new device with an entirely new purpose. Inventions such as we have named might modify naval economics from one year to another, and might run counter to the agreements of London and Washington. We must therefore be imbued, above all things, with the spirit, and work in accordance objectively and realistically, for all nations are in some degree tired of conferences. Public opinion has observed that certain conferences were called at the wrong moment. Conferences can only bear fruit in a wholly favourable political atmosphere. It is true that they deal with technical questions, but it is above all things essential that certain political conditions should be fulfilled. For if these conditions are not fulfilled the task of the conference becomes extraordinarily delicate.

During the last ten years Europe has been submitted by her medical advisers to a particularly lowering *régime*; she has been given sedatives and restoratives in large doses by way of resolutions and speeches. That is what happens after a war. In the days which followed the war of the First Empire, and during the existence of the Holy Alliance, Europe saw many congresses, but the ease of transport and the frenzy of modern life multiply these meetings. Public opinion gets tired, and wonders whether these intellectuals sitting at their tables are not heading for results contrary to their desires. France, who since 1914 has reduced her naval construction by 40 per cent., has loyally and scrupulously applied the regulations laid down at Washington. She has avoided expensive building programmes for fear of burdening her taxpayers indefinitely. She has constructed light vessels which do credit to the mathematical and scientific brains of her engineers. Certainly no nation is more tired of war, none is less warlike, than my country, none has so great a fear of the horror of casualties. France is thoroughly impregnated with the modern spirit. She is conscious that she has to fulfil a part before the world and before the territories which have been confided to her supervision. Moreover, in this age of economic

conflict the sea has become a commercial battlefield. Raw materials which provide mankind with the essentials of existence—light, heat, and food—follow upon the ocean the route determined by the laws of supply and demand.

To London came the men who spoke with the voice of France—Tardieu, fascinated from his youth by the international aspect of political problems, and Briand, born on the Atlantic coast, whom the tidal motion of the waves has filled with a mysterious and tender eloquence. These men did not seek to realise the selfish ambition of their country. They had no naval imperialism in view. They have that same feeling with which a man like MacDonald went to America to raise enthusiasm by his pacific speeches. My fellow-countrymen are, for their part, convinced that it will be with navies as it was with armies before the war. They weigh very heavily upon the future and are able to start wars.

What we are looking for is an agreement based on the principle of balance or equivalence. Just as in the economic sphere French and German industry, having come to an agreement and having established a series of conventions about raw material, have stabilised production and stopped quarrels which were in danger of ruining nations and condemning the working classes to unemployment, so we think that in naval matters our representatives should be able to arrive at agreements based on the balance of forces.

Disarmament is a collective effort. All parties stand and fall together. They reduce their armament together and evaluate their parallel of reductions mutually. Disarmament is not directed against anybody. It is not the object of an egoistic policy. In an atmosphere of peace all nations decide together to attain a result which is sanctioned by public opinion. However, an observer must notice that a conference like the London Conference has not exactly helped to tighten the bonds of friendship between France and Italy. A conference is in itself praiseworthy, but should it not consist first of a few quiet, hushed, diplomatic conversations without the display of these sessions to which the Press of all the continents is summoned? A dispute about a few technical details then becomes a political misunderstanding; in fact, there is no denying the result. Since the Conference things have been said on the other side of the Alps which were conceived in cold blood, but which were certainly due to the Press agitation which arose both before and after the naval discussions in London.

Nevertheless, the outstanding feature of this century is the progress in ideas and in the international spirit. This spirit reigns henceforward provided that we create a certain environ-

ment and international atmosphere in which our debates are ruled by a common understanding of problems. It is in this atmosphere and in this spirit that nations will arrive at a common policy of disarmament. This policy must be really collective and must be formed with everybody's consent. Each one must participate in it with perfect agreement. Altogether, each one collaborating with the other, we ought to arrive at a solution. Let us avoid all possibility of individualism, let us avoid everything that might shock nations and throw them against one another. Let us rather seek our solution in common. Let us hope that, moved by the international spirit, nations will understand each other henceforward and will realise more clearly their respective positions, their commitments and their obligations. France will not fail in performing the duties towards the colonial peoples entrusted to her in order that they might gain the moral and material benefits of civilisation. Nor will she fail in her duty towards the whole of humanity of being first in the field with the ideas of peace and progress.

PIERRE LYAUTEY.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AS AN ECONOMIC FAMILY

At the General Election in Great Britain a year ago nothing was heard of Imperial economic co-operation. No doubt Mr. Amery tried to make people see his vision of the Empire as an economic unit, but neither his constituents nor the country were listening. The appointment at about the same date of a Professor of Imperial Economic Relations at the University of London passed unheralded. Mr. Bruce in Australia and at the Imperial Conferences in London in 1923 and 1926 had been hammering away on the need for practical action to promote economic co-operation in the Empire, but Australia and the rest of the Dominions were busy with their own internal problems.¹ To-day Imperial economic co-operation in one form or another is on everyone's lips. In the Dominions and in the Colonial Empire, and even in India, as well as in Great Britain, statesmen and politicians, thinking men and women, the man in the street, and the columns of the daily newspapers are full of the subject. In Great Britain it seems likely that it will be the most prominent topic at the next General Election. What is the explanation of this sudden emergence into the limelight of an ideal which a year ago conveyed almost no meaning to the majority of people, which was impatiently dismissed as belonging to an unpractical order of thought? At first sight the answer seems to jump to the eye. Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere have done it by their 'crusade' for Empire Free Trade and by the formation of the United Empire Party, which, if its fortunes as a party are less rosy than Lord Rothermere would like to hope, seems finally to have committed the Conservatives not only to the advocacy of Imperial economic co-operation, but also to the promotion of

¹ The remarkable but unobtrusive development of the Imperial War Graves Commission (set up by the Imperial Conferences of 1917 and 1918) requires further notice than can be given to it incidentally here. By its stubborn insistence on the principles of equality of status, to which expression was finally given by the Conference in 1926, this Commission has established a real financial and administrative partnership in advance of anything which has so far been achieved in the field of Imperial co-operation.

practical measures to secure it, thereby giving a new meaning to the old name 'Unionist.'

The explanation is, however, not so simple. The Empire Marketing Board, with its posters, deserves much credit for democratising the subject. The two Press Lords have done a very great service, in spite of some dangers inherent in their Crusade, its methods and provenance, by bringing this question into the arena of public discussion. But when daily journals of a popular character set out to drive the great-hearted public in a particular direction, it is a safe assumption that the tide of public interest has already set strongly that way. The newspaper campaign indeed found the ground well prepared in advance. Not only had the Empire Marketing Board, whose origin traces back to Mr. Bruce's initiative at the Imperial Conferences, been busy encouraging people to buy Imperially, but a remarkable number of people and groups and schools of thought were already actively engaged in the study of one or other of the divers aspects of a subject which has extraordinarily wide ramifications. It is well that this was so, and it is most important that the process of study from different, if converging, lines of approach should be energetically continued. That the public has seized hold of a big and fruitful idea in the field of Imperial politics is a great gain, but it is accompanied by considerable dangers.

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If unduly generalised, the idea is not likely to be conducive to practical action. If it is narrowed down to one particular and relatively minor part of its content, in this case the question of tariffs and preferential duties, or if what ought to be a national and Imperial question, beyond party, is prostituted to the selfish purposes of a particular faction, what might be a powerful integrating force will become a disintegrating influence.

It is the intention of this article to review some of the underlying causes of the present popularity of the idea of Imperial economic co-operation, to study as many of its different facets as is possible within the limits of space, and to consider what practical measures can be immediately undertaken to promote true economic co-operation throughout the Empire. An endeavour will be made to place tariff questions in their right perspective, and to indicate that, while they are a feature of importance in the picture as a whole, they are neither central nor dominating and do not—if a quantitative measure is permissible—occupy more than some 10 per cent. of the canvas.

The famous and happy formula of 1926 laid finally to rest the

bugbear of inferiority of status as between the Dominions and the Motherland which has for so long distracted the minds of the members of one Imperial Conference after another from other urgent topics. With the unanimous acceptance of the formula by Governments and peoples alike the constituent parts of the Empire have been free to pay active attention to the means and methods of free association and equal co-operation within the Imperial family to which the Conference of 1926 pointed as the true line of advance. The constitutional question being out of the way, men's minds all over the Empire turned naturally to thoughts of the promotion of the economic welfare, not only of their own particular country, but of the Empire as a whole. This tendency was powerfully reinforced by consciousness of the economic maladjustments around them. The centre of gravity was shifting from political and constitutional to economic questions. Membership of a single Empire helped to prevent economic problems from being envisaged solely from parochial standpoints. It was natural, especially in Great Britain, that possible solutions for local economic distress should be sought in plans embracing the British Empire as a whole.

Very characteristic is the history of the Colonial Development Fund. It had been dreamed of, or planned, by successive Secretaries of State for the Colonies anxious to promote the wise development of the portions of the Empire in Africa, in the West Indies, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans—the whole of the British heritage outside India and the Dominions—whose welfare is the responsibility of the British peoples, and in particular of the Colonial Secretary. This dream was suddenly translated into fact by the passing in July 1929 of the Colonial Development Act at the instigation of the newly formed Labour Government as part of its programme for relieving unemployment in Great Britain. It involved the setting aside of a fund of 1,000,000*l.* a year from the revenues of Great Britain; the effects will be realised increasingly in the economic advancement of all parts of the Empire. The recent Report of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee makes it clear that the aims and scope of the fund are very extensive. Grants and advances are made not only for such projects as the Zambesi Bridge or the development of Famagusta Harbour in Cyprus, which bring large immediate orders to British industry, but also for the promotion of public health, the improvement of housing conditions, aerial surveys, research into problems of human nutrition, and all manner of other purposes.

The growth of the idea of the British Empire as an economic unit is a natural concomitant of the increasing tendency to think of Europe as an economic unit and to dream of a European

customs union. The word 'unit' is in both cases liable to mislead and to be misinterpreted. Certainly in the case of the British Empire it is better to think and speak of economic co-operation and an economic family than to adopt words which understress the harmonised diversity on which the unity of the Empire depends in its economic as in its political structure.

There is a long history behind the conception of economic co-operation in the British Empire. The names of Froude, Dilke, Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, Harcourt, Milner stand out among the pioneers who have worked towards this goal. Apart, however, from the question of tariffs and Imperial Preference, the machinery for reaching the goal and the machinery of co-operative effort have never been prominently presented for public discussion, and the Empire has not been envisaged as an economic group organised on a grand scale. The idea of the division of the world into a few large-scale economic units is a post-war development. It has been greatly stimulated by the tremendous advance in the economic power of the United States since the opening of the twentieth century. The thought of Europe as an economic unit has in particular been instigated by the example of the United States. Could not conditions equally favourable to material wealth and happiness be brought about in Europe by conscious economic organisation on a scale transcending national and political boundaries? Is not such a reorganisation necessary to enable Europe to stand up against the new economic imperialism of the United States? It is easier to apply the analogy of the United States to Europe than to the British Empire. In Europe the geographical area of the imagined unit is continental. History suggests that for the building up of a big economic unit there should be a customs union which, without destroying individuality or statehood in contiguous groups, could create a great free trade area within which all the groups would find increasing opportunity for economic life and activity. The United States of America themselves, Germany, Canada, Australia, South Africa, even India (in population by far the largest free-trade aggregation in the world), all suggest that the way to material advancement is from the smaller economic unit to the greater, and that a customs union is the essential gateway.

At first sight this line of reasoning precludes the possibility of making the British Empire into an economic group. It is not a continental *bloc* of contiguous States, and has not common land frontiers. It is this absence of common land frontiers and the fact that the British Empire is scattered over the seven seas which have for so long prevented men from seeing the vision of the Empire organised as an economic family. Its geography and its constitutional history were thought to put a

customs union out of court. Joseph Chamberlain, the greatest prophet of Imperial organisation of the last generation, did not indulge in wild talk about Empire Free Trade. Nevertheless he approached the question through the gateway of tariffs, and his campaign for Imperial Preference, becoming entangled in the partisan controversy between Protection and Free Trade in the United Kingdom, has left behind it a habit of mind which makes any audience in this country, when the subject of Imperial economic co-operation or organisation is mooted, think instinctively of tariffs and preferential duties to the exclusion of everything else. The most active propagandists for Imperial economic organisation to-day are trying to escape the issue either by shutting their eyes to the impossibility of Empire Free Trade within any reasonable period of time, or by pretending to themselves that free trade and freer trade have much the same meaning.

Is it a correct reading of history to regard a customs union as a *sine qua non* of large-scale economic groupings? Octroi duties are in fact widely prevalent even to-day in old-established customs unions such as France. They do not destroy her economic unity. That continental Europe will in due course form itself into a large-scale economic family is more than probable. A lowering of tariff walls will certainly accompany or follow economic co-operation between its constituent States. But a customs union and complete free trade are more difficult to forecast, and are surely not an essential prerequisite of economic co-operation in Europe. Already, in spite of tariffs that tend to grow rather than diminish, the political frontiers of Europe are criss-crossed and blurred by industrial and financial groupings which are rather unconscious or oblivious of nationalism than consciously international. The logical extension of the idea of rationalisation, the recognition of the unfruitfulness of economic nationalism, the indifference of applied science to historical survivals which it has outgrown have gone far in continental Europe to lay the foundations of economic unity. Still more is this true of the British Empire, where, in spite of the sturdy pride of nationhood in the Dominions and in portions of the Colonial Empire, cultural, racial and social traditions and ties, British common law, prevalent use of the English language, a common constitutional outlook, a widespread ideal of service, a common approach to a large proportion of the problems of daily life, and a considerable community of material interests reinforce political unity. They have sufficed not only to lay very strong and deep foundations, but even to erect a number of substantial edifices already in active occupation for the purposes of economic co-operation throughout the King's realms.

As the habit of economic co-operation spreads considerable modification of tariffs within the Empire will doubtless be effected, and as the Empire organises itself as an economic family practical considerations will correct existing anomalies in intra-Imperial tariffs and accustom industry to adopt an outlook wider than that which fosters local and parochial demands for prohibitive tariffs against all comers. But it is surely an error to treat tariffs as the starting-point for economic co-operation and to let them obliterate consideration of other more promising methods which are ready to hand or already in use. It is the growth and extension of the habit which will make freer trade within the Empire possible; concentration on tariff questions may impede instead of stimulating the growth of the habit. Imperial unity must always be largely a matter of the spirit. A tariff is at most an outer cover. Within that cover there must be a feeling of having something in common—a diffusion of goods and of individuals and of ideas. There is every reason to discourage the selfish aim of an Empire politically or economically exclusive. To lay stress on tariffs is dangerous just because it panders to the motive of shutting others out.

What, then, is being done at the present time to promote Imperial economic co-operation? How can what is being done be improved and extended? What more can be done? These questions have a special importance at this date, because at the moment of writing a Colonial Conference is sitting and in a few months an Imperial Economic Conference will be assembling in London, and their consideration ought to be their chief task. The word 'economic' must be taken in its widest sense if the maximum advantage is to be obtained from the discussions of the Conference, and the whole Empire must be included in its purview even though it is primarily a Conference of the Dominions and India. It is the more important to include the Colonial Empire in that the constitutional formula of 1926 is not entirely satisfactory in regard to relations between the Dominions and the Colonial Empire. It would be fatal to the unity of the Empire if the Dominions were to act strictly on the juridical view that the Colonies and Protectorates are the concern of Great Britain only, and the British Empire can never become an economic family if they are ignored. Fortunately logic and constitutional purism are not being allowed to override the facts of the situation. The Irish Free State continues to provide Empire builders for Imperial service throughout the world as freely as in the days of the Union. Canada is taking an increasing interest in the fortunes of the British West Indies. Not only the Rhodes scholars and overseas students of British universities, but others, men and women educated in the Dominions, are taking a growing share in adminis-

trative work in the African Colonies and Protectorates as civil servants, educationalists, in forestry work, in medicine, as well as outside Government service in engineering work of all kinds. Australian mining engineers and oil drillers are prominent in the mines and oilfields of Burma. India's connexion with East Africa is not confined to labourers and small traders, but she also sends sub-assistant surgeons to provide for services which could not be maintained otherwise till education raises the indigenous population to a higher level of civilisation.

The extent to which Imperial economic co-operation has already advanced is obscured by the fact that it is so largely a spontaneous growth owing almost nothing to conscious organisation and that machinery for co-operation scarcely exists. As long ago as 1888 an initial attempt to create such machinery was made when the Imperial Institute came into being, but events in the last forty years have left it largely stranded. Again in 1918 the Dominions Royal Commission recommended the establishment of an Imperial Development Board, but the project fell flat. These two failures were due in part to the preoccupation of the Dominions with questions of constitutional status, but still more to the mistake of attempting to deal with the economics of the Empire through a centralised body sitting continuously in London. Such an organisation is insufficiently flexible, nor can the requisite number of persons of influence in their own countries overseas spare the time for protracted work in London.

A fresh start was made with the constitution of the two Imperial Committees—the Imperial Shipping Committee and the Imperial Economic Committee. Both Committees are composed of representatives of the Governments in agreed proportions, and on the Shipping Committee certain representatives of business and shipping interests also sit. The chairman of each Committee is not a representative of any particular Government. There is an interesting difference in the method of appointment of members to these Committees. All members of the Shipping Committee, which is the older of the two, are appointed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, acting, so far as concerns the overseas Governments, on nominations of these Governments. On the Economic Committee the various Governments appoint their own representatives direct without any intervention of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, merely notifying changes to the Dominions Office. The cost of both Committees is, however, borne by the British taxpayer. The real financial partnership achieved by the Imperial War Graves Commission is still lacking.

The terms of reference of the Imperial Shipping Committee are :

To enquire into complaints from persons and bodies interested with regard to ocean freights, facilities and conditions in the inter-Imperial

trade or questions of a similar nature referred to them by any of the nominating authorities, and to report their conclusions to the Governments concerned ;

To survey the facilities for maritime transport on such routes as appear to them to be necessary for trade with the Empire and to make recommendations about speed of ships, harbours, docks, etc.

Shipping magnates have a natural predilection for freedom of trade, and would strongly oppose attempts to force them to develop their shipping on particular lines for the benefit of the Empire without regard to the economics of the round voyage. The tramp owners have an uncanny skill in discovering where a cargo is likely to be picked up, and it is on their skill that British trade, as well as British shipping, have long depended in competition with rivals. The Imperial Shipping Committee was brought into being to provide machinery for preventing dangerous clashes of interest between those who are developing raw material and those who own ships. It was Mr. Massey, of New Zealand, who foresaw the danger and secured the formation of the Committee which has done valuable service in reconciling the functions of British shipping as a world carrier and as the link which holds the Empire together.

The terms of reference of the Imperial Economic Committee are :

To consider the possibility of improving the methods of preparing for market and marketing within the United Kingdom the food products of the overseas parts of the Empire with a view to increasing the consumption of such products within the United Kingdom in preference to imports from foreign countries and to promote the interests both of producers and consumers.

These terms of reference were agreed to in 1925. At the Imperial Conference of 1923 it had been proposed to establish an Imperial Economic Committee with less restricted terms of reference :

To consider and advise upon any matters of an economic or commercial character, not being appropriate to the Shipping Committee, which are referred to it by any constituent Government, provided that no question which has reference to another part of the Empire may be referred without the consent of that other part.

These terms were accepted by a majority of the Conference, but had never been made operative. It will be seen that under the terms finally agreed the work of the Committee was subject to three limitations : It could only inquire into subjects agreed to by all Governments ; those subjects had to relate to the marketing of Empire produce ; and the object of its inquiries had to be the increased marketing of such produce in the United Kingdom.

The Imperial Conference of 1926 extended the terms so as to

enable it to conduct inquiries into the marketing of raw materials and to make suggestions for the conduct of trade surveys. Even so, however, the Committee deals only with a small section of Imperial economics. Nevertheless, it has done very valuable work. It has made a beginning of the all-important task of preparing the facts and bringing together some of the information needed for a survey of the economic needs and potentialities of the Empire as a family. Its reports on particular trades have been widely used all over the Empire, and it has recently presented to the public an exceptionally interesting document entitled *A Memorandum on the Trade of the British Empire*, written by Sir David Chadwick, the Secretary to the Committee. In this document the trade of the Empire as a whole is analysed into intra-Imperial trade, which is treated as the domestic trade of the Empire, and foreign trade. The figures bring out the fact that the foreign trade of the Empire, taken as a whole, exceeds that of the United States of America, and would almost certainly exceed that of the continent of Europe if the latter were treated as a unit in such a way as to exclude trade between European States as coming under the category of domestic trade. It is shown that the total value of trade conducted between the Empire and foreign countries in 1923 and 1927 is about three times the value of strictly intra-Imperial trade, but that, in spite of this, each considerable portion of the Empire finds a market for over 40 per cent. of its exports among other members of the Empire. About 84 per cent. of the total of intra-Imperial trade is focussed on the United Kingdom, either converging upon it or radiating from it. The difficulties of the United Kingdom in finding markets for its exports since the war, and the line upon which they might be solved, are suggestively brought out in the fact that whereas the United Kingdom exports to foreign countries have fallen by 30 per cent. in volume as compared to 1913, the fall in intra-Imperial exports from the United Kingdom is less than 9 per cent.

It should be an inspiration to statesmen of the Empire when they meet to discuss Imperial economic questions to know that they are dealing with the economics of a section of the world which does a larger international trade than any other one conceivable unit, and of a section in which the countries comprising it are dependent upon each other in each instance for well over 40 per cent. of their total export trade. They should further be heartened by the knowledge that, in spite of the lag caused by the United Kingdom's post-war difficulties, the external trade of the Empire as a whole has increased since 1913 more rapidly than the average of the world. If one of the main objects of the League of Nations is to strive to promote peaceful relations and

economic goodwill amongst all the countries of the world, the statesmen of the Empire, quite apart from any sentimental or cultural associations, will, in considering intra-Imperial economic relations, be working towards the same objective for a section of the world which is perhaps economically the most important of all.

It would be an immense addition to the services which the Imperial Economic Committee has already rendered in promoting the habit of thinking of the Empire as an economic family if a similar survey could be made by it of the Empire's position in the matter of the provision of capital for new development, distinguishing carefully between intra-Imperial and extra-Imperial movements of capital. It is not quite satisfactory that with unlimited demands for new capital for development all over the Empire the British Empire should on balance be an exporter of capital. London's liabilities for finding money for European reconstruction cannot of course be ignored, but the habit of investing imperially needs to be stimulated and the machinery of the London Money Market directed towards Imperial needs. The Colonial Development Fund, already mentioned, is a valuable step towards the canalisation of Imperial capital.

The most important recommendation hitherto made by the Imperial Economic Committee is that which led to the formation of the Empire Marketing Board. Political events in 1924 deprived the Dominions of the hope of certain preferences which had been held out to them at the Imperial Conference of 1923. The Empire Marketing Board was given a sum of 1,000,000*l.* a year with a view to furthering the marketing in the United Kingdom of Empire products, including home agricultural products. The theory is that this sum is given in compensation for the loss of the proposed preferences, and is not therefore to be regarded as a free gift from the pocket of the British taxpayer, but rather as a sum due to the producers of the Empire in place of the preferential duties which were to have served a similar purpose. The chairman of the Empire Marketing Board is the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and its members are appointed by the Governments of each of the Dominions, with a representative of the Colonial Empire appointed by the Colonial Secretary. Expenditure from the grant is under the control of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. No single body has done more to make people think imperially than the Empire Marketing Board, and its posters and films drawing attention to the possibility and desirability of shopping imperially are known throughout the length and breadth of Great Britain. Even more valuable than its publicity work has been the encouragement given to scientific research and economic investigation in every part of the Empire,

with a view to the practical application of the results for the good of the Empire as a whole.²

The existing official machinery for the organisation of economic co-operation includes also such bodies as the Overseas Settlement Board, the Standing Committee on Empire Forestry, the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux. The Executive Council of the Agricultural Bureaux is specially interesting as a type of a new form of machinery for Imperial co-operation, in which the principle of devolution is fully recognised, and by means of which agricultural research and to some extent the problems of the marketing of agricultural produce throughout the Empire are linked up. The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad, the Amani Institute in Tanganyika, the Veterinary Research Institute at Onderstepoort, the Waite Institute at Adelaide, and so on, are true embodiments of the ideal of an Imperial Economic Family. It is perhaps correct to class under the heading of machinery also the intra-Imperial Conferences on Education, Forestry, Agricultural Research, Communications, Statistics, and all sorts of other subjects. The habit of holding official conferences of this kind has developed spontaneously since the war, and offers striking evidence of the growth of the spirit of free association among the States of the Empire. This habit is not confined to Governments and officials. The Empire Parliamentary Association may be mentioned as an instance of an organisation which is half-way between the official and non-official categories, and by arranging visits to all parts of the Empire it has done much to stimulate family feeling. It is not necessary here to give instances of non-official Imperial conferences. Any reader of this article could at once call to mind many examples. Such non-official conferences are outside the category of official machinery of Imperial co-operation. Everyone will agree, however, that the annual meetings of the British Association in different parts of the Empire, in Canada and South Africa, for example, are powerful instruments in promoting the habit of scientific and intellectual co-operation. So, too, is the fact that such a body as the British Medical Association is organised as an Imperial body. The Empire Mining and Metallurgical Conference is another body which has followed the practice of meeting in different Dominions. It was this Conference which at its meeting in Canada in 1928 put forward a plea for a mineral survey of the Empire, which is to be further discussed at the Congress to be held this year in South Africa. Mention must also be made of the work of the British Cotton Growing

² For a full account of the activities of the Empire Marketing Board the reader is referred to the last annual report for the period ending May 1930 (E.M.B.28, obtainable from the Stationery Office at the price of 1s. net).

Association and of the British Engineering Standards Association and various Committees of the Baltic, each engaged in its own province in actively promoting the development of Empire production and encouraging uniformity in methods of grading and in trade practice. In particular the work of the British Engineering Standards Association, which aims at the introduction of common measures and standards throughout the Empire, suggests a most promising line of advance towards the rationalisation and standardisation of production and marketing on Imperial lines.

On the marketing side of agriculture, recent years have seen the growth of producers' associations all over the Empire. Their purpose is primarily to assist the producers of particular products in particular countries. What can be done by such means is brilliantly exemplified in the results achieved by the New Zealand honey producers. By imposing standards of quality for export and regulating supplies so that the honey did not all come on the market (mainly the London market) at once, and appointing an agent in London to receive shipments, blend the honey and place it among the wholesalers and retailers as New Zealand honey, with its identity insisted upon, New Zealand has revolutionised her position in the world market for honey. These producers' associations, however, are doing more than secure Imperial markets; they are becoming important organs of Imperial economic co-operation and are pointing the way to a possible new method of approach through import boards and bulk purchasing organisations to the solution of some of the problems which have tended hitherto to be attacked almost entirely through the medium of tariffs.

BASIL BLACKETT.

(To be continued.)

EDUCATION AND REFORMS IN INDIA

A FUNDAMENTAL question which the Simon Commission had to consider is that of education. The Government of India Act of 1919 launched India upon a voyage directed towards democratic and responsible government—of government, that is, by authorities who will be answerable for their actions to elected Legislatures, and, ultimately, to the electorate which has chosen those bodies. At the last census, out of a population of 247,000,000 in British India, only some 18,500,000 were returned as literate. The electorate to-day is even smaller. It may be urged that the Indian peasant (and, since 71 per cent. of the population are engaged in agricultural pursuits, the peasantry are predominantly important) is by his very nature a reliable voter. The *ryot*, as anyone who is acquainted with him well knows, is a true gentleman—quiet, courteous, dignified, of simple and moral habits, thrifty (save for amiable outbursts of altruistic expenditure which are imposed upon him by tradition), industrious, patient in face of calamity, a lover of the open air, of the soil which he tills, of the rain which nurtures, and of the sun which ripens, his crops. But his outlook is limited to the village, to the fortunes and mishaps of his neighbours, to his fields and to the excitement of an occasional pilgrimage. Shrewd within his narrow sphere, contented with his lot (which is far happier than that of his forbears under bygone forms of rule), he is quite ignorant of the problems of administration and liable to be misled by specious promises, fabricated rumours, and empty blandishments. The Commission realise that education is not an indispensable requisite for the intelligent use of the vote, but that it assists in the formation of an electorate which will be potentially more capable of understanding issues submitted to its judgment; and it is reasonable to regard the extent of popular education 'as a not untrustworthy general guide to a people's fitness for the exercise of political privileges.'

Nor does the problem end with the tiller of the soil. The object in view is the production, not merely of an intelligent electorate, nor yet of a class (which India happily possesses) of useful public servants, but also of what the Commission describe

as 'a directing class, capable of sane and inspiring leadership in the political field.' It is largely to secondary and higher education that we must look for the formation of these qualities and of a wholesome political atmosphere.

" Education is in fact 'a vital service.' It is a potent factor in creating a capacity for self-government; the manner of its handling under the Reforms will serve as a criterion of the working of the Constitution initiated in 1919; and success in its handling will, the Commission think, perhaps afford a better assurance to the peoples of British India than success in any other field that their own Governments are capable of translating ideals into action and guiding enthusiasm into fruitful channels. The importance of the subject was recognised in the Act, which directs the attention of the Statutory Commission especially to education. The Commission, mindful of this injunction and conscious of the complications and difficulties with which educational problems bristle, set up an Auxiliary Committee to investigate the subject.

This Committee, composed of six persons of whom three are Indians, produced last year a unanimous report, subject to several notes by individual members and one minute of dissent which deals with religious and communal questions. Part I. of the Commission's Report contains an interesting chapter on education, in which the Commissioners generally endorse the picture presented by the Committee.

The picture is not altogether encouraging. The inquiry does indeed show that growth has been rapid. In the ten years ending in 1927 the number of pupils in recognised institutions has increased by 46 per cent., the total expenditure on education by 118 per cent., and the amount of Government funds devoted to this object by 205 per cent. But it is necessary to look beneath these figures. The Committee had to lament the enormous wastage in elementary instruction, due to the brief duration of school-life, which involves the 'total loss of 60 per cent. of the expenditure on mass-education and the prevention of all but a few pupils from becoming literate.' Bengal—a province which claims to be among the most enlightened—faithfully observes Mr. Robert Lowe's injunction that education, if it is inefficient, shall at least be cheap, and pays its primary teachers (75 per cent. of whom have had no training) an average salary of less than 13s. a month. (It is only fair to observe that in Bombay the salary is from five to six times this amount.) The Commission stress the fact that adult education has hardly begun, save in the striking and valuable work done in the Army—that cockshy of Indian politicians, expenditure upon which they resent as absorbing resources which would be better employed on 'nation-building' activities.

The Committee went so far as to envisage a scheme of compulsory primary education calculated to bring under instruction 80 per cent. of the boys and girls at an additional annual cost of 15,000,000*l.*, against which certain minor savings might be effected. The estimate is based on a modest annual expenditure of 12*s.* for each boy and 16*s.* 6*d.* for each girl—which is the cost to-day. Capital expenditure is excluded from the bill; and the training of a new army of teachers would be a long and costly operation. Even the bare sum suggested would form a serious burden on provincial and local revenues, which are limited and inelastic. The imposition of the requisite taxes would present difficulty. 'People may be willing to pay taxes for education,' says Mr. Edwyn Bevan in his *Thoughts on Indian Discontents*, 'if they appreciate the value of education, but they have to be already educated up to a certain point before they appreciate the value of education.' Here there is a vicious circle. Though the principle of some sort of compulsion has been embodied in legislation in nine provinces, the practical adoption of compulsion has been slow in urban areas and, with the exception of the Punjab and the Central Provinces and Berar, has made no headway in rural areas. The Commission, though they received evidence which would support an extension of compulsion, regard universal compulsion as 'for the present hardly a practicable policy, if only on grounds of finance.' Nor is the difficulty merely one of finance. The Commission 'believe that the desire for education is widespread.' But other statements which they make appear to qualify this belief. 'The Indian villager may be willing for his child to go to school for a year or two, but, as soon as the child can give help in the fields or the home, economic pressure and long tradition are strong inducements to take the child away, especially as the cultivator does not, as a rule, value education for its own sake.'

But, if the percentage of literacy among the masses is low and that of those undergoing any sort of instruction is only $\frac{1}{4}$ of the population, the facilities for what the Committee calls 'education for the directing classes' are fully ample. Indeed, in several provinces 'the economic limit of the provision of new high schools has been reached.' The Committee (with one weighty voice of dissent) was able to paint a brighter picture. But such brightness as it possesses is flecked with sinister tones. The ambition of the secondary pupil is to enter a university; and, said the Committee, 'there are unmistakable indications that the standards in some of the universities are not satisfactory.' Indian universities 'are burdening themselves, and are allowing their constituent and affiliated colleges to burden themselves, with a very large number of students who have little or no chance

of completing a university course successfully, and on whom expenditure of money intended for university education is wasted.' Hence many fall out by the way; and, as regards the successful, the Committee records that it is well known 'that the universities and colleges of India are at the present moment turning out large numbers of graduates who cannot find employment.' It is an old story. Time and again has the Government striven to encourage technical and other vocational avenues. But the tide flows strong through the conventional channel, and India is swamped with 'failed B.A.'s, with unemployed B.A.'s, with immature and ill-disciplined students who, devoid as they are of experience or any sound mental training, offer the most promising material for the irresponsible agitator. 'We wish,' wrote the Committee, 'that there were more signs that the universities regarded the training of broad-minded, tolerant and self-reliant citizens as one of their primary functions.'

Here again expansion has been impressive. Ten new universities have sprung into being since 1916. But, when it is found that in one province the allocation of expenditure is 32 per cent. upon secondary, 22 per cent. upon university, and only 17 per cent. upon primary education, the suspicion arises that the pressure of middle-class opinion has won undue advantages for the type of instruction which that class so loudly demands. The outlay has not been judicious. The Commission find in the Committee's review and in the supplementary note (written by Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge) 'much evidence of the same waste and ineffectiveness which characterise mass education and the same defects of direction, control and administration to which they are attributable.'

The weaknesses are obvious. The general upshot is that a great but misdirected effort has been made. There has been much expansion; but the expansion, at least for the purpose of creating an instructed electorate, has so far failed. Ministers have had at their disposal far larger sums than were previously available for education; yet there has been no advance, commensurate with this expenditure, towards the diffusion of a sense of citizenship. Of the two main causes which have contributed to this failure (for it is no less than failure) one can be removed only by a radical change in the public attitude which at present renders the establishment of a satisfactory system of mass education 'one of the most tremendous problems which educationists have ever had to face,' and by the breaking down of prejudices which, among other things, militate against the instruction of women; and the Commission rightly describe the Indian woman as 'pivotal.' The other cause lies in these 'defects of direction, control and administration' which have already been

mentioned. Such matters are capable of a readier cure; and they may usefully be examined.

The Commission realise that their function was not to propound a scheme of educational reform, but to note the causes of weakness and ineffectiveness and the remedies which the Committee's investigation suggests, and to examine indications of the manner in which Ministers have exercised their responsibility for administration. They make it clear that Ministers have inherited a system—a faulty system; and they are careful to assure the reader that they would be very sorry if their observations 'were regarded as attributing reproach or blame either to Ministers or to their official predecessors.' The system under which education is conducted dates from the middle of the last century and from the initiation, in the latter half of that century, of the principle of local self-government. Education has always been, at least as regards its details, a provincial subject. But, prior to 1919, the Government of India exercised a large control over expenditure in the provinces, undertook university legislation, and, by the disbursal of grants ear-marked for particular objects, were able to direct the educational policy of local Governments. Moreover, there was a service called the Indian Educational Service, the members of which were recruited by the Secretary of State and performed important duties both in the colleges and some of the secondary schools and in the general work of direction and inspection. Even so, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report commented upon the number of agencies, public and private, which were at that time concerned with the guidance of educational development, and remarked that lack of co-ordination was the main defect of the existing system. Primary education was practically in the hands of local bodies. True, the influence of the district officer was then paramount on most of those bodies; but it did not necessarily follow that he and his colleagues always saw eye to eye with the educational inspector. Secondary education had been deliberately left almost entirely to private agency, with the result that it often expanded, not on any orderly and economic plan, but on indiscriminate lines dictated by communal or private interests. 'Bureaucratic' interference was resented; uneconomic growth led to depressed standards and unwholesome competition. The universities were largely non-official bodies vested with extensive powers; and the problem was complicated by what the Commission describe as 'the peculiar patronage' which they exercised over high schools in respect of recognition. There have been occasions when the disastrous results of this patronage have been tragically illustrated. In a word, neither the Government nor its corps of expert advisers was even then master in the sphere of education.

How have the changes of the past ten years modified this position? For better or for worse? In the first place, education was classed, under the diarchical scheme of the Reforms, as a provincial and transferred subject—that is to say, the Government of India were divested (with minor exceptions) of their directing power, and the portfolio of Education was handed over in each province to an Indian Minister responsible to the local Legislature. The central Government has now surrendered even its advisory functions. For, though the post of Educational Commissioner with the Government of India has been saved by a rather undignified device, the Central Advisory Board and the Bureau of Education (which the Commission rather curiously mention under the head of 'Directly Administered Areas,' though they were designed to exercise an all-India influence) have been abolished, apparently in the interests of economy.

It was only natural that, under the system envisaged in the Reforms, Indian Ministers should be placed in charge of a 'nation-building' branch of administration, in which they might be expected to manifest special interest. But their activities are subjected to a public opinion (so far as a public opinion can be said to exist) which shouts for quantity, ignores quality, and too often advocates lowering of standards and indiscipline. And, next, their efforts were hampered by two other administrative changes. First, the character and functions of local bodies were altered. In another chapter the Commission comment on the failure in India to realise the need for control by provincial Governments over local self-governing authorities, and contrast the increasing measure of Government's power of interference which in England has accompanied the delegation of wider and more complicated duties with the free devolution of responsibility upon local bodies in India—a matter in which (they remark) 'it is now evident that the action of some provincial Governments was both precipitate and excessive.' 'In England, where the principle of decentralisation is honoured and local self-government is strong and highly developed, much more power is reserved to and exercised by the Department, acting through its permanent educational advisers, than in India.' In the case of India the restraints were inopportunistically removed; the provincial Government lost the district officer as its agent on the local body; the Minister lost his powers of control; for he could no longer use the gentler forms of pressure and would naturally be reluctant to proceed to the extreme measures of dissolution or suspension—the pole-axe instead of the spur or the rein. The Commission say that the resultant mistakes are more correctly described as 'breaches of trust.' Government is the trustee, and 'trusteeship

involves the reservation and the exercise of the powers necessary for securing its due discharge.'

Second, the staff upon which the Minister has to depend for professional advice and the realisation of many schemes has been depleted and weakened. The Commission peak of the vital importance of Government inspection—'Government's administrative key to advance.' Yet there has been a partial transfer of the services of inspectors to local bodies, the number of inspectors, notwithstanding the increase of schools, has been diminished, and the character of the educational service has been changed in important respects. A Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India (set up in 1923) recommended the abolition of all-India services the members of which were engaged upon transferred subjects, on the ground that, although Ministers had been given full power to prescribe policy, they might be hampered in carrying out their policies by the limitation to their control over such services, inasmuch as the members were appointed by the Secretary of State and their salaries were not subject to the vote of the Legislatures. This argument is open to obvious criticism; and it may be noted that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report had emphasised the necessity of retaining in India 'the willing help and guidance of many men like those who have led her thus far on her way.' Nevertheless, in accordance with this Commission's recommendation, recruitment to the Indian Educational Service has been stopped, those who composed it (and who have not resigned in view of the growing difficulties of the situation) are dying out, and with them the European element is rapidly disappearing. Not only, say the Commission, does the provincialisation of the educational service and the closing down of recruitment for the Indian Educational Service make the problems of recruitment and training even more difficult than they were, but also, 'for better or worse, European standards and methods of education have been adopted in British India, and to say that for some time to come the experience of Europeans will be necessary for their effective application implies no reflection on the capacity of Indians to assimilate and profit by that experience and eventually to dispense with it.'

The gloom of the picture is relieved by the signs of new movements—the growth of a missionary spirit, a welcome activity among women, an awakening of conscience to the condition of the depressed classes, the generosity of the wealthy and the zeal of Ministers. These are forces which make for progress. But they require guidance; otherwise funds and efforts will be dissipated. The Commission note the unwitting intensification of difficulties by the very enthusiasm which has impelled Ministers to insufficiently considered advance on the old lines. A combina-

tion of administrative changes—changes which were almost simultaneous and have reacted one upon the other—has resulted in partial dislocation. Devolution of powers has taken place in the Executive, in the Legislatures, in local affairs. A perusal of this part of the Commission's survey suggests the question whether a due balance has been maintained between attempts to educate the people in self-government on the one hand, and, on the other, the progress already made towards general literacy and a higher average of intelligence without which such lessons will be nugatory. Have the safeguards been removed prematurely? Is the general mental calibre strong enough to bear the strain of this advanced course of instruction in responsibility? The Commission sum up the situation in a pregnant example of meiosis: 'The prospect of an educated India is remote, while the dangers which might arise from an uneducated India are not diminishing.'

H. SHARP.

THE GOVERNMENT AND OUR SUGAR COLONIES

Two months ago, in this Review, Mr. Ormsby Gore discussed 'The Sugar Crisis,' and its effects in our West Indian Colonies and Mauritius.

The declared present attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to that crisis is that, so far as assistance by tariff adjustment or regulation of price are concerned, they will not interfere with the normal courses of trade and markets, nor will they give any assurance that even the existing tariff preference will be maintained after this financial year. If, however, the Colonial sugar industry 'can be put by research or improvements in a position to withstand world competition,' assistance will be given from the Development Fund for improving cane, for combating diseases and pests of the cane, for improving means of transportation and cultivation, and possibly, though this is not clear, for assisting in factory improvements. Obviously no help of this kind can take early effect, even if the delays of the Development Board are not serious. Obviously, also, so far as it may demand expenditure or the increase of debt by planters and factories, these cannot be faced with sugar at its present price and prospects, and with the uncertainty as to the preference hanging over the industry. And if or when the worse comes to the worst, 'if any portion of the industry is temporarily or permanently suspended' (which is already occurring), 'then we shall have to take measures for finding some sort of alternative living for the workers displaced, and at any rate maintaining them if there is any appearance of distress.'

An 'appearance of distress'! The expression reminds me of nothing so much as of the philosophical comment made to me by a Jamaican in a period of local dearth in that island, caused by recurrent drought: 'Dem Pedro people, dem bred to hungry and starving from time!' 'The people,' said the Treasurer of Barbados to my Commission, 'will be starving; and will have to be fed.' That situation is already arising.

The concluding paragraph of Lord Passfield's despatch is, perhaps, of the whole, the most provokingly empty, and will

probably, to those conversant with the situation, appear, in view of their experience during the last thirty or forty years, the most astonishing. It runs as follows:

It must, unfortunately, be recognised that, notwithstanding all the assistance that may be available, it may not be found possible that the whole of the areas in which sugar is now produced should continue in the cultivation of that crop, and that in some cases the substitution of other crops may be necessary. I am confident that the help of the Colonial Development Fund will be liberally extended to support such measures to facilitate the substitution of other crops as may commend themselves to you and to my agricultural advisers.

What 'all the assistance that may be available' amounts to has already been pointed out. Unless a higher level of price than the present can be ensured, and the continuance of the preference—or its equivalent, at least—be guaranteed, the industry must slowly or quickly perish. Let it be recognised—I myself see no help for it now, though help might with some effect have been given six months ago—that some of the weaker estates must in any case go out. But let it also be recognised and frankly admitted, without further dissimulation, that under the conditions now indicated the whole industry will go out. And let it also be recognised and declared that that must not be allowed to happen. Not even a Socialist Government, committed by its Chancellor of the Exchequer to the most ultra-individualistic principles of competitive capitalism, can afford that discredit. For many years—ever since the Report of the West India Royal Commission of 1897 and earlier, but especially since the establishment of the West Indian Department of Agriculture—the best agricultural talent available, scientific and practical, and the best energies of numbers of very intelligent planters have been devoted to the problem of finding some alternative crop to sugar that could be cultivated at a profit. Lord Passfield has, in the 1897 and the 1930 Reports, in the archives of the West Indian Agricultural Department and in the reports being now sent forward from that Department in view of the present crisis complete demonstration of the practical futility of the suggestion that any alternative paying crop can be substituted for sugar in those districts into which it has been driven by economic necessity and has survived by its natural suitability. The most important practicable alternative means of even providing subsistence for the labouring populations—and that is not a money-yielding alternative—is that recommended by both the Sugar Commissions, that they should be provided with land to enable them at least to grow their own food.

It is now common knowledge [writes Lord Passfield] that the existing duties upon sugar imported into this country will not be altered during the

present financial year, and that the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on July 9 last holds good . . . that, as long as those duties, upon which preferences were given, are in operation, those preferences would be maintained. I trust that any persons who hesitated to continue planting operations owing to uncertainty regarding the continuance of the preference during the current financial year will now be reassured, and that they will be able to avail themselves of the help which his Majesty's Government have offered to provide as regards advances for the purposes of cultivation.

The 'trust' expressed in this sentence has conveyed to the persons concerned no reassurance whatever. If 'the continuance of the preference' *after* the current financial year (ending March 1931) has been assured, the passage might have the significance which it would appear to be meant to convey. 'Planting' means, on sugar estates, the ploughing, manuring and cultivation of land and the setting of new 'seed'—*i.e.*, cane-joints with buds, which, if done now, would grow into a 'crop' to be reaped about eighteen months later. Cane 'planted' this summer and autumn will be reaped not earlier than the winter and spring of 1931-32. Much, but not all, of it could be made into sugar and sold within that financial year; and if the preference were then still in existence the price would be so much the better. But as there is no assurance that the preference will be maintained after March 1931, whilst, on the other hand, Mr. Snowden declares that he will sweep it away as soon as he can possibly dispense with the sugar duties, the existing 'continuance of the preference' gives no 'reassurance' whatever in regard to the risks of 'planting.' The most this year's preference can do is to enable rather more to be spent (in view of the better prospects of price) on cultivating and attending to the cane already planted in 1929 or early in this year, and to encourage some continuance and maintenance of expenditure and employment of labour in attending to canes planted in or before 1928, and recently reaped, so that they may yield 'ratoon' crops, which would have been sacrificed had the preference not been maintained. This sacrifice is already, on some estates, being made. When, however, 'planting' stops it means that the estate is being wound up. It cannot live on ratoons.

The most serious immediate factor in the position is, in fact, the uncertainty whether the preference will be maintained after next March, or some guarantee given of at least equivalent help after that date. It is essential that the prime importance of this point should be recognised if it is hoped to enable any substantial part of the industry to be maintained, even at the present rate of its losses, in the hope of better future conditions. It is additionally important because the uncertainty which the Chancellor of the Exchequer resolutely maintained up to the date of his Budget statement this year, combined with his repeatedly announced

desire to abolish the preference, depreciated and in great measure destroyed the market for the 1929-30 crop of sugar up to the date of his statement. The existing situation, combined with similar reticence, will have the same effect on the market for the crop of 1930-31, until the next Budget statement is made. These considerations have repeatedly been pointed out to Lord Passfield. In his speeches and in his published despatches he has not, indeed, denied, but has discreetly ignored them.

The Government's attitude, as expressed by Lord Passfield, appears to those for whose interests he is responsible (and it may, without any element of unwarrantable assumption, be said—to his Governors and their local councillors also) to be comparable to that of a man who is shown a valuable ship and has had it explained to him that she has a large hole in her plates, is filling with water, is already beginning to sink, and in a short time, if the leak is not stopped, will founder. This is the immediate position of the British Colonial sugar industry. Already cane-planting estates, on which some of the most efficient factories depend, are being thrown out. Already new planting for any future crop is being suspended or drastically reduced. Already field labourers are being deprived of employment, whilst the wages of those retained (which Governors have attested could not tolerably be reduced) are being cut down. The like with factory staff. Large groups of estates with good factories, owned by strong companies, are being maintained at a loss, and without improvement or proper upkeep of their machinery. They are prepared to hold on up to a certain limit of loss, but not beyond. Then, if the leak in the ship has not been effectually dealt with, the foundering will accelerate rapidly. At the same time there is a man in the ship's course lying up for her with a torpedo, the promised abolition of preference. That will inevitably make very short work indeed of anything that may still remain above water.

Of course the man on the bank may not yet see that the ship is sinking. The beginnings of the process are not conspicuous. Jamaica and Trinidad, which get income and revenue from other resources than sugar, are keeping submergence at bay within their own bulkheads by local subsidies. No other Colonies are in a position to do so. But the effects on Colonial revenue and the increasing demands arising from the needs of the labouring population will assuredly in a few months' time begin to make themselves sensible even within the Colonial Office. I am informed that they are being reported already. And the man with the torpedo is still in the fairway.

Lord Passfield offers the ship scientific assistance to make better fuel, loans to improve her engines. If there is any difficulty about advances on freight he will promise to pay a quarter

of the loss which any lender on that security may incur, provided that the Colonial Governments (rapidly approaching insolvency) will bear another quarter and the lender incur the risk of the other half. The banks concerned very quickly made it clear (the Royal Bank of Canada publicly so) that the principles of banking security upon which they are accustomed to make advances to planters would be prudently adhered to, and that they would not be tempted to risk greater probable losses by the prospect of getting one half, up to a limit, of such losses recouped to them.

Lord Passfield's despatch refers to the statement of Government policy in regard to the West Indian and Mauritius Sugar Reports (Cmd. 3523), which, he says, 'gives briefly the reasons which make it impossible to accept the recommendations made by the West India Commission.' 'An Import Board . . . with a guaranteed price . . . would in effect require the community in the United Kingdom to contribute some millions of pounds a year to the sugar industry in the Colonies concerned.' Just how much net sacrifice it would impose upon consumers I need not here examine: substantially less than the 5,500,000*l.* appropriated this year for the British beet sugar industry in addition to the cost of preference which it enjoys equally with Colonial sugar production. But undoubtedly Mr. MacDonald's Government has to choose between the practical ruin of some of our most ancient Colonies, accompanied with severe damage to others, and the sacrifice of some part of our continually increasing cheapness of sugar. Briefly, my Commission argued that with sugar prices pooled through an Import Board, giving Colonial producers a living price and buying outside at the present bankrupt-stock prices, white sugar could be retailed here (without duty) at 1½*d.* per lb.—which, I submit, is quite cheap enough. With uncontrolled importation it could be retailed at 1½*d.* per lb.; the cost of maintaining our Colonial sugar industry and preserving a whole province of our Empire and the Colony of Mauritius from pauperisation and ruin being represented by the sacrifice of ¼*d.* per lb. of the increased cheapness. We shared the view expressed by Sir Henry Norman, Sir David Barbour, and the present Lord Grey of Fallodon in their 1897 Report:

The benefit which the British Empire as a whole derives from any lowering of the price of sugar due to the operation of the bounty system is too dearly purchased by the injury which that system imposes on a limited class, namely, Your Majesty's West Indian and other subjects dependent on the sugar industry.

Lord Passfield has also argued that 'other industries are in the same unfortunate position of finding price below the average cost of production, and that it would be impossible to stand the

drain of meeting the position of all these industries.' The comparison is inapplicable. The West Indies are an outlying province of our own State, which governs them, though they have no voice in its government. It happens that they are largely—in some cases entirely, and with no immediate possible substitute—dependent upon one important staple which we buy, but which is not, or is only quite artificially, and through State aid, a British home industry. Our State, as a State policy, created those Colonies and peopled them with transplanted Africans and Indians for the purpose of growing sugar. If our home industries are in difficulties, as they are, they provide mutual support, and we recognise as a State an imperative obligation to avert the worst results from our workers. The basis of our social institutions is not destroyed. Both the principal parties in the State advocate positive methods, overriding the principles of free individualism, for dealing with these difficulties. These Colonies have no such Imperial safeguards. We, as consumers only, get all the advantages of cheaper sugar; they bear all the loss—the destruction of their whole power of earning, without unemployment relief, and of the public revenue, which depends almost entirely upon the industry.

Unless the price of sugar is stabilised at a living rate the whole British colonial and home sugar industry will shortly be destroyed. The simplest way of avoiding this would be by means of an Import Board; and of all trades Colonial sugar is that to which it would be easiest to apply that method, for there is already practically only one British buyer, the associated refineries. The next best alternative is to guarantee maintenance of the preference. This is not, under present conditions, adequate to carry the industry through the present crisis with any hope of general recovery when smoother water is reached. In order to do this, the simplest mode would be to raise the British preference to the equivalent of the Canadian—4*s.* 8*d.* per cwt. A statesmanlike move would be to reduce the existing duty on sugar from its present rate of 8*s.* 2*d.* a cwt. to that lower figure, leaving Colonial sugar free. Unless such measures as these or their equivalent are quickly decided upon, the progressive ruin which is threatening these communities will soon overtake them.

I do not think that that is quite so negligible a prospect as the official attitude of His Majesty's Government would appear to imply that they are content to suppose. Independently of the cruelty to the Colonies involved in such callous meanness it will certainly provoke the contempt of all our Dominions and the malicious amusement of our national trade-competitors.

OLIVIER.

THE AFRICAN LABOURER IN 1929

THE lists of African policy have been generally left free for errant Quixotes breaking lances with religious fervour before the spasmodic applause of spectators whose attention is distracted by the duty of prodding their neighbours sleeping till more political issues come up for decision. The past year, however, has seen something like a tattoo, with even archbishops putting an edge to their croziers in their zeal to take a knock.

This awakening of interest is all the more remarkable for the fact that the lists have not run red with blood. A few lives lost in Durban, a few cattle lifted in Kenya, some stones flying in Gambia make about the sum of what usually alone can arouse popular interest in African affairs. Instead of intoxicating blood there have been a Commission, an International Conference, an Act of Parliament, and, surely least of all likely to awaken the sleepers, a couple of lectures at a university.

It is, however, by no means too early for some such stimulation of attention. Professor Buell, writing in December 1927, said that 'Africa is the one continent of the world where by the application of intelligence, knowledge and good-will, it is not too late to adopt policies which will prevent the development of the acute racial difficulties which have elsewhere arisen, and the evils of which have been recognised only after they have come into existence.' Yet what development there has been in the short period since he wrote throws doubt on his optimistic vision of a continent parching for lack of enlightenment. On the contrary, Africa, both white and black, is lapping up economic and social change so greedily as to justify the apprehension that before the statesmen have agreed on a formula, brewed and bottled it, their panacea will have become as undrinkable as the mead of the Anglo-Saxons.

THE EAST AFRICAN PROPOSALS

This would be a pity, for, even if realities are still coursing ahead of measures for the shaping of policy, nevertheless in the past year progress has been achieved in investigating the condi-

tions requisite for healthy development. In particular the Hilton Young Report is generally admitted to be the most important analysis of East African tendencies yet drafted by an authoritative body. Its main arguments can be traced to the realisation of the basic fact that the future of Africa depends upon the African labourer, whether working in European employment or on his own account on his own tribal lands.

Indeed, the Commission came to the conclusion that when non-native enterprise is introduced among primitive peoples—the main factor of the situation throughout East Africa except Uganda—the problems centring upon the supply of labour dominate the whole situation, both economic and political. An acute shortage of labour may have serious political repercussions and make the task of government in relation to the immigrant communities much more difficult. On the other hand, excessive demands on the native communities for labour must be most damaging to native society and to the proper development of native political institutions.

The Commission therefore held that, in dealing with native labour, the Government has two main duties to perform. The first is to ensure that the African sells his labour on fair terms. The second is to see that the labour demands of immigrant enterprises do not operate in such a manner as to prevent the proper development of native society. As regards the first point, a generous land policy is held to be the best measure of protection; in Africa adequate native reserves can take the place of trade unions. As regards the second point, the necessity is proclaimed of regulating the number of natives who go out to temporary employment, so that the number of adult males absent at any time is not so great as to endanger the proper development of native life, and at the same time of providing that natives who settle down to permanent employment outside the reserves are properly cared for with a view to their future development and their place in the social and political organisation outside the reserves.

The Hilton Young Report was followed by Sir Samuel Wilson's mission to East Africa. With the publication of the Under-Secretary's memorandum the chorus of approval set up by the supporters of the first gathered confidence and volume, while those who had been clearing their throats in helpless expostulation found themselves provided with a score agreeable to their ear. Yet those who are not musicians may well wonder what the pother is about. The majority of the Hilton Young Commission proposed a re-sorting of the Kenya Legislative Council; Sir Hilton Young himself proposed two alternatives; Sir Samuel Wilson has come along with three other solutions. To decide whether the elected Europeans shall be eleven thirty-eighths,

eleven thirty-fifths, thirteen thirty-ninths, thirteen thirty-eighths, or fifteen forty-seconds of the whole seems capable of arousing the enthusiasm of mathematicians only. Again, the Hilton Young Report concludes in favour of the appointment of a High Commissioner to control certain common services, and to inaugurate inquiries with a view to the ultimate creation of the post of Governor-General of East Africa. Sir Samuel Wilson also recommends the appointment of a High Commissioner with primary control over the common services, and points out that such an officer would in fact 'be in a position to do much of the work recommended by the Hilton Young Commission.' Though in the first instance the powers of Sir Samuel Wilson's officer would not be so extensive, and though his promotion to Governor-General is not so certain, nevertheless there is no such difference between the two reports as would prevent a conscientious Minister of the Crown from drawing up a scheme which he could maintain was a compromise, since it would embody the points of agreement in both reports.

Yet the Archbishop of York can say that Sir Samuel Wilson's suggestion, judged on broad principles, 'no longer appears as a proposal to adopt for action a part of the proposals of the Hilton Young Commission; it appears as something directly antagonistic to those proposals.'

There is no longer any mystery as to the point where the alleged antagonism arises. The Hilton Young Report was a difficult document to read. Now, however, that Sir Samuel Wilson's Report is before us for comparison its meaning is the clearer. The Hilton Young proposals are based on a belief in the urgent need for planning a safe path towards African native prosperity across the difficult country which leads from primitive traditional production for sustenance to Western production for sale, by labour either on European estates or on native lands. The Wilson Report ignores all questions of native policy. 'You are to proceed to East Africa,' Sir Samuel Wilson was instructed, 'in order to discuss the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission.' Sir Samuel Wilson appears to have interpreted these recommendations to the exclusion of the one that is fundamental.

Mr. A. J. Siggins, writing in the *Empire Review*, says little more than the Hilton Young Report. But what he says emphasises the impossibility of 'conciliating' two reports the details of which alone are capable of conciliation.

Until a definite and single native policy is laid down to cover at least all those parts of Africa under the British flag, any immediate steps towards a form of co-ordination of control would place Central and East Africa in the position of having to readjust parts of their policy to meet

either the rapidly increasing demands of the natives themselves or of the industrialists, who are attempting to develop the immense resources of the country with a totally inadequate labour supply. We are only at the commencement of our labour troubles, which will be greatly complicated by divergences in the native policies of those colonies most advanced in development.

THE COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT ACT

Across the babel of controversy on the Hilton Young proposals the Colonial Development Act cut with the clearness of a toastmaster compelling assent and almost silence. The Act was welcomed by all parties. The debates upon it seemed mainly to turn on claims for the merit of its introduction; at the most they served to clarify details of application. It would indeed be difficult to quarrel with the purposes of the Act. In the past Colonial development has had to depend largely on private effort. The future will bring no change, except the all-important one that the creation of the pre-conditions of private effort may be stimulated by grants or loans made after consideration by a committee the composition of which is a guarantee of its financial ability. The progress of under-developed areas and the promotion of employment at home are two results which can be expected from the Act with a mild degree of confidence.

Yet, as regards Africa, the Colonial Development Act raises the same fundamental issue as the Hilton Young Report. The lines of African progress have not yet been determined. There are divergences, not only between the East African and the West African policies, but also between the various territories within the two main geographical divisions, between Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya, between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, even between Nigeria and the Gold Coast. If development is stimulated in each territory before the divergences have been adjusted or justified, the future will complicate the labour problems of the present. Mr. Siggins' remarks could be taken word by word, 'stimulation of development' substituted for 'co-ordination of control,' and his conclusions would remain equally true.

No doubt Parliament was by no means indifferent to the necessity of attaching certain social safeguards to grants under the Act. Provision is made for the payment of standard wages, for the prohibition of forced labour and of the employment of children on works financed out of the Colonial Development Fund. These are details of value, but as details may prove insufficient. In addition, they give rise to questions of principle, to which they provide no answer. As regards the first, will, for example, the prohibition of 'forced labour' mean the prohibition, once the

works have been constructed, of enforced maintenance, which in some territories is distinguished from forced labour under the name of 'compulsory labour'? As regards the second, what labour and social guarantees will be required of public works and private industries, which, though they do not directly profit by the advances, expand with the improved economic facilities resulting from the advances?

To take a concrete case. Tanganyika is justly proud of the progress made by its native cultivators. With more money for experiments, for demonstrations, for the improvement of communications, this progress may be accelerated. Was a European member of the Legislative Council right in suggesting in 1929 that four-fifths of the work of planting, cultivating, and harvesting of native produce is done by women and children under conditions involving some degree of constraint? In the same year, to turn to European estates, was an officer of the Tanganyika Survey Department correct in estimating that for each coffee or tea unit of 200 acres a labour force of 200 men, 200 women, and 200 children is required? The present scale of employing African women and children on agricultural labour can be readily justified. There seems, however, to be a real need to estimate to what the expansion of that scale will lead before stimulated development has squared the pitch of healthy policy.

More serious, as involving a revolution in methods of labour, are the immense potentialities of Northern Rhodesia. It has been estimated by Mr. W. A. Wills that a labour force of 40,000 will be required to meet the capacities of copper production, with which Sir Edmund Davis has credited the Roan, Bwana and Rhodesian Selection Trust.

One might imagine [writes Mr. Wills, considering the purely financial possibilities] the supply would be easily obtainable out of a gross population in Northern Rhodesia of 1,000,000 natives, until one remembers that the Transvaal, recruiting from the great native reserves of Zululand, Basutoland and Mozambique (where alone there are 3,500,000 natives), etc., finds the greatest difficulty in keeping together a force of 200,000.

If the supply is not readily available, and if British money, both public and private, has been sunk in Northern Rhodesia in the belief that there will be no such obstacle to the exploitation of the wealth, will not there be a danger that the prohibition of forced labour on works financed by the Development Fund will have little effect on the ruling labour policy of the country?

THE RHODES MEMORIAL LECTURES

General Smuts' lectures, which must take their place in the events of the year as the most imposing justification of white

settlement yet pronounced by a statesman, provide in their turn the same warning of the vital necessity of considering all the implications of African development before allowing events to drift out of the control of reasoned policy. General Smuts aims at cultural segregation of the races combined with economic co-operation.

It may be thought [he says] that there is a clash between these two aims, and that civilisation by white contact must inevitably lead to the undermining and ultimate destruction of the native culture and social system. This is, however, not so. So long as there is territorial segregation, so long as the native family home is not with the white man but in his own area, so long the native organisation will not be materially affected. . . . It is not white employment of the native males that works the mischief, but the abandonment of the native tribal home by the women and children.

General Smuts' programme may be argued to exist in fact in certain of the East African territories. With more confidence it can be said to be already the adopted policy of Southern Rhodesia. But its implications have not yet been worked out generally, or in relation to the particular conditions of each territory. For example, has any single Administration come to any conclusion as to the ideal length of time for any male native to be in alien employment beyond his locality, account being taken of the needs of the employer and of the native community? In 1928 the Governor of Northern Rhodesia in the Legislative Council quoted a statement by a district commissioner to the effect that 'if every native carried out his obligations at his village, it is doubtful if he could spare more than six months of his time per annum to work for an employer.' Is this true of Northern Rhodesia? If so, is it not true of Kenya? A second vital question raised by General Smuts' arguments is the proportion of adult males that can be absent at any one time without injury to the community. The Belgian Congo Labour Commission recommended that a maximum of 5 per cent. of the fit adult males should be at any one time engaged in distant employment, that an additional 5 per cent. could without injury be employed about two days' march from the village, and that a further 15 per cent. could be engaged in European enterprise in the village. In Kenya, where there has been no similar inquiry, over 30 per cent. of the able-bodied men were in employment in 1928.

SOUTH AFRICA

Such problems of policy for the British Commonwealth and of detail for the particular territories all appear to require investi-

gation and decision before the developments, advocated with wisdom by General Smuts and planned with financial prudence by the Colonial Development Act, have created in Africa a machinery of production for which the provision of a native labour supply will tend to be considered as a necessity exceeding any requirements of social policy. Recent events serve to show how the natural economic hunger of the world is already accelerating these developments.

In South Africa it is admitted by every political party that the economic organisation of the country has been allowed to progress without sufficient attention to the fundamental problem of the part to be played in it by the white and black races respectively. The results have compelled the attention of the whole country, for, apart from political difficulties, recent years have seen a threat of fissure in the very economic structure. In particular the two primary industries of agriculture and mining are suffering from a shortage of native labour, while grave problems of adjustment in certain urban localities are arising from the influx of native labour for commerce and the secondary industries. As for agriculture, in October 1929 the situation led the Congress of the South African Agricultural Union to pass a resolution declaring that 'the welfare and prosperity of the white and native races of South Africa depends, in a large measure, on the complete segregation of natives from the towns, and the gradual repatriation of all male natives to the country, except such as are housed under the compound system while serving periods of employment.' This sounds very much like General Smuts' policy. But from the native workers the retort it meets is the old cry of 'too late.' In November Mr. Ballinger said that 'actual physical force would not drive the majority of Reef native people to work on the farms. They prefer unemployment, with all its attendant miseries, in the towns to serfdom on the farms.'

On the mines all kinds of solutions are being explored—the recruiting of tropical natives, the running of the diamond fields on an all-white basis, the increase in the proportion of native labour to white supervision. But the chief source of supply, Mozambique, already limited by the Convention between the Union and Portugal, is further threatened by a campaign in Mozambique itself.

No one denies [says Commandant Jose Cardozo] that the conditions of life in the mines have improved considerably, but this improvement has not yet come to benefit the native of Mozambique, who must not continue to be sacrificed on the land until the progress of medical science makes it possible to substitute them by Union natives, without the latter carrying to the kraals the scourges which our natives bring back.

The mines, with statistics in hand, can deny the implications in such a statement, and explain that, since the Portuguese Government has abandoned the policy of direct labour compulsion,

the local estate owners are apparently endeavouring to substitute another form of compulsion on the natives in Mozambique, and, by preventing them from following their customary occupation on the Transvaal mines, creating such a large surplus of labour in the province that the natives will have no option but to work on the local estates, no matter what the conditions of employment are there.

To judge between the contending parties is not necessary. What is clear is that the mines in the Union and the agricultural interests in Mozambique cannot now find that cheap and plentiful labour supply, which in other parts is still held up as one of the chief inducements for the investment of capital in Africa.

Yet from the municipalities of the Union are arising complaints of the unwanted invasion of natives. Into Johannesburg there is an annual influx of between 400 and 600 families; the municipality is required to supply suitable accommodation, involving a burden on the municipality of 100*l.* for each family. Not unreasonably, therefore, the municipalities are seeking new powers to regulate and limit the entry of natives to their locations. On the other hand, the native leaders claim that the land situation inevitably forces natives into the towns, and that to grant extended powers to the municipalities will be to tighten the bonds of agricultural serfdom, and to enable the urban employers to discipline their own workers by the threat of expulsion of the unemployed.

NORTHERN RHODESIA

South Africa's native labour problems are a very part and parcel of the economic machinery which exists and which at all costs must be kept in working order. If, however, the machinery could be constructed afresh it would be incredible if adjustments were not made in it to lessen the friction it causes. Where, therefore, there seems a possibility of a repetition of South Africa's economic growth advantage may well be taken of South Africa's experience. Such a possibility undoubtedly already exists in Northern Rhodesia. 'It is not impossible,' said General Smuts, 'that within the next ten years Northern Rhodesia will have a mining field second only to that of the Witwatersrand.'

In expectation, it would seem, of the immense labour demands thus to be made upon its native peoples Northern Rhodesia during the last twelve months has largely remoulded its native legislation.

In March 1929 a Native Authority Ordinance was passed,

which, while containing many apparently admirable provisions on the Tanganyika model of native administration, also permits the enforcement of labour for sixty days in the year. Among the persons exempted from this obligation are those who are fully employed in any other work, or who have been for a period of three months during the year. The adoption of this system was all the more surprising as in 1926 at the Conference of Governors of the British East Africa Dependencies the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia stated that he had no intention of taking any powers of this nature.

In the same month a Vagrancy Ordinance was adopted similar in many respects to the laws in force in Kenya and South-West Africa. A magistrate may order a convicted vagrant to find work within a definite time or to return to his home village, or to be detained in a house of detention. Every person so detained may be put to labour, and the superintendents of the houses are instructed to use their best endeavours to obtain suitable employment for the vagrants in their charge. 'Where any such employment is obtained, any vagrant who refuses or neglects to avail himself thereof without reasonable excuse, shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding three months.'

Towards the end of the year Bills were drafted providing for the registration of all male natives of employable age, and codifying and amending the previous native labour legislation. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Registration Bill explains that the carrying of an identity certificate 'will be of help in checking desertion from employment' and 'in many other respects will be of advantage to a native himself.' As for the Bill on the Employment of Natives, in many respects it is an advance on previous legislation. Provisions for the welfare of workers are more stringent, and a system of workmen's compensation for accidents is introduced. On the other hand, whereas in the old legislation labour offences such as desertion were generally punishable by fines and only in default of payment by imprisonment, by the Bill the maximum fine is 10*l.*, and imprisonment for six months may be imposed, in default of payment or without the option of payment.

Another measure of some significance prepared during the year was the abolition of the tax on plural wives and its substitution by an increase of 2*s.* 6*d.* in the tax on all male natives. The effect would appear to be to lessen the amount paid in taxation by the older men, and to increase that to be earned by the men of the most suitable employment age.

An adequate justification is no doubt forthcoming of the peculiar features in these changes. It is surprising, however, if

at a time when at Geneva the British Government is among the foremost in working towards an international decision against forced labour, and at a time when by the Colonial Development Act it has limited the possibilities of employing forced labour on public works, legislation should be adopted in any British territory which may be interpreted as a subtle combination of indirect pressure on the natives to seek private employment. That this is an economic as well as a social problem is shown by the fact that the progress of copper development is recognised by such financial authorities as Mr. Wills as depending in part on the native labour available, which in its turn is conditioned by the numbers of the population. In the neighbouring territory of Nyasaland the Report on the Census of 1926 assigns as one of the causes of under-population the absence of thousands of adult males seeking mine employment in the south. Experienced opinion, official and unofficial, medical and lay, the Superintendent of Census stated, is unanimous in putting this emigration among the forefront of the causes tending to reduce the native birth rate below its normal figure.

TANGANYIKA

Coming north again into Tanganyika, recent signs seem to indicate that in this territory it is European production which is threatened by the difficult native labour situation. General Smuts has appealed for an intensification of the white colonisation of the highlands of East Africa, which, if present methods are followed, will mean the carving out of new agricultural estates managed by Europeans, but worked by a native labour force, the chief advantage of which is its low cost. The comment on such hopes can be found in the situation at Kilosa, as summarised in the Land Development Survey Report. A few years ago all the able-bodied native population then went out to work on white estates. Now, however, 7000 of these natives have in eight months drawn

in cash from the local gineries an average of 25*l.* each for home-grown cotton. In other words, each man had stayed at home, grown and eaten his own food, acquired the tax due for himself and his two wives, and earned in eight months 40*s.* a month for the whole year, giving him a period of rest so dear to the native.

(In passing it may be noted that the cash wages of the high-paying sisal plantations of Arusha are 18*s.* a month, that in Nyasaland of the 83,000 males in European employment 19,000 receive less than 6*s.* a month and 60,000 between 6*s.* and 20*s.*)

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the supply decrease, unless the profits of European agriculture are large enough to enable employers to make employment very tempting. This may be possible in the production of high-priced tea and coffee; but I doubt if it can be done by the grain farmer or the pastoralist.

Native production, such as exists in West Africa, has not stood the test of an economic crisis such as may come with Eastern competition. Equally, it can be argued that European production on the basis of native labour has not stood the test of the competition of purely native-grown crops. Before settlement is encouraged on a large scale, at least for the production of other crops than sisal and high-class coffee and tea, a searching investigation of European and native agriculture respectively would be in the interests both of the Europeans and the natives.

THE SUDAN

Purely native production, it has been often said, is in danger from its inefficiency or its inability to meet the sudden changes world economics require. European-managed estates, on the other hand, have already reason to complain of the native labour shortage. Though Africa will certainly not progress along one single road, perhaps in some areas development will tend to follow a system which seems to combine the efficiency and monetary strength of European management with the absence of labour difficulties on native lands. In the Sudan, for example, the Plantations Syndicate is still pursuing its prosperous career. In the Gezira the tenant and the Government each receive 40 per cent. of the profits, and the syndicate 20 per cent. The technical services—supply of seeds, survey, advice, ginning, marketing—are undertaken by the syndicate. The tenants are free to work in their own manner. In 1928 the Government reports '£1,316,600l. in profits and advances was paid out . . . to 10,000 tenants, of which £909,500l. represented clear profits. The scheme is as popular and prosperous as ever, and there are three new applicants for any tenancy available.' Labour (60,000 to 70,000 people are required annually for the picking) 'continues to be readily attracted,' and the wages paid 'add to the purchasing capacity of many people besides the tenant and his family.' In the same year the syndicate could pay a dividend of 25 per cent., so all parties appear to have reason for satisfaction.

It is possible that a closer examination of the Gezira conditions would lead to the discovery of some defects. Is, for instance, the health of the migrant labourers adequately protected? But, on the facts at present available, it would seem that such an examination would be of benefit to certain of the other areas of British

Africa, when native labour and European capital and skill at present appear to be in opposition one to the other.

Indeed, wherever we turn in Africa, an urgent need is evident for a closer consideration of all the factors in the economic and social situation, and this both in the interests of each separate territory and for the information of the rest of Africa. Armchair critics are notoriously irritating, and pioneers notoriously irritable. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the pioneers the cry is gaining strength that there have been enough inquiries, commissions and reports, and that the man on the spot should be allowed to get on with his work in peace. But when the man on the spot is so busy that he has not time to profit by the experiences by the man on the next spot, and when the man at home is assuming ever greater financial, moral and international responsibilities, a policy of somnolent trust is no longer fair to anyone.

What is required is not a new *ad hoc* inquiry or a temporary commission, but a permanent watchfulness, organised and linked up with the permanent machinery for the general administration of the Empire. Whether this can best be effected by such officers as the proposed new High Commissioner for East Africa or by the Colonial Office or by a new organ in connexion with the Colonial development schemes is a question which may be considered as the definition of future functions is more carefully detailed. Before, however, the lists of African policy are again deserted by the public, advantage must be taken of the temporary interest to plan the mechanism by which the permanent watchfulness can function

W. BENSON.

RELIGION AND THE MODERN WORLD

THE seventh Conference of the Bishops of the Anglican Communion is to be held at Lambeth from July 7 to August 9 of this year. It is to be attended by more than 300 out of the total number of, roughly, 400 bishops now in communion with the See of Canterbury. The Conference, so far as its actual constitution goes, is a purely private gathering, and possesses no authority whatever to reach decisions in any way binding upon the Churches of the Anglican Communion. Nor is its main value necessarily to be measured by the immediate effect which any of its public pronouncements may produce. In recent years it has become a habit among many persons both inside and outside the Anglican Church to call for some clear lead from the bishops upon various controversial issues of the day. But these demands convey no guarantee that those who utter them have any intention of following such an episcopal lead, if it were given, or even of taking the trouble to discover whether in fact a lead has been given or not. No one knows better than the bishops themselves that their Church is not to be governed by pronouncements in the Press. And probably the chief results of the Conference of 1930, as of its predecessors, will be found in the fresh help and encouragement given to each bishop's work by the common discussion of the great problems which all alike, in their very diverse and often isolated situations, have to face. Such results are none the less important because they provide no subject for head-lines.

Nevertheless, it is fitting and inevitable both that the bishops should give some public expression of their mind upon the inter-pretation and application of Christian principles in the circumstances of the time, and that this expression should attract considerable attention in the religious world. The general subject of the Conference is 'The Faith and Witness of the Church in this Day and Generation,' and the particular topics dealt with by particular sections include the Christian doctrine of God (considered in relation to modern secularism), certain central problems of Christian morality (e.g., sex questions and war and peace), the unity of the Church in special relation to the South India proposals for reunion, Anglican ideals and principles of

Church government, the supply of clergy, and the special contribution of youth to the Church's life. Certainly the bishops cannot be accused of ignoring the burning problems of the day. All the main questions which are being asked in regard to the Church's rules of faith, conduct, and ecclesiastical order find some place on their agenda. The main fear is lest the pronouncements of the Conference should be criticised for not achieving what manifestly they cannot attempt, namely, the clear settlement, to everyone's satisfaction, of the most acutely debated problems which are now perplexing the intellect and conscience of the Christian world.

The most that can be aimed at in this article is to indicate how deep some of these problems really go, and how inextricably their roots are intertwined. Probably the question of reunion in South India is that which is exciting most anxiety within the Church itself; but really the most fundamental and critical subject to be considered is the doctrine of God, and it is with that that I mainly propose to deal.

Some very striking facts were brought out by the quite lamentable controversy about Prayer Book revision, which for a year or two recently made religion once more a subject of public and popular discussion in this country. It was then clearly revealed that, while a very large and probably increasing majority of our people do not go to church and make hardly any use of the forms of institutional religion, nevertheless the bulk of the laity of the Church of England see, on the whole, little need for change in those forms, while a keen minority of clergy and laity is chiefly zealous for the restoration of certain forms which are claimed as 'Catholic' and are at any rate mediæval. There is no widespread demand whatever for a devotional expression which will embody fresh thoughts about God corresponding to the new knowledge about the physical universe which has completely revolutionised the whole character of human culture and civilisation. On the one hand, modern secularism occupies itself with the things of space and time, with the means of man's livelihood and his control of his material environment; it reckes little of an eternal world, acknowledges no obedience to any spiritual authority, and regards the notion of divine government as an exploded myth. On the other hand, the religious public is but little concerned with the reinterpretation of its faith to meet the changing conditions of modern life. It is not greatly interested in any theological reconstruction. It seeks chiefly to defend traditional habits of thought and action against the menace of the secularist attack. It wants not to be disturbed. Such is a situation which may well draw from the bishops a summons to the reconsideration of the fundamental ideas about God involved in the Christian revelation.

Let us analyse the situation rather more deeply. Broadly speaking, it is true to say that mediæval orthodoxy regarded God as the great Sovereign of the Universe, enthroned above the skies, while to the more philosophic minds of the age He was also and chiefly the *ens realissimum*, the one ultimate and absolute reality, and ground of all being. By all the divine authority was believed to be embodied upon earth in a definitely religious and ecclesiastical organisation, the claim of which to exercise a controlling authority over every field of human activity and thought, secular and sacred, was generally admitted. Religion was the almost undisputed mistress of secular activities, and religion itself was under the control of an ecclesiastical hierarchy representing the Sovereign God. Secular departments of human thought and action were thought to be definitely further removed from God than the religious; but through the authority of the divinely appointed Church God exercised a sovereign sway over all, even though the secular arm of the State was allowed in its own sphere a certain independence. Not everyone was called to be 'a religious'—that was the higher vocation of some—but everyone was called to obey what the religious authority prescribed, and in that obedience lay salvation.

But now in the view of the world at large religion holds a quite different position. It is no longer assumed to be the supreme activity of the human soul, exercising an authoritative control from without over every secular occupation. Rather it is just one autonomous department of life among many, each of which puts in its legitimate claim, not indeed to dominate or control the rest, but to pursue its own distinct end in its own way, to set up its own independent standards, to be free from external interference. The typically modern mind—at least, as manifested in Western Europe and America—does not desire to forbid or to destroy religion, nor even rigidly to curtail its activities. Religious freedom and toleration are recognised as great achievements of the modern age, which many even of our advanced secularists would be eager to defend against the attacks of the new Bolshevik culture. But the very principles of such freedom and toleration imply that religion, not less than physical science, art, economics, politics and the rest, must recognise its own departmental character. And on the whole this departmentalising of human activity in the name of freedom has been very successfully carried out. To the intellectual of to-day religion presents one exceedingly interesting and clearly marked field of experience and study, which may very probably be assumed to make some contribution along with others to the understanding of the world we live in. To the man in the street it appears as a perfectly legitimate pursuit for those peculiarly constituted but doubtless

admirable individuals whose natural gifts or training have given them a particular bent in that direction. Not long ago a magistrate uttered words, which may be given a deeper significance than he intended, when he cautioned a woman whose religious activities had created some disturbance in a London street. 'You may,' he said, 'be as religious as you like—you may try to make other people religious also—but *you must not make yourself a nuisance.*'

The question, then, which has to be faced is this: How has the changed attitude to religion affected our thought of God? It is difficult to avoid the assumption that human knowledge of God is mediated by religion; that it is through religion that man comes into communion with God. This assumption was no doubt made, even if it was not explicitly declared, in mediæval thought. But then, since it was at the same time assumed that religion was the queen of life, belief in the sovereignty of God was not affected by the belief that the religious sphere was the only one in which God could really be approached. To-day the case is altered. A strictly departmental conception of religion tends to produce, consciously or unconsciously, an impression that the God of religion is a being somehow distinct from the author and ruler of the universe, or from any absolute ultimate and omnipresent reality. Many philosophers, of course, accept this distinction quite frankly. They distinguish sharply between the Absolute or Universal Spirit and the God of religion. Secularists would, of course, accept the same distinction, though they would go much further than idealist philosophers in disparaging the claim of religion to provide any valid knowledge about the nature of the world. But religious people themselves are in a great difficulty, greater than they generally recognise. Some, of course, would still maintain, at least dialectically, the sovereign sway of religious and ecclesiastical authority over the whole of life, and silence the too curious questioner with the thunder of infallibility. But most of us at least cannot escape the consequences of the plain fact that the main great departments of the world's life, departments in which Christians themselves have continually to move, have thrown off religious control altogether, and are conducted according to distinct laws and standards of their own. It is often said that people are perplexed as to the application of religion to their life in the world, their business or profession, or even to the life of the family. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that they do not understand how the God whom they learn about and approach in a religious department can be served also in departments which have become definitely non-religious.

From this point of view the somewhat plaintive and futile appeals for clear guidance from bishops or clergy are easily

intelligible. They represent a pathetically vain attempt to return to the good old days when the specifically religious authority could still exercise an effective sway over the whole of life. But in our close-knit yet infinitely complicated system of society the considerations which have to be weighed in determining conduct have become so multitudinous, and demand such varieties of special knowledge, that it is impossible for any ecclesiastical casuist to supply definite rules which at once convince the conscience and are plainly applicable to each particular case. The bishop or cleric has his own highly specialised task in administering the ecclesiastical organisation of which he is an officer; and the best he can do is to take expert advice and give wise and godly counsel in general terms. He is himself, when all is said and done, the expert of but one department.

Religion is but part of life. God is the God of the universe: In that antithesis lies the fundamental problem which faces the religious world of to-day. It is not, of course, a new problem; but the modern world feels it with a quite new force, because religion is more definitely and distinctly a part of life than it has ever been before. That is why in face of modern secularism the Church must reflect once more on its doctrine of God.

That is exactly what so few religious people are doing. And that, again, is the reason why those who are responsible for the agenda of the Lambeth Conference are so supremely right in putting down as the first subject for its consideration the doctrine of God in relation to modern secularism. It is so tempting to encourage revivals of religion which really leave out of sight altogether the fundamental need for a clearer thought about the relation of God to the world and human life as a whole. We are familiar with modern attempts to construct a religion without any real theology at all, to wax enthusiastic about religious experience without seriously considering the ultimate nature of that reality with which the experience is supposed to give us contact. Such attempts are commonly made by those but loosely attached to membership of any Church. But even within the Church itself there are not wanting teachers of unquestioned zeal and sincerity who seem to be seeking to intensify a religious experience among religious people by training them in certain methods of worship and devotion, and who seem to suppose that, if the specifically religious experience can thus be made sufficiently vivid and impressive, the problem of the relation of the omnipresent God to the non-religious aspects of life will solve itself. In this way it may be possible to do with religion what many modern experts are doing with art, *i.e.*, to make it an absorbing pursuit for the highly trained or naturally gifted few, at the cost

of rendering it almost unintelligible to the many. There are some people in every class—many of them belong to the poorest—who have an innately strong 'religious sense.' May not the Church concern itself with cultivating the religiousness of those whose mystical faculties readily respond, and make their devotion a substitute for a more catholic theology?

To answer this question in the affirmative would be to commit oneself to modernism indeed. For it would be to acquiesce in the departmentalising of life, which is the most prominent characteristic of our modern age. But within the Church of England at least the essential modernism of such a religious policy is effectively disguised by the fact that many of those who are most keenly pursuing it employ for the purpose methods of worship and devotion which present in externals simply a return to the Catholic tradition of the West. The lines of division between Catholic, Evangelical, and Modernist are not nearly so clear as most people suppose. Again and again we need to remind ourselves that it by no means follows that, because some local Church is extremely Catholic in its forms of worship and rules of observance, therefore the inner spirit of its thought is in any way approximating to the main tradition of Catholic theology. According to this tradition the main value of every religious act lies in *the thing done* in obedience to the declared will of the all-sovereign God; the thing done matters infinitely more than the feelings or experiences which men may or may not find in the doing of it, and which are so greatly affected by the outward manner and circumstances of the doing. It is this emphasis on the value of the thing done in obedience to God which leads to the celebrated doctrine of the *opus operatum* in connexion with sacramental theory. But in the minds of some of our most zealous and intellectual Anglo-Catholics this line of thought has in fact been quite abandoned. The outward rules and forms of traditional Catholicism are by them carefully taught and observed chiefly as a means of quickening a certain devotional experience in the human soul. They are much less interested in theology, that is, the doctrine of God, than in the training of a religious experience, of which all theologies are in their view but imperfect and temporary 'rationalisations.' In many ways this change has led to an enormous gain in devotional sincerity, of which it would be both wicked and foolish to underrate the value. But the fact remains that in their philosophic outlook such Anglo-Catholic thinkers are much more closely akin to Otto in Germany, Alexander in England, and to modernists of the psychological school than to theologians in the great tradition of Aquinas. For the modern philosophers mentioned agree in holding that God is really to be found and known mainly or only in a specifically

religious experience ; they have but scant respect for the grand old Catholic rationalism which has always taught in different ways that God is to be known by the reason and conscience of all men as the living ground of a universal order of goodness in the world.

The strength of Anglo-Catholicism, as of certain less powerful movements in Evangelicalism, lies in the fact that they are indeed keen and active revivals of *religion* in our modern world. But they do not clearly face or recognise the fundamental problem arising from the fact that whereas the God of whom they speak must be the supreme reality of the universe, the experience which they revive remains one section only of man's knowledge and activity, and has but little power to relate its own object to all that lies beyond. We cannot allow a specifically religious experience wholly to determine our doctrine of God without becoming in the end either ecclesiastically minded Churchmen or else vague pseudo-mystics, disqualified in either case from taking up the challenge of a secular civilisation. If our views are to be really *whole* views, it is rather the doctrine of God which must determine our treatment of religion.

If the foregoing analysis of the situation be at all a sound one, it is clear that the subject placed first on the agenda of the Lambeth Conference ought to exercise a decisive influence upon the others. Whether the bishops are considering the vexed problems of social and sexual morality, ecclesiastical order, the reunion of the Churches, or other questions no less far removed from one another in appearance, one fundamental question to be asked is always this : How far are those rules, on the observance of which religious people eagerly insist, really based upon a fundamentally rational and inclusive doctrine of God, or upon merely religious sentiments possibly derived from an ancestry both older and more primitive than either Christianity or Judaism ? The weakness of our religious modernisms, which build on the foundation of religious experience, no less than of a religious traditionalism, which is content to appeal to ancient rules of the Church, is that all alike are in danger of working with a doctrine of God unrelated to the whole of life, just because it is the product simply of the *religious* consciousness of mankind. The besetting temptation of our age is to fashion a religion for naturally religious people, and to let the secular departments of life look after themselves. But such a religion can be in its essence neither truly Catholic nor fully Christian.

For Christianity stands in the end by its claim to be the bearer of a revelation of God which transcends every religion ; and it is that claim which above all needs re-emphasis and re-interpretation in the peculiarly complicated conditions of modern life. The Bible from cover to cover is concerned with God, while the word

' religion ' hardly occurs in it at all. Yet no book is more drastic and more searching in its criticism of human religions. The great message of the Old Testament prophets is that Jehovah demands to be served in other than specifically religious activities. And this message leads up to the final climax in which God's eternal Word is revealed as incarnate in the manhood of the Nazarene prophet, crucified with the consent of the religious authorities of God's chosen people. It is that, at first sight quite incredible, limitation of the Godhead which really gives to the Christian doctrine of God its peculiarly inclusive breadth. For the revelation of God in the one whole man is in principle wider and deeper, at once more infinite and more definite, than the revelation of God in one section of the experience of all mankind. From henceforth God is to be found, not merely in any specifically religious department of knowledge or action, but in everything in the world which expresses, adumbrates, or reflects the ministry and the Cross of Jesus Christ.

Perhaps that revelation is wider in its scope than most of us have yet perceived. Consider especially the symbolic significance given to Jerusalem and Nazareth by the Fourth Gospel. Jerusalem is the home of strict orthodox Judaism where the Messiah is expected to appear. Nazareth is the centre of a debased, easy-going, worldly Judaism, adulterated by Gentile influences. But the true Israelite, Nathanael, recognises Jesus as the Messiah, coming from Nazareth. The story of Nathanael's conversion may well serve as an allegory for our times. Jerusalem typifies a narrow religious traditionalism ; Nazareth a lax, compromising worldliness. Both reject the Messiah ; but it is from Nazareth that he appears. Certainly, on the whole, the faults of our modern secular civilisation are those of Nazareth rather than of Jerusalem. Can, then, any good thing come out of Nazareth ? Perhaps to-day it is still from Nazareth that God is revealed ; and it may be that on our capacity to see it depends our own conversion and our power to convert others. Christians must see the hand of God in secular civilisation before they can convert secular civilisation to God. They must learn once more how much greater is God than religion before they can bring men back to a true religiousness. No longer can religion by the exercise of its authority from without control the manifold activities of the world's secular life. But a right emphasis on the God-ward value of those activities themselves, when seen in the light of the meaning of Christ's life truly presented, may enable those who are themselves occupied in each secular activity to serve God and work out their own salvation therein.

If such be the real hope, it must not be expected that the ecclesiastical authorities of a world-wide Communion should

receive immediate inspiration to lay down exact rules for Christian conduct which can be everywhere applied. Even when it comes to questions of ecclesiastical order and Church reunion, it is more important that what counsel they give should be clearly based on a Christian understanding of divine operations in Church and world than that particular points of controversy should at once be settled in favour of this party or that. Certainly the Anglican bishops cannot in a month's deliberation at Lambeth finally dispose of the vast questions raised by their agenda. Yet, even without epoch-making decisions, they may give a fresh bent and direction to Christian thinking, for which the few—if few they be—who follow it, and in the end others also, will be lastingly grateful. Notoriously, the destiny of the Church of England has been to occupy a middle position. Somewhere between Jerusalem and Nazareth, perhaps, she stands to-day. And, if she succeeds in keeping up some communication between a religious tradition on the one hand and a new world of secular civilisation on the other, she may be content even to bear the reproaches that of old fell upon Samaria.

OLIVER C. QUICK.

OBERAMMERGAU

IF I begin the account of a visit to this year's Passion Play at Oberammergau by talking of the weather, that is not because I am so firmly wedded to the Englishman's pet topic of conversation that I cannot shake free of it even on paper, but because it seems to me that the weather has an important bearing on the subject.

There is a widespread notion that the Passion Play and its players have both been 'spoilt.' The play is no longer produced, as it used to be, by a small community of poor wood-carvers at its own proper cost. No longer does the village council put by its pennies so that every tenth year there may be enough money in the box to keep the vow made by its ancestors in the plague year of 1632. So far from being a drain on the resources of the inhabitants, Passion Play year now brings wealth to their doors. A ceaseless stream of tourists flows through the village, buying tickets for its play, accommodation in the houses of its people, specimens of its wood-carving, postcards, souvenirs of every kind, all at strictly commercial prices. Obviously, the players also are—must be—commercialised. Obviously, the play is staged nowadays, not to the glory of God, but for greed of gain.

All this I had heard; and though it did not in any way agree with my own memories of the place as I last saw it in the lean year of 1922, or with the tales I had subsequently heard of the distress which fell upon it in the still leaner years which followed, I arrived in the village determined to satisfy my mind upon this point first of all, if I could. It is not easy to form an opinion of any value on such a point in three days, especially if you are the representative of a daily newspaper and must spend much of your time recording instead of receiving impressions. It is quite possible that I might have been able to come to no really definite conclusion on this point, if it had not been for the violent break in the fine weather on the night before the general rehearsal of the play, at which the audience consists chiefly of journalists from all countries and of dignitaries from Munich and the country round. All night it rained, and when we assembled in the Passionstheater at 8 o'clock next morning the drops were

beating a thunderous tattoo on the arched iron roof of the building.

Seldom have I seen such rain. Hour after hour it poured down in torrents. When you looked at the outer stage (which is built of stone and open to the sky) and watched the great drops splashing into the puddles, it seemed impossible that the sky could continue to empty itself at such a rate for long; but when you looked at the sky, there was to be seen no promise that it would ever stop. Nor did it, that day. Throughout the eight hours of the performance and the two hours of the midday interval, and afterwards right on into the night, it was always raining except when it was snowing. But even such conditions could not damp the ardour of the players. For them, the rain might not have existed. The chorus, in particular, was heroic.

This chorus, forty-eight in number, has a very important though unspectacular part in the Passion Play. It is modelled pretty obviously on the chorus of Greek tragedy, and performs much the same function, of commenting lyrically upon the action of the play. But it differs from the Greek chorus in the important respect that it performs no movements except a stately and ceremonious entry and departure. For the choric dances of the Greeks the unknown writer of the Oberammergau play (who was probably one of the monks at the great Benedictine monastery at Ettal, four miles away) has substituted a series of tableaux from the Old Testament, which form a running commentary upon the action of the play itself.

For example, Act III. of the play deals with the parting of Christ and Mary at Bethany. At the beginning of the act the chorus enters in single file from either side of the stage, and forms up across the stage in a great curve with the choregus in the centre. The choregus explains the general purport of the act, after which the chorus sings a stanza which expresses sympathy with Mary in her coming loss. This done, the song goes straight on to describe the grief of the mother of Tobias when her son left her to go to a foreign land. At a given moment during this part of the song the chorus divides in the middle and its two halves swing back like the two halves of a double door. Simultaneously the curtains of the inner stage roll apart, and the tableau of the departure of Tobias from his home is displayed. Then the curtain closes, the chorus swings back again into line, and the song changes to the lament of the forsaken bride in the Song of Solomon, who is the subject of the next tableau. This is now displayed with the same ritual. After the song is finished the chorus divides again and paces out, each half forming double rank as it goes.

Since the choruses are often extremely long and are invariably

written in slow tempo, and since the play consists of seventeen acts in all, before each of which either one or two tableaux are exhibited without variation of method, you will understand that the task of the singers is a heavy one in any circumstances, but becomes something like martyrdom in bad weather. Their dress, for men and girls alike, is Greek in design though distinctly Teutonic in execution, and consists of a flowing white garment under a long grey-blue cloak. They are bareheaded except for metal circlets, and the girls all have long hair flowing loose over their shoulders. In this garb they stand stock-still on the exposed outer stage for what must be very nearly three of the eight hours during which the play is in action.

None of the other actors are at the mercy of the elements in this way. Apart from the fact that no other actor, with the possible exception of the Christus, is on the stage so constantly, there is the very pertinent fact that no other actor has to confine his activities to the outer stage. Not only the tableaux, but nearly all the big set scenes take place on the inner stage, under cover. On the day of which I am writing most of the actors came through their ordeal without much outward sign to show for it; but the unfortunate chorus was plainly soaked to the skin during the first hour, and never again had a chance to get dry. Even so, not one of them faltered or showed discomfort; indeed, not until the afternoon, when a little chill wind that cut like a knife got up, and one or two of the girls had to brush the wet hair from their eyes—not until then did anybody deign to notice the weather at all. Anton Lang, the choregus, who is now an elderly man and had been suffering from a chill and loss of voice two days before, carried through his heavy task as imperturbably as the rest.

That convinced me, as perhaps nothing else could, that the spirit of devotion in which the play was first conceived still persists in Oberammergau. A cynic might say that a special occasion will always call forth a special effort—that, since this was the Press performance upon which the quality of the actors was to be judged, the actors had an incentive to do their best which would later be lacking. The cynic would, however, be wrong; for my landlady told me that bad weather is common at Oberammergau in May, and that every Passion Play year two or three of the chorus die as a direct result of the conditions in which they have to play their parts. After hearing this, I felt that I needed no further proof that the talk of commercialisation is mere nonsense.

Such talk probably had its origin in the minds of a certain class of well-meaning but sheep-brained tourists which arrived in the place with its collective mind made up as to what it was

going to find, and then, finding something different, felt itself aggrieved. The public has a vague general notion that the Passion Play is performed by 'peasants.' Since I returned from Germany a good many friends and acquaintances have asked me to describe the play and the people to them, and have all been astonished when I told them that simply to say 'Wonderful—and all just peasants!' would be to give them an entirely wrong impression. Oberammergau is not essentially a peasant community, and, what is more important, it never was. For centuries past it has been a community of artists, whose wood-carvings have been known far beyond their own borders. Their work was deservedly famous in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth it lost much of its original inspiration and became mechanical and stereotyped—the work of journeymen rather than of artists—but to-day, plainly enough, the divine impulse is at work amongst them again, for they have men who turn out carvings and figures full of feeling, life, and beauty.

Naturally, such a community is not content, merely for the delectation of tourists, to live in the primitive fashion demanded of 'peasants.' According to its pastor (to whose excellent handbook I am indebted for my facts concerning its past history) the standard of education in the village is a good deal above the average even for Germany. 'It would be difficult,' he says, 'to find another village of the size of Oberammergau in which so many foreign languages are spoken, in which music is so much a part of daily life, and in which literature and art are more understood and appreciated.'

Even if we make generous allowance for local patriotism on the good man's part, we can see clearly that he has a cure of highly civilised souls, likely to know what is going on in the world and to shape their lives accordingly. Their streets are paved and asphalted and watered by an up-to-date motor-driven cart. Their houses are well-built and electrically lit, and the one in which I stayed had parquet flooring throughout, and an automatic telephone. If you like to put it so, sophistication has set in.

But the sophistication is only skin-deep—a mere matter of mechanical progress. Beneath that thin veneer the people still remain the same—a simple, straightforward, kindly race, with beautiful, easy manners. My own feeling concerning them is not that they have been spoilt by the fame of their play, but that they have been able to withstand most admirably the spoiling process. The reason is that to them the Passion Play is primarily a religious ceremony, and only in the second place a dramatic spectacle. The fact that travellers from all over the world come to see their play is a source of gratification and justifiable pride to them, but is not of essential importance. If

there were suddenly no more tourists, the play would be performed less often in the course of the summer—but it would be performed with the same devotion.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is the spirit of devotion shared by a vast company of actors, rather than any great virtuosity on the part of individual players, that makes the Passion Play a profound experience. Since the play was first discovered for the English-speaking world reams of turgid nonsense have been written by sentimental journalists whose enthusiasms had run away with what little judgment they possessed, and the result is that many people have gone to Oberammergau with high expectation of this or that kind and have been bitterly disappointed.

When I went to the 1922 play I had as companion a musician, who was convinced that he was about to see and hear a tremendous work of art. His disappointment was pitiful to witness. He experienced a revulsion of feeling so strong that it drove him to fierce vituperation. He complained that the crucifixion scene was disgusting, the chief players—with one or two exceptions—could not act, the production was old-fashioned, the music was 'Haydn-and-water.' I had no preconceived notions to trouble me, for the reason that until I was told by my editor to go and see it I had never given the Passion Play any particular thought. I found the performance impressive in ways which my companion was in no condition of mind to appreciate.

Nowadays the flow of panegyric has ceased, and the tide seems to be setting the other way. An impression has been spread abroad that the Passion Play is nothing very wonderful after all, and that whatever glory there once was in it has now departed. It is my belief that the play, like the people, has changed only in certain external and inessential respects, and that it is to-day exactly as well worth seeing as it always has been.

To my mind, it is a mistake to attempt to judge this play by artistic standards. That in certain ways it is an artistic success is true, and is much more true in 1930 than it was in 1922, for reasons which will appear later. But its inspiration, its manner of working out, its form, are all religious rather than artistic. If I were told to criticise this play by the same standards as I should use in the secular theatre, I should have to begin by saying that there is almost no crime in the dramatist's decalogue which the good monk who wrote this play has not committed. He has, in fact, no theatrical guile whatever. He must be allowed the one virtue that he does tell his story; but he completely ignores the even greater virtue of compression, and takes an unconscionable time over the task. He labours his effects

unforgivably. He dissipates his best dramatic moments by allowing minor characters to talk at interminable length upon affairs of minor importance. And so on, and so forth.

Turning to the acting, I should have to say that most of the individual players attain no higher standard than our own amateurs who compete for prizes in the National Festival of Community Drama. Guido Mayr, who plays Judas, is a natural actor of considerable gifts; Johanna Preisinger, the Magdalene, has beauty, grace, and force of personality; Hugo Rutz, the blacksmith, makes a fine powerful figure as Caiaphas; but I imagine that many a village could match these three, who are the best of the Oberammergau company. Alois Lang, the Christ, does not strike me as having any particular talent for acting. His performance has a compelling power, not because of what he makes believe to be, but because of what he evidently is—a man of fine character, of simplicity and strength. And having dealt thus faithfully with the acting, I should have to go on to speak in disparaging terms of the music, for which my disgruntled friend of 1922 seems to have found the just phrase. It is 'Haydn-and-water.'

But I should be wrong to say all this. The play is not to be judged by such standards. The Ettal monk wrote his play, not for dramatic critics, but for worshippers of Christ. His aim when writing his dialogue was rather to make sure that he had got everything in than to leave anything out. He had none of the usual aims of the playwright before him. He had neither to invent incident nor to create character. Even the words of his dialogue were to a great extent predetermined. His play was written, not according to the needs of the ordinary theatre, but in a special form for a special purpose; its appeal to us therefore lies, not in its purely dramatic quality, but in its suitability to its special purpose. It was written as a vehicle, not for art, but for religion. If you insist on regarding it as a work of art, its quality is not fine enough to move you. But if you regard it in its true light as a great declaration of faith, then, whether you yourself happen to be religious or not, it can hardly fail to move you profoundly.

The effect upon you of the much-debated crucifixion scene depends entirely upon your own attitude towards the play. Dramatically speaking, this scene fails. Twice I have sat through it, and both times, in spite of (or possibly because of) the strongly realistic manner of its presentation, I have found that it makes no appeal to my emotions at all. To religious-minded people, on the other hand, the scene stands—as it should—as a tremendous climax to the whole tragedy. Delving into my mind to discover a reason for this violent cleavage of opinion, I have formed a

theory which, though I put it forward with diffidence, seems to me to be credible enough. The scene fails with me because throughout its length my mind is subconsciously occupied, not with the mimic action on the stage, but with the very real discomfort which is being endured by the chief actor during his fifteen trying minutes on the cross. The religious mind, I imagine, is troubled by no such consideration—not because it lacks pity or sympathy, but because it accepts the player's voluntary ordeal as an act of worship, and is rather edified than revolted by it.

I am strengthened in my belief in this theory by the fact that as soon as the crucifixion is over I find myself powerfully moved by the scene which follows—the Descent from the Cross. Two men set ladders against the cross and climb up to where the Body of Christ is hanging. Carefully and reverently, but with a businesslike expertness, they pass a band of white cloth across His breast and over the cross-beam, so that the long ends droop to the ground. Two other men hold these ends, and then, when the nails have been taken out that have fastened His feet and hands to the cross, they lower His body slowly to the ground, and lay it with the head in Mary's lap. The scene has no great significance in itself, but it has an effect as though Rembrandt's picture in the gallery at Munich (from which it has evidently been copied) had come to life; and when I saw it something in its simple realism caught me suddenly by the throat. I am sure that part of the emotion I felt was due (once again, subconsciously) to relief that the actor was now no longer in pain.

The pain that he must undergo during the crucifixion scene is very severe. The cross is so built that he gets little support for his feet, and the weight of his frame is held by some kind of strong hook at his back, so that his outstretched arms do not have to bear any part of the strain. But even so, only a very strong and courageous man could bear to remain for fifteen minutes (which seems to us in the audience to be more like thirty, and to the actor must feel an age) with his arms held aloft at full stretch and with no possibility of movement. I am told that by the end of the scene his arms are quite 'dead,' and that the task of getting him down from the cross is one that must be performed by experts and with the minutest care.

Although I have attempted to show that a visit to Oberammergau in search of æsthetic experience is foredoomed to disappointment, there are two respects in which the Passion Play is worth seeing purely as a dramatic spectacle. First, the settings, the groupings, the handling of colour effects, both in the play itself and in the interspersed tableaux, are marvellously well done, and are in direct contrast to the 1922 production. I

remember wishing eight years ago that the tableaux could be left out of the performance altogether, so tawdry and uninspired did they seem. This year a new mind, enriched by knowledge of modern theatrical practice, has been at work, and the tableaux are now a rich decoration whose removal would be a great loss to the play. The picture of the Lamenting Bride (already mentioned), seated all in white at her window, with eight Daughters of Jerusalem in saffron yellow disposed about her chamber, remains in my memory as an exquisitely lovely thing.

And second, and more important, are the big crowd scenes. These have a quality not to be matched on any other stage; and if you consider local conditions for a moment you will see why. For centuries now the Passion Play has been the central point upon which the life of Oberammergau has turned. With it are bound up all the family traditions, all the personal ambitions, the hopes of triumph and the fears of disappointment, which in other municipalities concern themselves with local politics. The Ammergau makes up his mind in early youth that when he grows up he will act this or that part in his play; and on the day when he achieves that desire his life is crowned with success. Each play in which he appears brings him ten years nearer his goal, or ten years nearer the time when he must admit failure. Each play gives him a new chance of proving his mettle in a subordinate part. Add to this his devotion to his religion and his pride in his birthplace, and you have the factors of an amazing communal enthusiasm which no mere æsthetic impulse could inspire. The finest theatrical producer in the world could never put upon the stage a crowd of 500 people of both sexes and of all ages, every member of which is utterly and completely wrapped up in his part. It is not in mortals to command success of that kind.

The first big crowd scene of the Passion Play, Christ's Entry into Jerusalem, is an unsurpassable and unforgettable stage picture. Some people think that the later full-stage scene, in which Pilate hands over Christ to the Jews, is even finer. It is certainly more dramatic; but that very fact impels me to prefer the earlier scene. There is a touch of artificiality in the Pilate scene, inherent in the manner of its writing. In it large numbers of people have to speak together, and are given long and complicated sentences to say. It is obvious that if a band of men have to shout such a mouth-filling sentence as 'We belong to Moses! We are and will remain followers of Moses and his teaching,' the only way in which they can make the audience hear the words is to speak strictly in unison.

Throughout this particular act, consequently, the various sections of the crowd give an exhibition of disorder so extremely

well-drilled that the figure of the producer is never absent from the mind's eye. But the great quality of the Entry into Jerusalem is its apparent spontaneity. In this scene there is no dialogue at all. Through the various entries pours a throng of people, singing hosannas and waving palm branches. They flood the huge stage with sound and colour, and in their midst Christ is seen riding by into the city. That is all. But for the moment you forget the theatre, and only know that you are taking part in a magnificent service of adoration.

W. A. DARLINGTON.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CRICKET?

As in politics, so in sport, a diversity of opinion is universally held by the leading authorities no less than by the numberless participants and followers engaged in its pursuit.

Cricket has long since ceased to be of merely national importance; apart from actual cricketers, it numbers to-day countless enthusiastic followers, not only wherever the British flag flies, but in every quarter of the civilised world. The fascination of the cricket-field never loses its hold on those who have once been enthralled by its spell. Although, by reason of age or circumstance, they may be debarred from the active delights of the game, the votaries of cricket will ever thrill responsively to the memories of joys once experienced in playing or watching the play of the great heroes of the past whose names to them are household words.

Since the County Championship was introduced by the Press, some forty years ago, the game as regards first-class cricket has undergone considerable changes. The question arises: Have these changes been for the benefit of the game and for those who play it?

I have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative. Like our main products and industries, first-class cricket is suffering from over-production. That is to say, there is a surfeit of professionals employed by most of our counties, which is not only detrimental to those amateurs who can afford to play, but also to those who for the sake of example might quite conceivably be able to play for six weeks or so at various periods during the season. The result is that the amateur is gradually being pushed out of the game, chiefly on account of the surfeit of matches. Unless a player can devote four months and a half to the game—this applies especially to the northern first-class counties—he probably does not get an invitation to play. We have seen what the effect has been of over-professionalising football. Where every player is a paid servant whose existence and livelihood is dependent on success, and with competition as keen as it is to-day and steadily on the increase, a tendency is created to study one's self rather than one's side. At present this applies more particu-

larly to Association football, but there are distinct signs that the same result is being brought about in first-class cricket.

The evil in cricket has been slow; nevertheless, the state of things to-day gives food for thought as to whether it is too late for the counties to put their houses in order. The present unsatisfactory condition of things is largely due to the vast county programmes which started when the last half-dozen counties were admitted into the Championship. This, in itself, could not very well have been avoided. These sides had proved that they were thoroughly deserving of recognition both from a financial and cricket point of view. Under the old *régime*, some forty years ago, professionals were paid 5*l.* per match and no winter pay. Yorkshire was the first county to institute winter pay, which, I believe, is to-day 2*l.* per week. The other counties have been practically forced to fall into line in this respect, although half of them are really unable to do so. Last season was an exceptionally fine and dry one, yet the balance-sheets, except in very few instances, made sorry reading.

In former days the professionals, who were far fewer in number, all had some sort of winter jobs either as groundsmen or in business, and were capable of earning a living outside their cricket. To-day, except to those who get to the top of the tree and find a regular place in their county eleven, the game is hardly worth the candle. The young player is up against a far keener competition than obtained in former years, and this, combined with the comparatively lazy and luxurious life he leads during the summer months, minimises his chance of getting work. A further obstacle is the increasing difficulty for a batsman only to get into a county eleven, and unless the player has an outstanding chance of obtaining this distinction he is almost sure to strike a bad patch during his first seasons, which results in his being left out. His nerve may be shattered, and he will probably be relegated to club-ground matches and be out of the eleven for a season or two. During that period he is earning a bare existence, and, not being a bowler, his chance of obtaining a permanent place in the eleven is very slight.

The selection of young players is undoubtedly made in too haphazard and ignorant a manner by many counties. Except in very rare instances, no young cricketer should be engaged by a county as a batsman only. There is an old saying that in both codes of football the wise judge looks to the half-backs when he gauges the strength of a side. The same remark applies to cricket if you substitute the bowlers for the half-backs. It is in reality the bowler rather than the batsman who will win the match. A bowler is born, not made, and, though he may learn much from logical and capable coaching, not above 10 per cent. of young

players can hope to become great at bowling, whereas 80 per cent. can be made into skilful batsmen, especially in these days when so much is done by the super-excellence of our county grounds to favour the batsman.

The restarting of county cricket after the war presented a favourable moment in which to review the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The whole question should then have been tackled and a remedy might have been effected :

- (1) By limiting the number of county matches to twenty.
- (2) By making it a *sine qua non* that at least half the side should be composed of amateurs.

By limiting the number of county matches there would be certain periods during the summer when the professionals would be free. During those times they might very well be employed in their own counties in bowling or coaching the various clubs and schools. They should be paid for the season's engagement. At present the professional is paid by the match, and in some cases leading players get a field fee. Half our counties are being ruined, from a financial point of view, by a plethora of county matches. The problem might be solved by the counties agreeing to play two-day matches of one innings apiece and eliminating three-day county matches of two innings. The third day of a county match is almost certain to be a dead loss financially. No matter how interesting the state of the game may be, the public can seldom afford either the time or the money to attend matches every day in the week. A further argument is that in many games on the third day stumps are drawn about 5 o'clock to enable the visiting team to travel to their destination, which may be several hundred miles away. Counties which indulge in county cricket weeks find that their supporters attend either on the first or second day's play of each match, but seldom on the last day, which in most cases results in a short day's play, a draw, or a foregone conclusion. The regrettable incident which occurred at Southampton early this season will serve to point a moral. Hampshire, with one run to win and half their wickets to fall, were compelled by Nottinghamshire to go in to bat on the third day. Nottinghamshire's idea was that had it rained all day they might have saved the loss of five points—a potent example of how cricket should not be played !

There are few outstanding personalities among the cricketers of to-day compared with those of thirty or forty years ago. This is due in no small measure to the introduction of googly bowling, which was invented by B. J. T. Bosanquet in the late 'nineties. It is googly bowling that is primarily responsible for the altered position assumed by our batsmen at the wicket, and known as the two-eyed stance. This, by the way, is a misnomer ; it should

be termed the two-shouldered stance, as it deals with the position of the shoulders. As the batsman stands at the wicket to-day his left shoulder is away on the on side and his body less sideways than formerly, while the stance at the wicket is far more open. The modern batsman has reacted to this innovation in a deplorable manner. The driving, especially straight driving, of other days has given place to a dull, stereotyped batting in many of our county sides ; and a further result is the lamentable weakness that is apparent to-day in a large percentage of our so-called first-class batsmen.

All present-day cricketers would do well to make a careful study of *The Personalities at the Wicket*, which includes the well-known portrait of the late W. G. Grace, by the late Archibald Stuart-Wortley ; and model lessons may be learnt from the wonderful instantaneous photographs by G. W. Beldam of F. S. Jackson (now Sir Stanley Jackson), the Jamsahib of Nawanagar, and the late V. Trumper, all taken in the act of driving, with the left shoulder in line with the ball they are driving. This attitude shows a striking contrast to that of the present-day players, many of whom step back while the ball is in the air, irrespective of its length, and with the full breadth of their chest facing the bowler, so that they are always in an impossible position to drive an over-pitched ball. The perfect exponent of the correct position at the wicket before making any strokes was A. C. MacLaren. To the initiated as well as the ignorant onlookers he gave an impression of supreme command and ability which has never been surpassed by any other batsman. In a minor degree the same may apply to F. E. Woolley to-day, but he, being a left-hand player, is not in quite the same category as the normal batsman, although the correctness, ease, and perfection of his graceful play would be very difficult to improve upon. Another dominating personality at the wicket is Hobbs. He can truthfully be dubbed the most evergreen batsman of to-day, or indeed of all time. He has the rare gift of knowing his own limitations, and what he can or cannot do in regard to his increasing age, though in spite of his forty-seven years his marvellous artistry as a batsman on all types of wickets shows no signs of diminishing.

There are fewer bowlers of real class to-day than there were formerly, and it is this obsession for trying something new without having the least command of what really counts in bowling that is in a great measure responsible for the low ebb of our present-day bowling. Apart from a natural ability, there is no short cut to success in bowling, and no bowler can hope to make good without real hard work. I have often been asked what really goes to make a fine bowler. I unhesitatingly answer : 'Guts and brains.' It is a lack of the former that causes the dearth

of fast bowlers to-day; and there is a strong need of the latter, if the bowler is to avoid the common pitfall of trying to accomplish too much, and consequently sacrificing length for the sake of employing a googly, without any command of pitch or direction. We look in vain to-day for any bowlers who can carry on the traditions of the late F. R. Spofforth, G. R. Lohmann, C. J. Kortright, Peel, Blythe, or Sidney Barnes, who were inimitable in their methods of delivery or variety of concealed pace, whilst the real fast bowler, always excepting Larwood, has practically vanished from our fields.

In these post-war days our bowlers cannot compare in physical fitness with their predecessors, nor are they capable of such long spells of bowling as were those giants of yore. Where to-day could we hope to witness such a feat as that achieved by W. Brearley some years ago in the Canterbury Week? None who were present will ever forget how he bowled right through the day, which was a broiling one in August, and bowled his last over just as fast as his opening one. It is true that Brearley was, and still is, a man of exceptional physique, but, even if we eliminate the obvious exceptions, our cricketers to-day are not nearly so strong nor so fit as were their pre-war prototypes. It is a pretty safe prophecy that when we send abroad a team of fifteen players more often than not at least three or four of the men will be *hors de combat* with minor ailments and unfit to play. Whether or not this lack of stamina is due to the softer conditions of life which have prevailed since the invention of the motor car and the introduction of other luxuries I do not pretend to judge. The fact, however, remains that the fieldsmen of to-day are not nearly so much on their toes, and the bowlers have not that vigour, perseverance, and accuracy, which are only to be obtained by frugal feeding and drinking, and the use of common sense as regards short sprints and physical exercises.

As regards batting, it is undeniable that, with the exception of our leading batsmen who are actually representing England, and a very few others, the style of batting as practised by our young professionals to-day is not only radically wrong, but almost painful to watch. The main principles in attack are quickness of footwork and the correct position of the body, which should be sideways at the moment of impact, with the shoulders loose, especially the left shoulder. To-day these principles are generally ignored, particularly as regards the play of the shoulders, and it may be said of at least half of our prominent batsmen that their shoulders, for all practical purposes, are non-existent. Correct methods of batting have suffered terribly of late years by the substitution of a poor defence, which is boring to watch and

results in many drawn-out games and depleted gates in nearly every county ground throughout the country. A terrible exhibition of batting took place only last month on the first day of the Kent week at Tunbridge Wells, when Kent met Worcestershire. The visitors batted for just under five hours and succeeded in making 141 runs on a very slow and comparatively easy-paced wicket. They were so obsessed with this two-shouldered stance that they were utterly incapable of trying to force the game. One of the Kent bowlers bowled eight half volleys in two overs, and not one of them was scored off or attempted to be hit, but they were simply played in front of the batsmen, whose whole body faced the bowler. Can we wonder that county cricket has lost the hold which it had on the public in former years, and that the balance-sheets suffer accordingly!

A great drawback in cricket to-day is that very few first-class teams are captained by men who have real inside knowledge of the game. So many captains are at fault over the question of a sticky wicket. They seem to be incapable of differentiating between a wet wicket which plays quite easily and a sticky one, which to-day is a *rara avis*. The following instance will illustrate my meaning: Towards the end of May, when Lancashire were playing Middlesex at Lord's, Lancashire had made a large first-innings score, and might easily have disposed of their opponents for under 100 runs in both innings on the third day. With a hot sun out after a wet night, a real sticky wicket would probably have resulted, and bowlers like R. Tyldesley and Hopwood might have been unplayable. But the ground was perfectly fit for play and was pronounced to be so by White, the head groundsman, yet there was no play on the third day. In the same way many a match has been abandoned in recent times through ignorance as to what effect weather conditions might have upon the ground, which expert knowledge would have pronounced to have been perfectly fit for play. It is such cases as these that upset the spectators, who leave the ground sorely disgruntled and disappointed.

Many inaccurate statements are being noised abroad concerning the inability of obtaining amateurs for the game. There should be no reason for fear on this score. The standard of cricket at the universities does not vary. Year by year the elevens are drawn from the best products of our great public schools, with the occasional addition of a first-rate Colonial recruit. Yet fewer Blues get invitations to play for their counties. In my day, and a good deal later, the Kent county amateur cricketers were, with the exception of our great leader and all-rounder J. R. Mason, K. L. Hutchings, and W. M. Bradley, all university players. I count it a privilege and a joy to have played under

such a leader and with such a side. The style of batsmanship which F. E. Woolley so ably portrays is due in no small measure to his first captain, who inculcated a correct method in his team, and played cricket himself in a match-winning style according to the conditions of the moment.

The alteration in the size of the stumps last year was made with the idea of helping the bowler, but, up to date, it has hardly proved to be the success that those who were responsible for its innovation anticipated. The root of the trouble is the doping of the wickets by so many of our groundsmen. To-day, even when a hot sun following heavy rain seems to warrant it, we very seldom get a real sticky wicket; moreover, the custom of covering it up on every occasion nullifies the assistance that it was hoped the bowlers would get from the use of larger wickets. When the question arises as to whether a match should continue or not owing to the condition of the wicket it is always the greater sportsman who is the sufferer. This was exemplified in the first Test Match at Nottingham this year, the captains of the opposing teams being A. P. F. Chapman and W. M. Woodfull. On the first day fairly heavy rain fell for two hours about luncheon time, producing conditions all in England's favour—*i.e.*, a rather greasy wet ball on a fast wicket with rain on top of it, a combination of circumstances than which nothing could be more favourable to batting, and especially to a forcing batsman. But Woodfull, in a most sporting manner, agreed to start play at 5.30. On the second day a similar question, as to whether the ground was fit to start play, was decided by the umpires, owing to the captains holding opposite views on the subject. In any match of importance it should always be left to the decision of umpires as to whether the wicket and ground are fit for play. Where rain has intervened after a match has started, the conditions will in most cases favour one side at the expense of the other.

Test Matches, which form such an important part of every cricket season in this country, are rapidly widening their scope. The admission of the West Indies and New Zealand (which will probably be followed shortly by that of India) and the recent extension to four days which is now allotted to each Test Match make them progressively exigent, so that greater demands are made upon our players and reserves, who for more than half the season are now unavailable for county cricket. It is to be hoped that four days will be the limit of extensions for games in this country. One day for each completed innings, however good the wickets may be, should provide sufficient time in which to win a match, if the game is played in the correct manner and spirit. Games such as those that were played the last time England's side visited Australia cause a strain and weariness to the players

which become a real burden; and it ought not to be possible to prolong any match to the extent to which the last Test Match in the West Indies was dragged out, when, after seven days' play, the game was abandoned because the visiting team had to catch the boat home. The altered state of things, as it affects county cricket, presents a problem to which the cricket authorities should give serious attention. The extra time allotted to Test Matches is a distinct menace to county cricket, and it is surely the moment when the counties and the Advisory Committee and the M.C.C. should take counsel together to decide what steps to take.

My considered opinion is that the remedy lies in having two-day county matches of one innings each. The results would be:

- (1) To reduce automatically the number of days' play without reducing the number of matches (say twenty-eight a county), which would give a much-needed rest to many of our leading bowlers.
- (2) To help the counties very much from a gate point of view, seeing that nowadays, however interesting a state the game may be in, the third day of a county match is almost invariably a dead financial loss.

There is bound to be opposition, as there always is whenever delegates and representatives act on behalf of committees and large areas. For instance, there might conceivably be objections from counties that thrive on their cricket weeks, like Kent and Sussex, or from others in the north, who might resent the idea of giving up playing during even part of Whitsun Week, which is, I believe, a holiday with them; but if only counties would sink the individual standpoint and regard the interests of cricket as a whole, we might yet arrive at some happy solution of present difficulties.

G. J. V. WEIGALL.

STATE-BARGES

A STATE-BARGE, though undeniably a boat, is even more a stage property for use in shows and pageants. Seldom has it any peculiarities of a nautical kind, and when they occur they are apt to be extremely small. The state-barge in the Victoria and Albert Museum, designed in 1732 for the Prince of Wales by William Kent—portrait painter, architect, and landscape gardener—has, for instance, an extra rowlock on its starboard side. The state-barge of the Clothworkers' Company—who have a seventeenth-century model of it at Mincing Lane—had a tiller curiously twisted upwards; but that was only in order that the steersman could see over the pavilion and the three golden rams (the crest of the Company) that stood upon its roof. Such boats have more interest for the student of decorative art with a taste for the rococo; though even he might be inclined to pass them by on the ground that their embellishment was but that of their period, already displayed abundantly enough on many a carven balustrade and console and organ-loft. And although there is room for ingenuity in the application of their insistent decorative motives—their dolphins and tritons and shells—it is probably what the state-barge recalls of bygone aquatic ceremonial that constitutes its chief claim to notice.

The water pageant in which the state-barge often played a leading part is as extinct as the Court Masque; and in England its heyday was more or less contemporary with that joyous ebullition of the Renaissance. Let us take as an early example the entertainment provided for Henry VII.'s queen when she came by water from Greenwich to the Tower. Her escort on that occasion was formed by the barges of the Lord Mayor and the City Companies, 'freshly furnished with banners and streamers of silk, and in especial a barge called the batchelors' barge, garnished and apparelled passing all other, wherein was ordeigned a great redd dragon spouting flames of fyer into the Thames, and many other gentlemanlie pagiaunts curiously devised to do her Highness sporte and pleasure withal.' The City barges were in frivolous company that day; but it must not be forgotten that the barge of ceremony had more austere and formal uses. We

need not go as far afield as the solemn annual assertion through many centuries of the claim of Venice to dominion over the Adriatic, which was made from the upper deck of that most sumptuous of state-barges, the *Bucentaur*. In England, time out of mind, it was the custom at Newcastle-on-Tyne for the mayor and the Brethren of the local Trinity House in their barges, 'gorgeous in paint and gilding,' to beat the bounds of the former's jurisdiction over the river, due proclamation thereof being made at its territorial limits both upstream and seawards. This practice of going on the river to settle boundaries can be traced by the corporation's disbursements to early in the seventeenth century, but is probably as old as the town's acquisition of a local 'admiralty.' Newcastle had a 'town barge' in 1676 fine enough for the mayor to take Sir Francis North, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, for a trip to Tynemouth in it. So upon occasion had the Doge of Venice—the parallels sounds ridiculous—employed the *Bucintoro* to show the beauties of the lagoon to distinguished guests of the Republic.

The Newcastle 'Barge Day,' as it was called, presented a scene that local marine artists such as J. V. Carmichael liked to paint; perhaps because not only had the *Bucentaur* attracted Canaletto's pencil, but also, whilst he sojourned in England, the state-barges of the eighteenth-century Thames. Incidentally we may note the odd coincidence that the Mayor of Newcastle should have gone afloat for this semi-legal function, as the Doge did for his, upon Ascension Day. At Hull, too, the mayor embarked upon the river to assert his rights as Admiral of the Humber. It is recorded that in 1727 the corporation of that town resolved that his worship 'do exercise his Admirall's jurisdiction,' and for that purpose they voted him a new flag with his arms in it to make 'a parade down Humber with a jury.'¹ These municipal excursions by water had a more or less serious purpose, though, since the local historian says that at Newcastle 'the whole town turned out to see the show,' they served as well the purpose of entertainment. 'The barges,' we are told, 'rowed by men in gay costumes, and accompanied by a flotilla of boats with streamers flying, moved down the river amidst the firing of cannon, the ringing of bells and the cheers of the crowds on shore and on board the bunting-decked ships alongside the quay.'²

So that, although dignified personages like port admirals and archbishops—his Grace of Canterbury had a barge which was wont to lie off Lambeth Stairs³—might have state-barges for

¹ Frost, *Early History of Hull* (1827), Appendix.

² Charlton, *Newcastle Town* (1885).

³ Possibly the small barge with a comparatively plain pavilion shown in Samuel Scott's painting of Lambeth Palace (London Museum) is meant for this.

their own dignified uses, we never get far away from the state-barge as an ingredient in holiday junketings upon the water. It is, of course, a mere coincidence—though a happy one—that the king's barge-house in Tudor times was situate in the then theatrical neighbourhood of Bankside; but we shall find the royal barge participating in aquatic shows of whose counterparts on land Ben Jonson was in his day the most distinguished deviser. It was in Ben Jonson's lifetime, too, that decorative art, impelled by the influence of the Renaissance percolating into England through France and Holland, made an unparalleled invasion even into the shipyards of the Navy. About the year 1614 Gerard Christmas is appointed 'carver' to the Royal Navy and the Lords of the Admiralty: he plies his art for twenty years, and then his two sons, John and Mathias, succeeding him, take in hand the elaborate carven allegories of the *Sovereign of the Seas*. It is symptomatic of the period that the praises of the work they put into this man-of-war should be sung by a playwright and designer of lord mayors' pageants, Thomas Heywood; and his book on the subject reminds one of nothing so much as that later volume in which Signor Luchini, citizen of Venice, catalogued the artistic wonders of the last of the Doge's state-barges. But in the *Bucentaur* and her like baroque decoration had a legitimate field: of the *Sovereign*, John Evelyn notes sadly that she was 'especially for this remarkable, that her building cost his Majestie the affections of his subjects.' From these facts may be gathered why it was that at this period the state-barge attained to the zenith of its flamboyance.

Though Evelyn calls the *Sovereign* 'monstrous,' he had a pretty taste for the ornate legitimately applied. He had hurried from Rome to Venice expressly in order to be present there on Ascension Day and to see the *Bucentaur* in all her glory. Nearly twenty years later he enjoyed the show upon the Thames when King Charles brought his Portuguese bride by water from Hampton Court to Whitehall, and thought it 'far exceeded' the Venetian festival. This Restoration water pageant, which Pepys as well as Evelyn witnessed (the former with difficulty, though he was consoled by the sight of the Lady Castlemaine perched upon some part of Whitehall), included groups of allegorical figures borne upon barges—the aquatic counterparts of the land 'pageant' on its car; and in it figured also the two gondolas which had been presented to Charles by the Doge Domenico Contarini.⁴ But, so far as appears from the old print by Stoop of this 'triumph,' the show fell far short of what the Venetians were able to do (as we shall see) just a century later. Yet Evelyn thought it 'the most magnificent triumph that ever

⁴ See Pepys' *Diary*, September 12, 1661: note in Wheatley's edition.

floated on the Thames.' He describes the royal barge used on this occasion as 'an antique-shaped open vessel, covered with a state or canopy of cloth of gold, made in the form of a cupola supported with high Corinthian pillars wreathed with flowers, festoons and garlands.' This description comprises nearly everything that need be said about the appearance of seventeenth-century English state-barges; nautically their form always tended to be archaic, and the 'state' or canopy, which is implicit in their name, was the chief care of their designers. The description Humphreus⁵ quotes of the barge of King James is very similar—'built in the fashion of a tower or little castle, enclosed with glass windows and casements faire carved and gilt, being wrought with much art, the roof being made with battlements, pinnacles, pyramids and fine imagery.' He adds that on the occasion of the state visit of Christian of Denmark to James it was towed by another barge with thirty oars. It had been the custom at Venice to tow⁶ the earlier *Bucentaurs* to the Porto di Lido when the Doge went there to marry the Adriatic. From the spectacular point of view probably towage by rowing boats would be less impressive than the advance of a great galley propelled by the rhythmic sweep of her own forty or fifty oars. But it is clear that without some use of that ancient implement the impressiveness of the water pageant vanishes; and as regards the Thames, we may surely surmise that all sense of it must have been lost when in 1839 an offer by the London and Westminster Iron Steamboat Company of the use of one of their steamers to tow the Lord Mayor's barge from the City to Westminster Hall was 'gratefully accepted' by the Corporation.

There is no doubt that Venice was the immediate *fons et origo* (we must leave Cleopatra and Caligula alone) of the water pageants of Europe. Her *Bucintoro* was imitated by the d'Estes on the Po and the Gonzagas on the Mincio: the Electors of Saxony had another on the Rhine, and the barge in which Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria disported himself on the waters of the Starnberger See early in the seventeenth century was built for him by Venetian craftsmen and given the same name as its original. There still exists a model of this craft in the Deutsche Museum at Munich: it had sails as well as oars, and displays a tendency to classicism in the twenty-six caryatids supporting the roof of its pavilion and the double beak in the fashion of a Roman galley that projects from its stem.

The Republic of Venice seldom failed to provide a *regata* for the delectation of Pope or Emperor or other notability visiting the city. In Italian there is a small library on the subject; and in

⁵ *Origin and Progress of the Company of Watermen* (1887), vol. i., p. 167.

⁶ Correr, *Venezia e le sue lagune* (1847), vol. i., pt. 2, p. 201.

English there is a contemporary account of the aquatic entertainment given to His Royal Highness Edward Augustus, Duke of York, in 1764—a show, as the reporter says, 'possible to be executed only in Venice.' In view of the kinship between such spectacles and the shows of the theatre, one fact, which we learn from another source, may be noted. Of the allegorical groups representing the four elements of Water, Earth, Air, and Fire which were borne by the four principal *peotas* in the procession two are stated to have been the invention of '*celebri pittori teatricali*.' This is how the English spectator describes the scene :

The four first *peotas* represented the four elements, the first of them entirely silvered over, and symbolizing the element of Water, representing the triumph of Neptune, adorned with figures of tritons, swordfish, dolphins, etc. The second expressed the Earth symbolized in the goddess Cybele, crowned with towers and adorned with various products, plants, flowers and animals, the whole being gilt and silvered over. The third was sky-colour and silver, denoting the element of Air, expressed by the rape of Orithya by Boreas, with Zephyrs and Cupids playing around in the air. The fourth was of flame-colour, with ornaments of silver, indicating the element of Fire, admirably expressed by the forge of Vulcan, sweating at the anvil with his naked Cyclops in gigantic figures, with Venus opposite in her car drawn by doves, and with other allusions agreeable to the fable. These four *peotas* bore the arms quartered of the four Venetian nobles deputed to entertain the Duke. The other five *peotas* were fitted out by their nearest relations. The first represented Great Britain led in triumph by Europe : the second shewed the whale-fishing, very well executed : the third exhibited the triumph of Venus in her car drawn by four doves : the fourth the chariot of the sun, drawn by four horses, preceded by Aurora in the act of dispersing night : the fifth and last, the triumph of Pallas, with trophies and allusions to that deity. All rivalling each other in pomp, and glittering with silver and gold, particularly the various elegant dresses of the rowers, musicians and other figures in each *peota* richly adorned with laces, besides the long fringes and tassels of silver playing upon the water.

To return, however, from their occasions to state-barges themselves, there was specially built for the convenience of the Duke, moving about Venice during a rather lengthy stay, an ornate *felucca* remarkable for its carved work : a pleasure vessel, which, having been laid up in the Arsenal 'for remembrance' after his departure, had the distinction of being destroyed long afterwards by Napoleon's soldiers on the same day that they hacked to pieces the world-famous *Bucintoro* itself. The rather dissipated scion of the House of Hanover who was thus honoured was the grandson of that Frederick, Prince of Wales, for whom William Kent—the fashionable Jack-of-all-trades of his period, as Austin Dobson calls him—had designed the state-barge now at South Kensington. It does not appear that amongst his many avocations Kent was ever either scene painter or property master, but

probably Edward Augustus saw nothing even at Venice that much excelled the invention of the English artist who provided his own family's state-barge—in the way, that is, of applied sea-lions and somewhat contorted mermaids endeavouring to 'support' shields of arms.

WILLIAM SENIOR.

CLEMENCEAU¹

WHEN a man has lived for nearly fifty years in the forefront of public affairs, his compatriots have little more to learn about him. When he has talked as brilliantly, written as profusely, and acted as energetically as Georges Clemenceau, when he has been at once the leading parliamentary gladiator and the most talented publicist of his time, when he has been twice Prime Minister and has brought his country victoriously out of a great war, proceeding always through every vicissitude upon certain clear-cut intellectual principles, continually and confidently proclaimed, there can be very little ambiguity as to what manner of man he is. To the French public few figures were so familiar as 'the Tiger.' They knew the force of his spring, the sharp edge of his claw. They had watched him pull down Ministry after Ministry by his gift of devastating invective and biting wit. They did not need the assurance of the elaborate volumes written 'in the evening of his thought' to realise that he was an unrepentant anticlerical with a wide interest in modern science and a stoical courage in face of the ultimate mysteries of fate. The admirable work of M. Martel was not required to remind them that there was no talker in France more vivacious or amusing, so wide has been the currency for his flashing sayings. Finally, though no statesman of modern times has been more ready to provoke or salute fierce forms of controversy, there was nothing in Clemenceau to surprise the Frenchman. In mind and character he was thoroughly Latin. For this last reason the five volumes of English prose which are the subject of this article are specially to be welcomed. They recall the incidents, too little remembered in England, of a singular career, and bring us close to a man of strong emotions

¹ (1) *In the Evening of my Thought*, by Georges Clemenceau. Translated by Charles Miner Thompson and John Head, jun. (two vols.). London: Constable & Co. (first, 1929).

(2) *Grandeur and Misery of Victory*, by Georges Clemenceau. George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd.: London, Bombay, Sydney.

(3) *Clemenceau, the Events of his Life as told by himself to his former Secretary, Jean Martel*. Longmans, Green & Co.: London, New York, and Toronto.

(4) *The Tiger, Georges Clemenceau*, by George Adam. Jonathan Cape: Bedford Square, London.

and powerful understanding, who for a short but very critical period of history exercised an important influence on the destiny of our own country. Though there is more to be learned about Clemenceau than will be found in these 1600 pages, what is here given is sufficient to exhibit the man in the strength and limitations of his rich Latin nature, at once fierce and logical, savage and tender, proud, artistic, witty, combative, to a people long inured to those habits of intellectual compromise which were least tolerable to his scornful and impatient intellect.

Georges Clemenceau, the son of Dr. Benjamin Clemenceau, atheist and republican, was born at St. Vincent-sur-Jard, in the Vendée, on September 21, 1841. There was something 'obstinate, limited, and savage' in the Vendéan peasantry which attracted the boy. The people and landscape of his native province were always close to his heart. 'Martel, I love the Vendée. Why? Because I passed my youth there. I know every field, every farm, every village. I have ridden on horseback through all its sunken roads.' So in his summer vacations, riding and shooting, fishing and flirting, he passed the best days of his youth. When he went to the academy at Nantes his father's influence began to assert itself. The old freethinker, who was known for his gift of pointed and bitter epigram, took pleasure in demolishing the religious theories which were put into the boy's head by his official instructor in philosophy. 'Once, pointing my finger at my instructor, I said, "But you are losing the thread of your argument." His answer was: "Leave the room."' Sometimes he would be taken to the public reading-room at Nantes, where his father would stride backwards and forwards declaiming against the empire and the priests: not, however, always with impunity, for one day in 1858, the imperial police being stimulated to increased activity after Orsini's plot, Dr. Clemenceau was arrested and sentenced to penal servitude in Algeria. 'I remember going with my mother to see him in prison. In front of the spies I went up to him and said, "I will avenge you," to which the old stoic replied, "If you want to avenge me, work."'

Medicine having already been for three generations the craft of the Clemenceau family, the boy was sent, at the age of nineteen, to Paris to qualify as a doctor. He was not, however, of the stuff of which medical specialists are made, and, though he obtained his degree and for some years practised as a physician among the poor in Montmartre, medicine was always the least of his serious interests.

At that time the student quarter in Paris was in a state of feverish excitement, and Clemenceau threw himself heart and soul into the agitation against the empire. In 1862 he launched a newspaper entitled *Le Travail*, in which friends of the Court were

so unsparingly attacked as to bring down on the fiery young journalist seventy-three days of imprisonment in Mazas Gaol. Having thus graduated as a martyr of liberty, he determined to visit the lands in which liberty was best understood. In England he made friends with John Stuart Mill and his circle, and then, crossing the Atlantic, settled for some years in Connecticut, where he taught French literature in a girls' school and married an American wife.

The year in which Clemenceau first emerged on to the stage of politics is one of the darkest and most terrible in the annals of modern France. The Prussian invasion, the capitulation of Sedan, and the siege of Paris portended the further disasters of a calamitous peace and an even more humiliating civil war. During this tumultuous and tragic period Clemenceau, as Mayor of Montmartre and as deputy to the Parliament of Bordeaux, played an energetic and honourable part. He voted against the cession of any part of French territory to the enemy, and endeavoured, at great personal risk, to mediate between the Communards of Paris and the Government of Versailles. For a time he suffered the fate which attaches to the man who tries to intervene between two furious antagonists. The air of Paris became suddenly unwholesome, but after a brief rustication he returned to the capital, and, being elected to the Paris Municipal Council, threw himself into the many urgent problems of reconstruction which the civil war had bequeathed to that important body. In 1876, after the most valuable kind of apprenticeship which a young politician can serve, he entered the Palais Bourbon as a determined champion of the still uncertain fortunes of the French republic.

The history of French parliamentary life during the early decades of the republican *régime* is marked by the intrigues, hatreds, and jealousies to be expected in a concourse of excitable men unschooled in the discipline of party loyalty. In this unquiet atmosphere Clemenceau achieved a peculiar kind of reputation, not altogether enviable, of being a man who deliberately avoided the responsibilities of office in order that he might be free to exercise his passion for political mischief. He was unpopular with the Chamber, which he never sought to conciliate, and fiercely suspected by his followers, who were never certain into what strange places he might lead them. 'A parliament,' he observes, 'is always irritated with a man whose politics are national in scope'; but if there be some truth in the statement that Clemenceau talked to the country rather than to the Chamber it is not a full explanation of his unpopularity. A cruel tongue was a more important factor in creating a general feeling of unfriendliness around him. Moreover, his notable powers as a

parliamentary gladiator were reinforced by a skill in the use of the revolver and the rapier, which made him a redoubtable champion in the duels which he was prompt, even in old age, to provoke or accept. A fierce hater must expect to excite passionate animosities, and to the legion of his personal enemies Clemenceau appeared to be no better than a bravo who found in the arena of politics the most diverting occasion for the indulgence of a quarrelsome and savage temper.

To these allegations were added other and graver charges, that he had murdered two generals in the Commune, that he was in the pay of the Jews, that he was the hireling of the British Government. All these charges were false, but each was capable of being supported by a tissue of plausible though fallacious evidence. The insinuation that, as the young Mayor of Montmartre, he had been a consenting party to the murder of General Clément Thomas and General Lecomte during the Commune insurrection clung like a malignant cloud round his reputation. In revolutions the sequence of events is difficult to establish, and for unthinking people it was a sufficient proof of Clemenceau's guilt that he was mayor of the district in which the murders were committed, that he was known to be opposed to the measures which the generals were ordered to carry out, and that he was on the scene of the crime soon after its occurrence. That these suspicions were pertinaciously entertained is proved by the fact that Clemenceau thought it worth while, in extreme old age, to supply M. Martel with a minute narration of his movements in Montmartre on the critical day.

To Clemenceau's friends the charge, so widely believed during the Panama crisis, that he was in the pay of the Jews and the English was always incredible. Clemenceau had many faults, but a willingness to sell his opinions was not among them. It was, however, unfortunate that Cornelius Herz, a Jewish financier deeply involved in the Panama scandal, had put money into Clemenceau's paper *La Justice*. The fact was not denied; but the inferences drawn from it were completely shattered by the modesty of Clemenceau's fortune.

The trade of a statesman in opposition is one of the most difficult to reconcile with self-respect. Governments are more often right than wrong, and oppositions more often wrong than right, for two obvious reasons. The Government has, and the opposition has not, the curb of responsibility and the support of departmental knowledge. Yet it is the familiar and besetting weakness of statesmen in opposition to behave as if the balance were reversed and the Government of the day altogether unworthy of confidence. From this common failing Clemenceau was not exempt. Having great powers of invective and a keen

enjoyment of a quarrel, he hit hard and gave no quarter. Yet it would be the greatest mistake to represent him as the unscrupulous *condottiere* of the Palais Bourbon. No figure in French politics was more consistent. Starting as a radical republican and a convinced secularist, he remained a radical, a republican, and a secularist to the end of his days. These terms, however, have each a connotation in France slightly different from that which they now bear in this country. Clemenceau's radicalism was of the old-fashioned *laissez-faire* type. He believed that once the nation was secured in its civil and political liberties, without the tyrannical interference of the monarch and the priest, the essential task of statesmanship was accomplished. In education he saw not so much a system of social insurance as an instrument of spiritual liberation. For him, as for Gambetta, clericalism was the enemy.

His republicanism, which was not the less fervent because it was hereditary, was of the same spiritual type. Having entered political life as an opponent of the Second Empire, he regarded all forms of monarchical or imperial government as inherently vicious and unsuited to the needs and temperament of France. Accordingly, in the early years of the Third Republic, when it was still uncertain whether royalism might not again prevail, he stood out as the indefatigable protagonist of republican principles. For him the republic stood for national strength no less than for social reform. Imperialism had been twice tried, and on each occasion had led to disaster. Only the republic could restore to France her proper place of pride among the nations. In this forecast Clemenceau has been justified by the event.

In view of the repeated disasters in which France had been involved by a policy of imperial adventure, it is not surprising that Clemenceau should have counselled sober thoughts on external affairs. For him France was enough. He wanted no conquests, he wanted no colonies. Let France be prosperous, strong, well defended against her secular foe—these were the terms which he asked of the republic. As his friend John Morley was a 'little Englishman,' so he was a 'little Frenchman.' To anything in the nature of imperial democracy he was unalterably opposed. For him Tunis and Tonquin were costly follies calculated to weaken and disperse the forces of the nation in face of a vigilant and powerful foe. He had not forgotten that, in the summer of Sadowa, the flower of the French army was away in Mexico. So in an age of competitive colonial expansion Clemenceau would have nothing of the current fashion. It is curious to reflect that the man who was afterwards to stand out as the greatest War Minister of France was persistently opposed to the formation of that colonial empire from which France, at the supreme crisis of her history, drew no small part of her military strength.

His anticlericalism, again, was of a type which does not easily flourish in the temperate atmosphere of Whitehall or Westminster, for it was more than a sceptical habit of mind, more even than a settled body of agnostic convictions—it was a theory of life to be proclaimed from the housetops and a militant programme for the improvement of the public hygiene. In Britain no politician concerned with his parliamentary future could afford to outrage the sensibilities of all the Churches; but the Tiger, to whom popularity was never an important consideration, found acute pleasure in assailing theology, with all its consequences for the mind of man and the life of the country. When France was divided into two opposing camps by the Dreyfus case, Clemenceau, convinced, against his earlier preconceptions, of the Jew's innocence, entered the lists against the generals and the Jesuits with vizzor down. There could be no mistake where he stood in the battle of the creeds, nor did advancing age temper his aversion from the consolations of the Church. His final apologia, written with the hand of extreme old age, burns with the fervour of a prose Lucretius.

When power at last came to him in 1906 he exhibited, to the surprise of his critics and the dismay of his friends, a genius for resolute action. A number of grave industrial disturbances were handled with a rare mixture of courage and tact. He was not afraid to go down among the formidable miners of Courrières, unprotected and unarmed, and when Albert, the leader of the Vignerons, then combined in a menacing strike, came to negotiate with the Government, he insisted, by a genial stroke of wisdom, in charging his hotel bills to the State. 'We all,' he said, 'must learn liberty. Education is achieved, not by words, but by deeds.' In his conduct of foreign affairs he was equally resolute, and even risked a war with Germany to avoid a diplomatic affront. In a Ministry which lasted less than three years he showed, despite some grave indiscretions, the decision, the energy, and the human insight which go to the ruling of men.

Nine years later (November 16, 1917) the crisis of the Great War brought him the supreme opportunity of his life. He was seventy-six and afflicted with diabetes, but he brought to the conduct of affairs a will to victory which no reverse could shake, and which he succeeded in communicating to the army and the nation. Widely suspect as he was to the officer class for his anticlerical opinions and his conduct in the Dreyfus case, he won their confidence. Everyone knew that Clemenceau was out for a fight to a finish, that he had a short way with defeatists, and that the armies could count on his unwavering support. His quality was proved when in face of the disaster in the Chemin des Dames he moved a resolution of confidence in the army chiefs. '*Qui dit chef, dit*

animateur.' Wherever he passed this veteran of seventy-six inspired a new breath of confidence and hope.

When the Peace of Versailles had been concluded, and the old man had been cast from power by the resurgence of democratic animosities, he was able to give himself to the joys of travel and books, and to the delights of his little fisherman's hut in the Vendée, where he could watch the moods of the sea and listen to the rustle of the breeze among the pines. Occasionally he would pay a visit to Paris, and there I chanced to meet him some time after his return from the East. He was still the best company in the world, sparkling with wit and amusement; yet there were spaces of sadness, as when contrasting the sacrifice of war with the selfishness of peace, and, speaking as one who had left the age of heroes behind him, he said, with his accustomed frankness, '*J'aime mieux la guerre.*' For the League of Nations he exhibited infinite contempt, and reserved his eulogies for Frederick II. of Prussia, speaking of him as a model ruler, and as the master of a style so excellent as to deserve illustration in any anthology of French prose.

Though he had all the resources which a cultivated curiosity can supply, he could not disinterest himself in the destiny of France, or in concern for the protection of his political record.

While he was travelling in India Foch published an attack on the Treaty of Versailles. The old Marshal described it as 'a bad, a very bad, Treaty,' since it failed to drive the Germans from the control of the bridgeheads on the Rhine. Now, the Treaty was the work of Clemenceau, and that it should be attacked by Foch, to whom he had given the marshal's staff, roused in him bitter indignation. In a strongly polemical volume, *Grandeurs et misères de la Victoire*, Clemenceau elaborated a rejoinder which had better not have been written. The Marshal was already in his grave, and posterity will form its own opinion of the Treaty of Versailles. It is true that on the main point at issue between them Clemenceau was right and Foch was wrong; but the Tiger France deserved something better from him than the ugly spectacle of a public conflict between the two outstanding heroes of her war epic?

Though Clemenceau contended against Foch that the new Europe was founded on right and justice, his outlook on the future was none the less thoroughly depressing. In Germany, despite the downfall of the empire, he discerned a perpetual source of danger to France only to be met by strong military defences and by the preservation in some form or other of a union between the Entente Powers. At the bottom of his heart he wanted Germany to be kept perpetually disarmed and everlastingly

helpless. So, when England refused to go into the Ruhr, Clemenceau failed to assign her abstention to the right cause, which was the belief that the economic convalescence of Germany was to the interest of Europe, but detected a reversion to that mischievous policy of stirring up trouble on the Continent which it is the well-known delight of perfidious Albion to pursue. Had John Morley been alive the Tiger would hardly have fallen into the error of thinking that a cordial understanding with England was compatible with a more drastic treatment of Germany. The very steps which Clemenceau blamed his successors for not taking would have led France further away from that goal of a solid English understanding which he advised his compatriots to pursue. Clemenceau knew and admired Lord Balfour. He tells us how, when he asked for Landau, the English statesman merely placed a hand upon his shoulder, sweetly murmuring, 'Ah, my poor friend!' Now the fact that Lord Balfour had led the Conservative Party into the League of Nations was a sign that if France were to persist in a policy of keeping Germany under she could not expect the concurrence of her recent ally. All this Clemenceau failed to appreciate, attributing to the cowardice of France concessions which were wrung by the hard lesson of facts, and to the lassitude of England an attitude which was grounded on a well-reasoned aversion from war. Two quotations will illustrate his views.

As for the Peace Treaty, never lose sight of the fact that there were two things to consider: what I got out of it, and what my successors got out of it. When I left office, Alsace and Lorraine had been given back to us; French troops occupied the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads; Poland and Bohemia had been put on their feet; Roumania and Serbia enlarged; we had reconquered Morocco, put our hand on the Cameroons and so forth. After which came M. Millerand and others, and the Treaty fell to bits. All there was still to do, all the work to be partitioned out over the months and years to come, was given up. I had not been out of office a fortnight before they announced that they were not going to extradite William II. and all those people who had burned, pillaged and so forth. Germany should have been made to disarm. . . . At Spa and elsewhere she was granted delay after delay; we removed all our commissions of control; and now the Boche army is built up again, Boche factories are once more turning out cannon, machine-guns, and everybody thinks that's perfectly all right.

And again:

She has been a very great lady, England, aloof, ruthless, but with an engaging quality about her. England alone is perhaps of all peoples the one whose will held on the longest. Unfortunately she has begun to show a kind of weakening, of lassitude. The conquest no longer serves to quicken the conqueror. What can you expect? Their history goes back such a long way.

The English have three kinds of enemies to take into account: first, their natural enemies . . . and these are not the most formidable; next, their Dominions, their offshoots in Asia, Africa and Australia, who are beginning to get restive; and, lastly, the English themselves; the English of to-day are less enterprising than those of a hundred years ago. Some virtue is going out of them.

'Clemenceau,' wrote John Morley in 1885, 'is able, bright and honest, but he is a lightweight.' If there was any deficiency of substance in the man of forty, it was made good in later life, enough there was always a strain of gay and reckless insouciance in Clemenceau's talk, which might well have led a serious English friend to undervalue his equipment for great undertakings. Certainly the author of *Au Soir de la Pensée* can hardly be described as 'a lightweight,' unless all who renounce metaphysical and theological speculations are to be so branded. Had Clemenceau in reality been a lightweight, he might have solaced his declining years very agreeably by composing a piquant dish of political and personal memories, or a treatise on French impressionist art, or a series of *causeries* on his Eastern travels, on the habits of birds and monkeys, on the Greek drama (which he loved so well), on the art of Pheidias, or on the classics of French rationalism. On all such topics he could have poured out his thoughts pleasantly, easily, and, we suspect, to the entertainment of a large public. What he elected to do was very different, and the index of a big mind occupied with the biggest things. Just as Robert Bridges between the ages of eighty-three and eighty-six summed up his philosophy of life in a long sacred poem, so Clemenceau, also an octogenarian, turned the sunset lights of his strong intellect on to a philosophy of the universe. To the professional students of metaphysics and science, the meditations of the Anglican poet and the French freethinker may seem equally unimportant. We do not imagine that Bridges has given a new theory to the metaphysicians, or Clemenceau a new fact to the professors of physical science. What is interesting in these two most sharply contrasted declarations of faith is the picture of human character which they present. In the case of Clemenceau it is the picture of a man of high cultivation and wide scientific knowledge, with the artist's eye and the poet's sensibility, but also with more than the ordinary allowance of rough common sense, in whom all the ideas and sentiments connected with and nourished by religious conviction are regarded with abhorrence as obstacles to the honest life. However people may dislike such opinions, they must admit that in Clemenceau they were compatible with a high degree of moral idealism, and with a genuine enthusiasm for disinterested knowledge. Nor was his rationalism of the vulgar type. Most critics of orthodox theology

are content to pit their negations against the affirmations of the Churches. They counter faith by reason, imagination by facts, the heat of enthusiasm by the chill of measured inquiry. Clemenceau was a different kind of sceptic. His faith in the 'poetry of the active universe' was as glowing as the rapture of the divine in contemplation of the mysteries. Here is a passage on the sunrise:

Colour! At last, here is colour breaking through the last screen of ashen gray, infusing the tumult of the scene with dazzling fire. The pale field-poppy of the dunes and the soft sea-green of the marine purslane send forth their fragrant invitation. The insignificant everlasting offers its deceitful gold. The spider has woven its lacy trap over the stiff heads of the broom. The little white snail hoists himself slowly along the twigs to complete the bouquet with an even whiter flower. The lark flutters singing in the heavens. From the mass of molten iron volcanic lightnings flash upon the reddening sea. And all that transformation of night into day, of death into life, has taken place without my having been able to detect at any moment the transition between the phenomena that together form a pageant which always invites me and always eludes me.

The cosmos is like the sunrise, a series of delicate gradations and perpetual changes, of energies crossing, joining, interpenetrating one another, not an atom indifferent to its surroundings, but each exhibiting the same spectacle of delicate sensibility. The iron rod which reacts electrically when it is touched, the tiny blossom which turns to the sun, exhibiting forethought and even maternal love, attest the essential unity of created things. It is for man to obtain an emotional understanding of the rushing creative forces around him. The means of scientific verification are increasing. Knowledge extends its boundaries. It seems that humanity will progress towards perfection until a cosmic catastrophe rings down the curtain on the human drama, which for a brief space of years is enacted on a tiny corner of the universe of things.

What is, is; and of that which is, I am. I am somewhere an atom of a transient something. Over other incidents of the cosmos I have the advantage of feeling and of knowing what happens to me and of reasoning on positive data so as to attenuate my sufferings and those of my fellow beings by obtaining for them, if they show themselves worthy to learn, brief flashes of happiness. The true 'civilized' man of all periods and of all countries is he who knows how to conquer himself and so to order himself as to devote always more and more of himself to the task which exceeds his strength, yet who expects nothing either of gods or of men.

Such, amid much that is variously interesting in this remarkable book, is Clemenceau's final deliverance on fate, man, and duty.

H. A. L. FISHER.

SOME LITERATURE OF THE GREAT WAR

THE literature of the Great War has assumed of late the character of a flood, and those who engage in the arduous task of the criticism of literature may be excused if at times they admit to a sense of bewilderment. The variety of the soldier's testimony is as great as the volume, and the critic's task is not made more easy by the circumstance that indubitable excellence of writing has given on occasion an air of verity to doubtful testimony.

I have no claim to be regarded as an authority on literature. I have some small claim as a student of the literature of war. I have read a considerable number of war books: I hope and believe that I have read the best of them. I was an infantry soldier in France and Flanders and in Italy. I have been the friend of many infantry soldiers. If my criticism has any value, it is not on account of my knowledge of literature, but on account of my knowledge of war.

I would have you, moreover, observe the title. It is '*Some Literature of the Great War*.' Few people are aware how great the literature of the war already is. A professor of a university of the United States, M. Norton Cru, has made this a special study. M. Cru has read 300 war books by 246 authors. I understand that these 300 books are either by French authors or have been translated into French. The Imperial War Museum at South Kensington has a library of 50,000 books. You will appreciate how few people have any right to describe themselves as authorities on the literature of the war, and before making a few general observations on the subject I wish at once to draw attention to the work of a much more competent authority, M. Norton Cru, and to that of M. Charles Delvert,¹ who recently wrote in *La Revue des Deux Mondes* an appreciation of M. Cru's² book.

M. Cru, himself a soldier in the war (I believe as a corporal of infantry), considers that the literature of the war should be treated in a scientific spirit. To that end he has made a marvel-

¹ 'L'histoire de la guerre par les témoins,' by Charles Delvert (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, December 1929: Paris).

² *Témoins, Essai d'analyse et de critique des souvenirs de combattants édités en français de 1915 à 1928* (M. J. N. Cru: Éd. les Étoiles).

lous collection, not only of books and documents, but of maps—indeed, even of trench maps. With the aid of these maps he has undertaken the useful task of dissipating, in so far as he is able, the fictitious element in the literature of war. When he reads reminiscences of those who fought he takes the trouble to verify whether the action took place on the day they mention, and if the regiment to which they belonged was, in fact, present. This, no doubt, is a very annoying practice: it is also a very useful one. He has, I think rightly, come to the conclusion that those who fought in the war should give their experiences from their memory, and not from their imagination. 'Quand on est combattant,' he writes, 'il ne faut pas écrire de roman de guerre, il faut toujours donner des souvenirs réels.' He makes the further observation, to which every soldier would, I am sure, subscribe: 'On ne peut pas raconter la guerre sans l'avoir faite, et tout le talent du monde ne pourra remplacer l'expérience.'

Having accepted M. Cru as a guide, I have rejected those books which have been written by men who did not serve in the war, and, moreover, books by those who did not actually serve as soldiers in the line. It is probable that no more false view of war exists than that which has been put on paper by those who observed the troops, but were not themselves soldiers. I do not wish to labour this point. I would only observe that those who saw the troops coming out of battle were, in general, sorry for them: the troops were not sorry for themselves. Self-pity is, perhaps, the most ignoble of all passions, and of self-pity the soldier was not, in my experience, guilty.

In regard to fiction I have given myself a somewhat wider scope than M. Cru, partly because there are one or two books of fiction which seem to me fiction only in name, and partly because I cannot dismiss from consideration that very remarkable work of fiction—or perhaps I should say that work of very remarkable fiction—*All Quiet on the Western Front*.

I have limited myself yet further to the fighting in France and Flanders. I served only on the Western Front, and had no experience of Mesopotamia, Palestine, or Gallipoli. This has meant the exclusion of such notable works as *These Men Thy Friends* by Edward Thompson³ and *Revolt in the Desert*.⁴ Both these books I have read and greatly admired, but the latter, at any rate, cannot be placed in the literature of the war. The experiences of Colonel Lawrence were unique. Of war in general his book is not evidence.

I have also omitted, though with some measure of regret, the books on fighting in the air. I have had no experience of

³ *These Men Thy Friends* (Edward Thompson: Alfred A. Knopf).

⁴ *Revolt in the Desert* (T. E. Lawrence: Jonathan Cape).

that form of war. But I must, in passing, say how greatly I admired two books which came out during the war by Alan Bott—who at that time used a pseudonym—*An Airman's Outings*⁵ and *Eastern Nights and Flights*⁶—and a more recent book, *War Birds, The Diary of an Unknown Aviator*.⁷

In considering the literature of infantry fighting on the Western Front I have in the first instance passed in brief review the books which to my mind are the most important, in the order in which they appeared. This has enabled me to indicate the general trend, as it seems to me, of that literature. I have further attempted to give the epitome of each book, where possible in the author's own words, in that passage or passages in which his point of view finds most eloquent expression. I have then offered a few conclusions, drawn from the evidence thus adduced.

The splendid and exalted mood in which the youth of England—and, indeed, I believe the youth of every country—went to war is illustrated in the poetry of the time, poetry now, in part at any rate, submerged in a welter of poetry written from another point of view. This mood found passionate expression in the five sonnets of Rupert Brooke,⁸ which were published in the early days of 1915, a little while before Rupert Brooke found a soldier's grave in an Ægean island. The spirit of those sonnets is admirably expressed in the first line of one of them, *Now God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour*. At almost the same time Julian Grenfell, captain of Dragoons, a few days before he died of wounds sustained at the Second Battle of Ypres, wrote the poem which of all other war poems will surely have immortality—*The naked earth is warm with spring*. The last lines of that great poem I can hardly forbear to quote :

The thundering line of battle stands,
And in the air Death moans and sings ;
But Day shall clasp him with strong hands,
And Night shall fold him in soft wings.

Night folded Julian Grenfell in soft wings in April 1915. A chorus from the *Hippolytus* was on his lips. The soldier and the poet were one after, I suppose, 300 years of divorce.

There is another poem by a citizen of the United States serving with the French Army, now, I am sorry to say, forgotten wholly in this country. It is not well that we should forget. I refer to Alan Seeger.⁹ His greatest poem was the *Lafayette*

⁵ *An Airman's Outings*, 'Contact' (Blackwood).

⁶ *Eastern Nights and Flights*, 'Contact' (Blackwood).

⁷ *War Birds, The Diary of an Unknown Aviator* (Hamilton).

⁸ *Collected Poems* (Rupert Brooke : Sidgwick and Jackson).

⁹ *Poems* (Alan Seeger : Constable).

Ode, a poem of pure exaltation, written a few days before he died in the Battle of the Somme. Another poem, to my mind a great poem (*The Aisne*, 1914-15), is of earlier date. Alan Seeger had no illusions as to the price of courage.

I have a rendezvous with Death
At some disputed barricade,
When Spring comes back with rustling shade
And apple-blossoms fill the air—
I have a rendezvous with Death
When Spring brings back blue days and fair.

It may be he shall take my hand
And lead me into his dark land
And close my eyes and quench my breath—
It may be I shall pass him still.
I have a rendezvous with Death
On some scarred slope of battered hill,
When Spring comes round again this year
And the first meadow-flowers appear.

Alan Seeger kept his rendezvous unflinching and undismayed. He had had more than eighteen months of infantry fighting. It is well to bear this in mind, because it is destructive of the theory that an exalted mood does not survive a soldier's first battle.

At this time Robert Nichols¹⁰ attained fame in *Ardours and Endurances*. A marvellous picture of a front-line trench in summer is given in his poem *Noon*. There are other poems of Robert Nichols which reflect a mood perhaps shared by but a few soldiers, but certainly a mood worthy of the dignity of poetry. I have in mind *Courage born of Fire and Steel*, *Farewell to Place of Comfort*, and *At the Wars*. His greatest poem to my mind was *Fulfilment*, but to this I shall return later.

Another mood, not of exaltation exactly, but of acquiescence and that sturdy valour which is among the proudest traditions of our race, found expression in certain books which came out in serial form in *Blackwood's Magazine*. I have in mind especially *The First Hundred Thousand* and *Carrying On*.¹¹ These are true pictures of the war as I experienced it in the early days. For my part I find the men of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders whom Major Wagstaff and Captain Blaikie led at Loos, and their successors, Angus M'Clachlan, Sergeant Mucklewame, and Private Bogle, at Longueval on the Somme, much more true to my experience than those who are now presented to us as types of the soldier. There is plenty of horror in the

¹⁰ *Invocation* (Robert Nichols : Elkin Mathews) ; *Ardours and Endurances* (Robert Nichols : Chatto and Windus).

¹¹ *The First Hundred Thousand* (Ian Hay : Blackwood) ; *Carrying On* (Ian Hay : Blackwood).

war books of that time, but the mind of man was still dominant over the horror. To this time also belong *The Adventures of an Ensign* by the anonymous 'Vedette,'¹² a marvellous description of the two great battles of Ginchy and Lesbœufs, in which the Guards Division took part on the Somme. The splendid morale of the Guards in the battle is there depicted in equal measure as the horror of the fighting, but the morale is the dominant theme.

Over the top! Has any man's life ever offered such a thrill, such a sensation of freedom, such a bursting from incarceration into liberty, from darkness into light, as that inspiring leap into the open? Gone the uneasiness, the doubtings of the eve—only the great moral uplifting, which the din of battle brings, remains.

These words were written during convalescence from wounds, when all the horror of battle must have been present in the mind, and time had had no power to exert its healing influence. They carry the mark of truth.

I have spoken at some length of the happy warrior. I must turn now to the unhappy warrior, who about this time found his way into prose in M. Barbusse's book *Le Feu* and in the poems of Siegfried Sassoon.¹³ I am very ill-acquainted with *Le Feu*,¹⁴ although it has been in my possession for some ten years, but I understand that the epitome of the book is very adequately given in a quotation from it which appears in a volume of poems of Siegfried Sassoon.

Dans la trêve désolée de cette matinée, ces hommes qui avaient été tenaillés par la fatigue, fouettés par la pluie, bouleversés par toute une nuit de tonnerre, ces rescapés des volcans et de l'inondation entrevoyaient à quel point la guerre, aussi hideuse au moral qu'au physique, non seulement viole le bon sens, avilit les grandes idées, commande tous les crimes—mais ils se rappelaient combien elle avait développé en eux et autour d'eux tous les mauvais instincts sans en excepter un seul; la méchanceté jusqu'au sadisme, l'égoïsme jusqu'à la férocité, le besoin de jouer jusqu'à la folie.

M. Barbusse and 'Vedette' appear to have seen the war with very different eyes.

Of Siegfried Sassoon I could speak much. He seems to have alternated between the very happy and the very unhappy warrior, but it is more than clear that his unhappiness was not on account of any wrong done to himself, but of the wrong done to his men. It is the nature of the generous mind to resent the wrongs of others more bitterly than one's own. The generosity of his mind will have been apparent to all who have read that beautiful book, *Memories of a Fox-hunting Man*.¹⁵

¹² *The Adventures of an Ensign* (Vedette: Blackwood).

¹³ *War Poems* (Siegfried Sassoon: Heinemann).

¹⁴ *Le Feu* (Henri Barbusse: Ernest Flammarion, Paris).

¹⁵ *Memories of a Fox-hunting Man* (Siegfried Sassoon: Faber and Faber)

It was well for the British Army that the horror of modern war was not able so greatly to dominate the minds of her soldiers as to render them incapable of completing the task which they had taken in hand. Of the horror of that war her poet sons were more than conscious. They felt the war and its sorrows perhaps more keenly than the ordinary man, but poets have their morale as well as soldiers, and perhaps the highest morale of all is that of the soldier-poet. I remember a poem which appeared in *The Times*, and, so far as I know, has not been reproduced since. It was, I think, by Robert Nichols, and I remember it well because it came out shortly before the Battle of Passchendaele. It appeared to me to be peculiarly apposite in those terrible days:

By all borne and left unsaid
By the soldier; by the mire
Closing o'er the comrade's head;
By the faces stripped by fire;
By sunlight's dumb and crowded wire;
By moonlight's lonely loathsome dead;
By the slow, the final dread
Slaying very life desire;
Englishman whoe'er thou art,
That is theirs, and this thy part,
Steadfast hold the English heart.

Immediately after the war ended war books became a drug on the market, and perhaps it was well. A period of reflection has enabled many of us to see things more steadily and to see them whole. But there is one book which came out shortly after the war, *The Way of Revelation*, by Wilfred Ewart,¹⁶ which cannot be overlooked. He died shortly afterwards in Mexico, killed by a stray bullet at a *festa*. Wilfred Ewart was a captain in the Scots Guards. There is a wonderful passage late in the book. He is lying wounded in a wood during the last advance, and he sees his Lewis gunners, the men whom he had trained, advancing through the wood as he had taught them to advance. One by one they fall, and he is left alone in the wood.

A phase of mental drowsiness succeeded; he pondered quietly over many things. Dreams and fancies, dreams and fancies stole upon his mind—those merciful dreams which clothe reality in happiness and peace. . . . Why and whence and whither—who should say? And where was the place of beauty in this self-destructive creation? The wood—it must have been fair enough in spring-time, and summer. Even now it held the pleasant contours, the russet and mahogany colouring, the warm red-and-black tints of the falling year. But its little community of birds and beasts, its immemorial silence, its dim and secret places, its wind-rocked solitude that had remained unbroken for generations: when

¹⁶ *The Way of Revelation* (Wilfred Ewart: Putnam).

this horror was over-past and themselves forgotten, would those calm and beautiful things return again?

I suppose that for few of us can these calm and beautiful things return again; but we have something else, and that something is expressed in his tribute to his men.

Those Lewis gunners, those sleepers yonder who knew nought of God, who never thought of themselves, who never approached in imagination their own sublimity—out of the humble simplicity of their lives had been achieved the greatest of all things.

So he knew—though it were his last conscious thought—that there moved in the world something greater than fear or grief or mental agony or earthly pain—some human force, undeniable, that triumphed over these and surpassed civilisation and vanquished the powers of the Prince of Darkness himself.

Owing to the disfavour into which war books had fallen a war book and a war play, both of them of high distinction, did not receive the attention which they deserved. Austin Hopkinson's *Religio Militis*¹⁷ was a remarkable attempt to evaluate the experiences of war in terms of philosophy. The exaltation of Austin Hopkinson, an officer of Dragoons, at the First Battle of Ypres, and afterwards a trooper of Dragoons (when disabled he re-enlisted at the time of the March retreat in 1918), is as great to-day as it was in those far-off days of Rupert Brooke and Julian Grenfell. I shall have much to say of him at a later stage.

*Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe*¹⁸ is a play of great merit, and to my mind one of the outstanding presentations of the point of view of the soldier. I would that I could give not a few lines only, but the whole of the dialogue in which the father and the son, who has come on leave in the full knowledge that his life is forfeit, discuss the war. The attitude of the soldier of intellect and imagination face to face with the harsh verities of war is here stated in lines of majestic power and eloquence. He has made his choice; it was of his own free will that he went to war and of his own choice that he will set out on a hazardous enterprise which can have no end but death. He denies that his life as a soldier has in it any element of servitude. He is obedient not to others, but to himself alone: 'Tout ce qui est, ne l'ai je pas voulu, ou consenti? Je connaissais très bien quels engagements je prenais en jouissant de la mienne. Je tiens avec probité ce que j'ai promis.' For war and its supposed majesty he has nothing but contempt: 'Et voilà cette fameuse guerre, beaucoup plus embêtante encore que terrible. Je ne la crains pas, et je l'abhorre. Je la fais, et je la méprise.' For military glory he

¹⁷ *Religio Militis* (Austin Hopkinson: Martin Hopkinson).

¹⁸ *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe* (Paul Raynal: Librairie Stock, Delamain et Boutelleau, Éditeurs, Paris).

has the fighting soldier's derision; he knows that the courage of the soldier is moral in its origin, that, indeed, any other form of courage could not support a man in the conditions of modern war. 'Ne crains tu pas,' says the father, 'que cette froide détermination, puisqu'elle remplace en eux le vieil enthousiasme, finisse par s'user, si par impossible la guerre dure? Que les courages s'amollissent?' The soldier replies in scorn: 'Au contraire. L'enthousiasme passe. Cette volonté sans illusions ne bronchera pas.' Despairing, but undefeated, he goes back to the trenches and that chance before which his head remains unbowed.

The change in the outlook of the public on war books took place late in 1928; it was marked by the success of *Journey's End* as a play and of *Undertones of War* and *All Quiet on the Western Front* in literature.

In *Undertones of War*¹⁹ Edmund Blunden gives a wonderful picture of the late New Armies, from which the professional soldier was almost wholly excluded. We get, if I may say so, a wonderful picture of Sussex at war. Those who have read the book will not forget that remarkable passage in which he pays tribute to the infantry soldier in that dreadful winter of 1916-17.

Man, ruddy-cheeked under your squat chin-strapped iron helmet, sturdy under your leather jerkin, clapping your hands together as you dropped your burden of burning-cold steel, grinning and flinging old-home repartee at your pal passing by, you endured that winter of winters, as it seems to me, in the best way of manliness. I forget your name. I remember your superscriptions, 'O.A.S.' and 'B.E.F.,' your perpetual copying-ink pencil's 'in the pink,' 'as it leaves me'; you played House, read Mr. Bottomley, sang 'If I was a tulip,' and your rifle was as clean as new from an armoury. It is time to hint to a new age what your value, what your love was; your Ypres is gone, and you are gone; we were lucky to see you 'in the pink' against white-ribbed and socket-eyed despair.

There has been much criticism of *Journey's End*²⁰ by men who did not serve in the war and profess to regard it as a libel on the soldier, and by some men who, serving in the line only in the early days of the war, remember the early mood of exaltation, but not the later mood of stubborn resolution wholly free from illusion which eventually won the war. For my part I find the play at once painful in its fidelity and of the very stuff of tragedy. It is the darkest hour of the war. The great German attack of March 1918 is imminent. Captain Stanhope's company is doomed, and every man knows it. If they spoke the language of rhetoric, if they were men inspired by consciousness of heroism,

¹⁹ *Undertones of War* (Edmund Blunden: Cobden-Sanderson).

²⁰ *Journey's End* (R. C. Sherriff: Victor Gollancz).

their fate could not stir our hearts in such measure. But they are true to type; they are the men whom we knew; their common humanity gives them a claim to our intimate regard and heightens the sense of tragedy. To me the two officers of the company who in this regard are unforgettable are Trotter and Stanhope: Trotter, the middle-aged ranker, a man of infinite good nature, without imagination, stolid, invincible; Stanhope, the young captain, his nerves in rags after three years of infantry fighting, supporting his courage and resolution by whisky in preference to quitting his post.

Perhaps Stanhope has the greater tragic stature. When the cup of bitterness overflows he turns to the young subaltern straight from England, who, knowing nothing of what he has endured, appears to be rebuking him for attempting to drown his sorrow and despair in drink. 'To forget, you little fool, to forget, do you understand, to forget. Do you think there is no limit to what a man can bear?'

There cannot but be a certain sense of the triumph of the spirit when on that dark morning of defeat the shelling rises to a fury and Stanhope goes up the steps to play, for the last time, his captain's part, to lead the men to whom he has been faithful, for whom he has sacrificed much more than life.

The success of *Journey's End* as a play was matched, and perhaps surpassed, early in 1929, by the success of *All Quiet on the Western Front*²¹ in the field of literature. M. Norton Cru has pointed out mistakes in fact and mistakes in psychology in this remarkable work of imaginative fiction. Any infantry soldier can do the same. M. Remarque, in easing his mind of an intolerable burden, has exaggerated and given a false picture, not so much of the things seen, but of the reaction of the soldier to them.

Still, I am glad that M. Remarque wrote his book, inasmuch as it may have brought home to many people who are still ignorant of it the physical infamy and unceasing horror which the spirit of man overcame. We soldiers are, in a sense, a lost generation. Few of us can read without emotion those lines in which M. Remarque speaks of the soldier's attitude towards the past.

These memories of former times do not awaken desire so much as sorrow—a vast, inapprehensible melancholy. Once we had such desires—but they return not. They are past, they belong to another world that is gone from us. In the barracks they called forth a rebellious, wild craving for their return; for then they were still bound to us, we belonged to them and they to us, even though we were already absent from them. They appeared in the soldiers' songs which we sang as we marched between the glow of the dawn and the black silhouettes of the forests to drill on the moor, they were a powerful remembrance that was in us and came from us.

²¹ *All Quiet on the Western Front* (E. M. Remarque: Putnam).

But here in the trenches they are completely lost to us. They arise no more; we are dead and they stand remote on the horizon, they are a mysterious reflection, an apparition, that haunts us, that we fear and love without hope. They are strong and our desire is strong—but they are unattainable, and we know it. . . . We are burnt up by hard facts; like tradesmen, we understand distinctions, and like butchers, necessities. We are no longer untroubled—we are indifferent. We might exist there; but should we really live there?

We are forlorn like children, and experienced like old men, we are crude and sorrowful and superficial—I believe we are lost.

M. Remarque's book has been succeeded by a flood of literature from Mittel Europa, some of which was apparently expected to attain success on account of entering into detail, not only of the horrors of war, but of certain routine discomforts of life, which also occur in peace. Some of these books are merely ignoble; they illustrate a point made by M. Norton Cru: 'Jadis le public voulait une guerre romancée avec drapeaux déployés et flamberge au vent; aujourd'hui, il aime une guerre non moins romancée, avec boyaux dallés de morts aux grimaces infernales et baisers aux cadavres.'

But I must except *Zero Hour*,²² though I thought it rather a dull book, and an exceptionally fine book, *The Storm of Steel*,²³ by Ernst Jünger. This splendid captain of infantry, fourteen times wounded in the war, remains unbeaten and undismayed at the close, notwithstanding the defeat of all for which he stood. Those who have judged the morale of the German Army from reading certain German war books should turn to Captain Jünger's description of the Battle of Guillemont, when the British barrage broke on the German line:

While this hurricane was raging I went along my platoon front. The men were standing, rifle in hand, as though carved in stone, their eyes fixed on the ground in front of them. Now and then by the light of a rocket I saw the gleam of helmet after helmet, bayonet after bayonet, and I was filled with pride at commanding this handful of men that might very likely be pounded into the earth but could not be conquered. It is in such moments that the human spirit triumphs over the mightiest demonstrations of material force.

In the final defeat of his cause he can yet say:

We stood with our feet in mud and blood, yet our faces were turned to things of exalted worth. And not one of that countless number who fell in our attacks fell for nothing. Each one fulfilled his own resolve. To-day we cannot understand the martyrs who threw themselves into the arena in a transport that lifted them even before their deaths beyond humanity, beyond every phase of pain and fear. Their faith no longer exercises a compelling force. When once it is no longer possible to

²² *Zero Hour* (Georg Grabenhorst: Brentanos).

²³ *The Storm of Steel* (Ernst Jünger: Chatto and Windus).

understand how a man gives his life for his country—and the time will come—then all is over with that faith also, and the idea of the Fatherland is dead; and then, perhaps, we shall be envied, as we envy the saints their inward and irresistible strength.

I am sure that we soldiers recognise in *The Storm of Steel* the men whom we fought. If the German soldier was accurately described in the other German war books, the war would have been over by December 1914.

Later in 1928 we had a book written with the fine insight and sensibility of the poet, *The Wet Flanders Plain*,²⁴ by Henry Williamson.

Mr. Williamson's book is full of splendid writing, the theme of which is a lament for wrongs done by man to his fellow-men. There is a terrible description of an unsuccessful attack on the Somme. This is followed by a picture of the infamy of Passchendaele.

A year drifts by, and I am standing on a duck-board by a flooded and foul beke in the Salient, listening in the flare-pallid rainy darkness to the cries of tens of thousands of wounded men lost in morasses of Third Ypres. To seek them is to drown with them. . . . the living are still toiling on, homeless and without horizons, doing dreadful things under heaven that none want to do, through the long wet days and the longer nights, the weeks, the months, of a bare, sodden winter out of doors.

Defeat and victory are words without significance to him. He sees only the waste and horror, the desolation of the human spirit. From Passchendaele he turns, unimpressed, to the great attack on the Hindenburg Line, which finally broke the martial power of Germany. He remembers in that victory but one thing, and it is well that he should remember in all that thunder the still small voice of humanity.

And in the stupendous roar and light-blast of the final barrage that broke the Hindenburg Line I see only one thing, which grows radiant before my eyes until it fills all my world: the sight of a Saxon boy half-crushed under a shattered tank, moaning 'Mutter, Mutter, Mutter,' out of ghastly grey lips. A British soldier, wounded in the leg, and sitting near by, hears the words, and dragging himself to the dying boy, takes his cold hand and says: 'All right, son, it's all right. Mother's here with you.'

I do not think that Mr. Williamson would admit that war had any credit side to set against its terrible debits.

Very different is the point of view of Lieut.-Colonel Rowland Feilding in *War Letters to a Wife*,²⁵ published in the autumn. This most gallant officer, whose courage was almost legendary, was a company commander in the Coldstream Guards in 1915.

²⁴ *The Wet Flanders Plain* (Henry Williamson: Faber and Faber).

²⁵ *War Letters to a Wife* (Rowland Feilding: Medici Society).

He commanded the Connaught Rangers on the Somme, at Messines Ridge, and in the March retreat of 1918. In the last battles of the war he commanded the Civil Service Rifles. All the horror of war is here, but man is still master of it. After all these years of infantry fighting he can yet say in a letter, written just after the Armistice, that there was a good deal to be said in favour of the old trench life owing to the atmosphere of selflessness and the spirit of *camaraderie*—that, in sort, there was no humbug in the trenches, and on that account the better kind of men who had lived in them would look back upon them with something like affection.

His letter of December 14 in the terrible winter of 1916-17, paying a tribute to his men, matches in truth and eloquence the passage, already quoted, from *Undertones of War*. He describes the life of the men in the trenches in the winter, wet through most of the time, freezing when they try to sleep, under constant shell fire, in a perpetual state of unrest and strain.

Think of these things, and compare them with what are considered serious hardships in normal life! Yet these men play their part uncomplainingly. That is to say, they never complain seriously. Freezing, or snowing, or drenching rain; always smothered with mud; you may ask any one of them, any moment of the day or night, 'Are you cold?' or 'Are you wet?'—and you will get but one answer. The Irishman will reply—always with a smile—'Not too cold, sir,' or 'Not too wet, sir.' The curious thing is that all seem so much more contented here than the people at home. Everybody laughs at everything here. It is the only way.

I must mention also *Good-bye to All That*, by Mr. Robert Graves.²⁶ The book appealed to me particularly, because I also was a temporary officer serving with a Regular battalion. My admiration for my regiment was not less than that of Mr. Graves for the Royal Welch Fusiliers.

The book appealed to me also because of its extraordinary candour and, as it seemed to me, sincerity. I think that the war, as it was represented in my experience, is more nearly described in the pages of *Good-bye to All That* than in any other book. I know that Mr. Graves has laid himself open to hostility at the hands of those who have resented his candour and his frank criticism; but after all there was much in the conduct of the war to criticise, and some of his criticisms, though they may give offence, may also have the effect of destroying a good deal of cant, and may even have a salutary influence on the complacency of some who are too prone to think that the soldier of the line, because he did not complain, had nothing to complain about.

There is a splendid picture of the Royal Welch Fusiliers

²⁶ *Good-bye to All That* (Robert Graves: Jonathan Cape).

going into action on the Somme, given by an officer of another regiment.

I saw your High Wood show through field glasses. The way your battalion shook out into artillery formation, company by company—with each section of four or five men in file at fifty yards interval and distance—going down into the hollow and up the slope through the barrage, was the most beautiful bit of parade-ground drill I've ever seen. Your company officers must have been superb.

'I have read,' said the colonel, 'of bravery, but I have never seen such magnificent and wonderful disregard for death as I saw that day. It was almost uncanny—it was so great.' A man so candid as Robert Graves would not have quoted these remarks if he had not believed in them. Criticism comes somewhat naturally to him, and praise from the hypercritical is more worth while than the easy commendation of the ignorant. On Armistice Day Mr. Graves, like many of us, did not take part in the contemporary merrymaking. The news of the Armistice sent him out walking alone along the dyke above the marshes of Rhuddlan (an ancient battlefield, the Flodden of Wales), cursing and sobbing and thinking of the dead.

The latest, and to my mind the best, of personal records of the war is *Her Privates We*,²⁷ by the anonymous Private 19022. This book challenges comparison with *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe*, in its depth of psychological insight, in its interpretation of the mind of the soldier, in its understanding of the significance of war. In both books the soldier is a man of intelligence and imagination serving in the ranks of an infantry regiment; in both books the attitude towards war is the same. Here is no self-pity, no repudiation of responsibility, no attempt to blame others for the disaster which has been the lot of an ill-starred generation. Private 19022 and his comrades are masters of their fate. Each could say, as the soldier of *Le Tombeau* said: 'Tout ce qui est, ne l'ai je pas voulu, ou consenti?' Each knows that, though enthusiasm may pass 'cette volonté sans illusions ne bronchera pas.' They are soldiers of their own free will; they will not break; they have faith in themselves and in their comrades.

Her Privates We opens with a marvellous description of the relief of a battalion on the Somme. At once the hand of a master is revealed; we see the drawn, pitiless faces of men despairing but undefeated. We follow their fortunes in a quiet sector to which they are withdrawn, and in their rest billets. We return with them to their battle on Serre Ridge in the late autumn of 1916.

The descriptions of the trenches are remarkable in their

²⁷ *Her Privates We* (Private 19022: Peter Davies).

fidelity. Of many I choose one, a relief of the line north of the Ancre:

They passed men on the firestep, men as fixed as statues when that ghastly light fell tremblingly on them from the sky; and one or two sprawled on the step, their backs propped against the side of the bay, snatching a little fitful sleep, their tin-hats tilted over their faces, and boots, puttees, and trousers plastered with mud that caked like mortar. Sometimes their eyes met a face, blank from the weariness that is indifference; and perhaps, because at this point they only moved forward a few yards at a time, they would exchange a few whispers.

'What's it like?'

'Oh, 'e strafed a bit this afternoon, but it's cushy enough.'

Bourne had never heard any other reply to that question in all the hundreds of times he had heard it asked. A face of expressionless immobility, with hard inscrutable eyes, and that even, monotonous whisper:

'Oh, it's cushy enough.'

Colonel Rowland Feilding and Private 19022, from widely differing standpoints, bear the same testimony to the soldier of the line.

Good as is the description of the fighting, the trenches, the rest billets, it cannot be compared with the superb picture of the Englishman at war. Here is the common soldier in all his essential sanity and good humour, the common people in whom the real strength and wisdom of this great nation have always rested. Proud, self-reliant, strong and simple, they know well what they are doing. Sergeant Tozer, Weeper Smart, Little Martlow, Shem, Madeley, Pacey—you were our comrades, the men we knew and loved.

We see them as they prepare for battle; we know that they will not break.

These apparently rude and brutal natures comforted, encouraged, and reconciled each other to fate, with a tenderness and tact which was more moving than anything in life. They had nothing; not even their own bodies, which had become mere implements of warfare. They turned from the wreckage and misery of life to an empty heaven, and from an empty heaven to the silence of their own hearts. They had been brought to the last extremity of hope, and yet they put their hands on each other's shoulders and said with a passionate conviction that it would be all right, though they had faith in nothing, but in themselves and in each other.

We may bid this sturdy battalion farewell undaunted and undismayed.

They marched out of the village, past the stone calvary at the end of it and men who had known all the sins of the world lifted to the agony of the figure on the cross eyes that had probed and understood the mystery of suffering.

One last book I would mention—a text-book, strangely enough—entitled *An Outline History of the Great War*,²⁸ by Major Carey and Captain Scott. It is intended for use in schools, and perhaps I may say that I can think of no text-book more suitable for them. We are enabled to see a battle in terms of fighting men, proud, passionate, humorous, sturdy, men who, by virtue of their humanity, can claim our affection as well as our admiration. A due balance is maintained in the presentation of the soldier. He is not depicted as moving in a rarefied atmosphere of conscious heroism and self-sacrifice. The happy warrior of the war correspondents and romantic novelists and the unhappy warrior of contemporary fiction alike find no place. We have here the real soldier, grim and steady, faithfully discharging his duty in circumstances without parallel in their infamy. It is most fitting that the frontispiece should be *The Desolation of the Salient*, a Royal Air Force photograph of the remains of Zonnebeke village in 1917. There the advocates of war may find something to ponder in the illimitable waste of shell-holes strewn with the carnage of the most terrible of battles, to which, as the authors observe, the agony of a nation has given the pregnant name of 'Passchendaele.' The last chapter is the complement of the frontispiece; no one after reading it can be ignorant of the burden that was borne by the infantry soldier, or think again in terms of 'pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war.' The authors have placed in their debt the men of their own generation, for whom this book will recall much that they would not willingly forget, memories proud and tragic, of victory and defeat, of hope and despair, of high fellowship, that sure weapon in the battle of life and in the face of death, made true and keen on the anvil of hardship and danger. To a later generation, to the men of tomorrow, they have told a story which cannot but be of interest and may confer something of pride and inspiration and resolve.

I have given as briefly as I can a survey of the literature which seems to me the most important of the infantry fighting on the Western Front. I may perhaps be permitted to offer a few conclusions arising out of the evidence which I have adduced.

First I suggest that no man has a right to speak for all soldiers. In a review of *All Quiet on the Western Front* I find these words: 'Universal in its appeal and application. It supersedes all previous histories and renders all later histories superfluous. The common soldier has found a supreme voice, which tells the tale of the trenches in accents of almost unbearable poignancy and beauty.' This is the ecstasy of criticism. The soldier was

²⁸ *An Outline History of the Great War* (G. V. Carey and H. S. Scott: Cambridge University Press).

infinitely diverse in type, and the type which is depicted in *All Quiet on the Western Front* was not, I believe, a very common type. It would be as wise to say that an artist such as Goya had rendered all later artists superfluous, and had made it necessary to forgive and forget the ineptitudes of Botticelli and Fra Angelico.

My next point is that the literature of war illustrates the dominance of the mind over things material. There is no limit to what a man can bear. 'What matter where, if I be still the same,' said the fallen Lucifer in *Paradise Lost*. Never did these profound words receive such majestic testimony to their truth as in the Great War.

The problem of the affirmation of the will in the face of death which confronted the soldier in the war was no other than the problem which confronts man at all times, face to face with the darkness of the universe and the mystery of his being. War, as Private 19022 observed, is only the ultimate problem of all human life stated barely, and pressing for an immediate solution.

My third point is that the fiction of disenchantment may safely be laid aside. There is no evidence in the literature of war written by soldiers that they went to war in a state of enchantment, and that the subsequent danger and discomfort and distress disenchanted them. We knew well what we were doing; we anticipated the horrors of war. They were not more horrible than we expected. Moreover, we had no foreknowledge of the splendid comradeship which enabled us sometimes to ignore, and nearly always to endure, the horrible things which we saw and the horrible things which we had to do. I have never been able to trace the origin of the legend that men enter on war in ignorance of its horror. The literature of the past gives no support to the idea. In early Greek and in Norse literature, which are concerned almost exclusively with fighting men, war appears to be regarded as neither righteous nor joyous, but as inevitable and decreed. The weariness and sorrow of war are in the foreground, and courage in defeat is the major theme.

We who have been soldiers know that the reward of courage is sometimes honour, but more often wounds and death. This theme finds constant expression in the literature of war. The brave man in adversity is surely the greatest of the world's stories. 'He saved others; himself he could not save.'

This is the real enchantment of war, and to many it is overwhelming. In the realm of the spirit that which counts is not what a man gets, but what he gives. In my experience of men in battle I found that the greater the demand, the more sure was the answer.

In life the Great Call comes only once, and when it comes there is every reason why you should not answer it—every reason but one. If you do answer it, whatever the cost may be, you will kindle a glow of

content in your heart that nothing can put out. If you do not answer, it does not matter who else forgives you, you will never forgive yourself.

Those words of a dead officer are quoted by Lieut.-Colonel Hotblack in *Fighting Tanks*.²⁹ That officer was killed one week later in a forlorn attempt to recover a wounded man from the German wire. There was every reason why he should not have made the attempt; every reason but one.

Those who think of life in terms of comfort and security may ignore the enchantment which the necessity of courage has for the minds of men, but its existence cannot be denied. The privilege of the soldier in time of war—that splendid life of courage, fidelity and unswerving loyalty to friends—is the privilege of the seaman and the mountaineer at all times. Year by year the sea and the mountains take their toll; yet their lovers are faithful to them. The sea is ever hungry, the mountains ever treacherous. They have neither faith nor honour. Why, then, are there seamen and mountaineers and soldiers? Surely because there, and there only, can certain men find their manhood, can feel that heightening of the faculties, that exaltation of the spirit, when fear and fatigue have alike ceased to have any power or influence, and when life and death are for one brief hour seen in their true perspective.

Extravagant pleasures entail extravagant penalties, but there are those who are willing to pay the price. And it must be paid, not once nor twice, but at all times. Man requires to know for his own satisfaction that he is as good a man as he was last year or ten years ago. In the last resort he must pay the penalty. It was a penalty which he foresaw and which he willingly accepts. He accepts it partly because of the privilege which it confers on him of the society of Men. Death and wounds have no significance to a man who has learned that life offers nothing more worth while than the approbation of his peers.

The soldier asks no other reward than the knowledge that he has been faithful to his trust. This is expressed consummately in the epitaph on the Spartans at Thermopylæ:

ὦ ξείν' ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα τοῖς πατρίοις ῥήματι πειθόμενοι

Go tell to Sparta, thou that passest by,
That here, obedient to her laws, we lie.

That translation is not mine; it is far better than I could give, but I think there is rather more in the word *πειθόμενοι* than 'obedience.' It expresses, it seems to me, implicit trust and faith. Life and death, victory and defeat, are immaterial, so

²⁹ *Fighting Tanks* (edited by C. Murray Wilson: Seeley Service).

long as the spirit remains undefeated, and the high fellowship of the soldier's creed is unsullied by any failure of courage or will.

In the literature of war, and more especially in the poetry of war, victory and its reputed glittering prizes find no place. Conspicuous among the poems which illustrate this point is that of E. A. Mackintosh,³⁰ lieutenant in the Seaforth Highlanders, who was killed at Cambrai:

Not for the day of victory
I mourn I was not there,
The hard fierce rush of slaying men,
The hands up in the air,
But for the torn ranks struggling on
The old brave hopeless way,
The broken charge, the slow retreat,
And I so far away.

It was when things were going badly that the soldier could not rest unless he was with his battalion. At the time of our great defeat in March 1918 the corridors of the War Office were filled with discharged and disabled men demanding to be sent back to their regiments. The poem of Siegfried Sassoon³¹ which, of all his poems, I most admire is that called *Sick Leave*:

When I'm asleep, dreaming and lulled and warm,—
They come, the homeless ones, the noiseless dead.
While the dim charging breakers of the storm
Bellow and drone and rumble overhead,
Out of the gloom they gather about my bed.
They whisper to my heart; their thoughts are mine.
'Why are you here with all your watches ended?
From Ypres to Frise we sought you in the Line.'

This is the greatest of all themes in the literature of war, the theme of comradeship. Hardly a book has been published on the war in which the reader does not find full, and, indeed, almost passionate, expression of it. In *All Quiet on the Western Front*³² there is a wonderful passage when the soldier finds himself lost in 'No-man's Land' and then hears the voices of his comrades in the trench.

At once a new warmth flows through me. These voices, these quiet words, these footsteps in the trench behind me, recall me at a bound from the terrible loneliness and fear of death by which I had been almost destroyed. They are more to me than life, these voices, they are more than motherliness and more than fear; they are the strongest, most comforting thing there is anywhere; they are the voices of my comrades.
I am no longer a shuddering speck of existence, alone in the darkness.

³⁰ *War the Liberator* (E. A. Mackintosh: John Lane).

³¹ *War Poems* (Siegfried Sassoon: Heinemann).

³² *All Quiet on the Western Front* (E. M. Remarque: Putnam).

I belong to them and they to me; we all share the same fear and the same life, we are nearer than lovers, in a simpler, a harder way; I could bury my face in them, in these voices, these words that have saved me and will stand by me.

As eloquent is the passage in *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe*,³³ in which the soldier, on whom the dark night of death is already descending, calls his dead friends to be present at his marriage. They only are invited: 'François Rexens, mort à Morhange; Philippe Sahuc, mort à Charleroi; Richard de Dambosc, mort sur la Marne; Jean Joseph Trébose, mort sur l'Yser. . . . Et voilà ceux que j'avais choisis pour m'accompagner dans l'existence. J'avais choisi trop bien. . . . Mes amis! Mes bons compagnons! Mes camarades! Mes copains!'

In *Undertones of War*³⁴ Edmund Blunden calls again to his men: 'Daniels, Davey, Ashford, Roberts, Worley, Clifford, Seall, Unstead, do you remember me yet? I should know you among ten thousand. Your voices are heard, and each man longed for, beyond the maze of mutability.'

If you talk to any soldier about the war he will always return to the same absorbing subject, the men with whom he served. He has forgotten much, but he remembers the splendid good-fellowship.

Faces cheerful, full of whimsical mirth,
Lined by the wind, burned by the sun;
Bodies enraptured by the abounding earth,
As whose children we are brethren; One.

Was there love once? I have forgotten her.
Was there grief once? Grief yet is mine.
O loved, living, dying, heroic soldier,
All, all, my joy, my grief, my love, are thine!

These lines of Robert Nichols³⁵ are, to my mind, the finest which he has written.

This comradeship has had a marked, but little understood, effect on the minds of the generation which fought the war. In a review in the *Spectator* of a number of war books recently published there was a sentence which expressed most clearly the point which I have in mind: 'Of political idealism, however, the belief in the virtues of systems, there is as little as there is much of what may be called personal idealism, a belief in and admiration for the virtues of human beings.'

These few words illumined much which had been dark to me in the last few years, and those who are concerned to know the mind of my generation and of such of the new generation as have

³³ *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe* (Paul Raynal: Librairie Stock, Paris).

³⁴ *Undertones of War* (Edmund Blunden: Cobden-Sanderson).

³⁵ *Ardours and Endurances* (Robert Nichols: Chatto and Windus).

been influenced in our point of view would do well to bear it in mind. We believe in men; we do not believe in ideas.

From comradeship I turn to leadership, which is, after all, a very slight distinction. It is the knowledge that we were leaders of men that is the final recompense for those who once had that privilege. It is leadership which we most need in the world to-day.

In Mr. Austin Hopkinson's book *Religio Militis*³⁶ he is concerned to bring home that the only solution of our industrial troubles is that the meaning of leadership in industry should have the same high meaning which it had during the years of war, that the officer who was granted the privilege of leadership should live with his men, should accept their hardships, should be to the forefront in times of difficulty and danger—in times of distress should be the first to make the sacrifice.

If only there were more men who had that philosophy of leadership and would practise it as Mr. Austin Hopkinson has practised it in Lancashire!

It has exercised many minds why the great qualities of comradeship and leadership, which were the gift of the war to us, have disappeared in so large a measure from our lives. A ready answer is that the general aim of the world to-day is to create more comfort and more security. Comradeship has little significance in a state of comfort, or at any rate it loses its keen edge. Leadership is of little importance in a state of security. But to this Mr. Hopkinson answers that 'we survivors of the war, wondering what fault of ours rendered us unworthy of a soldier's grave, may find satisfaction in the knowledge that peace no less than war can give us difficult and dangerous tasks to do.' So I am afraid that this answer will not suffice; I must seek another. Assuming that we are the men we were, why are we no longer leaders? Why are we not even comrades? The answer is partly, I think, that we are so scattered, and partly that we are not conscious of being wanted. Modesty and diffidence are among the virtues of the soldier, but those qualities prevent a soldier from pulling his full weight in time of peace. Mr. Hopkinson asks us to put aside our diffidence and to set our hand again to the great task which once absorbed our energy and directed our endeavour. And it is with words of his that I conclude this exposition of the meaning which, to me at any rate, is inherent in the literature of the Great War.

And what is left for us before we die, now when the new generation strikes its tents and rides out from the bivouac of youth clad in its shining armour? Some say our task is done, our usefulness exhausted, and our advancing years a bar to fresh adventure. Yet for my part I will not

³⁶ *Religio Militis* (Austin Hopkinson: Martin Hopkinson).

think that comrades who toiled and fought with me through all those years on sea and land will ever be content to rust in idleness. Our labours and our wounds give us at least a claim to yet another fight before the end. Our experience has shown us glimpses of another world of strange experience, and that untravelled universe we will explore till one by one we drop beside the trail. Come, my friends, 'tis not too late to seek that newer world. Put on the battered armour once again, close up our sadly thinning ranks, and once again forward to meet whatever toil or gay adventure fate may bring!

CHARLES DOUIE.

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EDDIES IN THE FLOWING TIDE

IN the closing sentence of an article on the 'Crisis in the Unionist Party' which appeared in the April number of *The Nineteenth Century* I made bold to say: 'The new ideas are on the march and will not be stayed.' My present task is to recount how swiftly and in what increasing volume the tide has flowed since then and, incidentally, what eddies it has generated by the reaction to it of different personalities and temperaments—eddies, as far as the Unionist Party is concerned, violently agitating the surface of politics and affording no little opportunity for open controversy; deeper eddies, not much discussed yet, but perhaps destined to have an even more profound effect on the whole future of politics, beneath the surface of the Labour and trade union movement.

Writing within a few days of Mr. Baldwin's speech at the Hotel Cecil on March 4, and commenting on the unanimous enthusiasm with which his pronouncement on the referendum had there been received, I expressed the view that the referendum

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could only achieve the double purpose of keeping the Unionist Party together and of winning the next election on one condition. That was that it was used as the starting-point for the whole-hearted advocacy, on its merits, of the broad case for Imperial Preference and for its necessary corollary, duties on foreign foodstuffs, while still reserving to the electorate a final decision on the details of an inter-Imperial agreement. If, on the other hand, it was used as a mere excuse for avoiding discussion of the implications of Imperial Preference in the way of duties on foreign agricultural produce, in fact, for an ostrich-like shirking of the issue, then, I concluded, there was bound to be a disagreeable awakening at the election.

The disagreeable awakening was provided much earlier—for the ultimate good of the party—by the restless and impatient activity of Lord Beaverbrook. While a large, and growing, section of the party undoubtedly went ahead confidently, preaching the whole policy, and expounding the referendum as part of the machinery for putting it into action within a few months of the return to office of a Unionist Government, there were, to put it mildly, indications of a very different attitude in authoritative quarters. On March 25 a letter appeared in *The Times* from Lord Salisbury in which the whole policy of Empire economic unity was dismissed as a 'fascinating ultimate aspiration,' and even safeguarding was minimised as something whose 'results must in any case be years ahead,' neither of them having an immediate bearing on the urgency of the situation. Such a letter, coming from the leader of the party in the House of Lords, was naturally calculated to make Unionists rub their eyes and wonder whether they had not slipped back from 1930 to 1903. Shortly afterwards the Unionist Central Office put out a leaflet in which the negative aspect of the policy was emphasised as 'Baldwin's pledge' that there would be 'no food taxes at the General Election and no food taxes ever without a direct vote of the people,' while the positive aspect was relegated to the region of the remotely hypothetical:

If as a result of the negotiations with the Dominions there should emerge any form of agreement that gives substantial benefits to our industries and our workers, and demands in return corresponding benefits for our Dominions in the form of foreign foodstuffs with which they can amply provide us—then that agreement will be put clearly before our people by means of a referendum.

Such a leaflet, treating 'food taxes' as something obviously undesirable in themselves which, in certain contingencies, might be, not recommended, but only 'put clearly' before the people, was certainly not in keeping with the spirit, even if it was within the letter of the compact between Mr. Baldwin and Lord Beaver-

brook. Little harm might have been done by aberrations like the two quoted if the leader of the party had taken an early opportunity to correct them by laying strong emphasis on his own conviction that Unionist policy, as regards Empire trade, was a policy of immediate action, and not of 'fascinating ultimate aspiration,' and that the winning of the referendum on an agreement which included food duties was no less important than the preliminary step of winning the election. Unfortunately, Mr. Baldwin's speeches, during the next few weeks, were confined, on this subject, to the briefest possible reiteration of the relevant passage in his Hotel Cecil speech. They did little to allay the uneasiness in the advanced wing of the party or the impatience of Lord Beaverbrook, who, impressed with the belief that public opinion was moving with ever-increasing acceleration in his direction, was already regretting the referendum, which he himself had suggested, as a dilatory expedient calculated to prevent politicians from making up their minds and, indeed, imperilling the whole of the policy on which his heart was set.

The West Fulham by-election afforded him an excellent opportunity for testing the movement of the public mind. Sir Cyril Cobb was a candidate who was prepared to go out wholeheartedly on the 'Empire Free Trade' platform, and the fact that the constituency was essentially a 'dormitory' constituency which might be supposed to fear the 'dear food' cry, and that the head of the Liberal Party organisation came down in person to mobilise the Liberal vote against the 'dear food' candidate, added zest to the passionate fervour with which he threw himself into the campaign. An increase of the Conservative vote by 2244 and a victory by the sufficient margin of 240 votes, as against a defeat by 2211 the year before, rewarded his indefatigable exertions and confirmed his judgment of the situation. The 'Glory Hallelujah' with which he hailed the result applied no less to the announcement, only a day or two before, of the new Canadian Budget, in which Mr. Dunning had embodied a wholesale revision of items in the Canadian tariff in the direction of Empire free trade or of more effective preference, and which he declared to be only an earnest of the spirit in which Canada wished to enter the Imperial Conference. Here was both a confirmation of the assertion that the Empire was opposed to a policy of economic co-operation and a reminder of the awkwardness of the referendum as a method of clinching business with a willing negotiator. Accordingly, on May 19, Lord Beaverbrook announced that he had done with the referendum, which had been used as a mere excuse for not facing the issue, instead of as a spearhead to advance the policy. Once more the political situation in the Unionist Party became strained. There was

little enthusiasm for the referendum, in which the public had shown no interest, and a widespread feeling that Lord Beaverbrook had had some cause for complaint. But the general verdict was that he was unnecessarily impatient, and that it was hardly fair to ask Mr. Baldwin to drop the referendum barely ten weeks after its formal adoption as the basis of party unity.

On Whit Monday Mr. Baldwin delivered his long-promised statement on agricultural policy. His declaration in favour of a guaranteed price for home wheat, of a duty on imported malting barley, and of effective measures to check the importation of dumped oats met with general approval from the farming community. But the speech made no attempt to correlate the proposals for British agriculture with any policy for Empire agriculture, and in one passage, indeed, used arguments ruling out protection for British agriculture which, while, no doubt, primarily intended by the speaker to refer to wheat, did on the face of them refer to agriculture in general, and lent themselves to quotation by opponents against any policy of food duties for Empire purposes. A speech in Aberdeen a few days later contained much the same argument, and suggested that asking for protection for British agriculture was crying for the moon. Lord Beaverbrook resolved to treat these utterances as a deliberate attempt to queer the pitch, and decided that the time had come for the renewal of the aggressive and coercive tactics which he had used in February. Once again, too, he thought that the 'rogue elephant,' Lord Rothermere, might be usefully employed to give weight and noise to the attack.

Accordingly, on June 17, the *Daily Mail* published a letter from Lord Beaverbrook complaining that Mr. Baldwin had failed to support the policy of the Empire Crusade and appealing to Conservatives to send their party subscriptions to him to be used in running candidates against any Conservative candidates who failed to toe the Empire free trade line. An appeal for funds, even for the object indicated, might not have created much commotion. But the suggestion that normal party subscriptions should be diverted was quite another matter. This was open war against the party as an organisation. Another letter two days later announcing that Lord Beaverbrook proposed to secure the summoning of a special meeting of the National Union to decide future policy was a no less direct challenge to Mr. Baldwin's leadership. Lord Beaverbrook's attack, if menacing in substance, was not intemperate in language. It was accompanied both in the *Daily Mail* and in the *Daily Express* by much stentorian trumpeting from Lord Rothermere in praise of Lord Beaverbrook as the only leader to save the nation, and of his policy of taxes on foreign foodstuffs as now 'not only economically

desirable but electorally possible,' and by even more than his usual borborygmic abuse of Mr. Baldwin and the 'discredited old gang' of the party leaders.

Mr. Baldwin countered promptly by summoning a meeting of all Unionist members of Parliament and candidates on June 24. In opening the discussion he brushed aside the issue of the referendum in a few sentences by pointing out that it was a piece of machinery adopted to secure the unity of the party, and that if it were given up at that moment it could only be for one of two alternatives, the old unqualified pledge against food taxes or the immediate free hand, on neither of which platforms he believed unity could be secured. 'Therefore, *in the light of present circumstances*, I stand where I did.' He then turned to what he regarded as the 'gravity of the national situation' involved in the attempt of Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook to dictate the policy of the Unionist Party. Comparing their activities to those of Mr. Hearst in America, he charged them with endeavouring 'outside the province of journalism, to dictate, to domineer, to blackmail,' with an irresponsibility and inconsequence which he proceeded to illustrate. The issue was one going to the very roots of constitutional government:

The desire to dictate the policy of a big party, the desire to choose the leader, the desire to impose Ministers on the Crown: the only parallel to that was the action of the T.U.C. in 1926, when they tried extra-constitutional means to impose their will on the democracy of the country. That is what you are up against. If you do not realise it, the sooner you do the better. We are told that, unless we can make peace with these noblemen, candidates are to be run all over the country. The Lloyd George candidates at the last election smelt: these will stink. The challenge has been issued to us. We are told that the gloves are off. If they are, we shall see who has got the dirty hands.

As an example of the kind of dictation which the 'Press Lords' wished to exercise he quoted a letter from Lord Rothermere to Mr. Hannon in which the former announced:

I cannot make it too abundantly clear that under no circumstances whatsoever will I support Mr. Baldwin unless I know exactly what his policy is going to be, unless I have complete guarantees that such policy will be carried out if his party achieves office, and unless I am acquainted with the names of at least eight, or ten, of his most prominent colleagues in the next Ministry.

Pointing out that for 'Baldwin' might have been substituted the name of any other leader of the party, he concluded by repudiating with contempt so 'preposterous and insolent a demand' and declaring that he would 'fight that attempt at domination to the end.'

The speech, revealing Mr. Baldwin as a hard hitter, unafraid of using strong language where his moral indignation was roused, and appealing both to the natural sympathy of the party for a leader who had been for years the target of unfair and vindictive criticism and to its sentiment of independence against outside dictation, was completely successful in disposing of the attack, in so far as it was a challenge to Mr. Baldwin's leadership. It would be outside the scope of this article to discuss in detail the issue on which, with a shrewd tactical judgment, he chose to concentrate. The power of the Press is no new thing in this country, and John Delane in his time had quite as much to say to the fate of Governments as any Press potentate of our days. The difference lies in the fact that the growth of democracy in the electoral sphere has also been accompanied by the growth of a mass production democratic Press. The control of such a Press, built up by business methods with which political judgment or consistency are not necessarily concerned, has created a new factor of political power. In the hands of men with little sense of public responsibility, and swayed by personal motives, it can become a purely disorganising and unsettling force, unless it ends in ceasing to influence public opinion at all. In the hands of men with strong and sustained political convictions and ambitions it may become something much more formidable, for good or ill. At present we are still some distance from the possibility of the supersession of parliamentary government by a new Press Cæsarism, and broadcasting, television, and the film may before long restore the balance in favour of older ideals of government. As far as the meeting was concerned, all the indignation centred on Lord Rothermere, who thus once again served Lord Beaverbrook's purpose both as a bludgeon and as a foil. Towards Lord Beaverbrook himself feeling was more indulgent; partly because there was a widespread sympathy with his views, but also because, in their advocacy, he had faced the ordinary rough and tumble of public debate and heckling, and not confined himself to self-glorification in his own or allied newspaper columns.

With the issue of 'Press dictation' disposed of, the meeting settled down to the question of policy, Sir Gervais Rentoul leading off with an official resolution welcoming Mr. Baldwin's statement on the referendum and approving the declaration that 'in the present circumstances it should be retained in the party programme as the surest and shortest method of achieving success.' The counter-resolution, or amendment, to the effect that the reasons for a referendum no longer obtained, and that 'the British Government should enter upon the forthcoming or any future Empire Conference with a free hand to discuss and agree upon the measures necessary to develop Empire economic

unity,' was moved by Colonel Gretton. For the referendum, on merits, hardly anyone had a word to say during the hours of debate that followed. The general sense of the meeting was well expressed and effectively focussed by Sir R. Horne, who wound up with an earnest appeal for unity, expressing his own view that the referendum was certain, within a few days or weeks or months at most, to be superseded by the flow of events, but that, in face of the challenge to the party organisation, and to its leadership, he intended to vote for the main resolution. That, in spite of his appeal, about a third of those present voted for the amendment was significant of the strength of feeling in favour of the free hand, but even more of the extent to which that sentiment had grown in the previous three months. The resolution was then carried, against one dissentient, and the meeting dispersed, satisfied with having vindicated the party's control over its own affairs, and content to leave the referendum to fade out at the earliest convenient opportunity.

Meanwhile, facts were speaking more powerfully and convincingly than all political speeches or newspaper articles. The unemployment figures went on rising, and by July 14 reached 1,939,900. The trade returns grew steadily worse, and the first six months of 1930 showed a decline in imports of over 63,000,000*l.* and of nearly 54,000,000*l.* in exports. Even more disquieting than the gross figures was the fact that, while our export of manufactured goods had gone down by over 45,000,000*l.*, our import of manufactures had decreased by under 3,000,000*l.*, and that in certain important lines, such as iron and steel, electrical goods, machinery and apparel, the heavy fall in our exports was actually accompanied by a serious increase in competitive imports. In other words, the world depression closed other markets to us without in any appreciable degree affecting the hold of our foreign competitors over our own home market. For the first time, too, these six months saw the United Kingdom fall from the second to the third place as an exporting country, Germany advancing to the second place with a total of 310,000,000*l.* against our 304,851,000*l.*

For the first time in its history the 'City' was seriously alarmed, not only at the immediate prospect, but at the whole national situation, and forced to reconsider the fundamentals of the position which it had taken up for over a century, ever since the historic declaration of the London merchants in favour of free trade in 1820. As recently as 1926 the City, as a whole, still clung to the ideal of international free trade, and a number of its leading bankers and business men had signed in that year the international appeal for the 'establishment of economic freedom as the best hope of restoring the commerce and credit of the

world.' But in the growing industrial difficulties of the last few years the banks, as creditors, have been forced to look at the position from the manufacturers' point of view, and to realise that no efficiency and no rationalisation can avail against the tremendous handicap imposed by free imports in a protected world. On them, too, as on the rest of the country, the conception of an Imperial economic system had begun to exercise its compelling influence. On July 2 a number of the leading bankers and business men met at Hambro's Bank, under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Hambro, and passed the following resolution:

It is resolved that urgent measures for the promotion of inter-Imperial trade are needed to secure and extend the market for British products both at home and through the export trade. Bitter experience has taught Great Britain that the hopes expressed four years ago in a plea for the removal of the restrictions upon European trade have failed to be realised. The restrictions have been materially increased and the sales of surplus foreign products in the British market have steadily grown. While we retain the hope of an ultimate extension of the area of free trade throughout the world, we believe that the immediate step for securing and extending the market for British goods lies in reciprocal trade agreements between the nations constituting the British Empire. As a condition of securing these agreements Great Britain must retain her open market for all Empire products while being prepared to impose duties on all imports from all other countries.

Among those who passed the resolution, or announced their adherence to it a few days later, were the chairmen of the five big joint stock banks—Mr. F. C. Goodenough (of Barclays), Sir Harry Goschen (of the National Provincial), Mr. Beaumont Pease (of Lloyds Bank), Mr. McKenna (of the Midland Bank), Mr. Tennant (of the Westminster Bank), two directors of the Bank of England (Sir Alan Anderson and Mr. Whigham)—and a number of other leading men, such as Lord Ashfield, Sir G. May (of the Prudential), Sir Herbert Lawrence (of Glyn Mills, and chairman of Vickers), Sir Guy Granet, and Mr. Vivian Hugh Smith. The impression created was profound. What impressed was not only the eminence of the names, but the fact that so many of them had, up to the last, avowed their faith in free trade, and their resolute opposition to all suggestions for a change in our national policy. And now they had gone the 'whole hog' with Lord Beaverbrook! There were no qualifications, no suggestions that any category of imports must on principle be exempt from discussion. For the sake of Empire agreements 'Great Britain must retain her open market for all Empire products while being prepared to impose duties on all imports from all other countries.'

Who killed Free Trade?
I said the banker;
I was its sheet anchor;
I've killed Free Trade.

Little less significant as a sign of the intellectual trend of the country, and perhaps even more important politically, has been the development of opinion in the ranks of the trade unions and of the Socialist Party. In practically every instance in the last few years applications for safeguarding had been supported by the trade unions immediately concerned, and their action, however much minimised and frowned upon in political trade union circles, had inevitably set others thinking. An even sharper stimulus to thought was supplied by Mr. Snowden's vindictive attitude towards the safeguarded industries. There was every reason, both in the industrial and in the revenue situation, for allowing the lace and other safeguarding duties that were due to expire this year to run on. There was no reason, except sheer pedantry, why the inevitable decision to retain the McKenna, silk, and sugar duties should not have been announced six months beforehand. The feeling rapidly spread in the Labour ranks that a theory which insisted on such senseless and mischievous action must be a senseless and mischievous theory. If ever a man has deliberately made free trade both odious and ridiculous, it has been Mr. Snowden. He well deserves the description Sheridan once gave of Grenville: 'I have known many men knock their heads against a wall; but I never before heard of a man collecting bricks and building a wall for the express purpose of knocking out his brains against it.'

Whatever the cause, the rank and file of the Labour Party have been discussing the question among themselves with a freedom undreamt of before. It is no secret that Mr. Thomas has never shared Mr. Snowden's objections either to safeguarding or to Imperial Preference, and such an intellectual leader of Socialism as Mr. G. D. H. Cole has now declared himself definitely converted to Protection by the facts of the new situation. But the most significant evidence of the change of outlook is furnished by the report of the Economic Committee of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress prepared in May and formally adopted by the Council at the end of June. This document, contemplating the possibility of the emergence of larger economic groups in the world, concludes that our present policy of isolation is no longer tenable; that world economic unity is not practicable at the present time; and that of the various possible groups, the British Commonwealth group is the one which sentiment and language, existing arrangements and tendencies, its admirable balance between raw materials and manufacturing industry and its facilities for internal migration, all make it our obvious interest to consolidate. The report, therefore, considers that advantage should be taken of the Imperial Conference 'to press for as full a development as possible of the economic relations between the

constituent parts of the British Commonwealth.' As machinery to further the desired end it advocates regular Economic Conferences and a permanent Economic Secretariat to help in the evolution of a common economic policy—its recommendations in this respect being practically identical with those of the Joint Preparatory Committee for the Imperial Conference set up by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of British Industries, and the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. In an appendix, no less interesting and important than the main report itself, free trade is dismissed as something non-existent in the world to-day, and not worth considering as a working aim, even if it were compatible with trade union and Labour principles to regard it as an ultimate ideal. Commerce must be regulated, and the imposition of tariffs is simply one among many devices, to be considered not 'with preconceptions based on the belief that certain fundamental principles or traditions must at all costs be adhered to,' but simply as a matter of expediency. The report is to come before the Trades Union Congress at the beginning of September.

Free trade as an intellectual conviction is dead. This is not the occasion to discuss the reasons why a very superficial economic generalisation, deriving some justification and plausibility from the facts of the time, should have hardened into a rigid creed, regarded by a whole nation as intellectually and morally self-evident and above criticism, and should have retained its power for eighty years in the face of all experience at home and abroad. Nor need we pause to consider in how many directions this creed has paralysed the thought of this country in the past, or what a stimulus, in other fields besides the purely economic, will be given by the liberation of our intellects from the old catchwords and shallow sophistries on which it was based. It is enough for our present purpose to discuss the bearing of the landslide towards Protection, whether on the national or the Imperial basis, on the immediate political situation.

For the Unionist Party the problem is essentially simplified, if it will only have the courage of its own convictions and lead the nation where it wants to be led. After the bankers' manifesto the leading Conservative newspapers, *The Times*, the *Telegraph*, and the *Morning Post*, hastened to assume that no more would be heard of the referendum, which now only awaits the appropriate occasion for its obituary notice. Whatever the arguments in its favour at one time, it is essentially a dilatory device, and the nation is in no mood for anything except decisive action. There can be only one policy for the Unionist Party to-day, and that is to demand an absolutely free hand to impose such duties as it may believe to be in the public interest. There is no reason

why it should impose a duty on any foodstuff, unless a clear balance of advantage, whether from the point of view of Empire negotiation or of domestic agriculture, lies in its imposition, or unless it is satisfied that the cost of living of the people is not prejudicially affected. But it should insist on the right to judge these points on merits, and to act upon its judgment, and not tie its hands in advance by pledges which are, in fact, an admission of untrustworthiness or incapacity.

How, in this case, is the party to meet the cry of 'dear food'—a cry far less effective, indeed, than it was, but still a serious factor to reckon with in an electorate such as ours is to-day? It cannot be done by putting our heads in the sand. Avoiding the subject on the platform is not going to mitigate what enemy canvassers will say in the back streets. There is only one way of dealing with bogeys, and that is to drag them into the light and expose them. The experience of safeguarding has already educated the public to understand that a duty will not send up the price if the untaxed supply is sufficient. But more than a merely defensive argument is required. What is needed is an offensive campaign to bring out the fact that the present system of ever-increasing taxes must mean, and does mean, dear houses, dear clothes, dear food, and ever-shrinking employment. No more effective platform argument could be used to illustrate this than the fact that the loaf to-day costs 3d. more than it did some twenty years ago when wheat was the same price as it is at present. We must rub it into the public that there is only one way to secure cheap food and to reduce the cost of living, and that is to reduce taxation, and that the only effective way to reduce taxation is to increase production, and that every measure, whether of safeguarding or of Empire reciprocity, which enlarges our market and increases our output must therefore be a measure making for cheapness. Our answer to a false charge should be not merely to deny it, or even explain it away, least of all to run away from it, but to fasten upon our opponents the true charge of being 'food taxers,' which we are fully justified in bringing against them.

In dealing with this question of 'taxing food' it is, however, worth keeping in mind that, electorally speaking, 'food' means, in the main, bread. The dear loaf complex is a very real psychological factor, and if that were removed, the fear about the effect of our policy on other foodstuffs would be a much less serious obstacle. Now, as far as home agriculture is concerned, we are already committed to help wheat production, not by the method of duty, but by the method of guarantee, probably supplemented, to judge by Mr. Baldwin's most recent utterance on the subject, by some quota scheme worked by the millers. If so, it is at least worth considering whether the same method might not be

applicable to Dominion wheat. If the method is that of the quota, the same machinery that would administer the United Kingdom quota could administer the Empire quota. If it is guarantee, an appropriate price could no doubt be fixed for Canadian or Australian wheat, and jointly guaranteed by the British Government and the Government of the Dominion concerned. Generally speaking, the method of a customs duty is by far the simplest, fairest and most flexible. It involves no bureaucratic interference with individual transactions. It exercises a steady pressure, gentle or firm according to the rate of the duty, upon the course of trade, but leaves time to those whom it hits to adjust themselves to the new situation by paying the duty while looking for other markets or contracting their output. It is thus far less likely to lead to friction, international, inter-Imperial or domestic, than any scheme of bulk purchase, or even of quota, worked under Government auspices. Lastly, unlike bulk purchase or guarantee, it brings in money instead of costing money, which means that the Treasury will not devote all its ingenuity to defeating or obstructing its operation. But there are a few cases of articles falling into a limited number of easily classified grades, and handled by a very small body of importers, where the method of quota or guarantee might be applicable. Wheat is one of these. Beef, mutton, sugar are other possible examples. There is no reason why Unionist policy should in appropriate cases not give careful consideration to this method of encouraging both home or Empire production, so long as it is clearly realised that over the greater part of the field the natural and most effective form of assistance is that given by duties.

It is on these lines, indeed, and still more on those of state-controlled bulk purchase, that many of the supporters of the present Government would have them approach the problems of the Imperial Conference. This appeared very clearly in the debate on the Unionist vote of censure on July 16, when Sir O. Mosley and Mr. E. F. Wise delivered two remarkably interesting speeches based on the complete acceptance of the ideas of protection and Empire economic unity, but advocating bulk purchase as the most economical and effective method of achieving the desired result. These speeches, listened to with obvious approval by a large proportion of the Socialist members, were directly opposed in argument and spirit to the official Government declarations made by Mr. Snowden and the Prime Minister.

The motion itself was in essence a 'fishing' one. Its object was to discover whether Mr. Thomas's statement on the Dominion Office vote that the Government would enter the Conference absolutely free to discuss every proposal on its merits had really

superseded Mr. Snowden's earlier declaration that all existing food taxes and their accompanying preferences would be wiped out as soon as possible. The debate certainly left no doubt as to the attitude of the dominant section in the Cabinet. While Mr. Snowden and Mr. MacDonald both made perfunctory references to bulk purchase which gave little indication of any real intention to give effective application to such a policy, the whole gist of their speeches was completely negative. The Dominions might, if they wished, discuss proposals involving duties. But the British Government were firmly resolved to have nothing to do with any such proposals. Both speeches, too, concentrated on proving that the Dominions would in no circumstances do anything for British trade, whatever advantages we might give them, and Mr. Snowden even poured contempt on the idea that any substantial expansion of Dominion trade was possible.

Whatever hopes Mr. Thomas may have entertained of making a great success of the economic side of the Imperial Conference have been pretty effectively scotched. No one who heard Mr. Snowden, or who knows the intrinsic difficulties, cost, and risk attending bulk purchase schemes, will expect anything much to materialise on that line. Nor need anyone fear the prospect of the Government going to the country after a successful Conference and 'dishing the Tories' with a programme of Empire unity achieved and protection offered. The Government will hang on, committed to a policy of negation on the Imperial as on the domestic issue, until such time as internal dissensions or Liberal dissatisfaction bring about a parliamentary defeat.

This throws the initiative in policy back upon the Unionists. Mr. Baldwin, in opening the debate on July 16, confined himself, as he was fully entitled to do, to stating what he would do if he were in office and in charge of the Imperial Conference. That situation, however convenient as enabling him to present to the country the actual details of an agreed scheme of Empire reciprocity, is not likely to arise. The prospect we have to envisage is that of an election, which may come at any time after the Conference, and for which it is essential to prepare the mind of our party and of the electorate from now onward. I have already stated what I believe to be the only policy which we can pursue—the policy of the free hand, free from all paralysing negative pledges or dilatory expedients, free for immediate and decisive action. But such a policy can only succeed if the ground is prepared for it by intensive preaching of a definite and coherent creed. To drift into it is only to court disaster. Recent bye-elections in Shettleston and North Norfolk have shown significant and hopeful reductions in Labour majorities. But they have also shown that even the amazing vigour and impassioned elo-

quence of Lord Beaverbrook, and all the power of his Press, concentrated on a single seat, cannot in a fortnight's campaign sufficiently shift the slow-moving and suspicious mind of a large section of the electorate.

What is needed to-day is not manœuvring for some formula to satisfy the timid section of our party, nor yet frightening them into courage by the threat of rival candidates, but an Empire crusade in the true sense of the word, a crusade of education, carried on with conviction and enthusiasm by a large band of workers from one end of the kingdom to the other. Whether that crusade is to be conducted by Lord Beaverbrook, or by the Unionist Central Office under Mr. Neville Chamberlain's capable direction, or, as I should like to see it, by both working in co-operation, is a minor matter. What is essential is that it should be begun as soon as possible, with the knowledge that the whole fate of this country and of the Empire depends upon its success.

L. S. AMERY.'

THE INDIAN SCENE

I. THE SIMON REPORT

THE task remitted to the Simon Commission when it set out on its ungrateful exploration was not merely to propose a scheme for the better government of India. It was—what is so often forgotten in Britain—to direct its inquiry in a particular direction indicated in advance. It may seem strange to those not in vivid contact with the extraordinary views of the Indian problem widely held in this land that in the first volume of the Report the Commission should have laid such stress on the objective definitely given to British policy—in the Declaration of 1917, which Lord Curzon had a considerable hand in framing; in the preamble to the Act of 1919; and in the Instrument of Instructions issued to those in authority in India—'the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the empire.' Last autumn that policy was further clarified by the authoritative statement that by responsible government was meant Dominion status. It is one of the many ironies of the Indian political situation that, whilst so much sound and fury were raised by the use of the term 'Dominion status,' so little attention was paid to the definition of our goal as responsible government. It passes the wit of man to conceive that there is any difference between the two. The real test applied to the recommendations of the Commission, by the men who will have to work them in India, is whether they lead directly to this end—responsible government, meaning, by that term, Dominion status.

But there is another condition which the recommendations of the Commission have to satisfy, on which the same emphasis is not laid. It is an axiom in constitutional history that almost any constitution will function if there exists the will to work it, whilst the most ingenious scheme ever devised may fail if it lack this vitalising ichor. What is the stage of public feeling which any new constitution must at any rate attempt to satisfy? Here it is best to use the actual words of the Report. Alluding to the increasing sense of unity, the Commission invite attention

to 'the growth of a passionate determination among the politically minded classes of all Indian races and religions to assert and uphold the claim of India as a whole to its due place in the world.' This overmastering sentiment is developed in the closing passage of the first volume, where it is set forth that :

While the experienced Indian member of the Services will admit the benefits of the British Raj and realise the difficulties in the way of complete self-government ; while the member of a minority community, putting the safety of his community first, will stipulate for safeguards ; and while the moderate may look askance at extremist methods which he will not openly denounce ; all alike are in sympathy with the demand for equal status with the European and proclaim their belief in self-determination for India.

No one who knows India will question the absolute accuracy and justice of these definitions. The two volumes of the Report cover nearly 800 pages, close-packed with knowledge, fact and argument. If we attempt to follow it through these forests we shall never see the wood for the trees. I shall therefore indicate only two or three broad questions of policy, examine them in the light of the dual conditions of the problem indicated above, and try and show how far they satisfy the essential facts which govern the Indian situation.

A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION : UNITY IN DIVERSITY

The Commission lays down two broad principles which have governed its recommendations—that the new Constitution should, as far as possible, contain within itself provision for its own development ; and that any constitutional changes now recommended for British India must have regard to a future development when India as a whole, not merely British India, will take her place among the constituent States of the Commonwealth of Nations united under the Crown. Both these are important ; the latter is immeasurably the more important. If the Commission had done nothing else, it would have justified its work by directing our gaze steadfastly towards the one possible end—the evolution of a federation which will embrace the whole of that vast and varied land. Many Indian publicists cherish the idea of a unitary State for the whole country, with a sovereign Legislature sitting at Delhi, responsible for Indian polity in small things as well as large. The inexorable facts of geography, as well as race, religion and history, are against them ; an all-embracing Legislature which must be predominantly Hindu would never be accepted by the great minorities, and would lead direct to fission and confusion. It would necessarily be divorced

from quick contact with popular feeling. The rural constituencies returning a single member to the Legislative Assembly are nowhere less than 6000 miles in area, and a constituency, taken at random from Madras, contains over 25,000 voters scattered amongst a population of 6,000,000, spread over an area of over 31,000 square miles. But, apart from the inexorable facts of geography, there is the infinite variety of India. Lest the Simon Commission be suspected of bias, let me quote one of the most experienced and suggestive publicists, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla, who in a scheme he propounded last year used these words :

Looking to the size of the country and the variety of peoples inhabiting India, it appears futile to concentrate attention on conditions which are successfully worked in different countries in Europe under very different conditions. A constitution really suited to Indian conditions can only be found on the principles of unity in diversity. There should be an All-India Government with specified duties and obligations and Free States with residuary powers forming a Commonwealth of India.

Moreover, it is only on federal principles that we can ever think of India as a whole—of the Indian States as well as British India. The basic weakness in all earlier constitutional proposals is that they have drawn a rigid line of demarcation between those areas for which the Crown is directly responsible and that third of India and fifth of her population which is under the princes of varying degree. True, Lord Chelmsford gave the Indian States a corporate existence through the Chamber of Princes ; that Chamber sits in the tripartite legislative building which brings the princes, the elders in the Council of State, and the Legislative Assembly under one roof. But there is no contact between the Indian States and British India save through the personality of the Viceroy ; no liaison between the Indian States and the Government of India in relation to the Legislature. That can be effected only through federation and the application of federal principles in the framing of the Constitution ; this is the one path to unity, and it must be resolutely trodden.

THE CONSTITUENT STATES

The foundations of this federation will be laid in the constituent States, which we now call provinces, with the ultimate association of the Indian States each under its own ruler. The Commission has nowhere been fortunate in its nomenclature, and we shall never think clearly until we abandon the term ' province ' and substitute ' State.' It may be argued that this is merely a name ; it is more, for it expresses an idea. So long as we use the term province, we shall always think of some area entirely

subordinate to the centre ; as soon as we adopt the designation State, we shall realise that these are distinct entities, each working out its own destinies according to its conditions and needs, where the vigorous ideas of the new India will find their fullest expression.

In regard to these States the proposals of the Commission are at once bold and wise. It proposes the abolition of dyarchy—the division of the administration into two parts, one responsible to the legislature and the other directly to the Governor—and the establishment of unitary autonomous Governments, under Chief Ministers, responsible to elected legislatures in everything which is not the function of the Federal Government, with special powers reserved to the Governors to ensure that the King's government shall be carried on in all circumstances. Out of this there arise four issues of importance—the special powers of the Governors, single or bi-cameral legislatures, the transfer of law and order to the Ministry, and the nature of the electorate.

In the present state of Indian politics it is essential that the State Governors shall be armed with special powers. Nowhere in India have definite parties emerged which could provide alternative administrations. Often this is ascribed to the existence of dyarchy and official *blocs* in the provincial legislative councils, and the assumption is made that they will immediately spring up the moment these obstacles are removed. That is not a possibility on which an autonomous and responsible government can be immediately based. These special powers are strictly limited ; they are confined to the preservation of order and the protection of minorities, with the fulfilment of statutory obligations towards the Federal Government, essential liabilities, and service questions. There is nothing anti-democratic in them ; with our eyes too closely fixed on Parliament, we overlook the powers vested in the President and governors in the United States of America. As responsibility develops and parties emerge they should fall into desuetude.

On the question of single chambers, or bi-cameral legislatures, opinion is divided within and without the Commission. Broadly, it may be said that there is no strong feeling in support of second chambers in India, and their establishment is often actively disliked. We already make heavy drafts on the political experience available, and with the powers vested in Governors there is no place for a revising chamber.

Round the proposal to transfer law and order to the Ministry a battle royal will be joined, especially in view of the intensity of communal feeling in India. But the arguments employed by the Commission are conclusive. There can be no real responsibility without the charge of law and order, and we do not seek to

perpetuate the confusion of divided authority. But in this connexion there is much to be said for the suggestion of Mr. Kikabhai Premchand, in the Minority Report which he appended to the recommendations of the Central Committee which co-operated with the Simon Commission, that the head of the police should be an All-India officer, above all local or communal influences, and that the control of the judiciary should be vested in the High Courts.

It is a misfortune that these liberal and far-reaching proposals, which should command general acceptance here and in India, are linked with others of the most controversial and dangerous character. What, after all, is the difference between government and no government ? It is the power of the Administration to make its will respected. We are aiming at basing these responsible State Governments on the popular will expressed through the ballot-box ; the character of the electorate is all-important. That at present is small, but, disproportionate as it may be to the population, it is still largely inexperienced. The Commission itself says : ' It is nevertheless apparent that ignorance and superstition put some classes of the electorate at the mercy of ingenious and unscrupulous canvassers. Undesirable forms of pressure are probably fairly common.' Yet, having used this and even stronger language, it recommends that the electorate be arbitrarily expanded to embrace about 10 per cent. of the population. It is difficult to discern any principle whatsoever behind this proposal. Why this particular figure of 10 per cent. ? It would be reasonable to suggest that the qualifications for the franchise should be widened and leave the electorate to expand naturally in response to it ; but to lay down a rigid figure, regardless of educational and social qualifications, is to court the perils of which Mr. J. H. Thomas has often warned the British people—the vesting of immense powers in an inexperienced democracy.

The Commission has further tied up its conclusions with a proposal for inquiry into the readjustment of the present boundaries of the provinces which are to grow into States. This is a favourite exercise of those who do not realise the immensity of the difficulties involved. There is an overwhelming case for the separation of Burma from India ; a less convincing one for the separate existence of Sind and Orissa. But the present provinces are something more than fortuitous collections of areas ; they are definite units of government, with strong provincial feeling behind them, and a costly system of administration built up on their integrity. Surely the history of the partition of Bengal carries its own lesson ? It is impossible to divide even a district without raising very strong local objections. There is also the

question of cost. In the financial memorandum by Sir Walter Layton annexed to the Report it is shown that the ratio of taxation to national income in India is small—6 to 8 per cent., according to the method of computation, as compared with 20 per cent. in Britain and Japan; but an unusually small proportion of the revenue raised is used in services which are of direct benefit in raising the status of the masses of the people. With the provinces requiring some forty to fifty crores of new money a year in order to discharge their obligations, it would be folly to add to the present excessively top-heavy expenditure by carving out new administrative areas which in no circumstances could be cheap.

A very important provision in the Report must not be overlooked. The provincial councils as at present constituted are legislative, and not constituent; they have no power to vary their own constitution. It is proposed to give them this power in certain directions and under certain safeguards, thus enabling them to grow without dependence on Acts of an overburdened Parliament. This satisfies the principle that the new Constitution shall, so far as possible, contain the germ of its own growth.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Special attention is devoted to the constituent States—and rightly, because they will form the foundations of the Federal Government—and the areas where the new spirit in the land will find the freest play. When we approach the constitution of the Federal Government it is to tackle a question of the greatest difficulty. Everyone is agreed that the Federal Government must be strong; that the Executive must be quick to act and free from the control of the Legislature in its day-to-day activities. There is another consideration not so often emphasised; many Indian publicists have declared that they will accept no Constitution which does not embody some measure of responsibility to the Legislature. But beyond these points of general agreement no two persons are at one as to how they are to be expressed. The proposals of the Commission are that the Federal Legislature shall be elected entirely by the provincial or State legislatures. That is wise. From the geographical conditions outlined earlier, it is clear that by direct election no real contact between the member and his constituency can be established. One of the greatest defects in the Act of 1919 was the abandonment of the secondary electorates; that excluded from the Councils many men of experience in local government and destroyed the valuable liaison between the provinces and the Central Legislature. The federal body is to inherit all the powers of the present Legislative Assembly, the Council of State, or Second Chamber, to be retained,

with the present special powers vested in the Viceroy. But the Executive is to be chosen entirely by the Governor-General, and to be neither removable by, nor responsible to, the Federal Legislature.

Is that a system which promises smooth working, or contains any element of permanence? Let us cast our memories back. Since the passing of the Act of 1919 the Government of India has been faced by an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly. That majority has been powerful for criticism, often very influential, directly and indirectly, but incapable of removing the Executive, consequently free from having to bear responsibility for its barbed shafts. On the one side there has been criticism without responsibility; on the other administration tempered by cajolery, certification and veto—conditions which assuredly have not tended to strength in the Executive. No doubt the Commission looks to the responsibility which members of the new Federal Assembly will owe to the State councils which elect them. Possibly it visualises the Federal Assembly as chiefly interested in providing funds for the provincial States whence they come through the Provincial Fund which Sir Walter Layton proposes. These are large assumptions in the present temper of Indian politics. The more one examines the problem, the greater are the complexities which it presents. But, recognising that a slavish imitation of British parliamentarianism is totally unsuited to Indian conditions, and that we have to create a federal system out of a unitary Government which has arrogated and exercised excessive powers, it seems to me that the constitution of the Federal Government must be further considered, with the determination to invest it, if possible, with the element of responsibility if it is not to founder on the rocks of irreconcilable opposition.

DEFENCE

Not less complicated is the position of the Army under the new Constitution. We must be honest with ourselves. Our present difficulties are largely of our own making. We have built up a splendid military instrument in the Indian Army, but until the first Indian cadets were admitted to Sandhurst after the war it was one in which Indians could serve only in a subordinate capacity. We are now confronted with this insistent demand for rapid progress towards responsible government, and a military machine which cannot, as it stands, be passed over to an Indian Government. The Frontier, with hordes of brave well-armed tribesmen hovering over it and a great State not a member of the League of Nations beyond, demands that the Indian Army must be maintained at the highest pitch of efficiency. The

maintenance of internal order amid the communal feuds which distract the land demands that it shall be an absolutely reliable instrument. For these reasons the Commission, whilst rejecting emphatically the idea that the needs of defence can be allowed to constitute an irremovable obstacle to the attainment of responsible government, and urging that steady progress should be made with the policy which contemplates the building up of an entirely Indian force, proposes that defence shall be treated as an Imperial concern, India contributing a fixed sum annually which shall not be votable. Here, again, we must ask ourselves how long will a Federal Legislature be content with the diversion of a large part of the revenues to military expenditure over which it has neither voice nor influence.

THE INDIAN STATES

No scheme for the development of the Constitution of India can be worth the paper it is written upon unless it embraces the Indian States as part of the constituent whole. And, as a personal view, it is imperative that the Indian States shall be brought within the fabric of the federation through their one organic body, the Chamber of Princes, and no ear lent to narrow particularism. The units of the federation the Commission visualises would be the provincial States with their Ministries responsible to their legislatures; and the Indian States autonomously governed so far as their internal affairs are concerned; and over all the representative of the Crown, as Viceroy in relation to the Indian States and Governor-General in relation to British India—an admirable ideal. As a first step it proposes the creation of the Council for Greater India, to contain representatives of British India and the Indian States, to treat of matters of common concern. It is probably impossible to go farther now. But what is Greater India? We know only one India, though it contains two parts, British India and the Indian States. This ridiculous title may jeopardise the Council from the first; it would be far happier to take a name which has prestige behind it—for instance, His Majesty's Privy Council for India.

CONCLUSION

The Report of the Commission has been approached from two angles—that it is sacrosanct, and in no respect must it be departed from; and that it is worthless and must be discarded. Both are equally absurd. I know of no report of any Commission in our history which was treated as the last word; certainly the recommendations of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford were sub-

stantially altered by Parliament. Nor can any body charged with the framing of a progressive Constitution for India fail to take the conclusions of this Commission as the groundwork. The first volume, which surveyed the field, is one of the most masterly Blue-books in our official literature. The recommendations in regard to the provinces, which we must treat as States, are far-reaching and on the whole wise. If the Commission falters when it comes to deal with the Federal Legislature and defence, that springs from the immense difficulties inherent in the situation; its proposals must be re-examined with the determination to seek a form of government which will be at once strong, and at the same time contain the seeds of growth from within and mobilise behind it the driving force of public opinion.

STANLEY REED.

THE INDIAN SCENE

II. THE REPORT AND AFTER

SEVEN good men and true were despatched by Parliament on a mission to square, if they could, the Indian political circle. They have circled the square miles of India, and have submitted the results of their inquiry, and the recommendations which they have to place before Parliament and the British nation, no less than before those limited numbers in India who are capable of playing an intelligent part in politics. Such men, outside the Indians in the higher services, are few in numbers, for I doubt whether there are more than a few thousand who could stand an examination on the Simon Report, no matter how many times they have read it; or who could give any reasoned idea of the real meaning of 'Responsible Government,' and the manner in which it should or would work over the sub-continent as a whole. Shouting for Swaraj is one thing; working it is another. Yet almost the whole of political India is writing and talking as if these two things were identical. Even those men who were able to draw up in polished English a Nehru Constitution as a thesis appear unable to perceive that when they say that they have not read the Report, and do not intend to read it, but that in their opinion it is a despicable document, they are destroying any reputation that they might wish to claim for commonsense, fairmindedness, and goodwill. One of the so-called 'Moderates,'—or 'Liberals,' as they like to term themselves—who has presumably read the Report, is said to have described it as 'a piece of unparalleled political humbug and chicanery,' and to have gone on to compare this document with Miss Katherine Mayo's book, *Mother India*. This is not the outpouring of some irresponsible fanatic, but the language used by a man who under this 'repressive British Government' held the high position of Law Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council.

And now to the Report itself.

Volume i. lays before the British public a wonderful panorama of the vast sub-continent which we call India, and the diversified nature of the races and creeds which go to make up its huge

population. The whole situation is depicted with great skill and lucidity, and is entirely free from exaggeration; indeed, the Commission is careful to be a little blind to the political defects, and exceedingly kind to the political virtues, which the actual working of the existing Reforms has disclosed. No body of men could have more greatly striven than have Sir John Simon and his colleagues to be fair both to British achievements and to Indian aspirations; to understand both, and to make allowances for all points of view.

In volume ii. the Commission has courageously laid bare the grounds for the numerous doubts and difficulties which have assailed it at every step, and has tersely and lucidly explained the reasons which have led it, on the balance of arguments, to prefer one conclusion to another. It has left no doubt in the mind of any impartial reader that it has based its recommendations on a strict adherence to the ultimate goal which Mr. Montagu announced and Parliament ratified by passing the Government of India Act of 1919. It has nowhere criticised the wisdom of that announcement, although it makes it clear that the ultimate realisation of the goal, when and if it is realised, is more likely to shape itself on some other model than that of Westminster. The Report stands, and will always stand, as a clearing of sound argument and lucid exposition in a vast wilderness of specious phrases, conflicting claims and turbulent demands, whereby the basic facts that must govern the situation are entirely obscured.

All will agree in principle that, no matter what shape the new Indian Constitution takes, it can succeed in the present and progress in the future only by peaceful co-operation between the divergent elements that go to make up the whole; and it is on this account that the Commissioners, while commending a bold advance towards self-government in the provinces, find it necessary to ensure security, both from foes without and foes within, in order that their scheme of constitutional advance may enjoy the degree of stability essential to all progress.

Since 1858, for the last seventy-two years, that stability has been secured, for reasons upon which it is unnecessary to dilate, by the maintenance of the *Pax Britannica*; and the Commissioners believe that for many years to come the continuance of this *Pax Britannica* must be secured, or the new constitutional fabric will be wrecked on the threshold. They therefore provide that the new Central Government shall be strong; that the Army in India must be kept entirely away from politics and political contest; that reserve powers shall continue to reside in the Governor-General and the Governors of provinces, to be used in certain emergencies of a specified nature, and that the security services must be retained on an All-India basis, and

under the control of the Secretary of State. With these bulwarks against the complete wreck of young self-governing institutions by foreign invasions or internal disorder, the Commissioners tried to envisage the future progress towards a federation of Indian States and British Indian provinces under a federal Government in which both shall exercise a voice in controlling those functions of government which are generally recognised the world over as pertaining to a central authority rather than to the component States which make up the combined territory.

The Commissioners have refrained from referring to the term 'Dominion Status' which has figured in the announcements of the Viceroy with the approval of His Majesty's present Government, and has just been repeated since the publication of the Report. Their silence is obviously deliberate. These announcements have been made without their consent in a way that was bound to prejudice the acceptance of their conclusions. They could not criticise the term without both criticising the Viceroy and the Government that had used or sanctioned its use. On the other hand, they were unable to commend it.

Every territory, small or great, developed or backward, is one of the dominions of the King. Every such dominion, from the great self-governing Colonial States down to the smallest island under the Union Jack, has a *status* of its own. The United Kingdom and India are exceptional only because one is called a kingdom and the other an empire, though they are equally dominions under the sovereignty of the Crown. The term 'Dominion' (with a capital 'D') is a term of comparatively recent coinage, and the status attached to it is one which has not yet been defined by statute. India might at some date take her place as a component part of the collection of self-governing States that owe allegiance to the Crown, but, if so, she would not fall into the same category as Canada or New Zealand, if only for the reason that greater India contains both the territories of Indian princes, which are not democracies, and of British provinces which would be self-governing in the modern sense. The constitutions of these dominion States inside the British Empire are not exactly similar to one another, and it is not even certain that they have reached a final stage, but Indian politicians concentrate upon the description of the group of Dominions which was put into popular rather than legal language at the Imperial Conference of 1926. From this description they derive the conclusion that these Dominions possess the right to secede, and that if similar conditions were applied to India, secession—that is to say, complete independence—could be no longer constitutionally and legally resisted. No one who reads the Montagu announcement of 1917, or the preamble to the Government of India Act, can

suppose that the responsible government to which he refers was intended to include a right of secession. To declare, therefore, that words used in 1926 in respect of British Colonies were implicit in an announcement made nine years before is to add to, and not merely to interpret, the significance of Mr. Montagu's announcement. Those who know Indian politicians, and who they really are, know that they do not care a straw about distant goals; what they want is immediate power, and they were certain to take the Viceroy's announcement as an attempt to mollify the ultimatum delivered by Congress in December 1928. The Government fell into this trap; the Simon Commission refused to do so; and the Government now find themselves in the awkward position either of admitting their error or of throwing over the Simon Report as, forsooth, a reactionary document. In the former case, they will be certainly accused of deceiving the Indian public; in the latter, they will certainly have deceived the British nation.

In the meantime the Commission has pointed out the only direction in which it is even possible to discern, however dimly, an India settling down as a federal State among the families of nations that compose the British Empire as it exists to-day. The road they sketch is long, and its length cannot yet be measured, but the course is set to a definite scheme of development instead of to a terminus of confused issues and disputable phrases.

The Commissioners would be themselves the last to deny that there is room for criticism of some among the multifarious proposals that they put forward. For example, their scheme depends upon the bulwarks standing against the pressure to which they will be subjected. They desire a franchise which will at least treble the present electorates in the hope that these enlarged electorates will exercise greater restraint upon an oligarchy (p. 94 of volume ii.) of Ministers and legislative bodies than the present smaller electorates have been able to do. They may, or they may not. Certainly the example of Burma, where elementary literacy is much more widely developed than in India, and the electorates are even now larger than the Commissioners project for Indian provinces, cannot be called encouraging. Indeed, it is the reverse. The Commissioners also advocate that the provincial legislative councils should be much enlarged, and they propose further the abolition of what is called the official *bloc*. The enlargement of the councils is intended to follow naturally from the extension of the franchise, but the abolition of the official *bloc* is recommended for other reasons.

The case for this drastic elimination of official influence from the councils is based on the argument that the presence of the small band of officials militates against the growth of the sense

of responsibility in these legislative bodies. This is the position taken by all those who desire to defend provincial councils from an indictment of irresponsibility. When the opinion is expressed that provincial legislative councils have on the whole not been too unreasonable, and the fact that certain Bills have been passed and supplies voted is adduced in their favour, it would certainly be worth investigation of the division lists in order to discover how many of the measures passed would have been rejected if it had not been for the voting power and the influence of the official members. Indeed, it would be necessary to go even further and examine what motions before these councils would have been respectively passed or rejected if the decision had been that of Hindu elected members only, for in the majority of councils, if there had been no official *bloc*, the Hindu vote would have been greater than the aggregate vote of the various minorities which find a place on these bodies. It is to be observed that in two provinces the system of government broke down; it is also to be observed that the National Congress, which at all events has not displayed much sense of responsibility for a great many years past, has throughout been entirely free from all Government influence within that body. To my judgment at least, this step proposed by the Commissioners is a leap in the dark. For it is at least equally possible that those reasonable Indians who have supported reasonable measures were inspired to hold out against the opposition by the example and support of the Government members and of their European non-official colleagues. The Commissioners have partially recognised this danger by their proposal to permit of the influence of a limited number of officials who can be heard on the merits of those subjects of which they possess special administrative or expert knowledge, but without any right to vote. This half-way house is absolutely essential if the abolition of official members on the legislatures should be accepted.

The Commission further proposes that a Governor may appoint one or two official Ministers (or even non-officials), Indian or British, who would not be drawn from the legislative council. Such a Minister would be in charge of a portfolio and would have equal rights with other Ministers as a member of the Governor's Cabinet. This is a very valuable safeguard which is sure to be resisted by the politicians. Lord Burnham's view that these official Ministers should be made compulsory by statute has much to commend it, for there would be a risk that a Governor might be tempted to dispense with such Ministers if their appointment was purely optional and was bitterly opposed by the intelligentsia. It is absolutely essential that the Governor's Cabinet should contain one or two Ministers whose tenure is not at the mercy of an irresponsible Press.

The Commissioners argue at length the propriety of transferring law and order (with the departments which that term covers) to the responsibility of the councils. They do not minimise the risks attaching to the course which they commend. They hope that the conferral of this power will so increase the sense of responsibility among Ministers and legislators that the evils which many predict from such a step will not occur. In this they are sanguine. There is real danger that the cause of justice may be tampered with for political, communal, and, I am afraid, sometimes mercenary reasons. It is well known that the onset of these tendencies is in its nature insidious, and may go a long way before it is clearly manifested. Disintegration in the loyalty and honesty of a police force or a magistracy may proceed very stealthily before the breaking point is reached. The individual occurrences which induce to it may not be susceptible of proof, and may singly not be very important, but their cumulative effect may be great, and even devastating. The check of an enlightened public opinion, so powerful in our own country to resist any such tendencies, is wholly lacking in India. The progress in restraining corruption has come, not from the pressure of public opinion in India, but from the application to Indian conditions of the standards which the Government and its higher services have brought with them from England. This is one of the reasons which must have influenced the Commission in the insistence that they place upon the preservation of a British element in the services. But, even with all the safeguards for the services which are recommended, there is no certainty that British recruits will be forthcoming, while, on the other hand, under the proposed Constitution, the influence that the services can bring to bear on the conduct of public affairs must obviously be much weaker in comparison with the past. The public servant had the assurance of support from the Government if he did his duty manfully. That assurance is even now much reduced, and in the future there may be no such assurance at all. A right of retiring on proportionate pension is not complete compensation for the loss of a secure career, and it at best offers only a very negative attraction to induce high-class recruits to enter the services. Nevertheless, the Commission deserves the gratitude of the services both for the generous tribute that it pays to their labours in the cause of India and for the recommendations that it makes in the hope of preserving them. This recommendation is in marked contrast to the defeatist proposal of at least one provincial Government that the security services must be provincialised for the gratification of provincial Ministers.

The Commissioners attach supreme importance to the extraordinary powers proposed for the provincial Governors and the

Governor-General. The necessity for such powers is often admitted, even by politicians, in the abstract, but their use in the concrete is a very different matter. The strain upon the Governor and the Governor-General to decide when the time has come to use these powers is bound to be very great. Even in the last few years there have been instances when they should have, but have not, been used. No instruments of instructions can be drawn up which do not somewhere conflict with one another, and wherever the observance of one instruction seems to involve the neglect of another the Governor, being a human being, will be tempted to follow the line of least resistance. A decision one way may raise a storm of clamour; a decision the other may sacrifice an interest which is unable to make its protest heard. It is obvious, therefore, that the selection of men for Governorships will be more difficult in the future than it has been in the past. Will the right men be forthcoming, and will they be selected?

The Commission's scheme for a 'Federal Assembly' to replace the present Legislative Assembly gives effect to a very important principle—namely, that the members of the new Assembly should be delegates to represent the provinces, and not the representatives of constituencies too large and too ignorant to establish any real connexion between the member and his constituency. Thus Bengal and Madras may have an inherent right to governing Bengalis and Madrasis, but such right cannot possibly extend to other parts of India. Only British rule made it possible to combine these countries and races under one Government, and only British rule can keep them combined. The fact that British authority has been exercised over several different peoples does not give these peoples any inherent right whatsoever to exercise authority over each other. All the right that they do possess is to see that in matters which pertain to the Central Power the interests of their own particular race are not subordinated to the interests of others. This necessity is met by the system of delegation which the Commission proposes.

The Simon Commission's scheme of progress represents a series of hopes based upon a true statement of facts, many of which tend to make the realisation of these hopes *primâ facie* very remote. It is a bold and brave attempt to keep India united and secure without repudiating the rash announcement made by Mr. Montagu. That announcement was made without any preliminary survey of the conditions. If the Simon Commission had made their survey in 1917, and Mr. Montagu had deferred any announcement until the results of such a survey were in his hands, then the history of Indian reforms would have been written differently.

And what comes after?

Each day the situation becomes more fraught with peril. For the last three years the policy followed in India has been to placate, if it were possible, a Hindu Congress which is set upon bringing British rule to an end, and each attempt to conciliate and placate has merely served to increase both the demands themselves and the insolent vehemence with which they are pressed. The great error has been to mistake a conspiracy led by Brahmins for a true national demand, and this mistake is being repeated every day. How is it possible to secure by conciliation the surrender of enemies who are flushed with success, and who believe that victory is within their grasp? The Constitution proposed by the Commission, or any other form of Constitution which can be devised to meet the facts, can only be workable if legislative bodies include a substantial majority—to use Mr. Baldwin's favourite expression—of 'men of goodwill.' If this had been secured in the past, then even dyarchy would have proved a success. But if, under the new Constitution, the 'men of goodwill' cannot find seats upon the Legislature, neither this nor any other Constitution can succeed. The 'Round Table Conference' has now taken the place of the Simon Report in Indian political eyes. Sir John Simon's letter to the Prime Minister was intended to provide for a consultation between representatives of Great Britain, British India, and the Indian princes as to the best method by which the Indian States could be fitted into a Constitution for Greater India, and it was suggested because the Commission's original terms of reference had not directly extended to the problem of the Indian princes. This plain objective, contemplated by Sir John Simon, has become so broadened that it has developed into a conference at which Indian politicians of all shades expect to make their demands, and expect the British Parliament to accept and give effect to them. If the Congress condescends to attend the Round Table Conference at all, the demand it must make will be for immediate full self-government similar to that existing in Canada or Australia, with a short period of grace by the end of which the British troops will be withdrawn. This is indeed the demand, if slightly disguised, which is put forward by the so-called Liberals, whose only claim to the title of 'moderate' is that, while they give lip disapproval of the civil disobedience campaign, they protest vigorously against any steps taken by the Government to defeat it.

The Government of India would appear to be bracing itself to treat the Simon Report as an interesting exhibit in the case, which shows the inability even of the men who composed the Commission to understand the situation. Yet it is these men alone who have had the unique opportunity of an intensive

examination of the problem without the influence of long years of Indian administration. Such action, if persisted in by the Government of India, is bound to lead to a crisis. Under the atmosphere which has been produced by the continuous policy of surrender before the ambitions of a tiny minority, supported by a venomous Press, defeatism is spreading among millions of Indians otherwise prepared to be loyal, among European business men, who are so shortsighted as to prefer temporary relief from boycott pressure, even at the cost of surrender, and at the risk of future extinction, and, finally, among many stout-hearted Government servants who fear that the slide down the slope has gone so far, and has become so rapid, that no Government which they can find in sight will be strong enough to stay it.

The goodwill necessary for the working of the Simon scheme, or any other scheme with the same objective, can only be secured if the men of evil will are defeated and discredited. It is impossible to rally loyal friends unless they can feel absolutely sure that they will not be abandoned to the tender mercy of the extremists.

The world is watching with intense interest the course of the crisis, and the whole of the British Empire is deeply concerned in the decision that will have to be made. There is imminent danger lest the British Government should be tempted to buy by surrender a temporary relief which can only put off the ultimate crisis by a very short period. The interests at stake are not the grandeur of the British Empire alone, but the peace and happiness of many millions of men.

REGINALD CRADDOCK.

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

No special exertion is needed to discover the origin of the idea which led to the United States of Europe. It stares us in the face. The very name under which it is discussed shows that it springs from the contemplation of the United States of America. In a sense, no doubt, the trend towards a European federation is but natural as a further stage in the evolution which gradually formed European nations by grouping together smaller units. Yet it is 'but natural' only in the somewhat sophisticated atmosphere of historically trained minds. The United States of Europe as a new, wider, and higher unity completing the historical evolution of England, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy does not appeal to us as possessing the same historically vital quality which these national evolutions themselves seem to have.

There is no doubt, at all events, that the determining factor which attracted the attention of publicists and statesmen to the idea of an United States of Europe was the existence of the United States of America. It may be argued that the United States of America had existed for nearly a century and a half. Yes. They existed. But Europe paid no attention to them. The war here, as in everything else, made all the difference, for it was the war that brought out the dramatic contrast between the disunited States of Europe and the United States of America. In a sense, it may be said that the war was lost by Europe and won by America. In a sense only. The phrase is but one of those hasty journalistic sentences which are like neat travelling cases requiring much compression in the packing and much kit left out. But somehow or other the very simplicity of the contrast struck the imagination, particularly when, as a result of the insane economic and financial consequences of the war, the United States of America rapidly became the wealthiest country in the world.

It was then that people looked up their political economy manuals and discovered the classic counter-argument of the English free traders against the protectionists, who gave the United States of America as a brilliant example of prosperity through protection. According to free trade adepts the United States of America owe their prosperity to the fact that they consti-

tute the widest free trade area in the world. The lesson for Europe was obvious. The Continent, it was said, is held in economic thralldom by a network of customs barriers which make trade and industry as precarious as they used to be in mediæval nations and for the same reasons. And the conclusion was no less obvious: let us abolish all these frontiers, and by setting up a European federation let us create a Continental unit on a par with that of the United States of America.

Such are the origins of what became known as Pan-Europa. The movement found a leader of unusual charm and intellectual distinction in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. It was, and still is, one of the most potent factors for peace and intelligent management of international affairs in the field, and by providing a wide, yet definite background for Franco-German conversations it rendered, and is still rendering, invaluable service to the cause of peace.

The next step was frankly official. M. Briand as the Foreign Secretary of the French Republic, and not merely in his private capacity, brought together all the European first delegates at the League Assembly in 1929 and put before them the general lines of a scheme for a European federation. Since then, at the request of the delegates concerned, M. Briand has drafted a memorandum which he has submitted to all the European Governments. This memorandum may briefly be summed up as follows:

The principle of European solidarity to be recognised by all European nations;

A federation of European nations to be set up;

The federation to respect the national sovereignty of every confederate State;

The federation to be organised within the juridical and institutional framework of the League of Nations;

The federation to leave untouched all European affairs at present under the jurisdiction of the League, but to concern itself with those which are left out;

The federation to have an organisation composed of a conference (analogous to the League Assembly), a committee (corresponding to the League Council), and a secretariat.

Now, the first criticism that comes to the mind is that a parallel between the United States of America and the United States of Europe is but one of those false similarities which Pascal compares to painted windows for the sake of symmetry. Much as California may differ from Maine, and Florida from Nebraska, the idea that the States of America and the nations of Europe are comparable entities is a most serious error. The States of America are a cross between natural environments as determined by

geography and climate on the one hand and artificial divisions cut on the map of a new country filled with uprooted immigrants. A few centuries hence California and Maine may differ in spirit as much as Portugal and Finland, but nowadays they do not. For Europe, in the relatively small territory which she occupies, is perhaps the richest creator of different cultures and ways of living that the earth has known. And it is this extraordinary wealth of human spirit and its manifestation in twenty centuries of history which is the specific quality of European life.

Just as the consciousness of our separate personality is at the root of our instinct of preservation and of our ambition, so the consciousness of a national culture and spirit is the cause of the nationalism of European nations. Security (preservation) and conquest (ambition) are national forms of life with the individual varieties of which we are fully familiar. The turbulent history of Europe may be explained in this way as the outcome of the exceptional wealth of national spirits in our continent. It is in vain that economic considerations are put forward in the belief that they will ultimately deal a death-blow to national separatism. Such an idea could only have sprung up in an epoch saturated with economics such as ours. But the fact is that, just as with individuals, nations put a certain number of things above economics; and in particular the things which guarantee their separate existence as nations.

Hence that nationalism, despite our economists, dictates economic life and not economic life nationalism; hence the uses and the abuses of protection. Viewed in this light, the comparison of economic conditions between Europe and the United States of America becomes illuminating. True, the vast free trade area of the United States is an economic asset. But how is it possible? Because what is lost by one State is gained by another State within the same national allegiance. When, as in recent years, cotton-spinning began to emigrate southward, New England suffered economic hardships, yet no ill feeling ensued because it all happened within the same family. What if the loss of Germany had been the gain of France or Poland? The economic aspect of things must wait on the political, and no unity of European economics is possible until Europe feels herself one.

With his usual penetration M. Briand has seen this point in all its importance. In his memorandum the need of solving political matters first is clearly emphasised. But what are these political matters? To enunciate them would be a hopeless task. Everything is political. I have seen political battles rage in Geneva over such matters as 'white slave' traffic or Esperanto. Everything is political, because directly or indirectly everything touches that feeling of separate personality which is glorified under the

proud and vain name of sovereignty. Now the important point is that this feeling of separate personality is as strong between European nations as it is between European and non-European nations, or, in other words, there is no political basis for a European federation which does not *ipso facto* provide a basis for a world federation.

This is an obvious fact. The idea that a continent provides a basis for union is fallacious. It is, in fact, an American idea born of a hasty generalisation of the American experience. It is true enough for the United States of America—though, again, we do not know how absurd it may appear to the Californians and New Yorkers of 2100 A.D.—but it breaks down even in the North American continent, as anyone who has spoken with Canadians and Mexicans will have realised. It has but little value in South America, a continent of dispersion. It means but little in Asia, where the connexion between Siberia and Syria is *nil*, even though the chain Japan-China-India-Indo-China may present a semblance of continuity to far-off eyes. It means nothing in Europe. We could imagine political evolutions which might bring about a federation of Spain with some South American countries, or of England with the United States of America, or of Italy with Egypt, or of Greece with Asia Minor, with less difficulty than a federation uniting Sweden with Serbia and Portugal with Norway. The links that unite European nations between themselves are at most as strong as, and often less strong than, those which unite any of them with non-European nations such as the United States, the Argentine Republic, or Japan.

Furthermore, the best machinery for furthering European and world union is already in existence. The League, with its Court and Labour Office, has many advantages over the European federation which M. Briand advocates. The first advantage is that the League exists and has behind it ten years of experience and considerable success. The second advantage is that the League brings to bear on European matters the co-operation of non-European nations. This is a most invaluable asset both on the theoretical or moral and on the practical or political plane. It is right that the principle of world unity should be emphasised by handing over European affairs to bodies in which all the world is represented, and the League thus remains above the reproach of provincialism which a strictly European body might call forth and would probably deserve. Then experience has shown that non-European co-operation brings in a soothing element by providing a certain number of judicial detached members for the committees concerned. On the ground of procedure, therefore, there seems to be no advantage in the new plan.

It is doubtful, moreover, whether more machinery should be

created while full use is not made of the available institutions. It is obvious that the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat are not working at full efficiency. This is truer still of the Court. Either these institutions are held up by difficulties or they are not. For instance, the Balkans, the Italo-Serbian difficulties, the Franco-Italian difficulties, are allowed to drift. Numerous conflicts of a judicial nature are held up on their way to the Court. Does anyone believe that a strictly European organisation would do more? The number of Assembly resolutions shelved without results, of conventions unratified, is already large. Is it wise to add to the list of international organisations while those already in existence are not used to the best advantage owing to passive resistance, remissness, suspicion, and even active opposition, on the part of most if not of all nations?

There is another danger. We are asked to contemplate a simultaneous working of the world League and of the European federation. Some meetings would be world meetings, others would be meetings of Europeans only. This would presumably apply to the Assembly (which would shed some of its members to become the European Conference), to the Council (which, shorn of its Asiatics and South Americans, would become a European Committee), to the Commissions (which would be equally operated upon to become Europeanised), possibly to the Secretariat. No one with any experience of Geneva should doubt of the disastrous effects of such a scheme on the feeling of world solidarity which it is so important to foster in our day. The loss in world solidarity would be infinitely greater than the gain in European solidarity by such a procedure. Every method tending to set up a barrier where no barrier was in existence before should be considered as in direct opposition to the best interests of the world.

But it may be argued that there are a number of European problems unsolved, and that until we solve them even our present world League must mark time. We have therefore to examine whether it is a fact that there are such things as European problems. Bearing in mind that such things as minorities and other after-effects of the peace treaties, such as the administration of the Saar territory and of Dantzig, are explicitly League affairs, it would seem quite safe to say that there are no European problems whatsoever—none, at any rate, that really matter. For Europe comprises four world Powers, and there are no important European questions which do not affect at least one of them. Every time a world Power is involved in a problem the problem becomes *ipso facto* a world problem. This is particularly clear in the case of England. Every important European question touches English interests and thereby becomes a world

question. That is why, by the way, the plans for a United States of Europe without England may be described as what is known in Spain as 'a hare pie without hare.' But the moment England is involved in a problem the United States and Japan are bound to be concerned in it. It is difficult to see, therefore, how a European federation could tackle any serious question with any degree of efficiency in the absence of the United States of America, of Japan, and presumably of England.

There remains the problem of security. In a review of a world subject from a world point of view—such as the present lines should be—candour and plain speaking have a first claim on the author. I may perhaps be forgiven for dissenting, as I am about to do, from the views often aired in this country on the problem of security and sanctions. M. Briand's scheme has been coldly received in many quarters as yet another attempt to organise sanctions and to surround the European *status quo* with a fortified line of treaties and covenants. The argument of M. Briand's English critics rests on the assumption that such a scheme would be effective, for neither the European *status quo* nor the idea of sanctions enjoys much favour in British public opinion. But the matter must be discussed a little more closely.

Let us first examine the vexed question of the *status quo*. Can the race which invented the marvellous notion of fair play forget that the European *status quo* was the outcome of a treaty in which the *status quos* of the other four parts of the world were defined? Surely not. Then why all these attacks on the French and Polish gains in Europe while Great Britain digests in peace her gains in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific? But let that pass for the present, and let us grant for a while that the European *status quo* alone must go. How is it to go? By war? Obviously a suicidal policy for Great Britain as well as for Europe. Then why object to a system which aims at guaranteeing that peaceful methods only are to be used in political changes? The charge that the French insistence on sanctions seeks to perpetuate the *status quo* may be true, but the fact that the system of sanctions itself would perpetuate the *status quo* is not substantiated. A determined Great Britain could do much, and in co-operation with a determined America she could do all, to ensure that the application of the system of sanctions would

- (a) Remove all war from the sphere of practical politics;
- (b) Permit a revision of the *status quo* on statesmanlike lines with the co-operation of that great statesman, Time.

But the universal nature of the problem must be recognised first. There is no European *status quo*. There is only a world *status quo* which can only be dealt with in a world way, and so this problem, which is one of the aspects of the problem of

security, cannot be solved on a strictly European basis—certainly not without England, almost certainly not without America.

As for the problem of sanctions itself, it will never be properly understood unless it be treated on its own merits and irrespectively of the aims and intentions of the nations that argue it. It is often discussed by the French on its military side. Will sanctions be effective? Let us have a general staff, plans of campaign, machinery. This attitude is merely provincial. It is the result of that Rhine obsession which the French suffer, not unnaturally perhaps, but which seriously impairs their fine universal quality of mind. In England, on the other hand, the problem is often argued politically. 'This country will never fight for . . . this, or against . . . that.' That empirical argument is often used in a way which might lead significant observers to doubt of the sincerity wherewith this country signed and ratified the Covenant. The problem of sanctions should never be discussed in either of these short-sighted ways. It is predominantly a moral and a psychological problem.

From the psychological point of view the key to the problem lies in this fact—that while institutions may be effective in preventing war, they are almost certain to fail in stopping it once it has begun. Therefore the English who argue 'this country will never fight for this, or against that' place themselves on the same wrong plane on which the French stand with their military obsession. The true problem of sanctions arises in the pre-war stage. It is only by a very clear and determined decision to fight if necessary in certain precise and determined circumstances that the world can hope never to see those precise and determined circumstances arise. The problem for England is that, whatever she may wish, she will not be able to stand out of any first-rate war in Europe, and therefore better for her to take the risk of promising war on her terms to ensure peace than of running into war by refusing to ensure the peace on her terms. There is no life without risks, and the anti-sanction school in this country seem to the neutral eye to have taken the riskier risk of the two.

But the problem is also moral. The Covenant rests on the idea of world solidarity, and the condemnation of the world aggressor is the natural outcome of such recognition. There is no choice between the recognition of a world law to apply to all and the claim of the national law to remain supreme arbiter. The proud and uncompromising attitude of the United States on the plane of unrestricted national sovereignty—a proud and uncompromising attitude which even the Kellogg Pact has not abated in the least—followed by the less clear but not very much more satisfactory attitude of Great Britain in her shrinking away

from the system of sanctions towards the system of unrestricted British sovereignty, has had deplorable moral effects in the public opinion of the world during the last ten years. Thus, for instance, though it would be grossly unfair to attribute to either Washington or London any political responsibility in the Franco-Italian difficulties, there is not the shadow of a doubt that if Washington had remained faithful to the Wilson ideal and London faithful to the Cecil ideal not even Signor Mussolini himself would have dared speak as he did in Florence and Milan, with, by the way, the mildest possible objection on the part of the British Press.

In the circumstances it seems difficult to object to M. Briand's efforts—assuming that they are inspired in the security-complex of France, which is the truth, but not the whole truth—particularly at the moment when Great Britain turns down the Channel Tunnel for reasons which ultimately, and in the absence of any better arguments, must be assumed to rest on an equal security-complex. This clears the ground from the objection against the scheme usually put forward in England. It is as well that it should be so, for the idea of a European federation can then be discussed on its own merits. Its shortcomings and the misguided analogies which stand at its basis have already been discussed in the preceding pages. It remains to be said, however, that, from the moral point of view, the fact that a great nation should put forward such a bold departure in international politics from an official platform is in itself an impressive sign of the times, and one which is bound to react favourably on that general evolution towards the political manifestation of world unity in adequate institutions which has been progressing before our eyes, though with differing fortunes, since the Peace Conference.

SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AS AN ECONOMIC FAMILY

II

THE question of industrial co-operation in the Empire has received much greater consideration owing to its closer relation to the tariff problem, and it will be enough to refer very briefly here to this part of the subject. Apart from tariffs, something is already being done, and much more might well be done, by the interchange of ideas between manufacturers in different parts of the Empire. There would seem to be scope for far-reaching agreements regarding the specialisation of particular forms of industrial production as well as for the standardisation of measures and methods, already mentioned as one of the purposes of the British Engineering Standards Association. The old habit of British manufacturers of regarding the Empire as merely the natural market for their industrial products, to be paid for by the Dominions and Colonies by the export of raw materials and foodstuffs, is one which dies hard. But it is an idea which has now been really given up by all the enlightened leaders of British industry, and once it is recognised in the Dominions that Great Britain is anxious as a member of the Imperial Economic Family to see industrial production flourish in the territories of its fellow-members, the opportunities for fruitful co-operation are immense. In matters of agricultural production progress has already been made in studying the special aptitudes of particular parts of the Empire for the production of specialised crops. The avoidance of over-production and cut-throat competition, particularly in tropical products, is essentially a matter for Imperial economic co-operation. The industrialist might learn much from what is being attempted in the province of agriculture.

Space will not permit of more than a short reference to other forms of economic co-operation, in the field of transport, aviation, migration, social services, medical services, education. The British Empire would seem to offer an ideal vantage ground for the use of the film for visual education and for spreading among the backward races of the Empire, more intelligently than has

yet been done by the efforts to impart literary education, as well as more effectively, the teachings of twentieth-century biology, psychology, hygiene and medicine. Soviet Russia has made full use for her own propagandist purposes of the possibilities of films. If the British Empire is to have as the basis of its free association something of that common background of ideas and ideals for which, in relation to the Dominions, reliance has been placed mainly on the racial and cultural affiliations of the white English-speaking peoples, it must pay special attention to the use of the film and broadcasting.

The creation a year ago of Imperial and International Communications, Limited, represented a first attempt to establish a great Imperial public utility company whose purpose should be to provide the Empire with the greatest possible facilities for communication by cables and wireless at the least possible cost consistent with the maintenance of strategic cables. The company owed its being to the recommendation of a special Imperial Conference which sat during 1928. The instigation to study the subject from an Imperial standpoint came in particular from Canada and Australia, who were not content to see the Pacific cable, in which considerable sums belonging to the taxpayers of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were invested, put out of business by the competition of wireless services run by the British Post Office. Imperial and International Communications, Limited, is subject to a considerable measure of Governmental control. Its dividend is limited, and it has undertaken serious obligations of a strategic character. It is supervised as regards its policy and rates generally by an Imperial committee, the Communications Advisory Committee, consisting of representatives appointed by the Governments of Great Britain and each of the Dominions, together with one representative of the Colonial Empire. This great Imperial public utility company now controls practically all the external telegraphic services of the Empire. The company is only at the beginning of its difficult and complicated task, and has many obstacles to surmount. Still, given wholehearted co-operation with the Governments of the Empire, the company should be in a position to render signal services to the commerce and trade of the Empire and to the knitting together of friendly intra-Imperial relations. It is a corporation of a rather special type, combining private capital and initiative and commercial management with a large measure of Governmental control, exercised, be it noted, not by one Government of the Empire on behalf of all the others, but by all the Governments of the Empire, and some features of its set-up may well prove a model for the organisation of other Imperial services.

A word must be said on the subject of Imperial financial co-operation. As already pointed out, the Empire is on balance still an exporter of capital, in spite of the fact that the development of its Imperial heritage calls for new capital investment far in excess of the available supply. Throughout their history, and in particular since the passing of the Colonial Stock Act in 1900, the Dominions and the Colonies have been able to obtain funds in London on specially favourable terms, a form of preference to which full value is not always given either in the Dominions or in this country by the more exuberant advocates of preferential tariffs. But there would seem to be room for greater financial co-operation than at present exists. Finance, like shipping, is far more prone to take an international than an Imperial view of its functions and opportunities, and there is little, if any, conscious effort or organised machinery for directing the available capital of the Empire into those channels of Imperial investment which are most likely to contribute the maximum benefit to the Empire as a whole. Recent events in Australia have emphasised the foresight of Mr. Bruce in setting up an inter-State body to advise on projects for capital development put forward by the various States of the Commonwealth, and likely, if not wisely supervised, to lead not only to the overstraining of the borrowing powers of Australia, but also to preference being given to projects less attractive and less immediately urgent than others which were being squeezed out. Is it out of the question to establish some Imperial machinery of an advisory character capable of doing for the Empire services similar to those which the Australian body is doing for the Commonwealth?

An attempt has been made thus far to paint with a broad brush a picture of what is being done to promote Imperial economic co-operation, and of the machinery which is in existence for the purpose. Before considering what more could be done, and in particular what the next Imperial Economic Conference should aim at doing, it is necessary to examine shortly the questions: Why is it being done? Why is Imperial economic co-operation thought desirable? What is, or should be, the relation of the British Imperial Economic Family to other great economic groups in the world? These questions call for clear thinking and an honest answer. There are honest doubts and hesitations in the minds of some of those whose willing assent and active help is needed in the cause of Imperial economic co-operation. Friends of the League of Nations sometimes fear that work for Imperial unity may prove incompatible with work for international peace. These fears are fostered by the glib application of militaristic terms and metaphors to economics,

and by that sixteenth-century political mentality which, in defiance of twentieth-century science, persists in regarding war and aggression as the natural aim and object of a nation or an organised group of nations. Propaganda for Empire free trade too often suggests that what is desired is a self-sufficing Imperial economic unit, aggressively exclusive, enclosed within prohibitive tariff walls. Exuberant publicists in all languages picture a future with the United States of Europe, the British Imperial Economic Unit, the United States of America, Russia, and the Far Eastern group confronting each other in a merciless economic struggle leading inevitably to new wars. Typical is a recent book by an American entitled *America Conquers Britain*. Its conclusion, at the end of 400 pages, is summed up in the following sentences:

No one knowing the facts can say honestly that the British and American economic empires are not belligerent rivals. . . . No one knowing the facts can say that hands-across-the-sea speeches on naval disarmament truces have removed the danger of armed war which historically has resulted from such economic war. . . . Either the supremacy of America will be recognised by Britain in peace, or that supremacy will be asserted in battles of blood. . . . British policy to-day—whether commercial, naval, or political—is conditioned by one inexorable fact: She is an overpopulated, dependent, exposed island. As a major world power her days are numbered. . . . What chance has Britain against America? Or what chance has the world?

It would be a great mistake to pay serious attention to such apocalyptic outpourings, or to be misled into accepting for a moment such a challenge to a fight to the finish. It is equally idle to pretend that desire for economic defence is not an important factor in promoting the ideal of Imperial economic co-operation. Modern science and modern machinery demand a wider sphere of action than can any longer be provided within the narrow limits of the British Isles. The time has indeed gone by when Great Britain by herself can maintain, not merely her preponderating commercial and industrial position in the world, but any reasonable economic life for her people. In the period of industrial depression through which we have been passing it is a great tonic to be reminded of our remarkable achievement in maintaining against heavy odds a standard of life for our workers far in excess of that offered to their fellows in any part of Europe. That this has been done on the basis of high labour costs is evidence of an extraordinary level of general efficiency which belies the lugubrious jeremiads to which we have been made to listen both at home and abroad. But we cannot maintain the position indefinitely unless we organise our economic life as a member of some much larger economic group. If it is right to

stigmatise as aggressive the belief that there are British standards, British traditions, and a British way of life which have made, and are capable still of making, a big contribution to the welfare and happiness of humanity and are worth preserving and defending, then the conception of a British Empire Economic Family is open to objection. But there is nothing aggressive in such a belief. The internationalist should never forget that the better is the enemy of the good. The approach to a rational organisation of the world is through the diversity in unity of a number of economic families, each contributing a certain individuality of culture. The time for a single world economic unit has not yet arrived, if it ever can arrive. The world needs an organised British Empire Economic Family and an organised European Economic Family to take their place alongside of the great economic unit of the United States. A single economic group as strong and as young and as vital as the United States cannot but threaten danger to the world and to itself if it has no counterparts and makeweights to preserve some sort of economic equilibrium. However just and idealistic, the United States cannot concentrate in themselves and preserve for future generations all that the spirit of man has inherited from the past. The right way to meet such utterances as those just quoted is to prove that the British Empire is more than a dependent European island, and that by organising itself as an economic family it is ready to take its place alongside the United States of America and the United States of Europe and other large-scale economic groupings as a potent instrument in developing a rationally ordered world of peacefully associated harmoniously collaborating States. Only so can modern science, with its ever-increasing control over the secrets of Nature, fully serve mankind and open up to the whole of humanity opportunities of material well-being and higher standards of attainment and aspiration compared with which the material achievements of the United States of to-day will seem but faint harbingers of the dawn.

There is little need to counter the objection that Britain, being geographically a part of Europe, ought to throw in her lot with the European Economic Family. Some good Europeans have for centuries deplored the equivocal position of England in relation to Europe. But her aloofness is a geographic and historical fact. Nor would her admission to a European Economic Family help Europe. Britain is Europe's most important market, and her adhesion would make the European group impossibly lopsided. Even without Britain Europe has an undue proportion of industrial capacity and an insufficient supply of raw materials and foodstuffs. Britain's membership of the British Empire Economic Family will not prevent her from

continuing to render the services she has rendered to Europe as the financial centre of the world and the exchange market between Europe and the United States.

A further source of hesitation as to the desirability of an organised Imperial Economic Family is to be found within the family circle. The 'little Englander' is not quite extinct in this country. Voices may still be heard stigmatising the 'All Red Route' as the 'All Red Rot' and complaining that the taxpayer of this country is to be bled white for the benefit of the Dominions and the Colonies. In India, which has more to gain from and more to contribute to an organised economic Empire group than any other single member, the politically minded are too much occupied with questions of constitutional status to be able to regard the idea of economic co-operation with the rest of the Empire in reasonable perspective. In some at least of the Dominions there are uneasy suspicions that the enthusiasm in Great Britain for economic co-operation with the rest of the Empire may conceal or connote an attempt to put economic limitations on their political autonomy. The reply to this class of objection is that the approach to the economic organisation of the Empire can only be along the line of free association and willing co-operation, that any attempt at domination in the economic sphere is as fatal to the Empire as an attempt to reintroduce political dictation. For many years to come Great Britain can and should remain the intellectual centre of the Empire, and in that capacity as well as in others she is entitled, and indeed is called upon, to give the lead to the rest of the Empire, above all in the spirit of service which has grown with and justified the growth of the British Empire. But Britain cannot and dare not approach the problem of Imperial economic co-operation in a selfish mood which asks continually what she is going to get out of it. If she gives the right lead, the Empire will respond in the same spirit, seeing the vision of the greatest good of the whole in the active co-operation of each part. For the rest, the discovery of the right machinery for economic co-operation and how best to bring it into being is perhaps the crucial problem on which more than any other depends the readiness of the Empire to accept the ideal of an Imperial Economic Family and work for its early translation into fact. It remains then to consider this question—how to improve and extend the machinery and technique of economic co-operation, together with the question what more can be done than is being done, and what the next Imperial Economic Conference should aim at doing.

Perhaps the most important contribution that the coming Imperial Conference could make to the promotion of Imperial

economic co-operation would come from a study of the constitutional machinery of such co-operation. As already pointed out, this question of machinery has been much neglected, and the terms of reference of such bodies as the Imperial Economic Committee and the Imperial Shipping Committee are restricted. The Imperial War Graves Commission, on the other hand, has proved the possibility of going much further, and its development indicates that it is not out of the question to aim at the establishment of an Imperial Economic Council, appointed and in some degree financially supported on a free and equal basis by all the Empire Governments. To this Council would be affiliated all existing intra-Imperial bodies, such as the Executive Council of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux and the various Imperial committees, and it would be the focus for new bodies hereafter created. Its function would be to deliberate and advise upon all economic questions which do not raise major political issues. The creation of such a Council would imply a permanent staff under the control of an authoritative body meeting at not too infrequent intervals. There seems to be no alternative to London for the headquarters of the permanent staff, but it should be possible to arrange for the Council to choose some other venue than London for occasional meetings. The permanent staff should include officers from overseas, and travel throughout the Empire by members of the staff in the prosecution of its investigations should be an important feature of their duties. The Council and its staff should take care not to get an unduly administrative bias. Whitehall's preoccupation with administrative problems tends to affect the atmosphere of Imperial Conference meetings in London. Administrative problems loom still larger when Ministers return to their own capitals. Minor common problems of administration are followed up with considerable energy by the various Governments concerned, but the larger questions of Imperial economic co-operation are apt to be withdrawn into obscurity, only to be dragged out again when the next Conference comes round. The Empire might well take a lesson from the experience and methods of Geneva. The opportunity offered by the annual meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva suggests, moreover, a means whereby at least one meeting a year of the proposed Imperial Economic Council could be secured without undue demands upon the Governments of the more distant parts of the Empire. Every autumn Ministers and other influential representatives of the Dominion Governments, among whom a considerable number are well versed in practical problems of commerce, industry and finance, meet at Geneva. Practically all of them visit London on their way to or from Geneva. There should be little difficulty

in arranging for an annual meeting of the Imperial Economic Council in London about the same time of each year.

Whether the coming Conference succeeds in achieving the establishment of such a Council or not, nothing should be done to hinder its ultimate realisation, and all possible steps should be taken to advance its coming. It is in any case of the first importance that the Home Government should invite special attention at that Conference to the whole question of the machinery of Imperial economic co-operation. With this end in view the remarkable growth of scientific co-operation within the Empire should be emphasised at the Conference, and the need for a corresponding development in other fields made clear. Existing achievements in true economic co-operation should be stressed and particular openings for extending that co-operation carefully fostered. Nothing but good can come of the exploration by the Conference both of the machinery and of the practical possibilities of economic co-operation.

A full survey of the immense field outside all tariff questions which is waiting to be cultivated by the free co-operation of the Empire countries cannot be made here. To a certain extent the ground has already been opened up in the first part of this article.¹ Some of the main heads may, however, be mentioned as examples.

(a) Rationalisation of Industry.

Rationalisation in Great Britain is the first essential need. If this is being actively attempted, and given a desire to co-operate and some common machinery for the scientific investigation of economic problems, there appears to be every prospect of gradually securing a more rational distribution of manufacturing industry within the Empire. Some tariffs, owing to difficulties of classification or to their general application, cause dislocation and expense out of all proportion to their value for revenue or protective purposes. Representative bodies of manufacturers in the industries concerned, meeting in different parts of the Empire, would surely produce results of mutual benefit. Their success would be certain if the Governments of the Empire were simultaneously studying the same problems in a spirit of co-operation.

(b) Standardisation.

Progress must necessarily be slow in taking full advantage of the opportunities within the Empire for standardisation in engineering and industry. Intense study and detailed documentation are needed.

(c) Statistics.

Imperial Conferences in the past have drawn attention to the

¹ *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1930.

need for greater uniformity in Empire statistics. Improvements have been effected, but fundamental differences still exist, and statistical information for the Empire as a whole is not readily obtainable, and where available is rarely analysed. Economic development and rationalisation, whether in agriculture or industry, depend largely on the supply of correct and comparable data. At present Imperial statistics are designed mainly to serve the varying needs of the local administrations. The emphasis laid on problems of administration in the atmosphere of Whitehall has very markedly influenced the treatment of the question of Imperial statistics, and the contrast with Geneva is here particularly noticeable. Rearrangement of the existing data necessarily collected would assist comparability and compilation of statistics on an Empire basis. The development of Imperial statistics should do much to promote knowledge of Empire production, possibilities, conditions and progress.

(d) Agricultural Intelligence.

Co-operation between Empire countries in scientific agricultural research is, as has been shown, developing rapidly. The machinery for co-operation invented for the Imperial Agricultural Research Bureaux suggests methods of improving the machinery of other forms of economic co-operation. Organisations have been formed to facilitate the interchange on an Empire basis of information on agricultural research and so lead to joint attack on common problems. The Empire Marketing Board is directly stimulating co-operative agricultural research. But, apart from research, there is scope for further common effort in the collection and supply of information on problems connected with marketing—both general intelligence regarding sowings or crops coming to market in Empire and competing countries and information regarding grading, standardisation, and statutory regulations affecting imports and exports, etc.

(e) Communications.

The formation of the Imperial Shipping Committee and of Imperial and International Communications, Limited, offers evidence of the recognition by the Empire of the need for associating its various parts in matters affecting communications. The working of these bodies and their potentialities should be fully studied by the Conference, since the need for co-operation is increasing rather than decreasing. Problems connected with the development of air communications and of broadcasting within the Empire also require study.

(f) Social Services.

The successful results of co-operation in agricultural research suggest that great advantages would flow from closer contact between the public health services and medical research workers

of the Empire, including the tropical Governments. Only partial effect has been given to a number of resolutions put forward by the recent Imperial Educational Conference. The use of films for educational and health propaganda offers great possibilities. The human factor should never be omitted from economic study, and the Empire affords special opportunities for co-operation on subjects such as social anthropology, ethnology, human dietetics, etc., not merely or mainly from the historical or antiquarian aspect, but from the standpoint of practical application to current problems.

(g) Financial Co-operation.

The Conference might with advantage turn its attention to measures for economising the use of gold and developing co-operation between the central banks of the Empire. Such co-operation would be of definite assistance in dealing with international monetary problems. For the economic development of the Empire more knowledge about movements of capital than is at present available would be of extreme value. The data for such study are very incomplete. The examination should aim not merely at establishing a balance of payments, but also at estimating new savings and the extent of their application within and without the Empire.

(h) Economic Relations between the Dominions and the Colonial Empire.

The Conference might well turn its attention to one further aspect of Imperial economic co-operation. The world is becoming increasingly dependent upon tropical products, and Dominion Governments are beginning to recognise the importance to themselves of the economic development of the Colonial Empire. Some of the Dominions are already directly responsible for the administration of dependent territories, presenting human and economic problems parallel to those of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain. In the island of Nauru a first tentative step has already been taken in associating Britain and two of the Dominions in the administration of a tropical dependency. If the British Empire is to become in any true sense an economic family the Dominions and India must be brought into closer relationship than at present with the Colonial Empire. The constitutional aspects of the subject are delicate and require careful exploration. It would probably be found, however, that Dominion Governments would appreciate an invitation to co-operate with the United Kingdom in the economic development of the Colonial Empire and to combine in studying both the constitutional and the practical problems which such co-operation involves.

At a public dinner in celebration of Australia Day last

January Lord Passfield declared that 'the soul of the British Empire requires more social tissue, and the opportunity would come to secure at the next Imperial Conference the means of expressing that sense of full Imperial co-operation.' The opportunity is indeed a great one, and if the coming Conference succeeds in interpreting and giving practical shape to the vision of an Imperial Economic Family which is already envisaged, however dimly, by popular opinion, and, refusing to let itself be bogged in controversial questions of tariffs, insists on taking a broad survey of the needs and possibilities of the economic life of the Empire, the record of its achievements will bear comparison even with the famous Conference of 1926.

BASIL BLACKETT.

RATIONALISATION AND THE STEEL INDUSTRY

THE iron and steel industry is like the ash-tree Yggdrasil, whose roots embrace the world. Both technically and economically it is one of the most important, most far-reaching, and most complicated of all industries. No one save a trained metallurgist versed in the whole range of applied physical, chemical, and engineering knowledge is capable of charting the industry's technical domain; its economic importance, scope and complexity, on the other hand, are more easily surveyed and measured. The magnitude of the industry is shown by the volume and value of its output. Last year the world production of steel aggregated nearly 120,000,000 tons; that of pig iron amounted to nearly 100,000,000 tons; and the value of this colossal mass of metal cannot easily have been less than 750,000,000*l.*, and may well have been 1,000,000,000*l.*—the latter figure being equivalent to nearly one-quarter of Britain's national income.

Four-fifths of the world's iron and steel is produced in five countries, the remainder being accounted for by the comparatively small output of a dozen other nations. The British industry ranks fourth in size amongst the giants of this family. Producing itself roughly one-twelfth of the world total, it is outstripped by the industries of the United States, Germany and France (including Lorraine and the Saar), which respectively account for one-half, one-seventh, and one-tenth of the whole. Nevertheless, in Britain's economy the iron and steel industry plays an important part. The net value of its output (excluding the cost of raw material) totalled roughly 60,000,000*l.* in 1924; the gross value of its output (including the cost of raw materials) cannot have been less than 100,000,000*l.* in 1929. It employs directly 250,000 persons, and a further 1,500,000 are engaged in industries, such as engineering and shipbuilding, whose products are mainly composed of fabricated iron and steel. It contributes some 70,000,000*l.* to our exports, or more than any other industry except cotton. No single home in the country but depends directly on the iron and steel industry for dozens of necessities

and scores of amenities. No single industry throughout the land but finds iron and steel in some form indispensable to its activity and prosperity. Because, indeed, of the very diversity of the uses to which its products are put, the iron and steel industry is not so much a single united trade as a congeries of trades, subdivided, interlocking, mutually dependent. Because of the weight and bulk of its raw materials, the immense size of its producing units, the large capital value of its blast furnaces, melting furnaces and rolling mills, the industry is specially exposed to the adverse effects of high transport charges and heavy local rates. Indeed, the industry's very complexity and size, which expose a large surface and innumerable sensitive parts to attack from every economic quarter, while lending it strength in good times, are responsible in bad times for a large part of its difficulties. As bitter experience has taught, this is notably true to-day.

That the iron and steel industry in Great Britain has suffered for a decade from almost continuous depression is by now a commonplace. In the years immediately after the war the depression was world-wide, and in none of the great producing countries did the industry enjoy any degree of prosperity. The destruction and disorganisation caused by the war had paralysed trade, undermined saving and the will to save, and sapped the demand for capital goods. For the time being, therefore, the demand for iron and steel (which largely arises from saving and capital development) was also inadequate, whereas the industry's productive capacity and potential supply were greatly in excess of current needs. Abroad the depression varied in duration. In the United States revival was accomplished and the pre-war output exceeded by 1923. In France and Belgium the war-time destruction of plant, equipment, and organisation took rather longer to repair, but by 1924 or 1925 both these countries had practically regained the level of pre-war output within their existing territories. In Germany the industry was severely hit by the territorial changes effected under the Treaty of Versailles; great, though only temporary, damage was also done by the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; and consequently recovery was delayed until a year or two after stabilisation. During the last four or five years, however, the iron and steel industry has forged rapidly ahead in the great Continental producing countries, while in the United States it has risen to heights previously undreamed of.

In Britain, on the other hand, there has been no such recovery. A state of depression, the gravity of which increases with its duration, is still manifest throughout most branches of the industry. Although the output of steel has been larger in most

years since the war, and notably since 1927, than it was in 1913, the output of pig iron has fallen much below the pre-war level. In both sections production is far less than the physical capacity of existing British plant; exports are about 15 per cent. smaller than in 1913, while imports are about 25 per cent. larger; unemployment has stood in the neighbourhood of 20 per cent. or more for seven years; prices have been most unsatisfactory; and profits and dividends have been exiguous and in many cases non-existent. It is true that not all the industry, nor all of its constituent firms, present so black a record. The student of detail can refer, for example, to the relative prosperity of 1923, when Britain harvested domestic benefits from the troubles of the Ruhr invasion. He can exhibit the tin-plate industry, which, on the whole, has done moderately well. He can show that, though eleven great concerns have paid no dividends on their ordinary capital since 1921, half a dozen companies (mainly manufacturers of specialities) have maintained their dividends with notable regularity. And, on the workers' side, overlooking the wholly exceptional events of 1926, he can point with pride to a freedom from industrial disputes which sets an example to many other industries whether prosperous or depressed. But though these and other bright spots exist, they do not succeed in lightening the picture as a whole or in materially relieving its general and oppressive gloom.

What has to be explained is this divergence in the fortunes of the industry abroad and the industry at home. The contrast is clearly seen in current production. To-day the world output of steel is 57 per cent. higher than before the war, but British production is only 26 per cent. higher. The world output of pig iron is 23 per cent. greater than in 1913, but the output of British pig iron is actually 27 per cent. less. Because of these changes Britain's share of the world total fell between 1913 and 1929 from 10.2 per cent. to 8.2 per cent. in the case of steel and from 13.2 per cent. to 7.9 per cent. in the case of pig iron. Moreover, whereas foreign producers have been able on the whole to produce at a reasonable profit—and often at a substantial one—even with prices at their current low level, British firms have succeeded in making only the smallest and most precarious of profits where, indeed, they have managed to make both ends meet at all.

The post-war depression of the British steel industry and its long-drawn-out continuance result from the combined operation of many forces. In the years immediately after the Armistice great stress was rightly laid on the world-wide impoverishment which robbed Britain of many markets. For a time also the fluctuations of the exchanges, and particularly the depreciation

of the German mark and the French and Belgian francs, aggravated Britain's difficulties by giving a form of artificial subsidy to the iron and steel industries of those countries. But these influences, adverse though they undoubtedly were, had spent their main force by 1926. Since then the causes of the troubles have lain principally in other directions.

Some of these causes spring from international differences or from general economic policy. Unquestionably wages and social charges are higher in Great Britain than in most, if not all, of the other great producing countries. Unquestionably also the burden of national and local taxation has checked production and swallowed up profits which would otherwise have been available for reserves or modernisation. Unquestionably, again, the British iron and steel industry has suffered from a monetary policy which, whatever benefits its Spartan rigour may have brought in other fields, has greatly intensified the difficulties of British manufacturers; while where new plant was installed abroad after the war during a period of inflation, the resulting capital charges (unless largely offset by other burdens, as in Germany) compare most favourably with capital charges and debenture debt in Britain, steadily and automatically increased in weight because of constantly falling prices.

Many people consider that these factors suffice to account for the post-war decline of the iron and steel industry in Great Britain, and for its relative advance abroad. Many also argue that these advantages make foreign competition unfair and amply warrant the complete or partial exclusion of foreign steel by means of an import duty. But when the situation is coolly considered it is plain that other influences have also operated, and that the solution of the troubles of the British steel industry are not likely to be quickly and simply achieved by the facile expedient of a tariff.

The truth is that the picture drawn by those content with proclaiming the comparative advantages of foreign producers is seriously defective. Both at home and abroad it omits essential elements and forgets decisive causes. In all the main producing countries abroad the iron and steel industry has made prodigious advances since the war. For the moment the United States may be disregarded, since less than one-twentieth of its output is consumed outside its own frontiers. But on the Continent—in France, in Germany, and in Belgium—the industry has been practically reconstituted from its foundations upwards. Paradoxically enough, the cause lies in the war and its aftermath; the very influences which might have been expected to harm the industry have proved in practice to be its greatest help. The destruction of the Belgian steelworks and of the French

steelworks in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais enabled the French and Belgian ironmasters after the war to reconstruct their entire works along the most modern lines. The transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France gave the French industry some of the finest and most up-to-date iron and steel works in Europe. The inflation, both in France and Belgium and also in Germany, enabled the ironmasters to equip their works with the latest devices at the lowest possible cost. The loss of the Lorraine works and the severance of the ties which had previously bound Luxemburg to the Ruhr gave the German industrialists of Westphalia both the motive and the occasion for enlarging and improving their own plant; and the necessities of situation after the mark had been stabilised in 1924 caused the pace of rationalisation to be maintained and even quickened.

Meanwhile at home the British industry was suffering first from excessive productive capacity, and secondly from the disadvantages of the pioneer and the pauper. Before the war the pig iron capacity was 11,000,000 tons and the steel capacity 8,000,000 tons. To-day the pig iron capacity is estimated at 12,000,000 tons and the steel capacity at about 12,500,000 tons. But whereas in 1913 the production of pig iron was 10,250,000 tons, or 93 per cent. of capacity, and the production of steel was over 7,500,000 tons, or 95 per cent. of capacity, in 1929 the production of pig iron was only 7,500,000 tons, or 63 per cent. of capacity, and the production of steel only 9,650,000 tons, or 77 per cent. of capacity. Whether these figures may reasonably be regarded as normal to the present situation is discussed below; suffice it to note here that during most of the past decade not even this level of activity was attained. Throughout all the post-war years the industry has been burdened with physical plant largely in excess of market needs, incapable of producing profitably at ruling prices, adding to costs through large overhead charges, and depressing prices through excessive competition.

At the same time that difficulties were being born of surplus capacity, other troubles arose from the existence of old-fashioned plant and practice and from the lack of funds with which to carry out the necessary modernisation. Even before the war British steelworks were often small by comparison with the great German and American plants, and there was a tendency for improvements to be made by remodelling and extending existing works rather than by scrapping them and laying down large units planned *ab initio* for mass production. Such a state of affairs was the natural consequence of pioneering; for the British industry, which was the first in the field, suffered when its rivals, taking advantage at a later date of the experience dearly bought by Britain, planned and built their works on a great scale and in

the most modern fashion. Since the war, it is true, there have been many improvements in Great Britain. Plant has been greatly expanded and the new installations are naturally of the most modern and efficient character. A number of new blast furnaces of comparatively large capacity have been built—though even these are far outstripped by the vast American furnaces, some of which are capable of producing 1000 tons of pig iron or more a day. Mechanical changing gear has now been introduced at about a quarter of the number of existing furnaces—the mechanically charged furnaces forming a higher proportion of those regularly in blast. Machine casting of pig iron is a little more common, though still very far from universal. Steel making furnaces have increased both in number and size. Coking plant is somewhat more modern. The percentage of steel made direct from molten pig iron (instead of from pig iron which has been allowed to cool and has then been reheated) is greater to-day than before the war.

All these are favourable factors; but nevertheless the British iron and steel industry is still not thoroughly modernised *on the average*. Its coking plant and organisation lag behind current practice abroad, and in this field Britain stands to-day roughly where the Continent stood before the war. Many blast furnaces are smaller than the best standard for most efficient furnaces, and although a number of new furnaces of large capacity have been built—many of them in consequence of arrangements made by the Government during the war—for the most part the efforts of the blast furnace industry have been directed towards improving the auxiliary machinery rather than towards reconstructing the furnaces themselves. In steel making practice and rolling mill practice the position is better, chiefly because of the large amount of new plant laid down during and immediately after the war; but even so, though the best British practice is probably equal to the best Continental practice, 'it is probable,' according to the Balfour Committee, 'that the average practice in this country is behind the average practice on the Continent.'¹ Again, Britain has much to learn from the Continent in the application of methods of fuel economy. And, in addition to such detailed and individual shortcomings, there is the more important fact that, taking the organisation of works as a whole, Britain lags behind. In the opinion of the Balfour Committee (and a gentler or more friendly critic than this Committee cannot be conceived), 'few British works, if any, are modern throughout in equipment and practice, with coking ovens, blast furnaces, steel furnaces, and rolling mills adjacent to one another, and making full use of waste gases. Moreover, there is not infrequently a lack of

¹ Committee on Industry and Trade: *Survey of Metal Industries*, pp. 27-8.

balance between the productive capacity at the different stages.' ² In the face of these faults, and even allowing for the fact that local circumstances and markets may well make the best plant and the best practice in one country unsuited to another, it is not hard to see that, with the Continental industry forging rapidly ahead, the British industry, even though advancing from its pre-war position, would be bound to fall relatively behind.

It is extremely difficult to give a fair and balanced picture of any industry or to keep thoroughly abreast of all current developments. Nevertheless, there is no considerable body of evidence which contradicts the facts just stated or throws doubt on their substantial accuracy. This description of the existing situation is intended to state *facts*. Even were it possible to do so, it would be useless to-day to saddle individuals with responsibility. For the truth is that the situation in which the British iron and steel industry has lived for some years past and is now living results, at least very largely, from the operation of impersonal forces. It has taken a long time for the fact of surplus capacity to become clearly manifest. At first, indeed, the trouble seemed to be, not a glut of plant, but a shortage of markets; and when the true position was disclosed by time, the damage had largely been done. Again, modernisation of iron and steel works is a very costly process. Those concerns whose profits provided the funds have made great improvements in their plant. The others, which either lost money or just made both ends meet, perhaps by postponing payments on their prior charges, can scarcely be reproached for not installing modern equipment which they could not afford or were unable to finance. Thus the circle is a vicious one: excess capacity and old-fashioned plant mean cut-throat competition and small profits or none; small profits result in unpaid creditors; unpaid creditors prevent funds from being raised; lack of money blocks the modernisation of plant and the scrapping of excess capacity.

Can this circle be broken, and, if so, where, and how? The answer, to use the current catchword, lies in rationalisation. Gradually, during the last couple of years, the true nature of the position and the urgency of rationalisation have been increasingly realised. A beginning has now been made. What does it amount to, and what promise does it contain for the future?

Before examining the changes and developments of the past few years it is important to grasp clearly the nature of the essential tasks which schemes for rationalising the iron and steel industry must carry out. Since rationalisation essentially means

² *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

the elimination of waste by adjusting supply as closely as possible to demand and attaining the maximum efficiency at the minimum cost through the best technique and most appropriate organisation, it is plain that the foundations of reconstruction can only be well and truly laid upon a prior estimate of demand. Not that a wholly accurate calculation can be arrived at except by chance. The problem is too intricate, and the variables too numerous, for success to be at all certain. But sufficient accuracy is possible at least to ascertain the probable limits of demand during the next few years.

Recently published figures show that in relatively normal post-war years the amount of steel consumed at home and exported has not fallen below a minimum of 9,710,000 tons or risen above a maximum of 12,660,000 tons.³ Whatever may happen ten or fifteen years hence, there is no clear reason for assuming that the latter figure will be substantially exceeded in the *immediate* future. In all the three years 1927 to 1929 British exports amounted to roughly 4,900,000 tons (in terms of ingots), and, contrary to the general conception, were practically 10 per cent. larger than in 1913. Home consumption totalled nearly 7,800,000 tons in 1929. These totals, though small by comparison with Germany or the United States, are not unsatisfactory in the light of our own experience. Those who expect them to be outstripped during the years immediately before us will not find it easy to establish their case.

The figure of 12,660,000 tons of steel ingots consumed and exported during 1929 is sufficiently close to existing steel capacity to suggest that the position is satisfactory. Actually, of course, there is a fly in the ointment; for the total is made up of imports to the extent of 3,010,000 tons, and only the balance of 9,650,000 tons comes from British steel furnaces. And in any event, the output of pig iron—7,580,000 tons in 1929, which

³ These are the figures for 1923 and 1929 respectively. The years 1921 and 1926 have been excluded because of protracted coal stoppages; 1922 because the industry was then recovering from the severe post-war slump; and 1927 because the total was swollen by abnormally large imports made in consequence of contracts entered into during 1926. All the statistics of steel given in this paragraph are in terms of ingots—*i.e.*, allowance has been made for the shrinkage of weight between the ingot stage and semi-manufactured and finished steel. Retained imports are a net figure—*i.e.*, re-exports have been deducted from total imports. The exact description of what is termed 'home consumption' in the text is 'ingot equivalent of steel available for consumption in the United Kingdom.' This includes additions to stocks in certain years and excludes reductions of stocks in other years; it has been assumed that these cancel out. For the figures see M. S. Birkett, *The Iron and Steel Industry since the War*, Table VI. (a paper read before the Royal Statistical Society on March 18, 1930, and shortly to appear in the Society's *Journal*), and the Committee on Industry and Trade: *Survey of the Metal Industries*, 1928, p. 49.

was the best post-war year since 1920—employed less than two-thirds of existing blast furnace capacity.

The pig iron problem has peculiar features which cannot be discussed here.⁴ But many industrialists and other authorities argue that the difficulties of the steel industry would be solved and full capacity worked if only the 3,000,000 tons of imported ingots were excluded from our shores and the same tonnage produced at British works. This proposal raises at once a horde of issues which are highly controversial whatever one's fiscal opinions. Suffice it to say that the policy of increasing British output and employing British plants by erecting a tariff against foreign steel depends for its success—and, indeed, even for the arithmetical accuracy of its argument—upon the assumption that the exclusion of foreign steel from Britain will not increase the competition of foreign producers elsewhere in the export market, and will therefore have no effect on British exports of British steel. If this assumption should prove incorrect, if shutting the door against the entry of foreign steel into Britain also meant shutting the door against an equivalent tonnage of British exports, then plainly a tariff on steel would merely shift the market for which British manufacturers produced and would not result in any net improvement in the situation. The point is vital. But it is not unfair to say that, apart altogether from all fiscal arguments for or against a tariff, no one has ever succeeded in proving that imports of steel into Great Britain could be reduced by means of a duty without also reducing British exports by an approximately equivalent tonnage. In few lines, if any, and in very few markets—including even those Empire markets which now absorb about half of our exports—is Britain's position so strongly entrenched that a serious, prolonged, and determined attack by foreign producers could be viewed with equanimity. And it is obvious that foreign producers would not allow their plant to stand idle because the British market was shut against them without making a determined effort to find outlets for their steel in other markets which Britain now serves.

From these facts and arguments, if correct, a single though unpalatable conclusion follows. If *at present costs of production* the maximum amount of British steel which can be disposed of at home or abroad totals some 9,500,000 to 10,000,000 tons, then,

⁴ The particular difficulties of the pig iron industry result from changes in steel making and in industrial practice. Scrap is used in steel making to a far larger extent than before the war, and has therefore displaced corresponding quantities of pig iron; scrap is also used in the iron foundries; and the wrought iron trade—formerly a large consumer of pig iron—has been seriously depressed. Another consequence of these changes is a heavy decline in exports of pig iron—which, indeed, more than accounts for the reduction in our total exports of all iron and steel products.

after making a reasonable allowance for plant held in reserve against contingencies, approximately 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 tons of existing productive capacity is redundant. Experts in the problems of the iron and steel industry may dissent from these figures. In themselves, the figures possess, of course, no importance whatever. But if they are broadly right, then they do show the rough limits of possible output under *existing* conditions, and therefore the approximate amount of plant which is surplus to current needs. If, on the other hand, they are seriously wide of the mark, then the experts will find it an easy task to demolish them; and in this labour of love the present writer will gladly join.

Given the approximate size of the market, the next step in rationalisation is to consider the industrial organisation and technical equipment best fitted to produce most efficiently and most economically. Since in present circumstances a large quantity of productive capacity is superfluous to current needs and must be scrapped, since efficiency must be raised by modernising, reconstructing and reconditioning existing plant, and since substantial resources are required for these purposes, it is obvious that the machinery of amalgamation must be employed. Not nation-wide, all-inclusive amalgamation of the entire steel industry of Great Britain. That is neither desirable nor possible. Not mere financial amalgamation, designed as an umbrella to save already water-logged resources from further wetting. That, though perhaps possible, is not desirable. What is really needed is essentially sound and constructive amalgamation framed with a constant eye to the real necessities of the situation and to the objectives ultimately aimed at.

The principles which should be followed are four.

First, it must be recognised that what is loosely called the iron and steel industry is in reality a complex of a large number of separate industries manufacturing a diversity of products, and that amalgamation can only be attempted between firms manufacturing similar products and articles cognate, ancillary, allied or associated with these.

In the second place, it should be clear that, if plant can be worked to full capacity, the most economical and efficient unit for iron and steel manufacture is a complex in which coking and by-product plant and blast furnaces, steelworks and rolling mills are operated in combination, one stage of mass production being followed smoothly by the next, the maximum fuel economy being achieved, and waste and surplus gas and heat disposed of for public use or for the generation of electricity. It is often argued that such an industrial complex produces too large a quantity of uniform products to be well suited to British con-

ditions and to the diverse needs of Britain's many and varied export markets. However this may be—and there is no reason why suitable adjustments should not be made in the general plan so as to meet our specialised needs—the type of plant which other great producing combines have found to be most economical and most efficient cannot be rejected out of hand by Britain.

Thirdly, it should be recognised that amalgamation must take place within suitable geographical areas, and that, unless the manufacture of a particular product is concentrated in a single area, it is unlikely that the whole production of any branch of the trade will be brought under the control of a single firm. Accordingly the type of amalgamation which is necessary must be based on the great existing iron and steel areas, such as South Wales, the North-East Coast, Scotland, the West Coast, and Sheffield, groups in each of these areas stretching out tentacles to cognate and complementary firms elsewhere.

Finally, it should be plain that, even when the necessary amount of amalgamation has taken place, there will still remain many independent firms, some of a considerable size, which, because of their position or specialised products or goodwill or established connexions, cannot be brought wisely and well into any larger organisation.

Against this background the importance and significance of the recent reorganisation movement within the industry can be surveyed and measured. During the past two years many changes have been made. They mainly affect half a dozen firms situated in four of the principal producing areas.

Practically the first big advance was made in November 1928, when the South Durham Steel and Iron Co., Ltd., amalgamated with the Cargo Fleet Iron Co., Ltd. These two concerns both belong to the Furness group, are neighbours, complement one another, and now form one of the three most important firms on the north-east coast. Eleven months later the two biggest producers in the same area, Dorman, Long & Co., Ltd., and Bolckow, Vaughan & Co., Ltd., announced the successful completion of negotiations which had been started about December 1928. With this fusion one of the largest steel concerns in Great Britain was constituted. The next advance took place in January 1930, when it was announced that Baldwins, Ltd., and Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, Ltd., the principal firms in South Wales, had agreed on terms of amalgamation, and that William Beardmore & Co., Ltd., and David Colville & Sons, Ltd., the two largest producers in Scotland, had reached a working agreement. The most recent development occurred last May. In that month

the reorganisation of an important Lancashire group was announced comprising, *inter alia*, the Pearson and Knowles Coal and Iron Co., Ltd., the Wigan Coal and Iron Co., Ltd., and the Partington Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., together with allied and associated firms. These businesses are splitting their coal and steel resources between two concerns; the steel plant will be controlled by a new company to be called the Lancashire Steel Corporation, which will concentrate its activity mainly in a reconstructed and thoroughly modernised works at Irlam, on the Manchester Ship Canal.

Alongside of these changes in the heavy iron and steel industry progress has also been made in the reorganisation of the heavy engineering and armaments industry, which, in turn, have also had reactions on the heavy steel industry proper. In January 1928 Vickers, Ltd., and Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd., amalgamated certain important sections of their businesses, and at the end of the year they were joined by Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., in founding a new company, the English Steel Corporation, which took over and concentrated the manufacture of steel. Finally, a reorganisation scheme for John Brown & Co., Ltd., was announced last May, and this, when completed, will not only carry the rationalisation of the heavy engineering and armaments industry a stage further, but will have repercussions in the heavy iron and steel industry as well.

The upshot of all these developments has been the creation, at all events in the principal producing areas, of great corporations which dominate the local output. In Scotland is the Beardmore-Colville group; on the North-East Coast are the Dorman-Bolckow combine (which is bound to become more closely associated with the Furness group) and the independent firm of Consett; in Lancashire is the new Lancashire Steel Corporation; the industry in South Wales will be ruled by Guest-Keen-Baldwins; while in Sheffield the United Steel Cos., Ltd., which was formed just after the war, will be the largest producer. Between them these firms probably control from half to three-fifths of the pig iron and steel output of the country. Though the hematite producers in north-west Lancashire are still largely unorganised, the only important remaining area in which democratic anarchy prevails is the Midlands, and there long-standing traditions of independence are being stubbornly maintained.

Any person outside the industry who attempts to appraise the exact significance of these changes faces an extremely difficult undertaking. On the whole the firms concerned publish very little information about the amount of reorganisation and modernisation they intend to carry out. This may be natural and even wise; but it makes the task of appraisal well-nigh

impossible. On the one hand, it is clear that even the amalgamations hitherto effected or already in train are pigmies by comparison with the great German and American combines. The largest of these groups cannot produce more than 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 tons of iron and steel a year, whereas the German Steel Works Union (*Vereinigte Stahlwerke, A.G.*) made over 6,000,000 tons of pig iron and nearly 6,500,000 tons of steel in its last financial year (when output was reduced by a month's lock-out in November 1928); the smallest American combine accounts for 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 tons, and the vast United States Steel Corporation for 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 tons. Not that the whole difference in scale is necessarily disadvantageous to Britain; it is probably more suited to British conditions. On the other hand, the existing state of the industry plainly makes thoroughgoing reconstruction and modernisation a most urgent necessity. The amalgamations and agreements thus far effected will succeed in putting their portion of the industry on its feet only if, eschewing mere financial manipulation, they tackle the real changes which are pressing and vital. The measure of their success will not be available until the financial results are published a year or so hence. Meanwhile the names of the concerns involved and the reputations of their sponsors may serve as a reassurance.

But even though the task of reorganisation may now be regarded as well under way, a number of problems still remain.

The first problem arises from the firms outside the present combination movement. Some of these outsiders are already strong, well-equipped and efficient. Others account for a very large proportion of the productive capacity which is surplus to current needs, cannot produce profitably at ruling prices, and yet overhangs and depresses the market. By one means or another this surplus capacity and the firms which own it will have to be disposed of. The problem is of very substantial magnitude, for the capacity which must thus be scrapped totals between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 tons divided up amongst a score of firms. In Germany the leading iron and steel companies have been grappling with a similar problem by buying up small undertakings. Half a dozen minor concerns have been dealt with in this way at a cost approximating to 3,500,000*l.* In Britain the shipbuilding industry, confronted by the same difficult issue, have latterly formed the National Shipbuilders' Security, Ltd., with the object of closing down and scrapping redundant yards. Whether one of these methods will suit the circumstances of the British steel industry, or whether other means must be devised, the problem

of the superfluous outsider must somehow be tackled and solved. It is a thorny problem, for many interests are concerned to keep these firms alive in spite of the harm they do; but if approached broadly and wisely it will not prove insuperable.

A second question is that of personnel. This matter, one of the most elusive and most intractable of all the difficulties confronting the iron and steel industry and many other industries also, springs largely from the evil effects of the war. The depleted ranks of those who should now be rising to the higher command may be insufficient to fill all existing needs; but, if so, there is all the more reason for making certain that no competent man is put off by inadequate remuneration. All industries tend to have their own scale of conventional rewards. The iron and steel industry stands to benefit most by paying highly the men who can make its profits greatest.

A third problem is that of labour. As recent speeches by recognised and conservative leaders show, the workers regard rationalisation as a very mixed blessing. Too often it yields them only a crop of Dead-Sea fruit; throws men out of the industry where they have won their training and spent their lives; and leaves them, at an advanced age, at best with their earning power seriously curtailed, at worst with no jobs and no prospects. It is true that no man—nor any investor, for that matter—has an established right to a specific position or definite earnings. It is true that economic change is no respecter of persons. But so important is it that reorganised firms should enter on their next stage with that good-will of the workers which can contribute so largely to success—just as ill-will, working through countless channels, can increase costs, lessen efficiency, and contribute to failure—that both wisdom and justice demand that the workers' interests should be especially considered and safeguarded in every rationalisation scheme.

What of the future? Is rationalisation worth while? Can the British steel industry again be made prosperous? Can it continue to live and thrive and grow? Or is it a failing trade which only superhuman efforts can save from speedy decay?

Whatever the future may contain, as regards rationalisation, at all events, the answer is clear. Disregard France, Belgium, the United States. Suppose that practically complete reconstruction after the war and capital costs halved or quartered by inflation make conditions in France and Belgium utterly different from conditions in Britain. Assume that the United States also is quite incomparable for other reasons. There remains Germany, where the most thoroughgoing rationalisation has been carried

out in circumstances certainly not less adverse than those ruling in Britain to-day. Recall the circumstances: a population demoralised by the most terrible inflation the world has known; markets topsy-turvy; productive equipment swollen in some places and atrophied in others; organisation utterly inadequate to the needs of peace; capital, particularly working capital, practically unprocurable. How could conditions have been worse than they were in Germany in 1924, when to all her domestic troubles were added the complications produced by the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr? And yet the German iron and steel industry carried through a reorganisation so complete and so effective that the profits of six principal Ruhr firms have averaged 11,500,000*l.* during each of the last three years, and, after placing large sums to reserves, have permitted the payment of dividends ranging from 6 to 8 per cent. per annum.⁵ If Germany could achieve this striking success in spite of all her initial difficulties and the extremely heavy price she had to pay for capital raised abroad, why cannot similar results be attained by the British steel industry in circumstances far more favourable?

That Britain's position is more favourable is shown both by the distribution of the world's steel industry as a whole and by her own natural advantages.

In round figures the world at the present consumes 120,000,000 tons of steel a year. Of this total 55,000,000 tons are consumed in the United States, 35,000,000 tons in the main European producing countries (Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium), and 30,000,000 tons in the rest of the world. Roughly two-thirds of the last amount is produced in the consuming countries themselves, and the rest is imported from the great producers. Exports to these consuming countries from Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and the United States total some 12,000,000 to 12,500,000 tons,⁶ and of these exports, Britain's is the largest share, amounting to nearly 30 per cent. of the whole. Her position in these markets

⁵ The firms are Vereinigte Stahlwerke (capital, 40,000,000*l.*), Mannesmann (capital, 9,250,000*l.*), Krupp (8,000,000*l.*), Klöckner (5,500,000*l.*), Hoesch (3,580,000*l.*), Gutehoffnung (3,000,000*l.*). The gross profits of these six firms aggregated 11,554,000*l.* in 1926-27, 11,388,000*l.* in 1927-28, and 11,644,000*l.* in 1928-29. Although the context is not quite clear, it appears practically certain that these profits are calculated *after* the payment of debenture interest. Full details of the sums placed to reserve and depreciation are not available; in the case of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, however, they have amounted to well over 4,000,000*l.* a year. See *The Times Trade and Engineering Supplement*, June 14, 1930, p. 325; and the *Economist*, February 22, 1930, pp. 399-400.

⁶ In addition to these exports to the *consuming* markets, Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium exchange a further 7,000,000 tons amongst themselves. In this trade Britain plays a small part as exporter, but, of course, an important part as importer; while the United States is here a negligible factor.

is remarkable. In Australasia her supremacy is practically unchallenged. She supplies half of all exports to Africa, two-fifths of those to Asia, a quarter of those to South America (a market in which American, German, and Belgian competition is extremely fierce). Even the continent of Europe (apart from the great producing countries)—a market which one might expect the Germans and the French to monopolise—takes one-tenth of its steel from Britain, or more than Belgium supplies.

These facts make it plain that, so long as foreign competition is not stimulated by mistakes of British policy, the British iron and steel industry, even in the worst of times, has a place in the sun which her competitors will not easily conquer. The reason lies in Britain's natural advantages. With blast furnaces and steelworks very favourably placed, often on the coast and always near her coal supplies, with capital in normal times both plentiful and cheap, with the most highly skilled and most reliable workers in the world, with unrivalled trading connexions and an untarnished reputation for products of supreme quality, it is only natural that Britain should have maintained her position even throughout the troublous years through which we have just passed.

On the whole, there are now reasonable grounds for moderate optimism. After years of isolation and individualism the industry has at long last come together and has formed an Export Association for developing trade overseas and a Steelwork Association to extend the market at home. After years of hesitation the task of reorganisation is now well under way. There is much still to do; and, in the face of continued improvements abroad, our own efforts cannot be relaxed for an instant. Nevertheless, fortified by Britain's immense natural advantages, the industry can now face the future with a measure of reasonable confidence.

JULES MENKEN.

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL

DURING the last few months the Report by the Channel Tunnel Committee of the Economic Advisory Council and the recent parliamentary debate have once more focussed attention on this long-discussed project. With the refusal of the Government to countenance the scheme, the practical question has again relapsed into a state of suspended animation, which permits the whole matter to be judged strictly on its merits. At first glance the question of whether such a tunnel should be built or not appears one to which an easy reply could be given in the affirmative or negative. Further contemplation of this problem demonstrates that the proposal is hedged around with extreme difficulties, and the incidence of effect impinges on a great variety of interests. The question of national defence, for instance, has definitely precluded for many years even the preparation of data upon which engineering estimates could be made. Political changes, in regard to foreign policy, are as kaleidoscopic in their nature as the colours which adorn a rainbow; while the economic considerations, which would ultimately make the tunnel a financial success or a failure, shift as constantly as do the trade returns of any great industrial country.

In view of such difficulties the Report of the Channel Tunnel Committee was naturally somewhat guarded: it could hardly have been otherwise, since the recommendations in its Report had to be based upon assumptions as to the probable situation in 1938, by which time it is estimated the tunnel could be completed. The conclusions of any committee are naturally far more valuable if unanimous, and in a case as closely affecting the national welfare as this one it is particularly unfortunate that a minute of dissent should have been added by one member of the Committee. It is, however, a matter for surprise that the minute of dissent of one member should have received so much more attention in the Press than the conclusions reached by the remaining 80 per cent. of the Committee, including the chairman. Discussion of national defence questions must be the preserve of those who are responsible for that defence. The engineering aspect is one to be left in the hands of the engineering profession, but in the Committee's

conclusion No. 5 the majority report that they believe 'a Channel Tunnel could be built,' and even the minute of dissent admits that 'if a tunnel could be built' the opposition expressed is primarily 'based on economic grounds.'

One may thus assume that a Channel Tunnel can be regarded as an engineering possibility and that the approximate cost, to be shared by the British and French Channel Tunnel Companies, would be rather over 30,000,000*l.* Just as the military and naval strategist must envisage every possibility in a situation which may develop years ahead, so the economist or statesman must estimate future trends before designing his policy in order that it may yield the maximum of satisfaction to society and the nation. It is to the political and economic background that attention should be given if the true importance of this project is to be realised. Let each of these be taken in due turn.

The Channel Tunnel Committee, by its terms of reference, was asked to confine its Report to an examination of the economic aspects of the construction of a Channel Tunnel, or other new form of cross-Channel communication. It will be seen that no mention is made of the political aspect, yet such a side to the question certainly does exist apart from all questions of national defence. There are without doubt many in this country who dislike entanglements of any kind which may bind Great Britain to continental Europe. It is, perhaps, somewhat difficult to diagnose this sentiment, but it is none the less powerful for that reason, and may be ascribed to insularity or to tradition. In many ways it is comparable to the feeling which is so much in evidence in the American Senate and House of Representatives, the desire to keep free of European politics, with all their intricate undercurrents. American sentiment in this respect is easier to understand, for it was the desire for freedom, often religious, which led to the settling of America and what is now the Dominion of Canada. The resultant force of this great body of American opinion is too often ignored in Europe; even President Wilson under-estimated its strength, and by so doing brought about his own fall, and with it every hope of America's entry into the League of Nations. Its effect upon the Disarmament Conference has not been without importance; in short, it is one of the great factors in world politics to-day.

That the same subtle current, as strong as any ebb-tide, has guided British foreign policy cannot be gainsaid. New York is nearer London to-day than London was to Paris a century ago, and modern inventions, such as wireless, tend to bring the farthest capitals into as intimate a touch as those geographically closer. The barrier of language makes Paris, Berlin, or Rome more

distant than ever New York or Montreal can be to many of those who have once visited the New World. It is the competitive attraction of directing foreign policy towards the Anglo-Saxon countries, or the Continent, that creates the clash of opinions which underlies most political controversies in Great Britain to-day. Truly such political considerations are closely linked with the economic; the campaign of the Empire Marketing Board, the birth and rapid decease of the United Empire Party, the whole concept of economic Imperial unity, and the close relations of the Bank of England with the Federal Reserve system of the United States, all bear witness to the attempt to turn away from Europe and seek increased trade through political ties with the English-speaking world elsewhere. To those who hold this view, often subconsciously, the Channel Tunnel scheme is anathema. Its progress would seem like the steady forging of a chain binding this country to Europe, to its national and racial hatreds, a guarantee that the country would be drawn irresistibly into feuds, and political bickerings, which it could not hope to understand. It would hardly be an exaggeration to term this feeling national, and the lack of welcome in this country accorded to the suggestion emanating from Continental sources, to set up a United States of Europe, shows how mistrustful Great Britain is of becoming a continental nation. One must admit that it is a logical result of British history, the freedom from invasion for centuries and the era of peace during the nineteenth century, which permitted this country to reap the maximum benefits of the Industrial Revolution, have given ample cause for the growth of a tradition which is part of the national outlook.

On the other hand, equally strong forces have recently been working in a direction diametrically opposed. Participation in a European war may have brought its inevitable reaction and the determination to draw apart as far as possible for ever, but it left the nation a heritage which not even the strength of tradition can ever undo. Active participation in the League of Nations, while yet the United States remains outside, a trade depression, which enforces the development of every possible trade route, European or inter-continental, and the recognition that the purchasing power of European countries is vital to this country's economic prosperity, all show that withdrawal from European conferences would deal a fatal blow at Britain's social welfare and industrial progress. Granted that these links, not forged from choice, but from necessity, exist, and for the same reason cannot be broken, it is doubtful if any physical connexion with the Continent would prove more than an invisible bond, joining together two political entities, which geographical conditions have placed in juxtaposition. The function of transport is the

breaking down of such barriers through reduction of the cost of movement and increase in speed, and the success of a transport system must be judged by its power to achieve these ends. Ocean, rail, or air transport as it grows in efficiency diminishes the natural barriers to social intercourse and induces closer political connexions. The gradual orientation from home affairs towards Dominion and foreign politics is a major trend in post-war Government endeavour. Recognising the present position as a *fait accompli*, any transport facility which helped to increase the mutual understanding between Great Britain and continental nations is to be welcomed as a lubricant to aid the smooth running of international conferences, whose actions are so liable to get clogged by grains of sand and, consequently, thrown out of gear.

To-day the separation of conceptions economic from those political is somewhat difficult to accomplish; unemployment, for instance, has been the sport of politics, but in reality it is an economic problem, and the successful remedies for it must be built upon sound economic foundations. Whilst the political aspects of the Channel Tunnel scheme are of importance, especially in the wider sphere of statesmanship, the economic viewpoint, though perhaps a little narrower, is hardly less intangible and makes an even more attractive study. To this side of the picture one may now turn one's consideration.

Economics has been termed the study of business in its social aspect, yet the Channel Tunnel Committee translated the adjective 'economic' as being almost equivalent to financial. With one exception they judged that the tunnel could be maintained and operated by private enterprise at a cost which would permit of the traffic through it being conveyed at rates not higher than those at present in force on the short cross-Channel route. Occasionally estimates are somewhat impolitely termed shrewd guesses, but such a term would be inapplicable in the present case, and from a perusal of the Committee's Report it is clear that accurate estimating of passenger traffic possibilities must have been a very heavy labour, since the results arrived at could only be obtained by scientific reasoning. The Report places the estimate of passenger traffic in 1938 at 2,357,000—a figure considerably higher than the estimate made by the Southern Railway, and materially lower than that of the Channel Tunnel Company or that of the Nord Railway of France. The percentage diversions from each of the existing cross-Channel routes have been estimated and appear in the Report, spreading from 100 per cent. for the Dover-Calais service to 45 per cent. for the Newhaven-Dieppe service and 21 per cent. for the Harwich services to the Hook of Holland, Flushing, Antwerp, and Zeebrugge. It would be idle to quarrel with such carefully calculated figures; though

individual faults could be found with them, equal objections could be raised against any set of figures put forward as an estimate. Even one member of the Committee itself characterised them as not likely to be reached, but added that he did not propose 'to examine in any detail the complicated figures and tables set out in this section.'

To form any estimate of probable passenger traffic, the psychologist is probably the best equipped technician, but accurate students of the psychology of nations are difficult to come upon, and in this case a knowledge of many nations is essential. To the Englishman the Continental horror of a Channel crossing is by no means easy to comprehend; to him it is a commonplace affair to visit France or Belgium; it is a small deterrent to a holiday programme, and many make the crossing on business each month. To the average Frenchman, on the other hand, a visit to London is an adventure not to be embarked upon lightly, and often regarded as the first and last chance in a lifetime. Letters from friends in France frequently conclude 'and when the tunnel is complete I shall visit London again.' Perhaps rightly, the Committee ignored this psychological aspect, which might well redress the proportion of three to one of British to other cross-Channel passengers, but it probably accounts for the higher estimates of passenger travel submitted by the Nord Railway and the Channel Tunnel Company, which are both familiar with the Continental viewpoint.

Extensive reference has been made in the Press, and its shadows are reflected in the Report, to this question of lack of balance in the traffic. A well-balanced traffic is the aim of every transport concern, whether by rail, ocean, or air, and is well exemplified in the rapid fluctuations quoted for tramp tonnage plying outward bound with coal and homeward with cargoes of cotton, wool, or wheat. A railway equally offers exceptional rates in an endeavour to eliminate the empty haul so far as possible, and even the tramway attempts to fill its cars in the slack periods by offering especially cheap midday fares. It is claimed by some that a Channel Tunnel would accentuate this discrepancy rather than redress it; but to assume such a situation is to disregard the possibility of adjusting charges in accordance with seasonal or other variations, such as is the regular practice in the North Atlantic and other ocean passenger trades.

The regulation of railway charges through the tunnel is not specifically mentioned in the Report, and this may prove a somewhat difficult question, because the British Railway Rates Tribunal will obviously have no power to regulate the charges over the French section of line, and presumably the fare per mile should be the same in the French and British sections of the tunnel. The

regulation of railway charges by a body appointed by a Government, or by a Government department itself, is admittedly the relic, so far as Western Europe is concerned, of a past era, when railways were monopolies and not subject to unregulated competition. Nevertheless, certain traffics can only be handled to best advantage by rail, so that the consumer of these commodities, and not, be it noted, the producer of them, must be protected. However, the futility of the present degree of regulation is evidenced by the inability of the British railways, in spite of wholesale economies, to earn their standard revenue, as provided for by the Railways Act of 1921, and to yield which the Railway Rates Tribunal was instructed to design a scale of charges. Similarly, the American railways have never yet been able to earn their 'fair return,' of $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on property investment, as ordered in the Transportation Act of 1920. Ability to earn sufficient net revenue to induce a continued flow of capital into an industry must be left to the initiative of that industry itself. Railways suffer materially in this respect, and a Channel Tunnel railway would have to be free from these needless shackles in a competitive arena. Cross-Channel shipping and air services would each in their own specialised spheres act as a safeguard and should suffice to keep the charges reasonably low.

Demand for goods or services is dependent upon price, and estimates of the volume of passenger traffic must vary with the level of fare per mile. The Committee's estimate seems to have been based on the present average charges, but there is no reason why a reduction of 10 per cent. in the charge should not induce an added 20 per cent. of passenger traffic. Admittedly, British railway experience and that abroad shows that the demand for passenger travel by rail is not as elastic as might be expected, and reduced fares have frequently resulted, at any rate for a considerable time, in reduced gross revenue, but, on the other hand, more frequent service by itself may offer the added inducement to travel. The Southern Railway, as a result of its progressive electrification policy, has increased the passenger travel from station X fivefold within a comparatively short period by offering a fourfold increase in the number of trains; the London and North Eastern Railway, by increasing the steam service at station Y, has brought about approximately the same results. Thus it would appear that increased frequency of service offered to the public does, in practice, materially increase the volume of traffic to be handled. True, there is a limit to the frequency with which trains could be operated on such a route, for every railway system has its bottle-neck sections which create congestion, and it is somewhat difficult to foresee with accuracy where such points would be most likely to occur. Much would depend upon the

degree to which present barriers to international travel would apply at the time of the completion of the tunnel. Greater delay exists to-day on the London-Paris route through Customs examinations than is caused by weather or late international connexions at the Channel ports. The greater the severity of Customs examination and the number of dutiable articles, the greater the bar to tourist development of a country. The silk duties imposed on those tourists entering British ports are a fruitful source of conversation on the decks of Atlantic liners; they are the subject of mention when holiday tours are being planned in Minneapolis or New Orleans. Such echoes resound as the word passes around, and have tended to divert much tourist travel from this country to our Continental neighbours. They completely frustrate the well-meaning efforts of such campaigns as the 'Come to Britain' movement, supported by hotels whose prices are higher than those of many American hotels and which are frequently unable to offer modernised accommodation. At one large hotel specially catering for American visitors a deposit is demanded on arrival—hardly a fitting welcome in a country supposedly intent on attracting tourist travel. It may be hoped, however, that such evidences of the post-war malaise will have disappeared by 1938, as their evil effects become better realised by the general public.

It is sometimes claimed that the construction of a Channel Tunnel would be valuable in that it might create work for the unemployed, a perverted form of economic theory which might well be compared with the suggestion to dig up road surfaces so that work might be made for road-repair men. No great project should be dependent on such arguments, and the case in favour of a Channel Tunnel is on a totally different plane. With unemployment rife for many years the country must strain every nerve to better its competitive position in the race for export trade. Whatever view may be taken of taxes upon imported manufactures, it is incontrovertible that if this country is to retain its position in international trade it must import heavy tonnages of raw materials and food supplies, and be in a position to export semi-manufactured or fully manufactured goods at as low a cost as possible. The Channel Tunnel has been regarded primarily as a route suited to passenger traffic, and probably the bulk of revenue will be derived from passenger travel; but the freight situation is by no means to be ignored, and an important percentage of valuable goods would utilise its facilities when they become available. Rail haul is rightly regarded as more costly than water-borne movement, but the elimination of handling charges and the risk which such handling must entail are powerful incentives to through loading without breaking bulk, in the case of perishable or fragile commodities. The steady growth in traffic of high

value by the existing train ferry from Harwich to Zeebrugge bears witness to the demand for such facilities, and it is extremely doubtful if certain contracts, as for example the cars built in England for the International Sleeping Car Co., could have been obtained but for the ferry which enabled the cars to be shipped over practically ready for service.

It is unfortunate that the loading gauge, namely, the width permitted to rolling stock, is more strictly limited on the lines leading to Dover and Folkestone than on the majority of main lines elsewhere. But the point cannot be stressed too strongly that the difference in width of British and Continental carriages is not more than a few inches. The Continental carriages are considerably longer than those which are built to the standard design of the four railways on this side of the Channel, but extra length does not reduce the weight per seat which has to be hauled, and it is doubtful if carriages over 70 feet in length ride as smoothly as somewhat shorter ones. The smoothness, comfort, and quietness of British express trains are always the subject of favourable comment by foreign railway officials, and many have been sent over in recent years to study the means whereby this has been achieved. Speed, safety, and comfort in railway travel are three respects in which the British railways remain peerless, and it is fitting that this should be so in view of the fact that England witnessed the birth of the steam locomotive, which has few rivals among the civilising inventions that the world has seen. Owing to our early ability to export locomotives, the running gauge of Continental railways other than Spain, Portugal, and Russia is similar to our own for all practical purposes, and provided the carriages did not exceed about 63 feet, they could run through from London to Sicily, Sweden, or Turkey. The Harwich ferry has shown in this direction what can be done with freight traffic; unfortunately, export traffic by that route has not reached the volume of imported goods. In spite of a widespread advertising campaign, the ferry service is better known in Continental cities than in Great Britain, and it is not uncommon to find British manufacturers who are oblivious of its existence. Such a situation throws much light upon our difficulties as an exporting country, and it might be that the existence of a Channel Tunnel, if completed, would be similarly ignored, but it would be less likely; there is little reason to suppose that the balance of trade would be more adverse with a tunnel in existence than it is to-day. There would doubtless be some diversion to the tunnel route from existing services, but comparatively small tonnages of high-class goods now enter or leave by the Dover and Folkestone gateways.

The Committee's Report, in its final conclusion, states that,

'although some interests would probably be adversely affected, the construction of a Channel Tunnel, by creating new traffic and thus increasing trade, would be of economic advantage to the country.' The minute of dissent expresses an opposite opinion, but it is difficult to understand this after perusing the detailed trade statistics, mainly applying to agricultural products, which are included in the Report. For instance, it is explained in regard to potatoes that only the early kinds grown in Spain would travel by the tunnel route, 'as after the first ten days of the season, when it is profitable to send Spanish early potatoes by the fast goods train across France to Boulogne, these supplies are sent by direct boat from Barcelona.' It is pointed out that there would be no competition with home-grown supplies, because these are not available until later in the season; under such conditions it is difficult to see how agriculture is likely to suffer to any material extent. Paternal care of British agriculture is in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, yet, whilst agriculture, it is stated in the minute of dissent, must be protected from any possible competition, no mention whatever is made of the aid that such a tunnel would give to the export of British fish, which even to-day travels daily to Marseilles. Any study of new traffic likely to be created by the tunnel is one of the most fascinating problems of transport economics, but to do it full justice one must first banish the conception of a London-Paris route.

International trade routes are as delicately woven as a spider's web, and just as the unwitting fly shakes the whole web, so a new artery affects the other arteries, until the flow of trade becomes stabilised once more under the new set of conditions. Transport is ever dynamic, and the condition of *ceteris paribus* is never really applicable. The prosperity of this country has been due in the past to the taking of risks; indeed, few great things are achieved, and few great battles won, without taking risks. There may be an element of risk to British trade in the construction of a tunnel, but there are advantages to be gained if the country is plucky enough to chance that risk. During the post-war period trade has slowly turned from the British ports to their Continental rivals, much American passenger traffic which flowed to Liverpool has been diverted to Italian ports, and returns to the New World from Cherbourg or Havre or Hamburg without touching Great Britain are frequent. Is it the rôle of this country to watch idly this steady transfer, and to make no move to recapture it? Social intercourse is said to result in good feeling and mutual understanding, while the dice are loaded in our favour by the tie of a common language and common ancestry. The shortest open sea passage between Europe and the North American continent

is from the north of Ireland to Halifax in winter, or the St. Lawrence in summer. To capitalise this geographical advantage on the route to Chicago and the huge industrialised area around it might not prove a heavy task, and a Channel Tunnel should do much to induce the inclusion of Great Britain in a European summer vacation. American tourist travel to Europe increased from about 280,000 in 1914 to over 430,000 in 1928, but only about 100,000 are stated to have visited this country in the later year. Transatlantic air services of the future will also take the shortest sea route. Ease of transit between England and the Continent will offer an important attraction, provided it be coupled with the elimination of unnatural barriers to travel, such as high visa fees, detailed Customs examinations, and the like. British products have always excelled in quality and in the output of the highest grade articles, a heritage of long-acquired technical and executive skill: this trend continues, and for its success depends upon the availability of quick transport facilities.

The clash of views over the Channel Tunnel is in reality the fundamental cleavage of two schools of thought—the one believing in the littleness of England, that it should become a small self-contained unit complete in itself, and assuming that its internal trade is its bread of life; the other realising that we are a world Power with world interests and responsibilities, that we live by export trade and cannot survive without it, whether directed to other sections of the Empire or to foreign countries. It is not hard to choose between these two conceptions, the one more suited to a dying Roman Empire, the other more becoming to a nation whose prosperity has been built up by adventure and the will to succeed. A Channel Tunnel may involve some risk, but it would certainly be an engineering wonder of the world, which would show that this country was capable of making an effort to remain the bridgehead of Europe.

C. E. R. SHERRINGTON.

WORLD WHEAT AND THE BRITISH FARMER

A REPLY

As the crop-growing districts approach an unparalleled crisis, leaders of political thought promulgate their policies. The Government of the day alone is silent and is content to watch most known civilised countries assisting their primary producers to swamp the farmers of England and cause this country to receive the coincidence of the surpluses of the world.

The official policy of *Labour and the Nation* is pressed from behind the Government benches—that is, the policy of an Import Board as advocated by Mr. Wise in *The Nineteenth Century* of June; and this article is designed primarily as a reply to it. But before coming to actual criticism of Mr. Wise's suggestion of a wheat monopoly for Great Britain it is well to follow his example and to consider the importance of policies for wheat, which is in itself significant, not only in the agricultural rotation, but also as a factor in the life of the nation. Sir Oswald Mosley, speaking in the House of Commons on May 27 and again on July 16, referred to the necessity of insulating this island from the electric shocks of international price juggling. He claimed that this is one great benefit of the Import Board, but it seems possible to introduce other wheat policies which would insulate us without electrocuting private enterprise. The principle of preference to the home producer in the home market can be worked out on a much simpler scale. It would not be nearly so difficult as Mr. Wise makes out to enforce a certain percentage of British wheat in the grist of the millers. The inevitable difficulty inherent in a regulation of this kind could be overcome when the necessity arose, and would present a much smaller administrative problem than the vast upheaval inherent in a scheme which implies complete State control of trading in the staple basis of the nation's food supply and the nationalisation of a vital industry.

Mr. Baldwin's Glemham speech offered a guaranteed price to the arable farmer, a tax on foreign malting barley, and a promise to stop the dumping of foreign oats. He thereby showed at long last a realisation of the gravity of the situation and 'held out his

hand to the industry.' In this policy there is a complete acceptance of the theory of the paramount importance of wheat legislation. Within the ample folds of the statement there lies undoubtedly the salvation of the corn-grower. No actual definition of the method of guaranteeing a price is given, but it is clear that a subvention which assures a working price to the farmer, while avoiding State control, is intended. This form of legislation has been very successful in France and Germany without a subsidy, and can be described as the quota policy. In France at the moment 97 per cent. of the home loaf must be made of French flour. In Germany the figure at present is 50 per cent. These policies seem to have been extremely successful; there has been need for few inspectors in Germany to visit the mills and to see that the quota is being zealously observed, and there have been very few cases of conviction. The English problem being different, since our percentage of home-grown grain cannot be so high, and other circumstances being as they are, it is doubtful whether a quota policy without subsidy would be sufficient, even if the Legislature insisted on the milling industry paying a fixed price to the grower. Mr. Baldwin has at any rate opted for a subsidy, and it is possible to suggest that the State should make up the difference between the world parity, or Liverpool option, and a remunerative price, which will be presumably between 50s. and 55s. The money for this purpose is to come from safeguarding duties. Thus agriculture will not be able to complain of neglect *vis-à-vis* industry. By this provision, and this provision only, in Mr. Baldwin's declaration, British agriculture is tied up to an international or Imperial scheme. It is its only contact with the outside world. The great principle is established that British agriculture wants, and must get, special individual treatment.

Meanwhile, Mr. Wise, in his article referred to, has definitely come out with an addition to his policy which takes into consideration the Imperial aspect. And Lord Beaverbrook, in his policy, claims that British agriculture can be saved by duties on foreign foodstuffs while Empire-grown foodstuffs come in free. In both cases British agriculture is linked up with the Empire; in the first it has to submit to the doubtful experience of an Import Board, and in the second it has to welcome Dominion shipments with open arms. It has been seen that Mr. Baldwin's policy lays down the principle of specialised treatment for British agriculture. There are many who feel that, while they want specialised treatment for the British wheat-grower, they want a wheat policy to be Imperial rather than parochial. It is therefore not impossible that the Glemham declaration will grow Imperial wings while at the same time retaining its own inestimable

value for the home producer, who feels that with the prospect of a fixed price the burden of his bank overdraft may be lightened. In order to give the Glemham policy Imperial wings it seems that the quota suggestion should be added to it, so that a certain percentage of the home market may be reserved at a fixed price to the British producer, a certain quota to the Empire, and the residue to the foreigner. Thus the home grower has specialised treatment, the Dominion exporter has an assured share in our market, and a gradually diminishing share is reserved to unrestricted world trade in order to avoid immediate confusion and to act as a safeguard in the transition from a free world market to a free Imperial market. The percentages can and must be scientifically calculated, and a complete Empire loaf should be ultimately envisaged.

This scheme has so far made no mention of tariffs, for which Lord Beaverbrook has worked with such dynamic energy. His great service seems to be that he insists on the fair consideration of the tariff principle, and is bidding fair to break the intellectual atrophy which, unless frontally attacked, might insist forever and a day that no duty of any sort shall ever be put on any article of foodstuff whatsoever. Lord Beaverbrook has in fact reintroduced the tariff principle. But there are many who feel that to save British agriculture by tariffs on foreign food there would have to be so immense a duty that the consumer would be bound to feel it. Yet consideration of the tariff weapon should not be excluded in the process of giving the Glemham policy Imperial wings. The 'moderate fixed duty' advocated by Palmerston in the Corn Law discussions might supplement the quota scheme. While it is too early to enter into detail, the system of a small cess or registration duty on the bulk commodities which has the recommendation of successful experience in Switzerland would arouse no serious economic objection or prejudice the consumer. Meanwhile there are certain foodstuffs of a quasi-luxury kind which would submit smoothly and easily to tariff treatment or embargo. In the debate of July 16 in the House of Commons the advocates of an Import Board rejected tariffs because these could not adapt themselves to fluctuations. The sliding-scale principle has dealt with fluctuations before, and the percentages of the quota might be adjusted upon a sliding-scale system.

In that portion of Sir Oswald Mosley's speech which reproduced Mr. Baldwin's Coliseum declaration upon this subject reference was also made to the need for Imperial rationalisation. There seems general acceptance of the need for rationalisation on an Imperial scale. The Conservative Party was the first to give serious weight in its policy to the tendencies noticed by

Lord Melchett during his recent visit to South Africa with regard to wool, and discussed also in Scotland by the farmers in framing their attitude towards the Canadian Wheat Pool. The quota policy forms an integral part of such generally accepted developments. In a quota policy British agriculture, fearing to be squeezed out, finds its safeguard in a market and a fixed price. In a quota policy the Dominion exporters find a market guaranteed to them. It is surely better to allow such a cadre of Imperial rationalisation to grow up guided by legislative wisdom but unfettered by Governmental control. Within this framework and upon such principles highly organised marketing arrangements offering reciprocal advantages will erect themselves which at the same time contain safeguards against any cornering tendency in the quota system.

The advocates of Import Boards insist on control, and their arguments find favour with those who cannot face tariffs or free trade, and who have an intellectual attachment to Socialism. They may grow in stature, but, despite their efforts to stop electrocution, they can so easily be short-circuited themselves. Simple legislative enactment can take the place of all the Socialist revolution they desire.

The premises upon which the advocates of a Wheat Purchase Board in Great Britain base their claim for a monopoly for the import of wheat are for the most part sound. No one can quarrel with Mr. Wise when he says that the steady diminution of arable cultivation requires the adoption of some drastic remedies.¹ There is also much truth in Mr. Hurst's statement that 'it is a species of mental laziness to reason by analogy from the economics of a free wheat market to the economics of a market whose supplies are rigidly controlled.'² Though one may not agree as to the exact extent to which it is held that supplies are rigidly controlled, or as to the extent that the milling industry in this country is trustified, it is at any rate certain that bulk purchase and delivery are more pronounced to-day than they were before the war. It is therefore axiomatic that problems in the wheat trade, being different, require a different mental attack; moreover, conditions in the arable districts of England require new policies to set them right. It is important to allow this much to the advocates of a wheat monopoly, that they do at any rate suggest something drastic, something which to Great Britain in peace-time is new, and something apparently evolved to meet modern conditions. The whole strength of their case lies in these three points; that is why their plan has received such universal attention: for, in reality, it may be shown that

¹ Paper to Farmers' Club, *Stabilisation of Wheat Prices*, col. 1, p. 11.

² Hurst, *The Bread of Britain*, p. 27.

the proposal is not one which is suitable to modern post-war conditions, being one which, though new to England, has been tried and rejected overseas, and one which is too drastic in scope for the benefits, if any, which could be expected from it.

The salient features of the scheme can be summarised thus. The whole purchase and import of foreign wheat for consumption in this country should be undertaken by a statutory corporation set up by Parliament for this purpose with full monopoly rights of import. It should be independent of detailed political control, and subject to a board of directors appointed by the Minister under certain conditions. Prices should be published ahead for as long a period as possible, and the board should purchase home-grown wheat at guaranteed published stable prices calculated on a proper parity with import prices. The milling industry should be rationalised under Government control, and supplies of wheat to the mills regulated so that there would always be a market available for the supply of British wheat of milling quality offered for sale.

Mr. Wise makes various points in his *résumé* of the monopoly idea. For it is that which we are primarily here considering, rather than the other wheat policies adumbrated above. The question of the necessary immunity from interference of the wheat monopoly leads directly to the first avenue of criticism along which it is proposed to travel. That criticism is based on the experience of such a policy in this country. The outstanding example occurred during the war period. Though it is often said that war experience is not applicable to peace-time, I think it would be unfair to maintain that a study of Sir William Beveridge's account of British food control would be irrelevant in considering the aptitude of a monopoly to deal with the wheat trade. The necessary allowances can be made.

In the opinion of the author of 'British Food Control,'³ the conduct of such a monopoly needs a relaxation of parliamentary scrutiny and it needs secrecy. As the Report of the Wheat Commission says⁴:

The accepted system of public and concurrent scrutiny of the normal financial work of Government departments is not readily reconciled with the attitude of reserve which is advisable in the case of commercial operations. When it becomes necessary for the State to assume vast commercial responsibilities, especially in relation to overseas Governments and traders, those entrusted with such duties must be invested with a measure of secrecy claimed and enjoyed by every private enterprise, or else the seller will benefit by knowing the needs and intentions of the buyer.

³ Sir William Beveridge, 'British Food Control': *Economic and Social History of the World War*, British Series, p. 340.

⁴ Cmd. 1544 (1921).

In times of peace the Import Board would draw upon its actions a glare of publicity which, as Lord Crawford has acknowledged, would not benefit its activities. We are told that it is to be free of detailed political control; but will the representatives of the people be satisfied to let questions upon the hard-won nourishment of the masses go without explanation? Very often the actions of the Board, while being moral and defensible, would arouse the deepest suspicion and resentment in the country whose right of interpellation in this democratic age it is proposed to restrict. Sir William Beveridge confesses that it would have been irksome for his Department to have been submitted to the rigours of Treasury control extended in normal times of peace to the departments of State. Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking in the House of Commons on the Air Estimates this year, referred to the need in the defence services for lightning decision and lightning action, and in a constructive speech dwelt on exactly the same question of the delay caused by reference to the Treasury. While the Board, as proposed, would not be subject to the same discipline as a Government department, the analogy holds good in that the same need for lightning decision in operations of international commerce, and the same delay over reference and control, would inevitably arise. Delay might cause expense, however efficiently the Board were conducted, and the consumer would pay. Private initiative must be quicker than the motion of a public corporation.

Sir William Beveridge says, further, that 'Effectiveness depends on completeness.' In Mr. Wise's scheme as it stands, without the addition of opinions or hopes, it is not proposed to control the bakers and their methods of distribution. The whole conception of complete control of our daily bread in peace-time makes the scheme appear the more obnoxious, but when the completeness, which we are told on unimpeachable authority is essential, is absent, the economic value of the scheme immediately suffers. Moreover, this stopping short before distribution takes away from the promoters all possibility of offering a solution of the question most vital to every citizen—that is, the unsatisfactory discrepancy between the prices of wheat and those of bread.

Sir William Beveridge draws the conclusion that control is definitely an organisation for dealing with a shortage. Though the machine, as tried in war-time, differs in many respects from that now proposed, the conclusions he arrives at are useful in assessing the potential value of the theories we are discussing. Except for this experiment, there have been few similar attempts in English history. Perhaps it was the failure of the Victualling Board in Napoleonic times which caused Burke⁵ to say: 'Of

⁵ Burke, *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity* (originally presented to the Right Hon. W. Pitt in November 1795).

all things, an indiscreet tampering with the trade of provisions is the most dangerous.'

As described in the latest book on the Corn Laws,⁶ 'when the war broke out in February of 1793, the Government took over the Corn Trade with the avowed intent of starving France. Apparently this policy came nearer to starving England than France. The merchants who were engaged in the foreign Corn Trade became alarmed by the uncertainties created by Governmental interference, and either abandoned the trade or bought cautiously.'⁷ To-day the merchants would be put out of action, but the uncertainty as to the duration of the monopoly would remain, together with the subsequent difficulty of restarting the grain trade on private lines. It was this uncertainty as to the duration of the monopoly, and also the fact that it became so much a political plaything, which caused Switzerland to reject the scheme by the referendum of July 1926 and Norway to abandon it during the years 1927 and 1928. Holland had a State wheat monopoly until shortly after the war, when it was abolished as being not suitable to post-war conditions.

This question of immunity from interference has therefore been studied and answered from a consideration of British experience in the Great War, and also in previous history. The other questions of completeness and uncertainty have also come up. Mr. Wise raises in his article some new developments since what he describes as the last publication of Labour policy. He acknowledges that the farmer would not be satisfied with parity with world prices. This is made patent by the very recent fall in wheat prices and the recent shipments of French wheat at prices very near 30s. a quarter, which are the only foreign attacks which Mr. Wise does not mention in his world review. He therefore acknowledges that it would quite possibly be necessary to subsidise the farmer to the extent of 10s. a quarter to make up the difference between 40s. and 50s. This presupposes, first of all, that the world parity is 40s., which is not the case at present. But, accepting this as a very generous estimate, it means that the cost of administration of the monopoly, together with this large subsidy, would involve a subsidy. This takes away from Mr. Wise's scheme much of the novelty which he had previously claimed for it. The stabilisation of prices by State purchase has often called down upon its head the criticism that it is inverted protection. Here we see that it is not only inverted protection, but that it has added to it the necessity for a direct subsidy.

⁶ D. G. Barnes, *The History of the English Corn Laws*, p. 75.

⁷ See also Francis Chalmer, *An Appeal to the County of Lancaster on the present Scarcity* (1800).

There are simpler ways of granting a subsidy and more direct methods of giving—Protection.

For the purpose of examining the economic questions of prices and costs, it may be well to study the history of the monopoly abroad. Switzerland is, perhaps, the most interesting country in which to consider the conditions of State trading in wheat. This was started in January of 1915 and lasted till 1926, with a transitional period from that date till 1929, when the present system was introduced. Under the present system, chosen by the people in a referendum, the Confederation takes upon itself the responsibility of storing wheat. The Federal Government takes over all home-grown grain suitable for milling at a price which will render possible the home cultivation of cereal crops. To protect the mills foreign flour is taxed, and the Government reserves to itself the right to import flour. If necessary, it may interfere to adjust the price level in remote districts by assistance in the matter of freights. The expenses of the subsidy to the home grower are made good by a registration fee according to the weight of all imports of every sort. (There are the requisite technical adjustments to make the cess equitable.) The Swiss Peasants' Union, which almost consistently supported the grain monopoly, the Consumers' Co-operative Association, and most independent voters in the Confederation support these proposals as achieving more for producer and consumer and risking less than the monopoly. Under State organisation the Import Board was responsible for indirectly subsidising the home grower (*Mahlprämie*) for free delivery all over Switzerland (*Frankolieferung*) and for undertaking sufficient storage of grain. Though the expenses of management were kept as low as possible (M. Paul Graber puts these at 15 cent. per quintal), all these charges had to go on the bread of the people. This was a first grievance against the monopoly. Further, it was held, not without justice, that under such a system there can be no cheapening of the price of bread. This is borne out by figures included in a pro-monopoly pamphlet by M. Paul Graber,⁸ which do not appear to be suitably answered, and by figures compiled by Dr. Oskar Schär,⁹ of the Consumers' Co-operative Association, on the basis of published bread prices of the Allgemeine Consum-Verein, Beider Basel, and the published import prices of corn. Dr. Schär comes to the following conclusion: that in 1913 (before the monopoly), where the cost of importing a quantity of grain fixed in relation to the amount needed to make a loaf was 24.41 centimes, the price of

⁸ *Annals of Collective Economy*, vol. xi., p. 270, No. 3, July-October 1926 (M. Paul Graber, 'Concerning the Wheat Monopoly in Switzerland').

⁹ *Die Wahrheit über das Getreidemonopol* (Dr. Schär, 'Auftrag des Konsumentur Komitees').

bread was 34.80 centimes, and the difference, therefore, 10.39 centimes, whereas in 1925 the price of import was 36.18 centimes, the price of the loaf 52.60 centimes, and the difference 15.82 centimes at the lowest and 23.82 centimes at the highest. He claims that the difference between 10.39 centimes and 19 centimes (the average in 1925) is too great to be accounted for merely by an increase in the price level and by the details in the new regulations which he specifies. Deducting these additions, which could bring the difference to 17 centimes, there still remains a definite rise due to State trading.

The quality of the flour caused dissatisfaction to the Swiss housewife, who had to take what she was given '*par l'ordre du moufti*.' The psychological effect of putting anything under the State is to invoke criticism, and when the resentment of the housewife is aroused it is hard to allay. The agitation was increased by the fact that the frontier dwellers declared that on their shoulders fell all the expense of free delivery to the mountaintops, and the human population rose in revolt at the thought that the State monopoly of import of feeding-stuffs had been rescinded so that animals fed free while human beings took what they were given at a fixed rate. The two monopolies go together, so it was held. It is interesting to compare Sir William Beveridge's assertion that the quality of flour was hard to maintain under food control, and to reflect that if wheat is to be controlled in this country all other cereals and feeding-stuffs will have to be controlled too.

Norway imports 90 per cent. of her wheat, and her problems are in some ways similar to ours. The alignment of parties as regards the question differs from that in Switzerland. Here the farmers are opposed to the scheme because the small farmer buys more grain than he produces and the question of feeding-stuffs is involved. The Consumers' Co-operative Movement, which handles 20 per cent. of the wholesale flour trade, were opposed to it on the ground—(1) that all monopolies are bad; (2) that the grain monopoly did not benefit the consumer; (3) that the fixed milling charge is a subsidy to inefficient mills and gives undue profits to the large mills, thus unduly raising the bread price level (this is also the argument of the Swiss Co-operative Movement); (4) that the monopoly is and was the sport of political parties and political changes. Dr. Oskar Jahnsen, Director of the State grain business,¹⁰ analysing the effect of the suspension of the monopoly in 1927, when the Conservative and Agrarian Parties came into power, gives figures which show that the consumption of wheat flour has slightly

¹⁰ Extract from Norway, February 1929 (published in vol. xxix., No. 1, *Journal of Department of Agriculture*, Dublin).

increased at the expense of imported grain, but that the Norwegian mills have been able to keep up their position very well, and that several new constructions and expansions in the milling industry have been carried out in the two years' interval, which will enable Norway to mill all her own flour. The opponents of the monopoly claim that the monopoly did not encourage milling efficiency. Dr. Jahnsen finds that during the last two years wheat imports have vastly swollen at the expense of rye. He points out that under the renewal of the monopoly the premium to the home producer will be included in the general expenses of State control, whereas under the open system from 1927-29 the cost of premium, preserved in a system not dissimilar from the new Swiss policy, was borne for one year by import taxes and for the second year by general taxation. It seems to have satisfied the advocates of the monopoly that the main benefit was an assured supply and an average by stable price. It is difficult to find any attempt to calculate the average ratio of Norwegian to the average world price. The price of bread was not controlled, and the main problem of the relation of the world price of wheat to the home price of bread was again shirked, though the same level of bread prices was maintained over the country by a pooling of transport charges. Approximately the same level of home production of cereals and the same prices prevailed whether there was or was not a monopoly, since the policy of rewarding home production in some way was never dropped.

In studying Professor Starcs' suggestions for State control of grain in Latvia¹¹ we find that the objects are to maintain an assured supply of breadstuff cereals, to stabilise alike the home market and the volume of imports, to stabilise the price of grain and consequently bread, to improve grain-growing conditions in Latvia. The scheme is worked out without any particular novelty.

Having examined the matter from the points of view of experience at home and abroad, there remain certain general considerations to append before resuming conclusions already formed. Reference was made above to the need for drastic action. The only drastic element in the plan proposed by Mr. Wise is the conception of State control. The mind, having taken this drastic decision, comes up against the slow, lumbering execution of bureaucratic administration. The time taken in establishing the organisation, delays and inevitable blunders, culminating in a realisation of the inadequacy of the machine to perform the duties required of it, would lead to the immediate conclusion that it was

¹¹ Professor P. Starcs, *The Grain Monopoly as the Means of Improving the National Agricultural Situation*.

at once too drastic in conception and not drastic enough in action—in fact, to the realisation that it would be too long a way round—whereas the new Swiss plan achieves results by a short circuit. From the international point of view the too drastic element would be manifested in the acrimonies resulting from the assumption of the rôle of shopkeeper by a sovereign State. Refusal to purchase from a country anxious of soliciting the 'patronage' of the State board would result in international spleen. The secrecy so strongly advocated by authorities might perhaps prevail before a transaction, but the completed transaction would have the full glare of publicity. For every transaction the State would have to take responsibility before the world. When the international price level is steadily falling it may be questioned whether it is wise to fix prices on a parity with world prices. The farmer's economic position is entrenched upon the soil. He rests upon rockbottom. As the price level sinks he is the first to be crushed. Artificial economic strata in the nation use his resiliency to save them from feeling the hard reality of Mother Earth, and he is to be consoled by chains binding him down and under.

To resume the threads of evidence which theory and experience alike support. (1) State trading and control of foodstuffs is even more obnoxious than nationalisation in any other form. The public may have daily occasion to criticise quality, methods, or price, while being obliged by the testimony of the Wheat Commission to exercise restraint and patience. (2) Control without being thoroughgoing shirks the main problem. Control of all cereals and feeding-stuffs must be considered. From the consumer's point of view, the relation of wheat to bread prices is not considered. Stabilisation of price at a certain level, though it means much to the working-class budget, is not enough if the price he has to pay has to bear the costs of State management and premiums to the producer. (3) A State board entering the world market is slower than private enterprise, is most likely to flutter the price dovescotes and send them soaring, and is likely to encourage retaliation on a national scale, so leading to serious results. (4) The producer can be helped much more expeditiously by legislation, without the need for, or the danger of, control. He will not be consoled by being attached to the world price level when this is falling. (5) The chief benefit to be acquired is that of certainty of price: this is counterbalanced by the uncertainty which would prevail as to the future of the monopoly with a change of political parties.

Experience seems to show that Government control is too cumbersome and controversial a method for the normal economy of a State in times of peace. Benefits to the producer can better be assured with less trouble, while the evils of private speculation

which it is designed to cure are said by competent authorities to cheapen supplies to the consumer, whose particular problem needs at any rate far more consideration than the 'stabilisation of wheat prices' proposes to give.

It remains only to say that if the controversy about wheat imports wakens the country to the need for adopting a responsible attitude towards our home agriculture and food supplies it will have achieved much. The country, when awake, will realise that the particular problem of our countryside and our food-producing Empire demand consideration in an individual way.

There is no further scope in this article for more, but surely the co-ordination by legislative action and the guidance of Imperial and home agriculture and food supplies offers far greater practical hopes of development and prosperity than a drab State monopoly.

R. A. BUTLER.

LAND, POPULATION, AND GENERAL SMUTS

THERE is one aspect of African policy which immediately concerns white as well as black; and that is the apportionment of African land between white settlement and native development. This in its turn is inextricably bound up with questions of population; and since without a proper perspective on population we are liable to go off the track about land, I propose to begin with this.

It has often been argued, for example, by white settlers in East Africa, and by those at home who favour intensive white settlement, that reserves should be demarcated on the basis of the existing native population and that the rest of the land should be made available for white occupation. Some go further and claim that natives have no right to possess land of which they are not now making adequate economic use. In other words, if white men can make better use of it, white men are morally entitled to possess it.

This criterion, it will be readily seen, would be fatal to the economic future of a country which is seriously underpopulated and whose perennial cry is for more native labour; and it is manifestly unjust in that it allows for the expansion of the whites, but not for that of the blacks, and ignores the proved capacity of the blacks to improve their methods of production under proper guidance.

More just was the principle advocated by the Hilton Young Commission, who urged that the extent of land reserved for native occupation should be conditioned by the needs not only of the existing native population, but also of the probable increase in the next generation. Clearly, however, this was only intended to cover the immediate future: the Commissioners themselves recommended further inquiry with a view to the discovery of more fundamental principles on this as on other questions; and it would be a thousand pities if this compromise of theirs, valuable as it was as a deliberate temporary expedient, should become erected into a permanent guide for policy.

The perspective we need is that of the biology of the growth

and decline of populations. For the last quarter of a century most native populations in equatorial Africa seem to have been stationary or going slightly downhill (though there are salient exceptions); and this seems due to the combined effect of indigenous and introduced disease, of various native customs and tabus, and quite possibly to the strange distaste for living or conferring the gift of life which has seized upon various primitive peoples, notably the Melanesians, on being brought under the influence of an alien and incomprehensible culture. There is, however, every reason to suppose that, by an improved public health service, by education, and by providing incentives to a fuller life, we shall be able to counteract and overcome these destructive tendencies and set native population on the upgrade again (as has, for instance, just been achieved in Uganda). And if so, it will not be long before the available spaces fill up. In South Africa the pressure on space has already begun. This is partly due to the insufficiency of the area reserved to natives, but at least equally to the fact that in the Union a fair rate of increase of native population has been maintained.

In point of fact, the sufficiency of an area for the needs of an existing population, or of its estimated increase in the next generation or so, is in the long, biological view a principle of secondary importance. Population density must tend towards a final equilibrium, and on its way thither will halt in various positions of comparative stability, each adapted to the general mode of life at the time. But when a relatively stable phase of life is upset, as African tribalism is being upset by white impact to-day, the stability of numbers is upset too, and we shall find population either growing until it puts pressure on the available land, or else shrinking until it is inadequate to the land it occupies. Shrinkage is a comparatively rare phenomenon, and the empty spaces can always be filled up from the surplus of more expansive peoples; thus the general tendency, as Malthus saw a century ago, is for populations to 'press upon their means of subsistence'—unless, as the Neo-Malthusians soon pointed out, deliberate steps be taken to keep the population at a lower density, before the pressure has become painful.

The consequences of this for our problem are obvious enough. The principle of reserving land which is enough for the needs of this or the next generation is a minimum principle whose observance will ensure that the canons of humanity and fairness are not violated at the outset; but it is entirely irrelevant when we consider the future and the definitive adjustment of populations which we would like eventually to see established.

I have in what follows deliberately avoided consideration of

the Indian question. It is a grave complicating factor, but need not be more. Since racial problems bring such peculiar difficulties, I personally should welcome the gradual disappearance of Indians from Africa—not from the least hostility to them as Indians, but because their presence at once trebles the number of racial problems. At any rate, I cannot conceive any responsible person in the present position of the world advocating intensive settlement of Indians in Africa.¹ We Europeans happen to be responsible at the moment for Central Africa. If we genuinely believe that the presence of Asiatics introduces extra complications there, and that we can educate natives to fill the Indians' place in the economic scheme, we have not only the right but the duty to try and prevent extra complications.

When we begin thinking of these questions (which are none the less urgent because their final solution lies a few generations further off), we see, if we are frank with ourselves, that the sole criterion for action is one of racial and social aspirations, not of population needs. There is a limited area of the world's surface—Africa—to be filled with people. With the suppression of wars and slave raids, and the encouragement of health and agriculture, population pressure will fill it in what, biologically speaking, is a very short space of time. We are at present going on the assumption that over much of Africa the filling process could be equally well accomplished, merely as a physical fact, by whites or by blacks. The only question of long-range principle of apportioning areas for native occupation, therefore, is this—how much of the surface of Africa would we like to see reserved for the growth of an essentially black civilisation, how much for the growth of one which is primarily white? And in deciding this we have to take into account a number of factors. First there is the existing native population and its present requirements in land. As I have said, however, these are minimum requirements, and there are many areas which are to-day grossly under-populated. The next is the suitability of a given area for white settlement. There are some regions in which it is difficult or impossible for the white human organism to live permanently; and there are many others in which he could exist, work and reproduce, but where the black organism could exist with much more comfort, work with much greater efficiency, and reproduce with much greater freedom. Such areas should be reserved for the growth of native civilisations; if white planters are to be allowed to settle there at all,

¹ Since this was written I find that Professor Thompson, who is certainly a responsible person, has advocated this very thing in his book. He would seem to be so much obsessed by population pressure that he shuts his eyes to the biological perspective of the matter, and therefore puts a temporary adjustment of Indian pressure above the more lasting achievement of a true African civilisation.

they must be few, and they must reconcile themselves to being strangers in the land, as they would if they settled in China or the country of any other alien civilisation. Within tropical Africa there remain the highland areas, in which both white and black can live and work on more or less equal terms, and those very few high areas to whose temperature, it would seem probable, the white man is actually better adapted than the native African (though the altitude may be bad for the hearts and nerves of both). The die is here cast, and the principle of reserving some of this land for white settlement is now recognised. What is not decided, however, is the proportion of such areas to be reserved to Europeans, and the density of the white settlement which is envisaged. The only rights which Europe has in the matter are those of conquest, occupation, and superior power. What she proposes to do in detail will depend upon how she tempers those rights derived from power with the principles of corresponding duties, and with considerations of long-range efficiency.

For instance, Western civilisation seems to have tacitly accepted the general principle explicitly laid down in Lugard's *Dual Mandate*, that colonial powers have a double duty, not only of protecting native populations and promoting their development, but also of making available the resources of the country to the world as a whole.

Policy must thus often be a compromise, for the two duties by no means invariably point in the same direction. Where the world has need of African crops or minerals and cannot get them without white settlement, or can get them better with white settlement, then white settlement is, to our present view, legitimate. However, there may well be cases in which, though legitimate, it might not be desirable. For instance, if the area suitable for whites was small and was in the middle of a larger area where native production and native development was being pushed forward, it might legitimately be felt that the difficulties created by a white island would overshadow the increased production of certain special crops. This is the situation in parts of Tanganyika to-day. The influence of extensive white settlement on native social life must also be considered. If it disorganises tribal life by withdrawing the majority of able-bodied men from their villages for large parts of the year, is this not a grave disadvantage, economic as well as social, to set against the advantages it confers? Parts of Rhodesia are said to be now almost bare of men owing to the magnet of highly paid employment in the Rhodesian and Congo mines.

Then are you to restrict the white man in tropical Africa to supervisory functions, so that, even in the 'white' areas, natives

will always be in a very great majority? or do you wish to have a civilisation in which the numbers of whites are not overwhelmingly disproportionate to those of the blacks? In the latter case, of course, you must envisage white men engaged in various quite subordinate kinds of work, including skilled if not unskilled labour, and therefore in competition with natives; and you must face the terrifying possibility that a 'poor white' spectre may arise in tropical as in temperate Africa to haunt and mock the civilisation which has given it birth.

Further, from the point of view of the world at large, are you going to exploit the resources of tropical Africa more efficiently if you bring in a large population of white men, whose standard of living is high, or if you rely as much as possible on the labour of independent native producers?

At the moment we do not know for certain if white men can continue to live and reproduce without impairment of health or efficiency in tropical Africa, even in the highlands. Though we can foresee that white immigration on a large scale might easily lead to grave difficulties, such as a 'poor white' section of the community, economic friction between white and black, or excessive demands for native labour, we find it much harder to see how such difficulties could be effectively guarded against. And we have no reason to suppose that a large white community would be more efficient than a small but picked one for promoting the material prosperity and development of the country as a whole. In the circumstances it would seem wise to go slow, and to envisage the white population of tropical Africa, settlers and traders as well as Government servants, as a limited and selected body of men on whom devolves the duty of acting as the agents of Europe in the dual task of supplying the rest of the world with what they want from Africa, and of helping Africa to develop along the lines best suited to her own people and her own conditions.

I have so far refrained from discussing General Smuts' very definite ideas of land and settlement policy in East Africa, as set forth in his recently published Rhodes Lectures (*Africa and Some World Problems*). His conclusions, however, are so different from mine, and seem to me to lead to such a curious and undesirable compromise, that they demand a detailed consideration.²

² This article was written before I knew of Mr. J. H. Oldham's little book, *White and Black in Africa: a Critical Examination of the Rhodes Lectures of General Smuts* (Longmans, Green & Co.), which was published while I was still in the tropics. It is, I think, interesting that my general conclusions, arrived at quite independently and from a different standpoint, agree closely with his.

With regard to the actual areas reserved for white settlement, the geographical considerations so forcibly put forward by General Smuts must clearly weigh with us—namely, the existence of an almost continuous belt of high land, much of it suitable for white settlement, from Kenya through Tanganyika and Nyasaland to Rhodesia and South Africa. The idea of a new area of continuous white civilisation from the Cape to north of the equator has undoubtedly a potent attraction, and should dictate the broad outlines of any policy of territorial segregation as between white and black. But that is a dream for the future; while it is desirable that nothing immediate we do in the way of encouraging native development will prevent its possible realisation later, for the present other factors should dictate the actual allotment of land to white immigrants. The desirability of going slow is one; and the other is the need for giving white communities the best possible chance of success. This cannot be done by scattered or haphazard settlement. Definite areas of reasonable but restricted size should be opened up in succession, and some trouble should be taken to plan each venture and to guide its development as a single whole; each area can then be enlarged as circumstances allow. In this way we shall get experimental cultures, so to speak, of white civilisation in different parts of Africa, and find out what white settlement can do under various conditions. If they work satisfactorily we can gradually encourage their extension until they join up into a more or less continuous area of white settlement, or at least white predominance. If they do not, we can relinquish the 'white backbone' idea without too much disappointment, and without having prejudiced other methods of helping Africa's development.³

In any case, a consideration which ought *not* to weigh with us is the possibility (envisaged by General Smuts on p. 64 of his book) of using the 'vast empty spaces' of Africa in the attempt to reduce unemployment in Britain. In the first place, the remedy is in itself, not a remedy, but a mere palliative; problems of population can only be solved biologically, and not by such mechanical means. But in this particular case the palliative would not even palliate appreciably. The total white population of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia in 1926 was about 25,000. To-day it appears to be rather less than double that figure. The most intensive schemes of settlement could not hope to add much more than

³ General Smuts writes as if lands above 4000 feet were always, or usually, suitable for white settlement. This is not the case: in certain regions much of this land is mere dry scrub, barren and hot. The 'white backbone' could not, as a matter of fact, be really continuous.

10,000 a year to this white population without dislocating the region's whole economic life ; and this quantity is often exceeded in the monthly fluctuations of our unemployed, who now amount to over $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions. In other words, we could not hope to reduce unemployment even by 1 per cent. by dumping unemployed men in tropical East Africa. Further, unless General Smuts envisages the presence in Central Africa of large numbers of white artisans and clerks as well as of settlers, which would enormously increase inter-racial difficulties, the most prolific sources of our unemployment would hardly be touched. As the population of Great Britain will, within a decade or so, be either stationary or declining, and as this fact and the practice of birth-control will alter the whole problem as far as it concerns later generations, we are justified in dismissing from our minds emigration to Africa as having any real relevance to unemployment. It is, if I may be Hibernian, a fleabite in an ocean, and a temporary ocean at that.

Apart from drawing attention to geographical facts, General Smuts lays down two principles. One is that any enduring or desirable African civilisation can only be based on rather intensive permanent white settlement in all areas where permanent white settlement is possible ; for East Africa he would include in this area roughly all land of over 4000 feet elevation. The other is that there should be territorial segregation of white and black. All areas not reserved for white settlement should be reserved for natives, and they should be there encouraged to develop along their own lines, with the maximum amount of responsibility for their local self-government. But the fewest possible number of natives should be allowed to live in white areas, and *vice versa*.

I may quote a few of his own words to illustrate the meaning which he attaches to his first principle. On p. 67 he says that, as foundation for the future civilisation of Africa, 'a large white population seems to be a *sine qua non*' ; and it is difficult to imagine a white population which shall be large and not contain many skilled workers, clerks, and technically trained men, who would then compete quite unnecessarily and very unpleasantly with the natives we have been laboriously educating to take up just such work. On p. 55 he says that 'the wasteful character of native production is being realised' even, I understand him to mean, in West Africa ; and on p. 51 writes that 'the white settler is the most effective and expeditious means of pushing forward the economic progress of the continent.' And finally (p. 50) we read : 'granting in principle that native interests should rank first, I still submit that white settlement under proper safeguards remains the best means to give effect to that priority'—in fact, that it is always better, as a means of fostering native develop-

ment, to have natives working for white masters than for themselves.

General Smuts, in fact, quite definitely regards native production as a *pis aller*, a second-best to white settlers producing with the aid of native labour ; he lays stress on the *rapidity* of white exploitation of African resources, without discussing whether this will conduce to ultimate stability or no ; and he quite definitely prefers that the future civilisation of Africa should be dominated from the start by the ideas of an immigrant white community rather than that it might develop along lines of its own, though, of course, profiting by Western ideas under the guidance of administrators and missionaries.

It is impossible not to sympathise in many ways with the idea of the 'white backbone.' The ample grandeur of Rhodes' ideas has captured the imagination of General Smuts, and this is the form in which he sees them realising themselves in the future. But he goes too fast ; he takes too many things for granted ; and he fails to envisage the essential differences between temperate and sub-tropical Africa on the one hand, with abundant areas as suitable for Europeans as for natives to live in, and tropical Africa on the other, where much of the area is definitely unsuited to white settlement, and the bulk of it better suited to black than to white. As a minor detail, he also overrates considerably the amount of fertile land at low levels. When he states (p. 56) that in addition to the highlands over 4000 feet, which he would reserve for white settlement, there are 'immensely larger areas of fertile lowlands and river valleys,' this is simply not true for some of the territories concerned. In Kenya, for instance, the greater proportion of such land is desert or semi-desert, as little suited to native agriculture as to white.

He very airily dismisses native production as wasteful, and therefore a second-best to white settlement. This is not, however, the general view in Tanganyika and Uganda ; and from what I can gather is quite contrary to the facts in West Africa. General Smuts, I believe, has never been in the Gold Coast or Nigeria : perhaps a visit to these coast-lines, which are prosperous in spite of the alienation of any land to white settlers being virtually prohibited, except for certain limited purposes, would cause him to modify his views. Do not let us forget, for instance, that the Gold Coast produces more than half of the world's cocoa, and all by native production.

But the real weakness of General Smuts' position appears when we follow out the effect of his two policies, white and black, upon each other.

He definitely lays down (pp. 98-99) that we should force the native wage-earner to retain his home in the native areas by

compelling married native women to stay permanently in the reserves and prohibiting men from being engaged by white employers if they are accompanied by their wives and children. This, he admits, will be difficult, since many white men prefer (not unnaturally !) their houseboys to live with their wives, and since the general experience of employers of native labour, including such important bodies as the Kenya and Uganda Railway, is that the men are more contented, work better, and stay for longer spells if they are encouraged to bring their families.

Personally I cannot imagine any proposal more calculated to hinder the development of a stable African civilisation than a system which would always ensure that a large proportion (for with intensive white settlement it would be a large proportion) of married native men would be separated from their wives and homes for six or even three months out of every twelve, and that the native villages would always contain a large proportion of grass-widows.

Even if you adopt the principle of intensive white settlement of a 'white backbone,' this state of affairs could still be avoided, but only by encouraging squatter settlements and model native villages in the white area. Not only, however, would this sacrifice General Smuts' cherished principle of territorial segregation, but such mixing of the races in close proximity clearly contains the germs of many grave difficulties for the future—as regards land, for instance, or racial discrimination. And the greater the extent of the white area and the more intensive its settlement, the more acute will every such difficulty become. General Smuts' solution, to my mind, is no solution at all: it is the setting up on an equal basis of two principles which are both admirable *in vacuo*, but which cannot be prevented from interacting and by their interaction producing a crop of highly undesirable results. One of them must relinquish its claim to equality; in the tropical parts of Africa this must surely be the principle of white settlement and white production. We are committed by the facts of history and by official promises to some degree of white settlement in East Africa; and for some purposes, both economic and political, white settlement is necessary, or at least very desirable. But white settlement should, as regards the interests of the country as a whole, be, not equal, but subordinate to native development and native production. And if it is definitely regarded as subordinate, the violent clash and wholesale difficulties inherent in General Smuts' scheme would be avoided. This is not to imply that difficulties will not arise under any scheme, or that white settlement, even on a small and carefully regulated scale, will not involve compromise. All government involves compromise; and all contact of markedly different races

and cultures brings peculiarly difficult problems. But at least, if white settlement is not regarded as an end in itself, but as subordinate to the general progress of a country in which the social and economic development of the native population is the first aim, then difficulties can be adjusted as they arise. Compromise is the oil of the social machine; but if the machine incorporates two antagonistic principles of equal driving power, no amount of oil will ensure efficient working.

JULIAN S. HUXLEY.

WOMEN AND PRIESTHOOD

'FOR any sane person the thing is so absolutely grotesque that he must refuse to discuss it.' The quotation is from an editorial comment in the *Church Times* of July 24, 1914; and the 'thing' that no sane person would discuss is the ordination of women to the priesthood.

The monstrous regiment of women in politics [continued the *Church Times*] would be bad enough, but the monstrous regiment of priestesses would be a thousandfold worse. We are not inclined, however, to treat the proposed Conference [on the subject] as a sane scheme; we regard it as of a piece with that epidemic of hysteria which has manifested itself in the violence of feminine militants. It will pass with time. . . .

The point of view of the *Guardian* was very much the same as that of the *Church Times*. Reference was made in the issue of July 16, 1914, to a 'preposterous' suggestion which 'emanates chiefly, if not entirely, from a little band of women who have pushed the claims of their sex to such a point that they have lost all sense of proportion.' And in the next week's issue there appeared a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury in which the writer, Mr. Athelstan Riley, alluded to the assertion of 'the equality of men and women in the sight of God—equality in privilege, equality in calling, equality in opportunity of service'—as 'very mischievous nonsense,' the acceptance of which 'would make the Church of England a laughing-stock throughout Christendom.' Mr. Riley professed himself to be aghast at the self-deception of those who were raising the question of the ordination of women, and asserted that they were snatching at empty shadows which could never satisfy their higher nature.

The monstrous regiment of women in politics seems nowadays a very tame affair; the leader of the epidemic of militant hysteria has had a statue to her memory unveiled by an ex-Prime Minister, and, so far from having died away, as the *Church Times* prophesied, concern with reference to women's ordination has now spread to the episcopate itself.

The prelates at this time in conference at Lambeth have received for their consideration a memorandum on the subject very carefully compiled by a group of Anglican men and women

working with the encouragement and under the guidance of an episcopal chairman. Among the memorial's signatories are four bishops, four deans, an archdeacon, eight canons, four doctors of divinity, two principals of clergy-training colleges, one rural dean, and five parochial clergy. Exactly what reception the memorial will receive it is difficult to anticipate, but no one in the least acquainted with the present episcopacy can suppose it possible that the tone of any comments which will be made will at all resemble the vituperative shrillness of the Church Press of 1914.

It is clear that the compilers of the memorandum are very far from expecting the bishops to set about ordaining women to-morrow. They are engaged in no 'conspiracy to capture the priesthood for women'—to quote once more the phraseology of 1914. The memorandum shows no failure to realise that the exercise of a vocation within the Church depends upon the Church's recognition of the validity of that vocation. Indeed, it is because of this realisation that the memorandum has been put forward. Perhaps the most impressive section is the final appendix, which consists of statements, quoted for the most part from letters, by women who believe that they have a call to the priesthood. It is impossible to think that these letters can be ignored by a body of men met together in virtue of the fact that they themselves are aware of a call which the Church *has* recognised. The statements will inevitably revive for them the recognition of their own vocation and the response with which, as young men, they found their own claim to consideration received by the Church. They will find themselves thinking of the encouragement and the welcome given them, of the way in which their doubts and hesitations were understandingly eradicated, and their aspirations strengthened and affirmed. They may find themselves wondering how they would have felt had their sense of vocation been incontinently ruled out as necessarily presumptuous, based upon self-deception or conceit, and obviously unworthy of a moment's serious consideration. Possibly some will find themselves forced to admit either that such a reception would have embittered them against the Church, or that it would have caused their own convictions to dwindle into nothingness. Others may find themselves admitting that, had their disability been universally assumed in advance, their vocation would not have revealed itself to them at all.

There is very little, if any, bitterness in the statements quoted in the memorandum. One writer says: 'I tried to strangle it'—*i.e.*, her sense of vocation to the priesthood—'in bitterness against religion, but without success.' Another: 'The only thing I can see is to teach divinity in girls' schools.'

While I like this and think it well worth doing, it does not give me what my vocation demands.' Another: 'I did go through a period of intense spiritual bitterness, but all that passed.' (Although her bitterness passed her sense of vocation did not pass.) Another: 'There is something which I can hardly put into words which makes it very difficult to let it be known that one believes herself called to this work. If there were any authority to which the vocation could be submitted (as in the case of men) it would be simple. But as the claim rests entirely on one's own personal judgment, which no one in authority will ever examine or confirm, the sense of being presumptuous is very difficult to overcome.' Yet another: 'When I left school I was quite sure that, if it had been possible, I should have sought ordination. . . . I love teaching and have no sense of having lived a frustrated life, but am perfectly conscious that for me it is only a substitute.'

Seventeen women—most of them with good academic qualifications and with practical experience in social work or in teaching—have agreed to the inclusion of their statements in the memorandum. How many women share the experience of these seventeen it is impossible to know—probably a considerable number; but whether there are seventeen, or seventy, or seven hundred is not the point. If there were only one woman with a sense of vocation to the priesthood, the question at issue would be the same. What has to be faced is quite simple: Is there any *principle* against the ordination of a woman? Is a woman who believes herself called to the office by God necessarily deluded? Is there something in womanhood, as womanhood, that debars a woman from the priesthood? Now that the sense of vocation in seventeen women has been made articulate and has been presented to the bishops in conference with a request for judgment, the time is clearly past in which it was enough to say: 'The thing is unthinkable; it has been settled once and for all. Moreover, women do not seek to be ordained.' It is difficult to think that the bishops—men whose sense of vocation is a reality—will be able to dismiss such an appeal with a curt command to put away the thought of ordination as a temptation of the devil. 'One deep calleth another.' The bishops are men who have themselves experienced God's call to the priesthood; they have, moreover, recognised the call in other men. They will, surely, as they read the letters of these women, recognise the call again. It is difficult to suppose that they who have found in the exercise of their vocation a sacred privilege capable of bringing deep spiritual satisfaction should placidly seek to dissuade these others from 'snatching at an empty shadow which can never satisfy their higher natures.'

It will be urged by many who are themselves outside the Church that the futility lies, not in the fact that women are seeking something which is and must be the exclusive prerogative of men, but in the fact that the whole notion of the priesthood is out of date and absurd. Obviously, if one does not believe in the Church, one does not feel the need of ministers in the Church. If one does not want to have priests, one does not want to have women priests. To argue the general question of the value of the priesthood would be beyond the scope of this article. It may be worth while, however, to emphasise the fact that the women whose statements are quoted in this memorial have a very genuine belief in the Church and in her need for priests. They have not put forward their statements in the spirit attributed to them by the Church Press of 1914. They are not 'claiming' admission to a 'profession' on feminist grounds. They are not insisting that to exclude women from the ministry is 'unfair' or 'unjust' to the women. The writers quoted do not want to be priests in order to prove that there is nothing men can do which women cannot do; they do not want to be priests primarily because they feel that there is need for the expression in the pulpit of 'the woman's point of view,' or need in the confessional for help which 'only a woman can give a woman.' They want to be priests for the same reasons that certain men want to be priests; they feel that God has given to them a call to serve Him and His Church in a particular way—a call which, in their eyes, would not be fulfilled by, for instance, ministry in any of the Free Churches. They believe that *incidentally* much good might come of the women's special appeal; but it is important to state clearly that they do not desire priesthood as the last step forward for feminism, but as a means towards the coming of the Kingdom of Christ. The weight of custom appears to them to be quenching the Spirit of God, and the loss to the Church appears to them lamentable. Again, none of these women is asserting that she has a vocation which she ought to be allowed to exercise immediately and without scrutiny. Any of them would take for granted, and indeed would feel an urgent need of, both testing and training before ordination.

It is difficult for those who have for long been accustomed to the idea of women priests, and whose own shock of surprise at the notion became a thing of the past a generation ago, to reiterate with any degree of freshness the counter-arguments to the objections put forward by those who continue to be distressed or enraged by the notion. 'Christ took upon Him the form of a man, not of a woman': true, but it is His humanity, and not His sex, that is essential to His incarnation. 'Christ chose none but men to be apostles': admitted, but neither did he choose a

gentile. 'St. Paul forbade women to speak in the Church': yes, but St. Paul was making regulations in a pagan city in the first century. 'Christian tradition supports the sex-limitation': it does, but it also supported slavery. 'A woman's physiological constitution is different from a man's': it is, but priesthood calls for no feats of physical endurance greater than those expected of, say, women doctors. One might easily prolong the to-and-fro of argument; but the exercise has some resemblance to a game of badminton played by opponents whose interests lie elsewhere.

It is doubtful whether any of the arguments brought forward against the admission of women to the priesthood have, at any rate for more than a few moments, seemed significant to anyone who did not, independently of argument, feel that there was something unseemly in the idea. Some people admit frankly that they can see no reason against having women priests, but that they would feel uncomfortable if they came into a church and saw a woman at the altar or at the confessional. There seems to be something very deeply rooted in nearly all Catholics which is moved to distress or to hostility when the idea of women priests is first brought to their notice. In some cases the emotional reaction is brief, in other cases it is protracted, but it is very rarely absent altogether. An objection which is based, not upon reason, but upon an instinctive emotional reaction, may be a sound objection or it may not. The subconscious, as Myers pointed out years ago, may be either a treasure-house or a rubbish-heap, and the same is probably true of the unconscious, if by that controversial term we may be allowed to designate whatever it is that stimulates a person to mental activity which he not only does not but cannot analyse.

The distress experienced by most Churchpeople fifteen or twenty years ago upon first meeting with the suggestion that women should be priests could scarcely have been more extreme had the suggestion been one sympathetic to, shall we say, incest. Are we, then, to assume that the instinctive reaction in the one case is necessarily as well justified as in the other? Surely not. An instinctive reaction may be valuable under certain conditions and worthless under others. When a lamb grows too big to stand beneath the ewe at time of suckling, it learns to kneel. This is a valuable reaction. But the cade lamb, when it has reached the same stature as this ewe-fed lamb, kneels too—a reaction wholly futile when its nourishment comes from a bottle in the adaptable hand of the farmer's wife. It is possible for civilised human beings to resemble the cade lamb and to react instinctively to one situation in a manner appropriate only to another. The people who dread to see women priests in England

in the twentieth century are like dogs trying to bury a bone in the drawing-room carpet.

The choice of metaphors must not, of course, be taken as implying that civilised life can do without those primitive elemental things which may be symbolised by mother's milk and mother earth. To set up as praiseworthy a world of feeding-bottles and drawing-room carpets and to depreciate the breast and the soil is not in the least the intention of this article. It is the writer's firm belief that the primitive elemental things 'birth, and copulation, and death,' along with the rhythm of the seasons and the crops, have intense primitive value, and will have so long as the world endures, but that Mr. T. S. Eliot's Sweeney is wrong in asserting that 'That's all, that's all, that's all, that's all, . . . that's all the facts when you come to brass tacks.' It is the firm belief of the writer of this article that there are also two other facts—creative religion and creative art—which have an equally intense positive value, and, furthermore, that these two facts are in a unique relation to all that Mr. T. S. Eliot sums up in Sweeney's formula.

To work out the analogies between the creative religion of the sacraments ('the outward and visible signs of inward and spiritual grace') and the creative art, which has been defined as the 'expression in a medium of an æsthetic impression which has been apprehended as worth while in itself,' and to analyse the relation of both to 'birth, and copulation, and death,' would take a great deal more space than is available here. It must suffice to suggest that in such an analogy and in such an analysis may be found the basis for a rational explanation of the age-long hostility to the admission of women to the Christian priesthood. A Christian woman priest has for generation upon generation been taboo. Certain taboos (*e.g.*, that upon incest) may reveal themselves as in accordance with rational ethical judgments which have a binding power of permanent value. Others—as those upon the woman doctor, the woman nurse, or the woman priest—have had a value which has proved itself to be transient. The taboo upon women priests is out of accord with a condition of affairs which includes an articulately expressed need on the part of women for the opportunity to share with men the human activity of creative religion.

It is more than likely that these latter paragraphs will seem to the reader both fantastic and obscure. Their relevance to the earlier sections is, however, so fundamental, in the opinion of the writer, that it would have been disingenuous to have omitted them.

To return from these speculative regions of psychology and metaphysics to the issue of the moment, and to put that issue in

its simplest form : certain women believe that they are called of God to serve Him in the priesthood ; certain priests, certain bishops even, believe that these women are indeed called of God ; these facts are being brought before the conference of bishops now assembled at Lambeth. It is clear that this is not a question only for the bishops and for the women who think that they have a call ; it is a question for all Churchpeople. Either a number of serious-minded women are deluding themselves and others, including many leaders of the Church, with regard to a very important issue, or the weight of custom is quenching the Spirit of God. This article is put forward primarily as a plea that no Church person should dismiss the question without thinking about it, and that no Church person should think about it without praying about it.

URSULA ROBERTS.

EUGENICAL REFORM—THE PLUTOCRACY

I

THIS article is the second of a series intended to elucidate the obstacles in the way of so reorganising our institutions that they would cease to function dysgenically and to inhibit our efforts to improve man as a biological organism. The series contemplates also a eugenical reform of the House of Lords, of the democracy, and of the intelligentsia ; but only the article on the House of Lords has so far appeared, in the *Eugenics Review* for January 1929.

Now a reform of the House of Lords may at first appear a very hopeless and reactionary undertaking. But it makes a convenient starting-point for an attempt to sublimate human snobbishness into a basis for positive eugenics, to transform our present 'nobility' into a real aristocracy, and to stimulate everywhere an appreciation of aristocracy in the original and proper sense of the word—*i.e.*, a regard for human excellence. Its intention was so to modify public opinion that institutions aiming at the improvement of the human stock could grow in it. Thus the reform of the House of Lords was to be a starting-point on the path of progress, the easiest, and perhaps the nearest, to a very distant goal.

It was not, however, overlooked that actually the House of Lords is a stronghold of the plutocracy, and little more than a clubhouse for the rich. Nor yet that the plutocracy is one of the great social forces which need to be converted to eugenics if eugenical progress is to be achieved. It may, indeed, be regarded as the most difficult and important to convert. It is certainly the most ubiquitous. For all capitalistically organised societies, and perhaps even those which profess communism, have plutocracies to a greater or less extent ; so that many 'democracies' may well be camouflaged plutocracies. In America, for example, the plutocracy is clearly very powerful, and though it need not be contended that it is the *dominant* factor in American political life, a plausible case might be made out for this contention.

I

Plutocracy may fairly be called the most elusive of all political institutions. It is often very hard to detect and to drag forth into the light of day. For it prefers to work unseen, and the infinite ramifications of corruption and graft which it injects into the body politic may well elude the most lynx-eyed investigator. Not that plutocracy has not an overt side: under favourable conditions a social display of wealth is possible, and indeed occurs wherever this does not too promptly entail the unwelcome attentions of the taxgatherer or the executioner. But the display of its power is not essential to the being of plutocracy. It can just as well keep in the background, and work in the dark, beneath the surface of political life. It resembles an iceberg in that nine-tenths of its extent escape the eye; but it can also, like a fungus, send forth tentacles to pervade, corrupt, and transform all political and social institutions. Like a termite, it can undermine all constitutions, corroding their whole substance and leaving only a deceptive *façade* which crumbles at the merest touch of adversity. Like a very Proteus, it can assume all forms and tempt all characters; for money is a means to all objects of desire and a frequent motive for all acts. In short, it is a very formidable power, and to succeed, eugenics must win it over to its side.

II

But plutocracy has also curious weaknesses. It has the defects of its qualities. It has, for example, the demonic rather than divine quality of being no respecter of persons. Thanks largely to the occultness of its power, it tends to impersonality, and even to hostility to personality. Hence, though plutocracy endures, plutocrats do not. They have not the staying power of monarchs and aristocrats. No dynasty of millionaires, not even the Rothschilds, Vanderbilts and Morgans, has yet lasted for centuries, like the dynasties of kings or the ancient houses of nobility.

Nor is the reason for this phenomenon far to seek. Plutocracy is definitely more demoralising, or rather more enervating, than the other forms of power, and saps the strength of those who wield it even more rapidly. In a monarchical dynasty there has usually been a great deal of natural selection. In former days fool-killing apparatus was plentiful and effective, even when it stopped short of the extreme Oriental method of procuring a capable ruler—namely, systematic civil war among the offspring of a deceased ruler. Right down into our times kings who got

too insane, or idiotic, or profligate, have been deprived of their thrones and their places have been taken by more efficient or reputable relatives.

For the royal clan generally formed a matrix in which, in spite of multitudinous temptations, efficiency could grow up and ability could come to the fore. Moreover, a strong *esprit de corps* was generated, and an ample field for ambition and endeavour was generally open. Even where a king had only one son to inherit his crown and no further complications, his relations to his successor were generally such as to demand a strenuous life from both of them and to put a premium on intelligence and circumspection. The wearers of a crown might sleep uneasily, but for this very reason they could not sink into total torpor.

What is true of monarchies very largely holds also of aristocracies. They, too, were practically forced to develop a strong family spirit, capable of stimulating, training, disciplining, and in the last resort controlling, their erring members. The maxim *noblesse oblige* and the *bushido* of the Japanese *Samurai* indicate this moral backbone of aristocratic power. Nor should it ever be forgotten that the greatest political achievement on record, the transformation of mediæval into modern Japan, of an impotent feudal State into a great world-power within the brief space of a single generation, stands to the credit of an aristocracy. From this point of view also *primogeniture* is an entirely rational and defensible institution. It is not merely that it produces 'only one fool in a family,' but that it directly stimulates ambition, and offers to the younger sons of noble families careers and possibilities of public service which could not have been afforded them if they had had to rise from the ranks. Social philosophers are apt to overlook how much energy is expended by the able merely in rising, and that this energy is merely wasted from the social point of view. Could the able only be discovered at twenty instead of at fifty, would not the world enjoy their services for the thirty best years of their life? But in a democratic State it is simply inconceivable that anyone, even an athlete or a film star, should become Prime Minister at twenty-three, like the younger Pitt, and by the time a politician has become of national importance he is nearly always past his prime. The achievements of the *cadets* everywhere, then, stand to the credit of aristocracy.

But when we come to plutocracy we behold a radically different picture. The plutocrat is one of the most uncontrollable of social forces. He can make money out of anything, from salutary invention and the organisation of new industries to speculation and corruptly acquired monopolies. Once he has made his money the *non olet* principle begins to apply. Ill-gotten

gains are just as powerful as the rewards of ingenuity and enterprise. Nor is he bound to use his money in any specified manner. The plutocrat is not, as such, under any obligation to anybody. True, he may not be, and very often is not, a lover of money for its own sake. He may have taken to money-making merely because he recognised money as the most universal, most liquid, and most pervasive form of power. He may merely have perceived its unique advantage—namely, that it is enough to be known to possess riches, and that he need not *spend* his money to enjoy the power it confers.

III

Having made his fortune, he can pretty well do as he likes with it. He can spend it or accumulate it as he pleases. He need not even live conspicuously. Indeed, both his power and his sense of power may be all the greater if he does not display his wealth but leaves it latent and lets its influence percolate through the social structure secretly.

Nor need he found a family. He may prefer to found an institution or to endow a craze. In America he very often does. In England he more often buys a title from the politicians who recognise his 'public services' (*and* his contributions to their party funds!), in order to please his wife and children, thereby recruiting the 'nobility.' But in so doing he is perhaps greasing the wheels of 'democracy' rather than exercising plutocratic influence, and the British method of financing politics is far less harmful socially than the American method of buying legislation. And even when the plutocrat has been 'ennobled' his family feeling is apt to be less intense and exacting than that of the old nobility: besides, he has often been too busy and too intent to shun delights and live laborious days to have much of a family. The money-maker rarely attains his end without sacrificing many things to Mammon, his god, in his own person.

IV

But his own sacrifices are nothing to those he imposes on his descendants and heirs. To these, under our present dispensation, Mammon all too often proves to be another name for Moloch. He becomes a monster arrayed in the girdle of Aphrodite and accompanied by Dionysus, the Muses and all the Graces, who corrupts their nature and destroys their life; while they all unwitting become his joyous victims. Much more attention than is usual ought to be bestowed upon the moral and biological effects of inherited wealth upon the stock of its possessors. Actually one of the quickest ways of exterminating a stock

would seem to be to endow it with great wealth. The ancients were far more alive to the destructiveness of what they called 'luxury'; we have been far too blind to the truth contained in their moralistic cant.

The truth is that, with our present provision for dealing with it, money acts in some respects as a racial poison. Even the liquidity of money power has serious disadvantages. Not only can it easily flow away again from the favourites of fortune—perhaps owing to circumstances beyond their control—but it is far too easily transferable to other hands to serve as a criterion of social fitness. Owing to the whims and vices of its possessors it gets 'dissipated' with them.

In former days it used to be a universal literary convention that the son of a rich man must be a spendthrift; nowadays this possibility is less obvious or less emphasised. It may be that the social classes from which plutocrats arise have become more immune to the allurements of prodigality and so more retentive of wealth; or it may merely be that accumulations have grown so vast that few prodigals know how they can spend so much. At any rate, the old adage 'three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves' no longer seems to hold extensively. It is rather 'three generations from shirtsleeves to tombstone.'

But though mere prodigality is no longer so fatal to great fortunes as it was, the liquidity of wealth still works great havoc with the personnel of the plutocracy. A millionaire's son is still very apt to lavish his wealth on actresses, and his health on bacchanalia, and his daughter to become the bride of a groom or a handsome 'good-for-nothing.' There is not, therefore, much guarantee that money will remain in the strong hands that made it, nor that the qualities which earned it will be found also in the hands into which it passes. If these qualities are valuable—and if not, why were they so lavishly rewarded?—there is no adequate provision in our society for their perpetuation.

Riches, moreover, are not only slippery and elusive, but also directly demoralising. In our modern capitalistic societies they provide the most effective stimulus to exertion—and the greatest allurements to work *before* they are gained; they function as the normal reward of labour, of ability, of distinction of every sort, as the source of honour and of power *after* they are gained. But they then also destroy the strongest motives to exertion and efficiency and almost inevitably entail degeneration. Thus the classes which produce and inherit wealth are largely paralysed by it. It puts them in the position of having what most men have to work for, but it provides them with no other work or useful social function. It does not overtly empower them to rule and to feel responsible for the conduct of affairs; for all our capitalistic

States profess to be 'democracies,' and plutocratic influence is exercised in secret. Thus the rich young man is deprived of the most urgent motive for exertion, the most available reward of ambition; the sinews of his energies are severed. Sooner or later he discovers, as in America, that there is virtually *no* career open to him. He has just to remain a rich man all his life, and nothing can be done for him. Society appears to have no use for *him*, though it is assiduous in begging for his money. Is it a wonder that he becomes useless to those who will not use him?

Nor does society merely show itself indifferent to getting any work out of him; it also sets to work to corrupt him. Every temptation to idleness and dissipation is thrown in his way; his resistance to temptation is sapped by every conceivable device. He is condemned to be a drone, and a vicious drone at that; the marvel is that any escape from this doom.

V

All these facts are really familiar enough to us all, though they are rarely mentioned. Eugenical reflection is needed to render us aware of their whole monstrosity. It reveals that the social attitude towards inherited wealth is as idiotic as it is iniquitous. For, after all, the material which we take such pains to spoil is the best we have, and the way we treat it is an outrage. We first enact that wealth shall be the greatest common measure of ability of every sort, and its appropriate reward. We do not, indeed, bestow it in due proportion to the ability displayed, nor always show a just perception of the social value of the ability rewarded; but still wealth, more or less, attends success in every walk of life, and no other rewards are really recognised. For with singular shortsightedness our 'democracy' has swept away the power of kings and nobles and all the claims of hereditary privilege, and has emancipated itself from the spiritual powers and theocracies: for science and the power of intellect it has never acquired any real respect. The power of money alone has not been disputed or touched. For money is a power *all* can understand, an idol *all* can worship. With money our democracy rewards its favourites, whether they be film stars or politicians, jockeys or heavy-weights. Thus it has *de facto* abdicated in favour of a plutocracy.

But our democracy does not respect the plutocrat, nor recognise in him any *personal* superiority. It declares that all men are born equal and hankers after such an equality of opportunity that anyone can become a millionaire. But if he succeeds, envy arouses hatred and he is treated shockingly. *Sterilisation of the fit* is the first law of reproduction in our 'democratic'

societies. That is the inner meaning of the statistical fact that the birth rate contracts the higher we rise in the social scale. The refusal to *employ* the rich, which we have traced above, is the second social law. The third is the systematic corruption of the 'idle rich.' The total result, as I have now pointed out for many years, is an elaborate social mechanism for enabling ability to rise to the top, which pretty effectively drains all classes of their ability. But when it has risen, it is destroyed. This is comparable with skimming off and casting away your cream after it has risen, or churning it into froth. Surely so fatuous a social policy must be fatal to the *progress* of humanity, and in the long run even to its survival.

VI

No doubt, it will be said, but what can be done about it? What way can you suggest for extricating us from this disastrous situation?

I would suggest, first, a little lucid thinking about the future, a little forethought. This will have to be done by all who are capable of thinking and have leisure to think; for our politicians, whose job rational forethought might be supposed to be, never think far enough ahead. They are all opportunists, hopelessly mired in the details of politics.

Secondly, an obvious expedient to arrest the corruption of the descendants of the rich, and to make them work, is the abolition of inheritance. In England we seem to be moving in this direction, and it would only be necessary to raise the death duties to 100 per cent. to do the trick. I confess that this expedient seems to me more specious than sound. In the first place, while it might arrest the degeneration of the sons of the successful into our 'idle rich' class, it would do nothing to increase their number, but, if anything, diminish it. So, the law of the sterilisation of the fit would still be operative. Secondly, it would have tremendous repercussions on the whole social structure. It would rob the able of all but *purely selfish* motives to work. And I am inclined to think that their output of work would suffer seriously. To what extent, one could hardly say; but it would appear to be a counsel of the most elemental prudence to wait and see how the present *experimentum in corpore vili* of 'Holy Russia' ends. At any rate, to all who have not been able to persuade themselves that communism can form an enduring and progressive social order and are not willing to scrap all the strongest motives to exertion which have so far animated men, no real case for abandoning the individualistic ordering of society has yet been made out.

But there is a case for reforming it, and that in the interest of the individuals themselves. If we realise the folly of utterly subverting the social order, we shall have to reconcile ourselves to a certain measure of plutocracy; but it need not be the sort of plutocracy we labour under now. It rests with us to render plutocracy a blessing rather than a curse. For it is not impossible to make it socially valuable and to *use* it. It is not impossible to stop the spoiling of our best stocks and the wasting of the 'cream.' It is not impossible to reverse the dysgenic tendencies of civilisation and to make the social order an instrument of betterment rather than of deterioration.

VII

To those who doubt this, and demand to know by what means this great change can be accomplished, I can answer by one word: by Education. But not by the education of those who are easy to educate, who crave for it and feel they need it, that is, of the poor, but by the education of those who are hard to educate, who do not want it but resist and resent it, that is, of the rich. And I know that this is a terribly arduous task.

All through human history the education of the rich and powerful has been a sorry chapter, one of the great unsolved problems, one of the outstanding failures of the social order. At no time, in no country, and under no constitution, whether monarchic, oligarchic or democratic, has society succeeded in giving to the children of its chief and ruling men sufficient stimulus and motive to exert themselves and to live worthily of their station and their ancestors, far less to persuade them to utilise their fortunate position in order to improve themselves and others. Of course, this source of weakness in all governments did not escape the acumen of the Greeks. We learn from Plato that it was a common topic of remark in the Athens of his time, and that the common inference from it was that virtue could not be taught. And certainly the greatest schoolmen and sages have made but a sorry job of the teaching of princes. From the days of Confucius and Plato down to that of the distinguished German professors who tried to instil some grasp of the realities of politics into the volatile mind of the Kaiser the record is one of all but unmitigated failure. Plato can hardly have been proud of Dionysius, even though we are told that he finally took to keeping a school, nor Seneca of Nero, even before he received his death-warrant from his hands; and it is not easy to trace any influence of Aristotle on the world-conquering career of Alexander.

But should it be inferred that the lesson of history is that the problem is insoluble? That would be to recognise an insuperable

barrier to human progress. Before we do this, ought we not to explore other possibilities? Let us rather mobilise our educational experts, of whom every civilised community supports an ample number, and summon them to devise a system of training that will at least pave the way to a solution, even if it only succeeds in making Eton about as efficient an organon of education as the ordinary elementary school.

VIII

In order to help them I will try to analyse out some of the causes of past failure, and, to conclude with, will venture on a few constructive suggestions of my own. Presuming that we are agreed that the fundamental cause of failure is a failure to provide sufficient stimulus to exertion for those situated as are the offspring of the rich, we may yet discern some serious secondary flaws in every system of education that has hitherto been tried.

It is, for example, a remarkable fact, and surely more than a curious coincidence, that the aim of all education, both intellectual and moral, has hitherto been to turn the eye of the soul *backward* into the past and not *forward* to the future. Among the intellectual subjects of training the leading rôles have been assigned to some ancient, obsolete and sacred language, and to the traditions of the tribe and the achievements of ancestors, as enshrined in a highly selective but patriotically stirring version of history. Moral education has similarly appealed to the wisdom of antiquity, to sacred writings embodying an original unchanging and unprogressive revelation and to immemorial custom.

We are constantly assured that all this is salutary, and even necessary to preserve social continuity, and to inculcate a spirit of reverence into the young; and there is doubtless much truth in this. But does it not harp somewhat monotonously on one string? And what stimulus to progress does it provide, and to what ideals does it teach us to look forward? At no point in this handing down of the cultural tradition can one find any allusion to the many problems of human life yet to be solved, any appeal for resolute thought about them, any tonic for the reason, any effort to elicit a spirit of adventure, any admonition to the young to shoulder the great tasks yet to be accomplished in a greater and more glorious future.

Yet, is it not precisely to such appeals that the soul of youth most easily vibrates, and to which its very ignorance and innocence render it more sensible? We complain of the 'cynicism' of the young, and sigh, contentedly, *ah, si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse pouvait!* and overlook that in our present

dispensation youth is not *allowed* to try even the most harmless experiments with the most effete conventions, because the old have sealed their minds against new knowledge and lost their faith in social progress.

If we ask, Why have the tribes of men always assumed this obstructive attitude? I fear we must answer that the real reason for their enormous emphasis on the past has been *selfish*. It has not been the good of the taught so much as the convenience of the teachers. Under the guise of arousing reverence for antiquity, of teaching the lessons of experience, of transmitting the traditions of the tribe, of preserving the continuity of its life, they have really aimed at inculcating respect for masters, pastors and parents, and so assuring their position. Otherwise, why is so much more stress laid on preservation than on progress, and why is not the continuity of life prolonged into the future?

Thus education, instead of being conceived broadly as preparation for the *whole* of life, for the exploitation of all its possibilities, has been narrowed down to an instrument of social discipline, a means to conformity. It is essentially a method of controlling the young and subjugating their minds, or at best of keeping them out of mischief so far as possible.

Of this sort of education our English public school-and-university training, especially in Oxford, is the *beau idéal*. What is it but a subtle conspiracy skilfully designed to implant traditional customs and stereotyped ideas? Both what is taught and what is omitted seems to have the underlying purpose of fostering a conservative bias in our leading minds and of stamping a caste-mark on the soul. It succeeds only too well. Its stamp is indelible, like tattooing. It turns out by the dozen polished sceptics who have never tried to know, and disillusioned cynics who have never tried to do, anything worth while.

Of course, the system incidentally enlists also the services of many able and devoted men who strive to make the best of the conditions, and perform wonders in overcoming its limitations and keeping the system (relatively) sweet and fresh. But the odds are heavily against them, and their activities hardly obscure the truth that the innermost aims of our social education, as well as its earliest and plainest manifestations, are best revealed, and can still best be studied, in the initiation rites of savages.¹

¹ Since writing this I have read an excellent article by Mr. J. Langdon Davies in *Harper's Magazine* for April 1930. He points out that the social relations of youth, under the conditions of the public schools, are still those of savage life, and that while some of their seniors are 'anti-savages' and resent the artificial degradation into which they were plunged just to remind them of their origins, no 'civilised' education is in sight. I agree, but, to get it, it would not suffice to civilise the young 'savages'; we need also to change the attitude of their seniors and the aims of the 'education' they impose.

IX

These methods, however, raise a grave psychological question. Are they the best adapted to develop the minds of the young? This seems hardly credible. They may be good politics, but they are surely bad psychology. They fail to tap the reserves of energy and enterprise latent in the soul of youth.

Now here is where, I think, there is a great opening for us eugenists to come in. It ought to be possible, nay easy, to arouse in the young enthusiasm for our cause. For, unlike tribal training, eugenics is essentially an affair of the future. It looks to the future to redeem the past. It is full of promise. It is an adventure. It is pervasive of all the activities of life. It demands an all-round training of all our powers. It connects up directly and intimately with the most pressing problems in the lives of the young. It must moreover evoke personal pride and the spirit of emulation; yet its ideal is social and not selfish. Its appeal is to anyone who feels he is good for anything. What can be better calculated to appeal to the psychology of youth?

X

On this psychological basis in the mind of youth what educational institutions can we build? In the first place, it is clear that our education must be *selective*. We must pick out the able and segregate them from the common herd. We shall thus avoid one of the chief causes of educational waste and failure by the contamination of good, quick-witted minds by masses of dulness and stupidity which keep them back and drag them down. This is one of the great sources of weakness in American and German schools: it is less felt in English, because a clever boy is generally allowed to run up the school despite his youth, although, of course, it is only in a few of the best schools that there are enough clever boys to extend him fully. This selection of the capable means special schools for the *élite*; for it is worse than useless to waste resource and energy in striving, vainly, to turn sows' ears into silken purses.

Secondly, having selected and segregated our ability, which is to be also our nobility, we shall train it *competitively*. It will inevitably train itself in that way, and we need not fear that under these conditions it will fail to be extended to the utmost and developed to the full.

Thirdly, the educator's function will mainly be to put before the eugenical *élite* high ideals, and to see to it that their development is harmonious and explores alike the physical, the intellectual, and the moral avenues to excellence.

Fourthly, the appeal of eugenic education will be universal: that is, it will reach all the classes which generate ability. It will be so far democratic. But, for the reasons we have analysed, its appeal will make the greatest difference in the quarters where it is most needed, which are at present most deeply sunk in sloth, most resistant to endeavour, and most indifferent to education. Without assuming that at first all the children of the successful will be found to have inherited the ability of their parents, we may fairly hope to draw many of our most valuable recruits from this class, and shall thereby materially restrict the ranks of the idle rich.

Lastly, if the scheme succeeds as it should do, its working will *progressively* alter the conditions so as to increase its own effectiveness. For in proportion as the products of our eugenical education increase in numbers and influence and display their superiority, the *prestige*, the attractiveness, and ultimately the necessity, of such education will be impressed on all. It will become a condition of success in life. The antithesis and tension between the able and the rich will disappear, because we shall have devised a mechanism which will induce the rich to develop their ability and will reward the exercise of ability and excellence with wealth. Thus shall we draw the poison-fangs of our present plutocracy and transform it into a true aristocracy. Nor need any eugenist be told that human societies *must* bring about the survival of their superior members and *must* recover the capacity for *biological* improvement, if the progress of humanity is to be assured.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

(To be continued.)

GRAPHOPOLIS—A UTOPIA FOR LITERATURE

PLATO, greatest of poets, banished poets from his Republic. On the other hand, the knights-errant of the Ideal would scorn the ideal State, and the land of dreams is not fit for dreamers. Denounce the ugliness and vulgarity of our age as savagely as you please, and the poets are with you, but any definite scheme of reform will make the artistic temperament shudder. The poetic mind is invincibly attached to the picturesque past, and averse to the logical, purposive future. Victor Hugo abominated the metric system as much as Anatole France despised Esperanto; and Sir Hall Caine, worthily expressing the prejudices of his fellow-craftsmen, declared that 'Shakespeare's spelling was good enough for him.' In our own day, George Moore may be considered as the *beau idéal* of consistent art worshippers, and to his mind social progress, including universal education, is 'not even a beautiful dream.' When genuine artists stoop to practical schemes of improvement they immediately lose caste: Anatole France's *On the White Stone* is dismally Philistine. Utopia is the paradise of the commonplace.

This opposition between two kinds of prophets—poets and reformers—is a paradox and a problem. The problem is not so fanciful for our own time and our own country as it may appear at first. Are we Americans losing poetic power because we are drawing dangerously near the dismal coast of Utopia? For in comparison with nineteenth-century Europe and its marvellous flowering of artistic genius, twentieth-century America is Utopia indeed. Our cataclysmic industrial progress, our appalling prosperity, our boundless democracy, our universities wide open to the masses, have outstripped the imaginings of such as Saint Simon and Cabet. Rabelais's *Thélème* is literally fulfilled in a great coeducational institution on the Pacific coast. I heard Pastor Russell tell us that the millennium had begun in 1897: we had merely failed to realise the fullness of our beatitude. We are already treading the pavements of the New Jerusalem. It is hard to conceive a material Utopia as far ahead of our present civilisation as we ourselves are of 'the Man with the Hoe.' We may travel much faster; we may add a telephote to our tele-

phone, and shake hands with distant friends through a tele-dactyl; we may even skyrocket to Mars or Venus over the weekend: in other words, we can make the world infinitely smaller and destroy the last vestiges of solitude and privacy. But the actual limits to a material Utopia are within the range of our conception, if not of our attainment. Just as victory over matter is almost within our grasp, we lose all conceit with it. The miracle of radio, as Aldous Huxley remarked, has chiefly served the broadcasting of twaddle. Interstellar communication might very well bring us no nearer spiritual perfection. The conditions vaunted as ideal by the Boosters' Clubs and other disciples of Macaulay seem to produce no Shakespeare; and there are many who wonder whether the same soil and the same climate can be equally favourable to poets and to plumbers.

Mr. Stuart Chase has touched upon the problem in his suggestive book *Men and Machines*. But the difficulty does not lie chiefly with mechanical appliances: it lies rather with the mechanical spirit, the spirit of standardisation, and that seems inseparable from a normal, harmonious, classical static, or Utopian world. We might smash all the machines, as they did in Erewhon, and spiritually find ourselves none the richer. Arcadian simplicity may be as tedious and stifling as the zippy atmosphere of Zenith; indeed, Sheila Kaye-Smith has found unplumbed stupidity in unplumbered villages. Here is our dilemma: we do not want brutal and wasteful anarchy, but perfect organisation turns society into a soulless machine. Poetry is the eternal protest against the mechanising trend towards Utopia.

In presence of such a problem three attitudes are possible. The first is, candidly and heartily, to damn art and literature. If they are in any way incompatible with sanity and sanitation, decency, comfort, orderliness, let them go!—a good riddance. Spiritual values which cannot be translated into terms of good citizenship have no validity at all. But this opinion is seldom frankly voiced: the rankest utilitarian does lip-service to anti-utilitarianism. He has his pew in church, and allows his wife to lionise long-haired virtuosi. Unfortunately, perhaps, the thorough-going Benthamite of to-day is dumb, in the original sense of the term.

This leaves us with two solutions, in both of which the claims of art and those of the social order will be recognised. Strange yoke-fellows, which may shy at each other! We must on no account start with the heretical assumption that art may have a social message: let us be faithful to the sacred doctrine of art for art's sake. But no artist will object if we admit that art is worth while, and that conditions inimical to art are therefore undesirable. Let us, then, ask the artists themselves to write

the specifications of their own Utopia. They like neither our present world, nor the world that reformers are attempting to create: what kind of a world do they want? In other terms, what civilisation would be most favourable to the production of art? The last method of approach would be to admit the feasibility, nay the inevitability, of a materialistic and social Utopia of the standard type. But, instead of taking it for granted, as George Moore does, that all art will of necessity perish in such an atmosphere, we may attempt to forecast what forms of art could possibly survive, and even what new kinds might be evolved. Are we so sure that art depends entirely upon ignorance, injustice and chaos? Are irregular verbs alone fit to be used in poetry and love? Let us assume the perfect state so dreaded by poets: could a niche be found for them?

The nearest approximation to an artistic Utopia remains William Morris's *News from Nowhere*—a paradise for house decorators and Roycrofters, a magnified Carmel-by-the-Sea before they put in the drains. The book is still a delight; but it is pretty thoroughly unconvincing. For it is ambiguous in its ideal and in its methods. Purely archaic in spirit, it brushes aside all the conquests of the machine age, yet it admits the services of a mysterious 'Power' which is the ultimate triumph of science and industry. Then Morris was a professed Socialist as well as an artist: at times, the voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.

André Maurois offers a purely literary Utopia in his fantastic trifle, *Voyage to the Island of the Articoles*. But the intention is too evidently satirical, not constructive. And the target of his satire is neither art nor society—only the well-known foibles of professional men of letters. For our purpose, this charming pamphlet is of no avail.

All Utopias are retrospective as well as prospective; their Golden Age is made up of elements borrowed from the past. We shall follow the same method in describing, without irony, the civilisation of our Articoles. We shall take into account the lessons of history as well as the desires of men. We shall apply the famous theory of Taine: art is the result of race, environment and time. If it be true, it ought to be reversible. In order to secure the kind of art we want, what social conditions are necessary? This question resolves itself into the historical problem: under what conditions has the art we admire been produced in the past?

It is evident that in such a complex product no single factor is absolutely indispensable: an unfavourable climate, for instance, may be offset by an abundance of natural resources.

It is evident, also, that if our prescriptions were taken too literally, they would sound like a satire of Taine's ideas and of the whole sociological method in artistic criticism. With these words of warning we may embark for Graphopolis, in the Land of the *Articoles*.

Graphopolis lies in the temperate zone. The tropics have failed so far to produce a literature that would rank supreme, in spite of natural wealth, beauty, and teeming population. The arctic regions can boast of Iceland, which in proportion to its numbers, took a high place among centres of poetry; but we are safe in assuming that the mean temperature of Graphopolis is decidedly higher than that of Reykjavik. There are sharply contrasted seasons—an almost torrid summer, a mellow golden autumn, a glorious winter of hard frost and snow, followed by the yearly miracle of the spring: how much poorer would poetry be in a land without April! Scotland is not barred out as the possible seat of our Utopia: a surly clime drives you to the fireplace and books—or to the radiator and poker. Too ideal a climate might be a handicap: I would not endorse the claims of San Diego, where they play the organ outdoors every day in the year, or those of Yuma, Arizona, where they offer you a free lunch every day the sun does not shine.

The country round Graphopolis is a varied land of mountains and vales, with a rugged, deeply indented coast. Mountains alone will not necessarily evolve great art: watches, cheese and hotel, not the poems of Carl Spitteler, are the chief products of Switzerland. At sea level or below the Dutch and Venetians have created great schools of painting: they are less prominent as writers—perhaps for the lack of Parnassian heights to scale. Moderate cliffs and crags will do, as in England, Scotland, or Attic Greece; even the molehills of Rome, Florence, and Paris may suffice. But the devastating platitude of Russia and of our Middle West is an obstacle to be overcome: Russia had no great literature until the nineteenth century. We once tried to induce a millionaire to give Houston, Texas, an artificial hill, in the hope of making that friendly city the Athens of the south-west. Cathedral heights and the palisades will serve the purpose for New York, and twin peaks for San Francisco; but there is little hope for Chicago.

Graphopolis is watered by a noble river, which in olden times was worshipped as a god. Poets find inspiration in the thundering falls above the city; in the swift-flowing stream, which they liken to human destiny and which grows sluggish before it merges with the measureless sea; in the sombre fury of the turbid floods in early winter or spring. It is also convenient for a watery

grave: romantic Paris needs the Morgue. The banks of the Chicago drainage canal rather discourage lyrical effusion. The Los Angeles river, so far as we know, has not become famous in song; yet it is not much worse than the classic Ilissos. Although the land is well watered, it would be advisable to have a small desert at hand: here Los Angeles scores a definite point. But Los Angeles, wasteful of artistic possibilities, is reclaiming and banalising its desert—as short-sighted as the fabled Auvergnats, who, blessed with the possession of a volcano, carelessly allowed it to become extinct.

Graphopolis is not a vast empire. A huge country is slow-witted. Whether it lives under a tyranny, or enjoys the alleged benefits of democracy, it is inclined to think in masses, crudely. How much more favourable is the city-State, Athens or Florence, or the tiny principality, like Weimar! A ruler has a ruler's psychology, whether he rule a thousand men or a hundred million; Dante was as truly an ambassador as Paul Claudel; a court is a court, even though it be that of the Hawaiian Islands or that of Emperor Soulouque. And patriotism, in the city-State, is concentrated, vivid, all-pervading, not a dull thing of hearsay and statistics. Party politics assume the dramatic intensity of family feuds. The city wall is infinitely more real than the arbitrary frontier. The artists in Montmartre once proclaimed the secession of the sacred mound from the deplorably *bourgeois* French Republic; and they were well advised. In Chesterton's fantasy the Napoleon of Notting Hill reconstitutes a colourful world on a purely local basis. The true Napoleon owed his greatness to his Corsican cradle. Culturally, vast entities are barren. The formula of the future is communalism, as in 1871—a world federation of independent cities.

What kind of community is Graphopolis—pastoral, agricultural, commercial, industrial? Pastoral life has given rise to a huge body of literature: even with us, cowboy songs are among the few authentic lyrical notes in a most unlyrical country, although they can hardly compare with the negro spirituals. In so far as herding is a lazy life, it favours dreaming, the prerequisite of all artistic expression; but it favours even more the vague musing which is so characteristic of contented cows. Pastoral poetry is mostly the work of city dwellers, and remains exceedingly conventional: Theocritus and Vergil are not much more convincing than eighteenth-century shepherdesses. The number of actual poets among actual shepherds is not impressive. He of Ettrick, James Hogg, is the first that comes to mind. Pasture land, like the desert, should be kept as a minor background; but, in itself, it would prove disappointing.

Agriculture is far less favourable to artistic expression than

cattle or sheep ranching: it is too busy a life, a life of constant, absorbing, benumbing care. So, in our modern folklore, the cowboy is the hero, the hayseed is the butt of unending jest. Yes, Burns did sing in his furrow, and cast a word of Franciscan sympathy to the 'wee, sleekit, tim'rous, cowerin' beastie,' whose housie he had laid in ruins. But how many Burnses are there on the roll of fame? France was long a land of peasants, but only the city birds were vocal. The fields are needed for material sustenance and spiritual refreshment, but the artistic power of Graphopolis, like the political, is concentrated in the city. 'Urbanity,' 'civilisation,' imply the *urbs* and the *civitas*.

Graphopolis is therefore a mart and a workshop, a place wherein the wits of men are sharpened by constant fencing. But Graphopolis is no mere country town, the all-sufficient centre of its own rural district. Such a condition would lead to parochialism and intellectual atrophy. Graphopolis is a commercial power, sending caravans and argosies to the farthest ends of the world. Preferably it is a *thalassocracy*, like Athens, Venice, the Hanseatic League, Holland, Scandinavia, or Portugal at the time of her literary glory. To be sure, the Phœnicians, navigators and merchants though they were, left no great literature; at any rate, they taught us our letters. Overseas trade is of commanding cultural importance, for it brings wealth, leisure and luxury, broadens the horizon, fosters the spirit of adventure. So to the wharves of Graphopolis cluster ships of all nations, spice-laden, freighted with dreams, even when they carry nitrates, hides, or guano. To Anatole France, who accused her of lacking imagery, the philosophical poetess Madame Ackermann triumphantly replied: 'No imagery? Have I not THE SHIP?' A complete bard is as inconceivable without the ship as without the spring. For no other reason we, as students of literature, are intensely interested in the proposal to make Paris a seaport.

Many arts and crafts are plied in Graphopolis: for artisans are creators of beauty, and may sing at their work. But the country is not predominantly industrial. It is somewhat premature to condemn industry as artistically barren. Industry is a very young giantess, barely out of an ailing infancy and of a sprawling, brawling, sulky, quarrelsome childhood. So far it has made for ugliness, hardly mitigated with evidences of power. We are told that a new beauty can already be descried under the grime; but it takes very optimistic eyes to see it. Industry, as distinct from the crafts, means mass production. The maker loses his individuality; freshness, creative power, spontaneity, are ruled out of his life; and all originality is likewise eliminated from the product. Witness the short stories turned out to-day by our most approved literary factories.

It is commercial England, seafaring England, with the sturdy background of rural England, that has made England's name glorious in art and letters. It was in its commercial, not in its industrial, days that New England was a power of the spirit. New York's intellectual supremacy has a mercantile rather than a manufacturing basis. Let us admit, then, that Graphopolis is poor in coal or iron, so that she will not be tempted to turn into Pittsburgh or Birmingham.

The crowds of Graphopolis are at home in the streets of their city; they do not rush feverishly, but they can afford to saunter and loiter. They stop for a friendly chat, they gaze at the evanescent and delightful art of window display, they have time to admire a marble statue in a public square; and, no less frankly, they feast their eyes on those living statues for whom the country is famous. They listen to some orator, poet or musician at the cross-roads; they sip the ambrosia of the land at little tables set on the very sidewalks, under the trees.

I surmise that the alcoholic content of Graphopolitan ambrosia is well over one-half of 1 per cent. Utopia settled the temperance question in an ingenious way: licences were issued to those drinkers who could plead that they needed stimulation for artistic thought. If they failed to produce valuable art, their licence was revoked; if they were successful, they were made Doctors of Potatorial Philosophy. A nation brought up in the worship of art could be trusted not to make beasts of themselves: gradually the privilege of the D.P.P. became a universal right. Those who abuse it are punished to the full extent of the (natural) law: through discomfort and loss of efficiency for minor offences; through disease and degeneration for repeated transgressions; and the ultimate penalty is death.

There is great variety among the types you meet in Graphopolis. A few dashes of colour are noticeable—ebony, black, brown, red and yellow, with many shades which demonstrate that no race prejudice prevails. But these picturesque notes are the exception: the enormous majority of the inhabitants belong, broadly, to the same race; and that race, needless to say, is our own. Asia and Africa each have their Graphopolis, friendly and independent.

The coexistence in any large number of widely different breeds creates such harrowing problems that no Utopia could settle them or survive them. Almost inevitably, pride, oppression, jealousy, resentment would spring up. One race, in all probability, would isolate itself in splendid conceit and quasi-mystic snobbishness, thus stunting its own intellectual growth and mutilating its human sympathies: a superior caste is never more than the pitiful fragment of what it might have been. Yet we might

conceive of conditions similar to those which prevail in Hawaii, where stocks from all parts of the world mingle with almost complete freedom. The literary results of miscegenation in Alexandre Dumas or Du Bois are decidedly encouraging. Perhaps in Graphopolis eugenics will have reached such a point that various bloods can be exactly dosed for the procreation of a great dramatist, a lyric poet, a sculptor, or an inspired cook; whilst race mixture would be sternly prohibited when the result is likely to be a synthetic-syndicated humorist.

Graphopolitans, as we visualise them, are white. But they are not all blonds. Complexions may be olive, amber, magnolia, ruddy and even pinkish; only the chalky pallor induced by artificial means will be under the ban. Hairs may range from Venetian red to raven black, through all the tints of bronze and gold: sonneteers would not be happy without dark ladies as well as ladies fair. Stature may be petite or impressively tall; figures slender or majestically rotund: we could not think of banishing G. K. Chesterton. On the whole, there may be a slight predominance of the Mediterranean type; but Nordics will not feel out of their element. Alpines specialise in plodding research and dismal realism: we have Mrs. Gertrude Atherton's word for it, and she has it on the authority of Madison Grant, who had it from H. S. Chamberlain, who had it from Gobineau, who had it from God Himself: so the chain of evidence is perfect. Alpines will have their modest place in the general scheme; but no book of poems will be allowed to appear if the author's cephalic index is above eighty. This simple rule will avert many literary calamities.

These people speak a sonorous, highly inflected, strongly accented language—full of idioms, allusive phrases, veiled metaphors, quaint survivals and delightful absurdities. They love it so that they revel in playing with it: they are great punsters, and they are constantly coining new words, logical or fanciful, pregnant with thought or merely musical. They rejoice in the possession of many dialects and forms of slang, closely related enough to remain mutually intelligible, but different enough to give a racier tang to any man's speech. Purism and standardisation are frowned upon as inartistic: teachers in elementary schools strive to release the latent originality of their students in matters of spelling and syntax. The Graphopolitans, like the Greeks and Shakespeare, are not widely interested in the speech of other nations; they have too rich a fund of their own. They realise, further, that polyglottism is not conducive to literary excellence: neither university professors nor *concierges* in cosmopolitan hotels rank very high as creative artists. A simple, practical, artificial language is used for business, for scientific

purposes, for international relations, and even for those branches of literature in which logical thought is of more importance than form: the literary tongue is held too sacred for such commonplace or utilitarian services.

In politics as well as in religion Graphopolis is pluralistic, or, in simpler parlance, tolerant. A goodly proportion of the population owe allegiance (including a very light contribution towards the upkeep of the court) to King Wenceslas XI., who is known as a good sport, and represents the gorgeous tradition of a thousand years. His annual procession through the streets of the city on the 5th of November is a magnificent pageant. Others pay tribute to Emperor Tamburlaine XXII., a mild little scholar who, by immemorial custom, never moves without an escort of wild horsemen. Still others do homage to Queen Cleopatra XLV., the winner of a beauty contest; and not a few join the strict, austere organisation known as the Anarchistic Brotherhood. It makes little difference, as the mere business of the State is transacted by managers, mostly Alpines, independent of king, queen, emperor, or grand Anarch.

The managerial State lives at peace with all its neighbours; but the king and the emperor occasionally wage war against each other or against foreign foes. The populace looks forward to these contests with the keenest delight. The ringing challenges, the Pindaric poems and battle hymns, the enthusiastic meetings or rallies on the eve of the strife, the departure of the gaily-clad heroes for the Field of Glory, add enormously to the enjoyment of life. Pacifists who would suppress that supreme form of entertainment are summarily condemned, by such authorities as Elie Faure, as the enemies of art and poetry. The Field of Glory is a large and wild tract reserved for that purpose within convenient distance of Graphopolis; from neighbouring hills, and from specially built towers, the whole population can follow the magnificent spectacle. The return of the conquering host, laurel-wreathed, with a golden nimbus in the sunset fire, is a sight never to be forgotten; but connoisseurs aver that a defeated army slinking in, ghost-like, in the dead of the night produces a subtler and more profound effect.

In religion all creeds are welcome, except scientific determinism, which spells artistic death. Graphopolitans are good pragmatists: all faiths are valid if they *work*—that is to say, if they enhance the enjoyment of beauty. Hellenism, Hebraism, and Christianity alternate in popular favour, and at times blend rather prettily. Some artists claim that without paganism there can be no salvation, and they are seen devoutly prostrate in the fanes of Aphrodite. But it is usually conceded that Christianity offers a more dramatic setting for human destiny, and casts a

richer glow round the mysteries of birth and death. The notion of sin, in particular, is considered as a marvellous, an inexhaustible, artistic device. Frankly acknowledging the services of æsthetes to the true faith, the Graphopolitan Church has beatified Baudelaire and James Branch Cabell. We need hardly say that a notable number of Graphopolitans are orthodox devil-worshippers.

There are classes, although there are no castes, in Graphopolis: several aristocracies, several clergies, a vast bourgeoisie with many subdivisions, and tiers upon tiers of 'masses.' These classes are definite enough: a man knows without a doubt whether he belongs to the upper middle class or the lower nobility; but interpenetration is not absolutely barred. The classes are in constant rivalry, and even conflict, but not at war. A system of airtight compartments between the social ranks would be detrimental to culture; but the total abolition of class distinction, if it were possible, would be even more deadly. For art as such thrives only on a class basis: whatever is universally enjoyed ceases to exist for the genuine æsthete, and 'popular' literature is a fallacy. The creation and appreciation of art are essentially methods of securing admission among an *élite*.

The Graphopolitan social scale is established on the basis of literary taste—from the highest aristocracy who read James Joyce's latest in the nursery to the lower middle class who can barely rise to the level of *The Little Minister*. The chief interest in Graphopolitan life is the breathless attempt of each class to catch up with the one immediately above. As soon as an *élite* is overtaken it ceases to be an *élite*, and its proud place is assumed by another group, which, in its turn, will strain every nerve to keep ahead in the chase. It is the national game. Fads, cults, shibboleths may be resorted to in order to baffle pursuers. But it is considered poor sportsmanship to take refuge in total incomprehensibility: it is as bad as shooting the fox, which, to the British, is the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Artists enjoy the picturesqueness and dramatic possibilities of the social ladder, with clusters of men fighting for a precarious foothold at every rung. Poets move up and down at will: they associate with kings or beggars, and consciously relish the paradox of both situations. Each class has a traditional costume, a code of ethics, a manner of speech of its own, which are carefully preserved in *fiction*. In real life every one is aiming to imitate the oddities of some other class, above or even below, and the result is delightfully confusing.

There are marriage laws in Utopia, and they are extremely strict. Without them, half of the world's tragedies, and four-fifths of its comedies, would cease to exist. These laws are part of the indispensable conventions of dramatic or narrative art.

Judging by the precedent of the most purely *artistic* civilisation that ever bloomed, that of the Troubadours, we may surmise that in Graphopolis poets will love with special ardour every wife not their own. The honour of the Graphopolitan husband will be satisfied if the verses inspired by his wife are of sufficient merit: G. B. Shaw gave us an adumbration of such a state in his skit *How he lied to her Husband*. For worthless poetry the only redress is an exchange of visiting cards, seconds, and bullets. For a woman to be sung by three bad poets in succession gives the husband sufficient ground for divorce without alimony. A chivalrous custom provides that the woman should have the first chance of using a love affair for literary purposes: the man's version can appear only six months later. A quaint statute, honoured mostly in the breach, prohibits addressing the same intimate poems to more than five lovers.

What think you of such a world: Cabell, Valle Inclán, d'Annunzio, André Gide, exquisite company of exiled prophetic Graphopolitans? Would you find in it enough colour, chivalry, adventure, and that tang of sorrow which makes life doubly sweet? Or will you spurn a world visibly made to your order, because it would rob you of the divine discontent and the transcendental scorn which mark you as poets?

ALBERT GUÉRARD.

writes Lucretius—which is the text of a homily in *The Woodlanders* and of other homilies in Hardy; but while there is often in the English poet something of the triumphant joy of the Roman in observing such a process, there is in him far more than in Lucretius, and, indeed, far more than in any other poet I know, a gloom, and a repining over death. So many of his mortals lament that they are mortal, and that this life is flitting away. He makes bereavement so terribly poignant. It would sometimes appear, even, that man's capacity for anguish is, to Hardy, the most human characteristic. This is the terrible doom of mortals; they are figments of creation, but, as the Chorus of the Pities sings in *The Dynasts*, they are figments, unlike the sun and the stars and the gases—they *feel*.

But O, the intolerable antilogy
Of making figments feel!

These are the things that strike the reader of Hardy, I say, at the outset. Yet we must not push the generalisations too far. To revert to my earlier warning—labels do not fit him. No sooner have we resolved that he is grim and gloomy, than we discover him to be a great humorist, a lover of Nature, who has caught much of natural beauty, and recorded almost every human mood, not merely the sad ones, that can be awakened by life outdoors. We have no sooner concluded that his gift is lyrical, than we come on a fine narrative poem, short or lengthy, or a short lapidary thing reminding one of the Greek anthology. If his purely satirical poems were collected, such things as *In Crinoline Days*, *The Curate's Kindness*, etc., they would fill a considerable volume. Again, even apart from *The Dynasts* and *The Queen of Cornwall*, Hardy is remarkably successful in dramatic poetry. Using 'song' in the stricter and narrower sense than lyric, he is a great writer of songs—songs that demand, somehow, musical accompaniment, and which one feels were conceived with that accompaniment. The fiddler in him makes him infallible in this suggestion of music. I open at random to find:

When friendly summer calls again
Calls again
Her little fifers to these hills,
We'll go,—we too—to that arched fane
Of leafage where they prime their bills
Before they start to flood the plain
With quavers, minims, shakes and trills
'—We'll go,' I sing; but who shall say
What may not chance before that day!
And we shall see the waters spring,
Waters spring

From chinks the scrubby copses crown;
And we shall trace their oncreeping
To where the cascade tumbles down
And sends the bobbing growths aswing,
And ferns not quite but almost down,
'—We shall,' I say; who, who may sing
Of what another moon will bring!

Sometimes the suggestion of the kind of musical accompaniment is given; for example, we are told that some verses of *Could I but will* are for major key, some for minor. Sometimes the poet would have us believe that a certain bit of music had fashioned his verse for him. The following exquisite poem is called *To a Movement in Mozart's E-flat Symphony*:

Show me again the time
When, in the Junetide's prime
We flew by meads and mountains northerly!
Yea, to such freshness, fairness, fulness, fineness, freeness,
Love lures life on.

Show me again the day
When from the sandy bay
We looked together upon the pestered sea!—
Yea, to such surging, swaying, sighing, swelling, shrinking,
Love lures life on.

Show me again the hour
When by the pinnacled tower
We eyed each other and feared futurity!—
Yea, to such bodings, broodings, beatings, blanchings, blessings,
Love lures life on.

Show me again just this:
The moment of that kiss,
Away from the prancing folk, by the strawberry tree!—
Yea, to such rashness, ratheness, rareness, ripeness, richness,
Love lures life on.

Hardy has often been called Shakespearean; in nothing is he more Shakespearean than in some of his shorter songs—for example, *If Grief come early*. Nor must we fail to mention among his songs *Murmurs in the Gloom*, to which he gives the sub-title *Nocturne*.

In brief, then, both in style and form, and in mood and interest, there is the greatest variety in Hardy. He ranges from little love-songs and dialect poems to philosophic questionings, from slight martial songs to *The Dynasts*, which in sustained poetic intensity, greatness of theme, and universality, in the artistic sense, ranks with the great things in literature.

All this, however, is perhaps a trifle general; I have not yet grappled with the question: *What is the quality of Hardy's poetry?*

The poet, as artist, must weld his material, which is language, words, to a perfect and inevitable form, and a form, moreover, which is rich in meaning. The slighter the thing the poet means, the easier it may be, perhaps, to hit the perfect form. *The Forsaken Merman*, by Matthew Arnold, is, I have often thought, the most perfectly expressed thing in English literature; but the thing which it expresses is, after all, slight—mere fantasy, in fact. It is not to any great degree 'a criticism of life,' to use its creator's own phrase; not very directly concerned with life, as most of us live it. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, on the other hand, we have pictured the passion and tragedy of a man who flings away half the world for love, and of a woman who can win such love; and the expression of this tragedy and passion matches the greatness of the theme. There is no point in objecting to my comparison that it is not fair to the two authors to compare themes so dissimilar. The great author chooses the great theme, it will be found. But the reader who is susceptible to the poetic spell does not go about analysing the themes of the poets. He recognises greatness in poetry, and is at all times sure of the quality of the poet, at the first touch of 'frenzy'—though it be only a single phrase. True, a single fine line does not make a great poem (to quote Arnold again). But it will be found that the great poems are encrusted here and there with jewels, and these have much to do with the quality of the poetry. They are not accessories or trappings; the thought of the poet burns with such intensity that these crystals are wrought on the surface, like sapphires on a volcanic seashore. The late Poet Laureate, in a recently published essay on Keats, has a passage comparing some of his expressions of this kind with those of Shakespeare. He does it in a manner that to my mind lays bare the sheer quality and character of either poet. The late Katherine Mansfield used to lie, on sleepless nights, exclaiming over some of the perfections of this kind in Milton, and hitting, with her sure artistic instinct, the very quintessence of Milton's genius.

I think I can cite things of this kind from Hardy, the crystallised outcroppings of a great poetic intensity, as unmistakably Hardy as Shakespeare is Shakespeare, and Keats Keats. For example:

The years have gathered grayly
Since I danced upon this leaze

Is it worth while, dear,
Now to call for bells?

thought outbrings
The many-sided mournfulness of things.

An aged thrush, frail, gaunt and small,
In blast-beruffled plume
Had chosen thus to fling his soul
Upon the growing gloom.
So little cause for carolings
Of such celestial sound
Was written in terrestrial things
Afar or nigh around,
That I could think there trembled through
His happy good-night air
Some blessed hope, whereof he knew,
And I was unaware.

Never a care-worn wife but shows,
If a joy suffuse her,
Something beautiful to those
Patient to peruse her,—
Some one charm the world unknowns,
Precious to a muser,
Haply what, ere years were foes,
Moved her mate to choose her.

In *The Dynasts* the Spirit of the Pities and the Spirit of the Years look on, as it were at a dumb show, while the Cardinal crowns Napoleon in Milan Cathedral. Pity asks:

'What is the creed that these rich rites disclose?'

The Spirit of the Years:

A local thing called Christianity,
Which in the wild drama of the wheeling spheres
Includes, with divers others such, in *dim*
Pathetical and brief parentheses,
Beyond whose span, uninfluenced, unconcerned,
The systems of the suns go sweeping on,
With all their many-mortaled planet train
In mathematic roll unceasingly.

Few readers, I think, will miss in some at least of these cadences the miraculous quality which only the divinest poetry has. It may be replied that poetic beauties may be culled from many poets: Arnold's

Unplumbed, salt, estranging sea,

or even Campbell's

At Linden ere the sun was low;

and perhaps hundreds of phrases in Virgil have each, for a moment, the power to transport us magically into an imaginative world. Yet none of these are great thoughts—'thoughts that wander

through eternity'—completely molten into beauty. In them, or near them, there lurks, in the case of Campbell, mere rhetoric; or in the case of Virgil, a troublesome artificiality, and even a lack of demonic force—or in the case of Arnold, a tone of weariness, calling up the formidable shade of his father. Other poets, again, are unfailing in artistry, but they are not sufficiently great-souled, not quite magnanimous enough, to impose themselves upon us and hold us. Unlike Coleridge's *Mariner*, they do not have their will with us. By this I do not mean that we have to be interested in Milton's theology, or Shakespeare's politics, or Homer's geography and history. These are the accidents of the poet's theme. His theme is always Life, Humanity, or at least the world and life as a powerful human mind, like that of Lucretius may conceive it. However local this conception, it is always universal. The power of a poet lies in his firm grasp of life and in his ability to carry his readers with him in his own poetic frenzy. He must call attention neither to his language nor to himself. He must conceal both art and artist. He must, in short, to use Plato's magnificent metaphor, thoroughly magnetise us with the magnetism that has drawn himself. His ideas must be deep and permanent; his soul must be great, noble; his poetry must be intense. It was said a long time ago that there is no recipe for securing a combination of these gifts. But, while Horace is often cited, the extraordinary difference between poet and poet is often forgotten. Yet our own Shakespeare and Milton show how widely differing are the moulds into which poetry is poured.

Now, in an attempt to enter into Hardy, we may begin with the circumstantial, with the background of his poetry, and proceed, if that is possible, to the fibre of the man's mind. Behind, and woven with Hardy's poetic power, there is a rich and multifarious mind and experience. Like so many of the great artists, he was at home in several arts. His interest, and indeed his learning, in literature, music, art, science, history and philosophy, reminds one of Goethe. But more than Goethe, and indeed in a Shakespearean way, he lived among, and completely caught, the life of common people. They are the 'commons,' however, not of a mongrelised and desocialised, but of an age-long society—shepherds, and woodlanders, and village-folk of long breed, with a speech partly moulded by the English Bible and the Anglican Liturgy, and of a secular habit and occupation, that has brought them close to the soil and the elemental truths of life. On the one hand, then, Hardy's studies have unwound for him the vast scroll of human achievement in seeking truth, of human folly in pursuing wealth and power; on the other hand, he has lived among a peasantry not very different, he feels, from the Roman legionaries whose memorials remain among them, perhaps not

very different from the serfs of Babylon. An intense awareness of the poetry of it all haunts him always. He can

find

Poetry ever lurk where pit-pats poor mankind.

His poetry is a powerful and intensely vivid expression of some of the deepest and some of the loftiest workings of the human heart and mind.

The words last quoted bring us to Hardy's conception of human life. 'Pit-pats poor mankind'! The phrase is characteristic of Hardy. He is no contemner of his kind, nor is he bitter nor cynical, but he is naturally gloomy; and he thinks man labours under a terrible fate. Man he conceives of as the creation—in an evolutionary process—of forces utterly blind and careless of their creations. Their 'figment,' Man, is unhappily endowed with feeling. He is only partly a free agent. He is so tiny a creature on so tiny a planet, and whirled in so vast a universe, that he cannot do much; and unfortunately his best efforts, as the best of men conceive them, are often thwarted, not merely by the action of his fellows, but by elemental forces. One of the commonest manifestations of this to Hardy is unrequited love—love of a noble kind, like Marty South's, for example. War, again, is a multiplied self-destruction of the human race, and the blasting of almost every human virtue; yet it is one of the commonest activities of men. The last poem but one in Hardy's last volume is a sonnet on this subject: 'We are getting to the end of visioning.' Again and again in his prefaces the poet warns us that he nowhere attempts 'any harmonious philosophy,' yet the cosmic scheme which is the frame of *The Dynasts* is hinted at in so many of the poems, early and late, that we may fairly take it as a settled conviction. The thing which, in my opinion, justifies the contention in Hardy's prefaces, that to label him 'pessimistic' is stupid, is his conception that man is at least partly free, and that the universe is possibly capable of amelioration. Meantime, gloomily and grimly, a fine example of English paganism, he bids his fellows ply their task and amend their lot as best they may. That man's inner light will ever deceive him he has not much fear—another refutation of the charge of pessimism. His great powers of irony and satire Hardy reserves chiefly for convention and hypocrisy, though he has a kindly tolerance for superstition, knowing it to be so deeply human. His poetry kindles most at devotion, love and pity, bravery and loyalty, and it is characteristic of him to find these virtues chiefly in the lower walks of life.

These *leitmotifs* in his thought are illustrated very clearly in *A Commonplace Day*:

—Yet, maybe, in some soul,
In some spot undiscerned on sea or land, some impulse rose,
Or some intent upstole
Of that enkindling ardency from whose maturer glows
The world's amendment flows ;

But which benumbed at birth
By momentary chance or wile, has missed its hope to be
Embodied on the earth ;
And undervoicings of this loss to man's futurity
May wake regret in me.

Again in *A Plaint to Man*—the whole poem (which is too long to quote) ; and in *An Inquiry* :

I said to It : ' We grasp not what you meant,
(Dwelling down here, so narrowly pinched and pent)
By crowning Death King of the Firmament ;
—The query I admit to be
One of unwonted size,
But it is put to you sorrowingly,
And not in idle-wise.'

' Sooth, since you ask me gravely,' It replied,
' Though too incisive questions I have decried,
This shows some thought, and may be justified.
I'll gauge its value as I go
Across the Universe,
And bear me back in a moment or so,
And say, for better or worse.'

Many years later, when It came again,
' That matter an instant back which brought you pain,'
It said, ' and you besought me to explain ;
Well, my forethoughtless modes to you
May seem a shameful thing,
But—I'd no meaning, that I knew,
In Crowning Death as King !'

In *The Lacking Sense*, of which these are the last three stanzas :

Ah ! knowest thou not her secret yet, her vainly veiled deficiency,
Whence it comes that all unwittingly she wounds the lives she loves ?
That sightless are those orbs of hers,—which bar to her omniscience
Brings those fearful unfulfilments, that red ravage through her zones,
Whereat all creation groans.

She whispers it in each pathetic, strenuous, slow endeavor,
When in mothering she unwittingly sets wounds on what she loves ;
Yet her primal doom pursues her, faultful, fatal is she ever ;
Though so deft and nigh to vision is her facile finger-touch
That the seers marvel much.

And while she plods dead-reckoning on, in darkness of affliction,
Assist her where thy creaturely dependence can or may,
For thou art of her clay.

The Dynasts opens in ' the overworld ' with a question from the Spirit of the Earth.

' What of the Immanent Will, and its designs ? '

and the Spirit of the Years replies :

' It works unconsciously, as heretofore,
Eternal artistries in circumstance.'

Deal then her groping skill no scorn, no note of malediction :
Not long on thee will press the hand that hurts the lives it loves :

And the ' after-scene ' of the same poem transports us to ' the overworld ' again, in which the Spirit of the Years is saying :

' Thus doth the Great Foresightless mechanise
In blank entrancement, now as evermore,
Its ceaseless artistries in circumstance
Of curious stuff and braid, as just foreshown,
Yet but one flimsy riband of its web
Have we here watched in weaving—web enorm
Whose farthest hem and selvage may extend
To where the roars and plashings of the flames
Of earth-visible suns swell noisily,
And onwards into ghastly gulfs of sky
Where hideous presences churn through the dark,
Mountains of magnitude without a shape
Hanging amid deep wells of nothingness.
Yet seems this vast and singular confection,
Wherein our scenery glints of scantiest size,
Inutile all—so far as reasoning can tell.'

The Spirit of the Pities queries :

' Shall blankness be for aye ? '

The Spirit of the Years asks the Pities how they would have fashioned things had they had the chance, which elicits a chorus almost Shelleyan, and with something of Shelley's anthropomorphism. The Spirit ironic girds at this, and the Years chant an agnostic reply. Partly, I think, in artistic compensation for the horror of the tale (the Napoleonic Wars), partly in explanation why, when Life is so terrible, man struggles on—and certainly not to make a ' happy ending,' or to express his own belief—Hardy closes the poem with another chant from the Pities—two questioning and despairing semi-choruses at first, and then a full and triumphant chorus :

SEMI-CHORUS I.

Nay :—shall not Its blindness break ?
Yea, must not Its heart awake,
Promptly tending
To Its mending
In a genial germinating purpose, and for loving-kindness' sake ?

SEMI-CHORUS II.

Should It never
Curb or cure
Aught whatever
Those endure
Whom it quickens, let them darkle to extinction swift and sure.

CHORUS.

But—a stirring thrills the air
Like to sounds of joyance there
That the rages
Of the ages
Shall be cancelled, and deliverance offered from the darts that were ;
Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashions all things fair !

But we must beware of taking even the last word of *The Dynasts* for Hardy's last word.

Of the supreme poetry of *The Dynasts* as a whole space does not permit us to make a detailed analysis. But some remarks on the stuff of it, its background and texture, and the author's point of view, may be serviceable as an approach. War, next to love, is the theme of the poets, it must not be forgotten ; and it is a remarkable thing that one of the greatest wars of all time attracted no poet until our day. From the very first Hardy was attracted to the theme ; some of his earliest verse, and some of his earliest prose, centres upon it. Traditions of it were rife in the home of his boyhood. The South of England has always been the recruiting place of the Navy, but it was not the Navy, and the glories of Nelson even, that attracted Hardy so much as the rustic turned foot-soldier. The type brought all his poetic qualities into play. The mixture of simplicity and swagger ; the grim humour ; the love-making, devoted and otherwise ; the glamour of swords and spurs, and the pulse-quickenning fifes and drums ; the exalted loyalties often evoked, and occasionally the sheer heroism—all these things were heightened examples of the 'purblind doom' of Man. It cannot be doubted that he viewed the whole history of the time from this angle, from the Wessex landscape and the scenes of his boyhood, which were the often-rumoured landing places of Napoleon. Just as Tolstoi viewed the defeat of Napoleon from the standpoint of the blindly striving Russian peasant, so Hardy saw it through and from the half-conscious patriotism of Wessex. But Tolstoi is Oriental in his fatalism ; Hardy is much more Greek and European in his philosophy. It has often been remarked that Napoleon's career strangely fits the conception of Greek drama. He is Fortune's darling and grows insolent ; like a Persian monarch, he aims at conquering the whole world. But the Scythians, or Russians, give him his first check by allowing him to wander over their vast

plains ; and a despised maritime people subdue him by sea and finally by land. The long tale of victories in Italy, Austria, Prussia, with the Peninsular and Russian campaigns for counter-check, and finally the matchless soldier fighting a world of foes, themselves make a dramatic scheme ; and Hardy, more than any Englishman since Shakespeare, has the dramatic sensibility of the Greeks. He is Shakespearean in his range of sympathies also. He tells us, indeed, in his preface, that he hopes the work will correct the writing of Continental authors, who have not sufficiently considered England's achievements. But though Nelson and Wellington and a dozen other English leaders are heroes to him, Kutuzof, Marie Louise of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Blücher are his heroes too ; and on the other side Napoleon, Ney and others are heroes no less, and all manifestations of the Immanent Will. Not that Hardy sees everything in the grey, with no distinctions between right and wrong, devotion and selfishness. But the distinctions by no means lie along the national frontiers. What a picture of stupidity and self-seeking he draws in Hapsburgs, Romanoffs, and Bourbons ! And the ruling classes of England fare hardly better. As Tolstoi's pictures of patriotism are largely confined to 'anonymous Russia' and the heroism of serfs, so Hardy's are in large part taken from anonymous Wessex.

But when all is said, every comparison with Greeks, with Shakespeare and Tolstoi, breaks down—*The Dynasts* is a completely new and original work of art, both in conception and execution. And this originality has its roots in the fact that Hardy is the first to introduce into poetry the ideas of nineteenth-century science. I am half-convinced that it is the suddenness with which he has done this that puzzles and angers his critics. The only other European poet who ever behaved so rashly was Lucretius, and the world of critics has hardly forgiven Lucretius yet. The claim used to be made for Tennyson that he was the poet of science, but that claim is sheer nonsense. Darwinism and astronomy furnished Tennyson with a few metaphors, but he no more accepted these things, nor made them part of his thought, than did the bishops. His metaphors are as hollow as the Platonic metaphors in the sixteenth and seventeenth century poets of Italy, France, and England. Now, we do not demand, of course, that the poet be up to date or abreast with the science of his time. We do not accuse Milton of error or hypocrisy because he completely overlooked Copernicus. We allow him the Hebrew cosmology as a literary convention. On the other hand, it should be clear that we have no right to confine our poets to antediluvian notions. Wordsworth in his day cleared our poetry of much poetical lumber ; he arrogated to himself the right, also, of extend-

And I shall answer : ' Sweet of eyes,
Carry me with you, Dear,
To where you donned this spirit-guise ;
It's better there than here ! '

—Till I remember

Such is a deed you cannot do :

Wait must I, till with flung-off flesh I follow you.

Mentem mortalia tangunt indeed ! But very often—not only in *The Dynasts*, but all through his poetry—his eye glances from this terrestrial scene ' of scantiest size ' to the *flammantia moenia mundi* of Lucretius, and again in the other direction, as Lucretius does, to tiny atoms of ' earth and air and rain,' which, though tiny, are of infinite meaning and importance. Lucretius is wholly a protest against the man-centred mind ; Hardy is completely man-centred, yet he flits to the ' back of the sky,' to use the phrase in the *Phædrus*, with a Lucretian facility.

Some, I suppose, would connect his gloominess with his philosophy, quoting his own phrase :

thought outbrings

The many-sided mournfulness of things.

But I do not think there is any necessary connexion. His gloom, I fancy, is part of his temperament, part of his physical make-up, perhaps. In his late years, as both the poems and the now published notes from his diary seem to show, this was reinforced by thoughts of his childlessness.

I have written this, first of all, in the hope that I may induce more readers to turn to Hardy's poetry, and, in a less degree, as a protest against most of the criticism of it that I have read. If it be true, as Mr. Santayana has said, that a poet's importance is measured by the degree in which his imagination has ' dominated reality,' it surely is necessary for critics, in the first place, to ask what ' reality ' is for men to-day, when science has more completely transformed our universe than it has ever done before—and that not for a few of us—and then to trace the contours of this reality in Hardy's imagining. That may be an arduous task for some who have donned the mantle of critic. But poetry will not wait for them to catch up. This is not to say, of course, that only the scientific minds can appreciate Hardy. Science is one thing, the revolution in human minds which science has caused is another. It is the latter which is ' reality ' for Hardy. Upon this his imagination plays, and, in my belief, with great poetic power.

CARLETON STANLEY.

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MOSUL OIL AND THE PIPE-LINE

THE matters now arising in connexion with the construction of a pipe-line to take the oil of the Mosul oilfields to the Mediterranean are of international importance. There are in Iraq two proved and tested oilfields, the development of which is held up by the absence of a pipe-line. The first is the Baba Gurgur field, near Kirkuk, on the north-western border of Iraq, in the hands of the Iraq Petroleum Company, consisting of British, French, American, and Dutch groups holding in equal shares ; and the second, the Naftkhana Field, near Khanakin, on the Persian border, worked by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This field lies partly in Iraq and partly in Persia. The Baba Gurgur oilfield is probably one of the largest and most prolific in the world, but its distance of some 600 miles from the Mediterranean must make the carriage of the oil to a port on that sea very expensive. On the other hand, Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, is only about 450 miles away, but the Suez Canal dues upon oil-tankers are so heavy that it would be profitable to the company to avoid them

at the price of constructing the extra 200 miles of pipe-line involved by the Mediterranean route.

The present low price of oil, its over-production in America, and the immense oil resources held in reserve in Venezuela would, in the absence of other considerations, make most of the great international oil interests sharing in the Iraq Petroleum Company reluctant to bring the Iraq fields immediately to the point of production. The American, British, and Dutch interests have long been working for a general agreement for restriction of output throughout the world, and, were they free to follow their inclination, they would undoubtedly, after exploring the oil resources of the Mosul area, refuse to develop them further until consumption had overtaken production. But they are not free agents. Under the terms of the Iraq Petroleum Company agreement Iraq has the right to declare the whole concession forfeited if the company does not, within four years of completing the testing of the area of the concession and the selection of working plots, begin to construct a pipe-line to the sea. And Iraq is growing impatient. It is now nearly four years since the tapping of the first great 'Gusher' well in the Baba Gurgur field. This one well alone is said to be capable of yielding 1,000,000 tons of oil a year. Iraq is in financial difficulties owing to the fall in the price of agricultural produce, on which she mainly depends for revenue, and she needs the royalties on her oil.

France also is impatient, so impatient that some of the English financial papers have hinted that her withdrawal of gold from England is due to a desire to put pressure upon the English financial and oil interests and force them to agree to an early construction of a pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. For France has made her share of the Mosul oil the basis of all her arrangements for the monopoly of the refining and sale of oil within her boundaries, and she regards its delivery at a convenient Mediterranean port as a vital factor in her defence. She can no longer contemplate dependence in time of war upon the conveyance from vast distances in neutral vessels of so essential a commodity, nor the being forced to bid for it in the open market against enemies or neutrals. At great sacrifice she has completed all plans for her security, and she cannot tolerate the gap left in them by the absence of an assured supply of oil under her own control. Up to this point the desires of France and Iraq are identical. They both wish to have the Mosul oil flowing to a Mediterranean port as early as possible. But the question of which port it shall be, whether a Syrian port (Tripoli or Alexandretta) or a Palestine port (Haifa), divides them sharply.

France, with her mandate over Syria, naturally presses for a Syrian port. Not only would the delivery of the oil on the

Syrian coast increase the prosperity of the chosen port and so benefit Syrian trade, but it would also in the event of war give France greater security for the conveyance of the oil to her own shores. For, even were Great Britain a benevolent neutral, France could not have such a free hand at Haifa, under British control, for organising the delivery of the oil to her tankers as she would have at Tripoli or Alexandretta. And supposing that Great Britain's sympathies were not with France in the war, there might be, she fancies, unpleasant possibilities of obstruction. She is prepared, therefore, to go to great lengths to secure her object.

Iraq is at least as impassioned in her stand for Haifa. Her reasons are various. First, she believes that a pipe-line from Kirkuk to Haifa would inevitably be accompanied by a railway, since between the Euphrates and the Jordan the line would traverse an almost uninhabited desert, and without a railway its construction and maintenance would be difficult. For a pipe-line to Tripoli or Alexandretta a railway would not be so essential, as the line would at no point after entering the desert be more than about 100 miles from existing railways (Aleppo-Nisibin or Aleppo-Homs), and supplies are easier to procure on that route. Thus, if Iraq can insist on the Haifa route, she hopes to get a railway to the Mediterranean constructed by the oil interests without expense to herself. Such a railway would run wholly through Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine—Transjordan ruled by King Faisal's brother and Palestine under the mandate of his British ally. There have been times when relations between France and Iraq have been difficult, and leading Iraqis have even had trouble in getting passports to traverse Syrian territory. Iraq does not wish to be dependent on French policy for her intercourse with Europe. Moreover, a Haifa railway would secure for Iraq a large share of the profits arising from the transit of European and American goods to Persia. These now go round by the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to Basra and thence on the Iraq railways through Baghdad to Khanakin, on the Persian border. But Persia is building a railway from the Persian Gulf to Teheran, which will divert all this traffic, and threatens the Iraq railways and Baghdad commerce with a serious loss, unless a new route through Iraq can be devised which will be even more attractive to Persian imports than the new Persian railway.

Now, a railway from Haifa would enable all goods destined for Persia from Europe and America to avoid the Suez Canal dues; and this saving, combined with the greater speed of conveyance, should attract them to Haifa and retain for Iraq the profits of their transit, leaving to the Persian railway from the Gulf the carriage only of Persian trade with India and the Far East. Again, a railway from Haifa could bring British military

help and military stores quickly to Iraq, if required, under the terms of the new Treaty of Alliance, without the delays of the circuitous voyage through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. Such help could not be ensured by a railway starting from a Syrian port, even if the pipe-line on the Syrian route were accompanied by a railway; for if Iraq were attacked by one of her neighbours, France and Syria might well be neutral and might forbid the use of the Syrian portion of the railway to British forces or material destined for Iraq. Iraq, therefore, considers a railway from the Mediterranean traversing only allied and Iraq territory vital to her interests.

Secondly, Iraq hopes that a railway and pipe-line to Haifa would permanently secure for her the desert corridor joining her territory to Transjordan and Palestine, which the ambitions of the desert tribes of Nejd threaten, in spite of the cordial relations recently established between King Faisal and King Ibn Saud. This corridor passes east and west between the southern frontier of Syria and the northern frontier of Iraq, and is at its narrowest not more than 70 miles wide. The Nejd tribes resent its existence, since it runs right across the routes followed by their caravans trading with Damascus, and they have often proclaimed their intention of obliterating it, although agreements between Nejd and Transjordan provide for the free transit of such caravans. If they had their way, they would completely cut off Iraq from the Mediterranean and would block the air route between Cairo and Baghdad. The British Air Company using that route would then have to bargain with Nejd for leave to fly over this desert, and might have to pay heavily for it, if indeed their passage were not entirely prohibited. It is evident that if a railway and pipe-line were built through this desert corridor by international interests, the Nejd tribes would not dare to encroach upon it, and Iraq need not trouble further about the security of her access to the Mediterranean and Egypt.

The railway would run for some 450 miles through Iraq, mainly in flat desert country where construction would be cheap, and for some 250 through Transjordan and Palestine, partly in hilly country. The latter section would be proportionately expensive. Palestine is no less anxious than Iraq that the pipe-line shall go to Haifa, and shall, if possible, be accompanied by a railway. She has received a large loan from the British Government for the improvement of Haifa Harbour, and were this port to be the point of departure for oil-tankers, and to be connected by rail with Kirkuk and Baghdad, its prosperity would be assured. Numbers of passengers between Europe and India would use this route, and the tourist traffic both in Palestine and Iraq would be immensely encouraged.

Lastly, Great Britain must prefer that the pipe-line shall terminate at a port under her control. It would be inconvenient that the British Mediterranean Fleet should be dependent on a Syrian port for its oil, and Great Britain is keenly interested in the stability and prosperity of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq.

Thus there is a sharp conflict of interest between France and Syria on the one hand, and Great Britain, Palestine, and Iraq on the other, as to whether the pipe-line shall debouch on the Syrian coast or at Haifa, being in the latter case accompanied by a railway. But, be the political interests what they may, the decision would normally rest with the Iraq Petroleum Company, which would obviously be guided by considerations of cost, harbour facilities, and security. As to cost there can be no question. The pipe-line to the Syrian coast, probably to Tripoli, would be cheaper, since it is about 100 miles shorter and avoids the expensive crossing of the Jordan valley. Moreover, water is more plentiful on this route. In the matter of harbour facilities there is some doubt. Tripoli could be equipped no less easily than Haifa with storage tanks and with arrangements for the discharge of the crude oil; but it is said that the prevailing wind at Tripoli is such that the oil-tankers arriving there empty and awaiting their load would have difficulty in mooring, and that the anchorage is inferior to that of Haifa.

The question of security is debatable. The western portion of the Tripoli line in Syria would pass just north of the Lebanon, near territory inhabited by a turbulent population which gave trouble to the French during the rising of 1925. If Alexandretta were preferred to Tripoli, the terminus would be threatened by Turkish ambitions and by brigand inroads from Turkey. On the other hand, the Haifa line would, for some 200 miles in the Iraq-Transjordan corridor, run close to the northern frontier of Nejd, exposed at first sight to attack. But all this country is practically uninhabited, and is far to the north of the area infested by the warlike Akhwan tribes of Nejd, who, bearing in mind the danger of bombing from the air, would scarcely venture to raid so far from their bases. On balance the security of the Haifa line seems greater than that of the line to Tripoli. If the Iraq Petroleum Company were free to decide, they might incline to the Syrian route, the question of cost outweighing all other considerations. But unfortunately for them they have difficulties about their concession, for the solution of which they may be obliged to bargain with Iraq; and Iraq, with unyielding voice, demands as her gain from the bargain that the pipe-line shall go to Haifa and that it shall be accompanied by a railway.

This situation has arisen in the following way. Shortly after the war the American Government were obsessed by the ground-

less fear that their oil supplies were approaching exhaustion, and by negotiation with Great Britain they not only secured to American interests a quarter share in the Turkish (now Iraq) Petroleum Company, but also succeeded in limiting the original monopoly of the company over the whole Mosul province by the 'policy of the open door.' Under this arrangement the company were, after a reasonable period of prospecting for oil, to select a fixed area for their operations, and the whole of the rest of the Mosul province was then to be thrown open to public tender. The Americans doubtless hoped that in this competition their financial resources would secure them the lion's share, which would be additional to the quarter share of the company's oil already obtained by them. Later on, in the negotiations of 1923 between the company and Iraq, the company, who probably did not then realise the enormous extent of the Mosul oil deposits, themselves proposed that the area to be selected by them in pursuance of this arrangement should consist of twenty-four rectangular plots of eight square miles each, and the final Convention between the company and Iraq embodied this provision. It was stipulated that the company should thereafter act as agent for the Iraq Government in conducting the auctions for the additional areas outside the company's twenty-four selected plots. These were to be held by the successful bidders from Iraq on the same terms as to royalties and other obligations and rights as the company's own plots, the element of competition consisting in the sums offered at auction. The Iraq Petroleum Company, in consideration of the fact that it originally held the concession over the whole Mosul province, was to receive the sums bid by the successful bidders at the auctions, the Iraq Government being content with its royalties on the oil.

The time has now arrived when under the Convention the Iraq Petroleum Company should select its twenty-four plots. But it is most unwilling to do so, because it is doubtful whether the 160 square miles allotted to it by the Convention will suffice even to cover the whole of the Baba Gurgur oilfield, the only oilfield which it has had time thoroughly to test. If this oilfield were not completely covered by the company's holdings, and rival companies were able to secure a corner of the field by bidding at the auctions, an era of competitive drilling, which has proved so injurious to the American and other oil industries, would set in; for the huge oil pool underlying the field could be tapped by the rival companies, and a frantic and uneconomic race might then ensue, each trying to drain away as much oil as possible before the others should succeed in exhausting the oil. This would obviously be grossly unfair to the Iraq Petroleum Company, which has borne the heat and burden of the day in securing the

concession and discovering and testing the field, and it would be against the real interests of Iraq. These would be best served by the methodical development of the field through one agency, which, like the Anglo-Persian Company in southern Persia, could make large plans undisturbed by competitors. It is true that the oil of the field might be got out more quickly by the competition of two or more rival companies, and that for a comparatively few years Iraq might gain huge royalties; but this would be achieved at the expense of so flooding the market with oil and lowering its world price that, with the expense of constructing and maintaining the long pipe-line, the operations of the rival companies would scarcely pay and the whole oil industry of Iraq might suffer a setback. It would be better for Iraq to receive a substantial, but not enormous, annual sum in royalties for a long period than for it to receive an extravagant amount for a few years; for when it had learnt all the financial vices of opulence, it might find that its chief oil pool was empty and that the oil interests of the world were unwilling to risk the expense of testing and developing other fields under the ruinous system of competitive drilling. Moreover, experience elsewhere has shown that competitive drilling into one oil pool is a very wasteful system and may spoil the field and lose a great part of the oil. The wisest policy for Iraq, then, is to insist on receiving early an adequate sum in royalties from what is suspected to be her greatest oil pool, but at the same time to conserve her oil resources and prevent waste by leaving its development in a single hand.

These reasons combine to make the Iraq Petroleum Company anxious to obtain from the Iraq Government a modification of the terms of their concession which shall give them a larger area, and perhaps a longer period, for experimental borings before they have to make their final selection. But the *quid pro quo* demanded by Iraq, the selection of Haifa as the terminal port for the pipe-line, and the construction of a railway alongside it, is too expensive for them.

And even were Iraq to get her way, it seems doubtful whether the opposition of France could be overcome. France feels so strongly on the subject, for reasons already explained and to which the Press of Paris and Syria bears witness, that she would probably be prepared to use all the resources of her diplomacy to frustrate the Iraq plan; and the means lie ready to her hand. She is none too enthusiastic about the proposal that Iraq shall enter the League of Nations in 1932, since this may embarrass her in Syria. Moreover, as traditional defender of the Eastern Christians, she sympathises with the objections of the thousands of Christians in the Mosul district to being left in the uncontrolled power of an Arab Government, as contemplated in the new Anglo-

Iraq Treaty. The protests of these Christians have already reached the English Press, and the Baghdad newspapers in their comments on the new Treaty have already expressed a fear that France will oppose the candidature of Iraq and prevent her obtaining the suffrages of two-thirds of the League Assembly which are necessary for her admission. Or even if France did not go to this length, she might insist on reimposing the 'capitulations' in Iraq, which she, like some other nations, professes only to have suspended for the duration of British control of the Iraq courts. If there is a real danger of such action, the exasperation of France over the pipe-line question would increase it, and the opposition of France in the League might bring all the painfully worked-out policy of Great Britain and Iraq to the ground. An issue must be sought from this dilemma.

Nor do the complications end here. While the tussle between Iraq and the oil company has dragged on, new interests have intervened and made Iraq even more reluctant than before to yield her point. A syndicate known as the British Oil Development Company, under the presidency of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester Wemyss, and with the backing of Lord Inverforth and other leading financiers, came forward in 1927 and asked for a concession similar to that of the Iraq Petroleum Company of twenty-four plots of oil-bearing land in the Mosul area outside the plots to be selected by the latter company. They urged that it was to the interest of Iraq to make the Iraq Petroleum Company select its plots without delay and to throw the rest of the country open to development; and, learning that in the eyes of Iraq the decisive factor was the construction of a railway to Haifa, they dangled before her somewhat indefinite prospects of financial help for that purpose. Later on, in order to avoid the opposition which might grow, both in Iraq and in the League of Nations, to the grant of a special concession to a purely British company, they invited to join them an Italian group, the Agenzia Generale Italiana di Petrolio, and subsequently a German group backed by certain well-known German industrial concerns, and a Swiss-French group. They carried on propaganda in Baghdad, with the result that the public opinion of Iraq has become confused and distracted between the rival offers, and tends towards driving the hardest possible bargain with the Iraq Petroleum Company and refusing any amendment of the original concession, except at the price of a pipe-line and railway to Haifa.

The position of the British Oil Development Company is, however, weak, because their demand is, not that they shall be allowed, as provided in the Iraq Petroleum Company's Convention, to compete with other aspirants at an auction for the areas which they desire, and to pay the price to the Iraq Petroleum

Company, but that these areas shall be assigned to them in return for definite financial help to Iraq. This could be arranged only by an amendment of the Convention, to which, of course, the Iraq Petroleum Company would, in its turn, not consent without a substantial *quid pro quo*.

*Thus we have the following position. Four great oil groups—British, American, French, and Dutch, joined into one company—have discovered and tested an immense oilfield. They are now bound by the Convention to begin the construction of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean, which, after traversing Iraq, must go either to a Syrian or Palestine port. Great Britain, France, Iraq, and Syria have under the strict terms of the Convention no voice in the choice of a route or harbour, which rests with the company. The route to a Syrian port (Tripoli) is cheaper, but less secure, than that to a Palestine port (Haifa). The French group favours Tripoli; the other three groups probably favour Haifa. France and Syria back the French group; Great Britain, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan desire Haifa and would support any groups which freely decide to vote for that port. The company is forced by circumstances to ask Iraq for an amendment of the Convention, failing which it may suffer grievous loss at the hands of rivals. This gives Iraq her chance to insist that her choice of Haifa shall prevail and also that a railway shall be built alongside the pipe-line to Haifa.

Iraq really cares only about the railway, and is indifferent as to the route of the pipe-line, provided it is built quickly so that she may begin to get her royalties on the oil. The company shrinks from the heavy cost of a railway in addition to that of a pipe-line, for though the railway might ultimately pay, some years would pass before it would do so. Iraq is adamant and will refuse to amend the Convention in the way which the company desire unless she gets her way. France is equally adamant, and might ruin the future of Iraq if her views are not met. In the meanwhile another great company consisting of British, Italian, German, and Swiss-French groups has intervened and asks Iraq to grant, in return for financial help to Iraq which might go some way towards building the railway, an oil concession outside the area to be selected by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Iraq would like to do this, but is prevented by the Convention with the Iraq Petroleum Company. She, therefore, in her turn wishes to amend the Convention so as to enable her to grant areas to the new company. This latter would probably agree with the three non-French groups of the Iraq Petroleum Company in favouring Haifa as a terminus for a pipe-line, either an independent line, if they found enough oil, or a joint one with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A FOREIGNER LOOKS AT THE BRITISH SUDAN¹

I AM not British, and I hold no brief for the British system. Most emphatically do I wish to state, at the beginning of this article, that I hold no brief for the British system. In the course of my wanderings in tumultuous places abroad I have had a good many encounters with the English under their various administrative forms: diplomatic missions, army and navy, police and law. I have always emerged from these brush-ups second best—an experience which still rankles. If on the one hand I was aggressive, finding much to criticise in their methods of bolstering up an obsolete Empire when they should be building a new world order, they, on their side, allowed no vestige of a scruple to interfere with the brutality of their reprisals.

That, however, is as it may be. I only mention these facts to explain that when I went to the British Sudan I had, *a priori*, no disposition to enthusiasm. Every single colony, protectorate, and mandate-run country I have visited has invariably moved me to anger or despair and to expostulatory writings. There was no reason to suppose that the British Sudan—of which, moreover, one hears exceedingly little in Europe—was likely to prove an exception to the rule. It was without hope or faith of any kind that I strolled into the British Sudan and discovered what I believe to be a unique experiment in colonisation, which has stirred very deeply both my heart and my brain.

The little museum at Omdurman, on the White Nile, plunges the visitor straightway, by evocation, into one of the blackest, most cruel and lawless chapters of African history; and no human record will ever set down all that African history has really been. It was Africa that made Winwood Reade call his great world history the *Martyrdom of Man*. The weapons—the thickset clumsy guns, the deadly barbed spears—the chain armour, the flags, the robes and seats of the chieftains, the old gala carriages, so carefully preserved in the small grey rooms, bear witness to a period of fiendish atrocities a living generation can still remember:

¹ This article is a much abbreviated version of an essay which will shortly be published in book form.

the domination of the Mahdi and the worse tyranny of the Khalifa, his successor. From 1884, when the Mahdi drove out the Turco-Egyptian exploiters of the country, to the defeat of Abdullahi at Omdurman in 1898, there stretch fourteen years of massacre, torture, looting, raping, without a break, all that religious fanaticism, racial ferocity, individual rapacity could invent and practise. An evil and repellent tale. Not a link in the chain but appears to be forged out of despotism, pain and blood.

Not even a Bolshevik could say that by taking over the Sudan in 1898 England made an enviable haul. The first administrative pioneers were military, and, unfriendly though I am to every sort of professional army, I recognise that homage is due unreservedly to the indomitable pluck they showed and to the enduring work they did. I am told they were given imprecise magisterial powers, a copy of 'King's Regulations,' and general instructions to push onwards in every direction. They were turned loose into a country that—it sounds unbelievable, but it is true—is as big as British India. They had to persuade a population, excessively and reasonably suspicious of all strangers—to whom, indeed, all strangers hitherto had been slave-raiders—that they were not Turks. (It was an uphill job, and even to-day the old people refuse to believe the English are a different race and call them obstinately 'Tourkawi.') And these English proved that the government they were establishing was, though a government, unlike the ancient despotisms. They created just rules unheard of before; they collected equitable taxes and brought the whole region under an elastic form of central administration. In some ten years they had taught a large portion of the Sudan that order and peace were realities and that men could be subjects and yet live protected and helped and not like hunted beasts. Behind them, Khartum, with an unprecedented quickness, consolidated their achievements and threw out new progressive organisations on an essentially civil basis. To-day, at the end of three decades, the Sudan counts over 6,000,000 souls; as a whole, it is self-supporting, the British taxpayer not giving a penny for its upkeep; individually, according to native standards, it is prosperous; it is disciplined, and climbing towards education. Public security is practically complete. Compared with other European colonial possessions 100 years old—and more—it is quieter, happier, richer, healthier. How have these astounding results been achieved?

Let us get it into our heads once for all, we Europeans, that the Sudan never had a civilisation—for I take my solemn oath that in thirty years or so from to-day the *Jeunes-Soudanais*, who are inevitably beginning to come into existence, will assert that

once upon a time it had a glorious past. This is a depressing prophecy, but it will come true. Every subject race, as soon as it becomes conscious of its subjection, seeks compensation in the spontaneously created legend of a glorious past. The Poles have bored us to death with this legend; so have the Irish, the Hebrews, the Arabs; India has made herself an intolerable nuisance with the same sort of nonsense. All alien-governed people develop this obsession, and so, too, will the Sudanese invent, in the near future, the romantic and fantastic annals of a gorgeous national history. They will discover that they, too, possessed an Alexander, a Cæsar, a Napoleon, a Mussolini. Already they are showing signs of idealising the Mahdi and the Khalifa, two of the most unmitigated monsters the world has ever produced. Until this scintillating halo of imagination appears, however, the drab truth remains that the Sudan has never been an ethnical or a historical entity. Consequently, when the English undertook its administration, they had a clear, if miserable, sheet on which to draw designs. They might have drawn the most detestable designs. The British might have done with impunity in the Sudan what the Belgians did in the Congo, or what the Germans did in West Africa. They might have reverted to the methods by which Algeria was pieced out by France for the benefit of her own settlers. They might have behaved like the Spanish and the Portuguese in South America, and like the Dutch in the East Indies. They might even have repeated their own record in India and in Egypt, which, to my mind, taking it altogether and in regard to the time they have been in occupation, is a very poor one.

To their eternal honour, be it said, they did not choose. They invented. The point I wish to stress here, as forcibly as I can—for it is the corner-stone of all their building in the Sudan—is that, either because they were particularly intelligent, or particularly honest and humane, or most surprisingly and fortunately imbued with the finest elements of the spirit of the times, they manifested from the beginning an admirable *modern* conscience and acted upon its dictates. They avoided the follies and the sins that up till now have invariably attended every attempt at colonisation. The Sudan is the latest thing in European exploitation, and it is the best. The English rulers struck straight out for an incredible objective—the welfare of the conquered alone. They inaugurated a *régime* that in at least three tremendously important things was completely new. (a) They left the native owner in possession of his land. Even where that land was capable of growing cotton—plantations that have become the main source of the individual native's prosperity and the firm basis of the equilibrium of the Sudan budget—they gave him seed, water, technical super-

vision, and yet left him his own master. (b) They did not allow the small settler, the small trader, and the middleman from home to come into the country. And (c) they abstained from every kind of forced and unpaid labour.

The British have moved with astonishing promptitude, enterprise and success. They have created a corps of agriculturists and entomologists to destroy the pests that attack the native crops; a group of veterinaries to look after and improve the native cattle; and a quite unrivalled body of biologists, bacteriologists, laboratory workers and doctors to fight native diseases. They have already trained native women to become midwives. They have instituted hospitals, primary and secondary schools and what corresponds to a native faculty of medicine. They have built railways and dams and ginning factories, opened roads and developed ports, and they *paid* the natives whom they employed as workmen. There is such security now in the land that when I had to travel back to Khartum from the extreme southern limit of Kordofan I was given only a car, a Sudanese driver who spoke no English, and the valediction of the District Commissioner. Armed with these, I was rushed for days across a blasted, withered, sun-bleached region, where the tall camels stalked ponderously along the tracks, and where the only human beings I encountered were stark-naked black savages with three or four spears in hand. They surrounded the car every time we had a puncture, silently watched the chauffeur at his repairs, looked at me, my luggage, my fat handbag—they could have snatched it from me with the slightest of gestures—and salaamed with their curious hesitating imitation of the military salute as I drove away. Not a soldier on the roads; not a police patrol; not the ghost of any authority.

I went to call on the Sudan Government. I had been warned that it did not care overwhelmingly for tourists, that I could not move a step without its permission, that I had to submit all my plans to its approval, and that in any case there was no possibility of my going on trek if it did not put its rest-houses—not that there is anything royally luxurious about them!—at my disposal. I have already pointed out that I am a foreigner, and before I climbed the stairs of the civil secretary's imposing dwelling I gave myself a little lecture which, I am convinced, sums up the beliefs ninety-nine foreigners out of a hundred hold with regard to the British character. 'Now,' said I, 'mind what you're about. . . . You have to deal with a very queer beast. When it is alone, it will be intelligent, fair, modest, sympathetic, natural, humorous, and it will know a prodigious lot. Altogether, it will be very charming. But when it is in a herd it is pig-headed, stupid, ignorant, unimaginative, prejudiced, appallingly self-

conscious, consequently ill-mannered; of an abysmal contempt for everything that isn't itself, and arrogant to the point of lunacy. Try, therefore, to get it alone, and it will help you with the greatest and most disinterested courtesy. Get it in its herd form, and, without more ado, you may as well pack and return home.'

I got it in a party, for at Khartum they are all in and out of each other's offices and houses, and yet I found that it was, collectively, as intelligent, liberal, and considerate as if it was isolated. It was untainted with officialism; it discussed everything under the sun as broadly as if it was in a Paris drawing-room—and talk, in a Paris drawing-room, can be very untrammelled!—and it was heart and soul and body immersed in its job.

I am doing my best to prevent this article from becoming statistical, because in the Sudan statistics, though absolutely honest, are so spectacular that I might not be believed, but I must quote a few figures here, just to show the significance of the Gezira plantations. On a small scale, and subject to all sorts of interruptions and climatic accidents, the Sudan has always grown cotton. The Khartum Government studied the conditions, and, after various trials, mapped out a very bold scheme with a private company, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. It was decided to grow long staple cotton of the best Egyptian type, which no other country had been able hitherto to produce. But the first necessity was a regular supply of water. By means of a loan guaranteed by the British Government the Sennar Dam, a gigantic undertaking, was built to hold up a quota of the annual Blue Nile flood which descends from the Abyssinian plateaux, and to organise the irrigation of the cotton plantations by gravity instead of by pumping plants. All the other cultivations benefited too, for the estates in the Gezira are divided into portions and produce cotton and food crops in rotation. That idea of co-operation with the native which dominates the Khartum mentality came into play again, and the land is worked on the basis of a three-fold partnership. The native cultivator receives 40 per cent. of the value of the cotton, the whole of the rotation food crops, and free water and free technical counsel. (His land is rented from him by the Government for a term of forty years, at the end of which he recovers full ownership. If he wishes to cultivate his own land, he may; if not, he gets a very enhanced rental for it. This measure ensures the complete cultivation and the good husbandry of the irrigated area, for, abandoned to himself, the native would certainly never have succeeded.) The Government and the syndicate share the remaining 60 per cent., in return for which the syndicate breaks up new soil, provides villages and cultivating plant, and collects, ships and markets the cotton. Whatever are the fluctuations of the commerce of

the world, the native growers, at least until the expiration of the syndicate's contract, are assured of the disposal of their crops. To-day the syndicate manages an area of about 550,000 acres, and the gross value of the ginned cotton, together with the cotton seed, can be estimated roughly at 3,500,000*l.* sterling a year.

Beside cotton, the rest of the indigenous cultivations immediately prospered—durra (the staple food of the Sudanese), wheat and barley, lentils, beans, onions and melons, the castor-oil plant, ground-nuts and sesame. The rapid and steady expansion of the railways stimulated native agricultural effort all over the country, for the Atbara-Suakim and Port Sudan branches opened up a very important field to transit and commerce—a direct trading access to Asia and Europe, such as the long, costly desert-and-river route up the Nile to the Egyptian coast had never been. There is a good deal of timber—'sunt' for boat-building, and mahogany—rubber, ivory, hides and skins; some minerals, such as gold, lignite, iron ore and copper. A special breed of tall, strong camels is raised, and most of the natives possess donkeys and bulls for transport, cows for milk—they do not kill them for meat—sheep and goats.

I do not know what ethnologists make of the various strains of this population, but one thing is certain: the blend has produced an appallingly ugly type. The harsh black faces are neither completely negroid nor completely Arabic; the bodies are tall and look like walking frameworks—every rib protrudes—the long limbs are as lean and repellent as the dry membranes that fall from the trees. The men are clothed, and the women enwrapped in stuffs from their waist downward, but their bust is ordinarily exposed, and never in my life did I see such unredeemably hideous breasts. All these people are certainly not poorer than the sedentary Arabs of Southern Algeria, for instance; they are freer in their customs and lead a more normal existence, and there is among them nothing like the same tragic prevalence of rotting eyes.

I learnt a good deal about 'devolution': an expressive word—the spreading of life outward instead of a synthetic concentration. Devolution is the keynote of British administration in the Sudan, and means the decentralising of power and its distribution among native chiefs, confirmed by the Government in their hereditary functions. The alternative to that would have resulted, evidently, in a fearful over-centralisation at Khartum, a tighter grip over the provinces and a terrific increase in salaries—money that can now be used for the betterment of native conditions. But it might have been done if the authorities were less liberally inclined.

One of the strangest paradoxes about the Sudan, and a fact

that you must always make an effort to remember (so little apparent it is), is that *in principle* the Government is essentially and thoroughly autocratic. Indeed, it is, *in principle*, the most autocratic I know. It is responsible, not to the Colonial Office, which, being obliged to deal with inferior peoples, has never learnt *savoir-faire* and possesses the deplorably low-bred habit of interfering, but to the Foreign Office, which moves in the best circles of sensitive nations, all acutely conscious of having won the war, and consequently insisting on parity, perfect consideration, equal treatment, huge portions of continents and whole seas—things that have schooled it to an admirable tactfulness. So the Foreign Office, for all practical purposes, leaves the Sudan alone. Its constitution is such that it would be the easiest thing on earth for it to turn into sheer satrapism. At one end of the pole is Khartum; at the other, the Sudanese peoples—no complicated web of native institutions in between; and, all along the line, nothing but the British administrators, rendering accounts only to the capital. Just a little ferocity in these administrators' hearts, just a little distortion in their brains, and there would have been another disaster to add to the list of the colonial catastrophes of the world. The administrative system in the early stages tended to insist on the application of the Government code in the Government courts, and the use by the native chiefs of their own inherent powers was restricted. But in the past ten years the wisdom of this began to be questioned by the administration itself, and the feeling gained ground that Western law is not necessarily always most suitable for Eastern peoples, and that the administration might be placed on a steadier basis if native custom was given a freer hand. These speculations were translated into very definite action by the present Governor-General, who pointed out on his arrival that the bureaucratic form of government then prevailing was bound, in the course of time, to lead to a repetition, in the Sudan, of the train of happenings in India, and that the best safeguard against the eventual cry of 'The Sudan for the Sudanese' was that the British should be able to reply with truth: 'Well, you've got it!' Now the northern Sudan is a congeries of Arab tribes. An Arab tribe in its natural circumstances is presided over by its sheikh, assisted by the elders. He directs their movements, keeps the peace and punishes offences. He administers traditional local custom, plus what he can remember of Islamic religious law. His authority depends on consent, the Arab being the most tenacious lover of personal freedom in the world and the least socially minded. Devolution reinstates the Arab chiefs in many of their old functions, and as a result minor offences are now dealt with by the sheikhs and elders themselves, and where men with the

necessary ability and prestige are found they wield considerable powers, which will be extended as the opportunity occurs. This new policy appears to be startlingly successful. Native administration will not be, of course, as efficient as direct administration, but the British accept that in the belief that in the long run it will be more valuable to the people. There is more margin for injustice and corruption, but the strength of public opinion, the insistence on public proceedings, on the co-operation of the tribal elders and on the recording of brief particulars of each case, and constant supervision and inspection by the English staff, lessen the perils of extortion and unfairness. It is essential to the scheme that these judicial powers should be used not by native magistrates appointed *ad hoc*, but by tribal chiefs in whom they are inherent. In the Fung province alone last year some 650 cases were dealt with by native authorities, and only half a dozen appealed against their verdict. The majority of the sheikhs are obviously gratified by the trust that is being shown in them, and are making conscientious efforts to justify it.

A similar policy is being adopted for the pagan black tribes, giving as much play as possible to their own institutions while suppressing such barbarous practices as are repugnant. But here the going is more complicated, and the British administrator must tread very lightly. Witchcraft, for instance, is the very devil. When a whole community assures the District Commissioner that one of their number is a wizard who is blighting their crops, killing their cattle and making barren their women, what is he to do? He cannot knock into their heads with a hammer the knowledge that witchcraft is a myth. If, on the other hand, he takes no action, the probabilities are that very speedily they will cut the sorcerer's throat. A pretty exercise in Pragmatism. I do not know how the British officials work it out, though in the frequent case of the 'rain-owner' perversely withholding the rain indispensable to the crops they place the wretched man under arrest for a time literally to save his life. My own very simple suggestion is that Khartum should come to the help of its harassed administrators by instituting as quickly as possible elementary classes in meteorology and biology, but when I say these logical things I'm *always* turned down!

I visited the Kordofan province, where the principal element of interest, both geographically and ethnologically, is the group of Nuba hills, the original home, it is supposed by some, of the Nubians. Before achieving that visit, however, quite a lot of telegraphing had to be done by Khartum, for you cannot wander about as you please in the interior. There is occasional unrest among the hillfolk—questions of taxes, or discontent with their own headmen, or simply the organic need for a stirring up of the

blood. All these races, it seems to me, relish an upset from time to time; they have lived so long in unstable conditions that complete peacefulness palls upon them. They fall into the most dangerous of all states—boredom. I propose that the Government should divert this perilous superabundance of energy into such channels as cricket and football. No, I am not joking. Bickering vanished from English life with the advent of cricket and football; and I do not see why tribal conflicts here should not succumb to the same treatment.

Dilling remains for me a place of very pleasant memories. I saw a perfect native hospital, and I was taken to visit the Nubas in their grim little hills. It was altogether an instructive halt. The native hospital is a thing to be proud of. It consists mainly of twelve brand-new airy tukls, which the Nubas much prefer to wards, each containing three or four pallet-beds. There is nothing tragic about it, perhaps because the black races will not, or cannot, keep up a tragic expression very long. Perhaps, too, a foreign eye is so diverted by the appearance of the patients that it does not instantly take in the pitifulness of their plight.

The competent native doctor, just graduated from the Kitchener Medical School in Khartum, who runs this establishment under the supervision of his English superiors, did the honours of the place with a quiet amiability which had neither servility nor swagger. There were cases of tropical ulcer, malarial fever, bilharzia, against which the Tropical Research Laboratories are waging a tenacious war; some syphilis, no consumption—a fair sample of the diseases prevalent among the race. I saw comparatively little conjunctivitis or trachoma; and what that means to a Socialist writer, who has spent fifteen years frantically trying—and perhaps by her very frenzy defeating her own aims—to get home Governments to fight native ophthalmia adequately, cannot be told. (I firmly assert that out of every ten Arabs in North Africa seven are blind or on the road to blindness.) We fetched the dispensary books and pored over them and found that out of 60,000 inhabitants of the district 46,315 were treated as outdoor patients in 1929, and 622 people were hospitalised. That is a first rate record.

The *whole* record of medical and health work in the Sudan is first-rate. At the top comes a great institution, the Wellcome Lee Stack Laboratories, which in the domain of tropical diseases and research now constitute a world-known scientific centre. There is nothing like them in any other colony, and the men who made them what they are, and those who maintain them at their invariable level of brilliant efficiency, are among the best and most devoted servants of our species. The Kitchener School of Medicine trains native doctors at the expense of the Govern-

ment. This school has already turned out about twenty fully qualified Sudanese practitioners. I learnt an interesting little fact concerning these graduates: last year the final batch of examination papers was carried off, by an American doctor, to one of the foremost universities in the United States, and the examining board of professors there declared that the papers were fully as good, and the medical standard reached was fully as high, as the corresponding tests set in the American university. Beside the very well-equipped and very well-managed hospitals in the big towns—Khartum, Atbara, Port Sudan, Wad Medani, Kassala—there are a number of provincial hospitals, such as the one I visited at Dilling, and the Government maintains a steamer which is partly a hospital and partly a laboratory to keep in contact with the inhabitants of the horrible swamps of the Upper Nile. An excellent measure taken by the medical authorities has been the licensing of sanitary barbers. The class of men who previously practised was an extremely low one, but to-day the members of this corporation assist the *mamours* (minor officials) in the notification of births, deaths, and vaccinations. The Government allows them a small annual payment, while in some provinces the barbers who have already been licensed receive ten days' annual training in the hospitals, where they are taught the treatment of simple cases: slight wounds, the routine handling of trachoma, aseptic precautions. These sanitary barbers are proving a decided success.

One of the ways in which the work of the doctors is brought near to the natives—recalcitrant at first; they always are, poor things!—is at the tribal gatherings, when the people flock in to attend native sports, races, horse shows. Then a doctor is likely to be present with his travelling hospital, and the people are afforded an opportunity to get into touch with him and his magic, and see for themselves what it all comes to. A very efficacious method. Another splendid achievement is the creation of a group of native midwives—there must be 100 of them now—trained in Khartum by two most energetic and competent sisters, who travel through the roughest districts to find recruits. Once trained, these women return to their villages, and their work and influence there can have very important results. I hope the Government will see its way to paying them, too, however modestly; for in that case their authority will be immediately increased, and perhaps a stand made against the hideous ritual mutilation practised on Moslem women in the Sudan.

One last word. In the far south, on the borders of French and Belgian Africa, a campaign against sleeping sickness has been carried out with conspicuous success, and the threat of this illness to the country—at one time extremely serious—has been practi-

cally averted. Camps are organised and admirably kept. All the natives who display symptoms are concentrated in the camps, where they live under the conditions that are natural to them, cultivating their own crops, and these places are so far from being unpopular or regarded as prisons that the sick are joined there and helped in their work by their healthy relatives and friends. Facts such as these need no comment—they are beyond praise.

The Nuba mountaineers give trouble now and then. They are very vigorous, simple-minded, excitable; they have been accustomed from time immemorial to pounce upon their weaker neighbours or to defend themselves against the Arab slave-raiders. So they evince a chronic disposition to take to the warpath for no rational motive whatever. They live in a district of very peculiar hills, not really high, but which consist of millions of fragmentary tumbled stones forming caverns and tunnels, in which labyrinths they disappear as soon as they perceive they are to be called to account. No other native tribe, and certainly no European force, can follow them there. When they have killed an English officer, or a policeman, or one of their own chiefs, they vanish entirely, and all that can be done to them in reprisals is to destroy by bombs from the air their *tukls*—which they rebuild in one day—and their flocks, which is a chastisement that displeases them more. But such childish minds cannot be really impressed.

The Nubas are heathen tribes with any number of separate languages and different intricate religious and ethical systems. Their District Commissioners, who love and defend them with a great and touching fervour, stoutly affirm that they are very moral and singularly devoid of cruelty; that they do not lie, do not steal; they murder each other sometimes, indeed, but without premeditation—only in the rage of a sudden nerve-storm. (They are never hanged for such murders.) They hardly ever filch their neighbour's husband or wife. If, inadvertently, they succumb before marriage to the reprehensible solicitations of that old *maquerelle* Nature, remorse and complicated (and remarkably funny) purifications immediately ensue in expiation of such grievous behaviour. It seems to me that there are two capital problems in this province: how to prevent the Nubas from piling on clothes, out of a spirit of imitation or emulation, as soon as they become prosperous—a proceeding which impairs their robust health and fine physique—and how to keep them from learning the Arabic language, a medium which will undoubtedly imbue, and contaminate, them with the Arabic mentality and customs. I should like to see the extremely conscientious Commissioners here become the protectors of the pagans against trousers and Islam, the dispensers of English and Biology, and

perhaps in two generations they will have in this district an astonishingly enterprising race.

My visit to the Nuba hills had the effect of reviving in my mind a very worrying question to which I find no satisfactory answer. It has to do with education, so I shall set it down here. I may be a crabbed, carping, carking, cantankerous spirit. Several colonial Governments have assured me heatedly that I am. I may argue too passionately and harshly. I may have a mania about education. Certainly I believe that all our main faults and miseries and madneses are due to a bad, or timid, or selfish, or muddle-headed conception of education. But I must speak according to my lights.

Let me begin by acknowledging what Khartum has done. It has already created a good many educational establishments and is strenuously pressing for more, as every conscientious ruler should. In 1928 there were eleven primary schools in the Sudan, eighty elementary schools or *kuttabs*, 489 subsidised native schools, three instructional workshops, a girls' training college, and seventeen girls' elementary schools—the latter are quite wonderful—with an attendance of 28,315 pupils in all. I have said something of the Kitchener School of Medicine. Another very important institution is the Gordon College, where natives are trained as teachers, engineers, and for minor posts in the clerical branches of the administration. There is also a section for Moslem law. It is thanks to this college that large numbers of young Sudanese are employed to-day all over the country as assistants to British chiefs, and have been able to replace the Egyptians and the Syrians whom it had been necessary to import in past years. An excellent thing, that the Sudanese themselves, and not strangers, should be associated with the English in serving their own nation. I went to see some of the more modest schools—the most significant, I always think—and found them all clean, well equipped, and well run. The number of girls' schools established in so short a time is unprecedented. Everywhere pupils are increasing—in 1928 there were some 5000 more than in 1927—the native demand for education is spreading, and steady efforts are made to meet this need.

These figures are very good, but the progress made takes place almost exclusively in the north. That upsets me. I wish I could have discovered more schools in the southern provinces. The latter are not yet well cared for. Some districts there have no schools at all. There is a certain tendency to forget them. I know that the difficulties are great: lack of money, climate, a small personnel, the multiplicity of languages among the pagan tribes. But the consequence is that all the institutions in the heathen regions are mission schools. It is extremely distressing

that a divided Christianity, purporting to have the same deity and yet teaching bewilderingly different dogmas, should have already got a grip on the negroes. Presbyterians, Baptists, Anglicans, Roman Catholics train them to read and write, but they also put into their heads their own religious notions. I have seen enough of mission schools to realise that, however deep the sincerity of the teachers, and however gentle their persuasion—when they are at their best, that is, for they can be tyrants just as well as anybody else—the inevitable favours which neophytes enjoy play a considerable rôle in conversions. They also lead to scissions in the native communities themselves. In any case, education in a colony is a State affair, not at all the business of more or less self-righteous religious congregations, and these intrusions are in reality a proof of the sluggishness of the State in a vitally important department. Khartum should get a move on in that direction itself, instead of letting its work be done by priests, nuns, ministers and clergymen's wives.

Moreover, I am depressed because of certain prepossessions on the part of the Government. In this English colonial venture, so extraordinary in almost every other way, the educational policy of the authorities is to 'develop native civilisation on its own lines.' This maxim applies to the Moslem races. Now, Khartum thought out its methods very carefully before it practised them, so there can be no question here of casualness or 'muddling through.' But the theory that underlies all this thought, this carefulness, this time, these pains, this spending of money, is, I submit in all humility, a ghastly mistake.

I owe it to myself to say that I am not speaking at random. I was born in the Orient, where my father held a high post in the foreign diplomatic service of his own country. Thus, during my adolescence, I lived in a Moslem land and spoke its language. When I was fully adult my work as a writer took me back to the East, and I spent my most impressionable years in different Mohamedan communities. By the test of my intelligence, my conscience and my experience, I believe that Islamic 'civilisation' is an abominable welter of superstitions, prejudices, limitations, degrading traditions, confused morals, and very often cruel customs. I am not talking here of the quality of Islam at its origin, though it has always seemed to me that its virtues, its generosity, its chivalry have been incredibly exaggerated. I am talking of what it grew up into and what it represents to-day. I believe it builds up a mentality utterly antagonistic to science. I believe that this mentality has to be shattered before any notions of modern knowledge can be instilled into a Mohamedan brain. I believe it is incapable of constructing a public *morale* and an idealistic or even merely honest civic spirit.

I live, furthermore, in a country which, apart from its two conventional devotions of 'La France' and 'La Famille,' possesses the shrewdest, most lucid, practical, hardest and most unsentimental intelligence conceivable. It has had to do with Moslem 'civilisation' for an incomparably longer period than the British. For centuries its propagandist services, its missionary and secular schools, its political institutions have been established in the Islamic world. A great portion of its colonies is Arabic. Its opinion, therefore, cannot be dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders. It holds the view—and in every detail, almost, reason and experience confirm that view—that Moslem 'civilisation' is an insuperable bar to progress, comprehension, essential order, cleanliness and hygiene. Sometimes circumstances have obliged it to subsidise existing Islamic schools, and the result is—take Tunisia, for instance, which has the most advanced Moslem 'intellectuals'—that not one of these centres of native learning has ever produced anything that is not sheer puerility in the domains of literature, philosophy, sociology. All this is so true that, in spite of its determination to 'develop native civilisation on its own lines,' Khartum, to make professors, doctors, superior clerks, anything with an atom of modern competence or a sense of responsibility, has to shove the natives into the higher colleges where the framework is *English*, where the professors are *English*, where instruction is given in *English*, and where the whole intellectual atmosphere is exclusively *Western*. So long as Khartum goes on teaching Arabic in the Sudanese schools, no profoundly new conceptions can take root in the Arab brain.

There remains the question of education among the pagan tribes, and here Khartum does not yet seem to have quite made up its mind. Oh, great and good Khartum! may I put in, with the profoundest deference, a timid word? You have, in this matter of dispensing necessary instruction to the heathen, a slate before you on which the marks already inscribed have not bitten very deep. They can be converted into something else without smashing the slate, as you would have to do in the case of the Arabs. Among these pagans there is complete ignorance of the Arab language. There are no Moslem inhibitions and traditions at all. The religious beliefs are entirely different, and the morality and social customs do not touch Islam at any point. It is certain that these pagans must learn a common tongue, for at present each village has a separate mode of speaking. Teach them English! I have been told by some of your cleverest officials that if these people do not know Arabic they will be hindered from entering Government employment and commerce. That is so; but they can be taught Arabic in the highest classes of their schools the while the basis of their enlightenment rests

on English. As language is the means of transmission of ideas and habits, they will be drawn directly into contact with Western civilisation, which, after all, is the most rational because the most critical. Moreover, since you have shown amazing genius in the accomplishment of bold and novel things, add one more experiment to the list of your successes! Mould these primitive, relatively unencumbered and plastic brains in the cast of a simple scientific ideology, and instil into them the clear understandable doctrine of evolution instead of the elaborate mysteries of still unsuspected divinities. Here is a programme, good and great Khartum, which can be followed more easily than you think, if only you shed the light of your countenance upon it:

English and Biology! English and Biology all along the line!

Yes, give, oh Khartum! the minds of these poor pagans a chance by starting them on the level of modern knowledge, and not with the religious dogmas of dead centuries, and you will have deserved well of the invincibly clarifying and aspiring spirit of man.

Before I leave the subject of education, let me ardently congratulate Khartum on its wisdom in the matter of cinema films. A cinema does exist, but it is inconspicuous, unobtrusive, and hardly encouraged. Thanks to the lack of official enthusiasm, the Sudan—a country in formation where, *in its own interest*, it is indispensable that the white man's prestige should be maintained—has not yet been pervaded by Hollywood. And the Sudanese have still to learn—may Khartum put off indefinitely the day of illumination!—that we are all, according to the portrait we so complacently draw of ourselves on the screen, mental and moral defectives, crooks, sharpers, imbeciles, criminals and whores—in a word, a people for whom the only hope of salvation is to be governed by those we are governing now.

The success of the Sudan experiment is due to the quality of its British civil administrators. Every observation I made during my weeks of wandering confirmed this opinion; everything I saw went to prove that the land itself and the native peoples in it are utterly incapable of producing results or forging ahead unaided. The little body of alien men that governs this country has alone made it what it is. But how this body of men manages to be so indisputably first rate remains a mystery which I cannot solve. They are all drawn from the British universities. They are all appointed when they are very young. The Commissioners of the Sudan who examine them personally in England make a point of knowing their athletic record, and their physique is taken into consideration. Their moral reputation is closely investigated. Still, such inquiries are at best only precautionary

measures and involve no guarantee that the candidates will turn out well.

Here, again, I must speak as a foreigner. Most of us Continentals, at one time or another, have met the young Englishman abroad—on his holidays in Switzerland or on the Riviera; tramping in Italy and Spain; on board boats during sea-trips. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that, through his own fault, he presents himself to us generally as an exceedingly silly, rowdy and obnoxious young animal. He is carelessly dressed. His manners are loutish or intolerably casual. His recreations are purely sportive or childish to a degree. He drinks too freely and smokes endless vile pipes. He plays the gramophone at all hours without the slightest regard for his neighbours' rest. He dances incessantly. He revels in rushing about and yelling like a half-wit on 'treasure-hunts'—or whatever the foolish amusement is called—and he indulges in indescribably inconsiderate and sometimes very brutal 'rags.' After you have listened to his conversation, you go about in a state of hyperamazement, asking yourself what the English universities imagine they are doing in the matter of educating English youth. Suddenly you think that you, too, might have been born English, and, smitten into bottomless horror by such a fancy, your ecstatic sense of escape makes you instantly revert to a forgotten religious fervour, and loudly do you thank the Lord God of Nations that you are not as the British are. Very well.

Then you go to the Sudan, as I did, and you find that this same vacuous, noisy, deadly dull, inconsiderate, irresponsible English graduate is governing men. Different men, complicated men—for the mind of an inferior race is much more sombre and tangled than the civilised mind. His governing of these men includes the dispensing of justice; and to be just he has not only to assimilate a hitherto unheard of legal code, but to understand impulses and mainsprings of emotions which he cannot possibly feel himself, and motives of behaviour and conceptions of morality which have nothing to do with his own experience. He is obliged to learn a very difficult language in a very short time, often with no other instructor than a textbook. He is forced to turn his hand, with no preliminary warning, to every sort of technical work that crops up in lonely far-away understaffed places—building roads, repairing bridges, surveying districts, even engineering—and he must acquire knowledge of such work as best he can, without giving away the secret of his ignorance to his native subordinates. He has to be well groomed and dignified in his person, *pour l'exemple*; cheerful and helpful in the society of his equals, who sum him up with great quickness and acumen; unselfish professionally—not out for personal kudos,

but falling readily into team-work—tenacious to overcome obstacles; stoical to resist the material discomforts and dangers of the climate and the special colonial temptations of drink, drugs and bodily neglect. In short, that youth we know in Europe as a Nuisance and a Stupid has to become one of an order of Samurai. And he *becomes* one of these Samurai! Such is the paradox of the young Englishman. I cannot even begin to explain it. There it is.

I have already said that the creators of this administration were from the very first bold, valiant, and distinguished minds. But it is one thing to have a high standard of honour and capacity for yourself, and quite another to infuse it into a service, and, what is more, to keep it at the same level for over thirty years! There must be in all these young Englishmen latent but potent forces which mature with startling promptitude as soon as they fall within an appropriate frame. When you see this maturity occurring in almost every case, you are obliged to go even further and admit that it must be a trait of the race. For, in spite of all my scepticism and alertness for gossip, I discovered no lapse and no exception. The record is sterling throughout.

Unlike the revered Mr. Kipling's, my own experience of Colonies until now has been that the white man is supremely ready, not to shoulder his burden, but to clamp himself as an unremovable Old Man of the Sea to the back of the native he has overpowered or annexed. But in the Sudan the practice is different. There the white man really is the servant of his order and of his time. No: *not of his country*—here it is that a miracle happens. This black land is not a mine to be ripped open and exhausted for the richness and glory of the home country. Far less is it the happy hunting-ground of the adventurer, the gold-digger, the industrial or commercial brigands, the ten-thousand-times accursed concessionaire. Graft is as if it had never appeared on this planet of ours. The custom of accepting 'presents' from the natives has never been started. The exchange of reciprocal '*bons offices*' between administrator and administree is unknown. I have seen no bullying (a method of governing which you cannot miss in a colony, so vivid is it in tone and gesture), not only no bullying in high places, but none in the relations of native police and native soldiers with native civilians. Yet if anything is a fact in this world of illusion and appearances, it is that as soon as a particle of authority is put into the hands of native minor officials the result is extortion. I have witnessed acts of kindness which made me gape; the insistence of District Commissioners on the good quality of the food to be distributed to the patients in native hospitals, or administrators on trek, who needed all their provisions, giving them away to the natives who required

them—infinitesimal things, to be sure, but revelations of the character of this humane and honourable service. Above all, I have found that every man feels a whole-hearted interest in his job—and proves it. The victories in the eyes of these British officials are a new train, a new road, a new dispensary or school, the checking of some devastating epidemic. Whatever the field in which they work, I certify that their chief goal is the amelioration of native life and native conditions. There may have been—there probably will be—some defaulting, but the movement up till now possesses such homogeneous strength that the inadaptables or the offenders are rapidly eliminated, and the effort continues unchanged in its essence, its implications and its achievements.

One word more, concerning the present discussions of Great Britain and Egypt on the subject of the Sudan. Personally I think it is a great pity that the Sudan should ever have been shared with Egypt, and that Egyptian money should have been used in the country. It would be incomparably better, to my mind, if England volunteered to pay the 750,000*l.*—the seventh or eighth part of the cost of a single battleship—that Egypt still gives, and which constitutes the basis of her claims on the Sudan. But economic considerations cannot for one moment be allowed to obscure the ethical issues of this question. The duty of the higher and better civilisation that has stepped in here and has made order out of unspeakable poverty, demented cruelty and chaotic lawlessness, is not to Egypt but to the Sudan. There are obligations by which our whole species lives or dies—above national prestige and *amour-propre*, loans and subventions, historical associations (pseudo-historical associations, in this case). The unforgivable sin against the world-spirit of to-day is to destroy or impede progress. The Sudan is making immense progress, and its advance is exclusively the work of its English administrators. To introduce among them as colleagues with equal powers of government an inexperienced and inefficient people who detest the English, and who are in their turn traditionally detested by the Sudanese, would lead to the arrest of progress and perhaps to a reversion to the old conditions, for it is easier to degenerate than to evolve. It is not by right of conquest, but by right of salvage, that, until it has reached a definite degree of civilisation, the still infantile Sudan should remain under the sole tutelage of the race that is training it to manhood.

ODETTE KEUN.

THE NEW PROTECTIONISTS

It is not difficult to understand why the bankers who pleaded four years ago for Free Trade have now announced themselves Protectionists. Their appeal for a reduction of European tariffs has failed. In most countries, both in Europe and outside, tariffs have risen since then, not fallen. Four years ago hopes of a substantial trade recovery with full employment were still entertained. No recovery has taken place, and the unemployment figures are worse than ever. Banks find themselves more deeply embarrassed by the monetary help rendered to textile and other depressed trades. Near ahead lies the dismal prospect of a revenue deficit and the imposition of increased direct taxation, with further bad reactions upon industry and commerce.

The inheritance of traditions is fatal to the vitality of principles, and business men of our time, who have accepted from the nineteenth century the gospel and the practice of Free Trade as essential conditions of our commercial supremacy, easily persuade themselves that the loss of that supremacy has falsified the gospel and requires us to adapt our fiscal policy to the changed conditions of our time. Few business men are believers in any general economic laws: their particular business experience makes opportunists of them. It does not, therefore, seem strange to them that, whereas Free Trade was our true policy a generation ago, Protection is best for us to-day. Timid in their verbal commitments, many of them have clung hitherto to Fair Trade, safeguarding, or some other subterfuge. Even now many would hesitate to come out for straight Protection. Fortunately the approaching Imperial Conference enables them to put a highly reputable covering upon their conversion. Their policy presents itself as the economic integration of the Empire, with Protection incidental. How far there exists a real compatibility between this economic Imperialism and a sound, not to say scientific, Protectionism they do not stop to consider. In a hot atmosphere of Imperial sentiment and financial apprehension they serve up this mixed grill.

Before turning to discuss its merits, I wish to express a certain measure of sympathy with the resentment of the new

Protectionists against the intellectual arrogance and the pontifical utterances of many of the past and some of the present prophets of Free Trade. It is idle to ignore the important changes that have taken place in the structure and operation of both industry and commerce since the mid-Victorian days. In this, as in other countries, the growth of trade unionism, with its substitution of collective for individual labour contracts, the enlarged part played by State and municipal business enterprise in production, insurance, and other social services, the replacement of competition in many important industries and trading processes by cartels and other combinations, have substantially affected the operation of the *laissez-faire* individualism, of which Free Trade seemed a natural appanage.

But have these changes rendered Free Trade no longer sound as a principle and beneficial as a policy to this country? This question deserves to be debated as coolly, clearly, and closely as possible before this country is committed to a political and economic change more momentous than any in our modern history. It is sometimes profitable to attack a large issue not immediately along its full front, but at some one or two critical points. Two such points, not distant from one another, are presented in the claim that this Imperialist protectionism will increase our export trade and will cure unemployment.

The severe suffering of our leading export trades, especially textiles and metals, is indisputable, due partly to increased competition from America, Germany, and Japan in those European, Asiatic, and South American markets which before the war were large purchasers from us and now buy from these strong competitors who "dump" their surplus goods at prices below their costs, partly to the erection of tariff walls behind which some former customers now manufacture for themselves. Now my first comment on this situation is that, serious though it is, it is not so desperate as it seems. The value of our export trade for United Kingdom goods in 1929 was 729,554,967*l.*,¹ as compared with 525,253,595*l.* for the year 1913, which, allowing for the rise in price level, presents a small decline from a high peak of prosperity. It is true that under normal conditions our improving plant and increasing population might have been expected to export a larger value, and that on the import side the same years show an increase from 768,734,739*l.* in 1913 to 1,221,591,024*l.* for 1929. But when it is suggested that such an unfavourable balance indicates early difficulties in paying for our necessary overseas supplies of foods and raw materials, the large value of our unseen exports (interest on overseas investments, shipping, banking and entrepôt services) is left out of

¹ Uncorrected figures (annual statement of trade, December 1929).

account. When it is remembered that we are still the largest creditor nation, having overseas investments which Sir Robert Kindersley estimates at about 4,000,000,000*l.*, we shall recognise that, though we are not investing abroad so large a sum as before the war, we are not actually strained in our foreign purchasing power.

The depression from which we are suffering is due in part to the failure of expansion of export trade, but also largely to the failure of internal markets. For, excepting cotton, the textile, and still more the metal, trades depend for success upon the rising standard of consumption of our growing population and the growing demand for metal goods in our own industries. After all, three-quarters of our manufactured goods are normally for home consumption. We could put up with some failure of expansion in our overseas trade were it compensated by an adequate growth of our internal markets.

But, having in mind these qualifications, let us admit that any policy which can stimulate our export trade is desirable, and ask whether the proposed protectionism is likely to do so. Now, though there are many variants of this policy, I take it that there is a general agreement to put on duties which will prevent our importation of foreign foods and raw materials, if our Empire is able to supply them, and to keep out foreign manufactured articles which we are equipped with the plant and labour to make for ourselves. Our Dominions (and possibly our whole Empire) will give a substantial preference to the importation of our manufactured goods over similar goods from foreign countries.

How would the adoption of such a scheme stimulate our depressed export trades? The first effect of confining our purchases of foods and raw materials to Imperial resources will be to raise their prices in this country. We must pay more for the same quantity and quality than if we bought them in the world market. Although the proportion of our food imports drawn from the Empire has considerably increased since 1913, the actual amount thus obtained is far less than that obtained from foreign countries, the value for 1928 being 330,000,000*l.*, as compared with 201,000,000*l.* from the Empire. For raw materials the increase from the Empire has been very little, and leaves us in 1928 dependent on foreign countries for 213,000,000*l.*, as compared with 121,500,000*l.* from the Empire. Now, is it reasonable to expect that any steps taken for the development of Imperial resources can enable us safely and profitably to release ourselves from dependence on foreign supplies? There are many important materials, such as cotton, timber, iron ore, and petroleum, which at present we derive

wholly, or almost wholly, from foreign sources. If we are to dispense with these sources of supply in order to encourage the discovery and development of Imperial supplies for such articles, we are engaging in a most hazardous procedure. Again, there are important foods which we derive predominantly from foreign countries and others where Imperial supplies fail in certain years, compelling us to fall back on foreign supplies. Dependence on Empire wheat would put our daily bread in jeopardy. For last year nearly three-fourths of our imported wheat was from foreign countries. By far the greater part of our imported beef comes from South America. Yet wheat and beef are the two first articles recommended by Mr. Amery for bulk purchase within the Empire.² Now we cannot bind ourselves by tariff arrangements to our Dominions for the purchase of their foods and raw materials without imperilling the foreign supplies. When Imperial harvests fail, as they sometimes will, we shall place ourselves at a great disadvantage in buying from foreign countries whose regular custom we have abandoned. My contention is that, as regards our imported foods and raw materials, we must pay more for a less secure supply if we try to substitute by tariff preferences the Empire for the world market. What, then, will be the effect of this procedure upon the costs of production in our export trades? The cost in our mines and manufactories will be raised, first, in respect of the higher prices of many raw materials; secondly, from the rise in money wages to meet the higher price of foods and of many manufactured goods as a result of the tariff. I am aware that some business men, holding that wage standards are too high in this country to enable them to sell in competition with European countries, look to a tariff as a substitute for the monetary wage cuts which they dare not press upon the workers. But they are mistaken. A "food tax" would only be accepted, if at all, by the workers on condition that they were compensated by a rise in money wages. In many employments wage rates are already regulated by the cost of living. When they are not, the refusal of employers to raise wages to meet a rise in the cost of living due to tariffs would bring about so much trade friction that industry would suffer in quantity of output and in cost.

Our export trades would meet the full brunt of this attack. Their selling prices in foreign markets, already too high, would be raised still higher and we should lose many of the markets we have retained so far. Would the Empire compensate this loss by the enlargement of its purchases of our more highly priced manufactures? It is true that the Empire has in recent years increased its purchases of our manufactured goods at a

² *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1930, p. 148.

considerably faster rate than have foreign countries. But in 1928 we were still selling to the latter 303,250,000*l.* as compared with 275,500,000*l.* to the Empire. Our tariff on foreign foods and materials will therefore damage seriously our largest export markets. Will that damage be compensated by any corresponding enlargement of our Empire markets? Will our Dominions, which already buy so largely from us in proportion to their incomes, increase their purchases at the higher prices they must pay? This question will serve best to bring out the peril to our export trade that lurks in the proposed 'integration of Empire trade.' The Dominions would rather buy from us than from foreign countries, provided the difference in relative prices is not considerable. But if we raise our export prices, owing to higher costs of production, three results will follow. They will buy less at the higher prices, foreign goods will come in over the preference, and lastly, they will be induced more rapidly to develop their own manufactures. Take Canada, for example. Her purchases from the United States have been growing far faster, in spite of the preference, than her purchases from this country. This is partly from a natural affinity in demand, partly from territorial proximity, and largely from the fact that the preferential tariff in our favour operates mainly in classes of goods where the United States do not compete. Our higher priced exports will certainly not encourage the inhabitants of our Dominions, or our Colonies, to buy more of our goods. Each one of our Dominions and several of our Colonies are bent on developing their own manufactures, so as to become as economically self-sufficing as possible. Canada and Australia have been conspicuously active in this policy. They will only buy from us what they cannot yet produce themselves. But they set no limit in their industrial development. They will buy from us their boots, clothes, tools, etc., until they can produce such articles themselves. Even then they will buy from us the machinery and other plant needed to equip their factories. But their set common policy is towards a self-sufficing nation. No proposals we can make at the forthcoming Imperial Economic Conference will bring any weakening of this resolve. Canada, Australasia, and South Africa will not for a moment entertain the idea of binding themselves to the production of foods and raw materials for the Mother Country, and of relying upon our manufactures for the supply of their industrial requirements.

Before concluding this section of my argument I should meet one bold objection that is sometimes raised. It is urged that a policy of tariffs would not raise the prices of foods and raw materials for our people. It would tend to such a development of Empire resources under the stimulus of a guaranteed market

that supplies would be as abundant, as cheap, and as reliable as when we bought freely from the world's market. This claim rests on the hypothesis that capital and labour, poured from this country into the vacant spaces of the Empire, would, by improved transport, irrigation and other developments, open up new agricultural and mining tracts potentially more fertile and richer than the areas first populated. In other language, the extension of the existing margins of cultivation will bring in lands that will be better, not worse, than those already occupied. Now, it cannot be denied that there are cases in support of this claim. The late Professor Simon Patten, of Pennsylvania University, based his support of Protection largely on this tendency of American pioneers to leave the more accessible lands of their early settlement for new, richer lands further west. But to represent this as the normal course of economic development in modern times is to fly in the face of facts. The costs and risks of any huge experiments in opening up central Australia, or in hoping for great successes in the unpeopled parts of North-west Canada, are not likely to tempt sound financiers in this country, even if the migration necessary to engage on such an economic policy was forthcoming. The normal history of farming and of mining does not encourage the adoption of so hazardous a theory. Even were such experiments successful, they would involve immense outlays of capital and labour for long periods before the success was established. Moreover, they presuppose a spirit of pioneer adventure which does not exist in the population we can spare. The sentimental Imperialist is easily captivated by talk about the congestion of population in Great Britain and the huge vacant areas in our Empire waiting to be peopled. If our Government were in charge of a Pharaoh, who could move whole populations at his sole behest and set them to some great 'task,' the problem might be soluble. An imaginative economist like Professor Stephen Leacock finds no difficulty in framing a project for 'the development of the resources of the outside Dominions by the credit, capital and labour of the United Kingdom.' He proposes

That a Committee be appointed to report a plan of Empire Migration Settlement and Development of Resources, the plan to involve, as its leading features, the investment of private capital from within and without the Empire, the grant of free passages, initial support and work under contract, to British labourers and their families, Government assistance from the Dominions concerned, in the making of surveys, roads, and communications, and the creation by Empire Incorporation of privileged companies to undertake the operations of development and settlement on a commercial basis and with a view to the pecuniary return to their shareholders.*

* *Economic Prosperity in the British Empire*, p. 246.

If two or three superfluous millions of our adult population were willing to leave English city, or even village, life in order to embark on this novel adventure in a distant, unknown country, and the occupants of that country were willing to receive them, and if in this period of depression our investors were willing, in face of the financial straits of Australia, Canada and South Africa, to embark all their spare savings upon this great Imperial adventure, one could only conclude that the British Isles and Empire were occupied by the most romantic people the history of the world has yet disclosed.

Now, we are not a romantic people, willing to plunge into some new gigantic enterprise out of a passion for the economic integration of the Empire, and willing to pay, to risk and suffer, for this great ideal. Nor are our Dominions thus minded. Business men, of course, are not devoid of sentiment. They will even admit a tincture of it into their trade operations. They will prefer to deal with their friends rather than with strangers. If they can afford it, they will even pay a little more for a friend's commodities, and will sell to him on slightly easier terms. But they will recognise that, though some occasional preferences of this sort are possible and agreeable, they cannot afford to run their business as a whole upon these lines. They will not deal with a friend if they can get a definitely better article at the same price from a stranger, or the same article at a considerably lower price. And they will always prefer not to bind themselves in buying or in selling to a friend, but will reserve free access to the wider market. So far the trade and financial relations between Great Britain and the Dominions have been run along these lines. On both sides amity and kinship have been allowed to influence economic relations. Because the slight structure of our import tariff has not permitted us to give preferences comparable to those accorded to our manufactures by the Dominion tariffs it is sometimes suggested that we are not contributing our fair share. But this view ignores the importance of the preferences given in the Colonial Stock Act of 1900, the Colonial Development Act of 1929, and the Empire Marketing Board (each of the two latter endowed with a yearly fund of 1,000,000*l.*), the Imperial Shipping Committee, the Overseas Settlement Board, the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, and the Imperial Economic Committee designed 'To consider the possibility of improving the methods of purchasing for market and marketing within the United Kingdom the food products of the overseas parts of the Empire with a view to increasing the consumption of such products within the United Kingdom in preference to imports from foreign countries and to promote the interests both of producers and consumers.' These terms

were agreed in 1925, and the next year 'raw materials' were also brought within its scheme of operation. The more rigorous Free Trader may object that the investment and trade preferences indicated in these measures infringe the strict tenor of his gospel. But the political unity of the Empire and the sentiment of kinship will reconcile most Free Traders to this policy, provided it is not carried so far as to place positive barriers upon foreign imports.

It will be said that our safeguarding policy has already carried us a little way along this road. But quite apart from the expressed intention of the Labour and Liberal Parties to remove these scraps of Protection as soon as financial considerations permit, the existing duties are almost negligible as factors in our fiscal policy. Their danger lies in the false economic and dangerous political implications they harbour. The protectionist proposals we have so far considered have passed under the cover of economic Imperialism, the protection posing as incidental to the claims of a closer economic Empire. From the standpoint of a 'scientific tariff' designed to protect the industries and employment of the United Kingdom, the intrusion of the Imperial motive is very disconcerting. The largest, and in many ways the most important, of our depressed industries is agriculture. If any trade can claim the title of a key or essential industry it is agriculture. But it makes no difference to our farmers whether the cheap wheat, or beef, or bacon, which overwhelms them, comes from Canada, Australia, Argentina, or the United States. If our development of the Empire enables the Dominions to shed an ever-growing surplus on our markets, the tariff that keeps out Argentina's wheat and beef will be little consolation. No doubt a period of respite and recovery would be provided by a tax on foreign foods which, by raising prices in this country, would put some land back to arable use and more money into farmers' pockets, to be taken later on in rising rents—all at the expense of the consuming public. But if the proposed development of Empire resources came off, British agriculture would soon be back in the depression from which it had temporarily emerged. It would be a victim to the prosperity of Canada and Australia. A sufficient all-round tariff directed equally against the Empire and foreign countries is what our farmers really want. They could then keep prices on a continuously profitable level, assuming that the better organisation of millers and bakers were not too strong for them. Why should farmers be left to the free importation of Empire foods when our industrialists would be enjoying full protection, until Canada was so fully equipped with American capital as to push her manufactures into our free market?

Enough has been said to show how injuriously the policy of Protection is affected by the dilution of Imperialism. If, as is assuredly the case, our future depends primarily upon low costs of manufacturing production, enabling us to sell overseas as much of our goods as will enable us (with the aid of our 'unseen' exports) to buy the increasing supplies of foods and raw materials we shall require, the only Protectionism that is plausible is one which keeps out foreign manufactures and leaves us free to buy untaxed foods and raw materials wherever we can get them cheapest and to develop markets for our manufactured goods wherever we can find good customers. I have no doubt that many of our Protectionists are not fooled by the mirage of imperial economic self-sufficiency, and would frankly prefer a straight policy of keeping out industrial imports which 'invade' our markets. Too much futile controversy has been wasted upon the effects of the Safeguarding Acts upon the trades they were designed to benefit. No economist would dispute the statement that particular trades can be, and often are, benefited by tariff protection. New trades can sometimes be nursed into prosperous childhood, depressed trades may be rescued from collapse. But these achievements are at the expense of other trades. When Mr. Amery declares that 'Free Trade as an intellectual conviction is dead,' denouncing it as 'a very superficial economic doctrine, deriving some justification and plausibility from the facts of the time,' he misunderstands the mind of the great majority of economic thinkers and the claim that Free Trade is a principle, not a passing expediency. Free Traders have consistently held that this policy is based upon the law that the widest measure of freedom of exchange between traders in different countries tends to induce producers in each country to put their economic resources, human and natural, to the most productive uses, and that the benefits of this system are shared by the producers and consumers of all the countries engaged in this co-operation. This is a basic principle of trade whose validity is not affected by the measure in which it is applied to the utilisation of the resources of any particular country, though the amount of advantage attaching to its application varies greatly with the intelligent direction of the capital and labour at each country's disposal.

The contention that the Protectionism practised by most other countries invalidates our policy of free imports is erroneous. It is true that we should gain more if these other nations had followed our example, as Cobden believed they would. But because they will not admit our goods freely into their countries, it by no means follows that we should gain by refusing free access to theirs. Because they prefer to adopt the foolish and

expensive method of taxing their consumers by a tariff which keeps out some cheaper goods, and raises the price not only of those admitted from outside, but of the home products, for the benefit of the producers of these latter, it does not follow that we should act in the same foolish manner. It is equally to our advantage to buy freely and to sell freely in the widest market. Because we are prevented by foreign tariffs from achieving the latter advantage, that is no reason for repudiating the former. To buy well is as important as to sell well, though the superior organisation of the producing over the consuming interests obscures this truth. We let in free the foreigner's goods, not for his advantage, but for ours, because the policy of free imports adds to the total volume of wealth at our disposal. There is something comical in the widespread belief that the foreigner is ever planning to dump the fruits of his labour on our shores without taking payment in the fruits of our labour, the only way in which payment can be made. If he gives more labour than we give in return, so much the better for us and the worse for him. In 'a new moral world' organised on a basis of equitable exchange this economy may be superseded. In such a world a better apportionment of the product to the workers in every country would furnish so much larger a volume of demand in the national market that the surplus available for export would be restricted, and its price would be higher than at present. But until such organisation of world resources is available, each nation will find it advantageous to buy what it needs in the widest market, without loading its producers with costs of production heightened by a tariff and its consumers with the heaped-up burdens of these higher costs as they emerge in high retail prices.

The folly of keeping out supplies of cheap food and raw materials from our markets is, indeed, so manifest that most Protectionists who remain unblinded by the Imperialist enthusiasm would confine their tariff to the case of imported manufactures. But there is little ground for such distinction. The greater part of the manufactured goods which enter this country is machinery or tools or materials, or other capital goods used in some productive or distributive business in this country, entering at some point into the costs and selling prices. If by a tariff we kept these goods out, we might employ more capital and labour of our own in producing articles dearer or worse, or both. But since this policy would, as we see, mean higher prices for the final commodities, consumers, called upon to pay these higher prices, would have to reduce their purchases of other goods, causing unemployment in the trades producing these goods.

Protectionists often summon to their aid the new terms

rationalisation, standardisation, and bulk production. If, they argue, our manufacturers could rely upon the complete possession of the home market, they could afford to equip and organise their business with all the best modern labour-saving devices. Secure of a large regular sale of their products, they would work at full pressure, reducing overhead costs to the lowest figure, and, where necessary, organising cartels for the disposal of any surplus products in the overseas markets at prices accommodated to these markets. In fact, they ask us to imitate the policy of Germany and America. But what is that policy? High prices at home, lower prices abroad. Two years ago, when Germany and America were enjoying a boom, this might have seemed plausible. But hardly now, when the conditions of production and employment are about as bad in these countries as in ours. The truth is that the project of securing a full regular employment of plant and labour by keeping out imported goods does not work. For the fluctuations of a kept home market are greater, not less, than the fluctuations of the world market. Here once more we touch the core of the Free Trade doctrine. A wide, free, various market is safer and more profitable than an artificially restricted market. It is better for us to continue to buy the foods, material, and finished goods we want from a number of customers bidding for our custom than to confine our purchases to sellers in our own country or the Empire. The narrower market not merely means less choice, but it encourages and enables conspiracies to regulate and hold up prices. If, as seems likely, the industrial world will organise its staple industries more and more along the lines of cartelisation, it will be more important than ever that we should not permit our consumers to become the victims of the restricted supplies and dictated prices of one national or international cartel, but should retain the utmost liberty of dealing with as many independent sources of supply as possible.

It is equally important that we should retain as many markets as possible for the sale of our manufactured goods, and increase our efforts for the opening and growth of markets in those areas of the world that are occupied by large populations in a backward condition and therefore amenable to education in new economic wants. The notion of selecting a time like this for specialising upon the development of markets in thinly populated parts of our Empire where we already possess most of the custom that is available, when there are immense areas with vast populations, such as Russia and China, whose development in the industrial arts, and in progressive standards of consumption, is capable of rapid growth within a single generation, is an almost incredibly foolish one. It will be said that there is nothing

in the proposed Imperial Protectionism to prevent us from taking our full share in the development of these and other foreign markets. Our export trade, furnished with a monopoly of the Empire market, will still seek to expand in these backward countries. But we should suffer from two grave disadvantages. On one I have already dwelt—namely, the increased costs of our manufactures owing to the dearer foods and raw materials consequent on our Imperial Preferences. Countries, such as America and Japan, which have made large recent inroads on our markets in South America and Asia will cut further into our trade, while our European competitors will enjoy a similar advantage in Africa and the Near East. Nor would this be the worst result of our reversal of our Free Trade policy. The acquiescence of other Great Powers in our absorption of a quarter of the globe has been in large measure due to a recognition of the fact that we have not sought to conserve these markets to our sole use, but have allowed other nations to buy and sell freely with the peoples of our growing Empire. Though the existing preferential tariffs have aroused some feelings of annoyance, the resentment that would arise from the new proposals would be deep and dangerous. To reply that, as reasonable people, they would recognise that Great Britain and her Dominions and Colonies have as good a right to impose Protection or prohibitive tariffs as they, the complainant Powers, is completely to ignore the lessons of history. Suddenly to withdraw from traders in these foreign countries valuable trading rights which they had long enjoyed would inflict grave damage on business interests influential with their Governments, and would worsen international relations at a time when all intelligent and serious citizens of civilised countries are striving to better them. We are well aware how bitter are the feelings on the Continent generated by the raising of new and higher tariff barriers. The withdrawal of our Free Trade practice would be an abject surrender to the principle of economic war which history has so often shown to be the instigation and the prelude to a war of arms. This performance by a nation which has taken the most active part in establishing an international instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes and the active co-operation of the commonwealth of nations would be a more dangerous blow to the prospects of a pacific civilisation of the world than any other that can be conceived.

Let me end upon a practical note. There is no accepted union either of hearts or interests between the Dominions and the rest of the Empire. This is expressed in no uncertain terms by Mr. Leacock, who tells us that 'None of the Dominions wants to link up their economic life with the goodwill or badwill, the

aspirations, the hatreds and the convulsions of the welter of peoples who live in British India and the Indian States. The inclusion of India and the Crown dependencies or half dependencies in the Economic Conference, of which I speak, would guarantee its failure.'⁴ Everyone acquainted with Dominion opinion knows this to be true. In other words, there does not exist throughout our Empire that sense of community of interests and desire for co-operation which is assumed by Imperialists in this country as a prime motive of their scheme and an essential condition of its success. 'The British Empire Economic Family'⁵ desiderated by Sir Basil Blackett is composed of elements so discrepant in race, government and civilisation as to afford little prospect of turning out a happy family. A policy relying upon enlarged future export trade with India, hitherto by far the largest of our Empire customers, but repelling Argentina, the most useful of our foreign economic *protégés*, nourished by our invested capital and paying us in large annual supplies of wheat and beef, would indicate a complete collapse of business intelligence in any Government that should adopt it.

J. A. HOBSON.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

⁵ *Nineteenth Century and After*, July and August 1930.

BRITISH AGRICULTURE AND RATIONALISATION

RATIONALISATION has only escaped being an 'ism' because it is applied to the health of industry rather than to a mental or physical culture. Yet, however much we may mock those for whom it is a panacea of political speech, it means something in the mind of most of us for which there is no other word; not even a marriage of co-ordination and reorganisation quite produce the meaning. It is vague and misused. Compulsory rationalisation is nearly always the remedy in our minds for others of whose methods we disapprove. Not unlike the author of *Hudibras*, we

Compound for sins we are inclined to
By damning those we have no mind to.

In agriculture, at all events, we are apt to consider the farmer as if he should be a shopkeeper rather than a husbandman following the most skilled profession in the world. In no other industry can the hobbyist find so many enchanting dappled horses to bestride. Therefore, for the land, before finding remedies, it is well that we should define the meaning of those remedies implied in the word 'rationalisation.' Very briefly, it would seem to be the practical application of a sense of proportion, not only within the industry, but in its relation to unemployment, the State and the Empire.

An instance comes to mind from an article in the last issue of this Review by Mr. R. A. Butler. He dealt shortly with the quota method of compelling our millers to use a certain proportion of home-grown wheat as a means of relieving the agricultural distress in this country. Mr. Baldwin, too, has spoken favourably in public of a guaranteed price for home-grown wheat coupled with an Imperial wheat quota. This line of thought is at once of the most far-reaching importance to the Empire and at the same time dangerous for us who farm, since it may obscure the other issues in home agriculture. Its importance is its great help to the Imperial wheat growers. It links, as few proposals have, the home farmer with the Empire farmer. For my personal belief is that the golden era of rationalised agriculture will

only come when we are organised to farm imperially. But wheat has assumed so large a hold on the public and the farming mind that we forget that it forms only 10 per cent. of our agricultural output, when grown on about 1,100,000 acres. Again, let us look at wheat in the light of potential agricultural development. If by uneconomic subsidy we pushed the wheat acreage up to 2,000,000 acres, we would re-absorb 17,000 men directly, and probably increase our output to 16 per cent.—not higher, because the highest yielding wheat land is still under cultivation. Therefore, the bigger the acreage relatively, the poorer the yield would tend to become. On the other hand, if we were to produce economically (as we could do in time) all the condensed milk, butter, and cheese now imported, together with all our own bacon and pork, we could re-absorb in direct labour alone over 400,000 workers. Thus a wheat policy in isolation is only an excuse for not going to the root of our agricultural difficulties. Hence my definition of rationalisation as a sense of proportion in practice.

But one cannot easily make remedies obvious without an analysis of our difficulties. These difficulties are rooted in the past, nourished by our climate and geography, and they will be with us in the future except through the most careful pruning. In the past the Industrial Revolution brought wealth, but it disinherited agriculture, which turned gamekeeper for a living. Wealth in the towns meant population, which means cheap food. Only a highly organised modern factory type of agriculture could have produced this in England. But the growth of wealth coincided with the maintenance of snobbery. The self-made Englishman seeks the secure established dignity of broad acres. The successful Frenchman peacocks on the scene of his triumph and builds a machicolated château beside his factory. But while the Englishman's hobbies are in the country, his brain is in the town. Absentee landlordism is a dead-letter, but there are few landlords who are not absentees in brain and leadership. Now, if a business man buys an estate, he takes up home farming in the week-ends. He is the victim of his manager and his stockman, for good blood stock is not only the *cachet* of a country gentleman, but the instinctive pleasure of the English. So he prefers to lose money on fat beasts at shows (and to scratch their gross, uneconomic backs with the chosen guests on Sunday afternoon) to spending wealth in the thankless task of furthering the industrial organisation of his land. I doubt if there would be much of an agricultural problem if the great industrial leaders had realised the importance of agriculture to them as something to develop rather than to exploit, or if millionaires in private life had worked like the old

eighteenth-century landlords, using their wealth, not to subsidise amenities, but to make agriculture self-sufficient, as Mr. Ernest Debenham and a few devoted colleagues are trying to do to-day. But now that the harm is done the amenity money is no longer available. Political prejudice, working through the tax-collector, is draining the landlord's supply of cheap capital. Yet no amount of public ownership or peasant holdings can make the desert blossom with the rose of profit. Indeed, that things are no worse than they are is largely due to the landlord still acting as buffer in the lean years.

Cheap food has sacrificed land to factory. Lack of leadership has wasted the farmer's opportunities in the past. What of the farmer himself? He is a very highly skilled empiricist of the soil, of plant and animal life; something of a rule of thumb scientist, botanist, meteorologist, veterinary surgeon, mechanic and manager, under such changeable conditions that factory labour organisation is child's play in comparison. His task is sufficient without expecting him to organise in his market as if he were a pocket Woolworth. In fact, one of his faults is that he pays too much attention to selling. For we have a market at our doors, though with transport rates out of all proportion to the mileage. This should be an advantage, but a market outside the farm gates destroys voluntary co-operation. The essence of co-operation is necessity and interdependence, long-sightedness, and freedom from suspicion. The man with a successful milk round in a small town will naturally not move to help the organisation of a cheese factory. The bottle-neck of export is what has made Danish co-operation the model for the world.

Our long-sighted farmers are not sufficient to leaven the loaf. Long-sightedness implies a willingness to forego traditional habits—if necessary, to forego old friends who are too often old parasites. There are few long-viewed farmers who have not invested and lost money, through lack of loyal support from their neighbours, in co-operative failures. Individualism and a lack of economic sense and inability to support anything but ready-made successes are at once the strength and the curse of the British farmer. The dealer in England is a ready-made success. He flourishes like the green bay tree. The farmer grumbles, sometimes unreasonably, at the middleman. He never forsakes him. He is nearly always in his debt. Above all, the English farmer has not organised his buying or his selling, because he has lacked necessity. He is not a peasant. Yeoman or tenant alternatives, not only of modes of agriculture, but of ways of life, have always been his. At home every other form of industry or trade to which he may care to turn his hand is before him, and abroad there is always the Empire. In Denmark

since 1864 the whole nation has had to farm successfully to survive. In Europe the peasants have few unpeopled colonies. Their patch of land must suffice. In the New World self-reliance has bred foresight and eliminated suspicion. Space and loneliness have bred interdependence. From the colonies there is no emigration to a yet more promised land.

But geography has not only put a market at his doors; it has diversified the demand for his produce. Climate has stepped in to intensify the difference. The dairy lands of Cheshire and the wheat lands of Norfolk are a far cry in all but miles. Lincolnshire, Lancashire, Ayrshire are the great potato districts. But in the triangle of which they form the corners there are twenty breeds of sheep, of cattle and of pigs, and as many more varieties of husbandry. How, then, can one expect grading and orderly marketing out of this welter by voluntary co-operation, especially when the industry is depressed and little public money is available? An obscure gold mine in China is likely to command more subscriptions than an English agricultural venture.

Money brings me to the last phase in this analysis. World deflation has depressed world agriculture, but, owing to our climate and our more rapid deflation, it has hit the British farmer the most severely. Owing to our climate, we can generally only grow two selling crops in four years, and as a principally stock-raising country our turnover in live-stock in under two years is very limited. If one puts the average rate of cash turnover of English farming at once in eighteen months, then it stands to reason that a fall in commodity prices at 10 per cent. per annum means that the farmer is losing 15 per cent. between sowing and harvesting. Even then he may have to carry over his crop in rick, owing to damp, for another six months, losing 20 per cent. by deflation alone. While if his capital is borrowed he will have had to pay two full years' interest, about 13 per cent., as well as having to pay back money which was borrowed at 100 and two years later is worth 120. A steel ingot, on the other hand, goes into Gary steelworks on one day and is delivered, for instance, as railway rollers the next. This may be an extreme example, but industry can always cut the time lag in periods of deflation vastly shorter than agriculture.

This illustration shows the distance between industry and agriculture, but one cannot analyse English agriculture's decline without the relation of agriculture to industry immediately leaping to one's notice. For many years the drift from the country to the town has proceeded at the rate of about 1000 a week. So long as industry was prosperous through export trade this depleted purchasing power at home was not noticed. The farm labourer and his family, as well as the 400,000 farmers, in

the country are still the largest single group in the community. But, while there is even now only a comparatively small growth in unemployment on the land, it is because the land has lost its potential unemployed to industry. Looked at from the point of view of capital equipment, the farmer's is almost the most heavily capitalised industry in relation to turnover. The wastage in his implements, owing to the rough nature of the work, is enormous. Again, the small market towns are dependent on the agriculture of the surrounding countryside. These towns are, in prosperity, enormous customers for factories. Moreover, the chemicals used in artificial manure are one of the greatest by-products of industry. Indeed, the great new agricultural research station of Imperial Chemical Industries at Jeallott's Hill points the moral. No industry uses transport of raw materials and finished products to the extent of agriculture. Last of all, physically and psychologically it yet remains to be proved whether industrial labour can be kept healthy without constant interchange of blood between town and country.

In direct labour alone, as I have shown above, one branch of agriculture might well absorb 400,000 extra workpeople; while so interlocked is the problem that only a highly successful industrial population can pay for the high quality of food products produced so well by home agriculture. Thus it becomes obvious that agriculture is the point at which one must start to unwind the vicious spiral of our trade depression; and it is obvious, too, that, if agricultural rationalisation, in its widest implications, is to be brought about, industry and the State must be eager—perhaps paying—partners. I say paying, because there must be two stages in this rationalisation. The one should dovetail with the other. In the first place, before we attempt to meet our difficulties in detail, we will be forced to 'contract out' of world agricultural depression. Most of the great agricultural countries of the world are doing this already. Their method has been to keep up prices at home, which gives the farmer a fair return, and to dump the surplus, subsidised or not, on other nations. In practice this means ourselves. France makes her millers grind 97 per cent. of home-grown wheat or else show an export equivalent of flour. Germany, to get ready cash in the autumn, subsidises her export of cereals in the same way. By paying reparations she benefits her own farmers and hurts ours. In the United States agriculture is backed by a fund of 100,000,000*l.* wherewith to flood the markets of the world in bumper years. The instances multiply swiftly.

For our Empire trade as well as our home farmer we must move swiftly. Leaving aside the Empire, there are only three ways—free imports and a home bonus per acre or per commodity,

an embargo, or protection. The repeal of the Corn Production Act ten years ago is a shattering example of the dangers inherent in a bonus. Subsidies should only be used in the transition stages, and then homœopathically. Protection must be very high to be effective, and thus must increase the cost of living. The simplest example of protection can be taken from wheat. A motor manager buys steel. He knows to a nicety how much steel he will need for one car. To him protection is obviously a benefit. A farmer plants an acre of ground with wheat. According to the season and his methods, he may grow fifty bushels or he may grow twenty. In this country wheat may be rotted by damp; in another country drought or locusts may have killed it utterly. This means uncertainty—bumper crops and famine crops. Always on a rumoured crop report speculation leaps in the world grain markets. As I write the grain movements in Chicago, owing to drought in the United States, are out of all proportion to the facts. Thus, not only does price fluctuation make protection uncertain on an open market, but a tariff wall, unless it amounts to an embargo, is bound to be jumped by the countries who must dump their surpluses. There remains, then, the embargo in one form or another for dealing with the great staples of agriculture. This might be accomplished by an Import Board. Socialist doctrine is dangerous in practice. But then, in the case of cereals, we have the quota method which disallows all, or all but a certain percentage of, foreign grain while interfering hardly at all with the private direction of trade, holding only the intervention of the State in reserve as a last resort. The case of meat is different. Meat does not go through the bottle-neck of the mill like cereals. Yet of meat we already produce 50 per cent. of our own supply, and we could easily produce all our needs within a given time. But an embargo at present is hardly practical politics, and protection is open to much the same objection as cereal protection. Therefore, in the matter of live-stock, we are faced with the necessity of a variety of remedies, which means rationalisation of our farming in every direction.

For many people will say that agriculture in England is not one industry, but one hundred, and you cannot treat it as one. Yet they are often the same people who say that wheat alone is the key to agriculture, for they argue with some reason that a decline of wheat acreage means more land given to milk, barley, oats, and potatoes. Yet even this is not altogether true. Last year showed a grave decline in wheat, but we had fewer cattle and a nearly level acreage of other crops. Potato acreage, for instance, varies 3 or 4 per cent. per season. It generally depends on the previous season's prices rather than on any other crop.

It is true that agriculture is one hundred industries, but they are interwoven. And the fields of England are as much one cloth as the coat we wear, yet interwoven of a million separate threads. But in all this intricate industry the stock-keeping side recurs again and again. You can, for instance, grow bullocks or run hill sheep and never grow an acre of wheat, but you will not long succeed in England as a wheat farmer unless you put organic manure from sheep, pigs, or cattle on your land. Indeed, arable sheep farming has been the key to successful cereal growing in the past. From another point of view, farmyard dung is most often used for the root brake or the wheat fallow. The winter yarding of bullocks or dairy cattle provides the dung. The root brake goes on a dairy farm to the sheep. Sheep-folded land grows the best barley, for which, after maltsters, pigs are the best market. But a really successful pig industry is interwoven with the by-products of the dairy industry and is connected in glut seasons with the potato industry, market gardening, and fruit farming. Thus it becomes an axiom that if you benefit one part of agriculture you benefit all parts, only for expediency it is best to begin at the centre rather than the fringes.

Not long ago Professor Haldane wrote some illuminating articles in *The Times* about the future shortage of meat supplies. There is not space here to dispute, even if one could, the wisdom of his judgment. But, given that world meat supplies are even steady, surely, if we have an island which by climate and skill can grow the best beef and mutton in the world and very fair wool, that can supply all its pork and bacon without any stretch of effort, that does supply all its fresh milk and could supply all its butter and cheese, it is worth beginning with stock farming. It is no exaggeration to say that by winning the greater part of self-sufficiency in stock farming we will have cured the cereal farmers' ills. An entirely self-sufficient dairy industry would bring into employment on the present-day basis of output 350,000 men. As a rider, add to that the estimate of the national pig industry counsel that a self-sufficient pig industry would bring in another 68,000 and you have one of the bogies of industrial rationalisation disappearing—that is, a large temporary (perhaps permanent) increase in unemployment. The above figures take no account of indirect labour in factory and mill. But—and here is another reason for looking further than cereals—ordinary arable farming, if properly rationalised, must mean a decrease in men employed per 100 acres as our organisation and our labour become better. So far all the agricultural machinery inventions—*i.e.*, sixteen furrow ploughs and harvester threshers—have gone to benefit new countries. But the time must come when the mechanisation of our English tillages is advanced beyond our

dreams to-day. Our knowledge of soil mechanics and our methods of coping with the climate stand to-day where our knowledge of artificial manuring did 100 years ago.

Thus the problem of rationalising agriculture in general is narrowing on analysis to live-stock farming in particular. So far, unfortunately, our efforts at agricultural prosperity have been devoted largely to the fringes. National marks for eggs, fruit, and tomatoes, even a guaranteed price for wheat, and the prevention of dumping of oats is only scoring 'outers' on the target. In fact, the dumping of oats and cheap feeding barley is a national benefit for cheap production of live-stock, dairy and poultry products. There are two reasons why one should help wheat and stop dumping; one is psychological—that is, the country, as it were, auto-suggests the necessity. The other is because the eastern counties, by soil and climate, are so dependent on cereals for prosperity. One cannot leave a great area out of one's plans. But if we are to rationalise where stock-feeding cereals are concerned, we should make every effort to see that they are admitted as cheaply as possible into this country. For the Scottish cereal farmer milling oats and for the English cereal farmer milling wheat and malting barley are the things for which he needs protection by a quota.

Not the least part of farming rationalisation is that the arable farmer should have live-stock to consume his low-price and low-quality cereals and other arable products. One instance will suffice. Last year a south-country farm had a particularly heavy potato and pea crop. These would have made a total loss on the market, but turned into pigs they made a handsome profit. Indeed, the potatoes, which became pork and bacon, realised 20% per acre clear profit. Thus, even in the case of cereal farming, if one helps live-stock one not only makes for better farming, but provides an outlet for surplus production. Now, to rationalise his stock farming, the farmer wants a double security—(a) a steady price; (b) a secure market. In the beginning, at any rate, the State alone can provide this. The fact must be faced. But the State will not grant embargoes on imports, protection or subsidies, and a guaranteed price unless it is definitely certain that the farmer will rationalise his end of the industry. Thus the State, in order to have an assured *quid pro quo*, should only give its help through channels that force the farmer to rationalise. I said before that the farmer should not be a shopkeeper. His task should end when he has produced the required article and delivered it to the nearest collecting station.

This means a rationalisation of transport for agriculture, and it may mean in the end a spread-over of the benefit now enjoyed by the sheltered industries to the unsheltered industries. It is

cheaper to ship a ton of wheat from Montreal to Liverpool than to send it by rail from Norfolk to Edinburgh. This accommodation of sheltered trades like transport to the depressed industries must come if we are to regain prosperity. High transport costs are as much a tax on industry as high rates. Agriculture is an excellent starting-point for this reform. Road and rail should be brought into unison. Lorry bodies should be so made that they can be moved entire from the chassis on to the rail trucks, and *vice versa*. Milk and eggs are largely collected now, but a great transport organisation for collecting and delivering all farm produce, with special cheap rates, is one of the first moves in a rationalised distribution of farm products.

Again, only granting help where you can force rationalisation, a guaranteed price for wheat should be paid according to quality at collecting centres. One of the outstanding reasons for the forces and for public institutions to have home-grown supplies is that by buying only from organisations like National Mark abattoirs they would force co-operation to be successful. This forcing of co-operation among farmers is a necessity. Like everyone else, they want the benefit without the effort. A few farmers standing out can ruin a whole district's co-operative effort. The recent failure of the hop-growers' organisation is an instance. It cannot be too strongly urged that a farmer's business is to farm, not to be a dealer or a salesman. One of the pitfalls of our present-day opportunities is the Co-operative Wholesale Society, an organisation so large and so multiple that it could have embraced every phase of agricultural buying and selling. Alas, by its definite affinity with one political party, it has made conditions a hundred times more difficult for the State—to use it to complete the bridge between producer and consumer. It may yet come about in the inevitable reaction from the English type of Socialism. Be that as it may, wherever possible the State should only give at the narrow point of grading and distribution, guaranteeing help only for standard and quality.

Thus it might well be feasible to give a bonus according to grade for every carcase going through a recognised abattoir or bacon factory. Similarly, one might deal with wool by grade through wool-sellers' organisations, in each case until such time as we are able with the Empire, or entirely at home, to supply all our wants when protection or prohibition of imports could be granted. But in return for this aid the State should insist on no live-stock sires being used unless they be certified. The State, too, should narrow the number of recognised breeds of live-stock to produce uniformity. It is useless to try to build up a grading organisation with State help unless you ensure the

breeding of gradable carcasses. In the milk industry the problem is different, since in this case it is not necessary to foster production. We are heavily over-producing in liquid milk. The State there has to help the industry to help itself by vertical organisation in absorbing gluts. A hard winter or disease on individual farms halves the milk supply. An exceptionally good May can temporarily double it. Therefore the distributors have a valid reason, since they suffer the surplus, for disproportionately high charges in retailing. If distributors and the farmers will not combine vertically—and they seem unable to—co-operative creameries and cheese factories should be set up in every district. Transport to these should be made as easy as possible. Even now the farmer could produce his milk more cheaply; it is certainly possible for the retailer, given an unfluctuating liquid supply, to reduce his charges. Lower price, cleaner milk, and education alone will increase liquid milk sales to the standards of consumption which one should assign to a healthy nation. Cheap credit for such creameries, or even a bonus for condensed milk and graded cheese from recognised organisations, should be available until our output allowed us to put an embargo on various imported milk products. But the standard of clean milk in return for these benefits should be set higher than it is to-day. Butter fat tests in the progeny and ancestry of dairy sires should become compulsory in the process of breeding up.

The remainder of the agricultural industry deserves the same kind of attention; for its difficulties are largely based on lack of standard and endemic over-production. Factories for tinning fruit and vegetables are being started. They should be helped forward by grant and credit, with the eventual hope in sight that when their economic production is sufficient for our needs they will have a protected market. In particular, farina factories for potatoes suggest themselves. On bumper potato years one might order a 2 or 3 per cent. quota of potato flour in the loaf. The luxury vegetable and fruit market should be secured at home by an embargo on imports during the luxury season. In return for this the proper grading and packing of home-grown vegetables should be a condition. This granting of credit to co-operators suggests another use—that of enabling the good farmer to borrow money in difficult times. In agriculture, owing to the time taken in producing a given foodstuff, short-term credit needs greater latitude than in industry. The banks to a small extent, but mostly the dealers and merchants, now supply this. The latter cripple the farmer, who is always having to pay the bad debts of others. He is in their pocket for his sales. He knows no economic freedom. Not the least useful function of credit might well be a State guaranteed fund working first through the bank and then

through the co-operative societies. Credit should be forthcoming as initial payment on crops sold, also for the farmer who needs the raw materials for his industry, like manures, seeds, and implements. These could, in fact, be granted through the co-operative societies in a form amounting to post-dated cheques. The co-operative societies would be strictly ruled in lending only to the farmer, whom, knowing locally, they believe will succeed, as they would be responsible if they threw good money after bad. The co-operative societies, in their turn, would be controlled in the auditing of their accounts by the banks. Hitherto the lack of proper accounting has been a strong reason, among others, for the failure of agricultural co-operative societies. This method would involve no State control, greatly reduce the risk of loss, and materially strengthen agricultural organisations.

Last of all, the rationalisation of fixed capital on the land, such as buildings, water, fencing, electricity supply, and drainage, should be made an integral part of a permanent wealth-producing State campaign for the temporary alleviation of unemployment. This whole policy of rationalisation as I have tried to outline it sums itself up in concentrating on what we can produce best by granting help, not indiscriminately, but through what is known in the United States as the merchandising end of agriculture—not hesitating to use import embargoes or protection where necessary, in the belief that no price rigging can take place in foodstuffs, with a Press ever vigilant to fan discontent for its circulation and opposition politicians ever happy to cry 'dear food.'

I have not space, nor is it here appropriate, to deal with the fascinating subject of rationalising the farm labourer himself. What I have outlined would cost money. It would be more than saved in the dole. Something for nothing only ends in paying *gd.* for *4d.* It will meet the bitter opposition of vested interests. In its great days Conservatism, in opposing *laissez-faire*, has not flinched in facing vested interests. It would be no mean task to carry out; for it demands singleness of purpose in the chaos of multiple counsels. It would be worth while if by so doing we keep our roots in the soil from which alone we draw life.

LYMINGTON.

THE CANADIAN ELECTION

THE Canadian Election has come and gone, with results that have confounded most of the prophets and can hardly have failed to astonish the leaders of the Conservative Party themselves, pre-election predictions and prognostications notwithstanding. The Liberal Government of the Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, which has been continuously in office since 1921, has gone down to ignominious defeat, Liberal candidates having been successful in only eighty-six constituencies, as compared with 119 at the last election. Five Ministers of the Cabinet lost their seats, including the Finance Minister, the Hon. C. A. Dunning, author of the election budget; the Hon. T. A. Crerar, Minister of Railways; the Hon. Lucien Cannon, Solicitor-General; the Hon. Dr. Cyrus MacMillan, Minister of Fisheries; and the Hon. F. W. Kay, Minister without portfolio; while Mr. Mackenzie King's own majority in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, was reduced. The standing of the parties is now as follows:

		At Dissolution.
Conservatives	139	90
Liberals	86	119
United Farmers	10	11
Labour	3	3
Progressives	2	8
Liberal-Progressives	3	12
Independent	2	2
	245	245

The Hon. Richard Bedford Bennett, the new Prime Minister, comes of United Empire Loyalist stock, and is a native of New Brunswick, although for years he has sat in the House as one of the representatives of the prairie town of Calgary, Alberta. He is a lawyer by profession, a bachelor, like his predecessor, Mr. Mackenzie King, and has just passed his sixtieth birthday. Mr. Bennett has been called on at a crisis in the affairs not only of Canada but of the Empire at large, and as an untried man will have a more than usually heavy burden of responsibility resting

upon him. Since his path seems likely to be beset with difficulties from the start, a considerable volume of public sympathy will accompany him in his endeavours.

While the general depression in all lines of business and the acute unemployment problem, conditions which usually react against the political party in power, undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the consistent turning of all classes of voters against the Liberal Government, to attribute the entire *débâcle* to this cause alone would be to overlook the sectionalism that constitutes so important a feature of politics in this part of the world, and the purely local reasons that have meantime inclined many inhabitants of British Columbia at one end of the scale to abandon their traditional conservatism and at the other have split the solid Liberal vote in French-Canada as it has not been split during a period of forty years. The terms 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' have to-day lost practically all their original significance, so that in attempting any analysis of the political situation in Canada it becomes necessary to deal with the country in its four main geographical divisions: the Maritime Provinces, Quebec and Ontario, the Prairie Provinces, and British Columbia.

The most moderate forecasts, based largely on the apparent apathy of the electorate, inclined to the belief that the pre-election state of the parties would not be greatly altered, and in some well-informed quarters it was even anticipated that Liberals and Conservatives might conceivably be returned in approximately equal numbers and the balance of power be held by the little group of United Farmers, Progressives, Independents, and Labour representatives from the West, who in recent years have learned to work more or less as a united body. But the unexpected happened in nearly every case. In the Maritime Provinces, while Nova Scotia contented herself with changing a representation of twelve Conservatives and two Liberals to one of ten Conservatives and four Liberals, New Brunswick turned heavily against the Government and took from them four of the seats held at the dissolution, thus leaving only one Liberal seat in the province as against ten Conservative. Two of the three seats held in Prince Edward Island by the Liberals were also lost, so that of the total twenty-nine seats in the three provinces only six are now represented by Liberal members as compared with twenty-three held by Conservatives. In Ontario the Liberals did relatively much better, emerging with a net loss of three seats only and electing a member in Toronto itself for the first time since 1896, ex-Mayor Church being defeated in that city. Indeed, the Liberal vote in nine Toronto constituencies rose from 35,209 in 1926 to 65,622 in the present election, a good omen, indicating that Ontario's anti-Quebec *bloc* is showing signs of breaking up.

In Quebec no less than twenty-six Conservatives were elected as compared with only four in 1926. The three Prairie Provinces (Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan), which at the dissolution were represented by twenty-three Liberals, eight Progressives, eight Liberal-Progressives, eleven United Farmers, three Labour members, and only one Conservative, have now elected twenty-three Conservatives, fifteen Liberals, two Progressives, three Liberal-Progressives, nine United Farmers, and two Labour members. While British Columbia, where the Conservatives considered themselves almost impregnable, turned strongly the other way, the Liberals winning three seats in Vancouver city and one in the adjacent city of New Westminster. The fourth Vancouver seat went to Labour, and the standing, from being twelve Conservatives, one Liberal, and one Independent, became seven Conservatives, five Liberals, one Labour, and one Independent. The Conservatives increased their lead in every province except Nova Scotia and British Columbia, and have now a majority in every province except Quebec.

Beginning, then, with the Maritime Provinces, where a representation of nineteen Conservatives and ten Liberals has given way to one of twenty-three Conservatives and six Liberals, it may be laid down generally that that candidate usually makes the strongest appeal to the Maritime voter who promises the greatest amount of national aid in the form of money grants from the Federal Exchequer for highways, bridges, agricultural and educational institutions, and other such public undertakings, the people of the Maritimes having felt for years that in this respect they were not on terms of equality with the other provinces. A Royal Commission sat on Maritime troubles not long ago, and drew up a list of recommendations which, the local Conservative Press claims, the Mackenzie King Government implemented only in a partial and unsatisfactory manner. Whatever the actual validity of this charge, it has undoubtedly worked in Mr. Bennett's favour, and the Conservative leader has also been fairly lavish in his promises. It is said, too, that in New Brunswick the French-Canadian vote, which is usually strongly Liberal, veered very considerably to the Conservative side because Mr. Bennett is a native son, and the French were anxious to give the province its first Dominion Prime Minister. This is possibly true enough, the *habitant* mind responding with peculiar readiness to such an appeal, while the fact enabled the Conservative leader to talk in his election manifesto of 'our righteous demand for Governmental assistance in equality with the other provinces.'

The Conservative *Evening Times-Globe* of St. John, N.B., thinks increase in unemployment and the 'relatively hard times' are largely responsible, and insists that the result 'must most

emphatically not be taken as indicating the rejection of economic co-operation through preferences and other means.' The Conservative Charlottetown (P.E.I.) *Guardian* calls the result 'a glorious victory for Canada and sanity in legislation and administration.'

In the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, which constitute the second section, the manufacturers are practically all-powerful, and although the interests of the rank and file of both provinces are largely identical, yet differences of race and religion have so far kept them in opposite camps. The French-Canadian, by nature, tradition, and training an essentially conservative person, did as a matter of fact call himself a Conservative and voted accordingly up till the year 1896, when an election was fought on the Manitoba school question which involved the rights of his fellow French-Canadians in that province. On that occasion the *habitant*, against all precedent and in the face of the express counsel and even injunction of his Church, voted for the rising young Liberal Sir Wilfrid Laurier (then the Hon. Wilfrid Laurier), who suggested compromise rather than the coercion in the form of a Remedial Bill which the then Conservative Government sought to enforce. Sir Wilfrid was returned with a triumphant majority to the astonishment of all beholders, thus proving conclusively that the *habitant*, when sufficiently roused or properly appealed to, is capable of acting quite independently of his spiritual advisers in political matters. 'My compatriots think with me,' Mr. Henri Bourassa, the fiery Quebec Nationalist, once said to Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 'Yes,' replied Sir Wilfrid, 'but they vote for me.' Although it has really been the Laurier tradition as much as anything else that has kept him constantly in the Liberal camp for so many years, the French-Canadian demonstrates every now and again that he does not always allow his heart to govern his head.

Unemployment, which is always most apparent in industrial centres, undoubtedly played an important part in Quebec in the present election, while the inflow of New Zealand butter, which has increased enormously in the last few years, and now amounts to many millions of pounds annually, was a bitter grievance with the dairy farmers of the Eastern Townships, notwithstanding the fact that the treaty with New Zealand expires this autumn. It has been stated, also, that the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, alarmed at the spread of anti-Catholic sentiment in the West, had decided that the time was ripe for securing representation for their province in the Conservative Party, and counselled their flock accordingly, although this seems very doubtful in view of the fact that, in the past, expressions of anti-Catholic sentiment in other parts of Canada have invariably

resulted in further solidifying the Liberal *bloc* in Quebec. Signs have not been wanting, too, that the provincial Government, which has also been overwhelmingly Liberal for many years, was losing its hold on popular favour, and the Irish Roman Catholic vote likewise, which is often sharply at variance with the French Roman Catholic, is said to have gone almost wholly Conservative, following the advice of its influential organ, the *Catholic Record*, which has been preaching that Quebec's Liberal *bloc* was a menace to the country's welfare. All of these local and sectarian interests and influences have doubtless combined to help the Conservative cause.

The Independent Montreal *La Patrie* says that Mr. Bennett has 'solemnly pledged himself to the country. It remains for him to accomplish what he has promised'; while the Independent *La Presse* of the same city makes this shrewd comment:

The economic unrest, universal in character, has favoured the opposition. However satisfactory the King Government's record may have been, the majority of the electors thought fit to be severe, attributing to its administrators the decrease of prosperity which has marked the last period of this administration. What has happened here is but a repetition of what has happened elsewhere. Since the Great War people who have had the privilege of voting have a tendency to use it against the established order and to overthrow Governments. More often than not the electorate is more easily impressed by criticisms than by praises, however deserved these may be.

The Quebec Liberal *Le Soleil* says the King Government's administration was without reproach, but was beaten by means of a strong organisation, and that if 'grave economic uneasiness' had not existed all over the world the King Government would have been returned. But the Conservatives successfully exploited butter in the country and unemployment in the cities, making people forget the 'splendid Dunning Budget' and the fact that the average of employed people from 1925 to 1930 was equal to, if not better than, all previous averages. The *Chronicle-Telegraph*, Quebec City's only English newspaper, thinks the result 'eminently wise and hopeful,' and rejoices at the break-up of the Quebec *bloc* and at the laying aside of 'lingering prejudices and worn-out shibboleths.'

Ontario, which in the last election returned fifty-three Conservatives and twenty-nine Liberals and others, this time returns fifty-nine Conservatives and twenty-three Liberals and others. Although relatively the Liberals did much better here than was expected, the province is still, as it invariably is in national politics, mainly anti-Quebec, which happens to mean Conservative because of Quebec's unvarying preference for the Liberal label. Ontario in this election has run fairly true to form.

The Liberal Toronto *Star* thinks it is quite possible that Quebec, with its profound belief in Canada first, found itself attracted to the banner of Mr. Bennett rather than to the Liberal standard emblazoned with the call of 'Empire first.' The Conservative Toronto *Mail and Empire* says that Mr. Bennett was the first to suggest an Imperial Economic Conference, and that he will go to the Conference to build up a mutually satisfactory trade agreement by which Empire trade will be safeguarded by reciprocal trade agreements of a protective nature.

It has been in the Prairie Provinces that the voice of the agriculturist has been most loudly raised, and the anger of the farmers against the influx of New Zealand butter, the raising of the American tariff against dairy produce, agricultural depression, poor crops, and other things, and only very slightly appeased by the Dunning Budget, with its countervailing duties against American produce, has vented itself in political action at the expense of the Progressives and the Liberals. There has also been the inevitable proportion of anti-Quebec sentiment, which has been kept alive partly, it is said, by Ku Klux Klan activities, and by the language of the French Press in championing the rights of their French-Canadian brethren in these distant parts. Only one solitary Conservative was returned by the three provinces at the last election, whereas no less than twenty-three have now been elected. While the Alberta farmers have for the most part remained loyal to their farmer members, returning nine as against eleven at the dissolution, the Progressives and Liberal-Progressives have lost eleven seats between them in the Prairie Provinces (in addition to four in Ontario) and are reduced to two and three respectively, a much heavier relative loss than the Liberal loss of eight seats. But since the principal swing has been in the direction of the Conservatives, and not to the farmers' political movement, all dreams of a balance-of-power party are at an end. Last year the provincial Liberal Government, which had ruled in Saskatchewan since 1905, was defeated by a combination of Conservatives and Independents largely because it was suspected of being in too close accord with the heads of the French Catholic Church, and, although it is anticipated this new provincial Government will become a purely farmer Government in time, the Conservatives have apparently been able to profit by the religious issue in the national election and swing most of the disgruntled voters into their camp. Here, again, an entirely local or sectional interest has exercised its influence in national politics in a curious way, while the anticipated reaction in Quebec Province, that of solidifying the Liberal *bloc*, has failed to materialise.

The Conservative Edmonton *Journal* considers the out-

standing feature of the result was that Bennett's majority came from all parts of the country, and that Quebec and the Prairie Provinces were mainly responsible, also that the turnover shows how great was the electors' dissatisfaction with the King Government's policies and how those of Mr. Bennett appealed to them. The Liberal Manitoba *Free Press* refers to the Conservative victory as 'the triumph of the High-Tariff Party.' The people, it says, have shown a widespread desire to try Mr. Bennett's 'magic cure-all,' and it thinks Mr. King was beaten in political strategy by his opponent, who engineered him into holding an election at a time when it did not suit either himself or his party.

British Columbia, the fourth and last section of the country, sends fourteen members to the Federal Parliament, and as a rule these are mostly Conservatives. It is often claimed that the reason of this is because so large a proportion of the population is of English origin, retired Army colonels and middle-class people of small means, but all of essentially Conservative types. While the presence of such people undoubtedly has an influence in this direction, it is probably not so great as is commonly supposed, and the fact that here also voters in Federal elections are dominated largely by local considerations seems to have been effectively demonstrated on this occasion, when the province has swung away from the general trend and its own tradition by raising its Liberal representation from one member to five, and reducing the Conservative representation from twelve to seven. The reasons put forward by the local Press to explain this phenomenon are varied. It is said that the preferential features of the Dunning Budget found special favour in the eyes of the large British-born element in the population, and that the Liberal Government's trade treaty with Australia, which was very profitable to lumbering, fishing, and other interests on the Pacific coast who wished to have it preserved, had been adversely criticised by the Conservatives. These essentially local considerations were probably enough the main cause of the defection, coupled possibly with the recognition by the more alert-minded of the voters of the stagnation induced by consistently voting the same way.

The Independent Conservative Vancouver *Province* thinks unemployment was the principal factor in the election generally, and does not think Mr. King was sufficiently sympathetic when the issue was laid before him. 'He had the misfortune to be in office,' this paper says, 'when the wind went out of the balloon, and he had to come down.' The other factors were more or less local and provincial. But it has been a satisfactory election, the *Province* considers, and has broken the solid undigested *blocs* both East and West. The Liberal Vancouver *Sun* asks why

twenty-six out of Quebec's traditional sixty-five Liberal seats swung Conservative. 'Unlike British Columbia,' the newspaper says, 'Quebec did not want British preferences and emphatically said so. But industrial Quebec, like the rest of Canada, seems to have voted for a higher tariff.'

It will thus be seen that the reasons that have swung voters this way or that in Canada's different geographical sections are for the most part bound up with local conditions and interests. It seems fairly certain that no one specific cause alone has turned the general body of Canadian voters in the direction of the Conservative Party, and the claim of the Conservative *Montreal Gazette* that 'in this election the provinces all across Canada have been able to speak for the first time in many years with one voice' seems hardly borne out by the facts. Indeed, had the swing towards Conservatism been of the unanimous kind the staunch party men deem it to be, there is little doubt that its reaction would have been felt first of all in the traditionally Conservative provinces of Ontario and British Columbia. But such has not been the case. The Liberals held their own fairly well in the former, and actually registered substantial gains in the latter.

The real puzzle is to discover to what extent, if any, the French-Canadian voter in Quebec was animated in voting Conservative against his customary tradition by motives similar to those of the prairie farmer in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, who turned from his allegiance to what were supposed to be advanced or left-wing Liberals and voted for the Opposition party. For these two bodies of voters between them were responsible for practically the whole of the turnover. The Conservative representation rose from ninety at dissolution to 139, a gain of forty-nine seats. Of these twenty-two were found in the Province of Quebec, eleven in Manitoba, and eleven in Alberta and Saskatchewan. With gains and losses in British Columbia and Ontario practically offsetting one another, the remaining seats were picked up in the Maritime Provinces. Quebec and the Prairie Provinces practically won the day for the Conservatives.

The Liberal representation has dropped from 119 at dissolution to eighty-six in the new Parliament, a net loss of thirty-three seats. Twenty-two of these were straight losses in Quebec, the balance being divided between the Maritimes and the Prairie Provinces. The remaining sixteen seats won by the Conservatives have been almost entirely at the expense of the Progressives and Liberal-Progressives in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, whose combined numbers have fallen from twenty in the last Parliament to five in this one—a net loss of fifteen seats. The Quebec

habitant turned against the Liberal ; the prairie farmer vented his wrath on the Progressive. These were the two decisive factors in the Conservative victory.

That these forces have had their origin in basic feelings of an identical kind seems scarcely credible when one remembers the wide variations in the types of voters. The prairie farmer is possibly the most independent thinker to be found in the whole Canadian electorate. For the most part he is antagonistic to the financiers and manufacturers of the East, and he and his spokesmen lose few opportunities of declaring their belief that they (the farmers) are exploited by these interests. He has gone into the wheat marketing business himself as the result of this belief, and has established farmer Governments in the provinces of Alberta and Manitoba. In the Federal field the United Farmers and the Progressives arose, with the threat of supplanting the old political parties altogether in the West, at any rate, and when in 1921 they returned an army of sixty-six Progressives to Ottawa (which included some twenty representatives from Ontario) it was felt that a new force had arisen in Canadian politics from which much might be expected. The new party, however, did not prove to be a cohesive body, and the working arrangement entered into with Mr. Mackenzie King and his Liberal Government was not satisfactory either to the rank and file of the party or to their supporters in the country. In the 1925 election their numbers were reduced to less than one-half, and the following year the Hon. Robert Forke, who had succeeded Mr. Crerar as leader of the new party, together with several other Manitoba members, returned to the Liberal camp. Mr. Forke ultimately went to the Senate as a Liberal, Mr. Crerar became Minister of Railways in the Mackenzie King Government, and the new Progressive body split into several groups. The swing of these farmer voters to the Conservative camp in the present election is to be interpreted in part as their way of expressing their displeasure with the Progressive leaders, Mr. Crerar in particular, who failed to hold the new party together and sold its strength to the Liberals. Further, so far are these voters from seeing eye to eye with French-Canadian *habitants* that many of them voted Conservative for purely anti-Catholic reasons. The invasion of their dairy-farming market, too, by New Zealand butter, rendered possible by the Liberal Government's fiscal arrangements, has undoubtedly been a factor in the situation, and, although it is doubtful whether the claim made by certain Conservative journals in the East that industrial diversity in the development of the Prairie Provinces has resulted in a changed view of economic essentials in those parts could be wholly substantiated, there seems to be undoubted evidence of a strong

revulsion of feeling among the general body of the electors there against a political party based solely upon occupational employment.

As already stated, it is Quebec Province that provides the chief puzzle. Such a landslide was beyond the wildest dreams of the most ardent party prophets. No cautious, unbiased, or well-informed writer was found predicting it ; the French papers gave no sign of any such impending change. The English *Montreal Star* (Independent Conservative) calls it 'a political miracle.' The reasons have already been gone into, but it may be said in addition that the propaganda of the Conservatives in this province was admittedly superior to that of their opponents, who were apparently lulled into a false sense of security by imagining the province was bound to vote Liberal as usual, and so did practically nothing to counteract the pamphlets and literature of the other party. This could scarcely have happened, nor would the principal French newspapers have been so consistently against Mr. Bennett, had the hierarchy made any strong request for a splitting of the vote between the two parties. The movement was evidently initiated by the *habitant* himself.

Although the tariff has been made one of the issues in this election, and no doubt a great many votes were cast for Conservative candidates because of the belief that Mr. Bennett's proposal to increase the duties generally against the United States and bargain for favours on a reciprocal basis in inter-Empire trade would help business all over the country, as a matter of actual fact there does not appear to be a great deal of difference between the two parties on this question. Mr. Dunning was accused in some quarters of stealing the Tory thunder by framing his Budget as he did, while the Liberal Press, since the election, is predicting that the results will not change the general tariff policies of the Dominion to any serious extent, as these have continued under Liberal and Conservative Governments on practically the same principles for many years. It seems likely that the Dunning Budget will remain in force for at least a year pending a studied revision by the Tariff Advisory Board, which will probably be reconstituted with a general policy along the lines advocated by Mr. Bennett in the course of his campaign.

A special session of the new Parliament is to be called early in September to deal with the unemployment situation, but this session will probably only last a fortnight or so in order that Mr. Bennett and his colleagues may leave at its expiry to attend the Imperial Economic Conference in London. The promised relief of unemployment is supposed to take the form of a trans-

continental highway and other public works, but the special session will reveal its exact nature.

The times are certainly critical, not only in Canada, but in the Empire at large, and call for statesmanship of a high order if the tremendous possibilities of the British Empire as a whole are to be properly taken advantage of and the most pressing of its present difficulties relieved. New ways and means of knitting the structure into an enduring whole have got to be sought for and found. The problem is one in the solution of which the business man and the statesman must work hand in hand, and nowhere has its many aspects been more clearly and forcibly set out than in Professor Stephen Leacock's new book,¹ the appearance of which is most timely. This interesting work by a Canadian economist should satisfy most reasonable people of the immediate necessity for what the professor calls 'the establishment of a system of mutual co-operation for the development of the vast potential wealth of the Empire and for the expansion of its present limited population.'

Whether Professor Leacock's proposal of large-scale colonisation by privileged or chartered companies settling communities instead of individuals, and with mineral, industrial, and commercial concessions as the incentive, the whole girt about with a British Imperial Tariff system, will be the final solution may be open to question; but it has this great advantage, that it could be put into operation speedily, and would not be too radical a departure from customary procedure. But whether the movement is to be launched by financiers or politicians or a combination of both, it must be launched by somebody and got under way speedily. On that score there is little room for doubt. It is devoutly to be hoped that at the coming Imperial Economic Conference a start of some kind will be made.

¹ *Economic Prosperity in the British Empire* (Constable, 7s. 6d. net).

J. B. M. CLARK.

THE SIMON REPORT

I. A NON-OFFICIAL EUROPEAN VIEW

THE Simon Commission Report has been awaited with feelings of anxiety and hope amongst what are commonly called in India the non-official Europeans. The word 'European' is used to connote all the British white men (and generally includes, when applicable, French, Germans, Italians, etc.) and to differentiate between them and the native-born Indians, who are also British subjects. Recognising the difficulties inherent in the present Constitution in India established by Act of the English Parliament, and realising the weight of influence of the politicians vociferous against its defects and limitations and their epidemics of refusals to work it, even in its more favourable aspects, the non-official European could hardly hope that perhaps the Simon Commission would be able to achieve a miracle in producing a Report and recommendations which would be accepted by the Indian politician.

No normally minded European of long residence in India and practical experience can have the least confidence that Indians in bulk will be able for some time to come to weld themselves into bodies or parties of sufficient character, independence, and ability to govern the country by themselves upon democratic or Western lines. This is very far from saying that India does not produce numerous men possessing many of the requisite qualities who, in association with the European in the Government or the Legislature, can do a very great deal to help their country along the lines of progress towards self-government which Great Britain, in its wisdom or otherwise, has taken initial steps to confer upon the Indian people.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report underwent considerable criticism at the hands of the non-official Europeans. The views their representatives then expressed have proved to have been well founded. The experience since obtained of the actual working of the councils has borne out many of their contentions. Nevertheless, the non-official European representatives in the councils and Assembly did their level best to work the Reforms—in fact, they claim to have been the party which most con-

sistently co-operated, and the Simon Report, vol. i., par. 216, pays tribute to the contribution which they have made to Indian politics, and their distinction in the legislatures for their public spirit, sympathy, and width of outlook. Like other sections of the community, the non-official Europeans may now claim to know even more and speak from actual experience of the working of the Constitution and the councils. They claim nothing from the Government or the Legislature that they are not willing to share with their Indian colleagues and competitors, but they have often had to resist attempts on the part of others to harm their interests, to limit their activities, and even to expropriate their concerns.

In the first place, the non-official European lays a definite claim, by virtue of traditions, to be considered an integral part of the Indian polity, for it was from him that the civil administration originally sprang, until the Crown took over from the East India Company. It is the European who conceived the idea of Indian nationalism, which the Pax Britannica alone has made possible. Though the terms of reference of the Simon Commission were to inquire whether and to what extent it is desirable to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government which has already been conferred, no responsible non-official European has openly advocated restriction. We favour slowness in development only because we are sure that premature advance will lead to a breakdown.

Disappointing and disheartening as the degree of Indian co-operation has often been, doubting as many of us do the suitability of Western democratic institutions for India at all, none of us has regarded it as feasible, especially in face of Lord Irwin's reiterations of the pledges of successive British Governments, to put back the hands of the clock. We have taken a very broad view with the desire to meet legitimate Indian aspirations in a more than liberal spirit, and we recommended to the Simon Commission the grant of full responsibility in the provinces subject to certain safeguards. The essential soundness of these safeguards was recognised by the Commission, which adopted most of them in principle.

After allowing for responsible government in the provinces, our first essential was the strengthening of the Central Government *vis-à-vis* the Assembly. The abolition of the Government *bloc* in the Central Legislature has at first sight the effect of weakening instead of strengthening the Government party. Our representatives were in favour of the nominated provincial Government representatives in the Assembly being free to speak and vote in accordance with the requirements of their provinces, and the Simon Commission brings this about by abolishing the

bloc. The adoption of a federal system of Government and the constitution of the Assembly by the election thereto of representatives of the provincial councils, instead of, as formerly, by direct election thereto from the constituencies, should have the effect of returning a much more responsible body of members. The form the final Central Assembly is to take cannot, however, yet be visualised, but one can guess where the recommendations will run counter to the hopes and wishes of the non-official European.

Our second stipulation for the Central Government to have powers of intervention in the event of breakdown of government in any province appears to have been accepted by the Simon Commission, which puts the case very well in the following words: 'This is no denial of self-government; it is an ultimate resource if self-government is repudiated' (par. 65).

A third proviso was that second chambers should be set up in the provinces. This view the Commissioners do not accept, but they are not able to make a unanimous recommendation one way or the other. Here, then, is obvious matter for the Conference, wherein the question can once more be argued and the Commission's Report, in which the subject is very fully dealt with in a chapter (iv.) all to itself, can surely be accepted as the basis for discussion. The finding of any considerable majority of the Conference on this question would appear to be likely to be acceptable to the British Parliament.

A fourth proviso, that adequate safeguards be provided for the administration of the police, is, in non-official European opinion, one of the chief considerations of the whole problem of self-government. The Associated Chambers of Commerce in the first instance went so far as to recommend (by a majority only) the transfer of the police and law and order to autonomous provincial Governments, their reason being that the surest way to make those responsible for government realise the need for an effective police force is to make them responsible for the maintenance of order. The European Association, however—the essentially (and only) political organisation of the Europeans in India—held firmly to the opinion that law and order should remain the equivalent of a 'reserved' subject, and the Associated Chambers subsequently came round to the same view.

The Commissioners' final conclusion that dyarchy must be abolished (vol. ii., par. 46) leads them, after weighty deliberations of the case for and against (pars. 60, 63), to the conclusion that the police must be a subject for which a unitary Government must take responsibility. This will for some time, I think, remain one of the most controversial conclusions of the Commission, and, if enacted, it will be long before the non-official European can be

expected to approve the decision. The change, if effected, may appear to work well enough for some time ; but this will be held, as in the cases of other institutions handed over to Indian control, to be largely due to the momentum of the past administration, and there are many who fear that there will soon be a decline in the discipline and confidence of the force. That it would give any marked impetus to the growth of public confidence in the police is too much to expect.

There is little doubt that in this decision the Commissioners took one of their biggest risks, and one which is likely to be regarded with much misgiving. It will be felt that both the magistracy and the police, under the control of a popular Minister, are likely to suffer considerable deterioration in honesty and efficiency. I deplore the thought of the police budget being subject to the vote of the councils, which have so far always shown a definite anti-police bias. I cannot envy the Minister who is to be responsible for it ; he is, under the Commissioners' recommendations, bound to be the butt of the whole Council.

It can be no consolation to a member of the services that he will be given special facilities to retire on proportionate pension ; this is no magnet to attract the best men to the post. It seems to me almost a logical conclusion that the member in charge of the police will have to be appointed in the same way as the other members of the councils if he is not to be in splendid isolation and disenthralled to the support of his colleagues, and I further think an Indian will have to have equal chance for the appointment.

It is no part of the European case that an Indian is not as competent to administer law and order as an European ; on that point they express no opinion. The view is generally held that no one could administer law and order in a province at a time when communal feeling ran high, if he were responsible to a popular council. If the Minister in charge were a member of either community, his position would be further complicated. There are Moslems who would be completely impartial, but no Hindu would give a Moslem credit for being so, if the police fired upon a Hindu mob. There are Hindus who would be equally unbiassed, but no Moslem would believe a Hindu was so, if he defended the shooting of Moslem rioters. Experience shows that when one community attacks an official for alleged unjustifiable severity, the official cannot expect anything more than half-hearted support from the community he has defended. The whole problem of keeping the peace in India differs from that in England, because in this country public opinion as a whole supports the forces of law and order passively and actively ; in India it is usually either indifferent or, often, on the side of disorder.

An all-important proviso which the non-official demanded was that no legislation discriminating as betw. British subject and another should be permitted under the Constitution in matters of taxation, professions, trade, industry and commerce. This is somewhat cursorily disposed of by the Commissioners in vol. ii., par. 36—'we consider that the only practical means of protecting the weaker or less numerous elements in the population is by the retention of an impartial power residing in the Governor-General and the Governors of provinces to be exercised for this purpose.'

The question of commercial discrimination finds no place at all in the index to the two volumes, and the scanty reference to it in par. 36 necessitates my enlarging upon it and giving it all the prominence I can. In my address to the East India Association, in March 1929, I expressed the opinion that probably only actual members of the councils themselves really understood the spirit of hostility in the Indian politician's breast towards British commercial interests. I admit at once it is certainly nothing like so evident (even if it exists to any appreciable extent) amongst the Indian commercial community, where usually only natural competitive instincts prevail and where the bulk of the business of the cities is done betwixt European and Indian together, and not betwixt European and European, as the politicians appear to suppose.

Seats on the councils are not won or held to any appreciable extent by the Indian commercial community ; and that is a grave commentary on the working of representative government in India. The vast majority of Indian representatives are professional men—mostly lawyers. It is men of this class who have been so active in the recent boycott of British goods propaganda, and not the commercial community, who only stand to suffer by it. In my seat in the Assembly I have had to listen to gross misrepresentation of British traders' influence and methods.

I cannot lay too much emphasis on these facts, nor on the actual passage by the Assembly into law, in the first 'Steel Industry (Protection) Bill,' of the enactment that no bounties conferred under the protective tariffs (to the payment of which the British trader is a principal contributor) may be paid to any company unless 75 per cent. of the directors be Indian. This, of course, means also that not more than 25 per cent. of the directors may be European, which is discriminating anti-British legislation, and the principle, having been agreed to in the Assembly by the Government, and by the Viceroy in his assent to the Bill, is likely to be pressed further on every occasion. Of what use, then, to the British in India is likely to be the recommendation of the Commissioners for 'the retention of an

expected to power residing in the Governor-General and the appear to us of provinces to be exercised for this purpose? It as in the no security whatever; it can rarely, if ever, be used, to be the contrary principle has already been agreed to by their and successors. Moreover, the attitude of the Viceroy and the in Commerce Member in regard to the Coastal Reservation Bill, g; when the announcement was made in the Legislative Assembly last Autumn that the Government proposed that a conference should be held between the representatives of the British shipping companies and the Indian interests concerned, does not inspire any confidence in the probable outlook of future Viceroys, who are neither selected from the commercial world, nor usually well versed in its point of view.

What I think is needed is a definite provision in the statute or the preamble upon which a Viceroy could and should take his stand. The Commissioners say: 'We are aware that such provisions have been inserted in many constitutions, notably in those of the European States formed after the war. Experience, however, has not shown them to be of any great practical value.' The obvious retort is in the Commissioners' own words elsewhere (par. 10): 'In any case the time is too short for any real judgment to be formed. . . . Ten years is not long enough to see the real effect of the new system, still less is it possible to forecast from the first decade what will happen in the next.'

The insertion of such a proviso in the Act would not weaken the powers of the Viceroy, in whom it is professed the means should exist to make it effective. There are under the present Constitution many matters which cannot be even debated in the Assembly without the previous leave of the Viceroy, and this proviso has, in my experience, worked well.

Our associations pressed that it would be proper and practicable to forbid altogether discriminatory legislation in respect of taxation, trade, professions, commerce and industry, and to this view we adhere. Our experience in the legislatures has made it only too plain what will be attempted unless a definite bar is there. It would be folly to assume there will be no question of bidding for votes, as the common practice of democracy is the outbidding of one another by the different parties, and we know a popular shot will be against British commerce. Witness such cases as the boycott of British goods at the instance of the Bombay Corporation, and the present series of boycotts against British goods of every description.

Sir James Simpson, speaking in the Legislative Assembly on the Coastal Traffic Reservation Bill, said, 'The parties behind this Bill have to-day cast their greedy eyes on shipping. Tomorrow others may cast greedy eyes on tea, coffee, oil, or anything

else.' He received the reply, 'Why not?' When he added the rhetorical question, 'Where are you going to stop?' the reply was frankly given, 'Don't stop.' Pundit Motilal Nehru, closing his speech in the same debate, said, 'We are trying to get out of discrimination by what you may, if you like, call counter-discrimination. Why should the people of this country not resort to it?'

I have given longer consideration here to the points which were stressed by the non-official Europeans in their evidence. Of the other recommendations of the Commission, their proposals in regard to the North-West Frontier Province are likely to meet with general approval; the abolition of dyarchy will be considered a wise course, and the method of choice of the Cabinet the one likely to secure the best men.

That the Simon Commission should report in favour of communal electorates was almost a foregone conclusion, and in accordance with our representations.

Adherence to the recommendations of the Lee Commission in regard to the nationality of the personnel of the services is another recommendation with which we are in accord.

The recommendations in regard to a redivision of the boundaries to some of the administrative provinces are well put. It is a question about which Indians feel sensitively, but if carried out, as the Commissioners suggest, by a separate committee, which advisedly should include a considerable proportion of Indians, the desirable changes may possibly be made harmoniously.

There will be general approval of the principle that the Constitution should contain within itself the means for its own development and the avoidance of further specific stages of inquiries. All who have been engaged in working the present Constitution know only too well the time wasted in the legislatures condemning the limit of ten years—which gave the character of a makeshift—and moving resolutions for immediate advance and so forth.

Some principal matters to engage the attention of the non-official Europeans at this stage and preparatory to their appearance at the Conference must be—the composition of the Governor-General's Executive Council (par. 169), the recommendation that the Commander-in-Chief should not sit in the Legislature (par. 170), the provisions of a special member as leader of the Federal Assembly (par. 171), and the distribution of portfolios (par. 172). I imagine they will not quarrel with much of the Report in these respects.

I fancy there will be much more criticism levelled at the difficulties the Government will be faced with in the new Federal Assembly in consequence of the abolition of the Government *bloc*.

Personally I can only foresee grave difficulties, but, as I have known cases of members definitely voting with their party only because they were confident the opposite Government view would be carried, I am hopeful that a better sense of responsibility will be engendered by the means proposed.

Let there be no mistake in England as to the attitude of the non-official European in India. We numbered only 21,780 adult males at the last census, and are not seeking to order the system of government in India purely in our own interests. We recognise clearly that the well-being of the Indian people depends as much on their economic resources as on their political development; we, having been largely responsible for the former, wish equally to help with the latter.

Many of us doubt the suitability of Western democratic institutions to India, a land steeped in the principles of autocracy and caste distinctions; but, believing in the principle of self-government, we admit the right of Indians to wish for and to take an increasing share in the administration, and we in no way wish to stand in the path of their legitimate aspirations. We wish only to give them a lead along the lines which we believe will carry them. We realise that we can only be successful in this aim if we express the right views, both frankly and fairly, and we feel confident that no reforms on Western lines will work at all unless we co-operate, and with knowledge, sympathy, and patience.

The immediate future Constitution for India cannot be a slavish imitation of Westminster, and India must go through a process of evolution and development until it reaches its full growth in the natural passage of time.

We desire that, in addition to being represented at the Conference as a minority community, we may have a further opportunity of being heard in criticism of the draft Bill which Government will submit to Parliament. Here, again, we ask nothing for ourselves that we are not willing to share with our Indian friends, since authoritative criticism is necessary to successful legislation and is essential to the peace of India, political and commercial.

I entirely agree with Sir Stanley Reed's view expressed in your August issue about the Commission's proposal arbitrarily to expand the electorate to about 10 per cent. of the population. As only 3 per cent. of the population is literate, why on earth should the franchise be extended so as to include 7 per cent. of the illiterates, an electorate which would follow any religious crank or charlatan and with whom the moderates would not have a look in? Even as it is the moderates are definitely handicapped in opposing an impractical revolutionary like Gandhi and feel paralysed.

The non-official European in general has taken no definite exception to Lord Irwin's use of the term 'Dominion status.' We regarded His Excellency's pronouncement as merely clarifying an issue already clear to us as being implied in the Declaration of 1917 and the Act of 1919. We have only doubted the wisdom of expressing it at a time when it was specially likely to be misunderstood or misrepresented as meaning more than it did and so bringing about an increase in lawlessness. The attainment in the fulness of time of full responsible government as an integral part of the British Empire has to us always been the goal, but no one has ventured to express a figure of decades as to when the goal can be reached. The uphill path is beslimed with genuine though regrettable distrust, disbelief, and the incapacity of inexperience, and is barred by political obstruction, a refusal to accept steps and stages which are likened to crutches, and an insistence on immediate and complete power. Most of us know how that power, actuated by race jealousy, would be used.

It is to be hoped that the British people have no intention of transferring the instrument of power they have built up into the hands of any class, who would use it for the furtherance of their own interests at the expense of every other class and community in the country, nor of consenting to a form of constitution under which British citizens could be treated as foreigners.

It is useless to disguise or deny the difficulties besetting the path—the just claims of the Indian States, the Army and Navy defence, the communal chasm between the Hindu and Moslem. The first two can only be surmounted by complete co-operation with the British and the third by the two communities themselves. No substantial effort has been made in the latter direction.

The onus of making the Conference effective now rests more with the representatives of the Congress than any other party. But even the Conference is no more than a stage in the process of evolution of a Constitution suitable for India, with provision within itself for its own orderly development and with, as leading Indians so generally agree, safeguards for the transitional period.

Lord Irwin, in an address to the Muslim zemindars of the Punjab on June 4, said that no settlement of the problem which confronts India can be considered satisfactory that does not carry the consent of and give a sense of security to the important minority communities who will have to live under the new Constitution. He has behind him in India probably a greater force of public opinion and support than is generally recognised in this country, and is on all sides acknowledged as a sincere

friend of and sympathiser with India. His patience and faith have earned him an enviable reputation.

It is vital that public opinion in Great Britain, where the ultimate responsibility will have to rest, should be accurately informed on matters of such importance to the great interests of the British in India, their stake in the country, their investments, and the price they have paid in blood and treasure in the development of that great country, in which the European is every whit entitled to the same equality of status as the Indian has in Great Britain.

It will be a matter of extreme difficulty to find the twenty-eight Europeans required to serve on the Assembly in addition to the considerable number required in the councils, with the host of practical, intimate, and personal problems which beset them. The British community is gravely anxious and worried about the future. Not only are commerce and livelihood at stake, but even the lives of the British men, women, and children.

The non-official European will probably be found reasonably willing, despite considerable misgiving, to accept the Report as a whole and to work a Constitution founded upon it with such perfections as the Conference can add to it for the removal of any proved injustice, but he regards it as the limit beyond which no risk should be taken. To him the Simon Report is the British Parliament's definite inquiry into and actual finding upon the conditions and facts which make up modern India. He recognises that its recommendations are founded upon the realities of the situation, and that it is only by facing these realities squarely and taking the Simon Report as its basis that the Conference can hope to function effectively towards reaching the last word. There is nothing in any of the public utterances of the Viceroy that can be legitimately construed into meaning anything to the contrary, despite all the protestations of those who wish to scrap the Report, especially those who assert that they have not read it!

W. S. J. WILLSON.

THE SIMON REPORT

II. THE CONGRESS SCHEME AND THE SIMON REPORT

THE Congress has presented the curious spectacle of an influential party, which has agitated for constitutional reform for many years, standing sullenly aloof from the Commission specially appointed to inquire into the present political situation and to report on the possibility of taking further steps towards establishing responsible government in British India. The Congress has adopted an attitude in thus standing aloof which has baffled the understanding of the ordinary observer. But in proceeding further to inaugurate a campaign of civil disobedience with the object of rendering fruitless the Report of the Simon Commission it has inevitably engendered suspicions as to its professed solicitude for the general welfare of India. It is difficult, therefore, for the British public to prevent prejudice influencing its opinion on the proposals of the Indian Nationalists, and it is the purpose of this survey to summarise the events leaving up to what is known as the Nehru Report and to set forth the Commonwealth scheme therein proposed for impartial judgment side by side with the recommendations of the Simon Commission for a Federal Government for India.

The Congress was founded in 1885 with the object of obtaining progressive reforms in the existing machinery of the government of India. Constitutional means were to be employed and moderate opinion prevailed. The goal was a system of responsible government similar to that in the Dominions. But the Congress session at Surat in 1907 was wrecked by Mr. Tilak's party from the Deccan, and the control gradually passed into the hands of extremists. The Congress was finally captured in 1920 by Mr. Gandhi, who changed the creed to Swaraj for India. The constitutional reforms of 1921 under the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme were received with unqualified opposition, though they marked an important step towards responsible government. Mr. Gandhi urged that the existing system was so 'materialistic' and 'satanic' that the only remedy was to sweep it away at once and substitute Swaraj. He never defined Swaraj. He left

that to be settled by the 'spiritual' genius of the peoples of India. He relied on 'soul force' for protection of her frontiers, and said: 'I would introduce the spinning wheel among the Afghan tribes and thus prevent them from attacking the Indian territories. I feel that the tribes are in their own way God-fearing people.' He is, however, reported on another occasion to have soothed the apprehensions of practical Parsees with the naïve remark that he did not think the British would really leave India. The Congress has not, indeed, been remarkable for constructive statesmanship. Criticism of the existing system has naturally been the strong point of a party without responsibility. But, challenged from time to time to put forward a detailed and workable scheme of the system it proposed, it resolved in December 1927 to call together a Conference of all interests to draft a Swaraj Constitution for India. The Conference, known as the All-Parties Conference, met in February 1928, but it was found impossible to give practical effect to the resolution. It was therefore decided in May 1928 to constitute a Committee under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru, which included 'spokesmen of some important view-points,' but on which 'it was not possible to represent all interests,' to consider and determine the principles of the Constitution for India. The Committee submitted its Report in August 1928, and the Report has since been known as the Nehru Report. It was approved by the so-called All-Parties Conference the same month with some important modifications. The Congress accepted it as so modified in December 1928, and resolved, on the motion of Mr. Gandhi, to organise a campaign of civil disobedience if the scheme were not accepted by the following December by the British Parliament. But there can be little doubt that the scheme would not be welcomed by the great mass of non-Brahmans, and a solemn warning against trusting in the protection offered by the Nehru Report was uttered only this month by the president of the All-India Conference of Depressed Hindus. The Report was repudiated promptly in January 1929 by the All-India Conference of Moslems, and has since then been repudiated from time to time by leading Moslems. It is to be remembered that, quite apart from the numerous non-Brahmans naturally suspicious of the proposals, there are estimated to be 60,000,000 depressed Hindus and 70,000,000 Moslems out of the total population of some 300,000,000 in India.

The Congress Party clearly cannot claim to have produced a scheme satisfying all parties. Compromise between moderate politicians and extremists can at most be alleged with any show of truth, and the compromise scarcely veils the extremists' programme. The Committee decided that the Constitution should

be full responsible government on the model of the Dominions, and framed its scheme on this principle, but observed at the same time that the Constitution so framed could be applied almost in its entirety to complete independence. The so-called All-Parties Conference emphasised this by resolving that acceptance of the scheme was not to be taken to restrict 'the liberty of action of those political parties whose goal is complete independence.' The Congress accepted the scheme as so interpreted, and is therefore free to point to the Nehru Report as the scheme of the extremists for complete independence or Swaraj. But the Congress cannot put it forward with any show of reason as the considered demand of the great masses of the peoples of India.

The Congress scheme as contained in the Nehru Report constitutes a Commonwealth Government with an Executive responsible to the Commonwealth Parliament. The Parliament is to consist of a Senate elected by the provincial legislatures and a House of Representatives elected by the people on an adult suffrage. There is to be a Governor-General appointed by the King. The provinces are each to have an Executive responsible to the provincial legislative council, elected similarly on an adult suffrage, and there is to be a Governor appointed by the King. There are to be joint or mixed electorates of all communities, with no reservation of seats for special interests, such as commerce and labour, or for non-Brahmans and depressed Hindus. But there is to be reservation for a limited period of ten years only for Moslem minorities on the basis of the Moslem population. The Commonwealth Government is to exercise jurisdiction in all matters of common concern and the provincial executives and legislatures in all local matters according to the schedules of central and provincial subjects attached to the scheme. A Commission is to be appointed to settle financial relations. Disputes between the central and provincial Governments are to be decided by a Supreme Court. The civil services are to be reorganised and retrenched, and the judges of the High Courts to be recruited solely from the Indian Bar. The Supreme Court is to take the place of the Privy Council, and there is no longer to be a Council for the Secretary of State. The Commonwealth Government is to control the Indian Army, and there is to be a Committee of Defence to advise the Government and to submit schemes of retrenchment to the Parliament. The Commonwealth Government is to have the same rights and discharge the same obligations in relation to the Indian States as the Government of India and to exercise the same powers in respect of foreign affairs as the Dominions. The Commonwealth is to have the same constitutional status as the other Dominions of the British Empire, but the Commonwealth Parliament is to have

power to change the Constitution at any time. Complete independence could therefore be voted without reference to the British Parliament, though there would remain the provision requiring legislation to receive the assent of the Governor-General or the King in Council in the way of immediate withdrawal from the British Empire.

The Commonwealth of the Congress scheme, though envisaging a federation of provincial units, differs in important particulars from the Federation of the Simon Report. The Commonwealth Executive would be directly responsible to the Commonwealth Parliament, with the Governor-General exercising no powers other than those of the constitutional representative of the King. The Central Executive of the Federation of the Simon Report, on the other hand, would remain substantially as at present pending the development of the self-governing units in the provinces. It would not be responsible to the Central Legislature, and the Governor-General, with wide powers in reserve, would be the head of the Federal Government, and not merely the constitutional representative of the King. Cogent reasons, which ought to appeal to all practical statesmen, have been given in the Simon Report for the retention, during the period of development, of a strong and impartial power at the centre to ensure the maintenance of the vital services, to safeguard minorities, to preserve internal security, and to defend the frontiers of India.

The Commonwealth Parliament would as to the Senate be representative of the provincial legislatures and as to the House of Representatives of the people on an adult suffrage. The Central Legislature of the Federation would, however, be representative both in the Council of State and in the Legislative Assembly of the provincial legislatures. The constituencies in the case of direct election by the people would, it is pointed out in the Simon Report, be so unwieldy that the constituents could never be in practical touch with their members; while it is of prime importance, on the other hand, for development on federal lines, involving intricate questions of provincial relations and finance, to establish a closer nexus between the members of the Central and of the provincial legislatures. It would, moreover, it is suggested, render practically possible the inclusion hereafter, if they so desired, of the Indian States in the Federation of Greater India.

The Commonwealth provincial Executives and legislatures also differ in important particulars from those of the proposed Federation. The provincial Executives in both schemes would be directly responsible to the legislatures, but important safeguards are provided for the protection of minorities and the preservation

of law and order in the proposals of the Simon Report. Dyarchy, together with the reservation of the department of law and order, would under both schemes disappear, but it would remain open under the latter, in view of the recognised risks, to strengthen the Ministry by the appointment of one or more official members. The Governor would also retain wide powers in reserve, and would be head of the Government, and not merely constitutional representative of the King.

The Commonwealth provincial legislatures would be elected on an adult suffrage. This would mean at once raising the electorate from the present 6,250,000 to 100,000,000. The impracticability of this proposal has been pointed out in the Simon Report and the more moderate proposal put forward of a present increase up to 20 per cent. of the adult population of 100,000,000. But communal representation has been the question which has given rise to the most serious of the perplexities surrounding the preparation of a workable scheme, whether under the Nehru or the Simon Report. The Committee responsible for the former, indeed, observed that 'the communal controversies are of no very great importance from the constitutional point of view,' and again that 'cultural autonomy provided and the fullest religious liberty given and the communal problem is in effect solved,' and it provided for these things in its constitution by a declaration of rights. But the Committee devoted, nevertheless, a third part of its discussion to communal representation. Its scheme was, in fact, repudiated on this very question by the All-India Conference of Moslems. The Committee's conclusions were that communal constituencies ought to give place to joint or mixed electorates, and that there ought not, on general principles, to be reservation of seats for any special interests. Commerce and labour were therefore to lose their special representation, and it was observed that there was no need of reservation for the great mass of non-Brahmans: 'Their grievances against Brahmins are all traceable to the ascendancy gained by the latter in the political and social life of the country. This is the natural result of their intellectual ascendancy which is now seriously threatened by the rapid advance of non-Brahmins.' The Committee likewise provided no reservation for depressed Hindus. It was merely remarked: 'We feel strongly that the depressed classes must be abolished, or rather that they should be raised socially and economically so that they may take their proper place in the community. . . . We have recommended that the education of all backward classes should be the special concern of the State.' But the Committee conceded reservation of seats for a limited period of ten years on a population basis, as opposed to the favourable weightage under what was known as the Lucknow

Pact, to Moslem minorities as a compromise with the Moslems. The Simon Commission considered, however, that commerce and labour and some other special interests ought to be separately represented. It concurred in stopping the reservation for non-Brahman majorities in the Madras, but not for the Mahrattas in the Bombay Presidency. The Commission recognised the force of the Moslem objection that the member returned by a joint or mixed electorate of Hindus and Moslems might well turn out to be more concerned to keep the favour of the Hindu majority than to represent the interests of Moslems, and it came to the conclusion that, in default of a fresh agreement between the parties, there ought to be separate electorates and reservation of seats for Moslem minorities according to the Lucknow Pact previously reached between the Hindus and Moslems.

The Commonwealth civil services would be entirely reorganised and retrenched by a special Public Services Commission. Control and recruitment would be placed under a permanent Public Services Commission. The judges of the High Courts would be recruited solely from the Indian Bar, and an Indian Supreme Court would take the place of the Privy Council. There would be no Council for the Secretary of State. The Simon Commission, on the other hand, held that the success of the constitutional changes proposed would depend in no small degree upon the maintenance of the high standards which the services have established. It would therefore retain the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service, and perhaps also the Irrigation and Forest Departments, on an All-India basis, at the rates of Indianisation settled by the Lee Commission, for recruitment by the Secretary of State. The Commission would not modify the structure of the High Courts, but would place them all under the administrative control of the Central Government. It would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, but would reduce the size of the Council of the Secretary of State.

The Commonwealth military forces would be controlled by the Commonwealth Government, and it would be its first care to make the Commonwealth self-contained in military as in other matters. It is not clear whether the scheme would include the withdrawal of British troops and officers. Mr. Gandhi, at any rate, would seem at one time to have expected that they would remain in India. But, as observed by the Simon Commission, 'it is not to be supposed that units recruited in Britain and officered by British officers are going to be mercenaries in some future India where the ultimate military authority rests with an Indian Minister for War or with an Indian Cabinet responsible to an Indian Legislative Assembly.' The Commission remarked, on the other hand, that 'at least for a very long time to come it

will be impossible for the Army entrusted with the task of defending India to dispense with a very considerable British element, including in the term British troops of all arms, a considerable proportion of the regimental officers of the Indian Army and the British personnel in the higher command.' The Commission then pointed out that 'the North-West Frontier is not only the frontier of India: it is an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole Empire,' and suggested that the solution of the problem might well be, while continuing to encourage Indianisation, to place the Army in India under an Imperial authority which would naturally be the Viceroy acting in concert with the Commander-in-Chief. There would have to be by agreement definite facilities for recruitment, transport and other matters, and an equitable adjustment of the burden of finance between the Indian and Imperial Governments.

The Commonwealth's relations with the Indian States would be those of the Paramount Power. It is certain, however, that this position would not be recognised by the Indian States. It is recorded in par. 58 of the Report of the Butler Committee that 'the States demand that without their agreement the rights and obligations of the Paramount Power should not be assigned to persons who are not under its control, for instance to an Indian Government in British India responsible to an Indian Legislature.' The Commonwealth's claim to the position proposed is based on the technical argument that the Crown, with whom treaties were made by the Indian States, was the King in Parliament, and that the Commonwealth would succeed to all the rights and obligations of the British Government established by Parliament in India. But this argument confuses the King in Council, who is the executive authority for making treaties with Indian States and also for carrying on the government of British India, with the King in Parliament, who has legislative power in respect only of British territories in India. The King in Council has hitherto, as a matter of convenience, exercised the executive authority both in relation to the Indian States and in relation to British India through the Government of India. But there is no obligation for the arrangement to be maintained, and it would, indeed, hardly be suitable or fair to the Indian States when once the Government of India has become responsible to a Legislature representative solely of British India and has ceased to be responsible to the British Parliament. The Simon Commission therefore emphasised the important recommendation of the Butler Committee that the Crown as Paramount Power should act through the Viceroy, and not, as hitherto, through the Government of India, and the Commission suggested a consultative council composed of representatives from both British

India and the Indian States for the purpose of consulting on matters of common concern or matters affecting the whole of India. The Council would be presided over by the Viceroy and would be called the Council for Greater India. The Commission observed that it would be a step towards the goal, however distant, of drawing together British India and the Indian States into a Federation of Greater India under the British Crown.

The Congress, in conclusion, has compromised its case seriously by the campaign of civil disobedience organised under the misguided leadership of Mr. Gandhi and by its refusal to present its scheme for impartial examination by the Simon Commission. The conversations which have recently been in progress between the leaders of moderate opinion and Mr. Gandhi's party offer it a final opportunity to join the Conference which will shortly meet at the round table and to co-operate in the preparation of a practical scheme for the future government of India. It is sincerely to be hoped that wiser counsels will prevail, and that the clamour for complete independence, which could only lead to disaster for India, will be relinquished once and for all in the common interests both of India and of the British Empire. The Congress scheme contains a number of proposals which would not be incompatible with the Federation envisaged by the Simon Commission. But there are others which show an unfortunate failure to face the facts and to work out a practical solution of the intricate problems involved. Sir John Simon has devoted to this task a ripe experience and an unrivalled intellect, and his presence at the Conference would be of inestimable value in separating the practicable from the impracticable and in helping the round table to prepare a workable scheme for the establishment of effective responsible government in India. The Congress proposals as to communal controversies have in particular satisfied none of the opposing parties. The Committee which framed them declared that 'we cannot have one community domineering over another,' but provided no guarantees against the maintenance in the future of Brahman supremacy over non-Brahmans and depressed Hindus. Caste has been the curse of the country for centuries, and constitutional declarations of rights and pious resolves as to education are futile for removing suspicions inherited from the bitter experiences of countless generations. The definite guarantee of a reasonable share in the government and safeguards as recommended by the Simon Commission are essential to reassure the non-Brahmans and depressed Hindus. The Congress proposals have similarly failed to satisfy the Moslems. It is true that seats would be reserved for them in the legislatures, but only for a limited number of years and in reduced numbers. The elected members would

moreover be made dependent in joint or mixed electorates rather on the good-will of the Hindu majorities than on the favour of their fellow-Moslems. The Simon Commission has recognised these objections and would pay greater regard to the aspirations and sentiments of the Moslems who were once the rulers of India. The Congress proposals as to defence again disclose a deplorable refusal to face realities. The tribesmen have so far shown no eagerness to take to the spinning wheel, and recent events on the North-West Frontier ought to be sufficient to satisfy anyone of the necessity for a long time to come of a strong British element in the Army in India. The Simon Commission has provided for this by a proposal under which constitutional development need not wait upon the Indianisation of the Army, as the defence of the North-West Frontier would be undertaken as the responsibility of the Imperial Government. The Congress finally, in proposing to take over the rights and obligations of the Paramount Power, has signally failed to appreciate the spirit and point of view of the Indian States. The princes are not lightly to be persuaded to submit to a subordinate partnership with the modern provinces of British India, but it would be open to them to take an honourable place as the proud representatives of rulers of the remote past in the Federation portrayed by the Simon Commission for Greater India. The Congress is an important and influential party, and its views, constitutionally represented, would be entitled to respect, but it is not by factious opposition that it is going to satisfy the British public that it stands for the true welfare of the great masses of the peoples of India. It is rather by co-operation with the representatives of other powerful parties and with the representatives of the British Parliament that it can contribute its share towards securing the future progress and prosperity of the continent of India in honourable partnership with the other Dominions of the British Empire.

M. H. W. HAYWARD.

GERMANY IN THE MELTING-POT

THE splendid era of stabilisation, reconstruction, and new prosperity which began for Germany in 1924, and which, in a way, was quite unique, seems definitely to have come to an end. As the course of events in 1929, and more particularly as recent developments, have shown, the whole superstructure of German political and economic life is once again being shaken to its foundations. Certain aspects of the German crisis are universal, and other countries are at the present moment faced with exactly the same problems and difficulties. Especially universal is the complaint that Germany is suffering from the lack of leadership both in the field of politics and in the field of economics. It seems to be one of the most curious and depressing features of the post-war world that there are no men who could or would lead it. Like most countries, Germany can number among her politicians, industrialists, and financiers a few particularly able, honest, and hard-working men. Some of them are undoubtedly people of outstanding ability. But there does not seem to be a single one among them who could claim to be regarded as a leader in the true sense of the word—a leader of national, or even international, importance. There is nothing specifically German in this absence of statesmen or heads of 'big business' capable of showing the nation a way out of its troubles: their 'opposite numbers' elsewhere have not been conspicuous for their success either.

But, whatever may be one's personal appreciation of the groups and individuals who are or have been at the head of the German State and the country's industry, commerce, and finance, the fundamental fact remains that within a comparatively short space of time Germany succeeded in recovering from the immediate and most disastrous effects of the war, and after seven years of difficulty became once again one of the Great Powers. This she managed to achieve despite almost unsurmountable handicaps, such as an immensely complicated internal political situation, inflation, the collapse of the mark, stabilisation, reparations, the Dawes and finally the Young Plan, and a foreign policy that had to shape itself according to these quite unprecedented factors, as well as international politics. Having emerged triumphant

from a process which very nearly resulted in a complete collapse, Germany entered a period of consolidation and expansion which lasted about five years. Is the present crisis merely an interruption in Germany's economic and political upward movement, or is she going to slide down again from the comparative height she had so painfully succeeded in reaching? Her vicissitudes are certainly manifold and plentiful, for she has to contend with some crucial difficulties, financial, social, and political, as well as with problems of a legislative, administrative, educational, racial, religious, and even of an ideological character, all of which demand a speedy solution. These problems are by no means of recent origin, and most of them have been lingering in the foreground or background of German politics for a long time. By constantly shelving them or by introducing half-measures and part-solutions successive German Governments brought it about that these problems, in the full accumulation of their combined weight, now present an exceedingly difficult and dangerous task for any new Government that will have the courage and the pluck to cope with them, or at least with those which are of immediate importance. The last two Governments were quite incapable of doing so, and the recent dissolution was a result which came as a complete surprise to everybody—most of all to the Reichstag itself. The elections to a new Reichstag will take place on September 14, and by the time this article is published the election campaign will be in full swing, and will be nearing its final—and no doubt very violent—stages.

Not counting the National Assembly of January 19, 1919, this will be the fifth general election since the establishment of the German Republic. Owing to post-war legislation the franchise in Germany has been so enormously enlarged that whereas in 1912 out of 64,900,000 inhabitants only 14,400,000, or 22·2 per cent., of the population had the right to vote, in the 1928 election there were 41,200,000 qualified voters out of a population of 62,400,000, or 66 per cent. It is significant, however, that, despite the widened franchise, the number of people actually availing themselves of their right to vote is decreasing, and has sunk from 83 per cent. at the National Assembly to 75·6 per cent. at the last general election, which took place on May 20, 1928. This election deserves attention, for it was fraught with results which have led finally to the present position. It was the first 'sober' election after the return to more or less normal conditions, for the two previous elections (which had both taken place in 1924) were still largely dominated by the spectre of inflation. Together with the National Assembly and the first general elections to the new republican Reichstag, they must be considered as an integral part of that aftermath of war and revolution which it

took Germany seven years to outlive. The salient feature of the 1928 election was the great recovery made by the Social Democratic Party. This party, which since the very inception of the German Republic had been numerically the strongest, had in 1924 suffered a certain eclipse. Many hundreds of thousands then voted for the reactionary *Deutschnationale* Party, because it promised them a full revaluation of their bank and savings deposits, mortgages, war loan, and other holdings, the value of which had been destroyed by inflation. By 1928 these victims of inflation realised that they had been duped by the unscrupulous demagogues of the Right—who were no more in a position to compensate them than anybody else—and this time they voted Left. The result was a net loss of 1,800,000 votes to the *Deutschnationale* Party and a gain of 1,700,000 votes for the Social Democrats and Communists. Out of 491 seats in the Reichstag the Social Democrats got 153 and the Communists 54. Together with the twenty-five Democrats they formed the rather heterogeneous and disunited *bloc* of the Left—a strong minority group of 232 members. The other parties were no better off, forming two equally heterogeneous and disunited minority groups—that of the Centre and that of the Right. The former included sixty-one members of the Roman Catholic Centre Party, forty-five members of Dr. Stresemann's People's Party, and seventeen members of the Bavarian People's Party—a total of 123, to which occasionally had to be added the twenty-three members of the Economic Party, thus increasing the Centre group's strength to 146 members. The minority of the Right consisted of seventy-eight *Deutschnationale*, who have since split up into several new groups, and thirty-five other members belonging to a variety of small reactionary parties, among them four elderly gentlemen from Hanover, whose battle cry was the restoration of the Guelphs to the throne the King of Prussia had robbed them of in 1866.

This medley of parties, groups, and organisations in Germany is truly bewildering and most unwholesome. Elected under the present system of proportionate representation carried to its extreme and absurd limits, the Reichstag, consisting as it did of three main minority groups all of which were full of internal conflicts and contradictions, found it quite impossible to fulfil its proper functions. After a great deal of strife and argument a coalition Government of the Left was formed under the Social Democrat Hermann Müller, which led an ineffective existence, until early in 1930 it collapsed and was replaced by a coalition Government of the Centre with a distinct leaning towards the Right under Dr. Brüning, the leader of the Roman Catholic Centre Party. This Government proved no luckier than its predecessor, and after a succession of failures there remained

no remedy but to dissolve the Reichstag. The significance of the dissolution and Dr. Brüning's further steps is far greater than that of an ordinary parliamentary crisis. Pressing financial and social measures were decreed after the dissolution by virtue of the much-discussed par. 48 of the German Constitution, which provides for emergency powers in case of national danger. That the authors of the Weimar Constitution never intended this paragraph to be used for financial and social legislation is obvious; on the other hand, the critics of Dr. Brüning would do well to remember that under the late President Ebert the paragraph was often invoked for legislation which was still further removed from 'national danger,' as, for instance, a decree concerning the medical assistance and health insurance or the protection of the wireless trade. However, in the present circumstances the application by the Brüning Government of par. 48, coming on top of dissolution, gave rise to much alarm and was interpreted by many as a definitely anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary step.

The nature of the present crisis is altogether of a different kind, and it would be wrong to give the dissolution and the application of par. 48 such an interpretation. As a brilliant German writer once said, 'There was never a revolution in Germany, but only a series of counter-revolutions'; and there is a great deal of truth in this observation. Yet the majority of the Conservative parties and groups formed as a result of the recent secessions from the too reactionary *Deutschnationale* Party are all proclaiming their readiness to 'accept' the republic, and seem to be definitely giving up the idea of a possible return to monarchy. If for a long time Germany could be described as a republic with very few republicans, now it can be safely asserted that she has very few monarchists left, and that the question has lost its interest.

Finance and politics are the principal causes of the crisis, and they are so closely interwoven that it is almost impossible to draw a line of demarcation. Germany must create new financial resources to meet the ever-expanding needs of her budget and to pay reparations. That is the crux of the financial problem. And the crux of the political problem lies in the definite endeavour the bourgeoisie is making to get rid of the growing and all-permeating influence of organised social democracy—the frank desire to cut down social charges and wages. At the same time the combined strength of Communism and Fascism is directed against both the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie, against the very State and the Constitution. Thus the crisis is one of adaptation of classes and groups to the new political and economic order, which became recently consolidated by the acceptance of the Young Plan and the liberation of the Rhineland. With these two events a new phase of Germany's political and economic

life has begun. Now that the solution of the two most pressing needs of foreign policy has been achieved—and it required a combined effort of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats—these two groups can give free play to their old dislike and distrust of each other. No longer held together by 'national interests,' which were dictated to them by the needs of foreign policy, both clans have become aggressive. The Social Democrats, who can claim the highest credit for the rôle played by them in foreign affairs, proved to be singularly unreasonable in questions of domestic policy. Not even the most ardent admirers of Herr Hermann Müller can call his Cabinet or the administration of the nation's finance by Dr. Hilferding a success. On the other hand, even the most violent detractors of Dr. Schacht, the then president of the Reichsbank, must admit that his onslaught on that Government in December 1929 was very largely justified. Albeit, in an extremely objectionable form, which the Müller-Hilferding Cabinet had every reason to resent, he told them a few fundamental home truths and protested against their indolent and profligate financial policy. The Agent-General for Reparation Payments also repeatedly warned the Government and even quite recently in his final report once again stressed the need for financial reform and economy. Both the Müller and the Brüning Cabinets turned a deaf ear on these warnings and allowed the crisis to reach its present state. But, while the refusal of the Reichstag to carry through the necessary financial reform has led to its dissolution, the real reason for Dr. Brüning's action, and for the collapse of the 'Grand Coalition,' has to be sought elsewhere. It would have been perfectly possible for Dr. Brüning to get his budget through the Reichstag and to avoid dissolution if he had chosen to come to an understanding with the Social Democrats in order to find a financial compromise. But, responding to an acute mood of class consciousness, the bourgeois parties had for some time past taken up an absolutely uncompromising attitude towards the Social Democrats. That is why they refused their further collaboration in the 'Grand Coalition' and turned out the Müller Cabinet immediately after the acceptance of the Young Plan. And that is why they subsequently refused even to enter into negotiations with the Social Democrats in the matter of finding a financial compromise.

The position of the Social Democratic Party in the 'Grand Coalition' Government had been a difficult one. Flanked by fifty-three Communists constantly attacking them on the left, and sharing power and responsibility with the bourgeois groups sitting on their right, they were compelled to follow a policy of compromise, and were quite unable to put any of their theories into practice. And they had yielded in two important questions

of financial and economic policy—the increase of indirect taxation and the increase of import duties. But on two other vital issues they were adamant and refused to give in—namely, the reduction of wages through compulsory arbitration and the reduction of the unemployment subsidy. Thus while social democracy was by no means militant in the Müller Government, yet it maintained a stubborn opposition to any attacks that were made on the fundamental principles of its social policy. It is this aggressive position of the Social Democratic Party in the matter of their social policy that made the continuation of the 'Grand Coalition' impossible and finally turned the bourgeois groups against them. Prompted by somewhat different motives, the People's Party and the Centre Party deliberately changed their tactics and turned to the Right. The People's Party represents a strong section of industry and commerce, and it wanted to get rid of the Socialists in order to solve the most urgent problems of financial and social policy in accordance with its own interests. As to the Centre Party, its action was very largely dictated by an ever-growing thirst for power, a desire to be able to govern without depending on the Social Democrats for their support. Its leader, Dr. Brüning, hoped to form a solid bourgeois *bloc* in the Reichstag, embracing not only the People's Party, whose present leader, Dr. Scholz, is much more a man of the Right than his late predecessor, Dr. Stresemann, but also the various groups that had just seceded from Herr Hugenberg's *Deutschnationale* Party, and, in fact, that very party as well. In attempting to get the support, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of Herr Hugenberg, Dr. Brüning went so far as to drag President Hindenburg into the political arena, and to use the aged and universally respected Field-Marshal as a tool to break up the 'Grand Coalition,' which is still firmly implanted in Prussia under Socialist leadership. Had he been successful, Dr. Brüning would have found himself at the head of an exceedingly strong political combination enabling him to govern without and against the Social Democrats. But Herr Hugenberg refused to come in at any price, and now, after the dissolution which thus became inevitable, Dr. Brüning is trying to pursue his policy of forming a majority of the Right by new methods. The result of these endeavours to solve the financial and political problems simultaneously by a mere regrouping of parties and of the failure to achieve anything at all is that a situation which was quite complicated enough has been rendered even more so, and that the crisis is more acute than ever. It is, indeed, a paradox that such a state of affairs should have been so largely due to the very Centre Party, which is the best organised, most stable, and clearest thinking political party in Germany, possessed of true statecraft and of thorough parliamentary

fate of the Liberal Party in this country. In 1919 it was represented by seventy-nine members; in the last Reichstag there were only twenty-five Democrats. Yet it is a party that has exercised the greatest influence both in the foreign and domestic affairs of the German Republic. It prevented the extremists of both Right and Left from carrying out their wildest schemes; it consolidated the State and, to the extent that this was possible, the parliamentary system; it did much to bring the complicated problem of the relations between the Reich and the States nearer to a solution; it initiated the policy of understanding with the Allied Powers, and its leader, Rathenau, was the author of that great work of reconciliation which it was left to Stresemann to complete. Some of the best brains in the country were Democrats. Yet, in spite of all this, the party lost votes and seats in every election, until the number of its representatives in Parliament shrunk to twenty-five. The very nature of the functions the Democratic Party had assumed in the German State was its damnation. It acted as a regulating and pacifying force in the political life of the country, and it was best qualified to serve as a bridge between the bourgeoisie and social democracy. It was essentially a party of the enlightened bourgeoisie, and certainly it never appealed to the masses. Too sound and too moderate, of late years it never had a chance of displaying any initiative, and, through being relegated to a position of inactivity, it completely lost its capacity for constructive work. Its occasional representatives in various coalitions were much nearer to the spirit of other parties than to that of their own, and Herr Dietrich, the present Vice-Chancellor and Finance Minister of the Reich, is a striking illustration of this. Prominent members like Dr. Schacht or Herr Theodor Wolff, the distinguished editor of the *Berliner Tagblatt*, resigned, either because they lost faith in the Party or because its atmosphere stifled them. The last thing left for the party to do was to dissolve or amalgamate with some other group, and the People's Party should have proved a suitable companion. But the Democratic Party formed an alliance with the Young German Order instead and started the new State Party. If the personal question between Herr Scholz and Herr Koch-Weser can be ruled out, and the People's Party finally does see its way to come in, here will be a nucleus of a bourgeois party of considerable strength, and a less Conservative one than the various other groups of the Right.

But the trouble in this election is that none of the parties, whether they are for or against the Brüning policy, is prepared to admit quite candidly the main point that is at issue. They all feel extremely uneasy about the problem of finance and the necessity of taking up a clear attitude in this matter, which is

Germany's most burning question. When a country is passing through an acute economic crisis it is always the demagogue who scores most. By giving rash and unscrupulous promises which he never intends to keep, he attracts the votes of all the embittered, disappointed, and exasperated strata of the population. Both the Communists and the Fascists are making political capital out of Germany's economic difficulties, and the number of their adherents has very largely increased. The split in the Right camp has weakened its fighting capacity, and the competition of the Fascists is bound to cause a great deal of damage to it. The moderate parties, including the Centre, the State, and the People's Parties, are rather apt to fall between two stools unless at the eleventh hour they can combine. What of the Social Democrats? After the unfortunate experiment of the Müller-Hilferding Cabinet, and with the wild attacks that are being made on them by the Communists, they will probably be glad to maintain their present position. They are also hampered by their desire, which is even now transparent, not to close the door completely to a possible understanding, or even coalition, with some of their adversaries in the future Reichstag. So far as it is possible to judge, then, no party will have an absolute majority, and once again a coalition Government will have to be formed. But who will have the balance of power, and will the coalition have a leaning to the Left or to the Right? Will the Social Democrats be able to rally in their camp all the real enemies of reaction? Or will the Centre succeed in grouping together the various bourgeois, Conservative, and even reactionary parties to form the solid capitalistic *bloc* they have been aiming at? But the number of Communists and Fascists in the next Reichstag will probably be considerably larger than before; if economic conditions get worse it certainly will. Now, it is their avowed object to make the normal working of the parliamentary machine impossible, and they always seem willing to combine against any Government. They were frequently a source of great embarrassment to the Müller and the Brüning Governments in the last Reichstag. If their numerical strength is seriously augmented in this Reichstag they are bound to represent a very real danger, a danger not only in the domain of internal affairs, but also in that of international politics. This appears unlikely, but it is a thing to be reckoned with. Excluding such a situation, however, it may be assumed that, whatever the leanings of the next coalition Government in Germany, the foreign policy of that country will be carried on along established lines. More than ever the world has cause to lament the death of Dr. Stresemann and the vacuum left in German politics by his disappearance.

But, although the present situation in Germany is a difficult one, there is no need to get alarmed. Electioneering is, as we all know, a most peculiar process, when people do and say things to which it would be wrong to attach too much importance, and more than to any country does this apply to Germany in her present state. Some of her politicians see the key of all evils in the Young Plan, and no doubt they will bitterly attack it in their election campaign, or even claim a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Good sense, however, is bound to prevail. The Germans may not be a political race, but they are a most excellent business people. They are suffering at the present moment from an unprecedented economic depression, caused partly by the world crisis, and partly by the second wave of rationalisation. Suffice it to say that they have over 2,750,000 unemployed, and that the plight of agriculture is even worse there than it is in Great Britain. Politics and economics being so closely interwoven as they are in Germany, a bad economic situation makes for bad politics. Given a slight improvement in world trade, Germany is bound to recover, for the Germans are the hardest working race on earth. Their effort of the period 1924-29 has proved it. But their handicaps are great. Shortage of capital stands in the centre of Germany's economic problem. The process of accumulation of home capital is not sufficiently powerful yet to satisfy the country's needs, and they are compelled to look to the foreign capital markets for their requirements. During the period 1924-29 Germany imported in one shape or another 17,000,000,000 marks. But Germany finds that the raising of foreign loans is getting more and more difficult, and this has had its repercussions on German foreign trade. It reduced her capacity to import more foreign goods. At the same time, the economic crisis having greatly reduced the purchasing power of the German population, a serious decline in domestic consumption was caused. In order to counteract the effects of the deficiency of the home market a great effort had to be made by Germany to increase her exports. The result has been that for the first half-year of 1930 foreign trade not only no longer weighed on the German balance of payments, but that exports, including Reparation deliveries, exceeded imports by about 510,000,000 marks; during the corresponding period of 1929 and 1928 there had been 'adverse' balances of 280,000,000 and 1,350,000,000 marks respectively.

It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the economic position of Germany. But to appreciate the political situation there it is essential to understand how largely shortage of capital on the one hand, and industry and foreign trade on the other, influence the trend of affairs in that country. The expansion of

foreign trade, therefore, should prove quite encouraging. If Germany can improve her financial and economic situation, her politics will get better. But the one thing is conditional on the other, and a business improvement can only take place if there are no political disturbances of any kind, and if she has a sound and stable Government. The arithmetical problems of the new Reichstag are, after all, a matter of secondary importance. What really matters is that the young German Republic, which only recently celebrated its eleventh anniversary, should put its parliamentary machine in working order, and have a Reichstag which is an instrument of, and not an impediment to, the consolidation of the Weimar Constitution. All those who are the sincere well-wishers of Germany will most ardently hope that on September 14 she makes a choice which will render her return to prosperity possible, and will contribute to the further progress of international understanding, peace, and stability.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

AFTER SEDAN

SIXTY years ago—on Sunday, September 4, 1870, to be exact—the citizens of Paris were awakened by the cries of newsboys calling out that the Emperor was a captive in Prussian hands. The report confirmed a rumour that had rushed like wildfire through Paris on the previous day, and, indeed, the Government and the Empress had received secret intelligence of the awful defeat at Sedan. Between four and five o'clock on the afternoon of Saturday the Minister of the Interior had placed in the hands of the Empress Eugénie a telegram from Napoleon III. It contained these words: 'The army is defeated and captive; I myself am a prisoner.' For a moment the Empress had lost her self-control, realising, as she did, how the surrender of the Emperor would affect the future of her son. For nearly twenty years Napoleon III. had inspired in the French in general, and in the Parisians in particular, a feeling of confidence in his energy. He had lived on the reminiscence of his *coup d'état*. The people had instinctively said of him: 'He is no poltroon to escape in a cab like Papa Philippe. He would blow himself up rather than give in.' And now the bearer of the greatest military name in France had capitulated with an army of 80,000 men.

The day which was to witness a revolution was one of cloudless sunshine—one of the most glorious September days ever seen. As it was Sunday, the streets were soon full. By eleven o'clock the Place de la Concorde was crowded, and from all the streets leading to it armed bands of National Guards were marching, shouting 'Vive la République.' On all sides, and hundreds of times, was heard the expression: 'An Emperor dies, but does not surrender.' The general feeling in Paris was one of relief, almost of elation: it was thought that now France, relieved from the incubus of a dynasty that had failed her, would arise with renewed and invincible strength. On the boulevards suddenly a cry was raised: 'La République est déclarée.' A regiment was at that moment passing by. It was met by a detachment of the National Guard coming from the Chamber. Guard, regiment, and people immediately fraternised. The *Marseillaise* was sung and the regular soldiers disappeared into neighbouring

cafés, where they were treated to drink. Exactly at twenty minutes past three the tricolour was seen to be lowered on the central tower of the Tuileries. From the windows of the great barracks by the Quai d'Orsay soldiers were waving handkerchiefs and re-echoing the cries of 'Vive la République' raised by citizens and soldiers in the streets below. Well-dressed ladies in open carriages shook hands with workmen and soldiers, all shouting the popular cry. Strangers fell on each other's necks and kissed with effusion. Men on ladders were everywhere wrenching down busts of the Emperor, and these, carried in procession with mock solemnity, were thrown into the Seine to the accompaniment of roars of laughter. Portraits of Napoleon III. and Eugénie were hurled out of the windows of the Hôtel de Ville, and the people danced on the canvas. All was sunshine, laughter and good humour. No blood was spilt. The people of Paris were as full of joyful enthusiasm as a band of schoolboys whose usher had disappeared.

But in a large city, and not least in Paris, even a jolly revolution on a fine Sunday morning brings out an undesirable element mad with a lust for plunder. There had been ominous shouts of 'Aux Tuileries,' and a large crowd had hurried towards the palace. Fortunately a detachment of the National Guard took over from the Imperial Guard just in time to keep out the mob which rolled back into the Place du Carrousel, panting and breathless like a wild beast baulked of its prey. Inside the building the safety of the Empress had become the subject of the gravest anxiety to her entourage. The Austrian and Italian Ambassadors had called in order to urge upon her the necessity of flight. About half-past three the Prefect of Police rushed in crying 'Nous sommes trahis,' adding that the crowds were beating down the railings. The Empress throughout the whole crisis had displayed absolute fearlessness, and consented to take refuge in flight only to avoid putting the lives of others in jeopardy. Yet she delayed to say farewell to her ladies, and to one of them who begged to accompany her the Empress replied: 'I fully appreciate your generous devotion to me, but I do not wish my misfortunes to be yours. In France no one should be unhappy.'

'Come,' cried Metternich and Nigra, 'there is barely time to get away.' The Empress was literally pushed out of the palace by her friends. The Austrian Ambassador gave her his arm. Signor Nigra led her companion, Madame Lebreton, sister of General Bourbaki and the only lady of the court who was to share her flight. It was soon realised that to leave the Tuileries by any direct way would be dangerous if not impossible, and the little party hastened, therefore, through the galleries which overlooked the Seine and passed into the Louvre, finally emerging

near the Place in front of the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois. It was necessary to wait while a troop of noisy demonstrators poured through the arched passage which leads from the inner court of the Louvre to the Place. Nigra offered his arm to the weary Empress. As a particularly uproarious band passed by with shouts of 'À bas l'Espagnole' and 'Vive la République,' Nigra asked the Empress if she felt afraid. 'You are holding my arm,' was the quiet reply. 'Do you feel it tremble?'

When the main body of the rabble had passed, Prince de Metternich hailed a closed cab, but before the ladies could enter it a street boy cried out: 'Voilà l'Impératrice.' Signor Nigra instantly entered into conversation with the lad to distract his attention, and in the meanwhile the ladies had got into the vehicle, which drove off, Madame Lebreton having directed the driver to the residence of M. Besson, a councillor of State, on the Boulevard Haussmann. It is somewhat remarkable that neither the Austrian nor Italian Ambassador had any plan but to put the Empress into a cab, and, more curious still, that neither of them offered the unfortunate lady the shelter and protection of his Embassy. On arrival at its destination the cab was dismissed and the ladies ascended to M. Besson's apartments. Unfortunately the councillor was not at home, and after waiting for about quarter of an hour, seated on the stairs, the Empress said: 'I cannot wait any longer. Let us go.' The two ladies then left the house, and for a few moments walked aimlessly about the streets, which were here deserted. Finally they saw an open cab which they engaged, and after a hurried consultation between the two ladies the driver was directed to go to the house of Dr. Evans, an American dentist who numbered the Imperial family amongst his patients. Dr. Evans was out, but was expected back shortly, and the ladies were ushered into the library to await his return.

Dr. Evans instantly placed himself at the service of the Empress. She thanked him, saying: 'You see I am no longer fortunate. The evil days have come and I am left alone'; and as she spoke tears filled her eyes. Dr. Evans then asked if Her Majesty had any special plans. Yes; she wished particularly to leave Paris, and hoped that it might be possible to escape to England. She had brought some passports with her—for several had been collected at the Tuileries for possible use in emergency—and one of them, obtained at the British Embassy, was soon declared suitable. In it all whom it might concern were 'requested and required to allow Dr. C—— (a British subject), going to England accompanied by a patient, Mrs. B—— (also a British subject), to pass freely, also without let or hindrance,' and so forth. It was decided that Dr. Crane, a friend of Dr. Evans,

should impersonate the Dr. C——; the Empress was to be the patient. Apparently the passport contained a provision for some companion for the 'sick lady,' and Dr. Evans was therefore to pose as her brother and Madame Lebreton as the nurse. Dr. Evans's wife had been spending the month of August in Normandy and was still at the Hôtel du Casino, in Deauville. Dr. Evans knew the neighbourhood well, and, as his wife might be able to render some assistance, Deauville was fixed as the objective, it being hoped that a yacht or boat of some kind might be found there in which to cross the Channel. As it would be highly inadvisable to travel by rail, it was arranged to begin the journey in Dr. Evans's own carriage and to count upon finding relays of horses and other vehicles along the route. Everyone was to be ready to start at half-past five the following morning.

Punctually at that hour on Monday, September 5, the party set off without any luggage. Dr. Evans in his *Memoirs* emphasises the fact when he says: 'Not a bag, not a package even of toilet articles, did one of us carry.' The reason for the omission is not clear, for a party escorting an invalid lady to England without even a handbag between them might arouse suspicion were the passport to be examined. The Empress wore a black cashmere dress, which she had not taken off for nearly a week, subject as she had been to calls at every hour of the day and night. Over this she wore a thin waterproof. A narrow white collar about her neck, dark gloves, and a black 'bowler' hat to which was attached a plain black veil completed her costume. No attempt had been made to disguise her features or person. In the hurry of leaving the palace she had taken with her absolutely nothing beyond the clothes she wore, with the exception of a small reticule in which were a couple of handkerchiefs. Madame Lebreton was also very simply dressed and without wraps of any kind.

The first test occurred at the Porte Maillot, where the sentry ordered the carriage to halt. Dr. Evans thought it better not to employ the story of the invalid lady, but merely to say that he was an American, well known in Paris, going to spend the day in the country with some friends who were with him, an explanation which satisfied the officer of the guard. The Empress had been silent and *distracte*, but as the carriage sped along the Route Impériale her spirits rose, and she talked with great animation about her present situation and the events which had led up to it. Of the French people she said that they had few convictions and lacked steadfastness. 'They are versatile but volatile. With them the standard of right is success.' She recalled how, but a few days before, she had told some of her friends that if ever the imperial dynasty should fall she would never leave the Tuileries in a cab as Charles X. and Louis Philippe had done.

'And that is exactly what I did,' she cried, and the humour of the coincidence made her laugh in spite of herself.

Some twelve miles short of Mantes the carriage stopped at a small wayside cabaret to water and rest the horses. The two Americans snatched a hasty meal, but the Empress and her companion thought it would not be prudent to leave the vehicle. Dr. Evans accordingly brought the Empress some bread and a piece of Bologna sausage, which she ate with relish when the carriage had moved off again. It was about eleven o'clock when the party approached the outskirts of Mantes. The morning papers from Paris had just arrived, and Dr. Evans, on purchasing the *Journal Officiel* and the *Figaro*, was immensely relieved to find that amid all the columns dealing with the Revolution there was no reference whatever to the Empress. It was now thought necessary to procure a fresh conveyance and horses, which, fortunately, Dr. Evans was able to do. His own carriage was, therefore, sent back to Paris and the party continued their journey. Her Majesty was intensely interested in the newspapers bought by Dr. Evans, and spoke volubly of the constitution of the new Government of National Defence. Of General Trochu, who had become President of this new Government, she talked with some bitterness. 'Only yesterday morning, spontaneously of his own volition, he pledged to me, on his honour as a soldier, on his faith as a Catholic and a Breton, that he would never desert me.' Her Majesty was quite overcome, her voice trembled and tears came into her eyes. A cynic might observe that it was the Empress who was now deserting General Trochu quite as much as it was he who was deserting his sovereign. Is it possible to detect in her utterance just the least little touch of spleen at finding her name unmentioned in either paper? Had she been such a cipher as all that? Only that very morning she had said to Dr. Evans that in no country was the step from the sublime to the ridiculous so short as in France. Marie Antoinette had achieved sublimity. Eugénie had left the Tuileries in a four-wheeler and only a corner-boy had cried out at her going. Was there something in legitimacy after all?

About two o'clock the travellers arrived at the little hamlet of Pacy-sur-Eure, the end of the stage agreed on with the driver. Here there was a difficulty in securing another conveyance. An old woman said she had a carriage but only one horse, unless she could borrow another to make up a pair. This she was able to do, but the borrowed animal was diminutive in comparison with its fellow, and the 'carriage' proved to be the most bepatched, benailed, and ramshackle contraption in the whole of France. There was nothing for it, however, but to push on, and after an hour's delay the Empress was *en route* again. About five o'clock

the village of Cambolle was reached, and here the first alarm was experienced. While the horses were being fed and watered, down the street were heard loud cries of 'Vive la France' and 'Vive la République.' Soon some waggons full of soldiers came in sight, but luckily they proved merely to be tipsy *mobiles* returning from a review at Evreux. Many of them waved their caps at the Empress's carriage and saluted it with shouts of 'Vive la République.' La Commanderie was reached just before sunset. Here a pair of fine horses were engaged—the owner declaring, to the anxiety of the fugitives, that 'they were fit for a queen'—and the Empress drank some coffee which Madame Lebreton had succeeded in getting made in the post office. On again to La Rivière de Thibouville. It was now nearly ten p.m., and almost 100 miles had been covered since dawn. Fortune had favoured the party so far. Not a single awkward query had been put to them. The Empress had been unnoticed. Yet it would be unwise to delay, for even now telegraph wires might be working all over France telling of the vanished Empress. The officer of the guard at Porte Maillot might have remembered the carriage, with two ladies inside, which had passed through the gate at dawn, and every village official and every custom-house officer might have been put upon the alert.

Dr. Evans was therefore anxious to engage another carriage and horses and to push on, only to be met with by the 1870 equivalent of 'Napoo.' There was no such a thing as a carriage within ten miles. In these circumstances the only thing to do was to make use of such rough accommodation as the *Soleil d'Or* could provide, but there were only two rooms for visitors, and both of these were occupied by an English coachman and his family on their way to Trouville. The coachman was, however, soon induced by a *douceur* to surrender the accommodation, and the Empress, acting the invalid, was escorted to her room. When she reached it the rough and scanty accommodation so tickled her sense of humour that she burst out into a peal of laughter, greatly to the alarm of Madame Lebreton, for the partitions were thin and a hilarious invalid might cause some suspicion.

In the middle of the night Dr. Evans and Dr. Crane were awakened by the clatter of hoofs, the sound of angry voices, and a loud pounding on the inn door. Had the flight of the Empress been discovered, and was this a squadron of gendarmes sent to arrest her? Cautiously peeping out of the window, the two Americans listened intently and were soon reassured—the midnight visitors were merely some gamekeepers who had been scouring the neighbourhood for poachers. In the morning there was further trouble: no carriage could be obtained except from Bernay, ten miles back, and this would mean several hours'

delay. True, the railway was near, the station being but a mile off, and it would be possible to get a train to Lisieux, only eighteen miles from Deauville. But could an invalid lady, who had to be escorted to her room, show such a rapid recovery as to be able to walk a mile? It was an awkward dilemma, but the luck of the Empress still held. A fine two-horse carriage drove up, and a gentleman descended at the inn to wait while his horses were resting. He readily responded to the suggestion made by Dr. Evans that he should allow his carriage to take the doctor's invalid 'sister' to the station. At the station there was another alarm. Just before the train moved out the stationmaster suddenly opened the door and looked hard at the Empress, and closed the door with a bang. She felt certain that she had been recognised, and even twenty years later she remembered the look the man had given her.

Lisieux was reached without further incident, but there an exasperating delay took place. It was a miserable morning, with heavy rain, and none of the party had an umbrella. Dr. Evans hurried into the town to find a livery stable, while the Empress and her two companions took what shelter they could in a doorway. Dr. Evans tried half a dozen places in vain, and had nearly given up hope when at length he found a carriage proprietor who agreed after some persuasion to take a party of four into Deauville. When the carriage had been driven to where the Empress was waiting she had been wet through and through by the drenching rain and looked wearied and exhausted from the long strain to which she had been subjected. However, soon after leaving Lisieux the sun came out, and in the afternoon Deauville was safely reached. Dr. Evans got out some distance short of the hotel in order that he might go on and warn his wife, and then, helping the Empress from the carriage, he led her swiftly through the hotel garden by a side door into the building and thence rapidly up to his wife's apartments. After greeting Mrs. Evans the Empress sank back exhausted into an armchair, exclaiming: 'Oh, mon Dieu, je suis sauvée.'

So far the 'staff-work' of the American doctor had been flawless, but now the hardest part of his task lay before him—how to get the Empress safely across the Channel. There were two possible methods—either to proceed as ordinary passengers by the Havre-Southampton packet or to hire some sailing craft for the exclusive use of the party. The first method was rejected, for Dr. Evans felt sure that the flight of the Empress must now be public property and, this being so, every port would be under close observation. He therefore decided to try his luck amongst the Deauville docks, where he made out two yachts, one an American schooner and the other an English cutter, the *Gazelle*.

Dr. Evans fixed on the latter, and, going on board, presented his card to the owner, Sir John Burgoyne, explaining that he greatly admired the yacht and would take it as a great favour if he might look round her. Sir John courteously agreed, showed the American round the vessel, and mentioned that he hoped to sail for England at seven a.m. the following day.

Evans then took Burgoyne aside and mentioned that he had a confidential communication to make, and that he was assured he was talking to a man whose honour he could trust. Sir John's reply was to hand Dr. Evans his card with the words: 'I am an English gentleman and have been in Her Majesty's service.' The American then unfolded his story, told Burgoyne where the Empress then was, and explained that it was Her Majesty's most earnest desire to escape to England, finally asking him whether he would be willing to receive the Empress, Madame Lebreton, and Dr. Evans himself on board the yacht and convey them to England. Startled by the revelation made to him, Sir John Burgoyne at first hesitated. Possibly a suspicion flashed through his mind that the plausible American and the 'Empress' might really be undesirables who had found France too hot to hold them. In any case, he had been weatherbound for several days, a heavy sea was still running outside, and he might not be able to leave in the morning, in which case the position of a fugitive empress on board a vessel flying the British flag, but in a French port, might be an embarrassment. Dr. Evans hinted that he would now sound the owners of the American yacht, but Sir John Burgoyne asserted that in the weather which was probable the schooner would certainly go to the bottom. Dr. Crane now added his persuasions to those of his colleague, and finally Sir John said: 'Well, gentlemen, you may submit the case to Lady Burgoyne. If she is willing to have the Empress on board, she can come.'

The three men then descended to the cabin and the facts were put to Lady Burgoyne. Was she willing to have the Empress on board? 'Well, why not?' was the immediate reply. 'I certainly shall be greatly pleased if we can be of any assistance to her, and I can readily understand how anxious she must be at the present moment to find a refuge. Let her come to us to-night, or as soon as she can safely do so.' The discussion then closed, and Sir John made an appointment with Dr. Evans for half-past ten that night to discuss details of the embarkation of the Empress. At this interview it was arranged that Dr. Evans should escort the Empress to the yacht at midnight and that Dr. Crane and Madame Lebreton should follow at a short interval. The programme was carried out without a hitch, although about eleven p.m. a French police agent visited the yacht and probably passed the Empress and Dr. Evans on his way back. It was a

wild night, and a strong westerly wind was blowing in sharp squalls. While the Empress and her escort were making their way by the rough road to the docks, off Cape Finisterre the newest British ironclad, H.M.S. *Captain*, commanded by a cousin of Sir John Burgoyne, capsized in a heavy squall with the loss of over 500 officers and men. At midnight Sir John Burgoyne met the two ladies, closely veiled, one of whom introduced herself as the French Empress. He conducted her on board the yacht. 'I know I am safe now, under the protection of an Englishman,' she exclaimed, adding: 'Pauvre France.' The Empress then became very hysterical, but was soothed by the kindness of Lady Burgoyne.

The *Gazelle* was a cutter yacht of 42 tons originally built as a coastguard tender for the Royal Navy, but, proving somewhat too small for the duty, she had been sold out of the service and converted into a yacht. She was heavily sparred and carried a good deal of canvas for a vessel of her size, but she was stoutly built and a good sea boat. At dawn on September 7 Sir John went on deck and, on coming below, reported a fresh west-south-west wind and rain. He declared his intention of getting under weigh at seven a.m. Dr. Crane accordingly left the *Gazelle* to return to Paris, taking with him some messages from the Empress to her personal friends. A little after seven o'clock the *Gazelle* was clear of the harbour and laid her course for Southampton. The weather was thick with rain and the sea was moderate to rather rough, but the wind was fair, and the yacht carried her spinnaker in addition to whole mainsail and second jib. A white ensign flew from the masthead and another from the peak, 'to show that we had someone of importance on board.' Up till noon there was every promise of a speedy crossing, but about one p.m. the wind shifted to almost dead ahead and increased in force. The spinnaker was taken in, the mainsail was reefed, the second jib was shifted for the storm-jib, and everything was got ready for a thrash to windward. Various stories are in existence as to episodes which are alleged to have occurred on the voyage. According to the account of Dr. Evans, the owner of the *Gazelle* raised the question of putting back, to be met by expostulation from the American, 'who insisted that we ought to trust in Providence.' Sir John Burgoyne has no mention of this occurrence, and indeed makes it clear that by this time the American dentist was in no condition to insist on anything at all. According to another dramatic account, later Sir John rushed into the cabin, cried 'All is lost!' and disappeared again on deck. Sir John Burgoyne had been a soldier and was a very experienced yachtsman; the legend carries its own refutation, but it is of interest as showing the traditional French 'Nous sommes trahis'

done into English. We have it on the authority of Sir John Burgoyne that the sea was not really high until the English coast was approached, but then conditions became most unpleasant, and he has put on record that in all his yachting experience he had never met a worse sea. During the night it was decided to heave-to until the force of the west-going tide had been spent. The vessel was battened down and a canvas covering was secured over the cabin skylight. A good deal of water was taken on board, but the *Gazelle* behaved splendidly, and, the weather beginning to improve after midnight, she reached Ryde Roads in safety and dropped anchor about four a.m. on September 8.

There the Empress landed and went to the York Hotel. By the bed in her room was a Bible, and on opening it her eyes fell on the words: 'The Lord is my Shepherd; I shall not want. He maketh me to lie down in green pastures; He leadeth me beside the still waters.' From Ryde the Empress hurried to Hastings to meet the young Prince Imperial, who, from northern France, had been brought to England by way of Belgium. The waters of calamity had closed over the head of the unfortunate Eugénie. But in her surging sea of sorrow she had yet one spar to cling to, in the person of her son. In him the star of the Bonapartes might once more shine. How that spar was wrenched from her grasp, how that star sank for ever in the waters of the Ityotyosi, was told two years ago in the pages of this Review.¹

F. E. WHITTON.

¹ 'The Death of the Prince Imperial' (*Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1928).

STALKS OF SORTS

THE stalking of the deer—that is the theme. Why not the stalking of the ibex, the markhor or the ovis ammon, with its exhilarating accompaniment of snowy mountain-peaks, rock-climbing and dangerous traverses? Simply because I have never had the opportunity of doing it. Why not of the elephant, the buffalo, the bison or the tiger? Because so extensive a survey would fill many pages and might well over-tax the editor's patience and the reader's credulity. Let us therefore confine ourselves to the stag. His pursuit is a noble sport and offers a satisfying variety. I am told that nowadays it is considered rather dull and is less popular than formerly. I am told also that it is wrong, that it merely encourages atavistic and bloodthirsty propensities, and that, if you want to stalk, you should do it with a camera and not with a rifle. I give all honour to the camera; its use involves courage and dexterity; its results afford pleasure, instruction, and the stir of romance to thousands who cannot have personal knowledge of the charm of the wild, who are doomed to toil in cities grey 'with no lance broken in life's tournament.' I freely confess to the old Adam in my blood; I am very, very wicked. But I plead at least some extenuating circumstances. My murderous habits were formed before the lens was perfected for the taking of animal pictures. For years my gun and rifle were the means of providing fresh meat for my camp-followers and myself. Even now, when I live in civilisation, the Highland farmer blesses me for keeping down the predatory herds; and he and the villagers enjoy the venison. May I add a more general defence? Stalking is one of the severest and most ascetic forms of recreation. It involves great exertion, long exposure to tropical heat or to bitter cold, endless waiting in clouds of midges or in wet clothes and a cutting wind, painful crawls, blank days and cruel disappointments. If it appeals to some of the evil in us, it also exercises certain virtues—endurance, patience and fortitude in misfortune; and it promotes bodily fitness. Let it be added that the true sportsman is humane; he shoots to kill

dead, not to wound; and, rather than chance probable disablement of his quarry, he will forgo his shot.

I am going to speak of three sorts of stalking—two done in India, the third in Scotland. The first is not stalking in quite the usual sense of the word. It is the pursuit of deer who make the depth of the jungle their habitat. Such are the mighty sambar (*Rusa aristotelis* or *unicolor*), who stands 13 to 14 hands and whose antlers may measure 40 or even 50 inches from base to tip of tine; and the beautiful chetel or Indian spotted deer (*Axis maculatus*). These beasts leave their shadowy haunts only for night feeding on neighbouring crops. You may manage a sort of stalk by heading them off while they are returning to the jungle in that magic hour 'when light and darkness passing greet and vigil parts from slumber.' I have got both species that way; but it is a bit of a chance. The other and more usual methods of hunting them are to have the deer driven or to go and look for them in the forest. Now driving deer in a jungle is poor sport. You may, it is true, have the opportunity of displaying your skill in a difficult running shot; and then you are as likely as not to wound. On the other hand, the stag may walk up quietly and stand close to where you are concealed behind a bush or perched on a tree. In neither case does the element of stalking enter at all; you are not pitting your own powers against the animal's. In the latter case you simply cannot find it in your heart to shoot. I have known a sambar stag come so near to me in a tiger beat that I could have touched him with the end of my rifle. I therefore say nothing about driving, but confine myself to the second method. Nor is even this method true stalking; rather it is a sort of silent hunting. But it calls for patience and perseverance, sharpens the eyes and the wits, and is invaluable as an education in forest-lore.

How many an afternoon did I waste, when I was a 'griffin,' trapesing through miles of woodland in hope of sighting game! Vain hope. The game was often there—close at hand perhaps, but screened by a clump of bamboos, or blending so subtly with the lights and shadows beneath the trees that I saw nothing till too late. My foot might light on a dry teak leaf; my solah-topee might obtrude beyond the corner of a bush. Crash! In a moment the animal is gone. I hear the sound of his going, but can see nothing. Even in his haste he seems to keep cover behind tree trunk or brushwood, just as a flushed woodcock will flicker behind boughs. I return tired and empty-handed.

Then one day I am in camp with H., a mighty and experienced hunter, the slayer of a hundred tigers. The forest is renowned as a favourite haunt of chetel. It is the cold weather, and we sally forth at 2 p.m. Not long after I start I observe the crack of a

rifle behind me. When I have tramped many miles, heard twice or thrice the stampede of startled beasts, and effected nothing, I turn my steps campwards. It has long been dark before I see the light of the fires and hear the murmur of the servants as they prepare dinner. As I approach the tents I behold H. wrapped in a topcoat and comfortably seated before a wood fire. 'Well! what luck?' 'Nothing seen,' I reply disconsolately, as I sink into a folding armchair beside him. 'But I thought I heard *you* shoot.' The old fellow jerks his thumb to one side. I follow the direction with my eyes. There, under the trees, two or three men are busy skinning a stag. 'Not a bad chetel,' says H. 'I haven't measured, but I'd give the horns 36 inches. And where have you been?' To the best of my ability I describe my peregrinations. 'Humph!' says H. 'You've had some stroll! I got my stag within forty minutes of leaving the camp; and I've been back a couple of hours, had a tub and toasted my toes. Now I'll tell you.'

No good just stravaiging through the jungle. Haven't the beasts got eyes and ears? What chance have you against them in this thick stuff? They're listening to you or watching you before you've a ghost of a notion they're there. Look here, my boy; your one chance in heavy jungle is to *be* an animal—pretend to be, I mean. Don't attempt to cover more than a couple of miles. This afternoon you've walked eight at least. But you've walked 'em just anyhow. You're far more likely to see things if you walk two miles properly. I'll bet you there are stags at this moment within 500 yards of our tents. Go very slow. Always hide behind a tree or a bush. Stop where you are till you've examined everything all round you. Don't let a blade of grass or a leaf escape you. When you're sure there's nothing in sight, fix on another piece of cover; it mustn't be more than 3 or 4 yards from you. Get to it in three paces, making all the noise you can with your feet. That's how a stag walks. Long pause; three steps. Another pause; another three steps. So you go on; and that way you don't scare the animals. And at last, if you keep your eyes skinned, you'll see the flick of an ear or the point of a tine sticking out among the leaves. Don't hurry then. Maybe you can't see his body and have to judge how he's standing and where the point of his shoulder should be. After that you've got to get your rifle up to your shoulder very, very gently. Then—

'Bath ready, sahib,' says the bearer. I go and wallow, pondering this advice; and then, and thereafter, I find it good. It is slow, laborious work at first. But the interest soon predominates. It is not merely looking for game. It sets you to learning the trees of the jungle, by careful scrutiny appreciating the beauty of their forms and foliage, their lights and shadows, discovering a thousand things which casual observation would never disclose. It sharpens the eyesight and the instincts which we possess but too little use. It is an initiation into the secret rites of the forest.

II

The end of May—the fiercest season of the Indian year, but a good time for sport; and there are two or three of us who realise that ten days' change from files and red roads and dust and stuffy bungalows is essential for the health of our souls and bodies. Four of those ten days will be consumed in the journey to and from a certain beloved valley. For the valley is 100 miles away—100 miles which we partly drive, partly ride, through leafless jungles winnowed by a burning wind and here and there crackling with forest fires. But we are content; for, as we go, we see before us, drawing ever nearer, the delectable hills in which our valley lies. They are low hills, flat-topped and tree-clad—not particularly inviting at a distance; but we know the beauties and delights which they hide among their folds. Those hills are a continuation of the tract immortalised in *The Jungle Book*; but they are even wilder than the headquarters of the Seonee pack, more remote from the haunts of men, more frequented by the beasts of the forest, more fully obedient to the jungle law. Shere Khan and Baloo (plenty of them) will be there waiting for us, and maybe Bagheera, though Bagheera is rather a rare specimen, being (so the naturalists tell us) just an occasional freak. There will be lots of other notorious characters, too; the only people we must definitely expect not to meet are Kala Nag and his family; somehow they do not care to visit in this neighbourhood. But we are not specially concerned with any of these. True, if Shere Khan comes along, we shall take a crack at him. But our main objective is the stalking of the deer.

It is the evening of the second day. For some time our path has inclined upwards. We reach the summit of a low ridge, which runs round like the rim of a giant cup. We rein-in our horses and gaze down into that upland valley, where the foot of man seldom intrudes, a sanctuary isolated from the world by the circle of hills and by many miles of rough forest. The level rays of the setting sun light up the glistening foliage of the sâl trees and the great open spaces of grey grass. Here, in these sequestered glades, there is real stalking to be had. They are the haunt of the swamp-deer (*Rucervus duvauceli*). In some respects he resembles our red deer. A full-grown stag stands 11½ hands; a good pair of antlers bears 12 tines, though I have shot several with 14. But the chief point about these deer is that they frequent the open glades and couch in the grass rather than in the depths of the forest. Hence you can mark your quarry and arrange a stalk. It may almost be said that the swamp-deer is the only large deer found on the plains of India which you can consistently stalk.¹

¹ The nilgai is found in grass as well as jungle. In the more open country or

Of course the sport afforded by the swamp-deer differs in many ways from stalking in Scotland. The surroundings, though beautiful enough, lack the majesty of the mountains. The approach to your game will not be planned along a steep hillside where you crawl through ravines, burns and 'slacks.' Here you have an undulating plain, and you will find good cover behind the strands of taller grass. While the means of approach are therefore easier than in the Highlands, the risk, should you be seen, is greater, and the utmost care must be taken not to expose yourself for a moment nor to make any sound. Swamp-deer (and the same may be said of sambar and chetel) depend far more than do red deer upon sight. On the controversial question of scent I will say only this. While it is definitely asserted by some competent authorities that the Indian species of deer, as also other creatures, such as the tiger, and most particularly the bison, cannot be approached down wind, I have in all cases found the contrary. The only beast in India which I can say with assurance has scented me is the elephant. I have crawled into the middle of a large herd of bison, who remained quite unconscious of my presence till I fired; and I have several times come down wind upon a solitary bull and lain watching within 100 yards for some minutes. I commenced stalking swamp-deer under the impression that it is essential to work up wind. But when I had, by pure chance, come down wind upon herds in long grass and found them undisturbed, I cast wind to the winds, and have never known its direction make any difference in the success or failure of a stalk. I shall be told that I am all wrong; but one can only give his experiences.

Night has descended on our valley. We sit out under the quiet stars, drink in the peace of the forest, and ponder on tomorrow's sport. The tall sāl trees stand motionless around us, their slender shapes clear-cut against the tropic sky. As night deepens the life of the jungle awakes. Mysterious sounds steal upon our ears; a furtive padding—it may be an inquisitive panther reconnoitring our camp; the startled cry of a hind; the distant 'conk' of a tiger seeking his prey. But it is time for us to sleep; we must be up before the dawn, and our camp beds have already been set out in the clearing.

When we mount our horses next morning there is as yet no sign of sunrise. Each of us, accompanied by one or two trackers, makes his way to that part of the forest which, by mutual consent, has been assigned to him. The sky lightens; a bird awakes and sings. No, it is only the false dawn; darkness closes down again; the bird discovers his mistake and returns to sleep. At

in fields the black buck, the four-horned antelope, and the chinkāra can be stalked. But these are of the antelope or of the gazelle tribe, not of the genus *cervus*.

last a pale grey tinges the east; the girdle of night, a clearly defined band of leaden luridness, narrows and sinks into the western horizon. I dismount and take counsel with Phaganu. He is a delightful aborigine—courageous, humorous, unspoiled, unwashed, almost unclad. We direct the syce to take the horse to a clump of trees where they will be hidden, and we ourselves move forward warily, while the dark foliage turns to brilliant green and subdued tones waken along the strands of grass. We come to the edge of a glade. It is a likely spot. I clutch the branch of a tree, swing myself up, and scan the glade with my binoculars. Yes, there is a herd. A stag is grazing. Two hinds are with him, alternately browsing and keeping watch. Other hinds and young stags are lying near; their heads move, their ears flick; they will have to be reckoned with. The stag is good enough—a 12-pointer. I scramble down; in a whisper I tell what I have seen.

At this point there arises another great difference between stalking in India and the pursuit of the red deer. A defect of the latter is that, unless you have long experience of the terrain, you are too much in the hands of the stalker, who knows all the folds and crevices of the hills. Here, on the other hand, I am master of my own destiny. It is I who have spied out the land and now arrange the campaign. A whispered confabulation with Phaganu, in which I unfold my plans. Then I crawl forward alone. For the most part the herbage is thin, crisp and short—perhaps 1 foot in height. Then comes a long narrow patch of rank stuff, the thick stems measuring 4 to 6 feet high. Probably the ground beneath the more luxuriant growth retains some moisture; for this hill-engirdled valley is the source of many streams. It may, of course, happen that the stag is surrounded on all sides by the former sort of grass. In that case, especially if the natural way of approach is down a 'falling lie,' one must take a long shot. But, with any luck and some careful steering, you should be able, by pulling yourself along through the taller grass, to get within easy range. The two dangers which beset you are the possible presence of a hind couching in, or at the very edge of, one of the strands of long grass which you use as cover; and, when you take your shot, the grass itself. There is something very deceptive in sighting through grass; the presence of blades sticking up on either side of the barrel and slightly overhanging it has the effect of producing a tendency to shoot high.

On this occasion all has gone well. The stag falls, instantaneously killed by a bullet just behind the point of the shoulder. The hinds and younger stags stand and gaze for a moment, then scamper off. The sound of the shot brings Phaganu crawling up behind with my second rifle. (It is prudent in these forests, where anything may happen, to carry two rifles with you, a light one

and a heavy one, and invariably to have one of them in your own hands.) 'Good bullet!' says Phaganu as he examines the mark; and, while I estimate the length of antler, he calculates the amount of meat which, when the stag has been borne to the camp, he will dry in strips upon a neighbouring tree and convert into biltong for future use. Then he looks up at me with a smile. 'We shall eat this when the rains come. But we are hungry and want food *now*. If the sahib should start a sounder this evening and shoot us a fat boar, we could eat it at once.'

Perhaps, however, we are not so lucky, sight no good stag, and find ourselves, by 8 a.m., still empty-handed and far from home. It is useless to stalk after that hour in the hot weather; the deer are invisible, couched under the long grass, and the heat is overwhelming. In that case a frugal meal of sandwiches and cold tea, and we go to sleep under a tree till 3 p.m., when stalking can begin again. Maybe we spend the night also sleeping on the ground, our mattresses dead leaves and herbage. It is this free life, the bivouac in some quiet glade, the opportunities of watching the animal life around you, that make up more than half the fascination of these expeditions. How many a pleasant day and night have I spent in these jungles without firing a shot—the sound and sight of beasts about us, the waking in the brief freshness before dawn! It is then that we may see Baloo busy devouring the luscious blossoms that have fallen from the mahua tree during the hours of dark, or the back of Shere Khan himself as he glides like a snake of clouded amber hue down the grassy slope of a nulla. I remember how, one evening when I was prowling about without intending a stalk, I crawled up among some rocks overhanging a stream which still harboured a few pools of water. Long time I lay there and watched the creatures drinking just below me; fourteen of them I counted—three kinds of deer and a small bison all fraternising together. When I thought they had drunk as much as was good for them I stood upright. For a moment they all stared at me in aggrieved surprise; then the little bison said 'grumph,' threw up his tail, and bolted; and the others followed his example.

III

And now Scotland. How different the scene! Here are no deep glades, no lines of shimmering foliage, no devastating heat. Instead a keen air, treeless mountain-tops, an endless tumble of hills and lochs below, raven, peregrine and eagle circling overhead. Nor is the sport the same. Here your stalker may do more for you than you like. But Duncan is an admirable companion on the hillside. He is long-limbed, lithe and, despite honourable

wounds got with Lovat's Scouts, untiring. And he is a true child of the mountains, revelling in a long day among their crags.

Many years had passed since my last shoot in Indian jungles when I began stalking the red deer. At first I was inclined to be scornful. The creatures seemed to regard my form (viewed at a reasonable distance) with indifference; and I felt inclined to complain, with Alexander Selkirk, that 'their tameness is shocking to me.' I was wrong. You may, subject to certain limitations, of which more anon, take liberties in respect of sight which you could never take with Indian deer. But the red deer has another sense which makes his pursuit far more difficult. It is almost impossible to believe that the stag on yonder hill, invisible to the naked eye and, even through the spy-glass, a mere suggestion, will scent us, if a fresh wind is blowing, across the two miles that lie between. Yet so it is. Therefore (and here, perhaps because I am a tiro at this form of sport, and hence conceited and prone to the laying down of maxims, I am going to become tiresomely pedagogic), if there are two ways of approaching a red deer, one of which may give him your wind and the other exposes you to view, unhesitatingly choose the latter, even if it involves many miles round and a severe climb. This is an absolutely elementary maxim. The second maxim is not so simple. It is necessary to judge the direction of the wind, not only where you are, but also where the stag is. In these deep, gusty corries it is often not the same. Let me illustrate this point by an occurrence which once befell me, and incidentally shows that the man with the gun need not always be entirely passive in the stalk and that Duncan is no tyrant. We were going up a glorious valley which looks down on one of Scotland's loveliest lochs and is overshadowed by one of her biggest Bens. The way up the valley runs from west to east; and from the east a bright wind is blowing. There is no mistake about it; the little white clouds race to meet us and pass on to cast deep azure shadows on the loch below. We sight two stags and three hinds high up on the hillside to the north. After a long ascent and a painful crawl among jagged rocks, we find our way blocked by sheep. Mountain sheep are a terror to the stalker; they are as wild as the deer, and, if they spot you, will tear away with a sort of snorting sneeze and give the alarm to any herd in the neighbourhood. We creep hither and thither among those rocks, seeking to elude the sheep. The best we can do is to get to a position where the less desirable of the two stags is visible about 300 yards away; the others are invisible in a deep gully which lies between. An awkward shot; and we both agree that it should not be risked. So we lie watching and waiting. Then suddenly down the hillside above the herd comes a sheep racing. (We discovered afterwards that a party were ascending the big

Ben, and they must have disturbed the sheep.) Off go the herd down the valley, and do not pause till they come to a bend in the hillside about two miles away. We wait to see them disappear round that bend before we stir. Of course, a wary old hind constitutes herself a rearguard, stays at the corner looking back, and will not get out of our view. But at last our patience is rewarded. The herd turn left and disappear into the depths of the valley. It is certain that they will not seek the lower ground; therefore they will probably make their way back up the valley. I suggest descending and cutting them off. Duncan dissents; we shall be to the east of them and they will get our wind. This is where the humble man with the gun comes in. I had noticed, as we ascended the valley, that the wind at the bottom of it was blowing from west to east—in a direction exactly opposite to the prevailing current. I get my way. We move cautiously down the mountain-side. I crawl forward to a rocky knoll, and am just in time to shoot the bigger of the stags as he passes the foot of a precipitous slope below.

So much for scent. I am going to inflict on the reader two other maxims which have to do with sight. Here also I have been profoundly struck by the difference between the instincts of the Indian and the Highland deer. You can take liberties with the red deer which would be fatal with the swamp-deer. My third maxim is this: if a red deer comes suddenly into sight, never attempt to crouch or hide; stand stock-still. There is a good chance that, blending as you do (if you are suitably clad) with your surroundings, you will not be observed. The fourth is to approach your quarry, if possible, from above, but to avoid the skyline. The deer keep a lookout on the ground below and on the skyline above; they are curiously unobservant of objects between themselves and the skyline. Another anecdote in illustration of this. I once spent a whole day zigzagging along the steep face of a glen in a vain endeavour to circumvent a small herd consisting of two old stags and four little ones. Once I had got within range. But the shot was a difficult one, through rather tall grass. Duncan dissuaded me from it and signed to me to crawl backwards and come up again to a point only half a dozen yards away whence I could get a clearer aim. I crawled back unskilfully and ruined the stalk. I might add, as a fifth and minor maxim, do not crawl backwards if you can possibly avoid it. You can keep your head down quite easily; and, like the proverbial ostrich, you think you are hidden. But retrogression has a fatal way of exalting the hinder portions of your anatomy, the merest glimpse of which above the ridge or clump of heather where you are hiding seems to arouse the liveliest apprehensions in the cervine breast. Off went the herd, leaving us

tired and disconsolate. We continued our search; but they would not settle, and, whenever we got a sight of them, there were the wretched sheep between, or the approach was impossible for some other reason. Finally, from high up the mountain-side, we saw them far below, and at last they were beginning to browse. The slope between them and us was steep and perfectly bare—scree mixed with thin, short grass. It looked hopeless—to *me* utterly hopeless. Then said Duncan, 'Let's chance it.' We started on our backs down the slope, working ourselves along with our elbows and lying quite flat against the surface of the ground. Our eyes were glued on the six stags below us, and, whenever any one of them lifted his head, we lay motionless till he had begun to crop again. This painful mode of progression lasted, as I afterwards discovered from my watch, three-quarters of an hour, during which we were in full sight of the herd, but *not* on the skyline; and that which was visible of us must have blended with the background. When we found that we could go no further without certain discovery my coat had transferred itself to the back of my head, my arms were bare, my elbows were bleeding. But we were not more than 150 yards from the stags. A tiny platform presented itself on my left; I let myself tumble on to the platform, waited till I was steady, and dropped one of the old stags.

Of course, there are many other things to learn about stalking—the equipment, the battery, the precautions to be taken when firing from among rocks, or firing downhill or uphill. I have touched on only a few elementary points regarding the stalk itself. For the stalk's the thing! It is the stalk that really pits you against your prey, calls out your powers of observation and resourcefulness and makes you 'go all out'—no circuit too long, no hillside too steep, no crawl too laborious. And, in the intervals between concentrated energy and absorbing thrill, when you can rest your limbs and let your eyes rove, then the senses reawaken with surprised delight to the pomp of the prospect, the solemnity of the mountains, the far-flung panorama below, the isolation from all sound save the music of the burn, from all life save the four-footed denizens of the hills and yon eagle that sails out over the glen.

September is upon us. The antlers are almost clean. The showers of August are over. The pearly strands of mist will be lifting from the mountains. Already in anticipation I see the green slopes, the grey screes, the soaring crags. And what are those globes of vapour, like tiny puffs of shrapnel, that break out along the hillside and gleam iridescent in the sunshine? It is the great stags shaking the moisture from their coats. So, to all who love the Highlands and their finest sport, big stags, straight rifles and, above all, long stalks!

H. SHARP.

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EUGENICAL REFORM

II. THE DEMOCRACY

To reform democracy on eugenical lines will seem to many as fantastic an undertaking as to reform the House of Lords: for is it not part of the democratic creed that all men are born free and equal? And is it not a vital part of the meaning of 'eugenics' that some are *better born* than others? To which it may be replied that no doubt if creeds were construed literally and acted on, the task would be hopeless; but fortunately this is no longer usual. Moreover, the democratic creed, in particular, is far from watertight, and still further from agreement with the facts of politics. So we should not be surprised to find that it falls short of absolutely excluding all hope of eugenical reform, for three good and sufficient reasons.

I

In the first place, not all democracies in name are democracies in fact. Because a State is officially denominated a democracy it by no means follows that the will of the people always and in all respects controls it and determines the course of national history. In all democracies that have ever existed there have been provided checks in practice upon the whims of the 'sovereign people' and the theoretical 'omnipotence of Parliament.' Thus, as was shown in the preceding article, our modern democracies all have in them a strong infusion of plutocracy, which may easily reduce democracy to a mere *façade*.

Again, unlike ancient, modern democracies all employ bureaucracies, and so far have capitulated to the demand (first urged by Socrates) for expert government. Now bureaucracy is quite as potent and insidious an enemy to the freedom and equality of ideal democracy as plutocracy itself. It is practically inevitable in all large-scale government. It can insinuate itself into all institutions and govern in their name. For it can exploit the human weaknesses of the depositaries of power, and it is only when a bureaucracy has long been allowed to rule unchecked and uncontrolled that it grows stupid, and forgets the arts of expert

government, as did the great bureaucracies of Austria, Germany, and Russia, which came to grief in the World War. It is true that in a 'democracy' also the bureaucrats are servants, theoretically, and not masters. From long experience, however, they have become past masters in the art of guiding, and hoodwinking, the rulers from whom they are supposed to take their orders.

Their power rests on the psychological fact that only great intelligence, coupled with perpetual vigilance and unwearying attention to detail, can compel an organised body of officials to carry out a policy they dislike, and prevent them from administering *any* political system in the manner most convenient to themselves. If the ruler is an 'autocrat' (whether a pope, a tsar or a dictator) who desires to know what is actually being done in his name, it is easy to wear him out by making him read all the documents to which his name is to be attached and taking good care to break his teeth and blunt his zeal on plenty of *routine* stuff before showing him anything of critical importance, which can best be slipped in at the end of a tiring day. If he is a politician presiding over a Government office who hesitates to take the advice tendered him by his permanent officials, any trace of laziness, ignorance, or preoccupation with other matters he may show can at once be exploited to his discomfiture.¹ Normally therefore, and in the long run, the permanent officials and the traditions of the office get the better of their nominal superiors, who discover that they are Gullivers securely tied up with red tape by their Lilliputian advisers, and that acquiescence is the way of ease and security. So far as bureaucracy has its way the ultimate ruler will always be found to be the master of pigeon-holes, who knows where every document is kept, and has the routine of the office at his fingers' ends.

If, lastly, the victim of professional skill is the sovereign people itself, and the politicians are the 'experts' deputed to ascertain its will, recourse may be had to many methods of deception. Bribery and corruption, promises and threats, excitants and dopes, are freely used, until such mind as the public has is thrown into utter confusion. The politicians in office have a great initial advantage; they have it in their power to appeal to the people at the time and on the issues that best suit themselves. But this advantage is often more than counterbalanced by the people's grim determination at all costs to oust the party in power and the ever-reviving hope that the Opposition may do better. So the art of engineering a general election becomes on the part of the Government an art of obtaining by false pretences

¹ This appears to have been the inner or office history of the notorious Zinovieff Letter, by means of which the first Ramsay MacDonald Government was beguiled into committing suicide.

a blank cheque to govern for another term, on the part of the Opposition an art of confusing the issue by abundant trails of succulent red herrings.

Even if democracy has been carried to the pitch of allowing direct consultation of the people by means of the referendum, the same principles still hold. It is quite easy to surfeit the sovereign people with this exercise of power by continually referring to it trivial or complicated issues until the masses weary of voting on them, and the expedient is discredited because the politicians can plausibly allege that the referendum is not wanted. This is the exact analogue of the device of stuffing an autocrat with unimportant documents. The whole *modus operandi* of bamboozling a democracy was of course discovered long ago, by the Greeks, and modern methods of electioneering, Press manipulation, etc., have not modified the essential principle of distracting public attention from what it is desired to keep secret by attracting it to something trivial which is calculated to engross it. It is best illustrated by the story of the Molossian hound with which Alcibiades amused the Athenians while he was conducting negotiations that would not bear the light of day.

II

Plutocracy and bureaucracy, then, can always be trusted to put sufficient grit into the wheels of democracy's chariot to prevent them from making too many revolutions. Both these political forces, however, presuppose that the masses are mostly fools or snobs; and this is not altogether true. Not all democrats are utterly impervious to the lessons of science and common sense. It is not impossible, therefore, that sooner or later they may take alarm at the dreadfully dysgenical trend of our civilisation and may give their consent, and even support, to the eugenical measures designed to cure it.

If we proceed to ask in what places democracy may soonest feel the pinch of its dysgenical ordering, we at once encounter three serious problems.

III

In the first place, what is to be done about the survival of the unfit which is tolerated, supported, and stimulated by our present institutions? Is nothing to be done to arrest the proliferation of the feeble-minded and defectives, and the growth and dissemination of insanity? At present civilised societies are doing practically nothing to prevent the deterioration of their germ plasm by the free breeding of the most undesirable sections of their population. So far from being restricted, it is encouraged in a variety

of ways, and financed by the progressive taxation of the classes into which the ability, energy, and industry of a society are more and more enabled to rise. Under this taxation, and other impediments to reproduction which social institutions foster, the classes in which the cream accumulates are more and more rapidly dying out. Thus civilised society is sterilising its ability and extirpating its good stocks, while artificially multiplying its bad ones.

There is no end in sight to this suicidal process, but it is clear that it cannot continue indefinitely. For the breeding and supporting of lunatics and 'morons' is an expensive process, which must more and more absorb all the resources and energies of a society which persists in it, and must end in catastrophe.

So long as democracies are not entirely manned by feeble-minded fools the impossibility of this policy is bound to become apparent. Sensible and hard-working democrats will then revolt against supporting idlers, wasters, and morons in ever-growing numbers at the public expense, which they will more and more understand to be at their own. Perhaps they will begin by eliminating first the idle rich, the froth at the top, before attacking the dregs at the bottom of the social mixture, the 'submerged tenth' and unemployables; but it is hard to believe that the workers can have much love for any sort of drones.

Accordingly, as Mr. Henry Sturt has suggested,^a we need not fear that a Labour Government, animated by trade union principles, will deal too tenderly with the defectives. We may expect rather that their proliferation would speedily be stopped, whether by segregation or by sterilisation, drastically and even ruthlessly. For Labour sentiment would be free from two pernicious delusions which have often affected capitalistic legislation. It would not demand plenty of cheap labour, and it would not believe that anyone was good enough to fight and therefore insist on superabundant cannon fodder. It may be freer also from the stupid conservatism which cannot see the need for new adjustments. So it may even prove that democracies will be readier to listen to the case for eugenics than capitalist plutocracies.

IV

Secondly, the willingness to do something eugenical will be enhanced as the grim spectre of *over-population* comes nearer and nearer. It may not yet be true that Western Europe is as tragically over-populated as China, and that its numbers can be limited only by starvation. But there is little doubt that its population has already far exceeded the *optimum*, and that its

^a *Socialism and Character*, ch. vi.

growing numbers are supported with increasing difficulty under the law of diminishing returns. No doubt Europe's economic troubles are partly due to its political fatuity in cutting itself up into small areas shut up in lofty tariff walls, and so artificially reducing its production and the efficiency of its industry. But still the fact remains that Europe cannot feed the population it has with the food it can produce. To make a living, therefore, it *has* to manufacture for export to the countries which can still produce a surplus of foodstuffs and raw materials. But as the population of these countries rises their surplus must diminish, and moreover, under the influence of the same morbid nationalism that is devastating Europe, they, too, are rapidly establishing manufactures and tariff walls to render themselves independent of European imports. The export trade of Europe therefore seems destined to diminish, and with it the population Europe can support.

But this process might be indefinitely delayed if Europe could contrive to breed *better men*, and to keep them employed at home. At present it probably still has some advantage in the *quality* of its population. As compared with the non-European stocks the European is still superior, not intrinsically, perhaps, so much as in social organisation and cultural tradition. However, the peoples which most nearly approach European standards of efficiency, the Japanese and the Chinese, suffer even more than we do from population pressure, and it seems an open question whether they are losing more by malnutrition of their masses or gaining more by the more extensive elimination of the unfit under their social conditions. Probably the adoption of a eugenic policy by either party would prove to be the decisive factor in the struggle for existence of the European and the Mongolian race.

As compared with the colonists sent out from Europe to America, Australia, and Africa, the advantage of the European is probably very slight. Doubtless Europe at *no* time exported its very best stocks, which could always rise to pre-eminence at home; but in the early days of European colonisation it certainly exported a large proportion of its more enterprising and energetic types. Also under the early colonial conditions it was more difficult to make good in the new countries, and so natural selection was much severer. So weaklings and incompetents of all sorts were eliminated much more ruthlessly, and a comparatively high degree of personal efficiency resulted. Then came a period in which the colonies grew most anxious to import labour, and usually *cheap* labour; so they naturally obtained an inferior sort of immigrant who was willing to do the hard and dirty work the descendants of the first colonists now disdained, and this *lowered* the quality of the population. The United States of America

conspicuously pursued this policy throughout the nineteenth century, while Australia kept out immigrants in order to keep up wages. America had her reward in her prodigious economic development, but at the cost of a terrible adulteration of her population, which may yet prove to have been her bane. At any rate, it has filled America with a very mixed crowd, and has reduced the old English stock to an upper stratum, and one, moreover, which is rapidly thinning out and seems doomed to disappear. As regards the future, America has now closed her frontiers to further mass immigration from Europe (though not as yet from Mexico and the Philippines), and the character of her immigration is therefore bound to change. It *may*, however, change greatly for the better. For her financial preponderance puts her in a position to attract whatever European talent she desires. She can drain any ability she may covet among the professional classes of Europe by the offer of more money and a bigger career. In other words, she can buy the best men as she can buy the best works of art, if she chooses. On the other hand, she is likely to *export* to Europe an ever larger proportion of her idle rich and an ever-increasing flood of tourists; for only so will she be able to spend the income on her European investments, so long as she refuses to take payment in manufactured articles. Europe will thus lose professional ability, and be turned more and more into a pleasure resort. This, of course, will be demoralising, and in the long run hardly to the advantage of the European stocks.

The best policy for Europe to pursue, the only hope of staving off stagnation and degeneracy, would therefore seem to be to augment the intrinsic efficiency of the European: only by excising sternly all the traces of dry rot in the social structure all the superfluities of naughtiness, will European man be able to maintain himself, or even to survive. We must get rid, therefore, of our unproductive and parasitic classes, alike of the idle rich and of the unemployables, and stimulate the rest to more and more efficiency. The loss of these parasites may no doubt entail a certain loss in numbers, but the loss in quantity will be so amply compensated by the gain in quality that the volume of production will not suffer. And a smaller, less dense, but better paid and more efficient, population will be far better situated to enjoy the amenities of life than the denizens of our crowded city slums.

This is surely a development that might be welcomed by the leaders of our workers. For though not egalitarian, it may fairly be contended that it would be truly democratic. It would afford to all an opportunity to lead a life worth living, and to rise in the social scale according to the measure of their congenital capacity; from all, also, it would exact some useful social service.

V

The same policy would seem to be indicated also by another consideration. Hitherto European labour policies have aimed mainly at limiting the hours and the intensity of labour, in order to relieve the cruel pressure of undue competition. Thus the efficient, with a fine *esprit de corps*, have sacrificed themselves to save the lame ducks. They have thereby greatly limited the output and the productivity of labour; yet they have woefully failed to limit competition, because they have not limited the supply of labour. This has always been in excess, and has enabled the greedy capitalist to cut down the rates of pay when his labour seemed to him to grow too efficient. Hence no really prosperous class of workers could arise.

But there is a possible alternative, which has been elaborated in America and to which its industrial success seems to be largely due. It is to limit the *supply* of labour, while increasing its efficiency. If labour is made scarce and dear, it must be made efficient; for inefficient labour is not worth the high wages that are paid. Hence the cutting off or diminution of the supply of inefficient labour would directly raise the wages of efficient labour, which could then attain and maintain an altogether higher standard of life. The workers would no longer be dragged down by the masses of inefficient casual labour which does not limit its reproduction and fills the asylums and floods the labour market with defectives. It can hardly be doubted, therefore, that if this class could be stopped from proliferating so much faster than the better workers the conditions of labour could be enormously improved.

VI

An incidental result might be to arrest the growth of population, or even to turn it into a slight decline. The cry of depopulation would then be raised, as it has so often been by panic-stricken militarists. These have long been accustomed to bewail the 'growing depopulation' of France, although before the war the actual figures showed an increase which averaged 50,000 a year, and although at present the French birth rate is two per thousand above our own. The alarmists infer that in a few years a decline of population must set in and continue into irretrievable decay; but they fail to understand that the decline of the birth rate is a reaction to our present overcrowding and unemployment, and means a blind and unscientific attempt of popular intelligence to reach an *optimum* of population. It may well coexist with a potential increase which will be realised so soon as a sufficient improvement is brought about in the conditions of life.

VII

We may take it, then, that these two problems, the proliferation of defectives and over-population, will drive intelligent democracies into eugenical policies. At first sight, however, both these problems seem to call for measures only of negative rather than of positive eugenics—that is, for measures to purify the national stock, and to rid it of defective elements, rather than to raise it to a higher level. In the main this objection would be true, though incidentally the intenser struggle to live in which Europe would be involved would put a premium on a development of higher types which even the most *doctrinaire* democracy could hardly afford to arrest as too aristocratic. There is, however, a third stimulus to eugenics, now pressing upon European democracies, which is definitely aristocratic in tendency and definitely favours *positive* eugenics. This is the competition between European and coloured labour.

This competition is rapidly becoming world-wide, though its effects are not yet felt as intensely as they will be when the masses of Asia, in India, China and Japan, are fully industrialised. At present there is still a great contrast between European and coloured labour. Broadly speaking, the former is better paid, better housed, and better fed. Moreover, the European worker is, pretty obviously, *the better man*. He is, in short, the *aristocrat* of the labour world.

But his position is far from secure. It is being undermined by the short-sighted and unscrupulous capitalists who are industrialising the East. They have already had a large measure of success. The manufacture of jute has already passed from Dundee to Calcutta, and Lancashire is fighting a losing battle to retain that of cotton against Bombay, Shanghai, and Japan. The demand for cheap labour never ceases, and, despite many object-lessons to the contrary, the business man is still ready to believe that the cheapest labour is that of the cheapest man.

So there is no encouragement to the production of better work by better men. Wherever white labour competes with coloured, the latter gains, and drives the former out of business. The white man becomes too proud to work. He leaves the dirty, hard, and low-grade work to his inferiors. He merely oversees, guides and controls.

So soon as he does this he gets into the deadly clutches of Gresham's Law. This sinister law applies as certainly to population as to coinage. As certainly as bad money drives out good do inferior populations crowd out and supplant superior. They fill the inferior jobs, which are plentiful, and restrict their superiors to the higher places, which are few. They compose the lower

strata of the population, which multiply and lift their superiors to the sparsely populated heights, where they peter out and grow extinct.

It would seem that nothing short of a complete reconstruction of our social structure could bring about a reversal of these tendencies. The psychological and economic forces underlying them must be fought with their own weapons and counteracted. For the alternative of repressing the coloured labour *by force*, though it naturally commends itself to the sentiment of the historically and biologically ignorant in all classes, would lead to consequences too terrible to contemplate, even from afar. It is sure to be tried—indeed, it is now being tried in South Africa and elsewhere; but it seems bound to fail there, as it has already failed in the West Indies and in South America. It is bound to fail, because, although a sufficiently brutal *and intelligent* policy of oppression might perhaps succeed in the countries which are now under white rule, it is not very likely that the white rulers will be intelligent enough to devise a biologically effective policy of this sort or persist in it long enough, while it is very unlikely that they will *unite* upon such a policy. The temptation to exploit and enslave coloured labour, rather than to exterminate it, would prove irresistibly attractive to a large and potent faction of the whites; the result would be class wars among the whites, to be followed later by successful slave revolts. These would doubtless be fomented and supported by the States *not* ruled by whites—at present China and Japan—and likely to be more numerous and powerful in future. At the moment world-wide race wars of extermination (which, be it noted, our premier prophet, Mr. H. G. Wells, with his uncanny prescience, has already prophesied) might end in the triumph of the whites, *if they were united*; but they are so unlikely to unite, and hate each other so cordially, that their future looks by no means bright.

A policy, therefore, that means injustice, violence, and war is not a solution of the labour problem to recommend to white democracies. It will be safer, easier, and infinitely better for humanity if they will endeavour to maintain themselves, not by oppressing others, but by improving themselves. Let them breed *better men*, and thereby both preserve their position at the head of the human race and set a good example of true—that is, of eugenical—progressiveness to the whole world.

VIII

It is not, therefore, wholly inconceivable that some democracies may be converted to eugenics. Indeed, in this matter also they would probably be easier to convert than capitalistic plutocracies,

still conservatively hankering after war and retaining an obsolete belief in force, slavery, and economic exploitation.

But, even if all the democracies should prove unteachable and unmanageable, there would still be room for hope. For not all democrats are utter fools, utterly impervious to the lessons of common sense and science. The more intelligent would abandon democracy when they saw that it was unalterably opposed to human progress. They would allow themselves to be reminded that, after all, democracy is but a form of government, and that *good* government is the final end of government.

If, therefore, democracy refused to minister to this end, some other expedient would have to be tried. Moreover, the post-war experience of Europe manifestly shows that it is by no means difficult to overthrow democracies, and that quite minute minorities can institute dictatorships, if resolute and favourably situated. True, these dictatorships have hardly introduced any new ideas into politics. Neither the Fascists nor the Communists have exhibited any novelty of political insight or ingenuity. There is nothing new in governing with bombs and bayonets or castor oil and cudgels. But it would be strange if the scientifically selected rulers sprung from a eugenical aristocracy which appealed to all men's noblest ambitions could not progressively improve upon these antiquated and atrocious methods.

IX

And finally, in the very last resort, if the human race should perversely, stupidly, and obstinately persist in refusing to enter upon the pathway of escape from its troubles indicated by eugenics, it will have to be reminded that it cannot hope, after all, to escape from the control of natural law. It can, no doubt, turn a deaf ear to the teaching of biology. A 'fundamentalist' reaction may even suppress all instruction in science. It can sustain institutions of all kinds which ignore and defy the conditions of sanity and sanitation. It has often done so in the past, and may do so in the future.

But if it does, it will suffer for its sins, as it has done heretofore. There is *no* way of eluding or deluding laws of Nature. They cannot be set aside by human enactment, and if they are defied they entail their consequences as before; only these will be found to be less acceptable.

Now the laws of Nature do not promise man an assured continuance upon earth, whatever he may choose to do and however he may conduct himself. They do not guarantee his survival nor render his progress inevitable. They leave him free, within wide limits, to determine his future. We need not progress. We can

prefer to stagnate. We can, if we choose, degenerate. We can even, in the end, become extinct.

In fact some or all of these possibilities are likely to be realised, if we go on as we are going. True, we are at present more favourably situated than mankind has ever been before. We have much more power over Nature—we have vastly more control over the conditions of our life—because we have far more knowledge, and our institutions of learning have not yet quite choked themselves with the waste products of the knowledge they were designed to transmit. We have far greater resources, which we can waste. We are farther from the danger line and the limit of subsistence.

But in the wickedness of his heart and the perversity of his thought man is quite as poor a creature as he was 10,000 years ago, when he devised his civilisation and failed to observe that he had unwittingly established a dysgenic institution which would arrest his progress. Since then he has remained at heart a barbarian, or even a savage, while becoming more of a fool. So it is quite on the cards that he may refuse to listen to the gospel of eugenics, and go on eating and drinking and mating, heedless of science and scoffing at the 'prophets of evil' who warn him vainly. In that case, men of the day, shall we not go and join the dinosaurs?

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

HISTORY AND MR. WELLS

IN a recent novel, *Mr. Blettsworthy on Rampole Island*, Mr. Wells warned us of the dangers of militarism and the blind obedience of tradition. He took as his medium an imaginary tribe of Patagonian savages. This tribe lived in a dark and narrow valley, existing miserably without the power of thinking progressively. They are in a state of chronic warfare with the other tribe further up the ravine, and have neither the imagination to conceive of the benefits of peace and union, nor even the intelligence to adopt any new method in strategy or tactics which might give them the satisfaction of victory. He paints a picture of the utter dreariness of these poor savages, cramped alike by the narrowness of their sunless ravine and the narrowness of their brutal and slavish mentality. In his latest novel, *The Autocracy of Mr. Parham*,¹ Mr. Wells is again a propagandist. He is once more warning us that, unless we can abandon our traditional methods of action and see the problems of politics more realistically, our civilisation will be lost. But in this book Mr. Wells has changed the scene slightly, and instructs us, not through the medium of Patagonian savages, but of an Oxford history tutor. He shows us what he conceives to be a typical history don, Mr. Parham, senior tutor of St. Simon's College, arriving fantastically at the position of Dictator or Lord Paramount of England. Installed in this great office, he rules the Empire and takes his part in world politics according to the best traditions of history. He identifies the salient *forces* in world politics; he follows the inherent *logic* of the situation. All that he does is 100 per cent. history according to the best standards of Richelieu and the great masters. It is an essential part of the game, or, one might say, essential to the 'composition' of his world picture, to find an enemy. This enemy, of course, is Russia. He organises in the classic manner a combination against her. All seems to be going well, when a conflict arises between Britain and America over the question of neutral rights, which Mr. Parham, as an historian, might have remembered. The two great navies mutually destroy each other. Then there begins a general revolt of the common uneducated people of England, who are so shamefully lacking in a

¹ Published by William Heinemann, Ltd.

sense of historical form. They refuse to recognise the necessity of acting according to the old diplomatic and military traditions. They will not go through the old steps; they deny the binding force of patriotic obligations and symbols; they blaspheme against History.

In spite of its fantastic and even farcical passages, the book is a serious presentation of a serious danger. In our world both the material forces and moral influences are rapidly changing. Our political forms and our political traditions may easily become obsolete and therefore dangerous. If one may adapt a famous phrase of a famous Oxford historian, 'scientific progress is out-running administrative order.' Man, in his bewildering and changing environment, is in danger from acting according to what psychologists would call the 'behaviour patterns' of an earlier age; we must get rid of historical 'fixations' on certain ages. And the fixation of which Mr. Wells seems to be afraid is fixation on the age of traditional diplomacy and warfare, the age that was ushered in by Richelieu and closed perhaps by Vergennes, but which has become, in a sense, classical. This classical tradition has had its greatest influence in French diplomacy, and it gives to French historical writing that geometricity which is so pleasing in point of style and often so misleading in point of fact. This traditional outlook Mr. Wells considers to be still a danger to us. When the very maintenance of civilisation seems to depend on economic and political co-operation, we act according to the meaningless formulæ of diplomatic antagonism. Through sheer sluggishness of the intellect and lethargy of the imagination statesmen go on dressing the lists for a tournament, forgetting that the weapons which are now used are lethal to combatants and to spectators as well.

Now, this deadly tradition which Mr. Wells fears so much is, in his opinion, fostered and perpetuated by our present methods of studying history in the universities, more particularly at Oxford. By means of the mythical figure of Mr. Parham he presents an indictment against Oxford history. It seems to him to have become classical and therefore dead, unrelated to the pressing problems of political action. He remarks in reference to Mr. Parham's mental processes:

It is one of the endless advantages of a sound classical education that you need never see, you can never see, a human relationship in its vulgar simplicity; there is always the enrichment of these regurgitated factors. You lose all sense of current events; you simply get such history as you have swallowed repeating itself.

Now, this is a very serious indictment. It cannot fail to be of interest to Oxford history tutors, and, as there seems at present to be no means of dissuading the wealthiest and most influential

people in the country from sending their most intelligent sons, and even daughters, to Oxford and Cambridge, it is presumably of general public interest as well. My first feeling on hearing this charge levelled at myself and my fellow-historians at Oxford is one of shocked and injured indignation. With most of Mr. Wells' general thesis I find myself in complete agreement. It seems to me to be one of the most obvious lessons of history that the preservation of States and civilisations lies in the ability to allow for changed conditions. Modern history as we teach it in Oxford would appear to me to be an aid to Mr. Wells' propaganda. We may at times become immersed in detail because of its convenience for examination purposes. But rival schools of history generally accuse us of a broadness and generality in our treatment of history which we call philosophic and others journalistic. It may be that we are traditionalist in some matters, but most of us, at any rate, would claim to be as conscious as most people of the rapidly ascending curve of change in the last century. In fact, not only are Mr. Wells' assumptions about the spirit of our teaching insulting in themselves, but his charges remind us of all those false analogies, those irrelevant comparisons, those shallow deductions from past to present, that ignorance of modern facts, that indifference to modern problems, that cowardly reliance on mere scholastic technique as a substitute for real education, that I am accustomed to associate with my colleagues and friends the tutors in classics and ancient history. Mr. Parham appears to be, not one of us, but one of them. One asks oneself whether, in dealing with Oxford, Mr. Wells may not have committed the cardinal sin against reality by thinking of Oxford as an abstract entity instead of as a complex of individuals with every variation of opinion known to exist among the intelligentsia of to-day.

But not only does Mr. Wells ruffle my complacency as a professional teacher of history, he outrages my pride as an academic man in general. For he suggests that it is the ordinary man in the street, the average vulgar person, who can see through the outworn forms, the shibboleths and traditions which sway the minds of so-called educated people. Mr. Wells seems to have a faith, which, were it held by anyone less uncompromisingly rationalistic, I should be tempted to call mystical, in the penetrating vision of the average citizen. In the universities we are apt to imagine that it is we who can see further through the set ideas and hardened conventions of life and politics. We do not attribute this merely to those supposed intellectual abilities by which we win distinction in our own examination system, but rather to the possession of leisure. Since we have the opportunity to observe and meditate upon the condition of the world

unharassed by the pressure of business life, we suppose that we are more emancipated from a thoughtless traditionalism. According to us, it is the man in the street, the man in the 'pub.' who requires to be warned of the danger of expecting that things will be in the future as they have been in the past. It is he, we imagine, who says, 'What I always say is that there must always be wars and fighting. It's natural, it's human; and as for that there League of Nations—well, we all know what that amounts to.' It is because it is so much easier to accept traditionalism, to worship symbols, and to re-echo patriotic cries than to peer behind these well-known forms into the complex nature of reality, that we consider that the average man stands in need of enlightenment from the universities. Mr. Wells, however, is of the opinion that the situation is exactly reversed, that the Stock Exchange or the Old Kent Road can by the light of their daily experience see further into the problems of world politics than the reflective scholar. It would be idle to dismiss Mr. Wells' opinion as unfounded. He is much more in touch with both worlds than most people. He must have good reason for holding the view he does. He is much too big a man to be motivated only by the justifiable resentment which one presumably feels when one has been patronised for over forty years by men of more expensive education and vastly inferior understanding. But one explanation of the difference of opinion may be that Mr. Wells is thinking more of the past products of Oxford teaching than of Oxford teaching as it is. He may have seen more of the hardened than of the molten lava of our university education. For it is an unfortunate fact that many men consider that, when they have concluded the formal or university part of their education, they must consolidate what they have learned rather than complete and extend it. There is in all established educational curricula, and in the classical curriculum in particular, one serious danger. This is, that it tends to teach a man that what matters in life is not to know what it is important to know, but rather to be able to prove that what you do not know is unimportant. We think of our education as an asset and we cannot bear to have it depreciated. Rather than submit to that we will be ready to depreciate everything else. Mr. Wells expresses this forcibly when he makes the vulgar Sir Bussy explode at Mr. Parham.

Parham, you're infernally well satisfied with the world. I'm not. You're afraid it may change into something else. You want to stop it right here and now. Or else you may have to learn something new and throw away the old bag of tricks. Yes—I know you. That's your whole mind. You're afraid that a time will come when all the important things of to-day will just not matter a rap.

The don, or at any rate the historical don, who can read these

words without a searching of heart must surely have lost his soul. And one's first impulse is to respond with indignation. When assailed by such a menace to his stock-in-trade many a cultured academic man will fight new ideas with all the despairing ferocity of an old hand-loom weaver attacking a steam-driven factory. But for the don as opposed to the university man who has moved on into another profession there is at least this much to be said. He at any rate has his pupils to keep him up to date. Pupils press their tutors hard, and in the effort to keep up to date a man may learn much. Mr. Wells describes Mr. Parham as being used to addressing 'muted' undergraduates, and as a result 'he tended if anything to over-develop his pauses.' But in real life undergraduates are anything but muted. Nor does any tutor who is worth his salt want them to be so. Quite half of the art of tutoring consists in getting your man to talk, and even argue. Dons when they pass into the outer world may appear, may even be, dogmatic, but that is not, like the dogmatism of the schoolmaster, a carry-over from his ordinary work, but a reaction or compensation against it. What with pupils who may have been reading all the latest books and critical and erudite colleagues, the chief danger for the don is that he tends to adopt an excessive agnosticism. That is why even recognised authorities adopt the habit of prefacing their views with formulæ like 'I think there is something to be said for the view that . . . ' or 'I had rather imagined . . . '

But, to return to the more technical question of academic history, Mr. Wells seems to be over-estimating the amount of attention which is given to diplomatic and balance-of-power periods. For one thing, many students give most of their attention to mediæval periods. They deal with an age which scarcely knew Powers or nations, which condemned as immoral the economics of competition. The political theory of this age is the theory of a world-State which, removed from its scholastic setting, is just such a conception as that for which Mr. Wells is fighting. It is true that if he is a pure or mere scholar, and interested only in the minutiae of Chancery writs or entries in *Domesday Book* he may accept Parhamese traditionalism for the present day; but if he allows his mediæval studies to fertilise his thought on other matters it will be a powerful antidote. Other historians are so modern in their interests that they care little for the problems of the age of classical diplomacy. They are concerned more with the emergence of economic factors in history and with the problems raised by the Industrial Revolution and the tendency of material wealth to grow at the rate of geometrical progression. And we have even at Oxford our Marxian determinists, dogmatists, and traditionalists indeed,

but of such a kind that they will act as a powerful corrective to Mr. Parham. But coming to the period of Mr. Wells' *bête noir*, Richelieu, it is doubtful whether he is studied mainly as the maker of great diplomatic combinations. At any rate, care will be taken to point out the greatness of his work as the great anti-traditionalist of his day, the man who crushed out the petty separatism of the Huguenots and put an end to the barren bickerings and local sovereignties of the feudal magnates and built up in the world of France a great State on the basis of universal disarmament. But if Mr. Wells wants to know how the age of Richelieu is being approached at Oxford, let him read the most recent notable work by an Oxford history tutor, Mr. G. N. Clark's study of the seventeenth century.² Here is a book which treats of every side of human activity during that period from population and commerce to international law and political philosophy, art, and engineering. The main purpose of this book is, not to stress the similarity, but to assess the difference between that age and our own. In it the reader will make the interesting discovery that, in the age of Richelieu, frontiers, as the modern world knows them, scarcely existed; the work of exact delimitation and standardisation of territory lay in the future, just as some day our present frontiers may be things of the past. Another point brought out by Mr. Clark is that the seventeenth century was the age in which knowledge of the nature of the physical universe increased so greatly that it could only be apprehended by a select few, and therefore there came about that disparity between the outlook and general philosophy of the educated minority as opposed to the masses. The cultured man came to live in a world of one more dimension than the vulgar, and was in his outlook on the universe as an adult to a child. In our own day popular education and such powerful agencies as the works of Mr. Wells may be bridging the gulf once more, but it was that gulf which gave to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their intensely aristocratic character as opposed to the Middle Ages and the present day. One aspect of this was that specialisation of war and diplomacy in the hands of a few while the masses blindly obeyed, for which Mr. Parham stands as a symbol. It is essential to realise that these conditions no longer exist, but it is unfair to academic historians to suppose that they are so unphilosophic as to be ignorant of such a fact.

It is, however, true that all formal courses of history have in the nature of things a tendency to congeal the past and to make students think of it in isolation from the present. Every period must have a termination, and a gap is left between that date and the present day for purely technical reasons of instruction

² *The Seventeenth Century* (Oxford University Press).

and examination. This has some advantages in that it may prevent the student from taking with him some of his political or other prejudices. But on the whole it seems to be a necessary evil, and we can only try our best to mitigate it. The best corrective is to be found outside the official study, in general reading, and all those numerous agencies which exist in our universities to interest students in current affairs. But Oxford is not blind to the desirability of extending the periods of historical study to as near the present day as possible. It has just been suggested that in the new school of philosophy, politics, and economics the period of history set should be from 1870 to 1914. If this is not adopted, it will be for two reasons. Many will object that a period that goes back so short a distance will tend to perpetuate that belief in the continuance of present conditions which it is the function of history to correct. And, indeed, it may well be argued that the period of the armed peace between the two Franco-German wars might become misleading and would very soon become classical. Others may oppose it on purely technical grounds, because of the lack of good text-books and the difficulty of adding to the enormous range of history which overworked tutors are supposed to cover. If Mr. Wells could get us the endowment for some new fellowships for this purpose he would be dealing a great blow at Parhamism.

But Mr. Parham, to one who knows present-day Oxford, remains something of an abstraction. There are no doubt some historians who have his outlook, but that is rather in spite of than because of the fact that they are historians. Parhamism is a danger more as dead matter than as a malignant growth in our academic world. The real difference, the real struggle, is between those who take a continuous and serious interest in the problems of modern politics and those who do not. These must of necessity be a minority—if you like, an aristocracy, but an aristocracy that has very little relation to wealth or birth and even to formal education. Many men of great wisdom, talent, and character are by the direction of their interests incapable of making a serious study of our political and economic condition. Among these may be historians, some of them of very great professional competence. But, on the whole, historians are compelled, by the nature of their study, to take the question of the political organisation of the modern world seriously. They may, on the whole, be classed with the politically conscious classes, as opposed to those who only devote to politics a modicum of frivolous attention—artists, actors, professors of literature, stock-brokers, clergymen, scientists and others. I believe that it is not in historical tradition, but in general apathy, that the danger to peace is to be found.

But one more point about the value of the study of history at Oxford remains. I have been concerned to show that Oxford history is less formal and traditional than Mr. Wells imagines. Does it teach anything the value of which Mr. Wells overlooks? There is perhaps just one thing. The central interest of the modern history school at Oxford is the study of the English Constitution in its development. One of the most senior of the historical lecturers at Oxford used to remark to his class: 'When you young men write essays about the foreign policy of Richelieu or Wolsey, you are simply talking through your hat; the one thing that really matters is the study of the constitutional history of England.' The first sentence should be highly pleasing to Mr. Wells, but he may doubt the value of the second statement. I am not here concerned to discuss whether the constitutional side is not now overweighted to the prejudice of social history. But the attention given to the study of institutional history has been of great value. Men like Maitland and Pollard have taught us to be institutional biologists and to study the processes by which institutions serve or cease to serve the people of a country. We study the genetics of institutions, the methods and results of transplantations, the unexpected metamorphoses, the process of decay. But Mr. Wells, in his impatient attitude to the League of Nations, seems to be overlooking some of the lessons of institutional biology. He seeks some alchemy which by a stroke of particular creation will give us a world-State. And here he seems to be moving away from the world of realities, neglecting his data, misunderstanding the nature of his material. It seems strange that Mr. Wells, who has always prided himself on being a biologist, can only look on institutions from the point of view of a chemist.

If one considers, not the products of Oxford in the past, but present and probable future products in relation to Mr. Wells' problem, it does not appear that their view of world politics is likely to be influenced by excessive traditionalism. To take one example, Mr. Wells seems to be afraid of the dangerous effects of the survival of the old rigid conception of State sovereignty. It acts as a deadweight on realistic political thinking and corresponds to no modern needs. Probably the doctrine is impregnably enthroned in the minds of the older generation. Moreover, in a crude form of jingoism and State-anthropomorphism it remains powerful in the mind of the average citizen, who is not likely to welcome the idea that Britain can no longer be a free agent in world politics. But those who teach in political science at Oxford or elsewhere find that the doctrine of sovereignty has very few defenders among present-day students. If one sets essays on the subject it is rarely that one comes across any pupil bold enough to put up a defence of

sovereignty. Most students seem to grasp very firmly the fact that States are not really absolute and independent of each other or of subordinate societies. The famous dictum of Maitland that 'there seems to be a genus of which States and corporations are species'³ is accepted as a truism rather than denounced as a heresy. And if students are at a loss how to define or describe just where the limits of the State are to be placed and in exactly what way it can remain the chief focus of political authority, they are no more confused than their most eminent professors. But in the present juridical confusion the historically trained student may remind himself of another dictum of Maitland, a dictum which, with all respect, I submit, might be reflected on by Mr. Wells: 'Contract, that greediest of legal categories which once threatened to devour the State, now resents being told that it cannot even painlessly digest a joint stock company.'⁴ In other words, there is no complete alchemy of political institutions. They are not made of inorganic material, but are born from other institutions, nor can they be swept away in a moment.

In observing the attitude of the present generation of students to problems of politics one gets the idea that the most important factors are, not their formal studies, but certain influences altering their fundamental attitude to politics. On the surface things seem to go on as before. There are the political clubs, the League of Nations Union, smaller and more transitory societies. One sees the same types—the romantic Tory, sometimes a Conservative, sometimes expressing himself through the Labour Party; the rationalistic Radical, generally somewhere very near the Liberal-Labour border; the ardent class-war Socialist who has succeeded in identifying himself with the proletariat; the steady, level-headed Conservative. One sees those to whom politics is a career, those to whom it is an ideal, those to whom it is an excuse for rhetoric and youthful indignation. But behind all this the effects of the study of modern psychology are apparent. We can do little more than speculate on their effects, for we are probably just at the beginning of a change which will stand out as clearly as the Industrial Revolution, the Moral Revolution. The younger generation are going to be self-conscious in regard to their political motivation. While they will try to scrutinise the world more objectively than ever before, they will, as a means to this, scrutinise their own minds; they will try to sift out the rational from the merely emotional and instinctive in their political attitude. Already they stop short in an argument or a tirade and confess to a complex or an obsession on the subject. Does this mean that we are coming to a golden

³ Maitland, Introduction to Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*.

⁴ *Ibid.*

age when we will have a young intelligentsia, with an entirely new grip on reality, with a really scientific political mentality? It would be optimistic to suppose that. Eventually, perhaps; but at present there are serious dangers in this psychological change. There seems to be a curious individualism about the present generation of undergraduates. It is not exactly self-seeking or self-centred, but it is very suspicious of all philanthropic appeals, of all calls to duty or service, for their own sake. Philanthropic or idealistic motives are carefully scrutinised and unmasked as subtle forms of selfishness and vanity. This process, which is only just discernible, must go on. It is useless to be obscurantist about it. If one has any faith in modern knowledge, one must welcome it. Meanwhile one must face the fact that some of the motive power of political action may be lost. The danger and horror of war need very little demonstration to intelligent modern youth. As Freud says on the last page of his most recent work: 'Men have brought their power of subduing the forces of Nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate each other to the last man. *They know this.* . . . Hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension.' ⁵

The old appeal and the old idealisms are losing their power. The influence of religion, and even the ethics of Christianity, grows weaker. Now perhaps secularist humanitarians like Mr. Wells and Mr. Bertrand Russell will realise how much of the strength of the movements they lead was derived from the moderate but firm idealism of Victorian evangelicism. For long people have tried to hold to a Christian code of ethics, in spite of a theology which modern science told them was false. Now they are being further estranged from the ultimate ideal of Christianity by a code of ethics which psychology tells them is unreasonable. In these circumstances the appeals to an absolute sense of duty and an ideal of brotherhood are not listened to; but the need for common concerted action for world peace is stronger than ever. The old motive power of emotionalism is going, but we shall have to hurry up if we are to be in time to save civilisation by intelligence.

R. B. McCALLUM.

⁵ *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 144.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCXLIV—OCTOBER 1930

THE INDIAN CONFERENCE

Quousque tandem—the schoolboy tag—must have been in the minds of many as they watched a much-enduring Viceroy struggling to achieve the impossible and placate the implacable. Lord Irwin's patience has now been sufficiently abused, and the Round-Table Conference will meet without Catiline and his comrades, otherwise Mr. Gandhi and the Nehrus. Even so, it will serve certain good purposes. It will redeem our promise to consult every interest in India before the new Constitution is framed. It will give our people, and especially our legislators, time to devote to the Indian problem some of the study which it requires. And it will demonstrate the complete inability of the Indian extremists to produce any rational scheme whatsoever for a settlement. These and other good purposes the Conference may serve, but there are two ends which it most certainly will not attain. It will not furnish us with any estimate of how the position is viewed by the great mass of the Indian people, and it will not arrive at a form of Constitution which the Indian

extremists will look at. Any doubts on the latter point have been finally dissipated by the ultimatum from Yerawada Gaol.

Is this to be counted altogether a calamity? In ordinary business an agreed settlement is the negotiator's goal, and to some observers the Conference will seem fruitless unless it secures this hall-mark of success. More serious is the consideration that, while India in her task of nation-making has need of all the brains and all the energy which her ablest sons can offer, she is going to have no constructive aid from the brains and energy which unquestionably inspire the extremist movement. These misfortunes, however, have to be faced. They are not of our making; and if the story of the last few years has anything to teach us, it is that no compromise and no concession along our lines of political thought have any appeal to the Hindu extremists. When they tossed aside the tentative but substantial advance offered by the Constitution of 1919, their demand was all for Provincial Autonomy. When there seemed a possibility of this being granted (it is virtually what the Simon Commission now advise), they promptly raised their call to Dominion status. On the Viceroy assuring them that Dominion status is our aim, they threw off all further pretence and demanded complete independence. *Swaraj*, or self-rule, has been their cry throughout; but their definition of the term has grown more and more extravagant with each of our attempts to meet them, until it is now confessedly a claim that India shall sever her British connexion and revert to an autonomous Hindu State with no Constitution and no means of defence. To this a Conference of responsible statesmen could hardly be expected to assent.

By way, then, of Indian representation there will be three definite groups at the Conference; this leaves out of account the Burmese, whose chief concern presumably will be the proposal to separate their country from India proper and to place it under some form of administration which has not yet been discussed. Of the three dominant groups, the first comprises the spokesmen of the Indian States. Their *rôle* will be one of some difficulty, though the particular Princes and Chancellors who have been invited may be trusted to fill it with wisdom and dignity. It will be difficult, because the individual members have no authority to speak for the Princes as a whole, each State being wholly independent of its neighbours. It will be difficult also because any intervention in the politics of British India will be regarded with suspicion, although their personal character and administrative experience should render some of the Princes valuable consultants. Their primary interest, however, will be to ensure the full recognition of their treaty rights with the British Crown and to encounter all attempts to bring them into allegiance to

any form of government which may be established in British India. Otherwise, their advice will chiefly be required in regard to laying down the federal lines on which, as all parties agree, the future Constitution of India as a whole must proceed.

The second group will consist of the right wing of the Nationalist party, once known as Moderates and now calling themselves Liberals. Their position will not be free of embarrassment. Though their demands rest at Dominion status, they have apparently, on the subject of complete independence, no special quarrel with the extremists, their differences being chiefly on the pace of advance and the methods of securing their object. Their desire to wrest the leadership of the Nationalist movement from the extremists will impel them to play for higher stakes than they can afford, on the chance of being able to show India that they can be trusted to drive a better bargain than their noisier comrades on the left wing. With them will be associated a few prominent Mahomedans who, for various reasons, have habitually taken a line of antagonism to British rule, but who cannot pretend to be typical of their community.

The third group is a loose aggregation of the representatives of various minority interests—the Moslems, the great landlords, the depressed classes, European commerce, Sikhs, Christians, etc. These are concerned not so much with the general problem as with objecting to any Constitution which does not provide such safeguards and guarantees as the protection of their respective communities seems to demand.

From the traditional piece of furniture appropriate to a Conference the round table promises to be converted into a platform. Each of those groups and diverse interests will seek expression; though it is scarcely conceivable that they will add much to the sum of human knowledge on the main issues, yet they will all claim to exercise the privilege, dear to the Indian mind, of putting their case in its fulness before the final tribunal. And it is to this tribunal that they will look for a final decision. In other words, with the Conference the period of bargaining and negotiations will come to an end, and the British Parliament will have to consider its verdict. In what manner this verdict is arrived at, whether, as in 1919, after a further public inquest by a Committee of both Houses or otherwise, is immaterial. What is essential is that there shall be a clear decision by Parliament, and an equally clear intimation that the decision is to be accepted and obeyed. There has recently been some tendency to overlook this elementary fact. Our distress at the unrest, our theories of self-determination, the eloquence of Indian patriots and their appeals to our idealism, have somewhat blurred the issue which lies between two simple alternatives. Either India must drive

out the British by force and achieve independence as America did, or she must abide by the orders of the British Parliament. There is no middle course.

If wisely handled, the Conference can help Parliament in arriving at this momentous decision. In the absence of the extremists, it cannot produce an agreed Constitution. It is unlikely to be able even to produce a Constitution which is agreed by those who attend it, and it may not make the attempt. But it can at least enumerate the problems and the issues. It can take the project of Sir John Simon's Commission, the only comprehensive project for a new Constitution which has yet been devised, and probe the criticisms upon it. It can render more precise the safeguards claimed by the minorities; it can possibly even discover what is meant by Dominion status. Too unwieldy for anything except general discussions, it will probably work chiefly through committees, the only means by which it can hope to epitomise the vast accumulation of evidence on every aspect of the question. In this way it may perchance throw light on certain points which are still obscure—the attitude of Indian opinion, for example, towards the electorate, towards Sir Walter Layton's taxation proposals, the future of the public services, the case for Second Chambers, and so on. But whatever may be the objective, and whatever the procedure, of the Conference, its essentials are threefold.

First, it must not be unduly protracted; the situation in India demands an early settlement of controversies which have already lasted too long. Second, and of high importance, the British members of the Conference must give the whole of their time and thought to its business. On the other side of the table they will be faced by some of the most acute intellects of modern India, by men who have devoted years to developing their demand and to persuasive dialectic in its support, whose knowledge of all the disputed facts and figures is intimate, and whose forensic skill it is difficult to over-state. To get upon even terms with such colleagues requires more than the few hours a week which the busy man can snatch from his office or the politician from his duties to Parliament and his constituency. It requires a whole-time study both of the case generally and of its salient details, and ample leisure to hear and see both sides of every issue.

The third essential need of the Conference, and that for which our prayers may most fervently be offered, is an extra dose of common-sense. In the matter of India we seem recently to have been suffering from such lapses in that elementary virtue as amount almost to what the jargon of the day styles an inferiority complex. We are so often taxed by the Indian extremist with lack of imagination that we begin to feel ourselves devoid of all

sympathy and understanding. Mr. Gandhi is so constantly held before us as a saint that we are becoming convicted of sin. We are charged so vehemently with arrogance in setting ourselves up as judges of India's fitness that we are constrained to admit the pharisaism latent within us. It is a curious instance of the power of Eastern hypnotism, and it is producing ludicrous results, a humbling of our hearts when there is no need to be humble, a lurking sense of shame when we have every reason for pride. It is less than eleven years since we launched the present Constitution with some feeling of generosity and confidence; many of us are behaving to-day as if we disowned its paternity. And yet what has happened in the interval to discredit the policy of 1919? We may have blundered here and stumbled there, but we have in all good faith persevered in the task of training and practising Indians in the art of government; and if they refused the training and the practice, wherein are we to blame? In no single respect has it been shown that the line of action which Parliament adopted eleven years ago is either an injustice to India or a constitutional impossibility.

If, therefore, we can get back to our ordinary common-sense, surely it is apparent that there is only one question on which the British people have to make up their minds and the British Parliament to formulate its decision, namely: For what measure of self-government is India prepared? The question is one of fact, and not of sentiment, and the answer is not to be sought in generous gestures. If there is clear evidence that in fact India is fit and ready for home rule, then she must have it; we must walk out and be content with the same friendly association as we enjoy with Canada or Australia. If there is evidence that she is not yet fit for self-government, or that she is fit for only a modified form of self-government, then we must maintain our control in whole or in part, as the case may be. If we do otherwise, we shall be doing wrong in India and to the world. We may yield to none in our homage to India's ancient civilisation or her subtle philosophies; we may reverence the lonely idealisms of Gandhi and Tagore; our sympathy with the Indian patriot's dislike of an alien occupation may be unfeigned, and we may appreciate to the full how the iron of constant subjection has entered into India's soul. At the same time we may assent with genuine cordiality to the axiom that good government is no substitute for self-government. But in none of these admissions do we find the final argument for the immediate political emancipation of India. The one and only final argument would be that immediate political emancipation will mean political freedom. Can that argument be sustained?

So strenuously and so often have the pros and the cons been

canvassed that to refurbish them seems almost an insult to the reader's intelligence. In support of the argument we have some evidence in the Indian States, which seem to present a general level of contentment with a purely Indian administration. The freedom of the people, even in the most enlightened State, is limited; but it may be—though in some of the States it is far from certain—that they have as much freedom as they desire. Against this consideration, however, it has to be remembered that the rulers of the States have a long experience in governing; that they have no external responsibilities, as Great Britain takes care of them in this respect; and that we could not now, even if we would, partition British India into a series of rajas' kingdoms. On quite different lines it may be argued that brahmanical Hinduism has established so complete a social organisation, and that the high-caste Hindu inherits so fully the traditions of a ruling class, that British control would easily and painlessly be replaced. Apart, however, from the fact that the substitute would be something widely divergent from our democratic ideal of liberty, the fatal difficulty here is that the Moslems will not accept a Hindu oligarchy, and that there are no signs of such an accommodation between the two communities as would make the transition either easy or painless.

To enumerate the reasons for the view that immediate self-government in India would not mean political liberty for the people is to catalogue the obstacles which lie in the way of India's advance as a nation, the handicaps inherent in her social and economic life. When any such catalogue is attempted, it is angrily attacked by the Nationalist on three grounds. First, all these evils, he cries, are the result of British rule; remove that incubus and they will disappear. Second, many of them are being rapidly reformed from within, a process for which we give the educated Indians no credit. Third, the sole purpose of the catalogue is to blacken India in the eyes of the world and strengthen the case for our selfish and hypocritical retention of power. In face of the indignation thus expressed—genuine and not unnatural, however unreasonable—it seems invidious to insist. But the evils are there; everyone who has worked in India knows that the progress of reform is slow and the impetus behind it feeble; and they unquestionably operate as clogs on political advance. Some of them are the consequences of Nature and climate; some, like the tyranny of the priesthood and corruption in local government, are not unheard of in Western lands, and there had better be no casting of stones; many of the others are rooted in ignorance, which the better education of the people, as national finance permits, ought largely to abate. Yet, when all these allowances are made, there remain factors in the organisa-

tion of Indian life which differ so widely from the corresponding elements in Western life as to make it impossible for us to see how they can be reconciled with political liberty. The most outstanding examples are the treatment of the depressed classes and the status of women, neither of which can by any stretch of imagination be ascribed to the British connexion. On both these evils reformers are at work—all honour to them; but they have little support from public opinion, and there is no assurance that home rule in itself would remove such obstacles to freedom, any more than it has done in the self-governing States.

Paramount over all the other steps to political freedom is the sense of nationhood, that unifying, binding power which is so difficult to define and so easy to recognise. The progress of Nationalism in India is real, but the onlooker is apt to overestimate it gravely. The existence of parties which call themselves Nationalists, the proceedings of the National Congress, the non-co-operation movement give an appearance of what we should ordinarily regard as national activity; but the appearance is in many respects fallacious, and the unity owes more to outside pressure than to internal cohesion. All through the older history of India the only common influence on the lives and minds of men was Hinduism; and, although its sphere was circumscribed by the advent of Islam, Hinduism still remains the dominant power in the country. The movements that are shaking India to-day are very largely the revolt of orthodox Hinduism against Western influences which threaten to imperil its supremacy. They attract, it is true, support from other quarters—advanced Hindus who are striving to escape from the bonds of orthodoxy, a few restless Mahomedans, and malcontents generally. But the ferment which we loosely call nationalism is in reality a stirring of Hinduism, and something very different from the nationalism with which we are familiar in the West. In all probability it will do good in the end, by paving the way for a true nationalism; but at the moment Hinduism, whether static or militant, is at the most the matrix of a future nationhood.

We come then to this inevitable conclusion, that, Indian nationhood being still in the embryo and the obstacles to the attainment of political freedom being what they are, the constitutional framework within which nationhood will grow up and political freedom develop must be a different structure from that which was devised for Canada and Australia when they started on their career as members of the British Commonwealth. In their case the conditions were complete personal liberty, much local patriotism, an acceptance of the theory of the equality of men, and the traditions of responsible government, as well as some practice in it. In India these conditions have yet to be

established, and any Constitution must be a scheme of preparation rather than of adaptation. Consider first the sense of nationalism, and how the Constitution can respond to its development. We do not contemplate one nationhood for the Punjab and another for Madras; there must be some means of union for the expression of their common interests and the exercise of their common privileges. Nor can we imagine that there will ultimately be one nationhood for British India and another for the Indian States; before an external aggressor they must stand or fall together, and in ordinary times the interlocking of their territories, their interdependence in commerce, transit, communications and currency, their racial and cultural associations, all require some machinery for co-operative action. The only machinery known to our political science is a federation; and the ultimate goal of the Constitution will be a Federated States of India, in which the units will be the great princedoms, groups perhaps of the smaller principalities, and the British provinces, either as now framed or subdivided and rearranged on lines of closer racial and linguistic harmony. The exact type of the central federal Government and the relations between the federal units will be for the political craftsmen of the future, as experience grows and the habit of common action ripens. All that the Constitution of to-day can do is to lay foundations which will carry the structure.

Turn next to the preparation for political freedom. It may be India's destiny to demonstrate to the world that the social system of Hinduism, with the primacy of the brahman and the regimentation of caste, is not incompatible with modern progress. But, before that is possible, there is much to be done. The humane treatment of the depressed classes and the liberation and education of women have already been mentioned; other reforms could easily be multiplied. The peasantry, to begin with, have to be redeemed from the serfdom of the moneylender; the habit of hoarding has to yield to the needs of industrial capital; the land tenures have to be alleviated. In social matters, the Hindu joint family—a nursery for parasites and an extinguisher on individual enterprise—may have to be broken up, and enormous changes must come in domestic hygiene and public sanitation. Education, as Sir Philip Hartog's report brings out, calls for far more scientific handling than it is now receiving, and the creation of an enlightened electorate in particular throws an immense burden on the statesmanship of the future. Behind all these and many kindred tasks lies the most difficult of all, the evolution of that sense of citizenship which will put an end to the more normal occasions of discord between the two great communities on whose co-operation the future happiness of India depends. Every one

of these labours is for the Indians themselves to encompass, and all that the new Constitution can do is to provide the Indian leaders with the power and responsibility of tackling them, and a reasonable security against the more grievous consequences of error.

We must now return to the Conference. It cannot be expected to formulate views on all these far-reaching problems, but it cannot avoid envisaging them as it discusses the political future. The next step towards self-government must be either whole or partial. If full self-government is granted at once, as one section of the Conference may claim, then experience and prudence will be sacrificed to a gigantic gamble in the well-being of the entire Indian people. If a partial measure of advance is decided upon, the Conference will find unbiassed testimony as to the present and a reasoned scheme for the future in the two volumes of the Simon Commission's Report. The scheme in particular provides for the two primary *desiderata* of the position. It lays the lines of a federal Administration and it gives ample opportunity to the federal units in British India to deal in their own way with the social and economic weaknesses which hamper the growth of nationhood, while it retains with the Central Government the power of preserving peace on the frontiers and internal order so long as the provinces are working out their domestic problems. At the risk of reiteration it must be emphasised that no other project yet framed offers any alternative solution; and it would be no derogation of either the dignity or the authority of the Conference if it would consent to take the Simon Commission's Report as the basis of its deliberations.

MESTON.

THE EGYPTIAN RIDDLE

IN Egypt the stage is set for the next act in the conflict between the Wafdist Parliament and the Government of King Fuad. For some time now either side has been quietly making its dispositions, and during this month of October, when a large instalment of the land tax falls due, it is the intention of the popular party (the Wafdists) to render the position of the present Government untenable by a general refusal to pay. The preceding scene had closed in the early summer with the defeat of Parliament. Since then the King, with our acquiescence, has interposed Sidky Pasha between himself and Parliament; but though the King may be camouflaged by the figure of this or that politician, the character of the plot remains substantially unchanged.

At first sight it would appear strange that a Wafdist Government which still retained the unquestioning support of 90 per cent. of the voters should have gone into voluntary liquidation. They were confronted by threefold difficulties—economic, constitutional, and political. The world depression had hit Egypt hard: the purchases of cotton inaugurated by Adly Pasha had been prolonged until the Government had spent some 13,000,000*l.*; and they were faced in the immediate future with the necessity of making either the unpopular declaration that the Government would not support the cotton market in the coming season, or the unrealisable declaration that they would. But their constitutional difficulties were equally acute, and even more fundamental.

In the speech from the throne at the beginning of the parliamentary session the Government had announced their intention of introducing legislation to safeguard the Constitution. To taunt a political party which endeavours to preserve parliamentary institutions with self-interest merely because its own supremacy would thereby be assured is merely pharisaical, but the terms of the measure imposing maximum penalties of penal servitude for life and a fine of 10,000*l.* were, though not retrospective, undoubtedly severe. The constitutionalist, however, had good grounds for uneasiness. Since the institution of parliamentary government less than seven years ago, four short-lived Parliaments have been elected, of which one did not even survive the opening

day. There were, however, other measures of a less controversial character over which the Government found the King equally unconciliatory. Laws for the establishment of an agricultural bank and for the erection of a Cour des Comptes and of a Cour des Cassations remained unsigned, while over the nomination of senators and certain administrative appointments a similar deadlock arose. In spite of the very wide powers that the King, after a tussle with his Ministers, had secured when the Constitution was drafted, his vote was only suspensory. Notwithstanding his opposition, a measure if revoted within a month by a two-thirds majority of Senate and Chamber became law. But the rumours of an understanding between the King and Sidky Pasha had reached the ears of the Wafd and made them nervous that they might meanwhile be torpedoed by the King as they had been before. Finally, their failures in the realm of foreign, as well as home, policy and the negative nature of their programme made the rôle of an irresponsible Opposition particularly congenial.

Whatever the decisive motive may have been, Nahas Pasha elected to resign, even though it left him open to the accusation of being a politician rather than a statesman, and of putting party before country.

The problem which faced England was not an easy one. If we denied the Wafd the power to coerce the King, which, in our absence, they would have possessed, were we prepared to give a minority Government the requisite support? The theory that the form of internal government which Egypt adopts is no concern of ours must be based on an ignorance of the fundamental fact that no Government except a Wafdist Government can last for a single day without our support. A Government can only maintain itself in power if it enjoys popular support, or depends on force, or takes advantage of the apathy of the majority of the population, though it may, of course, depend on more than one of these factors. Since the Protectorate was abolished in 1922, Egypt has seen three different forms of government: an autocracy, either the Palace ruling through a Prime Minister or a Prime Minister ruling with the acquiescence of the Palace, a minority Government, and government by the Wafd. Of these three, only the last commands popular support; the remainder all rely to a greater or less degree on force, and that force is necessarily ours. Without British officers in the police force and a British Army in the background no Government could rely on a sense of duty in either the Egyptian police or the Egyptian army prevailing over their sympathies with the national party. As our intervention is required only when the Egyptian forces fail in their duty of preserving order, and as

they fail only when the Wafd is out of power, it follows that our intervention is always exercised against the Wafd. If the King decides to oppose the Wafd, it is the British Army which prevents the Wafd retaliating; while if the Wafd desires to oppose the King, it is the British Army which chastises the Wafdist mob.

Thus no vacuum exists for each factor to exercise unmitigated its full and logical effect. Indirectly and ultimately the presence of the British soldier leaning Gallio-like over the parapet of Kasr el Nil Barracks pervades all Egypt, it sways the decision of the native *omdeh* hundreds of miles up the Nile as effectively as the King in his palace next door. Whenever events point to a trial of force, Great Britain, to protect interests which disorder might indirectly jeopardise, is forced to intervene physically. On this inevitable intervention minority government in Egypt always banks and often bluffs. Only recently a writer in the *Evening Standard* declared: 'One thing is quite certain, and the British public ought to know it, had the organising brains in the Egyptian police and army not been British, Cairo would have been in the hands of the Wafd on July 22 last.' In fact, England alone maintains the present Government in power.

The suggestion, therefore, contained in the reply of Sidky Pasha that abstinence from speech and overt action is the true criterion of the neutrality in internal affairs to which we are pledged is as fallacious as it is specious, and no one knows this better than the Pasha himself. To argue that inaction spells neutrality and indicates the cessation of influence is as mistaken as to maintain that the queen has no influence on the chess-board so long as she remains on the same square. Great Britain is a counterpoise, and no change of Government is possible unless she shifts her weight in the balance.

But Sidky Pasha certainly had cause for complaint. Having resolved to acquiesce in a minority Government taking office, we at least owed it to him not to aggravate the inevitable difficulties of his situation—for his task is far from easy. Outside a small clique he has no backing in the country. He is regarded as unscrupulous and ruthless. The King, with whom his relations have for years been far from cordial, would not hesitate to throw him over if he felt his own position secure. No reliance can be placed either on the provincial police force or the Egyptian army, on which the control of the country depends. Under similar conditions Ziwer Pasha in 1924, and Mahmoud Pasha in 1928, had at least been able to count on the unqualified support of the British Government. Yet on this occasion, afraid to accept the logical implications of our decision, we pursued the mischievous and irresponsible policy of encouraging both sides. Mr. Churchill might well ask whether

it was a film we were making by the banks of the Nile—Charles I. and Oliver Cromwell in an Egyptian setting.

At the critical moment, while disorder in Alexandria was at its height, Mr. MacDonald adopted the unprecedented course of addressing a warning, not only to the Government, but to the Opposition. To the Prime Minister it was to be 'made quite plain that His Majesty's Government did not intend to be used as an instrument for an attack on the Egyptian Constitution. In consequence they could be no party to an alteration in the electoral law.' Sidky Pasha would be held responsible for the protection of foreign lives and property in Egypt. Nahas Pasha, on whom a similar responsibility was laid, was also warned that domestic squabbles must not be allowed to imperil foreign interests. More entertaining stipulations could hardly have been devised. Sidky Pasha was to be precluded from attempting the sole solution on which rests his slender chance of founding a firm Government, while the opposition were to be denied that violence which Sidky Pasha will astutely take care to make their solitary means of expression. The British Government can hardly have been so naïve as to imagine that the Egyptian Prime Minister would welcome the issue to his opponents of a paternal injunction to behave themselves, even though it relieved him of some responsibility in the event of disorder. There was certainly ample excuse, if not justification, for the reply Sidky Pasha addressed to the Government. Not often does the British Government court and receive so deliberate a snub. His retort could hardly have been more effective unless he had chosen, as well he might have, to address it to Mr. Stanley Baldwin as well as to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.

The success of the King's Government in the struggle with Parliament, which is now entering on an active phase, depends on a continuance of the royal favour and of our tacit support. So long as Sidky Pasha does not offer the same personal provocation as did Mahmoud Pasha, the shock of the constitutional crisis in the spring will probably deter His Majesty from throwing over the pilot. But if he is to succeed in imposing his rule on the country in the face of the popular party, he will have to adopt measures which are not merely unconstitutional, but also repugnant to Western notions. So long as they are designed to promote the practical welfare of the country, and not personal or sectional interests, we shall probably tolerate them. But this is his difficulty—if they are not stringent, they will not attain their object; if they are, we cannot afford to countenance them, for we shall incur the odium of having made them possible. But even if he succeeds so far, the British Government want results, and sooner or later he is sure to be badgered about a treaty. The British Govern-

ment now realise that a one-man treaty is useless. So, once again, we shall assist at the familiar spectacle of an Egyptian Prime Minister endeavouring to detach the more moderate members of the Wafd and to modify the Electoral Law so as to enable him to control the elections and secure a majority for his own policy.

Prophecy is, admittedly, the most gratuitous form of error, yet the chances of his achieving the latter result, no matter what modification he introduces, may safely be deemed remote in the extreme. If the British Government were to leave him to consolidate his position in his own way, he might by wise rule win over a section of the country, and reduce to apathy the majority who should be getting yearly more convinced of the futility of political agitation. But the Wafd, if only to retain their hold, would be forced to challenge his position. *The Times* has rather ingenuously suggested that they can 'best prove their fitness to govern the country by showing moderation in the hour of triumph, and discretion in time of temporary eclipse.' Too great a prudence in times of eclipse leads to extinction. Already speech has been denied them: Parliament is closed, public meetings are forbidden, their papers have been suppressed, and the victim, gagged and bound, can only express himself by gestures. The Wafd have replied with a declaration of non-co-operation, and the first stage is to be the non-payment of the land tax. For such a policy to succeed, a better organisation and a far more general response is needed than for riot making. A dour determination is necessary, for there is nothing exhilarating about seeing your cattle and land sold to your enemies for a mere song when the Government distrain and put them up to auction. It appears more than doubtful whether the resolution of the peasant will be equal to this ordeal. If non-co-operation breaks down, nothing is left but demonstration, and demonstration, to be effective, must be violent. In short, the maintenance of the present *régime* constitutes a definite invitation to violence. If Sidky Pasha is unable to repress it, he will, no doubt, be careful to see that it takes a form which is likely to endanger foreign interests, and so make sure of our intervention; but even if he finds it unnecessary to involve us actively, we shall still have to bear the discredit of his repressive measures.

We shall then be faced with the problem whether it is advisable and justifiable to continue to give Sidky Pasha the moral support which he requires. Unfortunately, excluding the Wafd, no real alternative presents itself. For neither the King nor the Constitutional Liberals have any following, though both, no doubt, would claim that the fault was ours. We should have certainly found it difficult to sanction the *régime* which the King would have

aimed at establishing. If his private ambitions had only su- him to tinge the despotism which he coveted with the me- suspicion of constitutionalism, if he had organised a party who offered the elements of a just, disinterested, and constructive administration, his people would have forgiven the idiosyncrasies of his personal aims, and the British Government would at one time have thankfully relegated the control of Egypt to a *régime* that fell short of their present ideals of representative institutions. No country would have responded more readily to the idea of a benevolent autocracy, or drawn greater benefit from it.

The immense knowledge, influence and power which the Palace has gained since the King, a stranger alike to his people and their language, ascended the throne thirteen years ago is a sufficient proof of his ability and energy. With the death of Zaghloul a unique opportunity occurred for the King to assume the rôle of national leader, though the people were not slow to forget the activities of his young adviser Nashat, and to note the personal ends to which the brief supremacy of the Palace two years before had been directed. But the chance has passed, and will not recur unless the King is prepared to abandon the rôle of *tertius gaudens* which he has preferred to sustain all these years, to the discomfiture of both ourselves and the Wafd, and range himself whole-heartedly on the side of the treaty makers, confident that his astuteness, unaided and unfettered by the British Government, will then secure his supremacy and ready to stake his throne on the throw.

If we cannot support the King, neither can we bolster up the Constitutional Liberal Party, which, like Tom Noddy, is all head and no body. It is, in fact, numerically non-existent, and would be lucky to carry half a dozen seats out of the 220 odd of which Parliament is composed. This party has never organised a serious appeal on political lines to the common people, whom at heart it despises, and to this extent it must bear the responsibility of failure.

It is not the tragedy of Egypt alone that her most capable men should be those who do not secure public support. Individually, the Constitutional Liberals possess almost a monopoly of those qualities that should be most useful to Egypt—ability, knowledge of the world, a sense of statesmanship, and a polish, based in most cases on a Latin culture, which, in contrast to their compatriots, has made them insidiously attractive to our diplomats. For it is this 'moderate' group who have always obtained the greatest concessions from Great Britain, and it is with Adly, Sarwat and Mahmoud, regardless of their lack of mandate, that Great Britain has engaged so frequently in negotiations foredoomed thereby to sterility.

are thus forced back to the Wafd. What are the Wafd? According to one view, they are a set of unscrupulous agitators in the direct pay of Moscow, fired with undying hatred of capitalism, imperialism, and all the other 'isms' for which the British Empire stands; according to the other, they are a group of Gladstonian Liberals with a pious belief in the doctrines of liberty and representative institutions. In point of fact, it is a party led and directed mainly by an inner ring of professional politicians composed of landowners and lawyers. Its most enthusiastic supporters are students and schoolboys; but it has to-day an undoubted hold of one sort or another on the peasantry, which comprises 80 per cent. of the Egyptian people. It is, as no other party has ever attempted to be, a thorough political organisation; in every provincial capital there is a headquarters, in every town a committee, in every hamlet an agent. If the suspension of Parliament is prolonged, a shadow Parliament is ready to come into existence, complete with President, Cabinet and working committees.

Analogies from English or Indian politics are particularly dangerous. The Wafd must not, from their courting of the British Labour Party, be thought in any sense to be socialistic in tone, for the bulk of the landowning class belong to the party, and they stand for no economic creed; nor, as in India, is any degree of 'disloyalty' involved: their aims are fundamentally non-British; their sentiments are as anti-British as those of the Constitutional Liberal Party, no more and no less, though their methods have rendered their hostility more apparent. The domination of the country by the Wafd may be a tyranny which discourages the expression of moderate feeling by a non-vocal majority of its inhabitants, but the fact remains that it is an effective domination. With the Wafd in power there have never been either riots or bloodshed. Called into existence to meet a national emergency, it was held together and inspired by the genius of a national leader and the cry of complete independence; with the termination of its original mission it would tend to break up, as it is the force of external pressure rather than any real internal cohesion which binds it together. Whether or not it is this fear which always restrains the Wafd at the last moment from accepting proposals for a treaty, it does certainly appear that they will never have the courage or resolution to sign. If the Wafd will not conclude a treaty with us, neither can we usefully with any other party, for a treaty ratified by an emasculated Parliament or accepted by a minority Government will not even bring us those meagre and questionable advantages which are claimed for it.

For many years our policy towards Egypt has been to subor-

dinate everything to this single end. But is a treaty of such paramount importance to us? The main incentive, no doubt, of those who have so long worked for it is to put an end to a period of restless strain on either side. But something more than mere malaise must have been at the root of this frantic desire of successive Foreign Secretaries to reduce as gracefully as may be our commitments under cover of an act of generosity. Year in and year out as spring time came round the same unambiguous signs of desire for *rapprochement* have appeared. The blindness which such a condition is popularly supposed to induce has more often than not afflicted the Egyptian suitor who has returned to Egypt, confident as Sarwat that his charms, or as Mahmoud that his force of character, would be as irresistible to his colleagues as it had been to the British negotiators.

Three advantages are claimed for a treaty: first, a secure title—it has been suggested that our right to maintain troops on Egyptian soil might, if Egypt succeeded in getting the issue before any international court of law, be held to be somewhat flimsy; secondly, we should be rid of our responsibility for foreigners; and thirdly, we should earn the friendship of the Egyptian people.

A foreign Power might seek to complicate our position in Egypt by supporting an Egyptian appeal, but in 1922, when we declared Egypt an independent nation, the foreign Powers were formally given to understand that we considered our special position in Egypt such that any attempt to intervene in Anglo-Egyptian relations would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Eight years have passed, and acquiescence in our statement of the position has been universal. That blessed word 'rationalisation' can, no doubt, be invoked in favour of handing over foreign interests to the Government best placed to-day to care for them. Such an arrangement will, doubtless, lessen our embarrassments until the day comes, as come it may, when a foreign Power intervenes physically on behalf of its nationals. As to friendship, let there be no sentimental slush. A member of the Labour Government may declare with a glow of self-conscious generosity, 'We are giving Egypt independence'; but the Egyptian politician regards independence as a natural right. The heir to a property is not expected to evince special friendship for the usurping relative because he has eventually succeeded in dispossessing him. Causes of friction, it is true, should be minimised, and individual friendships between Englishmen and Egyptians will persist, but the Egyptian will continue to put his compatriot first, and his co-religionist second, and to feel a far closer affinity with certain southern European races than he can ever share with us.

When all is said and done, England, then, stands to gain very little from a treaty. One can only conclude that the policy of the British Government towards Egypt is part and parcel of their policy towards Iraq, Arabia and elsewhere, and is stimulated by an unnatural thrill similar to that which certain queerly constituted individuals derive from turning over the counterfoils of their cheque-book.

When they reflect that all these years the only real bar to an agreement has been our insistence on the maintenance of British troops in Egypt, that to gain this point Zaghloul would have sold his birthright, and that only last year any terms might have been wrung from the Wafd if they had been allowed the credit of eliciting such an incomparable concession, it must be their crowning mortification to have been induced to part with this trump card to the one man who could give absolutely nothing in return; and a card once played can never take another trick.

If, then, the treaty is not likely to bring us any substantial advantage, ought we not to substitute some other central idea as the basis of our policy? What is that central idea to be?

The most striking feature of Egyptian political life during the past ten years has been an instability which it would be hard to parallel in any other country. In that period fourteen different Cabinets have held office, and not so long ago as many as ten Prime Ministers and seventy Ministers and ex-Ministers were alive. The transition from one Government to another has been accompanied by direct reversals of major policy, as well as of administrative detail, by the substitution of officials of the right political colour, and by the persecution of all ranks of their political opponents. Under such conditions it is impossible for a country to make any real advance, either social, political, or material.

Should not our policy, then, be to promote and develop the Government which stands the best chance of a prolonged period of undisputed control? If we are convinced that the essential minimum of good administration can only be secured by the continuance of the present *régime*, and that, sheltered in the early stages, it will not merely succeed in imposing itself forcibly, but will strike root in the country, then, indeed, we have every justification for extending help and encouragement. But unless we have this conviction—and there is little enough in recent Egyptian history to support such a view—we have no right to prohibit, nor shall we in the long run do any good by prohibiting any particular form of political life. Nations, like people, may be educated and shepherded in one direction, but ultimately they must work out their salvation for themselves; and if there is ever to be any

stability in Egypt, Parliament must be allowed a full opportunity to prove its worth or its bankruptcy.

However unsuitable a form of government it may be for a country in the present stage of Egyptian civilisation, and however unrepresentative it may be of the average Egyptian fellah whom it claims to represent, it has become a force which it is foolish to overlook and idle to deny. Though *The Times* is perhaps overstating the fact when it asserts that there is a genuine and widespread desire that representative institutions should be given a fair trial, it at least is not true, as Mr. Lloyd George would have us believe, that it is we who are forcing ideas of democracy and government on an unwilling East. The astonishing growth of the idea of nationality shows how readily Western ideas can be assimilated. The Egyptian fellah, if asked who he is, will tell you to-day, 'Ana Masri' ('I am an Egyptian'), where ten years ago he would have answered, 'Ana Muslim' ('I am a Mohammedan').

For years politicians have chosen to regard as stationary the rate of illiteracy in Egypt, regardless of the immense extension of education. But of what value is this literacy test in any case? The book learning of a board school education substitutes often a mass of undigested facts with a fine self-conceit for the sterling character and common-sense that the old illiterates had. It would be better far to entrust the vote in Egypt to the old-fashioned Egyptian who lived a patriarchal life on his own estate, exacting and meriting the respect of his dependants, than to the hysterical effendi who will be in control if literacy is made the qualification for suffrage.

The Egyptian Parliament has so far had few opportunities, and used them badly. But parliamentary institutions would never have reached full growth in England had she not enjoyed a period of isolation from European influences and dangers in which to work out her domestic problems undisturbed by any dread of interference by her neighbours. It is their conflicts with England and with their King that have rendered Egyptian Parliaments so short-lived.

If, then, we are to give full scope for the experiment of some form of parliamentary government and to make the treaty no longer a primary object of our policy, a reconsideration of our position in Egypt is necessary.

It is interesting to recall that about the time of the Milner Commission the United States of America sent a *du-umvirate* on a very similar mission to the Philippine Islands. There, too, a white race was confronted by obligations and responsibilities in respect of an alien people of a lower standard of civilisation.

There, too, a clamour had arisen for independence. In the admirably definite and concise report which General Leonard Wood, the outstanding figure in the history of American colonial administration, submitted to his Government there stands placed at the very end, to strike with greatest emphasis, the words: 'We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.'

At that very moment we were elaborating the policy which four months later was announced to the world under our Declaration of 1922, the very enshrinement of the doctrine of responsibility without authority.

It is easy to under-estimate or to forget the difficulties of the time: a revolution followed by a gradual surrender of our power, until we could no longer, without Egyptian co-operation, ensure the administration of the country, an unchecked campaign of assassination, and three years of very definite official encouragement to Egyptian aspirations of independence. The opportunity was certainly very tempting of abating Egyptian hostility and shifting responsibility for an irksome situation, but there were certain responsibilities we could not evade. So long as we denied the right of entry to foreign Powers we had to protect their subjects and their interests. We also undertook obligations towards native minorities and reserved rights to ourselves for the preservation of Imperial communications. While retaining those responsibilities, we deliberately discarded every instrument which had enabled us in the past to discharge them. The Egyptian police and army were no longer under the undisputed orders of their English commanders, and English officials were either placed under Egyptian authority or rendered impotent. Not otherwise could we give independence in the unreserved spheres, but the foreign communities made it quite clear that in their eyes it was mere hypocrisy to attempt to disassociate ourselves from responsibility for the general condition of the country.

Powerless as we thus became on issues where the Declaration justified intervention, it was not surprising that such issues constantly recurred. The Wafd made little pretence of recognising any but the concessional aspect of the Declaration, while the Constitutional Liberals rendered only lip service to its terms. There was only this difference, that whereas the former preferred shock tactics, the latter favoured the more subtle attack by infiltration. In defence persuasion, bluff, or bayonets were our sole weapons, with the result that in minor issues, where we were likely to shrink from our last resource, they were able to ignore persuasion or call the bluff with impunity.

In such circumstances as these only an outstanding personality could hope to maintain our position without considerable erosion taking place, and all the force of character of the High Commissioner was needed to galvanise into some semblance of life the faded image of British prestige. If, at times, Lord Lloyd endeavoured to exercise preponderating influence in spheres which our policy excluded from our purview, it was because he realised more clearly than anyone that, on issues where we were vitally and legitimately affected, successful assertion of our rights depended on the strength of his own position, and not on any sanction that either he or the Foreign Office could apply. This is, however, a situation which, given even the exceptional man, cannot be maintained indefinitely.

If therefore we found, as we probably should, that the Egyptian Parliament were unalterably opposed to any reasonable treaty, we ought to recognise the fact, and no longer regard the situation as transitory. The time has surely come when we should abandon the obsequious importunacy which has lost us point after point, and address Egypt in this manner: 'We conceded you independence subject to certain reservations. There can be no question of going back on that Declaration now; it is neither advisable nor practicable. On the contrary, we intend to increase your liberty by scrupulously abstaining in future from our unavowed practice of trespassing in matters of policy and detail which are outside the scope of our reservations. But as regards these reservations, they were framed when we expected, within a reasonable period, to arrive at terms for their settlement. If we cannot yet agree on terms on which to hand over these responsibilities to you, we must have a working arrangement whereby we can fulfil them in the normal course of administrative routine without the necessity of periodical armed demonstrations, which are as repugnant to us as they are disturbing to your political life.' For no serious statesmen could subscribe to the bankrupt policy contained in Mr. MacDonald's bombastic declaration, 'Warships were sent to Alexandria, and that would be done again and again.' It might be found on investigation that no additional administrative facilities or sanctions were required in respect of three out of the four points; but to ensure the protection of foreign interests and minorities, the reservation over which continual clashes have occurred, we should need the grant of certain definite, though limited, executive powers.

In this way, by a mere administrative adjustment giving effect to a reservation that has been recognised for eight years, we should facilitate our own task in Egypt and, with the reduction of friction to a minimum, should create an atmosphere in which Egypt could work out her own political salvation. Democracy, as

Amiel has said, makes bad work but produces citizens, and it is to that slow educative value of representative institutions we must look with patience.

Such a policy offers, no doubt, no prospect of a startling leap forward, but not even will the most brilliant of treaties or declarations bring the Golden Age to Anglo-Egyptian relations. Let us recognise, if we must, that we live, as Lord Tyrrell once said, in an age of transition, makeshift and compromise; but our policy need not, therefore, be solely based on tactical advantage or the expediency of the moment. Rather should our watchwords be firmness, consistency, impartiality and sympathy; and let our politicians, diplomats and administrators take to heart the words of the Emperor philosopher:

How worthless are all those poor people who are engaged in matters political and as they suppose are playing the philosopher—all drivellers: do not expect Plato's Republic but be content if the smallest thing goes on well and consider such an event to be no small matter.

A. R. I. MELLOR.

LAMBETH, 1930

It can hardly be affirmed of the Anglican Episcopate as a whole that it is an unbusinesslike organisation. If its members are to be brought together from the ends of the earth every tenth year, quite a considerable part of each interim must be occupied in preparations of various kinds. The individual Bishops, faced with the likelihood of being absent from their spheres for some months, have to make arrangements for 'carrying on' till they can return. No inconsiderable portion of the overseas Bishops are men who join apostolic labour to a modest wage, and who cannot add to the provision for their long transport the charges of their maintenance for many weeks during the London season. Moreover, by an ancient and an honourable tradition, all the visiting Bishops, with their women-folk, may look forward to a brief visit to Lambeth Palace as the Archbishop's personal guests, and the Bishop of London, with characteristic expansiveness, follows suit at Fulham. Imperial Conferences, of course, are accustomedly managed on a similar or a much greater scale, but the Government Hospitality Department is continuous; it functions smoothly all the time; the Church, on the other hand, must improvise its arrangements *ad hoc*, and the visitors are the first to admit that this time all went smoothly and graciously, as usual.

But the Conference of 1930 saw a financial change, very little appreciated, but of no small significance. Hitherto the whole expense—adapting and furnishing the library for the sessions, circulating the necessary invitations, instructions and memoranda, providing lunch and tea for 300 men *de die in diem* for three weeks and for a large and favoured committee for a fortnight—has fallen upon the official income of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The whole company of the Bishops were actually his guests. It is true that in the background there were generous laymen who raised a fund for his Grace to administer, but the responsibility was his alone. This time the Home Church, by a vote of the Church Assembly, deliberately shouldered at least a considerable part of the burden. In two successive years the Budget of the Assembly has included an item of 1000*l.* for the purpose. There

be ready to receive us. Where is the harm? How can you deny us the good that must surely result to the cause which we all have at heart?

Take, as a sign-post, the less prominent case of Persia, where the Christian Church is faced by the simple severity of Islamic occupation, and has no other problems. The north of the country is evangelised by Presbyterians; the south by a storied undertaking of the Church Missionary Society. Three years ago the Christian leaders of north and south met at Isfahan and projected plans for union. If these have not yet got far, the sheer simplicity of the problem is full of promise. The plans came before the 1930 Conference at Lambeth for comment and advice. The Conference (resolution 41) expressed 'deep sympathy' and 'general approval'; it even followed the good example of its Unity Committee, admirably presided over by the Archbishop of York, in speaking of 'the Persian Church' or 'the Church in Persia,'¹ when what it really means thereby is the conglomerate of Anglicans and Presbyterians who are steadily opposing the Cross to the Crescent. The Unity Committee actually went on, with all due caution, to hint at possible schemes of joint Ordinations as between the two spheres.

Now, up to the point when you begin to talk about joint Ordinations, the Lambeth Conference does not need to be a body of leaders richly furnished with theological ability, but rather a band of sane men ready to refer all such questions to the arbitration of their own administrative experience in fields not very dissimilar. But India looms larger than Persia. India from the early days of Christian effort in that land has been the scene of the labours of Christians of every kind of 'view.' When the Church of England began its Indian missions it did not hesitate to accept the aid of Continental Lutherans. To-day the Cowley Fathers and the Oxford Mission to Calcutta rub amicable shoulders with envoys of the Church Missionary Society and with those of societies which regard the cause of Evangelicalism as being jeopardised if it be in any hands but their own. There was therefore something spectacular and arresting in a movement, now some eleven years old, for joining up the three forces which operate in South India—to wit, the Anglicans, the South India United Church (*i.e.*, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, etc.), and the Wesleyan Methodist Church. The very idea of it started theologians at home preparing great store of ecclesiastical ammunition. At least there should be such a barrage as never was. The Lambeth Bishops, as it turned out, were largely unaffected by all this technical literature. Some read it all, and

¹ *Lambeth Conference, 1930* (S. P. C. K.), p. 122.

were conscious of a surfeit; a few put it entirely on one side, feeling rather that it was their business to listen to the men who had experience of the actual conditions. The great majority of them, while of no mind to pull down one side of the Lambeth Quadrilateral—'the Historic Episcopate locally adapted,' etc.—or to make little of the value of the rite of Confirmation, were convinced of the worth of both by their personal experience, and did not need either antiquarian research or theoretical endorsement. So with both hands and a glad heart they could trust the South Indian Bishops to continue their negotiations. It is true that the Lambeth Conference envisages a state of things in which these South India Christians will become 'a distinct Province of the universal Church' (resolution 40 (b)). But no one in his senses doubts that whoever is Archbishop of Canterbury in 1940 will invite the Bishops of this imagined Province to the next Lambeth Conference.

And during those ten years one may quite reasonably hope that, at least as regards the mission field, there will be definite progress towards unity. The 42nd resolution of the Conference may be headed 'Special Areas'; it may talk about 'exception to the general rule'; it may have a note attached to it, quite unusually, as if to show that someone had got frightened at his own courage and must needs make it clear that he is not such a terrible reprobate after all. Anyhow, there it stands—not applying specifically to South India, but generally to the Church's advance everywhere, and it is worth giving in full with its appendant caveat:

Special Areas.

42.—The Conference, maintaining as a general principle that inter-communion should be the goal of, rather than a means to, the restoration of union, and bearing in mind the general rule of the Anglican Churches that 'members of the Anglican Churches should receive the Holy Communion only from ministers of their own Church,' holds, nevertheless, that the administration of such a rule falls under the discretion of the Bishop, who should exercise his dispensing power in accordance with any principles that may be set forth by the national, regional or provincial authority of the Church in the area concerned. The Bishops of the Anglican Communion will not question the action of any Bishop who may, in his discretion so exercised, sanction an exception to the general rule in special areas, where the ministrations of an Anglican Church are not available for long periods of time or without travelling great distances, or may give permission that baptized communicant members of Churches not in communion with our own should be encouraged to communicate in Anglican churches, when the ministrations of their own Church are not available, or in other special or temporary circumstances.

The Conference adopted the following explanatory note.—In view of the dangers of misconception, we think it desirable to say that in recognising

that a Bishop of the Anglican Communion may under very strict regulations and in very special circumstances permit individual communicants to join with members of other Christian bodies in their Services of the administration of the Lord's Supper, we felt bound to consider the difficulties created by present conditions, especially in some parts of the Mission Field. But we would point out that the very special circumstances and the very strict regulations specified in this resolution of themselves show that we are not departing from the rule of our Church that the minister of the Sacrament of Holy Communion should be a priest episcopally ordained.

Anyone who passes on from this to the resolution (No. 46), which has no such caveat, and which 'urges the desirability of organising and participating in efforts of Evangelism in co-operation with Christians of other Communions . . . as a means of strengthening [the] sense of unity in the Gospel,' need have no doubt that the members of the Conference in the lump were qualified to face the facts of the Christian situation.

But something beyond experience and sagacity and average theological equipment is required of men who come to deal with the problems of approximation to the ancient and hoary Communions of the Orthodox East, and to certain more western Christians who are not of the Roman obedience. It was here that the marked technical equipment of some of the English Bishops naturally and inevitably asserted itself. For long years—some of them almost from the days of their graduation—they had been training themselves by study and travel and personal contact with Orthodox ecclesiastics for such a time as this. The Œcumenical Patriarch had gone to work at an early stage to accumulate an impressive deputation, which was headed by the Patriarch of Alexandria, and consisted of those suave, long-bearded, keen-eyed ecclesiastics, with whose aspect many of us have become familiarised by travel through the Mediterranean. It is not their fault, but their misfortune, that political and dynastic considerations form a large part of their interests, and make them expect a kind of assistance from the Church of England which its remoteness from political administration precludes it from affording to them. On the other hand, their theology is rigid and age-worn, save where some of them have taken courses at western or German universities. They have a notion—quite natural in view of their principal contacts hitherto—that the best hope of attaining their objects, the likeliest chance of finding themselves in definite association with the Church of England, lies in the Anglo-Catholic section of the Church and in its further advance in numbers and importance.² So the real

² Their permanent representative in England, who is familiar with our language and with our ecclesiastical conditions, phrases his anticipation thus:

requirement in the negotiations with the Orthodox, of which Lambeth, 1930, marks a notable stage, is a well-trained theology, used with indubitable honesty. The Lambeth Conference is obviously too large for such a task. It can 'produce' a well-staged reception of the delegates. But there are few of its members who are capable of such precise negotiations, and those few need watching.

Roughly, it can be said to the Orthodox with complete candour that they need have no theological hesitation about union with a section of the English Church, or with sections of the national, regional and provincial Churches in communion with it. The published record of the Conference makes it quite clear where statements have been made to the Orthodox which are true of the part, but not true of the whole, even though resolution 33 (c) describes the record of the negotiations as containing 'a sufficient account of the teaching and practice of the Church of England and of the Churches in communion with it, in relation to those subjects.'

An instance or two will suffice to show the need for a complete candour and for the avoidance of any partial presentation of the facts. The Orthodox seem to have inquired, quite naturally, what is the attitude of the Church of England towards Prayers for the Departed. To this the Bishops answered 'that in the offering of the Eucharistic Sacrifice [a phrase which is itself a sectional variant for more usual descriptions] the Anglican Church prays that "by the merits and death of Thy Son Jesus Christ, and through faith in His blood, we and all Thy whole Church may obtain remission of our sins, and all other benefits of His Passion,"' ³ as including the whole company of faithful people living and departed.'⁴ There is no question that there have always been, or that there still are, members of the Anglican Church who use the words in this inclusive way. To say without any qualification that 'the Anglican Church prays' with this intention is to profess that what is true of the part applies to the whole. That, indeed, is equally characteristic of the famous *Responsio* made in 1897 to the Bull *Apostolica Cura* of Pope Leo XIII. by Archbishops Temple and Maclagan. The actual origin alike of the theology and the Latinity of this *Responsio* has never, perhaps, been openly avowed⁵; but, if it were, it would

'Why should we not think that a time is coming when the Catholic nucleus which always existed in the Anglican Church should not prevail over the whole body, so that it should appear in that form which would make reunion with our Orthodox Church possible?'

³ From the first Post-communion prayer.

⁴ *Lambeth Conference*, 1930, p. 139, par. 11.

⁵ See Bishop John Wordsworth's appendix in *Memoirs of Archbishop Temple* (1906), vol. ii., pp. 388ff, especially p. 391.

be realised how far there was or was not a real justification for the plenary fashion in which the *Responsio* kept using 'we,' as though there could be no others in question. 'This whole action,' it says in describing the Anglican Liturgy—'this whole action, in which the people has necessarily to take its part with the Priest, we are accustomed to call the Eucharistic sacrifice.'⁶ But are we? Is the statement widely applicable? Was it even so with Archbishop Temple himself? Those who justifiably ask such questions will be the first to wonder why, when the Orthodox were reminded out of Article XXVIII. that 'the Body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, in the Supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner,' they were not at the same time reminded that the Article forthwith adds: 'And the mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith.' No doubt the Orthodox are well aware of it.

Now, all this negotiating skill and all this theological preciseness are becoming of first-rate importance to the future development of the Church of England and of its various partners as represented at the Lambeth Conference. Not that there is anything new about either the skill or the preciseness or the negotiations which bring them into play. The famous library in which the members assembled has great store of letters dating from Archbishop Tenison's era, which show Oriental Orthodox and Continental Lutherans and the like making their approaches to Lambeth and receiving definite descriptions of the attitude of the Church of England towards this matter and that. But shrewd observers of the times will realise that all these inter-communications are taking on a fresh and fertile importance. 'Lambeth, 1930,' will of course always be of interest to some, because the Bishops made a more unmistakable pronouncement on questions of sex and birth-control than any that they have hitherto achieved, largely because close touch has been kept of late with the best medical and technical opinion. Others will fasten on the section headed 'The Christian Doctrine of God' and will feel that here under the able guidance of the Irish Primate the truths of the old Gospel can hold up their head to confront the latest advances of scientific and philosophic thought. Others, again, will turn eagerly to the report on 'Youth and its Vocation.' They may wonder that youth in particular should be selected for special treatment, and not childhood or middle age. But they will recognise that an effort has been made to set the religious life before young people in all its sobriety and seriousness, rather than, as is too often the case, in the sentimental light of a mildly exciting adventure.

⁶ *Lambeth Conference, 1930, p. 136.*

But these are pronouncements for the moment. In each case the situation may be quite different ten years hence. But the question of the development and future organisation of the Anglican Communion as a whole is a permanent problem to which 'Lambeth, 1930,' has made contributions of far-reaching consequence. For this reason it is well to focus attention upon the work of Committee No. IV. The personnel of it might seem inconspicuous, as if the notabilities were naturally seconded for more vital and intellectual considerations elsewhere. Its brief report has for the hasty reader a rather arid appearance—dioceses, provinces, national Churches and the like. But its subject is the future development of the Communion as a whole, and it is vital.

We may state the situation in the words of the report: 'There are two prevailing types of ecclesiastical organisation: that of centralised government, and that of regional autonomy within one fellowship. Of the former, the Church of Rome is the great historical example. The latter type, which we share with the Orthodox Churches of the East and others, was that upon which the Church of the first centuries was developing until the claims of the Roman Church and other tendencies confused the issue.'⁷ This is gently and considerately stated, but it is a challenge all the same. Over against the Roman type of centralised domination it sets the Anglican type of unfettered self-government, 'a commonwealth of Churches without a central constitution,' 'a federation without a central government.'⁸ Divest 'Anglican' of its geographical associations. Let it be but an ecclesiastical type, and it can serve to designate all that chooses to associate itself with Lambeth in that liberty which is where the Spirit of the Lord is.

Nevertheless, some measure of central organisation is needed, and one which can clearly stop far short of 'central government.' It is needed, because the lack of it involves risks of a Patriarchate—a plan which Lambeth itself would emphatically reject. It is needed because a decade is a long time in a world of rapid change, and, amid whatever limitations, we have to 'carry on.' It was this need which led to the creation of the 'Consultative Body,' a somewhat mysterious junta, which can easily now be changed into something more obviously representative, especially if the American Bishops will forget President Monroe and bear their part in it; which, indeed, they now seem likely to do.

A commonwealth of Christian Churches such as this might readily be joined by small bodies such as the Old Catholics and

⁷ *Lambeth Conference, 1930, p. 155.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

the Moravians, or by great historic Communionss such as the various Orthodox Churches and the Church of Sweden. It would give the great non-episcopal Churches at home, of whom the ordinary Christian thinks first and foremost and most fervently, when he thinks of reunion at all, a fresh opportunity and a compelling pretext for considering why they should any longer stand outside a federation which is wide enough to embrace all that is not of the Roman obedience, and which in time may avail to show Rome herself that here is something with which she need not fear to co-operate, but which is too valiant and world-wide to be merely subdued and absorbed. Then at last the peace of the world will be secured because the united voices of all the Churches demand it, and disunion will cease to retard the victory of the Cross.

ERNEST WORCESTER.

THE BROMLEY BY-ELECTION

THE belief in the validity of by-elections as a test of current popular opinion is one of the superstitions of English political life for which it is by no means easy to find a logical basis. In fact, the conditions in which by-elections are generally fought are so entirely different from those which prevail at a General Election that inference from them is always dubious. It is possible for energetic organisers to concentrate their forces upon a single constituency to a degree which is entirely out of the question at a General Election: the power of the machine is correspondingly magnified. Doubtless a long series of by-election victories or defeats has a real significance. It is scarcely possible to doubt, for instance, that the successive defeats of the Liberals before the war meant that the Liberal Government was thoroughly unpopular and would have been overwhelmingly defeated at the next General Election. But the isolated by-election is extraordinarily deceptive as a test of general popular feeling. Both Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli fell victims on different occasions to these false auguries. The most dramatic example of all was the Bermondsey by-election just before the Liberal triumph in 1910. At this election, in the very middle of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's 'raging, tearing propaganda,' the Free Traders, led by so stout and eloquent a champion as the late Mr. Spencer Leigh Hughes, were decisively defeated by a Protectionist tanner, Mr. Dumphreys. The victory immensely encouraged the 'Tariff Reformers' and proportionately depressed their antagonists. Yet it was entirely illusory. Mr. Dumphreys, in the event, never took his seat. He was defeated in Bermondsey at the immediately ensuing General Election, while his beaten opponent was triumphantly returned for Stockport. But no multiplication of such instances will diminish the popular interest in by-elections nor the significance, distorted by the hopes of the victors and the fears of the defeated, which is attached to them; and the Bromley contest was no exception to the rule.

Yet if the object of this election had really been to obtain the opinion of the country, a less representative constituency could scarcely have been chosen. As at present defined it has never

been represented by any but a Conservative. The repeated attacks of one of the ablest and most accomplished of the younger Liberals, Mr. Kingsley Griffith, were always easily repulsed; and at the General Election on a huge poll the Conservative majority in a three-cornered contest was well over 7000. If the Liberals have failed to shake the Conservative domination, Labour has been equally unsuccessful. In the only 'straight' contest in the constituency since the war a much respected local Labour leader of very moderate views was decisively rejected. The inference seems clear that the Conservative hold on the seat, very strong in any case, is doubly secured by the division of the other parties. Labour in Bromley will not support a Liberal candidate in any probable circumstances; and a very considerable body of Liberal voters cannot be induced to support even a moderate Labour candidate.

The circumstances in which it was fought might have been specially designed to make the result still more unreal and artificial. The election was decided on the old register, a fact which in any case would have meant the disfranchisement of many new voters. In Bromley, where building has been going on with quite feverish haste in recent years and the population has been swollen enormously by an influx of new villa dwellers, continually moving, this fact meant that literally thousands were deprived of their votes. In the near future this new vote may completely alter the political complexion of the constituency. In this August by-election it did not count at all. Add to this that it was an August by-election with half the population of the well-to-do comfortable suburb away and by no means easy to trace, and with the half that remained even less disposed than usual to any active display of political enthusiasm, and the unrepresentative character of the struggle becomes clearer still. Bromley is never exactly a hotbed of any form of political enthusiasm. In one populous quarter of the constituency at the last General Election all three parties failed completely to attract any gathering that could fairly be called a meeting. In the hot August days meetings were as somnolent and as sparsely attended as ever: an exasperated *Manchester Guardian* commentator was driven to refer to 'the South Sea island calm' of Bromley; and the description was substantially true. The country and the newspapers might be agitated by the issues at stake in the return to Westminster of a new member for Bromley. Bromley itself, till the very eve of the poll, was not.

But to one political party, at any rate, the issue really was of importance. Conservatism in the early days regarded the conclusion as foregone, and was mainly concerned to stamp it beforehand with the official seal and warn off newspaper interlopers.

Labour, profoundly depressed, never hoped to do more than make a demonstration. It never has done more in its own strength in Bromley. But to Liberalism, at the time when the vacancy unexpectedly occurred, the contest was obviously of extreme moment. The situation of the party was very anxious. Its credit had been deeply impaired by the continual schisms in the parliamentary party. In the constituencies the local organisations were suffering from the exhaustion and the disappointment of the great effort put out at the General Election. The rank and file were listless and despondent, the leaders themselves waiting rather hopelessly upon events. The collapse of the Electoral Reform Conference had ended one hope of securing a reasonable measure of representation for the 5,000,000 Liberal electors. The question jeeringly raised by many opponents was whether these millions any longer existed, and whether the whole party was not in reality in process of rapid and complete dissolution. This question the Bromley result seemed bound to answer: it might answer it with deplorable emphasis. Liberalism had always been easily the second strongest party there; but the Labour vote had risen ominously at the General Election. If the Liberal now fell to the third place, the writing on the wall would be unmistakable. A heavy Liberal vote, on the other hand—above all, a barely possible Liberal victory—would encourage the depressed forces of Liberalism to a degree out of all proportion to the real significance of the occasion.

Liberal headquarters rose to the situation with great energy. The young, popular, and extraordinarily energetic Liberal candidate found himself vigorously supported by the full resources of the powerful Liberal central organisation, and the 'star' meetings arranged by its managers were incomparably the best attended in the whole election. Sir Herbert Samuel's admirable opening speech was heard by a quite considerable audience—for Bromley, a very considerable audience indeed. Miss Megan Lloyd George's meeting was crowded to the doors, and Mr. Lloyd George himself attracted the usual multitude which flocks to hear him alone among contemporary orators. On this occasion the great crowd did not lose its time; for his speech, humorous and earnest, critical and constructive, and throughout marvellously eloquent, was a masterpiece of its kind. It deserves a place in any oratorical anthology as a model of what an eve of the poll speech ought to be.

Long before this, of course, the real drama of the election had developed. At the very beginning, almost before the curtain was fairly rung up, the Ghost had appeared in the person of a certain Colonel Combs, claiming to be the nominee of the local branch of the United Empire Party. As the existence of this body had

not previously been suspected, the Ghost was not taken very seriously by anybody. Most of the newspapers did not so much as mention him: those which did, did so only to deprecate his precipitancy. It was assumed that he would disappear; and so he did, but only to give place to a far more substantial personage. There was nothing ghost-like at all about Mr. V. C. Redwood; the only mystery about him was how exactly he got on to the stage at all.

It is certain that Lord Beaverbrook had nothing whatever to do with it. Personally friendly with Mr. Campbell, whom the official Conservative machine had hastened to adopt as the one and only true Conservative candidate, and entirely satisfied with his assurances on the question of Empire Free Trade, Lord Beaverbrook never had any intention of intervening in the Bromley election. The ambiguities of his attitude, which lent themselves to easy ridicule, were due, not to any real hesitation, but simply to the embarrassment of the position in which he found himself. From Lord Beaverbrook's point of view, Mr. Campbell was a sufficiently good Protectionist; and he regarded it as folly to risk, by opposing him, the return of an avowed Free Trader. Lord Rothermere also seems at first to have hesitated. Mr. Redwood always robustly denied that he was sent to Bromley by Lord Rothermere; he simply came. There is no reason to disbelieve him. For the first day or two after his adoption he did not in fact enjoy the support of Lord Rothermere's organs; it was only later that all the trumpets sounded suddenly to the battle. Why, is still a mystery. One main reason, no doubt, was Lord Rothermere's fierce antipathy to Mr. Baldwin, to whom Mr. Campbell, the Conservative candidate, never ceased to proclaim his devoted allegiance. Another may have been a desire to show that he could do in Bromley what Lord Beaverbrook had recently done in North Norfolk, and perhaps do it better. Yet a third possibly was the fact that he heartily approved the policy for which Mr. Redwood was so sturdily, and indeed so noisily, fighting. After all, it was his own policy, and there is no real reason why a man, merely because he happens to be a newspaper proprietor, should not have convictions and be ready to fight and make sacrifices for them.

It was the fact that Mr. Redwood stood for a definite policy, and a policy defined by a newspaper, that makes his appearance so very significant. Newspapers both new and old have continually 'campaigned' in favour of some one 'plank' in a policy in which they happened to be particularly interested. This is no new thing. The old Press did it quite as often and as insistently as the modern popular Press; the subjects have varied from the Bulgarian atrocities and Home Rule to housing reform and the

importation of foreign pigs. 'Independent' candidates have also occasionally stood under the auspices of a newspaper in support of these isolated issues. Mr. Esmond Harmsworth, though always reckoned as a Conservative, was elected for Thanet nominally as an 'Anti-Waste' candidate under the same auspices as those under which Mr. Redwood stood at Bromley. The late General Townshend and his predecessor were both returned as Independent members for the Wrekin Division of Shropshire with the enthusiastic backing of Mr. Bottomley and his paper. The peculiarity of Mr. Redwood's position was that he was not so much a newspaper candidate as the champion of a newspaper policy, complete in itself and distinct from that of any other party. It was, it is true, a somewhat crude and incoherent policy. There seems no necessary connexion between High Protection, rigid economy, and the strong hand in India and Egypt. But policies are not by any means always coherent; many bodies of political doctrine have been no more coherent and far less distinctive than this.

The policy—it is of high significance—proved highly popular in Bromley. Probably thousands of loyal Conservatives who supported Mr. Campbell in obedience to the party whip would really have preferred Mr. Redwood's policy. His full-blooded, uncompromising Protection commanded far more respect and excited far more genuine hopes than Mr. Campbell's cautious, watery variant possibly could do. His Imperialism was thoroughly popular, and the most genuine cheers which Mr. Campbell ever won were raised when he adopted and repeated Mr. Redwood's denunciations of the 'weakness' of the Government in India and in Egypt. But Mr. Redwood's trump card was that he was 'the prosperity candidate': it swung definitely over to his side a fairly large shopkeeper vote, normally probably Conservative, but attracted strongly, in the grip of the trade depression, to a candidate who promised them relief from the burden of taxation and the assumed injustice of foreign competition. That he came forward as the standard bearer of 'a new party' lent an air of verisimilitude to his promises. Mr. Redwood had other adventitious advantages besides his own forceful personality. The 'Trade' was on his side—a not unimportant asset in a constituency which is said to include within its wide borders something like 150 publichouses. The very unwise personal attacks of the Conservative Central Office, which became panic-stricken as the struggle proceeded and lost its head, won him certainly hundreds of adherents. There was nothing really discreditable in his record; it shocked nobody but the staid type of Conservative, who was sufficiently shocked with Mr. Redwood's methods already and would not have voted for him in any case.

The average Bromley elector was not shocked : on the contrary, he was rather irritated by disclosures which looked merely spiteful because they were really irrelevant ; and Mr. Redwood was quite astute enough to exploit the reaction which set in in his favour as a result of these attacks.

The main reason of the astonishingly large poll which the United Empire candidate eventually secured was, however, undoubtedly his claim to be the 'prosperity candidate.' A veteran statesman once expressed to me the opinion that the fate of all Governments is determined ultimately by the state of trade. There is substantial truth, if there is some exaggeration, in this view. United States politics furnish the classical example of the operation of trade conditions on politics. The great strength of the American Republican Party in the past has been that it was able to suggest that Republicanism was the political creed under which trade flourished ; while a Democratic Government was in itself a threat to trade. There is probably nothing in it : there is no reason to suppose that American Democrats are in fact less careful or efficient guardians of the material prosperity of their country than American Republicans. But it has so happened that the two or three serious checks in American prosperity (till the last three years) have all occurred under the short Democratic Administrations ; and the long periods of unbroken prosperity have coincided with the periods of Republican rule. The result has been to convert a political slogan into a tradition and a superstition, which has only recently received its first shattering blow in the occurrence, under a Republican Administration, of the most disastrous trade set-back the United States have ever known. British Conservatism has never been able quite to identify itself with the commercial prosperity of the country in the way the American Republicans have succeeded in doing. But there has for years been a vague suggestion that Liberal, or still more Labour, administration involved a menace to trade. It has been a grave handicap to both these parties. Mr. Campbell and his supporters vied with Mr. Redwood in the endeavour to exploit this belief ; but without very much success, because the prolonged post-war trade depression, mainly under Conservative Governments, had already gone far to shatter it. The 'new party' had stolen this particular weapon from the Conservative arsenal, and the plaintive pleas of orthodox Conservatives that it was really theirs passed unheeded.

The surprising effect of Mr. Redwood's intervention was to alter completely the bearing of the result on the three existing parties. It had seemed at first that the contest might be of importance, perhaps decisive importance, to the Liberals, and of hardly any to Conservatism or Labour. In the event it had little

apparent bearing on the future of Liberalism, and considerable bearing on that of the other two parties. The Liberals did not do very well ; but neither did they do particularly badly. They failed to win the seat, but they reduced very heavily the majority against them, and they retained without difficulty their place as the second largest party in the division. Their poll fell considerably, but it remained large enough to make the Labour cry that they were a 'fading' party rather meaningless. The net result was to leave them very much where they had been before—an uncomfortable, uncertain position like that of a swimmer struggling against a strong current and making little or no progress.

For the future of Conservatism this election will probably prove far more important. The Conservative managers had evidently intended to make it a demonstration of the strength of the party discipline and of its loyal devotion to Mr. Baldwin as its leader. Mr. Campbell was unwearying in protesting his devotion to both ; but the electors—even the Conservative electors—heard these appeals very indifferently. The local machine was just strong enough to hold the seat, but as a demonstration of party loyalty it was an extraordinarily unimpressive performance. It was so very evident that the loyalty, even limited as it was, was reluctant and half-hearted. Mr. Redwood in his long speech after the poll announced that he had lighted a fire which would never be put out. If he meant that the United Empire Party would now go on from strength to strength as an independent political party, he was probably wrong. Fires of this kind have a habit of going out of themselves. But if he meant that the policy for which he fought would in the reasonably near future become the authorised policy of the Conservative Party, he may have been right. With some of its crudities a little toned down that may happen. If it does, the Bromley election will really prove an important political landmark ; for it will mark the transition of Conservative policy from the form in which it has been moulded since the war—the form which its critics within the party denounce as 'semi-Socialism'—to a form much older, more rigid, and more definitely Conservative. Mr. Baldwin in his message to his champion at Bromley startled his own followers by referring to their party and doctrine as 'Tory.' It is doubtful whether the word has ever been used before officially by a Conservative leader. Mr. Baldwin's slip—if it was a slip—may have been an unconscious prophecy. It is quite possible that his party may be about to return, with incalculable results, to its older, half-forgotten traditions and beliefs.

For Labour the result was scarcely less significant. A declining Labour vote has been a feature of a succession of recent by-elections, and a natural one in view of the widespread and deep

disappointment created by the evident impotence of the Government to grapple with the difficulties which beset it. But in Bromley the Labour vote was halved and the Government party left ignominiously at the bottom of the poll—quite hopelessly defeated by an interloper without local connexions and without even the semblance of an organisation. Mere abstentions would scarcely have produced this result. The locust, in the shape of Mr. Redwood, must have devoured quite a number of votes cast for the Labour Party at the General Election. The 'prosperity' cry, that is to say, is quite as dangerous to Labour as to any other party—perhaps more dangerous. It is not necessary to exaggerate it. The solid industrial populations of the big towns will no doubt continue steadfast in the faith and return Labour members by overwhelming majorities for the great industrial centres. But what put Labour in office was not really this vote, but the surprisingly large measure of support which the party received at the last General Election in rural or semi-industrial or even residential districts. If that is going or gone, the great movement which has been sweeping onward with so apparently irresistible an impetus will receive a tremendous check at the next General Election. That may alter its whole character. If the Bromley by-election was a foreshadowing of that, as it may prove to have been, it was a portent indeed.

STUART HODGSON.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE RUSSIAN

THE resemblances between two men seem to us more striking when they do not stand before us side by side—more striking still when we have only one of the two before our eyes. 'What a wonderful likeness!' we exclaim. 'You might be his brother.' But if the other man in question were suddenly to appear on the scene the likeness would vanish. So it is with the Russian Revolution, which is now in its thirteenth year and which we are far from being done with. Everyone who has watched it has noted the resemblances between it and the great revolution in France, and has drawn contrasts between the year 1789 and the year 1917. I lack space here to deal fully with this theme, and it would be too soon to try to do so, as the Russian drama has reached only its third act—or its fourth. The long interval between the two great events has the effect of intensifying the differences between them, for historical occurrences are like statues, which in the course of a century take on an incrustation imparted to them by wind and weather. They grow romantic; and when they lose an arm, or even a head, the effect is merely to increase their artistic beauty. The Parthenon itself would give us a shock if by some magic we were to see it suddenly one morning in its Periclean perfection, in all its pristine brightness of colouring; the heroes of Homer, if we had the facts of their lives before us in documents, or even if we had the scenes of their battles reproduced for us in the cinema, would perhaps seem to us mere brigands and barbarians. The age of our grandfathers is thought of in all countries as the Golden Age just because of the effacing hand of time: the miseries and evils of the period have been forgotten. Leave a battlefield alone for 100 years and it may take on the aspect of a peaceful happy glade.

Millions of people whose hearts are thrilled by the sight of the actual document—now preserved in a Paris museum—in which the Rights of Man were proclaimed, or who even read its memorable sentences in books, will turn with horror from all that has been happening in Russia. They do not realise that in Russia the sacrifices made in the Reign of Terror are now forgotten,

while elsewhere only the sacrifices are remembered. Who shall condemn those emigrants, driven out from Russia—like those driven out from France—who fill the world with their grievances? When a man has lost everything—his fatherland, his family, his home—he must be of strong character, indeed, if he can admit, nevertheless, that behind such deeds of oppression an idea is at work which the Future has only to purify in order that its issue be deathless. I have met men of such strong character and learnt to know them.

In the France of 1789 there were exceptional individuals who desecrated the star of a higher justice rising up above the thunder-clouds. I may instance the case of two Americans—Gouverneur Morris and Washington. Writing to Washington in 1789 from Paris, whither he had come on a political mission, Morris declared that there were men and women of great qualities at work in France, but that they were in the background—a background deep in shadow. A great building of Liberty was being erected, he said, but out of materials which might fall to pieces and bring the architects to ruin. Washington replied that it was difficult for people under such conditions not to fall from one extreme into another; and that in this event rocks and unseen reefs might bring shipwreck, followed by a more accentuated despotism than that which had been exercised before.

What will follow the present *régime* in Russia? That is the question raised by everyone whose gaze is directed on Moscow, whether he yearns for or dreads a new dictatorship or tyranny. The answer to the riddle is not to be sought in the history of the French Revolution, for the two movements were different; perhaps more light is thrown on the development of the French Revolution by the development of the Russian.

Certain resemblances are at least unmistakable. In both cases we see a stubborn mediæval system of sovereignty condemned in theory in half a dozen books decade after decade and then practically annihilated by a rebellion of the people. In both cases the privileged class was overthrown, subjected to banishment and in some measure to the penalty of death. In Russia the landed property of a few of the nobles was given to the people; in France the feudal land system was done away with. In both cases an exhausted minority was replaced by a powerful majority by means of moral force in accordance with natural economic laws.

Nobody will still feel regret to-day over the loss to the French nobility and clergy of their immemorial power and boundless wealth through the motion of the Vicomte de Noailles on that August night in 1789, or over the throwing open of official and

military posts to all French citizens. The United States of America have had no experience of such a condition of things since they became independent; in Europe it had been the normal condition, and in Russia (which, indeed, ought really to be classed with Asia) it continued for another seventy years, until the practical slavery of the peasants was abolished; for until 1861 the Russian peasants—i.e., 85 per cent. of the population—were serfs. But it was not until 130 years after the French Revolution that the Russian Revolution achieved more thoroughly that status which, thanks to the former, had become common to all civilised States. Russia had needed a defeat in the war, and a few leaders, to awaken a people adapted to suffering and by nature not very active. Of all the European States none had incurred such inevitable losses from the war as Russia, for she had allowed herself for a longer period than any other to be duped by a proud and incorrigible class.

What happened in France in 1789 had not happened for two and a half centuries—had not happened since the Reformation: a people was carried away by a great movement. On both occasions, in 1789 as in 1917, the idea of a primitive right of mankind had taken possession of the soul, and after the proclamation of it had been made in new and convincing fashion by a few individuals, it had impelled the masses into immediate action; on both occasions the spark was kindled first in the capital cities, and then the conflagration spread slowly, never reaching many parts of the wide provinces and the extremities of the land. On both occasions the action was national, the idea international, for the French Revolution also was in its own eyes world revolution and was launched as such. And in truth it was a world revolution, though of much slower growth and subject to much greater modifications than was originally intended. The stream of Liberty, reddened with the blood of thousands of martyrs, did not pour into the plains, fructifying everything at once; hills and valleys delayed its progress, until at last, in greatly altered character, only a little reddened now, it split itself up in distant alien regions. Almost everything that we possess in Europe in the form of civilian liberty had its origin in that great impulse, and only if we look at the matter with the eyes of the emigrant can we fail to admit that similar indirect effects of the Russian movement are making themselves felt, more slowly, in very different ways, perhaps even against the ideas of the protagonists, but unceasingly. When recently I questioned Trotsky on the subject he said:

I have long been studying the sociological character of the Revolution, and I am now engaged in recording my impressions. Things may take a backward turn for us—perhaps we shall even go so far back as to have

another Tsar; but the great things we have achieved will remain, the abolishment of private ownership above all, and the handing back of millions of acres to a couple of thousand idle inheritors has become impossible.

History shows, indeed, that every thesis with great spiritual effects, every innovation capable of being put effectively into practice, resorted to in resistance against the habitual sanguinary conflicts, must begin by being carried to excess in order afterwards, when the heart-beat of the State has become more quiet, to be resumed as a positive vital force, the harmful elements in which have been eliminated. Did not the French Revolution kindle the idea of Equality, and was not its effect instead to strengthen Capitalism? Nevertheless, it kindled the idea of Liberty at the same time and, in a certain measure, brought it into existence. Can the modern history of Europe point to a more impressive document than the proclamation of the Rights of Man of the year 1789?—the proclamation that all men were born and remain free, and with equal rights; that all men were safeguarded against oppression; that all sovereignty was rooted in the nation; that no community and no individual could exert an authority which had not its root in the nation's will. The entire nineteenth century has been based upon these maxims; no Napoleon has been able to combat their essential truth; and one can point to no greater truth of their effects than the fact that to-day they are regarded as commonplace; for, as a Frenchman has said, the Utopias of to-day are the commonplaces of an enlightened to-morrow.

But the circuitous road to these victories of revolution was long, and was marked at first by scaffolds and the lime pits into which were thrown the thousands of the beheaded; it was accompanied by the clatter of the guns, which shot down more thousands of innocent citizens until the leaders themselves fell victims to the guillotine or the bullets. In this respect both revolutions are particularly alike—we are still in the midst of the intensification. Cagliostro and Rasputin respectively open the chains of events, in 1786 and 1914—in both cases three years before the outbreak; both of them acquired mastery over the hearts of the sovereigns by working upon their credulity and superstition; both knew how to influence minds of a decadent generation by intrigue; both won for themselves the enjoyments craved by their passions; until the one was condemned to death but afterwards allowed to languish in prison, while the other, without trial, was assassinated.

King Louis and Tsar Nicholas, so like each other in their weakness, were both dethroned, imprisoned, and done to death

by an excited populace; only the Tsar's end lasted a year, the King's five years. The French revolutionists, equally surprised by the lack of resistance offered to their seizure of power, proceeded more slowly, and they had even included in the proclamation of the Rights of Man the sentence: 'The person of the king is inviolable and sacred.' Nicholas was warned by a clairvoyant that he would be suddenly attacked and captured in a couple of days' time. King Louis, on the other hand, surrounded by a people given to free expression in speech and print, had been warned for years and ought to have been able to avoid everything. Seventeen years before his execution Turgot, on being dismissed from office as Minister of Finance, had foretold for him to his own face the doom of Charles I. of England. Both he and his consort had persisted in their thoughtless, spendthrift existence. Both in France and in Russia one must wonder at the patience of the people in tolerating such behaviour. The monarchical idea must have sunk extraordinarily deep in the mind of Europe for it to have been possible for the people to put up for twenty years with a king who came to the throne when he was twenty, ignorant, selfish and pleasure-loving, and for it to have been possible a hundred years later for another people to put up for twenty-four years with a neurotic tsar who stood in fear of his relatives, of his generals, of the priests, and, above all, of his own power.

In both countries the cleavage between the rich and the poor was extreme, for both lacked what to-day we call the middle class. In his famous treatise the Abbé Sièyes reckoned the number of the clericals and the nobles who were in complete control of France at 200,000 and the third estate at 25,000,000; in the same way tsarist Russia possessed a class of nobles, officials and priests quite insignificant in numbers who enjoyed complete sway until the founding of the Duma, and against whom the peasants and the workers, constituting 85 per cent. of the population, stood powerless.

'Within twenty-four hours the nation has gone forward a hundred years'—so it was declared in a letter written in August 1788 with reference to the calling together of the États Généraux. The letter was from the pen of Count Mirabeau, and if the adherents of the late Tsar Nicholas should speculate now as to what was lacking to them in the year 1917—what might at least have postponed their misfortunes for a while and then perhaps have won back power for them from outside by a war—they may well feel that it was a Mirabeau. Kerensky was lacking in almost all the attributes required for the playing of this great rôle of a political reformer. 'War against the privileged!' Mirabeau wrote at that time to a friend.

There you have my solution. . . . Moreover, I am a Monarchist in a high degree. . . . It would be a barbarous thing for our generation to have recourse to force. Thanks to the art of printing education should suffice to carry through all the revolutions which mankind owes to itself; only by this method of proceeding will the people lose nothing of what they have won for themselves. [And he proceeds:] You know that the time is past when the favour of a King was sufficient to make the fame of a minister. . . . In future only the nation will be decisive regarding success in politics.

When later the Revolution came into being with the storming of the Bastille, Mirabeau would perhaps have been the saviour of his order, only that he lacked, as he said himself, a virtuous youth and a spotless name. He held aloof from that decisive sitting at which, three weeks later, the Feudalists gave up their rights and he had the good fortune to die soon afterwards. Otherwise he would certainly have been beheaded instead of being the first Frenchman to lie in the Panthéon.

After his death the Revolution became more extreme. During the year 1789, at the first sitting of the Estates of the Realm, which one might almost compare with the first Duma, the representatives of the Third Estate still entered by a side door, ill-clothed, wearing shabby hats, while the clericals and nobles strutted about brilliantly attired; a year later the power was in the hands of the masses under the leadership of four clubs. One more year and the King is in flight. Yet another year and the Tuileries Palace is stormed and the Republic constituted. Five months the King is led to execution. Another year and the Dantonists, accused of corruption, are executed by order of Robespierre. Then after four months comes the great turn in the wheel of fortune: Robespierre is executed and power falls into the hands of the men of the Thermidor—July 1794. It is at this date, five years after the beginning of the Revolution, that this retrograde movement starts. Then comes another period of five years, ending with Bonaparte's consulate, and five years later the Revolution becomes outwardly a paradox when Napoleon becomes emperor.

The so-called Reign of Terror under Danton and Robespierre had lasted scarcely two years. What they were concerned with was no longer the political, easily achieved equality, but economic equality: soldiers' councils for the administration of certain battalions, the socialistic State, the education of the children by the State, the dividing up of the land for cultivation among the peasants, the levelling of private incomes, the prohibition of all luxury, the annihilation of the individual's interests in favour of the interests of the community. 'Il ne faut ni riches ni pauvres'—there must be neither rich nor poor. In all these features the

French programme was very similar to the Russian. The principal means for establishing all this was also a kind of Tcheka: a revolutionary court consisting of twelve jurors and five judges, with powers *de facto* to imprison or execute everybody and availing themselves of this power in thousands of cases. Just as in France the power passed from the Girondists to the more radical Jacobins, and then again from Danton to the more radical Robespierre, so we find it passing in Russia from the cadet Kerensky by way of the Mensheviks and social revolutionaries to the Bolsheviks, but all this happened, not in the course of two years, but in the six months between March and October 1917.

The Communist-Soviet Power, moreover, like the Convention, had to contend with the intervention of foreign countries; Lenin and Trotsky fought against the armies of Koltchak, Denikin, Udenitsch and Wrangel, and they sent forth on their banners to the frontiers the call for a world revolution, even going so far as to employ the modern means of wireless in order to spread their doctrine in all countries. But Lenin showed proof of a statesmanlike mind in the middle of the sixth year of his government—in the year 1921—when he gave way to the force of famine and abandoned, or at least shelved, his own doctrinaire laws by introducing the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.). Whether it was the cleverness of this regulation, or whether it was due to the general situation in the world, certain it is that within a year from then, in the spring of 1922—that is, within five years—through the Treaty of Rapallo, he had secured the recognition and friendship of Germany, followed by at least the recognition of most of the other States of Europe. So also it had been in France. Just five years after the storming of the Bastille the country had attained to the point of consolidation under the outside influence of the public opinion of the world and of the forces of moderation at home.

Here, however, begins the outstanding difference between the two movements. For a while in Paris in the sixth year of the Revolution things began to settle down again so steadily that in the twelfth year the First Consul was able to write: 'The Revolution is going back to the beginning. It is come to an end.' We are now witnessing a new intensification of the Russian Revolution in the corresponding twelfth year of the Soviet Government. Its causes are partly of a personal and partly of a material nature: partly they are a mere matter of atmosphere.

The first thing was to get rid of Trotsky, the last of the great protagonists, the creator of the Red Army, to whom his antagonists, owing to his great popularity, imputed dictatorial intentions, assuredly without grounds. Sunk in general esteem,

he remains in Russia writing and speaking against Stalin and his disciples as men of the Thermidor, who were yielding up the things that had been won by the Revolution.

The land had to be industrialised, the great farms had to be entirely done away with, private ownership had to be completely uprooted, in order to counteract the instincts of capitalism which were coming up again. Stalin had to silence such utterances, hearkened to as they were by all those who were discontented, and he did so by means of a dangerous *coup* by handing over his enemy to capitalistic Europe instead of killing him. At once, however, there remained nothing else for him to do than to adopt extremism himself, for he lacked the authority of Lenin, who alone was in a position to change round.

In addition, when Stalin the year before took over the policy of Trotsky in regard to the peasants, there was a general feeling that a ring was being formed in the world. Every step taken by the Western States was viewed distrustfully, Germany's natural wish to come to an understanding with France was suspected, and it was decided to make Russia absolutely independent, feeding herself, clothing herself and arming herself. So as not to have to buy the machines from abroad which she needed, Russia had to pursue agriculture at a fantastically high pressure in order to be able to export; grain exports, which before the war had averaged 11,000,000 tons, were now increased from zero to 3,000,000 tons, and the harvest was so small that 250,000 tons had to be imported. During the last years the exports had increased; a certain advance had been made again in the matter of these exports, but admittedly at the price of the peasants' food supply. Moreover, the effort to constitute great State properties and collective peasants' farms had this political basis—that it was feared that Stalin did not venture to follow undoubtedly better methods (those of developing individual farms and lessening the taxes upon the bigger enterprises) from fear of opposition from the Left.

The second recent mark of the intensification is the advance of atheism; but here also a comparison with that of France can scarcely be instituted, for the atheistic movement in France was fiercer. It is true that the old calendar was abolished then in France as now in Russia, and that already in 1792 it was decided, as to-day in Russia, to make every fifth day a day of rest, whereby every month was divided up into ten-day periods. Instead of naming the days after the old saints, they were named after animals and plants: wine, chestnut, horse, potato, ox, goose, honey. This was followed by the most violent attacks in the Convention on God and on the priest, religious vestments were worn in comic procession through the street, the royal tombs in

the Church of St. Denis violated, the words 'To Reason' were written upon the doors of the churches, and the beautiful Mme. Momoros displayed her charms as the Goddess of Reason in Notre Dame. Six months later Robespierre had begun to champion the existence of a Higher Being, and while still attacking the priests declaimed no longer against God. It was now he formulated the half-comic, half-pathetic decision which ran:

1. The French people acknowledges the existence of a Highest Being and the immortality of the soul.
2. The most fitting worship of the Highest Being lies in the assertion of the Rights of Man.

Now, instead of the beautiful lady, it was the less beautiful Robespierre who at a great festival figured as a high priest in a blue gown with a tricolour girdle and plume, carrying a sheaf of corn in one hand and a bouquet of flowers in the other. Above the church doors the words 'To the Highest Being' were inscribed now. Seven years later Napoleon concluded his *Concordat* with the Catholic Church; a year later Easter was once again celebrated for the first time as a thanksgiving feast.

The development in Russia ran on other lines. Only the Communist Party, to which only about 1,000,000 souls belong out of a population of 100,000,000, professes atheism, everyone who allows his child to be baptised being excluded from it; all the others possess freedom of belief and were free for a decade to visit the churches; only they did not often do so—at least, in 1924, when I was visiting in different parts of Russia and tried to investigate the matter. In Russia the churches had admittedly sunk to be a mere tool of the tsardom, the priest stood morally and intellectually far below the level of those of the Roman Church, and in literature the drinking and begging 'Pope' cut always a comic figure. The Russian peasant, as those who knew him best before the war used to declare, was superstitious rather than religious, and he was swiftly torn away from his mysticism and fears when the heavens failed to send down thunder and lightning on the agitators despite their Godless orations.

The old customs and habits of centuries which still survived have been more actively fought against during the last year; Stalin and his men were forced into this by the party of the Left, who accused them of being too tolerant. When a worker secretary of a great factory stepped into the assembly and, in order to curry favour with the central authorities, proposed the turning of the local church into a club-house, who could then venture to object? If the workers constituted the majority of the local *rayon*, the decision to close the church was ratified by the central body.

Occasionally things went otherwise. In one case in a village to the east of Moscow last autumn, when the officials from the neighbouring big town arrived to carry off the bells of the village church in conformity with the decree, the inhabitants rioted and killed the agents. In the trial which ensued the witnesses were skilfully manipulated so as to make it appear that the revolt was kindled by a few peasant proprietors, together with the Pope, and these were condemned and shot. There would seem to be dangerous political elements in such proceedings, and it was only the members of the orthodox religion who were apt to be prosecuted, not evangelical ministers, and rabbis. As for the few priests of the Church of Rome who fell victims, they would seem to have been agents of Poland, or to have been represented as such.

But since March last a new movement in the backward direction has been taken on this as in other important questions. The leaders of the party disassociated themselves from such Hotspurs, and Stalin, who had been obliged to allow the dissatisfaction to rise to a certain level, now feels strong enough to call back his agents. For six months past, from last autumn down to this spring, he was obliged to tolerate the persecution of the priests, the closing of the churches, the behaviour of the tax-collectors, because he had no accommodation for any more prisons. The younger generation, brought up on Communistic principles, presses forward, and the man at the head must now endeavour to go more slowly without possessing Lenin's authority.

The older men amongst the peasants cross themselves once more and say: 'Little Father Stalin is a wise man after all: he has given orders that we are to have our cow back and that we may go into the church once more.' For on March 15 the new proclamation appeared to the astonishment of all; the closing of a church is only to be permitted in accordance with the unanimous decision to this effect, and since the Madonna was spat upon in a procession last winter everyone is punished who mocks at religion. In this change of attitude, however, it would seem that we are confronted only with a tactical manœuvre, and, if I am not mistaken, the situation in Moscow is still far removed from the so-called Thermidor. Stalin is not Robespierre and Trotsky is not Danton. The breaking up of religion is not peculiar to Russia, for in other parts of Europe tens of thousands are yearly abandoning the church; the reasons for this are manifold, but I cannot deal with them here. Neither the Russian nor the French Revolution had religious causes or aims; one cannot even say that God, who in the seventh year of the French Revolution was once again acknowledged, has yet come back to Moscow in the thirteenth year of the Russian Revolution, for he was never

driven out by State decree. Neither Reason nor the Highest Being were inscribed on the church doors, nor was it ever ordained that the churches were to be closed and the priests to be expelled. Their influence was not enough for it to be necessary to uproot them. Moreover, the social problems, with which the Bolsheviks are above all confronted, are too serious and too simple for them to be burdened with religious problems.

The only religion known to new Russia is the religion of Work. In this passion for work the Russian Revolution differs fundamentally from the French; in France it was necessary for the dictator to call back all the citizens to their activities. In Moscow, ever since October 1917, people have worked feverishly, and this is all the more astonishing as the Russian in his disinclination for action is the very opposite of the Frenchman. Whether the work makes him happy is a great question, but that it is necessary nobody doubts. If the Bolsheviks had brought their people nothing else than the habit of work for all, they have achieved more than Europe had allowed itself to imagine.

EMIL LUDWIG.

A POLICY FOR CENTRAL EUROPE

THE land tenure reform legislation in the countries of Central Europe broke up the estates of about 35,000 large landowners and reduced them to the position of small owners or bought them out altogether. In short, the large landowner has disappeared from the life of the eastern half of Central Europe altogether, except in Hungary, where he still dominates social and political life, and to some extent in Poland. The aristocracy thus displaced was an aristocracy in the narrow sense, a separate caste surviving from feudal times, with only formal alterations in spirit and structure. It refused to adapt itself to modern conditions, assimilating neither new elements nor new ideas, standing out consistently against the extension of political rights and liberties. The principle of its existence, racial and social oppression, was responsible for the permanent crisis and inevitable collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The economic policy of this aristocracy was naturally dictated by the fact that its powers rested on the possession of the land; it consisted simply in protecting its own interests against other classes of producers by protective tariffs. It took practically no part in the development of industry and commerce. Not being directly concerned in the cultivation of the soil, as a rule it did not even take the initiative in introducing new technical methods in agriculture. Thus the new States lost at the same time a repressive controlling force in political life and a directing force in agrarian policy. After the war there seemed no likelihood that hundreds of thousands of small-owner cultivators, spread over thousands of square miles, working under conditions as different, for instance, as the sugar beet cultivator of Bohemia and the Rumanian wheat producer, with no common interest but the bare fact of landownership, should contribute much to the settlement of post-war Europe. But that single dominant factor has formed in each of the countries concerned a strong agrarian party which has proved itself stronger in the long run than any other concentration of interests.

It is necessary, of course, to distinguish between the movement in the Balkans and the movement in Central Europe. The

leaders of the Serbian and Bulgarian parties were inspired by radical ideals. The policy of Raditch, for instance, argued that, since in an agrarian State the peasantry is the only productive class, the State must be built up from below on the basis of the peasantry, the village community formed from the peasant families, the political district from the village communities, and from the political districts the State—that is, a State organised in the interests of producers, the Soviet system without the Marxian dogma. The party's policy naturally degenerated into exclusive agrarianism. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, on the other hand, the agrarian parties have never taken an extreme line, since they work under entirely different conditions. Agriculturists in these countries—particularly in Bohemia—are obliged to recognise the interests of the consumer of agricultural products, since agriculture itself is highly industrialised. There is, therefore, no trace of the anti-industrialist and anti-capitalist tendency of the movement in the Balkans. Here the principles of the agrarian parties have no reasoned political theory behind them; they consist simply in the claim for democratisation, not destruction of capital, for equal treatment in taxation and tariff policy, and, most important, in social policy. In Central Europe there is not the same astonishing contrast between town and village life in the matter of public health, educational and social institutions as American sociologists observed in the United States before the war; but the improvement of conditions of rural civilisation is a more imperative task, since communications are less highly developed and there is less migration to the towns.

Among the leaders of the agrarian parties in Europe are to be found the chief movers in constructive political achievement in these countries. Stambolijski, the late Bulgarian leader, a typical representative of the hard primitive methods of the class struggle, was, nevertheless, the first strong statesman to harmonise the interests of his country with those of his neighbours and with the whole international situation, and the first to bridge the gulf between former enemies—and between enemies whose hatred was so deeply rooted and intimate as that of the Serbs and Bulgars. It was Witos, who for long years had led the Conservative Peasant Party in Poland, who did more than any man to make Poland politically and morally capable of resisting the Russian attack, inspiring his people with the strength of the peasant—conservative, enduring, attached to the soil—with the mystic devotion of the Slav. It was Rataj, his faithful supporter, who maintained the dignity of parliamentary institutions in the conflict with Marshal Pilsudski in 1926. His colleague, Jan Dabski, will play an important part in the work of genuine democratisation in Poland and the strengthening of the peasant

democracy against Bolshevik influences. In Rumania the government of Maniu has succeeded in establishing a very solid conservative democracy, with guarantees of political liberties and of adequate treatment of ethnic minorities. In the struggle with the old *régime* Maniu amalgamated his party with the Rumanian Tsaranists, led by Madgearu, Mihalache, and Raducany: this unified peasant party has become, and seems likely to remain, the very centre of Rumanian State policy, a powerful force in the political life of the Balkans. In Yugoslavia the attempts of Jovanovitch and other prominent politicians to organise a strong agrarian parliamentary party did not lack response in the Serbian peasant masses, and there is no doubt that united agrarian democratic movements of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would have been able to give Yugoslavia a strong political axis, if it could have mastered regional rivalries, as it actually did in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Poland.

The strength of the agrarian parties lies, first, in the fact that agriculture represents the social and also the economic centre of gravity in these countries. Agricultural development is less dependent on national financial power than industry and commerce. Small units of production remain the most efficient from the standpoint of intensive cultivation, if they are united in co-operative marketing and credit associations.

Secondly, their strength lies in the steadying influence of the agricultural population in politics. After a war which changed the significance of so many ideas and upset so many old prejudices in Central Europe, it is to be expected that the whole series of social and political terms should lose their old meaning. We cannot speak of conservatism in the same sense as before the war; the state of affairs which we want to conserve to-day was formerly the ideal of extreme radicalism. Conservative policy at the present time means maintenance of the republic, and in this sense the peasant farmer is conservative. But he is not reactionary—he consolidates, concentrates; his steadying influence is an effort, not a dead weight, in political life. Radicalism, for the Slavs, is not a progressive policy; it is a negative attitude to the State, the habit of irresponsible criticism, driven still deeper into Slav mentality by the unhealthy political situation in the old monarchy, which merges easily into anarchism. Švehla has said, 'Anyone can say "No, I won't"; but to say "Yes" and bargain is the work of a statesman.' The peasant in the new social order cannot be indifferent to the wider interests of the State.

Equally salutary in the new States, where the anti-clerical and anti-religious agitation of the Liberal and Socialist Parties has simply driven the believing masses into the arms of the Clerical

Party, is his attitude to religion and morals. The Liberal Parties soon recognised the effect of their policy and substituted for it indifference in religious questions; the Social Democratic Parties have also recognised that they were working on wrong lines. The value of the peasant's attitude consists in his refusal to let anyone make political capital out of his faith or moral or religious ideals. Clericalism is not to be fought by the methods of the so-called 'progressive' parties. In this struggle the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party has never participated. The wisdom of this refusal to interfere with deeper religious questions has been proved by the results of the last two elections: the figures show that it has won relatively more votes from the Clerical Party than definitively the anti-Church and anti-religion parties.

The emergence of these firmly rooted organisations signifies a forward direction in the intricacies of Central European politics. The greatest achievement of the party in Czechoslovakia has been its success in uniting the different nationalities of the republic—an achievement of the impossible, it might have seemed to the foreign observer ten years ago. The old monarchy and the old social order were incapable of promoting better understanding between Czechs and the German Bohemians; they could do nothing but observe the intensification of racial friction. One has to recall the many attempts at conciliation, and the many falls of Ministries which they entrained, to realise the apparent hopelessness of this task. True, it is too soon to speak of a solution of the minority problem, but the party is feeling its way towards a solution on the only possible lines.

Further, agrarian democracy provides the only foundation for a foreign policy for the new States, based, not on casual alliances, but on recognition of common interests and co-operation of neighbours. To bridge the gulf between pre-war nationalism, which appealed to a low class of instincts and emotions, and post-war internationalism, which makes the highest moral and intellectual claims, is an impossibility. But for creative nationalism—as contrasted with pre-war disruptive nationalism, which is based, not merely on recognition of differences of language and customs, but on the recognition of the nation's contribution to human culture—there is a natural approach to international co-operation through a half-way house: recognition of the common culture of the Slav races. It is not the sentimental, intellectualist pan-Slavism of the pre-war period, founded on the belief that blood is thicker than water; that belief finds no purchasers on the modern political stock exchange. But our cultures originate from the same source, they are closely inter-related; we have the same, or similar, conditions for the creation of our contribution to the international forum. Only the

centuries divide us. If we ask what class of the nation it is which has kept its characteristic traits most unsullied by the touches of foreign civilisation, we find that it is not the professional or intellectual or the capitalist or the proletariat class, but the country people. Scientific students, such as la Fontaine, Muret and others, have established the fact that the majority of moral and intellectual, and, above all, artistic, elements in Czech and Slovak culture correspond exactly to the same elements in the Poles and the South Slav cultures. In the Czech and Slovak peasants' cottages old artistic themes, old customs, old philosophy, old traditional wisdom, and the old costumes have maintained themselves, which on closer examination would reveal their resemblance to the Polish. The fundamental similarities are greater than the superficial differences; this, as Muret asserted in a review of Reymont's *Chłopi*, is also true of the Russians and Poles. It is, of course, a community of cultures on a primitive level, but all the more deeply rooted. The peasant is not only the upholder of the national culture of the people or race, but at the same time, since he emerges from the mutually related masses, the representative of the old Slav spiritual values, that which is common to all the Slav peoples. Our political co-operation is a sociological necessity, resting on bases of science and sentiment.

Under present conditions of social differentiation, social *rapprochement* means *rapprochement* of peoples in their social groups and classes. In an attempt to give a democratic content to official political co-operation which represents only the form, co-operation of the Slav races would naturally begin with the farmer. It should extend itself to the industrial working class, to the industrialist and intellectual, to bring about a fusion of all classes in the co-operation of these nations, which would carry with it the necessity of bringing our legislation into line with that of the other nations.

To the argument for closer co-operation in matters of legislation with the other Slav races our opponents commonly raise the objection that it is impossible, since there are great differences in the degree of progress attained. Progress among the Slav races has a sinking curve from west to east, but a straight line from north to south, simply because the Czechs were engaged for centuries in a struggle with the progressive and cultivated Germans; they became habituated to the cultural methods of the struggle and of international competition. The Slovaks came into conflict with the Magyars, the Magyar nobility and feudalism. Their opponent was less civilised, and therefore their people could not reach maturity like the Czech people, which had a highly civilised opponent. In the same way the Poles in old Russia had a less advanced opponent, and they could therefore

appropriate modern methods from no one, in contrast with the western Poles in Poznań in their struggles with the Germans. Similarly with the Slovenes and Croats in Yugoslavia. The Slovenes in Western Yugoslavia were opposed to the cultivated Germans, and so their methods were more highly developed than those of their neighbours, the Croats.

We are, therefore, not so widely separated from the South Slavs and the Poles as at first sight appears. It is possible that the Pole from Poznań does not stand so near to the Pole from East Poland so closely culturally and psychologically as he does to the Czech, who has learnt his methods in the same way in the great struggle with the Germans. The same holds true of the Czechs and the Slovenes, and of the Slovaks and the Croats, who resemble each other because they had the same opponent for 900 years and have become habituated to the same kind of influences.

This conception of the sociological content of political co-operation is, of course, nothing new. Germany and Austria are doing the same thing, mutually adapting the legal principles of their civil and criminal law, their traffic rules, and the basis of their cultural policy. Formally the Anschluss does not exist, but *de facto* it is prepared for, not by official policy, but by the fact that the whole social structures in Germany and Austria are beginning to resemble each other, a process which will continue until their inner structure is absolutely identical. If the Germans, *via facti*, can bring about this sort of *rapprochement* there is no obstacle to our doing the same. If we are startled by this actual achievement of the Anschluss, it would mean that we and the Poles and the remaining Slavs had frittered away the first twelve years after the war without creating the easily attainable conditions for co-operation, *rapprochement* and consolidation of our national strength.

Only by this consolidation can the Slav races adjust their relationship to Germany satisfactorily. I am not referring here to the possibility of armed conflict, but to general questions of international relations, economic and cultural co-operation, and competition. It is a situation which must be treated with complete candour. The German question for the Czechoslovak State is not only the question of the 3,000,000 Germans within our frontiers, but of the 60,000,000 on the other side of the frontier. The Czechoslovak State will continue in any circumstance to apply its minority policy consistently. But, so long as we are only 10,000,000 Czechs and Slovaks, the feeling of insecurity will always be present, because for us alone an alliance with Germany is a *leonina societas*. If we are conscious that we, when united with the Poles and Yugoslavia, are not 10,000,000,

but six times as many, this disturbing feeling of insecurity will evaporate. Not only we, but also the Poles, could then conduct a sound minority policy and come to a genuine understanding with the whole great German people. It is this psychological factor which is vital to an honest peace policy.

Co-operation of the Slav races is the essential preliminary to closer union among the countries of Europe; it is, of course, an aspect of the same principle, closer international relations, which inspires all contemporary international politics. But the emergence of the agrarian parties not only supplies the basis of closer political contacts; it represents a fundamental step forward in economic welfare. Co-operation of the agrarian States is an essential preliminary to any project for European tariff union. Against the principle of the Pan-Europe movement no objection can be raised; the question is not, Do we or do we not want a Pan-European movement? but, Is Pan-Europe possible? Is it capable of benefiting anyone or not?

If we imagine Pan-Europe as a confederation with the tariff barriers raised, as a unitary customs area, then it is clear that Pan-Europe is not possible, and, even if it were possible, that it could not be advantageous and therefore not permanent. Europe is not an economic unity. West-Europe, predominantly industrial, has other economic interests than the agrarian States of Central Europe. West-Europe has a surplus output of industrial products, and therefore we must make a distinction between what would benefit the international capital invested in West-European industry and what the farmer in Central Europe urgently needs—the farmer, who, it must be remembered, represents 70 per cent. of the whole Central European population.

If Pan-Europe were to arise suddenly, sweeping away all the tariff barriers, including the agricultural, we should be overwhelmed by the economic and financial power of West-European industry. We should have all the disadvantages of a great customs area dominated by industry, and we should have neither the strength to resist nor the guarantee of an economic safeguard for agriculture. That would mean the pauperisation of the agrarian States of Central Europe and the pauperisation of agrarian democracy itself. If the farmers of these States cannot safeguard their products, and the State cannot safeguard its small peasant landholders, that would mean that agrarian democracy would be shaken to its foundations in Central Europe, since the agrarian represents the only stable element; it would mean that the ground was cut away from under the feet of cultural development in Central Europe. We should be

threatened by the danger of a chaos, which is to-day, in the neighbourhood of Soviet Russia, altogether unthinkable.

• That would be the effect of Pan-Europe as it is at present conceived, organised from the standpoint of West-European capitalism and industrialism. It is for this reason that we must approach the question of international *rapprochement* by progressing from the smaller problems to the greater, and not *vice versa*. Only in this way can Pan-Europe be made a reality, resting, not on public manifestations of international enthusiasm, but on a real abolition of the economic friction between the different States.

An economic union of the agrarian States is often rejected as downright impossible: their tariff and commercial policies are believed to open an unbridgeable abyss. To objections of this sort I always answer that it is undoubtedly true that the commercial policies of the agrarian States are mutually opposed, and that competition between them is bound to exist; but it is also true that competition exists between the German, Polish, and Czechoslovakian miner, and that, in spite of it, the Second International exists. Similarly there exists sharp competition between the French, German, and Czechoslovakian industrialists, and, in spite of it, they have their contracts and agreements. For the same reason an organisation must exist between us, in order to reduce the causes of conflicts to a minimum. The advantage of a general co-operation of the agrarian States would far outweigh the difficulties and possible disadvantages.

These advantages are the general agrarian and political internal conditions. We must not allow ourselves to be sidetracked by looking only at what the critics point out—that is, the difficulties and hindrances of commercial policy. We must realise that if agrarian democracy builds up an internal State policy for taxation, finance, transport, social legislation and tariffs, and if, as a result of solidarity, it arrives at a genuine agrarian policy, this internal policy, above all in the fiscal and economic sphere, will be able to do more than compensate the losses which agriculture suffers in the individual lands by making reciprocal concessions in their trade policies. Both the possibility and the necessity of our co-operation lie in the achievement of agrarian solidarity.

Anyone has the right to object that this is mere speculation. I, too, would regard it as speculation if I could not point to an incident which recently took place in Geneva. The discussion concerned the measurement of the tariff duties between European States, and during it the agrarian question suddenly crystallised. Without great preparations the representatives—not agrarians, but the official representatives of the agrarian States of Central

Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary)—sat down to the conference table, and were obliged to assert that it would be necessary to put up a united front of the agrarian or half-agrarian States of Central Europe against the demands of the predominantly industrial States.

What would a special regional understanding of the agrarian States in Central Europe imply? In practice it would mean at present Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Southern Slavs, Poland and her neighbours—that is, the Slav States with Rumania. That would be the core, representing a certain solution of the Slav question, since the Slav races would be more strongly represented than they would be in any other way, or ever have been in any of their international manifestations. But it would be represented in such a way as to offer a proof to the whole world that it is no question of an offensive community of the Slavs, because it would include beside us the Rumanians and later also the Hungarians, when they have created more favourable conditions for the growth of an agrarian democracy. But this agrees completely with certain results of international politics; the principle of regional agreements is already accepted and approved by the League of Nations.

The basis of international commercial relations is at present the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment. Now it is generally recognised in the League of Nations that this principle cannot be maintained, and that regional agreements must be reached whenever they are possible; that implies that when the regional agreement of our agrarian States comes about it must be organised on a basis of preference duties, and not of most-favoured-nation treatment. Once the validity of this principle is accepted in Central Europe, a new Central Europe would arise, brought together and supported by agrarian democracy. An international *bloc* will be able to regulate its relations to all the other States of Central Europe with the calm of security, and will represent the first and decisive stage of European *rapprochement*, which can only be firm and lasting if the difficulties, which at present could act like dynamite on the whole of Europe, could be settled in such a way that we could begin to build up the foundations of a United Europe where the obstacles are greatest. This procedure in international *rapprochement* is not the *a priori* West-European, which simply says: I want Pan-Europe; therefore let there be Pan-Europe. The ground must be prepared and the more important hindrances cleared out of the way. Not until the new Central Europe is united by its natural centre of gravity, agrarian democracy, will it be possible to speak of *rapprochement* between the European nations.

MILAN HODŽA.

A PLEA FOR THE PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILL

IN this energetic age, when so many matters of public interest are continually occurring and being packed into our minds by the daily Press, it is impossible to remember everything. Even among those who follow fairly attentively the proceedings of Parliament, I doubt whether more than a very few have more than a very hazy recollection of a certain private member's measure which created some little stir when a few years ago its introduction in the House of Commons took place—it was known in its brief day as the Abatement of Noise Bill.

The Abatement of Noise Bill originated in the fertile brain of the late Mr. Newton Oman, a Birmingham hardware manufacturer, who had conceived what he supposed to be a simple and practicable means of damping down the excessive din which is so trying a feature of modern life, and possibly a factor seriously inimical to the health of the community.

For some time, beyond writing letters occasionally to the local journals and reading a paper before the Edgbaston Lyceum Club, Mr. Oman does not appear to have pushed his plan very hard. At length one of his communications to the Press attracted more attention than usual, the upshot being that an organisation was founded and endowed with a moderate sum of money—the League for the Discouragement of Unnecessary Noise, more popularly known as the 'Make Less Noise' movement.

The usual procedure of societies of this type was faithfully followed and with fair success—the circularising of people of importance and of members of Parliament, with a lavish distribution of leaflets and pamphlets to the general public, lectures by paid and voluntary speakers, and so on. At the end of two years the time seemed ripe for endeavouring to obtain that legislation without which Mr. Oman's plan could not be put into operation. A fairly prominent member of Parliament was induced to overcome his reluctance to occupy the time of the House, several other members engaged themselves to support him, and, one of the latter having recently had a lucky draw in the ballot for private members' measures, it was possible to introduce the Abatement of Noise Bill on the next available

Friday—that being the day, as everyone knows, on which private members are permitted to air their little Bills.

To Mr. Oman and to the considerable body of non-parliamentary supporters he had secured the prospects of successful achievement seemed rosy. A good deal of lobbying had been done, whilst voters in all parts of the country had been induced to write to their own members asking for a pledge of support, and this, though in some cases ambiguously worded, had been given by a considerable number—a majority of the House, in fact.

First place in the ballot for this particular Friday had been obtained for a legislative effort, the pressing importance of which was not widely perceived—the Preservation of Crayfish (Pollution of Streams) Bill. Mr. Oman and some of his friends who had come early to listen to the proceedings of the House on this fateful day were astonished to hear it debated at interminable length. A member representing a home counties division—neither he nor it need be named—particularly distinguished himself for the length, if not the depth, of his speech: he revealed no really profound knowledge of the habits and biological needs of crayfish, but it was afterwards pointed out, as at least a curious coincidence, that in the constituency represented by this member was a factory employing hundreds of hands and engaged in the production of wireless sets—including loud speakers.

The Abatement of Noise Bill came up for hearing at twenty minutes to four, and at three minutes past four Mr. Speaker adjourned the House without question put.

The promoters tried again a few months later, and the Bill was so far even more fortunate than before in securing this time first place on the Orders of the Day. A very promising debate ensued. The opposition to the Bill was small and the adverse criticism was considered to be of a somewhat puerile and cheaply facetious character. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department intervened to congratulate the promoters of the Bill on their success in getting it discussed. He had felt, in listening to those who had opposed it, that there was no real volume of opinion against the fundamental principles embodied in this measure. Any matter of detail that required to be adjusted could easily be dealt with at the Committee stage. In short, the Under-Secretary took nearly half an hour to tell the intently listening House what a really splendid Bill this was. He took nearly two minutes to add that, in view of the congested state of business, he could hold out no hope whatever of the Government's giving it further facilities.

The Government never did. Most of the advocates of the 'Make Less Noise' movement began to lose heart. Mr. N. Oman is believed to have died of a broken one. And the Abatement of

Noise Bill, which nobody any longer loved, was quietly filed away in the archives of Parliament under its appropriate heading of 'Bills that Never had an Earthly Chance.'

As the reader has of course perceived, I have been speaking in parable—endeavouring to make one fiction serve as a composite picture of a number of fairly similar facts. Have I more than faintly caricatured the truth? I venture to suppose that no one who knows what takes place on those Fridays of each session when private members are permitted to try their hands at fabricating legislation will charge me with very much exaggeration.

Let us consider whether there is not a case for improvement in this matter. From time to time subjects arise suitable for legislation, but having the speciality that they do not naturally attach themselves to the peculiar theory and practice of any of the parties, or are more or less equally acceptable to all. The very fact that they have this non-party character may ensure for them wide support in the country and in Parliament. And yet a member of the House of Commons, speaking not so many months ago, could say all too truthfully of a measure of this type: 'Hon. members on both sides of the House have stated that they are in agreement with the principle of the Bill. That is about the worst thing that can befall any measure in this House. It invariably foreshadows its defeat.'

One reason why these private members' Bills have almost invariably no chance of getting beyond their early stages is that Governments seldom like them and that the Government in fairly recent years has had the power not only of initiating most of the legislation—which, so long as our party system exists, is a proper and inevitable state of affairs—but the power also of giving a most effective quietus to any legislation it has not initiated, by simply declaring it will not allow time for it to get passed.

The reasons why the Government generally does give that quietus are fairly obvious, though not necessarily defensible. The Government—which under our system means the Cabinet—is a body of exceedingly busy and harassed people who know that, try they never so hard, they will fail during their term of office to find time for all the party legislation their party expects. Are they, then, to provide time for measures their party does not expect? The decision, of course, is generally in the negative.

One does not want to be too cynical, but it is perhaps not unfair to suppose that the average Government is not desperately anxious to attach to the record of its career any legislation for which there is a large opposition vote, and for which, accordingly, the Opposition will be entitled to a large amount of the credit.

And then a Bill which is favoured by a considerable body of the Opposition may not find favour in the eyes of important members of the Government's own party. Serious unpleasantness may threaten, for the objectors know the Government can slay if it wants to. The temptation to slay is great, especially as it can usually be done in quite a kind and inoffensive way by a polite Secretary. 'The heavy programme of the Government'; the statement that the Department concerned finds the Bill to be unworkable; the vague offer of some form of inquiry, these seem to be the favourite methods.

It may be said that if there exist these non-party proposals for legislation commanding a considerable amount of support throughout the country, then surely one or another of the parties would find its account in adopting some of them as items in its programme. No doubt this happens from time to time. It rarely happens as regards the sort of subjects commonly embodied in private members' Bills. To understand why that is so demands a little knowledge of political psychology.

It must be remembered that the type of law-making the private member usually attempts is, so to speak, the gleanings of the field of possible legislation. Where there is a big and glaring abuse or some widely desired amelioration such as Parliament is competent to deal with, one or other of the parties is pretty sure to be willing to take the question up. The small abuse or injustice, the minor amelioration, create less appeal at headquarters and places where they draw up party programmes. Such matters make a poor show in the melodramatic General Election battle; they do not rouse passion—especially party passion—and therefore do not promise much in the way of vote-catching. Again, agitations for the remedying of small grievances and the production of small goods have about them a faint element of the ridiculous and the cranky; they may not get far in Parliament, but they are exceedingly likely to get into the comic papers. And British political parties regard as a useful asset a reputation for sobriety and seriousness, and they do not care to be associated with cranks.

But this is where the private member gets his opportunity, if he only could and would use it. For the fact is that many of these comparatively unimportant matters that are within his province are really more important than at first sight they seem. Even a trifling abuse is worth the labour of abolishing if it is widely felt. A small betterment cannot be said to be very small if you take account of all the good it is going to do over a considerable period. After all, in the lives of most of us it is the little things that count. Mr. Willett's idea was a comparatively little thing. Yet at the moment I cannot recall any other single Act of Parliament

of the last fifteen years that has advantaged the community to the same extent as has the Summer Time Act. It is very much to the point to cite it here, for although we got it by accident, as a war measure, it is precisely the sort of thing a group of private members would be likely to take up; and had it actually been left to them and the party rule that renders their labour impotent, we should doubtless have been wanting its benefits to this hour.

Perhaps almost everyone except a few professional politicians will agree with my contentions so far. It may be urged, however, that to suggest how the private member's Bill can be made an effective instrument of legislation is not easy. I have no doubt the difficulties are not insuperable—where there's a will there's a way. It is obviously a problem for Parliament itself and for experts. In the middle of writing this article I have read a recently published book by Mr. Ramsay Muir, *How Britain is Governed*,¹ and it was most interesting to arrive at the pages in which this extremely able student of politics deals with my present theme. Part of what he says is as follows (p. 205):

It may be suggested, therefore, that the procedure on private members' Bills should be amended, and turned into a really useful element, in the work of the House, by some such provision as the following. At the beginning of each session a committee representing all parties in the House should be set up—possibly the Committee of Selection, which now chooses the members of other Committees, would serve the purpose. To it any member, or any group of members (this would include the leaders of a non-Government party), should be entitled to send, not merely the title, but a *précis* of the heads of a Bill which he or they wished to introduce. The Committee should choose the Bills which were in its opinion most deserving of discussion. Successive Fridays should be devoted to debates on the Second Readings of these Bills. Those which were carried by a sufficient majority—say two-thirds of those present—should then stand referred to one of the Standing Committees of the House for detailed consideration, and in due course should come before the whole House—not necessarily on a Friday—for the Report Stage and a Third Reading. Not many Bills would stand this ordeal. But the possibility would be there, and it would not depend wholly upon the will of the Government. Some element of the independent initiative of the House of Commons in legislation would be restored without invading the primary responsibility of the Government for all the main legislative work of the Session.

One difficulty Mr. Muir does not deal with here. A law is not—at least, it should not be—merely the expression of an abstract principle. It has to be administered. Its administration more or less involves one or more of the Government departments—for the provision of inspectors, say, or whatever it may be. Now the permanent officials of any department concerned may deal a

¹ Constable & Co. (1930).

deadly blow to a Bill—whether a Government one or not—by convincing the Minister of that department that it is unworkable. As a rule, no doubt, these experts are pretty sound judges in such a matter, but they are not infallible, and it may be that occasionally their good-will is wanting. What looked like a clear case of the lack of good-will was revealed and severely commented upon less than two years ago. Lord Banbury and others introduced in the House of Lords a Bill designed to prevent, if the magistrates thought fit, a person who had been convicted of cruelty to a dog from holding a licence to keep a dog for a specific period. There can hardly be a single normal person in the country who will object to what was aimed at. The House was astonished to learn from the Government representative that the Home Office regarded the Bill as unworkable. He did not condescend to explain why. No wonder one of the noble Lords present, Lord Buckmaster, remarked: 'I object strongly that a Bill here should have its opposition entirely engineered not by the considered opinion of the Government but by some department which regards its interests as affected by the Bill or which, it may be, is sorry that it has not introduced the Bill itself.'²

What seems to be required, when Government officials decide that a private member's Bill is impracticable, is that the parliamentary representative of the department concerned should explain what the difficulties are and submit to the criticism of the House. If the House decides that the objections are frivolous or can be overcome, then it should be the duty of the Minister to see that his 'bureaucrats' loyally carry out the wishes of Parliament.³

There remains the important point of ensuring that private members' Bills really have a majority of support in the country. The alleged lack of this is often the excuse made for refusing them facilities—a very proper attitude in a democratic country—though Governments frequently fail to adopt it as regards their own measures. Governments, however, have as a rule plenty of opportunities for gathering what the electorate thinks about their own major measures. These have been canvassed in the Press and on platforms, and perhaps voted on at the last General Election. The private member's Bill in the nature of things can have no such opportunities for coming into the limelight and standing the fire of criticism. On the other hand, the very fact that such a Bill is a single and often a quite simple measure makes it much easier to discover how the country feels about it than in

² Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Tuesday, January 29, 1929.

³ Probably if private members knew their Bills had a reasonable chance of passing they would take steps to have them more carefully drafted, and also take accurate soundings as to possible opposition.

the case of the large and complex programme of a party. I imagine that if and when my Abatement of Noise Bill becomes practical politics the majority of M.P.'s will have no difficulty in sensing what the majority of their constituents think of it. A further safeguard of public opinion would be feasible with some of these private members' Bills—that of giving them a trial run, with the alternatives of renewal or withdrawal at the end of a year or some other specified period.

Summarising what I have said, then, I suggest that there is nothing improbable in the notion of a private member bringing forward a non-party measure which is worthy of being passed and which the electorate would be willing to have passed. I suggest that a somewhat Gilbertian situation arises when, as may often be, the very fact that a measure is widely and largely supported renders its chance of passing not greater, but less—because, for the reasons I have explained, the Government does not like it and has an almost absolute power of stopping progress. I suggest that the private members, some of whom honestly believe in their Bills, should think on these matters. And, as a final and additional suggestion, to those numerous 'societies' and 'leagues' which induce voters to badger their members into promising support for some particular proposed bit of legislation I suggest that it would be a good plan to leave such tactics alone for the present and to unite in securing a demand that the private members should get together and bring in a Bill making it possible to pass a reasonable proportion of private members' Bills.

G. H. BOWKER.

NOTE.—On the recommendation of a recent Select Committee there has been an alteration of Standing Orders which may brighten the prospects of private members' Bills a little. The effect seems to be that, consequent upon the beginning of a new session of Parliament in October, second readings are now spaced between October and December and January and March, thus leaving the Government the time they most want in April for financial business, and then four Fridays in May are set aside for the concluding stages of those private members' Bills which have made most progress. This should give a little more time, but does nothing to overcome the other handicaps to such Bills which I have specified.

THE RENASCENCE OF PERSIA

THE last decade has been a momentous period in the history of Persia. The ancient kingdom is witnessing a remarkable revival of the spirit of nationality under Shah Riza, who, rising from obscurity, has founded the Pahlavi dynasty. In this article I propose to outline the salient features of this veritable renaissance.

When I first travelled in Persia some forty years ago, I gradually realised that I was back in the Middle Ages. Communications had not improved since the days of Cyrus, who founded the Persian Empire in B.C. 550, and there was little contact with Europe. Nasir-u-Din, who was the reigning Shah, was a capable ruler according to Persian ideas, but, like Solomon in his old age, he devoted himself to the pleasures of the harem, which, incidentally, absorbed a large proportion of the revenue. Actually the Shah disliked educated Ministers, and frankly admitted that he preferred to be served by men who did not know whether Brussels was the name of a city or of a cabbage! Holding these views, he refused permission to travel in Europe, more especially for the purpose of education. The army, corruptly administered and led by officers entirely lacking in martial instincts, was practically useless as a fighting force, and the men eked out their lean years of service by working as porters. So far as I could gather, there was no particular discontent in the country, conditions being similar to those that had prevailed for centuries past. The very few Persians who had been educated abroad were disliked by their fellow-countrymen, and their influence was negligible. Indeed, it was difficult for such men, unless they had studied medicine, to find remunerative employment in their native land. At this period European civilisation was chiefly represented outside the capital by consular officers, by British and American missionaries, and by British bank and telegraph officials, whose influence was a great power for good. Europeans who knew the language and sympathised with the people were considered to be trustworthy friends, and constituted the only connexion of Persians with the civilisation of the West.

Sometimes it is difficult to give a date or name an event that stirred a people towards a movement, but such an event

was the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. It was designed to end the unhappy rivalry that existed between Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and in this it was successful, but, so far as Persia was concerned, the result was calamitous. By the terms of the Agreement the two Powers divided Persia into zones of commercial influence without consulting that Power, which, as was inevitable, bitterly resented the slight. Moreover, the Russian officials acted as if their zone, which included two-thirds of Persia, was to be annexed, and but for the Great War such undoubtedly would have been its fate. At the time of the Agreement the influence and popularity of Great Britain were at their zenith, owing to her deep sympathy with Persian aspirations for better government, which Mohamed Ali Shah was attempting to crush, not without the support of Russian officials. Persians have a proverb which runs: 'Enemies are of three kinds—to wit, enemies, enemies of friends and friends of enemies'; and when they realised the result of the Agreement they decided that Great Britain had ceased to be their friend.

During the Great War Persia was unable to maintain her neutrality effectively, with the result that British, Russian, and Turkish troops fought on her soil. To the patriotic Persian the position was deeply humiliating, and undoubtedly strengthened the rebirth of nationality. The Armistice found British troops and the South Persia Rifles, under British officers, maintaining order in the south; in the north-west British troops held lines of communication from the Irak frontier to the Caspian, and again we held lines of communication across Eastern Persia from British Baluchistan to Russian Turkestan. The British Government was extremely anxious as to the position in Persia. Her treasury was empty, there was no stable Government, and it was evident that there would be anarchy unless help were rendered. To add to the difficulties of the situation, the Bolshevik Government was hostile. In these circumstances Lord Curzon decided to negotiate an Agreement by the terms of which a Financial Adviser was to be supplied, together with administrative officers. It was also proposed to create a Persian army. The negotiations for this comprehensive scheme occupied nine months, but it was ready for ratification at the end of 1919. The Persian Prime Minister, however, realising the growing strength of the opposition to the Agreement, was unwilling to summon the *Majlis*, and as the months passed the national feeling against it increased in volume.

In April 1920 Denikin's fleet fled from Baku, which the Bolsheviks had seized. It sought refuge at Enzeli, where, by the advice of the British, it was disarmed and interned. As was bound to happen, the Bolsheviks followed up the fleet and

bombarded Enzeli. The British detachment was instructed not to fight the Bolsheviks and was withdrawn to Resht, and afterwards to Kazvin. This retreat in the face of the Bolsheviks constituted a heavy blow to British prestige, the Persian point of view being that we had undertaken to protect Persia and had failed to do so.

The *Majlis* was finally summoned to meet on February 20, and on the following day Riza Khan seized the reins of government and arrested the Ministers. The new Cabinet immediately denounced the Agreement, and the *Majlis*, after a debate in which violent attacks were made on the British, confirmed its decision. Looking back, one cannot fail to be impressed by the efforts of the British Government, which on more than one occasion undoubtedly saved Persia from anarchy. The situation after the Armistice may be compared with that prevailing in Afghanistan at the close of the second Afghan War. In both cases it was saved by the unexpected appearance of a strong man, Abdur Rahman in Afghanistan and Riza Khan in Persia, who proved to be the saviours of their respective countries.

Dynasties in Persia have usually been founded by successful soldiers. Riza Khan, by birth a peasant of Mazanderan, was an officer of the Cossack Division, which force was despatched to expel the Russians from the Caspian provinces in 1920. In this it signally failed, was routed, and took refuge within the British lines at Kazvin. A British officer was appointed to restore its *moral*. In this he was successful, so much so, that when a certain Teheran politician opened up relations with the force and suggested a *coup d'état* Riza led 3000 men to the capital, which was occupied without serious fighting.

Riza, as War Minister, displayed considerable strength of character, coupled with a grim determination to put an end to foreign interference. To ensure the devotion of his troops he insisted on certain branches of the Ministry of Finance being placed under his control, and, having by this means secured the sinews of war, he speedily ejected the politician who had initiated the *coup d'état*, and thenceforward he dominated the Government, becoming Prime Minister himself in 1923.

The relations of Riza Khan with the weakling Shah were ostensibly those of a loyal subject, but when Sultan Ahmad paid a lengthy visit to Europe he found himself a nonentity upon his return. Indeed, even at state ceremonies, the grandees turned their backs on their Shah to bow to the masterful Minister. Sultan Ahmad, realising that he could not cope with the situation, retired from the scene and recently died in Paris.

In March 1924, deeply influenced by the example of Turkey, there was a strong feeling in favour of the creation of a republic

with Riza Khan as President. The Press became violently anti-monarchical, telegrams advocating a republic poured in from the provinces, and Riza, impressed by the apparent strength of the movement, consented to the proposal. At this juncture, however, the Turkish Grand National Assembly not only abolished the Caliphate, but disestablished the Moslem religion. This caused a strong reaction in Persia, headed by the *Mujtahids*, and the movement suddenly collapsed, but not before Riza had adroitly joined the party of the *Mujtahids* and proclaimed that the establishment of a republic in Persia was contrary to the Shia religion! His influence had evidently suffered no serious set-back, since, in the following year, he demanded, and was granted, dictatorial powers by the *Majlis*. This grant was followed by the deposition of the absentee Shah, and in December 1925 a Constituent Assembly was convened which elected Riza Khan to be Shah.

From the beginning Riza set to work to assert his authority over the provinces, to disarm the tribes and to restore law and order. He perforce based his authority on the army, and, re-enlisting officers and men of the South Persia Rifles and the Cossack Division, he has organised an army, 40,000 strong, which is better trained and organised than any force commanded by Persians in modern times.

The difficulties of his task were great. To take the case of *Shaykh* Khazal, who had ruled the Arabs of the lower Karun Valley, almost as an independent chief, Riza was determined to enforce the authority of the Government, whereas the *Shaykh* foolishly denounced the new order. In the upshot he was arrested and interned at Teheran, and the revolt of his followers was suppressed. A still more difficult problem was the disarmament of the nomad tribes. The Lurs, inhabiting a mountainous region to the north of Dizful, resented the construction of a road through their country, realising that it was merely the preliminary to a railway. They rose in revolt and defeated the Persian troops, but finally they were pacified. Similarly the Kashgais, who fought the British so bravely in the Great War, revolted, but finally submitted. It must, however, be noted that neither of these martial tribes was defeated in the field, and, until beaten, they will continue to be a thorn in the side of the Shah.

The relations of Persia with Russia since the Armistice constitute an interesting study.¹ The Bolsheviks, following the policy of Peter the Great, determined to annex the rich Caspian provinces after the rout of the Cossack Division referred to above. They spread eastwards, occupying Mazanderan, and

¹ I would acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Toynbee's admirable *Survey of International Affairs* for 1928.

at one time thought of seizing Teheran, which would have been but feebly defended. However, they were doubtful as to the attitude of the British, and were loth to quit the abundance of the Caspian provinces for the rugged Elburz passes and the semi-desert area surrounding the capital. Finally they reported to Moscow that they had made no progress with the people, who detested their attacks on the Moslem religion, with the result that it was decided to abandon the policy of annexation and to make friends with Persia.

Owing to the hostility against Great Britain, which was at that time considered *the* enemy, a treaty was speedily concluded in 1921. By its terms Russia renounced all debts due to the Russian Government, and handed over the Banque d'Escompte, various roads, the Julfa-Tabriz railway, the quays and steamers on Lake Urumia, and the port of Gazian opposite Enzeli. Finally, all privileges under the Capitulations were renounced. It was stipulated that a Customs Convention should follow, but, owing to the peculiar economic views held at Moscow, this proved to be difficult. Indeed, relations became strained to such an extent in 1926 that an embargo was placed on Persian exports, which constituted a heavy blow to traders and agriculturists. In the following year a provisional agreement was arrived at, by the terms of which Persian exports were limited to 50,000,000 roubles, Russian imports being 10 per cent. less. When ratifications were finally exchanged in 1928 the port of Enzeli, which had been seized in 1920, was, at long last, restored to Persia and renamed Pahlavi. During the period covered by these negotiations the friendly feelings towards Russia that had been inspired by the Treaty of 1921 changed. This was partly due to a clearer recognition of the fact that the Soviet is distinctly an aggressive Government, whereas Great Britain has ceased to be considered in this light. Moreover, apart from the question of religion, which is still a living force in Persia, there is a deep gulf set between that country, with its determination to adopt European civilisation, and Russia, which has deliberately repudiated it.

To turn to the question of relations with Turkey, I have already shown how deeply Persia has been influenced by its political changes. But, in addition to the permanent hostility of Shia for Sunni, Persia can never forget that Turkey has repeatedly devastated her fertile provinces and has aimed at her dismemberment. In 1926 a Treaty of Perpetual Peace was negotiated between the two Powers, to be followed by negotiations relating to Customs and Posts. Good relations are, however, constantly strained by the 'Turkification by force' practised against the Kurds, whose kinsmen in Persia support them. In October 1927 a crisis was reached, when the Turks

believed that a detachment of their troops captured by the Kurds was imprisoned in Persia. Rupture of relations was threatened, but explanations were offered, and ultimately the treaty was ratified in 1930. The Kurdish question, however, may well continue to upset Perso-Turkish relations, and at the time of writing is acute.

The relations of Persia with Afghanistan need little more than a passing comment. A Treaty of Peace between the two Powers was duly ratified, and Amanulla visited Teheran on his return from Europe. The influence of his western neighbours undoubtedly encouraged him in his attempt to drive his more fanatical subjects along the narrow path of progress, which ended in revolution and his flight from Afghanistan.

The relations of Persia with Iraq are of especial interest. It would have been reasonable to suppose that the Persians would welcome the substitution of Great Britain as Mandatory Power for their hereditary enemy. But this was not the case. Great Britain, which had stripped Turkey of half her provinces, was, as stated above, considered to be *the* enemy, but, apart from this, there were other reasons. In Iraq more than half the population belongs to the Shia sect, mainly grouped round the sacred cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Samarra and Kazimain, which the *Mujtahids*, who are of Persian descent and keep in close touch with Persia, have made into centres of fanaticism. In the revolt of 1920 they took an active part against the British, and again, in 1922, a *Mujtahid* of Kazimain issued a *fatwa* that Moslems who failed to oppose the Anglo-Iraq Treaty would be denied burial in Moslem graveyards! Later in the same year, participation in the elections was forbidden by the same *Mujtahid*, who was deported to Aden as a stage on the pilgrimage to Mecca. By way of protest nine of the leading *Mujtahids* left Irak for Persia, where their frantic appeals to the fanaticism of their fellow-countrymen created intense feeling against the British. Time, however, yet once again proved to be the great healer. The *Mujtahids* heard that Irak was not upset at their departure, whereas the large income they drew from pilgrims practically ceased. Accordingly they yearned for Iraq, and, after giving assurances that they would leave politics alone for the future, they returned to their homes in chastened mood. The holy firebrand of Kazimain retired to Meshed.

A second question that aroused the deepest feeling in Persia was the status of the large number of residents in Iraq who were of Persian descent. In 1924 persons desirous of renouncing Iraq nationality were called upon to do so. Thousands were affected, many of whom neither understood the order nor could afford to pay the fees. To add to the complication, the Persian

Government claimed for those whose Persian status was established the privilege of Capitulations at a time when they were preparing to denounce them in Persia, and declared that, until they were granted, the Persian Government did not intend to recognise Iraq officially. To this stern pronouncement Iraq replied that, under Turkish rule, Persians had enjoyed no such privileges, and again, that Persia had expressed no intention of granting capitulatory privileges to Iraq subjects who were resident in Persia.

The case for Iraq was overwhelmingly strong, but Persian pride held the field, until, in 1929, the British applied to the League of Nations for its approval to terminate the Anglo-Iraq Judicial Agreement, by which certain privileges were enjoyed by Europeans. Persia, realising that the bottom was knocked out of her case, hastened to negotiate, with the result that a Mission was sent to congratulate the Shah on the anniversary of his third coronation, and, at a banquet given in its honour, the Prime Minister announced the official recognition of Irak.

Perhaps the most important proof of the new order in Persia is to be found in the abolition of the Capitulations, under which Europeans and their subjects could only be tried by their consuls. The first breach in the system was their denunciation by Turkey in 1914, followed by their abolition in the Peace Settlement at Lausanne. The Soviet Government, as already mentioned, renounced capitulatory privileges in 1921. This act was of especial importance to Persia, in view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomanchai, concluded between victorious Russia and defeated Persia in 1828, imposed the very system which it was now sought to abolish. It was evident that, without a complete reorganisation of the law and the judiciary, Persian courts would not be competent to try Europeans. The Government had already taken up this question, and in 1927 the New Judicial Regulations, based to a large extent on French law, were formally inaugurated by the Shah, and were followed by a notification to the Powers that the Capitulations would be abolished in the following year. In the negotiations that followed certain safeguards for foreign residents were insisted upon. The Persian Government probably realised the initial weakness of its judiciary, and displayed a reasonable readiness to meet the views of foreign Powers, provided that the principle of the abolition was accepted. At the time of writing reliable informants state that the judges are ignorant of the laws that they administer and give verdicts that contravene them. It is obvious that competent judges cannot be created by a resolution of the *Majlis*, and it will take time—probably a long time—before the laws will be efficiently and honestly administered.

It is an accepted axiom that without good communications no country can prosper. As already stated, Persia, until quite recently, was in what may be termed the 'caravan' stage, and to remedy this the Shah determined to construct a trans-Persian railway. He selected Khor Musa, an inlet on the Persian Gulf, as the southern port, and gave a contract for a line to be constructed across the Karun River to Dizful, a distance of 150 miles. In the north he concluded a contract for a shorter length of line from Bandar Gaz, a port at the extreme south-east corner of the Caspian, to Sari, a town to the west, which lies a few miles inland. The first sod of this grandiose scheme was cut in the autumn of 1927, and two years later the northern section was opened by the Shah, and is reported to be working although the track is overgrown with weeds. In January 1930 the section from Khor Musa (renamed Bandar Shapur) towards Dizful was also opened by His Majesty. The embankments had apparently not settled down, and, owing to floods following heavy rains, the royal train was derailed and the engine caught fire. In May the syndicate operating on the southern section declined to proceed, alleging that the Persian Government owed them 600,000*l.*, and the Persian reply was to denounce the contract.

Whatever the position may be, it is to be hoped that this pause will give time for reflection and further inquiry before continuing the gigantic task. It may be pointed out that the creation of a modern port at Bandar Shapur, where the land has to be reclaimed from mud flats, and where there is neither fresh water nor population, will cost millions sterling. Again, north of Dizful the line in its ascent to the elevated Iranian plateau will cross range after range of mountains, and will traverse a sterile country inhabited by a few thousand predatory Lurs who only graze it during the summer months. To Burujird is 356 miles and to Teheran is 730 miles. It is to be noted that, owing to physical difficulties, the main caravan route running from Bushire to Shiraz, Isfahan, and Teheran is left many miles to the east.

The northern section measures only 300 miles, but one-third of the distance will pass through the lofty Elburoz, and will involve some 25 miles of tunnels. The total cost may aggregate 50,000,000*l.*, and, in view of the poverty of Persia, its scanty population, its aridity and consequent lack of exports, I hold the view that, even if it were completed, the railway could never pay. If His Majesty would be pleased to follow the example of Peter the Great and visit England as a student, he would realise the facts, and would probably decide that Persia did not yet possess men or means sufficient for such an undertaking.

Persia lies on the 'Highway of the Nations,' and constitutes

an important section of the air route between England and India. Pioneer flights from Cairo to Karachi were inaugurated shortly after the Armistice, and in 1925 Persia agreed provisionally to grant the British a right of way along her southern coast. Probably, however, determined at all costs to carry through the abolition of the Capitulations, she suddenly announced that an airway along her coast would not be permitted, but that an alignment across Central Persia might be considered. Negotiations were thus brought to a deadlock until the question of the Capitulations had been settled, when an agreement was concluded with Imperial Airways allowing the coastal route, and in 1929 the through service *via* Bushire, Bandar Abbas, and Jask was inaugurated. Thanks to the energy of the German firm of Junkers, Persia possesses a series of airlines radiating from the capital to the four quarters of the compass. These lines connect at Baghdad and Bushire with Imperial Airways, and thus provide rapid communication with the outer world.

To conclude, Persia is fast changing—perhaps too fast in some ways. In any case, the process is a difficult one. She is under military rule, and although the old governors were corrupt, yet much of the money they amassed was spent among the people they governed and among whom they lived. To-day the military officers generally treat the provincials with unconcealed contempt; they are frequently changed and seldom know the people they rule. Again, taxation is heavier and is collected in full, whereas under the old order it was usual to strike a bargain with the tax-collector. Fresh taxation has been recently imposed in the form of a graduated income tax, which will involve a rise in the cost of living. It has also been decided to adopt a gold standard, which is bound to mean the creation of reserves in Europe. Consequently, although the finances have been set in order by an American Financial Adviser, the cost of the railway and other improvements may well prove a burden too heavy to bear. In short, as is also the case in Turkey, finance is the weak point.

Apart from this question, the recent election of Persia to the Council of the League of Nations will add to her prestige and rightly increase the national pride. Again, her undoubted renaissance will be fostered by the International Exhibition of Persian Art that will shortly be held in London, an exhibition that will prove to the world how brightly her genius has burned down the ages. Persia is now ruled by a resolute and patriotic Shah, who already has achieved much, and her many friends will wish His Majesty a long life in which to continue his beneficent activities.

PERCY SYKES.

THE PROBLEM OF THE BASQUES

THE Basques have always been something of a mystery. When, over 2000 years ago, the Romans first invaded the Iberian Peninsula the native dialects which they heard there must all have sounded equally uncouth and barbarous. Nevertheless, Latin writers such as Strabo and Livy single out for special mention a tribe called the Vascones, whose language served to distinguish them completely from their neighbours and to Roman ears was 'barbarous and not to be borne.'

The Vascones dwelt originally on the banks of the Ebro in the region round Calahorra. There is reason to believe that they were reduced to submission in the second century B.C., but they are not mentioned by name until the following century. Thereafter their gradual migration may be traced first northwards beyond Pamplona (Pompelo), where Pompey established his winter quarters among them during one of his campaigns, then westwards to the sea, and finally across the Pyrenees, the northern slopes of which they appear to have reached by the sixth century A.D.

About 1500 years ago, therefore, these Vascones are known to have occupied the region now inhabited by the Basques. It is unfortunately impossible to identify them with the Basques with complete certainty, for in the twelfth century the Latin name divided into two forms, Bascli (or Basculi) and Gasconi, which in turn became the modern appellations of Basques and Gascons. There is little apparent resemblance between the modern word 'Bâsque' (or 'Vasco,' to give it the Spanish form) and the name 'Eskualdunak,' or 'Euskaldunak,' which the Basques give to themselves in their own language. It has been shown, however, that this name means no more than 'those who possess the *euskara* (Basque language).' When the extreme inaccuracy is recalled with which the Romans Latinised the names of barbarian tribes or towns it appears by no means impossible that the Latin *vasc-* may be a corruption of the root *eusk-* (which is thought to come from the Basque *eguzki*, *iduzki*: sun), and that the two names may therefore be identical in origin.

Latin writers furnish very little information concerning the

Vascones, beyond the fact that they were fierce and fearless warriors, who in the intervals of making war danced and feasted in front of their dwelling-places in honour of a nameless god. The Dark Ages which followed the fall of Rome are, historically speaking, even darker in the Basque Country than in the rest of Europe. That the Basques did not lose their reputation for ferocity when they embraced Christianity is proved by the great number of martyrs whom they helped to earn an eternal crown, and by the fear in which they were held by the earliest pilgrims to the shrine of St. James, whose route to Santiago de Compostella lay through their country. In the fourth century Prudence described them as *inquietos Vascones*. Five hundred years later St. Leon, the first Bishop of Bayonne, was assassinated by 'very cruel pirates and satellites of the Devil.' Encouraged by his success, another bishop, St. Amand, visited the land of the Basques, where he 'hoped to win the palms of martyrdom on account of their ferocity.' Indeed, in the twelfth century the whole Basque race was included in a general excommunication earned by their persecution of the faithful.

It is difficult to judge to what extent the Basques were affected by the successive invasions of the Iberian Peninsula. Their survival as a distinct race has been commonly ascribed to the inaccessibility of their country. This inaccessibility, however, is little more than a legend invented to explain the very fact of their survival. The Basque Country is mountainous indeed, but the mountains are neither so high nor so rugged as those of the central and eastern Pyrenees, and they are broken by gentle valleys and rolling plains. If the country was never permanently occupied by Romans, Goths, Franks or Moors, this fact is ascribable rather to its barrenness, to ignorance on the part of all but the Romans of its mineral resources, and to the fact that it lay to the side of the main route followed by these invasions.

The Basques cannot have failed to come into contact with these conquering races. If they kept their blood pure and failed to absorb foreign civilisations accepted by their neighbours, the reason must be sought in their savagely independent outlook. That they played a considerable part in the reconquest of the Peninsula is evident from the *fueros*, or special privileges, which they then acquired. When the Moors had been driven southwards, and their conquerors were faced with the task of consolidating their victories, those who volunteered to colonise the reconquered lands were granted *cartas de población* (letters of settlement) conferring upon them in perpetuity certain rights and exemptions. These rights grew up in one form or another throughout Spain, but it was only in the Basque Country that they continued to be observed long after they had become a glaring anachronism.

They varied from province to province, from valley to valley, and even from village to village. Handed down by oral tradition, they grew into an unwritten code of laws of regulations dealing with all subjects, from the political constitution to the smallest details of everyday life. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they were codified, and some of them survive till the present day, although the majority were abolished during the Revolution in France and after the two Carlist wars in Spain.

For a long period the Basque Country was no more than a conglomeration of miniature counties and 'republics,' endlessly engaged in sanguinary warfare amongst themselves. By the twelfth century, however, Navarre was already a kingdom, Soule and Labourd viscounties, Alava and Guipuzcoa provinces, and Vizcaya a *señoría*. When the other petty kingdoms of France and Spain sacrificed their individuality to form united monarchies the Basques at first held aloof. The French provinces remained semi-independent under English dominion for some 300 years before they passed to France under Charles VII. and Henry of Navarre. In the fourteenth century Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava, which had always acted in concert with each other, voluntarily took the King of Castille as overlord, and in the sixteenth century Navarre was taken from the House of Albret by Ferdinand and Isabella. In each case, however, the suzerainty was purely nominal. Beneath the famous oak tree of Guernica the kings of Spain swore to observe the *fueros* of Vizcaya. The king was not, as elsewhere, the owner of the land, and his person was the only point of contact between his Basque provinces and his other domains. In the former he was represented by a *corregidor* or *bailli*. His Basque subjects owed him neither taxes nor, outside the limits of their province, military service. The actual administration was in the hands of a representative provincial assembly known as the *junta* (Spanish provinces), *états* (Soule and Basse-Navarre) or *biltzar* (Labourd). The king's representative could summon the assembly to meet, but without their consent no order of his was valid, and all executive authority was vested in the *syndic*, their nominee.

The Spanish Basque provinces were included in the embargo which precluded foreign countries from trading in South America. They maintained their own consuls in the Low Countries, with which they carried on an extensive trade, and on occasions they concluded separate treaties with foreign countries or with their brothers to the north of the Pyrenees. The great measure of independence enjoyed by the Basques at a time when European tendencies were all directed towards federation is a striking example of the manner in which their individualistic spirit favoured their survival as a separate race.

Except for the prosperity which foreign trade, privateering, and whale and cod fishing brought in their train, the condition of the Basque provinces changed little between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. During this period the outside world quietly accepted the existence of the Basques, and, taking but small interest in ethnological and linguistic problems, gave little thought to the question of their origin. The Basques, too, took themselves for granted, and it was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century aroused a thirst for that 'little knowledge' which is always so dangerous that they sought to solve the problem of their own existence and to establish the origin of the language which is their most individual characteristic.

The mediæval writer Scaliger (1540-1609) laid the foundations of a belief not only in the great antiquity of Basque by describing it as 'one of the fourteen languages which Latin did not destroy,' but also in its difficulty by adding: 'They say that they understand one another, but I do not believe it.' In about 1750 a Spanish-Basque priest called Larramendi awoke general interest in the language by publishing a grammar under the stimulating title of *El Imposible Vencido* (*The Impossible Conquered*). The first writers on the Basque language were all Basques and nearly all priests. Their works breathe a firm and serene conviction that theirs, and no other, was the language spoken in the Garden of Eden. At the end of the eighteenth century one Dominique Lahetjuzan, Vicar of Sare, went so far as to derive from Basque roots the names of Adam, Eve, Cain and Abel. Eden itself was naturally nothing but an abbreviation of *ederrena*: the most beautiful. Adam meant 'source, origine, abondance, mère, plénitude d'intelligence.' Eve meant 'cut out' (from Adam's side). Cain was the 'striker' and Abel 'he who invoked God by animal sacrifices' (*abere* is Basque for the Latin *pecus*). Lahetjuzan's patriotic zeal carried him even further, and he proceeded to derive the Basque *gorphutz* and *arima* (which are merely the Latin *corpus* and *anima*) from Basque roots meaning '*matière exhalante pétrie par celui qui est en haut*,' and '*ressemblance, rapport, multitude, centre, comble, abondance, source, plénitude*.'

Scarcely less fantastic were the opinions expressed by a Spanish-Basque priest-philologist called Erro. With rare good sense his colleagues made no attempt to conceal their opinion that he was a harmless lunatic. Erro, however, took his theories before the cathedral and chapter of Pamplona, who, after several months of deliberations, triumphantly vindicated him and put to shame his critics who had had the temerity to base their objections on mere common sense.

The beliefs shared by Erro and Lahetjuzan have not completely died out, for no more than twenty years ago a pamphlet

was published at Saragossa under the title of *Glorious Discovery, Recognition and Demonstration of the Identity of Basque and the Language of Paradise*.

Etymology, always a dangerous hobby, has tempted many later writers into unsound analogies between Basque and Celtic, Finnish, Georgian, Japanese, Hindustani (this from the irrepressible Borrow), and various North and South American dialects. The German scientist William Humboldt was the first to place Basque researches on a scientific basis in his book *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelt der Vaskischen Sprache* (Berlin, 1821). According to his theories the Basques were no more than a remnant of the Iberians who had once inhabited the whole Peninsula, but who, like the ancient Britons, had been driven by successive invasions into one remote and mountainous corner of the country. This theory, even if proved, would not lead very far, for little is known of the Iberians beyond the fact that they came originally from North Africa, and that they are in some way related to the Hamitic group of races. Humboldt, therefore, only substituted one unknown for another. For nearly a century, however, his theories divided students of the Basque problem into two camps—the 'pro-Iberians' and the 'anti-Iberians.' The latter, moreover, were united only in name, for some of their number believed the Basques to have come originally from Asia by way of Central Europe, while others, led by Julien Vinson, held that they had never been more than a small tribe living between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

There is something to be said on both sides. On the one hand, there are many place names scattered throughout the Peninsula which are completely Basque in appearance, and the mysterious Iberian inscriptions, as deciphered by Hübner and Boudart, reveal words which can plausibly be interpreted in Basque. On the other hand, the investigations of anthropologists show that there exists among the Basques, in a proportion of from 25 to 40 per cent., a form of skull which is found nowhere else in France or Spain. It seems unreasonable, therefore, to suppose that the Iberian type, if this be it, should have disappeared so completely from other parts of the Peninsula.

The latest theory, propounded by Bosch Gimpera, is a compromise between those of Humboldt and Vinson. This Spanish ethnologist supposes the Basques to be the remnant of the palæolithic (and therefore pre-Iberian) inhabitants of the Pyrenean region. Only thus, in his view, can their peculiar physical type be explained. At a very early date, however, they were subjected to strong Iberian influence and either adopted the Iberian language or borrowed largely from it, thus accounting for the points in common between Basque, Iberian, and the Berber

dialects. This hypothesis, if not conclusive, has at least the merit of combining in the most acceptable manner the established results of modern research. For the present, at all events, it may be accepted in the absence of anything more conclusive. "

Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was a general tendency to abandon the fruitless study of a problem which would probably never be solved, and to concentrate on the objective phenomena which could still be observed. The Basque language had failed to reveal any ascertainable relationship between the Basques and the other races of the earth. But its study has since proved far from unproductive in other directions, for it sheds invaluable light on the mentality of the people whose thought it expresses and on the stages of civilisation which they had attained when it was affected by successive external influences. If, for example, all words of Latin derivation are excluded from the Basque vocabulary, the latter is shown to be rich in pastoral terms, but noticeably poorer in agricultural terms. It may, therefore, be deduced that when the Basques first came into contact with Roman civilisation they were a pastoral people just beginning to turn their attention to agriculture. The words for most cutting instruments may quite possibly date back to the Stone Age, for they are derived from the word *aitz*: stone. In other respects the vocabulary indicates a primitive civilisation and an uncultured materialistic outlook. It is indescribably poor in abstract conceptions. The one word *gogo* denotes the mind and all its functions, such as will, desire, mood and thought. Another curious feature is the complete absence of collective nouns. There are separate names for every tree, animal, or colour, but none save those derived from Spanish for colour, tree, or animal in general.

The conception of a primitive, unimaginative race suggested by an analysis of the language is confirmed by the character of the contemporary Basque peasant. It is peculiarly unfortunate that his almost insular self-sufficiency, his suspicion of the foreigner, and consequent taciturnity have woven around him an atmosphere of romantic legend which causes him to be depicted as an imaginative dreamer living in a sort of Celtic twilight, meditating on the distant past and the equally remote future, and possessed of an outlook which, truth to tell, never existed among men until it was invented by Rousseau and Chateaubriand.

The outlook of the Basque peasantry is essentially objective. Although they are devout and unquestioning Catholics, there is a pagan quality in their faith which is reminiscent more of the Old than of the New Testament. They take their God for granted just as their ancestors must have accepted their Sun God or Thunder God. Like these, He is a God of wrath rather than of mercy.

Their faith is lacking equally in the mysticism of the Middle Ages and in the tenderness which has been discerned in Christianity in later times.

There is, indeed, in the character of the Basques a streak of hardness which is primitive in its neglect of the more cultivated virtues of compassion and altruism. This is not to say that they are needlessly brutal. Their hardness is not so much of a positive as of a negative order, which seems to show that this quality has sprung rather from the natural outlook of a race which has never apprehended modern ethical conceptions than from any definite defect in their moral composition. Indeed, they possess in a high degree the more robust virtues of loyalty, dignity, and patriarchal rectitude. Their hardness, however, suffices to explain certain somewhat unlovable traits in their character, such as their callous attitude towards suffering, both human and animal, their unconcealed contempt for every form of weakness and deformity, and their indifference to the feelings which may be wounded by their peculiar brand of biting humour.

The same almost primæval quality is discernible in their moral outlook, which is based less on any religious or ethical code than on the material interests of the family and the community. As a matter of course they speak out with the utmost frankness everything that is in their minds, but there is seldom or never any obscene intention. It never occurs to them to call a spade anything but a spade, and they never mince their words before their womenfolk, who nevertheless see therein no cause for blushing. In their songs, legends, or folk-plays there is never anything deliberately pornographic.

Adultery is universally condemned. A guilty couple may awake one morning to find a tell-tail trail of rushes uniting the doors of their houses. More often village disapproval is manifested in the form of 'rough music,' which in cases of extreme provocation leads to organised 'charivaris' called *tobera-mustrak*. These are long carnivalesque processions, culminating in a satirical play setting forth the details of the scandal, followed by an elaborate mock-trial and the sentence of the accused. It is significant that rough music of this sort is also earned by the remarriage of a widow or the thrashing of a man by a woman, two offences which are regarded less kindly in a primitive than in a civilised community.

No greater contrast could be afforded to Basque disapproval of adultery than their lenient attitude towards pre-nuptial promiscuity. Little or no importance is attached to a girl's escapades before marriage. Should she find herself in trouble she will be mercilessly teased and held up to ridicule in improvised songs. But she will not be expected to marry her lover, nor will

she have any difficulty in finding a husband. The latter, indeed, will not merely overlook the existence of an illegitimate child, but will welcome it into his home, just as primitive man must have welcomed every prospective pair of able hands.

Basque want of imagination finds its complement in a complete lack of creative originality. Almost everything which was at first regarded as an outward expression of Basque culture has eventually been shown to be an ingenious adaptation of borrowed ideas. It is only the intense conservatism of the race, leading them to cling to antiquated traditions long after their original models have disappeared, that has given rise to the mistaken impression that the culture and customs of the Basques have always been different from those of their neighbours. Possessing nothing original of their own, they are slow in their acceptance of foreign ideas, slow but sure in their assimilation of them, and very sure in their ultimate attachment to them.

That so conservative a race should ever have absorbed foreign traditions may seem surprising. But the Basques have had many more contacts with the outside world than is generally realised. Within historical times they have experienced an English occupation of Gascony and a later British invasion of the Peninsula. Their mercenaries went to the Navarrese kingdom of Achaia in Greece, to Palestine with Eleanor of Aquitaine, and to Wales with Edward I. Their sailors accompanied Magellan round the world, fished for cod on the Newfoundland banks, and taught the rest of Europe the whaling industry. Their corsairs were a thorn in the flesh of the British merchant marine from the seventeenth till the beginning of the nineteenth century. From these wanderings the Basques returned to their native land with their minds full of strange things seen and heard, many of which they adapted to their own use.

At first sight there is nothing more strikingly original than the Basque game of *pelote*. But a closer study of its history and development show it to have sprung from the mediæval game of *longue paume*, which was played in Italy and France until it was replaced by the *courte paume*, from which tennis is derived.¹

Similarly, Basque folk-song is full of reminiscences of early Church music, of mediæval court minstrelsy, of eighteenth century *chansonnettes*, and of the popular songs of many countries. These different materials are unified by a style of singing which owes more to modal than to diatonic tonality, and more to the rhythm of speech than to that of music. Peculiar as these songs sound to-day, they would probably have seemed much less distinctive 500 years ago.

¹ See *A Book of the Basques*, by Rodney Gallop. (Macmillan & Co. In the press.)

There are moments when the wanderer among the Basques seems to be transported back into the early Middle Ages. A year ago the writer was fortunate enough to witness the performance of a 'pastorale' at a small village in the province of Soule. A rough stage had been erected on the *pelote* court, and in the white backcloth there were two gaps—one for the entrance of the 'good' characters and one for that of the 'wicked.' The play, a life-history of François I. of France, lasted for five hours. The Frenchmen, clad in blue, were called 'Christians,' and their enemies, albeit Spaniards and Italians, were called 'Turks,' and came and went through the 'wicked' entrance, bowing to a little black dancing-jack called Mahoma who was suspended over their heads. They wore red uniform coats, yellow breeches, and tall crowns of flowers and feathers. The play was written in short quatrains which were rhythmically chanted on notes of varying pitch, while the actors marched backwards and forwards across the stage with no attempt at gesture or expression. The frequent battles were no more than elaborately conventionalised wurdances. To symbolise death the players lay down on a white sheet, and on every such occasion the action was suspended while the Satans performed an elaborate dance before carrying the body off to purgatory. So unique in the world to-day is the conventionalised technique of these plays that many writers have regarded them as an original Basque contribution to the art of the theatre. But in sober truth they differ but little from the mystery plays of the Middle Ages.

The variety of influences which have been combined to form what may be called the Basque 'style' is most easily discernible in decoration and in folk-lore. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Basques produced what seemed to be a highly individual school of carving in wood and stone. Their designs were principally geometric, but the discoidal tombstones, the lintel stones, and the wooden chests and household utensils which they decorated testify to remarkable powers of adaptation, variation and combination. Yet the germs of these patterns may be traced back eventually to Coptic and Merovingian models.

In the same way the traditional stories which are told round the fire on winter evenings are a naïve jumble of classical mythology, Oriental tales, Celtic fairy-lore, New Testament parables, and mediæval legends of witches and evil spirits. Only the setting and the details are truly Basque, and these folk-tales do no more than demonstrate once again the Basque talent for assimilating and retaining antiquated themes the invention of which must be ascribed to other races.

There are, however, certain Basque customs, acquired doubtless at a more remote period, the origin of which cannot so

easily be established. Throughout the country the children go 'wassailing' on various festivals. Thus on New Year's Day, in Navarre, they carry round the 'luck' in the form of the first rain that has fallen in the New Year; on other occasions they mask their faces or take a 'guy' with them. In one or two villages the peasants occasionally revive the 'hen-game,' in which a hen is buried with only its head showing and then beheaded with a ceremonial which recalls pagan animal sacrifices. In other places when the master of a house dies the fire is removed from the hearth and the ashes are scattered, or the cattle are taken from their stalls and are not suffered to lie down until after the funeral.

There are parts of Basse-Navarre where the peasants, when they gather on November evenings to strip the maize stalks, are visited at midnight by a 'white mare,' represented by two youths under a sheet. Students of the *Golden Bough* will have little difficulty in seeing in this white mare an animal personification of the Corn God. Nor will it greatly surprise them to learn that in Soule and Navarre a hobby-horse dances in the carnival celebrations and is 'hoisted' or 'shot' at the end of the dance.

This ritual dancing—for there is no doubt as to its origin in pagan ritual—is one of the most curious survivals in this country of survivals. Although it has come to be associated with the carnival or with various Church festivals and has suffered every sort of mediæval accretion, its original purpose peers through this transparent disguise wherever it is found. In Vizcaya it takes the form of a sword dance, in which the captain is finally held aloft like the stiffened corpse of a sacrificial victim; in Soule of a complicated pantomime in which the hobby-horse is pursued, shod, and gelded before his final hoisting; in Basse-Navarre of a Corpus Christi procession of fantastically clad dancers who leap before the high altar just as David leapt before the Ark. A sharp line of demarcation sunders these dances from the *aurresku*, *fandango*, and *farandole*, which are purely recreational in purpose. They are performed annually on fixed dates and with the utmost gravity by chosen teams of male dancers. Moreover, they are full of close analogies with the remains of the spring rite throughout Europe. If, therefore, it cannot be definitely proved that these primitive customs were borrowed from foreign sources, there is at least presumptive evidence that they are not peculiar to the Basques and that they were once general throughout Europe.

The more closely one studies Basque customs and traditions, the more one is driven to share the conclusions reached by Vinson after a lifetime of research—to wit, that 'the Basques have nothing original, nothing exclusively their own save their language.' Camille Jullian, the French historian of Gaul, is more explicit when he writes that 'each vanished age seems to have

bequeathed to Basque civilisation the heritage of at least one ineradicable custom.' This civilisation—if the word is not too pretentious for the homely peasant culture of the Basques—thus reveals itself to be no more than an eclectic epitome of the stages through which European civilisation has passed. Its contribution towards a solution of the problem of Basque origins is practically negligible.

On the other hand, this very fact raises a problem of no mean importance. What influences, what elements in the Basque environment have isolated these antiquated traditions and preserved them incorrupt as flies in amber? It may even be questioned whether this new problem is not really the more baffling of the two, and the more worthy of study. The origin of every branch of the human race is equally mysterious if it is sought far enough back in the remote past. But it is a matter of greater marvel that a small race like the Basques, who are in our time but not of it, whose very existence, indeed, is an anachronism, should have survived till the present day, uncontaminated by the admixture of other races and bringing with them something of their original mentality coupled with a host of traditions saved from the bonfire of the pagan past.

Hitherto the geographical explanation has been accepted as sufficient. But surely a few moments' reflection will show it to be inadequate. There are parts of Europe far wilder, far more mountainous and inhospitable, than the Basque provinces. Yet nowhere, not even in the Balkans, has there survived a race so primitive and so essentially ancient.

The solution of the problem must be sought in some element in Basque character, some alloy made up of pride and dignity, suspicion and reserve, conservatism and self-sufficiency, which, like an ancient Egyptian unguent, has preserved them till the present day, incorrupt yet embalmed in the past.

RODNEY A. GALLOP.

VIRGIL'S BIMILLENARY

SUCH celebrations as are punctually inspired by the effluxion of time prove too often to be merely opportunities for a fresh misunderstanding of their subject. They inevitably direct attention to the passage of years, to the mutability of taste, and to the multiplicity of the events, in the history of art or of action, that have succeeded the life or work that they commemorate. When the person or event celebrated belongs to the world of affairs, these considerations have their relevance; but they can only mislead the mind in its judgment of an artist and his works. They tempt the critic to think of a work of art as an antique, and to invent false reasons to explain why what he finds alive to-day should have lived so long. None the less, anniversary celebrations do forcibly remind us of the past, and by making it the subject of reflection provide an opportunity for revising error and re-enforcing truth.

What is it that makes Virgil as great to-day as he was 2000 years ago? The question plunges him who would answer it unawares into metaphysics, for he must recognise how far Time and Change have power in the world of Art. The world which admires the *Aeneid* to-day differs, it may seem, in almost every respect from the world for which the *Aeneid* was written. The physical conditions in which life is lived are different; new problems confront the intellect, and new views both of the nature of the physical world and of man's spiritual destiny are debated and believed; the world since Virgil's death has seen more than one revolution in morals and in art; the Empire whose birth he celebrated has fallen, and the language in which he wrote has died; yet his poems remain, not, indeed, as widely read by students of literature as in his own day, but by those who do read them at least as deeply admired. How is it that where so much has changed, the response evoked by the qualities of his work should stay the same? How is it—to put a question wider but cognate—that the classics have not lost their power in a modern world?

To this question two answers suggest themselves: the classics retain their influence partly because old reputations die hard, partly because classical literature, degraded into an educational instrument, has been inflicted upon each succeeding generation at an age when the power to resist is imperfectly developed and the memory is at its most tenacious. This, however, explains only what is superficial—the potency of the classics, not their power. It must be remembered that they contribute not only to the education of schoolboys and the libraries of gentlemen; that they do not depend entirely for their strength upon human weakness.

To the question what is the source of their real and permanent strength two answers may be given—answers which differ fundamentally, for between them there is all the depth of a metaphysical gulf. The first answer has never been more popular than it is to-day, and is never so loudly or so confidently given as on such occasions as that of a millenary celebration. It boldly recognises the mutability of things, and declares that in a changing world the classics themselves have changed. The classics change (it is said), and their change is not vicissitude or mutation, still less the change of decay, for they are not dead, they are 'alive to-day.' Once that claim has been advanced (and who dares challenge it?), it is but a step to the assertion that, living, they draw new life, new strength, new character, from each succeeding age. Each age, on this view, contributes something to Virgil, each age finds in him something new; 'to' each age he 'means' something different, and from each age he demands a new interpretation.

This answer is popular, for it reassures those who are inclined to ask how anything that belonged to a by-gone day can be of importance to us now—for, however 'modern' we may wish to be, when we turn to Virgil, on this view, we are not turning back; it allures those to whom any view is made plausible by the facile comparison of an abstract idea with a living organism—and no analogy is more popular or more delusive; and it comforts those to whom more than superficial learning is unattainable, for it sets an almost equal value on the classics in the original and in translation. Nor is the view without a certain philosophical plausibility. For the common reflection that the past is unalterable—a reflection which ministers sometimes to our comfort, sometimes to our despair—is in a sense unwarranted: the past not only can, but must inevitably, change, however passionately we may desire that time in its passage should isolate and leave untouched a moment or an hour. It is not merely that the past may fade in our memory; memory can keep its treasures as bright as when they were committed to it,

but it cannot keep them simply as they were: by every fresh word that we speak, by each fresh gesture, by each new thought and action, we change irrevocably the context of what has gone before. Every event in history adds to and so changes the whole of history, and so also the relations of its component parts. And just as meaning depends upon context, so, it may be said, each event is what it is through being a particular part of a particular whole—namely, the series of events in time up to the occurrence of that event. That past is perpetually changed by the momentary present, and to this change everything in time is subject. To every age, therefore, the *Æneid*, in a sense comes as something not merely fresh, but different, because every age changes by new knowledge, new opinion, new experience—a change which is dimly reflected in criticism and commentary—the *Æneid* which its predecessor handed on to it.

This, we suspect, is one of those grand metaphysical truths which strike most deeply on their first recital, and depend for their effect less upon their real merits than on the arrogance of their apparent claims.

Though it is, in a sense, true that everything in time is subject to change simply because it is in time and thus is constantly acquiring fresh relations, yet these acquisitions are mere acquisitions; there is something that acquires them; there is a persistent unity, which can be recovered by abstraction. And in our everyday life we usually attach more importance to that unity than to its adventitious qualities. Our behaviour to-day is determined rather by its probable effect on the events of the morrow than by its certain effect on the events of the year before last. We can, perhaps, atone for sins, but a sin atoned for is not a sin undone. Confidently can we say that

In all the ages this shall never be
As if it had not been.

A classical poet has reminded us that it is not within the power even of omnipotence to make undone that which has been done, and a modern poet that 'the gods themselves cannot recall their gifts.' That what is true of life is true of literature we are reminded by the familiar *dicta* which tell us that the spoken word cannot be recalled, and that the letter which has been written remains.

In this connexion it is salutary to remember that Virgil wrote his works for his contemporaries to read 2000 years ago; that they were then (so far as the Fates allowed him to complete them) complete, expressing his intention, not 'meaning' a hundred different things to a hundred different and unborn generations. 'The' *Æneid* is that poem which Virgil wrote and

his friends published after his death, free from the after-interpretation of twenty centuries. Those who forget this, and insist that the *Æneid* is even incomplete, will find that they are pursuing a quarry which they themselves have endowed with wings, and they cannot complain if they are eluded by that which they themselves have made elusive. Looking back over twenty centuries in their search for 'the' *Æneid*, they will find not one *Æneid*, but a hundred, each merging imperceptibly, as each generation merges, into that which succeeds it. If they are wise, they will remember that though we can enrich literature by personal associations, we do not thereby 'make' literature or change the literature that we find (though we may obscure and distort it beyond recognition); and a bimillenary celebration is a good occasion for reminding them that the *Æneid* was a completed whole 2000 years ago.

• For even if the *Æneid* may be looked at as a complex system or mere conglomeration, or as a living thing that changes as it lives, there must be some nucleus of that collection, and some explanation of its attractive power; there must be some reason why the living thing has lived so long beyond the ordinary span of literary productions.

The explanation is to be found on the other side of the metaphysical gulf—the side on which abstraction is allowed to do its necessary work. The 'nucleus,' the thing which has lived, is the *Æneid* that Virgil wrote, and the secret of its power can only be discovered by freeing it from the accretions of twenty centuries and looking at it, in so far as is possible, in the nakedness in which it left Virgil's mind. To discover what the author meant, nothing more, nothing less, nothing else, is the professed object of the scholar and should be the object of all intelligent readers; it is often a difficult task, and those who bring to it the prejudices of their own age make it more difficult still, not only for themselves, but also for their posterity. But those who endeavour to transport themselves back 2000 years and recapture the *Æneid* that Virgil wrote may be assured that they will find in it, and will not lose in discarding the accumulated interpretations of succeeding ages, the secret of its immortality.

II

'To judge rightly of an author,' says Dr. Johnson 'we must transport ourselves to his time, and examine what were the wants of his contemporaries, and what were his means of supplying them.' Certainly the wants of Virgil's contemporaries influenced him, as they must influence almost every artist, in his choice of a form in which to write; when he came to write his last and greatest work they even dictated its subject and in a

large measure determined his treatment of it. His poem was perforce of a tedious species in a difficult genus: it was a national epic. Within this awkward framework it had to look both backward and forward: to incorporate archæology, history, and myth; and to celebrate the foundation of a nascent empire and point the direction of its future triumphs. Its author had to bear the burden of Tennyson superimposed on that of Milton: his myth was as far removed from the world around him (though the distance is to us diminished by the telescopic effect of time) as was the Arthurian legend from the Victorian age, yet the history of which it was supposed to be a part was as vital to him as was to Milton the story which opened with the legend of Eden. Both a living present and a fixed tradition imposed their limitations on his freedom in the exercise of his art. Virgil's mastery over form and content was so great that his posterity has never completely realised that the form in which he wrote was of all literary forms almost the least suited to his genius. His art would have developed most freely had he devoted himself to the shorter and less exacting form of the epyllion; thus would he have obtained greater scope for variety and experiment, and he might have left us a collection of poems in which his genius would have appeared to better advantage than in the twelve books of a continuous epic.

The needs of his age, however, being what they were, Virgil satisfied them; how completely, his contemporary success reveals. To his contemporaries he was more than an artist; he was almost a prophet. To-day his message survives as something of only historic interest; its political import has lost its urgency, and its moral tone, though in advance of the age in which he wrote, is hardly abreast of ours; we do not go to the *Æneid* to learn chivalry or to the *Georgics* to learn contentment with a simple life, though the poems may have taught these lessons to their early readers.

Certainly Virgil is not a moral teacher in the ordinary sense of the words: he does not set out to tell us either by precept or by parable how to live, and his works may be searched in vain for an effective appeal to the promptings of conscience or to the sanctions of religion. True, he takes us to the Lower World, but his picture of the tortures of the damned and the pleasures of the blessed hardly provokes a resolve to imitate the virtues which led to Elysium or to avoid the vices which paved the way to Acheron. Few can have determined to eschew arrogance through reading of the punishment of the Alcidæ, and how many rapes can have been averted by a timely recollection of the fate of Theseus?

Nor is Virgil's picture of the Upper World any richer in examples for our moral instruction. Assiduous though he is in

his praises of simplicity and magnanimity, he teaches mortals not to look for pity, or even justice, at the hands of fate. The characters who claim most vividly our affection and our admiration—Nisus and Euryalus, Camilla, Pallas, Lausus—all perish as a result of their own valour and unselfishness. While virtue suffers, vice is painted in no darker colours: every boy admires Mezentius, and Mezentius is a savage; every man loves Dido, and Dido is abject passion incarnate. Most unfortunate has he been with his chief character—the hero whom he endows with every virtue, every talent, and every charm; the perfect son, the perfect soldier, the perfect Roman; the leader in whom Augustus was no doubt intended to recognise 'some faint shadow of himself' has impressed posterity as a tiresome prig, and the climax of the epic leaves most of its readers more eager to show their sympathy with the vanquished than to rejoice with the victor at the prospect of his approaching nuptials and the foundation of the city of Rome.

Virgil is far from being a moral, and still farther from being a religious, teacher. Yet in both morals and religion he has been influential. Even to-day most readers of the classics would go to him rather than to any other poet of pagan antiquity to find an echo, however faint, of their own religious convictions or their own religious doubts. In the Middle Ages he was regarded without difficulty as a Christian teacher, the Prophet of the Gentiles. This no doubt was due to accident—to the accident, for instance, that his fourth *Eclogue* was capable of a double interpretation. But such a misconception would not have been possible if Virgil had regarded himself as the mouthpiece of a religious doctrine. It is his lack of any positive religious conviction, his freedom from all dogma, that has made him the prey of the mystic, just as it is his extreme reluctance to indulge in any moral reflections (he allows himself three or four at the most in the course of the *Æneid*) that gives him a sort of moral sublimity. So, too, with philosophy: no writer with so few pretensions to having thought out a philosophic system is so often invoked as an interpreter of the mysteries of human life and destiny. In morals, in philosophy, in religion, he in many ways resembles Wordsworth; if he has not Wordsworth's confidence in the beneficence of nature, he equally believes that *mens agitat molem*, and is equally ready to extend his sympathy over the whole range of suffering. But his anticipation of Wordsworth cannot be illustrated by quotation; where the later poet is explicit, Virgil is content to leave his thought unspoken. 'Virgil says much in little,' wrote Dryden, 'and often in silence.' His silence has nowhere been supposed to speak louder than on the twin topics of religion and morality.

We hardly go to Virgil, then, in order to learn how to become good or wise, though to his contemporaries he may have taught both these lessons. If we wish to understand Virgil we must take into account these elements in his work, but if we wish to learn the secret of his perennial power, his power over us, we must ask not what external needs of his day he satisfied, but what, more simply, are the merits of his writings.

III

The secret of Virgil's immortality is, after all, an open secret: he was a successful artist. That has not, perhaps, always been the reason why his readers have admired him; he has often been worshipped for qualities that he does not possess; but as long as there are those who care enough for beauty and for skill in its production to seek them in his works, he will not be without an audience ready to do him homage.

This may be said not only of Virgil, but of a great deal of surviving classical literature: it will survive as long as there exist men able to read Greek and Latin and endowed with intellectual and æsthetic tastes, men who take pleasure in literature, and are eager to acquire knowledge of it and find the beauty in it. To those whose desire is for knowledge alone, classical literature will offer a field of attraction almost evenly distributed: their pleasure may lie in interpreting Persius, in investigating the prose rhythms of Isæus, in analysing the dialects of the lyric poets, in restoring the text of Manilius—in acquiring any sort of insight into any sort of author. Those who love great literature will read the classics chiefly for their masterpieces. Neither class of inquirers need ever fear that Greek and Latin literature will fail to provide them with the material that they seek. The pure artistic merits of the classics, like all such qualities, stand outside time: they are not subject to its influence, for good or for evil; they have gained nothing in the passage of twenty centuries, and they need lose nothing in the passage of twenty more. They are to-day exactly what their authors made them; and those who possess the gifts necessary for appreciating them need only go straight to them in order to satisfy their desires.

Virgil, in so far as he was an artist, has no especial message for this century, and the value of his works in one century does not differ from their value in another. To find it, we must go back to the source untainted by the multifarious influences of subsequent generations; but going back is no retrogression, for in the realm of the highest art there are no such words as 'out of date' or 'up to date.'

IV

A bimillenary is an occasion when to lay stress upon the timelessness of art is more than usually desirable. Yet it is necessary, especially when Virgil is the artist under our review, to remember that art, in this world, has to embody its products in forms which are subject to the influence of time. It is one of the cruellest conditions of human existence that beauty, to be communicated, must be clothed, or rather realised, in perishable forms. By this condition all the arts are sufferers. The works of the painter and the sculptor are more than any others subject to the domination of pure chance: innumerable must be the paintings and the statues that have been abolished by no other agency than the hand of time. The musician is in a slightly happier position, for he can multiply copies of his work; yet whenever it is re-created he is in the hands of his executant interpreter.

Literature is in this respect, since the discovery of printing, safest of all, but it has not always been so. The dust-heaps of Egypt remind us by their tantalising treasures that neither the merits of a masterpiece nor the multiplication of its written copies can make up for the frailty of the material to which in writing it is committed. And the East is not without examples of literatures whose concrete vehicle has survived, but which were written in a language to which the key has been irrevocably lost, so that whatever treasures they may contain are for ever hidden from our eyes. From these dangers Virgil is immune. His text has survived in a state of excellent preservation; his works have been reproduced in manuscript and print almost as often as those of any other author in the world, and knowledge of the language in which he wrote is perhaps unlikely ever utterly to perish. Yet he is, and always has been, open to a danger less devastating but more insidious. More than any other artist, his strength lay with the subtleties of language. He was pre-occupied more than any of his contemporaries, and himself increasingly as he grew older, with the selection and the use of words. Appreciation of his achievement, therefore, is bound up with an intimate knowledge of the language in which he wrote. In the choice of words to suit not only his meaning but his mood, in the variation of cadence and of colour, in the management of metre and of period, he was adept, and no poet has excelled him in the faculty of matching sense with sound. These matters are, in a greater or lesser degree, the concern of every poet, and his skill and interest in them does not differentiate Virgil from many other writers. But he went beyond almost every other poet in experimenting with words. It was the desire to do this,

and the precise nature of the experiments that he performed, that gave its especial, 'Virgilian,' character to almost every line he wrote. His experiments were at once delicate and daring; of their daring and delicacy the Romans, more familiar than it is possible for us to be with the *nuances* of their tongue, must have had better means of judging than ever posterity has attained: they could tell, and we cannot, how far Virgil indulged his fancy in inventing words, in reviving archaistic words, and in using words in novel senses and novel combinations. It is strange, therefore, that time has left undimmed the charm of Virgil's art, and that we should recognise it unconsciously, doing homage to the effect without knowing fully the nature of the cause.

In this respect there is one English poet who shares with him almost identical characteristics—Lord Tennyson. With him, as with Virgil, preoccupation with the use of language came to play a more and more important part in his composition, till it became with him, as with Virgil, at times an intolerable affectation; with him, too, the interest of his later work often lies in the unheard felicities of language in which he expresses the *nuance* of his meaning. When English is a dead language the novelty will have gone from such a phrase as:

all her dress
Wept from her sides as water flowing away.

Now that Latin is a dead language can we recapture the thrill given to its first readers by

tota cohors . . . relictis Ad terram defluxit equis?

only by comparing a sentence which we recognise as an experiment in a living language—

their malice on the placid lip
Froz'n by sweet sleep—

can we appreciate such a phrase as Virgil's

nec unquam
solvitur in somnos, oculisve aut pectore noctem accipit

When we read that Lancelot 'maddened with himself and moaned,' we are struck by a sense of novelty which Roman readers would almost certainly have felt, but which we do not experience in reading such a phrase as 'furor iraque mentem præcipitat.'

Tennyson's aptitude for periphrasis can hardly escape an English reader's notice as long as English is a spoken tongue; but how often in reading Virgil must we come without knowing it upon phrases which jarred upon their first readers just as

'the knightly growth that fringed his lip' and 'azure pillars of the hearth' jar upon us? If Virgil had been born in 1809 and had written in English, he might well have expressed the approach of his seventy-ninth birthday by declaring that

The centuries three strong eights have met
To drag me down to seventy nine.

What seems in Tennyson at times an irritating preciosity in the combination of words—he speaks 'Temple eaten terms' for terms kept by eating dinners in the Temple—is observable in Virgil, particularly in his later work—he speaks of a boundary stone as being set up 'litem ut discerneret arvis'; sometimes we are gainers over his contemporaries, and what seemed offensive to them is passed by us unnoticed; sometimes the felicity must have depended upon the strangeness, and both together escape our attention.

Experiments such as these were sometimes unsuccessful, but more often successful, and in the mass their effect was to widen the scope of the language, to increase its power as an instrument for the expression of thought. But language could not be so used without a certain sacrifice, and Virgil was forced to renounce qualities which have been the chief glory of other writers: speed is rarely a characteristic of his work, and glitter never. He could never—partly because of his fondness for long periods, partly because, whatever the length of his periods, he loved to linger by the way—have written such lines as these of Ovid (*Met.*, V. 648):

Jam super Europen sublimis et Asida terras
Vectus erat iuvenis: Scythicas advertitur oras.
Rex ibi Lynceus erat; regis sublit ille penates;
Qua veniat, causamque viæ, nomenque rogatus
Et patriam, Patria est claræ mihi, dixit, Athenæ;
Triptolemus nomen.

Such rapidity may have been in Virgil's power; it became less and less in his inclination. Nor would he have painted thus the following scene (*Met.*, VII. 835):

Egredior silvasque peto; victorque per herbas,
Aura veni, dixi, nostroque medere labori.
Et subito gemitus inter mea verba videbar
Nescio quos audisse. Veni, tamen, optima, dixi.
Fronde levem rursus strepitum faciente caduca,
Sum ratus esse feram: telumque volatile misi.
Procris erat.

Here is a picture painted with the utmost economy; with the fewest and deftest possible touches: each touch is definite; each word performs its own clear task. How rightly is Ovid made the

study of those who know but little Latin, and wish to learn themselves how properly to use it! But economy of words has its drawback; it cannot well indulge a luxury of feeling (*Met.*, VII. 694):

Procris erat . . . raptæ soror Orithyæ,
Si faciem moresque velis conferre duarum
Dignior ipsa rapi. Pater hanc mihi iunxit Erectheus;
Hanc mihi iunxit amor. Felix dicebar, eramque;
Non ita dis visum est, ac nunc quoque forsitan essem.

A frugal tongue is the inadequate servant of a tender heart: hard, clear words are ill-fitted to express a gentle and a vague emotion. Virgil, where he erred, erred in the opposite direction. He used language as an instrument for expressing *nuances* undreamed of by earlier or coeval Latin writers: his verbal sensibility was expressive of an equal sensibility of the emotions. It is not surprising that his manner differs from that of Ovid: he had so much more and such very different things to say. What is surprising is that to an age for which Latin is a dead language his art should be, of the two, the more deeply appreciated and admired.

V

It has justly been observed that certain books 'have stood the test of time, and been admired through all the changes which the mind of man has suffered from the various revolutions of knowledge, and the prevalence of contrary customs,' and that 'the long continuance of their reputation proves that they are adequate to our faculties and agreeable to nature.' The classics are endowed with this celestial stability: their beauties have been for twenty centuries before the world, never changing, ever open to those who are willing to undertake the labour of discovering them. Virgil's art will always bring the same delight to those who know his language well enough to appreciate his manipulation of it; but because he himself expended much labour on these matters he claims an equal diligence from his readers. It is the forecast of no irrational pessimism that, as time proceeds, the number of those willing to sacrifice the hours and shoulder the burdens demanded by classical study, simply for the sake of appreciating the gifts which only a knowledge of classical languages can confer, will undergo a steady diminution. The desire for worldly success and for the accumulation of wealth, the passion to keep abreast of current affairs in their ever-increasing complexity, to obtain acquaintance with the swelling volume of the literature of subsequent ages, and to conform to the degraded canons imposed upon literature and æsthetics by a pseudo-scientific criticism—all these operate, and have never

done so more potently than they do at present, against the study and appreciation of the classics.

Such are the enemies of classical study. It has something also to fear from its own injudicious partisans; for the real qualities of classical literature are never more effectively distorted than by its own misguided and enthusiastic admirers. Their ranks, unhappily, show no sign of diminishing, and they assure the classics a prolonged if vicarious existence; 2000 years hence it is possible that Virgil will still live—but only in translations, and only by means of the artificial respiration so often practised upon his works to-day: the breathing into them of a spirit alien to that of their creator.

JOHN SPARROW.

EUGENICAL REFORM

III. THE INTELLIGENTSIA

AMONG the social problems of the day none is more difficult than the question, What to do with the Intelligentsia? None also presents greater difficulties to the eugenicist. This problem is often overlooked because the intelligentsia is nowhere numerous, its members are not often held in personal esteem, and they are rarely to be found amongst the ruling circles (or rings) of modern societies. So it is hastily assumed that the intelligentsia is a negligible quantity. But the influence an intelligentsia exercises is quite disproportionate to its numbers and personal distinction, and for some purposes is decisive. The purveyors of new ideas of a social or political sort can do little without its aid. The eugenicist therefore must seek, if possible, to propitiate the intelligentsia.

Even numerically a more or less extensive intelligentsia is found in all 'civilised' societies. True, it is nowhere dominant, and its treatment varies. Sometimes it is treated brutally, as by Russia, which has made the interesting but hazardous experiment of driving out most of her intelligentsia, and is trying to crush and extirpate the remainder. Nevertheless, the non-Russian intelligentsia is so little 'class-conscious' as to show a good deal of sympathy with the Russian experiment. In Anglo-Saxon countries little intelligentsia is grown, and it is usually treated with tolerant contempt. It is stupidly overlooked that the intelligentsia performs an important social function, well or ill, and may do invaluable public service. It should not be taken for granted, therefore, that an intelligentsia is necessarily worthless or contemptible.

Indeed, it may even be suggested that, as every country has the Jews, so also it has the intelligentsia, it deserves. The Russians should have remembered this, even though their intelligentsia was such as their novelists described, and partly justified their Revolution. Certainly the intelligentsia is a social product, a resultant of social conditions, a by-product of the prevalent education. It is not born, but made, and may be made well

or ill. So its *quality* is quite variable. And whether or not a society recognises its responsibility for the quality of its intelligentsia, it can hardly disclaim responsibility for its *quantity*. For its numbers in every country clearly depend on the sort of education with which the young are nourished.

I have already remarked on one of the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon world, that it does not breed much intelligentsia. It is too healthy and healthy-minded, or too Philistine. It is also too much addicted to keeping its eye on the main chance, to the pursuit of the almighty dollar, to the making of a career, to support a flourishing intelligentsia. Lastly, it takes itself in all its pursuits too seriously, especially its sports; whereas an intelligentsia is more prone to play than to work, and disposed to make fun of the idols and conventions the masses worship.

It is true, however, that nowhere does the intelligentsia amount to more than an infinitesimal minority. Not that on this account its social importance should be under-rated. It is very important, much more than the rest of society realises, though not perhaps as important as it thinks itself. Not that we should grudge it the good conceit it has of itself. For to think oneself important is the beneficent illusion which sustains and stimulates us all. Still, the social function which the intelligentsia performs is beyond doubt vitally important. For its co-operation is essential to the success of any social movement and to the introduction of any new idea. If it likes, or rather if it likes it not, it has the power of strangling it, of interposing an impenetrable screen between a new idea and the many whom it concerns, and so of preventing the unthinking masses from ever hearing of its existence. That this is so will appear if we ask the question, What after all *is* the intelligentsia?

I

The intelligentsia may best be defined as a collective term for *the people who are interested in ideas*. Now most people are not so interested. They have not a mind for ideas, and so are devoid of the personal equipment needed for joining the intelligentsia. Moreover, they cannot *afford* to do so, being far too busy making their living. So the intelligentsia presupposes a certain degree of leisure and laxity of attachment to the basic needs of life. Or, alternatively, a profession or mode of life which entails encounters with ideas and demands a certain interest in them.

The idle rich do not supply many recruits to the intelligentsia. There are too devoted to sports, too absorbed in the routine of social 'functions,' to spare it more than a few eccentrics. Artistic and literary circles are more prolific and yield most of those who would pride themselves on belonging to the intelligentsia. The

higher journalism also is a great recruiting and play ground for the intelligentsia.

Journalism, moreover, ministers, not only to the economic needs, but also to the intellectual vices, of those who compose the intelligentsia. In other words, journalism not only helps them to make their living, but also titillates their intellectual interests. That is, they have the sort of intelligence which naturally assumes a journalistic attitude towards its objects. So the journalist becomes the typical mouthpiece of the intelligentsia. To understand the latter we must study the journalist.

II

Now the journalist is a very prominent, important, and formidable factor in modern affairs, though he is not, of course, devoid of weaknesses and vices. He has not usually the very highest order of intelligence. Indeed, he is almost bound to be superficial in his judgments, because he has to cultivate a certain facile and flashy but rapidly responsive intelligence, and particularly *because he has no time to think*. He has, no doubt, a certain interest in new things, being more or less of a newspaper man. But not all novelties are news, and they cannot as such reckon on a sympathetic reception by journalists. For one thing, novelties are not always easy to understand, especially at the first and superficial glance, which is usually all that the journalist can afford to bestow upon them. For as we saw, he is often a superficial thinker, and always has to make up his mind in a hurry. Also he has, of course, his prejudices and inveterate habits of thought like other men, while his experience of the world has probably rendered him cynical, and his experience of the manufacture of news sceptical.

So he usually finds it the path of least resistance to ridicule a new idea in an airy, irresponsible but ignorant way, rather than to take the time and trouble to expound it seriously, or even to report it fairly. Especially if he is in the employ of an established organ of conservative public opinion, he will inevitably feel that this for him is the path of safety. For in such an organ everything is cut and dried and must be handled in the traditional and customary manner, lest it should shock the old women of both sexes among its readers. At most a new idea may be ventilated, tentatively and apologetically, during the silly season. For then the strenuousness of close attention to politics or business or athletics may be relaxed a little, and a new idea may occasionally be allowed to disport itself a little in the public Press, especially if it is gaily and suitably arrayed in cap and bells. But usually the journalist will realise that in the eyes of his *clientèle* it is enough for an idea to be new and unfamiliar

for it to be regarded with suspicion. It may really be quite harmless and anything but revolutionary. It may even be the very thing the public wants and the salvation, could they but recognise it, of the very people who distrust it and are groaning under oppressions which it would relieve. It is just the frequency of this situation which justifies the description of the Conservatives as the stupid party. But the journalist of course fully understands all this, and as a rule he finds that it pays him best to make fun of any new idea he reports. It was for reasons of this sort, no doubt, that Aristophanes deluged with ridicule the new ideas of the most creative age the world has ever seen, the ideas of the Sophists and Socrates, of Euripides and Plato.

Nevertheless, if he conforms a little to convention, the journalist is in a very strong position intellectually. He has the ear of the whole public, and not merely of its long-eared section. For he is the only writer whose writings are read by all, and what he says goes. He reaches all, and not merely a small coterie. He alone, moreover, is read by the people who matter. The people who control affairs and really do things that determine the course of events, the politicians, business men, and trade union leaders, do not in general read: still less do they read books dealing with new ideas. But they must, and do, read newspapers. Hence they become dependent on the journalist for their intellectual provender, and hear only of such novelties as the latter chooses to impart to them. This may in part account for their growing poverty in ideas, their incapacity for constructive change, and their pathetic insistence in reiterating worn-out and worthless nostrums. A secondary reason for the lack of ideas in modern politics is that the enormous size of modern States calls for the standardisation of programmes and for machine-made politics, and crushes out practically all independence and originality of mind. Also the specialists who occasionally stumble upon new ideas find it much safer and more congenial not to emerge from the seclusion of their laboratories and lecture-rooms and the obscurity of their technical terminologies, and do not often give the journalist interviews in which he can expound and exploit their views. At present it seems to be chiefly the astronomers who are willing to provide the journalist with 'copy'; but then it is so much safer to express opinions about what is happening at a distance of many thousands of light-years than about the unemployment statistics of the next parish or the prospects of the Lancashire cotton mills.

III

In these circumstances, can the journalist be expected to take an intelligent interest in questions of eugenics? It seems

very doubtful. For the subject seems naturally to lend itself at first to ribaldry of the Aristophanic kind. And even admitting that in time this sort of thing is bound to wear itself out, as a member of the intelligentsia the journalist belongs to a 'class which is naturally biassed, by its origin and mode of life, against any thorough-going scheme of eugenical reform.

IV

To understand this, we should consider how an intelligentsia grows up in a modern society. It has already been remarked that an intelligentsia is a social product and relative to a definite type of education. It springs up as a natural reaction from the educational methods practised in a country. Now, educational methods are necessarily adapted, in the first instance, to the masses to be educated; consequently they are not altogether suited to the exceptional few. Or, alternatively, they may foster in the latter an excessive consciousness of their superiority, and incite them to look down on the masses with contempt. For both these reasons there is likely to arise an antithesis and antagonism between the masses and the intelligentsia, such that an idea which appeals to the former is not likely to be approved by the latter, and *vice versa*. Further, it is natural that the educational systems, and generally the social conventions, of any society should arouse criticism, and be seen through by the more penetrating minds in each generation, as they grow up. These minds, moreover, form the natural recruiting ground for the intelligentsia. The outcome is that the intelligentsia is always disposed to be critical of the institutions under which it has grown up, and often is in more or less open and serious revolt against the social order.

Usually, however, the roots of its criticisms do not strike very deep. They apprehend the superficial incongruities and stupidities of social conventions, but not their underlying wisdom. They resent the harshnesses and absurdities of social control and the hardships of hard cases, without realising that some control of individual vagaries is necessary and beneficial: hence they are little disposed to welcome self-control, even as an ideal, and shrink from anything that involves prolonged or 'ascetic' training. Consequently in all affairs of the sexes they are all for 'liberty.' Let everyone do as he pleases, regardless of the future and of the consequences of his acts. Never mind about posterity, which has done nothing for the present generation that it should curtail its freedom. Even as it is, insufficient for the day are the pleasures thereof. So eugenics appears to be merely an addition to the silly restrictions which cramp the style, and stimulate the revolt, of the young intellectual. No doubt he subsequently finds it

expedient to modify these convictions as he grows older, sobers, and settles down to the business of making his way in life; but they are evidently antagonistic to the eugenical concern with the recruiting of the race as a highly responsible undertaking, calling for long views, forethought, and self-sacrifice from all the parties to it. Even after sowing his wild oats the former rebel is hardly likely to be converted to the eugenical ideal; he is much more likely to turn materialist, restrict his family, and to sacrifice his progeny to his ambition.

V

Nor are the other items of the eugenical programme much better suited to appeal to the intelligentsia. The eugenical ideal demands the highest possible development of all human faculties—physical, mental, and moral. So it will look with favour on the bodily exercises and sports which play such a prominent part in our bringing up of the young, and are rightly considered salutary. It will not, of course, content itself with athletics or value them for their own sake; but it will ever bear in mind that the original meaning of 'asceticism' was simply 'training,' and that the ascetic's severities were originally admired (as they still are in India) as athletic feats of spiritual endurance. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, is composed merely of intellectuals. It abhors athletics. Indeed, many of its members probably became intellectuals precisely because they loathed the 'compulsory games' they were made to play at school. Nor have they since learned to love the outdoor life and exercises. Their habitat is urban, or at most suburban; they move and have their being in Fleet Street or on the boulevards. What suggestion, then, could be naturally more repulsive to them than a summons to humanity to go into training to transcend itself, in order that it might attain the far distant end of a superior race? Hardly even the eugenist's reprobation of sexual licence and promiscuous breeding.

There is every reason to fear, therefore, that our regular intelligentsia can never be induced to take up eugenical ideas with any degree of enthusiasm. Most of them will feel that these ideas are too discordant with their mode of life, however cogently they are put forward. Only negative services, therefore, to the cause of eugenics can be expected from most of the intelligentsia. They may be induced to perform their normal social service of taking note of new ideas. They may be willing to talk about them, and to damn them with faint praise. They may even be goaded into disputing and denouncing them. And they may thereby draw attention to them in more important quarters,

in which ideas are not usually noticed at all and which depend on the intelligentsia to become aware of new ideas at all. We should not, therefore, despair of eugenical reform merely because neither the journalist nor the other components of our present intelligentsia can be trusted to provide the motive force needed to bring the case for eugenics effectively before the public. We may get it taken up by other, stronger, and more earnest, social forces.

VI

In what directions shall we look for such support? In the first place, it should be made quite clear that no practicable scheme of eugenic progress should rely at all on politics. It should not presuppose to start with any appreciable amount of State support. It should not require legislation in any notable or revolutionary measure. It should not appeal for help or favours to politicians of any party. For the politician is a broken reed for any real reform to lean on. Considered as a class he is not, in modern democracies, a leader of public opinion, but a follower, even when he is popularly hailed as a leader. He will not, therefore, blaze a trail into unexplored regions of thought or action, though when someone else has pointed out the way he may sometimes be prevailed upon to advance along it, cautiously and timorously, if he can be persuaded that not too many of his adherents will become stragglers by the wayside. He is too keenly conscious that his primary duties are to keep his party together and to repeat its slogans, to keep his ear to the ground and to keep a sharp eye on the impending saltations of the electoral cat, just round the corner and outside his range of vision. Consequently his political programme is essentially composed of ground-bait for votes and ephemeral devices for evading pressing problems and tiding over the week-end. When he *has* to adopt a new expedient he is more likely than not to clutch at any nostrum that promises to extricate him from a difficulty of the moment. In short, in a democracy at any rate, he has to be more or less of a humbug and an opportunist, who cannot afford to look far ahead, and who most of the time has as little knowledge of what waters he is steering the Ship of State into as his blindest followers. The eugenicist therefore should not look to politics for aid; he may, however, rest assured that *when* he has proved his case and converted the public, politicians will be ready enough to advocate any legislation that may be requisite or desirable.

In default of the politicians, the journalists and the intelligentsia proper, in what directions shall we look for the necessary social support of eugenical endeavours? There would appear to be two great professions which it should be possible

to interest in eugenics and whose support might prove sufficient. Though not normally to be numbered among the intelligentsia proper, because too much preoccupied with their professional work to have much attention to bestow on ideas in general, they might perform the functions of an intelligentsia for the purpose in hand, because of the great affinity of the eugenical idea for their professional work, and its very direct bearing upon their problems.

Hence if any considerable proportion of these professions could be converted to eugenics the case for eugenics would be effectively brought before the public. The professions in question are the doctors and the teachers. The former even now are probably in a latent sympathy with eugenics, which needs merely to be organised and rendered vocal: for their professional work must have made them very extensively aware of the evils which result from the dysgenical practices of our present civilisation. And they know, of course, the many defects of man's bodily machine, the limitations of the medical art, and the need for a radical improvement in our physical endowment if the possibilities of a healthy and happy existence are to be widely realised. Many of them must know also that, in spite of the many and magnificent achievements of modern medical science, they are fighting a losing battle with disease, simply because the material upon which they exercise their art is progressively deteriorating. This deterioration, doubtless, makes more work for doctors, and work for more doctors; but the medical profession as a whole may surely be credited with rising above a narrow professionalism and with willingness to bring about an improvement in the human race.

But their sympathy with this cause is nevertheless subject to certain professional limitations. Because the defects they encounter and are called upon to cure are primarily *physical*, they are inclined to lay a somewhat exclusive and one-sided stress on the physical items in the eugenical programme. They hardly realise that it would be vain to turn man into a better *animal*, if one did not simultaneously develop in him a better *mind* and better *morals*. Further, the ordinary doctor has to be careful how he assumes the part of a social reformer. He must not affront the prejudices of his patients, he must be cautious in advocating anything which is very much in advance of public opinion. It is only the leaders of the profession, the big specialists and consultants, who are in a position to speak out and to give the public a lead. Happily, some of them have already done so, and others could no doubt be persuaded to follow suit.

VII

In this respect what is true of the doctors holds also largely of the teachers. They, too, have to be circumspect, and many of

them, especially headmasters, are apt to carry circumspection to the pitch of complete conventionality. But in other respects they have several advantages over the doctors. In the first place, they have direct access to the young, the hope of humanity when it is a question of progressive change—that is, to minds which are still plastic and receptive of new ideas, and not yet fossilised and sunk in ruts of habit. Moreover, they are more directly, and quite specially, concerned with the intellectual and moral features of the eugenical programme, for intellectual training is almost entirely, and moral training is very largely, in their charge. Finally, in this country at least, they have not a little to say also about the bodily training of the young. If converted to eugenics, and properly instructed, therefore, they could transform public opinion with almost miraculous rapidity. They could impress on their pupils the unitary nature of education as a harmonising of all faculties, a realising of all possibilities, a training for all-round fitness. They could develop and expand youthful admiration for physical prowess into aspiration to all-round excellence—as, indeed, they already often try to do. In short, they could put to shame the sordid reality of our actual conditions by holding out to the young, and through them to their cynical seniors, the glittering ideal of a better world inhabited by *intrinsically better* men, stronger, healthier, cleverer, nobler, more self-controlled and more beautiful, than the accidents of evolution and the incidents of history have allowed us to become.

VIII

If the teachers and the doctors can be converted to eugenics, we shall hardly need any further help. But of course they will need to be instructed by the 'pure' scientists, primarily the biologists, but also the physiologists, psychologists, and sociologists. But in social affairs too much must not be expected from pure science. For the pure scientists are too deeply corroded with 'scientific caution' to intervene in social questions. This means, mostly, that they are so specialised that they are not interested in the applications of science: also that they are not heroes, and shrink from taking responsibilities. Moreover, few of them are able to free the expression of their thought sufficiently from technicality, to render it intelligible to those that do not share their specialty. Lastly, it should not perhaps surprise us to find that many of them should insist on postponing all action upon undisputed scientific knowledge until some distant day when certain purely technical controversies which engross them have been finally settled. These do not reflect that it makes little or no difference to the practical applications of eugenics

whether the Lamarckians or the Darwinians or the Mendelians are right about the disputed points in their several theories of heredity, and that meanwhile the people are perishing, because nothing is done to stop their deteriorating in a suicidal social order which prefers to recruit itself from its admittedly inferior stocks.

IX

It may excite surprise that there should not have been in this connexion any mention of a great profession to which in former days any question involving moral issues would most certainly have been referred for authoritative decision. But it is precisely in matters of faith and morals that we can no longer look for guidance to the clerical profession. Unfortunately for us and for itself it has been reduced to silence and no longer ventures to make heard its voice in the discussion of the new problems which beset us. Its declared policy has been so rigid a conservatism that it has lost its intellectual initiative. For over 1500 years the Christian Churches have not seen fit officially to introduce any alteration into the Creeds in which they stereotyped the revelations with which they had been entrusted. By so doing they have intimated not obscurely that the immense growth of secular knowledge during this period has been totally devoid of spiritual significance, and has added nothing to our understanding of the nature and meaning of life. In this they may have been right, though it does not look probable.

But it is obviously false that the enormous changes in social conditions and in the organisation of human life which have taken place since the decay of the Roman Empire have made no difference to Christian ethics. Though all the Churches are reluctant to admit it, the contents of morals change, and moral valuations are slowly but surely adjusted to the conditions of life, even though the forms of obligation persist. So the clerical claim that morals are immutable and unprogressive is not maintainable in practice, and in face of the facts. Actually striking changes have occurred in moral valuations. The 'contemplative' life of the hermit and the monk is no longer regarded as the highest ideal of conduct, even in Catholic countries, and the Promised Land of the ascetic has been shifted to Tibet. Nor is indiscriminate alms-giving accounted a virtue any longer. Of the Seven Deadly Sins two at least are practically obsolete; for no one now would seriously reckon 'acedia' and gluttony among the seven worst of moral failings, while the reprobation of avarice has been tempered by a recognition of its affinity with the saving disposition which is such a valuable asset in modern economy. In many countries the laws and customs of marriage and divorce are in constant flux, and

no one can foresee in what institutions their evolution will end. The Church of Rome, which has most prided herself on her rigid adherence to apostolic tradition, has come nearest to upholding the ancient standards; but even Rome has woefully failed to preserve a decent length of the feminine skirt, and is fighting a losing battle against the practice of birth-control to which the Anglican bishops have just made a graceful but unavoidable surrender. The fate which has overtaken the dogma of Papal infallibility, however, most signally illustrates the drawbacks of a 'standpat' policy. The Pope is infallible in his pronouncements *ex cathedra* on matters of faith and morals; but this privilege is so dangerous to use that he never divulges *when* he is making such infallible pronouncements!

Thus by their unprogressiveness the Churches have lost control over the movements of opinion and the changes of valuations. They have incurred also the more serious charge of a lack of faith in their own mission. For ought they not to have *used* the capital of truth with which they were endowed to advance to *further* truths? Have they not acted exactly like the man in the parable who to preserve his talent buried it, instead of using it to earn more? So the social reformer finds himself forced to neglect the Churches. He cannot expect any active support from them; but neither need he fear any effective opposition. He may rest assured that if and when he succeeds in carrying through a salutary change in social ethics without their aid they will discover that it is quite in order, and by no means contrary to Scripture.

X

To conclude: the prospects of eugenics, though anything but assured, are not hopeless. For though there exist great masses of dulness and inertia to be moved, and though nothing more than partial and half-hearted support will be forthcoming from our present intelligentsia, there exist also social forces which can be effectively enlisted in a eugenical crusade, which will convince the country of the very urgent need for eugenical reform. For such propaganda the Eugenics Society is not unlikely to be equipped with the necessary means. For, happily, the fortune left to it, very appropriately by a successful farmer, Mr. Henry Twitchin, enables it to make a vigorous beginning in the arduous enterprise of converting an ignorant and unbelieving world.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

SOME AFRICAN ANIMALS

THIS article is not intended as a fragment of a technical zoological *opus*, nor as a recital of the detailed adaptations or strange life-histories of a few of the continent's hundreds of thousands of animal species, nor yet as a bit of popular natural history concerning its larger mammals and other prominent creatures, already almost too well, and certainly too much, described. It is merely an attempt to set down some of the most striking facts of animal life observed by a three-months' traveller who happens also to be a biologist, and some of the trains of thought to which they give rise.

In the first place, Africa is the continent most remarkable for the number and variety of its large mammals. Where else can you see a hundred great aquatic beasts, like hippo, in one glance, find creatures like giraffe, as tall as watch-towers, see herds of a thousand head—zebra, gnu, gazelle, and all the other various buck—or hear the roaring of lions so often and so readily? Where else can one still discover big animals new to science, like the okapi, the giant forest-hog, or the strange hyena-like creature only this year sent back from Uganda? Africa boasts the largest of all living land animals, the largest fresh-water mammal, and two of the three lone survivors of man's nearest kin, the higher anthropoid apes.

Many have marvelled at this abundance of large life, so spectacularly displayed to the traveller arriving from the coast before his train windows: but why is it so? We can marvel, partly because at home in temperate countries we have killed off all the big creatures until there is little left to marvel at. Partly, too, because Africa is tropical; for though in sheer numbers of animals temperate regions may rival the tropics, yet the tropics, with their richness and their permanent luxuriance, will always excel in variety. And partly because Central Africa, though tropical, is largely dry. Where the tropics are not dry, all the solid ground in them is covered with forest. And forest is bad country for seeing game. Game there may be in abundance, but it will not be in large herds; nor will it ever be conspicuous. But Africa east of the Congo basin and the western Rift is largely a

dry country, with broad arid plains, 3000 to 5000 feet above sea level. Here you can readily see any game that exists. And though the grass may often be scanty, and much of it dries right up in the dry season, yet the extent of the country is so vast that the great herds can simply migrate from one plain to another, from open plains to river-banks, from river-banks to foot-hills, as the need arises.

The pampas and other plains of eastern South America might show us a fauna almost equally amazing; but during the last Ice Age some strange fate overtook the great majority of its members, and the horses, the tank-armadilloes, the giant sloths, the toxodons, and other queer ungulates of many types no longer found upon the earth, were all mysteriously extinguished, at most a few hundred thousand years ago.

But if climatic changes in other parts of the world have helped to leave the African zoo unique, man has also helped. He has cleared the lions out of the lands north and east of the Mediterranean, the elephant out of the North African littoral, the wolves out of England, the bears and urochs out of Central Europe, the bison out of the great American plains. And he has been at it since the old Stone Age; it is quite likely that the extinction of creatures like the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros was due as much to human destructive skill as to change of climate. Whatever the multiplicity of causes, the East African fauna of large animals is unrivalled. May man at last turn from destroyer to preserver and keep it in its full glory.

But in many ways the birds and small creatures of Africa are more remarkable than the large mammals, and certainly less well known. I will begin with a fact about flowers which links on to animal life. Even the most casual observer in East Africa must be struck by the abundance of red flowers—not pink, like our temperate campions or thrifts or pinks, nor mixed with blue to give a purple-red, like our foxgloves or milkworts, knapweeds or dead-nettles—but real red, pure scarlet or pure flame. The erythrina tree lights innumerable hillsides with its tufted fires of scarlet, all the more conspicuous because every leaf is shed before it blooms. Then there are the flame-trees and the flamboyants which make Dar-es-Salaam so violently bright in their season. There are the leonotus, common plants of the wayside, tall herbs with a series of round balls of flame-orange flowers; there are scarlet frizzy-headed lilies in Uganda woods; there are the magnificent hibiscus, big red trumpets with stamens and pistil protruding far and proudly like the trumpet's jet of sound made visible; red-hot poker, orange-red aloes, and many other red-flowered plants.

I had been struck by this riot of red, but had not troubled my head to ask myself why. However, I suppose the habit of looking

for reasons gets so ingrained in the scientist that I had asked the question subconsciously. Anyhow, one day the answer flashed into my mind unsought. It is because of the many flower-visiting birds, the abundant members of the family Nectariniidæ, or sun-birds, which get most of their nourishment from nectar, supplemented by the insects they find in and by the corollas. Now bees have eyes which are sensitive to some of the ultra-violet rays invisible to us: but to red they are not attuned—it is no colour to them at all, but merely blackness. Birds, on the other hand, are sensitive to red; and whether they actually prefer it, or whether the flowers that set out to attract birds have developed a colour invisible to insects so as to remain unvisited by creatures to which they are not adapted, and by which they cannot be fertilised, it is certainly true that, just as the generality of moth-flowers, destined to be visited at night, are white and scented, so the generality of bird-flowers are red. And this scarlet of the bird-flowers, forced on them by natural selection, is in itself further dependent upon tropical conditions. For birds to exist whose staple of existence is provided by flowers you must have a land where flowers can bloom all the year round. Not only that, but birds small enough to visit flowers must live in a warm climate, for in a cold one the relatively huge amount of surface which they expose would make it very hard for them to keep up their temperature.

If tropical warmth is one of the chain of causes which gives rise to sun-birds, honey-eaters, humming-birds, and the red flowers with which their existence is bound up, it has other more direct and more serious consequences. It encourages reptiles and insects at the expense of birds and mammals. Birds and mammals share a peculiarity which is one of the triumphs of evolution: their tissues are no longer subjected to the varying temperature of the outer environment, for they live in an internal environment whose temperature is constant. They possess not only their own heating system, but one whose heat is regulated. It is on account of this that mammals and birds can penetrate far up into high latitudes, while reptiles and amphibia cannot. To take but one example, the British Isles possess half a dozen species of amphibians and all north Central Europe only a dozen; East Africa about 200. The difference of mean annual temperature between Northern Europe and Central Africa is about 20 degrees C.: and as a result the mean annual activity of a cold-blooded animal is about six times as great in Uganda as it is in Yorkshire. Thus it is no wonder that mammals and birds, while pre-eminent in temperate latitudes, have to share their supremacy with reptiles and insects in the tropics.

It is perhaps the insects that impress one most of all in Africa

—the mere numerical quantity of them (where but in the tropics could you have lights put out by insects and run the risk of suffocation by them, as is narrated of the lake-fly ?), their appalling variety (the layman perhaps does not grasp the fact that the number of kinds of African insect is to be reckoned, not by mere thousands, but is of the order of magnitude of a hundred thousand ; nor that dozens of new species are being discovered and described every year), their ceaseless activity all the year round (for there is no winter, and the dry season is only a very relative check to their activity), and the number of them that are engaged in spreading disease, attacking crops, or otherwise damaging man and his property.

Africa's big animals have been photographed almost *ad nauseam*. I endeavoured to get pictures of some of these smaller creatures. One should, of course, have a great deal of time and patience for any sort of nature photography, but with a fixed programme I had no chance of searching for subjects, and could only take the rare opportunities that presented themselves. And even these I sometimes missed. I bungled a fine chance of five dung-beetles making themselves balls of dung out of a single piece of excrement, and, owing to sheer laziness (*no one who has not walked a long way under an equatorial sun knows the distaste for further expenditure of energy which one can thus acquire in Africa !*), I failed to walk a quarter of a mile to get my camera for a picture of a river—there is no other word—of driver ants, and another day another quarter of a mile for about 200 butterflies of about twenty different kinds, all drinking at one little patch of wet mud. But a very large praying mantis having flown into the rest-house one night, I secured him in a glass and made a portrait of him next morning. The mantids are among the relatively few carnivorous insects—a fantastic epitome of miniature but cruel voracity. And later I got a photograph of a large caterpillar still crawling about though covered with the white cocoons of ichneumon-flies, and therefore eaten out inside to little more than a walking shell—another horrible product of Nature's amorality, confutation in itself of all the sentimentalism about a purposeful and beneficent Creator.

It is, however, the ants and the termites which are the most wonderful small creatures of the tropics, and I secured one or two pictures of these. One of the most familiar sights in East Africa is gall-acacia scrub. Gall-acacias grow in dry, barren country ; they are pretty when in leaf, and still more when covered with their little scented flower-balls ; but for most of the year they are nasty little trees, anywhere from 3 to 30 feet high, armed with formidable spines $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches long, and dotted over with peculiar black swellings the size of a large chestnut. These

swellings are the galls, and they are almost invariably inhabited by living colonies of ants. Tap a gall, and out of the little entry-hole which they have gnawed there swarm a couple of dozen little black ants, to rush about angrily, with abdomens stuck straight up in air, looking for the intruder. There must be many millions of gall-acacias in East Africa ; each acacia will bear scores, or even hundreds, of galls ; and most of the galls will harbour dozens of ants. There seems little reason to doubt that the ants help in protecting the plant. The thorns keep bigger animals from the leaves, while the ants deal with lesser enemies. There is also no doubt that the ants take on the rôle of guardians merely because they find convenient houses provided for them in the shape of the galls. But nobody knows for certain whether the acacia grows these structures unaided, or whether some irritation or secretion of the ants is needed to set the plant proliferating the gall, as that of other animals is needed for other galls. In favour of the latter alternative is the fact that now and again you see a gall-acacia without galls, though growing in the midst of gall-bearing trees.

Termites are more essentially tropical than ants ; one has no idea of their prevalence till one goes to a hot country. Coming back from the Congo through western Uganda, we came round a corner into view of a plain extending several miles and apparently covered with corn-stooks. Corn-stooks, on the Uganda plains—it gave one a queer feeling of unreality ; but then suddenly we tumbled to the fact that they were all termite-nests, hundreds upon hundreds of them, 5 or 6 feet high, spaced over the plain at regular intervals of about 30 yards. These were comparatively small nests ; other kinds of termites built nests 15 feet high or more. One bigish nest was dug open for me. It was exciting to see their little underground gardens, chambers filled with the white mass of the special fungus which they cultivate. And most exciting of all was the royal chamber in which lives the bloated queen, repulsive beyond all belief in her flabby pink-whitishness. Her stretched skin is so translucent that you have sight of tubes and strings floating about in the liquid interior : one thanked God for the opacity of the human abdomen. By her side is the king, her spouse, not a hundredth of her bulk, but yet bigger than any of the other misshapen specialists that make up a termite nation. The natives call him the *askari*—the policeman. I took the queen out and put her in a soap-dish for the night. She is so tuned up to egg-production that she cannot restrain herself ; before morning well over 1000 eggs—little long-oval whitish things—had been laid by her.

Another peculiarity of ant and termite life in the tropics is that, with the intensity of competition, many species have taken

to the trees, where they make compact nests either of gummed earth or of carton—chewed wood-pulp. None of the tree-termites nests that I examined had any of the typical soldiers, huge-headed and massive-headed, which defend the ordinary ground nests. In their place there swarm out as defenders the most fantastic creatures, their heads swollen and drawn out into a neck like phials. In point of fact, their heads *are* phials. They are filled with glands which secrete a horribly adhesive material, and their method of fighting is to squeeze some of this out at the hole at the tip of the phial-spout, thoroughly gumming up their enemies. They thus share with a few other insects, modern men, and skunks the distinction of having invented chemical warfare. All worker termites—another fantastic and rather horrible fact—are white and pigmentless and cannot stand the light of day. In order not to waste any working time, however, they build tunnels of wood-pulp down the trunk of the tree so as to get at decaying wood and other food on the ground below. Break open one of these tunnels, and you will see the double file of these wretched gnomes hurry away into safe obscurity.

Then protective coloration and mimicry, with the greater intensity of competition in the tropics, runs to a pitch beyond what one is accustomed to at home. Grey-brown grasshoppers pulled out to look like sticks, green grasshoppers striped like grass leaves, brown grasshoppers with their bodies and legs all distorted to give them the semblance of a dead leaf on the ground, bugs modelled to seem like thorns or like seeds, spiders like bird-droppings, spiders mimicking ants, with their one-too-many pair of legs held out to simulate the antennæ which they lack—the most casual search reveals wonder after wonder.

It is a matter of great surprise that more people in Africa do not take up some branch of natural history as a hobby. If you have the collector's instinct, there are still thousands of new species waiting to be discovered and described. There is always the chance of enduring fame—*ære perennior*—in having a new animal baptised *Smithi*, or whatever your name may be. If you are more interested in the habits of living things and the meaning of natural phenomena, the unexplored field is much more vast and rich. And yet ninety-nine out of every hundred white men and women in Africa neglect all this, prefer to spend their superfluous energies on golf, tennis and bridge, and when not pining for their next leave home make their lives as faithful a copy as possible of what they would have been in a London suburb or an English county town, instead of taking advantage of the unique opportunities which Africa spreads before them.

JULIAN S. HUXLEY.

EMILY BRONTË

It is perhaps easier for the imaginative biographer to write about Emily Brontë than about almost any other literary celebrity, for the simple reason that so little is known about her, and he is therefore able to re-create her in his own image, or in any other image that he may happen to prefer. More than one such writer has of late taken full advantage of this fair opportunity for conjecture, even to the length of finding in her greatest poem, *No Coward Soul is Mine*, 'Satan's hymn to God!' It may be well, therefore, to get back for a moment to the hard facts which underlie the problem of that strangely arresting personality.

Next to her genius, the most astonishing thing about Emily Brontë is the silence which surrounds her life. Charlotte and Branwell both made bosom friends who kept their letters and treasured their sayings; Anne won the affection of her pupils and employers; but Emily made no friends, and shunned acquaintances. Even in the intimacy of the family circle she kept back a large part of herself. When she was dead and famous, those who had known her searched their memories for revealing traits, and found, possibly to their own surprise and certainly to our loss, that they could remember nothing that was really worth remembering. 'She was taller than her sisters; she lived on porridge and milk-puddings; she played the piano; she did the house work and helped in the kitchen; she was fond of dogs; she walked on the moors'—and that was generally all. Long after Charlotte's death, Miss Ellen Nussey, who had enjoyed special opportunities, revived the memories of her first visit to Haworth in 1833. She was writing to a literary acquaintance about her famous literary friends, and she strove to be worthy of the occasion. Whenever Ellen Nussey tried to write worthily of her famous literary friends her style and diction are 'things to thank God for'; but she comes nearer than anybody else to telling us something significant about Emily at the age of fifteen. She describes her as having a 'lithesome, graceful figure,' naturally beautiful hair, unbecomingly worn, 'no complexion,' and 'kind kindling eyes,' which were sometimes dark grey, and

at others dark blue ; ' but she did not often look at you : she was too reserved.' Then Miss Nussey continues :

In fine suitable weather delightful rambles were made over the moors, and down into glens and ravines that here and there broke the monotony of the moorland. The rugged bank and rippling brook were treasures of delight. Emily, Anne, and Branwell used to ford the streams and sometimes placed stepping stones for the other two. There was always a lingering delight in these sports. . . . Emily especially had a gleesome delight in these nooks of beauty—her reserve for the time vanished.

' One long ramble in those early days ' had brought the party to a remote spot ' familiar to Emily and Anne, which they called " the Meeting of the Waters." '

Seated here, we were hidden from all the world, nothing appearing in view but miles and miles of heather, a glorious blue sky, and brightening sun. A fresh breeze wafted on us its exhilarating radiance ; we laughed, and made mirth of each other, and settled we would call ourselves the quartette. Emily, half-reclining on a slab of stone, played like a young child with the tadpoles in the water, making them swim about, and then fell to moralising on the strong and the weak, the brave and the cowardly, as she chased them with her hand. No serious cloud of sorrow had so far cast its gloom on nature's youth and buoyancy, and nature's simplest offerings were fountains of pleasure and enjoyment.

Thus Ellen Nussey ; and because of the beautiful kindling dark-grey dark-blue eyes, because, too, she was said to have been a pretty baby, and because it would heighten the pathos of her early death, some sentimental writers have persuaded themselves that Emily Brontë was beautiful. It would be unfair to judge of her appearance from existing portraits. No beauty, however brilliant, could have survived the ordeal of being painted by Branwell. But none of her contemporaries found Emily beautiful or even attractive. If they had, they would certainly have said so. We should probably have thought her ugly—at all events, at first sight. The Brontë nose did not make for beauty. As for the reserve which Miss Nussey noted as a salient characteristic at fifteen, it grew with years into an almost impenetrable aloofness. Did Anne ever penetrate behind it and read her sister's soul ? It is impossible to say, for Anne died within a few months of Emily, leaving no records except her simple poems and her two novels. Ellen Nussey says that in their childhood the two youngest of the Brontë girls were like twins, always together and always in harmony. They had collaborated over the Gondal stories, and paced arm-in-arm round the parlour table. Probably Anne understood her sister's moods better than anybody else ; but it is difficult to believe that she could have sympathised with, or even understood, that sister's deepest and most daring thoughts. Their minds were cast in very different moulds. At all events,

in her last, grim, obstinate, struggle with death Emily held both her sisters at arm's length, and wrung their hearts by refusing to accept their aid or sympathy.

As for Charlotte, it was not till 1845, when she discovered the little washing-book, in which Emily's poems were written in a microscopic hand, and took the liberty (fiercely resented by the owner) of reading them, that she even guessed the depths which lay behind her sister's reserve. From that moment her sisterly affection was tinged with feelings both of admiration and remorse—remorse for her failure to appreciate Emily at her true value and win her confidence. She tried hard to bridge the gulf which time and habit had dug between them, and of which she herself was now acutely conscious. But it was too late. In December of 1848 Emily passed for ever beyond her reach. ' Death stepped tacitly and took her,' and Charlotte's grief was all the more poignant, because it was so full of ' might-have-beens.'

That is the impression which one receives from Charlotte's letters at this period. But it seems more than doubtful whether the ' might-have-beens ' could ever have been realised. Charlotte was, though she did not know it, just the kind of elder sister to whom a rather shy and sensitive genius could never have opened its secret doors—practical, critical, and quietly, kindly, but persistently, dominating. She and Emily could never have been kindred spirits. Their minds and imaginations moved on different planes. With all her insight into character, Charlotte could never have understood, or entered into, the poetic temperament of her sister.

So Emily Brontë died at the age of thirty, an enigma in her own generation and in her father's house, and all that we really know about her inner life and thoughts is contained in her writings—some poems and a single novel. We may be quite sure that she did not reveal the whole of herself in what she wrote, and reasonably sure that she did not always herself understand whither the spirit was driving her. We cannot reconstruct her, as she was, from the glimpses which she gives us into the workings of her mind ; but we can at least draw certain inferences which help to explain both her reserve and the nature and quality of her work.

All children, when they are thrown much upon their own resources, create for themselves an imaginary world which becomes as real as, and far more exciting than, the actual facts of everyday existence. The Brontë children were thrown much upon their own resources, and the happiest hours of their childhood were spent in dreaming dreams. For most people this imaginary world fades into the distance with adolescence, partly because the wings of their imagination are incapable of further

expansion, and partly because their everyday life becomes either too full or too absorbing to leave time for dreams. But Emily was a poet, and her wings continued to expand. For her, the life of the imagination remained the most real, and the only truly satisfying, part of existence. She could feel significance and beauty (on the moors, for example) with an intensity which was rapture, and, what was peculiarly characteristic of herself; she continued to feel them in those vague, but passionate, yearnings which are the experience of childhood. Two things seem to stand out clearly from her poetry.

(1) She was conscious of a sense of loneliness, sometimes terrifying, and sometimes exhilarating; terrifying, when it made the world seem bleak and empty; exhilarating, when it made her feel in harmony with the elemental forces of Nature.

(2) She had a craving for some absorbing kind of love, of which possession was the essence, though the body counted for little in it—a love that was at once passionate and sexless.

But Emily did not only dream; she thought, and she had a powerful and original mind. We do not know how much she read of contemporary poetry—probably not much. But she must almost certainly have been familiar with *Adonais*. Here is Shelley:

He is made one with Nature : there is heard
His voice in all her music, from the moan
Of thunder to the song of night's sweet bird ;
He is a presence to be felt and known
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone,
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move
Which has withdrawn his being to its own :
Which wields the world with never wearied love,
Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above.

And here is Emily Brontë :

(a)

And thou art now a Spirit pouring
Thy presence into all :
The essence of the tempest's roaring,
And of the tempest's fall.

(b)

With wide-embracing love
Thy spirit animates eternal years,
Pervades and broods above,
Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates and rears.

The plagiarism was no doubt unconscious; but the resemblance is almost too great to be a mere coincidence. Possibly Branwell had recited the lines to his sisters, and Emily had assimilated them. He seems to have been fond of spouting Shelley.

Bé that as it may, *No Coward Soul is Mine* is a great intellectual, as well as a great spiritual, achievement.

And that was the trouble. The inner life of Emily Brontë, the thoughts which she thought and the dreams which she dreamed, had no relevance to 'that state of life into which it had pleased God to call her.' This was true to some extent of Charlotte also; but it was much harder for Emily to adjust herself to the claims of real life, because she lacked some of those normal sympathies and affections which help to make life interesting. She could feel significance and beauty in the wildest forms of Nature, but not in the lives, loves, joys and sorrows of those amongst whom her lot was cast. She was fond of animals, but not of children. She did not care for people. She had no curiosity to enter into, and explore, their minds; and her own she instinctively bolted and barred in their presence. She was more alone in company than in a solitude which she could people with her fancies, and only on the moors did she feel herself wholly in communion with something outside herself.

Such a clash between the demands of the inner self and the claims of life would, in many, have ended in revolt. But Emily Brontë was no rebel. Grimly and stoically she accepted the facts of life, and to the daughters of the Rev. Patrick Brontë, until the publication of their novels in 1847 had opened up new vistas, the facts of life meant the ultimate choice between a situation as governess in a private house and teaching in a school. Sooner or later—and it always seemed likely to be sooner rather than later—Mr. Brontë must die. There would no longer be a home at Haworth or anywhere else, and they would all have to earn their daily bread. To be prepared for the inevitable, to acquire useful knowledge, in order to be able to impart it to others—that was the plain duty which the Brontë girls felt to be imposed upon them by the circumstances of their life. For Emily it involved a very stern self-discipline. She must sacrifice the life of the imagination with its fearful joys and 'rapturous anguish,' and learn to live 'without the aid of joy.' She tried; but, courageous though she was, both physically and morally, it is interesting to note that she twice had to admit defeat. The first occasion was when, at the age of seventeen, she accompanied Charlotte to Roe Head (a particularly friendly, cheerful and happy school), pined for three months, like a wild bird in a cage, and had to be sent home. The second, when, three years later, she went as mistress to Law Hill School, Southowram, near Halifax, and resigned her post after six unhappy months. Whilst there was still a home at Haworth, Emily could not live anywhere else. But the future must have loomed very dark for her, for the pathetically futile idea that the three sisters, without adequate

capital, could set up a school of their own, could only have been envisaged by her as a mitigated form of bondage. In this connexion Charlotte wrote to M. Héger: 'Emilie n'aime pas beaucoup l'instruction, mais elle s'occuperait du ménage, et quoiqu'un peu recluse, elle a trop bon cœur pour ne pas faire son possible pour les enfants.'

Thus far Emily Brontë seems to explain herself. But there is one poem which, if it is really autobiographical, would make nonsense of the foregoing analysis of her character. Familiar as the lines are, they must be quoted in full.

Cold in the earth—and the deep snow piled above thee,
Far, far removed, cold in the dreary grave,
Have I forgot, my only Love, to love thee,
Severed at last by Time's all-severing wave?

Now, when alone, do my thoughts no longer hover
Over the mountains on that northern shore,
Resting their wings where heath and fern-leaves cover
Thy noble heart for ever, evermore?

Cold in the earth—and fifteen wild Decembers
From those brown hills have melted into spring;
Faithful indeed is the spirit that remembers
After such years of change and suffering.

Sweet Love of youth, forgive, if I forget thee,
While the world's tide is bearing me along,
Other desires and other hopes beset me,
Hopes which obscure, but cannot do thee wrong.

No later light has lightened up my heaven,
No second morn has ever shone for me;
All my life's bliss from thy dear life was given,
All my life's bliss is in the grave with thee.

But when the days of golden dreams had perished,
And even Despair was powerless to destroy,
Then did I learn how existence could be cherished,
Strengthened and fed, without the aid of joy.

Then did I check the tears of useless passion,
Weaned my young soul from yearning after thine,
Sternly denied its burning wish to hasten
Down to that tomb already more than mine.

And even yet I dare not let it languish,
Dare not indulge in memory's rapturous pain,
Once drinking deep of that divinest anguish,
How could I seek the empty world again?

Most people, apparently, take this poem literally, and believe that, at one period of her life, Emily was passionately in love with somebody whose identity has never been divulged. The lines must almost certainly have been composed in Brussels, when she

was twenty-four, for at no other time was Emily far away (as the poem implies) from 'that northern shore' and its beloved mountains. The theme, it should be noticed, is fidelity to a first and only Love *after a long lapse of years*—'fifteen wild Decembers.' We need not be pedantic about the number '15.' But if 'severed at last by Time's all-severing wave,' and 'After such years of change and suffering,' mean anything, they mean a substantial period of time, and any substantial period of time that we may fix on takes Emily back to her early teens. But apart from this, is it credible that, if there had been any love story in her life, Emily, most reticent and reserved of women, would have published to the world a secret so intimate and so sacred, even under an assumed name? That there is passion in the poem, nobody will deny. But Emily was a poet, and poets can feel passionately about imagined experiences, as well as about their contacts with real life. If they did not, Tennyson (to take one instance only) could never have written *Maud*. There is passion and romance in *Maud*, yet in his actual relations with women Tennyson was never either passionate or romantic. It seems reasonable therefore to suppose, though Romance would wish it otherwise, that this poem is true only of that imaginary world in which Emily lived her happiest and also her most poignant hours, and still to see her, as she appeared to her contemporaries, unapproachable by mortal man.

For those who live by the imagination, and find the real world empty of delight, there is a supreme joy in filling its emptiness with the creations of their own brain. Emily must have known this joy when she was writing *Wuthering Heights*. Yet, judged by any ordinary standards, she was singularly ill-equipped for the task of novel-writing. Charlotte, from the age of five, had been a critical, and rather censorious, student of character, but Emily's acquaintance with human nature, as it existed outside herself, was of the slightest. She did not even know the people in her own parish. She had heard them talk, and she had listened to her father's strange stories about them—which must have suggested the prevalence of a harsh brutality—but she had never tried to enter into their lives. 'My sister's disposition,' wrote Charlotte in the preface to a second edition of *Wuthering Heights*, 'was not naturally gregarious; circumstances favoured and fostered her tendency to seclusion; except to go to church or take a walk on the hills, she seldom crossed the threshold of home. Though her feeling for the people round was benevolent, intercourse with them was never sought; nor, with very few exceptions, ever experienced.'

Nelly Dean is, no doubt, a more or less faithful portrait of Tabby Brown, the devoted friend and servant at the parsonage,

but for the other characters in her story Emily had to draw upon her own imaginative experience of life, which is a very different thing from 'holding up the mirror to Nature.' Most of her characters have the unreasoned loves, hates, and cruelty of children, and in Heathcliff are incarnate the loneliness and the yearning for a passionate yet almost sexless love which haunt her poetry. At any moment the story might become ridiculous; but there is a strange power behind it, which makes it always fascinating and sometimes terrifying. In hardly any other book are we so constantly aware of genius, for we see it continually at work transforming the potentially absurd into the poignant or the horrible. And the effect is immensely heightened by Emily's gift for creating atmosphere and background—an atmosphere in which we cease to ask, 'Is this possible?' It matters not what house is the original of *Wuthering Heights*; we know the place in all its moods as well as we know our own home; and what Emily felt about the moors she has conveyed to us in a prose which, at its best, is unsurpassed in its effortless beauty.

If the 'Dear Sir' of Mr. Newby's letter, found in the rosewood desk which was once Emily's, was addressed to Ellis and not to Acton Bell (which seems unlikely), Emily had contemplated a second novel. One would guess *a priori* that she could only have repeated the Heathcliff theme in a different and, probably, a less convincing form. But it is of the essence of genius to confound the wise. As a poet, certainly, she still had much to say. The range of her genius had its obvious limits, but within those limits what might she not have achieved!

G. F. BRADBY.

THE LETTERS OF NAUSICAA

I. HOW THE ODYSSEY WAS WRITTEN

A FANTASY

Ithaca.

HERMIONE DARLING,

I loved your wonderful long letter all about your time in Argos. How wise of Daddy to teach us both to read and write. It must be fun being a princess in a great kingdom in the middle of things, entertaining envoys and travellers from all over the world and seeing reviews of fleets and of armies. And how splendid your Menecharmus must be in his own home, as a leader of his people in peace and war! And most wonderful of all, your very own little Laertes. How could he help being a marvel with Agamemnon and Odysseus as ancestors, not to speak of me as Aunt!

All the same, you haven't had a more wonderful year than your little sister has had, here in quiet little Ithaca. And now you shall hear all about it. You know how proud Daddy is of being a scholar, much prouder than of being a King, and above all how proud he is of his friendship with the great poet Homer in the old days when, as a younger son, he travelled and traded and fought in Ionia and the Euxine and Heaven knows where else, making the money which enabled him to restore the fortunes of our house, and rebuild the old palace of Odysseus. Nor need I tell you how often he has assured us that Homer would some day come and visit Ithaca in order to fulfil his promise to write another great poem specially about our ancestor's return from Troy. You know we never believed it would happen. Well, he came, he stayed with us for nearly a year, he wrote the most divine story ever imagined, and your own little Nausicaa helped, and figures in it. There's immortality for you!

You hadn't been gone a month and we were still all as flat as flat after the wedding, when a letter came by a Phœnician ship to say that he was just starting on a tour of visits and recitations to Sicily and Italy and the land of the Tyrrhenians, and would come to stay with us on his way back next summer. But nothing was

more surprising than his actual coming. He was rather earlier than we expected, and the Tyrrhenian captain who brought him seems to have got a scare that Taphian pirates were in the offing, and dumped him and all his belongings after dark on the shore of the little cove of Phorcys on the other side of the island. The poor Poet hadn't a soul to help him. He had lost one of his servants and his secretary at the court of King Polyphemus, as I shall tell you presently, and the other servant ran away just before he left Tyrrhenia. There he was, with a great treasure of gifts, gold and silver cups, jewelled brooches, marvellous embroideries, and no small weight of precious metal, not a notion where he was, alone, and barely able to see—for, poor dear, his sight is failing him fast. By luck he seems to have stumbled across our little Naiad's cave, where he carried the stuff into what I suppose he thought was hiding. Luckily the honest peasants who looked in to pray thought the packages all belonged to the attendant, and he, happily, seems to have been away for a few days. He then headed straight away for the remotest end of Ithaca, climbing the heights and luckily not falling over the cliffs before old Eumæus—or rather his dogs—sighted him and took him into the farm. There he stayed a day or two, learning something of our old legends and still more about pigs, and then Eumæus brought him along to the Palace. I gather the Poet did tell him who he was, but, of course, his name meant nothing to Eumæus, who only knows of poets and minstrels and jugglers as people who earn a living of sorts by helping the digestion of the great.

Anyhow, not wishing to enter the banquetting Hall in his working clothes, Eumæus passed him on to a servant who, following Daddy's standing orders about minstrels and suchlike, gave him plenty to eat and drink, but, evidently not impressed by his old travelling clothes, sat him down at the bottom of the hall at the table over which that old loafer Irus usually presides—rather tipsy and offensive too that evening, for which the Poet, who otherwise thoroughly enjoyed the joke, has had his revenge.

At the end of dinner Daddy, hearing that a new minstrel had turned up, asked him to play. Homer replied that he had been shipwrecked and lost his lyre, and when Daddy called out to ask if anyone could lend him one, he said: 'O King, have you none of your own on which you played in your youth, for, believe me, I have a kingly touch?' Then Daddy, remembering the golden lyre which Homer himself had once given him, had it brought down and handed to the Poet with many instructions to treat it carefully. The Poet began lightly on some story or other about Ares and Aphrodite—the kind of thing, I suppose, that you are quite accustomed to now you are married and come into hall. Then, when the men had done laughing and the women giggling,

he began a song which he had once composed for Daddy to console him for the loss of his helmsman and best comrade, Eurybates, in a great fight against the Carians. He hadn't got very far before Daddy broke down and cried; and then he broke down himself; and while everyone stood staring Daddy jumped up from his throne, ran all the way down the hall between the tables, and fell on the Poet's neck, and you never heard such an excitement, and they sat up talking nearly all night and would have talked for a month if Mummy hadn't packed them off to bed.

I wasn't there, of course, but Mummy told me everything, except the story of Ares and Aphrodite, and promised I should be introduced to the great Poet very soon. But while our parents thought Homer had more urgent things to do than seeing me, I introduced myself to him on my own, and in the very queerest way. He hadn't been with us a week, when I went off with three of the girls for a big family laundry—you know the little meadow, below Laertes's farm, where the stream runs into the sea. Well, we had done washing, and had a swim, and were playing ball in the sun to get dry before lunch, when suddenly one of the girls gave a shriek and they all bolted to cover for dear life. I looked round and saw, coming from the sea, a mighty great man, stark naked, with long dripping hair and beard and shaggy breast, like the God Poseidon himself, peering round eagerly for something as he advanced. I guessed at once who it was and what had happened, and sang out 'Turn round, dear friend of the Muses, while I throw a cloak round you, and then you can find where you left your own garments when you went in to bathe.' And, quickly slipping into my own tunic first, I threw a clean but slightly damp cloak over his broad shoulders, and called back the girls and told them to help him find his clothes and then bring him back to join us at lunch. And such an afternoon we had together. He made us sing him songs, and recited himself and made me recite—and I picked his own favourite bit of the *Iliad*—and told us the most lovely stories. And then we all drove back, but before we came in sight of the Palace, he slipped off and went in on foot, to avoid scandal, and I told the girls not to breathe a word to a soul, and no one knows to this day, though I think Daddy guessed something when the great poem was read out—Mummy only thought it not quite nice even to borrow my name for such an incident!

Two days later we were really introduced, and both acted the part perfectly. The Poet paid me a charming compliment, addressed to Mummy, comparing me to a slender young palm tree. I blushed furiously—not from mere maiden modesty, as Mummy thought, but it suddenly struck me that he had after all seen more of me than I had suspected. He went on to ask if it

was true that I was a scholar, and could recite all kinds of poetry, not only ancient Mycenæan but modern Achæan like his own, and had I really read the whole of his *Iliad* and *Return of Agamemnon*? I replied ever so gravely and demurely, and the introduction was over. But its consequences were not long in coming. The very next day, passing Mummy's room, I heard the sound of argument, and Mummy's voice saying, 'The idea of a girl acting as a man's secretary! And a King's daughter at that. It isn't decent.' Daddy muttered something about a King of poets and forty years difference in age, to which Mummy retorted: 'Yes, and there's no age so capable of foolishness as sixteen, unless it's fifty-six.' That got both Homer and Daddy with one arrow, for they are of the same years! I heard no more then, but the parental debate went on, and a day or two later I heard Mummy saying, 'Anyhow, I had arranged everything for her to spend the next few months learning cookery and household accounts and slave management. The girl is quite unfit to be married with nothing in her head but classics and modern poetry and music.'

When I heard that I knew it was all right, for if there is one thing that Daddy hates and wants to put off, it's my wedding. So sure enough I was started next day as the Poet's secretary to help with the new *Odyssey*, with Daddy's old nurse Eurycleia told off by Mummy to preserve the proprieties, which she did sleeping happily most of the time.

My chief duty was to take down the lines as Homer recited them. But I soon got beyond that. Often when he was stuck, I would suggest an ending to a line, or even two or three lines at a time. And then he consulted me all the time about the plot, and such fun we had over it. You see, he came here thinking there would be lots of detailed local legend about Odysseus's return. There were miles of doggerel about the Trojan War, all from the Ithacan point of view, and Homer said he felt quite inclined to scrap the *Iliad*, cutting out Achilles, Agamemnon and all the rest of them, and rewrite it as the *Ithacan Siege and Capture of Troy*. But there was precious little of what he really wanted. So we just set about inventing it, and putting in ourselves and everybody we knew.

Daddy and Mummy and our new Palace came in as the King and Queen and Court of the Phæacians. The Poet's own arrival and his meeting with me fitted in quite beautifully; even the young men who are supposed to be casting sheep's eyes at me, all figure among Penelope's suitors. Irus I've already mentioned, but the person who comes off really worst is King Polyphemus. Everywhere else in Sicily and the other places he went to the Poet had the most marvellous welcome—far exceeding anything he had ever received at home in Ionia or even on the Achæan

mainland. The King of Alba Longa, who is a descendant of Æneas the Trojan, gave him the most wonderful chased bowl of electron, which Hephæstus himself is said to have made as a gift for Anchises. The only person who treated him shabbily was Polyphemus, who invited him, not from any real love of poetry—his chief interest being the breeding of prize rams—but only for swank. He poisoned the Poet's favourite servant with his bad food; stole away his secretary by the bribe of a higher salary; mortally offended the Poet at table by telling him that he could see better with his one eye—he lost the other in a drunken brawl—than the Poet could with both; worst insult of all, he asked the Poet at his going how much he owed him for his recitations! The Poet's reply was that he was the debtor for so much hospitality and would presently repay in verses celebrating his visit. How he chuckled over that part of the *Odyssey* which settled this score, and over the joy it would give to all the rest of Sicily!

Sometimes we dropped work and just gossiped, and he would talk to me about his favourite authors, especially the old Classical poets, or about his travels. He seems to have wandered almost everywhere, after finishing his studies in Athens—his childhood was spent in Argos and Salamis—seeing life and sitting at the feet of all the greatest scholars and historians and poets of the time. After he had written the *Iliad*, which he did partly at Troy itself, he went to Crete, wishing to discover what there might still be found there of the old Minoan poetry and philosophy, from which our own Mycenæan literature borrowed so much, and possibly to write a poem on Theseus at Gnosso. He found very little, the island having been upset by so many wars and invasions and earthquakes since Minos' day, but heard that more might have survived among the Philistines, who are Cretan colonists and have lived undisturbed for centuries on the Syrian coast south of the Phœnicians.

So he visited Philistia, gathering much of interest historically, but somehow never finishing the intended poem. From there he went up to stay with the King of Hierosolyma, who had just completed building a magnificent new temple to Zeus, who is the only God worshipped by his people. This King was a great scholar and lover of literature and philosophy, and Homer said his library was the finest he knew out of Egypt, and contained, besides innumerable works in Eastern languages which he could not read, many important Minoan and Mycenæan manuscripts. He was also himself a poet and musician, though not as celebrated as his father, some of whose hymns to Zeus Homer had translated for him, and himself put to verse, adapting the melodies to our modes. Among the guests at that same court was a Queen of the Sabæans, who, he said, was the

cleverest and most fascinating woman he had ever met, except me! From there he went to Egypt—but it would take a book, and not a letter, to write all about that wonderful country, and I dare say you in Argos meet many travellers who have been there.

I once asked him why he did not put all the wonders he had seen and heard into his poems. But he said he was a poet and not a historian or writer of guide books. Did I think the *Odyssey* would really be improved if he described Odysseus as having visited all the places in Western lands which he had himself seen? For all he knew, Odysseus had voyaged to them all, as far as the Pillars of Heracles and beyond. But how would these real places have fitted in with the isles of Circe and Calypso and the entrance to Hades? Wasn't it much better to keep everything west of Ithaca in fairyland? He didn't read the ancient poems in order to find out what their authors knew about history or geography, and, while he hoped some of his own works might survive with theirs, he couldn't imagine anyone ever studying them in order to prove how much or how little he knew of these subjects.

I know you have been bursting with curiosity all this while to ask whether I fell in love with the Poet or he with me. Of course I did, even before I met him, at the mere thought of his coming, and he from the moment he saw—whatever he did see of me then. But we were both ever so good—especially the Poet—and Eurycleia's slumbers unlocked no doors to golden Aphrodite. Once or twice he patted my head or stroked my cheek when I had some bright idea. But he always counteracted this little tenderness by hastily talking about his daughters, thoroughly uninteresting, worldly young women, I gathered, or about his wife. I asked him once if he expected to find her, like Penelope, besieged by suitors, that he was always so concerned about her. He said, certainly, there would be scores of them, not wooing the old soul for her looks, but taking advantage of her soft-heartedness and guilelessness in money matters. Still I wanted no more, happy in working for him and with him, and seeing his great poem shape itself from day to day. Only towards the end did I feel a terrible longing to be able, like Penelope, to wipe out all the lines of each day's work from my tablets at night. Then came the dreadful day when he told me that he must leave in a few weeks, that he had to get back to his home, set his copyists at the manuscript of the *Odyssey*, and then, if the state of his affairs allowed it, go to Egypt to see if any of their wonderful doctors might still save his sight. We got through the last book and a half somehow, but our hearts were not in the work. Then came the great recitation, for which I was allowed to come into hall, and for a day or two all other feelings were lost in the pride and joy of having helped even in a small way. And then the awful last days and

the great farewell feast before he went down to the ship to sail with a fair wind at full moon. I said goodbye to him in the afternoon. He blessed me very tenderly and wished me a noble husband and lovely children and all good things in life.

But I had my own plans. Daddy had given him a servant boy, with many other wonderful gifts, to look after his things—Iolaus, you will remember he played with us when we were children. I persuaded Iolaus to get me another slave boy's kirtle, helped him to carry things down to the ship at dusk while they were feasting, and then got on board and hid under the gunwale. Presently they all came down to the quay and there was much wishing of farewell, and then Daddy and the party went back to the Palace and the Poet came on board. He went straight to where I was, groping with his hands, and when he touched me, said 'Dearest Nausicaa, you must return,' and gently led me on shore and up the road, telling the captain he still had a message to send back by me and would be gone only a few minutes. When we were out of sight he said: 'I knew you would come, and I wished you to come, for I still have my farewell token to give you.' With this he unfastened from his cloak a curious old brooch of gold with flowers of lapis lazuli and cornelian, which he always wore. I once asked him if it had a story and he said, 'No,' which I knew was not true. Now he told it me. It had been given hundreds and hundreds of years ago by a Chaldæan Queen to her lover, who was killed in war by the Cappadocians, whose King gave it to his favourite, from whom it passed through many hands, till it came eventually to Paris the Trojan, who gave it to Helen as the very first of his gifts, to fasten her cloak on the night they fled from Sparta, she having forgotten her own brooch in her haste. Homer himself received it as a youth in Athens from one whom he loved, who, on her deathbed, made him promise never to give it to anyone he loved less than herself. And he had worn it for thirty-five years without telling the story to a soul. Then he gave me a kiss—worth a year's waiting and a lifetime's remembering—turned me towards the Palace, and hastened back to the ship. I stumbled on a few steps homewards, and then turned and climbed up a little height under Neion and sat watching through my tears the ship sailing out in the moonlight, and prayed to all the Gods for his safety and for his dear eyes. When I crept home, long after midnight, Daddy was waiting for me, having looked in my room and guessed, but having said nothing to Mummy or the servants, and put me to bed with hot wine and spices, bless him, for I was as cold in body as in heart.

So there, Hermione, is the narrative of my wonderful year, for your very own eyes only. And now for my tuition in house-

hold matters, and after that, I suppose, one of the young lords of the isles—not Antinous, he swaggers too much; but Eurymachus is brave and kind and his old parents are charming, and the Poet liked him best. It will all be postscript, anyway, to the real story of my life. But I have helped the most divine of poets in his work, and helped our great ancestor to live in the best story ever told. And to what girl before have Athena and the Muses given such a privilege, even if Aphrodite frowned?

Your own loving
NAUSICAA.

II. SALVING HOMER'S EPICS

THE LAST PHASE

Colophon in Ionia.

DEAREST HERMIONE,

At last a letter from you, the first to arrive of many which must have gone astray in these terrible years. But the Gods be thanked, you and yours have reached Athens in safety, and are far better off as free citizens in a civilised community than if you had stayed on in Argos as underlings of these Dorian savages. What a splendid campaign your Menecharmus must have waged before the desertion of his allies lost all, and how proud, as a mother, you must be of Laertes's gallantry in the field. What you know of our happenings since Father and Mother died I am not quite sure of, for I have no idea which of my letters may have reached you. Happily they closed their eyes upon the peaceful and cultivated world in which they lived and which they adorned. That other dreadful world of savagery and ruin which we have been through since they could hardly have guessed.

Our troubles began five years ago with a general attack by the mainland barbarians on all the islands. Our brother Autolycus got all our ships together, waited till they had landed and then sank their fleet. Having separated and cut them off, he then destroyed them on each of the islands, but lost his life himself in the clearing of Dulichium. On the death of the last male of the House of Odysseus they elected my Eurymachus King, and we went back to our old home for a last anxious winter. In the spring they came with a new fleet and countless warriors. We were outnumbered everywhere, and had to fall back into the City and see Father's beautiful Palace become first the headquarters of the barbarians and then go up in flames after one of their orgies. Luckily we had got away most of his treasures and the best part of his library. For months we were besieged, and in the end, when further resistance seemed impossible, we decided

to abandon dear, sacred Ithaca, put all we had on our ships and sail for Asia. Father had made his fortune there, and I suggested to Eurymachus that we could create a new Ithaca somewhere in Ionia until the day when our children might regain the old.

We made the voyage in safety, found some of Father's old friends to advise and help us, joined up with other refugees from the Peloponnese, and, after two years of fighting, bargaining, and discussing, have established our home here in a fair land, far richer and more spacious than Ithaca, though to me it never can be the same. For me, as for Odysseus of old, no sight could be so dear as even the distant smoke from a beacon fire on Neriton. Still we are all safe; Eurymachus is prospering in trade and farming, and is the recognised leader of our new community; the children grow in beauty and understanding.

There is one other of our household now, a sacred and revered guest. If you cannot guess who it is, think of a long letter I wrote you more than twenty years ago after Homer stayed with us to write his *Odyssey*. I heard from him after his return home of the great success of the poem throughout Ionia. I heard again, a sad letter, after he had been to Egypt, that his eyes were incurable and that complete blindness was settling upon him. The last news I had was a few years later, that his wife had died and that he had accepted a friend's invitation to go and settle in Rhodes. Naturally my first thought, once we had arrived safely, was whether he still lived and where to find him. But in those confused days no one seemed to know or care. It was thought that he lived, but traders from Rhodes told me that he had left that island some years before, but whither no one could say.

One day Eurymachus brought in to dinner the captain of a Smyrniot merchant ship with whom he had dealings, saying, 'I think this is an old friend of yours, Nausicaa.' Who should it be but our old playmate, Iolaus, whom Father had given to Homer when he left us, and whom the Poet had afterwards freed, and started in business. He told us the sad story how the Poet's affairs had gone from bad to worse after his blindness, largely owing to his wife's extravagance; how after her death his daughters had made home impossible for him, and how a wealthy Rhodian friend had in pity taken him away; how after his friend's death his heirs had put him on a ship for Smyrna, where his daughters refused to take him in, and where Iolaus found him. At first he had lived in Iolaus's town house, but as Smyrna had become hateful to him, Iolaus had afterwards given him a cottage on a little property he had bought in Chios, and assigned a trusty old couple to look after him. There he had now passed some years, forgotten of the world at large, but occasionally visited by those who, even in these troubled times, retained an interest in poetry.

You can think how moved I was—never so much, perhaps, since the day I first heard he was really coming to Ithaca. Iolaus's ship was due to sail for Smyrna and Chios the very next day, and Eurymachus made no difficulties about my going: he is such a dear and so understanding, though books and poets, as such, mean very little to him. We landed at Chios and made our way out from the city on mules. At the end of a three hours' ride we came to the cottage, a humble little place, but on a terrace with a view towards the sea, and there, under an old plane tree, sat the King of Poets, unchanged except that his noble head and beard were snowy white. I ran up to him, took his hand and kissed it, telling him who I was. But my sobs must have made my words inaudible, for he only shook his head, so I put his hand on my shoulder, and from the brooch he had once given me. He knew at once and said, 'Nausicaa'; and then, quoting a line—one of my own suggestions—from the *Odyssey*, where his mother meets Odysseus in Hades, 'My child, how came you to me in this darkness,' and went on to say that he could die happily now, like Odysseus's faithful hound when his master returned. I replied, 'No, but you must now live again and live with us.' In a few minutes it was all arranged, and before the next evening the Poet and all his scanty belongings were on the ship. At this moment, as I write, he is sitting at the other end of the portico, chanting whimsical little nursery ditties to my small Penelope.

With us he is supremely happy. He loves talking of old times and retelling old tales to me. He is very fond of Eurymachus, and they have long discussions about the future of Ionia, and of our poor ruined, barbarianised Achæa. And he never tires playing with the children, who adore him. What he refuses to worry about, but what greatly worries me, is the future of his own wonderful poems. In the days of his vogue his wife seems to have sold many volumes which were his only copies; others appear to have been lost; less than a quarter of all his writings went with him to Rhodes, and of these only a remnant had survived Chios, where the old couple who looked after him had, it seems, drawn on the priceless rolls freely for any purpose for which parchment could be used in kitchen or garden. My own manuscript of the *Odyssey*, the first of two fair copies I took from my notes, was one of the few things saved, for he had kept it in a special case always close to him. Luckily my library, or rather Father's, but Eurymachus gave it me, contains a few of his works: besides my copy of the *Odyssey*, a copy of the *Iliad* and a volume of hymns and shorter poems. *The Return of Agamemnon*, which we were so fond of as girls, is lost. If you have a copy, or can get one made, do send it me and I will gladly pay for the cost of copying. I am trying now to collect manuscripts of his

works up and down Ionia. Iolaus has standing orders to buy at any price asked.

But the price is not the difficulty; it is to find the copies anywhere. It is dreadful how in these distracted times the most precious things get lost or thrown away. So far he has got me nothing but rubbish, clearly not Homer's work, though the owners seem to have thought so. I have the same trouble with the professional reciters, such few of them as can still make a living. I had one here for a week, whom Homer had himself taught years ago, and he gave us what he declared was the Poet's own *Fall of Troy*. But Homer, after hearing it, only shook his head, and smilingly said that the reciter had ended by dealing as effectively with his poem as the Achæans with Troy. He himself, though quick enough to detect what is not his own, has no longer the power to reconstruct any long passages from memory, though I have by coaxing retrieved some shorter poems, and a few favourite bits from the longer ones.

Is it possible that the Gods can be minded to allow all that wonderful treasure-house of music, of poetry, of prose literature, which grew up in our beautiful Mycenæan and Achæan world, to perish utterly, as so many of our cities and palaces have perished at the hands of the barbarians, and to be blotted out as if the thoughts that inspired them had never been? If so I pray to them that at least something—and I cannot help hoping that it may be something of Homer himself—may be permitted to survive, and rekindle, in some later generation, the torch of the spirit that may have been all but quenched. If so many exquisite works of art have been melted down lately, yet a few may remain to teach the goldsmiths of another day to refashion beauty in the metal that has known it once. And if nothing but the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* survive from all the wealth of that literature in which we were nurtured, our own creative speech, or even the speech of others, might yet, from them as a starting point, create anew all that may have been lost. At any rate, I am bringing up the children to regard our rolls of manuscripts as our greatest treasure. You may have something no less precious from the past to hand on to your young Athenians: the statecraft of Agamemnon and the eloquence of Odysseus. Who knows but what some descendant of yours and theirs may yet sway a great people with weighty words 'whirling like winter snow'? So be of good heart, dear Hermione; worse things have happened before.

Your own loving

NAUSICAA.

L. S. AMERY.

CORRESPONDENCE

'MOSUL OIL AND THE PIPE-LINE'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER.

DEAR SIR,—In the September issue of *The Nineteenth Century* there appears an article on 'Mosul Oil and the Pipe-Line,' by Sir Henry Dobbs. In that article it is stated that I am, along with other leading financiers, backing the business. May I say that this statement, so far as I am concerned, is not according to fact? Indeed it is untrue, and I shall be glad if you will have it corrected.

Yours faithfully,
INVERFORTH.

Baltic Exchange Buildings,
21, Bury Street, London, E.C. 3,
12th September, 1930.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12, Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT AND ITS PROSPECTS

At the beginning of the new parliamentary session friends and opponents alike are asking the question, 'How long can the Labour Government continue?' Nevertheless, in the absence of unforeseen catastrophes in India, or a still less likely division of Labour opinion on Imperial tariffs and food taxation, it is difficult to conceive of any disintegrating factor which would precipitate the resignation of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister definitely stated at the outset that the only adverse vote which would necessarily and inevitably lead to a dissolution would be a vote of censure. Up to the present such a vote has been once attempted and decisively negatived. On the other hand, there exists more than one sound reason why the Labour Government will endeavour to maintain its position and resist all attempts to dislodge it prematurely. Many members of the party are under the impression that an appeal to the country in the immediate future might result in the loss of fifty to sixty Labour seats and the return to

power of a Conservative Administration. It is obvious, they maintain, that the efforts of the Government to deal with the terrific problems of unemployment and its unprecedented expenditure upon relief works have not forcibly struck the imagination of the general public, nor even satisfied the majority of their own supporters inside, and still less outside, Parliament. Go where you will, they say, the voice of discontent is heard in any gathering of Labour men and women, often peevish and illogical, but none the less a factor to be reckoned with. Extravagant anticipations were aroused during the last General Election of a wholesale diminution of unemployment. It must be admitted that many Labour speakers, including even some of our present Ministers, declared that Labour was the only party which could ever cure unemployment. This dictum would be accepted as quite valid by, say, a gathering of the Fabian Society or any other collection of convinced and educated Socialists, but among those who listen to Labour speeches and vote for Labour candidates only a small percentage either understand the full bearings of Socialism, or grasp the idea of a co-operative commonwealth so well organised that unemployment might be reduced to a minimum. When, therefore, the ordinary voter is faced with a record of over 2,000,000 men and women out of work, he is apt to refresh the memory of a Labour speaker on the subject of these confident assertions about Labour's special capacity for banishing the evils of unemployment.

It is probable, therefore, that any election in the near future might be fought under strong disadvantages to the party in power. Until some visible improvement in our trade comes to pass, or, at any rate, some striking evidence of a great increase in the provision of relief work, it is assumed, and probably with good reason, that large abstentions would be found in the ranks of our working-class supporters. The fact must be faced that in the nine by-elections since the General Election the Labour poll has decreased by 33,273 votes, an average per seat of no less than 3697 votes. It may be true that the party has already set aside for public works the gigantic sum of 123,000,000*l.* as compared with the four and a half year's Tory figure of 6,000,000*l.* odd; it may be true that Mr. Lansbury promises enough extra employment in a few weeks for 180,000 men. Nevertheless, little tangible impression is made on the awful total, and Mr. Bromley even predicts another 1,000,000 or so by next spring. Any election to-day would, perhaps, be rendered almost farcical by the cloud of apathy which has settled upon millions of our countrymen and their families, condemned to live indefinitely amid penury and discomfort in a world of over-production and shrinking employment. The narrow defeat of the Mosley resolution at Llandudno reflects the general anxiety felt by our party organisations.

* There is another consideration which might deter the Government from any precipitate surrender of power. The financial position of the party is always published in audited form, and from the figures it is obvious that in times of such widespread poverty the position of the party funds must cause very real anxiety. The impoverishment of the trade unions resulting from the disastrous events of 1926 has been cruelly exaggerated by the political levy clauses of the Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act. In 1929 the total contributions received from the unions amounted to 25,500*l.*, a decrease of no less than 15,000*l.* since 1927, and the accounts were only balanced by the receipts from two special efforts embodied in the 'Bid for Power' and 'Victory' funds, no repetition of which could be confidently anticipated in the event of an election this year or next.

The main financial resource upon which the older parties rely is, of course, the private contributions of individual supporters. But this method of obtaining revenue has little meaning for the Labour Party. One can almost count on one hand the names of known supporters who could be described as rich, and the virtual sale of honours which has disgraced the political history of the older parties is absolutely foreign to the whole spirit of the Labour movement. *Domini providebunt* is not our official motto. And while the devotion of local members can generally be relied on to finance the candidate for whom they have rendered themselves responsible, it is doubtful if the funds of the trade unions available for political purposes will be adequate for the provision of panel candidates to anything like the same extent. So important a union, *e.g.*, as the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers only ran one candidate out of its panel of eight last time, and its resources are now lower than ever; nor is it reasonable to expect that the Miners' Federation can subsidise so large a number of candidates as formerly. Sound reasons of finance, therefore, would deter the Labour Party from incurring the heavy expense of a General Election until the finances of its trade union and other supporters begin to show improvement.

There is, moreover, one measure of such vital concern to the party that failure to pass it into law might react disastrously upon our electoral chances in the future. For many years past the rating and taxing of land values has figured prominently in Labour speeches and programmes. Again and again the present Chancellor of the Exchequer has stressed the obvious necessity of such a measure and pledged himself in advance to place it upon the Statute-book if and when opportunity permits. The rank and file of the party have failed to understand the reason

for the absence of such taxation from the last Budget, or, alternatively, why the presentation of a short Bill could not have been made at a much earlier date. The principle of land values taxation has long been accepted by the Liberal Party, and a considerable number of municipal councils with non-Labour majorities advocate the taxing, at any rate for local purposes, of this hitherto untapped source of wealth. In these circumstances it is possible (though by no means certain) that such a Bill would be accepted by the Peers. But in any case, the absence from a Labour Government's record of any determined attempt to carry perhaps the most generally popular of our proposals would create a feeling amongst our urban electors of bewilderment and bitter resentment. I remember well what thousands of Liberal voters said in 1910 when the Government of the day went to the country without even a serious effort to pass a 'one man, one vote' Bill, despite the fact that this proposal, perhaps more than any other, enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Liberal electors.

In view of the almost certain opposition of the Upper House, two years would probably be needed for the passing into law of Mr. Snowden's Land Taxation Bill, and also some measure of electoral reform to which we may be pledged.

Of all the problems and perplexities which beset the Labour Government, the most formidable is that which falls to the lot of our courageous Chancellor. The Unemployment Fund, already heavily burdened with debt, will require at least 20,000,000*l.* more before next April. Rising unemployment and diminishing incomes might drive to despair any other Free Trade Chancellor who realises that the limits of direct taxation are being rapidly reached. Will Mr. Snowden for once—*neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*—relax his rigid Budget principles by ignoring for the nonce the claims of posterity and suspending the Sinking Fund for two years in these evil days of economic distress?

Another formidable difficulty in our path is the demand made upon the Government by Mr. Bevin and other trade union leaders for the repeal of the Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act—'a complete restoration, without any equivocation, of the position before the Act was passed in 1927.' The Act was, in some of its provisions, a clever party measure of a peculiarly mean and ungenerous character. A great political party, amongst whose members are counted the overwhelming majority of the rich and well-to-do classes, deliberately and successfully set itself to cripple the political resources of the Labour Party, derived almost entirely from the coppers of our manual workers. The passing of this contemptible measure undoubtedly aroused a feeling of bitter resentment at the time, for it was evident that there was no appreciable volume of discontent against the existing methods

of levying political contributions, and our people, as a rule, readily sense any display of political or social injustice inflicted by the more privileged classes upon their poorer fellow-citizens.

Nevertheless, it is, I think, obvious that the demand for repeal proceeds mainly from certain trade union leaders; the rank and file of the party evince little enthusiasm for the drastic reversal of the 1927 Act. The financial problem involved has, for the time being, stabilised itself in practice; the keen men contract in, the indifferent or antagonistic do not. Nor is it certain that the provisions of the Act directed against the recurrence of a General Strike are so keenly resented by a generation which has experienced the social disasters of wholesale strikes and lock-outs, and the devastating effects of such disturbances upon the resources of the unions. The leaders, however, are brought face to face daily with the staggering diminution in the funds available for political purposes, and have good cause to realise how their bargaining power in negotiations with employers is weakened by the depletion of their resources.

If the full demands made by Mr. Bevin and his friends are brought before the House of Commons, the rejection of the Bill is almost inevitable. In view of the fact that Sir John Simon has declared the General Strike illegal, few, if any, Liberals would bring themselves to contradict their distinguished colleague by a vote in the House. Nor, indeed, could we expect from the Liberals any ready support for a measure which would *ex hypothesi* again rope into the political levies of trade unions affiliated to Labour a certain number of Liberal workmen.

In short, the best that the Government could hope for would be the abstention of some or all of the opposition 'below the gangway.' In these circumstances it is possible that this repealing measure might scrape through the Commons, with the absolute certainty of rejection by the House of Lords. The defeat of a measure enjoying so limited a popularity would not be regarded as fatal to the Government, for an appeal to the country against the Lords on such an issue would be an act of sheer political folly.

The pressing needs of agriculture have forced their way to the front once more, and the Government are faced with this *quæstio vexatissima* during the coming session. The devotion of a Labour Government to agricultural reform involves a certain element of political chivalry. From a very long and intimate knowledge of rural England I am convinced that any hope of electoral advantage based upon the zealous efforts of a Labour Ministry for the benefit of agriculture are quite futile. At this moment, up and down the length of rural England, the Labour Party and its proposals are the theme of hostile and contemptuous

criticism. The Conservatism of our country areas is so deeply rooted that even if the present Government established corn and meat tariffs to-morrow they would not necessarily receive the suffrages of the rural population. It was among the people of the *pagi*, or villages, that the dying embers of heathendom were kept alive, and decades will pass over rural England before the political pagans of to-day find the tenets of rural Toryism obsolete and replace them by something better.

This fact, however, will not deter the Government from doing its utmost towards discovering some palliative or solution of the present state of very real depression in the countryside, though the path is strewn with difficulties. The *crambe repetita* of small holdings, fixity of tenure, experimental farms, etc., leaves the average farmer or labourer quite cold; nor will it be an easy task for any Government to convert forcibly to the undoubted merits of co-operative marketing the most obstinately individualist class among the King's subjects. On the other hand, it is difficult to envisage a vote for protective tariffs on agricultural imports given by—to go no further—Messrs. MacDonald, Snowden, Alexander, or Graham; nor can I bring myself to believe that the Labour Party as a whole, apart from certain of its trade union leaders who may have been talked over by Imperialist Tories or weak-kneed Liberal Free Traders bent on securing a reduction in wages by indirect methods, will ever consent to a direct tariff on imported corn, meat, or raw material. Another alternative proposed—the creation of Import Boards—might prove more seductive. Socialists may be attracted by this example of State action, and its flavour of indirect protection might not seriously trouble a party beset by the unexampled miseries and difficulties of present-day unemployment. These possibilities are being explored at the present moment, but it is difficult to believe that the Dominions will accept Bulk Purchase as a substitute for their beloved tariffs, and, if the scheme became a *fait accompli*, he would be a bold man who would confidently predict the smooth sailing of such colossal commerce amid the violent changes and chances of international trade. If the people of these islands in times of economic stress were forced to pay 55s. a quarter for Canadian wheat when the world price fell to 45s., or Canadian or Australian farmers, after selling us all their wheat and wool, found, in a few months, that they had made an atrociously bad bargain, would any Government be strong enough to face the furious discontent of the populace and the virtual demand to treat the purchase agreements as 'scraps of paper'?

A difficulty of minor importance which may again confront the Government in the coming session is the trying attitude of

some 'left wing' members. It is no exaggeration to say that a small group of Independent Labour Party members, including certain discontents from the Clyde, has adopted for some time past an attitude of keen hostility to the Government. This disloyal band have not only abused their colleagues in the House and on various occasions voted against the Government, but have in their journals, in public speeches, and even in the columns of the 'capitalist' Press, denounced and belittled the Parliamentary Labour Party and its leaders. A minority of Independent Labour Party members in the House have at various times formulated the outrageous claim to act in practical disregard of the Cabinet's plans and policy, and this unexampled indiscipline has at times even infected the ranks of the parliamentary private secretaries.

There can be little doubt that these rebels, fresh from their rebuffs at Llandudno, will maintain in the new session this critical and hostile attitude. But the party as a whole has learnt to estimate at their true value a small body of men who, possessing neither tactical nor constructive ability, have, apart from their personal sincerity, so little to recommend them. Possibly the rebels themselves are beginning to realise their own futility: Mr. Maxton's speech at Llandudno was both mild and conciliatory.

The Government and its supporters are, I believe, ready and anxious to continue in office for at least two more years. By that time an admirable record of wise and humane legislation will have been completed. One thing, however, is vital to this continuance in office and brighter prospects of electoral success later on. The relations between Labour and Liberalism must be continued and, if need be, improved and defined. The facts of the case are perfectly clear. From the first moment we took office in 1929 we have been compelled to adapt ourselves to our parliamentary environment; our policy and our prospects have been throughout coloured and conditioned by the fact that the Government could only rely on a minority of votes as against the combined Opposition, and, on the other hand, that the Liberals were ready and willing to co-operate along moderate and reasonable lines.

As a result of these conditions the Government has been able to pass a number of admirable measures and present to the country a record of its first session's work, of which it is justifiably proud. Now and again, it is true, some Liberal members have purposely abstained from important divisions, or even gone into the Tory lobby; but such incidents are comparatively rare. In one remarkable instance—the case of Lord Hunsdon's appointment—the Liberals helped to save the Government from defeat

through the reckless and discreditable defection of a large body of its own supporters.

For many months, then, there has actually existed in practice, if not in theory, definite parliamentary co-operation between Liberalism and Labour. Neither one party nor the other has been always ready to admit the existence of this obvious fact; Liberals and Labour men alike have been generally shy of indicating to their constituents that they were working together at Westminster to secure certain measures mutually acceptable, or recalling the admitted request for such co-operation made by the Premier in regard to the unemployment problem and duly accepted by Mr. Lloyd George on behalf of his followers. Amongst many of the rank and file of the Labour Party, more especially in areas where Independent Labour Party influence is strong, 'Lib.-Lab.' co-operation is grievously suspect. Without recognising the true facts of the case and all that such co-operation has already meant, and will in the future mean for our party, there are many Labour speakers who rarely miss an opportunity of denouncing the theory and practice of any understanding between the two parties. A recent issue of the *New Leader* quotes a passage from the *Daily Herald* of September 19 to the effect that not only the problem of unemployment but other items of proposed legislation were being discussed between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd George, and adds the editorial comment that 'such an agreement would run counter to the prevailing opinion of the whole Labour movement.' The writer seems quite oblivious to the fact that the extension of widows' pensions, the Unemployment measure, the Road Traffic, Housing, Coal, and other Bills—in fact, almost the whole legislative output of the last session—was only rendered possible by the support of Liberal votes. It is no doubt true that the Independent Labour Party has no claim to represent 'the opinion of the whole Labour movement'—its discomfiture at Llandudno is a recent indication of this; but it is worth noticing that Miss Susan Lawrence, who presided over the Conference, also went out of her way to emphasise the fact that the 'most galling experience' of Labour members in Parliament was their forced reliance upon 'the support of doubtful and uncertain allies.' Many Labour men, in fact, not only predict, but earnestly desire, the rapid extinction of the Liberal Party; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the wishes or anticipations of those who predict the speedy disappearance of Liberalism as a political force are at all likely to be fulfilled. The Liberal Party in the House of Commons possesses, in relation to its numbers, a greater amount of ability and experience than either Toryism or Labour. The significant record, moreover, remains that in 1929 no less than 5,250,000 electors deliberately

bestowed their votes on Liberal candidates. Is it at all probable that this vast volume of political sentiment, closely connected as it is with the Nonconformity of Great Britain and rooted in the traditions of British commerce, will, in succeeding elections, either surrender its principles to those of a party largely controlled by brewers and protectionists, or sink its identity in the politics of the Labour Party, which, apart from certain differences of policy, may have to bear, however unjustly, the popular stigma of failure to reduce effectively the number of our unemployed millions?

Two alternatives lay before the Government at the close of the 1929 election. The new Cabinet might have followed the inept advice of the Independent Labour Party to have no truck with either of the older parties, state boldly its ambitions, bring forward full-blooded measures such as the nationalisation of the land or family allowances, and then, after the inevitable defeat of these proposals, appeal to the country. This crazy and suicidal plan would have ruined our prospects for a decade. The 'left wingers' who urged it upon our leaders habitually live in a world of political unreality. They entertain the delusion that the electors of Great Britain are in the mass keen Labour politicians like themselves. But of the 8,000,000 votes (out of 22,000,000) accorded to Labour at the last General Election the vast majority came from men and women who had never joined the party, read the *Daily Herald*, or attended a political meeting. Dr. Salter, speaking from a very long political experience, asserts that not 10 per cent. of Labour voters are actual Socialists. The fact is that we were mainly returned in our present strength because the country was heartily sick of the Tories for doing so very little, while the sincerity and idealism of the Labour Party appealed, as it always will appeal, to large sections of both manual and middle-class workers. The average Englishman is essentially a practical person; his idea of Parliament is a machine for action of one kind or another. If he is a Tory, he wants a consistent effort, not necessarily to avoid reforms, but to eliminate proposals which threaten to encroach on what he alleges to be public liberties or knows to be private ones. If a Labour man, he requires—vaguely enough sometimes, but none the less keenly—some betterment of the lot of the vast majority, some fairer distribution of the national wealth, a better chance for his children in the life-struggle. The first Labour Government of 1924 collapsed with subsequent defeat and the loss of forty seats, not on account of the Zinoviev letter, but because we had been able to accomplish next to nothing, and had finally, thanks to the almost incredible blundering of the Attorney-General, been driven to fight the election on a hopeless issue.

The Government chose the saner and more patriotic course, and its action was definitely endorsed by the overwhelming majority of its followers. Fully recognising the limitations attaching to any minority government, Mr. MacDonald's Cabinet addressed itself to a series of measures, including the provision of work for the unemployed, which, in nearly every case, would either receive the cordial support of the Liberals or else escape their parliamentary opposition.

The real explanation of a widespread disinclination to accept Liberal co-operation in a spirit of goodwill and appreciation may probably be sought in the relations between the two parties outside the House of Commons. In the field of municipal politics there exists too often a bitter enmity between Labour and Liberalism, which is rare at Westminster.

A further reason for the deeply-rooted suspicion directed against Liberal co-operation in Parliament is probably the fact that we are generally without experience of any form of government except that carried on by two parties. In the course of time we may no doubt accept a three or four party Government as quite a normal phenomenon, and agree that under such conditions alliances and concordats between different parties are sometimes necessary and desirable if the government of the country is to be carried on. Over and over again Socialist parties in Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and other European countries have had no hesitation in accepting a working agreement with another non-Socialist party. Half or more of a political loaf is regarded as better than nothing at all, no surrender of basic principles is offered or expected on either side, and no suggestion arises that such temporary *ententes* are treacherous or discreditable. Great Britain has already in the 'eighties had experience of a three-party Parliament, when the Irish members held the balance; and it may be that the course of British politics in the future may lead our Labour Party to modify its present dislike of co-operation, when necessary, with a third party, and to accept a position frequently adopted by our fellow-Socialists in Europe.

The appointment of the Electoral Reform Committee was a significant factor in the Labour-Liberal *entente*. The exploration of electoral reform had been promised in the King's Speech of 1929, and an exaggerated importance was attached to the work of the Committee by the rank and file of the Liberal Party, for it was clear at the outset that practical unanimity was to be regarded as the sole ground for a joint recommendation to Parliament and that such unanimity was obviously out of the question. The net result of ten interesting sittings was that the representatives of Labour and Liberalism were in practical accord in favouring a combination of the alternative vote plus

a number of valuable reforms in electoral procedure acceptable to both parties.

Although the proceedings of the Committee were of a strictly private character, and its members pledged themselves accordingly, a series of most misleading comments appeared in the Press during the continuance of the discussions. Even after the close of the Committee authorities of such standing as the *Liberal Magazine* and the *Manchester Guardian* contained statements and conjectures very wide of the mark. It was, *e.g.*, mischievously suggested that the Liberals had by Labour subtlety been 'led into a trap,' tricked into the surrender of their vital demand for proportional representation, and left stranded with no results of any practical benefit to their party. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Liberals played their cards well and wisely, and at the close had secured from the Tories an acceptance of the principle of a partial experiment in proportional representation and from the Labour representatives a definite basis for future legislation in the shape of the alternative vote plus several minor reforms, just in themselves and of great practical value.

In view of the Committee and its results, the question arises whether the promise of an Electoral Reform Bill will not be found in the coming King's Speech. Apart from other considerations, it is obvious that the Liberals, in return for their invaluable assistance in the passage of first-class Labour measures, may reasonably expect some *quid pro quo*, and demand that the Government should implement its earlier pledge of discussing electoral reform by the introduction of an actual Bill. It is a practical certainty that any such Bill would be summarily rejected by the House of Lords. In order, therefore, to secure its passage into law before the next election, the Bill would have to be introduced this session with the assured prospect of two more years of Labour in office.

The Labour Party has on hand an ample programme of legislative work, and no urgent reason exists for any serious curtailment of its full term of office. The rise of the party has been phenomenal, and its future appears to be assured. Power came to it in 1924 before it was ready for this trying responsibility, but many useful lessons have been learnt since that experiment in government; and it is worth remembering that, although the first Labour Government fell to pieces in nine months and lost forty seats in the following election, more than a million new voters rallied to its standard.

The position of the Labour Party to-day is infinitely stronger since the *primitiæ miseræ* of those earlier experiences. Never again will a Labour Government tolerate dictation from an extremist minority: Llandudno has proved this, if proof were

needed. Mr. MacDonald, more strongly established than ever before, enjoys the unique position to-day in British politics of a leader who merits and receives the practically undivided esteem and loyalty of his party. Our foreign affairs are safe in the hands of Mr. Henderson. Messrs. Snowden and Graham will be towers of strength when the inevitable fight against protective tariffs is once more upon us. Mr. Morrison has shown the way by a proposal of unprecedented magnitude and courage towards that conception of practical Socialism which will replace the 'feverish fancies' that rocked the cradle of the Labour Party and render Collectivism acceptable to millions who were repelled by the Socialist slogans of earlier days.

We hear of fresh activity in the Conservative organisation and of Tory plans ready for an election in three, six, or nine months. But it is difficult to believe that our opponents would deliberately seek to incur the *damnosa hereditas* of over 2,000,000 unemployed. We must, however, anticipate a determined effort to oust us directly a gleam of returning prosperity penetrates the surrounding gloom. Yet if the Government bravely faces the increasing terrors of national unemployment, if it pursues its course with sweet reasonableness, accepting any help the Liberals can usefully offer it in debate and in the voting lobbies, and recognising the implications of mutual good-will, no Tory vote of censure can hold any terrors for the Labour Party.

E. N. BENNETT.

INDIA AND THE WORLD

FIRST to fit India for freedom and then to set her free was the noble policy set before his country by a great Englishman seventy years ago. It was a distinct and intelligible policy for England to pursue, he maintained, and a way for both countries out of the embarrassments of their twisted destinies. It might take years—it might take a century—to fit India for self-government, but it was a thing worth doing and a thing that might be done. And the man who put forward this idea, and saw the possibility of its realisation, was not an idle dreamer with no practical common sense and no knowledge of the risks that those who pursued this policy must run. He was a man who had just gone through the Indian Mutiny and would be returning to India himself to run, if might be, all the risks of the policy he recommended. But he was a man of vision. He had had the reputation of seeing further ahead than his fellows. He had perhaps more of a touch of genius than any other Englishman who had served in India. And he knew how to handle Indians. As a lieutenant on the frontier, he had, on his own initiative and responsibility, raised an army of 6000 men and put down a revolt while the lumbering headquarters machine was only beginning to get into motion. He had served through the Sikh wars. And in 1857, as Commissioner of Peshawar, he had resisted the proposal of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab to withdraw to the Indus; he had kept Peshawar secure all through the Mutiny; he had even recruited thousands of men to aid us; and, most valuable service of all, he had by his far-seeing policy and skilful diplomacy been able to keep the Amir of Afghanistan friendly throughout all this critical period. This was the man—Sir Herbert Edwardes—who in 1860, while still only forty, put forward in a speech in England the bold policy of first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free.

And he was not the first of those who had served in India to express this view. More than 100 years ago Sir Thomas Munro, in an oft-quoted passage, had said the same thing. So, later on, had Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone. None of these great men had any desire to dominate over the Indians and keep them down

and under as a permanently subject race. Such an idea was wholly repugnant to them. They had respect for the Indians. They knew the history of our dominion in India. They knew that we had never gone there for purposes of conquest: we had gone there for trade, and it was only because on the break-up of the Moghul Empire all security for our trade had disappeared that we had been forced to provide that security and thereby had been drawn on into establishing dominion. They were aware that in those early days the London directors of the old East India Company had again and again enjoined their representatives in India to abstain from war and politics and stick to their legitimate business, or otherwise the Company would be bankrupt. But they knew also that when there was nothing but war all round those small trading settlements, and when they had to hold their own against French and Dutch rivals, the British in India had either to engage in war or retire to England, and that, even if they had retired, India would all the same have come under foreign dominion: if it had not been British it would have been French or Dutch, as Indo-China is now under the French and the Malay Archipelago under the Dutch. These Anglo-Indian statesmen knew all this—knew that wherever it was possible to leave Indians in rule they had so been left, as in the 600, great and little, Indian States which exist to this day. And knowing this, they desired in time to see dominion retransferred to Indian hands. Indians, in their view, were not to be kept in permanent subjection. They were to be fitted, and eventually left, to govern themselves.

And this idea of fitting Indians for self-government was not confined to certain individuals; it gradually became the national policy. A century ago it was laid down by Act of Parliament that Indians should be educated and taken into the administration of the country. And in 1861 a few were admitted as 'additional' members of the Viceroy's Council to advise Government in the making of laws. So successful was the experiment, that in 1892 more were admitted and they were given more power. Then in 1919 came the Morley-Minto reforms, when the Councils of the Governor-General and of the Governors of Provinces were very considerably enlarged and their powers increased, and when a number of the members were elected by public bodies instead of being nominated by the Viceroy. But the most important advance of all was made in 1917, when the British Government definitely took up the idea of self-government for India and, through Mr. Montagu, announced that their policy was 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'

Further, Government took big steps forward in the declared direction. By the Government of India Act of 1919 embryo Parliaments were set up in the Provinces and at the centre, and the Governor-General and Governors did not preside at their meetings: members elected their own presidents. Most advance was made in the Provincial Legislatures, and there such subjects as education, agriculture, local self-government, health, were handed over to Indian Ministers responsible to the Legislature. But in the Central Legislature also Indians were given increasing opportunity of influencing Government, of criticising and passing resolutions.

And all this time Indians were being admitted to higher and higher posts in the administration, till now half the Executive Councils of the Governor-General and Governors are composed of Indians; an Indian has held the post of Governor of a Province and even of Under-Secretary of State for India in London, and been given a seat in the House of Lords. The higher posts of the general administration are held by the Indian Civil Service, which used to be exclusively British, but now there are 367 Indians to 894 British. And in the lower posts of the administration there are 5500 Indians and only 630 Europeans; while the Judiciary is to an even greater extent manned by Indians. A stranger might go into the High Court at Calcutta and hardly see a single Englishman: the bench might be entirely Indian. From the High Courts downward there are only 230 British out of a total personnel of 2500. In the Irrigation, Engineering, Police, and Forest services the same process of Indianisation is going on. It does not make for efficiency—in the initial stages, at any rate. There is a perceptible slip backward. But the hope is that in the long run it will be the means of training Indians in the art of government. If we had continued to hold the higher posts in our own hands the Indians would have slowly atrophied and become less and less, instead of more and more, capable of carrying on the administration of their own country.

Now the Simon Commission is recommending yet further steps in the direction of the declared goal. They recommend little change at the centre and would retain the control of the Army in the hands of the Governor-General and retain his present powers of enacting any measures which he may think necessary for the peace and tranquillity of the country. In the hands of Governors also would be retained (under the general supervision and control of the Governor-General) certain emergency and overriding powers to save the situation should a breakdown threaten. But apart from these powers, for the present held in reserve, a great advance is recommended in the Provinces. There the whole administration—including even the police—is to be in the hands

of Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislature. In the Provinces it is recommended that Indians should now be given real responsibility in all subjects—not only education, agriculture, etc. These suggestions have now been considered by the Government of India and the Provincial Governments. They will be discussed at the Round Table Conference. Eventually a Bill to embody the result of all this discussion will be submitted to Parliament to be debated there. In due course another Government of India Act will issue, and India will start forward again with the latest model of constitutional machinery.

So now we are on the brink of the final, and by far the most risky and delicate, stage in the process of first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free. And here and now it is more than ever necessary to know how Indians themselves regard what is going on. And if we seek that knowledge we must be prepared for a shock. For to them we are not the benevolent, sympathetic, high-minded, trustworthy people we appear in our own eyes. To them we are the hard oppressors whose word is not to be trusted. We make promises, but we do not carry them out unless forced to—if necessary, by bombs. In spite of our protestations of freedom we keep the essential power in our own hands. And we continue to drain the country of its wealth. And this very year, while we talk of giving them responsible government, we at the same time adopt the most brutal repressive measures. Innocent persons are seized and tortured by the police. The most cultured people in India are thrown into gaol, and there treated with the utmost cruelty. And when trouble arises on the frontier we send hundreds of armoured cars and drive over the people, while defenceless men, women, and children are mown down in droves by our fire. This is what is believed by Indians—at least, by immense masses of them—and believed with all the greater firmness of conviction because of the control over the Press. At this moment, when more than at any other calm judgment is required, the Indians are ready to believe anything. They have firmly made up their minds that the British are tyrants and British rule Satanic, and nothing will make them believe otherwise. Lord Irwin, they admit, means well by them, but he cannot have his own way: he is in the hands of reactionaries. So they demand that we shall name a date—and a pretty near one—when we shall leave India, otherwise what happened in Ireland and Russia will happen in India. And if it is suggested to them that if the British Army were withdrawn the frontier tribes and Afghans would invade India, they reply that the Afghans and tribesmen would do nothing of the kind, for they are the friends of the Indians. These, it is true, are the views of the extremists. But the extremists only express with their voice

what is in the secret minds of many a moderate and what is spreading all over India. It probably represents, too, what most people on the Continent and in America believe about India and about our attitude towards Indians.

Now, if this is the state of opinion in India, it shows that we must be a great deal quicker in the up-take than we are at present. The Simon Commission eventually hatched out a first-rate Report. But the despatch of a vast Commission to India was a most cumbersome method of acquainting Parliament with the progress of the reforms during the last ten years. We are top-heavy with organisation. 'Simla' is bad enough. But when on the top of 'Simla' is piled 'Whitehall' and 'Westminster' we need not be surprised at the Indians being exasperated and impatient. And while they have sat through three years of Simon Commission they have another year or two of Conference and Parliament to possess their souls in patience through. The question is whether they will do it. Bombers are there to force the pace. Gandhi himself has been forced forward by them faster than of his own free-will he would have gone. And less pacific men than he might go further and faster.

We British might well despair. Honestly we have meant well by the Indians. The way they responded in the war touched us deeply. In making the announcement that responsible government was the goal of our policy, in passing an Act of Parliament to enable great steps towards it to be taken, in sending out Queen Victoria's last surviving son to inaugurate the new Assembly and the Prince of Wales to thank India for the part she had taken in the war, we had meant in practical form to show our good-will. And if, in spite of this, we are regarded as tyrants and every evil thing is believed of us, we might feel disposed to repent us of the concessions we have made and be in actual fact what we are believed to be. We might feel inclined once again to show the stern side of our nature.

But for my own part I believe there is not the slightest reason to despair and much cause for rejoicing. We have made mistakes. Who would not in such a gigantic task as ruling 320,000,000 people of differing religions and degrees of civilisation and speaking dozens of different languages? Would the Indians themselves have done any better? Would the French or the Dutch? But, with all our mistakes, we have done much for India. We have brought India into a single political unity; we have established peace and order where before was chaos; and we have brought one law and one administration for the whole. During the last half-century the population has increased by 20·1 per cent., the exports have risen from 60,000,000 to 4,000,000,000 rupees and the imports from 40,000,000 to 3,000,000,000, and the mileage of

railways has increased from 5300 to 40,940 miles. There are now 27,500,000 acres under irrigation by Government works and 67,000 miles of main and branch canals and distributaries; there are 9,247,617 pupils in the schools; and we have steadily trained Indians in the administration. And if Indians now think they can get on perfectly well without us, that should not give us cause for regret: it should be the very thing we should most desire. On the first shock it may be galling to our self-pride. We may also fear for the 1,000,000,000*l* we have invested in the country. But if we take a steadier view of the situation we shall find ground for an immense satisfaction. A splendid result of all our efforts is in sight if we will but keep our patience and our faith.

We are too prone to set excessive store by organisation and order. Order and organisation are essential, but only as a condition for freedom and expression. Freedom for progress, freedom for expression of all a nation's highest aspiration, is what is really wanted. Order and organisation are only a condition for freedom; and freedom itself only a means to the higher ends of expressing all that is most noble and beautiful in life. And when we look at present-day India from that point of view, who would not thrill at the sight? Life, and more abundant life, has come to her. She is being born again. As from the ancient land of Rome a young Italy has come to birth, so is it with India. Out of the old India a new India is arising. She, too, has been caught up in the more vigorous life which is pulsing through the whole world. With all the impetuosity of youth she is panting to express herself. They have to come out of her—all the new hopes, the high ideals, the ardent expectations, the eager straining after the heavenly visions. And she will not be restrained. She chafes at every delay and impediment. The solemn Simon Report she will not even open. She is straining far away beyond that. Her sons and daughters fear neither death nor imprisonment if only she can be free—be rid of the great leaden alien Government which is lying so heavily on her. As at the outbreak of the Great War a high exaltation spread through each country uniting all parties and sweeping men up to unbelievable heights of sacrifice and devotion, so is India now aflame with a lofty patriotic fervour. The very measures which Government have had to take in the interest of order have had the useful effect of combining factions. India is united as never before. Young Moslems join with young Hindus in devotion to the common motherland. The cities are thronged with processions singing and praying and bearing aloft the national flag. Even the imperturbable villages are stirred. They, too, feel the thrill of the new life. India is in the full throes of budding nationhood.

* Now this is a splendid spirit to have abroad. It has its sinister side. There is an underworld which revels in any chance of disorder. There are dark passions which may be unloosed beside the loftiest. There are red revolutionaries at work who care nothing for nationhood, who look on Gandhi as a simpleton and the whole intelligentsia who lead this movement as contemptible 'bourgeois.' And these rank revolutionaries are out to harm England, not to benefit India. They would reduce England, India, and every other country to the level of Soviet Russia. This sinister side has to be counted on and guarded against—especially as it is the factor which forces the pace and by threat of bombs drives Indian leaders along faster than they know they ought to go. But, apart from that, the glowing spirit of nationality with which India is now on fire is all to the good. And what we British, with our unrivalled political experience, have now to do is to devise means of capturing this spirit and finding for it a body in which it can adequately express itself. In our history we have been engaged on many political enterprises. In some we have failed. In more we have succeeded. But this is the greatest and most delicate and intricate of them all. For we have to deal with 320,000,000 human beings. And it is into a palpitating body, not an iron machine, that their spirit must be harnessed—a living body, not a rigid unyielding mechanism, a pliable, adaptable body capable of giving proper expression to the young and ardent spirit which is now surging through India.

So the dream of first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free is fast coming true. And now seems the auspicious moment for stating more openly and definitely what is implicit in the announcement of August 1917. That declaration said that the policy of His Majesty's Government was 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.' The formula was drafted by Lord Curzon and the announcement was made by Mr. Montagu. It is not so plain and direct as Sir Herbert Edwardes' definition of our object. But it amounts to much the same thing in the long run. For if self-governing institutions are to be developed till responsible government is realised, presumably India would be as free as Canada or Australia. And what is wanted now is a clear declaration that when India actually has realised responsible government she shall also have the responsibility of deciding whether she will remain within the Empire or go her own way.

What India really wants is standing—an honourable position in the world. She resents being subject to Great Britain. Men like Tagore and Gandhi are winning for her a position of high

honour among the nations. And a statement now that when the declared goal of British policy is achieved no attempt will be made to keep her within the Empire by force, but that if she remain within the Empire it will be of her own free-will, should be of advantage to her and to us: to her because from the moment it is made she can say that no one is in permanent dominion over her and that her destiny is in her own hands; and to us because we shall have satisfied our own conscience and be able to acquit ourselves of any intention to keep India in subjection a moment after she is capable of being mistress in her own house. Before ourselves and before the world both we and the Indians will stand in a better position directly that announcement is made.

But if we say this thing we shall be surrendering the whole position, some will argue. We shall be deliberately handing over India to the same chaos that prevails in China. India may decide to secede from the Empire. Then she will be overrun by Afghans and Afridis; Hindus and Moslems will again be fighting for supremacy; adventurers will be arising and carving out kingdoms for themselves; chieftains, great and small, will be warring with one another; marauding bands will be roving over India as they did on the break-up of the Moghul Empire, and as the bands of brigands are now ravaging China; and foreign Powers will be sending fleets and armed forces to India for the protection of their nationals. Most certainly there are these risks to be run in eventually leaving India to decide her own fate. But—and this must be specially marked—Indians will be at least as aware of these risks as we are ourselves. For they will stand to lose far more than we shall. It will be their country, not ours, that will be ravaged. And they have the example of China close by to show them what may happen. Besides which, for many years past Indians have been holding high positions in the administration and have become aware what government means. They have also attended Imperial Conferences and meetings of the League of Nations. They know, therefore, something of the risks which going outside the Empire may entail and the advantages of remaining within; and they have seen how willingly French Canadians and Dutch South Africans remain within the Empire. And we may presume that they will influence their fellow-countrymen to give no hasty or ill-weighed decision. So if there are risks which we may incur they are far less than the Indians themselves will have to run, and no greater than we, too, have had to run again and again in building up our Empire. And we may be sure that with India in its present state we shall never succeed in getting on without running some risk.

And is it quite so certain that India will never be able to govern and defend herself? China is indeed a melancholy

example of the incapacity of a people for government on the huge scale demanded of her and of India. India might be no better. Japan has only 40,000,000 inhabitants, and even the United States only 120,000,000. And these as well as China are fairly homogeneous people. But India, with her 320,000,000 of all degrees of civilisation, with her innumerable caste divisions, her antagonistic religions, and her variety of races, might find it vastly harder to hold herself together in one coherent whole and defend herself against outside attacks by sea as well as by land. The Congress Party think India could do all this to-morrow. I am not so hopeful. But I do think we may look forward to a not so distant time when India will be just as capable of governing and defending herself as, say, South Africa now is. The Indian States have all along governed themselves. And I do not see why British Provinces and Indian States should not steadily approximate to each other—the Governors of the British Provinces becoming less and less direct administrators and more and more like the Residents in the greater Indian States, not interfering in the administration, except in case of gross mismanagement, but forming a connecting link with the Central Authority. India would then consist of a number of self-governing units, some of which would be governed by hereditary rulers and some by Ministers responsible to an elected Legislature, and all looking to a Central Authority dealing with matters of common interest and the defence of the whole. This Central Authority might be dependent for some time yet on British support; but so were Canada and Australia in the early days of self-government, and so they are to-day to some extent, for neither of them is yet fully self-defending: they are both dependent at least upon the British Navy. And India, with a Constitution approximating to that of one or other of the Dominions and with the Viceroy becoming less and less the Governor-General and more and more like a constitutional monarch, might reasonably be expected to hold herself together internally and to protect herself against Afghans and Afridis though still depending, like all the Dominions, and like England herself, upon Imperial support when attacked by a European Power. The Indianising of the Indian Army would have to be taken up with much more of a will than has so far been put into it, and India be provided with a National Army capable of maintaining internal order and of holding the frontier against all but European attacks. But if this could be done the British troops in India might be held in reserve, like the British Navy, for defending India against any European attack; and India would then be on much the same footing as a Dominion.

We may not yet be able to see the time when so vast and varied a country as India would be able to hold itself together any

In religion I believe we shall always find the closest bond between us, because in religion we are in nearest touch with that Creative Spirit which is animating the world, and with that vision of the kingdom of heaven—of better things to come—which has been attracting all creation upward from all time and been shaping every activity to that supreme end.

But not only in religion : in philosophy, in science, and in art we can tighten the growing ties between us and the Indians. The poet Tagore has for years been working to develop a university at his home in Santiniketan which would be a meeting ground for men of culture from all the world over. And philosophers, men of science and men of art, from whatever country, are always welcomed in India. So also are men of culture from India welcomed in England. And here is a great field of activity for those who care for improving the relations between Great Britain and India. What the literary world has done in welcoming Tagore, and the universities in welcoming the philosopher Radhakrishnan, the Royal Society in admitting Sir Jagidis Bose and Sir C. Amman, and the India Society in showing their appreciation of Indian art, might be greatly extended in coming years as the present Renaissance in India grows in strength.

And the presence of so many leading men from India in the capital of the Empire affords an excellent opportunity for such a demonstration of the interest we British take in other and more fundamental aspects of life than the political connexion. We should like these Indians to go back to India realising that, much as we desire a happy solution of the present political problem, we desire still more intensely the strengthening and deepening of those spiritual relations which must always subsist between us whatever the outcome of the present political discussions.

Those assembled in conference must needs have their attention concentrated on the details of the political problem. But we outside it may emphasise the more enduring aspects of our relationship with India, and in so doing impart a temper to the Conference which will aid them to reach a solution agreeable alike to patriotic Indians and earnest-minded Englishmen. May we never forget how India stood by us when we were fighting for our lives. Through this crucial testing time of peace may we always bear that remembrance with us, and, like true comrades, stand steadily by her in the growing pains of nationhood. And in the midst of political controversy may we stay ourselves on those deep and spiritual foundations which must be the final basis of our permanent relations with India.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

THE MELTING-POT OF CENTRAL EUROPE

THE Great War brought about the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by upsetting the balance of a structure that held together a diversity of races and religions, of political, social and economic interests, during the reign of a King-Emperor whose whole being was wrapped up in the tradition, prestige, and power of the ancient House of Hapsburg. From the opening scene at Olmütz in 1848 till the curtain of death fell at Schönbrunn in the late autumn of 1916, Francis Joseph was guided by the single motive of preserving and, if possible, of extending his imperial heritage ; and the means which he eventually employed, during varying forms and degrees of autocracy, was the dualist system favoured by Andrassy whereby Magyar domination in Hungary was balanced by German centralist domination in Austria, and any federal concessions granted to the nationalities in the western half of the monarchy were likely to upset the prevailing system in the eastern half, and *vice versa*. Hence the reign of this unhappy monarch was one long endeavour to protect an equilibrium against the pressure of political, religious, and economic forces striving to attain what they claimed to be their rights. Structures relying solely on balance must, however, eventually topple over when subjected to excessive pressure, and this pressure must come sooner or later. In the case of Austria-Hungary it came with the Great War, which let loose strong national forces—Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Roumanians, Slovenes, and others—which had long been straining the fabric of the monarchy owing to the failure of attempts to solve their problems. If the war and its consequences upset the balance and caused the crash, the Peace Treaties collected the fragments and threw them into the 'melting-pot' of Central Europe, which now constitutes a situation greatly increasing the danger to peace created by other so-called 'peace settlements.' In the first post-war decade continuous efforts have been made to smooth over the dangers and difficulties arising out of the redrafting of the map of Central Europe, but these efforts have tended to obscure the true position and to delude the peoples by high-sounding words and phrases which are without any real meaning. I should, indeed,

be surprised if anyone can explain what is meant by 'a new moral unit, accompanied, perhaps, by a new political policy in Europe, a new political, economic and moral system of co-operation.'¹ Such ideas, whatever they mean, may exist in what the late Lord Cromer aptly described as 'political Cloud Cuckooland,' but they have no relation to the conditions which I have found to prevail in Central Europe, composed of newly formed territories some of which are mere miniatures of the old Austria-Hungary bearing the name of national democratic states. Having received the blessing of President Wilson and of a large number of ignorant idealists, these rudely formed territories have adopted the name of the 'New Central Europe,' although not one of them can be termed a complete national entity. They are merely broken fragments of a geographical and economic unity, based on the Danube and practically coinciding with the former frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Many high authorities maintain that the dismemberment of the monarchy was a serious mistake, and this view is not confined to representatives of the Central Powers. Jean Pierrefeu writes of Marshal Petain that

il avait une ampleur de vues qui dépassait beaucoup les perspectives habituelles aux militaires. Ainsi il n'était pas partisan de la dissolution de l'Autriche. Après les réformes nécessaires que l'Entente aurait imposées à l'Empereur en ce qui concerne l'autonomie des peuples de la double Monarchie, il pensait que l'Empire était seul capable de maintenir l'union et l'ordre entre les races naturellement hostiles qui, livrées à elles-mêmes, ne cesseraient pas de se faire la guerre et de compromettre la paix de l'Europe.²

The notice of M. Briand was recently drawn to this quotation by Dr. Schober, the former Austrian Federal Chancellor, who assured me in Vienna that this view was shared by the French Foreign Minister. It must, however, be admitted that nothing could have saved the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that it is now impossible to rebuild what has been broken beyond repair. The Hapsburg Monarchy has, for better or for worse, passed away never to return, and has given place to a Central European imbroglio which cannot be regarded as durable, and will need the most skilful handling if further disaster is to be avoided.

In dealing with the new states of Central Europe I will confine myself to those forming the Danubian area, and endeavour to show some of the political, social, and economic changes resulting from the Peace Treaties, the problems arising out of these changes, the conditions at present prevailing in these states, and the impressions which I have acquired as to the possibilities of the future. During my two visits to Central Europe during the last

¹ Dr. Beneš at the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations.

² *Grand Quartier Général* by Jean Pierrefeu. (Paris, 1920.)

six months I made every effort not to be pessimistic and to see things from a confident and hopeful point of view, and in recording impressions I have tried to avoid making unnecessary statements that might be disheartening to those who are sincerely working in the interests of peace. At the same time, I believe it to be a crime against humanity to attempt to disguise unpleasant truths, or to wrap them up in phrases which please the ear of the peacemaker but only deepen the obscurity in which he has to work. Let us now consider the group of states which have lost territory as a result of the war, and are therefore in favour of treaty revision.

When the peacemakers in Paris proceeded to break up the monarchy they left Austria a small territory, chiefly Alpine, with a population of just over 6,000,000 and a large capital quite unsuited to the needs of a small country. The remainder of the old Austria was parcelled out to various succession states. Roughly speaking, Italy received the South Tyrol (with 250,000 Germans), Trieste, Istria, the Cherso Islands, and Zara; Galicia went to Poland; Bohemia, Moravia, and a part of Silesia (with 3,100,000 Germans) were handed over to Czechoslovakia; Carniola, Dalmatia, and the condominium of Bosnia-Herzegovina were ceded to Yugoslavia; and the Bukowina was absorbed in Roumania. Whereas Austria was formerly a heterogeneous state, it is now a German state with negligible foreign elements in the population.³ Hence, by a radical proceeding in the course of which all districts with mixed nationalities were allotted to Austria's neighbours, German Austria became most uniform in nationality, and has been spared the minority question which stands out so prominently beyond her frontiers. But, while the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was an economic unit largely self-supporting and protected by customs tariffs against outside competition, Austrian industries are now deprived of their former markets and sources of supply within the old Empire, and have to face the difficulties of tariff barriers within this same area. A great economic unity has been broken up, and Austria has been left as a top-heavy fragment separated from the other essential parts that went to make up the economic whole. During the last decade Austria has passed through a period of great uncertainty and difficulty. Political differences, want of capital, new tariff barriers, and want of confidence abroad have hindered progress, but the Austrians are now gradually overcoming their difficulties, and their future looks more assured provided that political antagonisms are set aside. Dr. Schober had a firm grasp of the situation, possessing all the qualities necessary to influence the

³ About 90,000 Czechs, most of whom have migrated to Vienna; about 43,000 Slovenes, remaining by *plébiscite* in Southern Carinthia; and about 70,000 Croats and Magyars.

contending parties in the right direction, and it is hoped that his successor will follow in his footsteps ; but it is essential that all Austrians should realise that their future largely depends on economic factors, and that without peace at home and the disappearance of political armed forces the financial confidence of foreign nations cannot be expected. There has been much talk about union with Germany, and it is difficult to see anything that can prevent a realisation of the *Anschluss* in the more or less distant future ; but, as far as the present is concerned, Austria is trying to build up a small federal republic, free of external commitments and as far as possible self-supporting. Much has been done in recent years to increase agricultural production ; great efforts have been made to produce electricity from water power, in order to reduce coal imports from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to provide power for export to neighbouring countries ; and attempts to improve the quality of manufactured products have been largely successful. Indeed, considering the miserable conditions which prevailed in Austria just after the war, it is surprising what the people have succeeded in doing with the small resources at their disposal. The Hapsburgs have faded away, and there seems little in Vienna or elsewhere to show that they have left many regrets behind them. Dr. Schober assured me that there was no question of their return, but emphasised the fact that there was great need in Central Europe of one strong Power incorporating the smaller nations on a federal basis with local autonomy. As far as the Austrian minority in the South Tyrol is concerned, there has recently been some improvement, partly owing to Mussolini having realised that his former policy was unwise and partly to the success of Dr. Schober in concluding a treaty with Italy on the occasion of his late visit to Rome. Indeed, Austro-Italian relations are now on a better footing than they have been for a very considerable time.

While Austria has suffered severely as a result of the Peace Treaties, the heaviest burden of all has fallen on Hungary. This state has been reduced to less than one-third of its former size, and has lost over 3,000,000 Hungarians, thereby constituting in the neighbouring states large minorities in varying degrees of dissatisfaction, many of which are actually adjoining the country of their origin. Croatia and a part of the Banat, with 500,000 Hungarians, were ceded to Yugoslavia ; the whole of Slovakia and what is now known as Carpathian Ruthenia (in fact all former Hungary north of the Danube), with 750,000 Hungarians, have been incorporated in Czechoslovakia ; Transylvania, with its neighbouring districts and part of the Banat, with 1,700,000 Hungarians, were handed over to Roumania ; the Burgenland (close to Vienna), with 65,000

Hungarians, was given to Austria ; and the port of Fiume went to Italy. This dismemberment of former Hungarian territory has not only broken up by unnatural frontiers a geographical and economic unity composed of interdependent territories, but has created in the orographic area of the Carpathians and Danube basin an ethnographical and economic situation contrary to the best interests of the constituent states and disturbing to the peace of Europe. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the methods adopted at the Paris Conference have furthered the formation of national states. In the territory given to Roumania only 53 per cent. of the population is of Roumanian nationality ; in that ceded to Czechoslovakia only 48 per cent. is Slovak ; and in that handed over to Yugoslavia only 37 per cent. is Serb and Croat. Hence, these three succession states are burdened with a great mass of Hungarians, whose whole interests are bound up with their compatriots across the frontier and whose feelings for their new rulers are characterised by varying degrees of dislike and distrust. In Hungary, on the other hand, the population is about 90 per cent. Magyar, with small minorities confined to a few Germans and Slovaks with a sprinkling of Roumanians, Serbs, and Croats.

As a country, Hungary may be described as a rather conservative monarchy, the perpetual sovereign of which (according to mediæval tradition) is the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. All the power of the nation is concentrated in the Holy Crown, from which emanate all rights and to which is due the allegiance of all Hungarian subjects. The king is but a trustee of this royal symbol. It therefore follows that, as the person of the King of Hungary is considered only as the bearer of the Holy Crown, it makes no difference constitutionally whether there is a king or not. Hence the present regency of Admiral Horthy serves to tide over a difficult time when dynastic questions may develop into serious international disputes, without in any way prejudicing Hungary's *status* as a perfectly constituted kingdom. Although the legitimists claim that the Archduke Otto is the lawful heir, the fact remains that the Hapsburgs ceased to be kings of Hungary when the late Emperor Charles was deposed by law, and the Hungarian Government declared that before electing a future king they would agree previously with the Great Powers represented on the Conference of Ambassadors and would not act without their consent. Hungary is, therefore, still free to elect her own king, and influential circles in Budapest are of the opinion that at present the return of Otto would be neither wise nor even popular. Meanwhile there is a strong form of government under the able statesmanship of Count Bethlen, whose wise policy has guided Hungary through the most troubled times ; but it

seems that the majority of the people want a change, chiefly owing to the inability of the Government to improve the economic situation, and that with free elections a new Government would come into power. As, however, the system of secret ballot is the exception and not the rule in Hungary, a change of Government is most improbable. Out of 245 constituencies only 46 have the secret ballot, 25 being in Budapest and the remainder in other towns. The system prevailing in Hungary is behind the times, although considerable efforts are being made to improve matters in this respect; agrarian reform has been carried out to a limited extent, and the country is less under the control of the landowners than previously, although the old system has not disappeared. Relying almost solely on agriculture and her remaining agricultural industries, Hungary is suffering severely from the present agricultural depression, brought about by the increased production of the American continent, the new tariff barriers, and the dumping policy of Soviet Russia. Yet the Hungarians are little subject to Communist tendencies, which are practically confined to Budapest, the only really large town in the country.

As political feeling in Hungary and in the Hungarian minorities of the succession states forms one of the most important factors of the Central European problem, it is essential to realise that treaty revision and rectification of frontiers occupy the uppermost place in all Hungarian minds. The Treaty of Trianon is held to be the most unjust measure ever committed to paper, although Lord Rothermere's propaganda has been detrimental to Hungary in accentuating certain weaknesses in the Magyar method of claiming redress. The fact, however, remains that a large and influential body of objective opinion in Europe regards the treatment of Hungary as a grave injustice. I went to Central Europe with an open mind, with an earnest desire to form an objective opinion in this matter; but, hard as I have tried to find justice in the Trianon award, I have completely failed to do so, and I found that my view was shared by many statesmen and diplomats of disinterested countries. Although no offer has ever been made, it is unfortunate that many Hungarians say that they could not accept the return of the wholly Magyar territories as a final settlement, contending that this can only be achieved by the return of all the territories of the former Hungary; and it is difficult to visualise the Czechs, Roumanians, or Yugoslavs being prepared even to consider the return of any territory which they have acquired; but I shall return to this question later. A further Hungarian grievance, and a legitimate one, is that, while Hungary is almost totally disarmed and Budapest is within the range of Czech artillery, the three succession states of Czecho-

slovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia possess highly trained and well-equipped armies with a total war strength of 4,500,000. Although the Hungarian demands are, perhaps, excessive, a claim to sovereignty over wholly Magyar territories would be quite in harmony with the principles which are supposed to have guided the Peace Conference of Paris, and should be aimed at as the basis of an eventual solution. How far this is practicable, and how it could be achieved, is another matter involving the difficulty of separating Hungarian minorities from other racial territories contiguous to them; and this is only one of the many complex questions standing in the way of treaty revision. But one of the most outstanding features of the situation is that by far the greater number of Hungarians (about 2,000,000) are only separated from Hungary by a frontier line, although an important *bloc* in Transylvania is cut off by territory containing a large Roumanian population, and other smaller groups are so numerous and so scattered that their re-incorporation in Hungary would involve the re-establishment of some of the very conditions which the Peace Conference set out to eliminate. Yet it is quite clear that the period of time during which present conditions can continue in peaceful surroundings is limited, and the most one can hope for is the absence of neighbouring friction, which might infect and seriously disturb this palpitating region before national and social antagonism have a chance to subside. Let us now turn to the group of states which have acquired territory and, as the Little Entente, is working for the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Czechoslovakia, with all her admirable qualities, possesses few of the characteristics of a national state. Although the Czechs are the dominant race, they compose less than half of the population⁴ and only 65 per cent. together with the Slovaks; while the Germans, nearly a quarter of the population, occupy an area in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia amounting to over one-fifth of the entire country, and the Hungarians, numbering about 750,000, inhabit the southern boundaries of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Indeed, the Czechs now dominate two highly cultured races to which they were formerly subservient as well as the Slovaks, a more backward race which now shows signs of clamouring for autonomy, and the Ruthenians, a primitive race which has been assured autonomy⁵ although quite incapable of exercising that privilege. Efforts are being made to raise the people of Carpathian Ruthenia to a higher degree of civilisation, the Czechs claiming that their backward state is due to former Hungarian rule, but progress must be slow where half the population is illiterate. For her size Czechoslovakia has inherited great

⁴ The army is mainly composed of non-Czechs.

⁵ Guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

industrial resources cut off from their former markets and compelled to find new outlets, with an access to the sea confined to the waterways of the Danube, Elbe, and Oder and special harbour facilities at Hamburg, Stettin, and Trieste; but agriculture plays an equally important part in her general economic life, although the Germans are more industrialised than either the Czechs or Hungarians. It is not too much to say that, with all her disabilities, the agricultural, industrial, and social progress of this state is one of the most remarkable achievements of the last ten years. Agriculture is carried on according to the most modern scientific methods, with adequate provision for the instruction of the rural population. Industry has been revived and adapted to changed conditions with an energy and resource which has astonished foreign observers, so that an area which formerly served the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy now exports to all parts of the world. The vast and thriving industries of Plzen⁶ bear ample testimony to the enterprise and perseverance of the Czechoslovak people, and in social development the same qualities are everywhere apparent.

If Czechoslovakia may be described as a geographical and political deformity, these disabilities have been somewhat counter-balanced by the personality of President Masaryk, whose wise and far-sighted policy has succeeded to some extent in moderating racial differences and animosities, but the Czechs still suffer from their sudden change from a position of subserviency to that of domination. Experience has taught me that, where minorities are concerned, it is impossible to draw satisfactory conclusions from the evidence and statistics available, and that all one can hope for is a general impression based on national characteristics and local conditions. In this case I found that the Czechs and Germans get on moderately well together where it is in their mutual interests to do so, and that Czech policy aims at welding the two races into one homogeneous whole, but that the Czechs have a natural desire to 'get their own back,' while the Germans have difficulty in realising their new position. Where a former ruling race has become subject to a former subject race, the one being a Teuton and the other a Slav, political harmony is scarcely to be expected, and the same principle applies in a greater degree in the case of the Czechs and Hungarians. At Brno,⁷ the capital of Moravia and an important industrial centre, the German minority has few real grievances and is on fairly good terms with the Czechs; and at Bratislava,⁸ the capital of Slovakia, there is little to show that Germans,

⁶ Formerly Pilsen.

⁷ Formerly Brünn.

⁸ Pressburg in German and Pozsony in Hungarian.

Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks cannot live and do business together. Yet, although some Hungarian farmers may have materially benefited by the Czech agrarian reform, there is a strong political antagonism and sense of grievance throughout the whole minority. The Hungarians are not a material race, and the social factor plays an important part in the frontier question. A high-spirited race deprived of former superiority cannot see the point of view of successors whom it regards as lower on the social and cultural scale. But, whatever may be the actual conditions of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, they are admitted to be better than those of the corresponding minorities in Roumania and Yugoslavia.

President Masaryk is in the habit of making statements to foreign journalists to the effect that he has considerable sympathy for the Hungarians and their difficulties, and that he would in favourable circumstances be prepared to consider a modification of the present frontiers, but before this is in any way possible the Hungarians must change their tactics. The President made such a statement to me on August 13 last. As, however, such statements are always followed by denials from the Prague Foreign Ministry, one is reluctantly forced to draw the conclusion that the Czechs wish to create abroad an impression of generosity and of favouring a pacific settlement with Hungary, but that they are careful to safeguard themselves from any such commitment by means of an amended statement which they know will pass unnoticed.⁹ I only mention this as an example of the methods used to confuse public opinion abroad by states which have no intention of parting with any of their acquired territory, and Czechoslovakia comes under this category.

Roumania, greatly enlarged by the addition of Transylvania, the Bukowina and other territories formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, is essentially an agricultural country which may be said to have passed the ultra-nationalist stage of a high tariff policy based on the principle of 'Roumania for the Roumanians.' Indeed, this policy was reversed not many months ago to lower the cost of living and to make the necessities of the peasants cheaper, but any good results that might have been the outcome of this change were swamped by the world depression in agricultural produce. Sound in principle as was the policy of agrarian reform carried out in Roumania, the methods used have caused severe hardship to the new peasant proprietors, who are in great need of agricultural credits and other facilities to enable them to consolidate their position and carry on their cultivation.

⁹ *Sunday Times*, November 28, 1929, followed by statement in Prague Chamber. *Neue Freie Presse*, May 16, 1929; May 17, 1929; *Neue Freie Presse*, September 27, 1930; September 29, 1930.

Although there is discontent on this score, the Roumanians are naturally a contented peasant people with few needs, a considerable degree of culture, and moderate education. The return of King Carol, who has now been generally acclaimed except by the Bratianu Party, has done much to stabilise the political position, but this very wealthy country, full of agricultural and mineral resources, has no money with which to exploit her natural riches. Fortunately it is now recognised that foreign capital and enterprise are essential, and there is talk of a British Trade Delegation shortly proceeding to Bucharest. Roumania's greatest needs are internal improvements and external credit. When King Carol, who is seriously applying himself to the work of consolidation, was gracious enough to receive me in audience at Sinaia, he admitted that previous Roumanian Governments had renounced commitments undertaken by their predecessors, which had produced want of confidence abroad. His Majesty then emphasised the point that he undertook to see in future that all contracts signed by one Government would remain obligations of the Roumanian State and would be honoured by that Government's successors in office. The King assured me that this would be guaranteed, which is an important step in the right direction.

Although the great problem in Roumania to-day is to find the necessary means to keep the country on its feet, the Government are also faced with a discontented minority of over 1,500,000 Hungarians in Transylvania whose eyes are ever set on Budapest, and who have no interests whatever in the country to which they have been transferred. While M. Vaida, Minister of the Interior, led me to believe that he had in preparation a general law for all minorities in Roumania which would go as far as possible to satisfy their grievances, the Hungarian leaders in Transylvania show no signs of collaborating with the Roumanian Government, whom they consistently accuse of bad faith. It is necessary, however, to view this minority question in Transylvania from a broader angle and to realise that the root of the trouble lies, not with the Roumanians, who, I believe, are trying to the best of their ability to administer justice, but with the Peace Treaty, which transferred to Roumanian rule a highly cultured community completely out of harmony with Latin-Oriental ways and methods. While it is generally contended that it is impossible to satisfy the Hungarians, and that they enjoy conditions better than those of any other minority in Roumania, it is interesting to note that even the Roumanians of Transylvania¹⁰ are dissatisfied with the treatment they receive from their compatriots of the 'Old Kingdom,' which is probably due partly to the superior culture of the former

¹⁰ Transylvania has at different times throughout history enjoyed considerable degrees of autonomy.

and partly to a tendency on the part of the latter to treat them as returned *émigrés*. Of all the states watered by the Danube Roumania is the only one sharing a common frontier with Soviet Russia, yet Communism is a negligible factor, and even in Bessarabia there seems to be no danger at present, partly owing to the strong desire of the inhabitants to remain within the Roumanian State and partly to Russian fears of an autonomous movement in the neighbouring Ukraine. Roumania's external troubles lie at present rather to the west, and it is unpleasant to have to record that her most intimate domestic difficulty has been aggravated by the indiscretion and bad taste of the more irresponsible Press in this country. On the subject of Yugoslavia I do not feel competent to express any opinion owing to lack of first-hand knowledge, but it is sufficient to recall the fact that, while the Serbs as a fighting race have earned the respect of some Hungarians, their treatment of the Hungarian minority is alleged to be so harsh as to provoke the strongest resentment.

The foregoing account is sufficient to show that the Little Entente states contain within their frontiers powerful forces racially forming part of, and to a large extent contiguous to, a highly dissatisfied neighbour, and constituting a grave source of weakness to these states. Hungary, the home of these forces, is in sympathy and friendship with a progressive and overpopulated Italy pressing for expansion and looking for an opportunity to improve her position; while the Hungarians have also been looking round for other European forces to which to attach their claims for treaty revision. It is here that the Central European question, pivoted on the present distribution of the Hungarian people, has a direct and serious effect on the gravity of the question of the Polish Corridor, which is admitted by the highest European authorities to be the most dangerous menace to the peace of Europe. In Budapest I was recently informed that Hungary was inclined to look to Germany's opening of the Corridor question as the best opportunity for putting forward her claims, and a few weeks later events in Germany tended to show that the younger generation means business in its determination eventually to upset the *status quo* of Versailles. Whatever one's views may be in this matter, it is difficult to visualise coming generations of young Germans continuing the payment of huge sums in reparations, thereby crippling the honest efforts of those who never knew the Great War; and it is equally difficult to see the German nation, restored to its normal position in Europe, continuing to tolerate the settlement by which the Reich has been divided into two parts. Obviously, the Hungarians, divided up and reduced to practical impotence by the Treaty of Trianon, cannot hope to obtain redress by single-handed action, but events

are gradually developing which point to the fact that Hungary's future interests lie in the direction of Berlin in the north and Rome in the south. On the other hand, the maintenance of the *status quo* is a fundamental precept of French policy, and consequently the Little Entente states enjoy the full friendship and support of France, as well as the more indirect support of a strong and progressive Poland supremely interested in the preservation of newly acquired territory.

Hence it looks as if Europe may again be confronted with division into two opposing camps, namely, the discontented nations of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and possibly Austria,¹¹ *vis-à-vis* France, Poland, and the Little Entente as defenders of the *status quo*; while the divergence of these two groups may well be intensified by Franco-Italian differences and the struggle of these two Powers for political hegemony in the Balkans. I have stated in another place that 'the battle of the *status quo* has got to be fought out sooner or later, and on its result the future of Europe will depend.'¹² Hitherto, nothing has been said about Russia, which may play a deciding part in the decision of these issues. It is impossible any longer to remain blind to the fact that sooner or later Russia will recover her former position as a great European Power, and that pressure from that quarter will be an important force with which to reckon. There have already been indications of a tendency for Germany and Russia to co-operate, chiefly owing to the Polish question, and it is possible that a situation will arise where Russia may enable the dissatisfied states to force the issue of treaty revision.

The peace of Europe does not depend on the small states of the Danubian or Balkan areas, but on the Great Powers and their influences in these smaller states. Serbia did not cause the Great War, nor will the responsibility of any future war on a great scale be laid on the shoulders of countries such as Hungary, Roumania, or Czechoslovakia, although the conditions prevailing there can be used by the greater Powers for good or evil. But Central European differences can do much to aggravate situations where the Great Powers are at variance, and therefore every effort should be made to dissipate hatreds engendered by the great upheaval of 1914-18. In Central Europe great changes have taken place in the social order, and it is extremely difficult for a generation accustomed to the old *régime* to see the point of view of those who have deprived them of their possessions. In the territory now represented by Czechoslovakia power was formerly in the hands of the German and Hungarian aristocracy, high army

¹¹ There are close relationships between Vienna and the German minority in Czechoslovakia.

¹² *Britain and the Baltic*, p. 144.

officers, Church dignitaries and wealthy capitalists, who have now been replaced by a race of ordinary working people. It is not possible for the present generation of Germans or Hungarians, many of whom are now reduced to poor circumstances, to negotiate with the leaders of the new *régime*; and, therefore, the former ruling generation must be replaced by others before problems which now seem insoluble can be approached with any degree of confidence. Much also depends on whether war ignorance produces in the coming generation a conciliatory attitude arising out of freedom from war hatreds, or whether lack of appreciation of the horrors of war leads to national ambitions. Numerous ready-made solutions have been put forward for the consolidation of the Danubian states, most of them based on the federal principle, political or economic, and ignoring mutual animosities which make these systems impossible of realisation. Yet there is more chance of some measure of success in economic collaboration than in any other direction. Roumania and Yugoslavia have taken the lead in this matter, which may prepare the way for an eventual *bloc* of the agrarian states of north-east and south-east Europe, arising out of the feeling that some regular co-operation is necessary to tide over the present world crisis.¹³ At present this is the most hopeful sign in that discordant region. Fortunately, the first post-war decade has drawn to a close, and with it we hope will disappear its idealistic folly, its meaningless clouds of words and phrases, and its everlasting talk of 'goodwill,' which only exists in a gaseous form at Geneva. New forces are already coming into play which may blow away the cobwebs of fictitious values. If these new forces are wisely guided, they may well restore a war-shattered Europe by reintroducing a sense of reality and well-balanced judgment; but, if opposed, they may lead Europe to the brink of another catastrophe, in order to undo what many consider should never have been done.

Europe is faced with two alternatives:

(a) Maintenance of the present frontiers, with efforts to bring about economic co-operation in the hope of reaching political co-operation later on, but with the ever-present danger of crisis in another quarter which would be intensified by the situation in the Danubian states; or

(b) Anticipation of events by a general reconsideration of the peace settlements, thereby introducing a fresh atmosphere into the whole European system.

The former course would be an effort to maintain, in the hope of improving, a thoroughly unsatisfactory structure, which may

¹³ This was somewhat foreshadowed by the conference of representatives of the agrarian states at Warsaw in August 1930.

collapse at any time. The latter course would be to meet grave difficulties half-way ; to take into consideration the development of new forces ; and to realise that, while Europe of to-day has solemnly renounced war as a means of settling disputes, the whole matter may appear in a different light to the Europe of to-morrow. I leave my readers to form their own conclusions.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

TURKISH POLITICS: PERSONS AND PARTIES

THE westernisation and reform of Turkey is a subject which has aroused great interest among all students of Eastern and foreign affairs. Extraordinary changes have been put into force there both in constitution, in law, and in the national habits of life, and this with great suddenness. The sequence of these events is quite familiar, but it is not so easy to learn, either from books or newspapers, the currents at work in political circles in Turkey. In this sphere important events have recently occurred. From the point of view of day-to-day observation it may be useful and interesting to be informed as to the background of these ; and as events of this order determine from time to time in whose hands the actual powers of government reside, their reaction, even on a long view of the country's history, cannot be ignored. The extent of the influence exercised by such events, confined though they appear to be to the circles of politicians on their happening, can be suggested by a single wide example : if Mustafa Kemal Pasha had not established for himself a dominant position in Turkish politics, reform in Turkey would not have taken the striking course which it has.

Down to the end of the Great War the dominant party in Turkey was the Committee of Union and Progress (whose supporters are generally known as ' Unionists '). The three most powerful personalities in this group were Talaat, Jemal, and Enver Pashas : the last, although his name is the most familiar in the West, was not the brain of the party ; he was a man of fine private character, and of great personal courage, who attained the position which he did because he was ready to take the risks of putting into action what his associates planned. He was the party's man of action : Talaat was perhaps its leading brain. Another member of it, who was in one department of the greatest ability, was Javid Bey, who became Minister of Finance : he was one of the sect of Crypto-Jews of Salonika (who are Mussulman in name and externals, but are of Jewish blood and are said to practise Jewish rites in secret), and he was an economist and financier of talent. Minor figures, but men of importance who may also be mentioned for what follows, were Dr. Nazim Bey and

Ismail Jambulat Bey. It is, further, of interest to remember that Mustafa Kemal Pasha (who himself comes from Salonika, but is of pure Mussulman family) was, like every other educated army officer, a supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress, but for personal reasons, on account of his powerful and domineering character, was not on good terms with its leaders.

At the Armistice the power of the Committee of Union and Progress was broken. Its leading members fled abroad: Talaat and Jemal Pashas were later assassinated, and Enver Pasha was killed fighting the Bolsheviks in Bokhara. At Constantinople the reins of government passed to the Sultan and to the party in opposition (in the previous Parliaments) to the Unionists, which was known as the *Entente Liberale*. These elements were later wholly discredited and eliminated, and no further reference need be made to them. In Anatolia the movement towards a fresh national resistance began almost immediately. From this emerged the persons and parties now dominant in Turkish politics.

Far and away the best known of the leaders who emerged from the period of national resistance is Mustafa Kemal Pasha (generally known as the Ghazi Pasha), but it must always be remembered that he had not at that period the unique position which he has now. The first seeds of resistance were sown by Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha: the first Nationalist manifesto was signed not only by these two, but also by Rauf Bey, a naval officer turned politician. As the struggle continued other generals came in for their share of popular respect; such were Ali Fuad Pasha and Refet Pasha, who led the Nationalist troops into Constantinople amid scenes of unparalleled enthusiasm. Until 1921 the position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was merely that of the generally acknowledged leader of the Nationalist forces; in 1921 he was officially appointed commander-in-chief at the crisis of the war, the battle of the Sakkaria. From then till the conclusion of the war at Smyrna in 1922 he remained the supreme commander, with Ismet Pasha as his chief of staff. It should be noted that Rauf Bey, one of the co-signatories of the Manifesto aforesaid, returned to Constantinople and led a Nationalist Party in the last Parliament there, which secured the adoption by that body of a pact embodying the Nationalist demand. He was then arrested and deported with a number of other Nationalist deputies of that Parliament. It may also be recalled that, in Angora, Fethi Bey, whom we shall meet later, was fulfilling prominent duties; he was the Nationalist emissary in London.

The result of the campaign which ended at Smyrna placed the Ghazi Pasha on a pinnacle in the eyes of his countrymen. He was regarded as the saviour of the country and was the object of

quite universal gratitude and admiration. He became a name to conjure with, a personality who towered in the eyes of the Turkish people, and especially in the eyes of the army, far above all the other leaders and members of the Government and Assembly at Angora. But this did not apply so much to political circles: there were many among the leading men in Angora, both military and political, who considered that they or others were equally well entitled to take a leading share in the future government of the country.

From 1922 to 1923 the sovereignty of the country was vested in the National Assembly; and the Conference of Lausanne, where the Turkish delegation was led by Ismet Pasha as Foreign Minister, was in progress. After its conclusion the Ghazi Pasha, in October 1923, secured the establishment of a Republic and his own election as President. This was the first step towards securing an absolute predominance for himself.

Ismet Pasha then became Prime Minister. The Sultanate, but not the Caliphate, had been abolished, a member of the house of Osman, Abd-ul-Mejid Effendi, having been appointed Caliph. This arrangement was upset in March of the next year, 1924, when the Caliphate was also abolished and the members of the house of Osman exiled. This was accomplished by the passing of laws of secularisation, the first step of the subsequent reforms; and the following month the Assembly passed the new Fundamental Law or Constitution. The country acquiesced. There can be little doubt that this foretaste of reform came as a shock to the uneducated masses. On the other hand, the bulk of the educated and upper classes, still mainly located in Constantinople, were then solid for the Ghazi Pasha; but in definitely political circles the first hint of opposition was already to be heard. This came from the men of acknowledged position who already felt themselves being pushed into the shade, such as Rauf Bey. The Constantinople Press began to sing the same tune. Its leading figure at that time was Husein Jahid Bey; he should have been mentioned before as a prominent supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was a man of really fine intellect. The writer recalls now with admiration a leading article written by him at that time in his own newspaper, a brilliant exposition of the function and value of opposition parties. In the latter part of the year 1924 ill-health forced Ismet Pasha to retire: he left Angora and came to reside in Prinkipo. Fethi Bey became Prime Minister. Then the growing opposition to the Ghazi Pasha took shape, and an opposition party, the 'Republican Progressive Party,' was formed. Its most prominent members were Rauf Bey, Kiazim Kara Bekir, Refet, and Ali Fuad Pashas, and Adnan Bey, formerly the Government's diplomatic representative in

Constantinople. It should be noted that the disgruntled element among the politicians was here combined with three officers whose prestige with the army stood very high, and thus a bid was made for the all-important support of the army.

The party of which the Ghazi Pasha was president, and which had loosely embraced all the members of the Assembly in Angora, was then known as the 'People's Party': upon the formation of the new party, almost openly as a bulwark against the growing power of the President of the Republic, the People's Party also adopted the epithet 'Republican' and assumed the name it still bears, the 'Republican People's Party.'

The Republican Progressive Party was not destined to long existence. Early in 1925 a serious rebellion broke out in Kurdistan. The Ghazi Pasha seized the opportunity to strike three blows. On the score of weakness in administration he procured the fall of Fethi Bey and the return of Ismet Pasha to the premiership. On the score of encouragement of reactionary elements in connexion with the rebellion he procured the suppression of the Republican Progressive Party, the new opposition. Thirdly, he had all the most prominent Constantinople journalists arrested and brought to trial; in the result they were let go, except Husein Jahid Bey, who was exiled to Chorum, in North Central Anatolia. His paper was suppressed, and, though he has since been released, he now lives in retirement. Since that date the control of the Government over the Press in Turkey has been complete: still more stringent Press laws were subsequently passed, as will be mentioned. But apart from these the chief papers in Constantinople and Angora have been in the hands of the Ghazi Pasha himself or his close associates, and in other cases the owners have made their peace with the dominant party.

The Ghazi Pasha struck swift and hard. His prestige in the country was still unimpaired. Educated people supported his reforms and were determined to have no truck with reaction in a religious sense. Some suspicion of this undoubtedly ruined the prospects of the newly-founded opposition party. There was, besides, no member of the opposition party who inspired a fraction of the regard which the Ghazi Pasha did at that time: even the pashas concerned in its formation, though popular and admired officers, held no such place as he in the army's esteem. It must always be remembered that, among military men in Turkey, the Ghazi Pasha is regarded as a very great soldier: he has to his credit a heroic resistance at Anafarta in the Dardanelles campaign, the equally heroic victory in the critical campaign of the Sakaria, and the triumph of the advance to Smyrna. His prestige is held to stand high with foreign soldiers, and his life is reckoned to be worth an army to the country.

The Ghazi Pasha, after this further consolidation of his position, proceeded forthwith to put into effect a series of reforms. The Dervish orders were abolished and their property confiscated, while further secularisation of education took place. The fez was forbidden and the whole people were forced to wear hats. This perhaps not very essential reform struck people's imagination more than anything else. It had been debated by the Committee of Union and Progress, but never had they dared to attempt it; its sudden enactment was a further example of the resolution and audacity of the Ghazi Pasha. The Assembly thenceforward devoted itself docilely to current business and the adoption of new codes of law for the permanent organisation of society on a Western basis. It must be emphasised that, without the clear determination and the tremendous driving power of the Ghazi Pasha, the effective reform of Turkish life would never have been thus swiftly and decisively brought about; and on this ground it is fairly certain that history will eventually regard his personal success as the best thing that could happen to his country.

The final blow against his political opponents was struck by the Ghazi Pasha in 1926. It was reported in June of that year that a plot against his life had been discovered in Smyrna. Tribunals of Independence, a form of special court, had been set up at the time of the Kurdish rebellion, and one was now constituted to try the persons involved in the alleged plot.

The net was spread wide. A prominent deputy named Shukri Bey, a former Unionist Cabinet Minister, was deeply involved; Ismail Jambulat Bey, a deputy and already mentioned as a former well-known Unionist, was also drawn in. The remainder of the Unionist Party, men who were not deputies, held more or less together in Constantinople and revolved round Javid Bey: such were Dr. Nazim Bey, Kara Kemal Bey, and Abdul Kadir Bey, who also had been governor of Angora under the present régime. It was said that they had funds and an organisation, and that an offer of their support upon terms had recently been conveyed to the Ghazi Pasha and rejected by him. They were all arrested. As to the defunct Republican Progressive Party, Rauf Bey and Adnan Bey had gone abroad; but Kiazim Kara Bekir, Refet, and Ali Fuad Pashas were arrested. In the result, these three pashas were acquitted—it is said, at the instance of the army. The other persons named and taken were all executed. A Press law of extreme severity was passed. This was the highest point that the personal power of the Ghazi Pasha reached. It may be said that he was finally secured against all opposition outside his own party. But there was a feeling of terror throughout the country, and what had occurred may be

a sense of the country's needs combines with his personal policies to set him on the new course just adopted. This has, after all, been the case all along.

A special session of the Assembly has recently been held to pass temporary measures dealing with a phase of the economic crisis. Fethi Bey was previously elected a deputy for a vacant seat, and spoke in criticism of the Government. Some secessions had been reported from the Republican People's Party, but those who had declared themselves for the new party did not desert their usual seats in the Assembly nor sit together as a compact opposition *bloc*. Eventually only thirteen votes were cast against a motion of confidence in the Government. Ismet Pasha, however, had resigned and reconstructed his Ministry, introducing three new Ministers and taking back as Minister of Education Mahmud Essad Bey, one of his closest supporters, who had recently resigned from the Ministry of Justice. These events tend to confirm the estimate here made of the forces at work. If the Ghazi Pasha was satisfied with Ismet Pasha as Prime Minister, the new opposition party could never have been formed: if Ismet Pasha were not in a strong position himself, he would, in the circumstances, have already fallen. Nevertheless, his majority on the vote of confidence mentioned above must not be taken to represent the relative strength of the parties. It can well be imagined, in view of the history here related, that the joining an opposition party requires courage in Turkey, and that a great number of the present deputies may wait to see which way the cat jumps.

Besides this, the term of the present Assembly is coming to an end. Elections are due next year. There may well be a disinclination to hasten them. It would not suit the opposition, as yet unorganised, to do so. Nobody is in a hurry to give up the amenities of deputyship, which are considerable in Turkey. The Assembly will meet for its usual session at the beginning of November. There is, of course, always the possibility of sudden events in Turkish politics; but, at any rate, it is certain that the real trial of strength must come at the elections, whether next year or at an earlier date. The Ghazi Pasha is still president of the Republican People's Party. Will he remain so? Will he stand again with that label for the Presidency of the Republic? Or will he do so independently of any party? In all probability, the latter will be the course ostensibly adopted, though in fact that might be almost equivalent to standing in the opposition interest; for if true party government is little understood in Turkey, non-party politics are still less so. It may be expected, however, that some definite and unequivocal declaration of the neutrality of the presidential office will be made. If the Ghazi

Pasha stands for the Presidency, he will be elected; that is a safe prophecy, for, apart from considerations of the temporary degree of his popularity, he stands out as a personality so far above all others. It was rumoured in 1926 that he did not desire the Presidency again, but would prefer the activities of the Premiership. This, however, did not prove to be so, nor is it likely to be so now. He has elevated himself too far to care to come down to the arena again. Neutrality between two parties is doubtless the wisest course for him; but if the scales are to be weighted fairly between them, the party and the Government at present in power must first give way to the new opposition. Such a change may safely be predicted at no distant date, if, indeed, it is the desire of the Ghazi Pasha that it should occur.

JULIAN PALMER.

GREAT BRITAIN'S INTEREST IN FREE TRADE

I

If a modern Rip Van Winkle interested in economics who had fallen asleep a quarter of a century ago woke up to-day, conscious of the time which had elapsed since he last looked upon the world, his first impulse would be to say to himself, 'Bless me! Are they still discussing Protection and Free Trade?' He would find the same arguments on the one side and on the other being again adduced as they were between 1903, when Mr. Chamberlain began his campaign in favour of Colonial Preference at Birmingham, and 1906, when the General Election gave it its quietus. He would have overlooked the fact that folly, like hope, springs eternal in the human breast, for he could not fail to be surprised that, after the crushing defeat of Protection twenty-five years ago, the matter was again in debate.

The following document, which there is every reason to believe came from the competent hand of the late Mr. Huth Jackson, may be adduced in proof of what has just been said. No record can be found of it having been published. It might have been written yesterday, and is to-day as appropriate in defence of Free Trade as it was in 1904:

1. WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, Merchants, Bankers, Brokers, Traders, and others engaged in business in the City of London, members of both Political Parties, desire to place on record the alarm with which we regard the agitation now being carried on throughout the Country, for the re-imposition of Protective Duties.

2. It is proposed to abandon the existing policy of import duties for revenue purposes only, and to revert to Protection, including the system of Preferential treatment of the Colonies, both of which prevailed during the first half of the last century.

3. No Fiscal change could be more momentous in its effect upon the Commerce of the Country, upon the position of London as a Clearing House of the World, and on the condition of the Working Classes, in respect of their employment and cost of living. It would be a Commercial and Fiscal Revolution which would affect industry and commerce in every branch, and in countless details. If the policy is erroneous, if instead of

enlarging and improving our industries, it restricts and weakens them, the result must be disastrous to the nation.

4. At such a time the commercial Capital of the Empire should speak in no uncertain tone; and accordingly we feel it to be our duty to place before our fellow citizens our views, founded on long experience of our trade under the existing system.

5. The advocates of Fiscal change admit that in the conditions which prevailed during the thirty years from 1842 this Country prospered under the policy of unrestricted Trade. They contend, however, that during the course of the last thirty years the conditions affecting our external trade have changed in many respects, and it is upon this ground that they appeal to the Nation to revert to Protection.

6. That the period in question has witnessed developments widely affecting the commerce of this Country and of the World, is beyond dispute. New Markets have been discovered, new demands have created new industries. New inventions have opened fresh channels for trade. On the other hand, new and well equipped competitors for the World's Trade have entered the arena. Such changes result directly from the growth and consolidation of other nations and are inevitable. They can, in our judgment, be met only by the energy of our people, by improved education, by better organization both of production and distribution, and by attention to the teachings of economic science.

7. This truth becomes of special importance to a manufacturing country like our own whose exports are hindered by hostile tariffs, since it is only by importing the raw materials of its manufactures at the cheapest rates, and by reducing to the lowest point the cost at which it can export, that such a country can hope to maintain its position. The policy of Huskisson and Peel was the expression of the necessity of extending our manufactures by freeing them from Fiscal restrictions. Cheap food and cheap raw material were essential to our prosperity and progress. What was true then is more than ever true to-day, when five-sixths of our food supply are drawn from abroad, and are mainly paid for by the products and manufactures which, in turn, depend on an unfailing supply of cheap raw material. It follows that recent changes in the condition of trade render adherence to a system of Free Trade more imperative than ever.

8. We believe that the following maxims remain as true to-day as when submitted to Parliament by the Merchants of London in their Petition of 1820.

9. Foreign commerce contributes to the wealth of a country in proportion as it enables that country to import commodities for the production of which the soil and climate and industries of other countries are best calculated.

10. Freedom from the interference or restraint of the State assists the extension of Foreign Trade, and the profitable employment of the capital and labour of the country.

11. A country which excludes the production of others in order to encourage its own producers inflicts on the bulk of its subjects, who are consumers, a disproportionate sacrifice in the increased cost or inferior quality of the articles which they consume. The importation of a foreign commodity does not in the long run injuriously affect the total home output. Importation cannot continue without corresponding exportation. A particular home industry may suffer from free foreign competition, but

in the result, the capital and labour displaced find more beneficial employment in new or increased production better suited to our situation.

12. It is not possible permanently to limit Protection to a few selected branches of industry. Claims to similar treatment of kindred branches are immediately advanced, and each concession makes more difficult the refusal of subsequent appeals. The personal interests behind them are too strong and too persistent to be long resisted by general considerations of the public benefit.

13. A further and very grave danger is the effect on the tone of political and commercial life which the experience of Protectionist nations shows to follow inevitably from the pressure brought to bear, directly or indirectly, on members of the legislature in order to secure the admission of an industry within the tariff wall.

14. It may seem possible, by the imposition of high Protective duties against an offending Country, to compel her to reduce her Tariff against us, as a condition of more favourable treatment at our hands; but, in practice, no such arrangement can be made when, as is almost universally the case, the hostile Tariff has been fixed at a rate assumed to be necessary to protect a native industry against foreign competition, or to provide a sufficient revenue.

15. The history of commercial diplomacy between foreign countries during the last thirty years is an unbroken record of failure. In each case a preliminary Tariff war cripples the trade of either country, and the ultimate agreement arrived at, when both have become exhausted by the struggle, bears no proportion to the sacrifice made to attain it. Such as it is, however, it has been always secured automatically, and without any sacrifice to this country, by the most favoured nation clause which we enjoy with every country, by virtue of a system of free imports.

16. Apart from the argument that the proposed changes are necessary to save the country from commercial disaster, they are advocated as essential to the preservation of our Colonial Empire. We yield to none in our sympathy with any legitimate effort to draw tighter the bonds which unite the Colonies and the Mother Country. But we cannot ignore the fact that the satisfactory relations now existing between us and them are largely due to our concessions of their right as free communities to adopt their own Fiscal Policy. It is admitted that Free Trade within the Empire is an impossibility at present; but the difficulties in the way of preferential tariffs are equally insuperable. Home interests will conflict with Colonial interests, those of Colony with Colony, and even in the same Colony, those of one industry with another. The attempt to establish a uniform system cannot fail to produce mutual jealousies, and to imperil the relations of affection and loyalty which now unite Great Britain and her children beyond the seas.

17. The experiment to which we are invited is not forced upon us by any falling off in our external trade, or in the well-being of our people. There is of course no escape from the ill-effects of War expenditure or of the periods of commercial depression which visit each country in turn, but, apart from such temporary fluctuations, our prosperity, judged by every test that statistics can apply, has been great and progressive, and is associated with a more equable distribution of wealth than has ever been witnessed before.

18. In view of these facts and considerations, we desire to enter our

protest 'against every restrictive regulation of trade not essential to the Revenue, and against all duties merely protective from foreign competition.'
15th February, 1904.

Let us examine the present circumstances. See how closely they compare with those of a quarter of a century ago. Mr. Chamberlain based his attack on the fiscal system of Great Britain chiefly on Imperial grounds. 'Empire Free Trade' is the cry of to-day. In 1904 he had against him an array of the bankers of the United Kingdom, all persuaded that freedom of commercial intercourse was the best solution of the economic problem then. That fact, and the innate common-sense of the then electorate, knocked the bottom out of the movement in favour of Protection. Great Britain adhered to the belief that in the freedom of commercial intercourse was to be found the best solution of the economic problems of that day. But now a different situation presents itself.

In July 1930 a distinguished group of gentlemen, bankers and others, engaged in business in the City of London, signed, in circumstances which are rather obscure, a document of a very different character from the various manifestoes, not only of a quarter of a century ago, but even of the last decade. It contained the following remarkable propositions: 'that urgent measures for the promotion of inter-Imperial trade are needed to secure and extend the markets for British products both at home and through the export trade'; that 'the hopes of four years ago for the removal of restrictions upon European trade have failed to be realised'; that 'these restrictions have materially increased and the sales of surplus foreign products in the British markets have steadily grown.' The document goes on to state that the signatories 'retain the hope of an ultimate extension of the area of Free Trade throughout the world,' but believe that 'the best way to realise this hope would be to restrict our open market to Empire products, imposing duties upon imports from all other countries.' They belong to the species which may be called 'Free Traders, but—,' and the blank is always filled by measures of Protection.

What, it may reasonably be asked, is the cause of this continued tendency to put forward old and discarded remedies for a recurring malady? Examine the circumstances of each case, and it will be found that, with one significant exception, the clamour for Protection has always arisen during times of trade depression. Free Trade was adopted in Great Britain after a series of years of terrible depression. The generation of to-day has almost forgotten a phrase which was very prevalent seventy years ago. The 'hungry 'forties' was an expression often heard then, for the

memory of that disastrous decade had not faded out of men's minds. It had taken more than twenty years to bring people to the mind that this was the true solution of the difficult problem. The events of the next half-century proved the wisdom of the decision. It is true that with each subsequent depression of trade the quack remedy of Protection was prescribed. It is equally true that it was systematically turned down. The leader of the Conservative Party in Great Britain declared after one of these discussions that 'Protection was dead and damned.'

If anyone wants an unanswerable defence of Free Trade, he may get it from the experience of the war. Britain alone of all the contending nations adhered to her fiscal policy. Every one of the other combatants modified theirs in the direction of Free Trade. That the war would result in a period of acute depression had been foreseen by many people. It is impossible to destroy wealth counted in thousands of millions of pounds without producing a bitter result on the condition of the world. Sanguine hopes were expressed during the currency of the war that it would result in greatly improved conditions for this country. These have been grievously disappointed, as sounder judges felt they would be.

No question is here raised as to the justification or otherwise of the war, or as to where the blame for it rests. Its results alone are under consideration. As many foresaw, they have proved to be disastrous. The warnings which were raised during the war and after its conclusion were and are still being systematically disregarded. The first duty when impoverishment comes to individuals or to nations is economy. The literature of the last fifty years and more abounds in warnings as to what must result from extravagance. These have been entirely unheeded. We are now called upon by the bankers to abandon a policy which four years ago they blessed and to adopt one which, in the judgment of many, will produce disastrous results.

Before leaving this part of the subject, reference must be made to the most recent manifesto which was published on September 26. It states that a number of distinguished business men propose to form a non-party body to be called a 'National Council of Industry and Commerce,' of which the aim shall be 'to emphasise the necessity for the Government of this country to be run on business lines.' Every business man would be prepared to become a member of such a Council. He would fully sympathise with the following words from the text: 'The British people of to-day are tired of the waste and extravagance of successive Governments'; but when they go on to add that they 'are tired of slavish adherence of political parties to economic theories which have lost all relation to the fact of modern business life,' many a

business man would pause before he accepted the views of the proposed Council. The next paragraph intimates the intention of the founders of the Council 'to secure the adoption of proper methods for protecting the home market and to advance the cause of inter-Empire trade by every possible means.' In a word, this new body is but a reproduction of Mr. Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Commission, of which, we ardently hoped, we had heard the last.

But a new generation has arisen that knows not Joseph, nor the way in which the electorate twenty-five years ago banished all his ideas. We are called upon again to struggle to retain the freedom won so painfully for us nearly a century ago.

Neither in the resolution passed by those gentlemen who propose to form this new Council nor in the earlier Resolution of the Bankers are any new arguments adduced to reply to those set out in the Petition of the Merchants of London presented to the House of Commons in 1820; nor to their virtual restatement in the document of 1904 we have printed above; nor to the Bankers' Manifesto of 1926.

Sir Henry Morris, who presided at the meeting which formed the 'National Council of Industry and Commerce,' repeats, parrot-like, the arguments of twenty-five years ago. They, too, are 'Free Traders, but——' of a stranger kind than usual, for, they say, 'while the universal adoption of the policy of Free Trade may be as desirable as when first promulgated by Cobden, it is unattainable.' They go one better than the bankers, who went no further than to say that they 'retain the hope of an ultimate extension of the area of Free Trade throughout the world . . .,' and then proceed (very illogically, as it seems to the Free Trader) to propose accomplishing this hope by imposing still more extensive restrictions.

A weighty reply to the Bankers' Resolution of July 1930 was published early in September 1930. No attempt is made by Sir Henry Morris and his friends to answer this. These gentlemen and the bankers put their simple trust in the Dominions being willing to fall in with the ideal cherished by both those bodies of 'Free Trade within the Empire.' But are there any signs of this? Do not the Dominions with one accord declare themselves Free Traders indeed, but only as regards the policy of Great Britain? She shall forego a fiscal system which has proved of inestimable value for nearly a century. She shall impose tariffs against all the rest of the world, with which she has established intimate trade relations, and from which she draws large quantities of necessary supplies, in payment of the interest on her investments in those countries. In return for this serious hampering of her commercial relations with those countries, all that she is offered is that the

barriers against her shall not be raised; but those against everybody who does not belong to the British Empire shall be made still higher. May we not reply to this munificent offer in the words of the Gallipot, 'Thank you for nothing'?

II

This brings us to what is the most vitally important question before the country to-day, What is Great Britain's interest in Free Trade?

The convinced British Free Trader, or, as perhaps he might more properly be called, Free Importer, holds that in all circumstances the greatest advantages from commerce, whether national or international, can be obtained by providing as little hindrance as is possible to the free interchange of commodities. He holds that the imposition of obstacles must be justified by arguments of a very convincing kind. None of those now being put forward moves him from the belief that it is not by means of restriction that intercourse between men or nations will be facilitated. He continues convinced that this is the true policy all the world over. But he believes that, whatever policy may be thought desirable in other countries, in his own country freedom of commercial enterprise, national and international, is essential, for he maintains that the peculiar circumstances of Great Britain make the free import of commodities of essential importance to her.

Put briefly, it may be contended that it is not what she wants to *sell* that is of prepotent interest to this country, but what she wants to *buy*. She must be regarded essentially as a buyer. The Free Trader affirms that, in ultimate recourse, a purchase which is of vital importance to her implies a sale by her of the product of her activities. This aspect of the case appears to be overlooked by all those who plead in favour of Great Britain's adopting a policy of Protection.

A relatively small and densely peopled country is dependent for its means of sustenance on imports from overseas. In the special case of Great Britain, extending now over a very long period, the indispensable requirements have been for food and raw material for clothing. The latter requirement is not without interest, since there was a time when this country was, to a very considerable extent, the source of one particular article used for clothing by the rest of the world—namely, wool. Nevertheless, there were far-seeing people who in the middle of the eighteenth century, pleading for the free importation of bar iron from the Colonies of North America, dealt with the importation of wool in terms which could not be bettered by the Free Trader of to-day. The following quotation from their paper shows the attitude of

those who addressed a petition to the House of Commons in 1756:

1. There cannot be a clearer Proposition concerning Trade, than, that it is the interest of every Manufacturing Country to get as great a choice and variety of raw Materials, and upon as cheap terms, as can possibly be procured. For an error in this respect, is fundamental, and hardly to be corrected by any subsequent care or diligence. Therefore, the Legislature hath wisely ordained, That though Wool, for instance, grows in greater Plenty in England than perhaps in any other Country, yet the Wools of all Nations shall be admitted into England Duty-free; justly considering, That we can never have too great a Choice and Plenty of that necessary Material of extensive and profitable Industry, or upon too cheap Terms.

2. A Second Proposition, not inferior either in Evidence or Importance, is, That unless some Commodities are taken from other Countries by Way of Barter in the Course of Trade, You can have but a small Vent for your own Manufactures; it being impossible for any Nation to make all their Payments in Gold and Silver, even if they abounded with the richest Mines of those Metals. Nay, though it were possible, it may be greatly questioned, Whether it is not more for the Interest of a Manufacturing Nation to import sometimes raw Material by Way of providing for the future Industry of their People, than to be always importing Gold and Silver; which, when they come to be unconnected with Labour and Industry (as in this Case they would soon be) have no other Effect, than to introduce Laziness, Vanity and Extravagance—and in the End Poverty.

3. A Third Proposition, by way of Preliminary, is this, That Cheapness in regard to Price, and Goodness in regard to Quality, are the Support and Prop of all Manufactures; And that it is impossible, in the Nature of Things, for a Nation to preserve any Manufacture, if they strike off, or suffer to be struck off these two grand pillars, Cheapness and Goodness. They may indeed tamper for a while; and seem to do something, not unlike a Quack in Physic, towards botching up a broken Constitution, but it will soon appear, that all they have been doing, was only to make bad worse.¹

Let it be assumed that the proposition as to the necessities of Great Britain are admitted (and it seems difficult to deny them), we may proceed to consider how this affects the present controversy.

It is common ground that up to a certain date, which perhaps may be put as late as 1870, Great Britain was, in fact, the workshop of the world. Her manufactures had rapidly grown during the preceding generation. That growth continued as the demands for the product of her factories grew. To it may be attributed the enlargement of her outlook on international trade. Even 100 years earlier she was beginning to develop these views. It

¹ Quoted from *The Case of the Importation of Bar Iron from our own Colonies of North America*. 'Humbly recommended to the Consideration of the present Parliament by the Iron Manufacturers of Great Britain—London: Printed for Thomas Tyre near Grays Iron Gate, London MDCCLVI.' (Reprinted in the *Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute*, vol. ii., 1887.)

would not be impossible to substantiate a fair claim at even an earlier date than this, but, for the purpose of the present argument, it is enough to call to mind the fact that the principles to which we now give the name of Free Trade were already taking hold of the minds of thoughtful men. It took a long time to bring home to men engaged in industry and commerce the true theory of trade.

Reference has already been made to the Declaration of the Merchants and Bankers of London of 1820. It is of great significance in the present discussion. It was issued at a time when this country was suffering from the expenditure incurred in the prolonged conflict with France in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The far-seeing person who prepared that declaration was seeking, as a remedy for the condition of things paralleled by the results of the late war, precisely the contrary of that which certain persons are now endeavouring to impose on Great Britain. It took more than twenty years and the bitter experiences of the 'hungry 'forties' to convince the statesmen of Great Britain and the then electorate that the abolition of the Corn Laws was essential to Great Britain and a further considerable period to bring about the triumph of sound fiscal policy as the surest way to prosperity.

But we must not be led away from our main object by these very interesting considerations. Great Britain three generations and more ago, availing herself first among civilised nations of the power given her by the application of steam, became the workshop of the world. She proceeded to confer (on purely selfish grounds, it must be admitted) the advantages, such as they are, of this enhanced power given to men. The wealth which resulted from her activities at home she used with great, but entirely selfish, liberality in foreign countries. She proceeded to develop their industries as she had developed her own. She built railways. She did everything in her power to promote the 'industrialisation' of the rest of the world which was proceeding apace in the British Isles. Her population grew with extraordinary rapidity and speedily outstripped her powers of providing it with food and clothing. The capital she had sent abroad produced revenues which, brought home in the form of needed commodities, kept her growing population in a continually increasing condition of well-being, enabled her to devote her energies to the provision of manufactures required for the populations overseas, and brought about the immense foreign trade which, it may be said, continued to be the index of her growing prosperity.

But the lessons she had taught the populations outside the British Isles had produced their inevitable results. These people embarked on manufactures. As time went on they began to

overtake Great Britain in her special business. That this was inevitable will probably not be denied. Would it have been possible for the rail manufacturers of the third quarter of the nineteenth century to have refused the orders for rails sent them from the United States? They might have argued, with some plausibility, that every rail so sent was encouraging the manufacture of goods in America which otherwise might have been manufactured in Great Britain and carried on British railways, and so with every other article of commerce. Merely to state the proposition is to show the untenability.

In passing, another comment is that Great Britain, as pioneer, showed the way. Those who followed her in the race had the advantage of profiting by her experience. Sometimes they did better than their teacher, though as the years went on their teacher willingly learned by their experience. The mere fact that she was pioneer redounded to her disadvantage.

The net result of all this has been that there has been a growing tendency to import into this country commodities which some of the inhabitants think would be better made here. All sorts of plausible reasons are produced in favour of this view. Can we properly disregard it? Ought we not to take the larger view which says, 'There shall be left to the choice of the buyer the commodity which he thinks will best serve his purpose.' In the long run, if the country is to progress, a surplus must remain on any transaction which, over a sufficient time, we follow to its ultimate end. It may be that in the process some participant has been unable to meet the necessities of the case and an industry of some kind may be extinguished.

A somewhat cynical example of this may be found in the introduction of Free Trade about the middle of the last century. There *was* an industry which entirely disappeared—smuggling. When there was no tariff, no profit resulted on smuggled goods. He will be a very hardened Protectionist who will be prepared to affirm that the community at large was greatly harmed by the disappearance of a person who, in bygone days, was called a 'Free Trader.' If the present tendency continues we may perhaps see the revival of that industry. We may present it to our Protectionist fellow-countrymen and ask them whether they think that is a desirable product of a Protectionist policy.

Do not let us live in a fool's paradise! If the population of Great Britain is to be maintained, it must be by the import of large quantities of materials for use as food and clothing coming from abroad. These must be paid for, either by past savings, which count only for a relatively small proportion of the whole income of the country, or by present earnings. If these are insufficient, there is only one alternative—a diminution of the

population until a balance is secured and Great Britain is able to buy what she requires.

We come back to the proposition with which we started—that Britain, of all countries in the world, has to consider herself, not as a *Seller*, but as a *Buyer*. The proposition of the petitioners of 1756 is of universal truth, but is truer of a community like that inhabiting Great Britain than of almost any other. Our one hope of salvation lies in the production of commodities which shall be cheap, good and abundant, which is the ideal of the Free Trader. Whatever sacrifice may be necessary to accomplish this will have to be made by the nation at large. If we are to prosper, there must be a surplus over and above our prime necessities to maintain any increase there may be in the population, but (what is perhaps of more importance) to continue to add to the national income and so to improve the standard of life. All members of the community must bear their share in bringing about this state of things. The larger part of the income of the country goes in the reward of the labour of living men and women. It is therefore not surprising that the appeal now being made should be addressed to all members of the community, but most insistently to those who by their daily labour of hand and brain can most effectively contribute to the recovery of the prosperity which was destroyed by the war and its consequences.

HUGH BELL

OF CHEAPNESS

I. WHAT IT IS

CHEAPNESS, as twin sister to Plenty, used to be welcomed by unsophisticated folk in castle as in cottage. But changed conditions have brought the two into high financial circles, where life is more complicated, and if Plenty is still to find a welcome, she must come without her sister—a most troublesome person. The paradox merits examination.

'Cheap' means low-priced; but what is price, and when should it be called low? Price is the measure in money of a thing's value in exchange, not of real or intrinsic value—if, indeed, the latter is measurable. Exchange value at any time depends on psychological factors: the strength and distribution of desire to possess the thing, irrespective of its intrinsic worth or the rationality of the desire. The original blue twopenny postage stamp of Mauritius, intrinsic value *nil*, is to-day worth some thousands of pounds, because specimens are very rare and the stamp-collecting craze, intelligible at its birth, has unaccountably survived and developed a trade employing appreciable capital. Purely artificial though such values be, they are economic realities as long as the fashion holds.

Price at a particular time and place is determined by Supply and Demand. Supply, the quantity of goods seeking sale, depends not only on the quantity in existence but on the price offered. If the price rises, more existing things come on sale or fresh supplies are produced; on the other hand, Demand (money seeking to purchase) is choked down. If price falls, supply shrinks and demand grows. Unsatisfied demand raises prices and unwanted supply lowers them; and price settles at the level where supply equals demand, for there is then no unsatisfied buyer or seller to move it. Thus, an excess of supply corrects itself by lowering price and so creating fresh demand to absorb it; cheapness is the visible sign of plenty, explaining their association in the public mind, and the whole supply-demand-price system has that most valuable quality, automatic stability. But there is another valuation of goods which, in the

long run, largely affects prices; the Cost of any product is not a psychological valuation, but an arithmetical fact, and fixes a point on the valuation-scale below which the market prices, averaged over a period, cannot fall without causing a crisis in production, threatening to drive the producer out of business and so choke down supply. Two points about cost here claim attention.

(a) In manufacture it is ascertained by accounts which divide all the expenditure into two main classes: 'direct' expenditure (wages and materials) on manufacture of each kind of product, and 'indirect' ('overhead'), comprising all items not chargeable against particular products, such as maintenance of buildings and plant, depreciation, interest, supervision, etc. When the indirect expenditure has been spread rateably over the direct, the total for each kind of product divided by the numbers produced gives the cost per unit. Since the direct expenditure is proportional to output while the overheads are mainly independent of it, representing the standing charges of the factory, cost rises as output falls, and *vice versa*. If, therefore, a manufacturer, beginning to lose his market, is driven to reduce output, his costs go up and make it still more difficult to sell profitably—a position of cumulative instability. For the merchant, who has to distribute his standing charges over what he has paid for his stock, cost is similarly related to turnover; but as in practice he employs the manufacturer to make, not the manufacturer him to sell, he can generally reduce his cost in slack times by cutting the hapless manufacturer's price.

(b) In the successive stages by which an article is made and distributed for consumption, the finished product of one industry is the raw material of the next, and if we carry back through the whole series the analysis of cost into wages, material and overheads, we see that at each stage everything but remuneration of persons (wages and salaries) and of capital (interest, rent, profits) admits of further analysis on similar lines, so that ultimately nothing remains but remuneration of Labour (in the widest sense) and Capital. Of these two ultimate components of cost, labour will be found far the larger, so that, apart from a small capital element, the cost of anything represents the wages paid to two sets of people, the producers (Industry) and the distributors (Commerce).

But what if money, the measure of value, be not a fixed standard, but variable? Leaving China aside, the moneys of all the principal nations now bear fixed ratios to gold; but gold is a commodity with its own variable cost of production, and the mere fact that civilisation has made it the medium of exchange—the stuff for which everything is sold because for it everything

can be bought—and the measure of value, does not prevent its own value from changing. Its *price* cannot change substantially, being by definition its value in terms of itself; but its value in terms of other things, *i.e.*, its purchasing power, changes under the operation of supply and demand, with this special feature, that money seeking to purchase, generally called demand, is now supply, and *vice versa*. Value, like motion, is relative; and a fall in the price of a single commodity might be described as an appreciation of gold, just as in the world of relativity a man approaching a train might be described as a train approaching a man. But we only say our train is moving (west) when we see things in general appearing to move (east); and it is well to speak of gold as appreciating only when prices in general are falling; not necessarily all prices, for some may be rising, just as a man running after the train may be coming nearer, though the platform is slipping away. Of this more anon; but meanwhile note one consequence of changes in the value of money. We no longer regard labour as a thing the price of which (wages) is fixed by supply and demand with small regard to its adequacy for human needs, but go behind the money to the things that it will buy, called 'real' as distinct from 'money' wages; and when price-levels move, the distinction between these two meanings of 'wages' is apt to be overlooked. Another common ambiguity is failure to distinguish between the time-rate for a class or individual and the weekly earnings as modified by such factors as payment by results, overtime and short time. Trade union speakers are of course fully alive to this distinction, but they often seem to think less about weekly earnings than about maintaining or raising the nominal weekly rate.

Finally, when is a price to be called low? No price can be high or low in an absolute sense, but only relatively to some other price, such as that of the same thing at a different time or of a different thing, serving the same purpose, at the same time. We can confine our attention to the former standard, price-movement of the same thing; and in fact our main concern is not with cheapness (static), but with cheapening, or price-fall. So much by way of definition.

II. WHAT CAUSES IT?

While the mechanism bringing buyer and seller together at a new price is always supply and demand, the underlying cause may be a change in any of three things: the physical conditions affecting production or distribution, the value of money (gold), or the psychological conditions of the market. To follow the operation of these causes we must take each singly, on the

assumption *ceteris paribus*, though in actual experience *ceteris* never are *paribus*, but several causes may act together and mask one another's effects. Hence arise those popular statistical demonstrations that water runs uphill, which belong to the world of political economics rather than of Political Economy, and illustrate the saying that 'statistics will prove anything,' just as a thermometer will 'prove' that lighting a fire in a room lowers its temperature—if the windows are opened wide about the same time.

Changes in physical conditions that may lower prices are such things as new inventions or discoveries which reduce the cost of production or transport, or increase the supply obtainable at the old cost; and in agriculture the bringing under cultivation of new lands, improved strains of livestock or plants, and bumper crops. Such 'real' cheapness (as it may be called) does not affect everything simultaneously, and though bumper crops are incalculable, on the whole these causes, only in part offset by exhaustion of old lands or mines, may be expected to make for a gradual and permanent lowering of the average price-level. We saw that the automatic corrective of unwanted supply is the stimulation, through lower prices, of increased demand; but unless cost falls with selling price, a crisis in production will follow, contracting supply until price links up with cost at a new level. But in a world of increasing specialisation of plant and labour, overshadowed by the unemployment that it almost deliberately cultivates, the crisis solution is unacceptable; and many attempts have been made, some with Government aid, to peg prices and reduce supply by special combinations, either rationing production or, since in cultivation crops cannot be controlled like output in a factory, holding stocks off the market. If there were a Joseph to foresee accurately bumper and famine years, such plans might have the merits and success of the earliest recorded Government wheat-pool; but the cost of holding back large stocks (involving physical storage) is very serious, and if the second crop, added to a large carry-over, is again a bumper, failure is assured. The weakest point of such schemes is that, instead of utilising the natural corrective of lowered price, by pegging they encourage larger free-lance production and so defeat themselves; and such recent examples as rubber, Brazilian coffee, Egyptian cotton, North American wheat, are not encouraging.

The second cause of cheapness, a rise in the value of gold, brings us to the accepted 'Quantity Theory' of money (of which only the crudest outline can here be given) by which the general price-level is determined by the ratio of the total quantity of money and credit at the disposal of the public to the total

quantity of goods for sale. Since banks keep the total amount of credit, in the shape of loans, etc., within a certain proportion to their reserves, and hence ultimately to the gold they hold, the whole fabric of currency and credit stands upon, and is limited by, a base of gold. Consequently, as the total stock of monetary gold increases or decreases, the price level tends to rise or fall correspondingly. *Tends* only, and of course *ceteris paribus* again; and the possibilities of variation in *ceteris* are so infinite that close correspondence must never be expected; but the truth of the theory is not destroyed by that. The world stock of monetary gold is not growing in proportion to the increased volume of business done by a larger and busier population; and a Delegation of the League of Nations has lately reported that after the next few years the output of the mines will shrink, and ten years hence there will be a serious shortage, even on optimistic estimates, thus portending a continuous fall in prices, accentuated by any failure to distribute to the best advantage what gold there is among the business centres of the world. A further report is promised on consequences and remedies. Sir Henry Strakosch (a member of the Delegation) has published an important paper¹ showing that gold has appreciated (*i.e.*, prices have fallen) by 32 per cent. since 1925, including 17 per cent. between January 1929 and May 1930 (*Economist* Index); and holds that the action of the United States and France in sterilising (withdrawing from active monetary uses) 110,000,000*l.* worth of gold during 1929 'sufficiently explains the catastrophic fall of the general level of commodity prices in 1929 and the beginning of this year.' We shall return to the question how far the present fall in prices is to be attributed exclusively to shortage of gold.

The third cause, change in the psychological conditions of the market, is seen in what economists call the Trade Cycle, of which, again, space allows only a bald outline. In modern business, production starts with the merchant, who, having decided how the consumer-cat is going to jump, starts the manufacturer on an order of appropriate size. Both merchant and manufacturer draw working capital from their banks, obtaining short-period loans, the latter to pay wages and other outgoings until he delivers to the former; when the former borrows to pay the latter and himself repays the loan as he sells goods from his stock to the retailer, who in turn borrows and pays off as he rakes in the wages, the manufacturer is by this time paying out of a fresh loan. So money circulates, and the banks, who make an important part of their profits by so employing it, can regulate the total of their loans by varying the interest rate or by calling some of them in. Starting from a time of depression

¹ 'Gold and the Price-level' (supplement to *The Economist*, July 5, 1930).

like the present, the cycle begins by the feeling that things have touched bottom, aided by the cheapness of bank loans, inducing the merchants in some trade to begin ordering from manufacturers. More wages are paid and spent in shops, consumption of many things goes up and produces fresh orders to other trades, to make it good: more bank loans, and so *da capo*. As consumption presses on production, prices rise and profits increase; shares rise and new ventures are floated, causing orders for capital goods. Buoyancy spreads and a belief that years of good profits are assured. The pace quickens. *Possunt quia posse videntur*. At last, the banks' loans reach the limit permitted by their reserves: interest is raised, perhaps some loans are called in. Some weak firms, finding profits vanishing, must pull in and sell off stock to reduce their liabilities. This starts a downward movement, faith in higher prices departs, and the rising market, in which any fool can make profits just as any fool can govern in a state of siege, changes to a falling one. Nobody wants to order things to sell months later at lower price-levels. Less money circulates. The imprudent begin to fail, and the downward movement gathers pace until things touch bottom again.

The cycle is in fact an inflationary movement which, pulled up by the banks, leads to deflation; and the higher the rocket has soared, the further the stick will fall. Danger lies in the absence of any automatic regulator; the turning-point is fixed by the banks at their discretion, at the expense of their immediate profits. We cannot here discuss whether they should intervene earlier than they did (*e.g.*) in the recent American boom, but that experience will long be remembered.

There are thus two causes now acting on the general price level—gold scarcity and the slump; but how much of the fall is due to each? Though gold scarcity may have intensified the slump, it is not helpful to call the whole phenomenon 'appreciation of gold,' as it tells us nothing about how much we may hope to recover on the next upstroke of the cycle, with a stationary gold position. We have no good index of retail prices, but, taking the official cost-of-living figures, there was a drop from 167 on January 1, 1929, to 157 on September 1 last, or about one-seventeenth. In the same period the *Economist* (wholesale) index fell from 136 to 109, or about one-fifth. Is the price-level determined by the Quantity Theory the wholesale or the retail? It can hardly be both, if one moves three times as fast as the other? The fact is that the theory does not measure price movements, but static conditions, and in its *ceteris paribus* lurks the postulate that nothing should have happened to change the relation of wholesale to retail prices. Sir Henry Strakosch gives the monetary gold stock at the beginning of 1929 as

2,382,000,000*l.*, and shows that during that year 110,000,000*l.* of gold was 'sterilised.' The theory, as outlined, tells us nothing about the way in which the disappearance of gold sets in motion supply and demand so as to produce the predicted result, but time must be allowed for the process to work out. The gold shortage of about one-twentieth in a year corresponds not too badly with a price fall of one-seventeenth in twenty months; but it cannot be claimed that this is more than a coincidence. We may, however, provisionally conclude that there is nothing to prove that more than the retail fall is due to gold shortage, leaving us a hope that two-thirds of the wholesale fall may be recoverable.

III. WHERE THE PINCH IS FELT

However a price-fall may be compounded of real cheapness, gold appreciation and slump, its effect on business may be well shown on the lines of Sir Henry Strakosch's paper. Starting from the analysis (1927) by Professor Bowley and Sir Josiah Stamp of the national income for 1924, he gives the figures shown (with slight rearrangement) in column I of the table below:

Redistribution of National Income by Price Fall

Sources of Income.	Money or Quantity (£1 = 1 cwt.). Millions.	After Price Fall of 1 st th. Millions.	
		cwts.	£
	I.	II.	III.
1. National Debt holdings	405	445	405
2. Other debt holdings, pensions, rents	665	732	665
Total fixed money obligations (A)	1070	1177	1070
3. Other Government expenditure	285	285	259
4. Enterprise (profits of <i>entrepreneur</i>)	685	376	342
5. Work (wages and salaries)	2020	2222	2020
Total residue (B)	2705	2598	2362
Grand total	4060	4060	3691

Items 1 and 2 represent fixed incomes, including pensions and rents. With 3, representing all other Government expenditure, these are the prior charges on the national earnings, and the residue goes to 4, the entrepreneurs, who reap profits and fluctuating dividends according to the state of business, and 5, the workers, operative, clerical and managerial. The figures in columns II. and III. are designed to show the effect, on this distribution, of such a fall in price-level as we are experiencing. Neither the wholesale fall of one-fifth nor the retail fall of one-seventeenth represents this, because the incomes at 1, 2, and 5 of the table, though mainly spent at the retail level, include savings invested, which means spent on capital goods (buildings, plant, etc.) bought direct from makers at (or near) the wholesale level. As a convenient and possible figure we may take an average fall of one-eleventh for the total of 3,090,000,000*l.* The italic figures, representing the consequences of this assumption, are got as follows: Look at the column I. figures as representing, not money, but goods—'real' incomes—as though the average price of all products were 1*l.* per cwt.; and suppose that the total weight remains at 4,060,000,000 cwt. while price falls one-eleventh, remembering that with such a fall a sovereign will buy one-tenth more goods. The first result is that the fixed incomes (A) get one-tenth more in quantity, as shown in column II. The King's government must be carried on regardless of price-levels, requiring the same quantities of goods, and item 3 therefore remains at 285, though, as this means lower estimates (column III.), it may seem unduly sanguine. It follows that the 107,000,000 cwts. additional taken by (A) must be deducted from (B), leaving only 2,598 for enterprise and work together. This reduced sum might be shared on three different principles: (a) both parties share the loss; then real wages fall and money wages (lower prices of less goods) fall more; (b) real wages stand fast, money wages then falling with prices; (c) money wages stand fast, *i.e.*, the workers join the fixed incomes and the 2020 rises to 2222. In spite of falls of money wages here and there, (c) represents present facts much more nearly than (a) or (b)—indeed, some politicians contend that the cure for present troubles is to *increase* even money wages; and for simplicity the figures in column II. are calculated on (c), reducing 4 from 685,000,000 cwts. to 376,000,000. The figures in column III., representing the new distribution in money, are the weights in column II. priced at ten-elevenths of 1*l.* per cwt. The total national income has fallen from 4,060,000,000*l.* to 3,691,000,000*l.*, 9 per cent., but the profits of enterprise have fallen from 685,000,000*l.* to 342,000,000*l.*, or just 50 per cent. But, further, these profits cover both industry and commerce: how much has each of them lost?

The gross receipts of producers, paid at the wholesale level, have dropped one-fifth. Wholesalers have bought at this level and retailers have dropped only one-seventeenth. Where has the difference gone? Not wholly or mainly in extra profits; the cost of goods at any point between producer and consumer is a summation of the wages paid up to that point, with a small element of capital, and the wholesale fall has tapered off to less than one-third at the consumer's end because money wages in the sheltered distributive trades are pegged fast, and capital in those trades is doing better than in production. Having no figures separating production from distribution under 4, we are in a region of conjecture, and it can only be said that if what remains to enterprise is now going mostly to distributors, we should expect to see exactly what we do see: among producers, widespread inability to get their costs down to buyers' limits, dividends passed, bankruptcies, large capital losses written off by firms of the highest standing; and among distributors, modest satisfaction (*vide* chairmen's speeches at company meetings) that the admirable team-work of management and staff has produced not unsatisfactory results, as things go.

All that is claimed for these figures is that they show, not the actual proportions of the damage recently suffered, but the way in which, under our system, the whole strain is concentrated on the rewards of enterprise and, above all, on industry rather than commerce, explaining how a wholesale price-fall of the dimensions actually experienced, with a retail fall on a much smaller scale, may dislocate industry catastrophically.

IV. THE REAL CAUSE OF THE MISCHIEF, AND REMEDIES

Is this mischief the logical result of falling prices? Our table plainly indicates that its principal cause lies elsewhere. Money, the good servant, has become a bad master. Theoretically a counter in the distribution of wealth, which should disappear when the pool is divided, without affecting the result, it is found to leave behind it errors which in unacknowledged ways vitiate the whole share-out. The fault is not that the purchasing power of money may rise, but that its rise, however well recognised in theory, is forcibly and most illogically prevented by our wages system from producing its rightful effects. Could anything be more absurd than that, when industry is depressed and losing ground, the workers should *ipso facto* take out of the concern an ever-increasing part of the shrinking total product? The old political economy postulated that, as prices fell, money wages would be kept close to real wages by the harsh natural operation of supply and demand on labour. We rightly desire,

gold, and the system would function painlessly until a further change should occur. The evils now experienced during the settling-down process are those shown by our table—the transfer from enterprise to fixed-money men (including workers) of so large a portion of the product; but with these eliminated, the ‘growing- (or shrinking-) pains’ would be greatly assuaged, and a slow continuous fall would not develop into a crisis. Let no one, while awaiting the further report of the League Delegation, allow himself to be persuaded that Humanity is irrevocably destined to be (in Jennings Bryan’s phrase) crucified upon a cross of gold.

C. HARRIS.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT?

WE have long been accustomed to regard with an assured complacency the supposed virtues of our system of government, and to compare its smooth and efficient working with the instability of the Continental systems which were modelled upon it. The course of events since the war has brought a great disillusionment. Our system has failed to grapple with the difficult problems which have faced us, and, more particularly, with the crucial problem of unemployment. It has failed to give us competent leadership in which the nation can trust. It has failed to achieve any real continuity of national policy, with the result that there is a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about everything that we do.

Meanwhile, some of the Continental Governments have come through the ordeal of the post-war years with far greater success—France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland. Some of them have had frequent Ministerial changes, and occasional deadlocks. But in spite of, and perhaps because of, these, they have succeeded in pursuing a coherent and consecutive national policy. Perhaps the most remarkable success in this respect has been that of Germany, if we consider how enormous were the difficulties which she had to face, and how completely her politicians lacked experience of responsible government when her new constitution was hurriedly instituted in the dark days of 1919. It is easy to point to defects in the German system. But at least it has carried the German people, as a united nation, through a decade of extraordinary difficulty.

What is the explanation of the surprising contrast between the working of the British system and the working of the various Continental systems? I submit that the root of the matter is to be found in the fact that, in all the Continental countries I have named, there are a number of political parties, representing different bodies of opinion in the nation, no one of which ever possesses an assured majority, or can wield dictatorial power.

With the exception of France, all these countries have adopted proportional representation, which assures to every substantial body of opinion a strength in Parliament corresponding to its strength in the country. Indeed, apart from France, which is likely to adopt the system before long, there are only six countries in Europe (including Italy and Russia) which have not adopted proportional representation as a necessary element in true democracy; and in all these six there have been either dictatorships or revolutions during the last few years as protests against the misuse of power by casual and unrepresentative 'majorities.'

The consequence of the existence of several parties is that politicians are forced to seek the greatest common measure of national agreement. This is often difficult to attain. But it is worth attaining; because it means real national assent, and a real continuity of national policy.

We, on the other hand, cling to the notion that parliamentary government cannot be efficiently conducted unless power is entrusted to a party which has a majority in Parliament. The majority in Parliament may not, and commonly does not, represent a majority in the country, even of the votes actually cast; and under our system a large (though undefinable) proportion of the votes cast for any one party are given to it only because in many constituencies there are no candidates who truly represent the opinions of these voters, or, if there are, because they seem to have no chance of election, so that votes given to them will be wasted. It may safely be asserted that, under our system, no party having a majority in Parliament has ever really represented a majority in the country.

Nevertheless, our system prescribes that once a party has obtained a majority in Parliament, however accidental and unreal, it should be endowed with dictatorial power, so long as its majority is loyal; and it should be enabled to enforce the loyalty of its followers by holding over them the threat of a dissolution (which means a fine of perhaps 1000*l.* all round) if they dare to differ from their leaders. The powers wielded by a party Cabinet are almost unlimited: it is responsible for all legislation, all administrative work, and all finance. Other parties are reduced, in effect, to the function of criticising the Government, and endeavouring to discredit it in the eyes of the world, in the hope of replacing it. Even when a Government does not possess a clear majority, its dictatorship is scarcely qualified, because the power of dissolution enables it, in nine cases out of ten, to dragoon Parliament into submission.

Thus, while the Continental system may be described as government by discussion and compromise, aiming at the greatest common measure of national agreement, our system may be

described as party dictatorship; and while, in the Continental system, Parliament controls the Government and often unseats it, in our system the Government controls Parliament, and can dissolve it whenever it becomes restive. We share with the Fascists of Italy and the Bolsheviks of Russia the doctrine that one party ought to wield dictatorial powers. But while the Fascists and the Bolsheviks insist that the dictatorship of the one party should be permanent, in order to ensure continuity of policy, we hold that the ideal form of government is a violent periodical oscillation between parties which hold sharply opposed views on national policy, and which spend their time in denouncing and striving to discredit one another. We also hold that the decision between these violently opposed parties should be made by means of an appeal to the electorate, conducted in such a way as to disregard and override, as completely as possible, all the varied shades of moderate opinion. Since, in these appeals, the decisions are made in single-member constituencies, where a few votes may make the difference between success and annihilation, the decisive voice is given to a wavering margin of voters, often unthinking, who can give the powers of dictatorship to one party or another. To these the party managers must devote their attention, disregarding solid bodies of instructed opinion (which, in our system, count for little or nothing); the hope of capturing these voters by promises and catchpenny slogans, and the fear of alienating them, are necessarily the governing motives of our politicians.

It is perhaps not surprising that this system of party dictatorship, wielded alternately by parties which seek power by appealing to a wavering margin of the electorate, has not been strikingly successful in guiding the nation through a very troublous time.

II

We call our system 'parliamentary government.' This is a misnomer, because Parliament has no real control over government. The most it can do (and this it often does very effectively) is to delay and harass the work of government, and to provide the Opposition with an arena in which to carry on its incessant but purely negative work of discrediting the Government and trying to oust it. Parliament is in practice limited to this function, because it is denied the power of doing anything else—the Opposition party (or parties) being confined to the negative function of criticism, in accordance with the doctrine that 'it is the duty of an Opposition to oppose,' while the Government party is tied down, by all the force of party discipline, as well as by the fear of dissolution, to support the group of its leaders who form the Cabinet.

Parliament has no real control over legislation. No Bill has a chance of passing into law unless it is introduced by the Government. Government Bills are, of course, amended; but only to the extent which the Government is willing to accept; if an amendment is pressed which the Government dislikes, even though it has the support of many in the Government party, the threat of a dissolution is usually enough to ensure its defeat. Thus the Acts which are passed in any session may include provisions which a large majority in Parliament (if they were free to vote) would have condemned. This was so, for example, in the case of the Coal Bill, the only important enactment of the last session of Parliament.

Parliament has no control over administration. If any act of administration is challenged, it is defended by the whole weight of the Government majority, under the threat of dissolution. This applies not only to the main decisions on policy, in which the Cabinet has really taken part; it applies also to the whole range of administrative action, most of which is due to the permanent officials. Under the cloak of party dictatorship bureaucracy thrives and grows.

Parliament has no control over expenditure, in spite of the time-honoured formula (now mere cant) which ascribes to it 'the power of the purse.' The estimates of expenditure are put forward by the Government, having been framed by the bureaucracy. Nominally Parliament devotes twenty days in the year to the discussion of these Estimates, which cover an expenditure of 800,000,000*l.*; but these days are used for discussions on general policy, raised on motions to reduce the salary of this or that Minister, which are always either defeated or withdrawn when they have served the purpose of regularising a debate. No attempt is ever made to criticise or reduce expenditure; if such an attempt were made, it would be treated as a vote of no confidence, and defeated under the threat of a dissolution. For more than twenty-five years no Estimate has ever been reduced by Parliament. The control over taxation is almost equally ineffective. Taxes can only be proposed by the Government, and are enforced in the usual way. There is no Parliament in Europe that has less control over expenditure or taxation than the British Parliament.

Thus it may truly be said that Parliament is an almost impotent body, except in so far as its debates, by showing that some proposed measure will be unpopular, may persuade the omnipotent Government to modify its decisions. Debates are for the most part a waste of time, except as a means of advertising to the public the rival ideas of Government and Opposition. Their results are almost always foregone conclusions. This must

continue to be the case so long as the Government is held to have the right of forcing a dissolution whenever it is defeated. Hence it is not much of an exaggeration to say that the most important power which remains to Parliament is that of delaying and harassing the work of government. Its procedure, which is inconceivably cumbrous and slow, might have been devised for this purpose. But if its procedure were revised—if an efficient committee system were set up—Parliament might begin to do real work, and to exercise real instead of merely formal control. For this reason neither the Government (which enjoys dictatorship) nor the Opposition (which looks forward to enjoying it) is likely to agree to any such change. They would unite in chorus, saying that this would 'undermine the responsibility of the Cabinet,' which is another way of saying that it would qualify the dictatorship of the ruling party. And party dictatorship is the ark of our constitutional covenant, as it is in Italy and in Russia.

For the same reason the most powerful parties are opposed to any reform of our electoral system. To the idea of proportional representation, in particular, they offer, as the fate of Lord Ullswater's Committee has shown, a unanimous resistance, describing it as a new-fangled idea, a risky experiment, a doctrinaire theory which would never work: nobody seems to be aware that the system has been adopted in the great majority of the States of Europe, and that it works quite smoothly. The real reason for the failure of the Ullswater Committee on electoral reform is that any electoral reform, by representing fairly all the main bodies of opinion in the nation, would put an end to the dictatorship now wielded by the managers of one party or another; and one of the two larger parties is already enjoying this dictatorship, while the other looks forward to enjoying it. Electoral reform would make Parliament representative; and, according to the prevalent doctrine of this country, it is essential for the efficient working of representative government that it should *not* be representative.

III

The essence of our system, then, is the dictatorship of a party Cabinet, and the reduction of Parliament to something little more than a debating society; rival parties, of sharply opposed views, taking turns in the exercise of this dictatorship, so that there is never any assurance of continuity in national policy.

But the Cabinet which wields this dictatorship, and is jealous of any encroachment upon it by Parliament, is quite incapable of exercising it. The score or so of men (often not very able men) who constitute a Cabinet cannot possibly perform the vast and variegated functions which they have arrogated to themselves.

Individually, as Ministers, they are supposed to exercise control over huge Departments of State, which are not subjected to any other control; naturally they cannot in any real sense perform this function, especially as they usually know little or nothing about the work of their departments before they assume control; so the departments are uncontrolled and bureaucracy thrives. Collectively they have to determine the line of policy which is to be pursued on every crucial problem that arises, at home, or in the empire, or abroad: this alone (if the task were to be adequately performed) might well occupy all their time. They are also the national board of directors, who have the spending of an income of 800,000,000*l.*, and can raise as much more as they think necessary: if they do not supervise this colossal outlay nobody else will do so, for (as we have seen) Parliament is impotent. Further, they alone are responsible for the whole body of legislation, both the laws passed through Parliament and the vast complex of administrative orders and regulations having the force of law which now form an even larger part of our legal system than the actual Acts passed by Parliament. Parliament will, of course, discuss some of this legislation; but it will only discuss seriously one or two controversial measures, and it will only be allowed to alter these within narrow limits. If the Cabinet does not thoroughly discuss this vast body of legislation as a whole, nobody else will do so. And alongside of these colossal responsibilities, which are so vast that no group of twenty men could possibly do justice to them, the members of the Cabinet are engrossed in the endless game of politics, in party management, in electioneering, in propaganda on the platform, and in the thousand social and other activities in which the leaders of the nation are expected to engage. How can it be expected that the Cabinet should be able, amid such multifarious occupations, to think out the broad lines of national policy? And why should they trouble to do so, seeing that their decisions, if they arrive at any, are likely to be reversed as soon as the gamble of the next election brings their opponents into power? So distracting and so various are the demands upon them that every Cabinet must in fact live from hand to mouth, and from day to day, never able to see the problem of national government as a whole.

In truth, the functions which are imposed upon the Cabinet by our system of party dictatorship are so enormous that they cannot be performed in any adequate way. And because of this, the reality of power in every sphere—legislative, administrative, financial—falls to the bureaucracy. Now bureaucracy has many virtues. But there are two vitally important functions which it cannot perform, precisely because it consists of experts

and specialists who must necessarily take a disproportionate view of the importance of their own work. A bureaucracy can never pursue economy; and it can never see the problems of government as a whole, or shape a coherent policy in a time of difficulty.

The rapid growth of bureaucracy, which is now less effectively controlled in this country than in France, is not the only consequence of our system of party dictatorship. Since Parliament (which ought to exercise control over government on behalf of the nation) has been deprived of any real power over administration, finance, and even legislation, it is inevitable that other forces should fill the vacuum. The power of the Press—now largely wielded by a handful of irresponsible millionaires—has become very formidable, precisely because the Press can influence that wavering margin of voters who can give dictatorship to one group of party managers or another; and we have even seen a newspaper magnate claiming that he must be consulted before a Cabinet is formed. The great financial interests and the huge trusts—now more powerful than ever—find directorships for party leaders, and otherwise exercise a powerful but unseen control; the trade unions, which finance the Labour Party, are the power behind the throne whenever a Labour Government is in office. These formidable forces, unrecognised by the Constitution, which are concerned only with sectional interests, are insensibly annexing the authority and control which in theory belongs to the representatives of the whole nation.

IV

If what I have here written is even an approximately accurate description of the way in which our system of government is working, there is surely ground for misgiving about the conduct of our national affairs; and there is little ground for surprise at our failure to deal courageously and intelligently with our post-war problems.

It would appear that if we are to emerge from our troubles, and to tackle with confidence the enormous and complicated problems that surround us, one of the first necessities is that the need for constitutional reorganisation should be seriously faced, and the best ways of remedying the defects of our system earnestly studied. It is, indeed, surprising that so little attention is being given to the subject. The decline of public confidence in our methods of government is very apparent. It is, in truth, one of the main causes of the spread of a spirit of pessimism and defeatism among the people, which is one of the greatest of our dangers. The people feel the need of resolute leadership; and they do not get it. They feel that Parliament, if

it is to be worthy of its great name, should be playing the part of a Council of State, in which every serious body of opinion should have an opportunity of making its contribution to the framing of a vigorous, united and coherent attack upon our difficulties; and they see it as an impotent debating society, a mere arena for the endless acrimonies of parties.

If we do not take care, the outcome of this disillusionment will be a reaction against representative or parliamentary government. But it is not representative or parliamentary government that is failing, for our system is not in any true sense representative, and in it Parliament wields no real control. What is failing is party dictatorship, and the system of violent oscillation between opposite points of view; because this system is the very negation of the idea of government by reasonable discussion and compromise. The defects of our system, which have only become gross and flagrant within the last generation, can easily be rectified, if we are willing to rectify them. It is not possible, within the compass of a review article, either to analyse these defects adequately, or to indicate the remedies. On both heads there may well be wide differences of opinion. In another place¹ I have tried to give expression to the ideas both as to the evils and as to the remedies which many people now entertain. But the first necessity is that we should think seriously about the problem; and, above all, that we should ask ourselves whether we really believe that national affairs can be healthily conducted under a system of party dictatorship, with periodic oscillations between violently opposed points of view.

RAMSAY MUIR.

¹ *How Britain is Governed* (Constable, 12s. 6d.).

THE PRESENT POSITION OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

As the withdrawal of the Education Bill, 1930, has been attributed to a large extent to the organised opposition of the Catholic body in this country, a brief statement of the present position of Catholic schools in relation to the Catholic attitude towards the Bill may interest those who have followed recent discussions in Parliament and elsewhere.

Catholics, as a small minority in this country, recognise that, whilst they are entitled to put forward their views on the education question and to endeavour to influence to the best of their ability their fellow-countrymen regarding them, the settlement of the matter rests with the majority. They are encouraged, however, by the new spirit prevailing since the war, which has already swept away practically every religious disability remaining, to hope that if they can convince the public generally that their schools are suffering financial injustice, redress will surely follow. The concern of Catholics as Catholics is for their own children, for whom they desire intensely Catholic religious instruction in schools with a Catholic atmosphere, which can only be secured with Catholic teachers under Catholic control according to the present or some equally effective system. Catholics have always advocated the fullest freedom to other parents as to the religious education of their children.

As long as the State by law compels Catholics to pay taxes and rates towards public educational purposes upon exactly the same basis as other citizens, and to send their children to school, Catholics consider that they can in justice claim adequate aid from public funds for Catholic schools, to which alone they can conscientiously send their children. They appreciate, of course, that this claim must be exercised reasonably. They believe that they have evinced their willingness to do this in any applications made by them for new Catholic schools and in the readiness shown by them repeatedly to co-operate, with much self-sacrifice on their part, in sound movements for general educational developments in this country.

The Education Act, 1921, a codification of all previous Educa-

tion Acts still in force, which at present regulates the organisation of public education in England and Wales, derives its main principles from the Education Act, 1902, as extended in some respects by the Education Act, 1918. In the discussions upon the recent Bill 'the compromise of 1902' has proved almost a sacrosanct expression, a boundary on the way of educational development in a certain direction, beyond which, it is alleged, it was originally intended never to go, even in a happier post-war period. It may be well, therefore, to examine this 'compromise' to ascertain what it was intended to do and what it really effected. To begin with, Catholics did not look upon the 1902 Act as a 'compromise,' as far as they were concerned. As a minority they accepted it as the best terms then available, and as long as the general circumstances in which the 'compromise' was intended to apply have continued, they have endeavoured loyally, and even not ungenerously, to co-operate with the public authorities in its application. This the following table of figures, showing the position of Catholic elementary school accommodation at various stages since the passing of the 1902 Act, will readily demonstrate :

Year.		Number of Schools.		Accommo- dation.
1905-06	..	1,077	..	413,964
1910-11	..	1,088	..	379,115
1913-14	..	1,105	..	391,867
1919-20	..	1,123	..	399,894
1920-21	..	1,125	..	401,108
1921-22	..	1,129	..	404,162
1922-23	..	1,132	..	407,317
1923-24	..	1,136	..	409,182
1924-25	..	1,136	..	410,265
1925-26	..	1,141	..	413,575
1926-27	..	1,143	..	417,417
1927-28	..	1,144	..	418,061
1928-29	..	1,164	..	426,665

The decrease in accommodation between 1905 and 1910 does not indicate a diminution in the number of schools, but a willingness on the part of these schools to adapt themselves to the higher standards demanded by their closer association with local authorities.

The Balfour Act conferred the following substantial benefits upon Catholic schools as compared with their pre-1902 position :

(1) It gave them a firm place in the national system of education in this country.

(2) It placed upon local education authorities an obligation

of maintaining and keeping efficient any Catholic elementary schools within their respective areas, deemed to be necessary by the Board of Education.

(3) It secured for them many educational advantages, scholarships, centres for practical work, social services and the like, arising from co-ordination, development and other schemes.

(4) It gradually raised the standard in these schools with regard to the number and qualifications of the staff and equipment to that of the Council schools.

(5) It obtained for local authorities for higher education the power to aid recognised Catholic secondary schools.

Many critics of the dual system, however, appear to have forgotten that the 'compromise' of 1902 was by no means one-sided. Whilst giving voluntary schools for the first time a share in rates raised for educational purposes, it severely restricted and delimited the former powers of the managers of these schools, setting up a system of public control which the experience of the past quarter of a century has proved effective :

(1) It placed upon their managers the duty of providing at their own expense the sites and buildings of their schools and of keeping them in structural repair to the satisfaction of the local authority and the Board of Education.

(2) It transferred to the local education authorities the control of secular instruction in the schools.

(3) It gave the authorities the right to fix the numbers and qualifications of the staff in each school, together with, subject to an appeal to the Board of Education, the power to veto on educational grounds the appointment of the individual teacher, and the duty of nominating one-third of the managing body of each school, charged under the Act with the appointment of the teachers therein.

(4) It secured for the authority the right to inspect the schools, to direct the dismissal of teachers upon educational grounds, to order alterations or improvements in the school buildings, and generally to exercise such supervision over the work of the schools, save religious instruction, as to enable them adequately to provide for their effective maintenance.

(5) It deprived the managers of their former right of acting as treasurers or controllers of the schools, insisting that payment of all grants from public funds for them should be made direct to the local authorities, upon whom it imposed sole responsibility for allocating and disbursing these grants.

In view of the free use of the expression 'public control' in the discussions on Sir Charles Trevelyan's Bills, especial attention is directed to the last-mentioned change, which, it is not generally appreciated, withdrew from the managers of voluntary schools

the power to determine or to handle the smallest item of public expenditure upon them, except with the expressed sanction of the local education authority. As in recent discussions, however, the question of the appointment of teachers has been emphasised in connexion with 'public control,' it may be well to explain more in detail how the 1902 Act deliberately circumscribed the power of managers of voluntary schools in this respect. A concrete example, the practice of a large authority as to the appointment of head teachers of non-provided schools, will serve to illustrate best how effective in this direction public control is under the Act.

The authority, which requires the teachers appointed, whether heads or assistants, ordinarily to be trained and certificated, fixes limits of experience for appointments to headships of schools of varying sizes. The managers are instructed to advertise the vacancy and to use forms of application prepared by the authority for the purpose. In order to test his personality, academic qualifications and experience, the candidate nominated by the managers is interviewed by the authority's three principal officers, who afterwards report on the application to the sub-committee of the education committee charged with the control of the teaching staff. This sub-committee itself also interviews the teacher before arriving at a decision to give or withhold consent. This particular authority has withheld consent to several appointments, and appeals against its decision to the Board of Education, which have been very few, have always been dismissed.

From a consideration of the facts relating to the initiation and working of the principles of the 1902 Act, contained in the 1921 measure, Catholics are of opinion that :

- (a) The obligation placed upon the managers of these schools of providing from their own resources the sites and buildings was fixed by the Act in relation generally to the financial circumstances existing in 1902.
- (b) The system of public control set up by the Act should satisfy all reasonable advocates of public responsibility and oversight for public expenditure.

Since 1902 three main series of events have completely changed the financial circumstances then prevailing. Educational developments not anticipated twenty-eight years ago have substantially increased the financial burden placed upon managers of non-provided schools by the Act. The war and its aftermath have entirely altered the pre-1914 value of money, multiplying by about two and a half times the financial demands upon managers under the Act and decreasing materially the possibility of obtaining help from voluntary sources. Furthermore, one

huge post-war problem in particular, the housing problem, has cast upon managers of Catholic non-provided schools, in practice, the unreasonable burden of providing from voluntary sources at enhanced post-war prices new school buildings upon new municipal housing estates, which, with assistance of large grants-in-aid from public funds, have sprung up in various parts of the country.

Few words will be necessary to explain these three sets of conditions. Standards of school buildings readily approved a quarter of a century ago have now become out of date. Larger classrooms, practical workrooms, larger halls and corridors, more spacious playgrounds, modern sanitary arrangements are now rightly expected. In a report issued a few years ago by the Board of Education substantial fundamental changes were suggested in many non-provided school buildings, which have been accepted since 1902 as part of the recognised school accommodation of the country, and these changes, under the Education Act, 1921, will have to be paid for from private sources at enhanced post-war prices. The advent of the selective central schools and of the Hadow Report has again added to the burden of these managers, demanding automatically further improvements, additions and rearrangements in school buildings, costly in character, but certainly never contemplated by the 'compromise' of 1902.

The difficulties for managers of non-provided schools arising from the changed spending value of money must be obvious. Where prior to 1914 they had to raise 1*l.* for their schools, they now have to find nearly 2*l.* 10*s.* merely on account of the war. As everybody knows, the cost of building has increased beyond proportion. A school place which sixteen years ago cost 10*l.* to 12*l.* now costs about 30*l.*, or even more. All this additional expenditure, caused, as has already been stated, entirely by the war, has to be obtained by the managers from voluntary contributions, without any assistance from public funds, although all increases in public educational expenditure due to the war in other directions, falling upon local authorities, have been defrayed from taxes and rates, to which Catholics must contribute on exactly the same basis as other citizens.

As to the burden of providing new schools upon recently erected municipal housing estates, London, as an illustration, is, of course, the most impressive. New Catholic schools, all of which must be calculated at enhanced post-war prices, have been erected or projected thereon as follows: Becontree (two schools), Downham (two schools¹), Bellingham (one school), Watling (one school), St. Helier (one school)—seven new schools upon the housing estates of one authority! It cannot be suggested that

¹ In one case a small unrecognised school will be enlarged.

this special form of school provision was contemplated in 1902. The situation, too, is provocative for Catholics, for whilst every house upon these estates has been erected with generous assistance from public funds under the post-war Housing Acts, Catholic schools, which form part of the necessary school accommodation for certain children resident in them, cannot obtain similar aid.

Of course, twenty-eight years ago Catholics must have realised that time would bring changes in educational standards and developments, but neither parties to the 'compromise' of 1902 then contemplated that the results of a great war would multiply about two and a half times every charge, old and new, falling upon the managers.

On account of the changes mentioned above, especially the alterations in financial standards caused by the war, Catholics consider that they have a just claim for a readjustment of the financial arrangements of 1902, in order that Catholic schools may be replaced in the financial position with regard to private and public funds generally intended by the Balfour Act.

Within the past eighteen months, since the advent of Sir Charles Trevelyan to the Board of Education, further urgent difficulties for Catholic schools have arisen, which will again increase substantially their financial burden, if Parliament adopts the suggestions of the Government. The President of the Board of Education has already introduced two Bills with the object of raising the school-leaving age to fifteen years from April 1, 1931, and, although both have been withdrawn, the Prime Minister has given a pledge that a Bill with a similar purpose will be introduced early in the new session. Nobody can suggest that the raising of the school-leaving age from fourteen to fifteen years was contemplated by the 1902 Act. If a new burden of this character is in practice placed on Catholic schools, should not further help from public funds be granted them *ad hoc*? It is difficult to estimate accurately what the additional burden will be. Whatever the cost, whatever the self-sacrifice demanded, Catholics will not allow their young people of fourteen to fifteen years to attend non-Catholic schools. From the present average attendance at Catholic elementary schools Catholics will probably have to provide for about 30,000 additional children, if Sir Charles Trevelyan's project receives the sanction of Parliament. A large proportion of these will probably require new school places. At 30*l.* a place on the average—a conservative estimate, as the new age group will demand smaller classrooms, more space per pupil, practical workrooms, additional sanitary accommodation, larger playgrounds and consequential improvements to older buildings which always follow additions on modern lines—the Catholic body will have to find from about 750,000*l.* to 1,000,000*l.* capital

expenditure by April 1, 1932. How can Catholics hope to raise this large sum from private sources in such a short period?

Furthermore, Catholics venture to ask whether it is just to use this additional burden, admittedly, as has already been stated, never contemplated in 1902, as a reason for reopening the ordinary educational conditions with regard to non-provided schools then laid down.

The matter does not end here. The responsibility of providing for the new age group at an equally short notice will also be placed by the promised Bill upon local education authorities as far as children in attendance at Council schools are concerned. Strangely enough, without any suggestion of reopening the educational arrangements for Council schools as fixed by the Education Act, 1921, the President of the Board has officially admitted that the emergency legislation proposed places such undue responsibility upon local education authorities that they have a claim upon the Treasury for additional financial aid to enable them to meet the new demands in the short period proposed.

So eager, apparently, was Sir Charles Trevelyan to recognise the claim of Council schools and to compensate the local education authorities in this respect, that on September 24, 1929, before he had introduced his first Bill into Parliament, the Board of Education in Circular 1404 made the following statement:

The Government recognise that in view of the nature of the task which the Local Education Authorities are called upon to undertake and the comparatively limited time at their disposal, they are entitled to look for some special assistance from the Exchequer beyond that which they normally receive in respect of their ordinary expenditure on school building.

And proceeded to announce that it had decided:

to increase the grant payable in respect of all expenditure on the provision of Elementary Schools to which the Authority become contractually committed after the 1st September, 1929, and before 1st September, 1932, subject only to the condition that this expenditure shall represent an effective contribution to an approved scheme of reorganisation and development. In the case of any such expenditure the rate of grant will be raised from 20 to 50 per cent.

In these circumstances, if the raising of the school-leaving age by April 1, 1931, gives Council schools a claim for a special grant *ad hoc* from the Treasury, which the Government at once recognise, without reopening any of the ordinary conditions for grant under the Education Act, 1921, are not the Catholic body entitled to ask why (1) a similar grant is not available for Catholic schools, and (2) the proposed development is being used as a reason for reopening the arrangements of the 'compromise' of 1902? If Council schools receive an emergency grant, practically without

conditions, for emergency action, why should not Catholic schools be treated similarly?

The power to aid voluntary secondary schools, conferred upon local education authorities by the 1902 Act, would not have been affected by the Education Bill, 1930. In this respect, however, Catholics would appeal to the authorities concerned, in the interests of secondary education, to consider the generous attitude adopted by London, Birmingham, Middlesex, Bradford, Cardiff, and some other authorities towards Catholic secondary schools by aiding them upon a deficiency grant basis, if they are recognised by the Board of Education and conform to its grant regulations, thereby applying to these schools the principle underlying the compulsory maintenance of non-provided elementary schools under the Act. An examination of the educational results achieved by the adoption of the deficiency grant system would, Catholics are confident, convince authorities of its value for secondary education.

This paper, it will be noted, does not deal with the principle of raising the school-leaving age. Catholics, as a body, have no common view as to the educational or social value or otherwise of the proposed development

JOHN GILBERT.

THE IDEAL OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND¹

THE subject of this article is 'The Ideal of the Church of England.' In order to appreciate this ideal we must be prepared to go back to first principles. What is the function of a Church? By what are we to test its progress? Do we still need a Church? There is to-day in many quarters a revolt against what is called institutional religion. But I would suggest that in reality the need of a Church, the need of embodying religion in some form of institution, is to-day greater, and not less, if religion is to survive as a force in public life. There is a danger that it may get crowded out. Religion has not been disproved. It has not been consciously rejected. It has not been tested and found wanting. Rather, the competition of other interests has become so overwhelming that the deeper and less obvious and immediate needs of the soul are in danger of being neglected. This world, as enlarged and elaborated by the resources of physical science, has become a fascinating place. It is easy to become absorbed by its attractions, so as to live without any real thought of the eternal and the unseen. In former days, even though there was widespread neglect of public worship and much indifference to practical Christianity, it still remained true that by all but a small proportion of the community the main beliefs of the Christian religion were taken for granted. Men lived in an atmosphere created by Christianity. There was in the background the assumption of the truth of Christian principles. They were implied in all forms of education. If, for instance, we turn to the novels of such a writer as Jane Austen, at first sight we find singularly little reference to, or appreciation of, religion for one who is known to have been a devout Christian. But a closer examination of her writings suggests the reason for this apparent silence. The general Christian position is not made more explicit, because in the circumstances of the time it could be assumed. There was no need for a more explicit assertion of Christian principles.

¹ Being the substance of an address given at a meeting of the Westminster Group on June 18, 1930, by the Rev. E. J. Bicknell, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, King's College, London.

To-day the position is very different. A large number of the most popular writers are in opposition, not simply to Christ an dogma, but to Christian morality. There is hardly a Christian principle that is not disputed by somebody. More than this, a large number of novels are full of the suggestion that the restraints of religion have now been abandoned by all sensible people. Owing to a variety of causes England is rapidly drifting into the condition of a heathen country containing groups of Christians. It is true that the majority of the nation still retain a vague affection for the religion of their fathers and are in no way actively hostile to Christianity. There is a deep reverence for the person of Christ. But they have scanty knowledge of what that religion actually teaches. They have a vague belief that the Bible has been overthrown by modern knowledge. They have still scantier inclination to accept the moral and spiritual discipline of the Christian Church. The solid background of agreed beliefs on moral and religious matters, which supported the Victorian era, has disappeared. As Dr. Gilbert Murray has told us, the Cosmos has been succeeded by a Chaos. In short, we are reverting to the conditions of the New Testament, conditions that have never been outgrown or transcended in the mission field. There is a close parallel between the religious confusion of the Roman Empire and the condition of Europe at this moment. In the mission field it is plain that some form of organisation is indispensable, not less for the building up of Church members than for forwarding missionary enterprise. The solitary Christian is unthinkable, and would soon cease to exist. If his religion is to survive and hold its own against the pressure of a dominantly hostile environment, he must have the support and companionship of his fellow-Christians. There must be regular common worship and common life. In pagan lands Christ is seen to be inseparable from His Church. And England is in danger of becoming again a heathen land. So, if men are to retain a living faith and build up a Christian character, they need the support of Christian fellowship and worship. If a Christian atmosphere is to be created, if our social traditions are to be interpenetrated by Christian principles, there must be a society. A specially devout individual here and there, or a specially gifted thinker, may retain his religion in isolation, but the ordinary man requires a community of some kind. If Christianity is not to be limited to a small and select band of mystics and philosophers it must be embodied and expressed in the ordered life of a Church. At the very moment when organised religion is most widely repudiated it is most urgently required.

This need, we believe, offers to the Church of England at once

a challenge and an opportunity. We claim that in its ideal it represents the noblest attempt hitherto made to fulfil the mind of Christ. It is content with nothing short of the endeavour to embrace within the life and fellowship of a single body the fulness of Christian worship, thought and service. It refuses to rest in some easier ideal which promises immediate advantage. It strives to realise that wealth of ordered devotion and sacramental life which is the mark of Catholicism, to express those Evangelical and prophetic values which are the glory of Protestantism, and also to give full recognition to the claims of modern knowledge. Let us consider these points in order.

The Church of England claims to be the Catholic Church of this land. It enjoys unbroken continuity with the Church of the Middle Ages. It has been reformed—not for the first time—but not refounded. In its Prayer Book it has preserved all the essentials of Catholic worship in face of Puritan attempts to reduce it to a Protestant sect. It has maintained the historic ministry. The Preface to the Ordinal makes it as clear as words can make it that there was, and always has been, the full intention to continue the orders of bishop, priest, and deacon which had existed since the time of the apostles. In its doctrine the Church of England has never ceased to appeal to the authority of scripture as interpreted by the teaching of the Fathers and the practice of the primitive Church. It is impossible to point to any date and say that at that moment the old Church was abolished and a new Church set up by the State or any other body. We frankly admit that the ideal of Catholicism as expressed in the worship and life of our Church is not identical with that of the Church of Rome. We are not in the least ashamed of the fact. For in the Church of Rome, as it now exists, we do not find a sufficient and satisfactory embodiment of the principles of Catholicism. In the Orthodox Churches of the East we observe in some points a far more faithful adherence to the true Catholic position. Ever since the breach with the Eastern Church the Church of the West has suffered from the loss of the Greek tradition. The counter-Reformation tended to emphasise and increase this defect. Faced with the revolt of half Europe, the Church of Rome was fighting for its life. Victory could only be secured by military methods, by unwavering obedience and the acceptance of orders without criticism. These military methods have left an abiding mark on the life and outlook of the Roman Church. As has been recognised by a writer like von Hügel, the Church of Rome to-day is in many ways less liberal and comprehensive than the Church of the Middle Ages. There is less free investigation and discussion. It has never been able to lay aside its attitude of exclusiveness and intolerance

born of fear. We gladly recognise the many excellences of the Church of Rome. Its massive and unwavering witness to the reality of spiritual things is most impressive. It has never ceased to produce saints. It has great power for training souls in devotion and personal holiness. We have much to learn from its methods in these matters. We can also admire the loyalty and self-sacrifice of its members. Would that those who are most eager in our own Church to imitate the externals of Rome would imitate it here! But with its many excellences there is a lack of moral and intellectual freedom. What many of us regard as an insuperable obstacle against joining the Church of Rome is, not the necessity of accepting just this or that dogma, but the whole ethos of the Church. There is no recognition of the fact that the one solid basis of truth is the free consensus of minds that are qualified to judge. The fundamental divergence between Romanism and Anglicanism is concerned with the attitude to truth and authority. We claim that in this matter the ideal of the Church of England is the closer to the mind of Christ. The methods of the Church of Rome represent a one-sided development. Moreover, as events at Malta are reminding us at this time, the Church of Rome seems unable to purge itself from political ambition. To deny absolution to members of one political party is a proceeding hard to reconcile with the methods of Christ. Rome uses the piety of its members to support its schemes for political power. We are not criticising the genuine piety of the ordinary devout Romanist, but the political intrigues of ecclesiastics, who exploit the simple faith of the multitude for their own ends. They get their reward, but at the price of spiritual degradation.

Again, the external unity of the Roman Church is in many ways attractive. But a closer examination of that unity, of the means by which it is maintained and of the real divisions that it conceals, diminishes its attractiveness. A careful study of Roman theology shows that under the compulsory and universal use of identical formularies and phrases there often lies concealed a real difference of thought and belief. It is the willingness to accept and use certain forms of words that is demanded, not intellectual sincerity. Equally, too, behind outward unity worship there are to be found many religions. The real religion of educated English Roman Catholics is not identical with that, say, of the South Italians or South Americans. A visitor to Sicily can give a graphic description of how he found himself engaged in a devil-hunt led by the local priests. That is an exciting religious pursuit not practised in the streets round Westminster Cathedral. There is little wonder that English Roman Catholics who find themselves in such regions for the

first time have difficulty in recognising their own religion. When anyone is about to be converted to Roman Catholicism it is a pertinent question to ask whether he is being converted to the religion of the English Roman Catholics, or to that of Southern Ireland, or to that of Mexico. For these are by no means the same. In short, to criticise the Church of England as un-Catholic, merely because in details of worship or doctrine it does not agree with the Church of Rome, is to be false to the true standards of Catholicism. Whatever is Roman is not necessarily right.

Secondly, the Church of England aims at embodying in its own life the spiritual values of Protestantism, using that much abused term in the proper sense. Protestantism is not mere negation, though it may be true that certain perverted forms of Protestantism would seemingly lose all reason for their existence if the Pope and the Church of Rome should come to an end. Nor, again, in spite of many assertions to the contrary, is it merely a watered-down Catholicism. As a matter of history Protestantism has stood for the freedom of the Gospel. It has often battled for the cause of liberty. Above all, it represents the prophetic side of religion, which finds inadequate expression in the Church of Rome. Yet to-day, Protestantism in its old forms is in a bad way. Its danger has always been an exaggerated individualism. Formerly it was preserved in large measure from the perils that beset individualism by its adherence to the Written Word. The individual felt that he needed to cling to a power outside himself, and he found that power in the Bible, regarded in the most literal sense as the Word of God verbally inspired. Now modern knowledge has shattered for ever the old conception of literal inspiration which underlay the popular Protestant use of the Bible. The full results of this, especially in relation to the New Testament, have yet to be worked out. But already the effect is plain. In Protestant circles large numbers even of ministers have no clear idea of what they believe or where they stand. We are faced with a crisis not less momentous than that of the Reformation itself. Hence at this moment, as the Bishop of Pretoria has recently told us, Protestantism is largely engaged in 'living on its wits.' Here, and still more in America, it resorts to stunts to hold and attract members.

This is in large measure the explanation of the Fundamentalist movement. It is an attempt to defend the spiritual authority of the Scriptures by mistaken methods. In the long run it cannot succeed, and it can only sow a harvest of infidelity. Much as we may sympathise with its motives, it is false to the very principles of Protestantism. It refuses to trust the light that we have received. The true remedy is rather to be sought

in that which Catholicism can supply. What is needed to train and support individual piety is the ordered life and spiritual tradition of the Catholic Church, that approach to reality which can only be found in the atmosphere of worship and devotion. The New Testament itself is the literature of a worshipping community, and its truth can never be rightly understood apart from Christian life and worship. It was never intended to stand by itself. It is the glory of the Church of England that it consciously and deliberately strives to hold together the two sides of religion, the prophetic and the priestly, in the life and fellowship of a single community. For in truth each needs the other if it is to be strong and healthy. Protestantism is seen demonstrably to be lacking in certain elements of permanence. A Catholicism which leaves no room for free and full development of the prophetic side of religion tends to go bad. It is no accident that the Roman Catholic Church is to be seen at its best precisely in those countries where it has had the competition of Protestantism. Where it has had the field to itself, or succeeded in destroying Protestantism, as in Portugal or South America, it tends to become decadent. The tension between the institutional and prophetic elements in Christianity is a condition of soundness and vigour. And the ideal is that this tension should be found within the one Church, and not between two or more separated and competing bodies. We may fairly claim that the Church of England alone affords the opportunity for the development of a truly evangelical Catholicism.

Thirdly, there is the problem of modern knowledge. We are living in days when fresh knowledge has come in with a flood, and it is still coming. Never has there been such an age before. Abroad, in the mission field, we can see tribes passing from the Stone Age to the conditions of our modern civilisation in a few years. We forget that in matters of knowledge we ourselves are being compelled to make an almost equally rapid transition. There is more difference between the intellectual outlook of an educated man of to-day and of one, say, fifty years ago than between a man of fifty years ago and a scholar of the Middle Ages. No wonder that the adjustment of our religious thinking to these new and still changing conditions is difficult. Here we claim that the Church of England is able to provide an atmosphere in which these problems can most successfully be faced. It can furnish that background of Catholic devotion and evangelical fervour against which alone such questions can be discussed on a Christian basis. We are all aware of the danger of a barren intellectualism. Our complaint against a certain type of Modernist teacher is that he is too negative. He destroys, but he cannot build up. He has no Gospel. He forgets that

because a man learns that, *e.g.*, Moses did not write the Book of Genesis he is not necessarily any nearer to God. Correct information on critical matters does not necessarily augment the love of God. If we are to have a truly Christian theology, the intellect must work on materials supplied by the life of devotion and missionary zeal, individual and corporate. Otherwise it will be thin and barren. There must be spiritual experience behind the activity of the intellect if it is to be fruitful. Here in the Church of England there is the real attempt to form a synthesis between modern knowledge and Christian life and worship. We dare to be both Catholic and critical. There is a vital distinction between saying that the Church teaches a doctrine because it is true and saying that a doctrine is true because the Church teaches it. But the distinction between the two sayings often wears thin. It is the glory of our Church that it always proclaims that doctrine is to be believed because it is true, and for no other reason. It matters enormously whether we put truth in the first or in some lower place. Many of the difficulties of the Church of England at this moment spring from the fact that it seeks to put truth in the first place.

So, then, the ideal of the Church of England is to combine these three elements into a living whole. It is an ideal difficult of attainment. There is the constant temptation to sink into a mere compromise, to tolerate opinions that are mutually exclusive, without making the effort to see whether any of them happen to be true or not. There is the temptation to drift. The position is all the more difficult because, owing to circumstances of past history, the power of discipline has been grievously impaired, and, what is even more serious, the very idea of the Church as possessing the inherent right to order its own worship has been obscured in the minds of many of its members.

On the other hand, there is the opposite temptation to be impatient, to distrust the power of truth and goodness, to use the methods of this world in the supposed interests of spiritual advance. There are those who would rush to some simple and clear solution of all problems. The refusal to make an immediate decision is not necessarily due either to sloth or cowardice. The wise man often pauses, because he believes that opinions and policies that appear divergent are not so in reality. The present Bishop of Oxford has pointed out in one of his books that if a field of corn was surveyed by a farmer, a botanist, and a painter they would say very different things about it. In some sense—with due apologies to the philosophers—they would all be contemplating the same field. It would be easy to conclude that their descriptions of it had nothing in common. Yet each would be true. Further, each would

miss the fuller truth unless he had the patience to listen to what the other two had to say. So, as Mr. Malden has lately reminded us, when men complain that the Church of England does not know her own mind it often means that the Church of England knows more than is present to their minds. All would agree that the Church of England to-day is in difficult waters. In very large measure this is due to the exaggeration of party differences. The situation affords a challenge to all its loyal members to think and to encourage others to think in terms of the whole, and not only of the parts. A new group, the Westminster Group, has been formed for this end. Its aim is to propagate and enforce this ideal, to hold up before the world the glory of the Church of England, to invite men of all parties to co-operate in giving of their best for the welfare of the whole. Strange as it may seem, there has hitherto been no society working for this end. Party organisations abound and expend unlimited energy, but there has been no organisation to work for the Church as a whole. Since the group was started there has been abundant proof of the need for its existence. Evidence has been collected from many quarters to show that for some time the Church of England has been made the object of a well-organised and subtle attack in the popular Press compared with which past attacks by the Liberationists may be considered as negligible. There is a persistent and determined effort to hold it up to ridicule, to set in the limelight any scandal or failure that may occur, to suggest that it is spiritually dead or dying, and that no up-to-date or intelligent being can possibly belong to such an effete and deplorable institution. It is only fair to add that this defeatist policy receives considerable support from certain members of the Church itself who lose few opportunities in speech or in print from sneering at the body to which they themselves belong. On the other hand, the Church of Rome is held up to unlimited admiration. It receives a quite disproportionate amount of space in the papers, while the activities of other religious bodies are largely ignored. Its functions are reported at full length, and every opportunity is taken of impressing on the public mind that the one hope of religion for the future rests with Rome. There is no need to develop this theme, except to say that the evidence for this widespread propaganda is incontrovertible. What has been done to meet it? Hitherto practically nothing. The local clergy have for the most part ignored attacks in the local Press. The leaders of the Church of England seem to suppose that everyone reads *The Times*, and that if its doings are reported there is nothing more required. They ignore the influence of the more popular journals and the local Press. They are often

strangely out of touch with what the man in the street is thinking and saying. There is indeed an official Press bureau, which issues at rare intervals dignified pronouncements of unimpeachable accuracy of interest to few outside ecclesiastical circles. Since the absorption of the Church Defence Institution no attempt has been made on any large scale to put the point of view of the Church of England before the public. The case is allowed to go by default. The ordinary man is encouraged to suppose that nothing particular is being done by the Church because nothing is reported. The Westminster Group has at least made a beginning. Letters have been inserted in a large number of papers. Misrepresentations have been corrected. There is no attempt at aggression, but simply at securing that attacks on the Church, direct and indirect, do not go unanswered. The task is not always easy. In more than one instance papers of the highest repute have published violent attacks on the Church of England, but have refused to allow even a short letter of reply to appear in the next issue. But a beginning has been made, and the Westminster Group has in many cases been able to get fair hearing. It is essential that our case should be presented in the spirit of charity and truth and that the people of our land should have the chance of learning that the Church of England is alive and striving to fulfil the mind of Christ.

But the best defence of the Church of England is the development of its own spiritual life in all its fulness. Its ideal makes a larger demand on human nature than a merely partisan ideal. To this end the Westminster Group aims at drawing together men of good-will of all parties. It does not ask them to surrender their own convictions, but to work for the good of the whole. It frankly recognises that in times like the present there are many points on which honest and devout Christians must agree to differ. The supreme duty is to endeavour to understand the convictions of others and to discern the truth for which they contend. It has been objected that this policy of co-operation is vague. The objection largely comes from those who definitely disagree with the declared policy of the group on certain points. Thus the group has put in the forefront of its programme the desire to draw together men of all parties to co-operate in the common cause. This is naturally distasteful to those who wish to gain possession of the entire Church for their own party and to make life intolerable for those who differ from them. Again, the group is prepared to 'Support the corporate episcopate acting constitutionally through the Convocations in every effort to secure order in all directions by insisting upon the observance of the Prayer Book Use, as defined by the Books of 1662 and 1928, and in an agreed policy of fairness and equity.' This pronounce-

ment at least is not vague, though it may not please all the world. The group has also pronounced against disestablishment under present conditions, though it is prepared to face it and all its consequences if all other attempts at reform fail. It also seeks to support candidates of all parties who sympathise with its aims, and to search out men and women who are unwilling to come forward as candidates on a party ticket, but whose abilities would be of great value to the Church. At present such are lost to the Church. In certain quarters unity centres have been formed to bring together lonely members.

But there is every reason to hope that the emergence and spread of the Westminster Group is only a symptom. There is abundant evidence that, especially in the provinces, there is a large body of devout Church-people distressed at the party spirit that is weakening the life and influence of the Church, eager to support any movement that will vindicate the ideals of the Church as a whole, but uncertain what should be done. It will take time to convince them that something more than sympathy is needed. History shows that small and active minorities can often enforce their will upon reluctant majorities before the latter rouse themselves to united action. If the ideal of the Church of England, to which the great majority of its members are loyal, is to be maintained there is need for immediate thought and action. It has been objected, very naturally, that the formation of such a group involves organised action, and that we are suffering already from an excess of organisations; that it must result in meetings, and we already have too many; that it must necessitate the spending of money, and of that we have too little. These are, indeed, formidable objections against the unnecessary starting of new societies. No one will deny that there are too many meetings and societies. The real question, however, is not so simple. All would agree that there are certain needs which are primary and fundamental. If the Church of England is to continue to exist, it must make plain to itself and to the world at large the principles and purposes of its existence. These are at this moment in danger of being obscured, with very dangerous results to its own unity and health. If the condition of the Church were sound there would be no need of the 'Westminster' Group or of any other new Group. But in the present critical state of affairs there exists no society to perform this necessary function. We have taken our position too much for granted. We have supposed that because we are convinced of the excellences of our cause the world outside is no less convinced. In the world of to-day that is a dangerous illusion. We are not in the very least ashamed of the Church of England. We do not apologise for its existence. We recognise its

deficiencies; we desire the quickening of its spiritual life. But we hold that the ideal which it is striving, however imperfectly, to embody is the ideal which most fully represents the mind of Christ. It is therefore an ideal for which it is worth while contending, even if that involves time, money and organisation.

From this point of view the preservation and maintenance of the Church of England is a more than local concern. In the world of to-day men need a Church. They are looking for one in which they can be both religious and rational, one which can command the allegiance of free men. They are rightly repelled by intolerance and obscurantism. The worship and religion that they seek must be consistent with their highest ideals. Hence all members of the Church of England are called to rally to its support, to witness to its glory and truth, in the interest, not only of the Church itself, but of religion all the world over.

E. J. BICKNELL.

THE CRIPPLE: A SOCIAL PROBLEM

A PLACE, however small, in the larger human scheme of things is a *sine qua non* of human happiness. The ultimate tragedy of the cripple is that this has always been denied him. This is still true to a great extent, even in these enlightened times. Enormous strides have been made towards preventing his existence, and remaking him into a normal man when prevention has been impossible; but in spite of all that is being done along these lines, the cripple is still with us, and must remain so, so long as the human body continues liable to accidental injury, congenital deformities, and the various crippling diseases. He is in our midst, but too often not absorbed by us—he is among us, but not of us; and it is this feeling of being 'out of things,' together with the sense that he must always be dependent, which, quite as much as the inconvenience of his deformity, make life a hardship for the cripple. If he is to be saved from listlessness and depression he must be made to feel that he has something to contribute to the life of the community, and that he is in some real sense a part of it all. From the point of view of the community, also, it is of obvious importance that as many as possible of its dead liabilities should be transformed into living assets, with a value of their own.

Thus may appear a truism; but, if it does, it is only within the last few years that it has become so. The subconscious attitude that very little could be expected from those to whom so much has been denied has dominated a great proportion of the work done for cripples in the past. Much in the way of comfort and amusement has therefore been given and little asked, with the effect of increasing the cripple's natural sense of inferiority and dependence.

It is gradually becoming recognised, however, that a great number of cripples can be made independent if their special capacities are developed and they are taught to use them; and there can be no doubt that they must become better and happier human beings if they can be given a chance to stand on their own feet.

One of the earliest results of the dawning recognition of this principle has been the establishment of special schools for

physically defective children. These schools, which exist in most large centres, and for which the local education authorities are responsible, are doing extremely valuable work. In a school of this type which the writer was privileged to visit the curriculum included, in addition to the usual subjects, handicrafts, in which some of the more advanced scholars had reached a high standard of proficiency, and some elementary occupational instruction. There was also a clinic in connexion with the school where the physical progress of the children was carefully watched, and a massage and artificial sunlight department where treatment and exercises were given in accordance with the surgeon's recommendations. Hot baths were also provided for the children and an excellent midday meal for 1d. per child. Time for all these 'extras' must be found during the ordinary school hours; and this, coupled with the fact that every child requires individual handling to help him to overcome the mental and physical difficulties which are the direct or indirect result of his handicap, involves a positive miracle of organisation if everything is to be fitted in and every child is to have his most pressing needs fulfilled.

These schools inevitably vary in detail in different localities; but there can be no doubt as to the great value of their contribution to the mental and physical development of the crippled child. Less obvious, but even more important, is the excellent effect on his character of mixing with other children, some of whom are more severely crippled than himself and whom he can help in various ways, and the sense of responsibility and of *esprit de corps* engendered by life in a community to which he is made to feel that he has something to contribute.

There are, however, a large number of children whose disabilities keep them in hospital during a part of what would normally be their school life. Sometimes these months or years are lost so far as education is concerned; but those children who are fortunate enough to be sent to an up-to-date orthopædic hospital with a hospital school attached to it, or to one of the residential special schools under the local education authorities, are able to make at least some progress, if not to keep up with their more active fellows in the special school outside.

These hospital schools and residential special schools are increasing in number all over the country, but large areas still remain uncatered for. Like the ordinary non-residential special schools, they vary in detail. In the case of the orthopædic hospital schools the teaching staff is generally under the supervision of the Board of Education. Both in hospital schools and in residential special schools there must obviously be the closest and most sympathetic co-operation between the teaching and

nursing staffs. Hours of instruction must be fitted in to suit the exigencies of treatment, and the success of the school depends very largely on the spirit in which these adjustments are carried out. The general rule is whole-hearted recognition of each other's claims on the part of both departments, and the children benefit both physically and mentally in consequence.

The hospital school teacher's difficulties, however, do not end with the adjustment of her time-table. Not the least of her problems is how to teach in a ward where nearly all the children are in bed, where their ages, and still more their stages, vary, and where many of them are on their backs on frames and are unable to change their position. There are generally some who are up, but they do not simplify the problem. Notwithstanding all the difficulties, however, some excellent work is done, and the children are at least kept occupied and happy and encouraged to think, and to do as much as they can.

So far, so good; but the real problem of the cripple begins at the age of sixteen when he leaves the special school. If his treatment is then unfinished he remains under the supervision of the out-patient department of a hospital, and there can be no question of any career for him until the hospital has finally discharged him. If, however, as usually happens, he has no further treatment to undergo, he finds himself confronted with the prospect of looking for work in competition with normal boys from the ordinary elementary schools who have started work at fourteen, and have two years' experience behind them and no handicap. He is prevented, in most cases, by his disability and the resultant lack of physical stamina from undertaking the type of unskilled manual work which is the resource of the untrained; his age prevents him from starting as a learner in many of the trades of which he would be physically capable, on account of the Trade Board regulations which decree that wages in certain trades must be scaled according to age, and he has no apparent means of acquiring sufficient training to enable him to take up a skilled trade or any type of office work. The cripple can and should be independent; and yet, confronted by a situation such as this, what chance has he of becoming so? If he is not too severely crippled, he can attend ordinary continuation classes or a Board of Education trade or commercial school; and, indeed, where suitable arrangements of this kind can be made for him, it is the best possible solution for the slightly disabled, since it brings him into contact and competition with normal youth and teaches him to meet normal conditions in after life and to regard himself as on a par with normal people. Where these facilities exist it is often possible for a far-seeing headmaster or headmistress of a special school to put these boys and girls in touch

with the proper authorities when they leave and encourage them to take some special training.

Too often, however, the facilities are lacking or are too inaccessible, and the cripple drifts home and sinks into vagabondage or dependence.

There remains, also, a large number of cripples who are too badly handicapped to train with normal boys and girls, and who, because they would necessarily be slower in reaching a degree of proficiency, would tend to be confirmed in their natural sense of inferiority by constant comparison with the normal.

The efforts of a few devoted pioneers are proving that many of these young people, if they are trained along suitable lines, and with proper consideration for their difficulties, can obtain normal employment and become self-respecting and self-supporting citizens. There is a very small number of cripples' colleges in England which are at present working in this direction, the majority of which are residential and directly connected with large orthopaedic hospitals. This department of the work is admittedly in the experimental stage, and the problem of providing the most suitable training for each type of cripple under the best conditions remains for the future to solve. There can be no doubt that it must ultimately be considered and dealt with as a whole, and that it will take many years and much experience to solve it in any comprehensive sense. Some such scheme as that described below must ultimately be evolved and adapted to meet every need as it arises.

Excluding mentally defective cripples, who cannot be included under a scheme of the type described, the cripples to be dealt with will fall into three main categories:

- (a) Consisting of cripples who will be fit for employment under normal industrial conditions when their period of training is completed.
- (b) Consisting of those who will never be fit for employment under normal industrial conditions, but who are fit for work under conditions where their disability is allowed for, and for whom some type of sheltered employment is therefore necessary.
- (c) Consisting of those who are bedridden, or otherwise confined to their homes, but who can be given an interest in life and the possibility of at least a share in their own support by instruction in practical handicrafts and some assistance in the disposal of their products.

Any training scheme which professes to deal comprehensively with the problem must provide for these three classes of cripple. It must therefore include:

(1) Opportunities of training for the class (a) cripple which will give him a good chance of earning a livelihood on his discharge at the end of a reasonable period.

(2) One or more industries which may provide the class (b) cripple with the means of earning a livelihood under suitable conditions, which could not be duplicated in normal industry.

(3) One or more travelling teachers of practical handicrafts to give instruction to class (c) cripples in their own homes.

(4) An effective sales organisation to deal with the marketing of all products of any branch of the scheme.

(5) Some type of practical organisation for finding employment for class (a) cripples at the end of their period of training.

These five basic requirements will be found to apply in principle wherever the problem arises; they must inevitably be adapted in detail to the following local conditions:

(1) *Employment.*—This bears chiefly on the training of class (a) cripples. It is obviously ridiculous to train a man in a trade which offers no employment in his own district. In schemes applying to industrial areas, therefore, a close study should be made of the state of employment in the local industries before deciding on the type of training given, and the workshops themselves should be capable of adaptation to the requirements of some other type of training if any drastic change in the employment market should render this necessary. In schemes applying to country districts, where the principal openings for employment are for people capable of becoming agricultural labourers, it might be found more suitable to train the class (a) cripples in trades in which they might set up on their own in the villages. It would be nothing short of disastrous to train any country-bred boy or girl in such a way that he or she is driven into the already overcrowded urban labour market to seek employment.

Local employment conditions will also affect the methods of working of the employment organisation in connexion with the training scheme. In industrial areas this organisation should work in the closest co-operation with the existing juvenile employment bureaux, which are set up by the education authority in large towns to advise and help boys and girls from fourteen to eighteen years of age who are seeking employment. These bureaux receive information of all the openings suitable for young people; and their officers are generally most sympathetic with any attempt to help those who are physically handicapped, and very willing to do their best for any special cases which are drawn to their attention. Co-operation with the Ministry of Labour employment exchanges, which deal with cases over eighteen years of age, can also be profitably sought; indeed, in a scheme of the type under discussion, the great majority of discharged trainees

would fall under their jurisdiction in seeking for employment. A sympathetic relationship with large employers in the locality should also be cultivated, and every source of possible employment watched and, if necessary, canvassed. In sparsely populated areas, where the help of juvenile employment bureaux and employment exchanges must be dispensed with, the employment organisation must rely entirely on methods of this kind, and on building up a connexion and reputation of its own.

(2) *Markets.*—These affect the whole scheme to some extent, although only the industries conducted by the class (b) cripples, and the handicrafts taught to those in class (c) should be really dependent upon them. The market for goods is very often of quite a different type from the labour market, and the class (a) training must depend upon the latter. The class (b) industries will therefore, as a rule, be of a different kind from the trades taught to the class (a) cripples. Training colleges and industries which are organised in connexion with orthopædic hospitals and hospital schools have no difficulty in selecting suitable industries or in finding markets for them; surgical appliance making, surgical and ordinary boot making and repairing, and tailoring can all be carried on in connexion with the hospital, and in time may be developed to a degree of efficiency where all hospital requirements along these three lines can be supplied by the college and workshops. The problem of the unattached industry, whether in the country or in an industrial area, is very much more difficult, and a close study of available markets and their possibilities is essential before the nature of the industry is determined. This applies equally to the development of home industries for the more severely handicapped. It is essential that all branches of the scheme should produce only work for which there is a genuine demand and which can be put on sale at reasonable prices; there is nothing more fatal than to depend on bazaars, exhibitions, and an artificially worked-up market for the support of an undertaking of this type. The majority of the very small number of training colleges for cripples at present existing in this country are attached to orthopædic hospitals, which provide the principal markets for the products of the workshops. The industries described above as serving the needs of this type of community—*i.e.*, surgical appliance making, surgical and ordinary boot making and repairing, and tailoring—are taught to cripples of the (a) class as trades in which they may find employment on leaving, generally with the addition of carpentry and sometimes upholstery, two more trades for which the community itself can supply orders but which are not always entirely satisfactory as openings for normal employment. These colleges in general cater only for the class (a) cripple, although the occasional boy or girl who cannot be trained

to the necessary pitch on account of his or her handicap is absorbed wherever possible. On the whole, however, there is very little organised provision for the class (b) cripples, and almost none for the class (c), unless they are willing to go into an institution. None of the existing organisations would appear to have really come to grips with the problem of employment. This is perhaps because, being so few in number for the whole of England, they are compelled to take their trainees from all over the country, and it is almost impossible to keep in touch with the labour market in so many different localities.

The need is, therefore, for a number of training schemes combining the five points emphasised above and making the maximum possible use of existing facilities, each serving an area large enough to offer a wide field for marketing and employment, but sufficiently self-contained to enable a close touch to be kept with conditions over the whole field. This should not involve the provision of a large number of new colleges. What is needed, and what is in process of development, is an increase in the scope of existing colleges, and a much greater degree of co-ordination and of co-operation with normal institutions for training to ensure adequate provision for adolescent and adult cripples in all areas.

It would seem that only some central authority, such as the State, can ultimately make such a far-reaching scheme possible or effective. In the meantime, much valuable experimental work is being carried out by private enterprise; and it may well be that, in years to come, the State, as so often before, will use its resources to perfect and complete the task, which would never have been attempted but for the pioneering spirit of a few individuals.

It is a social injustice that any physical handicap should be allowed to deprive a human being of his chance to make a place for himself among his fellow-men: it is in order to minimise the likelihood of such injustice that such schemes as these should be promoted to the utmost.

CHRISTINA CHAPIN,

BLIND-SPOTS IN ENGLISH CIVILISATION

I. RAILWAY STATIONS AND POSTER ADVERTISING

I

It is strange that the English (the word is used in preference to its disagreeable alternative 'British,' and not in order to exculpate Scots or Welshmen from what is yet to come), who lay so much stress on 'good manners' in personal relationships and contrive such a degree of comfort in their homes, should ignore the importance of manners as an element in national deportment, and endure the inconveniences and indignities to which, by their public and public-utility servants, they are considerably subjected. The Englishman's urge to dress for dinner, the Englishwoman's passion for gentility, are presumably expressions of a desire to preserve self-respect and to make a good impression on strangers. Similarly, the unrivalled amenities of English home life are a genuine expression of national genius. Yet why, with this laudable ambition to present themselves in the most favourable light and to surround themselves with complete but unostentatious comfort, are these same people apparently indifferent to those outward appearances of their country which most quickly and forcibly strike visitors from other lands? Why are they apparently prepared to tolerate lack of consideration and of imagination in persons responsible for their public services?

Possibly the first of these paradoxes dates back to the old days when foreigners were blandly assumed to be inferior folk, whose opinion of England was of no importance. If so, the more quickly we realise those days are over the better for everyone. Criticism of England in other countries is plentiful, potentially damaging, and in many respects unanswerable. Is it hopeless to suggest that we remove at least those grounds for it which can be removed easily, and not only easily, but even profitably?

The examples of bad taste, stupidity, lack of imagination and want of practical sense with which this plea can be supported are necessarily miscellaneous, and may at first sight seem trivial. But points of good manners are equally miscellaneous and in themselves often trivial enough; yet all have this in common,

that an individual who practises them creates immediately a good impression and strikes a stranger as a being at once thoughtful and intelligent, while an individual who does not, invites condemnation as ill-bred or unimaginative. Is it a trivial thing that such a judgment as this should be passed on a person or on a nation? Are we sufficiently aware that the cultivated visitor from France or Germany considers the outward aspects of English life as uncivilised and tedious? Are we in a position to consider his arguments and dispose of them? Or are we, alternatively, still complacent enough to put the onus of barbarism on to our critics, and decide that, if foreigners prefer their own countries to ours, they can stay in them? One envies such confirmed self-satisfaction, but reconciles it with difficulty to what is natively described as the 'Come to Britain' movement.

Let us select in illustration of our thesis certain diverse phenomena of national life. Let us consider English, as opposed to Continental, practice in regard to railways and railway stations; advertisements and street manners generally; and postage stamps. Each one of these is sadly to the point, and, although not by any means the only illustrations pertinent to our present text, have the advantage of general familiarity.

II

The question of the architectural shortcomings of the English railway station has lately been ventilated by Mr. Frank Pick, of the Underground executive; and it is possible that, if so distinguished a propagandist of public good taste seriously intends to preach better railway stations, as he has preached *and achieved* better poster art and better lettering, something may come to pass. But Mr. Pick is too well aware of the immense impermeability of corporate intelligence in this country, too conscious of the imaginative sloth of ordinary individuals, to resent a humble word in his support; and there are aspects of the barbarity of English railway stations, in addition to the purely architectural, which merit all the reform and attention they can get.

Of course the most obvious (and therefore the most important) element of all is this very element of architecture. The architecture of the railway station should not only be suitable to its purpose, but worthy of the most vital public building of any town. Here is the gate through which travellers arrive, from which they issue forth; here is the place more utterly devoted to the service of the entire community than any town-hall or theatre or refreshment-house. It is impossible too lovingly to devise a railway station, because it is impossible to over-estimate its importance

in our urban scheme. And this is not quite all. The essence of good taste in architecture is what Mr. A. S. G. Butler, in his valuable monograph *The Substance of Architecture*, has called 'functional significance.' In other words, the right sort of building for a railway station is one which can only be a railway station; not one which is an adaptation of some extraneous grandiloquence to railway purposes.

Now, several of the London railway stations have elements of genuine station design; but in no one of them are these elements sufficiently powerful to dominate the whole. The train-shed at St. Pancras is an impressive and finely proportioned thing; but the ex-governmental hydro to which it is attached effectually baulks its claim to functional significance. Paddington has qualities of friendliness and harmonious design which, if the proportions of the station as a whole had not outgrown original intention, must have made of the terminus something individual and charming. But, as things now are, the central area of the old station has become like the ancient market-place of a town now industrialised—attractive, but no longer dominant. Euston has potentially one of the finest station entrances in Europe; but the place is so cluttered up externally with mean houses, and so subdivided internally into insignificant train-sheds, that the initial impression is first blunted and then dissipated altogether. As for King's Cross, it is not awake to the beauty of its own stark simplicity, or to the possibilities of its situation. Indeed, it contrives very successfully to evade notice by a dinginess and squalor which, for the sake of the efficiency of the railway staff, one can only hope to be intentional. It is a safe guess that, had the directors of the Great Northern, in the gay decorative days of long ago, been inclined to spend money on the embellishment of their main terminus, they would have produced a vulgarity almost classical. Perhaps, therefore, London is fortunate in that King's Cross should have survived, sordid and badly cared for though it be. One day the board may take a fancy to point the façade, or colour-wash it bright green or pink; to sweep away the futile hoardings which disfigure the space in front; to reglaze the train-sheds on modern lines, and create a splendid station at comparatively small expense. Of Waterloo more in a moment. Of Liverpool Street, Victoria or Marylebone nothing, either now or later.

It will be objected that any wholesale improvement in the great stations of England would be too costly a luxury for the now impoverished companies. Agreed—and no one but a visionary would seriously expect any such thing. But the fact remains that opportunities *will* occur (is it impossible that Charing Cross will supply one before very long?); that stations are so

enormously important to the self-respect of a great city and to its influence on visitors that such opportunities must be officially watched and officially used; and that a public subsidy to any really intelligent plan would be a subsidy wisely and profitably made. Unluckily, it has been proved useless to leave matters to the taste or good sense of the companies themselves. Only the Underground group from among all the railway companies of Great Britain have shown any sense of their responsibilities in this matter; and whereas they have created a system of stations and publicity without rival in Europe or America for practical convenience, beauty of proportion and artistic enterprise, their fellows have acted with reactionary ostentation, often combined with an indifference to the public good which is a poor return for their Victorian years of plenty. The tragedy of Waterloo is a bitter illustration of the capacities of a great company. A superb site has been sacrificed to a characterless jumble of degenerate classicism and bad statuary, which does not emphasise the upstanding line of the hill crest nor the sweep of the façade; which misses chances all along York Road; which wastes acres of valuable land in train-sheds and rails. The right place for these was, from the civic and (one would have thought) from the material point of view also, the now derelict expanse of Clapham Junction. Thence tubes could have carried the suburban traffic to the centre of the city, leaving only the long-distance trains to run through to a smaller, loftier Waterloo of glass and girders and towering concrete uprights, which would have served as diadem to the south bank of the Thames and, incidentally, have left the company with a lot of valuable land for disposal.

For the future are models and to spare. New York is a long way off, and I doubt whether it really offers the ideal solution. Beautiful though both the Grand Central and Pennsylvania Stations are, they are inclined to over-magnificence. Marble and gilding and such luxuries produce an ostentation greater than the occasion warrants and, indeed, one undesirable in a highly practical building. But Germany is much nearer at hand; and in Germany are to be found station designs of a deftness and sanity which could hardly be bettered. Königsberg, Karlsruhe, Darmstadt, and Stuttgart are the four newest and loveliest large stations of Germany. They rely for their loveliness on nothing but proportion and suitability. With arched girders and glass; with posters controlled and placed where they help the whole design and do not shatter it; with, externally, façades of the severest simplicity—these are the aids with which the latest station architects of Germany have triumphantly solved their problem.

Now, there are English architects as capable as any German of designing a modern railway station. But whereas the German

architect has authority behind him, traditional intelligence to support him, and a widespread sense of what is decent in urban behaviour to secure for his work a fair and independent survival, his English colleague has nothing. Nothing at all. His designs must be submitted to the wholly untrained opinion of so-called business-men who 'know what they like,' are out to save every possible penny and have never conceived of a railway station as a piece of public responsibility. Further, even suppose it to have been adopted, an architect's design is liable to be plastered with advertisements, obscured with hideous and miscellaneous lettering, and very inadequately cleaned.

So much for the stations themselves. But from a civic point of view they are not the whole story. Suitability and discretion in station design should extend beyond the actual sheds and booking-halls. And in this respect English practice is more behind the times than ever. Outside the area of the station, thought is hardly ever given to an open approach, to decent surroundings, or to a right relationship between the station and the town to which it belongs. Admittedly a midland manufacturing town (our manufacturing towns being what they are) is an almost hopeless subject for considered treatment. But there are cities which cry aloud for special handling, cities which so obviously merit (and would repay) a little imagination in their station planning, that their neglect is something more than folly. Oxford, for example, and Cambridge offer heaven-sent opportunities to the aspiring station designer; and one can imagine the thought which Germany, in her scrupulous wisdom, would bestow on corresponding towns. But for all we care, Oxford and Cambridge might be Swindon and Wigan. The gateways to two of the most interesting towns in England are at present mean, placard-littered places, approached through dreary streets, utterly without any suggestion of the ancient glories to which they lead, careless of the convenience of strangers, unworthy, characterless.¹ Of course, perfection cannot be conjured from imperfection with a wave of a wand; but a lot could be done forthwith. In the first place, every foul hoarding in the immediate neighbourhood could, within a shortish time, be swept away. Plain-grass plots (if flower-beds are too great a strain on the capacity of railway company or corporation) should fill the space before the main entrance and, as it were, usher the visitor to the city. The staff at smaller stations often contrive to make their platforms bright with flowers; why should our directorates be too proud or too apathetic to do similar service to more populous

¹ The D.I.A. *Cautionary Guide to Oxford* (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1930) should be obtained by everyone anxious for ocular proof of the squalor of the station neighbourhood in our oldest university city.

centres? Then, a large, well-designed map of the town (the Underground has shown what can be done in the way of maps at once decorative and useful) should stand immediately opposite the station exit, so that strangers may see their best way at a glance. Authority, apparently, has not troubled to realise that the visitor comes to see Oxford or Cambridge; he is not primarily interested in the programme of the local Theatre Royal, or the latest cereal, or the fact that a petrol station is vividly at hand, or that the cheapest boots or raincoats are available at this shop or that. Not only is he uninterested; he definitely resents having this irrelevant information thrust on his helpless notice. And he goes away with a queer reservation in his enthusiasm for these beautiful and historical cities, asking himself how it may be that the English, with such a past, should be blandly capable of such a present. He may well ask; no Englishman can give him a convincing answer.

It is, of course, only too plain that those responsible for English railway stations have never regarded themselves as servants of the community. Indeed, at one time railway authorities adopted the lofty tone of public benefactors, and expected their countrymen to be grateful for any travelling facilities which were considered as likely to make money for their providers. That time, at any rate, has gone by. The one-time autocrats are now suppliants at the public feet, and they must not be surprised if the public take their delayed opportunity of trenchant criticism. For there is still plenty to be said in the way of fault-finding, and on subjects of more general interest than architectural beauty or local suitability.

It may well be, that at present the generality of Englishmen and women (never having been taught to look at their towns and public buildings as potentially things of dignity and cleanliness) care little enough for such urban good manners and intelligence as have been here discussed. But there is a further aspect of station handling which should appeal forcibly and at once to the imagination of a practical and comfort-loving nation. How is it that the English are so badly provided with those supplementary conveniences to travel which are regarded as the natural right of railway users in Germany? In every large station there should be a post office, bath and dressing rooms, chemists, fruit-stalls, tobacconists, book-stalls, and above all refreshment-rooms, which are not only clean, civil and stocked with desirable things, but actually open when they are wanted. Wherever in England some of these auxiliaries to travel *are* available, they are crowded into huts along the platform edge and have no area of the station specially designed for them. Post offices are rare; while there is yet to be discovered, anywhere

but in the great termini, a station restaurant which is even tolerable.

How can it be that such a state of affairs is still contentedly endured? One guesses that the railway authorities owe their freedom from complaint in part to compensations and to circumstances which are not of their contriving. In the first place, the helpfulness and friendly courtesy of the average platform staff (probably in no other country are those qualities more general than in England) incline the English public to overlook their many deprivations. In the second place, they do not in sufficient numbers realise what is done for travellers in other countries in the way of subsidiary conveniences. But if only thousands of English men and women could experience the organisation and facilities at, say, Leipzig, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, Cologne, then indeed they might rise in their wrath and jar the home authorities from their sloth. Then no more should refreshment-rooms be open only when it suits those who make money from them; no more should sloppy tea be slammed on a marble bar and either swallowed standing or carried gingerly to a dispiriting and dirty table in a dark corner; no more should Sunday travelling be a sort of neolithic joke, with nothing open anywhere, and even the trains most grudgingly conceded³; no more should it be impossible to buy a stamp save by going out into the street. No more, in short, should important English stations be the barbarous, dirty and depressing places which by and large they are at present, nor the geniality of the porters, guards, and inspectors have a background quite unworthy of its quality.

III

The problem of advertisements, as part of a town's outward clothing, is naturally akin to the problem of the well-mannered railway station, because the station, as a place of great public frequentation, attracts advertisers as strongly as any other urban site.

Now, it is doubtful whether one (and perhaps the governing) element in the ethic of poster or placard advertisement has been properly thought out in England. A poster (be its material paper, wood or metal) is put up in a certain place so that the public (who are you and I) may willy-nilly see it. The more frequently you and I pass by that place, the more valuable it

³ It will hardly be credited, but on Sunday nights when an important Continental train arrives in Victoria, the underground communication to two at least of the other great termini in London has closed down. If we must be Sabbatarian, let us at least be thorough. It were better to veto the Continental train altogether than to confront foreign visitors, on the very threshold of our capital city, with this prime evidence of English indifference to public comfort.

becomes to the advertiser. In other words, we—the public—create value in advertising sites, and by the very fact of our going to and fro put money into the pockets of the site owners or site renters and enable the advertiser (if, indeed, he believes in advertising) to put money into his own. What consideration do we receive in return for this creation of values? Not only none, but less than none. Goods we do not want, exhortations which do not convince, glowing descriptions we do not believe, are forced on our attention, probably disfiguring what we want to look at, certainly fretting our eyes and minds with their stentorian irrelevance.³ Is it not the merest logic that what the public creates in value it should claim in tribute? Is it not obvious that poster and placard advertising should be taxed for the public good and taxed destructively? Yes—destructively. No matter if it be taxed out of existence; beauty and peace will be the gainers. While if poster advertisers prefer to pay their tribute rather than to cease their work, then the Exchequer is that much the richer, and so, indirectly, the public also.

This inescapable argument for the heavy taxation of poster advertising is the starting-point for any discussion of the means by which English public places and buildings may be rescued from their present degradation. Hoardings in the streets; field-advertising; the roadside clamour of publicity at the entrance to every country town; the detestable food and drink placards which add a finishing touch to the forlorn discomfort of nearly all our refreshment-rooms and publichouses; advertisements painted on blank walls and scrawled in huge letters across bridges; metal plaques screwed into railway cuttings—all these are not only offensive and destructive of something far finer than themselves, but are purely parasitic on the public, and should be made to pay heavily for the privilege of being so.

There is, of course, a distinction between advertisements of wholly extraneous products displayed on rented sites and advertisements set up on their own premises by a proprietor company. But the distinction is one of assailability, not of beastliness. For example, a jam manufacturer who paints his name and activity in giant (and usually ill-designed) lettering on the walls and roofs of his factory may as effectually destroy the dignity of an urban scene as any miscellaneous hoarding. But if attacked he would immediately (and successfully) invoke that sacred liberty of the individual which, however flyblown it may nowadays be in actual practice, is invaluable as an excuse for selfishness and indiscipline.

³ A particularly blatant example of wanton bullying of passers-by was, at the moment when these words were written, on view in Coventry Street. A vast placard (proudly described as the biggest advertisement in the world) obliterated an entire street corner with the name of an American film.

'A man,' he would observe, 'has a right to do what he likes with his own.'

But is he, in such case, indeed operating wholly with his private property? True that, while speculative agencies deliberately buy the right to disfigure a street corner or a roadside and resell that right piecemeal to various merchants, a factory owner uses his premises only secondarily for publicity purposes. But, inasmuch as he uses them for publicity at all, he incurs a duty toward the community because he is exploiting the community in the interests of his private trade.

There is, therefore, as much justification for public interference in advertising of this kind as in any other; the difficulty is to decide how interference may be made effective. Taxation, although logically applicable, could be so convincingly resisted as to be virtually impossible. The only solution is to secure supreme control by the local authority of the style and blatancy of all proposed publicity within its jurisdiction.

Which brings us to the chief obstacle to any rapid improvement in English conditions, and the sad handicap under which we, in contradistinction to Germany, perpetually suffer. Local authorities in Germany form a sort of lesser civil service. The officials are trained for their job; are taught to consider the demeanour of their town as in itself a thing to be cared for and cultivated. Successful members of the service are promoted from one place to another, and are only exposed to the urgings of self-interest in local administration to the extent that any official is liable to be subjected to outside pressure. But in England the elected local authority is often enough representative of the very commercial interests whose ill-bred self-emphasis so badly needs control. The few trained officials in English local government—the city engineers, sanitary inspectors and the like—are not only far too busy with their specialised jobs to supervise the outward amenities of their towns, but have not the power to override the council or to impose on it a general scheme of urban fitness. Similarly the town clerks and the education directors (who already do much indirect but first-rate civic service by restraining unwise display and diverting councillors along discreet and dignified ways) must rely on tact and persuasion, having, when these fail, no overriding authority. In consequence the English town, in comparison with its German counterpart, has a haphazard, un-coordinated and slatternly appearance; and the inherent mental untidiness of its central organisation is in nothing more clearly shown than in the hotchpotch of discordant and garish advertisements with which it is spattered.

Let us, however, end on a note of optimism. In fairness to the local authorities of to-day and in glad recognition of the very

marked progress made in urban good manners during recent years, it must be said that, in so far as civic control of external amenities is concerned, our prospects are brighter than they have ever been. In numbers of places real attempts are being made to check indiscriminate and tasteless advertising; to improve the lettering on public notices and shopfronts; to secure new buildings in harmony with their neighbours; and generally to educate readers and public alike to practise and to value the deportment of their town as they value deportment in their families and friends.

Wherefore it is the duty of those outsiders who care for these things to hold up the hands of whichever individuals in authority are already fighting for better municipal manners. We can all help in our small way by showing an interest in matters of civic dignity; by applauding good moves on the part of the local authority; by trying to convince the still unconvinced that, because personal good manners are in the long run better business than bad ones, so also a town of well-bred appearance has an advantage over one which is careless of its demeanour, loud voiced in publicity, or selfishly chaotic in development. Further, by supporting such organisations as the Scapa Society and the Design and Industries Association, we can strengthen their growing effectiveness. In default of power to forbid or to censor, these societies, by judicious photography, by public lectures and by the wise use of an unofficial word in season, are contriving to put before a hitherto indifferent public the vulgarity of an advertisement-ridden town, the quiet dignity of one more fortunate. They are also performing the even more urgent service of educating suppliers of materials for public services to improve their designs and raise their standards of workmanship. The bettering of civic printing grows more evident every year. It is to be hoped that makers of metal-plate notices and advertisements will before long begin to substitute real lettering for the late Victorian horrors which are still their principal stock-in-trade.

MICHAEL SADLEIR.

(To be continued.)

THE ANCIENT ART OF THE APHORISM

HAVING reached that period of life which is not undeservedly termed anecdotage, I shall make bold to begin with a story. I am not sure of the precise year; it was either at the end of the effete 'eighties or at the opening of those decadent 'nineties in which a minor poet remarked that he had painfully conjugated the verb *Agnosco* in every mood and tense. I was walking alone along a country road when I beheld a strange mechanical contrivance coming towards me surmounted by the familiar figure of a schoolboy or undergraduate who has since served as a President of the Classical Association. Bicycles I had seen before, but never one like this; and inevitably I murmured—to myself, let me add, so that nobody can confute my tale—'Safety first!' It was thus that I unwittingly gave birth to the now too familiar formula which, at first proclaimed at street corners as a paradox to arrest attention, sank in process of time into a truism, and now through the inattention of mankind is become a paradox again.¹

Everybody has heard of 'copy-book maxims,' but I wonder whether many people nowadays have really seen a child's copy-book with a maxim at the top of the page in a copper-plate hand. Even in my own childhood that sort of copy-book was going out of fashion. I cannot remember that I ever wrote in one myself, though I remember seeing such books, with 'Cleanliness is next to Godliness' at the top of the page, and the childish script getting further from both cleanliness and godliness all the way down.

There! I have made two attempts to begin this paper, and what I am aiming at is not yet clear to the reader, nor perhaps to myself. And at this juncture there comes into my mind—a little late, as you perceive—the wise maxim of the illustrious

¹ When, a few years later, I followed my old pupil's example in the process of acquiring the art I was several times reminded involuntarily of the Virgilian tag—*Antiquam exquirite matrem*. My skill was sadly behind that of another old pupil of mine, who mounted a 'safety' bicycle for the first time from his own doorstep and, being unable either to dismount or to turn except at a very gentle angle, rode for six miles by devious byroads till at last he found himself at his starting-point again, and fell off gracefully upon his doorstep, to the mingled concern and relief of an anxious and non-metaphorical *antiqua mater*.

Jowett, 'Never have a porch to your essay.' So I begin again, and this time without a porch.

I want to inquire what is the virtue of aphorisms, how they differ from truisms and from paradoxes and from slogans, and whether the art of the aphorism flourishes as much in modern times as it did in ancient, and if not, why not. Other questions may suggest themselves as we proceed, but here you have my main objective. And in following it up I propose, for my own pleasure and the reader's, to recall some of the most famous aphorisms of antiquity.

Let me attempt a rough definition of the aphorism at starting, and say that I mean by it a sentence of concentrated wisdom. It depends for its success equally upon its matter and its form, or rather, as in all perfection of style, form and matter are indivisible, indistinguishable. This perfection of style is one thing that differentiates it from the truism. I am disposed to think that one thing which marks the truism is the absence of any salt of style to save it from decay. It wearies us because there is nothing in it save its truth in which we can take an interest, and most of us have but a languid interest in truth. What says Bacon? 'This same truth is a naked and open daylight that doth not show the masks and mummeries of the world half so stately and daintily as candle-light. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure.' It is the mixture of a lie, surely, that makes the attraction of paradox. I exempt from this condemnation, of course, those sayings which are the paradoxes of one age only to become the truisms of the next. Any great writer who discovers a truth utters a paradox in the sense of something which is in conflict with current opinion. It was the special characteristic of Jowett, the dominant personality of my own undergraduate days at Oxford, that in conversation and lectures and sermons he was continually dropping quiet remarks so much as a mere matter of course that you had to turn them over twice in your mind to determine whether they were paradoxes posing as truisms or truisms masquerading as paradoxes. It was this which made them often so stimulating. But I still remember the disconcerting effect with which he would sometimes launch a quite unmistakable truism in those clear bell-like tones which seemed to demand that every word they uttered should be at least as precious as silver. 'It's a good thing to keep accounts' is one such utterance that comes back to me *verbatim* from a sermon in St. Mary's across a gulf of half a century. Even in the Plato introductions, a treasury of wisdom for which I can never be too grateful, there are sayings that have something of the ambiguity which the Delphic Oracle is credited with having deliberately sought. In the introduction to the *Sophist* there is a long passage

on Hegel which, as I have been told, Jowett submitted, in proof or in manuscript, to the criticism of T. H. Green. The story goes that the philosopher was reduced to despair by the vagueness of propositions which he could neither confirm nor dispute.

Few ancient authors are richer in aphorisms than Herodotus. This is the more remarkable because of the simplicity of his style. There is evidently something a little deceptive about his air of *naïveté*.

Egyptian priests could gammon you—
It was not very hard to do.

Do not let us be too sure of this. Think of the concentrated wisdom of *πάλαι τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποισι ἐξεύρηται* (I. viii. 5). A simple truth perhaps, but a truth that each generation in turn is in danger of forgetting. Is it not just here that the main difference lies between the aphorism and the truism? I remember how on my first night in Rome a long-haired young man from Chelsea turned up in the hotel, and plunged into our midst with the question, 'Is there an exhibition of modern art here?' There was silence deep as death, and the boldest held his breath for a time. Then an American young lady, with more wisdom than all men would expect of her age and sex and country, answered him: 'Young man, you are beginning at the wrong end.' Those who saw the Italian exhibition at Burlington House this spring will agree that Herodotus and the American young lady were right. *Πάλαι τὰ καλὰ ἐξεύρηται*.

Simplicity and sincerity are two qualities that will go a long way towards the production of an aphorism. I knew a child of two and a half whom a goodly collection of toys could not save from *ennui* on a persistently wet day. Leaving the nursery, he descended to the drawing-room and flung himself into an arm-chair with a deep sigh and the ejaculation, 'Oh! what's worth it?' Not a bad aphorism, that, born of a poignantly realised experience. My own longer experience of life leads me, it is true, to an entirely opposite conclusion. *Everything* is worth it, I am inclined to say, though I do not put this forward as an aphorism. But indeed the interest of life, of art and of books, of Nature and of humanity, is so inexhaustible that only Tithonus or Methuselah had any right to be bored. On second thoughts, I question whether even they had the right; for neither of them was afflicted with public entertainments, the one legitimate excuse for boredom that I have encountered. Their libraries, however, must have been severely limited: proverbs they had doubtless, but hardly the consolations of the literary aphorism.

Let me return to Herodotus, though only to recall briefly one of his characteristic stories. It is the account of the Samian exiles who came to Sparta to appeal for help (III. 46). In their

intense anxiety they spoke at such length that the Spartans told them they had forgotten the first half of their speech and therefore could not understand the second. The deputation retired, but came again, carrying an empty sack, and merely said, 'Our sack wants corn.' But the Spartans answered them, τῷ θυλάκῳ περιεργάσθαι—that is, 'You might have saved yourselves the trouble of bringing a sack, for we were quite intelligent enough to understand so simple a metaphor without it'—but the Greek says all this in three words.

There is an equally striking example of this merit of condensation in Thucydides. But first—at the risk of boring the reader, or perhaps I should more truthfully say, with the purpose of boring him—let me present some lines by Walt Whitman. I will admit that they do not represent Whitman at his best: he can attain on occasion that concentrated force which is the glory of poetry, just as he can also attain the moving cadences which are of the essence of poetry. But there are times when he attains neither, and his admirers apparently do not miss them; for I have extracted this poem from a poetical anthology.

Nothing endures but personal qualities.

What do you think endures?

Do you think a great city endures?

Or a teeming manufacturing state? or a prepared constitution? or the best-built steamship?

Or hotels of granite and iron? or any chefs-d'œuvre of engineering, forts, armaments?

Away! these are not to be cherish'd for themselves,

They fill their hour, the dancers dance, the musicians play for them,

The show passes, all does well enough of course,

All does very well till one flash of defiance.

A great city is that which has the greatest men and women,

If it be a few ragged huts it is still the greatest city in the whole world.

There you have Whitman; and now turn to Thucydides (VII. 77), the last sentence of Nicias's speech in the day of disaster at Syracuse:—*ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τεῖχῃ οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.* ('Men make the city, not walls nor ships that are void of men.')

I suppose that for concentrated wisdom, the hard-won product of a dispassionate analytic mind brooding upon terrible experience, the two great chapters (82, 83) of the Third Book of Thucydides might challenge the literature of the world. To how many of us did their truth come home in the years of the Great War!—*ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.* ('War, taking away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a stern schoolmaster and assimilates the characters of most men to their circumstances.')

'I must pass over that whole class of Greek poets whose name of 'Gnomic' implies that they specialised in the art of the aphorism. But I do this the less reluctantly because the deliberately didactic and aphoristic poet inevitably tends to platitude, and the platitude is the deadly enemy of that vital force in language for which we are seeking. I prefer to turn to the three great tragedians, each of whom abounds in pregnant utterances. The *Agamemnon* is as full as *Hamlet* of phrases that stamp themselves upon the memory and apply themselves anew at every turn. Of the delicate and wonderful art of Sophocles I cannot bring myself to speak, because the exactly right words have been spoken already by Mr. Mackail: 'Ornament in it is reduced to the lowest dimensions; for the lines and planes of the composition are the ornament. . . . Language produces its effects by reserve' (*Lectures on Greek Poetry*, p. 149). And again: 'One hardly notices the words; they have become translucent; it seems as if the poet who could do these things with these words could do anything with any words' (p. 150).

The first play of Sophocles that I read as a sixth-form boy was the *Ajax*; and, though apt to be impatient at that age with the moralisings of Greek choruses and the forensic logomachies of Euripides, I recall the deep impression which some of the aphoristic lines of Sophocles made upon me: the solemn opening of Ajax's speech, for instance:

*ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται.*

('All things the long and countless years draw from darkness and bury again from the light');

or the moving words of Tecmessa,

χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἢ τίκτουσ' αἰεὶ.

which I was delighted to find nobly rendered in a chapter-heading of *Felix Holt*:

Yea, it behoves a man

To cherish memory where he had delight.

For kindness is the natural birth of kindness.

Whose soul records not the great debt of joy

Is stamped for ever an ignoble man;

or the bitter reflection of Ajax:

*τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ
βροτῶν ἀπιστός ἐσθ' ἑταιρείας λιμήν.*

('For most men the haven of comradeship is unsure.')

Forty years ago I was a guest at a dinner-party at which several distinguished scholars were present. Mention was made of Sir Richard Jebb's translation of Sophocles, and with the

audacity of youth I ventured to criticise the style as unduly artificial. Challenged to make good my criticism, I quoted the rendering of a line in the *Antigonē*: 'Tis witless to be over-busy.'² All, the ladies included, expressed admiration for the felicitous turn, and I was left in a minority of one, reduced to my proper insignificance. Either the next morning, or the morning after that, when I was recovering a little from my discomfiture, I opened my newspaper and found a leading article into which by a *tour de force* a reference to Jebb as a supreme translator was introduced, and as the convincing proof of his felicity was cited the epigrammatic neatness of 'Tis witless to be over-busy.'! It remains to add that I am unrepentant, and have not yet abandoned hopes of founding an United Empire Party to support my view.

I shall not linger over Euripides, because his aphorisms have never appealed to me as have the sayings of Æschylus and Sophocles. It is true that a striking parallel to two of the most beautiful lines in Keats has been found in the *Iphigeneia in Tauris*. This is the line of Euripides:

θάλασσα κλύζει πάντα τὰνθρώπων κακά

Everybody remembers the lines in Keats:

The moving waters at their priestlike task
Of pure ablution round earth's human shores.

I do not suppose that Keats knew the Greek line; but if he did all that is most beautiful in his version is still his own.

And here I think I must leave Greek literature; though, as you see, I have said nothing of Homer, nor of the lyric poets, nor of the Greek anthology, nor of Hippocrates, the learned physician who deliberately cultivated the aphorism, nor even of Plato. Aristotle I omit less reluctantly, because, though he abounds in sentences that might claim the description of aphorisms, I found most of his utterances unattractive in form and difficult to retain in the memory. As for the orators, I do not fancy that, either in Greek or in Latin or in English, one would go to them for the best aphorisms. Burke is a noble exception ('Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great empire and little minds go ill together'). Of course, the orators give us plenty of slogans, down to the 'Wait and see' of one Prime Minister or the 'Ninepence for fourpence' of another. And this reminds me of one more of my ancient memories—the return of Lord Beaconsfield from the Berlin Congress and his boast that he had brought back 'Imperium et Libertas.' I remember how loyal

• ἢ γὰρ
περισσὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐθεὺς.

Conservatives sought vainly through Cicero for the phrase, till at last somebody lighted upon a sentence that contained both words and wrote to *The Times* to say this was doubtless the sentence of which his lordship had been thinking. But there were not wanting sceptical Liberals who opined that he had asked Lord Salisbury the Latin for 'empire' on the Channel crossing; and as for the other word, they whispered a calumnious rumour that he had pronounced it 'libertas.'

What is the difference between a proverb and an aphorism? Mainly, I take it, that the aphorism is literary, while the proverb is of popular origin. Sometimes, of course, a literary aphorism may become so familiar as to pass into a proverb. An example is 'The paths of glory lead but to the grave,' which, according to the schoolboy, a man called Wolfe died shouting at the capture of Quebec. And here I trust I may be pardoned if I digress for a moment to lament the decay in modern England of the popular proverb. Are there any circles where it is still current? Does any English farmhouse to-day possess a Mrs. Poyser? English country life is surely as much poorer for the disappearance of the old proverbial wisdom as for the disappearance of the old country herbal lore, the simples that were of sovereign efficacy for the healing of old-fashioned homely diseases. In part, no doubt, the decay of the proverb is due to the revolt against Victorian ethics or against all ethics, and also to the lessened authority of the Old Testament. That the Proverbs of Solomon should no longer carry to men the tremendous significance of Divine Law is not wholly matter for regret, for the wisdom of the Proverbs is often of a very mundane and self-regarding character and does nothing to lift its disciple into the loftier regions of the spirit. Still, on the lower human levels, what a marvellous collection of sayings have we there! How often must Solomon's teaching in days past have saved men from acts and words of irremediable folly! And as often success or failure in life is due to some quite trifling difference of behaviour, the little more or the little less of courage or tact or perseverance, how often must homely proverbial wisdom have had incalculable consequences for good. There are few of us who are not the better for reminding ourselves now and then of such humble oracles as 'Never cross the stream before you come to it' or 'Never trouble trouble till trouble troubles you.'

It would seem as if humanity must have its tags to repeat. Expel the proverb with a pitchfork, and it comes back in the slogan. Not an improvement, surely. What shall we say of the slogan, 'If it's so-and-so's, you know it is beer!' with its gratuitous insinuation that trade rivals do not provide the genuine article? Or of the reiterated injunction, 'Eat more fruit,' which

we follow so tamely that we are willing to pay fourpence apiece for large but juiceless oranges?

Come we now to the question, which of the two languages, Greek or Latin, is apter for aphorism. On the whole, I pronounce for Latin, mainly for a negative reason, the absence of particles. It is true that Greek particles are wonderfully rich in expressiveness. There was once a Clifton master who specialised in the endeavour to convey their full force; and still the wonder grew that one small head should carry all he knew and expected to be remembered about them. Γε, of course, was 'God wot,' but that translation was not a monopoly of Clifton; it was associated at Winchester with the honoured name of Morshead. But the palm belonged to ἀπα, which meant, as he assured his pupils, 'So it turns out after all.' There came a day when there was a cricket match, and one of T. W. Dunn's form was batting. He thought that he heard the impact of the ball on the wicket behind him, and turning round he exclaimed—no, it was not an English monosyllable, but ἀπα. Self-restraint, concentration, suggestiveness were all in that particle. What a triumph for the grand old fortifying classical curriculum! And yet I recall a phrase of John Addington Symonds—'the twittering reiteration of Greek particles.' He, if any man, had an instinct for style, form, moulded perfection of language; and I am inclined to think that he was right, and that Latin attains more monumental beauty than Greek because the simple dignity of its *sententia* is not broken in upon by particles.

Lucretius complained of the *linguae egestas*, the poverty of Latin speech, with which he had to contend. Yet how magnificent are the aphorisms and the 'jewels five words long' strewn through his great poem. On the very first page are the noble phrases in his Invocation to Venus—'tibi suavis dædala tellus Summittit flores, tibi rident æquora ponti'—words which may have inspired the English nature-poet with the loftiest lines of his *Ode to Duty*:

Flowers laugh before thee in their beds,
And fragrance in thy footing treads.

And still in the First Book is that marvellous passage on Superstition which ends with the unforgettable lines,

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.

It was only the other day that an Englishman wandered through the streets of Vladivostok, sickened at heart by the misery he saw on the faces of the inhabitants. Why were they so unhappy? he asked himself; and came to the conclusion that the cause did not lie in the daily struggle for existence, the very real shortage

of food, but in 'the incubus of the State religion—the dogma that there is one sovereign, exclusive, precise and immutable panacea for all the ills that have afflicted the human race since man became man.'

Nobody can be more religious [he writes] than your militant atheist, though inevitably that is a truth which is hid from his eyes. Think how passionately religious Lucretius was! And there in that darkening room where we were waiting for the train there ran through my head those lines about human life lying abject before the eyes of those who had eyes to see—lying crushed to earth beneath the heel of Religion. Religion was showing her head high in the heavens and covering the earth with her feet. And then a Saviour arose—a Greek—who broke her power by daring to defy her. . . . As I picked up my bag to carry it down to the station I prayed that these poor people, whose harrowed and harrowing faces I should probably never see again, might find their saviour too.*

You will not think, I hope, that I have strayed too far from my subject in citing this example of the power with which the phrases of ancient poetry can come home to one of our own countrymen passing through that strangely moving experience of seeing the agony of a great multitude in a foreign land and being powerless to touch it. It would seem as if the only consolation vouchsafed to him in that hour was the thought of the Roman philosopher moved long ago by that same spectacle of human misery.

I must pass on, and yet I cannot help lingering just one moment more to remind you that to this closely packed passage, a triumph of concentration in poetry, belongs the marvellous phrase 'Flammantia mœnia mundi' which our English Gray, the most classical of all our poets save one, sought to make his own, yet could not quite equal in majestic brevity, 'the flaming bounds of place and time.'

How wonderfully, again, the aphoristic genius of the Romans is shown by this! Ovid is a poor, frivolous, effeminate creature, whose whinings for his well-deserved exile on the Danube draw down upon him at this day the bored contempt of northern schoolboys who flock to the Alps in midwinter to secure more snow than their own septentrional shore can be trusted to provide. Yet this same Ovid can achieve a monument more durable than bronze—five concentrated words of confession—'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor'—five words that contain all that his Jewish contemporary, the great apostle of the Gentiles, was saying in his own immortal sentence—immortal, yet lacking in the supreme concentration of the Latin elegist: 'The good that I would, that I do not; the evil that I would not, that is with me.' And here perhaps I should anticipate the ingenuous

* Arnold Toynbee in *Manchester Guardian*, February 20, 1930.

critic, and explain that I am quite aware that the Apostle Paul did not write his sentence in English.

It was mainly the Fourth Eclogue and the Cumæan Sibyl that led to Virgil's mediæval reputation as a magician, but his genius for aphorisms was at least a contributory cause. This it was which made the consultation of the *Sortes Virgilianæ* a hopeful proceeding. Charles I., according to tradition, lighted upon a dire prophecy of doom. But think how many must have drawn new courage from contact with such a line as

O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem.

And here, as I omitted Homer in his rightful place, let me recall the wonderfully heartening line :

τέλαθι δῆ, κραδίη · καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.*

Or, again, to return to Virgil :

Tu, ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito.†

Or, more finely still :

Aude, hospes, contemnere opes, et te quoque dignum
Finge deo.‡

(' Dare, my guest, to despise riches and mould thyself to like dignity of godhead.')

Tennyson's praise of him is rightly remembered as among the finest compliments ever paid by one poet to another. It is less often recalled in our day that Bacon spoke of him as ' the chastest poet and royalist that to the memory of man is known.'

Whether we turn more readily to Virgil or to Horace for counsel is mainly a matter of temperament. The ampler ether, the diviner air, which ' lumine vestit purpureo,' ' invests with a purple light,' the magical leaves of Virgil, and which, we may feel, rendered so specially appropriate the invocation of the English statesman as he brought to a close his impassioned appeal for the abolition of slavery just when the first rays of dawn entered the windows of the House of Commons—that unearthly atmosphere is entirely absent from Horace. But this may be precisely the reason of Horace's greater power over a different type of mind. On the whole, there is no literature in the world which, in proportion to its small total bulk, furnishes a store of aphorisms

* *Odyssey*, xx. 18.

† *Aeneid*, vi. 95.

‡ *Aeneid*, viii. 364.

§ Parenthetically may I pay my tribute of admiration to the aphoristic instinct of the English schoolboy who gave an unexpected ethical turn to Virgil's simple description of the preparations for an *al fresco* meal—' Subiciunt veribus prunas et viscera torrent'—understanding it to mean ' They prefer plums to truth and burn their insides ' !

equal in popularity to those which are drawn from Horace's Odes and Epistles. Time cannot wither them nor custom stale.

Another Latin poet who practised the art of the aphorism with signal success is Lucan. Had he survived only in quotations of single lines, I imagine that his fame would stand far higher than it does. May not this indicate that Matthew Arnold's favourite test of poetry by the great single lines is not as infallible a touchstone as he would have us believe ? Lucan's single lines are surely unsurpassable in effectiveness.

Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.

Stat magni nominis umbra.

Nil actum credens cum quid superesset agendum.

Perhaps I should call these epigrams rather than aphorisms, since they are shafts aimed at a particular situation. Yet the distinction does not seem very important ; for in each line the particular is universalised, so that we apply it continually to fresh men and fresh occasions.

Persius and Juvenal I must omit, though both are rich in examples. Of Latin prose-writers I presume that Seneca would have supplied the largest number of aphorisms to the Middle Ages. He is out of favour in our own day, but his turn may come again. Four writers of Greek under the Roman Empire—Plutarch, Lucian, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius—hold their ground well under all changes of fashion ; but we must not linger in their company now. Tacitus cannot be passed over even in the most cursory survey, for no greater master of concentrated phrase ever lived. Was more ever said in few words than is comprised in his epitaph on Galba—' Omnium consensu capax imperi, nisi imperasset ' ? Indeed, we have not to go beyond the first page of the *History* to come across so pregnant a phrase as ' rara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quæ velis et quæ sentias dicere licet '—a formula that acquires a new poignancy when we let our thoughts dwell on the condition of both Russia and Italy to-day. Lord Morley has one sentence about Tacitus which puzzles me. He quotes a saying from an unnamed author that, of all writers, Tacitus has the supreme power of putting the reader himself into the confessional. I have walked through Tacitus's grim gallery of imperial poisoners, assassins and informers, and my withers are still unwrung. I hope this is not because I am too hardened a criminal.

Let us pass for a few minutes to the moderns. Lord Morley affirms that French literature is specially strong in the aphorism, English literature correspondingly weak ; and I suppose this to be the general impression. In so far as it is well founded, I will hazard the conjecture that the superiority of the French in the

art is due to their greater faithfulness to classical tradition. It might also be maintained that this aphoristic excellence is merely one exemplification of that lucidity which is the characteristic excellence of French prose. It was a Frenchman, Joubert, who gave memorable expression to the aphorist's ideal: 'If there is a man tormented by the accursed ambition to put a whole book into a page, a whole page into a sentence, and that sentence into one word, I am he.' Joubert did not mean that he was a phrase-maker. 'I polish not my phrase,' he writes, 'but my idea. I linger till the drop of light I need forms and falls from my pen.' There we have the true ideal.

Is it possible to reach this ideal in English? The synthetic languages have an undoubted advantage over the analytic in impressive brevity. That is largely why it is easier to compose a satisfying epitaph or inscription of any kind in Latin than in English. Yet we should frankly admit, I think, that part of the advantage of the ancient tongues is just a little unfair. Nothing could be less attractive or effective as a motto than 'Avoid excess'; but say *Μηδὲν ἄγαν* instead, and the counsel is at once invested with music and dignity and the glamour of antique association. But English literature is far richer in noble aphorisms than most people imagine. Mr. Logan Pearsall Smith compiled a *Treasury of English Aphorisms*⁸ two years ago, and I think that material could be found for more than one equally good collection without using any of the sentences included in his interesting book. His list of authors is as follows: Bacon, Selden, Browne, Hobbes, Ben Jonson, Milton, Donne, the two Fullers, Jeremy Taylor, Shaftesbury, Dryden, Penn, Halifax, Pope, Chesterfield, Swift, Johnson, Gibbon, Hazlitt, Blake, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Sir H. Taylor, Emerson, George Eliot, Arnold, Bagehot, Jowett, Stevenson, Samuel Butler, Creighton, Churton Collins, Santayana. I presume that Shakespeare and the English Bible are omitted because they might not have left room for anybody else. But there are other notable omissions: Ascham, Sidney, Steele, Addison, Gray, Goldsmith, Burke, Reynolds, Cowper, Lamb, Carlyle, J. S. Mill, Ruskin, Seeley, Arthur Helps, the authors of *Guesses at Truth*, George Meredith. In proportion to the total bulk of his writings Bacon perhaps yields the largest crop of aphorisms—not in the Essays merely, but also in the *De Augmentis*. But Hazlitt, in my judgment, ranks very high on the list. In spite of his lapses into prejudice, the splendid sanity and wisdom of his outlook on life and men and books are such that Charles Lamb must have been right in that generous tribute which he paid in a time of estrangement: 'I should belie my own conscience if I said less than that I think W. H. to be, in his

natural and healthy state, one of the wisest and finest spirits breathing.' 'Most of us have probably at one time or another given similar praise to R. L. Stevenson. For the courage and cheerfulness with which he fought heavy odds of illness one can never admire him enough. Yet it must be said that his philosophy wears somewhat thin as a man grows older. Rub the gilt off his aphorisms, and you are apt to find that nothing much is left. Let me take just one example—the last sentence of his admired essay on *Walking Tours*: 'And whether it were wise or foolish, to-morrow's travel will carry you, body and mind, into some different parish of the infinite.' Cancel the last three words, which are a felicitous and suggestive touch, and yet of the nature of superfluous trimming, and what remains? 'To-morrow's travel will carry you, body and mind, into some different parish.'

Although not a little prose-writing at the present time, especially descriptive writing, reaches a high level of competence, few would maintain that good aphorisms are at all common. The aphorism is, as a rule, the fruit of slow meditation; and few books of the present day are produced slowly. The journalistic practice of paying by the thousand words is not favourable to the aphorism. How much would Joubert, with his passion for condensation, have earned in a day? The Dean of St. Paul's has the temperament, the ability, and the literary taste that are wanted for the making of aphorisms; but he said good-bye to all that when he joined the staff of the *Evening Standard*. I am not disposed to be despondent about literature; but whilst this is a good age for experiment, it is not a good age for the maintenance of tradition. And I fancy the aphorism thrives best among those who read *multum non multa*, and train themselves on the great classical tradition.

It is time that I drew to a conclusion; and what shall it be? Lord Morley, in that delightful paper on Aphorisms to which I have referred, gently conducted his hearers to a conclusion more consoling to their modesty than stimulating to their ambition. Did any of them cherish the purpose of writing aphorisms? If so, his advice to them would be, Don't. I presume neither to follow nor to dispute so illustrious an example. I content myself with reflecting that it is better to read the aphorisms of the wise than to attempt to compose rival aphorisms of one's own. Πάλαι τὰ καλά ἐξεύρηται. It is not easy in this late age of the world to discover new truths; and to trick out old truths in new finery is but a sorry business, though it is less pitiful than the invention of paradoxes whose only claim upon the attention is their bold denial of the truth. But to seek out choice pearls from the literature of the ages is a happy employment of time, and the

⁸ London (Constable, 1928).

wisdom that we garner in this way is not without its uses in daily life. It tends to serenity and to kindliness, not to cynicism. Perhaps its main drawback is that it does not conduce to fluency either in writing or in conversation. He who has learnt to love such utterances of concentrated wisdom as we have glanced at in our hasty survey will scarcely have at command the small change which is the current coin of daily converse. It is probably something more than a coincidence that the great Jowett, whom I have mentioned as a notable practitioner of the aphorism, was apt to strike a chilly awe into social gatherings, not by barbed shafts of caustic wit, but more often by perfectly amiable, yet wholly disconcerting, silence. And so, as I fold my manuscript, I seem to hear my readers drawing from their oracles the hackneyed but appropriate comment: 'I knew 'twould be a bald conclusion.'⁹

⁹ *Comedy of Errors*, II, ii, 110.

J. H. FOWLER.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12, Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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THE IMPORTANCE OF STANLEY BALDWIN

THE circumstances of the time appear to have placed Stanley Baldwin in a position of greater importance than that of any which has been occupied by an Englishman for many generations. For, if we dismiss from our minds all the petty details of present political and industrial controversy, the fundamental problem, to which an answer of some kind must be found almost immediately, is the question whether a democratic parliamentary constitution can be preserved in this country. It is at length becoming clear, even to those who have made no serious study of the matter, that democracy is a peculiarly unstable form of government, since it inevitably engenders the very bacilli which are ultimately fatal to it. In one country after another parliamentary government has putrefied, languished, and died. Nor is there any reason whatsoever to suppose that the more bracing atmosphere of Great Britain will enable democracy to withstand the auto-toxins which have destroyed it elsewhere, unless there is present a condition to which I shall make reference later.

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The two main factors which inevitably destroy democracy are closely associated, and are respectively moral and economic. The overthrow of parliamentary institutions is practically impossible while any considerable proportion of the nation holds Parliament in respect. For, in such circumstances, any attempt to effect a *coup d'état* will be met with armed resistance by men who are determined to preserve an institution which they not only honour for its dignity and glorious traditions, but value as the symbol and guardian of their political liberties. But when those who compose the personnel of Parliament are such that they can rightly be regarded with indifference or even contempt, then no man will risk his fortune or his life in the defence of an institution which is manifestly dying through its own rottenness.

Again, if we regard the matter from the economic point of view, we find that unrestrained democracy based upon universal franchise almost inevitably produces a complete breakdown of credit and industry. Demagogues, for their own ends, teach the electorate that the nation may successfully consume more than it produces, and may continue this process indefinitely, provided that votes are used to maintain the charlatans in office. When the crash comes, when every form of inflation has been recklessly employed to avert the inevitable disaster, and when the most urgent thought of the citizens is not whether one political party or another shall receive their votes, but rather whether they themselves will receive their dinner, then their love of political liberty and their desire of self-government disappear in a night, and any man who wishes to do so may enslave them, if only he will restore order from economic chaos and thus enable them to live. Why did the Russians welcome the tyranny of Lenin, and the Italians that of Mussolini? Was it not that unbridled democracy under Kerensky in the one case, and hopelessly corrupt political parties in the other, had squandered the national capital in buying votes so recklessly that men at length understood that bread could be bought only at the price of liberty? If a further drunken helot is demanded, let the doubter regard the present position of Australia, where the locusts of the towns have devoured the crops of the primary producers, and now appear to be about to take a final plunge into the flaming trench by compelling the inflation of the currency. Can Australia ever regain her balance so long as the town proletariat dominates the real producers by its votes? and is there any escape from ruin except through unconstitutional action by the latter?

Yet many who now avert their shocked gaze from the wild orgy of political folly in Australia, and have held up their hands in horror at the similar folly whereby Russia was ruined, entirely fail to perceive that exactly the same drama is being played by

the politicians of their own country before their very eyes. They forget that inflation is a plank in the platforms of all three British parties. Inflation by tariff is now the accepted policy of the Conservatives; the more pernicious form of inflation represented by borrowing for relief works is the latest of the national pestilences which we owe to the inventive genius of Mr. Lloyd George; while the Socialists have their plan for ruin swift and sure in their advocacy of the policy of taking the printing presses from the control of the Bank and handing them over to the demagogues. In each case the object is the same. Each party wishes to gain the support of the ignorant voter by offering a political nostrum which will cure economic evils without any thought or exertion on the part of the patient, and enable the rake's progress to continue. The Conservative Party has discovered that small subcutaneous injections of cocaine gave relief from pain in sundry outlying portions of the body politic, and now prescribes similar injections over every square inch of its surface. The Lloyd-Georgian Party has observed that alcohol has a stimulating effect, and proposes, therefore, to nourish the patient entirely upon methylated spirit. While the Socialists wish to administer a gallon of prussic acid in order to induce a painless and calm condition.

In each case not the least attempt at diagnosis is made. Symptoms are treated, and we are assured that no one need have measles if he will consent to have the spots carefully whitewashed. Yet everyone knows where the real trouble lies, and knows also that it can be overcome at once if the patient can be persuaded to submit to the painful operation which alone can give permanent relief. Let us examine the origin of the trouble.

We have an unemployment crisis, and we industrialists are forced to turn our workmen out on the streets. Why? Because we cannot sell our products. Why? Because the price is too high. Why? Because the cost of production is too great. Why? Because political and trade union action has prevented wages from being lowered when prices fall, has cut off the replenishment of capital which might have been used to furnish the equipment required if artificially raised wages must be paid, and has added an immense burden of taxation to the standing charges of our industry. In other words, the unemployment crisis is the direct result of the solidifying of wage-rates. If wages were perfectly liquid, the wage-earner might sometimes fail to get a living wage; but he would never be unemployed. If wage-rates were solidified at a high enough figure he would never be anything else but unemployed.

Before the period of real political corruption, which began in

1910, the trade unions were able to give wage-rates a degree of solidity which prevented the starvation of the worker. If, as frequently happened, the unions misjudged the situation, a certain amount of unemployment arose. But the depletion of trade union funds by the latter soon indicated where the mistake lay, and adjustments usually followed quickly. Wage-rates were liquid enough to render disaster avoidable. But the system of political corruption (termed with unconscious truth 'Unemployment Insurance,' because it insures that there shall be unemployment) has eliminated all possibility of adjustment. For its sole object is to prevent wage-rates from declining when prices fall. It achieves this object by protecting the wage-rate of the man who is in employment from the competition of the man who is out of employment. But it does this by forcing the former to provide for the sustenance of the latter. That is to say, only part of the product of the worker is available for sale, while a part is handed over to the non-worker. This, with a fixed wage-rate, naturally increases the cost of the portion available for sale, restricts its market, and forces more men out of employment.

In a country fully organised by trade unions, a really complete system of unemployment insurance, particularly if introduced at a period of inflation, must in the very nature of things ultimately and inevitably produce universal unemployment. In Great Britain at the present time we have reached the point at which an arithmetical progression in the unemployment returns is on the verge of becoming a geometric progression. We are nearing the complete breakdown of industry and the collapse of our credit system. Various methods of currency inflation may for a short time be useful for staving off the inevitable. But their utility depends entirely upon their effect in reducing real wages while leaving money-wages intact, and the recent history of Australian industry proves that political trade unionism will quickly sit upon that particular safety-valve and prevent it from giving relief.

Industry is powerless to save itself, and at length people are beginning to realise that the grip of politics upon it must be relaxed if economic chaos is to be avoided. But this is a matter of almost insuperable difficulty under a democratic constitution. The non-workers have votes and are gradually reaching a position where they will possess an actual majority over the workers. It is easy enough to start a great nation on the road to ruin with 'ninepence for fourpence,' but it is fearfully difficult to turn it back as it rushes to dissolution. Other nations, following similar policies, have saved themselves at the very brink of destruction by violently overthrowing democracy and depriving the people of political liberty. It may be that we shall also find revolution

the only possible remedy, and that, in spite of our long experience of parliamentary government, even we will be unable to make democracy other than fatal. If revolution is unavoidable, I am but one among many who are prepared to make it. In my humble capacity I have done my best to secure the lives and liberties of the workers, and, if democracy makes it impossible to preserve both, I hold the opinion that we must devote our efforts to preserving the former, even if it happens to involve the loss of our own.

Having now traced (I trust with perfect demonstration of the sequence of cause and effect) the connexion between Mr. Lloyd George offering ninepence for fourpence (or fivepence per vote—which is the same thing) and myself (or those who disagree with me, for the gods are capricious) hanged on a lamp-post, I would remind the reader that there is one condition under which the breakdown of democracy is no longer inevitable. The two main factors which induce an anti-democratic revolution are, as has been stated above, the loss of respect for Parliament owing to the contempt earned by politicians and the economic chaos produced by the earning of that contempt. If politicians are not contemptible they will not produce economic chaos, and, moreover, the people will ward off the attacks of revolutionaries on a Parliament which commands respect. The survival of democratic institutions depends, therefore, upon the character of politicians, as Plato pointed out some time ago.

Now, it is a remarkable fact that in Great Britain at the present time there is only one politician whose name is familiar to the general public and who is generally believed to place the public interest, as he understands it, before all other considerations. There are others equally worthy of confidence whose names are known to this or that section of the people. There are others who probably have more statesmanlike qualities and, it may be, a more correct appreciation of what is to the real advantage of the nation, combined with a no less genuine desire to pursue such a policy regardless of their own interest. Most of us could mention a few names of such persons. But they are not generally known, or likely soon to be known, to the public. Some of them will probably rise to high office in the future, and may even become great and loved leaders of the people. But this at least is certain, that the nation at the moment knows but one politician *omnium consensu capax imperii*, and is content to leave the future historian to add or to omit the rest of the quotation as he may think fit.

Let the reader understand that I express no opinion as to whether the public instinct in this matter is a true one or not. Indeed, that question does not really enter into the matter, and,

if it did, might be debated *ad nauseam* without final agreement. The importance of Stanley Baldwin at this juncture arises from the fact that it was unnecessary for me to mention his name when writing the last paragraph. If he were in reality the greatest charlatan that has ever deceived a nation with empty promises, the fact remains that the people as a whole have confidence in him and in no one else. His position is singularly like that of Lord Kitchener in the early days of the war. The reader will remember the feeling of genuine relief which came over us when we learnt that Kitchener was to be placed in charge of our military forces. His policy has since been the subject of drastic criticism, which, in many respects, was perhaps justified. But the fact remains that his presence gave us confidence which would otherwise have been lacking. In the same way, Stanley Baldwin has the confidence of the nation in the present crisis, and certainly no one else has it.

In August 1914 it was obvious that hundreds of thousands of us would be obliged to undergo hardships such as we had never before imagined and that a stupendous national self-sacrifice was demanded. We were willing to fulfil that demand, but we wanted a man to give the order, and we got one. In December 1930 the nation is faced with what is perhaps an even more urgent demand for self-sacrifice. Whether we are equally willing to fulfil this new demand is doubtful. At the least, it is certain that we shall not do so unless we have a man to give the order, and for my part I know of only one who can do so with any hope of an effective response. It is doubtful whether even he can induce us to save ourselves. For it is an unfortunate fact that, although men are ready to suffer untold hardships and even death itself for the sake of their country's honour, they never show an equal readiness to live within their incomes for that same ideal. But surely the attempt should be made.

If political liberty is to be preserved in Britain, two things must be done and done quickly. Confidence in Parliament must be restored, so that men will defend it against its enemies from whatever quarter they advance to the attack. And the poisonous system of pauperising the people must be rooted out. The latter task can never be effected without revolution unless the former has first been achieved. How, then, shall the good name of Parliament be restored? The past records of the individuals composing the Socialist Party are such that it is utterly impossible for them to be regarded with confidence, quite apart from the fact that they have rendered it obvious that they have no belief in the theories which they publicly advocate. Indeed, Socialism is to the Socialist Party no more than what Free Trade is to the present degenerate remnants of the Liberal Party—a useful

election cry well calculated to produce a good number of votes : *vox et præterea nihil*. Again, no sane man could look to Mr. Lloyd George for the restoration of Parliament's good name ; such a suggestion would raise derisive laughter in any company. Hence we are driven to the conclusion that only the Conservative Party can cleanse the Augean stable of present-day politics. But that party is terribly hampered by difficulties which may prevent it from carrying out its task.

In the first place, it contains a considerable number of persons of acknowledged probity, tested courage, and by no means inconsiderable intelligence, but living in a world which has completely disappeared. They and their forbears have served the nation both in peace and war, but their service to the country has always been a form of service which has placed them in positions of authority and of privilege. They do not, and cannot, understand that the present crisis is such that all privilege, all right to take command over their fellows, and even all material wealth, may have to be surrendered if the people are to be saved from the ruin which unbridled democracy has prepared for us. There was a period during the war so critical that some of us gave up all the claims to commissioned rank which our military experience justified, and went back to the humblest positions in the Army. There was a period after the war so critical that some of us, who are owners of industrial undertakings, gave up for ever all claims to the profits of the concerns which we had built up out of nothing. Perhaps we were mistaken, and perhaps we threw away our own chances without in any way helping the country in its troubles. But, whether we were right or wrong in those past crises, I am convinced that the circumstances of the time and the safety, honour, and welfare of the people of Great Britain now demand entire self-sacrifice, and complete renunciation of privilege on the part of those who by birth and education are the natural leaders of their fellow-countrymen. This is no time for pointing out that the terrible position in which the working classes now find themselves is the direct result of their own greed and folly expressed at elections. Terrible suffering awaits them, and they are our own people. What, then, does it matter to us that the fault was theirs? We must help them, and above all we must eliminate the vile demagogues who have led them into this morass.

The second great difficulty of the Conservative Party is due to the existence in its ranks of a group commonly known as the 'Forty Thieves.' These persons are a constant menace to the party and to the whole system of parliamentary government. To my mind, there is only one way to extirpate this malignant tumour, and that is by the deliberate adoption of the policy of refraining from interference with the industrial and financial

affairs of the people. If there is nothing to be 'wangled' it is certain that the 'wangers' will disappear, and the whole atmosphere of the Conservative Party will be cleaner and healthier. When the Liberal Party abandoned Liberalism and Free Trade twenty-five years ago it prepared a place in Parliament for the 'Forty Thieves' on the one side, and on the other for the trade union and co-operative society members who are likewise in Parliament with the sole aim of loading the dice to give unfair advantages to those sections of the nation which pay them to do this dirty work. A real Conservative Party should endeavour at once to repair the damage done by the Liberals.

As for the other enemies of clean politics, they are more of the nature of evanescent bug-bites than permanent dangers, for the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. And even in that sad event, canonisation is assured if we produce the files of the newspapers which they own. For the *advocatus diaboli* before the Congregation of Rites can do nothing in the face of such evidence, particularly as he will lack the moral support given by the presence of a client who will be otherwise engaged.

There is one more difficulty which the leader of the Conservative Party must surmount before he can hope to increase the confidence of the nation to a degree great enough to enable him to pass the drastic and unpopular measures which alone can save the country from ruin. This obstruction is what we know as the 'Old Gang'—which is to say, the colleagues who have proved their incapacity in high office. One, *laus Deo*, has gone to the limbo of incompetent Ministers, and another must surely be sent thither the first opportunity. Towards another the conventional attitude is that he is more damaging as an enemy than as a friend. But surely the history of the last Conservative Administration has finally exploded this legend by showing that it is impossible for him to surpass as an enemy his devastating effect as a friend. In addition, two, and possibly three, others must go before the 'Old Gang' can be regarded as effectively broken up. But will that infinite capacity for suffering fools gladly, which caused the *débâcle* in the election of 1929, again persuade the leader of the Conservative Party that he can fight successfully when hampered in every movement by the dead weight of the 'Old Gang'? Does he realise that the points of those knives, which at present produce a pleasant tickling sensation between his shoulders, will sooner or later be thrust home? The task before him can never be carried out with second-hand or shop-soiled colleagues, and the country, with a true instinct, is asking why no use is made of the splendid material to be found in the ranks of the Conservative Party. Indeed, the demand for younger Ministers is becoming so insistent that, in a year or two, even the

highest office in the State may be filled by a man who has not completed his eighth lustrum.

Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. There is only one man in politics to-day whose name is familiar to the people and who is trusted by them, no matter how keenly they criticise him. If economic chaos and revolution are to be avoided, the whole corrupt system based upon the principle of ninepence for fourpence must be broken down at the earliest possible moment. No politician unknown to the public, and no politician who is distrusted by the public, can perform this task, and herein is to be found the importance of Stanley Baldwin. A second appeal to the better feeling of the electorate may meet with a more satisfactory response than the first encountered. But if it does not, the resources of civilisation will not have been exhausted. For if democracy cannot be cured, at least it can be killed.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

FROM REFERENDUM TO FREE HAND

FOLLOWING a previous article in this Review,¹ the more recent vicissitudes of the Preference movement are now to be discussed likewise in the light of its past history, which already extends to thirty years of continuous activity. In so long a period—with one political generation succeeding another and such an event as the Great War intervening to obliterate the past—it is inevitable that the earlier phases of the movement should be unknown to the new generation of electors and forgotten by most of the older. Yet the historical perspective is necessary for judging the practical importance of any fresh developments which may appear in the foreground from time to time. With this aid one may, for example, avoid mistaking a vicious circle for a line of progress.

I. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE

In contrast with all previous occasions, this year the British Government entered the Imperial Conference not only with trade worse than at any time within living memory, but when the policy of Preference had lately been approved by organised bodies representing all sections of our economic life. Besides the usual resolutions from chambers of commerce and others there were significant pronouncements from quarters previously hostile. The Trade Union Congress displayed the new attitude of the wage-earners; the Federation of British Industries at last could testify that not only by count of heads, but by analysis of trades, its members were now overwhelmingly in favour. Even Finance, the silent citadel of Free Trade, had emitted a manifesto confessing that, since foreign countries were plainly not going to abandon protection yet, Empire Preference was the right policy for us. While home opinion had thus been converted wholesale to the necessity of a new fiscal policy, the Dominions, desperately hard hit by the slump in prices, were more eager than ever before that Britain should give them a reciprocal Preference. In spite of all this, their earnest overtures have again met with a blank negation, again thinly disguised with the pretence that there are 'other

ways' than tariff preference still to be explored with the intention of doing something.

Surely the real issue is no longer the policy of Preference, but our party system itself, which alone now stands in the way of the consummation which all the Britannic peoples desire. Each of the three parties has now had its chance and proved its incapacity. Each in turn, while protesting its eagerness to develop Empire trade, has pandered to popular superstition by abjuring 'food taxes,' and has taken refuge in the pretence of 'other ways.' In 1902 the Conservatives began it, when they repealed the general duty on imported wheat, which was hurting nobody. But at that time their only notion of an alternative plan was to leave trade out of account and ask for naval contributions. In 1907 it was the turn of the Liberals. Championed by their new recruit, Mr. Winston Churchill, they let him shout to the world that they had 'banged and barred the door.' It was this session that witnessed the real birth of the 'other ways' fallacy, which has so often been revived. How absurd, have protested the embarrassed Free Traders time and again, to pretend that you cannot have an effective policy of Empire development without 'taxing food'! In 1907 their great idea was 'communications'—*i.e.*, subsidised steamship lines and on the 'all red route.' But nothing had been done when the next session came round in 1911. Then the Liberal Government played the usual card. A 'Dominions Royal Commission' was charged to investigate every possibility 'consistent always with the fiscal policy of each part.' So a select body of worthy gentlemen spent several years in touring the Empire at the expense of the British taxpayer. They produced a very voluminous and interesting Report. To it may be traced the origins of the Imperial Economic Committee, and of other 'Imperial' research bodies now existing; but nothing more substantial. Reading between the lines of their Report, the real conclusion of this Commission plainly was that while 'other ways' could be devised in plenty, none of them could be worth much except as supplements to tariff preference, implying duties in Britain on competitive food imports.

The War Conferences of 1917 and 1918, to which may be added the meeting in 1921, brought a belated recognition by Britain of the principle of Preference. The Government being a coalition, all three parties were nominally committed. Besides the old revenue duties on sugar, tea, etc., the new duties which had been put on in the war afforded the means of applying the principle at once. But the small range of imports so affected did not include the products most important to the prosperity of settlers in the Dominions; which are dairy produce, meat, corn, and fruit.

¹ 'Preference and the Referendum' (May 1930).

The Coalition having been dissolved in 1922, it fell to the Conservatives to conduct the Imperial Conference in 1923 on their own responsibility. Thus they obtained their second opportunity. They thoughtfully anticipated it by pledging themselves at the preceding election to introduce no 'fundamental change' of fiscal policy in the lifetime of the next Parliament. When the time came all they could do, by way of reciprocating the admittedly valuable fiscal preferences of the Dominions, was to promise preference on a few side lines, such as canned fish. That was better than nothing—had it ever been carried out—but hopelessly inadequate for a party which had gone to the country with Empire development in the forefront of their programme. Willing the end, they had renounced the means. Therefore at the Conference the quest of 'other ways' had to be resumed. The lead was taken by Australia, Mr. Bruce being ready to test the Socialist ideas which were so widely favoured in his own country and in Britain by the Labour Party. Accordingly a special Committee was appointed to examine in particular the policy of State control of imports through a licensing system and, in conjunction therewith, bulk purchase from the Dominions by the State in Britain of food imports required to supplement home production. Since similar proposals in another guise have been revived by the present Government as something new, it may be well to repeat a summary of the 1923 Committee's conclusions:

Prohibition of imports, accompanied by licence or State purchase, would throw producers, merchants, shipping companies and everybody into perpetual and paralysing uncertainty; whereas 'if you have a tariff, everybody knows what the tariff is.' State purchase would tend to raise prices without any corresponding benefit to the Exchequer, and the responsibility of arranging what prices should be paid would be 'far too invidious to be borne.' In practice, moreover, as was seen during the war, State control of prices meant control at a level favourable to the least efficient producer; and the existing excessive middlemen's charges were, the committee observed, partly a legacy of the high prices fixed by the State in the war period. But while condemning these proposals the committee agreed 'emphatically' that, in the interest alike of producers and consumers, the profit margins should be kept as small as might be reasonably possible. The way to achieve this was to be found, they suggested, in the closest co-operation both between the Governments and between trade organisations in the Dominions and Britain. The Governments could help, for example, by furnishing better statistical information.

Thus once more the fallacy of the 'other ways' theory was exposed, leaving the policy of tariff preference where Chamberlain had placed it twenty years before, as the *sine qua non* of Empire development.²

The conclusion after 1923 that in fact there are no 'other ways' did not require to be confirmed by another waste of time

² *The Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 148-9.

in 1930. No doubt there may be use for non-tariff devices, ranging from scientific research to subsidised transport, statutory quotas, and perhaps even State purchase. But none of these can bring any adequate expansion of Empire settlement and Empire trade unless foreign imports are to be restricted. And to effect that restriction the method of tariff preference alone has the advantage of being a proven method, familiar everywhere outside Britain. Moreover, it provides for its own expenses, generally at the cost of the overseas seller, instead of demanding a further levy on British taxpayers to finance it. For example, the Imperial Economic Committee, which was set up by way of compensating the Dominions for the unfulfilled promises of 1923, was endowed with an income of 1,000,000*l.* a year, to be provided by direct taxation of ourselves. It now appears that the present Government has promised some further assured income to the Empire Marketing Board from the same source. There is no 'equality of status' in this; but no doubt Dominion statesmen may regard it as something given in return for their unilateral preferences.

On the economic side the Imperial Conference which has lately ended appears a strange and tragic repetition of 1907. As though the clock had stood still for twenty-three years, the records of these two sessions might be changed about, without any obvious violence to history. In 1907 the Dominions were led by Australia; in 1930 Canada resumed at length her proper place; but that is the only difference. In 1907 Deakin's fervent and outspoken advocacy of Preference anticipated Mr. Bennett's. Deakin's exposition of the policy as National Protection modified by Imperial Preference put it on the same basis as Mr. Bennett's postulate of 'Canada First.' In both cases we find the leading Dominion well supported by the others, though Laurier, as a French-Canadian, was always restrained by the sense—which the others took for granted—that Britain, too, had a right to put her own interests first. In both cases we note the warning of the Dominion Ministers that persistent refusal must ultimately drive them to seek markets elsewhere, implying increased purchase of foreign goods at the expense of British. In either case one consequence of banging the door has been to stimulate the idea of inter-Dominion trade agreements apart from Britain—only to show, by the results hitherto, how comparatively little scope there really is for this.

On the negative side Mr. Snowden had already anticipated the Conference with his declaration that he intended to abolish all the existing import duties which enabled Preference to be given. Only an inability to sacrifice so much revenue at once prevented him in his first Budget from emulating the Conservative

Government of 1902 and actually putting Preference back to zero after thirty years. The sole success of the recent Conference is that it has contrived to exact from the present Government a promise to maintain these threatened preferences for another three years. An immediate response was made by South Africa, in Mr. Hertzog's promise to maintain likewise the British preference in South Africa for the same period, despite the implications of his recent treaty with Germany. This illustrates the spirit which was present, if only our Government had been intelligent enough to respond.

But it is not only in the vista of the Imperial Conference itself that we see Preference in the rut of a vicious circle. We have now to trace the reactions of the Conservative Party to events since the spring. In the previous article we have seen how the pressure of Lord Beaverbrook's crusade, with its single objective of a tariff on foreign food, had induced Mr. Baldwin to adopt the revived proposal of a referendum. Then we had the new comedy of Lord Rothermere trying to herd the simple crusaders into his own pen of '100 per cent. Conservatism.' Though labelled 'United Empire Party,' it gave quite a minor place to 'Empire Free Trade.' To disentangle the crusade from the awkward embrace of his friend—who had helped to enrol its members through the *Daily Mail*—Lord Beaverbrook was constrained to return all the subscriptions and, after a decent interval, solicit them afresh through his own newspapers. The fact that the movement seemed to emerge all the stronger from such shocks of ridicule and dissolution was surely a striking testimony to the strength of its popular appeal.

Meanwhile Lord Beaverbrook was complaining—though history could have warned him—that the referendum was being used by Conservative headquarters as a way of avoiding rather than facing the vital issue of taxes on foreign food. This charge being true, the party leader had to attempt further manœuvres. A weak point in Lord Beaverbrook's position was that he advocated the duty on foreign wheat as, incidentally, protection for the British farmer. At Worcester, on August 3, Mr. Baldwin argued, quite reasonably, that no duty less than 1*l.* a quarter could be effective for protection. A duty on that scale, he feared, might enable Dominion growers to corner the market and exploit the British consumer. He therefore proposed to protect the British farmer without any tariff, by imposing a certain 'quota' of home-grown wheat on British millers, who would be required to pay a guaranteed price for it, to be made up by a State subsidy. As for Preference, he repeated his proposal to negotiate a draft treaty with the Dominions and submit it to the people. Whether it would involve 'food taxes' he still avoided saying. But he

tacitly dropped the referendum, leaving it to be understood that the draft agreement would be submitted at a general election instead. Here, again, Mr. Baldwin was only following the footsteps of the pre-war leader, who likewise had slid from 'referendum' to 'double election.' The latter proposal avoided the constitutional objections to the former. But it did not meet the more practical objection, that you can hardly expect the Dominions to say 'exactly' what they will give in return for what, until you are equally in a position to fulfil your side of the bargain without undue delay. Lord Beaverbrook has been right all along in asserting that you must first get a mandate to tax foreign food. No doubt that is what Mr. Bennett meant when he stipulated, 'First, accept the principle.'

There was now no course open to the crusaders but to go straight ahead and run their own candidates for Parliament, wherever there might be any prospect of success. This would generally mean attacking Conservative seats, especially in the south and in rural areas. An opportunity came in September with the by-election at Bromley. Here the United Empire Party jumped the claim, putting up a candidate who was strong on Lord Rothermere's special points,³ but a little ambiguous about food taxes. He polled better than expected; and might have got in, his supporters declared, had not Lord Beaverbrook refrained from helping him.

The Bromley experience was a jar to the party, but there was worse to come. A similar vacancy soon arose in South Paddington. The official candidate, a local alderman, failed to satisfy either section, apparently pledging himself turn-about to the official policy of 'no food taxes at the next election' and to the contrary demand of the crusaders. When the latter began to look for an independent candidate, party headquarters felt that something must be done. On October 16 was published a letter from Mr. Baldwin to the party chairman, Mr. Neville Chamberlain. The Imperial Conference, which had been in session a fortnight, gave him a convenient peg. In view of the 'extreme urgency' of Preference, so Mr. Baldwin wrote, he no longer had in mind 'any suggestion of a referendum or a second general election.' The party would go to the polls next time 'with a programme to which the electors will be asked to give their final and definite assent.' Although, as Mr. Bennett had stated, the details of an Imperial policy could only be worked out by consultation between experts, the Conservative Party accepted 'the principle of

³ The list has varied at short intervals. Lord Rothermere evidently holds, with Mr. Baldwin, that policy is the prerogative of the party leader, who may change it from day to day if he likes. Hitherto his principal points have been: a high tariff on imported manufactures; drastic economy; and no more surrender in India or Egypt.

Imperial Preference contained in his proposals.' The case of each article was to be examined separately. But as to wheat he had a definite suggestion. This was that the quota system he had already promised to the British farmer should be supplemented by a quota of Dominion wheat, thereby not only giving a guaranteed market, but also 'a completely effective antidote, which tariffs alone would not supply, to the dumping of Russian or bounty-fed wheat from foreign countries.' It would have, he added, the additional advantage that it could be worked through the normal trade channels, avoiding 'import boards or bulk purchase by the State, to which we are unalterably opposed.' In regard to other commodities, 'the results of our investigations may well show that either in addition to or in substitution for tariffs there are other effective means of translating into action the main principle.' But the party would be willing to discuss 'in the most sympathetic spirit' any other proposals besides its own.

In now proposing a Dominion wheat quota Mr. Baldwin may have felt that he was not only serving 'party unity' by again dodging food taxes, but the interest of the country by indicating a plan which the Government might adopt with the prospect of Conservative support in the House. At any rate, at the Conference this plan was given special attention by the economic committee under Mr. Graham. Though their report is inconclusive, it hardly suggests that the quota would be quite so easy to work or effective in result as Mr. Baldwin asserted. To the layman its operation as outlined seems extremely complicated and bound to require some special machinery to supervise the 'normal trade channels.' The Dominion price would still be the world price, fixed by foreign 'dumping' as before. The only apparent advantage of the quota is that it might facilitate the direct exchange of so much Dominion wheat, at the world price, for so much British goods. But in comparison with this device the well-tried tariff method is simplicity itself. Naturally the Dominions prefer the latter because it would give them scope for capturing a larger share of the British market by their own enterprise, instead of subjecting them to the arbitrary decrees from time to time of a Board which, theoretically omniscient, could only guess at world conditions ahead and would inevitably be subject to political pressure.

In the party Press Mr. Baldwin's pronouncement was hailed as the policy of the 'free hand,' doing away with any vestige of excuse for 'splitting the vote' in future. But, once bitten, twice shy. The chief crusader was quick to sound the alarm. Mr. Baldwin had not yet said that at the next election he would seek a mandate to impose food taxes; and the quota could be no

substitute, anyway. As had so often happened before, ever since 1902, the Conservative leader's carefully chosen words were open to the suspicion of trying to have it both ways. Either the Food-Taxers or the Free-Fooders were going to be let down; and experience knew which. On the very next day a gallant Vice-Admiral was commissioned to carry the banner of the crusade in South Paddington. Meanwhile the United Empire Party had nominated a lady. But Lord Rothermere—who had lately handed over the new party to a committee—bade his friends in South Paddington support the Admiral, thus atoning handsomely for Bromley. Together the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express* rejoiced that there was to be 'no splitting of the Empire vote'—ignoring the official Conservative. As the contest proceeded the Admiral, vigorously supported by Lord Beaverbrook in person, was seen forging ahead. Once more Mr. Baldwin had to move another step. In a letter to the official candidate he wrote:

In approaching the Dominions . . . we shall be free to adopt any and every method conducive to the development of Empire trade, including the taxation of foreign foodstuffs . . . as the greater includes the less, our policy embraces the Empire crusade proposals, and there is no excuse for dissensions within the Conservative ranks.

Still he had not said that at the next election (not the next but one) the party would seek a mandate to tax foreign food. The Admiral held his course. But there were also ugly signs further afield of growing discontent with Mr. Baldwin's 'weak' leadership. Accordingly a party meeting was held on October 30, being the eve of the Paddington poll, in hopes of both scotching the Admiral and stopping the rot. Mr. Baldwin was to give an address and then retire for a vote of confidence to be taken. Restating the policy—which he declared must always be a matter for the party leader alone—he complained, 'my hand has been forced throughout the year.' He had been unwilling to commit the party to 'taxation of food' until he was sure that 'we were going to get something for it.' But now the Imperial Conference had resolved his doubts. 'For the first time we learnt that the Dominion Prime Ministers were willing to do business.' So he had come to adopt the 'policy of the free hand.' Nevertheless, when he left the hall, out of the 578 selected representatives no less than 116 voted to depose him. It could only have been an angry gesture. There was no one to succeed him who could command throughout the country so wide a respect, not to say affection. And any new leader must soon have found himself equally helpless in the grip of 'party unity'—as the pre-war 'whole-hoggers' found out after they had discarded Balfour for Bonar Law. But if Caxton Hall failed to stop the rot, neither did it scotch the Admiral. On the morrow South Paddington put

him at the head of the poll, with a generous margin over Mr. Baldwin's henchman.

Those who like straightforward politics must hate the system that can choose a leader for his honesty in order to corrupt it. How else can one excuse Mr. Baldwin's audacious pretence that now 'for the first time we learnt that the Dominion Prime Ministers were willing to do business'? For the past thirty years they have shown themselves only too willing to do business whenever we might be ready. As to Canada in particular, Laurier's original offer of 1902 has been lying on the table ever since, awaiting our willingness to tax foreign wheat. It was on precisely the same lines as Mr. Bennett's. Let us recall that Laurier (a) specified the market for wheat as Canada's special interest; (b) required our Government first to 'accept the principle,' *i.e.*, of putting—or rather keeping—a duty on foreign wheat; and (c) offered on that basis to negotiate in detail an extension of British Preference in Canada. Mr. Bennett offered no more and no less.

But if a leader who is the slave of 'party unity' and can only move under its dictation is bound to disappoint some of his followers, he is equally liable to be let down himself. In October a vacancy occurred at Shipley, a Yorkshire constituency in the distressed area of the textile industry. It had been a Labour seat, gained, as usual, by a minority vote in a three-cornered contest, with the Conservative second. The local Conservative Association now brought out a candidate who concentrated on 'safeguarding' the textile industry, and declared quite definitely against taxing food. Just when Mr. Baldwin was hoping to dish the Crusaders with his new policy of the 'free hand' the party candidate at Shipley was flatly rejecting it; and won the election. This time the Crusaders had not intervened. Of course the local managers claimed that the repudiation of food taxes had done the trick. So we must expect that most of the party candidates in the north will follow this lead when the next election comes. What, then, will be the party's position if returned to power? It will still lack the 'free hand.' Mr. Baldwin, who has already approved Mr. Bennett's invitation, might go to Ottawa with a view to negotiating a detailed agreement. Either the negotiation would fail, or it would require the taxation of food. If he brought back a draft agreement he could proceed no further without another appeal to the country. Fully twelve months would thus be consumed. Such being the prospect, what becomes of his recent plea that Preference is now a matter of 'extreme urgency'? Nor can one forget that following the rebuff in 1907-11 came the great fight in Canada over the proposal of unrestricted reciprocity with the United States, which was barely defeated. If the

approach of the American election should give rise to a fresh proposal of that kind, who can be certain that Canada would reject it again?

Round the taxation of food, which has always been the key to Preference, the Conservative Party is seen to have wandered in a vicious circle. After thirty years of abject grovelling to the 'little loaf' it has lost capacity to confront the bogey which it has been content to accept from its opponents at face value. But Preference is, indeed, a matter of urgency, as never before. In its economic aspect it is the only still untried means of restoring our trade position; and already South Africa's treaty with Germany shows that Dominion warnings were seriously meant. Apart from that, among actual policies it alone—or, at least, pre-eminently—effectively asserts the unity of the Empire, by claiming for the Britannic Commonwealth *as an international entity* the privileged right of its member States to trade between themselves on privileged terms. Since in most other relations the Imperial Conference has virtually adopted the theory of divided or multiple monarchy, which legally implies independence, there is nothing substantial left except Preference to preserve the principle and practice of unity.

II. THE LINE OF PROGRESS

The same history which exposes the fact of the vicious circle indicates with equal clearness where the line of progress would lie. To move in company with 'Canada First' we must have a policy of 'Britain First'; not—as so many either demand or complain—'the Empire First.' To that extent the Free Trade diehards have really been sounder than the Conservative leaders, who keep on assuming that we must consult the Dominions before we do anything. Even Lord Beaverbrook, apparently, would not exercise the mandate he wants for taxing foreign food until he had consulted the Dominions. But in these thirty years, during which all the Dominions have established an effective system of Preference, there is no instance of any of them ever consulting the British Government before proceeding to revise its own tariff. Why should Britain alone be deemed unable to do the same without consulting the others?

The answer is, of course, that all three parties in Britain have hitherto assumed that, apart from Preference, we can have no need for a tariff on imported corn, meat, dairy produce, and fruit; and further, that any such duties must be a hardship on the consumer. Hence has arisen the doctrine, which has become traditional, that we can only put on these duties if the Dominions will make it worth our while. Surely the time has come to reconsider these assumptions. To-day it is common knowledge

that (a) a huge deficit of revenue is in prospect; (b) the ratio of indirect to direct taxation has been continuously falling as expenditure has increased; (c) this expenditure is largely represented by social services for the benefit of those who do not pay direct taxes, including many who, if they neither smoke nor drink, pay hardly any indirect taxation either; (d) the consequent weight of direct taxation has become an excessive charge upon productive industry, increasing its costs and preventing the accumulation of necessary reserves; (e) the world competition for the food market in Britain has become more intense than ever, foreign competitors shrinking from no sacrifice to obtain or retain it.

With these points in mind, let us consider the possibilities of broadening the basis of indirect taxation, and incidentally establishing Preference. The following estimate of revenue is based upon official figures⁴ of the values consumed in this country, distinguishing home-grown, Empire and foreign supplies:

	Home.	Empire. (£ millions.)	Foreign.
Wheat (flour)	10.6	30.8	29.5
Meat	98.6	38.2	85.7
Poultry and eggs	22.2	6.1	16.3
Dairy produce	62.5	32.6	33.3
Potatoes, etc.	31.3	3.2	10.0
Fruit (orchard)	8.5	3.4	7.4
Fish	15.2	1.9	7.7
	248.9	116.2	189.9
Preferential duty, 5 per cent. =		5.81	
General duty, 10 per cent. =			18.99
Total revenue =	24,800,000 <i>l.</i>		

If we include also oats, barley, and maize we have in sight an initial revenue approaching 30,000,000*l.* There is no reason to suppose, considering the world competition, that a 10 per cent. duty would restrict the volume of imports, and thereby raise prices, which would stimulate further production at home. Since there is nowhere else at present for the world surplus to go, 'dumping' would continue as before, unless checked by special measures which lie outside the scope of a revenue tariff and the present discussion. At least until world consumption began once more to overtake production the main incidence of these duties would be on the oversea producer, who for his own part habitually assumes that this would be the result. If so, the new revenue would represent a contribution from the countries which

⁴ *Report on The Agricultural Output and Food Supplies of Great Britain (1929, p. 31).*

export to our market; just as our own export trade, cutting profits to overcome tariffs abroad, is forced to subsidise the exchequers of the States concerned. In short, to an extent constantly varying with the conditions of supply and demand, the new revenue would be 'non-tax,' and therefore a real relief if used to reduce the direct taxation which inevitably comes out of our own pockets. But even without any rise in prices the British farmer would at least have the satisfaction of seeing his competitors, Dominion as well as foreign, paying a toll for the upkeep of the common market. As to the Empire rebate, the effect would certainly be a gradual increase of Dominion supplies at the expense of foreign. In proportion to this effect the revenue would decline. To maintain the revenue we should have to revise the tariff from time to time, increasing the preferential rate of duty. That would be an appropriate occasion to negotiate with the Dominions. But a generous measure of reciprocal Preference would have been established at once without the delay, trouble and uncertainty of any consultation at all.

No doubt the thirty years' history forbids the hope that any of the three existing parties will now adopt the fiscal reform which responds to the crying needs of Britain first and the Empire next. But all three are seen to be torn with internal dissension, and discredited in the eyes of the country. Surely the opportunity now exists for all advocates of either Protection or Preference to join forces in a campaign to return independent representatives to the next Parliament. The bold initiative and great resources of the much-abused 'Press barons' can hardly be taken as exhausted yet. Both Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook are manifestly patriotic, even if they lack faith in Mr. Baldwin; whose denunciations of them at least testify to his own belief in their power. Both are fully alive to the national emergency. Surely they could now unite their respective followers on an economic platform combining protection of manufactures, revenue duties on all imported food competing with our own, and drastic economy. The proposal *not* to exempt Dominion produce should secure the adherence of the National Farmers' Union, whose executive hitherto has stood aloof and suspicious.

But more is required than material resources. A new spirit in leadership is called for. After thirty years of the dear-food bogey, which was a purely political invention, it has come to be assumed by all party managers that the electorate consists mainly of a half-starved proletariat. Like the Roman rabble, it is held to be concerned only for free food and amusement, and certain to reject any policy which, however necessary to the national welfare, might conceivably exact the price of a glass of beer or a picture ticket. Thus do the politicians tacitly sum up the social

result of the expenditure we have lavished all these years on education and social services. In no other civilised country do they take so mean a view of the citizens they have created. Surely they are wrong; but at least let the British electorate be put once to the test—which has never yet been done—before the damning judgment is accepted. The due leader of 'Britain First' should venture the novel appeal to individual self-respect and national pride. Otherwise the old party leaders might as well be left undisturbed to compete once more in degrading the community with their pauper's gospel.

Given the new kind of leadership—known in the war—the suggested campaign should attract the support of many organisations and a host of individuals from all classes throughout the country. Considering the popular disgust with the three existing parties, 'Britain First' might emerge from the impending election numerically the strongest party in the new Parliament. Having passed a Budget on the lines indicated, the new Government could go to Ottawa for the Economic Conference next year with reciprocal Preference an accomplished fact, and with the means in hand to make agreements for extending and stabilising it on tariff principles which would at last be common to all the Britannic States.

RICHARD JEBB

POLICY IN PALESTINE

THE Government's recent statement of policy on Palestine has been attacked by the Zionists and their supporters both at home and abroad. Little mention has been made of the basis of that statement, which is Sir John Hope Simpson's Report on immigration, land settlement and development. Criticism, however, always makes more savoury reading than policy, and it is probable that far more people have noticed the complaints than have studied the statement itself. Thus it seems worth while to examine the Government proposals in the light of the treaty obligations of Great Britain, and of actual conditions in Palestine up till now. Such an analysis proves that the Government's view of our obligations does not vary from that of its predecessors, and that its political plans are also the same. What is new is an economic programme designed to fulfil a part of our duty in Palestine which hitherto we have neglected.

It is impossible to ignore the importance of the ante-natal history of our treaties regarding Palestine, for the war pledges created in the Arab and Jewish races hopes and claims still maintained. From 1915 on the Arabs were incited to disaffection from their rulers by promises summed up by the Allies in their War Aims Note to Washington of January 1917 as 'the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks.' Messages were dropped in Palestine from 1917 on, calling upon the Arabs to fight for their liberty. The correct interpretation of the famous McMahon letter of 1915 would provide a nice textual problem—even if it had been officially published. Admittedly it promised Arab independence, but while the Colonial Office in 1922 declared that a reservation excluding the district west of Damascus applied to Palestine, the Arabs argue that the western boundaries, named as the Red Sea and Mediterranean, included Palestine. It must be, incidentally, one of the queerest geographical aberrations even of the Staff, if a British general meant the Jordan when he wrote the Mediterranean. What is not in doubt is that the Palestinian Arabs believed that we promised them independence, a belief confirmed by the Covenant of the League.

The war promise to the Jews of November 1917 was public, since it was designed to enlist the support of Jews everywhere, and especially in the United States. This was the famous Balfour Declaration, promising a 'National Home in Palestine for the Jewish people,' it being understood that the rights of non-Jews in Palestine should not suffer. In view of the immense variations of interpretation given to the Declaration, it is interesting to note that the English Zionists asked for a text promising 'The reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people,' and that this was refused. Many aspirations, however, from a religious foyer to a Jewish State, have found cover under the Balfour Declaration, and it is embodied in the Mandate.

Treaty texts are dull, but the main provisions governing Palestine are so seldom correctly quoted that it is necessary to give them in full. Even Sir John Simon and Lord Hailsham, in writing to *The Times* in support of the Zionists, quoted selected chips of the Mandate—a method appropriate, perhaps, to the great advocate seeking authority to prove his case, but scarcely so proper to a judge whose business it is to marshal the whole relevant law.

The treaty texts which concern the present controversy are :

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1919)

Article 22.—(1) To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

(4) Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

THE MANDATE (1923)

Preamble.—Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them, and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Manda-

tory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

Article 2.—The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 6.—The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Article 11.—The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country, or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish Agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as those matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration.

The objects of the Mandate, therefore, are the welfare and development of the native people and recognition of their independence, and the National Home for the Jewish people. The means detailed are the development of self-governing institutions, Jewish immigration and settlement, limited by the provisoes that the civil and religious rights and the economic position of the non-Jews are not to be prejudiced, and administrative control of natural resources and the land system in the interests of the whole community.

Both the Covenant and the Mandate which embodies the pledges of native development and adds the National Home are solemn international engagements. It should be added that the Covenant is the senior and governing treaty, by virtue of Article 20, which abrogates all obligations inconsistent with itself and pledges members of the League not to enter into inconsistent future

engagements. Added provisions of the Mandate, therefore, are valid only in so far as they do not clash with the Covenant.

Those people who talk glibly of the Balfour Declaration as though it were the only British engagement regarding Palestine are greatly under-estimating our pledges. And the difficulties involved in those obligations leap to the eye. They can only be simplified by arguments such as those used by the Arabs—that the Balfour Declaration is incompatible with the welfare of their people, and that its inclusion in the Mandate is therefore illegal under the Covenant and should be denounced by the Mandatory. The Zionist simplification is to assert that the Balfour Declaration supersedes the Covenant and that the pledge of native welfare, if it should impede the establishment of the National Home, is not meant to be carried out. This reasoning inverts the Mandate, which limits every National Home clause by the proviso that it is only to be established in so far as it does not damage native interests.

The British Government has always, however, affirmed that both sets of promises existed and must be carried out. The October statement adopts the definition which the Permanent Mandates Commission formulated last June as the essence of the Mandate :

- (i.) 'The obligations laid down by the Mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight' ;
- (ii.) 'The two obligations imposed on the Mandatory are in no sense irreconcilable.'

This position tallies exactly with that held by British Governments since 1922. None has denied the Covenant or Mandate. Mr. Churchill, in the 1922 correspondence on Palestine, explained to the Arab Delegation that the Balfour Declaration involved an interpretation of the 'independence' clause of the Covenant different from that adopted for Irak and Syria. Seeing that the majority of the Palestinian population opposed the Balfour Declaration, a national Government would render the fulfilment of that pledge impossible. But Britain was ready to grant to the people of Palestine the greatest measure of independence consistent with fulfilment. Thus he recognised the Covenant as binding, although its application was deflected from the normal course by the Balfour Declaration. The Government then issued a statement defining its interpretation of the National Home under the Mandate, of which the key-sentences are :

The Government 'would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*.

... But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance.'

The reception of this statement was significant. The Arabs rejected it, claiming still that the Balfour Declaration was inconsistent with the Covenant. The official Zionist Organisation accepted it, welcoming the statement that the Jews were to be in Palestine 'as of right.' The more extreme Zionists, those who say that a National Home means nothing if not a Jewish State, split away from the official policy of acceptance, and, because of their desire to revise the statement in a more Jewish sense, are called the Revisionists.

Lord Balfour, when the Mandate was approved by the League of Nations Council in 1923, said that it had been represented that the interests of the Arabs were not sufficiently safeguarded ; but the most anxious attention had been paid to the position and interests of the Arab populations by the British Government, and there was no wish or intention that the provision of a Jewish Home in Palestine should in any way injure the best interests of the Arabs. Every precaution had been taken that the provision of a Jewish Home should not encroach upon the interests or susceptibilities of any section of the population. The material prosperity and moral interests of all the people concerned could not fail to be advanced by the course which the British Government intended to pursue.

The duality of Palestine obligations has been clearly defined by the Mandates Commission. In its first Report on Palestine in 1924 it said that 'according to the fundamental principle of Article 22 of the Covenant the paramount duty of the mandatory Power was to ensure the development of the mandated territories by administering them in conformity with the interests of their inhabitants. On the other hand the Mandatory was instructed to fulfil the Balfour Declaration.' The Mandate was a 'two-fold duty.' This Report was accepted by the Conservative Government then in power. It is therefore fair to say that the present Government's acceptance of the 'double obligation' does not vary by a tittle from the doctrine of previous Governments.

But treaty obligations must be applied, and there's the rub. The October statement makes concrete proposals, both political and economic. On the political side it proposes to carry out the intention announced by Mr. Churchill in 1922 to foster a full measure of self-government by gradual stages. The Legislative Council suggested is exactly the same as in the 1922 scheme : eleven official members, including the High Commissioner, and

twelve elected members, consisting of eight Moslems, two Christians, and two Jews. The Government say sternly that they mean to defeat attempts to circumvent the plan by appointing councillors if the elections fail; and the High Commissioner is to retain power to keep order and fulfil the Mandate.

Much water has run under the bridge since 1922. At that time the Jews took part in the elections; the Arabs largely boycotted them, and they had to be declared null. Then an appointed Council was tried, which also failed because Arabs would not serve on it. An Arab Agency similar to the Zionist Agency was offered and rejected in 1923. The Administration fell back upon purely bureaucratic rule, with its advantage of oligarchic efficiency (power was concentrated in the hands of the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary, and the Attorney-General) and its drawback of lack of contact with the feelings of the people.

Meanwhile an interesting change-over of racial attitude to this situation has happened. The Arabs have always claimed a democratic constitution in fulfilment of the Covenant. This would, of course, enable them to control immigration and the National Home. It was refused in 1922 and again in 1930. But, while their first reaction was to refuse any share in working the Mandate, they have come to feel that even a restricted measure of self-government is desirable to counter-balance the influence which they all believe is exercised against their interests by the Jewish Agency in London and Palestine. They seem inclined now to accept the Legislative Council. The Palestinian Jews, on the other hand, welcomed the abortive elections of 1922. Their mood was then one of assured optimism, voiced by their chairman, Dr. Eder, when he told the Commission of Inquiry on the 1921 riots that there could only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the members of that race were sufficiently increased. Later, however, the doctrine of the 'Jewish majority' evolved—an aim voiced by Mr. Sacher, the chairman of the Zionist executive, as well as by Mr. Jabotinsky, the Revisionist leader, in evidence before the Commission of Inquiry on the 1929 riots. This ideal presupposes, as Mr. Jabotinsky explained, that self-government will be delayed until the Jews have attained the majority of the population, so that under a democratic constitution the Jewish policy will always prevail. The settler Jews seem, on the whole, to dislike any self-government at present, and they have threatened to boycott the elections. The international Zionist Organisation, beyond a statement regarding the 1922 policy that nothing was further from its purpose than to prejudice in the smallest degree the civil

and religious rights or the material interests of the non-Jewish population, has preserved a discreet silence on its further political aims, and is also silent upon the present policy.

To sum up the political problem. There is little doubt that the limited interpretation given to the National Home is a disappointment to most Zionists, and totally unacceptable to many. They cannot be expected to surrender their dear dream of the Jewish State. This must account for their frequent misquotation of the Mandate, which is an attempt to convince others, and possibly themselves, that their full claims are justified. It is the basis of the policy of trying to create a Jewish majority by immigration. On the other hand, the maintenance of the National Home policy certainly involves a breach of the Covenant. No definition of independence known to history is compatible with holding down a people by military power in order to force upon it an immigrant nation to whose presence and claims it is solidly opposed. So say the Arabs, and with justice; nor can final autonomy in a mixed State, when the National Home is securely rooted, be considered a fair compensation for the denial of the right of all free peoples to control entry to their country of an alien race. The Shaw Commission of Inquiry was right in saying that one of the fundamental causes of the 1929 riots was the disappointment of the Arab political and national aspirations. The disappointment is final, for the Arabs never can be independent; the National Home prevents it. In this difficult situation the British Mandatory has to do as best it can. Its compromise of a Council with limited powers is necessary, because bureaucratic absolutism in a land whose very babies lisp politics, in Arabic and Hebrew, is an impossible form of government. The people must have some responsibility and outlet for their opinions. Alternatively we must line Palestine with troops and have military rule, which is repugnant to modern political ethics; and most expensive.

It is on the economic side that the Government statement marks a new departure. Three reports of recent years have thrown light upon the economic obscurity of Palestine. In 1928 the Report of the Joint Palestine Survey Commission—the Report on which the enlarged Jewish Agency was constituted—examined the situation from the Zionist point of view. The Shaw Commission of Inquiry into the 1929 riots, persuaded that the anti-Zionist Arab feeling was due to economic fear as much as to political disappointment, asked for an expert inquiry into the possibilities of land development in order to check the creation of a landless peasantry. The Government accordingly sent Sir John Hope Simpson to examine the situation on immigration, land settlement and development. His Report contains far-reaching

recommendations on which the Government has founded its land policy. The basis is a verbal quotation :

It can now be definitely stated that at the present time, and with the present methods of Arab cultivation, there remains no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish agencies hold in reserve.

The statement goes on to say that it is the duty of the Administration to ensure that the position of other sections of the population is not prejudiced, and, subject to that condition, to encourage close settlement of Jews on the land. To attain these objects a more methodical agricultural development is called for.

Only by the adoption of such a policy will additional Jewish agricultural settlement be possible consistently with the conditions laid down in Article 6 of the Mandate. The result desired will not be obtained except by years of work. It is for this reason fortunate that the Jewish organisations are in possession of a large reserve of land not yet settled or developed. Their operations can continue without break, while more general steps of development, in the benefits of which Jews and Arabs can both share, are being worked out. During this period, however, the control of all disposition of land must of necessity rest with the authority in charge of the development. Transfers will only be permitted in so far as they do not interfere with the plans of that authority.

The details which follow are a *précis* of the Hope Simpson proposals ; and they mark the beginning of an active land policy, aimed at securing the livelihood and improving the cultivation of the Arab cultivators, and thereby to gain by intensive culture room for additional Jewish settlement. The full implications of this policy can only be realised by reading Sir John Hope Simpson's Report (with a map). Everyone should do so ; it is excellent reading, and the more convincing in that its main conclusions on fact, and some on policy, are confirmed by the Jewish Joint Survey Commission's Report.

An active land policy in Palestine will be new indeed, as a retrospect of our government shows. We took over an agricultural country in the state of dereliction known as the ' Turkish blight.' Two-thirds of its people were peasants, capable and hard-working farmers, but victims of a land system under which all the profit wrung from the soil went into the pockets of landlords and usurers. They were too poor to improve their mediæval methods. Some were small-holders, the majority tenants who could be turned out at the will of their landlords. There were also colonies, German and Jewish. The 13,000 rural Jews were chiefly settlers in ' P.I.C.A.'¹ colonies subsidised by the Rothschilds. They were refugees from the oppressions of Eastern Europe ; as a rule they acted as merchants and hired Arabs to do

¹ Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association.

the actual cultivation. Wages were low, but the Arabs were allowed to remain on P.I.C.A. lands. They were better off than under some Arab landowners, and their relations with their employers were excellent.

After the war the great flood of Zionist colonisation set in. Their settlements have increased from five to fifty-two. Inspired by a passionate belief that the National Home must strike roots, they cultivate the soil themselves. Land is bought with subscriptions from world Jewry to the Jewish National Fund as ' the inalienable property of the Jewish race.' Only Jews may inhabit it, and the Arab tenants are evicted. If he hires non-Jewish labour the colonist may be turned out. The colonies are subsidised ; only one, Kfar-Yeheskiel, is self-supporting in a limited sense. The Jews, divorced for ages from the soil, have naturally wasted much money and effort in training themselves. But with boundless enthusiasm, modern equipment and teaching, and money behind them, they promise to produce a true peasantry. Already their holdings show great agricultural advance by contrast with Arab farming, as is always the case with rich modern colonies set in a poor and backward land ; though in some things, such as irrigated orange-culture, the Jews have merely copied Arab methods.

Palestine, then, has seen Jewish land purchase, often at inflated prices. The Arab landowner has been enriched ; the fellah has been evicted. The Administration has done nothing, reasoning, in the realistic British way, that if it left the land to the free play of economic forces capital would win, the Jews would get the land, and their settlement would be encouraged. In effect, except for prices, the *régime* has suited the Zionists very well. All Palestine was theirs to buy, and their attitude was fairly summed up by the Joint Survey Commission's Report : ' The possibilities for Jewish settlement are limited by the supply of cultivable land in Palestine.' It was, of course, dead against British colonial tradition to leave the peasants helpless. Yet three successive ordinances, all so feeble that they indicate little intention of seeing that the fellah was protected, have been, in practice, dead letters. For instance, from 1921-29 the law directed that tenants whose holdings were sold over their heads by landlords should retain enough land to support their families. This law was evaded by the landlord evicting first and selling the land as vacant, or by inducing the tenants to go for a money compensation. The Jewish purchasers must have been cognisant of these dealings. A typical case was the sale of the Valley of Esdraelon by the absentee Sursock family. This is the best stretch of cornland in Palestine. Its sale depopulated twenty-one out of twenty-two villages of cultivators ; the District Com-

missioner considers that 6000 people lost their livelihood. The Jews gave 30,000*l.* compensation to some 800 tenants, and have sought to prove that the whole population is settled elsewhere; but of 688 Arab families they can only list 379 as now cultivating the land.

In any case, the result of the *laissez-faire* British system has been the creation of Jewish reserves. In Palestine this is emphasised by the peculiar terms of the Zionist land purchase and leases. But history relates no instance of land acquired by colonists returning to native ownership, so that this position may be regarded as normal. Conditions in Palestine, however, are abnormal, being dominated by land shortage. The country is chiefly desert and infertile hills, and partly plains. The cultivable hill country, reckoned by the Hope Simpson Report as 612,500 acres, is already tilled to the last inch, and the Report holds out little hope of its improvement save for some forestry and fruit-growing with Government help. Here it agrees with the Joint Survey Commission, which recommends that the Zionists should attempt no further hill settlements, as they cannot pay. The fertile land in the plains capable of intensive, and in certain areas of irrigated, farming is given as 1,023,500 acres. The Jewish holdings of some 321,250 acres are almost all in the plains, so that they may be counted as owning a third of the fertile soil. The Jewish cultivating settlers are about 18,300, or 3600 families, with an average available acreage of 86 acres per family. The Joint Survey Commission says that 40 to 80 acres are necessary for a dry farm—preferably at least 60. It gives also the possible farms of Palestine as 33,000 irrigated and 50,000 non-irrigated, and the rural population as 446,000, or five people (an average family) for each possible farm. In the orange groves of the coastal plain $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 acres will keep a family. The Hope Simpson Report says that outside the Jewish areas the remaining land is 1,314,750 acres; the number of cultivating fellahin families is 61,408, and of landless fellahin families is 25,572. The area required to maintain a fellahin family decently is $32\frac{1}{2}$ acres. But if all the land were divided between the cultivating families, only $20\frac{1}{8}$ acres is available; and if the landless families were added, $15\frac{1}{8}$ per family. The number of peasants who have been rendered landless by the Jewish land purchase is uncertain, but it must run into thousands, and the land which would normally have been available for their development, and has passed into Jewish hands, is cut off from them for ever.

Neither the Joint Survey Commission nor the Hope Simpson Report counts the Beersheba Plain in the south nor the Huleh Swamp as available for immediate development; because the first would need expensive well-boring, the second even dearer drainage.

In view of the desperate situation of the fellah, Sir John Hope Simpson suggests that a Development Commission should be set up, consisting of a British chairman, an Arab and a Jew, to carry out a great scheme of land settlement for both Jews and Arabs. This will involve control over all sale of land (expropriation if necessary), the redistribution of peasant holdings, the granting to them of occupancy rights against eviction, their education in intensive cultivation. The scheme would cost 60*l.* per holding; and if Jews settled demand more money and equipment than is allotted, they must get them outside the Government scheme. Land credits and co-operation should also be organised. Years of work will be needed, but Sir John believes that by the economy in land resultant upon intensive culture the landless Arabs can be settled and room found for 20,000 families from outside. Meantime the Jews can continue settling their lands; more than half the Zionist holdings are still untitled.

Now, the drawback of this plan, from the Zionist point of view, is that it will prevent land purchase for the meantime and the growth of the Jewish 'islands' in the country. Its advantage will be that it is the only hope of allaying the dangerous hatred and fear of the Arab people, who all believe that the Jews mean to push them beyond Jordan out of their country. For the Government it means that it is at last, by carrying out Article 11, beginning to fulfil the second of its obligations in Palestine, to further the welfare and development of the natives, and see that their economic position is not prejudiced. This duty, so far, Britain has disregarded. It is interesting that the Permanent Mandates Commission, in June, strongly recommended Government land development to help the Arabs, in the interests of both races.

Space forbids detailed consideration of the whole of the Government statement on such matters as security. But its provisions on immigration must be dealt with. Since 1922 Britain has reiterated that Jewish immigration must be limited by the absorptive capacity of the country, and that it must not cause unemployment, a principle accepted by the Zionists. The Hope Simpson Report indicates that some Arab employment has been created by the National Home. But apart from the fellah, there is serious unemployment among trades such as camelmen, stonemasons and carpenters, displaced by Jewish competition. Moreover, the General Federation of Jewish Labour not only insists on the exclusive racial system of the Zionist colonies, but works for the substitution of Jewish for Arab Labour in P.I.C.A. colonies, and sees to it that Jewish industries employ Jews only. This is fair enough in cases where money is subscribed for Jewish enterprises. Where a visa is asked for an immigrant to fill a permanent job, it will of course be granted. But when the

immigrant, after temporary employment, will be thrown upon the general labour market, the Government is obviously right in saying that it must 'reduce or if necessary suspend Jewish immigration until the unemployed portion of the 'other sections' is in a position to obtain work.' Zionists have read extraordinary meanings into this—for instance, that all immigration is to be stopped. It only applies, of course, to the category of workmen under the Labour Schedule, and fears should be calmed by the recent permit for 1500 immigrants, which does not indicate any departure from the policy of the White Paper, but merely follows the principles laid down on p. 136 in the Hope Simpson Report.

The problem of Palestine and of the National Home has always been quantitative. How large can the Home become, allowing for the development of native welfare? How many settlers can a tiny land hold whose population at its present rate of increase will have doubled in thirty-five years, and which is too hot and too short of power for much industrial development? There is a moral dilemma for Zionism involved; is it right to press for increase, even if that means hurting the Arabs, or should the purity of the unselfish Zionist ideal be preserved even if it means a smaller National Home? It is difficult for the Jews to admit limitations. They feel an almost religious fervour for the National Home, and, like all people who combine desire and ideal, tend to think that the end justifies the means. To outside observation, however, the patriotism of the Arab is as worthy of respect as that of the Jew. In any case, the duty of Great Britain is clear, if difficult; we cannot defraud the native race for which we are trustees, and we must establish the National Home. The only way in which we can balance these obligations is to create peace between Arab and Jew by an active development of the country, for the benefit of both nations, such as the Government proposes. When this is begun we shall for the first time be fulfilling our whole duty under Covenant and Mandate.

FREDA WHITE.

INDIA: THE SUPREME OPPORTUNITY

It would be agreed, I think, by everyone associated with the Round Table Conference that the proceedings of the opening days produced a remarkable and very encouraging change of atmosphere. Before November 12, so far as my experience went, it was the rarest thing to meet any informed man in London, whether British or Indian, who would confess to being hopeful. The assertion was made, positively and in many quarters, that there was no possibility of any general agreement among the Indian groups. It was said that the gulf between the Hindus and the minority communities was being widened, that either the rigidity of the Princes or else the extremism of the political left wing would create an early deadlock, that the Conference might break up within a fortnight. It was said, further, that the fact of the Government's going into the debate without a definite programme must prove fatal. The forecasts, indeed, were more melancholy than anyone could recall in connexion with the many conferences of the past ten years. This article is being written at the end of the first week of plenary sessions. In commenting upon the events or prospects of the Conference I must, of course, be cautious. But I begin with an emphatic word of hope in the Round Table. Its task is appallingly difficult, but I am convinced that, given certain conditions, it could succeed, and succeed in a notable, even an impressive, degree.

The ceremonial opening in the Royal Gallery of the Lords was an extraordinary occasion, and it made an irresistible appeal to the imagination. Compared with an imperial Durbar at Delhi, it was, of course, a sober affair, but in actual significance it was infinitely more impressive. In no other country than England could a parallel assembly be convened. He would have been an insensitive Briton indeed who could witness unmoved this gathering of Princes and Indian statesmen, lawyers and councillors, agitators, social reformers—some of them representing communities which had never before permitted one of their members to cross the sea. There was no pageantry. Apart from the silent entry of King George, who wore morning dress and did not even seat himself upon the throne before beginning

to read the royal speech, there was no ceremony. This was a conference for business—for business, of the highest moment; and the first thing one noticed was that the sense of urgency found expression in every one of the speeches. When the Maharaja of Kashmir said that neither Britain nor India could afford to have the Conference fail, he was saying in the fewest words what everyone present knew to be the plain fact. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is a man for a great occasion. There were many who expected that he would deliver an inaugural address containing a fine gesture towards India. There were certainly not a few who believed that he would give some indication of a more or less positive policy as a lead to the Conference, although as a matter of fact the Prime Minister's caution, at the Lord Mayor's banquet and elsewhere, had shown quite clearly that he could not do this. He preferred to be colourless in style and studiously general in terms—except that he indicated, in a word, that the proceedings of the Round Table Conference were not to be public.

The surprise of the opening day was twofold. It came first in the substance of the brief speeches from the Princes, and secondly in the challenging unanimity with which the delegates from British India, and especially Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the Moslem leader from Bombay, sounded the note of Equal Status in the British Commonwealth and Dominion self-government. The utterances of the four political delegates who spoke in the Royal Gallery ought not, as a matter of fact, to have aroused even a slight degree of astonishment in any listener. It has long been known to all who endeavour to keep abreast of Indian movements that during the past few years there has been in India a steady consolidation of opinion upon the issue of racial inequality, with which, inevitably, is involved the question of a new essential relationship between India and the paramount Power. The Report of the Statutory Commission contains only a few references to the public mind of India, to prevalent opinion or feeling, but such passages as it devotes to this subject are accurate and discerning. The most important of these is the concluding paragraph of Part I. It contains the following:

We should say without hesitation that, in all its variations of expression and intensity, the political sentiment which is most widespread among all educated Indians is the expression of a demand for equality with Europeans and a resentment against any suspicion of differential treatment. The attitude an Indian takes up on any given matter is largely governed by consideration of his self-respect. It is a great deal more than a personal feeling; it is the claim of the East for due recognition of status. . . . While the member of a minority community, putting the safety of his community first, will stipulate for safeguards; and while

the moderate may look askance at extremist methods which he will not openly denounce, *all alike are in sympathy with the demand for equal status with the European and proclaim their belief in self-determination for India.*

There is no possibility of disputing the rightness of that reading of the Indian mind. Considered in relation to political theories and expedients, it means an insistence upon Dominion status, not as a remote or indefinite goal, but as a matter of agreed principle, the acknowledgment of which is to be followed by immediate practical steps; or, as Mr. Jinnah put it, the translation and fulfilment in action of British declarations and pledges. The universal demand for equal status with the Europeans, noted by the Simon Commission, means, when stated in political terms, that Dominion status represents the main constitutional demand made by all the parties and leaders in common. However moderate the leader, whatever the character of the community he may represent, we shall find that the minimum is this. True, it has not been defined by any Indian statesman or group. No one, so far as I know, has ever set out to describe a Dominion of India in terms comparable with those that describe the peculiarly British institutions of Canada and Australia. But that, when we are thinking of the growth of Indian opinion and the influence of a political idea, is beside the point. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, in the powerful speech with which he opened the first session, argued that when the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia were being created, people did not pause to ask what exactly it all meant. The important point would seem to be that in the India of our time Dominion status has come to stand as the only alternative to *puran Swaraj*, complete independence, which the politically-minded classes are willing to entertain. The Maharaja of Bikaner, speaking at the first plenary session of the Conference, said that the Princes had watched with the most sympathetic interest the rise of the 'passion for an equal position in the eyes of the world, expressed in the desire for Dominion status, which is the dominant force among all thinking Indians to-day.' That statement contains the essence of the matter, and coming from a great Rajput Prince it is all the more significant. We may add to it the declaration of Mr. M. R. Jayakar, who spoke immediately after the Maharaja: 'If India were given Dominion status to-day, in the course of a few months the cry of independence would die of itself.'

Equality of status, then, was the matter upon which the Indian delegation made its initial affirmation, and the Conference passed immediately to the discussion of the immensely important question whether the scheme of the new India should take the

form of a unitary government or an All-India Federation. The Simon Commission, it will be remembered, had drawn in outline the project of a federal India. The Commissioners held the view that this must be the form of the ultimate Constitution, if a settlement of the problem is to be achieved upon an All-India basis. But they assumed the opposition of the Indian States, thus being led to the conclusion that a federated India must be a far-off event, while in the Simla dispatch upon the Simon Report the Government of India has treated the project of an All-India Federation as a project which cannot be other than remote. It may have been known—it certainly should have been—that Dominion status would be so widely advocated as to amount to an almost unanimous demand; but no one, I think, could say that the Government could be expected to foresee that the Conference would display an almost equal measure of agreement on behalf of an All-India Federation, or the United States of India. The minorities were understood to be unfavourable to the idea. It had always been recognised that many prominent Liberal and moderate leaders regarded it as a danger. Not the Government alone, but virtually everyone who had discussed the issues of the Round Table with the delegates on their arrival in London, had been led to the conclusion that the crux of the Conference would be the question of autocratic government for India (as envisaged and insisted upon by the Simon Commission) or some definite measure of responsible government at the centre. Predictions, indeed, were freely made that the demand of the Indian Liberals and their allies upon so crucial a matter might prove to be an insuperable obstacle; that, in short, the Conference might break upon it. This question, however, did not emerge in the early stage, but instead the interest of the Conference was absorbed in the problem of Federation, to which a series of plenary sessions were exclusively allotted. As a matter of fact, they were not entirely devoted to the principle of Federation, but that was to some extent because Lord Peel, by means of a speech of brilliant provocation, made a diversion of which Dr. Moonje, a champion of orthodox Hindu nationalism, took the fullest advantage in debate.

Federation, however, was the first great issue of debate, with the Maharaja of Bikaner, in the noteworthy speech from which I have already quoted, taking the lead. His Highness said:

We of the Indian States are willing to take our part in, and make our contribution to, the greater prosperity and contentment of India as a whole. I am convinced that we can best make that contribution through a federal system of government, composed of the States and of British India. . . . It will not be beyond the wealth of experience available at this table to

advise a means of linking these differing units into a powerful federal administration.

To Bikaner succeeded Patiala, whose Maharaja stated his adhesion to federalism in no less emphatic terms. Sir Muhammad Shafi, for the conservative Moslems, took the same side, and Lord Peel, coming to practical matters before the Conference after the more militant portions of his speech, not only declared for federation, but pointed to the effect of the solidifying opinion upon the constitutional proposals submitted by the Government of India:

I can hardly conceive myself that in a country so vast, so diversified, and so populous, it is possible to set up and maintain what is called a unitary government. . . . This idea [of federation] has been planted, has flourished, and has grown rapidly. With all respect, I should say that in this matter the Report of the Government of India seems to me to be somewhat out of date. It seems to contemplate the setting up of such a scheme as being a remote possibility of the future, but not, I think, in the present.

Whereas, on the contrary, Lord Peel argued, the rapid growth of the idea, and the large amount of sympathy it had enlisted, was a tremendous gain. It would, he added, be one of the most remarkable federations in history. Undoubtedly it would; and the fact that its sponsors stretch over the wide hinterland between the greater Princes and an ex-Secretary of State in a Conservative Cabinet implies an unlooked-for body of support for the federal idea.

I have noted that the Conference was opened in an atmosphere of hope and expectation which contrasts with the general gloom in which the delegates made the journey from India to London. By the time these lines appear in print the Round Table will have covered a large portion of the ground that it is required to survey. The outlook may in the interval have undergone further changes, possibly of serious import. We cannot tell. In the meantime, however, we must take account of the fact that transcends all others in importance—namely, that, while the Conference is at work in London, the eyes of the world are upon an India in revolution; an India which, to many European and American observers, is overflowing with portents that are—or so these observers believe—unrealised and largely unremarked in England, the country most deeply affected by them. It used of old to be said that there were no facts in Ireland. There are men and women living in Britain to-day who are inclined to think that there are no facts—concrete and calculable facts—in India. We British people—responsible, as no people in history has ever been, for decisions affecting the destiny of one-fifth of the human race—will be courting disaster, for ourselves and for India, if we fail to

understand the momentous things that have happened and are happening in India. Let me try to set forth, in the briefest and simplest terms, a few of the more salient features of that unparalleled crisis upon which, in the November issue of this Review, Sir Francis Younghusband had some earnest and weighty things to say.

India is the most sensitive region of the Oriental world. It is inconceivable that, after a century and a half of Western influences and British rule, the country could have remained unmoved in the midst of the revolutionary forces which have transformed the greater part of the Asiatic continent. Let us suppose, as we may, that the prolonged chaos of China has served as a terrible warning to the educated classes of India. It is far otherwise with the Moslem countries within easier reach. Twenty years ago nothing seemed less possible than that they should awake. No death of society, it was thought, could be deeper than that which had fallen upon the Islamic lands. And yet, within a short space of ten years, India has looked out upon the new life of Turkey and Arabia, of Persia and Afghanistan, and has seen many of the peoples of Central Asia within the Russian system reacting to the harsh stimulus of the Soviets. The traditional Anglo-Indian view has been that, no matter what might happen to Hindu Nationalism, the Moslems of India would remain content with the position of a protected minority, a steady support to the British Raj. That view was tenable so long as the Islamic peoples from the Black Sea to the borders of China lay undisturbed in their sleep. It disappeared with the creation of the Arab kingdoms, the dictatorship of Mustapha Kemal in new Turkey, and the as yet unadvertised efficiency of Riza Khan in Persia. Here is the major part of the explanation of the new Moslem confidence at the Round Table. National awakening and political consciousness move only in one direction, towards self-assertion and self-determination, which mean in the end equality of status with the surrounding world.

Turn now to the profoundly disturbing spectacle which India has presented since the revival of civil disobedience nine months ago. Mr. Gandhi's decision to carry out his march from Ahmedabad to the sea came after three months of vexatious debate and vacillation, during which one thing at least was placed beyond all doubt—the impossibility of negotiating with the Mahatma. Following the Viceroy's declaration of November 1, as to the 'natural issue' of Dominion status, Mr. Gandhi discussed with a group of Indian leaders, representing different shades of Nationalism, the conditions under which the National Congress Party might enter the Round Table Conference. It is

Well known that there was, among the political leaders, a strong wish to accept the Viceroy's offer, that as a preliminary Lord Irwin consented to meet Mr. Gandhi and four others, and that the Mahatma, disregarding the points agreed upon before the audience of the Viceroy, took a line in reference to conditions which clearly revealed his own determination to give no sanction to the Round Table. It was perfectly well known that he himself had, from the beginning, intended to stand aside. He is well aware that a constitutional conference is no place for him. Perhaps, indeed, he would agree that there could be few imaginable things more incongruous than that. But it is conceivable that, left alone with Lord Irwin, or freed from the pressure exerted by the Nehrus, he might at any rate have been ready to recommend the choice of National Congress delegates. His refusal to do that, and his refusal to discuss the conditions framed by the political leaders, amounted to a final announcement of his resolve to ignore the experience of the first non-co-operation campaign (1920-22) and risk everything upon a call to mass civil disobedience.

It was this resolve, needless to say, which precipitated the amazing scenes in Bombay and other cities which, since the arrest of the Mahatma in May, have provided the Press of the world with the revelation of an Oriental mass movement without a parallel in the annals of empires. The National Congress leaders themselves were certainly not prepared for this revelation. The Mahatma's own despairing appeals, during the weeks before his arrest, were proof enough that he read failure in his symbolic march and his ritual defiance of the salt laws. We should not be wrong in thinking that the Congress leaders expected the collapse of the civil disobedience campaign when it was made clear that the Government had decided to arrest all the local leaders, to proscribe the Congress organisation, and to make an end of the district 'councils of war.' It appears to be undeniable that the Nationalist leaders were hardly less astonished than the Government was when civil disobedience continued and the boycott was maintained after all the Congress leaders were put in prison.

Since the declaration of independence in January and the defiance of law and authority by the leaders, the National Congress agitation presents three aspects at least which combine to make it unique among mass movements. It is kept up despite the imprisonment of all the leaders of the front rank and the rigorous proscription of its local committees; it has retained, notwithstanding countless acts of lawlessness and the use of repressive force by the police, so large and widespread an element of non-violence as to demonstrate the immense personal influence of the Mahatma; and it has been supported by sections of the Indian

commercial classes, including many industrialists and men of wealth, to an extent which has amazed the Government and the British community in India, who—naturally enough—found it impossible to believe that manufacturers and merchants could bring themselves to back a crusade containing the certainty of heavy losses for themselves. The events of 1930, however, are without precedent. They make a record of disturbance and persistence which, combined with the continued popular influence of the intransigent Congress leaders—Jawaharhal Nehru by far the most important—adds a chapter of enormous significance to the chronicles of Eastern nationalism.

The first stage of the Conference in London has seemed to bring a promise of settlement greater than had seemed possible before the gathering at the Round Table. But that more hopeful prospect is counterbalanced by a condition of affairs in India from which it is difficult to infer anything save clouds and darkness for the closing months of Lord Irwin's Viceroyalty—unless the Government, in agreement with the Conservative and Liberal leaders, should be enabled to make a decisive gesture at St. James's Palace. There is only one mind at the Round Table upon certain matters which are of the essence of the problem. It is realised that the foundations of a settlement must now be laid, that a break-up of the Conference would be an immeasurable disaster, that the present chance can never recur. It is the supreme opportunity, and as such British and Indian statesmanship must confront it. Sir Francis Younghusband has stated the central issue in terms which I may be permitted to paraphrase thus: The policy of Britain towards India has been repeatedly declared, and the British declarations stand. That policy comprises what the Prime Minister at the Guidhall called 'freedom in self-government.' It involves the principle of equal status, and one further principle which might well be announced with authority and finality—namely, that unwilling membership of the Commonwealth is no longer conceived as possible by the British people. One other thing, surely, is overwhelmingly manifest. Britain cannot hold an unreconciled India. The Round Table has gone far to demonstrate that a reconciled India is within our reach.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

HEREDITY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS

THE advent to power of a Labour Government has given rise to many problems, but perhaps no body of men have to face greater difficulties than the members of the House of Lords. The responsibility and difficulty of their position must be apparent to all who consider the nature of the situation. On the one hand, the majority of them feel strongly that many of the measures which they are called upon to pass are contrary to the interests of the nation. On the other hand, they are aware that to provoke an election on any but the gravest issues would be more productive of harm than of good. The curtailment of their power by the Parliament Act does to some extent decrease their responsibility, but it is not generally realised that even their present power of delay is sufficient, in the congested state of parliamentary business, in a great measure to wreck the programme of any Government. Although the House of Commons possesses the power to pass a Bill in the teeth of the Lords, yet by a resolute opposition the Upper Chamber can so delay its passing that the rest of the Government's programme would be thrown out of gear.

The firm and yet moderate attitude adopted by the Peers when confronted by the Coal Bill of last session must have come as a surprise to those who considered that the present Upper House is powerless. The Lords' amendments were not confined to points of detail or drafting. They were maintained unaltered in the face of really bitter Labour attacks. They were pressed up to the point at which substantial victory was assured, and it is safe to say that the House, which, by its comparative subservience to Conservative measures of very doubtful wisdom, had to some extent lost prestige during the late Administration, has more than regained it to-day.

But if as a result of future controversies the Government goes to the country on a 'Peers *versus* People' issue the result may well have a fatal effect on Conservative prospects for many years. This is because the actual composition of the House of Lords is misunderstood and deliberately misrepresented in the country. The man in the street thinks of the Peers as a purely hereditary body mainly composed of rich landowners. It is the

object of this article to show the complete fallacy of such a belief by discussing the actual composition of the Upper House.

Over 700 peers have a right to attend the House of Lords. This figure includes minors. The number who do attend fluctuates within much smaller limits. Less than 100 peers may be called regular parliamentarians. A number of others come up for an occasional debate, such as that of the Prayer Book, which attracted the unusual attendance of 329 peers, but do not normally sit. Others make their only appearance in the House in order to speak on some topic in which they are particularly interested. But in 1929 only 138 peers are recorded in *Hansard* as having spoken.

Divisions in the House of Lords take place at very irregular intervals. The small numbers of the Labour Party make it unprofitable for them to challenge many. The practice is very different from that of the House of Commons, where divisions are frequent. Moreover, the practice of abstention from the Lobbies is much more common in the Upper than in the Lower Chamber. Any analysis of the divisions would, I feel, give a fallacious picture of the actual weight of the hereditary element in the House of Lords. The power that a peer enjoys does not consist so much in his vote as in the privilege of using the House of Lords as a platform from which he may use his powers of persuasion. It is not uncommon to see the Government, after marshalling their followers to defeat the amendment of a private peer, subsequently accepting its substance in an amendment of their own. The House of Lords, more truly than the House of Commons, is a deliberative assembly, and there is probably no assembly in the world in which a persuasive speech has more influence, though that influence is not to be measured by its immediate effect in the Lobby. An analysis of the importance of the hereditary element in the House of Lords will rather be gained by a study of *Hansard* than by the division lists. The analysis of *Hansard* (House of Lords) for 1929 discloses some interesting facts. A peer who never speaks probably seldom votes. In 1929, 138 peers addressed the House of Lords. Of these 73 owed their membership of the Chamber to heredity and 65, including bishops and law lords, to their own prominence. Thus more than 43 per cent. of the speakers were created peers, law lords, or bishops.

An even more striking result is obtained if we analyse the columns of *Hansard* spoken. Out of 2131 columns in 1929, only 639 were spoken by hereditary peers. Twenty-seven were spoken by bishops and the large figure of 1465 by created peers. This is partly due to the fact that most front-bench speakers are created, not hereditary, peers. Thus the hereditary peers occupied less than 32 per cent. of the time of the House. Out of

the words uttered in the 'hereditary' Chamber two came from the lips of non-hereditary peers.

I have spoken in this article of 'those who owe their membership of the Chamber to heredity.' But we are not to assume that the hereditary system is solely responsible for the high positions that most of the active peers hold in the State. Without suggesting that the weight of their counsels is to be measured by the amount of *Hansard* that their speeches occupy, we may safely assume that the active House of Lords member speaks more than ten columns of *Hansard* in a year. Now let us look at the noblemen who exceeded this length in their speeches in 1929. I speak here only of lords who have inherited their titles. It is surprising to find that they are only nineteen in number—a tribute, perhaps, to the usual brevity of peers' speeches. Of this number ten have for longer or shorter periods been members of the House of Commons. In their case it is obvious that the hereditary system has curtailed, not increased, their power in the State. Few would exchange the position of an M.P. for a peerage without some regret and a sense of diminished power and influence. It is interesting to note that of the remaining nine peers two were members of the Labour Party and two are Liberals.

What do these figures show? Surely, that the *actual* membership of the House of Lords (as opposed to its potential membership of non-attending peers) is not of a character to justify the gibes levelled against its hereditary character by 'progressives.' In fact, the majority of those who regularly or frequently attend the sessions would be found worthy of a place in a reformed Chamber. The bulk of the 'reformed peers' would, of necessity, have to be men of considerable political experience. That is certainly true of the present House. They must, it is urged, have among them a considerable number of experts and of men who have won recognition in the professions. Here, again, the present House satisfies the conditions: no profession is unrepresented among the peers. The suggestion has often been put forward that representation should be given to other ecclesiastical bodies than the Church of England; in practice this obtains in the present House. Whenever the interests of a particular denomination—be it Roman Catholic, Wesleyan, or Jewish—are involved a spokesman for his co-religionists can be found among the peers of to-day.

In one respect only does the actual attending membership of the House of Lords differ markedly from a reformed House. It is most desirable that in the latter there should be an adequate representation of trade unions. Although several members of the House of Lords have in the past earned the right to be called

manual workers, none of them is, I believe, a trade unionist. In dealing with labour problems it is a disadvantage that the House hears the employer's side of any dispute set forth with great knowledge and does not hear the opinions of trade unionists at first hand. In point of fact, the veteran leaders of trade unions would not find the atmosphere of the House of Lords uncongenial. They would meet there men of long administrative experience whose fundamental point of view is not dissimilar to their own. The main reason why the present Government has not tried the experiment of introducing this element into the House is the natural dislike of trade unionists to accept hereditary honours. Life peerages would meet the case more satisfactorily. If the Government were seriously anxious to improve the efficiency of the House of Lords—which they are not—they could do so within its present limits and without tackling the extremely difficult question of its ultimate reform.

Many proposals for a reformed House have been put forward in recent years. But before we consider the different methods of choosing members—by local authorities, by special electoral divisions, by panels of the House of Commons, or by appointment—we should make up our minds as to the type of men sought. With the exception noted above, the most proper men in the country to fulfil the duties of members of a revising chamber are already to be found in the present House, and they are the men who, in *any* sensible scheme of reform, would ultimately compose it. The principal reason for the hostility of Labour to the reform proposals of 1927 and those brought forward by Lord Middleton and other peers in subsequent years was in respect of the retention of the hereditary element. So far the Peers have insisted upon this. All proposals for reform have given the hereditary peers a right of nominating some of their number to seats in the reformed House, if they did not prefer the chance of election to the Commons. It is seriously to be questioned whether, in the interests of the peerage itself, such a condition is really necessary. An analysis of the hereditary peers who actually take a considerable part in the debates of the House will show that they are nearly all men of such experience and political capacity that their nomination to a reformed House by any moderate Government would be practically certain. Is it really necessary to safeguard, by a provision which would certainly prove unpopular in many quarters, the modicum of the rights of those peers who seldom attend the House and whose share in its debates is small? I do not wish to be understood as decrying the advantages of heredity in politics, but in the circumstances I doubt whether it is worth while to uphold it to such an extent as to prejudice an agreed settlement of the problem of reform. For

only by an agreed settlement will the reformed House, if it ever comes into being, command the necessary influence in the country.

The so-called 'backwoodsman' by no means deserves the strictures generally levelled against him. Immersed in the care of his estates, in local work of an administrative character, in the government of industry or in his profession, he naturally has little time to attend the sittings of the House. But his contributions to national politics, though rare, are often extremely valuable. Many of the most important and fruitful debates in the House have been initiated by peers who seldom attend its sittings. These men are experts in some particular subject: the House of Lords probably contains a greater number and a wider range of experts than any other body. The ideas and experience which these 'backwoodsmen' bring to its debates are of incalculable national value, and it is important that in any reformed House that contribution should be preserved. Might not this be effected by giving to all hereditary peers *a seat without a vote* in the Upper Chamber?

Nothing has here been said on the question of the powers of a reformed House. The conviction is steadily growing among the peers and others interested in reform problems that this should not at present be discussed. When the membership of the House of Lords has been reformed the question of powers may arise, but it is more probable that a reformed House confidently using the powers at present theoretically attached to the unreformed House would find those powers amply sufficient. It is the menace of a 'Peers *versus* People' election, rather than the Parliament Act, that curtails our powers.

There is little hope that any Government will seriously take in hand the task of reform of the House of Lords. The weakness of the last Administration—or perhaps we should say the thoughtlessness and intransigence of some Conservative members of Parliament—let slip an opportunity that is unlikely to recur. But Lord Hugh Cecil has recently set us an excellent example in keeping the matter in the public mind by publishing a scheme of reform in a pamphlet. His proposal to leave the present House of Lords 'high and dry' as a dignified debating society, while constituting a Third Chamber to do most of their work, is open to one serious objection. There are not enough first-class brains in politics to make two efficient Chambers under the present system. Where, one may well ask, would be found the human material for *three* Chambers? But it is important for his scheme, as well as others, to be discussed. While our legislative machinery goes halting on an injured leg, ill-conceived and ill-drafted legislation will continue to handicap the country.

IDDLESLEIGH.

THE RIDDLE OF RUSSIA

It has been said that in the time of Catherine II. Europe was completely mystified about Russia. A similar mystification, perhaps more explicable, prevails to-day. Unfortunately the testimony of those to whom one would naturally look for guidance—those who lived in Russia for years, and are not now restrained by Bolshevik supervision—is often of little value. Their personal losses or prejudices debar them from seeing objectively. When not explaining why all the prophecies made during a decade have been successively falsified, they are intent upon drawing comparisons between 1913 and 1930. That contrast may be of historical value. But those seeking to peer into the future turn with more interest to a comparison between 1929 and 1930. It is not what Czarism might have done, but what Communism has done and is doing, which alone can throw any light on the problem.

The idea that the Bolshevik leaders are all rogues and adventurers must be dismissed. It is confuted by their mode of life. With the power at their disposal they could satisfy the most exacting fancies and indulge in the greatest luxury. But they pass an austere and laborious existence. It is not entirely a coincidence that the two or three who have erred in this respect have fallen from power. Even comfort is hardly possible on an income of 250*l.* a year, though one pays no rent, is provided with a motor car, and can obtain free theatre tickets. Nor have these men even that outward appanage of power which flatters the vanity of many democrats. They submit to a party discipline which, in rigidity and strictness, is equalled only by that of Fascism. It is not extraordinary that (apart from those who fear to return to Russia for political reasons) there are from time to time officials of the Soviet Government abroad who, having tasted of the flesh-pots, are unwilling to take up again that life of unremitting toil. Official corruption, a handicap of good government from the days of Peter the Great, and which was responsible for the Japanese War and the subsequent downfall of the Czarist régime, has been in a great degree eliminated. A murderer will only suffer imprisonment for a few years. Peculation at the expense of the

State may lead to capital punishment; and on such charges Communists are judged more severely than those who are outside the party pale.

It would be futile to dwell upon the horrors which form part of the story of the Russian Revolution; and equally futile to seek to excuse them. The Bolsheviks are practical revolutionaries, and therefore terrorism is one of their natural weapons. Every revolution gives rise to cruelties which appear as senseless as they are appalling. Rosa Luxemburg truly said that at close range the great French Revolution must have seemed a bloody and useless farce. It is only in the course of time that these inevitable accompaniments of any violent national upheaval assume their proper proportion. The psychology of terrorism may be interesting; and probably revolutionaries sometimes become terrorised themselves by the phantom of counter-revolution. But the Bolsheviks, who have no nerves, belong to a different category. There is reason to believe that in this respect Russian terrorism is defeating its own ends. The foreign engineers and experts in Moscow do not conceal the fact that their work is often delayed or impeded because their Russian colleagues are too afraid of possible consequences to do anything on their own responsibility.

The Bolshevik leaders are attempting a grandiose experiment. They are not actuated by hope of personal reward, but solely by their belief in a political economic creed which they have exalted into a religion. Their sincerity is as unquestionable as is their ruthless and unscrupulous application of the doctrine that in the maintenance and propagation of their faith the means justify the end. They resemble less the makers of the French Revolution than the Spanish inquisitors. The strength of their convictions makes them genuinely indifferent to the judgment of this generation. Time alone can definitely pronounce whether they are far-seeing statesmen or misguided fanatics. But at present they are inoculating the Russian people with a belief in their convictions. To an extent unsuspected in Western Europe, those who are not Communists, including many who were once definitely hostile to Communism, are beginning to believe, almost reluctantly, that the new order of things will finally enure to their material welfare. The unflinching confidence Bolshevism shows in itself has contributed to this result almost as much as the constant propaganda of its precepts.

Even one who finds the political doctrines of Communism repugnant, and its economic theories of doubtful value, conceives that it should be possible to regard the panorama (and everything is still kaleidoscopic) with reasonable detachment. However much Europeans may disapprove of the methods used by Asiatics in what is fundamentally an Asiatic country, the only opinion on

that subject which possesses any practical importance is that of the people directly affected. And since there is no parallel of this stupendous attempt of a great country, which is unable to borrow money abroad and unwilling to obtain capital by developing its natural resources in partnership with foreign capitalists, seeking to industrialise itself at reckless speed, and to pay its own way while engaged in that costly operation, one may well murmur, 'L'expériment vaut d'être vue.'

Eighty-five per cent. of the 150,000,000 people who dwell in Russia live on or by the land. There are more than 25,000,000 peasant families. The United States, with a population of 120,000,000, has in all about 6,500,000 farm units. The problem of the peasants is, therefore, of paramount importance.

One hears of the dictatorship of the peasants and proletariat. It is perhaps significant that the Constitution should mention only the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' The sole qualification of this bald assertion is a subsequent reference to that dictatorship 'mustering around itself the majority of the population.' To what extent, after ten years, has the proletariat mustered around itself the peasantry, which constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population? The Bolsheviks were alert to turn the revolution to their advantage. In 1917 they did not forget the lesson to be drawn from 1905. That astute observer Count Witte once wrote that the essential part of the 1905 outbreak was the peasants' cry, 'Give us land.' Of the various groups weltering in the turmoil of 1917 it was only the Bolsheviks who realised the importance of this fact. Lenin won the support of the peasants when he advised them to seize and divide among themselves the estates of the great proprietors, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly. The peasants neither knew nor cared anything about the theories of Marx and Engels. Bolshevism earned their temporary support simply because it partly satisfied their land hunger. In fact, the revolution did not abolish private ownership in land as the peasants had known it, but only abolished private ownership of vast properties by great landlords. At the same time, it acknowledged the practical peasant ownership of small properties, augmented enormously the number of these holdings, and in many cases increased them in size.

The dilemma was obvious; and the Bolshevik leaders were under no illusion. They recognised that Russia could not be considered a Communist country, although the land was theoretically vested in the State, so long as 85 per cent. of the population was able to insist upon being guaranteed *bourgeois* privileges. It was therefore necessary either quickly and absolutely to subjugate the peasants, or patiently to try to inoculate them with

the serum of Communism. To the first course there were several objections. Comparatively, the number of peasants was overwhelming. However, their inability to combine or to organise rendered that an almost negligible danger. Of more importance was the fact that 75 per cent. of the Red Army was composed of peasants. There was thus always the risk of unpleasant repercussions if that class became too dissatisfied. That would have been fatal, since the army is one of the two shields which ensures the safety of the *régime*. Finally, the Soviet administration was dependent upon the good-will of the peasants in order to get the means to industrialise the country—dependent upon them for the surplus grain which could be sold abroad for the gold necessary for machinery, and to pay for foreign technical assistance.

Lenin was always greatly impressed by the gravity of the problem. But the solution he advocated varied. At one moment he asserted that there was no necessity to make unwilling converts of the peasants. He contended that as they perceived the advantages of Communism they would embrace it of their own accord. At first he had no doubt that it would be possible to reconcile the views and interests of the proletariat and the peasants, and that therefore the revolution could triumph and Soviet Russia could thrive in isolation as a Communist State. On this subject Trotsky followed the ideas of Marx more closely than did Lenin. He was convinced that no real unity between the proletariat and the peasantry could ever be attained. In his opinion, therefore, the Russian Revolution could never be successful except through the support of similar uprisings in Western Europe.

As time passed Lenin became less confident of any speedy solution, while not abandoning his contention that it was possible finally to reach an agreement between the two elements. This change in his ideas was reflected when he said:

The critical question is whether we shall be able to proletarianise the peasants before they are able to organise themselves against us. Their numbers are overwhelming, and they could swamp us. The conversion of the peasants can only be carried out by electrification and tractorisation—thousands and thousands of tractors must be brought into use. . . . It is by communal farming that the Socialist State is systematically progressing by gradual stages.

Wise words! But it was Lenin himself who set them at defiance. The peasants having answered his purpose in ousting the great landed proprietors, he inaugurated the period of Militant Communism. The poorer peasants were incited against their richer neighbours. All crops in excess of what was necessary for bare subsistence were confiscated, in order to obtain a maximum supply of grain for sale abroad. Then began a stubborn struggle. Moscow

used all the forces at its command, not excluding the most violent measures of terrorism and coercion. The peasants held firm, hid their produce, and eventually refused to sow. The people in the towns suffered, as food ceased to come from the country. This was the *impasse* when the sailors of Kronstadt, who in 1917 had turned the tide of the revolution, rose in rebellion. They threatened to take the situation into their own hands unless the whole policy was reversed, and the peasants were allowed to produce and sell freely. The Communist leaders, always resolute in action when faced by a physical crisis, did not hesitate. They repressed the revolt with a strong hand. But the sinister warning was not lost on them. Militant Communism was succeeded by the New Economic Policy, and confiscation gave way to a tax on produce.

In 1925 Stalin made further concessions, whereby the richer peasants were allowed to take more land on lease, and to employ a limited amount of labour—which was also a distinct benefit to the poorer peasants, whose time is never fully occupied on their own holdings. The opposition of Kamenev and Zinoviev to this policy led to their being expelled from the inner councils of the Communist Party. Stalin, an Asiatic of Asiatics, has always contended that Soviet Russia could survive as a Communist State, even were no other European country to adopt the same system. Leaving aside possible personal differences (respecting which the evidence is necessarily scanty and obscure), that was the essence of his difference with Kamenev and Zinoviev. But he believes that the socialisation of Soviet Russia will—or anyway must—come through collective farming. Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky declared, in effect, that the *tempo* of industrialisation was too rapid, that collective farming was not feasible within any reasonable time, and that the State would have to leave the individual farmers to their own devices, since it was absolutely dependent on their good-will. This was almost abandoning Communism as a lost cause. It was not simply that they were opposed to pressure being put upon the peasants. The matter was more important and went much deeper. This explains why, although Stalin had already relaxed the pressure on the peasants, and Rykov and Tomsky had already publicly recanted, they were compelled to do so again at the Congress of the party in July 1930, when (Bukharin was absent on account of illness) they were even cruelly pilloried and mercilessly ridiculed.

In March 1930 Stalin modified the orders given at the end of 1929. There had been a gross abuse of the arbitrary power given to the local soviets to ruin those alleged to be Kulaks. Tens of thousands of cattle were slaughtered by those who feared to be given that dreaded cognomen if they owned more than one cow; and Soviet Russia is, in consequence, suffering to-day from a

scarcity of meat. Within a few weeks after the new decrees had been issued many thousands deserted the collective institutions and returned to individual farming. To-day proportionately 30 per cent. of the peasants are collectivists. This is considerably less than the number at the height of the campaign of forcible collectivisation. Still, seven or eight years ago the total was only 2 per cent.; and it may be recalled that between 1926–27 and 1927–28—in the space of twelve months, when no pressure was brought to bear—the number and area of collective farms just doubled.

There is the root of the whole matter. The cause of collective farming in Russia needs no support except that provided by ample and visible demonstration of its benefits. Any impulsion of another kind from Moscow will only defeat its own ends by arousing the suspicion of the peasants. The Soviet Government is fortunate, since in this instance sound economic policy coincides with its political aims. There is no doubt that in the ordinary course the number of collective farms would continue to increase steadily, until the vast majority of the peasants had adopted one or other form of the collective system. But Communism must ever press the *tempo*, and can rarely let time do its beneficent work. That is a weakness inherent in all revolutions.

Those who imagine that the Russian peasants are hoping for a change of *régime* misconceive the facts. Their standard of life is higher than it was before the revolution, but they are even less content, for now they have been taught to expect more. In the jargon of the day, their class-consciousness has been awakened. They resent the fact that the supply of the manufactured articles they need is restricted, and that they can get less of them, for any given amount of their agricultural produce, than before the revolution. Moreover, in view of their ingrained individualism, certain restrictions weigh upon them more heavily than upon the proletariat. They are more articulate about these grievances than about what they have gained. But they are never unmindful of the fact that it was the revolution which gave them the land that they had coveted for generations. Their anticipations were not fully realised. But they recognise that whatever was available was divided amongst them. Now they have no great landlords over them. They are therefore suspicious about any change of *régime*, and hostile to it in advance. They argue that it could only be to their detriment. They are unable to conceive that they would be left in undisturbed possession of the land they seized. The Russian peasants will never be Communists at heart, though by adopting collective farming they may appear to practise the theories of Communism. But in a large measure they accept the present *régime*; and, although they want more liberty

than it gives them at present, they definitely do not want to set it superseded.

The increase in grain production is striking. After the war and the days of militant Communism it sank, in 1921, to 34 per cent. of the 1913 crop. By 1927 it had risen to 77 per cent., and has since exceeded the pre-war total. The wheat-producing area under cultivation this year was said to be 6 per cent. greater than that sown in 1913. The Soviet authorities find this persistent progress encouraging. But circumstances beyond their control have upset their calculations. The world is glutted with grain, and there is no natural market for the surplus produced by Russia. The 1930 Russian crop is somewhat larger than that of 1929, which was a good average year. This has enabled the Soviet Government to make heavy sales abroad below the market price. However, since it pays for the grain in its own paper money and is paid for it in gold, any price is practically pure profit. And the end is not yet, in respect either to grain or manufactured articles. Nevertheless, ruthless dumping is likely to prove a two-edged sword, and to end by restricting rather than increasing the total of Soviet Russia's exports. It is significant that, acting under the provisions of an existing law, the French Government now proposes to establish a system of import licences for various products sold abroad by Soviet Russia.

The Bolsheviks can repeat Peter the Great's boast that he had made the Russian people work as they had never worked before. The thoroughness with which the State has mobilised the working power of the nation is illustrated by the number employed. In 1922-23 there were 6,636,000 engaged in industry, transport, building, health work, and other branches of activity. This number increased in the succeeding years as follows: 7,330,000, 8,256,000, 9,808,000, 10,313,000, and 11,801,000. To-day the total is well over 13,000,000, or approximately double what it was eight years ago. This accounts for the increased production. For the production has increased substantially, although quality has not always kept pace with quantity. Since 1927-28 both the amount and the value of the industrial output has surpassed that of 1913. About 99 per cent. of all that is produced comes from State organisations. Notwithstanding the increased production, there has only twice been a favourable trade balance—in 1926-27 and in 1928-29. The figures for the first seven months of the fiscal year 1929-30 showed a large adverse balance. But the period when exports are usually heavier—May to October—had yet to come.

In order to reach any conclusions about the Russian situation the official basic figures must be accepted as correct. Only the Soviet Government knows the facts. Those critics who reject *en*

plac the Soviet's statistics are left with only their own conjectures and predilections as a foundation. No good reason has ever been advanced for condemning Soviet accounting in this wholesale fashion. Contradictions are sometimes disclosed. But figures are as clay in the hands of the potter for anyone who has a little ingenuity in the art of making them perform. An American authority, who recently spent some time in Russia,¹ decided that the 'statistics prepared by the Commissariat of Finance represent profound study, and compare favourably in accuracy with those prepared by similar institutions in most other countries.'

Russia is to-day a country of statistics. Too much is expected from them, and there is a tendency to attempt to prove too much by them. But it is an error to imagine that all figures issued by the State are treated as sacred. In this, as in many other matters of fact, the Communists are their own severest critics. Only a few months ago, when statistics issued about the progress of collective farming seemed too favourable, they were immediately denounced by the Moscow Press.

The official basic figures, those relating to the amount of agricultural or industrial production, to the amount of gold reserve, and to similar subjects, must, I think, be accepted as accurate. But the Soviet Government sometimes arranges its statistics in the fashion which will present the position in the best possible light, even when it has to do so at the expense of clarity.

It is difficult to assess the financial situation of Soviet Russia. Upon analysing the budget, one finds that what may be called the ordinary budget is comparatively simple and quite moderate. But a budget including the whole economy of a State which jealously monopolises all foreign commerce, and controls, directly or otherwise, a great percentage of internal trade, must necessarily be complicated. In one way the position of the Government is strengthened by its entire freedom from any question of exchange. It uses its paper money (which it maintains at a fictitious figure by the simple process of not allowing it to be taken out of or brought into the country) in payment for the produce which it sells abroad for gold. The fact that the Government itself absorbs, and uses for its own ends, the outcome of all labour, over and above what suffices to provide a bare existence for the toilers, and that it controls and regulates prices, gives it peculiar powers of manipulation. Apparently it can inflate and deflate at will.

The Soviet Government claims that the Russian working man is better off than under the Czarist *régime*. That contention is derided by many critics. But there can be no doubt that rela-

¹ Mr. Bruce C. Hopper, formerly an instructor at Harvard.

tively the position of the working man has been greatly improved. He gets the best that is obtainable, little and poor as that may be. No one is treated so well. To-day there is no wealthier class which he sees or envies. He is made to believe that he is the important person in the State ; and, given the pettiness of human nature, that counts for much. Above all, he has been made to feel that he is the part-owner of every enterprise. Amongst the more positive advantages he enjoys are the provision made for the education of his children, and the fact that he himself gets the best of care when he falls ill. The diminished power of his increased wages do not allow him to have any comforts ; but he never had any in the past. The great difference to-day is that he has a firm belief in the future. He is convinced that he must necessarily submit to a low standard of living to-day in order to attain a higher level on a permanent basis. This enables him to do a maximum of work on a minimum of sustenance. Despite certain peculiar privileges he possesses, the general conditions under which he lives certainly compare unfavourably with those prevalent in Western Europe. But of that he knows nothing, and even does not believe it when told. In Russia the people are at present nourished—over and above what just suffices for their existence—on skilfully administered injections of hope, which answer their purpose extremely well. Possibly that is because hope is a stimulant to which the Russians were unaccustomed in former times. They are confident that the plans in process of execution will, within the next few years, enable them all to live upon a higher scale. Time alone can tell whether they are being deluded.

The Five-Year Plan is designed, *inter alia*, to industrialise a country which has always been overwhelmingly agricultural. It contemplates that in 1932-33, although the grain exports will have been greatly increased, the total agricultural exports shall be only 50 per cent. of the grand total. The plan proposes to do more than double production in both branches. It also provides for the amelioration of social conditions, including a great increase in the available housing. Much has been written about what has already been accomplished or is under way. There is the great tractor factory at Stalingrad, with its housing accommodation for 10,000 men, which, when in full operation, will turn out 100,000 tractors every year ; or, as the Communists like to express it, one every five minutes of the twenty-four hours, day and night. In Leningrad is the largest electrical equipment factory in the world. And there is also a Ford motor factory, the immense Dnieprostroy hydraulic station, and the large cement works being established at different points throughout the country.

The Five-Year Plan has not been executed in its entirety in

either of the two years it has been in operation. But an impartial observer will probably be astonished by what has been accomplished. The incomplete details which have been published during the past few weeks indicate that a very great percentage of the programme for 1929-30 has been carried out. Only the implacable Communist leaders are likely to regard this as a failure, especially as there has been an important increase in the production of pig iron. It is the light-industry section of the Five-Year Plan which is falling behind. The costly equipment of heavy industry absorbs most of the available money. This will bear hardly on the proletariat and peasantry, which were counting on the light-industry factories to supply them with the manufactured articles which they so sorely need.

All Russians seem to be interested in the Five-Year Plan. All are working feverishly for it. Many hundreds of thousands who have no liking for Communism are enthusiastic about it. They are impressed by the grandeur of the conception, are confident that it will minister to their ultimate welfare, and readily make the sacrifices which its completion demands. The Five-Year Plan is not Communist, though it is being carried out by Communist methods. The industrialisation of Russia is a natural economic development, which was even progressing in the final period of the bankrupt empire. It was not difficult to increase the *tempo*, when everyone was made to work for the State. But that is only half—and the simpler half—of communisation. The equalisation of distribution is more complicated than the harnessing of all labour to one chariot. So long as a low level is set for all, a fair measure of equality is possible. But it will become increasingly difficult to maintain that equality in proportion to the raising of the standard of living. The late Lord Balfour's gibe, that Bolshevism was an excellent instrument for making all poorer, but had yet to prove that it made anyone richer, was the terse enunciation of a problem which one day will perhaps tax the ingenuity of the Communist Party.

The opinions of the principal American engineers and other experts, whose services have been retained by the State, are of exceptional value. It would probably be a fair summary to say that they have been astonished by the general desire to learn, and by the quickness the Russians have displayed, especially in their comprehension of everything mechanical ; disappointed by the lack of application and of perseverance ; and appalled by the entire absence of organising or directing ability. They see no reason why the Soviet Government should not be able to carry out its plans of industrialisation, in so far as they are limited to building great factories and obtaining the labour and raw material necessary for mass production. They doubt whether it will be

possible to operate them successfully without the aid of foreign managers and technicians. They are amazed by the docility of the people ; and they consider that Russia is the only country in the world which excels their own in richness and variety of undeveloped natural resources.

More illuminating than statistics are the attitude and sentiments of the Russian people. They form a curious object-lesson in the effect of habit, and the result of listening to the same story, day after day, over a long period of years. No one who has not recently been in Soviet Russia can fully realise the miracle wrought by constant and intelligent propaganda, together with segregation from the rest of the world. For it is little short of a miracle that, notwithstanding all hardships, the majority of Russians actually believe that they are better off than the masses in other countries, and indignantly reject all suggestions to the contrary. Communist foreign propaganda is an inferior product. It is sometimes absurdly inept, and is rarely so extensive as is usually supposed. It derives some of its importance from the very fact that it is exaggerated by a certain portion of the Press.

Russian propaganda abroad is carried on less with the object or hope of forcing a speedy issue than in order to worry and engage the attention of capitalistic countries, so as to prevent any attack during the reconstruction period. For the Soviet Government is almost absurdly nervous of a conflict being forced upon it. It believes that sooner or later a clash with Russia's most ancient enemy, Poland, must come about. The result is not feared ; but it is clearly realised that even a successful war would delay the continuation of its economic plans, and to some extent destroy the work already accomplished. Soviet Russia devotes 12·7 per cent. of her budget to military purposes, as compared with 35 per cent. so spent by Poland. It may be confidently asserted that the aviation and chemical branches are under German direction. This co-operation has become closer within the last twelve months. It is noteworthy that, although Russian Communism is based on the theory of internationalism, it has aroused sentiments of nationalism more intense and more widespread than ever prevailed in the days of the Romanoffs. Anyone who imagines that the Russian people are sunk in the depths of apathetic resignation will be amazed to discover how often it only requires a little scratching to disclose a Chauvinist.

Stalin is the supreme master. He has a firmer hold on the situation than Lenin ever had. He neither enjoys an equal measure of popularity, nor does his personality have the same influence on the country. But he has the party machine more completely within his grasp. Stalin does not inspire affection or devotion as did Lenin, but he is much more feared by his political

Communist is another question. The Communist Party is undertaking to industrialise in an incredibly short period a great agricultural country, and to meet the cost out of income. Two elements essential to the experiment were a State monopoly of all labour and production, and some confidence on the part of the people in the feasibility of the scheme and Communist ability to bring it to fruition. The first already existed. The second has been inspired to a degree which sometimes seems fantastic. Almost invariably, underneath all restiveness and irritation, one finds the firm conviction that the Five-Year Plan spells salvation. The most striking feature in Russian life to-day is this hope, despite all adverse conditions. Perhaps the explanation is that, contrary to the general idea, the passage of time has played in favour of the Soviet Government. Burdens long supported have become tolerable, and the continued existence of the *régime* has bred faith in the success of its plans and increased the number of its adherents. But the only vital questions are—what is the limit of the endurance of the Russian people? and will the Communist leaders make the mistake of overstepping that limit? It is now evident that only the future can supply the answers. In the meantime, Western Europe is committing the mistake of under-rating the progress which is being made, and of exaggerating the dissatisfaction of the people.

LAURANCE LYON.

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

DURING 1917-18 a Parliamentary Committee, representative of all parties and of the Civil Service, with Lord Haldane as its chairman, inquired generally into the functions of government, as they obtained both before and during the war, and made far-reaching recommendations for procedure when peace was restored. The old order of things, a Cabinet consisting of departmental ministers meeting under the Prime Minister, they condemned out of hand. 'The inevitable outcome of our existing method of organization is,' they stated, 'a tendency to Lilliputian administration.'

The growth of bureaucracy was foreseen and safeguards were suggested. These fall broadly under two heads—first, more effective supervision by the Cabinet over the activities of the departments, and, secondly, more real and more stringent control by Parliament itself over departmental methods. The Cabinet, they say, must be small in number, and should be composed mainly, if not entirely, of ministers without portfolio. The proved impracticability of a Cabinet minister having leisure to think out organisation and preparation for action 'in the mere interstices of the time required for the transaction of business' is emphasised. In other words, he must be freed from departmental cares and pre-occupations. To enable the House of Commons to exercise effective control over the departments it is recommended that Estimates and Accounts should be made more significant of the expenditure proposed or recorded in them, that a series of Standing Committees should be formed, each charged with the consideration of the activities of a group of cognate departments, and that the ministers in charge of departments, as well as their subordinate officials, should appear before these Standing Committees.

That some such checks are needed is made clear, not only by the rapid extension during recent years of bureaucratic practices, but also by the failure of departments to reduce their establishments to anything approaching pre-war dimensions, even though the work they are now called on to do is, in some instances, appreciably less than in 1914. Nor is this result surprising. No

Cabinet composed wholly or mainly of departmental chiefs is ever likely to be economically minded or to prove itself an adequate supervisory body. Each minister, quite naturally, has his own departmental axe to grind, and each is fully aware that, if he starts throwing stones at his colleagues' departments, he may discover that he himself is living in a glass house. Moreover, the temptation to indulge in the pastime known as log-rolling is obvious. Under such conditions the departments stand to gain on every occasion, without check or hindrance from above.

A new note—new, that is, to the present generation—is struck in the Committee's Report. A distinction is advocated between the executive powers derived from the Crown and the financial powers which have their origin in the House of Commons. This clear-cut cleavage between the functions of direction which properly pertain to the Cabinet and the work of the departmental minister is implicit throughout the whole Report, and, in their proposals for a drastic rearrangement of departmental duties, the Committee have attempted to disentangle the executive business of government from the purely administrative.

Had they seen fit to do so, they might have added that the distinction they advocate and all its implications were, till little more than 100 years ago, regarded as a bed-rock principle of the Constitution. During the eighteenth century no head of a department or supply board was in the Cabinet. The First Lord of the Admiralty, the sole apparent exception to this rule, owed his Cabinet rank to his representing the executive office of the Lord High Admiral, then, as now, in commission. With the exception of naval and judicial business, all executive action in fulfilment of policy, both in peace and in war, fell to the First Lord of the Treasury and to two, later three, Secretaries of State. The sphere of responsibility of each of these executive authorities was clearly defined.

The invasion of the Cabinet by departmental ministers is a comparatively modern innovation, and matters have now reached such a pass that every head of a department, no matter how insignificant it may be, is prepared to maintain that his own dignity and the dignity of his department are impugned unless he has a seat in the Cabinet. During little more than 100 years the Cabinet has been doubled in size, and there is no valid reason why it should not be redoubled in another century or so, unless measures are adopted to check its growth. A redrawing of the lines of demarcation between executive and administrative duties, as proposed by the Haldane Committee, would be a first step in the right direction.

The Committee refer in terms of strong approval to the existing arrangement in the Army, where 'the principle has been

adopted of placing the business of inquiry and thinking in the hands of persons definitely charged with it, whose duty it is to study the future and advise those engaged in actual administration.' 'This principle,' they add, 'ought by no means to be limited in its application to military and naval affairs. The business of executive government has been seriously embarrassed from the incomplete application to it of similar methods.' As a preliminary step to the further discussion of the Committee's recommendations I propose to follow out the train of thought suggested by these paragraphs taken from their Report, and to inquire what advantages have accrued where the principle in question has been logically applied in military affairs, and what disadvantages have ensued from its non-observance. Broadly, for the purposes of such an inquiry, the history of the Army may be divided into three periods, the first period lasting from 1689 until the Crimean War, the interval of forty odd years between the Crimean War and the Boer War forming the second period, and the time that has elapsed since then constituting the third period.

The outstanding feature of the first period was the strict maintenance of a clear line of separation between executive and administrative functions. The bargain struck in 1689 between William III. and Parliament is common knowledge. The size of the Army and the funds necessary for its maintenance were matters to be decided by Parliament, its government and command being exercised by the Crown, which acted through one of the Secretaries of State. When the system eventually reached full fruition powers of command were delegated to a Commander-in-Chief, whose headquarters were at the Horse Guards in Whitehall, while the Secretary-at-War, with his office in Pall Mall, was the principal administrator of the Army. Both approached the Cabinet through one or other of the Secretaries of State, who, in the words of one who had himself been Secretary-at-War, 'could move and control the machine without being troubled with its details.' This system was strenuously upheld and defended by statesmen like Castlereagh, Liverpool, and Palmerston for constitutional reasons, and on practical and military grounds by Wellington and Hardinge. In the Navy till 1831 and in the Army in India till 1905 a similar distinction between executive and administrative duties was rigidly maintained.

Further, it is an interesting though little known fact that German military institutions, since copied in most countries, had their origin in our own system. In 1821 the King of Prussia, owing to the spread of liberal ideas after the Napoleonic wars, was faced with much the same problem as had confronted William III., and it was on the advice of the Duke of Wellington

that he formed a General Staff office for executive purposes apart from the War Ministry. Thus our own Horse Guards and the Great General Staff in Berlin were plants grown from the same seed; differences of soil and environment account for variation in growth and appearance. During fifty years Prussia applied thoroughly and scientifically the principle of distinguishing between executive action and administrative business, and in 1870 she demonstrated to the world the inherent soundness of that principle. Moltke, the leader and strategist, and Roon, the army reformer and organiser, were the fine products of the system thus evolved. Since then Germany has, to her own advantage, applied this same principle, originally borrowed from us, in the domain of industry and commerce as well as in the affairs of State.

The weakness of our own military system during the pré-Crimean era lay in the administrative machinery being throughout civilian in character, in the military executive having no control whatever over it in peace, and in the Secretary of State, the co-ordinating authority in the Cabinet, taking, as a general rule, very little interest in military affairs. Consequently, when war came, we were invariably unready, and a Marlborough or a Wellington had to build up an administrative service as best he could in the face of the enemy. Hence arose the scandals of the Crimean War, when a small stationary army almost starved within five or six miles of its sea-base. As Lord Wolseley bitterly remarks in his *Story of a Soldier's Life*, our army before Sevastopol 'was not a going military machine.'

The lesson of the Crimea was obvious. The administrative services of the Army had to be militarised, and the story of the next forty years and more is concerned with this process. The Horse Guards was abolished and the Commander-in-Chief's functions were merged into the general amalgam of miscellaneous duties entrusted in 1855 to the newly appointed Secretary of State for War. Now, for the first time, generals and their staffs, not in the War Office alone, but in the districts as well, found themselves saddled with financial responsibilities which, more and more, absorbed their time and attention to the exclusion of military considerations. No one, I venture to assert, who knew the Army at home during the 'nineties will deny that ability to deal with the office file had become the chief criterion of the good general and the good staff officer. Between 1873 and 1898 no Army manœuvres were held, and the stereotyped Aldershot field-day was the beginning and the end of advanced military training.

All this while most valuable work was, it is true, in progress—work connected with the names of Airey, MacDougall, Wolseley,

staff officer can overrule a director even in matters of finance; if he does so, he automatically relieves the director of his normal accountability and takes the burden of financial responsibility on his own shoulders. Thus the group consisting of a Commander-in-Chief, his principal staff officers, his Judge Advocate-General and his Financial Advisor, the only officials who have the right of direct access to him, is not dissimilar both in number and in the method of transacting business from the sort of Cabinet that is adumbrated in the Report of the Haldane Committee.

The chief characteristics of Army government and administration, as now practised in most civilised countries, are as follows:

First. A sharp line of cleavage is observed between executive functions on the one hand and administrative business on the other.

Secondly. The rôle of the executive authority is leadership pure and simple. It looks ahead, elaborates policy, and gives subordinate commanders and the heads of administrative services the assistance that comes only from clear thinking in high places. An executive burdened with the details of financial responsibility and the pre-occupations of office procedure has been proved by the stern logic of facts incapable of fulfilling its mission either in war or in peace.

Thirdly. The importance of the executive duly co-ordinating the work of all subordinate services cannot be exaggerated. This object is achieved by a scientific grouping of all cognate functions, each group being supervised and controlled by an individual member of the executive staff, who ensures that the Commander-in-Chief's decisions are made clear to all concerned and that his policy is carried into effect.

Fourthly. It follows that the administrative departments are, *for executive purposes*, completely under the control of the executive, which, in an emergency, may overrule the head of a department in a purely financial matter. Normally, however, a departmental head is financially accountable, both as regards the provision of funds and their expenditure, not to the executive, but to Parliament, whose business it is to arrange for the adequate examination of departmental Estimates and Accounts and the continuous supervision of departmental methods and transactions.

It is the purpose of this article to inquire whether these principles which underlie the government of armies can with advantage be applied generally to the machinery of State government. As already explained, the Haldane Committee of 1918 held not only that they can be, but also that they ought to be, so applied, though they recognised that 'the elaboration of policy

cannot be so readily distinguished from the business of administration' in the sphere of civil government as in naval and military affairs. None the less, their recommendations conform throughout to the military precedent. The limitation of the Cabinet in point of numbers, the exemption of its individual members from administrative responsibilities, the well-thought-out grouping of services, the drastic departmental reforms proposed by the Committee, and the machinery suggested to enable Parliament adequately to control departmental, and incidentally bureaucratic, activities: all these proposals are in strict accord with the principles underlying naval and military government.

At great length the Committee advocate the grouping of State departments according to the particular service rendered to the community as a whole. National Defence and External Affairs form, for example, one such group, and a generation which, year in and year out, witnesses the repercussions of foreign and Dominion relations on questions of armaments and disarmament is hardly likely to cavil at such a conclusion.

The Haldane Committee, writing as they did during the war, make in their Report one observation of very far-reaching significance for the future. 'The gradual introduction,' they say, 'of the co-operation of the ministers of the Dominions in affairs which belong to a Cabinet now charged with the interests of the Empire as a whole, points to the probability that the organisation we have in view is likely to become requisite in new directions.' Within a limited space it is not possible to discuss all that this remark imports. Suffice it to say that, if and when Imperial Defence becomes something more than a mere phrase, the full meaning of the distinction between the functions of command and of administration will at once become apparent, and this truth, principle or maxim, call it what one will, might well be inscribed in letters of gold on the agenda paper of every Round Table Conference which deals with Imperial affairs. The production of armed forces and their administration is, and must ever remain, the concern of each self-governing portion of the Empire. If, on the other hand, Imperial Defence means anything at all, command is, and must ever remain, a prerogative of the Crown, to be exercised by the Crown acting through a minister or a body of ministers representative of the Empire as a whole.

I cannot do better than conclude by drawing attention to the achievements of a man of genius who had the vision to comprehend the legitimate demands of executive authority, with special reference to the grouping of the national resources for a given object, and was ready to stake everything to win for himself the powers necessary for success.

On December 4, 1756, William Pitt, later Earl of Chatham,

became a Secretary of State in the Duke of Devonshire's Cabinet, and in this capacity he was specifically charged with supervising the departments dealing with foreign, colonial, and military affairs. Simultaneously, his close ally, Lord Temple, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. Through a Court intrigue both were summarily dismissed from office on April 6, 1757.

The Seven Years War had been in progress since May 1756, and never were England's fortunes at so low an ebb. With a population of 7,000,000 she was engaged in a life and death struggle throughout the world with France, which had thrice her population. Ireland, on her flank, was sullenly hostile and absorbed one-fifth of the standing army for its defence. Parts of Scotland, only eleven years before, had been in open rebellion. France, Austria and Russia, with Saxony and Sweden, were united to crush Prussia, her only ally on the Continent—90,000,000 against 5,000,000. Hanover, the British king's own province, was an ever-compelling encumbrance on the island power. In North America France, with the support of the principal Indian tribes, aimed at hemming the British power within the districts lying between the Atlantic seaboard and the Alleghany mountains to the westward. Firmly established in Canada, she claimed as her own the whole of the hinterland from the Mississippi to the Pacific, and with Montcalm, a man of genius, in command she bid fair to make good her claim. On the British side the colonists were unorganised, disunited, and little inclined to help. True to the tradition they had brought with them from the Mother Country, they regarded war as being solely the business of the regular naval and military forces and the finance of war as an appropriate charge against the British Exchequer.

The nation hardly had time to recover from the shock of one disaster before some other, even more startling, was announced. The opening act was the loss in June 1756 of Minorca, which for fifty years had been a British possession and, even more than Malta to-day, was regarded as the keystone of our naval position in the Mediterranean. As a consequence of this loss the life of a British admiral was sacrificed in the following March. In June 1757 news arrived from India of the fall, some months earlier, of the trading station of Calcutta, with its attendant horrors of the Black Hole, and in the same month Frederick of Prussia met with a crushing defeat at Kollin which seemed to presage an end to his resistance. In July the Hanover defence force, 40,000 strong, commanded by a son of George II. and paid for by subsidies from the British Treasury, was overwhelmed on the Weser, and two months later a humiliating convention was signed. In August the French occupied the Belgian coast, and invasion threatened throughout the whole length of the Channel.

Gloomy as was the prospect in Europe, that in America was as bad, or even worse. Thrice in little more than two years considerable British forces, composed mainly of regular troops, had been exterminated in frontier warfare. Each of these defeats, not only relatively, but actually, was much more serious and more far-reaching than the disaster at Isandlwana which half a century ago stirred the nation to its depths. The great lakes had become a French possession, and both there and in the Mississippi valley Montcalm was busy establishing and strengthening a long chain of forts and trading posts in pursuance of his hemming-in policy. In August the British Commander-in-Chief in America reported that the French position at Louisburg and in Canada generally was impregnable, and he definitely refused to attack. To make matters worse, the British North American naval squadron was so shattered by a hurricane in August that it had to abandon its station and recross the Atlantic to refit.

Small wonder that Chesterfield, a cool observer, could write in July as follows: 'I am sure we are undone both at home and abroad. At home by our increasing debt and expenses; abroad by our ill-luck and incapacity. The King of Prussia, the only ally we had in the world, is now, I fear, *hors de combat*. The French are masters to do what they please in America. We are no longer a nation. I never yet saw so dreadful a prospect.' Such, briefly, was the setting of the drama during the opening stages of the Seven Years War.

What was Pitt's attitude in this desperate crisis? During his brief spell of office in the winter he had seen enough to convince him that divided control in war spells disaster, and he has left on record in imperishable words his impressions of direction by a sanhedrim. 'The members of such a body,' he said, 'shift and shuffle the charge from one to the other. Says one, I am not general. The treasury says, I am not admiral. The admiralty says, I am not minister. From such an unaccording assemblage of separate and distinct powers with no system, a nullity results. One, two, three, four, five lords meet—if they cannot agree:—Oh! we will meet again on Saturday. Oh! but, says one of them, I am to go out of town.' Such was a War Council in 1756, and such, or something near akin, was more than one War Council within the memory of the present generation.

Every conceivable factor, personal as well as political, combined, it would seem, to make Pitt ready to grasp at high office, if the opportunity offered. He had been twenty-two years in Parliament without attaining Cabinet rank. He had married three years previously, and for the past two years he had been largely dependent, for the support of his wife and young family, on an allowance of 1000*l.* a year given him by his brother-in-law,

Lord Temple. He was now in his forty-ninth year and his health was wretched; he was constantly subject to attacks of gout of a very virulent description which prostrated him physically and mentally for weeks on end.

Politically he stood almost alone in the world. The King and the Court party were openly hostile to him. The great Whig feudal clans who monopolised the offices of State disliked him as much as he despised them. The Grenville family alone supported him. The faith the people of England had in him was his chief political asset, but, in an age of pocket boroughs, this was not a foundation of much value on which to build.

Incapacity, counsels of despair, and a long series of disasters stared him in the face, but he never quailed. 'My lord,' he had said to the Duke of Devonshire in March, 'I am sure I can save this country and nobody else can.'

Such were Pitt's circumstances, and such his ideas, when, on May 25, 1757, Newcastle approached him with an offer of the appointment of Secretary of State in a new ministry he was forming. Pitt refused the offer pointblank unless naval affairs were brought as completely under his control as foreign, colonial, and military affairs had been during his previous term of office. The King, who wanted to retain Lord Winchilsea, a Court favourite, at the Admiralty, was furious. Newcastle and the bulk of the Whig magnates were secretly pleased, as they held that Pitt would be discredited in the eyes of all patriotic men for insisting on what appeared to them to be a question of quite minor importance. They regarded his action as a display of mere personal vanity and ambition. Pitt's friends and political adherents took the same view and were aghast. On May 27 they held a meeting to protest against their leader's attitude.

Pitt could have been under no illusions as to the risks he ran both to his own reputation and to his chances of preferment. He was fully aware that the King and the Court party would, if possible, carry on without him; and he knew Newcastle, the old parliamentary hand and arch intriguer, well enough to understand that he would be only too glad of a good excuse to exclude from office a most uncongenial colleague. But he never wavered. For nearly a month he refused to compromise on the subject of the Admiralty. He, and he alone, realised that war is a one-man business; he, and he alone, had the vision to foresee that, in the years to come, neither he nor any other man, however gifted, could save the country under a system of divided control. During the weeks of uncertainty that followed, Pitt's lonely figure stands out as one of the noblest in all history.

At last, towards the end of June, Pitt won his point, and on June 29 he began a period of office that has left an indelible mark

on the world. Anson, a distinguished sailor, became First Lord of the Admiralty. In this connexion the late Sir Julian Corbett, in his *England in the Seven Years War*, has given so lucid a description of the system which from now on held good during more than four years that I make no apologies for quoting at some length what he wrote.

Pitt, [he says] within the broad lines of the Government's policy, practically exercised the office of First Lord, while Anson discharged that of First Sea Lord or Naval Chief of Staff, a part which exactly suited his taste and his capacity. But even so, the system of direct communication was rarely, if ever, applied to purely naval operations. Its chief use was for combined expeditions in which an admiral and a general had to co-operate, and it was essential to have one fountain of instructions to co-ordinate their action, as well as to preserve the secrecy which is the soul of such operations. . . . In practice the system worked admirably. Indeed the whole direct-acting organisation into which our clumsy constitutional machinery had suddenly been transformed was one of peculiar perfection. In effect, for the purposes of the war the administration was scientifically separated into a supply department and an executive department which were kept practically distinct. At the head of the one was the Duke of Newcastle, as First Lord of the Treasury, at the head of the other was Pitt; that is, diplomacy, the army and the navy—the three executive factors in war—were under his supreme direction, and the great officers in each department were in relation to him as expert advisers. Thus without the preoccupation of supply he was free to co-ordinate the three national forces as completely and harmoniously as a general in the field wields his horse, foot and artillery.

It is for this reason—because on this occasion we had for once an organisation for war which, theoretically at least, could scarcely be nearer perfection—that the progress of the struggle is so well worth patient study, not merely for soldiers and sailors, but for every man who directly or indirectly feels the responsibility of government.

Such in broad outline was the system of conducting war for whose attainment England's greatest statesman risked more than life itself. For nearly four and a half years he was Defence Minister in the widest significance of the term, and as such he was able to save his country in the hour of her direst need. His achievement was the British Empire.

Pitt was in no sense a dictator untrammelled by constitutional observances. He was just a minister of the Crown carrying out a policy decided on by the Cabinet of which he was a member. This was made abundantly clear when, in October 1761, he was overruled in the Cabinet on a major question of war policy and resigned office in consequence. In executive action only, within his recognised sphere of influence, he had wide latitude, as many other ministers have had both before and since. It was primarily owing to the position he had won for himself by his foresight that he was able to accomplish what he did, and, given such a

position, others doubtless could and can achieve similar success in circumstances where a council or committee is foredoomed to failure.

Has Pitt's example no lessons for us to-day? Men of experience in affairs argue that nowadays it would be impracticable to confer on any one individual, other than the Prime Minister himself, such powers as Pitt wielded, and that obviously the Prime Minister cannot, or ought not to, attempt to assume the rôle of Defence Minister over and above his other heavy responsibilities. Such an argument cannot be gainsaid, if it has to be accepted as a prior assumption that a Cabinet of twenty or thirty ministers is the hall-mark of democratic government. This assumption, however, is negatived directly or implicitly on every page of the Haldane Committee's Report.

Given a small Cabinet consisting wholly or mainly of ministers without portfolio, as suggested in that Report, a Minister of Defence possessing powers similar to Pitt's would be one only of four, five, or six ministers, each of them, under the Prime Minister, supervising and co-ordinating the activities of a group of cognate departments. They all would stand to the Prime Minister much in the same relation that his staff stands to a commander-in-chief in the field. So far from overshadowing their chief, they would enable him, without his being overburdened by detail, to get a much firmer grip on the machinery of government as a whole than is now practicable. Matters brought to his notice would have been well threshed out beforehand and his task of arriving at sound and sane decisions would be rendered as simple as is humanly possible. In peace such a conception is desirable, in war it is essential, and it can be, and should be, applied throughout the whole machinery of government, and not in defence matters alone.

The plan of government outlined in the previous pages is not the mere dream of an idealist. It has been put forward as a practical proposition by men of immense experience in the business of State—men like Sir Robert Morant, Sir George Murray, and the Right Hon. J. H. Thomas—and it is sponsored by an ex-Lord Chancellor and one of the most eminent constitutional lawyers of his day: 'There is much overlapping and consequent obscurity and confusion in the functions of the departments of executive government. . . . A rearrangement of the supreme direction of the executive organisation has been rendered necessary, not merely by the war itself, but by the prospect after the war.'

Such was their considered and unanimous opinion.

GERALD F. ELLISON.

PRINCIPLES OF INDIRECT RULE IN AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION

THE agitation which has broken out among the settlers in East Africa over the new White Paper on Native Policy is not a little surprising. For, as a recent message from Uganda reminds us, the White Paper involves no change whatever in the principles according to which Uganda—and for that matter Tanganyika also—is administered. All it does, in fact, is to work out in detail the applications of the principles already enunciated by the Hilton Young Commission, already accepted by the Colonial Office. Indirect Rule is one of the chief methods which we have adopted to foster native interests along the general lines laid down in the White Paper; accordingly, it may be of some interest to enunciate some of its principles.

My own interest in the question was kindled by a visit to the Wanyamwezi and Wasukumu country, north of Tabora, in western Tanganyika, where indirect rule is achieving remarkable results. I must confess that 'indirect rule' had previously only a very hazy meaning for me. After seeing it working in a particularly interesting form at Shinyanga and Ngudu, I was made more able to grasp the significance of what I afterwards read about it; and so, what with my visit, Lord Lugard's *Dual Mandate*, and the extremely interesting memoranda on Native Administration issued by the Tanganyika Government under Sir Donald Cameron's signature,¹ I feel I am beginning to understand something of this peculiarly British contribution to the methods of Colonial administration.

The principle of Direct Rule is that native peoples are to be administered, their taxes collected, their disputes settled, their schools and hospitals, seed farms and irrigation works, and other social and economic services provided, all by the interposition of the central Government, working through agents appointed directly by it. In territories like those of Central Africa this, of necessity, means that local administration must be put into the hands of paid headmen appointed by Government, who accord-

¹ No 1, *Principles of Native Administration and their Application*; No. 2, *Native Courts*; No. 3, *Native Treasuries* (Dar-es-Salaam, 1926).

ingly come too often to be looked on only as tax-gatherers and tools of a remote and arbitrary power, alien to the actual life of the people, their ideas and customs, their aspirations. In these circumstances, the tribal organisation, its customary law, its traditions will tend gradually to disintegrate, or to be forced underground and take the form of anti-governmental organisations and secret societies. Policies of direct rule were followed by the Germans in Tanganyika before the war, and by us in Kenya until the establishment of native councils in very recent times.

The policy of indirect rule, on the other hand (I quote from one of the above-cited memoranda), is 'the principle of ruling through the Native Chiefs, who are regarded as an integral part of the machinery of Government, with well-defined powers and functions recognised by Government and by law, and not dependent on the caprice of an executive officer.' And thus follows a rider: 'It must be clearly understood that the policy of the Government is to maintain and support native rule (within the limits laid down) and not to impose a form of British rule with the support of native chiefs, which is a very different thing.'

Indirect rule, in fact, means the employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate, their gradual moulding, by means of the laws made and taxes imposed by the central Government, and of the guidance given by the administrative officers, into channels of progressive change, and the encouragement within the widest limits of local traditions, local pride and local initiative, and so of greatest possible freedom and variety of local development within the territory.

The principles of indirect rule were first fully worked out in Nigeria under Lugard's Governorship. There, however, large and important kingdoms and emirates were already in existence, already linked on to world civilisation by means of their Mohammedanism, and with their own highly-developed if not always admirable systems of law, taxation and government, their own traditions and history often extending far into the past. The method of ruling through these existing agencies was in many ways the line of least resistance. The chief novelty was the insistence as a matter of principle on the wide freedom given to the local organisation to keep its own traditions and basic ideas and to develop along its own lines, with the minimum amount of central despotism, however benevolent, or tutelage, however well-meaning.

The special interest of the application of these principles in Tanganyika lies in the fact that in this territory even the most advanced native institutions were on a far more primitive plan than those of Nigeria, or even than the more-developed systems

In neighbouring parts of Central Africa, such as the elaborate kingdoms of the Baganda or the Banyaro to the north in Uganda, or the Watusi to the west in Belgian Ruanda. Here in Tanganyika it would have been far easier to ignore the native tradition and social structure, and to impose our own methods and systems from above. Up till 1925, although the British Government in Tanganyika had decided against any system of purely direct rule, it had not really thought out whether it was going to embark upon indirect rule in the full sense, or upon the compromise policy of using native chiefs and native institutions to introduce our British methods according to a system devised in a Government office at the capital. The real difference between true indirect rule and the imitation article is whether the system is home-grown, authentic local produce, or is imposed from outside, take-it-or-leave-it, stamped with the manufacturer's name—'British Government.'

In Tanganyika, since 1925, the unit of governmental organisation has been, wherever possible, the native authority, working in conjunction with the white district officers. And the native authority consists usually of a chief and his elders; but the importance of the council may vary greatly from place to place, and in some cases government is carried on by a federation of chiefs. The areas over which these bodies exert their authority vary greatly in importance, from little districts of less than a thousand inhabitants up to sultanates of perhaps a quarter of a million. The natural tendency has been towards the amalgamation of the quite small districts into larger units and federations, as giving greater efficiency of administration.

The chiefs are not appointed by the Governor: they are recognised by him, which is a very different matter. Sometimes a chieftainship is strictly hereditary, in other cases the people elect, or we had better say select, their chief; and there are various grades of latitude between the two extremes. In general, the Government reserves to itself the right to refuse to acknowledge a particular individual as fit to hold office; but this is only exercised in extreme cases.

This, then, is the first great difference in practice between direct and indirect rule: in the one case, the chief is a creature of Government, a mere appointee; in the other, the traditional representative of the people. The second great difference concerns the payment of the native authorities. Under the direct system the headman or chief is paid a salary from headquarters. Under the indirect system he is not paid at all by the central Government. On the contrary, he is looked upon, in regard to the finance of his district as in regard to his own status and appointment, as the repository of local independence. In the old

tribal days the normal state of affairs was for chiefs to receive from their subjects either tribute or service (or both). Under the system of indirect rule this bond of economic duty between people and chief still receives recognition, but it has been regularised and modified both in relation to the existence of central authority and to new conceptions of the duty of the local ruler to his people. The essential point is this—that although the central Government fixes for each district the amount of the native tax (hut and poll tax), this is collected by the native authorities and paid into their own treasuries. A certain percentage is then paid over by the native treasuries to the central Government as their contribution to the business of general administration; and a certain fixed sum (varying with the size and importance of the district) is further paid to the chief as his 'civil list,' and as salaries to various officials of his native administration. In this way the people feel that the chiefs belong to them, while the chiefs are brought to realise that they are no mere puppets of the central Government, but an integral part of the administrative and economic organisation of the territory.

After these amounts have been paid out, a considerable proportion of the tax-money (in all save a few backward districts where the tax so far has had to be fixed very low) remains unspent. In addition, the native treasury receives other revenue from fines and fees imposed in the local native courts, and from various minor sources, such as market dues, salt royalties, and so forth.

How is the spending of this balance controlled? Here is the third essential of indirect rule. Under direct rule any surplus of money from native tax would probably go straight into general revenue, and in any case would be expended by the Government according to schemes planned out at headquarters. Some centrally planned schemes of wide application are always necessary; where indirect rule exists, the Government can carry them out with the aid of the fraction of the tax-money passed on to it by the native authorities. But here the balance in a native treasury is regarded as being entirely under the control of the local native authority, to be expended as the chief and his council think fit for the benefit of the district. Not unnaturally there will be need for many years of guidance and advice from the District Officer; and his sympathetic and even forceful influence may sometimes be needed to prevent extravagance or folly. But he has no official control, and the system does in practice work out as it was intended—as an encouragement to foresight and an increased sense of responsibility on the part of the native authority, and as an enhancement of local patriotism and general interest in the development of the district.

Fourthly and finally we come to the administration of law. Under direct rule an overburdened white man attempts to deal with the legal affairs of tens of thousands of natives. In spite of finding his energies overtaxed, he knows, if he reflects a little, that only a fraction of the accumulated litigiousness of the people actually finds its way to him. Either violent or illegal means of settling disputes may be increasing, or the old traditional methods of native justice, although unrecognised by white authority, are dealing with the bulk of cases out of his sight, below the surface. This latter state of affairs seems undoubtedly to have been going on in Kenya before native councils were created. Among large tribes like the Kainondo only an infinitesimal number of cases come up to be tried in the white man's courts. No Africans are fond of going to law, and we have no reason to think that the Kenya tribes suddenly changed their character in this respect. In any case, it is certain that the elaborate system of native land tenure has continued to work through the ancient machinery without any organic connexion with 'Government.' Very luckily for the future of the country, the traditional native institutions tenaciously continued to live a subterranean life, waiting until circumstances allowed them to sprout fully again above ground.

But under the full system of indirect rule, not only are native courts recognised, but they are recognised as the mouthpieces of local law and custom, only to be interfered with or modified if they conflict with certain fundamentals of white justice. Thus the law which regulates the dealings of a native people with each other is no more imposed upon them from without than the chief who rules them; it is their own law, an indigenous product.²

As time goes on, attempts will naturally be made to approximate the various local codes, thus avoiding obvious difficulties such as the trial of a stranger according to laws wholly different from his own. Meanwhile, in some districts the interesting experiment is being carried on of recording in writing the local common law, as well as the decisions of the native courts. In this way, since writing is the parent of large-scale coherence, an autochthonous legal system, closely adapted to local conditions

² In the Musoma district I was given an example of how under indirect rule the natives get the law they like, and not an alien code. The people here are very frightened of witchcraft, and take great precautions to conceal their excrement, nail-parings and so forth, for if an enemy got hold of such products of their bodies there would be no limit to the harm he might do. Recently a man was caught stealing another man's urine. The presumption was that he wanted it for magic purposes, and the native court inflicted the heavy fine of 10s. And the District Officer, when he went through the records, upheld the judgment. According to certain standards, he was wrong to confirm what he knew was based in error; but, granted that the territory has embarked on the policy of indirect rule, he was perfectly correct.

and yet far more elaborate than the original tribal code, may gradually develop.

Here, as elsewhere, some control must be reserved to the representative of the central Government; and the District Officer, in addition to being the first court of appeal from the native court, has the duty of examining the records kept by the clerks of the native courts as he goes on tour through his area, and the right of revising sentences or of ordering the rehearing of cases where he thinks fit.

There are some parts of Tanganyika territory where the German method of ruling through paid headmen or *akidas*, coupled with the policy of deliberately discouraging the old tribal organisation (a policy which appeared to have been vigorously practised in some parts of the colony, hardly or not at all in others), seemed to have broken down the spirit of tribalism and its institutions. In the southern coastal area of Lindi (I am citing the Report on the Administration of the Tanganyika Mandate in 1927 issued by the Colonial Office to the League Council) the forty years of direct rule, combined with other detribalising influences such as the penetration of Arab culture, seemed to have destroyed all trace of the original social system. Investigation showed, however, that the tenacious conservatism of the people had retained a clan or family group system, and that in the heads of the various family groups (who still dealt with the apportionment of land) there lay to hand the raw materials for native administrators under an indirect system of rule. In spite of months of investigation by District Officers, followed by explanation and promises of a change of system, the people refused to believe that the old paid headmen (who had to be continued in office until new officials could be appointed) would ever really be replaced by men representative of popular institutions. When finally the change was effected, and native administrations were actually formed, ruled by councils of family heads, collecting their own taxes, and trying cases in their own courts, the people became enthusiastic. One member of a council summed up the situation by saying, 'You have given us back our country. We are men again.' Since then very notable progress has been made in shouldering the new responsibilities and in recovering the spirit of independence so long suppressed.

Then in some regions there exist tribes whose organisation is such that it is impossible to use it as a basis for an efficient system of indirect rule. Back from the south-eastern shore of Lake Victoria, for instance, as I was told by a friend who is Administrative Officer there, is a tribe organised so completely on the age-group system that the elders have no say in affairs. Each age-class consists, of course, of all the young men initiated

at one time; and a new class is inaugurated about every seven years. The affairs of the tribe are in the hands of the senior age-class of warriors—young men from about twenty-five to thirty-two years of age. At the conclusion of their time they pass on to the elder stage and hand over the reins of office to the age-class below. This meant a complete lack of continuity, and was always liable to lead to their making the best of their short term of office by practising extortion. The United States has been finding the Spoils System unsatisfactory. It is equally unsatisfactory for Africa. So the old organisation, in its existing form, had to be suppressed, and one deliberately set up which was more adapted to modern conditions when peace, not war, is the rule, and the tribes are not sovereign entities, but parts of a larger community.

There still, I believe, are a few backward or difficult communities in Tanganyika among which it has not yet been practicable to introduce indirect rule. But their number is decreasing year by year. Year by year, too, the responsibilities of the existing native administrations are being enlarged, and, through adjustments of tax, the amount of money which they have at their disposal for their people's advancement is being increased. Every administration has its faults; doubtless our administration of this Mandated Territory is no exception, but at least no one can deny that we are putting into practice and carrying out, with a thoroughness and rapidity which has surprised even the warmest partisans of the system, one important duty laid upon a mandatory Power—the development of the native inhabitants along lines fitting them to take over more and more of the government of their own country.

JULIAN S. HUXLEY.

VISITORS FROM THE EAST TO THE PLANTAGENET AND LANCASTRIAN KINGS

IN the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the British Isles represented to the dwellers in the East the Ultima Thule of the known world, and few and far between were the Oriental visitors of the period who penetrated to our remote and forbidding shores. Nevertheless, the leading part played by English kings in the Crusades, the contact so strangely established between Edward I. and certain rulers of the Mongols by a mutual hatred of the Saracen, the need of Western help against the growing menace of the Turks felt by the eastern outposts of Christendom, led sundry emissaries from the East to seek the presence of the westernmost of the sovereigns of Europe. The five visitors of whom I propose here to tell have only one factor in common—namely, that the object of their visits was the same: to seek the aid of the English king against the armies of Islam; in other respects they show a singular diversity. Three were the envoys of a king; two were themselves crowned heads. One was Catholic and by race a Frank, one was Orthodox and a Greek, one a Genoese established in Central Asia, one a Tatar converted to Christianity, one a Mongol born a Nestorian Christian in Peking. It is with the last mentioned that I will begin my narrative.

In 1227 there died the Mongol conqueror Jenghiz, who, born the son of a petty Central Asian chieftain, had built up an empire that extended at the time of his death from the China Sea to the Crimea. Of this empire Jenghiz was the first *khakan* (Great Khan), the supreme overlord, under whom individual provinces were governed, with varying degrees of autonomy, by feudatory khans of his family. In 1251 one of his grandsons, Hulagu, the conqueror of Baghdad, established in Persia, subject to the suzerainty of the *khakan* in Peking, the dynasty of the *il-khans*, which endured for the ensuing century; and it is with a grandson of Hulagu, Argon, who reigned in Persia and Mesopotamia as the fourth *il-khan* from 1284 to 1291, that we are for the moment concerned.

One of the outstanding and perhaps most surprising characteristics of the princes of the House of Jenghiz was their tolerance

in matters of religion. Nominally Shamanists, as were the earlier Mongol sovereigns, they were equally friendly to Christianity, Buddhism and Islam; it was not until the empire of Jenghiz and Kublai fell to pieces from sheer unwieldiness that the rulers of its component parts gravitated definitely towards Islam in the West, Buddhism in the East. If they showed favour to one faith more than to another in this earlier period they did so towards Christianity. They took to wife not only Mongol ladies belonging to Nestorian Christian tribes, but even Byzantine princesses; sometimes they allowed their children to be baptised; while they sought on several occasions to enter into political relations with Christendom, seeing in the pope and the temporal rulers of Europe possible allies against their principal western enemies, the Arab *khalifate*, the Egyptian Mamluks, and the empire of the Seljuq Turks. One of those most favourable to Christianity and most eager for an alliance with the Christian West was the *Il-Khan* Argon, whose three embassies to the Court of Edward I. form the subject of the first part of this paper.

The story of the earliest of these embassies is told in one of the most curious manuscripts that have come down to us from the Middle Ages—one of the most curious because, true counterpart of the narratives of Marco Polo and his European contemporaries, it relates the experiences of a Mongol Christian, a native of Peking, in the course of his travels from his birthplace overland to the remote West. I will not recapitulate here the beginning of the story, which is concerned with the birth, parentage, and upbringing of two native members of the Nestorian Church in China, Mark and Bar-soma, both Uighurs by race, of their determination to enter the monastic life and the priesthood and to make the pilgrimage from their distant Chinese home to the holy places of Palestine, of the vicissitudes of their long and dangerous journey across Asia. Suffice it to say that Mark ultimately finds himself elected patriarch of the Nestorian Church under the name of Yahb-Allaha III., and, instead of returning to his native land, remains at the seat of the patriarchate in Mesopotamia with his friend Bar-soma at his side.

Six years after Yahb-Allaha's consecration Argon determines to enter into negotiations with the pope and the princes of Europe for an alliance against the Egyptian Mamluks, and asks the patriarch, with whom he is on friendly terms, to find him a suitable envoy. Yahb-Allaha nominates Bar-soma, a choice particularly agreeable to Argon, who believes the despatch as his ambassador of a real Mongol Christian of high rank, the intimate friend of the patriarch of Eastern Christendom, to be well calculated to convert to his views the pope and the Frankish kings. Accompanied by an appropriate retinue and entrusted with letters and

presents to the potentates to whose courts he is being despatched. Bar-soma sets out on his mission in 1287, supplied with 'thirty excellent mounts and 2000 *mithqals* of gold.' The manuscript now proceeds to describe in detail the successive stages of his journey, first to the shores of the Black Sea and thence to Constantinople, where he is welcomed by the Byzantine emperor, Andronicus II. This emperor, whom the author of the manuscript calls Basil, mistaking his title *Basileus* for his name, was connected with the Mongols through the marriage of one of his daughters to the ruler of the Golden Horde, and receives the envoy with great friendliness, placing at his disposal as a residence what would now be described in Constantinople as a *khan*. Having inspected the sights and shrines of Byzantium, Bar-soma obtains the emperor's leave to proceed on his way in order to comply with the orders of King Argon 'to penetrate among the Franks,' takes ship to Italy, sees Stromboli in eruption, and from the terrace of a house in Naples witnesses a naval battle between *Irid Kharladu*, the author's version of the name of the King of Naples ('il re Carlo due'), and *Irid Arkun* ('il re d'Aragon'). After this introduction to European politics our envoy proceeds to Rome, where he learns that the pope (Honorius IV.) is dead, but he is conducted into the presence of twelve great lords called *kardinale*, assembled in conclave to elect a new pope; to these he expounds the nature of his mission as well as the Nestorian confession of faith. Since, however, there is for the moment no pope with whom he can discuss the business of his embassy, Bar-soma proceeds to the other States to which he is accredited, beginning with Genoa, where he sees the Holy Grail, taken by the Crusaders at the capture of Cæsarea, in Palestine, in 1101. His next visit is to the King of France, Philip IV., who orders his 'emirs' to show the envoy the sights of Paris, and then follows that part of his embassy which is of special interest to us—namely, his visit to 'King *Alangitar* in *Kasonia*.' The author of the manuscript, or a copyist, has here again mistaken, as is his habit, the title for the personal name, for this mysterious personage is none other than the King of 'Angleterre,' Edward I., then visiting his province of Gascony. Twenty days after leaving Paris Bar-soma reaches 'the town'—no doubt Bordeaux—where the king is in residence, and is received by Edward with enthusiasm upon his unfolding his master's proposals for a simultaneous invasion of the Holy Land from east and west. 'We, the kings of these regions,' declares Edward, 'have placed the emblem of the Cross upon our bodies, and have no preoccupation greater than this [*sc.* the recapture of Jerusalem]. My heart rejoices to learn that what I long for, King Argon desires also.'

The king then received, at his own request, the Holy Com-

munion at the hands of this Nestorian from Peking, whom he sends on his way with gifts and with a favourable answer to the invitation of his master. Bar-soma, having thus no need to cross the Channel, now revisits Rome to negotiate with Nicholas IV., the pope elected during his absence, and returns home towards the end of 1288.

In the hope of converting from words into deeds the offers of co-operation brought back by Bar-soma, Argon in 1289 decides to despatch another embassy to the pope and to the Kings of France and England, and on this occasion selects as his envoy not only a Christian but a European in the person of one Buscarel, a Genoese of whose previous history little is known. Leaving Persia after the Easter of 1289, Buscarel presented himself in the first instance to the pope, who from Rieti on September 30 of that year addressed a bull to Edward; in this bull Nicholas requested the king to receive kindly the noble Genoese, *Biscarellus de Gisulfo*, and to give careful ear to the message he would deliver from Argon, the illustrious King of the Tatars. We have few details of the incidents of the voyage, but we know that on the eve of the Epiphany, January 5, 1290, Buscarel arrived in London, accompanied by three gentlemen, a cook, eight horsemen and six domestics. Remaining in England twenty days, thirteen of which were spent at court, he presented his letters from Argon and the pope, and was received with great friendliness by the king, who defrayed from his own purse the mission's entire expenses. When Buscarel recrossed the Channel it was as the bearer of a letter from Edward to Argon, in which the English king expressed his intention to lead an army against the Sultan of Babylon (*i.e.*, Egypt) as soon as he had obtained the pope's concurrence. It is curious to note the modern sound of his form of address to Argon: 'Your Royal Highness—*vestra regia celsitudo*'; but he was in keeping with his times in his promise to send by special messengers a consignment of falcons for which the il-khan had asked.

The pope, more than anxious to take advantage of the proffered Mongol help, was urgent that Edward should keep his promise, but Edward, whilst full of good intentions, was immobilised in Britain by his wars with the Scots. Thus was Argon twice disappointed of his hopes, but he made yet another attempt to organise the campaign he had at heart, and in 1290 despatched a third embassy to the pope and the King of England, under the leadership of one Chagan, a converted Tatar. Chagan, who had adopted the baptismal name of Andrew on his conversion, was evidently a personage of importance, since the previous plenipotentiary, Buscarel, was now a member of his suite, and only figures as the second name on the list of his staff. The details of

Chagan's stay in England are not preserved, but the mission remained in the West sufficiently long to learn in Rome of the capture of Acre, the last outpost of the Crusaders in the Holy Land, by the Mamluk Melek al-Ashraf in May 1291. The news caused something like consternation in Europe, and the pope now redoubled his efforts to give tangible effect to the il-khan's proposals. But Argon did not live to see the return of his ambassador, for he had died on March 7 of that year. While we have the text of the pope's letters by Chagan, we do not know the nature of Edward's answer; more than ten years later, however, in March 1302, he wrote to one of Argon's sons, Kazan, then reigning as the seventh il-khan, and to the Patriarch Yahb-Allaha, to excuse and explain his failure to lead an army to Palestine. Accompanying Edward's envoy, one Geoffrey de Langles, we meet once again our old friend Buscarel, who joined the party in his native Genoa and there helped the English mission to buy their requirements for the journey. That they equipped themselves on a generous scale may be inferred from the sum of 193*l.* 12*s.* 7*d.*, a heavy amount in those days, which they expended on silver plate, 44*l.* 5*s.* on crockery and accoutrements, and 15*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* on the fifteen carpets which they used as beds. Less extravagant was the outlay of 2*s.* on two 'parasols,' bought at Trebizond and Tabriz respectively. On the conclusion of their mission the envoys returned to England with a caged leopard, fed during the voyage on sheep carried from Constantinople for the purpose.

We will now pass to the reign of Edward III. and to the visit to his Court of the king who may justly be called the greatest knight-errant the world has seen, King Peter I. of the Lusignan dynasty, that reigned in Cyprus from 1192 to 1489. The Latin kingdom of Cyprus was in truth a prolongation of the crusading kingdom of Jerusalem. On the execution of the luckless Conradin in 1268 the title of King of Jerusalem, together with the meagre remnants of the kingdom, passed to the Kings of Cyprus; and, after the fall of Acre, the Kings and Queens of Cyprus received the crown of Jerusalem at Famagusta as being the Cypriote town geographically the nearest to the lost kingdom, the reconquest of which was henceforth their prevailing ambition. By none of these princes was the ambition more passionately cherished than by Peter I., who reigned from 1359 to 1369, but was vowed, even from the days before his accession, when he was still Count of Tripoli, to a perpetual crusade against the Saracens. Peter commemorated his vow in his Order of the Sword, whose motto was '*pour loyauté maintenir*'; and it is recorded that he kept a naked sword constantly suspended on his neck in memory of his oath. Whatever be the truth of this story, it is at all events the case

that of all the Kings and Queens of Cyprus he is the only one to be depicted on the coinage holding a sword instead of a sceptre.

This Peter, then, filled with crusading ardour, twice went the round of the courts of Europe to collect men and money for the recovery of the Holy Land. In 1362 he set out on the first of his journeys to the rulers of Christendom and, after visiting the pope, the emperor, and the King of France, crossed the Channel to enlist the aid of the Kings of England and Scotland. He was helped in his quest by his handsome appearance, his courtly manners, his gallant demeanour, and his skill in all knightly accomplishments; and Froissart, to whom we are primarily indebted for our detailed knowledge of Peter's Odysseys, calls him 'a man of excellent understanding, master of many languages, and much beloved.' It was in 1364 that King Peter, after waiting in Calais for twelve days for a favourable wind, crossed the Channel and landed at Dover, where he remained two days while his ship was unloaded and his horses were disembarked. He then travelled by easy day-journeys to London, where he was honourably received, not only by the British lords sent by Edward to meet him, but also by several barons of France, then held as hostages in England.

It would take me a day [relates Froissart] were I to attempt relating to you the grand dinners, suppers, and other feasts and entertainments that were made, and the magnificent presents, gifts and jewels which were given, especially by queen Philippa, to the accomplished king of Cyprus. In truth, he was deserving of them, for he had come a long way and at a great expense, to visit them, to exhort the king to put on the red cross, and assist in regaining countries now occupied by the enemies of God. But the king of England politely and wisely excused himself, by saying: 'Certainly, my good cousin, I have every inclination to undertake this expedition; but I am growing too old, and shall leave it to my children. I make no doubt, that when it shall have been begun, you will not be alone, but will be followed most willingly by my knights and squires.' 'Sir,' replied the king of Cyprus, 'what you say satisfies me. I verily believe they will come, in order to serve God, and do good to themselves; but you must grant them permission so to do; for the knights of your country are eager in such expeditions.' 'Yes,' answered the king of England; 'I will never oppose such a work, unless some things should happen to me or to my kingdom which I do not at this moment foresee.' The king of Cyprus could never obtain any thing more from king Edward, in respect to this crusade; but, as long as he remained, he was politely and honourably feasted with a variety of grand suppers.

About this time king David of Scotland had some affairs to transact with king Edward that made it necessary for him to come to England; so that when he heard the king of Cyprus was there, he hastened his journey, in order to meet him, and made such dispatch that he arrived in London before he had left it. The two kings were much rejoiced to meet, and congratulated each other upon it. The king of England gave them two grand entertainments in his palace of Westminster. At the last of these,

the king of Cyprus took his leave of the king and queen of England, who made him very magnificent presents: king Edward gave him also a ship called the *Catharine*, which was very beautiful and well built. The king of England had had her constructed, by his orders, to make the voyage to Jerusalem. She was valued at twelve thousand francs, and lay in the harbour of Sandwich.

Not by Edward alone was Peter feasted in London, for, like royal visitors of a later age, he was dined by the mayor of the city; one of the historical paintings in the Royal Exchange depicts the celebrated banquet, at which the Kings of England, Scotland, France and Denmark were King Peter's fellow-guests. Stow, in his *Chronicle*, gives us the following account of this entertainment, which appears to have lived long in the memories of the citizens of London:

Henry Picard, vintner, mayor of London, in one day did sumptuously feast Edward king of England, John king of France, the king of Cyprus (then newly arrived in England), David king of Scots, Edward prince of Wales, with many noblemen and others: and after, the said Henry Picard kept his hall against all comers whosoever that were willing to play at dice and hazard. In like manner, the lady Margaret, his wife, did also keep her chamber to the same intent. The king of Cyprus, playing with Henry Picard in his hall, did win of him fifty marks; but Henry being very skilful in that art, altering his hand, did after win of the said king the same fifty marks and fifty marks more; which when the said king began to take in ill part, although he dissembled the same, Henry said unto him, 'My lord and king, be not aggrieved: I covet not your gold, but your play; for I have not bid you hither that I might grieve you, but that amongst other things I might try your play'; and gave him his money again, plentifully bestowing his own amongst the retinue. Besides, he gave many rich gifts to the king and other nobles and knights, who dined with him, to the great glory of the citizens of London in those days.

Returning to the East after an absence of nearly three years, Peter swooped down upon Egypt, the stronghold of Arab power, and by a brilliant *tour de main* seized Alexandria, although he held it for only one day. Again he went on his travels, undeterred by the ephemeral nature of his triumph, but was recalled by troubles in Cyprus. In 1369, after a reign of ten years filled with a variety of picturesque and tragic incident with which the history of the Middle Ages affords no parallel, he was stabbed to death by some of his nobles, and with Peter died the hopes of the last Crusade. Not wholly undeserved is Chaucer's kindly judgment on the gallant and ill-fated king, whose visit to Edward III. brought to England something of the glamour of his romantic island kingdom:

O worthy Petro, King of Cypre, also,
That Alisaundre wan by heigh maistrye,
Ful many a hethen wroghtes tow ful wo,
Of which thyn owene liges hadde envye,

And, for no thing but for thy chivalrye,
They in thy bedde han slayn thee by the morwe.
Thus can fortune hir wheel governe and gye,
And out of Ioye bring men to sorwe.

The last of the five visitors was the only one in the long list of Byzantine emperors to penetrate to the British Isles. In 1391 Manuel Palæologus, being then a prisoner in the hands of the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid I., the terrible 'Yildirim' (Thunderbolt), succeeded to the perilous inheritance of his father, the Emperor John V., and had to escape from Brusa in order to ascend a throne that was already tottering before the pressure and blows of the Turks. Little more than Constantinople and the Peloponnese remained to the Eastern emperors of their former territories, and the Turk was drawing ever closer the ring of ships and armies that was gradually encircling the coveted capital. An attempt to relieve the pressure with western support resulted in a crushing defeat of the Christian forces by Bayazid at Nicopolis on the Danube in 1396, and Manuel's situation was well-nigh desperate when he decided in 1399 to make a personal appeal to the kings of the West for farther succour in his plight.

On December 10, 1399, Manuel set sail from Constantinople in Venetian galleys, breaking his journey in the Peloponnese in order to leave his wife, the Empress Irene, and his three young sons in the care of his brother Theodore, despot of the Morea. He then proceeded to Venice, where he was received in state by the Doge and the Senate, was lavishly entertained and was promised material aid against the common enemy. The Italian chroniclers of the time make many references to the imperial visitor, whom they call Chiriamomolle, a corruption of *Κύρ Μανουήλ*, the Lord Manuel.

His sojourn in Venice at an end, the emperor passed on to Padua and Pavia, being treated with all honour by the Carrara and the Visconti, and then crossed the Alps into France, where, but for his visit to England, he spent the ensuing two and a half years. The French king, Charles VI., had recently recovered from one of his attacks of madness and gave, together with his family and his court, a warm welcome to his august but unfortunate guest. Manuel's well-proportioned and impressive stature, his noble mien and bodily activity, his superb horsemanship which belied the long hair and beard, both prematurely whitened by misfortune, impressed themselves deeply upon the imagination of the Parisians, who were astonished to see the venerable sovereign vault with the agility of a youth, without setting foot on the ground, from the horse which had carried him from the Bridge of Charenton to the back of the white charger that awaited him, a particular honour, at the gates of Paris.

It may be well to recall here how it came about that this monarch in distress, without lands, without money, without troops, without resources, with the mere shadow of power, was yet able, an itinerant beggar, to command the respect, indeed the veneration, which was enjoyed by the greatest and most powerful of his predecessors. Not even the long tale of defeats and other humiliations had served to kill the awe which was felt by mediæval Europe for the sacrosanct character of the Byzantine emperor. The Basileus of Constantinople had always embodied in its completest form the monarchical conceptions of Christendom: the heir to the authority and traditions of the Cæsars, he was not only the final legislator and the supreme military commander of his people—he was the elect and anointed of God, the head and defender of the Christian religion, the equal of the apostles. He was king and priest alike, infallible both in temporal and in spiritual affairs; and he exacted and received the most Oriental forms of submission from his subjects, who approached his person in the attitude of adoration and were content to style themselves his slaves. Thus, not even the misfortunes which had left the once glorious Eastern empire but a maimed torso had extinguished the tradition of majesty built up in more prosperous centuries; and men still regarded Manuel, even on his humiliating errand, as the Lord's anointed and as the personification of imperial Rome.

Manuel rapidly endeared himself to the Parisians. He was an honoured guest at the important social events of the day. He hunted and he visited churches (having an especial affection for the Abbey of St. Denis), while to attend his private chapel, where the liturgy was celebrated for him according to the Byzantine rite, became one of the fashionable pastimes of society in the French capital, to whom the icons and the Eastern ceremonial afforded an interesting novelty. All was going well when King Charles's health suffered a relapse; and it was doubtless this circumstance which led Manuel to visit England, at a season unpropitious both politically and climatically. For it was little more than a year since Henry IV. had seized the Crown from the unfortunate Richard II. (who met his end in the very year of the visit), while the Channel crossing on that 11th day of December, 1400, was evidently a rough one. Landing at Dover and thence proceeding through Kent, Manuel was well received at Canterbury by the Austin Friars, and on December 21, the feast of St. Thomas, was met at Blackheath by Henry. From Blackheath the two sovereigns made their entry in procession into London, and both there and subsequently at Eltham, where he spent Christmas, Manuel was entertained in a manner which evoked his warm appreciation.

The Prince with whom we are now residing, [he writes to his friend Manuel Chrysoloras in Constantinople (the emperor added to his other qualities a wide range of intellectual interests and considerable gifts of literary expression)] the King of Great Britain—a country which may be called a veritable other world—this Prince of great substance, embellished with a thousand great qualities, adored even by those who do not know him and causing those who have seen him but once to say that Fame, losing her divine power, is unable to celebrate such merit; this Prince, I say, illustrious in rank, illustrious in mind, who can deal a hard blow but also knows how to win friends with prudence, who holds out to everyone a helping hand, offering himself as a universal protector to all who have need of protection, has followed his natural inclination in becoming for us a haven after a double tempest, the one of nature, the other of fortune. His speech is full of charm; he delights us in every way, honours and loves us equally. His only fear is that what he does for us is not enough, and he seems on this account to blush, so magnanimous is he. He will give us help in men-at-arms, in archers, in money and in ships, which will convey the troops whithersoever it be necessary.

Alas! that Henry failed to justify this somewhat fulsome praise. Accepting at their face value Henry's assurances, Manuel returned in February 1401 to Paris, whence he wrote to his friends in Constantinople that his plans for the expedition to be fitted out by the French and English kings were maturing so well that he hoped soon to be returning in its wake to his dominions. Unhappily, Charles VI. now suffered another return of his malady. While Manuel lingered impotently in France, waiting for Henry's promises to materialise, the French were too distracted by the struggle between the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans for the control of the kingdom to give much thought to the luckless Greek. And then, suddenly, salvation came whence it was least expected—from the East. The Mongol Timur the Lame, that greatest of all human destroyers of men, had burst, himself a rebel against the House of Jenghiz, out of Central Asia and, at the battlefield of Angora in July 1402, brought the advance of the Ottomans for the time being to a standstill. The terrible Yildirim was a prisoner in the hands of the yet more terrible Tamerlane, to die in captivity a few months later. Manuel now hastened back to his capital, the richer only by a few galleys, sundry presents, and happy recollections; but his empire had received, as if by a miracle, a respite of half a century before it met its end under the heroic leadership of the last Constantine, Manuel's youngest son.

H. C. LUKE.

RENAUDOT, FATHER OF FRENCH JOURNALISM

IN the history of every country there are men of distinction, whose merit only a few realise, and whose fame is confined to a small circle. At the same time, in drawing a sketch of any man who seems in the world's eyes only to have played a secondary part, one is apt to find that what he did has turned out infinitely more beneficial than has ever been acknowledged. Theophraste Renaudot, journalist and philanthropist, with his 'innocent inventions,' as he himself termed them, falls into this category. The inauguration of registry offices and bureaux of information, the 'Mont de Piété' in France, the dispensary, and above all the *Gazette*, were his creations. On the whole, little has been written about him, even in France; probably because his life was a busy life of organising, without that element of personal adventure, or romantic incident, so necessary for biography. His inventions have stood the test of time, while his everyday life and conversation are unknown. He first gained some posthumous fame in 1859, when the bibliographer, Hatin, called attention to his achievements and reproached France for her neglect and forgetfulness of them.

Renaudot was born in 1586 in Loudun, in Poitou, a small hill-town overlooking a valley through which three rivers flow into the Vienne. Loudun, now so peaceful, was at that time the centre of conflict between Catholics and Huguenots. The father of journalism, as Renaudot may be justly called, was reared among scenes of incendiarism and bloodshed. But there was as yet no war-correspondent.

His childhood was an unhappy one, due in large measure to physical defects, among which a flattened nose was a conspicuous feature. Neither his father nor his mother were proud of their child; the former treated his son with harshness, the latter with indifference; she could never, she said, understand how this ugly boy had come to be her offspring. But, while Renaudot grew to manhood deficient in grace and comeliness, his face showed intelligence of no mean order and kindness; and it also wore an expression of great energy. As time went on he developed a

charm of manner and a gift of conversation that made listeners forget his deformities, and won him the admiration of many and the affection of the poor.

Renaudot went to a grammar school in his native town, but his school days were as fraught with unhappiness as his home life. His companions teased and mocked him, playing every kind of trick on him. After he had borne this treatment with fortitude for some months, M. Boulanger, the master, awoke to the fact that he had among his pupils a particularly bright lad. His school life at once assumed a new aspect. The master rejoiced to find a boy who wished to learn; the boy was glad to have an understanding and sympathetic mentor. An intimacy sprang up between the two, for which Renaudot was grateful; they went for long walks together along the river banks, when the younger, handicapped as he was by nature, found it possible to make a confidant of the elder. We are nowhere told the tenor of their conversations, but the liberal and broad-minded attitude of Renaudot's mind throughout his life must largely be attributed to the teaching of this uncommon schoolmaster. School days soon drew to a close. After a sad leave-taking and with many searchings of heart, the pupil separated from his master in 1592, and took the 'diligence' for Montpellier to enter the university, whither his father, at last alive to his son's talents, willingly sent him, though opposing the career his son proposed to follow.

Renaudot's university life was in many ways a replica of his school days—a new set of mockers and a fresh batch of companions, whose delight similarly was the coarse and rather brutal practical joke. But character and brains won in the long run. His talents were too conspicuous to be disregarded. When at the age of nineteen he took his degree of doctor of medicine, his fellow-students hailed him with triumph.

History has drawn a veil over Renaudot's doings during the next two years. He seems to have travelled extensively in Italy; to what town or principedom he went is, however, a matter of surmise; he may, possibly, have visited the medical schools of Bologna or Padua. Renaudot's biographer makes these suggestions to account for his introduction of the 'Mont de Piété' into France, which institution originated in Italy. In any case, it was good for him to leave his native country for a time to learn about things beyond its borders and to widen his outlook.

During these years France, and not only Poitou, was in a piteous condition, owing to the prolonged wars of religion. The bitter fight between Huguenot and Catholic had been ruining agriculture and decimating the town population. Loudun itself was divided into two camps, and nothing appeared to stay the

hands of the partisans, except on one memorable occasion of the visit of Louis XIII. to the town. When at last some cessation of hostilities took place throughout the country, disbanded soldiers and unemployed flocked to the cities, spreading disease and famine. Communications were unsafe, bandits roamed the roads, pillage and murder were rampant. Paris in particular was in a sad plight, a large part of the wandering population migrating thither.

Now, about this time a highly interesting and unexpected meeting took place, which changed the course of Renaudot's life. Richelieu, already Bishop of Luçon (1606), had begun his upward career, and was living in semi-seclusion in his priory at Coussay; awaiting the hour when the wheel of fortune would turn definitely in his favour. His chosen guide and counsellor at this critical period of his life was a crafty and extremely able Capuchin priest known in history as Père Joseph. His fiery eloquence in the pulpit, his skill and coolness in diplomacy, combined to place him in the confidence of Richelieu. While still a young man he was deputed to lead a crusade into the very stronghold of the Huguenots. He came to Loudun, and here he met with Renaudot, in whom he quickly recognised exceptional gifts. That Renaudot was a Huguenot did not deter the Catholic father from making friends, while each saw qualities of mind in the other that made friendly intercourse a foregone conclusion. They met again and again, until Renaudot was taken by his friend to be introduced to Richelieu, with whom a friendship was struck and continued unbroken till the death of the latter. Richelieu was so impressed by the medical ability and, above all, by the progressive ideas of Renaudot that when an opportunity offered a little later—in 1612—he put the claims and merits of his friend before the Queen Regent. Renaudot was summoned to Paris and given the title of Physician to the King, with, it is supposed, a salary of 800 livres. His career in his native town, where he had employed all his leisure in increasing his knowledge of anatomy, was thus cut short. He left for the capital, owing his appointment not only to his medical skill, but also to his humanitarian views, since he regarded his profession as 'a means of proving his devotion to the public good.'

Before leaving his native town Renaudot married for the second time Jeanne Baudot, by whom he had five children—three sons and two daughters; but, as has been hinted, his public life so absorbed his powers of mind and body that his home life never came into the limelight.

On his arrival in Paris Renaudot immediately set himself the task of making life easier for the proletariat, but these philanthropic activities, which fill a chapter by themselves, do not

directly concern Renaudot as father of the French Press, and may, therefore, be omitted here.

Renaudot's journalistic fame rests on the *Gazette*. In recent years modern French Press-writers, stung perhaps by Hatin's reproaches of seventy years ago, have raised him to even greater glory by acclaiming him father of French journalism and by founding in 1926 a literary prize in his honour called the 'Theophraste Renaudot prize.' It is adjudicated on by a jury of ten leading journalists, who meet in anterooms of the restaurant A la Fontaine Gaillon, where the Goncourt Academy lunch together to decide who shall be the Goncourt prizeman. The journalists come to interview the academicians before the meal, round about eleven o'clock. As they have usually to wait two or three hours for the final decision, they decided to turn this enforced leisure to account, and founded this prize, which carries no monetary reward. The selection the journalists make is, however, a recommendation of considerable value.

Details of the beginnings of the *Gazette*, the forerunner of the modern newspaper, are wanting, but it was probably printed in the House of the Grand Coq in the Rue de la Calandre (now non-existent) and distributed by newsvendors in the city and through the country. Renaudot was convinced that his venture would supply a long-felt want. But starting a paper in the seventeenth century was not a simple matter. Would-be editors were confronted with many obstacles. A first and indispensable necessity was a permit to print. In the circumstances, Renaudot naturally turned to Richelieu, who had now (1631) taken hold of the reins of government, and put his scheme of a paper before him. It was a memorable meeting between these two friends so different in character—the one expounding his ideas for the public good; the other regarding the matter from the point of view of the State and the confirmation of his own power. Since Richelieu's consent was essential and the success of the paper dependent on him, Renaudot listened with patience while the Minister laid down the lines on which the paper should be run, and indicated the manner in which he would receive State aid. There seems no doubt that diplomatic agents and those who controlled foreign affairs in those days co-operated in supplying items of interest, much in the way that is done to-day. Richelieu himself was quite alive to the uses of this 'innocent invention' in spreading news to a public growing in importance. Information and articles were directly due to his pen, and it is certain that Louis XIII. contributed notes and articles, some of which, on account of their disparaging remarks against the Court, got Renaudot into trouble a few years later.

The first number of the first French paper, the *Gazette*, at

last made an appearance on May 31, 1631, and has continued practically without interruption up to the present day. Others in Holland, England, and Germany may claim precedence, but the French paper was not fitful, as they were, and, once started, it continued. What is interesting about the first issue is, not so much what it contained, but the comparatively short time—two months—that the news took to reach Paris from Constantinople, while from Rome, Venice, and Vienna one month only was required.

The success of the *Gazette* was immense; it was literally torn from the hands of the newsvendors as soon as issued. The excitement of this new thing thrust upon a wondering public can well be imagined. Carriers delayed their journeys to provincial towns and across the borders in order to provide themselves with copies. The demand was great everywhere, and even subscribers to the new publication are mentioned in letters of the period. It seems almost a miracle that the *Gazette* became known so rapidly. Peiresc, that learned seventeenth-century patron of letters in France, who lived at Aix en Provence, was among the early subscribers. A glance at his correspondence shows how he looked forward to its receipt. When it did not arrive he wrote with bitterness to his friend Dupuy, in Paris, complaining of the irregularity of delivery, and fretting because numbers were wanting in his set and begging him to buy and remedy this defect. He got angry because the people in Marseilles received the *Gazette* sooner than he did at Aix, and because the printers of Lyons pirated the news and sold counterfeit numbers. When he was asked to contribute articles himself to the *Gazette* he refused on the ground that there was nothing to write about. At the same time, he was especially critical of the would-be journalists of that day. 'The importunity,' he wrote, 'of those who come to ask for news is sometimes very great. They imagine, not only that one is obliged to tell them when one has any news, but to have news when one has none—at least, of the kind they require.'

The pirating that went on was a serious matter for Renaudot. The privilege granted to him had been very complete. It gave him the monopoly of papers and news as well as the permission to print and sell wherever he liked. But these extensive powers were not sufficient. Competitors appeared in spite of them. Printers and colporteurs were jealous of his success and defied the injunctions, and detractors rose up among the literary. It speaks volumes for Renaudot's courage, and also for Richelieu's patronage, that he weathered the storms that raged round him. Renaudot not only maintained his position, but extended it by the publication of a variety of supplements under different names with information not considered suitable for insertion in the

Gazette itself. A contemporary in a eulogy of the paper concludes with a remark as true to-day as it was then: 'So much knowledge is necessary to the making of a paper that I do not understand how anyone has ventured to try it.' From a historical point of view the value of the *Gazette* cannot be exaggerated; it is one of the authorities for the reign of Louis XIII. and the minority of Louis XIV. Treaties of alliance forwarded by ambassadors, the relations of sieges and battles written by generals and accounts of events by Richelieu, have made this collection a source-book for the period.

Besides Louis XIII. and Richelieu, mentioned before, the list of editors and contributors is a long one, including men of standing in French literature. An interesting episode about a change of editorship, but after Renaudot's day, is told when the Duke de Choiseul resigned in 1770. The then editors, Suard and Arnaud, were dismissed. They had been indiscreet enough to allow the insertion of a paragraph in which it said 'that the Countess of Waldegrave, wife of the Duke of Gloucester, was in receipt of a pension of 5000*l.* payable by the establishment in Ireland.' The English ambassador protested at the printing of such a sentence, declaring that these remarks were displeasing to his Court, since the marriage had not been recognised. Any reason is at times sufficient when a scapegoat is wanted!

We may pass over as not deserving of a layman's attention those points about the publication of the *Gazette* in which the curiosity of the bibliographer would delight. But the story of the issue of two editions on June 4, 1633, are significant as evidence of what a powerful Minister would ask and an energetic editor carry out. On the evening of June 3 the abbot Le Masle, one of Richelieu's staff, knocked at the door of Renaudot's house demanding immediate attention. Renaudot, worn out by the editorial duties of the day, was on the point of retiring for the night. Hearing the nature of the interruption, he went out to meet the abbot, who, without any preliminaries, explained that he had come with imperative injunctions from his master to make sure of the printing of an article of twenty-eight lines in the morrow's issue. It was late, the *Gazette* had already been printed off, and some copies had even gone out to country subscribers. Renaudot, however, rose to the occasion; the distribution was stopped, twenty-eight lines were struck out here and there, the article inserted, and a fresh issue was quickly run off. The crisis was overcome, and the first issue was for all time placed among bibliographical curiosities. Ever since that day journalism has continued the handmaid of politics. The true independent Press is still an ideal to be sought after. Ministers to-day write or speak to the representatives of the Press much

as Mazarin did to Renaudot: 'I need your invention and your Press more than I ever did; you see the condition to which I am reduced, you see the storm that has arisen. Your skill is needed to turn the affair in its right direction.'

Though Renaudot's journal was now well launched he was beset by enemies for other reasons. He had won the love of the poor and needy by his registry office and his 'Mont de Piété,' but had incurred the implacable enmity and displeasure of the doctors of Paris. The medical faculty, headed by Guy Patin, rose up in arms against him. It objected to his practising medicine; it disapproved of his methods of treatment and of his giving his services to the poor gratis; it declared, further, that there was an ancient rule that no one should be allowed to practise in Paris without having first obtained the degree of the University of Paris, and that it held the privilege of granting them direct from the Pope. Aspirants for licences must be presented to the Chancellor of the Academy and receive the apostolic blessing before he could treat or practise. Hatred knew no bounds; disputes waxed furious, pamphlets full of gross personal invective followed each other in quick succession, until the Faculty appealed to the courts and to Parliament, where, after a protracted struggle between the litigants, a verdict hostile to Renaudot was pronounced. The charitable institutions on which he had spent so much time and thought were closed. This was the end for a while of much of his work. The *Gazette*, however, was untouched, and the journalist unconquered. The strain of continued struggle at last began to tell on his health. He succumbed to the common enemy on October 23, 1653, after an illness of many months, to remain for ever in the annals of France as the foremost philanthropist of his day and her first great journalist.

It is not without interest to recall the scene in *Cyrano de Bergerac* where Rostand introduces Renaudot inquiring for details of Cyrano's victory over the 100 hirelings sent to punish the poet who had written satirical verses about the Duke of Guise. Cyrano at first refuses, but Le Bret, his friend, points out that Theophraste Renaudot himself, the inventor of the *Gazette*, is waiting and wishes to know, adding in explanation:

Cette feuille où l'on fait tant de choses tenir !
On dit que cette idée a beaucoup d'avenir !

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

BLIND-SPOTS IN ENGLISH CIVILISATION

II. PLACARDS AND PUBLIC NOTICES, LETTERING, POSTAGE STAMPS

A PRECEDING article on this subject treated of the shortcomings of English railway stations and travel amenities, and of the unwarranted self-assertion of poster advertisers in forcing their names and activities on public notice, without either obtaining public permission or paying their footing as a public nuisance.

It was maintained that England does herself less than justice by tolerating uncivilised survivals in stations and gross lack of consideration toward railway travellers; further, that, although local authorities are in many places showing an increasing determination to control, in the interest of a town's outward appearance, indiscriminate and discordant advertising, we have still a long way to go before our towns can compare for decency and ordered efficiency with those of, for example, Germany.

It is now desirable to carry a little further our investigation into the more remediable shortcomings of which English urban communities are guilty; and to pass, by a natural transition, from poster advertising of a purely commercial kind to those announcements of a more informative nature, which too often bear their share in the disfigurement of England.

Predominant among them are the placards announcing coming and contemporary events—sporting fixtures, concerts, public meetings, plays, films and so forth. These are useful and necessary phenomena, but it is not essential for them to occupy as much space or appear as ubiquitously as at present. Indeed, their purpose would be more practically served if all could be on view in regular and appointed places—a state of affairs easily establishable by the adoption of the placard-kiosk so familiar in European cities, combined with a definite limitation of the size permissible to individual notices. It is nonsense to maintain that, in order to inform the public of its existence, a film or a play needs a coloured poster as big as a house or a gigantic cut-out representing the star actor kissing the heroine. If the public know that all entertainments are set out on a special kind of kiosk, they will take the trouble to visit such a kiosk and read the programmes

through. The consequent disappearance of display advertisements will be accepted with resignation, if not with delight. Incidentally, also, producers and organisers will be saved a lot of money.

Allied to the desirability of less blatant announcements of various amusements is the need for improvement in house-front lettering generally. This is perhaps the most urgent and yet the most easily effected of all reforms in the present demeanour of the English town. It will be observed that the giant placards and cut-outs advertising films and plays, to which reference has just been made, appear not only on rented sites, but on the actual theatres and cinema-houses themselves. When thus affixed they produce an effect which can without exaggeration be described as loathsome.¹ And they do something more. They betray with melancholy clearness the muddled thinking and wasteful stupidity of the various persons concerned in the exploitation of theatrical and film production. One almost despairs of a mentality which, having presumably taken some trouble over the design of a building, having certainly spent a lot of money in putting one up, can deliberately deface the main front of that building with discordant lettering and figure-painting, usually bad in themselves and always alien to their background.

Equally senseless, because equally damaging to architectural design, is the style in which shop names are too often affixed to the buildings in which they are housed. Here and there are welcome signs of improvement in this shop-naming, but reform is still very far from complete.

An almost perfect example of contradictory folly in the defacing of a carefully designed street front is provided by that section of the Strand which backs on to the Adelphi. Recently erected buildings consist of a large cinema (uninspired and too heavy for its site, but at least within limits designed) and a delicate and really considered row of buildings in an adapted Adam style and built of brick and stone. The cinema lost no time in covering its facade with the crudest and most superfluous posters, figures and coloured lights. This is the way of cinemas, and one can only hope that their right to act so blatantly in a public street will sooner or later be challenged. But there was worse to come. The Adam building was hardly unscaffolded a week, before a dozen different kinds of shop-front lettering had been scrawled and sloped all over it. How in the world can a practical race like the English tolerate such lunacy? Why go to

¹ The facade of the Garrick Theatre, as it is at the moment, may be recommended to anyone anxious to see how to advertise a play with a maximum of crudity and a minimum of consideration for others. Also as evidence of how easily the English, when they want to be dashing, succeed in being vulgar.

the pains of an Adam building at all, if you are forthwith going to permit its degradation with miscellaneous and inharmonious inscriptions? Life must be a tragic business for the English architect; and one marvels, not that so few fine examples of civilised urban architecture exist in this country, but that so many devoted designers are willing for their art's sake to create beauty and novelty, knowing that the children of their imagination will instantly be sacrificed on the altar of a ruthless commercialism.

Now, that this sort of thing should happen far less aggressively in Germany is not altogether due to the greater discretion of German tradesmen. Certainly the more sensible business men in Germany have got beyond the rather crude reliance on advertisement by noise which, under American influence, now possesses our English salesmanship. But there are hundreds of less intelligent persons who would, if they had the chance, vulgarise German towns as ours are vulgarised. Quite rightly, however, they have not the chance. And an admirable illustration of what they *would* do to Germany if they could, what they *do* do to England because they can, is provided by the same Strand of which a cautionary tale has just been told.

Not long ago there was erected at the corner of Wellington Street a new office building. It had not the faultless artistry in upright design which distinguishes the great Karstadt store in Hermannplatz; but at least its theme was perpendicular, and it relied on unbroken upward lines for its significance as part of a street wall and as a corner piece. Two or three of its upper floors are now occupied by two advertising agents, and both of these firms have elected to plaster their names right round the building in great *horizontal* rows of lettering. One of them is a very large and important German firm, whose self-announcements at home are impressively different from that decided on for London. It is difficult not to conclude that in Germany such wanton destruction of the essential pattern of a building would not be permitted, although clearly the will to destroy is not necessarily absent.

The undeniable want of style and finish in the streets of English towns, though principally due to the excesses of advertisement or commercial self-assertion, is not wholly so. Not only are there certain announcements (street names, traffic instructions, Post Office notices, and the like) made on civic or governmental responsibility, which do not in general reach the standard of taste and practical good sense desirable in a civilised community, but there are also such essential elements in the make-up of a street as the use of colour on walls and woodwork; the design and placing of lamp standards; and the employment of lighting for

after-dark effect, which could as easily be harmoniously and trenchantly manipulated as they are at present unimaginative and indiscriminate.

The first group of imperfections must, as has been said, be charged to the sloth or conventionality of officialdom. In no department of urban activity is complacent maintenance of a bad old tradition more evident than in the methods adopted for naming and numbering streets. Here and there are notable exceptions, to which tribute should joyfully be paid. More than one of the London borough councils have introduced a style of name plaque which shows that definite thought has been given to secure an effect both clear and harmonious. But how many such councils shall be found among the hundreds of boroughs responsible for labelling their streets? Also, in what other country are, generally speaking, the names of streets so awkwardly and thoughtlessly placed as in England? The majority are set so high on the walls that after dark they are invisible, and even by day none too obvious. Further, they are not frequent enough, it being the custom to put a name on one corner only of a side street, and virtually never on a main road at the point where a side street joins it, so that persons coming up toward this main road might, by looking straight ahead, see what street they are approaching. As for the numbering of houses, the English system (in London particularly) is of international fame for its illogicality and inconvenience. Is it not extraordinary that in these days of much vaunted equality and efficiency the traditions of nineteenth-century snobbery should be allowed to persist, so that a house can still claim membership of some once fashionable square or terrace, although in fact it opens into a quite different thoroughfare? In this matter of house-numbering authority in England is of an unpardonable laxity. The design of a town should be determined in the interests of communal convenience and efficiency, not to flatter the social aspirations of a small minority; and it is a part of majority convenience that all and sundry should be able to find their way about by the mere application of their own common sense.

The best system, in my experience, for street-naming and street-numbering is that long ago adopted in Berlin. At every street corner, and on both sides, is a lamp standard, and from the arms of each standard hangs a plaque, bearing the name of the street along which the arm in question points, and the house numbers included in the block immediately indicated. These plaques are so placed as to be easily legible by day or by night, from the pavement or from omnibus or tram. It is impossible for the stranger not to know where he is; it is impossible for him to turn to the right in search of his particular goal when he should

properly turn to the left or even cross the road. In short, by perfectly simple means, *but as the result of deliberate thought on the part of officials*, the charting of Berlin is complete and universally comprehensible. Why has no such thought ever been taken in England? Does such a community as London deserve less consideration than the capital of Germany? One is naturally reluctant to think so. But this much is certain—that, deserved or undeserved, London has never got it, and will not get it unless it insists on intelligent forethought as a necessary qualification in its governors.

The numerous street announcements made necessary by the development of modern traffic conditions give to Londoners an all too rare opportunity for self-congratulation. Quite lately (presumably a man of taste has come to authority in official circles) the style of lettering adopted for one-way traffic notices has admirably changed. Real thought has gone to the designing of these notices; and it is gratifying that the doctrine of good lettering for public announcements, so courageously and for so long a time maintained by the Underground, should at last have gained a really important disciple. A similar improvement may be noted in lettering the boxes for litter recently affixed to London lamp standards. They were at first frankly bad. They are now markedly improved. In the same way Post Office notices are beginning to be printed and manufactured with a greater regard for typographical good manners.

The potentialities of house-colouring and of electric-lighting, as beautifiers of a city respectively by day and by night, constitute an element in town design of rather a different kind from the preceding. But they are even more important (because more noticeable) and in England no less deplorably neglected.

Consider first of all the part played by colour in the streets of English towns. Not only is it very small, but one cannot fail to be struck with the dulness and lack of enterprise in the very scale of available colourings. The greens, reds, browns, greys and purples, which a builder or decorator in this country is prepared to supply, have a flat conventionality of tone which is the despair of any seeker after a slight variety of colour. Unusual colours *can* be obtained; but it is nearly always necessary for them to be specially mixed, nearly always certain that they will fade or sour; and no one who has set out to obtain such special mixings will deny that the experience is exhausting, infinitely lengthy, and far from reliable.

Now, nothing of this kind happens in France or Germany. There, in the smallest colour merchants' or decorators' shops, may be seen long ranges of subtle and carefully differentiated colours;

while, as one walks the streets, houses are visible on either hand colour-washed in two or even more of those tints, usually well matched, always cheerful and stimulating. In Germany it is very frequent for the railway station and other public buildings of a small town to be treated in harmonious colour-wash; and if any intending traveller desires to see for himself how attractively such treatment can be carried out he may be recommended to look out of the train as he goes through Offenbach a/M. (ten miles from Frankfurt) and note the entire group of station buildings (including a well-designed goods yard) clean and gay in their fresh green and pinkish grey.

The limitations of after-dark display-lighting in English towns are of course to a great extent due to the fabulous cost of our electricity in comparison to that in many European cities. A lot might be said of the price paid by Englishmen for the privilege of supporting a large number of private electrical companies; and a lot more of the prospects of really cheap electricity even under the new system of national power supply. But, after allowing for the handicap of unnatural expense, the use made in England of illuminations for commercial purposes is considerably behind the times.

Apart from the flood-lit tower of the Underground headquarters (the loveliest sight in all London after dark), apart from a very occasional modernist experiment in facade-lighting of constructive design, our achievements as practitioners of the art and science of sky-signing are pitifully crude. American example has, in this as in other things, put us on the wrong road. The majority of our sky-signs are of the spotty, winking variety, which once made of Broadway a wonder of the world but are now *démodés* and uninteresting. Without denying that striking and, until one tires of them, attractive effects can be secured by the restless whirling ingenuities which now adorn one side of Piccadilly Circus and are nibbling at Trafalgar Square, one must realise that the most up-to-date technique relies rather on flood or on plastic strip-lighting than on mechanically manipulated sets of lamps. In other words, light is now used architecturally rather than pictorially. The latest German and Scandinavian cafés, cinemas, dance-halls, and department stores make considerable and very telling use of lights shielded by dull glass and arranged in such a way as to outline the main uprights or cross lines of the buildings. Sometimes the very essence of the facade consists of frosted-glass pinnacles, which at night become simple columns of light from pavement to roof, and not only call attention to the building they adorn, but help the whole street by emphasising the perpendicular lines on which in last resort its beauty should depend.

*At a corner, on the other hand, a fine effect is often gained by several horizontal lines of light—differently coloured, maybe, but continuous and with no movement save a sort of liquid flicker, set high up on the house fronts, and translating the curve of the buildings into terms of brilliancy.

Why are such experiments as these the commonplaces of European towns, the exceptions of our own? Why has England, to all intents and purposes, not yet emerged from the nursery in this matter of display-lighting? We cannot excuse ourselves because we have to work with buildings of Victorian design which, all broken up into cornices, ornaments and other protuberances, do not lend themselves to long straight stretches of illumination. The so-called West End of Berlin consists almost entirely of houses of the same kind, and their elaborations have been successfully subdued. We can hardly (without confessing failure on another score) complain that our newest buildings are rarely of sufficiently modern outline or proportion. No. In this, as in every aspect of the problem of public stylishness and good manners, we must blame our traditional selfishness and lack of taste. As with railway stations, as with open-air advertising, so with sky-signs, those responsible for English practice think of nothing but their own purposes and their own self-interest; nor is there any authority to force them to think otherwise. As for English taste, is it too much to say that in its corporate manifestations—as expressed, for instance, in the design and embellishment of public or commercial buildings, in the conception and practice of advertising—it is, generally speaking, either frankly common or else timid and, in a feeble way, over-ornate?

From all of the foregoing there emerges that bizarre but melancholy contradiction in racial psychology with which our whole discussion opened. It is surely undeniable that, although *individually* the English are capable of a more cultivated taste and a more scrupulous way of life than the nationals of any other country, corporately—that is to say, in the persons of their official representatives or directorial bodies—they show a fundamental obtuseness to the finer points of public behaviour, combined with a traditional indifference to the impression made on foreigners.

Which brings us to the final count in this very summarised indictment of our avoidable shortcomings. For in no expression of national character is our unconscious but damaging mediocrity mirrored with a more dreadful precision than in the contemporary English postage stamps.

How many people ever stop to think of the effect on the reputation of a great people produced by a wide dissemination of

stamps at once pretentious and feeble? How many people ever think to compare the productions of the English Post Office with those of other nations? And yet, were they to make such a comparison, how many could deny that, whereas the stamps of twenty other countries (some more or less equal but many greatly inferior to our own in resources, influence, and aspiration) show in varying degrees attempts at originality, at modernism or at beauty, ours are utterly unworthy of their motherland, heedlessly designed and coloured, unimaginative and fussily genteel?

And their wretchedness is the more humiliating in that the first postage stamp of all was issued by England, and was a stamp whose dignity and elegance of design has never been excelled. The 'black penny' of 1840 is a beautiful stamp, with a beauty due not only to its reproductive process (in those days and for small numbers engraving, which would now be too expensive, was economically possible), but also to its simplicity. The fact points the moral of our later degradation and links the argument to what has gone before. In any corporate capacity we seem unable to realise any longer that the simple, if it be right in proportion, is more beautiful than the elaborate. As a result, we send all over the world little bits of paper, each one of which is a mortifying betrayal of the spiritless and antiquated taste of those appointed to decide our national designs. Take a set of the current English stamps and study them. What is wrong? Ask rather what is right. The designs are hardly designs at all; they are crowded agglomerations of wreaths and ribbons and dolphins and poor conventional lettering and numerals. The colours (with one or two exceptions) are thin, and, what is worse, utterly ordinary. By the Postal Convention certain values have to be printed in certain colours. So be it. But there are good reds and one or two reds so trite as to be bad; there are blues which are unusual, considered and satisfying, and there is just blue. Inevitably those responsible for our stamps choose a trite red and the mere blue. Why? Because, presumably, it is too much trouble to try and improve the colours, and because the department responsible for choice of inks and of designs does not regard that responsibility as a particularly heavy one.

Roughly speaking, the history of English philatelic design is a history of decadence. Until the middle 'fifties the standard of the original 'black penny' was well maintained. A little extra wording or ciphering was introduced, but the designs remained serene and dignified, and the first reds and blues were admirable. Then came the introduction of surface printing; and although the issues of 1855, 1862, 1865, and 1873 were more platitudinous than their predecessors, they were comparatively free from

trivial ornament. With 1880 matters began to degenerate. The stamps of that year, of 1884, and of the Jubilee issue of 1887 were like those of the Australian Colonies of the same epoch—mean, indeterminate, and washy in colour—which timid tradition persisted right on to the death of Queen Victoria. But still the small-bourgeois quality of English philately remained untarnished with sham elegance. The stamps were just dowdy; nothing more. With Edward VII., however, first crept in the horrid gentility which has become our master. Like the silly little wreaths and useless pilasters with which the Regent Street of to-day commemorates its murdered Nash, the incidental decoration of our stamps became pretty but trivial. The tendency grew stronger; until to-day we have a series of designs as feebly stylish as any in the world.

The situation has during the last two years been aggravated by the appearance of two special issues. The commemorative issue was for long enough held to be beneath the dignity of a powerful and gentlemanly country. Nicaragua and Portugal and so forth might tickle the palates of speculators with this special set or that; Great Britain was above the need for such financial shifts. But, whether from a sudden blossoming of official æstheticism or because it actually dawned on someone in authority that money would not come amiss even to Great Britain, the old policy was abandoned; and within a very short time were devised and published a special series of stamps to commemorate the Wembley Exhibition, and another in virtue of the International Postal Congress.

The former were, as matters turned out, a fair equivalent to the disastrous vulgarity which they claimed to celebrate. The Wembley stamps, like the Wembley Exhibition, were large and square, with a design at once pompous and confused. It seems that we are still at the stage when brooding or aggressive lions and waxwork Britannias express our utmost idea of grandiose dignity. But Wembley was not the worst. The meeting of the Postal Congress called forth an issue meaner in design, more torpid in colouring, and cruder in execution than any issue achieved in this country since the worst days of the 1880's. Without exaggeration, this Postal Congress issue was a tragedy; for not only was it Great Britain who came upon the stage thus pitifully attired, but the occasion was one when, of all others, care should have been taken to do something worthy of the country's capacity. The stamp authorities of the world were meeting in England. The eyes and minds of every stamp official, stamp user and stamp collector were turned on England. And with a flourish, which would be comic were it not rather cause for tears, England produced these lamentable things.

There is an unanswerable argument for the immediate replacement of the stamps of Great Britain with something of which their users need not be ashamed,

Is there no official in the Post Office, who in his heart of hearts grieves over the sorry lack of distinction in our present issue, who longs for something more forcible, something at which—whether they approve it or not—users and recipients alike will look a second time? English philatelic *workmanship* is among the finest in the world. We can produce fine stamps, if we are allowed to do so; but of what use as national propaganda is good workmanship if it be degraded to the service of tasteless and trivial design?

As for what manner of stamps are to be substituted for those now in use, discussion could be usefully invited. Perhaps some newspaper will launch an inquiry? I believe the venture would provoke more enthusiasm than authority is inclined to realise; and whether or no a verdict of general value were to emerge from the experiment, at least opinion would have been stirred on a matter of some national importance. Also the views of the public would be of themselves intriguing.

Many people would vote for a pictorial set, representing the historic scenes or buildings of a historic land. Personally, I am not an enthusiast for the purely pictorial stamp, which smacks of the holiday poster and easily degenerates into over-elaboration and unnecessary detail. But even a pictorial issue would be better than what we have at present; and if general approval could not be won for something at once plainer and more arresting, let us by all means be pictorial.

Others, perhaps, would favour our following the example of New Zealand and reverting frankly to the earliest 'Queen's heads.' A set on the lines of the 'black penny' in really unusual shades of colour, and with the very minimum of wording required by modern usage, would be a beautiful and impressive thing. If, on the other hand, something quite new were desired, why not vary the King's head as a centre-piece with a telling but simplified design of St. George and the Dragon for, say, values to sixpence; a good Britannia for sixpence to one shilling; and introduce a really fine King's head, in two-colour labels with as little incidental decoration as possible, for the remaining high values?

It would be so easy to get a hundred good competitive designs; and among them would certainly be two or three which, though they might not satisfy everybody, would at least give an indication of the artistic capacity of the race, and would prove to other countries that at last we recognise the importance of stamps as an element in national good manners

MICHAEL SADLEIR.

CHRISTINA ROSSETTI

DECEMBER 5, 1830; DECEMBER 5, 1930

I

ONE by one the great Victorians round the point of their centenary; and to the eyes of the younger generation, no doubt, most of them seem like vague, spectral galleons of the past, scarcely visible through the intervening mist of prejudice and change. But with Christina Rossetti that is most emphatically not the case; between her and us there stretches no such obscuring cloud. Her clear and shining genius is still so close to us, so inalienable a part of our daily converse with poetry, that it is difficult to realise that, if to her heritage of Euterpe there had been added the guerdon of Tithonus, the author of *Goblin Market* would actually be 100 years old this month. Of all the legacy of the Pre-Raphaelites—poetry, painting, criticism, precept—her simple, sincere, and exquisite contribution has 'worn' incomparably the best. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that her credit as an artist has never stood so high as it does in the present year of her centenary; and the cause is rooted in the essential virtues of her temperament and workmanship.

There are just two infallible preservatives in the life of poetry—perfection of technique and sincerity of vision; and Christina Rossetti held the secret of them both. They were inseparable qualities of her work, and they were spontaneous expressions of her nature. 'Her style,' Mr. Arthur Symonds has said, 'was innocently unaware of its own beauty'; and her work has, in its more intimate appeal, outlived that of the turbulent little group into which she was born, for the simple reason that she saw further than they did, and felt more deeply. Poetry, more perhaps than any other art, is the sport and victim of changing taste; and the poetry that is most emphatically in fashion at one period is the first to fall out of date. But from every ebb and flow of taste there is left a certain residue of poetry that is unaffected by 'movements' and reactions. The country songs of Herrick and the religious dreams of Vaughan are as fresh

to-day as in the years when they were written ; and in simplicity, sincerity, and close affinity to the lasting consolations of the human heart Christina Rossetti is sealed of the company of Herrick and of Vaughan.

We can realise more clearly what this implies when we consider her relation to the movement in which she was involved. The Pre-Raphaelites were deliberate reactionaries. They found themselves exiles in a material, commercial, ugly universe, struggling in the throes of an industrial revolution. They wanted a way of escape from 'the snorting steam and piston-stroke,' and they believed that they had found in the Middle Ages and the Italian Renaissance the most comfortable sanctuary from the chimneys of Sheffield and the lorries of Tottenham Court Road. They chose that world of the past to typify the world of the soul, a garden full of flowers and fruit, of fountains and of music. What they did not realise was the shattering fact that all these consolations were purely artificial, joys of the eye and ear, with no lasting appeal to the heart. Christina Rossetti alone of the little company was swept off her feet by the conviction that the palace of peace, like the Kingdom of God, was within, and not without. She loved the good things of the senses, light and colour, sound and savour, but she was not content to accept them as Life. Unless they were laid aside, she believed, the soul could never commune with itself in confidence. So within the border of her little garden she built an oratory, and closed the door upon herself, her dreams, and her prayers. From that time onward her life and her art grew into perfect harmony with one another. She had discarded forever the mistaken idea that the self-respecting artist can use his art as a sort of compensation or balance for a life lived on an entirely different level. Like Milton, she determined that he who would 'write well in laudable things ought himself to be a true poem.' And it is that confession of faith which lends significance to the outlines of a life, which is otherwise quite remarkably bare of the sort of incident and adventure which might appeal to the ingenuity of the biographer or the psychologist.

II

The Rossettis came from the neighbourhood of Naples, and from a family in humble circumstances enough. Christina's grandfather was a blacksmith, and her grandmother could neither read nor write. But the grandfather, Nicola, gave his sons a good education, and they profited by it. Andrea became a canon, and Domenico a lawyer, while Gabriele, father of the poets, 'took to poetry and other forms of literature.' He wrote librettos for operas, was curator of marble and bronzes in the Naples Museum,

and when his political poems got him into trouble escaped to England ; settled in that rather depressing metropolitan area between Tottenham Court Road and Great Portland Street ; and in 1826, when he himself was forty-three and his bride in her twenty-sixth year, married Frances, daughter of Gaetano Polidori, a native of Tuscany, himself a poet and a man of letters. Polidori's wife was English, and he lived in a pleasant country house at Holmer's Green, near Great Missenden, with a shady garden, full of flowers, to which he delighted in welcoming his grandchildren, who were born to Gabriele and Frances more rapidly perhaps than their slender means could comfortably justify. Maria Francesca was born in 1827, Dante Gabriel in 1828, William Michael in 1829, and Christina Georgina on December 5, 1830.

The home in which this remarkable family first saw the light was at 38, Charlotte (now Hallam) Street, a dreary backwater, with a *cul-de-sac*, and a publichouse immediately opposite the windows. There they lived until Christina was between five and six years old, and when they moved, it was only to a house a little further down the road. The child's infancy was entirely associated with an atmosphere of fog and lamplight, the cry of the milkman, and the evening debates of her father's Italian friends, who used to gather in the parlour, many of them squalid and menacing, to denounce the political condition of their native land, and call down vengeance upon all existing Governments. There, from her seat by the fireside, the little girl listened and wondered. In the spring came visits to her grandfather in the country, green trees, a pond, animals, sunshine, and sweet scents. She came back to her dingy home, and pondered these things in her heart. There could hardly have been a better prelude to poetry, unpromising as it might look on the surface.

For, if it be true that one half of poetry is emotion remembered in tranquillity, it is no less true that the other half is beauty yearned after in exile. In the moment of ecstasy, when the heart is overflowing with impressions, the power of speech is in abeyance. It is when the vision has passed, and the mind is travelling to recover it before it vanishes, that the moment of record arrives. The Hebrew poet was registering a very unusual emotion when he refused to sing the Lord's song in a strange land. It is the melody of captivity that goes home to the heart ; and it was that melody that Christina Rossetti learned to sing, as she gazed across the street at the soiled window-curtains and broken furniture, and dreamed of the meadows and woods around Great Missenden, and of the dead mouse she had found by the garden path and buried in a bed of moss—her first experience of death and dissolution.

III

Her personal appearance in those early days has been vividly preserved to us, not only in description, but in pictorial portraiture. In her sympathetic and searching monograph, which was the first, and is likely to remain the most permanent, of all these centenary tributes,¹ Miss Mary Sandars reproduces a drawing by Filippo Pistrucci, one of the Rossettis' Italian refugees, which was made when Christina was seven years old. It is an arresting little face. The expression is moody; the well-arched mouth is sensitive and sad; and the entire face is dominated by the large, expressive hazel eyes, half-meditative, half-mischievous, and glittering with a quiet sense of humour. For, in spite of all her youthful seriousness, Christina Rossetti was never devoid of fun. She is said to have been irritable, careless over her lessons, and always delicate in health, but she had a way of laughing at her troubles, which often found its expression in verse. She began to write rhymes in the nursery; the earliest of them preserved was written when she was eleven; and many of them were playful and ironic. It cannot be pretended that the humour penetrated very deeply, but the form of the verse was, from her very first experiments, true and musical. When Grandfather Polidori was shown a sheaf of these exercises he predicted at once that Christina would be a poet, and in her seventeenth year he gave practical evidence of his approval by printing a volume of her verses at the private press with which he used to amuse himself at Park Village, Regent's Park. These poems were afterwards reprinted by William Michael Rossetti in his *Collected Edition* of his sister's work, and they remain curiously interesting as illustrations of the first natural impulses, to which she was eventually to return, after her brief bondage to the fashion of the Pre-Raphaelites. Religion, love of Nature, and a feminine yearning for primal affection are the recurrent themes, and religion is the most powerful of all.

The Christian religion was indeed the prevailing influence in the childhood of the Rossettis, and their mother was its domestic priestess. Gabriele, the father, had begun life as a Roman Catholic, and declined into a sort of benevolent agnosticism; but his wife was fervent in training her family in the traditions of the Church of England, and at Christ Church, Albany Street, Christina received her first instruction in that discipline to faith and doctrine which was to dominate her life and irradiate her poetry. The church she attended was conducted upon what are known as Anglo-Catholic principles, and she embraced them without challenge or hesitation. From the moment when she

¹ *The Life of Christina Rossetti*, by Mary F. Sandars (Hutchinson).

began to think for herself her religion became the pervading spirit of her life; nothing that threatened to disturb it was allowed to intrude upon her thoughts.

The story of her two love affairs has been often repeated; she sacrificed them both to the convictions of her faith. She was only nineteen when James Collinson, the first of her admirers, presented himself, and he does not appear to have been a very attractive person. He was an artist of sorts, but Holman-Hunt, under whom he studied, found both the man and his work 'tame and sleepy.' He must also have been vacillating by nature, for he had exchanged the Church of England for the Roman communion; and then, when he learnt that Christina, who had responded to his protestations of love, would never consent to marry a Roman Catholic, he 'set about,' in her brother's words, 'considering whether he really was so firmly a Catholic as to be unable to revert to his original' allegiance. He did so, and was accepted as a suitor. Two years later he was troubled by fresh scruples, and was received again into the Roman Church. Thereupon Christina broke off the engagement, though not without bitter suffering. The sense of loss never really left her, and returns again and again to overshadow her poetry.

I have a room whereinto no one enters
 Save I myself alone:
 There sits a blessed memory on a throne,
 There my life centres . . .
 If any should force entrance he might see there
 One buried yet not dead,
 Before whose face I no more bow my head.
 Or bend my knee there;
 But often in my worn life's autumn weather
 I watch there with clear eyes,
 And think how it will be in Paradise
 When we're together.

Her second love affair was years later, when she was in her early thirties; but, since this alliance also was frustrated by religious difference, it falls naturally into this context. Charles Bagot Cayley was a writer and a linguist, who had translated Dante and the Hebrew psalms, and was considered a reputable scholar, if possibly a bit of a bore. For two or three years he was a frequent visitor at Dante Gabriel's house, and an assiduous attendant upon the poet's sister. Then, at last, he declared himself, was questioned as to his religious views, and had perforce to confess himself unorthodox. Christina liked him very much; she had taken great pleasure in his company; but she could not possibly yoke herself with an unbeliever. So once more she preferred celibacy to a marriage of mixed interests, though in

this instance she did not deny herself the privilege of a friendship which lasted until Cayley's death. Henceforward her days were untrammelled by such bitter-sweet accessions of impulse and denial; and, though there were moments when she might still persuade herself that her heart was like a singing bird, the bird was caged, and the cage was no less certainly a prison because she had chosen it for herself and had closed its door of her own free will.

IV

But long before this haven was reached Christina Rossetti was to experience a stormy passage of influence and emotion, which for the time turned her genius aside from its natural direction altogether; she was to be engulfed in the turbulent waters of Pre-Raphaelitism. This particular incident in her life has not hitherto been separated by her biographers from its immediate context; they have been inclined to take it in their stride, as though *Goblin Market* and *The Prince's Progress* were natural phases of the poet's development. As a matter of fact, they were quite different from the body of her work—they were derivative and deliberate exercises in poetic expression; and though technically and metrically they produced some of the most beautiful poetry that Christina Rossetti ever wrote, it was poetry of a kind uncongenial to her native genius, of a kind to which she did not again return, when once the stress of the family 'movement' had passed over and left her free to follow her own inclination.

This point invites rather closer consideration. To begin with, it is the first truth about Christina's poetry that she never forced herself to write, nor attempted to seek subjects for her art. 'Just because poetry is a gift,' she said, 'I am not surprised to find myself unable to summon it at will, and use it according to my own choice.' Happily she had no need to do so. The flow of her poetic impulse was continuous, as the dates in the Collected Edition prove. New every morning was the well-spring of her poetry, which bubbled up again, clear as crystal, with every fresh daily impact of beauty, faith and love. But the Pre-Raphaelite idea of poetry was quite different from this spontaneous lyrical aspiration. In poetry, as in painting, the Pre-Raphaelites set out to counterfeit what they called Nature by minute observation, and to replace the woolly smugness of the popular artists of the day by an elaborate canvas, in which every stitch in a tapestry, or every shaving on a carpenter's floor, should be conscientiously copied from the actual object. They called it Nature; it was really Still Life; and their poetry was encrusted with verbal jewels and heavy with imagery.

When *The Germ*, the first ill-fated manifesto of the movement, began its brief career of four disregarded numbers, Christina Rossetti was just completing her nineteenth year. She contributed seven poems to the magazine, of which four at least are among the most beautiful things she ever wrote, and these were written when she was no more than eighteen.

Oh roses for the flush of youth.
And laurel for the perfect prime;
But pluck an ivy branch for me
Grown old before my time.

Oh violets for the grave of youth,
And bay for those dead in their prime;
Give me the withered leaves I chose
Before in the old time.

That lovely lyric was written two months after her eighteenth birthday, and an even more perfect poem, *When I am dead, my dearest*, was written earlier than that. The achievement is wonderful; and, like all absolutely natural art, it seems inevitable and unconscious.

But during the next few years the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood was busy proclaiming its new gospel; and it was impossible for Christina, an impressionable girl, and the youngest of the household, to avoid being drawn into its discipleship. In this regard she was essentially a follower; and when Swinburne acclaimed her as 'the Jael who led our hosts to Victory,' he was only, in his characteristically flamboyant fashion, paying tribute to the influence which her natural and untutored mastery of rhythm exercised over his own early experiments in quantitative verse. So far as she was ever a Pre-Raphaelite, Christina Rossetti was a captive, and not a champion. But, while she remained in their tents, she gave to the movement two of its most exquisite and characteristic pieces of poetry—*Goblin Market* and *The Prince's Progress*.

Both these poems are finished, elaborate, and satisfying works of art; and both of them are entirely outside their author's customary range. Like Tennyson's *Maud*, *The Prince's Progress* was the result of a friend's remark that a lyric, otherwise complete in itself, seemed to need some surrounding story to explain it. Sir John Simeon said that to Tennyson when he first read the lines 'O that 'twere possible,' and Gabriel Rossetti made the same remark to his sister when she showed him the poem beginning 'Too late for love, too late for joy.' In both instances the hint resulted in a fine, various, and balanced piece of workmanship; but there is no denying that both were constructed upon the Victorian principle of seeking a subject from outside and investing it with individuality by treatment rather

than by conception. And this was particularly the case with Christina Rossetti's two outstanding narrative poems, which are simply saturated in the opulent colour, and decked out with all the heaped-up detail, of the Pre-Raphaelite studio.

The story of *Goblin Market* might have been found in the pages of Grimm; but it is twisted into a sort of moral allegory by the intervention of the *dévoté's* passion for self-sacrifice. It is, on every account, by far the most imaginative of its author's works; but, it seems, compared with the rest of her poetry, to be seen through a distorting glass, which, however harmonious and beautiful the picture may be, leaves it always with a sense of the grotesque, to puzzle the fancy. The metrical ingenuity adds to the effect of bewildering elaboration; as Mr. George Saintsbury says, 'The more it is studied, the more audacious may its composition seem.' In one sense it is 'a *macédoine* of measures,' apparently deliberate and scholarly; in another it is a spontaneous outburst of melody, utterly unconscious of its own technical achievement. In fact, without the least realising what she was doing, Miss Rossetti was effecting, in *Goblin Market*, something very like a revolution in English metrical resources, and all with so natural a grace that it needs a prosodist as learned as Mr. Saintsbury himself to analyse her innovations. 'As it stands,' he says, 'it is doubly or even trebly enjoyable as a mere feast to the ear, as a display of prosodic skill, and, historically, as an exemplification of the powers given by centuries of successful and unsuccessful endeavour, and of the way in which the most apparently lawless excursions can be reduced by law.' And through it all there gleams the rich imagination of a mind content to revel at leisure in luxuriant and fantastic imagery.

White and golden Lizzie stood,
Like a lily in a flood,—
Like a rock of blue-veined stone
Lashed by tides obstreperously,—
Like a beacon left alone
In a hoary roaring sea,
Sending up a golden fire,—
Like a fruit-crowned orange-tree
White with blossoms honey-sweet
Sore beset by wasp and bee,—
Like a royal virgin town
Topped with gilded dome and spire,
Close beleaguered by a fleet
Mad to tug her standard down.

All this is in the full Pre-Raphaelite fashion; and the romantic, idyllic story of *The Prince's Progress* is even more closely cut to the prevailing mode. It was almost the only instance, says

William Michael Rossetti, 'in which she wrote anything so as to meet directly the views of another person'; and in adopting Dante Gabriel's suggestion she had also caught no uncertain echo of his method. This simple story of a wayward prince, who set out in quest of his promised bride, lingered on the way, played with light loves in the portal, and arrived to find that his princess had died of a broken heart, is indeed, in Edmund Gosse's phrase, 'adorned with verse of the very highest romantic beauty,' but there is yet an air of artificial, self-conscious narrative about it, which is the very antithesis of the poet's native temperament.

Midway down the mountain side
(On its green slope the path was wide)
Stood a house for a royal bride,
Built all of changing opal stone,
The royal palace, till now descried
In his dreams alone . . .

Above his head a tangle glows
Of wine-red roses, blushes, snows,
Closed buds and buds that unclose,
Leaves and moss, and prickles too;
His hand shook as he plucked a rose,
And the rose dropped dew.

The voice is the voice of Christina; but the hands are the hands of Gabriel. We do not actually escape again into the clear, crystalline atmosphere of the sister's lyrical genius until the procession of the Brotherhood has passed her by, carrying with it its banners and garlands, its flutes, viols and manifold instruments of music; and leaving her virginal solitude once more undisturbed in contemplation of the barren road, winding uphill all the way, to its lonely summit, surmounted by the cross and crown of thorns.

V

'Hers was a stern God,' says her latest biographer,² but that perhaps is in itself a too stern judgment. There was nothing really stern about Christina Rossetti's religion, for its final sanction lay in a harmony of will and purpose. The God of her faith did indeed demand the full service of the soul, but He repaid the sacrifice with interest. In quietness and confidence His servant found her strength. She loved the good things of the world, but she was glad to give them up, because she knew that the world of the spirit was more satisfying than the world of the body. It may be objected that she was always sad; and we have her own testimony to that effect—'I suppose I have a natural

² *The Life of Christina Rossetti*, by Mary F. Sandars (Hutchinson).

tendency to despondency'; but her sadness was due to an imaginary sense of her own shortcomings, not to any fear of punishment or retribution. She set herself constantly to subdue her depression. 'Cheerfulness,' she said, 'I consider a fundamental and essential Christian virtue,' and she extolled it as a protective colouring which the sufferer can always, by the exercise of free will, impose upon sadness, 'as a bright and shining veil.'

In this spirit of reconciled resignation she settled down to a middle age of meditative peace. In her younger days she had submitted herself to many distasteful experiences: to the toll of teaching in a school which no one seemed to need; to the contemplation of her brother drifting from the faith which was the lodestar of her life into associations from which her virginal reticence may well have shrunk back alarmed; to the momentary adoption of literary ideals with which she could not possibly be at ease. But she was liberated early from these trammels, and the rest of her life was self-contained, conventual, and confident. She made a home with her mother and two aunts in a quiet backwater in Bloomsbury, dedicating her pen exclusively to the themes that lay nearest to her heart. She wrote devotional books in prose, many of them quite beautiful in form as in feeling; the flow of her religious poetry was constant and fervid; the bulk of her work in verse is among the most considerable of all the fecund Victorian period. She made very little money. Her brother records that until she was sixty years old she never made as much as 50*l.* in any one year by her pen; and there exists a touching letter from her to Edmund Gosse, in which she protests that the twenty guineas which he had obtained for her from an American magazine is really more than she ought to accept, and suggests that she shall refund some of it, 'especially as so much of the bulk of my article accrues from quotation.' She was poor, by any modern standard of competency, but she had enough for her needs; and, for the rest, her life was a vigil, awaiting the perfect realisation of a dream which was never far removed from her imagination. From time to time visitors broke in upon her solitude, and all of them seem to have carried away the same impression of a nature entirely in harmony and at rest. She was pale and delicate, but her eyes were strikingly bright, grey with blue lights in them, which kindled under the influence of sympathy into a swift, responsive glance of comprehension. She dressed austere in a style which concealed the gracefulness of her figure, generally in black silk, with white cuffs and collar, secured by a plain brooch.³ Her voice was musical, and she read poetry with a charming emphasis. Sometimes her friends would remonstrate with her for over-taxing her strength, would even

³ *Christina Rossetti*, by Mackenzie Bell (Hurst & Blackett).

hint that such lack of care might have alarming results. 'What then?' she would reply. 'The sweeter after this stripped earth will be the shady rest of Paradise.' That vision had indeed become for her the closest of all realities.

Fair City of delights, the Bride
In raiment white and clean,
When shall we see thee loving-eyed,
Sun-girdled, happy Queen?
Without a wrinkle or a spot,
Blood-cleansed, blood-purchased once:
In how fair ground is fallen the lot
Of all thy happy sons!
Dove's eyes beneath thy parted lock,
A dove's voice soft is thine;
Thy nest is safe within the Rock,
Safe in the very Vine:
Thy walls salvation buildeth them
And all thy gates are praise,
O fair, O fair Jerusalem,
In sevenfold day of days.

It is thus that, in the most perfect of all her lyrics, she confronts the transitory pleasures of the world she had rejected with the consolations of her abiding kingdom of faith and hope.

Passing away, saith my Soul, passing away:
With its burden of fear and hope, of labour and play,
Hearken what the past doth witness and say:
Rust in thy gold, a moth is in thine array,
A canker is in thy bud, thy leaf must decay.
At midnight, at cockcrow, at morning, one certain day
Lo the Bridegroom shall come and shall not delay;
Watch thou and pray.
Then I answered: 'Yea.'

A mind so closely attuned to the things of the spirit had no need of lengthy preparation for release; yet she was given a very long period of illness to endure, and a severe ordeal, mental and physical alike. For the last eighteen months of her life she was racked by pain, and weakened by exhaustion; it was inevitable that she should be depressed; yet she resolutely refused to spare herself any of her manifold services and duties. None the less, she was weary now, and ready to go. The last lines she ever wrote are witness to that.

No more a tired heart downcast or overcast,
No more pangs that wring or shifting fears that hover,
Sleeping at last in a dreamless sleep locked fast.
Fast asleep. Singing birds in their leafy cover
Cannot wake her, nor shake her the gusty blast.
Under the purple thyme and the purple clover,
Sleeping at last!

She died very peacefully, on the morning of December 29, 1894, within a month of completing her sixty-fourth year.

VI

Religious verse is of all forms of poetry the most difficult in which to keep a firm footing; it is surrounded by pitfalls, and the descent into insipidity is swift and fatal. It would be impossible for any poet to write as copiously as Christina Rossetti wrote in this perilous vein without sometimes catching an echo from the popular vocabulary of the hymnologist. But, if there are such slips in her workmanship, they are almost miraculously few; and it is universally agreed that there is hardly a lyric bearing her name which does not charm the imagination and linger fragrantly in the memory. It has been said that the shadow of death lay too persistently across her sunlight; and that is not unnatural when the frailty of her own health was perpetually reminding her of the fragile tenure of human life. But it cannot be too firmly insisted that, in her familiarity with the idea of death, there is not even a passing taint of morbidity. To leave this beautiful world might be sad, she seems to say, were it not the fate of all things beautiful to fade; but there are tears in the laughter of man; and the suffering of the present time is not worthy to be compared with the happiness to be revealed.

In that great hour of unknown suffering
God shall be with me, and His arm made bare
Shall fight for me: yea, underneath His wing
I shall be safe at last and freed from care.

That confidence stands firm, a ringing challenge to the sceptic; that sincerity seems to sweep doubt off its feet; and the secret of Christina Rossetti's hold upon the world, 100 years after the day of her birth, lies in the perfect intercommunion of the twin qualities of her genius. Her art was naturally and incomparably true, and she devoted it to a faith which was the very well-spring of her being. Fashion, trick, sensation, all those glib passports to popularity, are inconceivable in connexion with the poetry of Christina Rossetti. She endures as seeing, with perfect clarity, an invisible world which transcends all types and shadows, gathering to itself, transformed and ennobled, the joys, distractions, and consolations of our bewildered humanity. Her art is true, simply and innocently true, to her vision; and art and vision, inextricably commingled, acclaim her the most perfect of all the English women poets, if not indeed of all the women poets in the literature of the world.

ARTHUR WAUGH.

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