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THE AGE OF ŚRĪ MADHUSŪDANA SARASVATĪ.

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Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is a star of first magnitude in the galaxy of Advaitic authors. His encyclopaedic learning, his brilliant dialectics, and his uncompromising advocacy of Advaita have earned for him an abiding place in the list of Sanskrit philosophic writers. Though an adept in the baffling technicalities of modern Nyāya, he keeps in his heart the flame of devotion to Śrī Kṛṣṇa undimmed and in describing the charms of the Lord in his *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* on the *Gitā*, he often rises to the highest altitudes of genuine eloquence. His *Ānandamandākinī*, a hymn of more than 100 Stanzas in praise of Śrī Kṛṣṇa shows that he is a poet of no mean order. He it was who took up the gauntlet thrown down by Vyāsarājasvāmī in his famous *Nyāyāmṛta* and put forth before a wondering world his *magnum opus* the famous *Advaita Siddhi*, containing a systematic refutation of all the arguments that have been urged against the Advaitavāda. *The Advaita Siddhi* has since maintained its value as a magnificent storehouse of convincing arguments in defence of the Advaitavāda. An intimate knowledge of the works of Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has, in fact, come to be regarded as the high water-mark of Vedāntic scholarship.

It is a matter for genuine regret that no reliable information is available regarding the age in which he lived and the main incidents of his life. Even the question of his date remains unsettled. We shall, therefore, attempt in the sequel to determine the age in which he lived by an examination of all available evidences both internal and external. Many such attempts have already been made by various scholars to which we should like to make a brief reference at the outset.

(1) The late eminent judge and Sanskrit scholar, Kāśināth Trimbak Telang of Bombay, discussed the question before the

Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1874. We have not been able to have a look at these papers. We find a *bona fide* reference to the subject in the following passage in Mr. V. N. Naik's small brochure :—

"In the same year (1874) he read two learned papers (1) on the Cālukya Copper plates (2) on the Date of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of *Gītā Gūḍhārthadīpikā*. In this paper he combated the views of Lassen and Burnouf that Madhusūdana lived in the XVI century A. C. Telang came to the conclusion that he flourished in the reign of Aurangzeb *either at the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century*" (*Kāśināth Trimbak Telang* p. 67). There is evidently some confusion of thought in the portions italicised above. Aurangzeb ruled between 1658 and 1707 A. D. We may not be wrong if we assume that according to Mr. Telang Madhusūdana Sarasvatī lived in the latter half of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century A. D.

(2) The next attempt to determine the age of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is contained in the Sanskrit introduction to Bopadeva's *Harilīlā Viveka* with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Commentary published in the Calcutta Oriental Series. Paṇḍit Īśvara Candra the writer of the introduction claims to be a lineal descendant of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and states that his information is based upon "Vaidika Vāda Mīmāṃsā" a *śāstra* of the western Vaidika Brahmans of the Kāśyapa ^{Ac-} cording to this history Madhusūdana Sarasvatī was a contemporary of Tulasīdās, the great Hindi poet and devotee (1620 A. D.).

(3) In the Introduction (pp. 4 to 6) to the Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts acquired for the Government Sanskrit College Benares during 1918-1919, Mr. Gopināth Kavirāj M.A. the present principal of the College writes as follows :—

"Being as I take him (Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,) to be, on the strength of evidence furnished by Puruṣottama a pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, a contemporary of Nṛsimhāśramā, both of whom are said to have been defeated in argument by Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa in a public controversy, he may be placed in the middle of the 16th Century; for Śiromaṇi's date is about 1520 A. D. and

Nṛsimhāśrama completed his *Vedānta Tattvaviveka* in Samvat 1604 or 1547 A.D."

(4) In his learned introduction to the *महाविद्याविडम्बन* of Vadindra (p. XXVI) published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series, Mr. M. R. Telang assigns Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to 1700 A. D. without assigning reasons for his view.

(5) In the Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute Vol. VIII. Part II (1926-27) there is a learned article on "Madhusūdana Sarasvatī : His Life and Works" by Prahlad C. Divanji, M.A., L. L. M. After a careful examination of all the available evidences, he concludes that "Madhusūdana must have lived in the latter half of the 16th and the former of the 17th century". Having thus summarised the literature (available to us) on the subject we shall now proceed to state our view of the matter. We hold that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī must be assigned to *the last three quarters of the seventeenth century A. D.* Our view is based on the following considerations :—

(A) It is well known that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote his *Advaita Siddhi*, in answer to Vyāsarājasvāmī's *Nyāyāmṛta*. Vyāsarājasvāmī lived between 1446 and 1539 A. D. Supposing that a period of 50 years should at last have elapsed between the writers, we may assign Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to the end of the 16th century A. D. at the earliest.

(B) Similarly, we can see that the *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa* was written as a reply to Śaṅkara Miśra's *Bhedaratna*.¹ Śaṅkara Miśra intended his *Bhedaratna* as a counterblast to Śrī Harṣa's *खण्डनखण्डखाद्य*. He says

¹Śaṅkara Miśra's *भेदरत्न* appears to have received another rejoinder in Mallanārādhya's *अभेदरत्न* or *अद्वैतरत्न* which was commented upon by Nṛsimhāśramā in his *तत्त्वदीपन* (Vide Nos. 4524 and 4525 in Vol X of the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in the Government Oriental Library Madras). Mallanārādhya says,

अभेदस्य परित्राणे रत्नस्याचार्यशङ्कराः ।

यामिकास्तेन तन्मार्गाद्युक्तं हस्तेन वारणम् ॥"

This *अभेदरत्न* is the same as the one referred to by Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita in his *वेदान्तपरिभाषाशिखामणि* (p. 295 of the Śrī Veṅkateśwara Press Edition). It may be noted that Dharma Rāja Dīkṣita, Rāmakṛṣṇa's father and author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* refers to Nṛsimhāśramā as his *paramaguru*.

“भेदरत्नपरित्राणे तार्किका एव यामिकाः ।

अतो वेदान्तिनः स्तेनान्निरस्यत्येष शङ्करः ॥

To this Madhusūdana Sarasvatī rejoins in the following verse :—

अद्वैतरत्नरक्षायां तार्किका एव यामिकाः ।

अतो न्यायविदः स्तेनान्निरस्यामः स्वयुक्तिभिः ॥

Śaṅkara Miśra lived after 1529 A. D. as pointed out by Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganath Jha in his introduction to Śaṅkara Miśra's *Vādivinoda* published in the *Śyāmacharan Sanskrit Series*, Allahabad.

(C) The learned writer of the introduction to the *हरिलीलाविवेक* states that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote a commentary on the *सिद्धान्तलेशसङ्ग्रह* of Appayya Dīkṣita whose date has been fixed beyond any possibility of doubt to be between 1554 and 1626 A. D. If with Mr. P. C. Divanji we assume an interval of 50 years to have elapsed between Appayya Dīkṣita and his commentator, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī should be assigned to the 2nd quarter of the 17th Century A. D. The term वेदान्तशास्त्र occurring in the introductory verse of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *सिद्धान्तविन्दु* is explained by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī in his *न्यायरत्नावलि* as follows:- शारीरकमीमांसाचतुरध्यायी । तद्वाण्य-तदीयटीकावाचस्पत्य-तदीयटीकाकल्प-तरु-तदीयटीकापरिमलरूपग्रन्थपञ्चकेत्यर्थः. Thus according to Brahmānanda Sarasvatī whose authority cannot be lightly brushed aside, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī came after Appayya Dīkṣita the author of वेदान्तकल्पतरुपरिमल. In this connection we may also note the benedictory verse of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Bhaktirasāyana*

“पदनखनिविष्टमूर्तेरेकादशतामिवावहन्निष्ठाम् ।

यं समुपास्ते गिरिशस्तं वन्दे नन्दमन्दिरे कञ्चित् ॥

On the very face of it this stanza appears to have been intended as a refutation of the superiority of Śiva maintained by Appayya Dīkṣita in some of his controversial works.

(D) We now come upon what we confidently regard as the most positive piece of evidence regarding the age of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. In his commentary on *संक्षेपशारीरक* of *सर्वज्ञात्मन्* Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adversely criticises Rāmatīrtha's interpretation contained in his commentary on the same work, as

may be seen from the following passages from the two writers which are placed side by side for purposes of easy reference :—

I

रामतीर्थः

मधुसूदनसरस्वती

अभितः सर्वात्मना श्रुतिस्मृतीति- तत्स्तुतिरूपं तत्स्वरूपनिरूपणपरं
हासपुराणैस्तात्पर्येणोपपादितस्वभा- ग्रन्थं करोमीत्यर्थ इत्यन्ये (सं. श. I. 1.)
वेन, आभिमुख्येन वा प्रत्यगभेदलक्षणेन
स्तवीमि स्तवनं करोमि—तत्स्वरूप-
निरूपणपरं ग्रन्थं करोमि इत्यर्थः (सं.
शा. I. 1.)

II

भूमभावो ब्रह्मभावः । अत्र भूमशब्दो भूम्नो भाव इति व्याख्यानमनुपा-
न भाववचनः । किन्तु “भूमा सम्प्रसा- देयम् । बहोर्भावस्य भूमशब्दवाच्यत्वेन
दादध्युपदेशात्” इति न्यायेनाखण्डब्रह्म- भावशब्दवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः (सं. शा. I. 2.)
वचन इति विवक्षित्वा भूमभावेत्युक्त-
मिति द्रष्टव्यम् (सं. शा. I. 2.)

III

अत्र यदिशब्दप्रयोगादभ्युपगमवाद- अत्रानिश्चितार्थयदिशब्दस्वारस्येन
तास्य पक्षस्य द्योतिता (सं. शा. प्रौढिवादोऽयं ग्रन्थकारस्येति केचित्
I. 169.) (सं. श. I. 169.)

IV

किलेत्यनयोः पक्षयोः स्वसारुचि अत्र केचित् किलशब्दाभ्यामस्वा-
सूचयति (सं. शा. I. 174.) रस्यं द्योतितं....इति (सं. शा. I. 174.)

The comments of the two authors on *सङ्क्षेपशारीरक* I. 292 and II. 75 may also be consulted in this connection. It will therefore be clear that the date of Rāmatīrtha would supply an upper limit before which Madhusūdana Sarasvatī could not be placed. Now, when did Rāmatīrtha live? Anantadeva, the author of *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व*, a short treatise on Advaita, refers to Rāmatīrtha as his guru.

यच्छ्रीमद्रामतीर्थेभ्यः सम्प्रदायसमागतम् ।

श्रुतं सत्तर्कसचिवं विविच्य तदिहोच्यते ॥

इत्थं परिव्राजकपूज्यपादश्रीरामतीर्थानुसृतिप्रसादात् ।
सिद्धान्ततत्त्वं गतवाग्विवादमनन्तदेवेन मुदा न्यरूपि ॥

This Anantadeva was the father of Āpadeva, the author of the famous *मीमांसान्यायप्रकाश* and *बालबोधिनी* a commentary on Sadānanda's *Vedānta Sāra*. Āpadeva's son Anantadeva was the author of *स्मृतिकौस्तुभ*, *भाट्टालङ्कार* and other works. As he himself says in his *स्मृतिकौस्तुभ*, he was a protege of Baj Bahadur, a chief-tain of Kurmācala whom Prof. Jolly has assigned to the period 1644-1664 A. D. The following genealogical table is given for facility of reference :—

Anantadeva (author of *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व* and disciple of Rāmatīrtha.)

Āpadeva (author of *मीमांसान्यायप्रकाश* and *बालबोधिनी*)

Anantadeva II (author of *स्मृतिकौस्तुभ*, *भाट्टालङ्कार* etc.,) a protege of Baj Bahadur (1644-1664 A. D.).

Hence we may be justified in placing Rāmatīrtha two generations before Anantadeva II, about the close of the 16th century A. D.; and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who criticises Rāmatīrtha could not have flourished before the close of the 16th century A. D.

Here we should like to remark in passing that the learned paṇḍit, who edited the *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व* in the Benares Paṇḍit series, identifies the author of *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व* with Anantadeva II. But this identification is wrong for the following reasons :—

(a) Anantadeva II says at the beginning of his *स्मृतिकौस्तुभ* that his father Āpadeva was the author of *न्यायप्रकाश* and that his grandfather Anantadeva I. wrote the *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व*

मीमांसानयकोविदो मधुरिपोः सेवासु नित्योद्यतो
विद्यादानविभावितोत्तमयशा आसीत्तदीयात्मजः ।
यस्यानन्तगुणैरनन्त इति सन्नामार्थवत्तां गतं
येनावादि च वादिनां श्रुतिशिरःसिद्धान्ततत्त्वं मुदे ॥
न्यायप्रकाशकर्ता निरवधिविद्यामृतप्रदः सततम् ।
मीमांसाद्वयनयवित्तनयस्तस्यां पदे वोऽभूत् [?] ॥

(b) Again, Āpadeva quotes the following passages in his *बालबोधिनी* and introduces them with the words “तदुक्तं तातचरणैः”

and “अत्रास्मद्गुरुः, ऐहिकपारलौकिकफलेच्छाविरोधिचेतोवृत्तिविशेषात्मको विरागः” and “नाज्ञानसमष्टिरीश्वरोपाधिः” and these passages are respectively found on pages 30 and 47 of Anantadeva's *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व*.¹

Let us now return to our main enquiry. We have seen that Rāmatīrtha's date supplies the upper limit of the age of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. We shall now proceed to determine whether a lower limit can also be fixed. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's famous *kārikā*—

“तस्यैवाहं ममैवासौ स एवाहमिति त्रिधा ।

भगवच्छरणत्वं स्यात् साधनाभ्यासपाकतः ॥”

which occurs in his *Gitāgūḍhārthadīpikā* XVIII. 66. is found quoted by Haridīkṣita in his commentary on Śivagītā (XIV-43.). Haridīkṣita was also the author of a *ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति*, published in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series. At the end of this work, Haridīkṣita himself gives the date of its completion.

गजेश्वरसमूहसंख्ये (१६५८) शकेऽब्दे चानलाह्वये ॥

ज्येष्ठशुक्लत्रयोदश्यां ग्रन्थः सिद्धिमगादयम् ॥

This year corresponds to 1736 A.D. It will be thus clear that by the beginning of the 18th century A. D. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's writings had become famous enough to be quoted as authoritative. Hence the conclusion irresistibly follows that he flourished in the last three quarters of the 17th century A. D. and it is gratifying to note that this view is fully corroborated by the statement of Īśvara Candra in his introduction to *हरिलीलाविवेक* that about Śaka 1600 (1678 A. D.) the Emperor of Delhi sent for Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who vanquished the Paṇḍits of the Royal Court in a public controversy. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī was therefore alive in 1678 A. D. Mr. K. T. Telang's view quoted above, that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī was a contemporary of Aurangzeb, is also fortified by the results of our independent enquiry.

In conclusion we should like to add a few words regarding Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's place of nativity. According to the *Vaidika Vāda Mīmāṃsā*, he was a Kanouj Brahman whose ancestors had migrated from their original home and settled at Nava-dvipa in the East Bengal. In his *Gitāgūḍhārtha Dīpikā* (VI. 34.)

1. In my introduction to the *Advaitamakaranda* published by the Śrīraṅgam Śrī Vāṇī Vilas Press I have adopted the erroneous identification of Anantadeva II with the author of *सिद्धान्ततत्त्व* ।

he makes the following interesting statement तन्तुनागो नागपाशः तांतनीति गुर्जरादौ प्रसिद्धः महाहृदनिवासी जंतुविशेषो वा । This naturally leads one to suppose that his mother tongue was Guzarati. We can however reconcile the two statements by positing that he was a Guzarati Brahman whose ancestors had migrated to Bengal but did not forget to cultivate their original mother tongue in their new home. Mr. P. C. Divanji makes the following curious statement—But as he had adopted the appellation “Sarasvatī” which is found to be in vogue in the north, his commentator Brahmānanda Sarasvatī calls him a “Gauḍa Brahmaṇa”. In the first place we have not come across any such passage in Brahmānanda Sarasvatī’s works. And in the second place Mr. Divanji ignores the fact that “Sarasvatī” is but the name of one of the ten orders of Smārta Sanyāsins. The appellation “Sarasvatī” is as common in the south as in the north. Śaṅkarānanda Sarasvatī, Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī, Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī and Svayamprakāśānanda Sarasvatī were all inhabitants of South India.

In a further article we shall give a systematic and critical review of all the extant works of Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

COMPOUNDS IN TAMIL LANGUAGE.

BY

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Tolkāppiyāṇār classifies compounds or¹ tokai molī under six heads² :—*Vēṟṟumaittokai*, *uvamaittokai*, *viṇaittokai*, *paṇputtokai*, *ummaittokai* and *aṇmolittokai*. *Vēṟṟumaittokai*³ is that in which the members which form the compound stand in case-relation to each other as *por-kuṭam* (gold-pot). It corresponds to *taṭpuruṣa* in Sanskrit. *Uvamaittokai*⁴ is that in which one member is compared to another as *pon-mēṇi* (gold-appearance). It corresponds to *upamānapūrvapada-karmadhāraya*. *Viṇaittokai*⁵ is that in which the first member is a participle denoting time and the second member is the noun which it qualifies as *kol-yāṇai* (elephant that kills, killed or will kill). It corresponds to a part of *viśēṣaṇa-pūrvapada-karmadhāraya*. *Paṇputtokai*⁶ is that in which the first member is generally a quality denoting colour, shape, extent, taste etc., and the second a noun which has that quality as *karuṇ-kutirai* (black horse). This also corresponds to a part of *viśēṣaṇa-pūrvapada-karmadhāraya*. *Ummaittokai*⁷ is that in which each has two or more members, the

1 It may be interesting to note that *tokai* in Tamil and *samāsa* in Sanskrit convey the same sense.

2 வேற்றுமைத் தொகையே யுவமைத் தொகையே
வினையின் றொகையே பண்பின் றொகையே
யும்மைத்தொகையே யன்மொழித் தொகையென்
றவ்வா றென்ப தொகைமொழி நிலையே. (தொல். சொல். 412).

3 வேற்றுமைத் தொகையே வேற்றுமை யியல். (தொல். சொல். 413).

4 உவமைத் தொகையே யுவம வியல். (தொல். சொல். 414).

5 வினையின் றொகுதி காலத் தியலும். (தொல். சொல். 415).

6 வண்ணத்தின் வடிவி னளவிற சுவையினென்
றன்ன ிறவு மதன்குண துசவி
யின்ன திதுவென வருஉ மியற்கை
யென்ன கிளவியும் பண்பின் றொகையே. (தொல். சொல். 416).

7 இருபெயர் பல்பெய ரளவின் பெயரே
யெண்ணியற் பெயரே நிறைப்பெயர்க் கிளவி
யெண்ணின் பெயரே டவ்வறு கிளவியுங்
கண்ணிய நிலத்தே யும்மைத் தொகையே. (தொல். சொல். 417).

members being connected with one another by 'and' and denoting persons, measures, numbers, weights etc., as *puli-viṛ-keṇṭai* (tiger, bow and keṇṭai fish) etc. It corresponds to dvandva in Sanskrit. Anmolittokai¹ is the possessive compound, the members of which may stand to each other in any of the three relations—quality-noun relation, conjunctive relation and case-relation. It corresponds to Bahuvrihi in Sanskrit.

It may be noted here that the number of compounds in Tamil agree with that of primary compounds in Sanskrit and the names given to them in Tamil are more suggestive of their function than those in Sanskrit. These compounds are treated in syntax as though they are single words².

The above classification of Tolkāppiaṇār is fairly exhaustive; but such compounds as *karu-niṛam*, *cārai-p-pūmpu*, where both the members are either qualities or names which denote the genus and species of the same object, are not taken into account; but Cēṇāvaraiyar explains in his commentary on the same sūtra that they too are paṇṇuttokai, on the strength of the expression *enṇa-kiḷaviyūm*, which means 'similar words', in the sūtra.

All the later grammarians, except the authors of Viracōliyam and Pirayōkavivēkam, i.e., the authors of Nēminātam, Naṇṇūl, Ilakkaṇaviḷakkam and Ilakkaṇakkottu agree, as regards the classification of compounds, with Tolkāppiaṇār. And Naṇṇūlār tries to improve upon Tolkāppiaṇār as regards the definition of paṇṇuttokai³ so that it may apply to compounds like *karu-niṛam*, *cārai-p-pūmpu* etc.

But the author of Viracōliyam, who lived at the time of Virarājendra Cōla (1062 to 1070 A. D.) and preceded Naṇṇūlār, saw that a large number of Sanskrit compounds like *anīti*, *anīliyam* etc., were freely used in Tamil and they, along with some

- 1 பண்பு தொகைவருவது கிளவி யானு
முடிமை தொக்க பெயர்வழி குணம்
வேற்றுமை தொக்க பெயர்வழி குணம்
மீற்றுதின் நியலு மன்மொழித் தொகையே. (தொல். சொல். 418).
- 2 எல்லாத் தொகையு மொருசொன் னடைய. (தொல். சொல். 420).
- 3 பண்பை விளக்கும் மொழிதொக் கனவும்
ஒருபொருட்கு இருபெயர் வந்தவும் குணத்தொகை. (ரன். 365.)

Tamil compounds like *karu-niṛam*, *paṇṇiru-toḷi*, *teṇ-kiḷakku*, could not be directly explained with the rules on compounds stated by Tolkāppiaṇār. Hence he began to classify them exactly in the same way as is done in Sanskrit :—*taṇṇuṇan* (tatpuruṣa) *paṇaṇel* (bahuvrihi), *kaṇṇmatārayam* (karmadhāraya), *tuṇiku* (dvigu), *tuṇantuvam* (dvandva) and *avviyapāva* (avyayibhāva)¹. Some may say that he might have left out *avviyapāva* since examples for it are very rare; it is true, but such words as *yatākkiramam*, the tadbhava of Skt. *yathākrama*, are sometimes found and they have to be explained.

The most important point to be noted in Viracōliyam, as also in Pirayōkavivēkam whose author closely follows that of Viracōliyam with some difference here and there, is that most of the stanzas found in the chapter dealing with compounds *tokaiṇṇaṭalam*, in both are exactly the translation of the kārīkās on samāsa assigned to the authorship of Vararuci in Sanskrit. They are as follows :—

Vararuci

बोढा समासास्सङ्क्षेपादेकत्रिंशद्विधाः पुनः ।
तत्राष्टधा तत्पुरुषः सप्तधा कर्मधारयः ॥
सप्तधा च बहुव्रीहिर्दिगुराभाषितो द्विधा ॥
इन्द्रश्चतुर्विधो ज्ञेयोऽव्ययीभावस्त्रिधा मतः ॥

Viracōliyam

தற்புருடன்டல் நெற்கன்மதாரயந் தாங்கியசீர்
நற்றுவிசுத்தொகை நாவார்துவந்துவ நல்லதெய்வச்
சொற்பயன்மாதர்க ளவ்வியபாவ மிதென்றுதொன்மை
கற்பமகமாப்பகர்ந் தார்தொகையாறுங் கனங்குழையே.
(வீரசோ. தொகை, 2.)

Pirayōkavivēkam

தற்புருடன்றுவிசுப்பல நெற்கம் தாரயனே
நெப்பல வானெடுங் கட்பகந் தேமொழி யொண்டொடியாய்
சொற்பயி லவ்வி யயீபாவ மேனைத் துவத்தனெனக்
கற்பவர் கூறுஞ் சமாசனக் ளேதொகைக் கட்டளையே.
(பிரயோக. மாச. 3.)

- 1 தற்புருடன்டல் நெற்கன்மதாரயந் தாங்கியசீர்
நற்றுவிசுத்தொகை நாவார்துவந்துவ நல்ல தெய்வச்
சொற்பயன்மாதர்க ளவ்வியபாவ மிதென்றுதொன்மை
கற்பகமாப்பகர்ந் தார்தொகையாறுங் கனங்குழையே.
(வீரசோ. தொகை, 2.)

तत्पुरुषोऽष्टविधोऽभूत्प्रथमादिविभक्तिनञ्कृतैर्भेदैः ।

.....
स चैकवद्वाव्यनेकवद्वावीति द्विधा द्विगुः ॥

எழுவாய்முதலெழு வேற்றுமையொரு மெழுந்தளையில்
வழுவாதஞ்ஞொடெட்டாந்தற்புருடன் வளர்க்கலிசு
சுழுவார்த்தவெண்மொழி முன்னுய்வருந் தத்திசப்பொருண்மேற்
குழுவாரொருமை யொப்புப்பன்மை யொப்புக்குறி யிரண்டே.
(வீரசோ. தொகை. 3.)

தற்புருடத்தொகை வேற்றுமை யெட்டனுட் சார்ந்த நஞ்ஞச்
சொற்பொரு ளன்மை மறைபின்மை காட்டுந் தொகைத்துவிசு
முற்பத மென்பிற் பதச்சத்திதார்த்த முடித்துமெழுஉம்
பற்பல வேகவற் பாலியநேகவற் பாலியென்றே.
(பிரயோக. சமாச. 4.)

सप्तभिराख्याभिर्वा विख्यातो यस्स वै बहुव्रीहिः ।

.....
द्वाभ्यां पदाभ्यां बहुभिः पदैर्वा सङ्ख्याभिर्धाय्यन्त्यपदं द्वयं वा ।
यत्याभवत्पूर्वपदे सहश्च दिगन्तरालव्यतिहारलक्ष्मा ॥

இருமொழிபன்மொழி பின்மொழி யெண்ணே டிருமொழியெண்
மருவும் விசியா நிலக்கணமற்றைச் சகமுன்மொழி
பரவுந்திகந்தரா ளத்தொகையன்னப் பகடுற்றொகை
விரியுமோழைவை வேற்றுமொழிப் பொருண் மெல்லியலே.
(வீரசோ. தொகை. 4.)

இருமொழி பன்மொழி பின்மொழி யெண்ணே டிருமொழியெண்
டருமொழி யொற்றொழி திக்கந் தரானஞ் சகமுனிற்சு
மொருமொழி யேனைவிதி காரலக்கணத்தோடு வரும்
பெருமொழி யாகுவெகு விரியன் மொழிப்பே ரடைந்தே.
(பிரயோக. சமாச. 7.)

कविभिस्सप्तविधस्यादित्येवं कर्मधारयः कथितः ।

.....
विशेषणं पूर्वपदे विशेष्यं तयोभयत्रापि विशेषणं च ।

यस्योपमानं परतस्तदादौ सम्भावना चाप्यवधारणा च ॥

முன்மொழிப்பண்பு மிருமொழிபண்பு மொழிந்தமைந்த
பின்மொழியொப்பொடுமுன்மொழியொப்பும்பிணக்கொன்றிலா
முன்மொழிநற்கருத் தன்முன்மொழிநற் றுணியு மென
நன்மொழியார்கன்ம தாராயமாடுள்ள நாட்டினரே.
(வீரசோ. தொகை. 5.)

முன்மொழிப் பண்டிரு பண்பு விசேடிய முன்மொழிதன்
முன்மொழித் துல்லியம் பின்மொழித் துல்லியமொய்குழலாய்
முன்மொழிச் சம்பா வனையவ தாரண முற்றுமலை
நன்மொழிப் பண்புத் தொகைக் கன்ம தாரண னற்றமிழ்க்கே.
(பிரயோக. சமாச. 5.)

[Here the author of Viracōliyam omitted the class where the noun qualified by the adjective stands as the first member of the compound (विशेष्यं पूर्वपद) since, perhaps, it was difficult for him to find an example for it in Tamil language; and hence he stated that Kaṇmatārayam is of 6 kinds, instead of 7 as found in Sanskrit. But the author of Pirayōkavivēkam has included it also and gives செய்வப்புலவன் நிருவன்னுவன் as an example for it.]

यत्राव्ययं पूर्वपदं यथा वा सुबन्तमाहो द्वितयं सुबन्तम् ।
पूर्वोऽपि मुख्यो बहुशः पदार्थस्तथाव्ययीभावमितीरयन्ति ॥
स हि द्वन्द्वश्चतुर्थो स्यादुधैरिति विनिश्चितः ।
इतरेतरयोगाख्यः समाहाराह्यस्तथा ॥

1 முன்மொழியவ்வியஞ்சேர் தொகை பேர்முன் மொழித்தொகை
சொன்மொழியவ்விய பாவ மருவுந் துவந்துவரும் [யே
வன்மொழியாமிதி ரோதரம் வாய்ந்த சமாகாரமா
நன்மொழியானுரைத் தார்கன் சமாச நறுநுதலே.
(வீரசோ. தொகை. 6.)

முன்மொழிப் பேர்ச்சொ லிடைச்சொ லிரண்டு முரணி நிற்குந்
தன்மொழி யவ்வி யய்பாவ முட்மைச் சகாரத்திலே
யின்மொழித் தொந்தன்² சமாகாரத்தோடிதரோதரமா
மன்மொழித் தோற்றமுஞ் சமுச்சயத் தோடுமன் வாசயமே.
(பிரயோக. சமாச. 6.)

तत्पुरुषोऽष्टविधोऽभूत्.... ।

उत्तरपदजनितार्थः प्रायो मुख्यः..... ॥

..... द्विगुः ।

अस्यापि पण्डितैरन्तर्भावस्तत्पुरुषे मतः ॥

¹ He has not mentioned that class of avyayibhāva where the members are nouns, as madhyēgāram since such words have not been taken into Tamil language.

² Cf. Bhattōji Dikṣita's vṛtti on चार्थे द्वन्द्वः—'समुच्चयान्वाचयेत-
रेतरयोगसमाहाराच्चार्याः'

.... कर्मधारयः कथितः ।

तत्पुरुषान्तर्भावात्तद्व्याधान्यमीरितं चास्य ॥

प्राधान्यं प्रायशोऽस्मिन्नुभयोः स्यात्पदार्थयोः ।

स हि द्वन्द्वः.....

தற்புரு டன் லுவி குக்கம் தாரபன் றுமுதன்மை
பிற்புர மாமெழு வாயா மொருஉத்தொகை பெண்ணைங்கே
முற்புர மவ்விய யயீபாவ மொப்புமுறை பிறமுன்
சொற்புரத் தொக்கவை யெல்லா முதன்மை சுவந்தனுக்கே.
(பிரயோக. சமாச. 8.)

The statement 'அவ்வியயீபாவ மொப்புமுறை பிறமுன்' which means that the relative importance of the first or second member in avyayibhāva and upamita samāsa will change, is made on the strength of the words प्रायः and बहुशः in 'उत्तरपदजनितार्थः प्रायो मुख्यः' and 'पूर्वोऽपि मुख्यो बहुशः पदार्थः' respectively. The author of Viracōliyam, having dealt with this classification of compounds in 5 stanzas, mentions also the classification made by Tolkāppiyāṇār as the opinion of a class of Tamilians.

The only point of difference between these two kinds of classification is only with respect to avyayibhāva and nañtatpuruṣa, since other tatpuruṣas, dvandva and bahuvrihi are identically the same as vēṇṇumaittokai, ummaittokai and aṇmolittokai, though with different names, and karuṇadhāraya and dvigu may somehow or other be brought under uvamattokai, viṇaittokai and paṇputtokai.

BUDDHADATTA.

By

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Buddhadatta, the father of Buddhist Exegetical Literature, flourished in South India about the 4th Century A. D. He unquestionably belongs to a generation of scholars earlier than the reputed Buddhaghōṣa whose Pāli commentaries have obtained great publicity and acceptance during the last 800 years and more to the detriment of Buddhadatta's works. These latter have been of late subjected to so much neglect that there is not a single monastery in Burma to my knowledge, where the works are studied or taught at the present day. So complete has been the eclipsing of Buddhadatta, by the fame of his over-rated successor.

Tradition has taught that the two great commentators lived at the same time and that their works were almost synchronous in point of their composition. Even apart from the fabulous element in the Burmese (Buddhaghosuppatti) account, a close student of Pāli Literature will find in it very little indeed that may be reconciled with the simplest canons of textual criticism. In early Pāli Literature, it is always true that the more prolix the style, the later the work. Buddhadatta's works are all marked by a highly epigrammatic style which had its vogue during the early centuries of the Christian Era. Again Buddhadatta's mode of presenting his matter is further evidence of the priority of his works. It is different from, though as valuable as, that of the patiniddesā, the method of Buddhaghōṣa's expositions.

The attempt to make the two teachers contemporaries of each other is rendered still more difficult by a statement in the epilogue to the Sammoha viṇodanī, ascribed to Buddhaghōṣa. The statement in question asserts that the work was undertaken at the instance of another Buddhaghōṣa, so that there were at least 2 Buddhaghōṣas living about the 4 or 5th Century A. D. Buddhadatta was not only a predecessor of Buddhaghōṣa but one whose works are presupposed by, and paved the way for, the works of Buddhaghōṣa.

The Śāsanālaṅkāra, following the tradition, makes them both co-contemporaries of the Talaing king San Lan Krom, who ruled at Arimaddanapura in Burma, the modern Pagan on the banks of the Irrawaddy. This San Lan Krom was in all probability a member of the Śālaṅkāyana Dynasty of kings who, as far as historical records (most of them copper-plates) prove, from the time of Samudragupta till 350 A. D. continued to be kings (Mahārājās) at Veṅḡipura, on the Coromandel coast, noted for their naval power and maritime commerce. The same kings seem to have extended their patronage to the Buddhist Clergy resident at Kāñcīpura and elsewhere in their dominions. It is also noteworthy that this same San Lan Krom is credited with the introduction of Buddhism into Burma.

The fact that the Śālaṅkāyana kings are not mentioned in the works of Buddhadatta, however, cannot tell us much, not even that Buddhadatta himself had never travelled up to Burma, where amongst the Clergy his works soon grew popular and came to be used in the chief monasteries; for the name of the Ceylonese king of the period, too, is absent in his chief commentaries. All these, however, contain a reference to a ruler at Urāgapura the modern Uraiyūr,¹ then a flourishing port on the banks of the Kāverī Delta. To Accuta Vikrama of the Kadamba line of kings, Buddhadatta, though a clergyman, had attached himself as a minister according to the prevailing custom there. Ilandatta, the name under which Buddhadatta is known to Tamil Buddhists, is mentioned with due deference in early Tamil Literature, as the chief advisor of the ruling king at Uraiyūr. In the light of this evidence, we can explain why from his works, the names of other contemporary kings have been excluded and all the tribute of the acknowledgement is paid to his official patron. Kings of Ancient India, especially those in the south, have regularly had for such advisors or ministers, competent scholars who might be Brahmins or monks.

By birth, Buddhadatta belonged to India, though to Ceylon is due the credit of giving him his education. His own words

¹ It should be remembered in this connection that the correct view seems to be that *Urāgapura* in Sanskrit does not correspond to Uraiyūr but corresponds to the old *Ālavāy* or the Sanskritised *Hālāsya* which answers to the modern Madura in the South. Kālidāsa mentions *Urāgapura* in verse 59 of canto, VI which corresponds to the modern Madura. S. K. Sastri.]

lead us to think that he was born in a Brahmin family at Urāgapura, the flourishing seaport which swarmed with metropolitan markets, and men of all nationalities. It is situated at the head of the Kāverī Delta and in the first centuries of the Christian Era could be reached by flat-bottomed coasting vessels. It was the capital of the Cola country which was proverbial for its fertility of soil, luxuriant vegetation and extensive fields.

Buddhadatta has not left us much information about his boyhood. We must surmise that he received the usual Brahminical training in his childhood and acquired from his parents the love of truth and a thirst for knowledge and above all his inimitable courage of conviction. His intimate knowledge of certain Brahmin customs and speculations would lead us to believe that it was acquired before his conversion to Buddhism and before the restrictive rules of Buddhist monachism could effectively narrow his vision of the outer world.

We next find him as a member of the local clergy, residing at the Kelasa Vihāra, on a hill a mile from Urāgapura, built by Kanhadāsa or Venhugopa, another Kadamba King of a previous generation. This Venhudāsa is the same Viṣṇudāsa, whose conversion of the Cola King is detailed in the 10th Chapter of Viṣṇupurāṇa. He does not however seem to have won any degree of distinction at Kelasa Vihāra about this period. He must have felt that his education could not be completed without a trip across the channel to Ceylon and an intercourse with the monks of Anūrādhāpura, whose fame of Buddhist scholarship reached, even at that early time, such remote places as China and Tibet. Accordingly Buddhadatta crossed the seas, by native sailing vessels and arrived at the Cola port in Ceylon. Next we hear that he spent a number of years in Ceylon at the Mahāvihāra, the great monastery at Anūrādhāpura. It appears that foreign students migrating to Ceylon for study went to this particular monastery, though there were other towns as well with great monasteries in them.

Here he appears to have composed his earliest work a quasi-clerical work, wrongly attributed to Buddharakkhita. This poem which occupies a peculiarly high position in the realm of Pāli poetry, analogous to that of Milinda Panha in Pāli Prose, pays in language of the highest order and prosody of the greatest complexity, meet praise to the Great Leader who renounced the world and found the True way. "*Jinālaṅkāra*" recalls the most

exquisite of Sanskrit poems with any of which it would bear quite favourable comparison. The author, though a clergyman, is yet young, full of life and emotion, and paints most gorgeous descriptions of life and men.

The Enlightened one is praised for his extraordinary power of determination in resisting the charms of the palace. Making that a basis, Buddhадатта most poetically portrays the features and lineaments of Princess Yaśodharā the mother of Rāhula. Unique in Pāli Literature, it has its parallel only in the works of Sanskrit writers like Bāṇa and Kālidāsa.

Jinālaṅkāra established the repute of Buddhадатта as a most venerable member of the Order and as one of the best writers of Pāli verse. Recognised throughout Ceylon as a great scholar, he was much in requirement at the court of other Buddhist princes, for Buddhадатта was invited by the kings of Veṅgi, whose patronage had set the Buddhist school at Kāñcīpura on a sound basis, as well as by the Chief of Miladu. It is not unlikely that Buddhадатта was consulted, if not actually deputed, in connection with introducing Buddhism into Burma, where the kings of Veṅgi, the Śālaṅkāyanas, had made more or less permanent settlements.

During the years of his residence at Anūrādhāpura he should have studied the Sinhalese commentaries in the original, for there is no evidence to show that they were available in any other tongue at the time. The work of translating or exploiting the Sinhalese commentaries still waited to be done by scholars like himself. Buddhaghosa, whose name has cast that of Buddhадатта into the obscurest shade, chose to translate the commentaries, just as any competent scholar wanting the capacity for independent thought and original composition, might prefer to render into another language what has already been written in one, and deserves the respect that is due to all honest work. But Buddhадатта's choice was different, and the divergence in aim and achievement of the two great authors is a direct consequence of this. Buddhадатта saw that though the act of translation did not demand of its votary much more than a mastery of the vocabulary and idioms of the foreign language, it was yet too slow and tedious a process to be attempted with reference to the Buddhist writings by any single scholar. The works in Sinhalese were as numerous as they were of value and a scholar might not hope to help Buddhist culture to any appreciable extent by translating

even six or seven of the copious Sinhalese commentaries. Thus it was that he preferred to give in a few original works of his own, all the knowledge of the Sinhalese exegetical literature he was able to acquire in a life-time. His works therefore stand as a remarkable achievement, presenting in Pāli valuable information available till his time only in Sinhalese. The matter of the Sinhalese book is allowed to pass through 'the prism of a vigorous intellect' and expressed in a style of writing hardly less than the greatest.

According to the Gandhavaṁśa, Buddhадатта composed five works in all, namely,

1. The 'Jinālaṅkāra' - a votive Wreath for the Jina.
2. The 'Vinaya Vinicchāyā' - Vinaya determined.
3. The 'Uttara Vinicchāyā' - Further issues determined.
4. The 'Abhidhammāvatāra' - Introduction to Abhidhamma, preceded by the 'Rūpārūpa Vibhāga'.
5. The 'Madhurārtha Vilāsinī' - The commentary on Buddhavaṁśa.

A close student of Buddhадатта will surely be struck by the unity that marks the group of Buddhадатта's works. I, for one, perceive a scheme which gives to each of the works a definite place as a part of a bigger whole. *Jinālaṅkāra*, the earliest is the tribute of an earnest follower who has chosen to dedicate his life to the study of the Master's words and to the promulgation of the gospel. Next, in 'Vinaya Vinicchāyā' the practical life of self-control and discipline, pronounced by the Buddha as indispensable to the attainment of the ideal, is studied analytically and rendered available for future generations in Pāli. The settlement of doubtful points left undecided in the *Vinaya Vinicchāyā* forms the subject matter of the *Uttara Vinicchāyā*. In the next work, the whole of the Abhidhamma Literature, another of 'the three baskets of the Law,' is summarised, nay crystallised, in classical Pāli verse. The 'Rūpārūpa Vibhāga' appears to have preceded the 'Abhidhamma-Avatāra' in which it now forms a part and has been modelled on Sāṅkhya lines of classification. The "Abhidhamma-Avatāra" on account of its comparative brevity has unfortunately been classed amongst 'Lethans' or 'handbooks' of Buddhist Philosophy. The misnomer is irritating in the extreme. One who has read the *Abhidhamma Avatāra*

and also the Sanskrit Sūtras of Yoga or Nyāya tends to place the Abhidhamma Avatāra amongst the most important works on philosophy.

To the Sutta Piṭaka, or the mass of tradition that had been accumulating ever since the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, threatening to mystify and obscure the personage it was intended to glorify, Buddhadatta must have given his attention as to some serious cause of dread. Accordingly, in his commentary on the Buddhavaṃśa which is by itself an almost unintelligible fragment of antiquity, Buddhadatta preserves what in his opinion deserved such preservation.

Thus we see that he has done what was distinctly above the capacity of a mere commentator who, when stripped of the halo of a remote past, is no better than a dignified annotator. Buddhadatta aimed very high and gave to the world, within the compass of about four thousand verses, the entire Buddhist religious literature, extending from the old traditional stories and legends to the most practical points of religious life and thence to the most abstruse philosophical literature. His work is marked by an anxiety to give to the Buddhist faith the status of an organised religious system, strong in its principles and steady and unequivocating in its statement of them and backed by an acceptable system of psychology and metaphysics. His ambition was to raise Buddhism from a popular, uncertain, superstitious congeries to the high level of other Indian philosophical systems by giving it in the learned tongue, Pāli, a new body of unexceptionable literature similar to the Sutta Literature of the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Vaiśeṣika schools. It will be no exaggeration to say that the Vibhajjāvādin School, so very influential for centuries, owed much to the pioneer work of Buddhadatta.

Though none could have realised better than Buddhadatta himself the supreme importance of the work and the value of his own services to Buddhism, he most rigorously excluded from his works references to himself, as though it were his intention to show the world how thoroughly convinced he himself was in the 'no-soul' theory he established as Law. His work reminds us of the practice of modern scientists who write treatises on their subjects more to give the world what they have discovered of the Truth than to make their work an occasion for personal advertisement and self-display. Selfless is Buddhadatta to the extreme and it is only a very careful scrutiny coupled with a desire to

know the author from his work that reveals to us glimpses, dim and distant, of the great genius who came forward for the first time to restore in all its pristine purity the Buddhist faith that might otherwise have been lost in the mazes of popular superstition or absorbed irrecoverably in the Hindu Religion.

FRAGMENTS OF MĀTRGUPTĀCĀRYA.

BY

T. R. CHINTAMANI, M. A.,

LIBRARIAN, ADYAR LIBRARY.

Mātrgupta occupies a very important place in the galaxy of poetico-rhetoricians. Why time has thrown into oblivion the works of such an illustrious author as Mātrgupta, it is difficult to imagine. So far we have not been able to unearth any of the lost works of Mātrgupta. Consequently an attempt is made in this paper to bring together all available quotations from the works of that author and present them to the world of scholars in a connected form.

Indian History is very cruel with regard to the age, activities, nativity and personal history of most of the important figures in the political as well as literary history of Ancient India. Still there are a few living figures for us in this distance of time. Mātrgupta is one of those few. While his works are lost, his personal history is well-known. We have sufficient records to determine the exact date and period of this writer; materials regarding his personal history are also available. He therefore does not share the fate which is common to most of the Sanskrit writers.

Kalhaṇa in his Rājatarāṅgiṇī gives the following account of Mātrgupta:—

Harṣavardhana, alias Vikramāditya, had in his court a poet by name Mātrgupta¹. He was very conservative and consequently was not prepared to push himself up to royal favour of his own accord. The king was not unaware of the high poetic talents and deep culture of his protege; but he intentionally ignored him. In absolute poverty, without proper food, decent clothing, and timely sleep, the poet continued to serve his master with diligence. He knew no comfort.

At last the time came when his stars began to exert their influence, being in the ascendant. On a particular night it happened by chance that all the guards were asleep; the lamp which was dimly burning in the apartments of the king was put

1. Refer to Rājatarāṅgiṇī III—129-229.

out by a strong wind; the king wanted the lamp to be re-lit but there was no servant to do it. He shouted at the top of his voice but there was no response from any of the guards. Mātrgupta who was waiting at the gate entered and did the needful. While he was about to retire, the king wanted to know his exact position in life and asked him how he alone was awake at that dead hour of night. The poet composed the following verse on the spur of the moment.

शीतेनोद्धृतस्य माषशिमिवचिन्तार्णवे मज्जतः

शान्ताग्निं स्फुटिताधरस्य धमतः क्षुत्क्षामकण्ठस्य मे ।

निद्रा काप्यवमानितेव दयिता संत्यज्य दूरं गता

सत्पात्रप्रतिपादितेव वसुधा न क्षीयते शर्वरी ॥

Rājatarāṅgiṇī III—181.

On hearing this verse, the king realised the sin he had committed by neglecting his duty in not having recognised the merits of the poor, needy and eminent poet and began to contemplate as to how best he could expiate the sin.

At dawn he rose, having already come to a conclusion with regard to Mātrgupta. The kingdom of Kāśmir was then without a ruler. That kingdom was his vassalage and the responsibility of finding a suitable ruler to that country devolved upon Harṣa. Now he called upon Mātrgupta and handed over to him a note in which there was an order to his ministers at Kāśmir that Mātrgupta should be anointed their king, and bade Mātrgupta deliver it unto the hands of his ministers at Kāśmir and do as they required. The poet was unaware of what the king had written and did as ordered. He marched along to Kāśmir with many auspicious omens at every step. And as soon as he delivered the Royal message, he was anointed king of that country. We also learn from Kalhaṇa that he was not of the same place to which Harṣavardhana belonged. Probably he was a Southerner.

This is the story of Mātrgupta which we find narrated in the Rājatarāṅgiṇī. Whatever might be the actual significance of this anecdote, the following incontrovertible facts could be deduced from this account.

i. that Mātrgupta was a contemporary of king Harṣavardhana;

- ii. that he was a king of Kāśmir; and
- iii. that he was a great poet.

The Rājatarāṅgiṇī itself mentions him as a contemporary of poet Bhartṛmenṭha and this fits in well with other facts. Consequently the date of Mātr̥gupta synchronises with that of Śrī Harṣa (606—647 A. D.).

About the works of Mātr̥gupta we have absolutely no information. We are not in a position to definitely postulate what works he might have written. From the evidences available, the following facts could be gathered.

I. He might have commented on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni. The basis of this conjecture is as follows :—

On page 348 of the India Office Catalogue we find the description of a manuscript called Nāṭyapradīpa. Therein the author Sundaramiśra makes the following statement—

तत्र भरतः—

आशीर्वचनसंयुक्ता नित्यं यस्माद्युज्यते ।

देवद्विजनुपादीनां तस्मान्नान्दीति संज्ञिता ॥

सूत्रधारः पठेत्तत्र मध्यमं स्वरमाश्रितः ।

नान्दी पदैर्द्वादशभिर्द्व्याभिर्वाप्यलङ्कृता ॥

अस्य व्याख्याने मातृगुप्ताचार्यैः षोडशाङ्गिपदान्विता इयं उदाहृता ॥

From this it is possible to draw two conclusions (*i. e.*) that Mātr̥gupta commented upon the Nāṭyaśāstra or that he commented upon the two verses given above in some context or other. The more probable of the two conjectures is that he commented upon the whole work.

II. Mātr̥gupta should have been a poet of no mean order. The verses ascribed to him by Kalhaṇa in his Rājatarāṅgiṇī, by Vallabhadeva in his Subhāṣitāvalī, by Kṣemendra in his Aucityavicāracarcā—all speak for themselves. These verses might have been composed at random, or they might have formed part of a complete work; but about that we have no information at present.

III. Rāghavabhaṭṭa in his commentary on the Śākuntala, Sarvānanda in his commentary on the Amarakośa, Vāsudeva in his commentary on the Karpūramañjarī and certain other writers give copious extracts from an unknown work of Mātr̥guptācārya. That unknown work should have been an extensive one, dealing

with rhetoric, dancing, rasas, principles of literary criticism and so on. The work should have been modelled on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata.

Before proceeding to the actual quotations themselves one or two points have to be cleared with regard to Mātr̥gupta's date and identity. Mātr̥gupta cannot be identified with Kālidāsa as Mr. Bhau Dhaji seems to surmise. The arguments of Bhau Dhaji have been systematically refuted by various scholars and those arguments need not be repeated here again.

Dr. De in his "Sanskrit Poetics" says, with regard to Mātr̥gupta :—"and probably he (Mātr̥gupta) belongs to comparatively recent times, being certainly unknown to Abhinavagupta, Dhanika and other writers".¹ From this it is clear that Dr. De regards Mātr̥gupta, the ālaṅkārika to be different from the protege of Harṣavardhana. Dr. De admits that Mātr̥gupta is referred to by Śāradātanaya in his Bhāvaprakāśikā and consequently Mātr̥gupta should have flourished either in the 11th or 12th century (*i. e.*) later than Abhinavagupta and earlier than Śāradātanaya.

Now it needs only to be pointed out that Dr. De was not correct when he remarked that he was unknown to Abhinavagupta. In his Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta mentions Mātr̥gupta and quotes a verse of his. The passage is this:—

यथोक्तं भट्टमातृगुप्तेन—

पुष्पं च जनयत्येको भूयोऽनुस्पर्शनान्वितः ।

Page 944 of Vol. IV, of the

Adyar manuscript of the Abhinavabhāratī.

Kuṇṭaka an immediate successor of Abhinavagupta mentions Mātr̥gupta by name in his Vakroktijīvita. The relevant extract is given below.

अनुसरणदिक्प्रदर्शनं पुनः क्रियते । यथा—मातृगुप्तः—मञ्जीरप्रभृतीनां सौकुमार्यवैचित्र्यसंवलितपरिस्पन्दस्यन्दीनि काव्यानि सम्भवन्ति ।

Now that the only objection which Dr. De has in identifying the contemporary of Harṣavardhana with the ālaṅkārika has been removed, we believe that Dr. De will reconsider his position. There does not seem to be any serious difficulty in regarding the two Mātr̥guptas identical.

Now with regard to the name of Mātr̥gupta, the following variations occur. A manuscript of the Ṭikāsarvasva of Sarvānanda

1. Sanskrit Poetics, Vol. I, p. 33.

belonging to the Adyar Library calls him Mātraguṇa in one place and Mantragupta in another place. This difference may be due to scribal errors. Abhinavagupta gives him the title Bhaṭṭa. We may now proceed to the actual quotations themselves.

MĀTRGUPTA, A POET

नायं निशामुखसरोहराजहंसः

कीरीकपोलतलकान्ततनुशशाङ्कः ।

आभाति नाथ तदिदं दिवि दुग्धसिन्धु-

डिण्डीरपिण्डपरिपाण्डु यशस्वदीयम् ॥

P. 142 of Kṣemendra's
Aucityavicāracarcā. N. S. Ed.

नाकारमुद्रहसि नैव विकथसे त्वं

दित्सां न सूचयति[सि] मुञ्चसि सत्फलानि ।

निशब्दवर्षणमिवाम्बुधरस्य राजन्

संलक्ष्यते फलत एव तव प्रसादः ॥

No. 2550 in Vallabhadeva's Subhāṣitāvalī.

शीतेनोद्धतस्य माषशिमिवच्छिन्ताणवे मज्जतः

शान्ताग्निं स्फुटिताधरस्य धमतः क्षुत्क्षामकण्ठस्य मे ।

निद्रा क्वाप्यवमानितेव दयिता संत्यज्य दूरं गता

सत्पात्रप्रतिपादितेव वसुधा न क्षीयते शर्वरी ॥

No. 3181 do. and also
Rājatarāṅgiṇī.

MĀTRGUPTA, AN ĀLANĀRIKA.

DEFINITION OF SŪTRADHĀRA.

चतुरातोद्यनिष्ठातोऽनेकभूषासमावृतः ।

नानाभाषणतत्त्वज्ञो नीतिशास्त्रार्थतत्त्ववित् ॥¹

वैश्योपचारचतुरः पौरुषेयविचक्षणः ॥⁴

1. This is quoted by Rāghavabhaṭṭa also in his commentary on the Śākuntala. p. 5. N. S. Ed.

2. वैश्यो is the reading adopted by Raṅganātha in his commentary on the Vikramorvaśīya, p. 5. N. S. Ed.

3. Rāghavabhaṭṭa's reading is पौरुषेय. p. 5. N. S. Ed.; Raṅganātha also, has the same reading. p. 5.

4. Between this and the next line, Rāghavabhaṭṭa has some more lines.

FRAGMENTS OF MĀTRGUPTĀCĀRYA

तत्तद्गीतानुगानेककलातालावधारणः² ॥

अवधार्य प्रयोक्ता च योक्तृणामुपदेशकः ।

एवंगुणगणोपेतस्सूत्रधारस्स⁴ उच्यते ॥

Pages 5, 6. Vāsudeva's commentary on the
Karpūramañjarī. N. S. Ed.

Vāsudeva in his extract from Mātraguṇa's definition of Sūtradhāra has omitted some lines and they are supplied by Rāghavabhaṭṭa. They are :

नानागतिप्रचारज्ञो रसभावविशारदः ।

नाट्यप्रयोगनिपुणो नानाशिल्पकलान्वितः ।

छन्दोविधानतत्त्वज्ञस्सर्वशास्त्रविचक्षणः ॥⁵

Ś. Com. P. 5. N. S. Ed.

ON THE DEFINITION OF NĀNDĪ

आशीर्नमस्त्रिरूपः श्लोकः काव्यार्थसूचकः ।

नान्दीति कथ्यते.....

Raṅganātha on Vikramorvaśīya, p. 4; 7.

EFFECTS OF THE STAGE, DRESS ETC. ON RASA :

रसास्तु त्रिविधा वाचिकनेपथ्यस्वभावजाः ।

रसानुरूपैरालापैः श्लोकैर्वीक्ष्यैः पदैस्तथा ॥

नानालङ्कारसंयुक्तैर्वाचिको रस उच्यते ।

कर्मरूपवयोजातिदेशकालानुवर्तिभिः ॥

माल्यभूषणवस्त्राद्यैर्नेपथ्यरस उच्यते ।

रूपयौवनलावण्यस्थैर्यधैर्यादिभिर्गुणैः ॥

1. तत्तद्गीतानुगल्य is Rāghavabhaṭṭa's reading ; also Raṅganātha p. 6.

2. कलतालावधारणः is Raṅganātha's reading. p. 6.

3. अवधार्य is found in Rāghava's Commentary ; also Raṅganātha p. 6.

4. अभिधीयते is Rāghava's reading;

निगद्यते is Raṅganātha's reading p. 6.

5. These lines are quoted by Raṅganātha also in his Com. on Vikramorvaśīya.

रसस्वाभाविको ज्ञेयस्स च नाट्ये प्रशस्यते ॥ *Ibid.* p. 7.

ON THE PRĀKRITS TO BE USED IN A DRAMA :

प्राक्प्रतीचीभुवोः सिन्धोर्हिमवद्विन्ध्यशैलयोः ।

अन्तरावस्थितं देशमार्यावर्तं विदुर्बुधाः ॥

आर्यावर्तप्रसूतास्तु सर्वास्वेव हि जातिषु ।

शौरसेनीं समाश्रित्य भाषां काव्ये प्रयोजयेत् ॥ *Ibid.* p. 8.

ON THE DEFINITION OF A NĀṬAKA :

प्रख्यातवस्तुविषयं धीरोदात्तादिनायकम् ।

राजर्षिवंशचरितं तथा दिव्याश्रयान्वितम् ॥

युक्तं वृद्धिविलासाद्यैर्गुणैर्नानाविभूतिभिः ।

शृङ्गारवीरान्यतरप्रधानरससंश्रयम् ॥

प्रकृत्यवस्थासन्ध्यङ्गसन्ध्यन्तरविभूषणैः ।

पताकास्थानकैर्वृत्तं पतङ्गैश्च प्रवृत्तिभिः ॥

नाट्यालङ्कारणैर्नानाभाषायुक्पात्रसञ्चयैः ।

अङ्कप्रवेशकैराढ्यं रसभावसमुज्ज्वलम् ॥

सुखदुःखोत्पत्तिकृतं चरितं यच्च भूभृताम् ।

इतिवृत्तं कथोद्धृतं किञ्चिदुत्पाद्यवस्तु च ॥

नाटकं नाम तज्ज्ञेयं रूपकं नाट्यवेदिभिः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 9.

स्वैरङ्गैश्चापि बीज्यङ्गैः प्रकुर्यादामुखं बुधः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 13.

ON BĪJA LAKṢAṆA AND ITS PECULIARITIES :

काचित्कारणमात्रं तु काचिच्च फलदर्शनम् ।

काचिदारम्भमात्रं तु फलमुक्त्वा क्रिया क्वचित् ॥

व्यापारश्च विशेषोक्तः काचिद्वा फलसाधकः ।

बहुधा रूपेकमेवं बीजरूपेण दृश्यते ॥

फले यस्य हि संहारः फलबीजं तु तद्ववेत् ।

वस्तुबीजं कया ज्ञेया अर्थबीजं तु नायकः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 15.

THE LANGUAGES TO BE SPOKEN BY THE VARIOUS CHARACTERS :

संमतानां देवतानां राजन्यामात्यसैनिके ।

वणिग्भागधसूतानां पाठ्यं योज्यं तु संस्कृतम् ॥ *Ibid.* p. 15.

THE OCCASIONAL USE OF SANSKRIT BY NĪCA CHARACTERS :

योज्यं विदूषकोन्मत्तबालतापसयोषिताम् ।

नीचानां पण्डकानां च नीचप्रहविकारिणाम् ॥

विद्वद्भिः प्राकृतं कार्यं कारणात्संस्कृतं क्वचित् ॥ *Ibid.* p. 126.

ON THE DEFINITION OF BHŪṢAṆA¹ :

उपमाचैरलङ्कारैर्गुणैः श्लेषादिभिस्तथा ।

रत्नाढ्यैर्वहुभिर्युक्तं भूषणैरिव भूषणम् ॥ *Ibid.* p. 20.

ON WHAT IS KNOWN AS ANTARASANDHI :

खण्डो दूतश्च लेखश्च नेपथ्योक्तिस्तथैव च ।

आकाशवचनं चेति ज्ञेया ह्यन्तरसन्धयः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 20.

ON THE DEFINITION OF SAṆCĀRIKĀ :

गृहकक्षाविचारिण्यः तथोपवनसञ्चराः ।

यामेषु च नियुक्तानां यामशुद्धिविशारदाः ।

साञ्चारिकास्तु ता ज्ञेया यवन्योऽपि मताः क्वचित् ॥

Ibid. p. 57.

ON THE DEFINITION OF SENĀPATI :

शीलवान्सत्त्वसम्पन्नस्त्यक्तालस्यः प्रियंवदः ।

पररन्धान्तराभिज्ञो यात्राकालविशेषवित् ॥

अल्लशालादितत्त्वज्ञो लोके चाक्रम[वक्र]तां गतः ।

देशवित्कालविज्ञैव भवेत्सेनापतिर्गुणैः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 62.

ON THE DEFINITION OF HASITA :

विकासितकपोलान्तमुत्फुल्लामललोचनम् ।

किञ्चिल्लक्षितदन्ताग्रं हसितं तद्विदो विदुः ॥

1. Thirty six varieties of bhūṣaṇa have been mentioned by Bharata in Nāṭyaśāstra. Dhanika tries to combine all of them into one.

.....

उत्तमस्य समुद्दिष्टं स्मितं हसितमेव च ॥ *Ibid.* p. 74-75.

ON THE USE OF PATĀKĀSTHĀNAKA :

मुखे प्रतिमुखे गर्भे विमर्शे च चतुर्ष्वपि ।

भेदास्तन्धिषु कर्तव्याः पताकास्थानकस्य तु ॥ *Ibid.* p. 110.

ON THE DEFINITION OF THE THIRD
PĀTĀKĀSTHĀNAKA :

अर्थोपक्षेपणं यत्र¹ गूढं² सविनयं³ भवेत् ।

⁴श्लिष्टाप्रत्युत्तरोपेतं तृतीयं तन्मतं तथा ॥ *Ibid.* p. 123.

ON THE DEFINITION OF KAṆCUKIN :

ये नित्यं सत्यसम्पन्नाः कामदोषविवर्जिताः ।

ज्ञानविज्ञानकुशलाः कञ्चुकीयास्तु ते स्मृताः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 154.

ON THE DEFINITION OF PRATIHĀRI :

सन्धिविग्रहसम्बद्धं नानाकार्यसमुत्थितम् ।

निवेदयन्ति याः कार्यं प्रतीहार्यस्तु तास्मृताः ॥

Ibid. p. 156.

ON THE DEFINITION PARICĀRIKĀ :

संवाहने च गन्धे च तथा चैव प्रसाधने ।

तथाभरणसंयोगमाल्यसङ्ग्रहनेषु च ।

विज्ञेया नामतः सा तु नृपतेः परिचारिका ॥ *Ibid.* p. 199.

ON PHALAYOGA :

यदाधिकारिकं वस्तु सम्यक्प्राज्ञैः प्रयुज्यते ।

तदर्थो यस्समारम्भस्तत्कार्यं कथ्यते इति ॥

अभिप्रेतं समर्थं च प्रतिरूपं क्रियाफलम् ।

इतिवृत्तं भवेद्यस्मिन्फलयोगस्त उच्यते ॥ *Ibid.* p. 230.

1. यत्, is another reading. *Ibid.* p. 151.

2. न गूढं is another reading. *Ibid.* p. 123.

3. सविनं is the other reading. *Ibid.* p. 123.

4. श्लिष्टप्रत्युत्तरोपेतं— *Ibid.* p. 151.

ON ADBHUTA RASA :

अद्भुतो विस्मयः स्थायिभावप्रभव उच्यते ।

प्रासादोद्यानशैलादिगमनैर्दिव्यदर्शनैः ॥

सभाविमानमायेन्द्रजालशिल्पादिदर्शनैः ।

हृदयेप्सितलाभैश्च विभावैस्तस्य सम्भवः ॥

P. 145 Tikāsarvasva of Sarvānanda,
T. S. S. Edition.

ON BĪBHATSA RASA :

विकृतैः पूतिमांसादिदर्शनश्रुतिकीर्तनैः ।

विभावैर्जायते चासौ बीभत्सो नीचसंश्रयः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 147.

ON THE THIRTY-SIX VARIETIES OF
VYABHICĀRIBHĀVAS :

निर्वेदो ग्लानिराशङ्का तथासूया मदः श्रमः ।

आलस्यमथ दैन्यं च चिन्ता मोहः स्मृतिर्मतिः ॥

व्रीडा चपलतामर्ष आवेगो जडता धृतिः ।

गर्वो विषाद औत्सुक्यं निद्रापस्मार एव च ॥

त्रासो हर्षः प्रबोधश्च अवहित्यं तथोग्रता ।

वितर्को व्याधिरुन्मादो मरणं शौचमेव च ॥

त्रयस्त्रिंशदिमे भावा विज्ञेया व्यभिचारिणः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 150.

ON THE ANUBHĀVAS IN ŚṚṆGĀRĀBHINAYA :

तस्य लोचनचातुर्यभ्रूक्षेपस्मितविभ्रमाः ।

चित्राङ्गहारवाद्यादिरनुभावगणः स्मृतः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 151.

ON BĪBHATSĀBHINAYA :

नासाप्रच्छादनाव्यक्तपादपाताक्षिकूणनैः ।

हृष्टेखोद्वेजनावैश्च तज्ज्वरभिनयः स्मृतः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 151.

ON LĪLĀ

प्रियवाग्भिरलङ्कारैर्मधुरैः प्रीतियोजितैः ।

प्रियस्यानुकृतिः स्त्रीणां लीला स्यात्तु यथोच्यते ॥ *Ibid.* p. 160.

MISCELLANEOUS :

पुष्पं च जनयत्येको भूयोऽनुस्पर्शनान्वितः ॥

Adyar Manuscript of the
Abhinavabhāratī Vol. IV, p. 944.

PLANETARY MOTIONS IN HINDU ASTRONOMY

BY

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The earliest notion about planetary motions was that the sun and the planets, with the stars, were carried diurnally westward by a mighty wind or aether, called Pravāha, which was moving continuously in a kind of whirling vortex. "It was supposed that the apparent eastward motion of the planets in their orbits was brought about by an overpowering influence of the stars, causing them to hang back, and that the irregular motions were produced by invisible deities at the apogees and the nodes of the different orbits, those at the apogees attracting them unequally by means of reins of winds, thus guiding them in their course, whilst the others, situated at the nodes, deflected to the north or south of the Ecliptic."

The notion that the planets were carried by an aether whirled about the sun was one also prevalent in Europe before the times of Kepler and Newton. Even Descartes and Leibnitz and a crowd of followers bestowed much labour and extensive learning in proving the system of vortices to be a necessity.¹

The Hindu astronomers in their earliest attempt to explain the planetary motions supposed a uniform motion in a circle about the earth but that, they found, did not really represent the true motion of a planet in its orbit, although the hypothesis served sufficiently to determine the mean motion and mean place of a planet when deduced from observations carried on for lengthened periods. They knew that every planet in its course was subject to great irregularities, the motion undergoing continual changes. At one time it would be direct towards the east, until the planet reached a stationary point, where it would seem to be at rest; then a retrograde motion would begin, and continue for a time, till another stationary position was reached, and the eastward motion would be repeated. It was to account for these irregularities that the epicycle was invented.

This contrivance was ascribed by the Greeks to Appollonius. He conceived that a planet in its course described, with uniform

1. *Vide* Brennan's Hindu Astronomy, page 84.

motion, the circumference of a circle, called the deferent, the centre of which was the centre of the earth. It was also supposed that, whilst the centre of the epicycle was moving eastward in the direction of the signs, the planet itself was moving in a direction contrary to that of the signs. By this hypothesis it was easy to show the various changes in the motions of the planets. This theory was generally adopted by western nations, with the addition of other epicycles, introduced by Ptolemy, as necessary for expressing the apparent motions with accuracy.

Āryabhaṭa was the first Hindu astronomer who had correct notions of the planetary motions and made corrections in the system received by him from earlier sources, specially that of Parāśara. Lalla followed his method. He ascribed to the epicycles, by which the motion of a planet is represented, a form varying from the circle and nearly ecliptic. The method followed in the old Sūrya Siddhānta included in the Pañca-siddhāntikā of Varāhamihira is different from that followed in the Āryabhaṭīya. The same method in its main principle is found in the present text of Sūrya Siddhānta. Brahmagupta's Khaṇḍakhādyaka, though known to have followed the Āryabhaṭīyam, exactly follows the old Sūrya Siddhānta in its methods of epicycles. It is strange why Brahmagupta has not followed the method of the Āryabhaṭa regarding the dimensions and elements of epicycles though he himself says that he has followed a work of Āryabhaṭa in writing Khaṇḍakhādyakam. It is hence probable that this Āryabhaṭa whom Brahmagupta is supposed to have followed is a person entirely different from the famous Āryabhaṭa and is a third Āryabhaṭa of that name.

The Hindus had two methods for calculating the true place of a planet from its mean place, as determined by the rules of the Sūrya Siddhānta. One of these method resembles that of Appollonius, with this difference, that whilst the planet moved uniformly in its epicycle, whose centre moved in the deferent concentric with the earth, the epicycle itself was conceived to be variable, the circumference being greatest when the planet was in the Apsis (at apogee or perigee; the true and mean places being then coincident), and least when the planet was at a distance of 90° from those points. The other method supposes that, whilst the mean place of a planet is a point moving uniformly eastward, round the circumference of a circle whose centre is the earth, the planet also moves uniformly eastward, in


the same time, round the circumference of an equal, but eccentric circle, whose centre is situated in the line joining the Apogee with the centre of the earth, the distance from it being the eccentricity.

The motion of a planet is of eight kinds, *i.e.*,

1. Vakra (decreasing retrograde motion),
2. Ati-vakra (increasing retrograde motion),
3. Vikala (stationary),
4. Manda (increasing direct motion less than the mean motion),
5. Mandatara (decreasing direct motion less than the mean motion),
6. Sama (mean motion),
7. Śighratara or Ati-śighra (increasing direct motion greater than the mean motion), and
8. Śighra (decreasing direct motion greater than the mean motion).

Of these kinds, the five motions Ati-śighra, Śighra, Manda, Mandatara and Sama are direct and the two motions Vakra and Ati-vakra are retrograde.

In order to find the true place of a planet, its mean place and that of its apogee are first computed, the difference between them (called the *kendra* or mean anomaly) is taken and its sine is found; these are used for constructing the various epicycles.



Suppose a circle A B C D represents the deferent of a planet, in the plane of the orbit, the radius being 3438, the centre E representing the centre of the earth, and the line A E C the line of apsides. Let a small circle at A cutting the line of apsides at H represent the epicycle of a planet, the point H of the circumference being at the greatest distance from E will be the apogee or higher apsis. If we now conceive that while the centre of the epicycle (starting from A and supposed to be moving in the circumference of the deferent in the direction A B C D, i.e., in the order of the signs of the Zodiac) completes one revolution in the deferent; the planet starting from H and moving in the epicycle also completes one revolution in the same time, in a contrary direction of the signs. Then, it is assumed as a first approximation, that the direction in which the planet would appear to be seen at any time, when viewed from E, would be the direction of its true place. The conception here formed is that of an ordinary epicycle of an invariable magnitude. But the Hindu epicycle has its circumference continually varying, being greatest when the centre is at A or C, and least when the centre is at B or D.

Suppose C_A and C_B are the circumferences of the epicycle for any of the planets at A and B respectively, then, for any intermediate point, M, with anomaly K the circumference of the epicycle would be $= C_A - (C_A - C_B) \frac{\sin K}{3438} = C_M$, such a circumference is called the Sphuṭa or rectified periphery.¹

After describing how the rectified periphery of a planet's epicycle is constructed, Sūrya Siddhānta gives the following rule for calculating the first equation of the planet, when the *kendra* or mean anomaly is known :—

“Multiply the sines of the Bhuja and Koṭi (of the first and second *kendra* of a planet) by the rectified periphery (of the first and second epicycle of the planet); divide the products by the degrees in a circle (or 360°) (the quotients are called the first and second Bhuja Phala and Koṭi-Phala respectively). Find the arc whose sine is equal to the first Bhuja phala; the number of minutes contained in this arc is called the Manda phala (the first equation of the planet).”

This rule can be interpreted in this way. Suppose H to be the intersection of the epicycle, with the line of apsides E A,

1. Sūrya Siddhānta, Chapter II, verse 38.

the higher apsis or apogee. Then a planet supposed to start from H, in the epicycle, with a uniform motion, and to describe the circumference of the epicycle, in the same time as its centre, starting from A, and moving uniformly in the concentric, completes its revolution in that circle. When the centre has moved over an arc AM of the concentric, in the direction of the signs of the Zodiac, the planet P will have moved over an arc HP of the epicycle, such that, AM and HP will be similar arcs; therefore the angle MEA will be equal to the angle HMP, so that PM will always be parallel to AE.

If now, PE be joined, cutting the concentric in the point V, then the direction in which the planet would be seen, when viewed from E, the centre of the earth, would be that of the line EV, and the apparent place of the planet in the concentric would be V. Consequently, V is called the true place, and MV, the distance between the mean and the true places is the arc required in finding the true place. Now Pn, the perpendicular from P upon EM, is the sine of the Manda-phala or first equation. In the similar Δ s PnM and MNE, $\frac{Pn}{PM} = \frac{MN}{ME}$ or $Pn = \frac{PM}{ME} \cdot MN$; but $\frac{PM}{ME} = \frac{\text{circumference of epicycle at M}}{\text{circumference of concentric}}$ and $MN = \text{sine of arc MA} = \text{sine K}$.

$$\therefore Pn = \frac{C_M}{360^\circ \times 60} \cdot \text{sine K} = \frac{C_M}{21600} \cdot \text{Sine K}.$$

$$\text{Also } \frac{Mn}{MP} = \frac{NE}{ME} \text{ or } Mn = \frac{MP}{ME} \cdot NE.$$

$$\text{But } ME = \text{cosine of arc AM} \therefore Mn = \frac{C_M}{21600} \cdot \cos K$$

Now MN is the Bhuja and Pn is the Bhuja-phala and NE the Koṭi and Mn the Koṭi-phala

$$\text{Bhuja-phala} = \frac{\text{rectified periphery at M}}{360^\circ} \times \text{Bhuja and}$$

$$\text{Koṭi-phala} = \frac{\text{rectified periphery at M}}{360^\circ} \times \text{Koṭi}.$$

The arc of which Bhuja-phala is the sine is the Manda-phala, or first equation of the centre. This would be correct, if PE had been the radius. The corrections to be applied are given in the following rules¹ :—

1. Sūrya Siddhānta, Chapter II, verses 40, 41 and 42.

"To find the second equation of the minor planets—Mars, etc. Find the second Koṭi-phala (from a planet's second kendra). It is to be added to the radius, when the Kendra is less than three signs or greater than nine signs; but when the Kendra is greater than three signs and less than nine, then the second Koṭi-phala is to be subtracted from the radius."

"Add the square of the result (just found) to that of the sine of the second Bhuja-phala; the square of the sum is the śighra-karṇa, or second hypotenuse. Find the second Bhuja-phala of the planet; multiply it by the radius, and divide the product by the second hypotenuse.

"Find the arc whose sine is equal to the quotient (just found); the number of minutes contained in the arc is called the Śighra-phala (or second equation of the planet)."

Now $P_n = \frac{CM}{21600} \sin K$, $\sin K = \text{Bhuja-phala}$, in which K may be the first or second Kendra, and according to the position of M , $\sin K$ may make M_n vary in sign.

$\therefore E_n = EM \pm M_n$; but $PE^2 = P_n^2 + E_n^2$,
or $\text{Śighra-karṇa} = PE = \sqrt{P_n^2 + (EM \pm M_n)^2}$

$$= \sqrt{\left\{ \left(\frac{C_M \sin K^2}{21600} + \left(3438 \pm \frac{C_M \cos K^2}{21600} \right) \right) \right\}}$$

Again in $\triangle P_n E$, $\frac{V_o}{P_n} = \frac{VE}{PE}$ or $V_o = \frac{VE \cdot P_n}{PE}$

$$\sin oV = \therefore 3438 \times \frac{C_M \sin K}{21600} \div \sqrt{\left\{ \left(\frac{C_M \sin K^2}{21600} + \left(3438 \pm \frac{C_M \cos K^2}{21600} \right) \right) \right\}}$$

i. e. $\text{sine Śighra-phala} = \frac{\text{Radius} \times \text{Bhuja-phala}}{\text{Karṇa}}$ where $\text{Karṇa} = \sqrt{[(\text{Radius} \pm \text{Koṭi-phala})^2 + (\text{Bhuja-phala})^2]}$.

Then the method of approximation is used to find the true place of a planet. "Find the equation (from the mean place of a planet), apply the half of it to the mean place, and to the result apply the half of the first equation (found from that result), from the amount find the first equation again, and apply the whole of it to the mean place of the planet, and to the rectified mean place of the planet, apply the whole of the second equation found from the rectified mean place, thus the true place of a planet is found."

When the mean place is in advance of the true place, the equation is to be subtracted, but when the true place is in advance of the mean place, the equation is to be added, and at the higher and lower apsides the two places will coincide.

Bhāskara, however, gives a very brief account of the method of epicycle. He says :—

"Taking the mean place of the planet in the concentric as the centre, with a radius equal to the eccentricity of the planet, draw a circle. This is called Nicocavṛtta or epicycle. Then draw a line from the centre of the earth passing through the mean place of the planet [to the circumference of the epicycle]. That place in the epicycle most distant from the centre of the Earth, cut by the line [joining the centre of the Earth and mean place of the planet] is supposed to be the place of the higher apsis; and the point in the epicycle nearest to the Earth's centre, the lower apsis. In the epicycle draw a transverse line passing through the centre of it [and at right angles to the above mentioned line which is called here Ucca-rekhā]. As the mean planet revolves with its Kendra-gati (the motion from its higher apsis) in the first and second epicycles marked with the 12 signs and 60 degrees towards the reverse signs, and according to the order of the signs respectively from its higher apsis. Mark off, therefore, the places of the first and second Kendras or distances from their respective higher apsides in the manner directed above; the planet must be fixed at those points. Here also the perpendicular line from the planet to the Ucca-rekhā is the sine of the Bhuja of the kendra; and that from the planet on the transverse line is the cosine. The Bhuja-phala and Koṭi-phala are the sine and cosine in the epicycle. The Bhuja-phala is the Bhuja (the base) and the Karṇa (hypotenuse to complete the rightangled triangle) is the line intercepted. The equation of the centre is here the arc of the concentric intercepted between the mean place of the planet and the point cut by the hypotenuse. The equation thus found is to be added or subtracted as was before explained.¹

Bhāskara, however, gives preference to the method of the eccentric which he describes at a considerable length and where he makes the circle invariable in magnitude. Bhāskara maintains that the Earth is in the centre of the universe, and the sun, the moon

1. Siddhānta Śiromaṇi, Bāpudev Śāstri's edition, Goḷādhyāya, Chap. V, verses 24—29.

and the five minor planets, Mars, Mercury, etc., revolve round the earth in circular orbits, the centres of which do not coincide with that of the earth, with uniform motion. The circle in which a planet revolves is called *Prativṛtta*, or eccentric circle, and a circle of the same size which is supposed to have the same centre as that of the earth, is called *Kakṣāvṛtta* or concentric circle. In the circle, the planet appears to revolve with unequal motion, though it revolves in the eccentric with equal motion. The place where the planet revolving in the eccentric appears in the concentric is its true place and to find this, a correction called *Manda-phala* (1st equation of the centre) is applied to the mean place of the planet. A mean planet thus corrected is called *Manda-Spaṣṭa*, the circle in which it revolves is called *Manda-Prativṛtta* (1st eccentric) and its farthest point from the centre of the concentric, *Mandocca* (1st higher apsis). As the mean places of the sun and the moon when corrected by 1st equation become true at the centre of the Earth, this correction alone is sufficient for them. But the five minor planets, Mars, Mercury, etc., when corrected by the 1st equation are not true at the centre of the Earth but at another place. For this reason, astronomers have assumed the concentric circle as second eccentric of these five planets, they take another circle of the same size and of the same centre with the earth as concentric, and in order to find the place where the planet revolving in the second eccentric appears, in this concentric, they apply a correction called *Śighra-phala* or second equation of the centre, to the mean place corrected by the 1st equation. The *Manda-Spaṣṭa* planet, when corrected by the second equation is called *Spaṣṭa* or true planet, the second eccentric is called *Śighra-Prativṛtta*, and its farther point from the centre of the Earth is called *Śighrocca*, the 2nd higher apsis.¹

Bhāskara says, "As the centre of the circle of the constellation of the Zodiac coincides with the centre of the Earth, and the centre of the circle in which the planet revolves does not coincide with the centre of the Earth, the observer, therefore, on the Earth does not find the planet in its mean place on the Zodiac. Hence the correction called *Bhuja-phala* (equa-


1. *Vide* the foot-note by Paṇḍit Bāpudev Śāstri under verse 7. *Goḷādhyāya* Chap. V, *Siddhānta Śiromaṇi*, edited by Wilkinson and B. D. Śāstri.

tion of centre) is applied to the mean place of the planet to get the true place."

Then Bhāskara proceeds to give a construction of a diagram to illustrate the eccentric theory. "In the first place, describe a circle with the compass opened to the length of the radius (3438). This called the *Kakṣāvṛtta*, or concentric circle; at the centre of the circle draw a small sphere of the Earth with a radius equal to $\frac{1}{15}$ th of the mean daily motion¹ of the planet. In this concentric circle, having marked it with 360°, find the place of the higher apsis and that of the planet, counting from the first point of Aries; then draw a perpendicular diameter passing through the centre of the Earth and the higher apsis (which is called *Ucca-rekhā*; the line of the apsides) and draw another transverse diameter perpendicular to the first also passing through the centre. On this line which passes to the highest apsis from the centre of the Earth, take a point at a distance from the Earth's centre equal to the eccentricity or the sine of the greatest equation of the centre, and with that point as centre and the radius equal to the radius of the concentric, draw the *Prativṛtta* or eccentric circle. The *Ucca-rekhā* answers the like purpose also in this circle, but makes the transverse diameter different in it. Where the *Ucca-rekhā*, perpendicular diameter, (when produced) cuts the eccentric circle, that is the place of the higher apsis in it also. From this, mark the first stellar Aries, at the distance in degree of the highest apsis; the place of the planet must be then fixed counting the degree from the mark of the 1st Aries in the usual order. The distance between the higher apsis and the planet is called the *kendra*. The right line let fall from the planet on the *Ucca-rekhā* is the sine of *Bhuja* of the *Kendra*. The right line falling from the planet on the transverse diameter is the cosine of the *Kendra*, it is upright and the sine of *Bhuja* is a transverse line. Therefore the sum or difference of the cosine and eccentricity (respectively) is here the *Sphuṭa-koṭi* (*i. e.* the upright side of a right angled triangle from the place of the planet in the eccentric to the transverse diameter in the eccentric), the sine of the *Bhuja* (of the *kendra*) is the *Bhuja* (the base) and the square root of the sum of the squares of the *Sphuṭa-koṭi* and *Bhuja* is called *Karṇa*, hypotenuse. This hypotenuse is the distance between the Earth's centre and the

1. Hindu astronomers take the horizontal parallax = $\frac{1}{15}$ of the daily motion.

planet's place in the eccentric circle. The planet will be observed in that point of the concentric cut by the hypotenuse. The equation of the centre is the distance between the mean and apparent places of the planet; when the mean place is more advanced than the apparent place, then the equation thus found is subtractive; when it is behind the true place, the equation is additive."¹



The foregoing rules can be explained in this way. Suppose A B C D and H P L to be two circles having their radii each equal to 3438¹, the number of minutes in the radius, and their centres E and O at a distance from each other equal to the number of minutes in the greatest equation of the centre of a planet's orbit. If E represents the centre of the earth, then the circle A B C D is called the concentric and H P L whose centre is O is called the eccentric. The line joining O E, and produced is the line of apsides. The point H, where it meets the eccentric is the higher apsis, and L the lower. Now suppose the planet moving in the eccentric describes the arc H P, in the same time that an imaginary planet moving in the concentric with the same mean motion, describes the arc A M, then the arcs A M and H P being equal, the radii, M E and P O are parallel, and the lines M P and E O joining equal and parallel lines are themselves equal and parallel; therefore, P M, the line joining the true and imaginary planet is always equal and parallel to the eccentricity E O. Now the line E P joining the centre of the Earth with the planet, is the direction in which the planet will be seen from E, and V the point in which it meets the concentric is called the true place of the planet; the distance M V between the mean and

1. Siddhānta Śiromaṇi—B. D. Śāstrī's edition, Golādhya, Chap. V, verses 10—17.

true places is the equation of centre. The arc M A is the kendra or mean anomaly = K and M N drawn from M perpendicular to H E = sin M A = sin K¹, N E is the cosine of M A = Cos K. In Δ s

$$M P n \text{ and } P E G, \frac{Mn}{MP} = \frac{PG}{PE} \text{ or } Mn = \frac{MP \cdot PG}{PE} = \frac{e \sin K}{PE}$$

$$\text{Also } PE = \sqrt{PG^2 + EG^2} = \sqrt{\sin^2 K + (\cos K \pm e)^2}$$

$$\therefore (\text{Sin equation of centre}) = Mn = \frac{e \sin K}{\sqrt{\sin^2 K + (\cos K \pm e)^2}}$$

Sin K is here the line M N or its equal P G of the figure. It is sometimes called the "sine of the Bhuja of the Kendra", at other times it is called the "Bhuja of the Kendra", and again more briefly "the Bhuja"; cos K which is the line N E or its equal G O is sometimes called the "Koṭi", at other times "the sine of the Koṭi", and more at length "the sine of the Bhuja of the complement of the Kendra," the line P E is the Karṇa or hypotenuse, and we have Karṇa² = Bhuja² + Sphuṭa Koṭi². In the case of the Epicycle, the sine becomes Bhuja-phala and the cosine is Koṭi-phala.

Bhāskara then explains the motion in Double Eccentrics in the following verse:—"The mean planet moves in its Manda-Prativṛtta (first eccentric); the Manda Spāṣṭa planet (*i. e.* whose mean place is rectified by the first equation) moves in its Śighra-Prativṛtta (second eccentric). The Manda-Spāṣṭa is, therefore, here assumed as the mean planet in the second process (*i. e.* in finding the second equation)."

For this reason, having assumed the Manda Spāṣṭa planet for the mean, which Manda-Spāṣṭa can be determined in the concentric by describing the eccentric circle etc., through the mean planet and Mandocca, we are to mark the place of the stellar Aries from the Manda-Spāṣṭa place in the reverse order of the signs and then determine the place of the Śighrocca in the order of the signs. Through the places of the stellar Aries and Śighrocca we are to describe the 2nd eccentric circle etc., in the way mentioned above and then to find the place of the true planet in the eccentric.¹

1. Sin K of Hindu astronomy is the same as R. sin K of modern astronomy.

2. Vide notes by Paṇḍit Bapudev Śāstrī under verse 18, chap. V Golādhya, Siddhānta Śiromaṇi, edited by himself and Wilkinson.

Bhāskara then proceeds to compare the motions in the epicycles and eccentrics, by constructing the mixed diagrams of the eccentric and epicycle. He says "The planet appears to move forward from Mandocca or 1st higher apsis, in the eccentric circle with its Kendra-gati (the motion from its Mandocca) and in the order of the signs and to the East; from its Śighrocca, 2nd higher apsis, it moves in antecedentia or reversely, as it is thrown backwards. When the epicycle, however, is used, the reverse of this takes place, the planet moving in antecedentia from its 1st higher apsis and in the order of the signs from its 2nd higher apsis. Now as the actual motion in both cases is the same, while the appearances are thus diametrically opposed, it must be admitted, therefore, that these expedients are the mere inventions of wise astronomers to ascertain the amount of equation."

These two methods of calculation, whether by assuming the motions as being in an eccentric or in epicycle, lead to the same results exactly. But it is seen that, whereas the planet on the former hypothesis is conceived to move in the direction of the signs, on the latter hypothesis the apparent motion of the planet in the Epicycle would be in a contrary direction. It is thus indicated by Bhāskara, "If the diagrams (of the eccentric and epicycle) be drawn unitedly, and the place of the planet be marked off, in the manner before explained, then the planet will necessarily be in the point of intersection of the eccentric and the epicycle."

"If the figure for the eccentric and concentric be first drawn, then the planet moving in the eccentric, and starting from H, the higher apsis, is supposed to have described the arc H P in the direction of the signs, and the line P M drawn parallel to H E, will meet the concentric in the point M, the place of the imaginary mean planet supposed to be moving in that circle, and P M is equal to E O, the eccentricity. If now with M, as a centre, and a radius equal to the eccentricity, a circle be described, this circle will be the epicycle, in which a planet moves through the arc H P from the higher apsis H, in the same time its centre will have described the arc A M of the concentric, and the radius being equal to the eccentricity, it is equal to H P, or the epicycle and the eccentric intersect in the same points and all the other lines and angles of the figures, according to one method are identical with those of the other method. It is always obvious that in

the eccentric the planet will move on the arc HP of the eccentric in the direction of the signs of the Zodiac; but in the epicycle, the arc H P of that circle is in a direction opposite to the signs."¹

There is, however, some difference in the methods used by the Sūrya-Siddhānta and Śiromaṇi. The chief difference lies in the definition of Kendra. In Bhāskara's work (1) the Kendra in Siddhānta Manda Epicycle = longitude of the mean planet—the longitude of the Ucca;—(2) the Kendra in Śighra Epicycle = longitude of Ucca longitude of the mean planet. But in the Sūrya Siddhānta Kendra = longitude of the Ucca—longitude of the mean planet in both Manda and Śighra operations. Again Bhāskara directs that the Kendra should be given in the Manda and Śighra epicycles in opposite directions (*i. e.* with the motion of the meanplanet in the Śighra and against it in the Manda). But the Sūrya Siddhānta gives only one rule (*i. e.* it is to be in the direction of motion of the mean planet)². Again to ascertain where the equation is positive or negative, the Sūrya Siddhānta gives one comprehensive rule, *viz.*, "the equation is positive when the Kendra is within six signs (180°) and negative when the Kendra, is between six and twelve signs (180° to 360°) in both the Śighra and the Manda operations."³ Where as Bhāskara gives two distinct rules, *viz.*, "in the Manda operation when the Kendra lies between 6 and 12 signs, the equation is positive, and when the Kendra lies within six signs, the equation is negative; the reverse is the rule in the Śighra operation."⁴

Hence we can conclude by saying that the Hindu methods of calculating the mean motions by means of epicycles and eccentrics are purely original inventions and are in no way influenced by the Greek methods.⁵

1. Brennand's Hindu Astronomy, page 227.

2. *Vide* an article by Prof. P. C. Sengupta on Planetary Motion, page 34.

3. Sūrya Siddhānta, Chap. II, verse 45.

4. Siddhānta Śiromaṇi. Grahagaṇita, Chap. VIII, verse 18.

5. Mr. G. R. Kaye is wrong in assuming Greek influence in an article published in J. A. S. B. No. XV, 1919.

SOME MISTRANSLATED ŚLOKAS OF THE DAŚARŪPA

BY

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It is far better, it always seemed to me, to save our ancient texts from misinterpretation than to build theory after theory about their authors and date which in many cases—to use Max Muller's words—collapses at the first breath of criticism or scepticism. I do not know whether attention has been fully drawn to the fact that many are the works that have suffered much at the hands of scholars whose study of Sanskrit was only very limited and superficial. I propose here to give a few instances from Haas' translation of the Daśarūpa.

1. The following is the 2nd śloka of the 1st pariccheda :

daśarūpānukāreṇa yasya mādyanti bhāvakāḥ
namaḥ sarvavide tasmai Viṣṇave Bharatāya ca.

and its translation is :—

“Homage to that omniscient Viṣṇu whose senses revel in the semblance of his ten forms [of incarnation], and to Bharata, whose poetic sensibilities revel in the imitation of the ten forms [of drama] (*daśarūpa*).”

Here we see that the translator takes the word *bhāvaka* to mean ‘senses’ and ‘sensibilities’, whereas it really means ‘mediators’ and ‘men of taste.’ For senses and sensibilities we should have ‘*bhāvanā*’; not *bhāvaka*. And the translator thinks that *yasya* goes with *bhāvaka*. But it is not so. It should be taken with *daśarūpānukāreṇa*. Perhaps this misunderstanding of his was due to the fact that, in his explanation of the above śloka, Dhanika places the word *yasya* after the explanation of *daśarūpānukāreṇa* and before the word *bhāvaka*:

daśarūpānukāreṇeti : ekaṭra matsya-kūrmādi-pratimānām
uddeśena anyatra anukṛti-rūpa-nāṭakādinā yasya
bhāvakāḥ dhyātāraḥ rasikāśca, mādyanti-hṛṣyanti.

Though here *yasya* precedes *bhāvaka*, it should not be so construed. This will be apparent when we note the impropriety of the sense that we have—whose (Bharata's) men of taste. Men

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of taste cannot be Bharata's. But the *daśarūpa* (ten kinds of drama) may well be said as Bharata's on account of their being defined and elaborately treated by him in his *Nāṭya Śāstra*. So the correct translation of the śloka should be as follows :—

Viṣṇu by whose assumption
‘Homage to that.....and.....

Bharata by staging of whose
of ten forms, *matsya*, *kūrma* etc. mediators
ten kinds of drama men of taste become highly
pleased.’

2. *Kasya cid eva kadā cid dayayā viṣayam Sarasvatī viduṣaḥ
ghaṭayati kam api tam anyo vrajati jano yena vaidagdhim.*
is the next śloka, which Haas translates into :—

‘Sarasvatī through her favour furnishes to any intelligent man at any time that subject, whatever it be (*kam api*), by which somebody else becomes cultured.’

and he adds his notes :—

“The sense is : The goddess Sarasvatī freely provides themes for literary works to persons of intelligence, and through these works culture is diffused among others.”

We can hardly meet with a more perverse translation of a Sanskrit text. The author of the *Daśarūpa* means to say in this śloka that it is only on a rare occasion and on a rare man that Sarasvatī bestows her blessings, furnishing the man with a theme by which others become highly cultured. This the author says in order to make it known to us that such a treatise as the *Daśarūpa* is not an ordinary production in the literary world, but very rare, wherefore we should not miss it. This is meant by Dhanika's introductory words.

śrotuḥ pravṛtti-nimittam pradarśyate—

One wonders that *kasya cid eva*, *kadā cid eva*, and *kam api* should mean to the translator, ‘any intelligent man’, ‘at any time’, and ‘whatever it be.’

3. The following is the 122nd section of the 1st pariccheda in the translation of the *Daśarūpa*:

nāṭyadharmām(n) apekṣyaitat punar vastu tridheṣyate.
‘This subject-matter [just mentioned] is further declared to be of three kinds, with regard to the dramatic rules (*nāṭyadharmā*).’

Notes.—This section serves as an introduction to sections 123-128. Contrary to the usual practice of our author, the three kinds are not specially named and enumerated before they are taken up individually in sections 123-124, 125-127, and 128.

The mistake in these notes will be at once seen if we read the second half of the śloka :

sarveṣāṃ niyatasyaiva śrāvyam aśrāvyam eva ca.
which means :—

1. That which may be heard by all (*sarva-śrāvyā*) ;
 2. That which is to be heard by a particular person (*niyata-śrāvyā*) ;
 3. That which is not to be heard by any body (*aśrāvyā*).
- Haas translates into :

‘Of the matter in hand (*niyatasyaiva?*) some is to be heard by all, some is not to be heard by all.’

Of the above mentioned three kinds, the first and last is spoken of in the first half of the next śloka (section 124), while the second (*niyata-śrāvyā*) is sub-divided in the latter half (section 125). The whole of the next śloka (section 126) defines the first sub-division (*janūntam*); and then there is only a single line (section 127), which defines the second sub-division (*apavūritam*). Here is the end of the topic which was begun in *nātyadharmān apekṣyaitat punar vastu tridheṣyate* (Sec. 122).

The author Dhanañjaya explains in the next śloka (sec. 128) what is called *ākāśa-bhāṣita* which has no relation whatever with the previous topic. Dhanika’s explanatory words though sparingly used are all in these places very clear; and introducing this śloka he says:—

nātyadharma-prasaṅgād ākāśa-bhāṣitam āha—

So to say, as Haas has said in the above quoted notes in apparent contradiction to the commentary, ‘...they are taken up individually in sections 123-124, 125-127, and 128’ only testifies to a superficial study of the *Daśarūpa*.

LITERARY NOTES.

(Continued from the previous part)

II

A NOTE ON THE DATE OF THE TATTVASAMĀSA.

BY

T. R. CHINTAMANI, M. A.

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Almost all writers on Indian Philosophy have unanimously held the Sāṅkhya work called *Tattvasamāsa* to be of comparatively recent origin (*i. e.*) later than Mādhavārya, the author of the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha*, for that work has not been referred to in the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha*. Prof. Das Gupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy* says, “Another short work of late origin is ‘*Tattvasamāsa*’ (probably 14th century)”¹ Dr. Keith in his *Sāṅkhya System* regards the work to be later than 1380, the time when the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha* was composed.² Prof. Garbe in his *Sāṅkhya Philosophy* says that it should have been written after 1400 A. D.³

It was only Professor Max Muller that was prepared to assign a high antiquity to that work. According to him the *Tattvasamāsa* was one of the oldest and basic works of the Sāṅkhya System.

Curiously enough we find extracts from this *Tattvasamāsa* quoted in a work which belongs to the period of Mahendravarman, the famous Pallava King of Kāñcī, in the 7th century of the Christian Era. The work called *Bhagavadajjukam* attributed to one Bodhāyana Kavi is mentioned in the Māmaṇḍūr inscription of the Pallava King (*i. e.*) Mahendravarman. In volume IV of the South Indian Inscriptions, we find that inscription edited, but the editor reads *भगवदज्जुकम्* instead of *Bhagavadajju-*

1. *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I, p. 212.

2. *Sāṅkhya System*, p. 91.

3. *Sāṅkhya Philosophy*, p. 68—70.

III

DATE OF THE SĀṆKHYA PRAVACANA SŪTRAS.

By

T. R. CHINTAMANI.

The opinion current among orientalists regarding the date of the so-called Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtras is that it should be considered to be later than the author of the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha for the obvious reason that he fails to mention that work. Omission cannot and should not always be regarded as a negative argument. It has been mentioned in the previous note that the Tattvasamāsa though not referred to in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha, is still older. A similar statement may be made with regard to the Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtra also. If the author of the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha does not refer to it, a contemporary and a near kinsman of his refers to the Sūtras and quotes one of those Sūtras. Mādhavamantrin, the famous commentator on the Sūtasāṁhitā quotes the following Sūtra in his commentary on the Sūtasāṁhitā.

अत एव साङ्ख्यैरुच्यते

“सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणानां साम्यावस्था मूलप्रकृतिः” इति ।

P. 407 of the Sūtasāṁhitā. Madras Edition.

Now this Sūtra occurs as the 61st Sūtra in the first *adhyāya* of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras which we have at present.

Mādhavamantrin, pupil of Kriyāśakti Paṇḍita, the general of the first dynasty of the Vijayanagar Kings, should not be confounded with Mādhavācārya, alias Vidyāranya, the famous commentator on the Vedas; he should be held distinct from Mādhavārya also, the author of the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha. Mādhavārya is the later of the three in point of time.

Mādhavamantrin, Vidyāranya and Mādhavārya belong to the same period and they were contemporaries.¹ Consequently there is no reason to regard the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, now available, to be later than the author of the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha.

1. Vide “Sources of Vijayanagara History” p. 51.

THE SANGHAM LITERATURE.

By

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In the course of a comparative study of the Tamil Daṇḍi Alaṅkāram with the Sanskrit Kāvyaḍarśa, which I made early last year (soon after the publication of the Tamil Daṇḍi Alaṅkāram, second edition, by the late Cennākam Pandit Kumaraswami Pulavar) I came across the following passage in the Kāvyaḍarśa.

मुक्तकं कुलकं कोशस्सङ्घात इति तादृशः ॥

and the commentary of Taruṇa Vācaspati thereon (which Rao Bahadur M. Raṅgāchārya refers to as A in his edition) remarks

कोशः, नानाकर्तृकसुभाषितरत्नसमुदायः ।

सङ्घातः, एकार्थविषयः एककर्तृकः पद्यसङ्घातः, शरत्सङ्घातद्रमिडसङ्घातादिवत् ॥

The point that, I thought, is worth further investigation is this reference to *Dramiḍa Saṅghāta*.

The author of the Kāvyaḍarśa is reputed to have been a native of Conjeevaram and apparently he was well acquainted with the *Dramiḍa* works of note; and the commentator who seems to have clear notions of what Daṇḍin had in mind when he mentioned *Saṅghāta* refers to *Dramiḍa Saṅghāta* as a famous example of a *Saṅghāta*.

The Tamil Daṇḍi Alaṅkāram, the Sūtras of which at least are of great antiquity (two of which are quoted by Aḍiyārkkunallār) refers in the Sūtra portion to this *Saṅghāta* as Tokai (தொகை). It is interesting to note that this classification *सङ्घात* is not found in later writers on Alaṅkāra either in Sanskrit or Tamil. Now, let me extract the relevant passage from the other commentary *Hṛdayaṅgamā* which is also published by Rao Bahadur M. Raṅgāchārya.

एकस्मिन्नेव प्रयोजने प्रवृत्ता नानाविधाः श्लोका भवेयुश्चेत् तथाविधानां समूहः सङ्घातः ॥

It is noteworthy that the 'eight collections' or எட்டுத் தொகை which form the so called Śaṅgam literature satisfy, each of them, the above definition.

Modern speculations about the chronology of the Ancient Tamil History are based on the conception of a Śaṅgam Age. There has been for centuries a tradition among Tamil poets and paṇḍits that there were three Tamil Śaṅgams at different ages of Tamil history.—The popular conception, at least so far as the third Śaṅgam is concerned, is that the forty-nine poets of that Śaṅgam or assembly were contemporaries who along with Lord Śiva sat at an assembly at Madura and formed an Academy to set their hallmark of approval on contemporary Tamil works.

The main source for these speculations is a passage in the commentary on Iraiyaṇār Aha Poruḷ. Critics have discussed the evidentiary value of this passage and considerably discounted it already¹. I am not going to discuss in this short note the question again. But I would like to point out the following :—

(1) that poets ascribed in that commentary to the first and second Śaṅgams are found included in the existing collections which are attributed to the third Śaṅgam.

(2) the period ascribed to these forty-nine poets in the commentary is 1850 years—during the rule of 49 Kings of Madura, three of whom were recognised poets கவியாங்கேற்றினர்.

Therefore even if we accept this tradition as regards the third Śaṅgam, it is to be remembered that the poems included in the eight *Tokais* or Anthologies belonged to a period of nearly two milleniums ending with Ugra Peru Valuti. There is therefore no basis for imagining as is often done, that the forty-nine poets were contemporaries.²

Another noteworthy point about these eight Anthologies is that they were compiled at different times; the names of the poet who prepared each anthology and the king under whose patronage it was prepared is found mentioned in the published editions of these works. And an investigation into their dates will help considerably in fixing the ages in which the different Śaṅgam poets lived. In the absence of such investigation, it is rash to conclude that the forty-nine poets were contemporaries of one another and lived, as some say, in the early centuries before or after the Christian Era or, as others think, in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era.

1. See "Tamil Varalāru" By K. S. Srinivasa Pillai.

2. The *Veṇbās* called *Tiruvalluvamālai* are obvious forgeries.

The error seems to have arisen because of the reference to a conference of learned men under the patronage of a Pāṇḍya king which resulted in the obtaining of Aha Poruḷ by the grace of God Śiva. Stories of Jain Saṅghas were similarly current and these probably led the paṇḍits, poets and commentators of the mediaeval ages to imagine the three Śaṅgams or assemblies, contrary to the earlier tradition recorded in the commentary to Iriyaṇār Aha Poruḷ. The error gained strength by the fact that convocations or assemblies of learned men for the determination of the merits of a poem or of a system of philosophy were common in those days. It is to one such convocation when the Lord Himself entered the debating hall and won in the debate and got the prize and gave it to one Dharumi that St. Appar refers in his *Tēvāram*. At a similar convocation St. Periyālvār is supposed to have established the Paratva of Śrīmān Nārāyaṇa.¹

There are references to சங்க in the *Divya Prabhandams* and in other works. These references are clearly to the *Draṁiḍa Saṅghāta* works.

It is possible that the Sanskrit word *Saṅghāta* was adopted in a curtailed form as *Saṅgha* or that *Saṅgha* was a Sanskrit variant for *Saṅghāta*. Apart from these, there are no early references to the *Saṅgham* works as works of contemporary poets and they are invariably referred to as the eight *Tokais* (i. e., *Saṅghātams*) or anthologies.

An emphasis on the *Saṅghāta* nature of these Tamil classics is necessary, in the interest of researches in Tamil chronology and the reference therefore by Taruṇa Vācaspati to *Draṁiḍa Saṅghāta* was, I thought, of considerable value.

I may add that in a recent edition of the *Āryā* verses of one *Sundara Pāṇḍya* the editor refers to these Tamil classics as *द्रमिडसङ्घ* poems, and I would commend this way of referring to the Tamil classics as *Saṅgha* works.

1. See the தனியன்—நண்டிய சங்கம் எடுத்தேத்த.

MĀMALLAPURAM¹ AT THE SANGAM AGE.

By

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Dr. Jouveau Dubreuil, the famous French historian, says in his *Pallava Antiquities* "Māmallai did not probably exist before the time of Pallava Narasimhavarman I and that it was this king that founded it, gave it the name of Māmallapuram after his own name of Māmalla and began the cutting of the *rathas* and caves therein." The late Mr. Gopinatha Rao also endorses the view on page 16 of his *History of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas*. No scholar has, till now examined this theory closely.

But, from my investigations, I find that the town ought to have existed even at the sangam period. Kaṭiyālūr-Urut-tirañ-Kaṇṇaṇār, (கடியலூர்-உருத்திரன் கண்ணனார்) a poet of the Sangam Age describes in his *Perumpāṇāruppaṭai*, how a poet, who received presents from Toṇḍaimāṇ-Iṭantiraiyan, the king of Kāñci, met on his way another poet and advised him to go to the same king for bounty. In the course of the advice is described the flourishing condition of the country of Toṇḍaimāṇ and the way leading to Kāñci is given in full detail. The place described just before Kāñci is seen from the following lines :—

“நீர்ப்பெயற் றெல்லைப் போகிப் பாற்கேழ்
வாலுளைப் புரவியொடு வடவளந் தருஉம்
நாவாய் சூழ்ந்த நனிநீர்ப் படப்பை
மாட மோங்கிய மணன்மலி மறுகிற்
பரதர் மலிந்த பல்வேறு தெருவிற்
* * * * *
பட்டின மருங்கி னசையின் முட்டில்
* * * * *
கொழுநிணத் தடியொடு கூர்நரூப் பெறுகுவிற்
வான மூன்றிய மதலை போல
ஏணி சாத்திய வேற்றருஞ் சென்னி
விண்பொர நிவந்த வேயா மாடநீ

1. Māmallapuram is now known a Mahābalipuram or Seven Pagodas.

நீரவின் மாட்டிய விலங்குகடர் ளெகிழ்
உரவுநீ ரழுவத் தோடுகலங் கரையுந்
துறைபிறக் கொழியப்போகி” (319-351).

The gist of the above lines is that one can see within the limits of Nirppeyarū (நீர்ப்பெயற்று), a harbour full of ships carrying horses from western countries and merchandise from northern countries, streets full of store-houses of rich mariners and a light-house in a highly elevated place as if it were a prop to Heaven etc. This clearly shows that Nirppeyarū ought to have been the sea-port of the country of Toṇḍaimāṇ in the same way as Korikai to the Pāṇḍyas, Muciri to the Cēras and Pukār to the Cōlas. That *Nirppeyarū* was not distant from the capital of the Toṇḍaimāṇ is clear from the fact that it is the last town mentioned, which had to be passed through before reaching Kāñci.

If in the expression “நீர்ப்பெயற் றெல்லைப் போகி பட்டினம் படரின்”, Nirppeyarū had not been the name of the paṭṭiṇam or sea-port town itself, the author would surely have mentioned its name as in the following lines of *Cirupāṇāruppaṭai*.

“மணிநீர் வைப்பு மதிலொடு பெயரிய
பனிநீர்ப் படுவிற் பட்டினம் படரின்” (lines, 152-3).

Here ‘மதிலொடு பெயரிய பட்டினம்’ means the sea-port having the name of the fortress, or in other words, known as *Eyir-paṭṭiṇam* (ஏயிற்பட்டினம்).

Nirppeyarū means literally that which receives the shower of the sea ((நீர் + பெயல் + து) (*i. e.*) the city which abounds in sea-borne goods. Tirumaṅgai Ālvār expresses the same idea in one of his hymns on the shore temple of Viṣṇu at Māmalla-puram by the phrase *kalaṅkaḷ-iyāṅkum-mallai-k-kaṭaṇ-mallai* (கலங்க ளியங்கு மல்லைக் கடன்மல்லை) which means *Kaṭaṇ-mallai* (Māmallapuram) which is very prosperous on account of the in-coming and out-going ships. *Nirppeyarttu* (நீர்ப்பெயர்த்து) is mentioned as another reading for the same at the foot-note by Mahāmahopādhyāya V. Swaminatha Ayyar Avl. This seems to be more appropriate since it means that which has the name of the sea. The word *nīr* means sea. This can be seen from ancient Nighaṇṭus as *Piṅkalantai* as also from the following quotations.—

“நீரின் வந்த கிமிர்பரிப் புரவியும்” (பட்டினப், பாலை, 185)

“நீரொலித் தன்ன நிறைவேற் ருனையொடு”

(மதுரைக் காஞ்சி. வரி. 369.)

Evidently both the readings refer to Kaṭaṇ-mallai, the name by which Mahābalipuram is mentioned by the Ālvārs. The practice of using the synonyms for the name of a thing or place will be seen from the following illustrations—

(i) 'Matil' is used for 'eyil' in the expression *matiloṭu-peyariya-paṭṭiṇam*¹ (மதிலோடு பெயரிய பட்டினம்) which means, 'the sea-port having the name of the fortress' or in other words 'Eyirpaṭṭiṇam'.

(ii) 'Porṭoṭi' is used for Vañci (Karūr) in the expression *Porṭoṭi-p-peyarppaṭṭūm²-ponnagar²* (பொற்கோட்டிப் பெயர்ப்பட்டும் பொன்னகர்) which means the city having the name of the golden creeper (i. e. Vañci, the ancient capital of the Cēras known familiarly as Karūr).

(iii) 'Kuruku' is used for the bird *krauñca* in the expression *kuruku-peyar-k-kunṇam³* (குருகு பெயர்க்குன்றம்) which means *krauñcagiri*.

It will be observed that while in the above expressions we have the full name appearing in other words in the expression Nīr-p-peyarttu we have only the synonym of the word *kaṭal* (nīr = sea), part of the word *kaṭaṇ-mallai*. That the same poet was in the habit of translating part of the name of a place or thing and used it as if it represented the whole name can be seen from the following expression which appears in the Perumpāṇ-ārru-p-patai, 'paṇavai-p-peyar-p-paṭu-vattam' (பறவைப் பெயர்ப் படுவத்தம்) is used to denote *irācāṇṇam* (இராசாணம்), a kind of superior paddy. Here the word *paṇavai* (bird) is used to denote *aṇṇam* (swan), and the word *aṇṇam* obtained by translating 'paṇavai' is used to signify the whole word *irācāṇṇam* (a kind of rice). Hence we may safely infer that the poet had recourse to the same artifice in the lines under consideration.

Nīrpeyarttu and Kaṭaṇ-mallai may, therefore be taken to denote the same place as Māmallapuram.⁴ It is worth noting

1. Śīrupāṇ. l. 152-3.

2. Maṇi-mēkalai, 26, 92 ; 28, 101-2.

3. *Ibid.* 5, 13 ; Śilappatikāram, pp. 516, 517.

4. From inscriptions, we learn that *Jalaśayanam* was the name of the shore-temple at Māmallapuram. *Jalaśayanam* means 'the lying (posture of God) by water'. Māmallapuram is also known as 'Talaśayanam', as in, 'தலசயனம் புறமான தையூர்' (S. I. I. iii, p. 356) from the Viṣṇu temple of that name in the interior. This temple is so called be-

that a light-house existed there even at the Saṅgam period as is found now.

From the foregoing points it will be seen that even at the age of the Saṅgam Mahābalipuram was a famous sea-port where ships thronged in numbers and busy foreign trade was carried in an extensive scale. Hence the theory that Mahābalipuram was built by Narasiṃhavarman I in the middle of the 7th century as Dr. Dubreuil thinks is not supported by the available facts. On the other hand they point to the conclusion that the city was as ancient as the Saṅgam age and was improved to such a large extent by Narasiṃhavarman I with his architectural rathas, temples etc., that from his time it came to be called Māmallapuram, after his name Mahāmalla.

cause of the lying posture of the God on land. If Māmallapuram was ever known by the name of its shore-temple, *Jalaśayanam*, we can easily see that the expression 'Nīrpeyarttu' will mean that which has the name of water (*jala*) and was the place referred to as Māmallapuram. In this connection it is worth mentioning that Mahāvidvān R. Raghava Iyengar Avl. has suggested *nīrppāyarralai-p-pōki* (நீர்ப்பாயற் றலைப் போகி), as an emendation for *Nīrppeyarttellaippōki*. If it be the original reading we can easily see that *nīr-p-pāyal* is exactly the literal translation of *Jalaśayanam*.

1. The same is dealt with in detail in my 'Ālvārkaḷ Kālanilai' published in the Tamil monthly *Tamilian Friend*, Madras.

THE ABHISĀRIKĀ VAṆCITAKA¹—A FORGOTTEN PLAY
BY VIŚĀKHADEVA.

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Peterson in his introduction to the 'Subhāṣitāvalī' observes that among the verses that are attributed to Viśākhadeva in the anthologies, there are some that are not found in the *Mudrārākṣasa*; hence he legitimately infers that Viśākhadeva may have some other work also to his credit. This inference is true for there is a mention of the drama *Abhisārikāvaṇcitaka* in both the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* and the *Abhinavabhāratī*, in Viśākhadeva's name.

The date of Viśākhadeva can be fixed with a fair degree of accuracy. As the late Mr. Justice Telang observes he "cannot be earlier" than the 8th century A. D.

Unlike the *Mudrārākṣasa* the *Abhisārikāvaṇcitaka* seems to be a love-play. The following are the references to the above drama.

i. कदाचित्कामोऽनुत्पद्यमानः अङ्गलीलालक्षणात् विचेष्टितात् उपजायते ।
नष्टरागप्रत्यानयनं वा ततो भवति । यथा विशाखदेवकृते अभिसारिकावन्धितके
वत्सेशस्य पद्मावती भट्टशबरीवेषाद्याचरणरूपात् लीलाचेष्टितात् कामः प्रत्या-
ख्यातः (प्रत्यानीतः or ? प्रत्यायातः)

P. 55, Vol. III. *Abhinavabhāratī*, deposited in
the Govt. Oriental mss. Library, Madras.

ii. क्रोधो यथा--श्रीविशाखदेवकृते अभिसारिकावन्धिते वत्सराजः सम्भावित-
पुत्रवधायै पद्मावत्यै क्रुद्धः । तथा च अभ्यधात्--

प्रदुष्टोऽग्राह्यं सरितमवगाढः श्रमवशा-

दुपालीनशशां फलकुसुमलोभाद्विषतरोः ।

फणाली.....नार्भीत्युत परिचयां क्रौर्यनितरां

विषज्वालागर्भां चिरमुरगकन्यामनुसृतः ॥

P. 484, Vol. II. *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, deposited in the
Govt. Oriental mss. Library, Madras.

१. अभिसारिकया सत्या [शबरीवेषेण पद्मावत्या] वन्धितः उदयनो यस्मिन् तत्,
अभिसारिकावन्धितकम् ।

From the above two extracts we understand that the play has two names (*e. i.*)

(1) *Abhisārikāvaṇcita*

(2) *Abhisārikābandhitaka*.

These two extracts furnish us with some material from which we may make some surmises as to the significance of the title and the nature of the plot.

It is well-known that Udayana was a love-hero of the *dakṣiṇa* type. It is also known how the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa lulled the king into the belief that Vāsavadattā was burnt, and persuaded him to marry Padmāvatī. In the same way a mischievous character in this play, might have, with the determined purpose of bringing about an estrangement between the king and Padmāvatī, set afloat the rumour that Padmāvatī killed Udayana's son and that she was a murderess.

Udayana had many wives and we do not know whether Padmāvatī, as the rumour had it, killed the son of Udayana born of Vāsavadattā or somebody else; but we may hazard a guess namely that it might be Udayana's son through Vāsavadattā.

Mutual jealousy and hatred are not unusual features where polygamy prevails and the capricious king probably gave full credence to the prevailing rumour. He lost his self-control. His deep love turned into deep hatred. Rage and fury took possession of him. He saw in Padmāvatī not the nymph of celestial beauty but a "serpent woman glowing with flames of poison". He rebuked Padmāvatī in menacing tones.

Poor Padmāvatī, a victim to slander, found that she had lost the love of Udayana. She tried to regain it. To go and plead before the king and to vindicate her innocence would be useless and futile. Hence she hit upon the following plan. Dressed as a charming huntress she attracted the attention of the tender-minded Udayana. As time rolled on Udayana found himself completely enmeshed in her love. When Padmāvatī found that the love of the king was genuine she revealed her identity. Probably then she explained her innocence.

Thus there is the *नष्टरागप्रत्यानयन* as said in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. This then explains the significance of the title. By a

clever impersonation of a huntress, Padmāvatī in the roll of an Abhisārikā deceives the king and regains her lost love.

“The course of true love never runs smooth” said Shakespeare and this play is another exquisite illustration of this statement. The plot appears to have been on the lines indicated above.

This drama also shows how Viśākhadeva finds himself in his elements alike in polity and Śṛṅgāra, and that he can make diction dance to the theme he chooses.

॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ शब्दब्रह्मदर्शनम् ॥

BY

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I

‘शब्दब्रह्मेति यच्चेदं शास्त्रं वेदाख्यमुच्यते ।

तदप्यधिष्ठितं’ येन नमस्तस्मै चिदात्मने ॥

अस्ति विविधदर्शनपरिशीलनपचेलिमस्वान्तानां समेषामियं समा सम्प्र-
तिपत्तिः—यत्किल श्रुतिशिरसामैदम्पर्यं भिन्नेष्वभिन्नं दर्शनेषु, विच्छिन्नास्वविच्छिन्नं
प्रक्रियासु, महासामान्यमिव चकास्ति ; यत्र च, प्रतिस्वं स्वप्रधानानीव बहूनि तन्त्रा-
ण्युपनिबध्नन्तोऽपि, सर्वज्ञकल्पा एकं भवन्ति मुनयः; तस्य भावयाथात्म्यस्य विना
सम्प्रदायपरित्यागं, विना च दर्शनसङ्करम्, अखिलशास्त्रगतिसामान्येन संदर्शनं
विपश्चितां भवति मुख्यं प्रयोजनम् । अनुरूपं च तत्तेषां तथाविधायाः श्रुत-
शीलयोस्सम्पद इति । किं बहुना, बाह्या अप्यद्यत्वे, न केवलं भारते वर्षे, विपु-
लायामेव विश्वभरायां लब्धजन्मनां सितासितनैकविधतत्त्वनिबन्धानामवगतिसामान्य-
लिलक्षायिषया महान्तं यत्नमातिष्ठन्ते । अस्य च गतिसामान्यस्य लम्बने त्रयः प्रक्रमा
भवन्ति । विरुद्धवदाभासं वेदवाक्यजातं दर्शनग्रन्थविभागं वा परित्यज्य नव्यमार्गे-
णापूर्वार्थसङ्कलनमिति प्रथमः, यं वेदबाह्या रोचयन्ते । त इमे संप्रदायविहीनतया
कमपि सर्वानभिमतमर्थमुत्प्रेक्ष्य पर्यवसाने पुरुषार्थाब्याह्नयेरन् । क्लिष्टयोजना-
न्तरकरणेन सर्वेषां ग्रन्थानामेकार्थसंपादनं नाम द्वितीयः, यं विज्ञानभिक्षुप्रभृतयः
प्रतिपेदिरे । तेऽपि पाण्डित्यचिख्यापयिषामात्रप्रवर्तितव्याख्याभेदास्सन्मार्गावलम्बि-
नामनपेक्ष्याः । विद्यारण्यश्रीचरणाचार्यमधुसूदनसरस्वतीप्रमुखैरनुक्रान्तस्तृतीयः,
यत्र किलाव्याहतसंप्रदायागतस्वस्वार्थनिष्ठानामेव वाक्यानां वक्तृणां वा पर्यवसित-
भावसंगमनं विस्मयास्पदमायतते । यथाहुस्तुरेश्वराचार्याः—

“यथा यथा भवेत्पुंसां व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रिया ज्ञेया सा चाप्यत्रानवस्थिता ॥”

इति । मन्यामहे श्रीभगवत्पादा अपि द्वितीयाध्यायेऽविरोधप्रदर्शनगमनिकयामुं
क्रममुद्देशयामासुः ।

मर्तृहरिणाप्युक्तम्—

“उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलालनाः ।
अस्त्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततस्सत्यं समीहते ॥” इति

तत्सिद्धं—उत्सृज्य प्रथमं द्वितीयं च पन्थानं विचार्य बहुधा सङ्गृहणीय-
स्तत्त्वदर्शनाभिमुखो लोकः पण्डितकुलेन, नापूर्वार्थप्रकल्पनया, न च यथावस्थित-
प्रक्रियाबाधनेनेति । तत् यदिदं प्रथमेन प्रक्रमेणाभिनवार्थोत्प्रेक्षणं पुरुषमतिवैश्व-
रूप्यादन्यान्यस्वभावमनवस्थितं तदिति नेह विचारक्षमम् । द्वितीयस्तु शास्त्राभिमत-
मार्गावलम्बनापदेशेन प्रवर्तितः; सम्भाविततैश्च श्रीभट्टनागेशादिभिरुपाश्रितः ।
स कदाचित् तत्त्वविज्ञासूनां केषाञ्चिद्युक्तरूपः प्रतिभायादित्यवश्यं तदसारता-
दर्शनाय यतितव्यम् । तत्रापि शब्दब्रह्मदर्शनयोर्मतद्वयसिद्धप्रक्रियान्यथाकरण-
व्यावर्तनेन पर्यवसितभावानुगतिसंदर्शनायेह शब्दब्रह्मदर्शनं प्रक्रम्यते ।

तत्र प्रथमं तावच्छब्दतत्त्वनिरूपणावसरे निर्भेदस्वभावमान्तराखण्डवाक्य-
स्फोटमेव तत्तद्वाह्यार्थाध्यासकल्पनाया अधिष्ठानं प्रसाध्य तदनुप्रसङ्गेन विज्ञान-
भिक्षुणा सङ्कल्पितां सदसत्ख्यातिं सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तमुख्येक्षमाणस्य श्रीभट्टनागेशस्य
व्यवसायमुपादबहे; यस्य परीक्षणाद्वितीयस्य प्रक्रमस्यापरमार्थत्वं व्यक्तीभवेत् ।

चित्रमिदं ग्रहीष्यन्ति भावुकाः—कथमिव सर्वतन्त्रनिष्णातोऽयमपि विगीत-
मर्थमभिदधीतेति । अथवा गमनीयं कथमपि सर्वशास्त्राणां प्रक्रियांशेऽपि गति-
सामान्यमिति स्वयंकृतदृढाभिनिवेशस्य मनोरथसंपत्तौ पुष्कलेयं साधनसम्पत्,
यदखिलशास्त्रेषु पारगतमस्य प्रावीण्यमप्रतिहतश्च प्रज्ञाप्रसरः । तदिममेव कृत-
विमर्शमुपहरामो यस्य सारासारयोस्सन्तः प्रमाणम् ।

आलक्ष्यते हि श्रुतिपथमवतीर्णमात्रेषु शब्देषु समनन्तरभाविनी अर्थस्फूर्तिः ।
तत् कः खलु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः, येनायं प्रतिनियतोऽर्थसम्प्रत्यय इति? एवं
विचिन्वाना नानैवानयोस्सम्बन्धभेदान् पृथग्वर्तमानशशास्त्रस्थास्सन्दृशुः । ईश्वरेच्छा
शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्ध इति केचित् । अनुभावकत्वं तदित्यन्ये । शब्दार्थयोः परस्परा-
ध्यासगृहीतं तादात्म्यं, तन्निर्वाहो वाच्यवाचकभावो वा स इति वैयाकरणाः ।

तत्र विच्छिन्नयोरिव सतोः शब्दार्थयोरसम्भाव्यमभेदाध्यसनमिति तत्सम्भा-
वयितुमनाः श्रीभट्टनागेशः ससाक्षिकया बुद्धिवृत्त्या बहिर्दर्शितानपि विषयान्
तस्या एव बुद्धिवृत्तौ प्रत्यर्पयामास । एवमन्तस्सञ्चारितेषु विषयेषु, अर्थानां तदुप-
ग्राहिवृत्तीनां, शब्दस्य च तत्र तादात्म्यं सम्भवदध्यासमुपकल्प्य सर्वं रमणीयं
मेने । अथ च यथेयं प्रक्रिया सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः स्यात् श्रुतिसिद्धा च, तथा
संविधानाय सुदूरमन्विष्यन् साङ्ख्यप्रवचनभाष्यं नाम कञ्चन संवादग्रन्थमुपलभे ।
वितर्कयामो, यस्य प्रणेता विज्ञानभिक्षुस्तदात्वे बहुभिः प्रामाणिक इति परिगृहीतः
स्यात् ।

तत्त्वतस्सर्वसङ्करवादी सोऽयं विज्ञानभिक्षुरन्वर्थनामा, यस्य विज्ञानं
बहुभी रूपैराकीर्णं दृश्यते । तत् आच्छिन्नैः प्रकीर्णकैरर्थैः सङ्घटितेयं प्रक्रिया
कथं नाम हृदयमविरोहेदिति सुधियो विदाङ्कुर्वन्तु ।

प्रसाध्येवं बौद्धयोः शब्दार्थयोरभेदं, ततस्त्रस्यन्नात्मख्यातिभयात्, सद-
सत्ख्यातिं नाम भिक्षुक्तं वादमुपचिक्षेप । सर्वं किल वस्तुजातमान्तरेणात्मना
सदपि बाह्येन रूपेणासदेव । तस्य सदसतो भानं—ख्यातिरिति सविस्तर-
माचख्यौ । अस्यां च ख्यातौ “सदसत्ख्यातिर्वाधाबाधाम्याम्” इति साङ्ख्य-
प्रवचनसूत्रं प्रमाणमिति ।

अत्रेदं वक्तव्यम् । भवेदेतदेवं यदि नाम ख्यात्यंशे वैयाकरणाः साङ्ख्य-
वादमवलम्बन्त इति किमपि निश्चितं प्रमाणमुपलभेमहि ; यदि वा यथोक्ता
ख्यातिस्साङ्ख्यैराद्रियेत । तत्रानादरणादेव स्वग्रन्थेषु नेदृग्विधां ख्यातिमपेक्षते
कोऽपि वैयाकरण इति बहिरेव प्रथमः पक्षो निरोद्धव्यः । अथापि स्यात्—
अपुरस्कृतापि स्वैरियमप्रतिषेधमात्रादनुमन्येत, यदि व्यवतिष्ठेत लब्धरूपा केषा-
ञ्चिदर्शने । यावदियं प्रतिपक्षभूतैरख्यात्यन्यथाख्यातिवादैः प्रतिबद्धप्रसरा नैवा-
त्मानं लभते साङ्ख्यादिदर्शनेषु ; तदा कोऽस्या अप्रतिषेधः, दूरत एवानुमतिः ।

तथा हि विधीयमाने साङ्ख्यदर्शनस्य कोष्ठशोधने न शक्यं निलीनरूपा-
प्येषा कचिल्लक्षयितुम् । “सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताज्ञानं मोक्षनिबन्धनम्” “विवेक-
ख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयं प्रकृतिचेष्टितम्” । “लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तस्तस्मादुःखं स्वभावेन”
इति च तत्र तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्भेदाग्रहप्रतिबद्धमिव, तद्ग्रहणमात्रायत्तलाभमिव च

१. साङ्ख्यप्रवचनसूत्रम्. ५. ५६.

२. साङ्ख्यकारिका. ५५.

मोक्षमभिव्याहरन्तः स्वरसोन्नीतामख्यातिमेवाभिप्रयन्ति साङ्ख्ये इति गम्यते । न चाविचारितमूलं 'अख्यातिवादी प्रभाकरः' इति लोकप्रतीतिमवलम्ब्य साङ्ख्यत्व-
मस्य निर्बन्धमात्रेणास्थातुं युक्तम् । युक्तं तु साङ्ख्येभ्य एव प्राभाकरा इमं वादं
परिजगृहुरिति प्रज्ञातुम् । तथा चाख्यातिनिरूपणगतां "एतेनान्यसम्प्रयोगेऽन्य-
विषयज्ञानस्य स्मृतित्वतत्प्रमोषौ सर्वत्र व्याख्यातां द्रष्टव्यौ" इति पञ्चपादिकामेव-
मवतारयन्ति विवरणाचार्याः—“नन्वतत्त्वे तत्त्वज्ञानमिति शास्त्रकारेणैव दर्शित-
स्संसर्गविभ्रम इति नेत्याह—एतेनेति” । शास्त्रकारेणेति—साङ्ख्येनेत्यर्थः ।
एतदुक्तं भवति—प्रमास्मृतिभ्यामन्यो भ्रमो नाम न तृतीयो ज्ञानराशिस्समस्ति ;
सेयं भ्रमज्ञानमात्रस्याभावोऽख्यातिरिति प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानैः प्राभाकरैरन्यैर्वा यथामूलो-
दितं प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम्, न विपर्ययेण, तदिह ; अतत्त्वे इति संसर्गायां सप्तमी-
विभक्तिं प्रयुज्य भवतां शास्त्रकारः कपिल एव संसर्गविभ्रममाह ; तत्कथं संसर्गा-
ग्रहणं भ्रम इति शङ्कासमाधानाय 'एतेन' इत्यादिमूलं—इति । अवतारितस्य मूलस्य
“वक्तव्ये च पूर्ववादिनाप्यविवेके संसर्गज्ञानकल्पनागौवादख्यातिरेव युक्तेति
भावः” इति विवरणं स्पष्टार्थम् । एतेनासत्यपि संसर्गविमर्शे, यत् संसर्गभिमान-
स्तद्व्यपदेशो वा भ्रमत्वाभिमतज्ञानस्य फलं, तदभिप्रायं शास्त्रकृद्वचनं व्याख्यातमिति
वेदितव्यम् ।

अपि च न्यायसिद्धेऽस्मिन्नर्थे लिङ्गदर्शनं भवति । एतद्वाददूषणोपसंहारे
पञ्चपाद्यामुक्तं “तथा च तन्त्रान्तरीया आहुः अनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषा स्मृतिः
इति” । कथं कृत्वेदं ज्ञापकम् ? तन्त्रान्तरशब्देन पातञ्जलं योगदर्शनमाह । प्रस्तु-
तादन्यत् प्रस्तुतेन सजीतीयं तन्त्रं तन्त्रान्तरमुच्यत इति शाब्दन्यायविदः । तथा
ह्यस्य गोर्द्धितीयोऽन्वेष्टव्य इत्युक्ते गौरेव द्वितीयोऽन्विष्यते नाश्वः पुरुषो वा ।
तदनेन योगदर्शनेन प्रस्तुतसजातीयेन भवितव्यम् । यथा च साङ्ख्येन सजातीयं
तत्, नैवं प्राभाकरेणेतीदं साङ्ख्यसम्मतस्याख्यातिवादस्येह प्रस्तुतत्वे लिङ्गम् ।

अथवा नावश्यं मूलव्याख्यानयोरेवं निगूढभावसंवेदनायातितरां क्लेश-
स्सोढव्यः । साङ्ख्यमतविवेचनावसरे प्रत्यक्षमेवाचार्यब्रह्मानन्दसरस्वत्यो वदन्ति ।
इदं तन्मतोपसंहारस्थितं तदीयं वचनम्—“एवं चासंसर्गग्रहेण न कस्यापि बाध
इति लाघवम् । अत एव भ्रमस्थले प्राभाकरोऽप्येवमाहेति भावः” इति । इदं रजत-
मिति संसर्गज्ञानाश्रयणे ख्यात्यन्तरेष्विव नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानेन तस्य बाधः कल्प-

१. पञ्चपादिका. ७. पृ. २. पञ्चपादिकाविवरणम्. २३. पृ. ३. पञ्चपादिका. ९. पृ.
४. योगसूत्रम्. १. ११. ५. सिद्धान्तबिन्दुटीका. ५९. पृ.

नीयः । तदकल्पनादस्मिन्मते लाघवमित्यर्थः । एवमख्यातिवादं प्राधान्येन साङ्ख्य-
मते प्रदर्श्य प्राभाकरे तमातिदिशति—अत एवेति । अनेनातिदेशेनेदं दृढीकृतं
भवति—यत्तदुक्तमस्माभिः साङ्ख्येभ्यः प्राभाकरा इमं वादं परिजगृहुरिति ।
तस्मादख्यातिवादी साङ्ख्य इत्येष पक्षस्साधीयान् ।

अवश्यं चायमेव पक्षस्साधीयान् । साङ्ख्यदिबहुदर्शनपरिशीलिनामेतत्कर-
बदरनिर्विशेषं प्रतिभाति—यत्साङ्ख्यः, उपयन्तोऽपि षष्टिं पदार्थानां, असङ्गादि-
स्वभावमात्मानमेव परमतात्पर्येण स्वशास्त्रे प्रतिपिपादयिषन्ति । न च तत्क्रमते
नियतस्य प्रक्रियाविशेषस्योपगमादत इति तादर्थ्येनेतरदर्शजातं निरूपयन्ति । अत
एव “एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः” इति सूत्रे साङ्ख्यदिदर्शनान्यशेनाशेन वेदान्तार्थ-
न्याचक्षाणानि कामं पुरुषबुद्धिसौकर्यमपेक्ष्य कामपि प्रक्रियां रचयन्तु; तात्पर्य-
विषयेषु त्वर्थेषु अनपेक्ष्यमेवां ग्रामाण्यमिति भाष्यभामत्योः स्थितम् । अत एव चां-
शेनापि तत्त्वयाथात्म्यं व्याचिकीर्षद्विरस्मदीयैर्दर्शनकृद्भिः प्रक्रियैका प्रदर्श्यते, यत्र
प्रमाणप्रमेयविभागः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था चेत्येवमादि सर्वं लोकयात्रानिर्वहणाय साधु
समर्थितं चकास्ति । तस्याश्च प्रक्रियाया अभावहेतोर्हन्त ! कति वा दर्शनाभासा
उद्भिन्नमात्रा एवाद्यत्वेऽदर्शनं गताः । तदिह प्रेक्षावद्भिः प्रक्रियामात्रानभिनिविष्टै-
रपीदमेकं नोपेक्ष्येत, यस्यादेशाय सर्वज्ञकल्पा मुनयोऽवतरेः ।

साङ्ख्यदर्शने चानया दृष्ट्या परीक्ष्यमाणे, योऽस्य प्रतिपाद्यः स्वप्रधानः
पुरुषः, तस्य स्थापनायां कियानुपकारो भवति, केन वा ख्यातिवादेनेति विवेक्त-
व्यम् । अस्ति संसारित्वाभिमतस्यात्मनो बन्धो नाम, यस्मान्मोक्षमाणान्प्रति प्रव-
वृते निखिलं शास्त्रजातम् । तत्र प्रत्यगात्मनः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिः स्वो धर्मः ;
कैवल्यावस्थायां सत्यपि तद्योगे साधनाभावात्किमप्यकुर्वन्, विषयसम्प्रयोगाभावा-
दभुञ्जानश्च भोगान् विधूतबन्धस्तिष्ठतीति वैशेषिकादयः प्रतिपन्नाः । प्राक्च तत्त्व-
ज्ञानान्नित्योऽप्यपरिच्छिन्नोऽपि स स्वस्मिन्नारोपितैरुपजनापायपरिच्छेदादिभिर्देह-
धर्मैरन्यथैव विभाव्यत इति मिथ्याज्ञाननिर्मूलनाय तैरन्यथाख्यातिवादिभिः पदार्थ-
तत्त्वनिर्णयप्रधानं शास्त्रमारब्धम् । सा हि शक्तिः शक्येन विना न निरूप्यते ।
मोक्षदशायामपि तस्याः शक्यसम्बन्धोपगमे संसारादविशेष इत्यपरितुष्यन्त औप-
निषदा इदं व्युदस्थापयन् । अन्तःकरणपर्यन्तस्य कार्यकरणसङ्घातस्यैव कर्तृत्वं
भोक्तृत्वं च । आत्मा तु सदैव शुद्धः सदैव मुक्तः, केवलमविद्योपस्थापितेना-

निर्वचनीयबन्धेन तद्वानिवाजायत इत्यविद्यानिवर्तकसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्ताय तत्त्वज्ञानाय तैस्सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ।

तदत्रापि दर्शनेऽनिर्वचनीयैरपि धर्मैः कल्पितेन संसर्गेण तद्वानिवेति सापेक्षवचनकरणादात्मनः कियानपि बन्धसंस्पर्शोऽङ्गीकृतः स्यात् । एवमनुशयानै-
स्साङ्ख्यैरख्यातिवादो दर्शितोपपत्तिरुपाजहे । अहो तस्य महर्षिकपिलस्य सुश्लिष्टं
भावगाम्भीर्यम् ! तदाहुरार्यमतयः

“तस्मान्न ब्रह्मतेऽद्वा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।

संसरति ब्रह्मते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः” १ ॥

इति । एतदुक्तं भवति—बुद्धिधर्मा बुद्धावेव ; नारोपिता अप्यात्मनि, आरोपमात्रस्यै-
वालीकत्वात् । सुख्यहं दुःखी मूढ इति च व्यपदेशमात्रमिति ।

परमार्थतस्तु नानया दिशा तैरात्मनोऽसङ्गत्वं प्रत्याशा कार्या—प्रकृति-
पुरुषयोः स्वस्वामिभावो विम्बप्रतिबिम्बलक्षणस्संयोगो वा नित्य इति हि साङ्ख्य-
मन्यन्ते । तदेषां मते प्रकृतिसंयोगनिमित्तं मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिः, अनिमोक्षो वा
प्रसज्येत । अतश्चात्मव्यतिरेकेणोपाधिमात्रस्य बाधने शास्त्रं प्रवर्तते । कल्पनैक-
शरीरानुपाधिधर्मानुपगततोऽपि न तैरात्मनः कोऽपि संस्पर्शोऽस्ति । अध्यासं
निरूप्य श्रीभगवत्पादा आत्मन ऐकान्तिकासङ्गत्वप्रतिपादनाय, मन्यामहे, विशेष-
तस्साङ्ख्यानं यथोपलक्षितातङ्कप्रतिसमाधानाय चैवमादिशन्ति “तत्रैवं सति यत्र
यदध्यासस्तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन बाणुमात्रेणापि स न सम्बध्यते” २ इति । अत
एव—तापकं रजः, सत्त्वं तप्यं, न पुरुषः; वेदान्तवादिनां तु तप्य आत्मैवेत्य-
निर्मोक्षस्यात्—इति साङ्ख्यकृतस्याक्षेपस्य परिहारसाम्यं मतद्वये प्रदर्श्य पुन-
स्साङ्ख्यस्यैव दुर्वारमिमं दोषं प्रसज्यन्ति स्म भगवत्पादाः “अदर्शनस्य
तमसो नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्” इत्यादिनेत्यलम् । ईदृश्यामर्थव्यवस्थितौ विज्ञान-
भिक्षुणोपक्षितस्य सदसत्ख्यातिवादस्य नेहावसरोऽस्ति कश्चित् । तस्माद्विमुच्य
श्रीनगेशवचनेषु परमार्थप्रत्ययं, आभ्यन्तरविषयपरीक्षणेनाख्यातिवादी साङ्ख्य
इति निर्णेतव्यम् ॥

स्यादेतत् चमसाधिकरणे अजामन्त्रव्याख्यानरूपमिदमस्ति भाष्यम् “तां
प्रकृतिमज एकः पुरुषो जुषमाणः प्रीयमाणः सेवमानो वानुशेते । तामेवाविषयात्मत्वे-

१. साङ्ख्यकारिका. २. ब्रह्म. शां. भा. १. १. १.
३. ब्रह्म. शां. भा. २. २. १०.

नोपगम्य सुखी दुःखी मूढोऽहमित्यविवेकितया संसरति” ३ इति । विवृतं चैतदा-
चार्यवाचस्पतिमिश्रैः “चित्तिशक्तिस्त्वपरिणामिन्यप्रतिसङ्क्रामापि बुद्धिसत्त्वादात्मनो
विवेकमबुध्यमाना बुद्धिवृत्तैव विपर्यसेनाविद्यया बुद्धिस्थान् सुखादीनात्मन्यभिमन्य-
माना सुखादिमतीव भवति” इति । भाष्यभामतीवचनयोरनयोः प्रधानवादसम्मत
एव विवेकाग्रहपूर्वः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरभेदाध्यासो धर्मसंसर्गाध्यासश्च व्यक्तमनूद्यमानः
प्रतीयते । हन्त महता परिकरबन्धेन साङ्ख्यानमख्यातिं विचिन्वानाः कोष्ठशोध-
नका भाष्यभामतीभ्यां विरुध्यन्ते । “साङ्ख्यानमप्यस्ति भ्रमः । स च बुद्धावेवेति
विशेषः” इति कल्पतरुणा च विशेषतः ।

सत्यं महावाक्यस्थानीयोऽयमजामन्त्रस्साङ्ख्यानम् । सत्यं चेदृशेन मन्त्रेण
स्वमतमौपनिषदमाशङ्कमानं साङ्ख्यमवतारयद्विरभिन्नतदीयप्रक्रियमेव मन्त्रार्थः प्रका-
श्यते । तथापीदं तावत्पृच्छामः—कः खल्वनुशयः स्फुटार्थयोरनयोर्भाष्यभामत्योः?
यन्निमित्तवैयकुलीपरिहारायेवेदं साङ्ख्यानमपीति व्याख्यातुर्वचनम् । ननु चेदं
कस्याप्यनुशयस्य परिहाराय स्यात् ; स्पष्टप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं वा । सर्वं वाक्यं सानुशयमेव
पश्यतो भवतो वा कः कामः समृध्यते ? एवं तर्हि समर्थयिष्यामो वयम् । नास्ति-
भ्रमास्साङ्ख्या इति सिद्धं कृत्वा क्रममाणमिदमेव भवतां साक्षित्वेनानुक्रान्तं वचनं
भवत्यलमस्मत्पक्षव्यवस्थापनायेति । प्रसिद्धं च प्रतिवादिनः साक्ष्यवचनेन मात्र
सूचितं वादिनोऽर्थं प्रमाणीकुर्वन्ति न्यायविदः ।

अथवा कृतमिहासद्यवहारस्थितं कौटसाक्ष्यमुदाहृत्य । साङ्ख्यानमस्ति भ्रम
इति वाक्यार्थपर्यवसानमपि चिन्तनीयमेव । न वा किञ्चिदपूर्वमिवात्र चिन्तनीय-
मस्ति । चिन्तितपूर्वमेतदाचार्यदीक्षितेन्द्रैः । तथा ह्यनध्यवसायव्याख्यानरीत्यैव
वाक्यमिदं तैर्व्याख्यायते—भ्रम इति । स त्वगृहीतासंसर्गधर्मधर्मविषयज्ञानद्वय-
रूपः, तदुभयसंसर्गविषयकैकज्ञानरूपो वेत्यन्यदेतत्—इति । इदमत्राकृतम्—
साङ्ख्याः किल पुरुषस्यासङ्गत्वमङ्गभीरुका नान्यसंसर्गं तत्राध्यस्यमानं रोचयन्ते ।
“तामात्मत्वेनोपगम्य,” “बुद्धिस्थान् सुखदुःखादीनात्मन्यभिनिविशमाना” इति च
भाष्यभामत्योर्नायं संसर्गविभ्रमस्य सिद्धवदनुवाद इति भ्रमितव्यम् । धर्मधर्मिणोर्वि-
वेकाग्रहणस्य फलमभेदसंसर्गव्यपदेशमात्रमिह भ्रमशब्देनोच्यते । एवं हि ‘उपगम्य’
‘अभिनिविशमाना’ इति पदद्वयं सामञ्जस्येनानुगतं भवति । अथवा यथाश्रुताक्ष-
रार्थग्रहणपरिश्रान्तमतय इत्थं व्युत्पादनीयाः । अस्तु संसर्गभ्रमः, न तावता पुरु-

१. ब्रह्म. शां. भा. १. ४. ८.

प्रत्यासङ्गत्वमपैति । छायाया बुद्धिवृत्तिं गाहमाने पुरुषतत्त्वे संसर्गविभ्रमो नाम । तत्रस्थः प्रतिबिम्बात्मैव तेन संस्पृश्यत इति । तदिदमप्युक्तं 'चितिशक्तिस्वपरिणामिन्यप्रतिसङ्गमापि' इति । तदाहुः---

“तस्मात्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥” इति ।

वस्तुतो न पूर्वोक्तेन हेतुनात्मनः सङ्गकृतो दोषश्शमयितुं शक्यः । प्रतिबिम्बो नामोपाध्यन्तरूपलभ्यमानो विम्ब उच्यते ; न विम्ब एव साक्षात्, नापि वस्त्वन्तरम् । तद्यदिदं बुद्धिधर्माः प्रतिबिम्ब आरोप्यन्ते—विम्ब एव तदारोपितास्ते भवन्ति । एतदोषपरिजिहीर्षयेवोक्तमित्यन्यत् इति । अन्यशब्देन द्वितीयाध्याये विशिष्य साङ्ख्याननुवादग्रन्थपरीक्षणेन सर्वपामाचार्याणामख्यातिवादी साङ्ख्य इति निर्भरो व्यक्तीभविष्यतीति सूच्यते ।

स्यादेतत् । स तु भ्रमः बुद्धावेवेति विशेष इत्युक्तं कल्पतरौ । तत्कोऽसौ साङ्ख्यानं विशेषः? अयं विशेषः—अख्यातिवादिनां साङ्ख्यानं प्राभाकराणां च मते यद्यपीदं रजतमिति संसर्गविषयं चाक्षुषं भ्रमज्ञानं न सम्भवति, तथापि इदं रजतमिति रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तेः, सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशस्य च भ्रमस्थलेषूपपादनाय साङ्ख्या अन्ततश्चाक्षुषज्ञानसमनन्तरभाविनं मानसमिदं रजतयोस्संसर्गावमर्शमुपेयुः । प्राभाकरास्तु—इदं रजतमिति न बाह्यं, नापि मानसं भ्रमज्ञानं समस्ति ; केवलं संसर्गाभिमानमात्रमेतत्, यन्मूला पुरोवस्तुनि प्रवृत्तिः, रजतव्यपदेशश्चेति व्यवस्थिताः । एवमविशिष्टेऽप्यख्यातिवादे मानससंसर्गप्रतिभासोपगमानुपगमाभ्यां साङ्ख्यप्राभाकरयोरस्ति विशेष इति । अत एव अतस्मिन्स्तद्बुद्धिरित्यध्यासस्वरूपमभिधाय भगवत्पादाः “सर्वथापि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभसतां न व्यभिचरति” इत्युक्तलक्षणेऽध्यासे सर्वदर्शनसंवादं दर्शयन्ति स्म । तत्रान्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासोऽख्यातिवादिनामसिद्ध इत्याशङ्क्य विवरणाचार्या इत्थं विवेचयामासुः “अख्यातिवादिनापि मानसं संसर्गज्ञानं संसर्गाभिमानो वा वक्तव्य इत्यभिप्रायः”^१ इति । मानसं संसर्गज्ञानं साङ्ख्यैः संसर्गाभिमानस्तु प्राभाकरैरित्येवं योजनीयम् । देहादावनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिरविद्येति साङ्ख्या मन्यन्त इति च तत्त्वदीपने स्पष्टम् । तदिदमप्यभिसन्धायोक्तमित्यन्यदेतत् इति ।

१. साङ्ख्यकारिका. २०.

२. ब्रह्म. शां. भा. १. १. १.

३. फल्गुपादिकाविवरणम्. ३६.

स्यादेतत् । द्वितीयाध्यायस्थितैर्वचनैरख्यातिवादी साङ्ख्य इति आचार्याणामविप्रतिपत्तिर्लक्ष्यत इति प्रतिज्ञातम् । कानि पुनस्तानि वचनानि ? तान्युदाहरिष्यामः “सत्त्वानुरोधित्वाच्चेतनोऽपि तप्यत इवेति चेत् परमार्थतस्तर्हि नैव तप्यत इत्यापतति ; इव शब्दप्रयोगात् ।.....अतश्चाविद्याकृतोऽयं तप्यतापकभावो न पारमार्थिक इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्”^१ इति । तापकं रजः, सत्त्वं तप्यमिति बुद्धितत्त्वस्यैव संसारबन्धोपगमे पुरुषस्य तापोपशान्तये सम्यग्दर्शनमुपदिशत् शास्त्रं साङ्ख्यानानमनर्थकं प्राप्नोति । एतदोषपरिहाराय सत्त्वानुरोधित्वादीदं साङ्ख्यवचनम् । तत्र निगूढं भावं विशदयति “दर्शितविषयत्वात् बुद्धिसत्त्वे तप्ये तदविभागापत्त्या पुरुषोऽप्यनुतप्यत इव, न तु तप्यतेऽपरिणामित्वादित्युक्तम् । तदविभागापत्तिश्चाविद्या । तथा चाविद्याकृतस्तप्यतापकभावः”^२ इति । अविभागापत्तिरित्युक्ते बुद्धिपुरुषयोर्मा भूत् परमार्थतोऽभेदगमनमिति व्याचष्टे “अविभागापत्तिस्तर्हि क्षीरवत्सत्येति तन्निमित्ता तप्तिः पुंसस्सत्या स्यात् ; अत आह—तदविभागापत्तिश्चेति । अविवेको ह्यविभागः”^३ इति ।

यद्वोचाम, अन्यदेतत् इत्यनेन द्वितीयाध्यायगतोऽभिप्रायविशेषः सूच्यत इति, तदाविष्करणाय दीक्षितेन्द्रैरित्यमयं ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते “अख्यातिवादिनस्साङ्ख्यस्य मते भ्रमविषयैक्यविवर्तभावदित्याशङ्क्य विवेकाग्रह एवाविभागशब्देन विवक्षित इति व्याचष्टे—अविवेक इति” । उदाहृतेषु हि वचनेषु अविद्या, अविभागापत्तिः, अविवेकः, विवेकाग्रह इत्येतेषां पूर्वपूर्वं प्रति उत्तरोत्तराणि त्रीणि व्याख्यानपदानि भवन्ति । तदत्र भाष्यभामल्योविशेषतः कल्पतरुपरिमल्योऽख्यातिवाद एव साङ्ख्यानमभिमत इति निर्भरः स्फुटमवगम्यते । यदपि “सदसख्यातिर्बाधाबाध्याम्” इति साङ्ख्यसूत्रं प्रमाणमन्यैरुपन्यस्तं, तेनापि यथोदितलक्षणा ख्यातिस्साङ्ख्यानं सेत्स्यतीति तेषामिदं मनोरथमात्रमित्युपरिष्ठान्निवेदयिष्यते ।

तदेवं सदसख्यातिवादस्सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त इति श्रीभट्टनागेशाभिमानस्य मूलशैथिल्यापादनायाख्यातिवादिनस्साङ्ख्या इत्येतद्विस्तरेण प्रतिष्ठापितम् । अमुमेव हि ख्यातिवादं स्वकस्य सिद्धान्तस्य मूलं श्रीभट्टनागेशो मन्यते—योगिनः किल सेश्वरास्साङ्ख्या एव; तदेभिरपि साङ्ख्यानं सदसख्यातिरेवोपेक्षिष्यते साङ्ख्यत्वसामान्यादिति । न चेदृशीं योगिनां ख्यातिं सम्पाद्यैतावति तुष्यति; भगवत्पादीयां

१. ब्रह्म. शां. भा. २. २. १०.

२. भामती. २. २. १०.

३. वेदान्तकल्पतरुः. २. २. १०.

४. परिमलः. २. २. १०.

सदसद्विलक्षणानिर्वचनीयख्यातिमप्यनयैकीकर्तुमभिलषति । न खलु ब्रह्मसूत्रेषु भगवत्पादभाष्ये वासौ नामास्माकं ख्यातिरिति विशिष्य नाम कृतमुपलक्ष्यते । तुल्यरूपेषु तन्त्रान्तरेषु सिद्धा सदसत्ख्यातिरेव त्वमीषामभीष्टेति गम्यते । प्रसिद्धं च न्यायविदोऽनुक्तमन्यतो गृह्णन्ति । कृतं वात्र सन्देहेन । “पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवक्ष्यप-
दिश्यते”^१ इति सूत्रे कण्ठरवेण भगवत्पादा एतदनुमन्वते “परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतं भवतीति न्यायादिहापि योगशास्त्रप्रसिद्धा मनसः पञ्च वृत्तयः परिगृह्यन्ते प्रमाण-
विपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयो नाम” इति । स यदि विपर्ययो योगिनां सदस-
त्ख्यातिर्भवेत्, अवश्यमेषा प्राप्नोति वेदान्तवादिनामिति श्रीभट्टनागेशाभिप्रायः ।
एवंविधशिरोवेष्टनादिकृतसर्वानर्थमूलभूतस्यास्य वादस्य मूलत एवासाङ्ग्यत्वप्रति-
पादनायास्माभिरिदं प्रथमं प्रकरणमारब्धम् । यथा चायं वादो न योगिनां, न वा
वेदान्तवादिनामुपकरोति, तैः प्रतिषिद्धश्च तथाभ्यन्तरविषयपरीक्षणेन द्वितीये
प्रकरणे निरूपयिष्यामः ॥

॥ ॐ ॥

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENT IN ANCIENT INDIA AND THE
STATE IN ANCIENT INDIA, By Beni Prasad M. A., Ph. D.,
D. Sc., Published by the Indian Press, Ltd., Allahabad.

We acknowledge with great pleasure the receipt of these two valuable books from the Indian Press Ltd., Allahabad. The first of these contains a very interesting foreword by Prof. Keith. The author, in these two books, has given a conspectus of the history and the achievements of what was known in Ancient India as Artha Śāstra or, as it was often referred to, Daṇḍanīti. The exact meaning of the word “Artha-Śāstra” is not very clear especially in the light of modern conceptions. The word Daṇḍanīti, however, is more scientific and the vyutpatti given to the word in the Śānti-Parva of the Mahābhārata brings out a conception akin to that underlying the Austinian theory of sovereignty. The Artha Śāstra came to be very early recognised as a special branch of study *viz.*, as one of the four main kinds of knowledge enumerated by Kauṭilya or of the eighteen vidyās of later writers. It was also given a place as the chief item in the curricula of studies enjoined for a Kṣatriya Prince before he is called upon to assume the responsibility of the sovereign or of the Crown Prince. There is one danger which besets the path of the modern scholar and worker in this branch of study. The translation of the Sanskrit nomenclature of Artha Śāstra into modern political terms and phrases which have acquired a specific significance and therefore convey ideas which are the result of long experience and thorough and scientific application is apt to mislead us into thinking that all those ideas were clearly visualised by the ancient writers on Artha Śāstra. One is, however, happy to find that the author has steered clear of this and resisted the temptations of an intrepid patriotism, glorying in the thought that Ancient India had anticipated the modern conceptions of state and polity. Though an attempt has been made to give a scientific exposition of the Theory of state as described by the ancient writers on Artha Śāstra, still it must be confessed that the impression is left upon the reader's mind that the powerful, subtle, analytic and scientific intellect of Ancient Indian

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thinkers with which we have been familiar in the other branches of ancient learning has not shone to its best advantage here and the treatment of the subject here descends to the level of the mere enumeration of practical tactics to be adopted in the art of Government and warfare extending even to puerile details.

Whatever this may be, the author has done full justice to the subject and conveyed to the western world a fairly accurate idea of the science of Government in Ancient India. We congratulate the Indian Press Ltd., on the neat printing and get-up of the two books.

K. BALASUBRAHMANYA AIYAR.

THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE, By Prof. S. Radhakrishna, M.A.,
Published by George Allen Unwin Ltd., London.

This is a fine book published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London and is the outcome of the Upton lectures delivered by the Professor himself on the invitation and under the auspices of the University of Oxford. It is indeed, a succinct, brilliant, and masterly exposition to a Western audience of what the Hindu view of life and the fundamental spirit of the Hindu religion and philosophy are. In these lectures, the Professor's attempt is, in his own words "to indicate the central motives of the Hindu faith and show its way of approach to some of the pressing problems of the day". It may, no doubt, be that the reader, at the outset, is carried away by the force of the Professor's arresting and inimitable style and the effect of his trenchant and pregnant phraseology and is, therefore, apt to give ready acceptance to the author's conclusions and views. Still, unbiassed and calm reflection also will, in general, confirm the truth and justice of them. It must be recognised that anybody who approaches the present theme is confronted with difficulties of a varied and complicated nature. The period during which the Hindu thought and culture have been fashioned and moulded is so vast, the paucity of accurate historical material is so great and the confusion introduced by the imperfect investigations and observations of scholars of all sorts and by their broad generalizations sometimes biassed and often based only on bold speculative inferences from slender data is so bewildering, that anybody, however eminent he may be, must largely depend on our sympathy and charity of judgment as regards the success of his efforts. Amidst these conditions, to have presented a brief and

clear idea of Hinduism, its achievement and its outstanding features in bold outline and to have interpreted it in relation to the everpresent problems of the world in terms and aspects familiar to western thinkers is an achievement entitling the author to our admiration and lasting gratitude. He has tried successfully to remove the many misconceptions rampant in the world about the religion, culture and civilisation of the Hindus, to furnish the true explanation for the seeming contradictions and apparent injustices and to point to the true perspective of History. Though in some places the author has been affected by the prevalent tendency to generalize and draw large conclusions from slender and incorrect basis (vide the reference to Dakṣiṇāmūrti etc., in pages 39 and 40) still the main conclusions fairly rest on solid foundations. Everyone will be disposed to agree with the conclusions in his first lecture on religious experience "that Hinduism is not a definite, dogmatic creed, but a vast complex but subtly unified mass of spiritual thought and realization", or with the statements in his second lecture on 'The conflict of religions' that "In spite of the fact that Hinduism has no common creed and its worship no fixed form, it has bound together multitudinous sects and devotions into a common scheme" and that "that the Hindu solution of the problems of the conflict of religion is likely to be accepted in the future seems to be fairly certain". Nobody will quarrel either with the pithy statement in his third lecture "that Hinduism is more a way of life than a form of thought" and that "while it gives absolute liberty in the world of thought, it enjoins a strict code of practice". The author is at his best in the last chapter on Hindu Dharma wherein he explains the true meaning of caste, its justification in ancient India and contrasts it with the combative tendencies of the modern class organizations. He concludes thus "While caste has resulted in much evil, it has some sound principles underlying it". On the whole we may say without fear of contradiction that the Professor has succeeded in the short compass of these lectures in fully conveying to his hearers an accurate and clear idea of the theme he set to himself to expound.

K. BALASUBRAHMANYA AIYAR.

A HISTORY OF SANSKRIT POETICS By Mr. P. V. Kane, M.A.,
LL. M.

This little volume which is an Introduction to the "Sāhitya Darpaṇa", a popular work on Alaṅkāra Śāstra, is really a masterly and critical introduction to the study of the science of Sanskrit Poetics. The learned author has, in this volume, not only surveyed the whole range of the field of Sanskrit Śāhitya Śāstra, but also given a brief summary of the contents of all the important works on the subject. The origin, growth and development of the science are discussed in elaborate detail with due regard to chronology. The chief doctrines of the different schools are clearly elucidated, and learned criticisms offered on their respective merits. It is well known that differences are noticeable not only in fundamentals between the protagonists of the different schools, but even in respect of minute details in each system, and these are also clearly pointed out by the author. Special mention may be made of the learned discourses about the relative priority of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, and the criticisms of the *rasa*, *dhvani*, and the *Vakrōkti* theories, as revealing the author's wide research and critical acumen. It is possible that scholars may differ from the author in respect of a few of his views, but we have nothing but praise for this achievement of his. One special feature which enhances the utility of the work is the wealth of appropriate quotations from the Sanskrit texts, with their references. We heartily commend this little volume to students and scholars as it is calculated to rouse interest in a critical study of the science of Poetics and stimulate further research in this interesting branch of knowledge.

N. KUPPUSWAMI AIYAH.

A CORRECTION.

It is with great regret that I have to point out that a serious error has been allowed to creep in my article entitled 'The Vārtikas' published in the January issue of the Journal of Oriental Research, Vol. II, Part I. On page 30, the following Sanskrit passage occurs:—L. 5. यतोऽनादिष्टादचः पूर्वत्वे स्थानिवत्त्वमतो भगवा-
न्कात्यायनः ॥ प्रसारणिभ्यो ङं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः

It should be printed thus:—यतोऽनादिष्टादचः पूर्वत्वे स्थानिवत्त्वमतो
भगवान् कात्यः प्रसारणिभ्यो ङं प्रोवाचेत्यन्वयः ॥

K. G. SUBRAHMANYAN.

EDITORIAL.

We have great pleasure in drawing the attention of our readers to an extract which will be found printed in Appendix to this volume and which appeared in the columns of "The New India" of June 17th. It is a short and interesting account of an adaptation on the stage at Melbourne in Australia of the "Shakuntala" of Kālidāsa. The actors of the Live Art Society of Melbourne may well be congratulated on their fine æsthetic sense and taste in selecting the appropriate tunes suited to the particular theme and in choosing the colours of the costume. They have set an example which may well be followed by the actors on the Indian stage.

We have great pleasure in drawing the attention of our readers to the prospectus and rules of the Sanskrit Academy, Madras, recently started by leading scholars and lovers of Sanskrit in Madras. The idea of starting an Academy was suggested by Mr. V. V. Srinivasa Iyengar who is so well known for his culture, fine taste for art and drama and his love of Sanskrit. It is, indeed, an organisation which is bound to prove very useful in the near future.

NOTEWORTHY CONTENTS OF ORIENTAL JOURNALS.

INDIAN ANTIQUARY.

January, 1928.

1. *Progress of the collection of Manuscripts at the Dacca University (1926-1927).*—By N. K. Bhattasali, M. A. A number of manuscripts have been acquired for the Dacca University in 1926-1927. The manuscripts are given under different headings. The report wrongly mentions the Upaniṣads under the heading Dharmasāstra.

2. *Sources for an account of the Embassy of Sir William Norris to Aurangzeb.*—By Hari Har Das, B. Litt.

3. *St. Thomas in South India.*—By Dr. P. St. Thomas, M.A.

4. *Notes on Currency and Coinage among the Burmese.*—By Sir R. C. Temple, Bt.

Supplement—*The Śaurasenī and Māgadhi śtabakas of Rāma śarman.*—By Sir G.A. Grierson.

February, 1928.

1. *Folk songs of the Tuluvas.*—By B. A. Saletore, B.A., L.T., M. R. A. S.

2. *A possible identification of the mount Devagiri mentioned in Kālidāsa's Meghadūta.*—By A. S. Bhandarkar, B.A. The author identifies Devagiri with Devagurāḍa, about 6 miles south-east of Indore. The article is accompanied by two plates.

3. *Malabar Miscellany V—A Rājasihma Inscription at Talekkād in Cochin.*—By T. K. Joseph, B. A., L.T. Mr. Joseph edits this important inscription and gives a translation also. He seems to think that this Rājasihma belongs to 8-10th century. The article is accompanied by a plate.

4. *Rāwal Jaitrasihma of Mewar.*—By R. R. Halder. The author gives some account of this king who ruled between 1213-52 A. D.

5. *The Śaurasenī and Māgadhi Śtabakas of Rāmaśarman.*—By Sir G. A. Grierson.

NOTEWORTHY CONTENTS OF ORIENTAL JOURNALS 175

March, 1928.

1. *Notes on currency and Coinage among the Burmese.*—By Sir R. C. Temple, Bt.

2. *Mar Sapor and Mar Prodh.*—By T. K. Joseph, B. A., L.T. These are two Christian Saints.

3. *Buddhist Women.*—By Dr. B. C. Law. Dr. Law gives some account of Buddhist women mentioned in the Buddhist Texts. They are:—

Abhirūpādanandā; Jentī or Jentā; Cittā; Sukhā; Setā; Sīhā; Sundarī; Nandā; Khemā; Aropamā; Rohiṇī; Subhā; Tissā; Sumedhā; Viśākhā; Arulā; Gopikā; Candā; Guttā; Vijayā; Cātā; Uppalavaṇṇā; Sumaṅgala mātā; Puṇṇā; Sundarī; Vimalā; Mittā-kālīka; Sakulā; Sonadiṇṇā; Alomā; Muttā; Puṇṇā; Dantikā; Vaḍḍhesī and Uttamā.

4. *Supplement.*—Notes on Piracy in Eastern Waters.—By S. C. Hill.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE MYTHIC SOCIETY.

January, 1928.

1. *A preliminary note on the Hill Paṇḍārams of Travancore.*—By L. A. Krishna Aiyar, M.A., M.R.A.S.

2. *Haṁsa Sandeśa—A study.*—By K. Krishnamacharya, B.A., L.T. The author gives a critical appreciation of Vedānta Deśika's Haṁsa Sandeśa.

3. *Sūrya Prajñāpti.*—By Dr. R. Shama Sastri, B. A., Ph.D. This is a continuation from the previous numbers.

4. *Anthropometry of the Kanikars of Travancore.*—By L. A. Krishna Aiyar.

5. *Tamil kingdoms and their Government.*—By Pandit N. Chengalvarayan.—The author deals with the topography of the Tamil Country; its trade and commerce; the three Dynasties (i.e.) Cera, Cola and Pāṇḍya; the social life, government etc., of those days.

6. *The Irikkal Kovilagam, Trichur.*—By A. Govindawariar, B.A., B.L.

7. *Studies in Bird Myths. No. XX.*—By S. C. Mitra, M.A.

MODERN REVIEW.

February, 1928.

Stūpas of Caitiyas.—By R. D. Banerji.

JOURNAL OF THE BIHAR AND ORISSA RESEARCH SOCIETY.
March, 1928.

Royal patrons of the University of Nālandā by Rev. J. Heras, M.A.

Found by Kumāragupta I as seen through the records of Huen Tsiang. The university was called, from the beginning of its existence, Nālandā (*i.e.*, charity without intermission).

Skandagupta, the son of Kumāragupta I built another Saṅghārāma.

Puragupta, the patron of Vasubandhu, vigorously practised the rules of his ancestors and built another Saṅghārāma. It was during the time of Narasimhagupta, a fervent disciple of Vasubandhu, perhaps for the first time that the university of Nālandā was destroyed. Kumāragupta II.

Harṣavandhana built a vihāra of brass in addition to one Saṅghārāma ;

The Maukharis : Pūrṇavarma : Bhāskaravarman : The articles is accompanied by a plan of the University.

2. *Revised notes on the Brahmin Empire.*—By Jayaswal.

3. *Weights and measures in Ancient India.*—By Banerji Sastri.

4. *Harappa and the Vedic Hariupia.*—By Binode Bihari Roy.

The modern Harappa is identified with Hariupia, on the side of the river Paruṣṇi (Ravi). Probably this city of Abhyavarti and Kavi was demolished by Indra coming to the help of the Aryan invader Sudās. The city of Hariupia was the seat of Aryan civilisation in the fifth Millenium B.C. and not non-Aryan according to Mr. Marshall and others.

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY
January ; 1928.

1. *Is the Nyāyapraveśa by Diṇnāga.*—By Prof. Giuseppe Tucci. On the authority of Kwei-Chi and Shent'ai the disciples of Ywang Chwang, the author shows that Nyāyapraveśa and Nyāyadvāra (generally spoken of as Nyāyadvāratarka Śāstra) are two different books, of which only Nyāyamukha is the work of Diṇnāga and that the Heturvidyā Nyāyapraveśa is by Bodhisattva Śāṅkarasvāmin.

2. *Temple and image worship in Hinduism by Farquhar.*—Temple and image worship grew up among śūdras and it was

NOTEWORTHY CONTENTS OF ORIENTAL JOURNALS 177

thrown open to the three Aryan Castes about 400 B. C. and thereafter steadily climbed to its present supreme position.

3. *Notes on Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda.*—By C.W. Gurner.

4. *Amitraghāta.*—Bindusāra, the son of Candragupta whom the Greeks called Amitraghāta (अमित्रघात) (as seen in a work of Athenaeus the 3rd C. A. D.) should be Amitraghāta, which is one of the epithets of Indra.

5. *Date of the Subhāṣitāvali.*—By D. C. Bhaṭṭācārya. Disagreeing with Dr. De who is tempted to put in some of the verses as interpollations because of the incorporation of verses later than the 12th C., Bhaṭṭācārya shows that there was an earlier Vallabhadeva who composed a Subhāṣitāvali and only to this, Sarvānanda refers. He places the printed Subhāṣitāvali after Śrī Harṣa, since there is a reference to his Khaṇḍakhādyā.

INDIAN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY.

March, 1928.

1. *Jātaka Gāthās and Jātaka Commentary.*—By Prof. M. Winternitz. The Professor discusses in this article the value of these works for historical purposes.

2. *The authorship of the Nyāyapraveśa.*—By A. B. Keith. Dr. Keith here tries to refute the arguments that tend to dispute Diṇnāga's authorship of the Nyāyapraveśa, thereby trying to prove Diṇnāga's authorship of that work. He regards Diṇnāga to have been older than Praśastapāda.

3. *Relation between Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī.*—By P. V. Bapat. The author regards Pāli as the oldest Prākṛt and the Ardhamāgadhī to be a later development.

4. *A Copper-plate charter of the Haihaya King Mahārāṇa-karatnādeva II of the Cedi year 878.*—Edited by L. P. Pandeya. The plates are printed along with a Devanāgarī transliteration.

5. *Philosophy of Vasubandhu in Viṃśatikā and Trīṃśatikā.*—By S. N. Das Gupta.—The Viṃśatikā is a work of Vasubandhu and the Trīṃśatikā is a commentary thereon by Sthiramati. The author gives a short summary of the doctrine of Vijñānavāda contained in that work.

6. *Rāḍha or Ancient Gaṅgā Rāṣṭra. II.*—By Nundolal Dey. The author tries to identify Rāḍha Rāḍa Lāḍha Lāḍa Lāḍa, Lāla. The article is to be continued.

7. *Upaniṣadvrata*.—By Umesh Candra Bhattacharjee.
8. *Greek Influence on Hindu Astronomy*.—By Sukumar Ranjan Das.
9. *Ranjit Singh's Civil Administration*.—By Narendra Krishna Sinha. The account given in this paper is based on the records in the Imperial Records Department.
10. *Eastern India and Āryāvarta*.—By Haran Chandra Chakladar.
11. *Town Planning and House Building in Ancient India according to Śilpa Śāstras*.—By K. Rangachari. This is a continuation from the previous issue.

APPENDIX.

ŚAKUNTALA, Staged in Melbourne.

Would'st thou the young year's blossoms and the fruits of its decline.

And all by which the soul is charmed, enraptured, fed.

Would'st thou the Earth and Heaven itself in one sole name combine ?

I name thee, O Śākuntala ! and all at once is said.

GOETHE.

Australian papers have given much prominence to the staging of Kālidāsa's great drama *Śākuntala* which had been chosen as the chief attraction for the Live Art Society's short season at the Playhouse, in Melbourne, in April. Here is *Table-Talk's* appreciation of the performance :—

The impressive production of the great Indian poem, "*Śākuntala*" in the effective translation made by Laurence Binyon, and the three Irish plays from the Abbey Theatre, at the Playhouse last week was an effort that deserved much bigger support than was given, for it was a very high artistic achievement, and something much above the average in attainment.

It was in *Śākuntala* that the big interest lay, for this was a stupendous effort for a society of young people, even though directed by one of artistic insight and experience like Mr. Howard Eadie. First of all, the fine translation of the sixteen-hundred-years old work of Kālidāsa by Laurence Binyon was a fine achievement. Then the saturation of the performers and the young musician Stewart Burton, in the spirit and atmosphere of the story and the beliefs of the time, to such an extent that they were enabled to positively live the characters, and in the case of Mr. Dudley, to interpret the spirit in musical composition was remarkable.

Never has more sincere, unaffected acting been seen in Melbourne than was given by every member of the cast in *Śākuntala*, even to the little child. There was no attempt at individual effect, each one was intent only to give the spirit of the character, and in every case, the delivery of the beautiful lines was impressive in its earnestness and absolute naturalness, and the enunciation was beautifully clear.

Stewart Dudley had—so those who have lived in India declare—by some miracle caught the spirit of India in his music,

in which he had used the Indian graduation of scale, which are three times as many as we employ. Like Wagner, he has a leading motif for each character running through, and the vocal solos introduced are weirdly quaint and thrilling—while naturally with such notation, some of the music strikes the ear with unusual and strange dissonances, there are parts of it that are warmly rich and beautiful in tone.

The biggest and culminating triumph was achieved by the luminous yellow of the Celestial charioteer's wonderful costume, which seemed almost dazzling in its luminosity. The stage settings were kept indeterminate and subdued, but were effective.

The whole production has left an ineffaceable impression upon those who were fortunate enough to see it. That such really wonderful effects could be attained by young aspirants without the aid of proper stage lighting effects, and with few stage conveniences and accessories is a notable attainment that arouses wonder in those who can realise the difficulties surmounted.

THE MUSIC.

The music of the play, though very interesting in itself, is to be judged as part of the whole production.

The overture opens with the King's love singing theme, given first in the low register of the orchestra. This is continued by the higher strings and wood wind to a climax, with a first hint of the curse motive. A bridge passage for strings and wood wind leads to Śakuntala's love-singing theme played by the violin; this works up to a repeat of the same given in the higher octave by the flutes and oboes. A tremolo passage for strings, with a further hint of the curse motive, is followed by the development of the King's theme working to a full climax of both the King's and Śakuntala's themes leading straight to the curse motive at full orchestral strength. A quiet passage for strings ending with a cadenza for the oboe is followed by the golden peak theme given by the flute in its highest register. The overture foreshadows the entire development of the drama: the sublimation of the earthly unstable love to the universally significant reunion at the mystic's retreat in the Himālaya Mountains. The incidents of the drama are limited in the use of the curse and other motives.

Before and during part four, an off-shoot of the Golden Peak theme will be heard, suggestive of the nymphs, who sing their farewell to Śakuntala

The Sanskrit Academy, Madras.

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TOLKĀPPIYAM

The earliest Extant Tamil Grammar

With a short commentary in English

BY

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Scheme of transliteration:—

அ = a	க = k	ல = l
ஆ = ā	ங = ṅ	வ = v
இ = i	ச = c	ழ = ḷ
ஈ = ī	ஞ = ṇ	ள = ḷ
உ = u	ட = ṭ	ற = ṛ
ஊ = ū	ண = ṇ	ன = ṇ
எ = e	த = t	குற்றியலிகரம் = i
ஏ = ē	ந = n	குற்றியலுகரம் = u
ஐ = ai	ப = p	ஃ = ai
ஒ = o	ம = m	மகரக்குறக்கம் = m
ஓ = ō	ய = y	
ஔ = au	ர = r	

This scheme is the same as that followed by the Tamil Lexicon of the University of Madras except for the last four; k is used there for ஃ, but I prefer to have the same ஃ in transliteration also since the k may give a mistaken notion that it is a guttural sound while in fact it is guttural only when it is followed by the guttural etc. Its pronunciation is determined by the succeeding consonant. Refer to sūtra 38.

TOLKĀPPIYAM.

Eluttatikāram (Phonology)

1. Nūnmarapu¹ (Ancient Terminology.)

1. *Eluttenappaṭuṭa*

Akaramutal

Nakara viṇuvāy muppaḥṭenṭa

Cārntuvaran maraṇin mūnralan kaṭaiyē.

The thirty (sounds) from a to ṇ except the three secondary ones are termed *Eluttu*.

Note.—Iḷampūraṇar, the earliest commentator on Tolkāppiyam and Naccinārkkinīar, another commentator on the same opine that this sūtra deals with the name, number and order of sounds. But Civañāṇamuṇivar in his Tolkāppiyamutarcūttiravirutti condemns their opinion and says that this sūtra deals only about the term *Eluttu*.

2. *Avaitām,*

Kurriya likaram kurriya lukaram

Āytameṇṭa

Muppār pulḷiyu meluttō raṇṇa.

They (secondary sounds) are i, u and & which are represented by dots (in script).

Note.—Civañāṇamuṇivar takes muppārpuḷḷiyum to qualify all the three, viz., kurriyalikaram, kurriyalukaram and āytam. But Iḷampūraṇar and Naccinārkkinīar take muppārpuḷḷiyum to qualify only āytam.

3. *Avarruḷ*

a i u

E o eṇṇu mappā laintum

Ōraḷa picaiḷḷuṇ kurṛelut tenṭa.

Of them the five sounds a, i, u, e and o are called kurṛeluttu or short sounds and sound one aḷapu or mātrā each.

1. This chapter deals with the classification of sounds, contiguous consonants and the symbols for certain sounds.

4. *Ā ī ū**Ē ai**Ō au eṇṇu maṭṭā lēlum**Īraḷa picaikku neṭṭelut teṇṭa.*

The seven ā, ī, ū, ē, ai, ō and au are called neṭṭeluttu or long sounds and sound two mātras each.

5. *mūvala picaittal ōrelut tiṇṇē.*

One eluttu never sounds three mātras.

Note.—Here eluttu must mean symbol and not sound, since āa is pronounced exactly in the same way as the pluta a in Sanskrit. Besides the word elūtal in the following sūtra suggests it.

6. *Niṭṭam vēṇṭi narvaḷa puṭaiya**Kūṭṭi elūta leṇṇanār pulavar.*

Learned men say that, to lengthen the sound, the symbol for the short vowel or symbols should be written close to that for the long vowel according to the quantity needed. Ex. āa, ii etc.

Note.—The expression 'eṇṇanār pulavar' suggests that the author of this treatise is not the first grammarian in Tamil language.

7. *Kaṇṇimai noṭiyēṇa vavvē mālirai**Nuṇṇili nuṇarutōṭ kaṇṭa vārē.*

One mātrā is the time taken for one wink of the eyes or one snap of the fingers, according to the opinion of accurate grammarians.

8. *Aukāra viṇuvāyṭ.**Paṇṇi reluttu muyireṇa molīṭa.*

The twelve (beginning with a and) ending with au are called uyir or vowels.

9. *Nakāra viṇuvāyṭ.**Patineṇ neḷuttu meyyēṇa molīṭa.*

The eighteen (beginning with k and) ending with ṇ are called mey or consonants.

10. *meyyō ṭiyaiyinu muyiriyal tiriyā.*

The nature of vowels is not altered even when pronounced after consonants (i.e.) the quantity of ka, ca, ṭa, ta etc. is only one mātrā.

11. *Meyyi ṇaḷavē yaraiyēṇa molīṭa.*

The quantity of a consonant is half a mātrā.

12. *Avviya ṇilaiyu mēṇai mūṇṇē.*

The other three too (the secondary vowels) are of the same nature; (i.e.) the quantity of i, ū and ə is half a mātrā each.

13. *Araiyaḷaṇu kuṇkaṇ makara muṭaittē**Icayiyā narukun teriyuṇ kālai.*

The quantity of m is shortened to quarter of a mātrā when it follows some consonants. Ex. Pōṇṇi.

14. *Uṭṭeru pulḷi yuvvā kummē.*

Its symbol is that of m (ṁ) with a dot within.

Note.—Iḥampūraṇar and Naccinārkkinīyar interpret this sūtra to mean that the symbol of m (ṁ) is that of p (ṇ) with a dot within. But since the 13th sūtra deals with shortened m, it is but proper to mention about its symbol and not that of ordinary m. But the meaning given by me in the Bishop Heber College magazine was supported by Pandit M. Raghava Iyengar in his article on Tolkāppiyaṇārum Puḷḷiyeluttukkaḷum published in Centamiḷ Vol. XXV, p. 165.

15. *Meyyi ṇiyarkai pulḷiyōṭu nilaiyal.*

The nature of the consonant symbol is that it is provided with a dot. viz., ṁ, ṇ, etc. for k, c etc.

16. *Ekara okarat tiyarkaiyu marṇē.*

e and o also are of the same nature, (i.e.) the short e and the short o should be written as ௪ and ௫.

Note.—In the time of Tolkāppiyaṇār e, ē, o & ō were written as ௪, ௫, ௫ & ௫, while they are now written as ௪, ௪, ௫ & ௫.

17. *Pulḷi yillā vellā meyyu**Muruvuru vāki yakaramō tuyirttalū**Mēṇai yuyirō turuvutirin tuyirttalū**Māyī riyaḷa vuyirtta lārē.*

All consonant symbols without dots as ௪, ௫, ௫, ௫ etc. represent consonant sounds followed by a and those for consonants followed by other vowels are different.

18. *meyyiṇ vaḷiya tuyirtōṇṇu nilaiyē.*

Vowel follows a consonant in uyir-mey or consonant-vowels as ka, ki, ku etc.

19. *Valleḷut teṇṭa kacaṭa taṭara.*

K, c, ṭ, t, p and ṛ are called, valleḷuttu or hard or voiceless consonants.

20. *Mellelūt teṇṇa ṇāṇaṇa namaṇa.*
 ṇ, ṇ̄, ṇ̄̄, ṇ̄̄̄, m and ṇ̄̄̄̄ are called melleluttu or nasals.
21. *Itaiyeḷūt teṇṇa yarala vaḷala.*
 y, r, l, v, ḷ and ḹ are called itaiyeḷuttu or semi-vowels.
22. *Ammū vārum vaḷaṇkiyaṇ maruṇkiṇ*
meymmayaṇ kuṇaṇilai teriyuṇ kūlai.

The above eighteen (consonants), when carefully examined in their usage, are followed by the same consonants or by different consonants and the former is called *uṇaṇilaimayakkam* and the latter *meymmayakkam*.

Note.—Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar interprets the sūtra to mean 'the above consonants when carefully examined, are followed by other consonants; or they being followed by vowels are followed by other consonants followed by vowels; the former is called *meymmayakkam* and the latter *uṇaṇilaimayakkam*. ḷampūraṇar's interpretation seems to be better.

23. *Taṇalala veṇṇum pulḷi muṇṇark*
Kacaṇa veṇṇu mūveḷūt turiya.

Only k, c, and p can follow t, r, l and ḷ. Ex. kaṭka, kaṭci, kaṭpa; kaṛka, muyaṛci, kaṛpa; celka, valci, celpa; kolka, Niḷciṇai and kolpa.

24. *Avaṛṛuḷ*
Laḷaṣkūṇ muṇṇar yaṇavun tōṇṇum.

Y and v also can follow l and ḷ. Ex. kolyāṇai, celvam; veḷyāru and kaḷvaṇ.

25. *Ṇāṇaṇana maṇaveṇṇum pulḷi muṇṇart*
Tatta micaika ḷottana nilaiyē.

ṇ̄, ṇ̄̄, ṇ̄̄̄, ṇ̄̄̄̄, m and ṇ̄̄̄̄̄ are followed by their corresponding voiceless consonants. Ex. kaṇkaṇ, kaṇcaṇ, kaṇṭaṇ, kantaṇ, kampaṇ and kaṇṇu.

26. *Avaṛṛuḷ*
Ṇaṇaṣkūṇ muṇṇark
Kacaṇaṇa mayavaṇ vēḷu muriya.

K, c, ṇ̄ p, m, y and v also can follow ṇ̄ and ṇ̄̄. Ex. eṇku, veṇcāntu, veṇṇāṇ, paṇpu, veṇmai, maṇyāru, eṇvaṭṭu; puṇku, puṇcey, eṇṇāṇ, aṇpu, vaṇmai, iṇyāl, and puṇvaraku.

27. *Ṇanamava veṇṇum pulḷi muṇṇar*
y ṣ kā ṇ̄irraṇ meyṇer raṇṇē.

Y also may follow ṇ̄, ṇ̄̄, m and v. Ex. uriṇyātu, porunyātu, tirumyātu and tevyātu.

28. *Ma ṣ kāṇ pulḷimūṇ vaṇvun tōṇṇum.*

V also can follow m.

Note :—ḷampūraṇar gives nilam valitu as the example for this sūtra, while Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar says that, in his time, examples for this sūtra had died out.

29. *Yarala veṇṇum pulḷi muṇṇar*
Mutalā keḷuttu ṇ̄akaramoṭu tōṇṇum.

Y, r and ḷ can be followed by those consonants which can stand as the initial member of a word (i.e.) k, t, n, p, m, c, v, ṇ̄ y and ṇ̄̄. Ex. āyka, ārka, āḷka etc.; vēyṇṇaṇam, vēṇṇaṇam and vēḷṇṇaṇam.

Note :—ḷampūraṇar gives vēykaṭitu, vērkaṭitu etc. as examples for this sūtra, while Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar, vēyka, ārka etc. in their place and remarks that such examples as are given by ḷampūraṇar are not suitable since each example is not a single word; but this remark does not seem to be quite satisfactory since this section deals only with the consonants that can possibly follow another consonant.

30. *Mēyṇṇilai cuṭṭi ṇellā veḷuttun*
Tammur rāmvārūm vaḷavalaṇ kaṭaiyē.

All consonants except r and ḷ can be followed by the same consonant. Ex. Kākkai, eṇṇaṇam, paccai etc.

31. *A i u am mūṇṇuṇ cuṭṭu.*

Demonstratives are the three (sounds) a, i and u. Ex. avaṇ, iṇvaṇ and uṇvaṇ.

32. *Ā ē ō am mūṇṇum viṇā.*

Interrogatives are the three (sounds) ā, ē, ō. Ex. uṇkā, uṇkē and uṇkō.

Note :—ḷampūraṇar and Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar add yā also to the above list; but it might have been omitted by Tolkāppiyāṇar since it is not a single sound. Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar says that examples with the interrogative ā were very rare in his time.

33. *Alaṇṇaṇ tuyirttalū morricai nūṭalū*
Muḷaveṇa molipa vicāiyōṭu civaṇiya
Naramṇin maṇaiya eṇmaṇṇar pulavar.

Learned men say that the words and consonants have their quantity increased in music, vocal and instrumental.

Note.—Iḥampūraṇar adds 'in vocative also'.

(Nūṇmarapu ends.)

2. Moḷimarapu.* (Wordology).

34. *Kuṛṛiya likara niṛṇal vēṇṭum*
Yāveṇ ciṇaimicai uraiyacaik kiḷavik
Kūvayin varūm makara mūrntē.

i stands after m and before yā in the iṭaiccol *miyā* used with a verb when a person is addressed. Ex. Kēṇmiyā, cēṇmiyā, etc.

35. *Puṇariya ṇilaiyīṭaik kuṛukalu murittē*
Yuṇarak kūṇṇ muṇṇart tōṇṇum.

i may also stand as the final member of the first of two words in sandhi; more about it is dealt with later on (i.e.) in *kuṛṛiyalukarappuṇariyal*. Ex. Nāku + yātu = Nākiyātu.

36. *Nettēlut timṇarun toṭarmoli yīṇṇuṇ*
Kuṛṛiya lukaram vallā ṇūrntē.

ū appears as the final member after a hard consonant in words having a long vowel before it (like *nāku*) or in *toṭarmoli*, (like *teṇku*, *varaku* etc.).

37. *Iṭaiṇṇaṭiṇ kuṛuku miṇṇumā ruṇṇē*
Kaṭaṇṇā ṭarinta puṇariya lāṇa

u is further shortened in sandhi and it is dealt with in *kuṛṛiyalukarappuṇariyal*. Ex. Cukkū + koṭu = Cukkūkoṭu.

38. *Kuṛiyataṇ muṇṇa rāyṭaṇ ṇuḷḷi*
Uyiroṭu puṇarntaval lāṇa micaittē.

ḷ is always preceded by a short vowel and followed by a hard consonant. Ex. Eḷ ku, kḷcu, kḷṭu, kḷtu, kḷpu and kḷru.

Note.—The nature of ḷ is similar to that of Jihvāmūliya in Sanskrit as in Kaḥ-karōṭi (कःकरोति) if it precedes a guttural and Upadhmāniya as in Sanskrit kaḥ-paṭhati (कःपठति) if it precedes a labial (i.e.) its organ of articulation is determined by the succeeding consonant. Air is allowed to pass till the place of articulation of the succeeding consonant and suddenly arrested. Since it is not an open sound inasmuch as it is invariably preceded by a short vowel, it cannot be classified as a vowel; neither is it a consonant since it cannot be followed by a vowel.

* This chapter deals with the secondary sounds since they are not found as independent entities outside words, the consonants that can stand as the initial member of a word and those as the final member.



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THE BOY COWHERD

विषय विज्ञान-सामान्यतया विज्ञान विषय
 विज्ञान-सामान्यतया विज्ञान विषय
 विज्ञान-सामान्यतया विज्ञान विषय
 विज्ञान-सामान्यतया विज्ञान विषय

THE WORKS OF PRABHĀKARA.

BY

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In a paper contributed to the Madras session of the Oriental Conference, Mahāmahopādhyāya, Professor S. Kuppu-swami Sastriar, Avl., makes the following remarks :—

“ In the Madras manuscript of the Sarvadarśanakaumudī, by Mādhava Sarasvatī, referred to above, it is stated that Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on the Śābara Bhāṣya (*i.e.*) Vivaraṇa and Nibandhana. The following extract gives this information and some interesting particulars about the Prābhākara literature—

प्रभाकरप्रस्थानं तु—भाष्यस्य प्रभाकरकृतं व्याख्यानद्वयम् । एकं विवरणं षट्सहस्ररूपम् । अपरो निबन्धनसंज्ञः द्वादशसहस्रम् । विवरणस्य ऋजुविमला, निबन्धनस्य दीपशिखा, टीकाद्वयं शालिकनाथकृतं प्रकरणं शालिकनाम । नयविवेको भवनाथकृतं प्रकरणं द्वादशसहस्रम् । तटीका वरदराजकृता अष्टाचत्वारिंशत्साहस्री ॥

P. 122 of the manuscript of Sarvadarśanakaumudī.

From the foregoing extract it is clear that Prabhākara's Br̥hatī should be identified with the Vivaraṇa; and the Nibandhana which Dr. Jha identifies with the Br̥hatī (*see* lines 18 and 19 at page 9 of Dr. Jha's book—Prābhākara School), turns out to be different from the Br̥hatī, for the commentary on the Vivaraṇa, called R̥juvimalā by Śālikanātha deals with the Br̥hatī and not with the Nibandhana. The colophon इति प्रभाकरमिश्रकृतौ मीमांसाभाष्यविवरणे reported by Dr. Jha as found at the end of the second pāda of the second Adhyāya in the Br̥hatī manuscript belonging to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, supports the identification of the Br̥hatī with the Vivaraṇa.”¹

1. Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Page 477 and ff.

अग्रे दीर्घतरोऽयमर्जुनतस्तस्याग्रतो वर्तनी
सा घोषं समुपैति तत्परिसरे देशे कलिन्दात्मजा ।
तस्यास्तीरतमालकाननतले चक्रं गवां चारयन्
गोपः क्रीडति दर्शयिष्यति सखे पन्थानमव्याहतम् ॥
Kṛṣṇakarnāmṛtam.

He then proceeds to show, on the strength of certain internal evidences, that the Bṛhatī is only another name for the Vivaraṇa and not the Nibandhana.

Now, from the extract given above from the Sarvadarśana-kaumudī, one fact is clear that Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Śābarasvāmin. This fact is recorded by other writers also. The following references are worthy of note :—

1. Rāmānujācārya, in his Tantrarahasya, printed in the Gaekwad Oriental Series remarks at the outset.

आलोच्य शब्दत्रयमर्थत्रयं श्रुतीनां

टीकाद्वयं व्यरचयद्बृहतीं च लघ्वीम् ।

भाष्यं गभीरमधिकृत्य मिताक्षरं यः

सोऽयं प्रभाकरगुरुर्जयति त्रिलोक्याम् ॥

बृहतीं तथैव लघ्वीं टीकामधिकृत्य शालिकनाथः ।

ऋजुविमलां दीपशिखां विशदार्थमकृत पञ्चिकां कमलः ॥ P. 3.

2. Varadarāja in his Nayavivekadīpikā says at the beginning of the 2nd Adhyāya—

टीकाकारो हि प्रथमं विवरणटीकां कृत्वा पश्चान्निबन्धनटीकां कृतवानिति
किंवदन्ती । निबन्धनमतस्यापि
शिष्यप्रशिष्यपरंपरया वर्तमानत्वात् निबन्धन इति वर्तमाननिर्देशः ॥

Adyar Manuscript. Vol. II, p. 3.

3. Appayya Dīkṣita in his Parimaḷa remarks in the 3rd pāda of the 3rd Adhyāya—

गुरुणा हि निबन्धनटीकायामङ्गसीत्रामणिबृहस्पतिसत्रयोः कर्मान्तरत्वं
प्रसाधितवतापि विवरणटीकायामर्कान्तरत्वं व्यवहृतम् ॥

P. 789, Nirṇayasāgar Edn.

These extracts go to prove definitely that Prabhākara wrote two commentaries on the Śābara Bhāṣya. Varadarāja gives us an additional information that Prabhākara wrote the Vivaraṇa first and then the Nibandhana. Rāmānuja records the same tradition in his commentary on the Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathi Miśra. He says :—

विवरणं नाम प्रथमं गुरुणा प्रणीता लघ्वी टीका इति तत्संप्रदायः ।
निबन्धनं नाम पश्चाद्गुरुणैव प्रणीता बृहती टीका ॥

Adyar Manuscript. P. 633.

Thus we see that the Vivaraṇa was written first and that the Nibandhana next. Now what could have been the reason which compelled Prabhākara to write two commentaries? The following explanation is offered in certain quarters : Prabhākara wrote the Vivaraṇa and his teacher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa chanced to look into it. The doctrines propounded therein were antagonistic to his and consequently he criticised them in a work of his (Kumārila's). Prabhākara had to defend his position and in refutation he wrote the Nibandhana. This explanation may be taken for what it is worth, but cannot be brushed aside as baseless. Śālikanātha, in many places in his R̥juvimalā points out how the Bṛhatī (Nibandhana) is intended to refute the statements made in the Vārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Let us now turn to the identification of the work of Prabhākara that is now available. The available work is called the Bṛhatī and a commentary on it by Śālikanātha, named R̥juvimalā is also available. Writing about 20 years ago Dr. Jha was not then aware of the 2 works of Prabhākara. He was aware of the references to Prabhākara as Nibandhanakāra and when a work of Prabhākara was discovered, he at once named it Nibandhana. It was Mahāmahopādhyāya, Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastriar who first drew the attention of scholars to the two works of Prabhākara. And on the strength of certain evidences which he was able to collect, he viewed the question from a different point of view and came to the conclusion that the available work called Bṛhatī could not be identified with the Nibandhana but only with the Vivaraṇa. I had occasion to view the question fully during the course of my official work as librarian of the Adyar Library and I shall summarise the results of my enquiry briefly.

Mādhava Sarasvatī states in the Sarvadarśana Kaumudī that the Vivaraṇa consists of (about) 6,000 granthas (every grantha consists of 32 syllables) and the Nibandhana of 12,000 granthas. These figures cannot be accurate to the letter but are only approximate. Now the Bṛhatī is available up to the end of the sixth Adhyāya and it consists of nearly 8,000 granthas. There are six more Adhyāyas and that portion is yet to be discovered. It is obvious, therefore, that this cannot be the Vivaraṇa, which is

the smaller of the two works. The portion of the commentary for the 6 Adhyāyas exceeds 6,000 granthas which is the extent of the entire Vivaraṇa. Now this point raised a doubt in the statements of Mādhava Sarasvatī. The R̥juvimalā, which is now available, is a commentary on the Bṛhatī and Mādhava Sarasvatī says that it is a commentary on the Vivaraṇa. Professor Kuppu-swami Sastriar thought probably that Mādhava Sarasvatī was wrong in his calculations. To me it seems that he was wrong, not in his calculations, but only in making the R̥juvimalā a commentary on the Vivaraṇa. The following are my reasons:—

(i) Appayya Dīkṣita refers to the R̥juvimalā as Nibandhana-pāñcikā. He says:—

उक्तं हि निबन्धनपञ्चिकायामृजुविमलायां अनन्वितावस्था हि संबन्ध-
ग्रहणोपायतां गच्छन्ती वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तौ निमित्तम् ॥

Parimala, P. 139, Nirṇaya Sagara Edition.

Pañcikā is the general name of the works of Śālikanātha (for example, Vivaraṇa-pāñcikā, Nibandhana-pāñcikā, Prakaraṇa-pāñcikā etc.). It is evident from the extract that Appayya Dīkṣita regarded the R̥juvimalā as a commentary on the Nibandhana.

(ii) Rāmānuja in his Nāyakarātna remarks:—

निबन्धनं नाम पश्चाद्गुरुणैव प्रणीता बृहती टीका ॥

(quoted ante.)

This extract explicitly records the fact that the Bṛhatī is otherwise called Nibandhana.

(iii) Varadarāja's remarks, in his commentary on the Naya-viveka given under, elucidate the point clearly.

a. विवरणे त्विति । तत्र हि पूर्वपक्षे प्रयोगविधिमन्त्रार्थवादात्मकत्रिविध-
वेदस्य स्मार्तान्वयमुखप्रामाण्यमुच्यते । न केवलं बृहत्यामिव मन्त्रमुखमित्यधिक-
मित्यर्थः ॥

Nayavivekadīpikā Adyar Ms. Vol. I, p. 175.

b. लक्ष्यां तु संगतिपूर्वपक्षौ प्रकारान्तरेण इत्याह—विवरणे त्विति ॥

Vol. I, p. 256.

c. नन्वत्र विवरणटीकायां प्रासङ्गिकमिदमुदाहरणमित्युक्तम् । तदयुक्तम् ;
निबन्धनवत् साक्षात्संगतेरध्याये संभवात् इत्याशङ्क्य यथादीपशिखाटीकार्यं
अवान्तरसंगत्यभिप्रायमाह—विवरणे त्विति ॥

Vol. I, p. 491.

d. नन्वत्राधिकरणपञ्चकमेकीकृत्य पठतो निबन्धनकारस्य कोऽभिप्राय
इत्याह—अधिकरणेति । अस्फुटभेदत्वादित्यर्थः । कथं तर्हि पृथगधिकरणत्व-
मित्यत्राह—त्रयमिति । अन्यमन्यं परिहारमुपदर्शयितुं पृथगधिकरणं भाष्ये
निरसनं कर्तुं विधाभेदाद्विन्नमित्यर्थः । लक्ष्यां तु वस्तुबलादधिकरणं भेदेन ॥
Vol. I, p. 527.

e. विवरणे तु शेषकार्याणां द्रव्याप्रयोगत्वे चतुर्थ उक्ते कथमत्रोपांशु-
याज्यस्य जौहविकस्य शेषकार्यैः शेषप्रयुक्तिशङ्का इत्याशङ्क्य चतुर्थोक्ता
प्रयोजकवत्त्वस्य अन्यथागतिरुक्ता । तामाह—लक्ष्यामिति ॥
Vol. III, p. 602-B.

f. नन्वेवं विवरणमते भाष्यस्थविशिष्टविध्युक्तेः का गतिरित्याशङ्कामनूय
यद्विशिष्टं भक्षणं तत्त्वरूपविधिः तत्र लीनः क्रमः शब्दावगत इति
क्रमापेक्षिणा विधिना स्वीकृत इति विधिस्वीकाराभिप्राया विध्युक्तिरित्याह—
लक्ष्यामिति ॥
Vol. III, p. 634.

g. विवरणे तु भक्षान्तरविध्यर्थं विधेयान्तराभावः प्रपञ्चित इत्याह—
लक्ष्यामिति ॥
Vol. III, p. 637.

h. ननु निबन्धनमते न्यायादेव सिद्धे प्रधानमात्रान्वये वाक्यस्य का
गतिरित्यत्राह—बृहत्यामिति ॥
Vol. IV, p. 215.

In these extracts 'a' differentiates the Vivaraṇa from the Bṛhatī; 'b,' 'e,' 'f' and 'g,' identifies the Vivaraṇa with the Laghvi; 'c,' tries to point out that there is no inconsistency between the Vivaraṇa and the Dīpaśikhā; 'd,' differentiates the Nibandhana and the Laghvi; 'h,' regards the Nibandhana to be identical with the Bṛhatī. These extracts are enough to show that the Nibandhana is the same as the Bṛhatī and that the Vivaraṇa should be distinguished from the Bṛhatī.

(iv) At the beginning of the second Adhyāya Bhavanātha says in his Nayaviveka:—

प्रथमेऽध्याये प्रमाणलक्षणं वृत्तमिति भाष्यम् । तदेव निबन्धने व्याख्या-
तम् “यथाप्रमाणं शब्दस्तथोक्तमित्यर्थः” इति । तद्विवृतमृजुविमलायां “येन
प्रकारेण न[णान]पेक्षत्वात्त्वेन शब्दः प्रमाणमिति लक्ष्यते, तदनपेक्षत्वं प्रमाण-
लक्षणमुक्तम्” इति ॥

Nayaviveka. Adyar Ms. Vol. I, p. 232.

Now the corresponding passage in the Br̥hatī reads thus:—

प्रथमेऽध्याये प्रमाणलक्षणं वृत्तमिति । यथाप्रमाणं शब्दस्तथोक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

Br̥hatī. Vol. II, pp. 438—439.

It is clear that Bhavanātha quotes from the Br̥hatī, through its other name Nibandhana.

(v) The opening verses of the R̥juvimalā lend support to the view that it is a commentary on the Nibandhana. The verse itself runs thus:—

सृष्टं विद्यानिशाब्धं सिद्धिनिबन्धमयवासरम् ।

उज्जासितजगज्जाड्यं नमस्यामः प्रभाकरम् ॥

(vi) The following passage occurring at the beginning of the 9th Adhyāya of R̥juvimalā finds support for the view, propounded herein, in the Vivaraṇa.

अतश्च 'ब्रीह्रीनवहन्ति' इत्यनयैव चोदनया नीवाराणामपि कार्यत्वमवगम्यते । तदिदं कार्यनिरूपणज्ञानमुपजायत इति कार्यजं शब्दम् । तेन "नाप्रमाणत्वं नाशब्दत्वं नोपदेशत्वम्" इति स्वयमेव भगवता विवरणकारेणोदितमित्यनवश्यम् । श्लोकमप्युदाहरन्ति —

"प्राकृतस्थानपातितपदार्थान्तरकार्यतः ।

ऊहः प्रयोगो विकृत ऊह्यमानतयोदितः" ॥ इति ॥

Pp. 5-6.

Unless it be different from the work on which the commentary is written, the whole argument comes to nothing. It is clear therefore that the work R̥juvimalā is not a commentary on the Vivaraṇa.

(vii) Later writers on Mīmāṃsā refer to certain doctrines as special to the author of the Nibandhana and almost all of them could be traced in the extant Br̥hatī. Doctrines referred to as special to the author of the Vivaraṇa are not to be traced in this work. A certain amount of reservation is necessary here, for there are doctrines common to both the Vivaraṇa and the Nibandhana. We must leave them out of account. The following references will clear my position.

I have given in parallel columns certain references to the Nibandhana and the corresponding portion of the Br̥hatī. A perusal of these extracts will convince any reader that the references to the Nibandhana are only to the extent Br̥hatī,

इह अविशेषेणेत्यनेन द्रव्यगुणभावा- किं तावत्प्राप्तमविशेषेणेति । कोऽभि-
र्थानां त्रयाणामपि कार्यत्वमवशिष्टं इत्यन- प्रायः द्रव्यं वा भवतु क्रियार्थम्, क्रिया
ध्यवसायेन पूर्वपक्षो विवक्षितः । अनध्यव- वा भवतु द्रव्यार्थः ॥
सायपूर्वपक्ष एव निबन्धनटीकायां दर्शितः ।
भाष्यगतस्याविशेषेणेति पूर्वपक्षे हतूपन्या-
सस्य चाध्यवसाय एव तात्पर्यं
वर्णितम् ॥

यद्वा विवरणटीकानुसारेण प्रति-
पदाधिकरणशरीरमत्र लिखितम् ; तन्मते
हि प्रतिपदाधिकरणे कर्मैव विषयो न द्रव्य-
गुणौ इति निर्धारितम् ।

विवरणे त्विति । तन्मते कृत्वपूर्वा-
धीनप्रवृत्तिपुरुषफलाधीनप्रवृत्त्योरेवाविचार्य-
त्वेन प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् तयोरेवात्र लक्षण-
मुच्यते । यत्र तु फलरागात् प्रवृत्तिः
तत्पुरुषाधीनप्रवृत्तिः । इतरत् कृत्वार्था
न प्रवृत्तिः इति । एवं च

सूत्रे अर्थपदं फलपरम्, लिप्तापदं च
प्रवृत्तिपरम् ॥

निबन्धने तु अर्थपदमुपादानपरम् ।
लिप्तापदं तु शेषत्वपरमित्यर्थः ॥

ननु विवरणमतेन कामाधिकारता,
निबन्धमतेन जीवाधिकारता ॥

अभिष्टोमसाम कृत्वा यजेतेति वचनं
स्फुटशास्त्रभेदचिन्तेयम् इति सङ्गतिः
निबन्धने ॥

विवरणे तु किं साध्यभेदमात्रात्
उतानुबन्धभेदात् इति चिन्तेयमिति
सङ्गतिः ॥

अर्थस्य नियोगे सिद्धिः । तच्चोपादान-
मित्युक्तम् ॥

किंभूतः पुनरधिक्रियते ? एतावता
हैनसा युक्तो भवतीति श्रवणात् जीवत
एवाधिकारः ॥

अथेदानीमेतस्येति का कथा ।
स्पष्टोऽत्र शास्त्रभेदोऽतद्वर्मकस्य इति

In all these instances one can clearly see that what is referred to as Nibandhanamata is found in the Br̥hatī and what is stated to be the Vivaraṇamata is not to be traced in it. Does it not follow from this that the work we have i.e. the Br̥hatī,

should be the same as the Nibandhana and different from the Vivaraṇa ?

I have referred to a few correspondences alone. There are many more but they have not been recorded here for want of space.

Instances can be multiplied but they are unnecessary.

Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastriar's internal evidence is based on the following passages in—

i. Vidhiviveka and the Nyāyakanikā.

न ह्येष प्रयोगो विधेर्विषयः, अननुष्ठेयत्वात्, अशब्दार्थत्वात्, क्रम-
वद्वयतिरेकेण इदंतया अनिरूपणात्

P. 413, Vidhiviveka.

.....तत्र विवरणकृतो हेतुमाह—अननुष्ठेयत्वात्
निबन्धनकृतो हेतुमाह—अशब्दार्थत्वात् ।

P. 413, Nyāyakanikā.

ii. Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathi Miśra—

तस्मात्सर्व एव तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्च क्रमो न विधेयः इति विवरणकारः ।
निबन्धकारस्त्वाह—भवतु तार्तीयक्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चैकादशादिकाया अभिधान-
संभवात् ग्रहणेन विध्यैदमर्थे सति विध्याक्षितानुष्ठानतया विधेयत्वम् etc.

P. 148, Nyāyaratnamālā.

Now these two passages explain the same idea relating to *krama* and the professor says that these are in perfect agreement with what is stated in the *Bṛhatī* at the beginning of Chapter V.

नन्वयमनारम्भणीय एव क्रमस्याविधेयत्वेनानङ्गत्वात्, अनङ्गलोपे च
प्रधानस्यावैगुण्यात् । कथं पुनः क्रमस्याविधेयत्वम् ? तदुच्यते ।

स्वरूपेणाविधेयः सन् विधेयस्याविशेषणम् ।

अभिधाविधुरत्वेन ग्राहकेणावधीरितः ॥

विध्यङ्गभावविधुरो विध्याक्षेपबहिष्कृतः ।

क्रमः केन प्रकारेण वैधानीयकमृच्छति ॥

न तावत्क्रमः स्वरूपेण विधातुं शक्यते, अनुष्ठेयत्वात् । न हि स्वतन्त्र-
क्रमोऽनुष्ठानं शक्यते । द्रव्यादिवदिति चेन्न, अतद्विशेषणत्वात् । अथापि स्यात्
यथा द्रव्यादीनां स्वतोऽननुष्ठेयानामप्यनुष्ठेयभावार्थविशेषणतया विधिगोचरत्वम्,
एवं क्रमस्यापि भविष्यति इति तन्न, अविधेयविशेषणत्वात् । द्रव्यादयो हि विधेय-

भूतभावार्थविशेषणभूताः युक्तं यद्विधीयन्त इति । क्रमस्तु न तथा, संघात-
विशेषणत्वात्, तस्य चाविधेयत्वात् न हि संघातो विधीयते, पदार्थास्तु निर्धा-
र्यन्ते, न च ते क्रमस्य भूमयः । न ह्येकैकत्र क्रमः संभवति, तस्मादविधेय इति
संख्यावदिति चेत् न, उपलक्षणत्वात् । तत्रैतत्स्यात् “एकादश प्रयाजान् यजति”
इति । यथा संघातवर्तिन्यपि संख्या विधीयते तद्वत्क्रमोऽपीति । तन्न, उपलक्षण-
त्वात् संख्यायाः । न हि तत्र एकादशसंख्या विधीयते, सङ्ख्योपलक्षितास्तु
अभ्यासा विधीयन्ते; ते च क्रियात्मका एवेति युक्तमेव विधीयन्त इति । तस्मात्सर्व
एव तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्च क्रमो न विधेय इति विवरणकारः । निबन्धनकार-
स्त्वाह—भवतु तार्तीयक्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चैकादशादिकाया अभिधानसंभवात् ग्रहणे
विध्यैदमर्थे सति विध्याक्षितानुष्ठानतया विधेयत्वम् । न त्वेवं पाञ्चमिकस्य क्रमस्य
संभवति न हि तस्य किञ्चिदभिधानमस्ति ; अनभिहितं च न ग्राहको ग्रहीतुमीष्टे ॥

तत्र प्राभाकरमतेन पूर्वोत्तरपक्षावारचयति—नन्वयमिति । ननु
अनङ्गत्वेऽपि क्रमविशेषितप्रयोगसाध्यत्वात् प्रयोगविधेस्तदाधारः [रम्भः,] स्यादित्य-
त्राह—अङ्गलोपे चेति । यत् साङ्गं तदेव प्रयोगविधिः स्ववैगुण्यपरिहारार्थः [र्थं
प्रयुङ्क्ते] । नन्वन्व[नङ्गं] तल्लोपेऽपि स्वस्यावैगुण्यादतो न तदादर इत्यर्थः । प्रश्नो-
त्तरमुखेन क्रमस्याविधेयत्वमुपपादयितुमुपक्रमते—कथमिति । तत्र प्रथमं विवरण-
कारमते पूर्वपक्षमाह—स्वरूपेणेति । स तु वस्तुबलवादिताया वस्तुस्वभावपर्यालोचनेन
सर्वस्यापि क्रमस्याविधेयत्वं मन्यते । निबन्धनमतेन पूर्वपक्षमाह—अभिधेति ।
वैधानीयकं विधेयं [यत्वम्] । तत्र प्रथममर्थं व्याचष्टे—न तावदिति । स्वरूपेण
स्वातन्त्र्येणाननुष्ठेयत्वात् अनुष्ठानमयोग्यत्वान्न हि कर्म—क्रमः स्वातन्त्र्येणानुष्ठेयते ।
पदार्थेष्वनुष्ठेयमानेषु स्वयमवर्जनीयतया निष्पद्यत इति न विधिगोचरत्वमश्नुत
इत्यर्थः । शङ्कते—द्रव्यादिवदिति । “दध्ना जुहोति” इत्यत्र सिद्धरूपस्यापि दध्नो
यथा होमोपरञ्जनाद्विधेयत्वं तन्नात्वा[थास्याः]पि स्यादित्यर्थः । न हि संघातो विधीयत
इति युगपदनेकपदार्थसंघातगोचरे विधिर्न कचिदपि दृष्टचरः । विशिष्टविधिरपि
नानाविशेषणविशिष्टैकपदार्थगोचरो न तु संघातगोचरोऽतो यः क्रमाश्रयः नासौ
विधेयः, यस्तु विधेयो नासौ तदाश्रय इति भावः । संघातविशेषणतया विधेयत्वं
दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेन शङ्कते—संख्यादिवदिति । नामोपात्तायास्तत्र विधेयत्वमेव
नास्तीति परिहरति—तत्रेति । एवंलक्षणत्वात् एवंस्वभावादित्यर्थः । न हि
तत्र पञ्चप्रयाजानुद्दिश्यैकादशत्वं विधातुं शक्यते । पञ्चानामेकादशत्वायोगात् ।
किं तु संख्याया अभ्यासमुपलक्ष्य स विधीयते । ततश्चाभ्यासे क्रियमाणे श्रुत-

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मेकादशत्वं स्वयमेव संपद्यत इति न विधेयत्वं तस्येत्यर्थः । पूर्वपक्षमुपसंहरति—
तस्मादिति । तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्चेति । “वपदकर्तुः प्रथमभक्षः” इत्यादिषु
प्रथमादिशब्दावगम्यः पदार्थद्वयाश्रितः [श्रयः] पार्वापर्यलक्षणस्तार्तीयः क्रमः,
पाञ्चमिकस्तु बहुपदार्थाश्रयो विततिलक्षणः शब्दानभिधेयः, उभयस्यापि अभिधेय-
त्वानभिधेयत्वलक्षणवैषम्यसद्भावेऽपि वस्तुस्वभावपर्यालोचयनायां [या] न [भि]
विधेयत्वं इत्यर्थः । विवरणं नाम प्रथमं गुरुणा प्रणीता लघ्वी टीका इति
तत्संप्रदायः । निबन्धनं नाम पश्चादनेनैव प्रणीता बृहती टीका । तन्मतेनेदानीं
पूर्वपक्षमाह—निबन्धनकारस्त्विति । स तु शब्दबलवादितया शब्दस्व-
भावपर्यालोचनाभिधेयस्य क्रमस्य संख्यायाश्च विधेयत्वमङ्गीचकारेत्यर्थः ।
ग्राहकग्रहणेति । प्रथमं ग्राहकग्रहणं तदनुग्राहकशेषत्वं तदनन्तरं पूर्वकाले वर्त-
मानाद्गतोः क्षरणशेषत्वं, पश्चात् तद्ग्राहकशेषत्वं, ततः प्रयोगविध्यनुग्राह्यत्वं, तदेव
च विधेयत्वमिति तन्मतपरिपाटी ; तार्तीयस्य क्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चाभिधानसंभवा-
त्तत्सर्वं संभवतीत्यर्थः । पाञ्चमिकस्य तु तद्वैपरीत्यमाह—न त्वेनमिति । तदे-
वोपपादयति—न हीत्यादिना ॥

Now let us compare this with what is found in the opening portion of the 5th Adhyāya of the Br̥hatī.

ननु च क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थचिन्ता प्रवृत्ता किमिदं प्रयोजकाप्रयोजकलक्षणं
प्रवृत्तमिति, उच्यते । क्रमचिन्ताया मध्ये (?) शवोपयोगात् वक्ष्यमाणौपयिकतया
सङ्कीर्त्यते न प्रवृत्तैकतया । एकयोगप्रवृत्तौ प्रयुक्तानां (?) हि क्रमो नाप्रयुक्तानामिति
प्रयोजकसङ्कीर्तनं यदि प्रयोजकाप्रयोजकप्रयुक्तानां क्रमश्चिन्त्यते । अभिधेयः तर्हि
प्रयुज्यते, नाप्रयुक्तस्य विधानम् ॥

केन वोक्तं क्रमो विधीयत इति । विहितविधानमेवात्र चिन्त्यते । किं यथा
प्रतिपन्नविहितविधानमनुष्ठेयम्, उतानियमेनेति । कथं पुनरयथाप्रतिपन्नानुष्ठान-
माशङ्क्यते, विनियोगशून्यत्वाद्विधानावगमस्य । नान्तरीयको हि विधेयावगतौ
विधानप्रत्ययः । अतो यस्तादर्थ्येन स चोदनार्थ इति मन्वानः पूर्वपक्षवाचनियमं
मन्यते ॥

ननु च “अचर्युर्ब्रह्माणं दीक्षयित्वा” इत्यत्र क्रमविधानमेवोपन्यस्तं
भाष्यकारेण—“विधेयान्तराभावात्”—इति वदता । यद्येवमयुक्तमिदमस्त्ये-
वात्र विधेयान्तरम्, अनेनाभी दीक्षयितव्या इति ; कर्तृविशेषविधानमध्वर्यु-
विधावपि नियम एव ; किं हेयमेवेदं भाष्यम् ? नेति वदामः । यदिदं चेति

अयोवयुत्याभिधाने च गम्यते कर्तृविशेषविधौ तदयौ(?)तौयिकतायेव
कर्तृविधावुपयुज्यते (?) न सम्बन्धिविधौ, इति तन्निष्ठा श्रुतिरित्युक्तम् ।
अप्रयुक्तस्याविधेयत्वं हेतुरुक्तः । एवं तर्हि “हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ
वक्षसः” इति एतदप्युदाहरणं स्यात्, नेति ब्रूमः । पाठगतस्यायमथशब्दोऽनुवादः ।
कर्तृविशेषविधौ अनन्यान्यतः क्रमोऽवगन्तुं शक्यते क्त्वाप्रत्ययादिति सूत्रम् । किं पुनः
कारणं, नान्तरीयको नियमः आद्रियेत । पुनर्बाह्यचोदनालक्षणानिवृत्तौ योगनिवृत्ता-
वाशङ्कोपपद्यते, सत्यं नोपपद्यते । अत एव च नानुष्ठीयते किं त्वर्थप्राप्त एव
क्रमान्तरं निरुणद्धि, अन्यस्यानवगमादित्युच्यते । अतोऽनपेक्षत्वमेवाप्यभि-
धीयमानमप्युकारायैव भवतीति न दोषः । पुनरुक्तस्याद्याशङ्का त्यक्ता ॥

A careful comparison of the passage quoted from the Br̥hatī and the Nāyakarātna leads me to believe that the Nibandhanapakṣa of the Nyāyaratnamālā could be clearly traced to the Br̥hatī. In the same breath Rāmānuja tells us that the Nibandhana that is referred to is the same as the Br̥hatī and that the Vivaraṇa is otherwise known as Laghvī.

From the discussion above, is it not proper to argue that the Nibandhana of Prabhākara is the same as the work that we have at present ? I would request my revered Professor to reconsider his position in the light of the remarks made in this paper and let us have his decisive views on the point.

STUDIES IN THE IMAGERY OF THE RĀMĀYAṆA.

BY

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I

Despite the Dhvanivāda, which assigns a subordinate place to Alaṅkāras or figurative images, both poets and critics have always shown immense interest in them in India. Bharata, the earliest of the known writers who deal with the subject of Alaṅkāras, recognises four of them in his Nāṭyaśāstra,¹ but their number went on increasing, until it reaches the respectable number of 125 in the Kuvalayānanda of Appayya Dikṣita, without, of course, counting the Sub-divisions. The last great work belonging to the Alaṅkāraśāstra, the Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannāthapaṇḍita, written long after the Dhvanivāda had received almost universal recognition at the hands of poets and critics, is primarily a detailed study of the Alaṅkāras. It is not merely critics who take delight in defining and analysing these figures of speech, but poets also exhibit a weakness for them throughout the whole period of Sanskrit literature. Nor is there anything surprising in this. Figurative imagery is bound to have its place in all good poetry. Even critics like the Dhvanivādins, who have declared that poetry has a higher function to perform than the mere presentation of beautiful imagery, have admitted that imagery, if carefully used, can serve this very higher purpose.

The interest of our critics, from Bharata to Jagannāthapaṇḍita, has, however, been in the *form* of the Alaṅkāras. It must be admitted that our Ālaṅkārikas have bequeathed to us a very deep, penetrating and detailed analysis of the *forms* that Sanskrit imagery can assume. Great efforts were made to distinguish one form from another. In later times, all the devices provided by the Navinanyāya for reaching extreme accuracy in definitions were adopted for the purpose. The history of the Alaṅkāraśāstra is, to a very great extent, the history of the discovery of newer and newer forms of images, of a more and more scientific

basis for classifying them and of the formulation of more and more accurate definitions of them. Appayya Dikṣita's "Citra-mīmāṃsā" and Jagannāthapaṇḍita's "Rasagaṅgādhara" are indications of the kind of controversies that must have been carried on in circles of critics in ancient India.

There is, however, something more than *form* in any given image. An image usually involves a comparison and a comparison presupposes three things :—the object of comparison (the upameya) the standard of comparison, (the upamāna) and the point of similarity (the samānadharmā). These might be called the *contents* of an image. The contents might remain the same while the form varies and the form might remain the same, while the contents vary. The following passage from the "Citra-mīmāṃsā" would make this quite clear :—

चन्द्र इव मुखमिति सादृश्यवर्णनं तावदुपमा । सैवोक्तिभङ्गीभेदेनानेकालं-
कारभावं भजते । तथा हि—“चन्द्र इव मुखं मुखमिव चन्द्रः” इत्युपमेयोपमा ।
“मुखं मुखमिव” इत्यनन्वयः । “मुखमिव चन्द्रः” इति प्रतीपम् । “चन्द्रं दृष्ट्वा मुखं
स्मरामि” इति स्मरणम् । “मुखमेव चन्द्रः” इति रूपकम् । “मुखचन्द्रेण तापः
शाम्यति” इति परिणामः । “किमिदं मुखमुताहो चन्द्रः” इति सन्देहः । etc.¹

In the above passage, the contents of all the figures of speech are the same, namely, the face and the moon; but the *form* varies according as it is upamā, or rūpaka or something else.

The Alaṅkāraśāstra is essentially an analysis of the *form* of the images. This analysis was undertaken partly to satisfy a natural intellectual curiosity and partly, because, it was felt that it had something to do with the aesthetic pleasure we feel when we come across a beautiful image. It may be admitted that it *has* something to do with it. How else can we explain the different effect on us of the different figures of speech even when the contents remain the same? But one may also ask the question : have not the contents also something to do with it? When Kālidāsa writes :—

अथ वा कृतवाग्द्वारे वंशेऽस्मिन् पूर्वसूरिभिः ।
मणौ वज्रसमुत्कीर्णे सूत्रस्येवास्ति मे गतिः ॥²

1. Citramīmāṃsā, p. 6, (Nirnaya Sagara Press Edition).

2. Ragh. I, 4.

1. Bharata-Nāṭyaśāstra, XVI. (Benares Edition).

S. K. De. Sanskrit Poetics II, p. 6.

Do we like the comparison only because it has taken the form of upamā, or also, because, of its appropriateness *i.e.*, for its contents?

We cannot doubt that our Ālaṅkārikas had recognised the share of the contents in making an image beautiful. According to Bhāmaha, the defects of an upamā, as mentioned by Medhāvīn, are as follows :—

हीनतासंभवो लिङ्गवचोभेदो विपर्ययः ।

उपमानाधिकत्वं च तेनासदृशतापि च ॥¹

Vāmana's list is almost identical :—

हीनत्वाधिकत्वलिङ्गवचनभेदासादृश्यासंभवास्तदोषाः² ।

It will be observed that these are defects in the *contents* of the upamā and not in the *form*. Appayya Dikṣita puts the whole thing in a more positive form when he says :—

उपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरर्थयोर्द्वयोः ।

हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्युच्यते काव्यवेदिभिः ॥

कविसमयप्रसिद्धयनुरोधेनोपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरेव साधर्म्यमुपमा । न त्वतथाभूतयोः । अत एव “कुमुदमिव मुखं प्रसन्नं” इत्यादि नोपमा । तथाभूतयोरपि वस्तुत्वद्रव्यत्वादिकृतमहद्यं साधर्म्यं न तथा । किं तु हृद्यमेव कान्तिमत्त्वादिकम् । सर्वोऽपि ह्यलंकारः कविसमयप्रसिद्धयनुरोधेन हृद्यतया काव्यशोभाकर एवालंकारतां भजते । अतः “गोसदृशो गवयः” इति नोपमा । “गौर्वाहीकः” इति न रूपकम् । “स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा” इति न सन्देहः । “इदं रजतं” इति न भ्रान्तिमान् । “नायं सर्पः” इति नापह्नुतिः । “पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते” इति न पर्यायोक्तम् । “पर्वतो वह्निमान्” इति नानुमानम् । “स देवदत्तः” इति न स्मरणम् । “तस्थ-स्थमिषां तातंतामः” इति न यथासंख्यम् । “पुत्रेण सहागतः पिता” इति न सहोक्तिः । “तेन विना गतः” इति न विनोक्तिः । “श्वेता धावति” इति न श्लेषः³ ।

The meaning of this passage cannot be mistaken. There is here recognition, in theory at least, of the importance of the *contents* in an image, of their share in the production of the pleasure we feel when we come across a good image. A recent

English writer says:—“What precisely is the origin of the pleasure we take in the pictures of metaphor and simile, as distinct from unfigurative word-picture? I think that, over and above the delight in a picture, there is a little shock of surprise caused by the unexpected rapprochement of two notions that seemed, a moment before, unconnected and remote from one another. The noticing of likenesses (need I refer to babies?) would seem an ever-fresh source of pleasure—we call comparisons odious, but love them none the less. And when the likeness is perceived in the midst of unlikeness, perhaps even despite obvious and preponderating unlikeness, the pleasure is proportionately greater.”¹

In spite of this theoretical recognition of the importance of the *contents* for the beauty of an image, we find in our Ālaṅkāra-śāstra no study, no analysis of them. But if it is true that the contents have something to do with the pleasure we derive from beautiful images and if it is true that imagery has played a conspicuous part in all periods of Sanskrit literature, then such an analysis of the contents of the images might yield interesting results. It should, it seems to me, throw some light on the history of Sanskrit literature. It would show to what extent the contents vary or remain the same in the different authors and periods of Sanskrit literature. Explanation would have to be sought for the variation or the repetition, as the case may be. It would show the range of the poetic power of the different writers and their relation to one another. It might throw some light on the relation between *form* and *content* in the evolution of the images. In short, no history of Sanskrit literature could be considered complete which did not include a historical treatment of Sanskrit imagery, from the point of view of form as well as of content. In the existing works on the History of Sanskrit literature, such as those of Professors Keith and Winternitz, there are, no doubt, many interesting remarks on the imagery of Sanskrit poets, but no systematic treatment. The task is a big one, but a beginning has to be made. The following pages are no more than a humble attempt at such a beginning. I have thought it best to begin with the Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa², because it is there that we find the beginnings of Kāvya.

1. Stephen. J. Brown. “The World or Imagery.” London 1927.

2 The Bombay Recension of the Rāmāyaṇa has been used for this study.

1. Bhāmahālaṅkāra, II. 39.

2. Vāmana's Kāvyaālaṅkārasūtra Vṛtti, IV, ii, 8.

3. Cītramīmāṃsā, p. 6.

The first step in the study of the imagery of the Rāmāyaṇa is to determine the occasions on which the images appear in the work. As every one knows, the work is an immense one. As one reads it, all sorts of scenes pass before our eyes. There are descriptions of cities and landscapes, fierce rākṣasas and mighty monkeys. There are moving scenes in which husband and wife, father and son, master and servant, king and subject, prince and priest take part and give expression to their innermost feelings. There are accounts of duels and battles, devastation of countries, burning of cities and ruthless destruction of armies by weapons, human and divine. There are speeches born of indignation and anger, lamentations expressive of profound sorrow, and exhortations of wisdom. With all this, the work is mainly a continuous narrative of events, big and small. Into the main story of Rāma and his exploits are woven countless episodes centering round the minor characters of the work. The question before us however, is : In all this variety and richness of subject-matter, what are the occasions which particularly call forth imagery from the poet ? In answer to this, it may be stated, in a general manner, that images are found throughout the work. There is hardly a sarga in which at least a few comparisons do not occur. They may not always be very striking, they are often mere repetitions of quite commonplace images like कमलपत्राक्ष, इन्दीवद्वयाम, राजीवलोचन, नरशार्दूल, मुनिपुंगव, देवसंकाश etc. Our interest lies not in these, but in those which occur on special occasions. For, there are some occasions on which these images seem to come in quick succession and in greater abundance. It is these which are striking and arrest our attention. It is these which seem to have been introduced by the poet deliberately, with a full knowledge of the effect they will have on the hearer or the reader. I give below a list of passages in which the images are thus more striking. It is by no means an exhaustive list, but, I hope, sufficiently complete, not to invalidate any conclusion that may be drawn from it.

- I. 18, 50-52. ... Daśaratha describes his joy on the arrival of Viśvāmitra and compares the occasion to others.
- I. 48, 2-5. ... Sumati asks Viśvāmitra who Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are, while describing them.
- I. 49, 14-15. ... Description of Ahalyā as Rāma sees her.

- I. 55, 9-10. ... Description of Viśvāmitra, defeated and humiliated by Vasiṣṭha.
- II. 1. ... Description of Rāma by Daśaratha.
- II. 2. ... Description of Rāma by the people.
- II. 3, 27-29. ... Description of Rāma as Daśaratha sees him coming.
- II. 4, 5, 6. ... Description of the preparations for the abhiṣeka of Rāma as Yuvarāja.
- II. 7, 1-30. ... Mantharā's speech to Kaikeyī on hearing of Rāma's coronation.
- II. 8. ... Mantharā's speech.
- II. 9, 41-46. ... Kaikeyī's description of Mantharā.
- II. 10, 23-26. ... Description of Kaikeyī in distress.
- II. 12. ... Speech of Daśaratha on hearing of Kaikeyī's two boons.
- II. 15. ... Sumantra's description of Rāma's palace.
- II. 16, 9 f.f. ... Sumantra's description of Rāma.
- II. 16. ... Poet's description of Rāma as he goes out to meet Daśaratha.
- II. 18, 4-7. ... Description of Daśaratha in distress.
- II. 20, 32-34. ... Description of Kausalyā in distress.
- II. 20, 49-55. ... Kausalyā's lamentation on hearing of Rāma's exile.
- II. 34, 2-3. ... Description of Daśaratha in distress.
- II. 40. ... Departure of Rāma.
- II. 43. ... Lamentation of Kausalyā.
- II. 59, 28-30. ... Lamentation of Daśaratha.
- II. 65, 66. ... Lamentation of Daśaratha's wives after his death.
- II. 73, 1-5. ... Bharata's indignation on hearing Rāma's exile.
- II. 93, 8-15. ... Description of Citrakūṭa by Bharata.
- II. 94. ... Description of Citrakūṭa by Rāma.
- III. 16. ... Description of winter in Pañcavaṭī.
- III. 19, 3-4. ... Khara's speech on seeing Śūrpaṇakhā mutilated.
- III. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30... Description of battle between Rāma and the Rākṣasas.
- III. 31, 41-44. ... Mārīca's advice to Rāvaṇa not to take Sītā away.

- III. 37, 12-20. ... Mārīca's second speech to the same effect.
- III. 47, 32 f.f. ... Sītā's reply when Rāvaṇa proposes marriage.
- III. 51. ... Battle between Jaṭāyus and Rāvaṇa.
- III. 52. ... Description of the ravishment of Sītā.
- III. 56. ... Sītā's reply to Rāvaṇa's proposal of marriage.
- IV. 14, 19-23. ... Sugrīva going out to battle.
- IV. 15, 19-21. ... Description of Rāma by Tārā.
- IV. 17, 1 f.f. ... Description of fallen Vālin.
- IV. 19, 21-26. ... " " by Tārā.
- IV. 23, 22-28. ... Lamentation of Tārā.
- IV. 28. ... Description of the rainy season.
- IV. 29. ... " " autumn.
- V. 1. ... " Hanumān's leap across the ocean.
- V. 2. ... " Laṅkā by Hanumān.
- V. 4. ... " Laṅkā.
- V. 5. ... " A moonlit night.
- V. 6. ... " Rāvaṇa's palace.
- V. 7. ... " " "
- V. 9. ... " " harem.
- V. 10. ... " " "
- V. 14. ... " Aśōkavana.
- V. 15. ... " Sītā in distress.
- V. 18. ... " Rāvaṇa's visit to Sītā.
- V. 19. ... " Sītā in distress.
- V. 21. ... Sītā's reply to Rāvaṇa's proposal.
- V. 22. ... Speeches of Rāvaṇa and Sītā.
- V. 28. ... Sītā's lamentation.
- V. 56. ... Description of mountain.
- V. 57. ... " Hanumān's return leap.
- VI. 5. ... Rāma's lamentation.
- VI. 16. ... Rāvaṇa's indignant speech to Vibhīṣaṇa.
- VI. 24. ... Rāvaṇa's angry speech to Śuka.
- VI. 53. ... Battle between Vajradanīṣṭra and Śuka.
- VI. 58. ... " Prahastā and Nila.
- VI. 59. ... Description of Rākṣasas.

- VI. 61. ... Description of Kumbhakarṇa.
- VI. 71. ... " Atikāya.
- VI. 102. ... Fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa.
- VI. 103. ... " "
- VI. 111. ... Vibhīṣaṇa's lamentation on the death of Rāvaṇa.

Before explaining the above list, it must be stated that the bulk of the Rāmāyaṇa is made up of narratives, written in a simple style, in which the story progresses from incident to incident and episode to episode. Interspersed among these narratives and forming, on the whole, *only a minor portion of the work* are some speeches and descriptions. It is quite clear from the above list that the images, when they do occur in greater abundance and in a striking manner, occur in these speeches and descriptions and not in the narrative portion of the work, which is devoted to the telling of the story. It is in these speeches and descriptions that we have to see the beginnings of the later Kāvya, in very many of which the narrative portion is reduced to the absolute minimum and the speeches and descriptions occupy the whole work.

Taking the speeches first, it will be found that they are generally uttered by the characters under the stress of some *emotion*. Sometimes it is *jealousy*, as in the case of Mantharā who addresses Kaikeyī when she hears of Rāma's impending coronation as Yuvarāja. Sometimes it is *sorrow*, as when Daśaratha and Kausalyā lament about Rāma's exile or when Tārā laments on the death of Vālin. Sometimes it is *righteous indignation*, as when Bharata hears of Rāma's exile or when Sītā rejects Rāvaṇa's proposal of marriage. Sometimes it is *pity*, as when Mārīca tries to dissuade Rāvaṇa from his scheme of taking Sītā away. These emotions spontaneously call forth imagery from the poet. The images are generally of a homely nature and therefore very effective in expressing the emotion in question. Sītā's speech in III, 47—when Rāvaṇa proposes marriage is a very good example.

This connection between image and emotion is, by the way, quite interesting, because it is one of the topics dealt with in the Dhvanyāloka.¹ Ānandavardhana is, on the whole, rather suspicious. He is afraid that too many images in a passage

1. Dhvanyāloka, p. 85 f.f.

meant to evoke sentiment might distract the attention of the reader away from the latter. He advises caution, without barring images altogether. He sums up his views as follows :—

ध्वन्यात्मभूते शृङ्गारे समीक्ष्य विनिवेशितः ।
रूपकादिरलंकारवर्ग एति यथार्थताम् ॥
विवक्षा तत्परत्वेन नाङ्गित्वेन कथंचन ।
काले च ग्रहणत्यागौ नातिनिर्वहणौषिता ॥
निर्व्यूदावपि चाङ्गित्वे यत्नेन प्रत्यक्षेक्षणम् ।
रूपकादेरलंकारवर्गस्याङ्गत्वसाधनम् ॥¹

This errs perhaps on the side of caution. The English writer quoted above goes much farther when he writes :—“The more emotion grows upon a man, the more his speech, if he make any effort to express his emotion, abounds in figures—exclamation, interrogation, anacoluthon, apostrophe, hyperbole (yes certainly, hyperbole!) simile, metaphor. His language is what we sometimes euphemistically describe as ‘picturesque’. Feelings swamp ideas and language is used to express, not the reality of things, but the state of one’s emotions.”²

I must not be understood to say that *all* emotional speeches in the Rāmāyaṇa abound in figurative images. I only mean that they have a *strong tendency to do so*. There are some exceptions. For example, there is the first reply of Daśaratha to Viśvāmitra when the latter asks for Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa to be sent with him for the protection of his sacrifice. The request must have given a shock to Daśaratha and his reply is no doubt full of emotions, but there is hardly any image in it.

The descriptions in the Rāmāyaṇa are of a most straightforward nature, much as we would expect them to be when art is in the first stage. All the things contained in the thing to be described are enumerated in detail. No attempt seems to have been made to pick and choose. One could say they are almost like catalogues, if the word did not connote absolute absence of poetic merit. The following description of Citrakūṭa by Rāma might be considered a typical one :—

1. Dhvanyāloka, p. 88.

2. The world of Imagery, p. 90.

पश्येममचलं भद्रे ! नानाद्विजगणायुतम् ।
शिखरैः खमिवोद्विद्धैर्धातुमद्विर्विभूषितम् ॥
केचिद्रजतसंकाशाः केचित् क्षतजसन्निभाः ।
पीतमाङ्गिष्ठवर्णाश्च केचिन्मणिवरप्रभाः ॥
पुष्पार्ककेतकाभाश्च केचिज्ज्योतीरसप्रभाः ।
विराजतेऽचलेन्द्रस्य देशा धातुविभूषिताः ।
नानामृगगणैर्द्वीपितरक्षवृक्षगणैर्वृतः ।
अदुष्टैर्मर्त्ययं शैलो बहुपक्षिसमाकुलः ॥
आम्रजम्बवसनेल्लोष्ठैः प्रियालैः पनसैर्धवैः ।
अङ्गोलैर्भाल्यतिनिशैर्विल्वतिन्दुकवेणुभिः ॥
काश्मर्यारिष्टवरणैर्मधुकैस्तिलकैरपि ।
बदर्यामलकैर्नीपैर्वैत्रधन्वनवीजकैः ॥
पुष्पवद्भिः फलेपेतैः छायावद्भिर्मनोरमैः ।
एवमादिभिराकीर्णः श्रियं पुष्पत्ययं गिरिः ॥¹



This passage illustrates not only the detailed, catalogue-like nature of the descriptions, but also their *directness*. When the poet wants to say that there are wild animals on the mountain, he says, *quite directly* : “नानामृगगणैर्द्वीपितरक्षवृक्षगणैर्वृतः”. This point will become still clearer when we compare this with what Kālidāsa does in similar circumstances. When he wants to say that there are lions and elephants on the Himālaya, he does not say so directly, but says :—

पदं तुषारसुतिधौतरक्तं यस्मिन्नदृष्टुपि हतद्विपानाम् ।

विन्दन्ति मार्गं नखरन्ध्रमुक्तैर्मुक्ताफलैः केसरिण किराताः ॥²

It is into such direct and detailed descriptions that the poet introduces his imagery, which therefore serves, chiefly, to add vividness to the details and lend a certain picturesqueness to the whole description. How this is done can be best understood if we now study the contents of the images.

To be continued.

1. R. II. 9, 4—10.

2. Kumārasambhava, I, 6.

PROFESSOR SRINIVASACHARI'S
"RĀMĀNUJA'S IDEA OF THE FINITE SELF"
AN EXAMINATION OF CHAPTER I
A REPLY

by

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Under the above title Prof. Sundararama Aiyar has written a fairly long article in the April-June number of this journal. In case any one of the readers of the journal interested in philosophy has not yet read Prof. Srinivasachari's book we would strongly recommend a study of it as, in the words of the introduction, it "renders the fundamental tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school intelligible to all average students of philosophy." The central aim of the whole exposition is a constructive criticism of the different categories employed in metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics with a view to correlating them into a synthetic whole of the relation between the Jīva and Īśvara. In attempting, therefore, to analyse the book into chapters and propositions, the critic is very likely to lose the wood in the trees and may not succeed in conveying a true impression of the author's views. Another feature of the book is the transparent aim of the author to understand and present his subject in as fair and full a manner as possible without slavishly exalting his hero or condemning other systems. An appreciative exposition of Rāmānuja's views is given and the reader is left to form his own impressions of the place that his philosophy should occupy in the world's systems.

The learned critic opens his article with the sentence: "Prof. Srinivasachari puts forward (in the first chapter of his work) a severe criticism of the various points in what he considers to be the Advaita doctrine of Śaṅkara. He labours under serious misconceptions regarding that doctrine, and his criticisms are altogether unjustifiable and misleading." He follows this up later with many similar passages.

Advaita, like other great systems of philosophy, has been expounded in various ways by various persons. One of these expositions which is generally admitted to be a very fair one is found in the Mahāpūrvapakṣa of the Śrī Bhāṣya. Whenever Prof. Srinivasachari uses the word Advaitin he has evidently this exposition in view. But the learned critic has obviously a very different exposition in view, which he attributes to Śaṅkara. There are but three references to the Advaita doctrine in this chapter and we shall show that they are all taken from Rāmānuja's Mahāpūrvapakṣa.

(i) "The Advaitin and the Dvaitin distinguish between primary texts and secondary texts". (*Vide* pp. 18 and 19 of the Ananda Press Edn. of the Śrī Bhāṣya.)

(ii) "To the Advaitin experience is rooted in inexplicable illusion (Anirvacanīya) and contradiction (Bādha)". For this, *see* pp. 16 and 75 and p. 22 of the same Edn.

(iii) "A judgment like 'this is that Devadatta' does not establish bare identity, as the Advaitin says, by the removal of contradiction between the subject and the predicate". This is based on the Advaitin's view of Sāmānādhikaraṇya in p. 19 of the same edn.

There are also described in the book under review two direct references to Śaṅkara to which the learned critic has taken exception. We shall show that in dealing with these passages, he has not only misunderstood the author's view, but also misled the reader. It is necessary that the passages referred to should be studied in their context and so we give the full paragraphs below :—

- (1) Rāmānuja insists on the equal validity of all the Upaniṣadic texts and claims for his interpretation the authority of timeless tradition and logical satisfactoriness and verifies it by a quotation from Damaṇḍakārya for whose authority Rāmānuja has the highest esteem. The Śāstra speaks of things as they are in reality. This method of interpretation is not accepted by the Advaitin and the Dvaitin who distinguish between primary texts and secondary texts, Pradhāna texts and Gauṇa texts. Śaṅkara, for example, directs attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts

therefrom. But Rāmānuja lays stress on Śruti as a whole and relies on logical stability. It is in this way that he deduces his first principles of realism (Sātkhyāti) and co-ordination (Sāmānādhikaranyā) and establishes the truth of Jīva as a Prakāra of Īśvara. The reality of God is to be conceived on the analogy of organic unity in consonance with the criteria of sense-perception and inference. Both sentient and non-sentient beings (Cit and Acit) are shown to be modifications of Brahman and of a tissue with Him.

- (2) The philosophy of Rāmānuja is a synthesis of metaphysical, moral and religious experience and is rooted in the thought that Brahman is the ground of experience as well as the goal of experience. The Supreme Being is also the supreme good and the ultimate goal of all religious endeavour (*Kāraṇam tu dhyeyam*). The Absolute of thought is also the "Inner Ruler Immortal" and the Lord of love and bliss. The glory of God and this goodness are fulfilled in His redemptive grace. The theory of being is vitally related to the theory of knowledge, will and feeling. Brahman is the ideal of experience in which the ideals of truth, goodness and beauty are related and realised. Reason is both pure and practical, and the dualism that we find in the systems of Spinoza, Kant and Śāṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja. His governing idea is that Brahman is the first cause and the final cause and there is no contradiction between the Absolute of thought and the God of religion. Brahman constitutes the real Reality of the universe (Tattva), the means of realisation (Hita) and the realisation itself (Puruṣārtha).

The first passage is extracted by the critic thus : "Rāmānuja insists on the equal validity of all the Upaniṣadic texts and claims for his interpretation the authority of timeless traditions and logical satisfactoriness and verifies it by a quotation from Drāmiḍācārya etc. On the other hand, according to our author the Advaitin distinguishes between primary texts and secondary texts, Pradhāna texts and Gauṇa texts. Śāṅkara, for example,

directs his attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts therefrom."

A reference to the full paragraph quoted above will show that the object of the author is to explain the well-known claim of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins that whereas the Advaitins emphasise the *abheda śrūtis* like *tat tvam asi* and explain away *bheda śrūtis* like *prthagātmanam preritāram ca matvā juṣṭastatastena amṛtatvameti* and the Dvaitins do the reverse, they themselves attach equal importance to all the texts by interpreting them in the light of the *ghaṭaka śrūtis* which declare the world of sentient and non-sentient beings to be related to Brahman in the same way as the human body is related to the human soul.

In the original, the sentence "Śāṅkara directs attention to the Mahāvākyas and derives his chief thoughts therefrom" is contrasted with the very next sentence "But Rāmānuja lays stress on the Śruti as a whole." The learned critic, by completely omitting both the latter sentence and all reference to the Dvaitin and by contracting the intermediate passages, leads the reader to infer that Rāmānuja's insistence on the validity of all upaniṣadic texts is contrasted with Śāṅkara's view. This misleading suggestion is then strengthened by the sentences : "We can assert in reply that

(1) Śāṅkara also insists on the equal validity of all the upaniṣadic texts and

(2) that he does not distinguish anywhere between what our author calls 'primary texts and secondary texts'. Śāṅkara himself never in his Bhāṣyas makes mention of the term Mahāvākyas." He thus leads the reader to infer erroneously that the author has made these incorrect statements. After some further explanation, he announces "On the grounds above stated, we hold that Prof. Srinivasachariar is in error in saying that Śāṅkara or any of his followers do (*sic*) not admit the equal validity of all Vedāntic texts." But the author never said any such thing. What the author said is that whereas Rāmānuja derived his chief thoughts by considering the Upaniṣads as a whole, Śāṅkara derived his chief thoughts from what are usually called the Mahāvākyas. The sentence "Śāṅkara for example directs his attention to the Mahāvākyas" does not imply that Śāṅkara himself calls these passages 'Mahāvākyas.' It only means that he attaches more importance to

those passages which have since been called Mahāvākyas though not by Śaṅkara himself. This the learned critic also admits in a way when he says that even if Śaṅkara has not used the term Mahāvākyas, he is fully aware of the fact that sentences like *tattvamasi, aham brahmāsmi* are important in the Upaniṣads. In fact, every impartial student must accept that Śaṅkara attached more importance to *abheda śrutis* than to *bheda śrutis* from the mere fact that he is the well-known apostle of pure unadulterated monism which cannot in its very nature give full value to the *bheda śrutis*. The criticism of Prof. Sundararama Aiyar based on this passage is therefore wholly unfounded.

Now for the second extract: The reference to dualism and Śaṅkara occurs in the 7th sentence. The entire passage contains 9 sentences all of which except the 7th describe Brahman in the triple light of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics or religion. He is described as the ground of existence in metaphysics, the supreme good of ethics and the ultimate goal of religion, and again, as the Absolute of thought in metaphysics, the Inner Ruler Immortal in ethics and the Lord of Love and Bliss in religion. This latter description in the 3rd sentence is repeated in the 8th sentence and the 9th forms the closing sentence. In the midst of these, the 7th sentence "Reason is both pure and practical and the dualism that we find in Spinoza, Kant and Śaṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja" describes one of the effects of this synthetic view and forms practically a self-contained statement. It consists of two parts each explaining the other. The learned critic in making his extract omits the first half of the sentence and joins its second half to the second half of the eighth sentence (dealing with the general subject of the paragraph) to form a misleading combination thus :—

"The dualism that we find in the systems of spinoza, Kant and Śaṅkara disappears in the synthesis of Rāmānuja. His governing idea is that there is no contradiction between the Absolute of thought and the God of religion."

The original 7th sentence clearly shows that the dualism objected to is of the kind that exists between pure and practical reason i.e. the building up of metaphysics and ethics on separate bases as Kant did. The creation of a distinction between *paramārthadaśā* for pure reason or metaphysics and *vyāvahārikadaśā* for practical reason or ethics by Śaṅkara is

also a case of this kind. Now this could give the learned critic no cause for quarrel. By manipulating the extract, he creates in the minds of his readers the illusion that the author attributed to Śaṅkara a contradiction between the Absolute of thought and the God of religion, a dualism "in the universally¹ recognised sense of that term as referring to two distinct (and pluralistic) realities of the same order." It must be obvious that the author's sentence refers to dualism, not as the admission of "two distinct realities of the same order", but to the very admission of the existence of two different orders of reality as *Paramārtha* and *Vyāvahārika*.

The critic has also attempted to ridicule some of the doctrines of Rāmānuja expounded in the book by considering them from his own standpoint and without trying to understand the original. He has evidently forgotten that Prof. Srinivasachariyar's exposition is of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and not of his own independent views and he has not realised that he has represented it as faithfully and truly as he could, bearing in mind the fundamental principle that the best way to understand a philosopher is to realise his point of view. In the criticisms under reference, the author's statements of Rāmānuja's position are attacked as if they were the opinion of the author himself. Here is an instance of such a criticism :—

"It is strange that Prof. Srinivasachari should propound such an astonishing paradox as is contained in the following. 'The cognition of silver in the shell, when the latter is mistaken for the former, arises from defective perception, owing to which the element of silver alone is seen and not of the shell.'"

It is strange that Prof. Sundararama Aiyar should have failed to see that the author is only setting forth Rāmānuja's view

¹ In this connection the following passage from Hans Driesch may be of interest :—"Dualism, in our opinion, must be the last word of metaphysics even if we should like to be monists. For there is the diversity and discrepancy between what is *whole* and what is *not whole* or contingent; the logical contradiction between wholeness and contingency being, in our opinion, the very foundation of all dualism." Here the word "dualism" is used only in the author's sense and not in what the critic claims to be "the universally recognised sense of the term." *Philosophy of To-day*, p. 429.

without expressing his own opinion thereon. Further one cannot see what there is paradoxical or strange in Rāmānuja's view itself. Thus, when I mistake a piece of rolled gold for genuine gold, I perceive the element of gold (i. e., the qualities that raise in me the belief of its being gold) in it, but omit to perceive the elements of rolled gold (i. e., the qualities that with the presence of those already perceived would establish it as rolled gold). When I perceive both sets of qualities, I see it truly as rolled gold.

The learned critic takes objection to the author's statement that "to the Advaitin, experience is rooted in inexplicable illusion (Anirvacanīya) and contradiction (Bādha)." He first objects to the translation of the word *anirvacanīya* as "inexplicable". To say that this is the translation generally adopted (*Vide* p. 106 Thibaut) may not probably carry much weight with him. But, it is significant that he himself has not offered a better rendering that would convey the import of the word with greater accuracy. And, does not the word "inexplicable" connote the idea of incapacity of logical proof or deduction as explained in p. 75 of the Śrī Bhāṣya?

By a very regrettable *suggestio falsi* the learned critic makes it appear that the author said that to the Advaitin, "phenomenal existence".....is "known as an "illusion" while it lasts as an experience, as an actual happening, in our waking and conscious life." Further on he asserts: ".....Śaṅkara distinctly says that phenomenal existence is "true" while it lasts, —not that our experience of it is an "illusion" or "rooted in contradiction (Bādha)" while our experience of it lasts," as Prof. Srinivasachari assumes from his insufficient knowledge of Śaṅkara." Nowhere has the author of the book conveyed the idea that according to the Advaitin the illusion is *known as an illusion* while it lasts. An illusion and the knowledge of it as an illusion are so mutually incompatible at the same time that none with any pretension to psychological knowledge would think of making such a statement. Moreover Prof. Srinivasachari does not assume 'that our experience of phenomenal existence is an "illusion" or "rooted in contradiction" while our experience of it lasts'. The author's sentence does not bear out the allegation and the words we have italicised have been added by

1 Italics mine.

the learned critic to the author's statement to give point to an otherwise pointless criticism. I have very carefully gone through this section of the book after reading Prof. Sundararama Aiyar's review and cannot find any passage therein which could even distantly mean 'while our experience of it lasts. To an unbiassed reader of the sentence, its indubitable meaning must be clear, namely, that experience is the result of an inexplicable illusion and contradiction. To say this is not the same as saying that the experience knows it to be an illusion at the time of experiencing it which is what the learned critic attributes to the author.

The criticism is made further on: "The Professor, as we have already shown is *entirely wrong* in thinking that Śaṅkara holds that in our perception of the external world we experience an "illusion." How the learned critic divined the author's "thinking" is a mystery. But is it not obvious that what the Professor was "thinking" is "that Śaṅkara holds that in our perception of the external world we experience (*what is from the pāramārthika point of view*) an illusion? What an unhappy instance of *suppressio veri*!

We need not dwell at length on the concluding portions of the learned critic's article where he tries to bring the author to ridicule by saying that "he has entirely failed to understand the Advaitin's position," that he has "got into this muddle," "has discovered a mare's nest of his own or like Don Quixote, is tilting with the creations of his fertile powers of fancy, poetic or philosophic." It is to be regretted that in his ardent advocacy and defence of the Advaitic position, the learned critic has so far forgotten himself as to make personal references to the author of a not very edifying character. It would certainly be presumptuous for any one to remind so eminent and cultured a gentleman as Prof. Sundararama Aiyar of the well-known conventions of literary and philosophical criticism. One can only hope that the Professor did not mean all that he has said. As regards the doctrines that he has called in question, it is enough to point out that they are the views of Rāmānuja the clear exposition of which alone was the main purpose of the author in writing his book. In conclusion, we submit that the method of criticism adopted by the learned critic is fair neither to the book nor to the author.

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS.

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SECTION II—SYMBOLS AND UPASANAS.

How far the Vedic thinkers had progressed in their cosmological and psychological speculations we have not the means of exactly determining, but we have seen that they had already found the First Cause latent in the heart of man. The great equation had already been accomplished. There followed a long series of attempts to realize it. Of these the Upaniṣads give us the faithful but incomplete records, and show how on these conceptions teacher after teacher who had attained the goal shed his own light for the guidance of his successors. It has been remarked before that it is very important for us to remember that the attitude of the Upaniṣads towards all knowledge Vedic or Vedāntic (Upaniṣadic) is that it is nothing without realization.

तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः ।

नानुध्यायाद्ब्रह्मशब्दान् वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् ॥

says Yājñavalkya. Janaka who has studied the Vedas and listened to the Upaniṣads (See Brh. Up. 4. 2. 1;) receives from Yājñavalkya, as a priceless boon, the instruction that enables him to 'attain fearlessness.' Similarly Śvetaketu, who had spent twelve years in vedic study, is instructed by Uddālaka in that *One* with whose knowledge all is known—other instances are Brh. 2. 1; and Kauṣī. 4, and the instruction of Nārada in Ch. Up. 7. All this cannot be taken to mean that the fundamental conceptions of the Upaniṣads were foreign to the vedas. They only teach that knowledge without realization is vain indeed. In Ch. Up. 4. 14. 1, the fires, having instructed Upakosala, say to him "you have this knowledge of ourselves and the know-

ledge of the soul, but the teacher will tell you the way." And that teacher himself, in the days of his discipleship had had a similar experience. Having, by miraculous means, been fully instructed in the sixteenfold Brahman embracing the earth, atmosphere and the heavens, as well as the self of man, he comes at last to his teacher for the teaching that will help him "to attain his end." We cannot say that the Upaniṣads disdain the Vedic gods, and rituals. We also find them expounding in all seriousness many seemingly inadequate symbols and upāsana, even after these had been superseded by others embodying fuller conceptions. They had served their turn, and might do so again.

Symbols and Upāsana.

Prāṇa and Vāyu.—In two of the earliest Upaniṣads, the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya (Brh. Up. 1. 3) (Ch. Up. 1. 2) we find versions of an ancient story glorifying the Prāṇa, the breath in the mouth as the only one among the bodily functions that is not afflicted with evil—with death.

Another narrative glorifying Prāṇa is a favourite theme of the Upaniṣads. (see Brh. 6. 1. 7-14 : Ch. Up. 5. 1. 6—5. 2. 2; Kauṣī. 2. 14). Cp. Praśna, 2. 3. 4. In this the Prāṇa is adjudged the greatest among the vital organs. All the others depend upon it. Every thing is its food. Water is its garment. In these stories the psychical Prāṇa is identified with the Cosmical Prāṇa.

In Brh. (1. 5. 21-23) this story appears again in a more elaborate form, with the personal and cosmical relations of the vital airs and their corresponding divinities made explicit. The functions all become a form of the *Breath*, the Cosmical forces of the Wind. Similarly in Kauṣī. Up. (2. 12) the cosmical powers revert into Wind—the vital airs into Breath. (See also Kauṣī. Up. 2. 14) where the vital breath is already identified with the intelligential Self of all beings (in agreement with Kauṣī. Up. 3 which will be fully treated later on).

In Brh. Up. (3. 9. 8-9) Yājñavalkya reduces the 3306 gods to one and a half—the wind and finally to one,—the Breath, called Brahman, the *Yon tyat*. The Taitt. Up. (1. 14) praises Vāyu as the perceptible (Pratyakṣam) Brahman. (See also Maitrī. Up. (4. 4. 5-6).

Bṛh. Up. (2. 2) describes the Prāṇa as the new-born *Infant*, whose abode is the body, the covering the head, the post breath, the rope food. (See also Bṛh. 1. 5. 14) Cp. Ch. Up. (6. 7) Praśna (6. 3. 4). Bṛh. Up. 1. 5. 14 speaks of the sixteenfold Prajāpati with his changing fifteen parts and the constant 16th part (which is the breath in all creatures. (Cp. Ch. Up. 6. 7). Praśna. Up. 6. 3. 4 describes the sixteenfold Person. Here all the sixteen parts disappear at last in the Puruṣa, which is, therefore, something over and above the breath—an advance on the earlier conception, that is due to the later date of the Upaniṣad.

Very soon the Prāṇa symbol was combined with others to keep pace with advancing ideas. (See Bṛh. Up. 1. 5. 3). Here the Self is conceived as a Triad of Speech, Mind and Breath. Thus—

- | | | | |
|-----------|-------|-------|---|
| 1. Speech | Earth | Fire | These enter Union, from that
the Breath is born. |
| 2. Mind | Sky | Seen | |
| 3. Breath | Water | Moon. | |

Ch. Up. (4. 10. 4) shows perhaps a more advanced stage. Here the Fires instruct Upakosala thus "*Prāṇo Brahma, Kam Brahma, Kham Brahma*" and he replies 'I understand that Brahma is Life. But Joy and Space, I do not understand.' He is then instructed in the Prāṇa and Space. The finishing touch is given by his teacher who tells him of the Ātman as the person in the Eye—'the Immortal the fearless' and his mystic names Saṁyadvāma, Vāmanī, Bhāmanī—as a means to final release. To this may be compared the gradual instruction of Nārada in Ch. Up. (7th Prapāṭhaka) where the inquirer is led onwards through a series of conceptions to Prāṇa—the individual self, in which everything is fastened as the spokes in the hub, and from thence to the Bhūman which is the same as Sukha.

We will now consider two other instances. One of these (Ch. Up. 4. 1-2) shows the Prāṇa-vāyu doctrine in its early form, and at the height of its popularity, if such an expression can be applied to any Upaniṣadic teaching. The other (Bṛh. Up. 3. 7), shows its position with the greatest philosophers in the most active period of Upaniṣadic thought—In Ch. Up. 4. 1. 2 the great Jānaśruti seeks instruction from a wandering beggar with gifts of a thousand cows, a chariot, a gold necklace, and his own daughter. Raikva instructs him in the doctrine of Prāṇa-vāyu

as 'snatchers-unto-themselves' (as Hume puts it) and the five-fold nature of the Self and the Universe, the knowledge that gives the Knower the benefit of all the good actions that people do. This is a very old story belonging to a period when the doctrine of Prāṇa-vāyu was held in very great repute. In Bṛh. (3. 7) Wind is declared to be the string that holds the worlds together, and, among a series that enumerate one by one the cosmic forces and the bodily functions, the Antaryāmin is described as that *One* who, 'dwelling in the wind, yet is other than the wind, whom the wind does not know, whose body the wind is, who controls the wind from within—' the Soul, the Inner Controller, the Immortal.

In Bṛh. Up. 1. 4. 7 also, the breath, the eye, the ear, the voice and the mind are the names of the acts of the Self. "Whoever worships one or the other of these, he knows it not." And this same self is the 'padanīya' of the All. By the self one knows the All—'as by a foot-print.' We are reminded of R. V. X. 46. 1; 2;

प्रहोता जातो महाज्ञमी विन्तुषद्वा सीददपामुपस्ये ।

दधिर्यो धायि स ते क्यांसि यन्ता वसूनि विधत्ते तनूपाः ॥

इमं विधन्तो अपां सधस्ये पशुं न नष्टं पदैरनु गमन् ।

गुहा च तं तमुशिजो नमीभिरिच्छन्तो धीरा भृगवोऽविन्दन् ॥

See also Praśna Up. 3. which teaches the source, the entrance, the location—the fivefold extension and the cosmical and personal relations of the Prāṇa. Before leaving the subject we will consider one more instance which combines the Prāṇa with the Prajñātman or Intellectual Self in the conception of the Ātman. It gives a very complete exposition of the doctrine of Prāṇa, and is most appropriately put into the mouth of Indra, as he gives instruction to Pratardana Daivodāsi.

1. The Prāṇa is the Prajñātman—both dwell together in the body and both depart together.

2. This Prāṇa is superior to the vital Breaths :—
(for the reasons given in the Prāṇasaṁvāda.)

The seeing and understanding of this.

The person becomes unitary in the Prāṇa. Speech with all

In deep sleep. names, the eye with all forms, the ear with
all sounds, the breaths with all odors, the
mind with all thoughts goes to it. On awakening,

From the self the vital airs disperse
to their several stations. From these
The sense powers arise, From these
The Universe appears.
The proof or *siddhi* thereof.

When a person is about to die, he loses the power to
speak, hear, see etc.

Then the vital airs merge once more into the Prāṇa, and
depart from the body when that departs.

3. *The Sarvāpti in Prāṇa by means of the Vital Airs.*

	Functions.	Bhūtamātrās.
Prāṇa, with the Intelligence mounts the functions and obtains the existential ele- ments or the Bhūtamātrās.	Speech	Name.
	Breath	Odor.
	Eye	Form
	Ear	Sound
	Tongue	Taste
	Hands	Karma
	Body	Pleasure and pain.
	Generative organ	Bliss, procrea- tion.
	Feet	Goings.
	Mind	Thoughts and desires.

4. Apart from the intelligence, none of the organs could
do their appointed work. One should, therefore, desire to under-
stand this knowing subject.

5. The ten Bhūtamātrās and the ten Prajñāmātrās are
correlated. From either alone no appearances could result.

All these Bhūtamātrās are fixed on the Prajñāmātrās, these
on Prāṇa, as in a wheel the felly and spokes on the hub.

In this section some important developments occur.

1. The life-force is one with the knowing subject.

2. All objects of knowledge exist only when cognised by
this knowing subject.

The Sun and the Eye are often found connected in the
symbolism of the Upaniṣads. Brh. Up.
Āditya and the eye. 2. 5. 5, Ch. Up. 3. 18. 3, Ch. Up. 3. 19. 1—
teach the worship of the Sun as Brahma—apparently an old
form of Upāsanā even in the period when that Upaniṣad came

into existence. Maitrī. Up. 6. 16 with special reference to this
passage teaches the same, with amplifications. Here the Sun is
identified with Time and the Year. Maitrī. 6. See also Praśna
1. 8 and Maitrī. 6. 8. 9. In these the Sun is connected with
Prāṇa. These references in the later Upaniṣads show that this
symbol continued to exercise a great influence throughout this
period.

The golden Puruṣa in the Sun, correlated with the person
in the eye is a favourite Upāsanā of the Upaniṣads, and is one of
the earliest forms in which the Brahman-Ātman idea was
symbolised for the purposes of realization. Brh. Up. 5. 5. The
Sun is the Real (Sat). The person in the Sun and the Person in
the Right Eye depend on one another through the Sun rays and
the life-breaths. The mystic name of the former is 'Aham'
that of the later 'aham'. See also Brh. 2. 3. Ch. Up. 1. 6
seems to be one of the earliest forms of this Upāsanā. In
Maitrī. 6. 7 the person in the Sun and in the eye is Bharga
(Splendour) because with light-rays (*bha*) is his course (*gati*).

In the honey section of the Brh. Up. 2. 5. 3 Speech and Fire
are connected. In Ch. Up. 3. 18. 3 Speech,
Fire and speech. a fourth part of Brahma, shines with Agni as
its light. See also Brh. 1. 5. 11.

Both Fire and Speech conceived as Universal had occupied
a high place in R̥gvedic thought. See RV. X 125, where Vāk
says:—

4. Through me alone all eat the food that feeds them,
each man who sees, breathes, hears the word out-
spoken.

They know it not, but yet they dwell beside me,
Hear, one and all, the truth as I declare it.

8. I breathe a strong breath, like the wind and tempest,
the while I hold together all existence,
Beyond this wide earth and beyond the heavens,
I have become so mighty in my grandeur.

Another pair is Mind and Space. Mind is also sometimes
correlated with the Moon and Space with
Manas and the Ākāśa. Hearing. See Brh. Up. 2. 5. Again Space
is often connected with the space in the heart. Brh. Up. 5. 1.
pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇamevāvaśiṣyate

Om ! Brahma is the ether primeval, the ether that blows !

In Ch. Up. 3. 18. 1, Mind and Space are connected as Symbols personal or Cosmic of the Brahma whose 4 quarters are (Speech-Agni) (Breath-Vāyu) (Eye-Āditya) (ear and the quarters of heaven).

Ch. Up. 1. 9. 1 describes Space as the Ultimate world ground.

Sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni, ākāśādeva samutpadyanta
ākāśam prati astam yanti ākāśo ha vā ebhyo jyāyan,
ākāśa parāyaṇam.

So also Brh. Up. 5. 1. 1 which identifies Space with Brahma. Based upon such conceptions, upāsānās equating the space within man with the space without are frequent.

Space is the cosmic equivalent of the Ātman. See Brh. Up. 3. 2. 12 where the Ātman goes into Space and breath into wind, and Ch. Up. 3. 14. 2 where Brahma is called 'ākāśātmā', also Maitrī. 7. 16. In Kauṣi. Up. 2. 14 also the soul is ākāśātmā.

Space is sometimes conceived of as the body of the Universal Soul. See Ch. Up. 3. 15. Taitt. Up. 6. Brahma is Ākāśasarīra. Space is once called the *nirvāhita* of name and form—(individuality) Ch. Up. 8. 14. 1.

It is under the aspect of Full—Non-active, that space symbolises Brahma according to Ch. Up. 3. 12. 7-9.

यद्वै तद्विज्ञेतीदं वाव तद्योऽयं बहिर्धा पुरुषादाकाशो यो वै स बहिर्धा
पुरुषादाकाशः ॥

अयं वाव स योऽयमन्तः पुरुष आकाशो यो वै सोऽन्तः पुरुष आकाशः ॥

अयं वाव स योऽयमन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तदेतत्पूर्णमप्रवर्ति पूर्णमप्रवर्तिनी
श्रियं लभते य एवं वेद ॥

See also Brh. Up. 2. 1. 5. Kauṣi Up. 4. 8.

The same symbols also stood for the blissful nature of the Ātman. In Ch. Up. the fires instructing Upakosala say to him "prāṇo brahma, kam brahma, kham brahma" and here Kham is equated with joy. And in Ch. Up. 7. 22. 23 Sukha-pleasure is the same as Bhūman. "There is no pleasure in the small" says the teacher.

Besides these four, there are other correlated pairs less important. Of these, Brh. Up. 2. 5, gives a list in a section called the honey-doctrine which is traced back to the R̥gveda. Here

the correlativity of all cosmic forces with corresponding bodily functions is made clear, and the Absolute Soul is immanent in all these and in Law, Truth and Humanity.

1. Earth	The Body.
2. Waters	Semen.
3. Fire.	Speech.
4. Wind	Breath.
5. Sun	Eye.
6. Quarters of Heaven	Ear.
7. Moon	Mind.
8. Lightning.	Heat.
9. Thunder	Sound.
10. Space	Space in the heart.

This is the *honey-doctrine* taught by Dadhyāc Ātharvaṇa to the two Aśvins.

Brh. Up. 4. 2 discusses six Upāsānās of Brahman viz., Speech, Breath, Sight, Hearing, Mind and Heart which are one by one dismissed as incomplete by Yājñavalkya. Being connected with Brahman in a section in which Brahman and Ātman are interchangeable terms, we have to understand by Speech, Breath etc., the personal functions as well as their cosmical equivalents.

Yājñavalkya explains the aspects which each of these 'one-legged' Brahma symbols is meant to teach.

Speech	Prajñā.
Prāṇa	Priya.
Sight	Satya.
Hearing	Ananta.
Mind	Ānanda.
Heart	Sthiti.

Hence the Āditya and Eye symbols stood for Truth (Satya); the mind, either with Ākāśa or the moon, for bliss (Ānanda); the ear and the Quarters of Heaven for Endlessness (Ananta); Prāṇa for the dear (Priya)—*na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* declares Yājñavalkya—Brh. Up. It also stood for existence; the heart for Sthiti—steadfastness. That is to say, all the important aspects under which Brahman is later on conceived are comprised in these symbols—Intelligent, dear, true, endless, blissful, unchanging (Sat-cit-ānanda) (Satyam-jñānam-anantam).

Brh. Up. 2. 3 expounds the two forms of Brahman—(1) the formed mortal, stationary, actual, (2) the formless, immortal, moving, yon. Thus—

<i>Adhidaivatam.</i>	<i>Mūrta.</i>	<i>Amūrta.</i>
	Whatever is different from Wind and Antarikṣa the essence of this is the Sun	Wind and Antarikṣa the essence of this is the Person in the sun-disk.
<i>Adhyātmam.</i>	Whatever is different from Prāṇa and the Space within the Self the essence of this is the Eye.	Prāṇa and the Space within the Self the essence of this is the Person in the right Eye.

The whole is concluded by the formula 'Neti Neti' and 'Satyasya Satyam.'

In this Upāsanā (Brh. Up. 2. 3) all the elements of the afterwards famous formula Sat-cit-ānanda (existence-knowledge-bliss) seem to be present. *Sat* symbolised by Prāṇa and Vāyu—*Cit* by Āditya and the eye—*Ānanda* by Antarikṣa and the Space in the Self.

Agni, Vāyu and Āditya—Time, Breath and Food—Brahmā, Rudra and Viṣṇu—these are the foremost forms of the Supreme. To whichever one the worshipper is attached, he wins its world. These forms one should meditate upon, praise, and then deny, says the later Maitrī. Upaniṣad (See 4. 6).

In the middle period of Upaniṣadic philosophy which culminated in the teachings of great teachers Uddālaka, Yājñavalkya and their contemporaries, there was a growing tendency to transcend symbols and upāsanās.

In the first period doctrines and philosophical theories had appropriate Upāsanās attached to them by their originators—perhaps it is even true that in those days philosophy had not yet learned to stand on its own feet. In the second and most active period of Upaniṣadic philosophy, thought moved too quickly to formulate new symbols and upāsanās to fit every new idea. In the third period which inherited this rich legacy of thought and experience, the old Upāsanās were still maintained with

characteristic loyalty, and we find them made to serve as the vehicles of thoughts and theories that came long after them.

It must have been towards the close of this middle period that the earlier Upaniṣads assumed their present form—many of them bear the marks of the great teachers under whose auspices they must have been collected. For instance in Kauṣītakī, (4. 20) the doctrine, in which that Upaniṣad specialises, of the Prāṇa equated with Prajñā, is introduced into its version of the Gārgya and Ajātaśatru story. And in Brh. 2. 3, the Upaniṣad 'Satyasya Satyam' of Ajātaśatru is interpreted again in keeping with a more advanced idealism.

We will arrange the doctrines of this middle period in their probable order of development and wherever possible, indicate the great teachers who were responsible for them. Some of these were contemporaries, but one or two were legendary or even mythological figures.

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| 1. Kauṣītakī and Paingya | Prāṇa. |
| 2. Vāmadeva (Ait. Up. 5. 1-3) | Prajñāna. |
| 3. Sanatkumāra | Sukha-Bhūman |
| 4. Śāṇḍilya | Tajjalān. |
| 5. Pratardana | Prāṇa-Prajñā. |
| 6. Aśvapati Kaikeya | Food and the Eater. |
| 7. Satyakāma and Upakosala | The fourfold Brahma in the world and the individual. |
| 8. Ajātaśatru | 'Satyasya Satyam' |
| 9. Uddālaka Āruṇi | The Antaryāmin-Being and Becoming. |
| 10. Tittiri (Brahmānanda Valli-Taittirīya Up. 2) | Ānanda. |
| 11. Yājñavalkya | 'Neti—Neti!' |

Prāṇo Brahma. The doctrine of Prāṇa is a special feature of the Kauṣī Up. According to Kauṣītakī, of Paingya and Kauṣītakī. Prāṇas the Self, the Mind is the messenger, the Eye the watchman, the Ear the announcer, Speech the handmaid. All these bring offerings to the Prāṇa. Therefore he who knows himself as this Brahma (Prāṇa) must refrain from begging, consistently with his belief. Paingya's conception is that the Prāṇa is the Self, enclosed by

mind, Ear, Eye and Speech in successive layers. The Upaniṣad is the same, 'na yācet'—a sort of complement to Aśvapati's mystical Agnihotra.

Vāmadeva—The Pantheistic Self of the Aitareya Upaniṣad.

Prajñānam Brahma—Idam adarśau itī —tasmāt Idandro nāma. The Self is that whereby one hears, sees, smells etc.—that which is heart and mind—in a word, Prajñāna. He is the Self and the whole world. All this is guided by Intelligence (Prajñānetra) based on Intelligence (Prajñāpratiṣṭhita). He is *Idandra*—the Self other than speech, breath, sight, hearing, touch, mind etc.—with three conditions and three dwelling places, the witness—*Idandra* (*It-seeing*) mystically called Indra; because, as the Upaniṣads often assert, the gods prefer what is hidden, and dislike the obvious.

Sanatkumāra.
Sukha-Bhūman.

Yo vai bhūmā tat sukham, na alpe sukham asti. Sanatkumāra leads the inquirer onwards through a long series of upāsanās such as name, speech, strength, food etc. to Prāṇa the individual self, and thence through Satya, Matī, Śraddhā and Kṛti to Bhūman (the Plenum) which is the same as Sukha—"There is no pleasure in the small, only a Plenum is pleasure." It is established on its own greatness, or rather not on greatness at all? For there is nothing other than it. It is above, below and everywhere—and it is our Self. He who knows this has pleasure and delight in the Ātman—only he is free—for him everything rises from the Self. The conception of the Ātman in this comes up to nearly the later Advaitic level. But Mokṣa has not advanced beyond the idea of an unlimited happiness expressed nearly in terms of the happiness we all know. A satisfaction of all possible desires. "Yam yam antam abhikāmo bhavati, yam kāmam kāmāyate, so asya saṅkalpādeva samuttiṣṭhati, tena sampanno, mahiyate." Ch. Up. 8. 2. 10.

Tajjalān. The doctrine of Śāṇḍilya is a culmination of these three lines of thought, of the Ātman as Prāṇa, as Prajñāna, as Sukha-Bhūman. In the earlier period of Upaniṣadic thought, we have seen how the symbols and upāsanās that expressed their highest thought, also showed similar development of the Brahman-Ātman concept along these three main lines, and how these three sets of symbols were combined in a greater conception (Brh. Up. 2. 3). In the

Śāṇḍilya Vidyā another such merging of the three ideas takes place again, and the expression of this is not yet free from the conventions of early Upaniṣadic thought. Brahman is made of mind—therefore blissful *prāṇa-śarīra*—therefore the Real—*bhārūpa*,—therefore of the nature of Intelligence. He is Ākāśātmā, and above every distinction of great and small. "This soul of mine within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice or a barley corn or a mustard seed or a grain of millet or the kernel of a grain of millet; this soul of mine within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater than these worlds."

But the historical value of the doctrine of Śāṇḍilya is not just this. In it, a definite turn is given to the development of the Brahman-Ātman concept. The Self of Śāṇḍilya is a Saguṇa Brahma—*satyasaṅkalpa, sarvakarma, sarvakāma, sarvagandha, sarvarasa, sarvamidam abhyūṭa*—no advance along this line can lead to anything but a Self without limitations but with every great attribute.

We come forth from Him, live in Him and are reabsorbed into Him—Liberation is entrance into this all-containing Being. "Into him I shall enter on departing hence." Śāṇḍilya's pantheism strikes an almost deistic note.

Pratardana and the Inner Agnihotra—the doctrine of Prāṇa-Prajñā.

Praṇo asmi Prajñātmā. Prāṇa equated with Prajñā is the Self.

Speech, breath, eye etc. are the portions of Prajñā (Prajñāmātra). Name, Odour, Form etc. are its externally correlated existential elements (*parastāt prativihitabhūtamātra*).

The Bhūtamātras are fixed on the Prajñāmātras, these on the Prāṇa like the felly and spokes in the hub of a wheel.

The Bhūtamātras and Prajñāmātras are correlated. From either alone no *rūpa* would result. The Prāṇa-prajñā is the one who speaks, smells, hears etc., yet he remains untouched by good and evil.

Through the intelligential elements into which Prajñā divides itself, one obtains all the existential elements which form the world. In deep sleep (Suṣupti) the intelligential elements together with the existential elements are unified in the Prāṇa. On awakening, from the Ātman the vital breaths disperse to their proper stations, from them the senses, from those the worlds.

Attention is centred on the Prāṇa. It is on Prāṇa that the Prajñāmātras as well as the Bhūtamātras are fixed. Prāṇa is the hub of the wheel of existence, and Prāṇa is Prajñā—what the nature of this Prāṇa is, of which even here, Prajñā is only the externally correlating factor, we are not told. Only this—speech, smell, form etc. are not what one should desire to understand, one should know the speaker, smeller, seer etc.

But, *vijñātāram arē kena vijānīyāt?* says Yājñavalkya. And as a natural outcome of this idealism it is boldly declared—“by no deed of His is His world injured, He does not become greater by good action nor indeed lesser by bad action,” but it is immediately added—the doer of good goes upwards and the doer of evil goes downwards.

Prāṇo brahma kam brahma kham brahma. We know from Brh. Up. (4. 1. 6) that Satyakāma Jābāla was a contemporary of Yājñavalkya. But there is nothing very new in the teaching associated with him and his disciple Upakosala. The fourfold Self in the world and in the individual is Brahma. He is to be worshipped as Prāṇa, Kam (Joy) and Kham (Space). His mystic names are *Samyadvāma*, *Bhāmanī*, *Vāmanī*. This Self is untouched by good and evil. The idea of our real Self standing aloof from the good and the evil of our lower natures is suggested and is clearly and boldly stated in Pratardana's teaching. From now on, it becomes a generally accepted theory, but without any prejudice to the value of virtue and morality.

Satyasya Satyam. The reality of the Real—this is Ajātaśatru's definition of Brahma. Setting aside as inadequate all the twelve (in the Kauṣī. Up. Sixteen) upāsanās advanced by the learned Bālāki, Ajātaśatru expounds the Ātman by means of the illustration of a sleeper. The vijñānamaya puruṣa has withdrawn into the Space in the heart, having taken to himself the intelligence of all the Prāṇas. In sleep he enters the high and the low, free from the limitations of the body. But in deep sleep he reaches the summit of bliss. From this knowing subject come forth all the Prāṇas, all worlds and all beings. He is the Real of the Real—a concession is here made to our empirical consciousness—All is real, but only in Him, and

by Him. The element of reality is this Subject that projects from itself all objects. The bolder stand-point that faces the ‘unreality’ of the Soul is not Ajātaśatru's.

In Brh. Up. 2. 3. the *satyasya satyam* of Ajātaśatru is interpreted from this stand-point, no doubt in the light of the teaching of the master-mind that dominates the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Here the formed (Mūrta) Brahma is *Sat* (in the sense of actual not true) and the Amūrta Brahma is the *Tya*—(Yon)—But the Self—it is *neti neti*; and *satyasya satyam*, we feel, is a weak anticlimax to this. But we will not anticipate Yājñavalkya.

Yena aśrutam śrutam bhavati amatam matam avijñātam vijñātam syāt. The teaching of Uddālaka occupies an intermediate position between the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā and the philosophy of Yājñavalkya. Tradition makes Uddālaka Āruṇi the teacher and rival of Yājñavalkya. According to him, creation is an evolution from Being which was *in the beginning one only*, without a second. He emits heat, from that water is engendered, from water food. The highest Being then enters these divinities as the Jīvātman and separates out name and form. Everything is a combination of these three, the difference is just a matter of name. This highest divinity pervades the world, like salt dissolved in water. Elsewhere, (in Brh. Up. 3. 7) Uddālaka questions Yājñavalkya about the Antaryāmin who “dwelling in all things, yet is other than all things, whom all things do not know, whose body all things are, who controls all things from within”—the Soul—the Inner Controller, the Immortal.

As for the material world, all things are combinations of Heat, Water and Annam; these three are the reality, everything is made up of these; differences are only a matter of name. “Whatever red form fire has, is the form of heat; whatever white the form of water, whatever dark the form of food. The firehood has gone from fire; the modification is merely a verbal distinction—a name. *The reality is just ‘the three forms’.*” The reality is, it should be noted, not just ‘Being’ but the ‘three forms’. Heat, Water and Food which were first engendered by ‘Sat’ and which after they were created, became real.

Our condition here is one of ignorance and bondage. We get a fore-taste of our real state in deep sleep. All creatures have Being as their root, have Being as their home, have Being as

their support. "Sanmūlāḥ soṃyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatnāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ."

It was the life, not the light within us, that engaged the attention of Uddālaka—that which is the finest essence, "aitadātmyam idam sarvam, tat satyam sa ātmā tat tvam asi Śvetaketu." The life-force reduced to its ultimate aspect of Being, is his last resort. Uddālaka stopped short at Pantheism, as Śaṇḍilya had done before him. He did not follow the implications of the doctrine of an only Reality—'ekam eva advitīyam' to their natural conclusion.

Tittiri—the Ānanda-maya Brahma. *Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.* As in Uddālaka's teaching, but with greater detail, the Taitt. Upaniṣad traces the course of evolution from the Primal Ātman to the person. Then follows an analysis of this person—the Annamaya Puruṣa, within that, the Prāṇamaya Puruṣa, then the Manomaya, the Vijñānamaya, and finally as the very self of Brahma—the Ānandamaya Puruṣa. This Ātman creates the world, and then enters into it. He becomes both the Sat (actual) and the Tya (Yon) both the real and the false.

The Taitt. Up. goes beyond the Sat (Being) of Uddālaka to the non-existent, in the sense that, strictly speaking, the source of all is not the existence that we know. Just as it was the aspect of Being that engaged Uddālaka's attention, it is that of bliss in which the Taitt. Up. finds the very highest aspect of the Ātman. This bliss is not to be expressed in words, and unthinkable. This the knower attains—the man free from desire. Neither good nor evil can affect him, who is lost in bliss.

Yājñavalkya. *Neti neti.* The individual soul is *Indra* or *Indha* and his wife *Virāj*. They meet in the space within the heart. This is the person who consists of knowledge among the senses. Brahma is beyond all attributes—and can only be described by *neti neti* and by negative epithets such as *Asaṅga Agrhya* and so on.

The soul and the Brahman are one, not merely in the sense that the soul comes from it, and goes back to it, but in the uncompromising sense that here and now, it is Brahma—and never was anything else. The whole world is a creation of the Self, what the individual soul desires He creates. The difference between sleep and waking is just this—in sleep he is self-illumi-

nated *svayañjyotiḥ*. There, just as he has created this world out of his desires and his Karma, even so he created the world of dreams. 'For he is a creator.'

*Svapnānta uccāvacamiyamāno rūpāṇi deva kurute bahūni
Udeva stribhiḥ saha modamāno jakṣadutevāpi bhayāni
paśyan.*

The highest form of His is when in deep sleep He has no desires and sees no dream—That is his "*āptakāmam, ātmakāmam, akāmam rūpam śokāntaram.*" There He is free from all bonds, and is not followed by either good or evil. This state is not annihilation. There is no destruction of Himself as the knowing subject—'yad vai tanna paśyati, paśyan vai tanna paśyati, na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer vipariloḥ vidyate, avināśitvāt.'

The chief feature of Yājñavalkya's teaching is a clear recognition of all the implications of the doctrine of an only reality. The stand-point of idealism had been reached before him as we have seen, but his was the bold mind that soared above all its pitfalls. When like Maitreyī we tremble before the abyss of utter annihilation, he draws us tenderly and surely away, assures us that Mokṣa is not a ceasing to be—but only a great bliss of which one gets a foretaste in deep sleep, or in union with a beloved one.

The deepest feeling in us is love. Yājñavalkya traces it back to its source and sweeping aside all that is small and unworthy in our human love, shows that it springs from the essential element of dearness that is the nature of the soul. As a later Upaniṣad says—it is to be worshipped as '*Tadvana.*' (It-is-the-desire). Good and evil do not adhere to the soul, because the world in which they played their parts has been only a dream, unreal when the Reality is known. Desires must cease because as long as we desire, we continue to create our world. Desires will cease in realization when all objects pass away, and the knower becomes one with the Ātman—that is, of all things, the only one desirable.

This Ātman can only be described thus '*neti neti*'. It is one only—therefore above Space. One only, therefore above Causality. Unborn—undying, therefore not of Time. What is it? *It cannot be known.* "*Vijñātūram arē kena vijānīyāt?*" Of the individual soul we can say it is the person consisting of knowledge

among the senses, *Iudha* and *Virāj* in the Space in the heart; but of the Soul, as it really and truly is, nothing but 'It is not thus, it is not so'—for our words limit the unlimited.

Thus the summit of Upaniṣadic thought has been reached. What remained to be done was—(1) a systematising, which was carried out partly by the later Upaniṣads, and fully in the Vedānta systems, (2) a further investigation along the same lines, from the point where Upaniṣadic thought turned, once and for all, away from Nihilism. This was accomplished by the Buddhist philosophers.

The later Upaniṣads. The later Upaniṣads speak of the individual soul as the Honey-eater (Experiencer) the enjoyer, Kaṭha Up. 4-5.

Ya imam madhvadam veda ātmānam Jivam antikāt.
Īśānam bhūta bhavyasya na tato vijugupsate.

In the Kaṭha also we find the famous figure of the soul as a chariot-driver, which perhaps suggested the episode of the Mahābhārata where Īśvara as Kṛṣṇa expounds the Gītā to Arjuna, the individual soul.

Ātmānam rathinam viddhi śarīram ratham eva tu
Buddhim tu sārathim viddhi manaḥ pragrahaṁ eva ca
Indriyāṇi hayān āhurviśayāṁsteṣu gocharān
Ātmendriyamanoyuktam bhokte tyāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ

Under the same figure the later Maitrī Up. speaks of the Individual soul, as the Kṣetrajña, but distinguishes another soul the Bhūtātman, who is over-come by good and evil and transmigrates. He does not see the Causer of action who stands within himself.

The metaphor of the two birds on the tree of life is a very old one—(R. V. 1-164—20). The two birds are the Individual soul that enjoys the fruit of action, and the witness that looks on without being affected by good and evil.

The Māṇḍūkya Up. shows a further development. In it, in addition to the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, a fourth state is recognised, and in relation with these four, a four-fold Ātman. The first state is the Jāgaritasthāna—It is outwardly cognitive and enjoys the gross. This is Vaiśvānara.

The second state—the Svapnasthāna is inwardly cognitive (Cp. Bṛh. Up. 4. 3. 9, 141) and it enjoys the fine—(Cp. Bṛh. Up.

4. 2. 3). This is Taijasa. The Susuptasthāna is the third state. It is unified, Prajñānaghana-ānandamaya—and enjoys bliss. This is Prājña—and is described as Sarvajña, Sarveśvara—and the Antaryāmin—the origin and end of all beings. This is not the highest however.

The Turiya is indescribable, except by negatives. It is not Antahprajña, nor Bahihprajña nor Prajñānaghana—it is unseen, ungraspable, unthinkable without marks. It cannot be designated, it cannot be dealt with; it is *ekātmapratyayasāra*—its essence the realization of oneness with the self.

This realization of the essential unknowableness of the Supreme Self is ever present in the later Upaniṣads.

Kaṭha Up. 6. 12.

Naiva Vācā na manasā prāptum śakyo na cakṣuṣā
Astīti bruvato nyatra, katham tadupalabhyate ?

and Kena Up. 2. 1.

yasyāmatam tasya matam matam yasya na veda saḥ
avijñātam vijñātām—vijñātamavijñātām

See also Īśa Up. 9. 10. Muṇḍ 3. 1. 8.

The doctrine of the absolute oneness of the soul, excludes the reality of anything other than it. That the universe of names and forms has only a seeming reality is implied in the doctrines of the great Upaniṣadic teachers. In Ch. Up. 6 Uddālaka assures his son "*Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, trīṇi rūpāṇītyeva satyam*" and in the idealism of Yājñavalkya even this is transcended and reality is predicated only of the Ātman who creates all objects from Himself. "For He is a creator" In Bṛh. Up. Yājñavalkya says of the Person made of intelligence, that He, remaining of the same, goes along both worlds, *appearing* to think, *appearing* to move. This doctrine is perhaps even earlier than Yājñavalkya. The phenomenal is distinguished from the noumenal not by an uncompromising denial of all reality to the world but by conceding to it a secondary reality as in Bṛh. Up. 1. 6. 3 the world of name, form and work is the real—actual (Satya) which veils the Immortal. So also in Ajātaśatru's *Satyasya Satyam*.

The first occurrence of the term Māyā is perhaps in the Śvet. Up. 1. 10 and 4. 9. 10.

Māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt,
Māyīnam tu maheśvaram (4. 9. 10).

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The individual soul is enmeshed in the Māyā of the Lord.

In the three-fold Brahma of the Śvetāśvatara a place is conceded to Pradhāna (Matter), Pradhāna and Hara (the individual Soul) and the Actuator (Preritā) "*Bhoktā bhogyaṃ preritāram ca matvā sarvaṃ proktaṃ trividhaṃ Brahmaṃ tad.*" Śvet. Up. 1, 11. See also Kaṭha Up. 4, 5, 6, 7 where the Bhoktā, the cosmic person, and Aditi are mentioned. See also Śvet. Up. 4, 5 which is even more Sāṅkhyan in tone.

"Ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām
Bahviḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ
Ajohyēko juṣamāṇonu śete
Jahātyenām bhuktabhogām ajo nyaḥ"

There is an ever-increasing consciousness of the vanity of human wishes in the later Upaniṣads. As long as we desire, we perform actions and have to enjoy the fruits thereof. In other words we *create* the world of our desires and remain bound down by bonds of our own making. Karma can give rise only to good or bad results. The Self is above good and evil—Mokṣa is not a state that is brought into being as the fruit of any action, being eternal. "*nāsti akṛtaḥ kṛtena.*" That which is not made cannot be won by action. Good deeds will win the heavenly world, bad deeds will lead us downwards, but Mokṣa is a state above these two.

In the very nature of things we perform actions, voluntary or involuntary. How then shall we obtain release. Indifference, desirelessness, actions performed without desire cannot bear fruit of any kind. Desires will cease only when we realize that there is nothing other than the Self.

He who in fancy forms desires,
Because of his desires, is born here and there.
But of him whose desire is satisfied, who is a perfected

Soul.
All desires even here on earth vanish away. Muṇḍ.
Up. 3. 2. 2.

Iśāvāsyam idam sarvaṃ
Yat kiñca jagatyām jagat
Tena tyaktena bhuñjīthā .
Mā grdhaḥ kasya sviddhanam
Kurvanneveha karmāṇi
Jijīviṣecchatam samāḥ

Evam tvayi nānyatheto sti
Na karma lipyate nare.

Iśā. Up. 1. 2.

Thus the problem was solved by work without attachment.

This is at last exaggerated into a positive dislike for the world which is expressed in the later Maitrī, Up. (1. 3). Here the indifference towards the world advanced in the older Upaniṣads with so much moderation and judgment has degenerated into a pessimism that is unlovely, and unlike the free and joyous spirit of the early Upaniṣads.

To be continued.

DEFINITION OF POETRY OR KĀVYA*.

BY

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(Continued from page 223 of Vol. III, part III, J. O. R. M.)

CHAPTER III.

THE ĀLAṆKĀRIKAS.

Now I should come to our own Ālaṅkārikas. Things, we know, are generally defined in three ways :—by their causes, by some special features, inherent and permanent in them, or by their effect. To exemplify in order:—that which is produced by fire is smoke; that which burns is fire; that whose creation is this whole universe is Brahman. Now if you consider the different definitions of poetry given by our Ālaṅkārikas you may easily find that everyone of them belongs either to the second or the third of these categories of definition. But nowhere can we meet with a definition that belongs to the first category. The reason perhaps is this. We know that things unknown are defined by things known. The reverse is impossible. If so, it is very plain that poetry cannot be defined by its cause. We cannot know what its cause is until we know what poetry is. Power of imagination, high talents, great scholarship, all these and such other phrases are too general to give a correct idea of that recondite faculty of man which gives birth to poetry. When we wish to specify that faculty, or the constituent parts of that faculty, we cannot do so otherwise than by phrases like *poetic* faculty, *poetic* imagination and so on—a fact which decisively proves the case in question, namely, without knowing what poetry is, it is impossible to know what the cause of poetry is. I maintain that Daṇḍin and Maṇḍana were fully conscious of this fact and therefore they first defined poetry without referring to its causes, and pointed them out afterwards so that those who wished to become poets might know the directions in which

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they should move for the achievement of their object. Since, thus, the causes of poetry have nothing to do in our attempt to get at a definition of it, we may well pass over them.

It is somewhat curious that in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, the earliest extant work on Poetics, we cannot find a definition of poetry, though, as he says at the end, "पद्यं शरीरं निर्णीतम्", the whole of the first *Pariccheda* is devoted to describing 'body of poetry.' When Bhāmaha says—

शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम् ,

[The word and and sense taken together are poetry.]

it cannot be deemed that he intends to define poetry. Rather the idea underlying these words seems to be that neither the word nor the sense alone is poetry, but both of them taken together. In spite of such unaccountable silence of Bhāmaha in the matter of defining poetry, we are not wholly left in the dark as to what, in his opinion, makes a literary composition fit for the name of poetry and differentiates it from other kinds of literary productions. Since, as is shown by Sovani in his 'Pre-dhvani schools', (BCV., p. 393-4) Bhāmaha repeatedly says that *Vakrokti* embellishes the poetic speech and sense, it may be concluded that according to Bhāmaha the indispensably essential requisite of poetry is *Vakrokti*. But we should first determine what Bhāmaha's *Vakrokti* means. When we consider the few *śloka*s scattered here and there through the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* which speak of *Vakrokti* (and which are, all of them, specifically pointed out by Sovani), we are generally of the impression that it is, in Bhāmaha's view, the all-embracing principle of poetry, and thus it is more or less synonymous with *Alaṅkāra* in the old *Ālaṅkārikas*' sense of the word. But such conclusion I can hardly persuade myself to accept. At the end of the second *Pariccheda*, Bhāmaha does mention and illustrate what is called the *Svabhāvokti* *Alaṅkāra*. Although this *Alaṅkāra* is there introduced with 'some say that' "इति केचित् प्रचक्षते", it will not be reasonable to say that he does not accept it as one of the poetic figures. If so he would have stated expressly as he had done in the case of *Hetu*, *Sūkṣma* and *Leśa*. While Sovani, ignoring II. 93 of Bhāmaha, declares that according to him *Vakrokti* is the life-giving principle of poetry, Dr. De not only does not take notice of it but goes to the length of asserting that

'such *Svabhāvokti*, or natural mode of speech to which Daṇḍin is so partial, is not acceptable to Bhāmaha, who refuses to acknowledge *Svabhāvokti* as a poetic figure at all.' [See his introduction to the *Vakrokti-Jīvitā*, p. XIV.] I would say 'he does not take notice of it', not he is ignorant of it. We know, from a foot-note of his in page 21, that Dr. De has seen that *śloka*. There he means to say that Kuntala refutes *Svabhāvokti*, following Bhāmaha's theory of poetry. Where, we should ask Dr. De, does Bhāmaha refuse to acknowledge *Svabhāvokti*? So far as our study of the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* goes, nowhere in its six chapters can we find any statement of Bhāmaha to that effect. As I have already said, "इति केचित् प्रचक्षते" is not sufficient to prove the non-acceptance of *Svabhāvokti* by Bhāmaha. If it be said it is sufficient, many *Alaṅkāras* would have to be struck off from Bhāmaha's list. For instance take *Āśīś*. Bhāmaha says आशीरपि च केषाञ्चिदलङ्कारतया मता. No one would say that the *āśīś* *Alaṅkāra* is not acceptable to Bhāmaha because he adds 'some accept', 'केषाञ्चिन्मता'. Just the same is the case with *Svabhāvokti*. And further there is not a single *Ālaṅkārika*, except indeed Kuntala, so far as we know, who denies *Svabhāvokti* a place in poetry. Udbhaṭa, the famous commentator of Bhāmaha, treats of this *Svabhāvokti* in the very place and order in which Bhāmaha has treated it. Daṇḍin's list of *Alaṅkāras* is headed by *Svabhāvokti*, or *Svabhāvākhyāna*, as it is called there. As Daṇḍin criticises Bhāmaha's views on many a point, he would have, when explaining the *Svabhāvokti* *Alaṅkāra*, surely uttered at least a few words of censure—which is not the case—had he thought in the least that Bhāmaha refused to recognise *Svabhāvokti* as a poetic figure. All the difference we can perceive between Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's treatment of *Svabhāvokti* is this. Bhāmaha, though not, like Daṇḍin, expressly classifying *Alaṅkāras*, yet, having in mind the same division as Daṇḍin's and having regard to the predominance of 'Vakroti' *Alaṅkāras*,—I mean the *Alaṅkāras* other than *Svabhāvokti*—in poetry, gave priority to such of them as he intended to illustrate by his own *śloka*s, 'स्वयं कृतैरेव निदर्शनेः' and treated *Svabhāvokti* at the end of the chapter. But Daṇḍin following a more scientific method and having in mind the division he is going to make at the end 'मित्रं द्विधा स्वभावोक्तिर्वक्रोक्तिश्चेति वाङ्मयम्', mentions and treats of *Svabhāvokti* first of all.

Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, therefore, are indubitably of one mind and in full agreement in dividing Alaṅkāras into two kinds, Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti, and consequently the Vakrokti of the one means as much as that of the other, nothing less, nothing more.

Dr. De, however, tries to show in his introduction to the Vakrotijivita (pp. XIV—XVIII) that there is some difference between Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's Vakroktis. But he is not there very clear and my impression after a very careful perusal of these pages is that he has missed the true significance of II. 362 of Daṇḍin and that he is unnecessarily troubling himself to interpret in his own way the word Vakrokti, which Daṇḍin only once uses there. Though I do not now propose to go any further in proving the truth of my statement, yet I wish to say one word as to Dr. De's understanding of the views of the two commentators of Daṇḍin about the śloka referred to. After quoting Hṛdayaṅgamā, Dr. De writes:—‘Taruṇavācaspati agrees with this interpretation but differs as to what group of Alaṅkāras Daṇḍin signifies by this collective name : *Svavyākhyānavyatiriktā sarvālaṅkṛtīr vakroktīr ityucyante*’ (this should be in singular *ityucyate*). It is here obvious that *svavyākhyāna* is an erroneous reading for *svabhāvākhyāna*. For, among the Alaṅkāras mentioned in the beginning of the chapter by Daṇḍin or anywhere in the Kāvyaadarśa we cannot find one with the name of *svavyākhyāna*. Even if one should perversely insist upon the correctness of the reading, yet there is no alternative except to take it to mean *Svabhāvākhyāna*. So, there exists no difference of opinion between these two commentators of Daṇḍin as to what group of Alaṅkāras is meant by Vakrokti.

Now coming to our present consideration it is shown that, according to Bhāmaha too, Svabhāvokti is a poetic figure. That Kuntala vehemently attacks this theory is a fact which we plainly see through the creditable edition of the Vakrotijivita by Dr. S.K. De. But his statement (P. 21, f. n.) that, in rejecting Svabhāvokti, Kuntala follows Bhāmaha is unauthorised and unsustainable. When Kuntala says यत्तन्निवृत्तैरपरं स्वभावोक्तिरक्षणमलंकरणमाम्नातम्, (because the ancients have mentioned another figure named Svabhāvokti), he meant by ‘the ancients’, it seems to me certain, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. We know that Kuntala does not as a rule agree on everything with Bhāmaha. For, we are informed by Sovani (BCV, p. 396) that he rejects the

athāsaṅkhyā Alaṅkāra and some others which are accepted by Bhāmaha. Why cannot that be the case with Svabhāvokti? As said before nobody among the preceding or succeeding Alaṅkārikas seems to be willing to support Kuntala on this point. He is left pitifully alone. His *Sāstraic* and somewhat pedantic arguments against Svabhāvokti come into conflict with experience. Let everyone that has taste for poetry see whether there is any difference or not between these two compositions :—

गोरपत्न्यं बलीवर्दस्तृणान्यत्ति मुखेन सः ।

(quoted in Rudrata's com. VII. 10.)

and,

आक्रोशन्नाह्वयन्नन्यानाधावन् मण्डलैरुदन् ।

गा वारयति दण्डेन बालः सस्यावतारिणीः ॥

(Bhāmaha II. 94.)

In convincing ourselves as to the fitness of Svabhāvokti to be treated as an Alaṅkāra of poetry, these words of Leigh Hunt may be advantageously borne in mind :—

“Nay the simplest truth is often so beautiful and impressive of itself that one of the greatest proofs of his genius consists in his leaving it to stand alone illustrated by nothing but the light of its own tears or smiles, its own wonder, might or playfulness”. (ECE. p. 303).

Now there is a line in Bhāmaha which gives room for doubt about his acceptance of Svabhāvokti as a poetic figure. After declaring that *hetu*, *sūkṣma*, and *leśa* are not accepted as Alaṅkāras, he subjoins his reason thus : समुदायाभिधानस्य वक्रोक्त्यनभिधानतः (II-86).

I am not clear about what is meant by समुदायाभिधानस्य. Yet it may be roughly translated thus :—

“Because taken as a whole it does not involve Vakrokti.”

This reason of Bhāmaha for his non-acceptance of the three Alaṅkāras at once leads us to think that according to Bhāmaha there can be no Alaṅkāra where there is no Vakrokti. But I do not think that is the meaning of Bhāmaha. As is shown above, in Bhāmaha's view, all the Alaṅkāras other than the one, Svabhāvokti, are governed by the Vakrokti principle. An Alaṅkāra, if it is to be really so, must belong to the one or the

other of the two kinds of *Alaṅkāras*—*Svabhāvokti* and *Vakrokti*. When the real nature of a *pseudo-Alaṅkāra* is to be explained, what we should do is to show that there is neither *Svabhāvokti* nor *Vakrokti*. It would be quite wrong if, speaking of a particular poetic expression, we say that this is not an *Alaṅkāra* because it is not a *Svabhāvokti*. For there are *Alaṅkāras* such as *uṣamā*, yet they are not *Svabhāvoktis*. In the same way it would be wrong if, taking a passage, we say that because it is not a *Vakrokti* it cannot be an *Alaṅkāra*. For there is an *Alaṅkāra* called *Svabhāvokti* and it is not a *Vakrokti*. So before we can pass judgment upon a certain expression as not having any *Alaṅkāra*, we should satisfy ourselves as to its coming under neither of the two heads of *Alaṅkāras*—*Svabhāvokti* and *Vakrokti*.

Now *Svabhāvokti* has no subdivision, while *Vakrokti* has so many. When this is well borne in mind, it will appear quite reasonable that whenever the names of *Alaṅkāras* such as *uṣamā* and *dīpaka* are heard, we at once understand that they are not of the *Svabhāvokti* kind. If thus, the very names of the other *Alaṅkāras* invariably give the idea of their not being *Svabhāvoktis*, there is no use of stating it expressly. In this light should be interpreted the line in question. *Helu*, *Sūkṣma* and *Leśa* by their very names imply that they are not the species of the *Svabhāvokti* *Alaṅkāra*. Then, if these non-*Svabhāvokti* *Alaṅkāras* are really *Alaṅkāras*, they should involve some kind of *Vakrokti* in them. But they do not. *Bhāmaha* thinks so. Therefore, they are not accepted as *Alaṅkāras*. This is, I believe, the real meaning of *Bhāmaha*.

When the foregoing remarks are kept in mind it will be clearly seen that the word *vakrasvabhāvoktyā* in the second line of *Bhāmaha* I. 39, युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते, need not be necessarily interpreted as *Sovani* has interpreted it. He takes the word to mean the same as *Vakrokti*, ignoring the second element "*Svabhāva*" in that compound word. According to him the word is to be parsed वक्रस्वभावा उक्तिः; but it may be as well parsed so as to mean वक्रोक्ति and स्वभावोक्ति. Since in his interpretation, the word *Svabhāva* becomes purposeless in the sentence, my interpretation, it may be seen, according to the interpretative laws of *Mīmāṃsā*, is preferable. I should like here to point out, though it has no direct bearing upon our present consideration, that *Sovani* is misconstruing the line

quoted above when he explains it thus :—'All the sub-divisions of poetry I mentioned (by him 16-30) are admissible to the designation of *Kāvya* in so far as they possess *Vakrasvabhāvokti* or imaginative speech.' (BCV. p. 394.)

Bhāmaha after further dividing a four-fold division of poetry into two, three, four and lastly five kinds and explaining what the first four kinds of the last division are, writes :—

अनिबन्धं(द्वं) पुनर्गाथाश्लोकमात्रादि तत्पुनः ।

युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते ॥

We see that in this *śloka* there are three separate sentences ending with (1) श्लोकमात्रादि (2) तत्पुनर्युक्तं वक्रस्वभावोक्त्या and (3) सर्वमेवैतदिष्यते. Of these three sentences the first describes what the fifth kind of the last division is. A metric composition in *Prākṛt* dialects is generally called a *gāthā*, and that in *sanskrit* a *śloka*. This *anibaddha* of *Bhāmaha* is called *muktaka* by later *Ālaṅkārikas*. By the second sentence *Bhāmaha* means to tell us this; *ślokas* such as

भोजनं देहि राजेन्द्र घृतसूपसमन्वितम् ।

and

गोरपत्यं बलीवर्दस्तृणान्यात्ति मुखेन सः ।

must not be brought under this kind. There is no *Alaṅkāra* here at all; neither *Svabhāvokti* nor *Vakrokti*. The third and last sentence indicates that he approves of all the species of poetry divided and described by him in the preceding *ślokas*. True, all that is not expressly rejected may readily be taken as approved by him. However, since he is next going to controvert another division of poetry, *Bhāmaha* thinks it proper, as all the experienced and able writers would think, to finish the previous topic in this way. Unless the *śloka* is interpreted in this way, the two words in the first line— तत् and पुनः, would remain without any connection either with the preceding or the succeeding sentence.

If thus both of these *uktis* are equally embellishers of poetry, does it not go without saying that one of them alone will not do for the purpose of defining poetry? The definition formed with one of these two principles is sure to leave out those pieces of poetry, the poetic essence of which is the other principle—a fact

which will render the definition faulty of *aryāṃ*. So we should take leave of Vakrokti and look elsewhere in Bhāmaha for some such poetic principle as can help us in forming a definition of poetry. To the best of my belief, the following two lines, with a little difference in wording but the same in substance, may be taken to indicate what Bhāmaha considers the essence of poetry :—

अग्राम्यशब्दमर्थं च सालङ्कारं सदाश्रयम् । (1-19.)

अलङ्कारवदग्राम्यमर्थं न्याय्यमनाकुलम् । (1-35)

In these two lines, the words, other than *मालङ्कार* and *अलङ्कारवत्*, mean this—that poetic speech and sense should be free from blemishes. From the words *मालङ्कार* and *अलङ्कारवत्* we are to understand that Bhāmaha's theory is that *Alaṅkāra* is the life-principle of poetry. So I think 'अलङ्कृतो शब्दार्थो काव्यम्' is the definition of Bhāmaha. The name of the work itself, *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, is suggestive of Bhāmaha's theory of poetry. As Sovani has pointed out (BCV p. 305), Bhāmaha uses the word *गुण* in the sense of *Alaṅkāra*. Bhāmaha makes no difference between *गुण* and *अलङ्कार*, not through want of keen critical acumen. Since he is decidedly posterior to the sage Bharata, who with unmistakable distinctness, enumerates both poetic *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*, it is impossible that the difference known to Bharata between these poetic embellishers did not come to his knowledge. He knew it full well but held the opinion which his commentator Udbhata has expressly recorded about it. Therefore it is, and it is unaccountable otherwise, that he not only uses nowhere in the *Kāvyālaṅkāra* the word '*guṇa*' in the sense in which other *Alaṅkārikas* use it, not even when he speaks of the three famous *guṇas*—*माधुर्यं*, *प्रसाद*, and *ओजस्*, but also uses it in the sense of *Alaṅkāra*.

Just the same seems to be the case with Daṇḍin. Whereas Bhāmaha first cites *भाविक* as an *Alaṅkāra* and then calls it *guṇa*, Daṇḍin in the first chapter calls *श्लेष* etc., *guṇas*—

इति वैदर्भमार्गस्य प्राणा दश गुणाः स्मृताः—

and then in the second chapter calls them *Alaṅkāras*—

काश्चिन्मार्गविभागार्थमुक्ताः प्रागप्यलङ्क्रियाः ।

साधारणमलङ्कारजातमथ प्रदर्शयते ॥

(1-42).

(II-3).

Commenting upon this *śloka*, Taruṇavācaspati tries in plain language to prove that the *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* are undistinguishable. I think the following few lines of his are worth quoting here :—

पूर्वं श्लेषादयो दश गुणा इत्युक्तम् ; कथं ते अलङ्कारा उच्यन्ते इति चेत्—शोभाकरत्वं हि अलङ्कारलक्षणम् ; तल्लक्षणयोगात् तेऽप्यलङ्काराः । शोभा-हेतवो गुणाः, शोभातिशयहेतवोऽलङ्कारा इति कैश्चिदुक्तम् ; शोभातिशयहेतु-त्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वान्नान्यं भेदहेतुरिति गुणा अलङ्कारा एवेत्याचार्याः । ततः श्लेषादयो गुणात्मकालङ्काराः पूर्वं मार्गप्रभेदप्रदर्शनायोक्ताः । इदानीं तु मार्गद्वय-साधारणा अलङ्कारा उच्यन्ते ॥

To those who will carefully read the above *śloka* of Daṇḍin, it would be apparent that Taruṇavācaspati's exposition of the text faithfully brings out Daṇḍin's meaning. It is only Vāmana that has begun to demarcate distinctly *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* and their respective functions in poetry. Though, as I have already observed, Bharata separately mentions, defines and illustrates *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*, and implies thereby that *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* are different and cannot interchange their names, yet Bhāmaha, being of the opinion that the difference between them is only illusory and fanciful in as much as both groups in the same way function as poetic embellishments, tacitly disregards and rejects Bharata's views, and accepts only one category of poetic embellishers, *Alaṅkāra*, though sometimes called *guṇa*, which includes everything that may be thought an indispensable element of poetry. To this theory of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin gives his whole-hearted assent and indirectly indicates the undistinguishableness of *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* by giving a definition which comprehends both of them :—

काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मानलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते ।

But Bhāmaha differentiates *कथा* and *आख्यायिका* from each other, and refuses to distinguish *वैदर्भ* from *गौडीय*. This is not acceptable to Daṇḍin and here he attacks Bhāmaha with some vehemence. According to Daṇḍin, *Alaṅkāras* are to be divided into two classes—special and common. Most of the so-called *guṇas* Daṇḍin thinks, are *Alaṅkāras* of the special class; because they are accepted by Vaidarbhas alone; not by Gauḍas. Though, thus, with regard to some details, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin hold mutually

conflicting and opposite views, yet they are in full agreement as to the identity of *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* and about the acceptability of *Svabhāvokti* as a poetic *Alaṅkāra*, as I have shown in the foregoing pages.

The fact that Vāmana divides *guṇas* into two groups, as those of word and those of sense, and *rīti* into three kinds instead of two, leads, naturally, some to think that he has made some improvement upon Daṇḍin and therefore both of them are of the same school. (BCV, p. 398.) But the nomenclature of the ten *guṇas* being the same in Bharata too, why cannot the improvement be upon Bharata as well? In truth, though the names are the same, they are given very different meanings by each author. For instance, Daṇḍin's *śleṣa* is Vāmana's *ojas*; while Vāmana's *śleṣa* has nothing corresponding to it in Daṇḍin. And Vāmana's *śleṣa* too is further strained by Jagannātha so as to give it a more restricted sense. This process of innovation from Daṇḍin to Jagannātha may be shown in the case of each of the *guṇas*. Hemacandra has already made an attempt in his *Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi* to show the various meanings given by his predecessors to the names of *guṇas*. Similarly though Vaidarbha and Gauḍīya *mārgas* of Daṇḍin are accepted by Vāmana, they are fundamentally different as understood by him. While Daṇḍin accepts ten *guṇas* in Vaidarbha, Vāmana accepts only three. Further I do not think Daṇḍin's conception of these *mārgas* is the same as Vāmana's. In Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, we do not meet with the term *rīti*. Daṇḍin's *mārga* means kind or way. In many places he uses this word मार्ग, where it is quite impossible to take it in the sense of Vāmana's *rīti*. Moreover, he often indiscriminately uses also the words वर्त्म, पन्थाः, प्रस्थानम् instead of मार्ग. All this goes to show that *mārga* has not assumed any technical sense in Daṇḍin.

Nor do we see that Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin speaks of the essential principle of poetry as the *soul* of it. Such an idea seems to have never come to their mind, word and sense are embellished by what are called *Alaṅkāras*, and they are poetry, and they please the readers or hearers of taste. This much and no more is the idea of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, concerning poetry. True, Daṇḍin uses in the beginning of the *Kāvyaadarśa*, in connexion with poetry, the word denoting body, which some may think, implies that the author meant to call the charac-

teristic principle of poetry its *soul*. But it seems to me that it will be almost impossible to answer if it be asked why the word should be taken in such a far-reaching sense. This word is annotated in the *Hṛdayaṅgama* as meaning स्वरूप. And in *śāstraic* discussions such phrases are very often used as लक्षणशरीर, अधिकरणशरीर etc., where शरीर is not intended to suggest any contrast with the soul. Exactly the same, I believe, is the case here. To Daṇḍin, *Alaṅkāra* or the embellisher is to poetry what sweetness is to milk (I. 102). If still on the sole authority of this single equivocal word, it be tenaciously held that Daṇḍin has conceived of a *poetic soul*, I am at a loss to know why the same cannot be said of Bhāmaha also, who at the end of his *Kāvyaālaṅkāra* says—षष्ठ्या शरीरं निर्णीतम्. The general trend of the *Kāvyaālaṅkāra* and the *Kāvyaadarśa* will, if well understood, surely prove that the idea of a *poetic soul* is wholly foreign to the mind of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

Now these considerations make it inevitable that I should once more disagree with Sovani, who writes :—

"The chief writers of this (*rīti*) school were Daṇḍin and Vāmana." (BCV, p. 396.)

According to Vāmana, the *guṇas*, not at all identifiable with *Alaṅkāras*, constitute what is called *rīti*—which is the soul of poetry, while the *Alaṅkāras* are mere accessories to it. This is all that marks his school as different fundamentally from that of Bhāmaha, who contemplates no *soul* of poetry, speaks of no *rīti*; makes no difference between *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*; but holds that the embellished word and sense taken together are poetry. If so, let one judge candidly, whether Daṇḍin belongs to Bhāmaha's or Vāmana's school. It is shown that Daṇḍin too contemplates no soul of poetry, speaks of no *rīti*, and makes no difference between *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*. Nor does Daṇḍin seem to maintain, as Vāmana does, that the absence of the so-called *guṇas* alone will render a literary composition unpoetic. When the consideration of these fundamental principles makes it clear that they do not and cannot belong to one and the same school, it is of little consequence that they use the same terminology such as Gauḍa and Vaidarbha, *guṇa* and *Alaṅkāra*. In the same way, the fact that Daṇḍin recognises the two *mārgas* of poetry, Vaidarbha and Gauḍa, which Bhāmaha rejects, can no more establish their belonging to different schools

than the fact that Daṇḍin accepts the three *Alaṅkāras*, *hetu*, etc., which Bhāmaha disfavours. Of this view we find a supporter in Jayaratha. Commenting upon the first passage of the *Alaṅkāra-sarvasva*—इह हि तावत् भामहोद्भटप्रभृतयः चिरन्तनालङ्कारकाः—he observes :—

“इहेत्यादिना । प्रभृतिना दण्ड्यादयः । तावच्छब्दो विप्रतिपत्त्य-
भावद्योतकः । (p. 3.)

and again.

तदेवं चिरन्तनैः प्रतीयमानस्यालङ्कारान्तर्भाव एवोक्तः । तदुपस्कार्यः
पुनरात्मा कैश्चिदपि नाभ्युपगतः । वामनेन प्रतीयमानस्यालङ्कारान्तर्भावमभिदध-
तापि तदुपस्कार्य आत्मा कश्चिदुक्त इत्याह वामनेनेति । (p. 7.)

and again in introducing the line—उद्भटादिभिस्तु गुणालङ्काराणां प्रायशः
साम्यमेव सूचितम् he writes :—

तदेवं विशिष्टपदरचनात्मिकायाः काव्यात्मनाभ्युपगताया रीतेः तदति-
शयहेतवस्त्वालङ्कारा इत्याद्युक्त्या अन्तर्भावितध्वनयोऽलङ्कारा उपस्कारका इत्येतन्म-
तम् । अन्यैः पुनरेतदपि प्रत्युक्तमित्याह—उद्भटादिभिरित्यादिना । (p. 7.)

After quoting these words of Jayaratha which settle the case once for all, little remains for me to say by way of explanation regarding the question we are inquiring into. So we may, without any fear of contradiction, declare that Daṇḍin is a follower of the *Alaṅkāra*, not the pioneer of the *rīti*, school. The result we obtain from this conclusion is that we are in a position to know that Daṇḍin's definition of poetry is the same as Bhāmaha's.

Vāmana too, though following a school quite different from Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's, does not seem to reject this definition of poetry. Probably his first Sūtra is intended for giving a definition, though it is not in the usual form of a definition. His employment of the word *Alaṅkāra* there is in the same general sense of embellishment as in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. But in the next Sūtra he uses it in the restricted sense of “figures of speech”, excluding *guṇas*. Nevertheless, as apparently this narrow sense would not do for the purpose of definition, he had necessarily to use it also in its formerly usual wider application.

Ignoring the first Sūtra we would naturally think that Vāmana's definition should be रीतिमत् काव्यम् or गुणवत् काव्यम्. It is only to prevent such a wrong notion about Daṇḍin's definition, arising in scholar's minds, that I have been so particular to show that Daṇḍin's school is that of *Alaṅkāra*, not of *rīti*. Vāmana also, though distinguishing between *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* as the factors that produce and those that heighten poetic beauty, did not wish it to be understood that, according to him, *Alaṅkāras* should be considered unimportant in poetry. Therefore he begins with defining poetry, not deviating from his predecessors.

Among the *Ālaṅkārikas* later than Vāmana, except a few commentators on older works, there are none who hold *guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* as of one category. Consequently the term *Alaṅkāra* became since then settled in the sense of figures of speech; and sometimes it was used to mean the charm produced by them. But nobody employed it so as to include in its meaning the *guṇas*, or the beauty resulting from them, evidently to avoid confusion. So, it was no longer possible to make a definition of poetry with the help of *Alaṅkāra* alone, and the definition of the old *Ālaṅkārikas* began to be thought inadequate. And it needs hardly be told that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find another term general enough to comprehend all the charming elements of poetry. Under these circumstances it is but natural that Mammaṭa, and following him, others, should try to make a definition, putting into it separately the absence of blemishes, *guṇas*, and *Alaṅkāras*, all of which were at once denoted in the old *Ālaṅkārikas*' definition by the single word *Alaṅkāra*. Thus, it will be seen that though the wording is different, yet the substance is the same in the old and the new definition.

It would seem to many that, as becomes a devout adherent of the theory of Ānandavardhana, the father of the *dhvani* school, who seems to define poetry by its effect,

“सहृदयहृदयाह्लादिशब्दार्थमयत्वंमेव काव्यलक्षणम्” (1 p. 7).

Dhvanyālōka.

Mammaṭa should have defined it otherwise than he has done. But in accordance with a tradition current among the *śāstraic* authors—शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः—he thought it necessary, perhaps, to point out first the objects of poetry: and

of the many objects mentioned by him, आह्लाद (pleasure) is one—
सद्यः परनिर्वृतये ।

When, thus, he got at the idea of आह्लाद as producible by poetry, indeed it did not occur to him that he might define it by its effect. Therefore he searched in the body of poetry itself for some characteristic feature useful for the purpose of definition and found that the definition of the old Ālaṅkārikas was quite acceptable and required only a verbal change, which accordingly he did, as shown above.

Moreover there is some advantage in making such a definition, for it serves as 'the contents' for the whole book. That authors have such a convenience in their view may be plainly seen from the following *śloka* of Vāgbhaṭa :—

साधुशब्दार्थसन्दर्भं गुणालङ्कारभूषितम् ।
स्फुटरीतिरसोपेतं काव्यं कुर्वीत कीर्तये ॥(1. 2.)

Here lies, too, the explanation of the fact that all the authors on Poetics, posterior to Mammaṭa, with the exception of Viśvanātha and Jagannātha, give their definitions more or less in the same form as Mammaṭa.

Thus far, we were speaking of the definitions of poetry that belong to the second division of definition, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. Regarding these definitions there may arise a question. What are the Ālaṅkāras, *guṇas*, and *doṣas*, which form these definitions? Unless and until we know what they are, we cannot understand the definition of poetry based on them. One is sure to be disappointed if one looks to Bhāmaha for a definition of Ālaṅkāra. Perhaps Bhāmaha thought that the word Ālaṅkāra is simple enough to indicate at once what is meant by it. I think what was in Bhāmaha's mind was expressly told by Daṇḍin in this extract :—

काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मानलङ्कारान् प्रचक्षते ।

But this not only does not help us to answer the question "What is Ālaṅkāra", but leads to a greater difficulty. In order to obtain a definition of poetry, that is Kāvya, we are now inquiring what Ālaṅkāra is. If, now, the definition of Ālaṅkāra involves the question of poetry, then it is obvious that both these definitions become subject to a serious defect which

is called अ-योन्याश्रय, which means interdependence; we cannot understand either of them without knowing the other.

There is another way of defining, familiar only to our *śāstraic* authors, and followed when any other attempt to give a definition fails. When the species of a genus to be defined are of a limited number, they define the genus as being any one (अन्यतम) of the species. Let us suppose there is the question to be answered : What is metal? The answer according to the above method will be this,—any one of gold, silver, iron etc., is metal. In the same way perhaps we may have a definition of Ālaṅkāra : that which is identical with one or another of दीपक, उपमा etc., is Ālaṅkāra. But such a kind of definition should be entirely discarded here. For ours should not be an endeavour to have somehow or other a definition of a thing, even though it be uninforming and unmeaning, but to find out the governing, pervading principle, and to define the thing through it. Otherwise, the definition will be a verbal and arbitrary one, and will not serve the purpose of definition. When we hear the above-mentioned definition of Ālaṅkāra we are not in a position to know from it why *Upamā*, etc., should be called Ālaṅkāra and not otherwise, or why some other modes of speech cannot be accepted as Ālaṅkāras. Ālaṅkāra is not, we know, a term like our own names, merely conventional. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the ancient authors ever thought of such a kind of definition.

Such being the case we can declare that no earlier Ālaṅkārika has given us a workable definition of Ālaṅkāra. So recent an author as Vaidyanātha, the well-known commentator on Appayya Dīkṣita's Kuvalayānanda, in the beginning of the commentary, thus defines Ālaṅkāra in the verbose style of Naiyāyikas :—

“अलङ्कारत्वं च रसादिभिन्नव्यङ्ग्यभिनन्त्वे सति शब्दार्थान्यतरनिष्ठा
या विषयितासंबन्धावच्छिन्ना चमत्कृतिजनकतावच्छेदकता तदवच्छेदकत्वम् ।”

It may be doubted that this definition is defective of *ativyāpti*, because it can as well apply to *guṇas* which are, in later Ālaṅkārikas' view, as is already explained, different from Ālaṅkāras. But it should be borne in mind that all the later Ālaṅkārikas, except perhaps Jagannātha, accept *guṇas* as belonging to the *soul*, (*rasa*), and not to the *body*, (the word and sense)

of poetry. Now the first part of this definition ending with कति need not be taken into consideration as it has no direct bearing upon the present question; and the last part may, for convenience sake, be stripped of its *śāstric* garb and put thus into a more easily understandable form :—

यद्विशिष्ट(स्य)शब्दार्थान्यतर(स्य)ज्ञानं चमत्कृतिजनकं सोऽलङ्कारः ।

Roughly rendered into English, this means—that is Alaṅkāra, possessed of which, word and sense, through their cognition, produce pleasure. In poetry, word and sense are producers of pleasure; but what renders them capable of producing pleasure is Alaṅkāra. If the true significance of Vaidyanātha's definition of Alaṅkāra is fully grasped, it will be clearly seen that the definition of Alaṅkāra itself involves the definition of poetry. If, then,

यद्विशिष्टो शब्दार्थौ चमत्कारजनकौ सोऽलङ्कारः

is the definition of Alaṅkāra, it goes without saying that

यौ शब्दार्थौ चमत्कारजनकौ तत्काव्यम्

is the definition of poetry. It is already stated that Ānandavardhana's definition seems to be contained in these words of his :—

“सहृदयहृदयाह्लादिशब्दार्थमयत्वमेव काव्यलक्षणम्” ।

Now we see very plainly that this definition of Ānandavardhana may be easily equated with that of Vaidyanātha deduced from his definition of Alaṅkāra. What is thus far said of Alaṅkāra equally applies to *guṇas* and *doṣas*; for, they too, cannot be defined without finally resorting to *camatkāra* (चमत्कार) of which *āhlāda* (आह्लाद) is another name.

‘दोषास्तस्यापकर्षकाः’ ‘उत्कर्षहेतवः प्रोक्ता गुण....’

are Viśvanātha's definitions of them. So we may put aside the former definitions of poetry which include Alaṅkāra, *guṇa* and *doṣa* and take up the last mentioned one into consideration.

That this definition which is formed directly with the ‘effect’ of poetry belongs to the third class of definitions is too obvious to need mention. While enumerating the objects of poetry, Mammaṭa mentions five others along with this *camatkāra* or

paranirvṛti as he calls it there. Of these six, Hemacandra rejects three, wealth (अर्थ) worldly knowledge (व्यवहारवित्), and the removal of evil (शिवेतरक्षति), on the ground that poetry does not unfailingly bring wealth, nor is it the only means of obtaining the last mentioned two objects. Among the remaining three—pleasure (आनन्द), fame (कीर्ति), and sweet edification (कान्तसंमिततयोपदेश)—pleasure is the chief. Here, using the very words of Abhinavagupta, as he does in many places, Hemacandra writes:—

यशोव्युत्पत्तिफलत्वेऽपि पर्यन्ते सर्वानन्दस्यैव साध्यत्वात् । तथा हि—
कंवस्तावत् कीर्त्यापि प्रीतिरेव सम्पाद्या । यदाह ‘कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलमाहुः’
इत्यादि । श्रोतॄणां व्युत्पत्तिर्यद्यप्यस्ति तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा
प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य
व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायासमितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि च आनन्द एव
पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यफलमिति ।

The material at our disposal cannot help us to trace the source from which “कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलमाहुः” is taken.¹ Whoever may be the author of this quarter², it is plain that he means to say that the fame results in Svarga. Uttuṅgodaya takes this Svarga as the pleasure enjoyable in this world itself. It is not strange that our authors interpret the word in this sense. I fail to see, however, why the word should be taken here in that secondary meaning, discarding its proper meaning, which is heavenly bliss. Now we are naturally induced, here, to ask a question ‘How fame, instead of Dharma, can lead one to Svarga?’ To this question there is an answer in Bhāmaha.

रुणाद्धि रोदसी चास्य यावत् कीर्तिरनन्धरी ।

तावत् किलयमध्यास्ते सुकृती वैबुधं पदम् ॥

(1. 7.)

[As long as his undying fame fills the space between the earth and the sky, so long the man of good deeds occupies the world of Vibudhas, gods, (which is Svarga.)]

1. Prof. H. Jacobi points out that it is taken from the third of the ślokas, quoted by Vāmana at the end of I. 7. in his com. on sūtra 5.

2. Vāmana himself might have been the author of this quarter. [S. K. Sastri.]

Most probably the author of the quarter कीर्ति स्वर्गफलमाहुः had in his mind this *śloka* of Bhāmaha. The indeclinable किल shows that Bhāmaha too is referring there to some ancient authority and that authority is, I think, Indradyumna's episode in the Vanaparva of the Mahābhārata.

To be Continued.

KĀLIDĀSA AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE.*

BY

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I am deeply grateful to the President and the members of the Sanskrit Academy, Madras, for giving me an opportunity to pay my humble tribute to the memory of one, who may, with ample justification, be regarded as the greatest poet of India, save Vālmiki. Indeed, I believe, the Academy will not be worth its name if it does not celebrate the anniversaries of the great masters who have made Sanskrit learning and literature the priceless treasure and abiding possession of us all. We may without fear of exaggeration say that Kālidāsa ranks among the illustrious galaxy of the world's greatest poets. Whether in the art of exquisite and chiselled poetic expression or in the dulcet symphony of sound or in vivid imagery and graphic portrayal and brilliant word-painting or in the wonderful artistic creation of immortal romantic types or in the true vein of prophetic vision and insight focussed on the fundamental problems of human nature, society and destiny, he is, to say the least, unsurpassed by the poets of other countries. If Shakespeare has created a Desdemona, Kālidāsa has evolved a Śakuntalā. It may be that each represents a distinct type consonant with, and characteristic of, the genius of the race to which the poet belongs, but each, surely, is the noblest product of poetic imagination. No wonder, therefore, that even in translation, Śākuntalā inspired in the mind of a foreign poet and scholar like Goethe a profound æsthetic appreciation which took the form of a poem in her honour.

"Wouldst thou the young year's blossoms
and the fruits of its decline
And all by which the soul is charmed
enraptured, feasted and fed !

* A lecture delivered under the auspices of the Sanskrit Academy on the occasion of the celebration of the "Kālidāsa Day."

Wouldst thou the Earth and Heaven itself
in one sole name combine
I name Thee O Śakuntalā
and all at once is said."

It is curious, however, that, like Shakespeare whose personality was so hidden behind the veil of time that it gave room to the Baconian controversy of later times, Kālidāsa too remains unknown except through his works. Even from his works, it is very difficult to evolve more than a bare conjectural outline of his personality and life. They contain very few suggestions about himself—his life, his activities and the contemporary events of his period. Such suggestions, as there may be, are so artfully interwoven into the fine texture of poetry that the casual and unwary reader fails to detect them. Keen controversy has raged among scholars in regard to every aspect about him—the age to which he belongs, the country in which he lived, the court in which he shone as a poet and even his name. Some scholars have made him the contemporary of Agnimitra, the son of the Magadha Emperor, Puṣyamitra. This will carry his age as early as 186 B. C. Others have confirmed the traditional account of his being one of the nine gems of the court of Vikramāditya of the Vikrama Era viz., 57 B. C.; while the trend of latter-day opinion, of scholars like Professor Keith and historians like Vincent Smith has been that he must be ascribed to the glorious period of the Gupta Emperors. They see in the very name, Kumārasambhava, a clever allusion and compliment to the birth of Kumāragupta and in the descriptions of the *Digvijaya* of Raghu a panegyric on the exploits and conquests of the far-famed Emperor Samudra Gupta whose victories are described in a pillar at Allahabad in verses said to be composed by Harisena. Different theories have been put forward as regards his birth-place, such as that he was a native of Magadha, Ujjain, Kashmir and Central India. Even the name, Kālidāsa, has been the subject of criticism and doubts have been thrown as to whether it is, after all, not an honorific appellation and suggestions have been made as regards the existence of three poets bearing that title. It is interesting to note that a *Nighaṇṭu* (dictionary) known as *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa* refers to three other names of Kālidāsa viz., Raghukāra, Medhārudra and Koṭijit. The *Śabda-kalpadruma* refers to a *śloka* by the great Ālaṅkārika, Udbhaṭa—

सीमन्तिनी च नलिनी च कुसुदती च
चन्द्रप्रभा च रघुकारसरस्वती च ।
कान्तोज्जिता हिमवता रविरस्मितता
मेघावृता जडधियाभिहता न भ्राति ॥

in which the name Raghukāra is mentioned by him. These controversies bid fair to remain unsettled for a good length of time to come.

One fundamental fact, however, emerges from the various discussions indulged in by numerous scholars that the poet must have lived in a period of transition which intervened between the ultimate decline of Buddhism and the victorious re-assertion of the ancient Hindu ideals of culture and civilisation. It is this fact, which, to a great extent, accounts for the picture which the poet has revealed to the men of his generation, of the life, ideals and the social fabric of ancient India of the Vedic and Purāṇic times, especially when we remember that the most effective doubt was thrown on the truth and soundness of the Hindu conceptions of religion, philosophy and society by the dissident religion of Buddhism and that, for a few centuries, Hindu religion and civilisation seemed to have entirely gone under, while Buddhism reigned as the State religion and the popular faith of the masses. It stands to reason that, during a period of transition, doubt and conflict when the Hindu mind was casting about for the proper ideals, standards and principles of religion, philosophy and society, the poet should give through the medium of his works, the proper lead to his countrymen. A re-statement of the whole position and a proper emphasis on the real spirit of the ideals of the past must certainly have been very helpful in the solution of the many problems that must have confronted the common man of his times. And it is the complete ignoring of this aspect of the matter that led scholars like Professor Keith to make the unfounded charge against our poet that "He seems to have been fully content with the orthodox views of his time and that we must not seek in him for any solution or the suggested solution of the mysteries of life". I am glad to say that the learned Professor has modified this view to a large extent in his recent book on "The History of Sanskrit Literature". Moreover, the all-absorbing and alluring quest for discovering various subtle references to contemporary views,

theories and incidents and the solutions which the poet might have given is, in itself, a difficult task and requires thorough acquaintance with the Sanskrit language and the technique of the learning and sciences that are embodied in it and all of us are handicapped by the absence of accurate chronicle of past events. If Kālidāsa's works are read carefully in the light of the aspects hereinbefore indicated, it is possible to find in many places in his works indications of the workings of the poet's mind in regard to these "Mysteries of life". However attractive the subject may be, I do not propose on the present occasion to embark upon this quest. Suffice it for me at the present moment to give two or three instances to make my meaning clear. In the tenth canto of the *Raghuvamśa* where the praises of the Lord are sung by the Devas when they approach Him for protection against their enemy, Rāvaṇa, you will find that the poet in two of the *ślokas* suggests the right point of view of approach with regard to the vexed question of the attitude of man towards religion and faith in God and the divergent systems and schools of thought obtaining in the country.

बहुधाप्यागमैर्भिन्नाः पन्थानः सिद्धिहेतवः ।

त्वय्येव निपतन्त्योषा जाडवीया इवार्णवे ॥

प्रत्यक्षोऽप्यपरिच्छेद्यो महादिर्महिमा तव ।

आप्तवागनुमानाभ्यां साध्यं त्वां प्रति का कथा ॥

Raghu. X.

In the first of the *ślokas* it is evident that the poet who is alive to the fact that humanity has been honestly endeavouring to approach the God-head in many divergent ways, reconciles them all by pointing out that they all lead to the same goal and warns the followers of one sect or system of thought from being bigoted and narrow enough to imagine that theirs is the only way that leads to heaven and all others are groping in the dark and emphasises the supreme truth that "God fulfils himself in many ways." Such a spirit of tolerance was in the view of the poet, absolutely necessary especially in a period of great conflict of ideals and rival schools of thought in the country. In the second *śloka* the poet has explained the reason for such differences and points out how they would inevitably arise in a region where revelation and inference have to play the leading part.

The treatment of the topic of love will, more than any other, reveal to us the characteristics of the workings of the poet's mind in regard to the fundamental ideals and conceptions of humanity. The great human emotion of love which is as wide and all embracing as humanity itself, has been the constant theme of poets of all ages and climes. According to Indian literary critics, it is a very important *Rasa* and it is claimed for Kālidāsa that he is, pre-eminently a poet of this *Rasa*-vide the *śloka* ascribed to one Rājaśekhara in the anthologies.

एकोऽपि जीयते हन्त कालिदासो न केनचित् ।

शृङ्गारे ललितोद्गारे कालिदासत्रयी किमु ॥

It is, therefore, appropriate and necessary to see how far the poet is unique in the treatment of this soul-enthraling emotion. If we analyse carefully all the works of the poet with this particular object in view, certain very important considerations will emerge. As we all know, love is a peculiar sentiment subsisting between the two sexes necessarily diverse in kind and nature, yet pre-ordained by primordial instinct and by the will of Providence to come together. It is a feeling which is inextricably mixed with physical instincts and the sex impulse and has necessarily to adjust itself to the many complex and sometimes even irreconcilable elements of human nature and conditions of life and society. The emotion of love has to be divorced and kept apart from the grosser and material aspect of lust or passion. It has to be depicted in its relation to the various problems that tend to modify its effect on the mind under the stress and strain of the many varied and complex situations that arise in life. Though, therefore, the idea denoted by the word is apparently simple, like the kindred word "religion", it comprises almost all the different aspects and problems of human emotion and nature. Humanity from the very beginning has been trying to solve the many problems that this great emotion produces in its actual reaction on life. And justly, therefore, it has been the constant theme of poets all the world over. In our country it has been exalted to the pedestal of being one of the four main *Puruṣārthas* into which the goal of all human activity can be classified. And the Lord in the *Bhagavad Gītā* mentions *Kāma* as one among the many manifestations of the divine essence. In depicting the sentiment of love and in imagining and evolving the situations in which the characters are placed giving rise to the play of this

emotion, the poet has placed one important ideal before his mind's eye and worked his plot towards that. In the poet's own words it may be described as *Samānurāga*. This he holds as of the very essence of ideal love and capable of conferring untold happiness upon the parties and creating the atmosphere of peace and equipoise of mind. It is a situation which arises from mutuality of love, equal intensity of feeling and reciprocal knowledge that the one is beloved of the other. The mental state of the lover and the beloved is the product of the combination of all these forces, and the poet regards it as the acme of human happiness. In the *Mālavikāgnimitra* the hero says:—"If the *Samānurāga* is subsisting between the lover and beloved even the extinction of the body is preferable to them who have no hope of coming together;

परस्परप्राप्तिनिराशयेर्वरं शरीरनाशोऽपि समानुरागयोः ॥

Mālavikā. II.

and in *Śākuntala*, Duṣyanta is of the opinion that the mutual longing creates happiness even though the lovers have not the satisfaction of union.

कामं प्रिया न सुलभा मनस्तु तद्भावदर्शनायासि ।

अकृतार्थेऽपि मनसिजे रतिमुभयप्रार्थना कुरुते ॥

Śāk. II.

As we can very well understand, in the mental consciousness of both, an equilibrium is reached wherein the great emotion of love is shorn of all its outward trappings and material aspects, and emerges out as the pure and spiritual emotion of love. The poet glorifies this *Bhāvabandha*, as he calls it in other places, to the exalted height of religion and offers the great spiritual consolation to the couple that even if the only fitting consummation of that love viz., indissoluble marriage, is not an accomplished fact during their life on earth, it is of such an enduring character that it will subsist in the next birth as a *Samiskāra* and produce the inevitable result of their union. The poet profoundly believed in this as a solution for all the tragedies that we see in the world follow in the wake of obstructed and unsatisfied love. Imagine for instance, this poetic and spiritual consolation offered to Ophelia in Shakespear's *Hamlet* and to Elaine the Fair in Tennyson's *Lancelot and Elaine*. As a devoted Hindu, the poet has deep faith in it as a fact and based the conception of the whole poem of *Kumārasambhava* on this central idea, vide the verse—

अथावमानेन पितुः प्रयुक्ता दक्षस्य कन्या भवपूर्वपत्नी ।

सती सती योगनिसृष्टदेहा तां जन्मने शैलवधूं प्रपेदे ॥

Kumāra. I.

In the *Śākuntala* the poet has explained the philosophical basis of the above truth in the words put into the mouth of king Duṣyanta when he was under the spell of a *Śāpa* which, in a much lesser degree, has the same effect on the human consciousness as death.

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्

पर्युत्सुकी भवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।

तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वम्

भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥

Śāk. V.

"A person even though pleased by hearing sweet sounds or seeing objects of beauty, still, feels a melancholy. The reason for this is that he remembers in his subliminal consciousness without being fully cognisant. The abiding affections are of such permanence that they endure even after life." This truth is, to some extent, echoed in English literature also. The Vicar says in Goldsmith's "Vicar of Wakefield" 'But the melancholy which is excited by the objects of pleasure or inspired by sounds of harmony soothes the heart instead of corroding the soul.' A. C. Benson is his "Essay on Beauty" says, 'I always feel that the instinct for beauty is, perhaps, the surest indication of some essence of immortality in the soul and, indeed, there are moments when it gives one the sense of pre-existence, the feeling that one has loved these fair things in a region that is further back even than the beginnings of consciousness.'

The poet has set the seal of disapproval on all sinful unions, 'gretna-green' marriages, secret unions and loves at first sight which are not based upon the slow and steady evolution of human passion under normal conditions amidst natural surroundings and between similar and equal natures but are the products of the sudden gush of passion which as often suddenly end in violent estrangement. In his opinion they are not at all conducive towards the well-being and happiness of humanity.

The drama of *Vikramorvaśīya* has been evolved with the distinct purpose of showing to the world the incompatibility of

such loves and the many difficulties which they give rise to and may possibly engender in the world. The folly of the king falling in love with a celestial nymph and not a human being who, by her very allotted occupation in life, must be outside the bounds and restraints of marriage, suddenly in the course of rescuing her from Rākṣasas—a folly comparable to that of the Merman in Mathew Arnold's 'Forsaken Merman'—leads necessarily to complications which are the direct result of this out-of-the-way relationship and produces even temporary insanity of the lover banishing him for a good length of time from home and his kingly duties in his capital city of Pratiṣṭhāna. Though the birth of a son affords some kind of consolation to this happy union, the very event under the peculiar circumstances of the case threatens to end the happiness. And it is only the convention of the Indian stage which does not allow a tragedy that comes to the rescue.

This aspect is also beautifully worked out in the plot of the Śākuntala where the miseries undergone by Śākuntalā are attributable to the folly of secret and sudden love which is only expiated by a fairly long stay in the hermitage of the sage Marici. The poet has indicated this in the words of Śārṅgarava—

इत्थं आत्मकृतं परिहृतं चापलम् ।

अतः परीक्ष्य कर्तव्यं विशेषात् संगतं रहः ।

अज्ञातहृदयेष्वेवं वैरीभवति सौहृदम् ॥

Śāk. V.

The whole poem of Kumārasambhava has been devoted to depict the emerging of the exalted emotion of love stripped completely of all the encrustations of the grosser, sinful, and sensual passion and lust. This the poet has achieved by an allegorical and artistic delienation of the characteristics of the God of Love and the purification of his nature under the re-vivifying fire of the third eye of Lord Śiva from which he emerges as *Anaṅga* (the pure sentiment of love unattached to the material body which represents the grosser and sensual side of lust and passion). The God of Love, goaded by Indra to gain his object and imbued with gross and sinful thoughts about which he boasts in the beginning to Indra, was unable to achieve the purpose, failed miserably and was burnt to death. But the pure love of Pārvatī, inspired by the *Samskāra* of her chastity in her previous birth

re-inforced and purified in her present birth by extreme penances and austerity, succeeded entirely to the satisfaction of the Devas and the rest of the world. For the sinful thoughts of Kāma See the *Slokas*

कामेकपत्नीव्रतदुःखशीलां

लोलं मनश्चारुतया प्रविष्टाम् ।

नितम्बिनीमिच्छसि मुक्तलज्जां

कण्ठे स्वयंप्राहनिषक्तबाहुम् ॥

असम्मतः कस्तव मुक्तिमार्गं

पुनर्भवकेशभयात्प्रपन्नः ।

बद्धधिरं तिष्ठतु सुन्दरीणा-

मोचितभ्रूचतुरैः कटाक्षैः ॥

Kumāra. III.

The poem is a conclusive demonstration of the glorious ideals which the poet had in view and furnishes the true interpretation of the great Purāṇic story of *Kāmadahana* to mankind. The title of the poem has been misunderstood and people have been set athinking as to why Kālidāsa never finished the whole story and stopped with the eighth Sarga. There is even a tradition that the story was finished by his son. The real explanation can be comprehended if we bear in mind the main object of the poet as described above. To continue the story after depicting the marriage of Pārvatī and Parameśvara is a work of supererogation on his part. The title of the poem has to be understood not as the birth of Kumāra but as the union for Kumāra. But it may be well asked why then, the poet should not have named his work Pārvatipariṇaya. The answer is that the reason for the marriage of Śiva and for his being dragged into the vortex of *Samsāra* from the exalted heights of his *Tapas* is an act of favour for the Gods in being the cause of the birth of a hero who will save the whole world from the ravages of Tārakāsura. She had been married once before to Śiva in her previous birth and to distinguish this marriage from the other one, some other title indicating the story has necessarily to be given for the poem.

On the whole it may be said, without fear of contradiction or exaggeration that this glorious ideal of chaste and unsullied

love, of indissoluble and inextricable union that is the essence of the great Ardhanārīśvara conception, has not been better described and set before the view of man-kind, समादिदेशैकवधूं भविती प्रेम्णा शरीरार्धहरां हरस्य. The credit for this achievement falls to the poet whose anniversary we are assembled here to celebrate.

Another aspect of this emotion of unsullied love broad-based on, and springing out of, the *Ekaṣatnīlva* on the part both of the lover and beloved is self-abnegation and self-forgetfulness. This, in its intensified form, when applied to the attitude of mind towards God, has been extolled as the peculiar religious emotion of *Bhakti*.—the Vaiṣṇavite doctrine of *Nāyaka-Nāyikā Prema*. The poet has devoted the whole of that lyrical masterpiece, *Meghasandēśa*, to bring to the mind of the reader the full force of this self-surrender. A study of that poem will reveal to the reader how the Yakṣa completely forgets his own self and becomes insensible to his own sufferings but entirely imagines himself to be in the situation of his beloved from whom by the curse of Kubera he has been separated. The very thought of depicting the suffering, which his beloved, he fancies, is undergoing in the distant city of Alakā and the consequent satisfaction that her love, is as intense and equally matched with his, is enough for him and sustains him in the fateful hours of the long-drawn-out agony. Critics have often asserted that the *Meghasandēśa* has largely drawn upon the *dautya* of Hanumān in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It may be the idea of the poem was suggested to him by the *Rāmāyaṇa*. But the situations described and the sentiments in *Meghasandēśa* are quite different in degree and in nature from those in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. This utter self-abnegation and forgetfulness which is so beautifully brought out in the *Meghasandēśa* is not at all a prominent feature in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, though the intensity of feeling due to separation and the sacredness of love arising out of the *Ekaṣatnīlva* of the lover and the beloved are common to both. Unlike the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *dautya* of the Yakṣa is a pure fantasy and an illusion born out of his own intensity of feeling. Though, in the terminology of Indian Alakāra works, the *Rasa* depicted is *Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* it is a type peculiar and unique to Kālidāsa.

One criticism which may be offered in connection with the situations which the poet creates in his dramas is that so far as the *Nāyaka* is concerned, his affection cannot be of the same

chaste and pure kind as that of the *Nāyikā*, especially because the heroes are all polygamous and the heroines are only second or third wives of the king. In the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, unlike as in the *Śākuntala* and *Vikramorvaśīya*, the king has even grown up issue by his other wives. That there must necessarily be some disparity between the lover and the beloved under such circumstances, must be readily granted. The social life of the age and the court surroundings in which the literary activity of the poet is placed and the necessity to enact the drama for the pleasure of kings may afford some explanation for this phenomenon. The poet is himself alive to this and tried to justify the situation by making his heroines mothers of great heroes who have brought glory to the dynasty.

अनसूया—वयस्य ! बहुवल्लभा राजानः श्रूयन्ते ! यथा नौ प्रियसखी बन्धुजन-
शोचनीया न भवति, तथा निर्वह ।

राजा—भद्रे ! किं बहुना ।

परिग्रहबहुल्वेऽपि द्वे प्रतिष्ठे कुलस्य मे ।

समुद्ररशना चोर्वी सखी च युवयोरियम् ॥

Śāk. III.

In that way the necessity for such marriages has been made out in the scheme of things. It may even be he might have thought that by enacting such scenes, some wholesome and salutary effect might be produced on the minds of kings so as to deter them from the unhealthy instinct of polygamy.

The 19th Sarga of *Raghuvamśa* is an apt description of lust, unbridled passion and sensual enjoyment which brought about the downfall of the solar race, and affords a striking illustration and warning to all, especially to the kings of his own generation. The poet has purposely given a detailed description of the amorous pleasures and sports of king Agnivarṇa which produced the terrible malady of consumption and brought about the ignominious end of a glorious line of kings who set the ideal of married love regulated by the *Aśramic* division and consecrated by the sole object of the continuation of the race. Contrasted with this, he gave the other picture in the same poem of the tragedy of king Aja where that *Ekaṣatnīlva* of the lover towards the beloved is beautifully impressed upon the mind of the reader. In an age when people were loathe to set up rigid standards of

conduct for men, while emphasising absolute moral standards for women, the poet drew the picture of a man though high placed and surrounded by the temptations of his position, yet, so devoted to his wife that he refused to love again after the first love ended in misery. It reminds one of the Buddhist *Saṅga* rule that neither the widower nor the widow can remarry and the poet evidently showed his partiality for this higher ideal in the following *śloka* of the *Raghuvamśa*.

प्रमदामनुसंस्थितः शुचा नृपतिस्सन् इति वाच्यदर्शनात् ।
न चकार शरीरमग्निं साह देव्या न तु जीविताशया ॥

Raghu. VII.

If we apply the ordinary canons of criticism, we may say that both aspects of *Śṛṅgāra* viz., *Vipralambha* and *Sambhoga* the poet has dealt with in his works. A closer analysis and more subtle appreciation of the spirit of his works will reveal these distinguishing features indicated here. A strong religious nature and a profound belief in divine dispensation has given a peculiar Hindu colouring to the poet's manner of treatment. While one imbued with the modern spirit may wish that *Śakuntalā* would strongly protest against her treatment by *Duṣyanta* and do something in revenge against him at the very moment she is ruthlessly discarded, especially in her pregnancy we find her resigning herself to her fate and accepting the position of being a denizen in the hermitage of sage *Marici*. It may also be pointed out that *Kālidāsa* has nowhere depicted that other concomitant of intense love viz., Jealousy. Of course in the dramas to some extent this has been outlined in the jealousy of the *Devis* for the new love of the king. But nowhere has it been introduced as a factor interfering between the hero and heroine and creating complications. It has not cleverly been worked into any plot by him as Shakespeare has done in the 'Othello'.

In fine, the picture of love presented by *Kālidāsa* is of the spiritual and æsthetic type, so happily blended together that Religion is Beauty and Beauty is Religion.

A NOTE ON THE 102ND STANZA IN PURANĀNŪRU.

BY

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எருதே யினைய துகமுண ராவே
சகடம் பண்டம் பெரிது பெய் தன்றே
யவவிழியினு மிசையேறினு
மவண தறியுநர் யாரென வுமணர்
கீழ்மரத் தியாத்த சேமவச் சன்ன
விசைவிளங்கு கவிதை நெடியோய் திங்க
ணணிறை மதியத் தனையை யிருள்
யாவண தோரின் னிழல்வாழ் வோர்க்கே.
Erutē yilaiya nukamuṇa rāvē
Cakaṭam paṇṭam perituṭey tanrē
Yavaliliyinu micaiyēriṇu
Mavaṇa tarīyunar yāreṇa vumaṇar
Kīlmarat tiyātta cēmavac caṇṇa
Vicaiivilaṅku kavikai neṭiyōy tiṅka
Nāṇirai matiyat taṇaiyai yirul
Yāvaṇa tōṇiṇ ṇilalvāl vōrkkē.

The learned commentator on *Puranānūru* interprets this stanza as follows:—Oh king renowned for your bounteous charity, serving as the spare axle attached to the cart full with merchandise by the salt merchants with the idea that the cart is likely to break when it has to go up or come down on the way since it is drawn by young and inexperienced bulls, you are like the full moon; how can the darkness (of poverty) envelop those who live under your shade?

He then writes that there is no comparison implied in the first two lines and that the youth and inexperience of the bulls, and the fullness of the load are simply mentioned to show that the cart is likely to break.*

* 'எருதே யினைய துகமுணராவே, சகடம் பண்டம் பெரிது பெய் தன்றே' என்பது உவமங்கருத்தாது சகடத்திற்கு வரும் ஏதங்குறித்து உமணர் சேமவச்சயாத்தற்குக் காரணமாய் நின்றது.

From this it is evident that, in his opinion, the renowned Avvai, the authoress of this verse, compares the king Pokuṭṭeṭṭiṇi to the spare axle. This would be possible only when this verse was composed in honor of Pokuṭṭeṭṭiṇi when he was *heir-apparent*. Then the suggested meaning would be "You are crowned heir-apparent since nobody knows when your father will be unable to hold the reins of government."

According to this interpretation the beauty of the first two lines, it seems to me, is marred. If, on the other hand, we take that this verse was composed when Pokuṭṭeṭṭiṇi just came to the throne and take the words 'icaivilaṅku kavikai neṭiyōy' to mean 'oh king of noble descent from ancestors renowned for their bounteous charity' and the word 'icaivilaṅku kavikai' is compared to the spare axle, it seems to me that the first two lines are very significant and also a complete simile may be worked out of the first six lines :—

Just as the (foresighted) salt-merchants provide the cart full with merchandise with spare axles lest the cart, driven by young and inexperienced bulls, should break when it has to go up or come down on its way, so also the (foresighted) ancestors of the king have done bounteous charity lest the administration of the kingdom should break at the hands of a young and inexperienced king. The points of comparison are as follow :—

<i>Upamēya.</i>		<i>Upamāna.</i>
Young and inexperienced king	...	Young and inexperienced bulls.
Kingdom	..	Cart.
Burden of ruling over the kingdom	..	Load in the cart.
King's (foresighted) ancestors	..	(Foresighted) salt merchants.
Bounteous charity (of the ancestors).	..	Spare axle.

The suggested meaning in this case would be :—Oh king of noble descent! do not be disheartened in holding the reins of Government because you are young and inexperienced. The result of the deeds of charity of your ancestors will surely come to your rescue.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

DACCA UNIVERSITY ORIENTAL PUBLICATIONS SERIES NO. I.

THE KICAKA-VADHA OF NITIVARMAN.—With the commentary of Janārdanaśena, edited from original manuscripts, with an introduction, notes and extracts from the commentary of Sarvānanda-nāga—Published by the University of Dacca—1929.

Dr. Suśil Kumar De's scholarly industry has made available to the world of Sanskrit Scholars, *Niti-varman's Kicaka-vadha*, which is a rare Kāvya of the *śabda-citra* type, full of *yamakas* and *śleṣas*. From the references to the Kicaka-vadha in Alaṅkāra-works like the *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* of Bhoja, it is obvious that it should have come to be recognised as a typical *yamaka-kāvya* before the 11th century A. D. In the history of *śabda-citra* in Sanskrit, the *Kicaka-vadha* marks an important stage of development. Perhaps *Niti-varman* wrote this *yamaka-kāvya*, to illustrate the extent to which *yamakas* might be used as accessories in the delineation of a *rasābhāsa*, like Kicaka's *śṛṅgāra*. We are reminded in this connection of what Ānandavardhana says regarding *yamakas* :—

“यत्तु रसवन्ति कानिचिद्यमकादीनि दृश्यन्ते, तत्र रसादीनामङ्गता यमकादीनामङ्गितैव । रसाभासे च अङ्गत्वमप्यविरुद्धम्” ।

—[Dhvanyāloka-page 87-Nirṇayasagara edition.]

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

THE PANDYAN KINGDOM BY K. A. NILAKANTHA SASTRI.

This book is the outcome of a series of lectures delivered by Mr. Sastri under the auspices of the University of Madras in 1926. A scholar of repute, Mr. Sastri is well qualified for the task he had undertaken. Though the Pāṇḍyan kingdom has had a long record and also appears to have played a conspicuous part in the history of South India, still, the extant historical material is very meagre and obscure and furnishes ample scope

for investigation. Mr. Sastri, himself, says in the preface to his work "We are by no means sufficiently equipped to attempt a full and satisfactory account of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom". Often enough, this is the case with many a dark chapter of Indian history. Still, scholars are tempted to fill in the gaps with bold speculations based on inconclusive similarity of names and ingenious surmises from slender data. Sometimes wrong data are imagined purely on account of the want of sufficient knowledge of the language in which the historical material is embodied and on other occasions the judgment of scholars has been warped by racial prejudice, communal bias and preconceived theories. Mr. Sastri has avoided these pit-falls and approached the subject with the humility, honesty of intellect, sound judgment and impartial attitude which must characterise an ardent seeker after truth in Indian history. With commendable candour he has confessed his inability to put forward definite conclusions whenever the problems still admit of further material being discovered, sifted and analysed. He has endeavoured to give, in his book, a brief conspectus of the history of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom till the 16th century A. D. Though he may not have brought out new material or discovered new facts, he has tried to test many conclusions already arrived at by former scholars in the light of the fresh material discovered such as "The Sinnamannur plates of Rajasimha" and "the Madras Museum Plates of Jatilavarman."

There have been already many distinguished scholars and orientalists who have done valuable work in South Indian history and have made important contributions on the subject such as Bishop Caldwell, M. Dubreuil, Kanakasabhai, Sundaram Pillai, L. D. Swami Kannu Pillai, Venkayya, Dr. S. K. Iyengar, T. A. Gopinatha Rao, Mahamahopadhyaya V. Swaminatha Iyer, Krishna Sastri and K. V. Subramania Iyer and we are glad to say that Mr. Sastri, by his work is qualifying himself to be added to this illustrious roll.

The edition is neatly printed and it is a pity that, though the lectures were delivered under the auspices of the University of Madras, still, the University authorities have not published them in book form but have left to the lecturer himself, the task of publication with the help of his own resources.

K. BALASUBRAHMANI AIYAR.

HINDU EXOGAMY BY S. V. KARANDIKAR, M. A.

This book deals with a subject which has not yet been thoroughly investigated by scholars. With the exception, probably, of Mr. P. Chensel Rao's work styled "*Gotrapravara Nibandha Kadambam*," there has been no exhaustive treatise on the subject by well-qualified men. This book is, therefore, a very welcome addition to this branch of learning. The author has dealt with the subject very exhaustively and has traced the history of 'Gotras and Pravaras' from R̥gvedic times and also the development of the rule of *Sapinda* Exogamy. The whole subject has been approached by him from the attitude of a social reformer and he has come to the conclusion that the exogamous restrictions are really harassing and that the modern Brahmins will do well to re-examine them and introduce suitable changes in the rules. He also warns the Non-brahmin communities who, he thinks, have a tendency to imitate the Brahmins, from following these restrictions without analysing and sifting them. The work really deals with many very controversial matters. Indeed it is a vigorous presentation of one aspect of the case and certainly cannot be called a judicial and impartial investigation of the whole matter. In some places, the author even betrays prejudice against Brahmins as a class, not only those of the present day, but also their distant forefathers. In justice to the author and the subject, a more exhaustive review is necessary in the future parts of this Journal.

We congratulate Mr. S. V. Karandikar, M. A., certainly upon his frank, lucid, and exhaustive manner of treatment of the subject from the point of view of the modern reformer and D. B. Taraporevala & Sons on their well-printed edition.

K. BALASUBRAHMANI IYER.

MADRAS ORIENTAL SERIES No. 4.

The Madhyamakavatara
OF
Candrakirti

CHAPTER VI
WITH THE AUTHOR'S BHĀṢYA
RECONSTRUCTED FROM THE
TIBETAN VERSION.

BY

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PREFACE.

Śrī Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* Chapter VI with the author's *Bhāṣya* is reconstructed from the Tibetan translation published by Prof. Louis de Vallee Poussin in the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* Series. He has also partly published a French translation of it in a famous French Journal '*Le Museon*' (1907, pp. 249—317; 1910, pp. 271—358; 1911, pp. 235—328). In addition to what has been done by the learned professor, I have also identified some other verses cited in the *Bhāṣya* and reproduced all of them in my reconstructed text. The footnotes give all the references.

Madhyamakāvatāra consists of thirteen Chapters. I have, here, reconstructed the 6th Chapter only which is the most important. The resume for the other Chapters will be given later on in an appendix.

In connection with this I have consulted the following:—

- (1) *Madhyamakāvatāra* translated into French by Prof. Poussin (*Le Museon* above referred to)
- (2) Tibetan-English Dictionary by Śarat Candradas, (Calcutta).
- (3) Indices Verborum (Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanskrit) to the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti and the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara. *Bibliotheca Buddhica* XXIV.
- (4) Indices Verborum (Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanskrit) to the *Madhyamakakārikās* of Nāgārjuna edited by Prof. Poussin, prepared by the present writer (to be published shortly).
- (5) Ditto to the *Apramāḍavarga*, *Śikṣāsamuccayakārikās* and *Viṃśaka* and *Triṃśaka kārikās*, prepared by the same (to be published shortly).
- (6) A Bilingual Index of *Nyāyabindu* by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (Bib. Ind. 1917).

(7) Indices of words (Tib.—Sans. and Sans.—Tib.) in the Sragdharā Stotra edited by the same (Calcutta).

(8) Indices of words and phrases in the Nyāyapraveśa, part II. edited by V. Bhaṭṭācārya. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. XXXIX.)

(9) Glossary of the Sanskrit, Tibetan, Mongolian and Chinese versions of the Daśabhūmika-Sūtra, compiled by J. Rahder, (Paris, 1928).

21. November, 1929.

N. A.

नमः सर्वज्ञाय

॥ मध्यमकावतारः आचार्यचन्द्रकीर्तिना विरचितः ॥

(षष्ठं प्रकरणम्)

(73, 1) इदानीं षष्ठं चित्तोत्पादमधिकृत्याह ।

स्थितोऽभिमुख्यां सुसमाहिते हि संबुद्धधर्माभिमुखी स चित्ते ।
इदंप्रतीत्योद्भवतत्त्वदर्शी प्रज्ञाविहारालभते निरोधम् ॥ १ ॥

पञ्चम्यां बोधिसत्त्वभूमौ ध्यानपारमितापरिशुद्धिभावात् षष्ठ्यां भूमौ
समाहितचित्ते स्थितः गम्भीरप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादतत्त्वं च पश्यन् बोधिसत्त्वः
प्रज्ञापारमितापरिशुद्ध्या निरोधं लभते । न तु पूर्वम् । प्रज्ञाधिकसद्भावस्या-
भावाद्भि दानादिपारमिताप्रकर्षयुक्तः निरोधमाप्तुमक्षमः । प्रतिबिम्बाकारधर्मतावग-
मात् पञ्चम्यां बोधिसत्त्वभूमौ बोधिसत्त्वैः मार्गसत्यस्यालम्बनात् संबुद्धधर्माभि-
मुखाच्च अस्या भूमेरभिमुखी नाम ॥

(73, 17) सांप्रतमन्यगुणगणान् प्रज्ञापारमिताधीनतया प्रदर्शयितुमाह ।

यैथान्धसङ्घं ससुखं समस्तमेकस्सनेत्रो नयतीष्टदेशम् ।

जनस्तथादाय जिनत्वमेति प्रज्ञा गुणान्न च नष्टनेत्रान् ॥ २ ॥

यथा सचक्षुष्क एकः पुरुषः सकलमन्धगणमभिजिगमिषितं देशं
सुखं नयति तथा प्रज्ञापारमितापि तथ्यमार्गमार्गलोकनप्रकृतिकत्वात् तदन्य-
पारमितागुणानादाय समन्तभद्राख्यां सुगतभूमिमधिरोहति । अत्राह यदुक्तं

“इदंप्रतीत्योद्भवतत्त्वदर्शी प्रज्ञाविहारालभते निरोधम्” इति ।

1. Variant: rkyen-ñid-hdi-pai-de-ñid इदं प्रत्ययतातत्त्व. (L. V. P.)

2. For this comparison of अन्ध and सचक्षुष्क see अष्टसाहस्रिका
p. 172, and a passage from प्रज्ञापारमिताशतसाहस्री cited in बोधिसत्त्व-
वतारपञ्चिका IX. I. (Bib. Ind. p. 347) (L.V.P.).

कथं बोधिसत्त्वो धर्मं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं पश्यन् इदंप्रतीत्योत्पादतत्त्वं द्रक्ष्यति । उच्यते । अविद्याघनपटलनिःशेषावृतबुद्धिलोचनानामस्माकं न तत्त्वरूपं विषयतामुपगच्छति । यथायुक्तमभूमिप्रानां तु विषयो भवति । अतो न तदस्मभ्यं प्रष्टव्यम् । किं तु ये अविद्यातिमिरपटलोन्मूल-यदविपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनलिप्तप्रज्ञालोचना अविद्यातिमिरपटलविरहिता विमला बोधिसत्त्वा भगवन्तो बुद्धाश्च । तेभ्य एवाध्येष्यम् ॥

(75, 6) ननु आर्यप्रज्ञापारमितार्यदशभूमिकादयो ये सूत्रान्ताः पठिताः तेषु आर्यप्रज्ञापारमिताचारी बोधिसत्त्वः कथं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादतत्त्वं पश्यति इत्युक्तम् । अतः आगमानुसारात् युक्तं वचनमिति चेत्, नैतदस्ति । आगमाभिप्रायस्य दुर्निर्णयत्वादस्मादृशः तत्त्वमागमादपि देशितुमक्षमः । स्वतन्त्रतामधिकृत्यैव-मुच्यते । शास्त्रं पुनः प्रमाणभूतेन पुरुषेण प्रणीतम् । अविपरीता-गमपरिच्छेददर्शनत आगमाभिप्रायनिर्णयात्

जानाति धर्मं स महागभीरं यथागमेनापि नयेन चान्यैः ।

तथार्यनागार्जुनशास्त्रनीत्या यथाव्यवस्थं मतमुच्यते हि ॥ ३ ॥

(76, 1) यथा बोधिसत्त्वः प्रज्ञापारमितायां चरन् यथातत्त्वं धर्माणामात्मतां पश्यति । तथार्यनागार्जुनेनाविपरीतमागमं ज्ञात्वा युक्त्यागमाभ्यां धर्मा-णामात्मभावो यथाभूतो निःस्वभावलक्षणकः स्पष्टं देशितः । तस्मात् यथैव नागार्जुनपादाः युक्त्यागमाभ्यां धर्माणां तत्त्वं उपादिशन् । (तथा) मया तदुपदिष्टं मतं यथाव्यवस्थमुच्यते ॥

(76, 10) अथ तावत् कथं तथार्यनागार्जुनस्य अविपरीतागमनिर्णयः स्यात् इति । आगमात् । यथोक्तमार्यलंकावतारे ।

²दक्षिणापथवेदल्यां भिक्षुः श्रीमान् महायशाः ।

नागाह्वयः स नाम्नातु सदसत्पक्षदारकः ॥

1. My translation is literal. But Dr. Poussin says :—the word 'chos' is difficult to explain. So leaving out the word he translates thus : Comment donc le bodhisattva doit-il voir le प्रतीत्यसमु-त्पद pour voir la vraie nature de la "production en raison de ceci" ?

2. See लङ्कावतारसूत्र ed. by Bunyin Nanjio, Kyoto, p. 286 (Vess; No. 165, 166.) दक्षिणापथ explained in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, Chapter XIII. 25. महेन्द्रो मलयः सखो मेलक पिङ्गरः । एतेषु संभिता देशा स त्रेयो दक्षिणापथः ॥

प्रकाश्य लोके मद्यानं महायानमनुत्तरम् ।

आसाद्य भूमिं मुदितां यास्यतेऽसौ सुखावतीम् ॥

आर्यद्वादशसहस्रमहामेघे¹ऽप्युक्तम्—

“लिच्छविकुमारोऽयं सर्वसत्त्वानां दर्शने नन्दक इत्यानन्दः निर्वाणाच्चतु-श्शतेषु वर्षेषु व्यतीतेषु नागाह्वयो भिक्षुर्भूत्वा मदेशानां विस्तरेण प्रकाश्य अनुपूर्वेण सुविशुद्धप्रभाभूमिनामकलोकधातौ तथागतः अर्हन् सम्यक्संबुद्धः ज्ञानाकरप्रभा-भिधो भविष्यति ” इति ॥ अतोऽस्याविपरीतागमनिर्णयः सिद्धः ॥

(77, 6) तच्च शास्त्रं यथाभूतप्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददेशनाफलकं पूर्वमभ्यासात् संताने समाहितशून्यताबीजानामेव देशितव्यम् । नान्येषाम् । श्रुतशून्यतानामपि तेषां तत्र प्रतिपन्नविपर्ययाशयशालित्वमहानर्थयोगात् । एवं हि कदा-चिदपण्डितः शून्यतां विहाय दुर्गतिमेभ्यति । कदाचित् शून्यतार्थोऽभाव इत्येवं विपरीतनिश्चयं गृहीत्वा सर्वभावापवादमिध्यादृष्टिं जनयित्वा वर्धयेत् । तस्मात् शास्त्रा निश्चिन्त्याधिमुक्तिविशेषं श्रोतॄणां शून्यतादृष्टिर्व्याख्येया ॥

(77, 18) कथं पुनरस्य शून्यतादेशनार्हत्वादस्य शून्यतोपदेष्टव्येति दुर्नि-श्चयं निश्चेतुं शक्यमिति चेत् तत् बाह्यलक्षणैर्निश्चेतुं शक्यत इति तद्वेतुलक्ष-णोपदेशार्थमाह ।

पृथग्जनत्वेऽपि निश्चयं शून्यतां प्रमोदमन्तर्लभते मुहुर्मुहुः ।

प्रमोदजास्त्राविनयातलोचनः तनूरुहोत्फुल्लतनुश्च जायते ॥ ४ ॥

यत्तस्य संबुद्धधियोऽस्ति बीजं तत्त्वोपदेशस्य च भाजनं सः ।

आख्येयमस्मै

उक्तलक्षणवते,

परमार्थसत्यं

एवंभूताय श्रोत्रे तत्त्ववक्तुः प्रयत्नो न निष्फलो भवति । तत् कस्मात् ।

यस्मात् ।

तदन्वयास्तस्य गुणा भवन्ति ॥² ५ ॥

1. There is one महामेघ in Kandjour, Mdo, XVIII, Csoma-Feer (L. V. P.).

2. These two stanzas are cited in the Subhāṣitasāṅgraha, fol. 14: (Ed. Bendall, Museon, 1903. p. 387, tire a part, p. 13). p. 78, 4, variant.gañ = ses yeux sont plains de larmes. (L.V.P.) In stanza No. 4. c. the word underlined is unintelligible. Tib. has: प्रमोदजास्त्राद्रलोचनः । For the similar बाह्यलक्षण see लङ्कावतारसूत्र, pp. 63, 64.

(78, 14) न केवलं तस्य श्रोतुः शून्यताग्रहविपर्ययोत्पन्नार्थयोगो न भवति । शून्यतादृष्टिश्रवणहेतुका गुणा अपि उद्भवन्ति । कथम् । तच्छून्यताश्रवणं कोशला-भकल्पं मत्वा तदविनाशाय

शीलं समादाय सदैव वर्तते ददाति दानं करुणां च सेवते ।
तितिक्षते तत्कुशलं च बोधये प्रणामयत्येव जगद्धिमुक्तये¹ ॥ ६ ॥
संबोधिसत्त्वेषु करोति गौरवं

तत्र दौःशील्येन दुर्गतौ पतितस्य मम शून्यतादृष्टिरुच्छिन्ना भवेत् इति विदित्वा सदा शीलं समादाय वर्तते । शीलोत्पन्नसुगतेरपि मम दरिद्र-भूतस्य अन्नौषधिचीवरादिजीवितवस्तुपर्येष्टिपरायणतया शून्यताश्रवणमुच्छिन्नं भवे-दिति दानं ददाति । शून्यतादृष्टिर्हि करुणापरिगृहीता बुद्धत्वं नयति, नान्यथेति करुणां सेवते । मन्युनाह्यपायगतो दुर्वर्णं प्राप्नोति । तत्प्रत्यायेन चार्यसंमानितो न भवेदिति तितिक्षते । सर्वज्ञत्वापरिणामिताः शिलादयो हि न बुद्धत्वप्राप्तिहेतवोऽमे-याविच्छिन्नफलोत्पादकाश्च भवन्ति इति जगद्धिमुक्तये बोधये च तत्कुशलमूलं प्रणामयति । बोधिसत्त्वान् मुक्त्वा अन्ये प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादयाथात्म्यमुपदेष्टुं न शक्नु-वन्ति इति चिन्तयित्वा संबोधिसत्त्वेषु गौरवं करोति ॥

(80, 3) एवं चिरं निरन्तरं कुशलसंभारमावश्यकमुपचयीकृत्य

नये गभीरे विपुले त्रिचक्षणः ।

जनः क्रमादेति भुवं प्रणन्दिता²मिदं तदर्थी शृणुयाच्च वर्त्मकम् ॥ ७ ॥

प्रमुदितभूम्यर्थीत्यर्थः । इदं इति वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणकम् । तत्र धर्माणां यथाभूतत्वोपदेशे तावदयमागमः । यथोक्तमार्थदशभूमिके³—

“योऽयं भवन्तो जिनपुत्रा बोधिसत्त्वः पञ्चम्यां बोधिसत्त्वभूमौ सुपरि-पूर्णमार्गः षष्ठीं बोधिसत्त्वभूमिमवतरति । स दशभिः धर्मसमताभिरवतरति । कतमा-भिर्दशभिः यदुत सर्वधर्मानिमित्तसमतया च सर्वधर्मालक्षणसमतया च सर्वधर्मा-नुत्पादसमतया च सर्वधर्माजातसमतया च सर्वधर्मविविक्तसमतया च सर्वधर्मादि-

1. सुभाषितसंग्रह. Hol. 15. (L.V.P.)

2. The word rab-tu-dgah-ba technically means प्रमुदिता which is the first bhūmi of ten Bodhisattva bhūmis. (See दशभूमिकसूत्र ed. by Rahder p. 5.)

3. दशभूमिकसूत्र ed. by J. Rahder, भूमि VI. p. 47.

विशुद्धसम

सर्वमायास्.....

॥ च सर्वधर्मानाव्यूहानिर्व्यूहसमतया¹ च
तिबिम्बनिर्माणसमतया च सर्वधर्म-
भावाभावाद्यसमतया च । आभिः दशभिः धर्मसमताभिः अवतरति । स एवं-
स्वभावान् सर्वधर्मान् प्रत्यवेक्षमाणः².....षष्ठीमभिमुखीं बोधिसत्त्वबोधिमनुप्रा-
प्नोति तीक्ष्णयानुलोमिक्या क्षान्त्या (न च तावदनुत्पत्तिकधर्मक्षान्तिसुखमनु-
प्राप्नोति) । इति ॥

(81, 4) अतोऽत्र धर्मानुत्पादसमतया युक्त्या देशितत्वादेव अन्यां धर्म-
समतां सुदेशनां सन्धाय आचार्यो मध्यमकशास्त्रे प्रथममुपन्यस्यति ।

न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः ।

उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः कचन केचनै ॥ इति ।

जात्विति कदाचिदित्यर्थः । कचनशब्द आधारवचनः कचिच्छब्दपर्यायः
देशकालसिद्धान्तान् ब्रूते । केचनशब्द आधेयवचनो बाह्यानामध्यात्मिकान् भावान्
वक्ति । तेन कचित् देशकालसिद्धान्तेषु बाह्यानामध्यात्मिकानां भावानां स्वत
उत्पादो न संभवतीति योज्यम् । अत्र नेत्ययं सत्तासाधकेन स्वत उत्पादेन संब-
ध्यते । न तु वित्तिना । तन्निषेधस्य अर्थसिद्धत्वात् । एवं प्रतिज्ञात्रयमपि योज्यम् ॥

(81, 18) तत्प्रतिज्ञाचतुष्टयमनूद्य उपपत्त्या साधनायाह ।

तस्मान्न तस्य जनिरेव, कुतः परस्मात्

द्वाभ्यां न चास्ति, कथमेव भवेदहेतुः ॥

तस्मान्न तस्य जनिरेवेति यदर्थकं ‘न स्वत उत्पन्ना’ इति । एवमवशिष्टमपि
योज्यम् ॥

1. आव्यूह = समारोप; निर्व्यूह = अपवाद । See मध्यमकवृत्ति p. 298, 13 :
स न कंचिद्धर्ममाव्यूहति । तस्यैवमनाव्यूहतोऽनिर्व्यूहतस्त्रैधातुके चित्तं न सज्जति ।
(L. V. P.). The लङ्कावतारसूत्र (Kyoto) p. 196. has the forms आनायूह
and अनिर्यूह in a phrase अनायूहानिर्यूहलक्षणं तत्त्वम्.

2. The portion left out in Tib. is प्रत्यवेक्षमाणोऽनुसृजन्ननुलोमयन्निवि-
लोमयन् श्रद्धादभियन्त्रितियन्नविकल्पयन्ननुसरन्व्यवलोकयन् प्रतिपद्यमानः षष्ठीम् ।

The sentence within bracket is not in Tib. and is added from the
Sanskrit text.

3. This the first stanza of the मध्यमकशास्त्र of नागार्जुन ।

(82, 5) कस्मादयं पुनर्नियमः । यस्मात्
तस्माद्धि तस्य भवने न गुणोऽस्ति कश्चित्
जातस्य जन्म पुनरेव च नैव युक्तम्¹ ॥ ८ ॥

तस्येति जायमानस्य जनिक्रियाकर्तुरङ्कुरस्येत्यर्थः । तस्मादिति तस्यैव
जायमानस्यात्मरूपादित्यर्थः । अतः तस्मादेवाङ्कुरस्य स्वात्म्यात्तदेवाङ्कुरस्वात्म्यं
नोत्पद्यत इति प्रतिज्ञार्थः । कस्मात् । यस्मात् लब्ध्वात्मसत्ताकस्य तस्यैवा-
ङ्कुरस्य विद्यमानात्तस्मादेव स्वात्म्यात् भवने न कश्चिदधिको गुणोऽस्ति । पूर्वं
लब्धत्वात्सत्तायाः । स्वत उत्पादपक्षोऽयं युक्तिविरुद्धश्चेत्याह ।

जातस्य जन्म पुनरेव च नैव युक्तम् ॥ इति ।

(82, 18) अत्र केवलप्रतिज्ञामात्रतया उपपत्तिमधिकृत्याह ।

जातस्य जन्मनि पुनः परिकल्पिते हि
नैवाङ्कुरादिजननं समुदेष्यतीह । इति ।

उत्पन्ने बीजे पुनरुत्पिप्सिते कः प्रतिबन्धः पुनस्तदुत्पत्तौ । येनास्य
स्वोत्पादप्रतिषेधात् अङ्कुरो जात इति कल्पयेत् । तदङ्कुरकाण्डादयो² नात्यन्त-
मुत्पत्त्यन्ते । अपि च

बीजो भवान्तर्गमितः प्रसुजायतैव,
यथोक्तकारणादेव ॥

अथाङ्कुरोत्पादस्यानुग्राहकप्रत्ययाः सलिलकालादयो बीजं विकुर्वन्तः अङ्कुरं
जनयन्ति । स चाङ्कुरः कारकेण सममवस्थानस्य विरुद्धत्वात् बीजं नाशयन्नु-
त्पद्ये । तस्मान्न यथोक्तदोषावतारः । बीजाङ्कुरयोरनन्यत्वान्न स्वत उत्पद्यत इति
न । इति चेत्, नैतदपि युक्तम् । यस्मात् ।

कुर्यात्स एव किल तस्य कथं विनाशम् ॥ ९ ॥

बीजाङ्कुरयोरनन्यत्वात् । अङ्कुरेणैवास्य नाशो न युक्तः स्वात्मवदिति
भावः ॥ किं च ।

1. These two lines are cited in मध्यमकवृत्ति p. 13, 7 etc. 73, 11 (L.V.P.)

2. The Samskṛt equivalent for the word Sḥubs-hchah-ba, p. 83, 6 is not found in Vocabularies available to me.

Note.—Cf. sūtras & 189, 193.

354. *Vērrumai yalvaḷik kuṟukalun tiritalum*
Tōṟṟa millai yenmanār pulavar.

Learned men say that there is no change in *non-case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *tāṇ kuṟiyaṇ* etc.

355. *Alaṇe nīrutikeṭa valḷeluttu mikumē.*

If *alaṇ* is the standing word, the final *ṇ* is dropped and the initial voiceless consonant of the coming word is doubled. Ex. *alaṇ + kuṭam = ala-k-kuṭam* etc.

356. *Muṇṇen kiḷavi muṇṇart tōṇṟu*
Millen kiḷavinicai rakara moṟṟa
Rolliyaṇ maruṇkiṇ mārūiya marapē.

It is an old usage that *r* is inserted between *muṇ* and *il* in *sandhi*. Ex. *muṇ + il = muṇṟil*.

357. *Ponṇen kiḷavi yīrukeṭa muraiyiṇ*
Muṇṇart tōṇṟum lakāra makāraṇ
Ceyyūṇ maruṇkiṇ roṭariya lāṇa.

The final *ṇ* of *pon* is dropped and *lam* is inserted after it in poetry whenever it is so needed. Ex. *Polam-paṭa-p-polinta-koycuvarpuravi*.

358. *Yakara viṟuti vērrumaip poruḷvayin*
Valḷelut tiyaiyi navveluttu mikumē.

If a word ending in *y* is followed by a word commencing with a voiceless consonant, this consonant is doubled in *case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *nāy + kāl = nāy-k-kāl* etc.

359. *Tāyen kiḷavi yiyarkai yākum.*

There is no change in *sandhi* if the standing word is *tāy*. Ex. *tāy kai* etc.

360. *Makaṇvinai kiḷappin mutanilai yiyarrē.*

If the above word *tāy* is preceded by *makaṇ* and followed by a word denoting the action of *makaṇ*, the change in *sandhi* is what has been said at first (*i. e.*) sūtra 358. Ex. *makaṇ rāy-k-kalām* (meaning *makaṇ tāyōṭu kalāyitta kalām*).

361. *Mellelut turalu moliyumā ruḷavē.*

There are words after which nasals too are optionally inserted in place of voiceless consonants. Ex. *vēy-k-kuṟai, vēy-ṇ-kuṟai* etc.

362. *Alvaḷi yellā miyaḷpena molīpa.*

H

It is said that there is no change in *non-case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *nāy kaṭitū* etc.

363. *Rakāra viṛuti yakāra viyarrē.*

The change in *case-relation sandhi* when the standing word ends in *r* is the same as that when it ends in *y*. Ex. *tēr + kāl = tēr-k-kāl*.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 358.

364. *Ārum vetirūñ cārum pīrū
Melleluttu mikutaṇ meyperal tōṇṇum.*

Nasal is inserted after the standing words *ār*, *vetir*, *cār* and *pīr* (if the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant). Ex. *ār-ñ-kōṭū*, *vetir-ñ-kōṭū*, *cār-ñ-kōṭū* *pīr-ñ-kōṭū* etc.

365. *Cāreṇ kiḷavi kālvaṇṇ valikkum.*

If *cār* is followed by *kāl*, the voiceless *k* is inserted between them. Ex. *cār-k-kāl*.

366. *Pīreṇ kiḷavi yammoṭu civaṇṇum.*

Pīr may take the increment *am* also after it. Ex. *pīr-añ-kōṭū* etc.

367. *Lakāra viṛuti ṇakāra viyarrē.*

The change in *case-relation sandhi* when the standing word ends in *l*, is the same as that when it ends in *ṇ*. Ex. *kal + kuṛai = kaṛ-kuṛai* etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 333.

368. *Melleluttu tiyaiyi ṇakāra mākkum.*

L is changed to *ṇ* if the coming word commences with a nasal. Ex. *kal + muri = kaṇ-muri* etc.

369. *Alvali yellā muraḷeṇa molīṇa.*

L is optionally changed to *ṛ* in *non-case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *kal + kuṛitū = kal kuṛitū* or *kaṛ-kuṛitū* etc.

370. *Takaram varuvali yāyṭa nilaiyalum
Pukariṇ reṇmaṇṇār pulamai yōrē.*

Learned men say that there is no harm even if *l* is changed to *ṛ*, if the coming word commences with *t*. Ex. *kal + titū = ka ṛ. titū* or *kaṛ. titū*.

371. *Neṭiyala viṛuti yiyalṇumā ruḷavē.*

If the vowel preceding *l* is long, there are cases when there is no change in sandhi. Ex. *pāl titū*.

372. *Nelluñ celluñ kolluñ collu
Mallatu kiḷappiṇṇum vēṇṇumai yiyala.*

If the four words *nel*, *cel*, *kol* and *col* are standing words, *l*, even in *non-case-relation sandhi* is changed to *ṛ* as in *case-relation sandhi* (when they are followed by words commencing with a voiceless consonant). Ex. *nel + kāyttatū = neṛ-kāyttatū* etc.

373. *Illeṇ kiḷavi yinmai ceppiṇ
Valleluttu mikutalu maiyiṭai varutalu
Miyarkai yāṭalu mākāram varutaluñ
Koḷattaku maraṇi ṇākīṭa ṇuṭaittē.*

If the word *il* denoting negation is the standing word (and if it is followed by a word commencing with a voiceless consonant), the same consonant is doubled, *ai* or *ā* is inserted or there is no change. Ex. *illai koṇṇaṇ*, *illai-k-koṇṇaṇ*, *illā-k-koṇṇaṇ*; *eṇṇil-kuṇam* etc.

374. *Valleṇ kiḷavi tolirpeya riyarrē.*

The word *val* takes the same change in sandhi as verbal nouns (ending in *ñ*). Ex. *val + kaṭitū = val-l-u-k-kaṭitū*; *val-l-u-niṭci* etc.

375. *Nāyum palakaiyum varūñ kḷalai
Yāvayi ṇukaraṇ keṭutalu murittē
Yukaraṇ kēṭuvali yakara nilaiyum.*

If *val* is followed by *nāy* or *palakai*, *u* is sometimes dropped when *a* takes its place. Ex. *val + nāy = val-l-u-nāy* or *val-l-a-nāy* etc.

376. *Pūlvē leṇṇā vāleṇ kiḷaviyo
Ṭāmuṇ peyarkku mammiṭai vaṇṇumē.*

Pūl, *vēl* and *vāl* take the increment *am* after them (in *case-relation sandhi*). Ex. *pūl + kōṭū = pūl-añ-kōṭū* etc.

377. *Tolirpeya rellūñ tolirpeya riyala.*

All verbal nouns ending in *l* have the same change in sandhi as those ending in *ñ*. Ex. *pul-l-u-k-kaṭitū*, *pul-l-u-niṇṭatū* etc.

378. *Veyileṇ kiḷavi maḷaiyiya ṇ. lai yum.*

The change in sandhi when *veyil* is the standing word is the same as when it is *maḷai*. Ex. *veyil + koṇṭāṇ = veyil-attu-k koṇṭāṇ* or *veyil-iṛ-koṇṭāṇ* etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 243 & 288.

379. *Cuṭṭumuta lākiya vakara viṇuti*
Murpaṭak kiṇanta vuruṇiya ṇilaiyum.

Words ending in v and commencing with demonstrative roots have the same change in sandhi as when they are followed by case-suffixes. Ex. av + kōṭṭu = av + varṇu + kōṭṭu = avarṇu-k-kōṭṭu etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 134 & 184.

380. *Fērrumai yalvali yāyṭa māḥum.*

V is changed to .: in non-case-relation sandhi (if it is followed by a voiceless consonant). Ex. av + kaṭiya = a.: kaṭiya.

381. *Melleṭut tiyaiyi narveṭut tāḥum.*

V is changed to the same nasal as the initial nasal of the coming word if it so happens. Ex. av + āṇṇ = aṇṇāṇ etc.

382. *Ēṇavai puṇari ṇiyalpeṇa molīṇa.*

There is no change in sandhi if v is followed by others Ex. av-yāl etc.

383. *Ēṇai vakaran tolīṇpeya riyarṇē.*

The word ending in v other than those mentioned before [(i.e.) the word tev] takes the same change in sandhi as verbal nouns ending in ṇ. Ex. tev-v-u-k-kaṭitū, tev-v-u-ṇiṇṭatū etc.

384. *Lakāra viṇuti rakāra viyarṇē.*

The change in case-relation sandhi of words ending in l is the same as those ending in r. Ex. pūl + kāl = pūl-k-kāl etc.

Note.—Cf. Sūtras 358 & 363.

385. *Tālēṇ kiṇavi kōloṭu puṇari*
Nakkiṭai varuta luvittu māḥum.

If tāl is followed by kōl, the increment akkū may also be inserted between them. Ex. tāl + kōl = tāl + akkū + kōl = tāl-ak-kōl or tāl-k-kōl.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 129.

386. *Tamiṇ kiṇaviyū mataṇō rarṇē.*

The word tamiṇ also may similarly take the increment akkū after it. Ex. tamiṇ + kūttū = tamiṇ + akkū + kūttū = tamiṇ-a-k-kūttū.

387. *Kumiṇ kiṇavi maraṇpeya rāyir*
Pireṇ kiṇaviyo tōriyar rākum.

Kumiṇ denoting a tree takes the same change in sandhi as pīr. Ex. kumiṇ + tōl = kumiṇ-an-tōl or kumiṇ-n-tōl.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 364 & 366.

388. *Pālēṇ kiṇavi melleṭut turālvē.*

The word pāl takes after it also a nasal (corresponding to the following voiceless consonant). Ex. pāl + kiṇarū = pāl-ṇ-kiṇarū or pāl-k-kiṇarū.

389. *Ēlēṇ kiṇavi yuruṇiya ṇilaiyum.*

The change in sandhi when ēl is the standing word is the same as when it is followed by case-suffixes. Ex. ēl + kāyam = ēl-aṇ-kāyam.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 195

390. *Aḷavu nīraiṇu meṇṇum varuvali*
Neṭumutal kuṇukalu mukaram varutaluṇ
Kaṭinilai yīṇṇē yāciri yarkka.

Revered elders opine that when ēl is followed by words denoting measure, weight and number, ē is shortened to e and u is inserted after l. Ex. ēl + kalam = eḷu-kalam; eḷu-palam; eḷu-mūṇṇu etc.

391. *Pattēṇ kiṇavi yorritai keṭuvali*
Nīṇṇal vēṇṭu māyṭaṇ pulli.

When the word pattu follows ēl, t is dropped and .: takes its place. Ex. eḷupa .: tū.

392. *Āyiram varuvali yukaraṇ keṭumē.*

When āyiram follows ēl, u is dropped. Ex. eḷ-āyiram.

393. *Nūrūṇṇu varūṇ māyirak kiṇavikkuk*
Kūriya neṭumutal kuṇukka miṇṇē.

If nūrāyiram follows ēl, ē is not shortened to e. Ex. ēl-nūrāyiram.

394. *Aiyam palleṇa varūṇ miṇṇuti*
Yalpeya reṇṇu māyiyā ṇilaiyum.

The same is the case when words ending in ai, am and pal and denoting number follow ēl. Ex. ēl-tāmarai, ēl-veḷḷam, ēlāmpal.

395. *Uyirmuṇ varuṇu māyiyā ririyātū.*

The same is the case when ēl is followed by a word commencing with a vowel. Ex. ēl-akal, ēl-uḷakkū etc.

396. *Kiṇēṇ kiṇavi yurāḷat tōṇṇum.*

If kiṇ is followed by a word commencing with a voiceless consonant, the latter is optionally doubled. Ex. kiṇ + kuḷam = kiṇ-k-kuḷam or kiṇ-kuḷam.

397. *Ḷakāra viṛuti ṇakāra viyarrē.*

The change in sandhi when the standing word ends in Ḷ is the same when it ends in ṇ. Ex. *muḶ + kurai = muṭ-kurai* etc.
Note.—Cf. sūtra 303.

398. *Melleḷut tiyaiyṇ ṇakāra māḷum.*

The final Ḷ is changed to ṇ if the coming word commences with a nasal. Ex. *muḶ + maram = muṇ-maram.*

399. *Alvaḷi yellū muraḷeṇa moḷipa.*

It is said that Ḷ optionally changes to ṭ in *non-case relation sandhi*. Ex. *muḶ + kaṭitū = muḶ kaṭitū* or *muṭ kaṭitū*.

400. *Āyḷa nilaiyalum varainilai yṇṇē*
Takaram varūṇ kūlai yāṇa.

None prevents the optional change of Ḷ to ṇ, if the coming word commences with t. Ex. *muḶ + titū = muḶ + titū = muṭ-titū* or *mu ṇ. titū*.

Note.—t changes to ṭ by sūtra 151.

401. *Neṭiyata viṛuti yiyalpā kuṇavum*
Vēṛṇumai yalvaḷi vēṛṇumai nilaiyalum
Pōṛṇal vēṇṭu moḷiyumā ruḷavē.

There are words which have a long vowel preceding Ḷ and have no change in sandhi and also which have the same change in *non-case-relation sandhi* as in *case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *kōḶ kaṭitū* etc.; *puṭṭēmpappuyanmāṇi* etc.

402. *Toḷiṛpeya rellān toḷiṛpeya riyala.*

All verbal nouns ending in Ḷ have the same change in sandhi as those ending in ṇ. Ex. *tuḶ-l-u-k-kaṭitū* etc.

403. *Iruḷeṇ kiḷavi veyiliya ṇilaiyum.*

The standing word *iruḶ* has the same change in sandhi as the word *veyil*. Ex. *iruḶ + koṇṭāṇ = iruḶ-attu k-koṇṭāṇ* or *iruḶ-iṛ-koṇṭāṇ*.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 243, 288 & 378.

404. *Puḷḷum vaḷḷun toḷiṛpeya riyala.*

The words *puḷ* and *vaḷ* have the same change in sandhi as the verbal nouns ending in Ḷ. Ex. *puḷ + kaṭitū = puḷ-l-u-k-kaṭitū* etc.; *puḷ-l-u-niṇṭatū* etc.

405. *Makka ḷeṇṇum peyarnilaik kiḷavi*
Takkavaḷi yaṛintu valittalu murittē.

The standing word *makkaḷ* sometimes has Ḷ changed to ṭ, though it generally undergoes no change. Ex. *makkaḷ + kai = makkaḷ kai* or *makkaṭ-kai*.

406. *Uṇarak kūṛiya puṇariyaṇ maruṇṅiṛ*
Kaṇṭuceyaṛ kuriyavai kaṇṇiṇar koḷalē.

All the changes which the final consonant of the standing word undergoes and which are not mentioned in this chapter are to be learnt from usage and ought not to be neglected.

Puḷḷimayaṇkiyal ends.

9. Kuṛṇiyalukarappuṇariyal

(Chapter on sandhi when the standing word ends in ū).

407. *Ireḷut torumoli yuyirttoḷa riṭaittoḷa*
Rāyḷat toḷarmoli vaṇṇoṭar meṇṇoḷa
Rāyiru mūṇṇē yukaraṇ kuṛukiṭaṇ.

There are only six kinds of words where ū is found. They are *ireḷuttorumoli* or words like *நாகு* (nākū) or *ஈறு* (īṛū) made up of two vowel-consonants, or of one long vowel and one vowel-consonant, *yuyirttoḷarmoli* or words like *வாகு* (varakū) or *அரசு* (aracū) having a vowel-consonant between the first vowel or vowel-consonant and the last vowel-consonant, *iṭaittoḷarmoli* or words like *தெக்கு* (teḷkū) or *எல்கு* (eḷḷū) having a semi-vowel between the first vowel-consonant or vowel and the last vowel-consonant, *āyḷattoḷarmoli* or words like *எக்கு* (e.ḷkū) or *கக்கு* (ka.ḷcū) having an āyṭam between the first vowel or vowel-consonant and last vowel-consonant, *vaṇṇoṭarmoli* or words like *கொக்கு* (kokkū) or *எட்ட* (eṭṭū) having a voiceless consonant between the first vowel-consonant or vowel and the last vowel-consonant and *meṇṇoṭarmoli* or words like *தெங்கு* (teṅkū) or *எங்கு* (eṅkū) having a nasal between the first vowel consonant or vowel and the last vowel-consonant.

408. *Avarruḷ*
Irōrrut toḷarmoli yiṭaittoḷa rākā.

The word which has a semi-vowel following the initial vowel or vowel consonant and preceding a consonant other than the first part of the final vowel-consonant, cannot be regarded as *iṭaittoḷar*.

409. *Allatu kiḷappiṇum vēṛṇumaik kaṇṇu*
Mellā viṛutiṇu mukara niṛaiyum.

Both in *non-case-relation sandhi* and in *case-relation sandhi* ū appears at the end of the above six kinds of words.

410. *Vallor̥rut toṭarmoli val̥l̥uttu varuval̥i*
Tollai yiyarkai nilaiyalu murittē.

Ū at the end of *vallor̥ruttoṭarmoli* may remain as such if the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant. Ex. *kokkū-k-kaṭitū* etc.

411. *Yakaram varuval̥i yikaran̥ kur̥uku*
Mukarak kiṭavi tuvarat tōṇṇātū.

If the coming word commences with *y*, the final *ū* of the standing word is replaced by *ī*. (the shortened *i*). Ex. *nākū + yātū = nākī-yātū*.

412. *Ir̥l̥uttu mol̥iyu m̥uyirttoṭar mol̥iyum*
V̥ēṇṇumai yāyi n̥or̥ṇṇit̥ai y̥iṇamikat
Tōṇṇam v̥ēṇṇum val̥l̥uttu mikuti.

In case relation sandhi if *ir̥l̥uttorumoli* or *uyirttoṭar-moli* is the standing word and the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant, the voiceless consonant that precedes *ū* is doubled and another voiceless consonant similar to the initial member of the coming word is inserted after *ū*. Ex. *yātū + kāl = yāṭṭu-k-kāl*; *yāṭṭu-c-cevi*; *m̥uyir̥ru-t-talai*; *kayir̥ru-p-puṇam*.

413. *Or̥ṇṇit̥ai y̥iṇamikā mol̥iyumā ruṭavē*
Yattit̥at tillai val̥l̥uttu mikalē.

There are, among *ir̥l̥uttorumoli* and *uyirttoṭarmoli*, words which do not undergo the change mentioned in the previous sūtra, when they are standing words; nor is the voiceless consonant similar to the initial member of the coming word inserted after *ū*. Ex. *nākū + kāl = nākūkāl*; *varakū + katir = varakū-katir*.

414. *Iṭaiyorr̥rut toṭaru māytat toṭaru*
Naṭaiyā yiyala veṇṇaṇṇār pulavar.

When *iṭaiyorr̥ruttoṭar* or *āyṭattoṭar* is the standing word, the sandhi that takes place is the same as is mentioned in the previous sūtra. Ex. *teḷku + kāl = teḷkūkāl*; *e.ḷkū + kaṭumai = e.ḷkū-kaṭumai* etc.

415. *V̥aṇṇoṭar mol̥iyu m̥eṇṇoṭar mol̥iyum*
V̥anta val̥l̥ut̥ tor̥ṇṇit̥ai mikumē
Mellor̥rut toṭarmoli mellor̥ ṇellām
Vallor̥ ṇir̥uti kiṭaiyōṇ ṇākum.

