


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THE WORDS ĀRYA AND DRĀVIḌA.

BY

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European scholars have a *penchant* for taking Indian words which possess a precise connotation attached to them and associating with those words absolutely new and sometimes hazy concepts. Thus the word *ārya* has a definite meaning in the Vedas. In more than seventy-five per cent. of the cases where the word is used in the mantras of the Ṛg Veda it occurs in hymns to Indra or Agni; this constant association with Indra and Agni proves that in the Vedas the word *ārya* is used to denote a follower of the Indra-Agni cult. Thus the evidence of the Vedic mantras conclusively proves that the Ṛsis regarded *ārya*, but as a title-name. The great modern commentator on the Vedas, Śaṅyācārya, has recorded in his Veda-Bhāṣya the age-long tradition with regard to the meaning of the Vedic words; selecting at random instances of his explanation of the word *ārya*, we find that he defines *āryāḥ* as *śetārāḥ*,¹ those who sing the mantras or hymns of praise, *āryāṇi* as *karmayuktāni*,² practising fire-rites, *āryaryāṇi* as *karmānuṣṭhātṛeṇa śreṣṭhāni*,³ most excellent through performing fire-rites. But yet European scholars have made Āryan the name of a race of men; this race ever since its invention more than a hundred years ago, has been begging for its 'original home' from the Pamirs to the Pyrenees and yet the wandering ghost has not been laid to rest. Anthropologists have no use for the concept of an Āryan race: Keane calls 'Āryan' a linguistic expression forced by the philologists into the domain of Ethnology, where it has no place and meaning. . . . The "community or group of communities . . . by whom the Āryan mother-tongue was evolved . . .

1. Commentaries on R. V. i. 103, 3.

2. Commentaries on R. V. vi. 22, 10.

3. Commentaries on R. V. vi. 33, 3.

have themselves disappeared as a distinct race Of an Āryan race there can be no further question since the absorption of the original stock in a hundred other races in remote pre-historic times. . . . Dr. W. Z. Ripley remarks that instead of a single European type there is indubitable evidence of at least three distinct races (This) does away at one fell swoop with most of the current mouthings about Āryans and pre-Āryans".¹

Not only have the Āryas of India been made into a special race but their rivals and opponents, the Dasyus, have also been made into a separate race. The Ṛṣis who sang the Vedic mantras described the Dasyus as *apaerata*², of rites differing (from the Ārya ones), *anagnitra*³, fireless, *abrahma*⁴, without prayer, also not having Brahmanas as priests, *anvcah*⁵ without *ṛk* mantras, *anindrah*⁶, not worshipping Indra. These words summarize the cult-differences between the Ārya and the Dasyu; thus the Ārya poured all his oblations to the Gods into the burning tongue of Agni, specially lighted for the purpose, he accompanied the offering with *ṛk* or *yajus* mantras; in this worship he was assisted by Brāhmaṇa priests, and during the offering he invoked Ind chiefly and along with or after him, several other Gods and begged them to partake of the oblations, but the Dasyu offered his sacrificial food or portion direct to his God without the intervention of the fire-God, he did not utter mantras during the process, he required no Brāhmaṇa priest to mediate between him and his God and he prayed to one God at a time. In this sense, all the Hindus of to-day, not excluding Brāhmaṇas, (except one in ten thousand or more) are Dasyus, because the Vedic fire-rites have been, in all but in name, ousted from Hindu homes. In ancient Āryāvarta, in ancient days, the Ārya rites were the successful rivals of the Dasyu rites. Notwithstanding this rivalry, which, combined with a desire for cattle and other forms of wealth, led sometimes to wars between the Āryas and the Dasyus, the ancient Āryas did not regard themselves as of a

different race from the Dasyus. The Dasyus no doubt hated the Ārya rites and destroyed them when they could. Hence Yāska explains *dasyu* as *uḥadūsayati karmāṇi*¹, who destroys (Ārya) rites and Sāyaṇa as *anuṣṭhātṛṇām upakṣapayitārah śatrarah*² enemies who destroy the observers of the fire-rite. But throughout the long course of tradition, the Āryas and the Dasyus have been regarded as belonging to one race. Thus it is said in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa that Viśvāmitra, when he rescued his grand-nephew Śunahṣepa from being immolated as a victim in a human sacrifice performed at the instance of Rohita, son of Hariscandra, the Ṛṣi adopted the released victim as his son and gave him the name of Devarāta. Fifty of Viśvāmitra's natural sons protested against Śunahṣepa's elevation to the place of the eldest son of their father and Viśvāmitra cursed them saying *antān vaḥ prajā bhakṣiṣṭa*³. This is rendered by Keith, 'Your offspring shall inherit the ends (of the earth); but Sāyaṇa interprets '*antān bhakṣiṣṭa* as '*Caṇḍālādirūpān nīcajātiviśeṣān bhajatām*', 'they shall become Anāryas (Dasyus)'. Sāyaṇa's is much the better interpretation, for the Brāhmaṇa adds, '*ta ete āndhrāḥ puṇḍrāḥ śabarāḥ pulindā mūtibā ityudantyā bahavo Vaiśvāmitrā dasyū-nām bhūyiṣṭhāḥ*'⁴ these are the (people) Āndhras, Puṇḍras, Śabaras, Pulindas and Mūtibas, who live in large numbers beyond the borders; most of the Dasyus are the descendants of Viśvāmitra'.

Thus no difference of race is postulated as between the Āryas and the Dasyus. Indeed Indian opinion cannot be otherwise because as stated in very many Vedic texts, Manu was regarded as the progenitor of the Indian race; the phrase *Manuṣpitā* occurs ever so many times in the Vedic Mantras. Yāska explains *Manuṣpitā* as *Manuśca pitā mānavānām*,⁵ Manu, the father of men. In the Manu smṛti and in the Mahābhārata, the Dasyu tribes of Puṇḍras, Oḍras, Drāviḍas etc. are said to be Kṣatriyas who had become Dasyus because they gave up the Ārya rites and lived away from Brāhmaṇas⁶.

1. Keane's Man Past and Present, pp. 445-447.

2. R. V. v. 42, 9.

3. R. V. v. 189, 3.

4. R. V. iv. 16, 9.

5. R. V. x, 105, 8.

6. R. V. vii, 18, 6; x. 27, 6.

1. Niruk. vii. 23, 1.

2. Com. R. V. i, 51, 8.

3. Ait. Brah. vii, 18.

4. Ait. Brah. vii, 18.

5. Niruk. xii. 34.

6. Manu. x. 43, 44; Mahābhārata Anusāsana P. 2103 ff.

Brāhmaṇas in early Tamil literature and *āriyam*, the sacred language of the Brāhmaṇas,¹ viz., Samskṛt.

Another Indian word that has been tortured more than the word *ārya* is the word *drāviḍa*. This word is the result of the attempt of men of Āryan speech-habits to pronounce the word *tamiḷ*, the name given to themselves and their speech by the people who lived between the Vēṅgaḍam hill and the legendary Pahrulī river in the Southernmost part of South India. The northerners who first learnt the word were probably traders with whom the ancient Tamils came into commercial contact. Now *ḷ* is a sound peculiar to Tamil and the nearest approach the northerners could make to it was *l* or *ḍ*. *ḷ*, *l* and *ḍ*² are all retroflex or, as the French say, 'cacuminal' sounds, i. e., sounds produced at the top of the throat. The Samskṛt grammarians call them by a similar name³. The place of origin of *ḷ*, *l* and *ḍ* is thus the same; of these *ḷ* is a rolled sound, *l* is a lateral fricative and *ḍ* a plosive. This gives the phonological explanation why people who cannot pronounce *ḷ* hit on *l* or *ḍ* as the nearest approach to it. So the ancient speakers of Prākṛt changed *ḷ* in Tamil into *l* or *ḍ*; they also voiced the initial dental stop and so the word became *damiḷ* or *damiḍ* in Northern lips. The change of *m* into *v* is a common phenomenon in Indian languages. According to Indian grammars *v* is a labio-dental fricative⁴ and was perhaps so pronounced in ancient times; but in practice *v* is pro-

1. The phrase *āryavācaḥ* occurs in Aitareya Āraṇyaka ii. 2, 5.

2. Even within the Dravidian languages, Tamil *ḷ* becomes *ḍ* in Telugu e.g., *ḷu* becomes *ḍu*, and *ḷ* in Kannada as *talai* becomes *taḷe*.

3. Says Śaunaka in the Rg Veda Prātisākhya, *mūrdhanyaṇ śakūra śakūra varṅau*, the top sounds are the *ṣa*, *ṣa* series i. 9. Tolkāppiyam, Eḷuttatikāram iii, 13 says நுணி நா வணரி யண்ணம் வருட, ரகார முகாரமா யிரண்டும் பிறக்கும், 'when the tip of the tongue goes up and touches the palate *r* and *ḷ* are born.'

4. பல்வித முயைய வகாரம் பிறக்கும், 'the sound *v* is produced by the contact of the (upper) teeth and (lower) lip,' Tolkāppiyam, Eḷuttatikāram iii, 16. Samskṛt grammars say: *vakūrasya dantosthau*, *v* is labio-dental. But Śaunaka's Prātisākhya of the Rg Veda says 'śeṣā oṣṭhyāḥ i.e., the rest, viz., u, ṁ, o, au, p, ph, b, bh, va, the *upadmānīya*, are labials. Op. cit. i. 9. Hence the pronunciation of *v* as a bilabial is not merely a modern development but existed in the days before Pāṇini.

nounced like the Spanish *v* as a bilabial. Hence *v* changes into *m* and *vice versa* in Indian dialects.¹

There remains then the explanation of the intrusion of *r* in the first syllable. It is a well-known fact that when Prākṛt words become Samskṛt, the first syllable takes on an *r* and, when Samskṛt words became Prākṛt, an *r* of the first syllable drops out². The following are examples selected at random:—*grāma*, *gāma*; *bhrātā*, *bāta*; *dhṛḍha*, *diḍha*; in certain dialects of Prākṛt, the *r* of Samskṛt reappears in the wrong place, such as, *karmam*, *kammam*, *kramam*; *dharma*, *dhamma*, *dhrama*; *drakṣyati*, *dakhati*, *drakhati*; in Telugu also a similar relation between the spoken language and the literary dialect exists; thus *prāta*, *pāta*, *krotta*, *kotta*, *krinda*, *kinda* etc. This tendency is so strong in all Indian languages that ignorant Tamils who wish to ape the heavily Samskṛtised Tamil dialect of the Brāhmaṇas, change *deham* into *dreham*, imagining that thereby they turn the word into Samskṛt.

Thus it has been shown how *draviḍa* was evolved out of *tamiḷ*. But there are some lovers of Samskṛt who are wedded to the theory that the Tamil language is derived from the radically different Samskṛt tongue and who hold that the Samskṛt word *draviḍa* was corrupted into the *tamiḷ*. This theory assumes that the Tamils who inhabited South India at least from the beginning of the new Stone Age,³ or as Tamil tradition has it, from the

1. A familiar instance is the change of *dēvuḍu* into *dēmūḍu* in spoken Telugu, and contrariwise, *mama* into *mū(v)a*. Prākṛt *būdāmi* corresponds to Tamil *vūdāvi*, and Samskṛt *vātāpi*. Examples from literary Tamil furnished to me by Mr. S. Vaiyapuri Pillai, Editor, Tamil Lexicon are *மிதவை*, *விதவை* both meaning boiled rice, also rice boiled in milk, *மினை*, *வினை* still further degenerated into *இனை*, meaning high ground, not supplied with water. The change of *விழி* in common speech into *மிழி* and later into *முழி* is another instance of the same phenomenon.

2. I do not here propose to discuss the question whether Prākṛt, the spoken language, was derived from Samskṛt, the literary language, as most Samskṛt scholars assume or whether from the Prākṛta, natural language, the Samskṛta, the reformed, refined language was born, as most students of the science of language hold, for the undoubted fact of the insertion of *r* in the one and the omission of it in the other, is enough for the present argument.

3. Vide my 'Stone Age in India' pp. 43—47.

beginning of this world-period,¹ had no name for themselves till Saṁskṛt speakers of a much later period endowed them with a name. This theory also involves the assumption that Saṁskṛt *ḍ* becomes *ḷ* in Tamil; this it does not ordinarily, because Tamils can pronounce *ḍ* without difficulty and hence it remains *ḍ* when it passes into Tamil, e.g., Saṁskṛt *Hidimba* is *idumbaṇ*, not *iḷumbaṇ*. The theory is too far-fetched to deserve further discussion.

Now the meaning of this innocent word *draviḍa* has assumed certain metamorphoses in the hands of European scholars. At first it was made the general name of the agglutinative languages of the extreme south of India, which unlike those of ancient North India have preserved the individuality of their structure notwithstanding the pressure of Saṁskṛt for several milleniums. This new use of the word *draviḍa* was in imitation of the extension of the meaning of the word in the Indian expression, the *pañcadraviḍa*. The Brāhmaṇas of India are divided in comparatively recent Saṁskṛt usage into the five *Draviḍas* and the five *Gauḍas*. The *Draviḍa* Brāhmaṇas are distinguished from the *Gauḍas* by the fact that the former do not eat meat but the latter do eat the meat of the five five-nailed animals. The former give the value *ṣa* to ष, and the latter, *kha*, (e.g., *uṣaṇiṣat*, *uṣaṇikhat*), the former pronounce ञ as *ja*, the latter as *ya*, e.g., *sūrya*, *sūrja*) etc., and by certain other differences of *ācāra*. The phrase *pañca draviḍa* is really a contraction of *draviḍādi pañca janūḥ*, the five tribes whose names begin with *Draviḍas*, for the list of these is *Draviḍas*, *Karnāṭas*, *Gujjarātas*, *Mahārāṣṭras* and *Tailaṅgas*² and the list of *Gauḍa* Brāhmaṇas is *Gauḍas*, *Sārasvatas*, *Kānyakubjas*, *Maithilikas* and *Utkalas*³. Probably the phrase *pañca draviḍāḥ* is a contraction of *draviḍa pañcakāḥ* and the *pañcagauḍāḥ* of the *Gauḍādi pañcakāḥ*. Hence the phrase *pañca draviḍa* is an instance of a legitimate extension of the meaning of the word *draviḍa*. In imitation of this, Caldwell

1. Parimēlalakar, in his Commentaries on Kuṛaḷ, 955, says; ancient families means superiority from the time of creation, like the *cēras*, *coḷas*, *pāṇḍyas*.

தொன்றுதொட்டு வருதல் சேரசோழ பாண்டியரென்றும் போலப் படைப் புக்காலம் தொடங்கி மேம்பட்டு வருதல்.

2. Śabdakalpadruma, II, p. 760.

3. Śabdakalpadruma, II, p. 370.

used the word *Dravidian* (English adjective from *Draviḍa*) as the name of the new philological concept arrived at by him—that of the family of languages to which Tamil, Telugu, Kannaḍa, Malayāḷam, Tulu, Kui and Khond belong. Hoernle imitating Caldwell gave the name *Gaudian* (English adjective of *Gauḍa*) to the family to which belong the modern dialects spoken in North India. This third meaning given to *Draviḍa* is bad enough but perhaps excusable. But this continuous extension of meaning becomes intolerable when the anthropologist steps in, and with his old-fashioned ideas of the fixity of the physical characteristics of races discovered by the calculation of the ratios of various curved lines in the head, the measurement of sundry angles and the estimation of the colour of the skin, the eyes, and the hair, reaches the idea of a race that dwelt in India before the Aryans came and must needs call the race *Dravidian*. This is the fourth connotation of the word *Dravidian*. As if the confusion were not enough, the linguist who had already invented a *Dasyu* race, now equated *Dasyu* with *Dravidian*, and we now read in books on ancient Indian history of the *Dravidian* race on the banks of the Ganges.

DEFINITION OF POETRY OR KĀVYA*

BY

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(Continued from page 180 of Vol. III, Part II, J. O. R. M.)

CHAPTER II.

ARISTOTLE.

Now I turn to Aristotle. He says in his Poetics :—" Epic poetry, tragedy, comedy also and dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation." I. 2.

" There is another art which imitates by means of language alone and that either in prose or verse." I. 6.

" . . . as if it were not the imitation that makes the poet. . . " I. 7.

" . . . since he is a poet because he imitates. . . " IX. 9.
We may gather from these extracts that according to Aristotle poetry is to be defined as an art, the fundamental principle of which is imitation—that imitation being through the medium of language. Though all the other branches of Fine Art, namely, Music, Dancing, Painting and Sculpture, are also imitative, their medium of imitation is not language ; and though History employs language, it is not imitation. Poetry alone is both imitative and has language for its medium.

To an Indian Ālaṅkārika, I believe, this definition will cause not a little surprise. Poetry, imitative ! He, who is called a poet, is, we know, under various circumstances, which need not detain us here, inspired with some pleasant ideas which he expresses

*Thesis approved by the Madras University for the degree of Master of Oriental Learning.

in an elevated style of his language. What is there that makes his art imitative? It seems certain that had it not been for the old age in which Aristotle lived and for the high esteem he was held in, as a philosopher, no critic would have hesitated to pooh-poo such a definition of poetry. That feature of a thing forms its definition which strikes us most when we perceive the thing and which at the same time forms its distinguishing characteristic. Not only we do not get an idea of its imitativeness, when we take up a piece of poetry, but we feel immense difficulty in connecting the idea of imitation with it. While it is true that great geniuses often conceive and express the same idea independently, it seems also equally true that they have sometimes views which would seem to one another extremely strange. Aristotle says many things in his *Poetics* which we find said in our *Alaṅkāra Śāstra*. The very manner in which his *Poetics* is written is Indian-like. But this definition of Poetry of his is such that an *Alaṅkārika* would at once remark that it is subject to the defect of 'asambhava.'

In colloquial use the term imitation not only indicates the action of producing the likeness of something—which is part of its proper meaning; but also gives an idea of want of originality on the part of the imitator. Critics tell us that though such is the case, the Aristotelian employment of the word is not intended to give any such degrading idea. But on the contrary it is to be taken in the sense of original creation. Thus, arguing step by step, Butcher says finally:

"Imitation, so understood, is a creative act. It is the expression of the concrete thing under an image which answers to its true idea. To seize the universal and reproduce it in simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a reality already familiar through sense perceptions; rather it is rivalry of nature, a completion of her unfulfilled purpose, a correction of her failures" (p. 254).

Now, as our objection to the definition is not grounded on the assumption that the term imitation implies want of originality, we may well leave off that consideration. In truth, imitation itself may become an art when it is one's professed occupation and is practised with much skill. A servile imitator is usually affecting to seem original and anxious not to be found out; and feels much shame when people come to know that he is copying another. This is what the disgraceful element of the popular sense of

imitation, consists in. It is not an easy thing to imitate another exactly. It requires as every art does, much labour and practice before it can reach its perfection. Nor, if perfect and dexterously performed, it is unproductive of pleasure. In imitation, too, there is much room for originality. We have our *Vikāṭakavis* who at times entertain even grave philosophers by imitating the twittering and chirping of the birds, the weeping of the child, the barking of the dog and various actions of men and other animate and inanimate things, the imitation often being so exact that if the man that imitates be not before our eyes, we would certainly mistake him for the very being or thing he imitates. It cannot be denied therefore the place and rank of an art. What is art but that faculty of man, which, cultivated by steady practice, makes for his enjoyment? Nature produces, Philosophy contemplates, Science examines; Art prepares, and again Nature, in human forms, enjoys. The very word 'Kavi', generally meaning poet, attached to 'Vikāṭa', humorous, proves that he occupies as an artist a position similar, though inferior, to that of a poet.

Now I say I object to the definition not because imitation implies want of originality, but because I fail to see any justification in calling the function of the poet, imitation. What does imitation mean? To produce the likeness of something? No. Let us suppose two men are doing the same thing without any knowledge of each other. Will their productions be not alike? Yet, can we say that the one is imitating the other? Does it then mean to reproduce something, that is, to produce something after an original already existing. 'Yes', almost all will readily reply. But take one who deliberately speaks or acts or dresses himself or puts on airs like another. There is certainly imitation. But see whether we are to speak of him as imitating the man himself, or his speech, action, dress, or countenance. Speakers speak, we know, in both ways. If thus to speak in both the ways is correct, then, we do not bring out all the sense of the word imitation, when we say that to imitate is to reproduce something. It is only one meaning of the word. In that sense the word may be only used when the object of imitation is the thing produced and not the producer. When *A* is imitating *B*, we do not and cannot mean that *A* is reproducing *B*. *A* is simply doing as *B* is doing and we mean only that. So the word has two meanings: to act intentionally as another acts, and to reproduce something, that is, to produce in-

tentionally a thing after an original. If all this is true, then, when allowance is made for poetry being an imitative art, the saying of Aristotle "Art imitates nature" may well apply to this branch of fine art, poetry; and the following words of Butcher have no meaning so far as poetry is concerned.

"Nor indeed could it possibly bear the sense that fine art is a copy or reproduction of natural objects. The use of the term 'nature' would in itself put the matter beyond dispute. For nature in Aristotle is not the outward world of created things. It is the creative force, the productive principle of the Universe (p. 116).

"It has been already mentioned that to imitate nature in the popular acceptance of the phrase, is not for Aristotle the function of fine Art" (p. 122). Yes, let us take the word, 'Nature', in the very sense he ascribes to it. How does it then go against its application to a fine art. Nature produces these outward things or rather we may here say, men in action, and after her the poet produces his 'men in action' who are similar to those of nature. Have we not there an imitation? Nature is the creator of this Universe. Poet is the creator of a similar Universe, which is his own :

अपरे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः (Dhvanyāloka. p. 222.)

In the boundless world of poetry, the poet is the sole creator.

But to return to our present consideration. We have seen what imitation is. Now let us see whether the function of poets can be imitation. According to Aristotle the poet imitates, that is, reproduces, 'men in action' (II. 1).

In accordance with what has been said in explaining the word 'imitation' this may be more plainly put thus : Nature originally creates 'men in action'. Following her the poet creates his 'men in action' who are the likenesses of those of nature. Here one may, and reasonably, ask where do his men in action exist? In the common imitation we perceive the two quite distinctly—the original, and the thing similar to it produced by imitation. But in the so-called poetic imitation nothing but the literary composition is perceived corresponding to the 'men in action' of nature. The ready and natural answer one is apt to give to this question will be this. Since, in Arnold's words, 'the idea is the fact', 'the idea

is every thing in poetry', the 'men in action' of poetic creation are to be seen and do exist in the ideal, imaginary world. Now there arises a second question. Where is this imaginary world? In the mind of the poet or of the hearer? This we may answer thus. The former view is untenable. All the imaginary operation of the poet is cause to poetry not its creation. All its creation lies in the mind of the hearer. Poetry first sets in motion the imagination of the hearer and then, through the images it creates, appeals to his feelings. Thus we see that by saying 'the poet imitates men in action', Aristotle means that the poet creates men in action in the mind of the audience—'men' that are similar to those in the real outward world.

In the same way, the imitativeness in all the other fine arts is to be explained. That sculpture and painting raise in the mind of the spectators images of men in various situations is well known almost to everybody through personal experience. As regards music and dancing it may be doubted that they raise no images in our mind though they awaken certain feelings in our heart.

But Aristotle thinks they do. With reference to dancing he says :

"... for even dancing imitates character, emotion, and action by rhythmical movement." I. 5.

What Aristotle means is, if I rightly understand him, that the feelings of our heart roused by dancing and music are not our own and original like those we experience during our failure and success in life. They originally belong to others. They are conveyed to our heart through the medium of movement and melody as they are conveyed through language and action in drama. Therefore, they are imitative. Since these feelings are those of human beings, they bring with them to us some idea of the images and mental conditions of the human beings to which they belong, though the idea may not be so clear as when it is carried by language and other medium. In this way, 'Dancing and Music imitate character, emotion, and action, or when shortly put, 'men in action.'

It is the objects of these fine arts, 'men in action', that make all the difference between these and the useful arts, such as cookery, architecture, etc., both kinds of which in general imitate nature. If cookery is an imitative art, I fail to see why architecture cannot be such a one though Butcher would say 'it would not have satisfied his idea of artistic imitation'. P. 149.

It is not however imitative of human life. Therefore it is that Aristotle did not reckon it among the fine arts. As regards the differentia in the fine arts themselves Aristotle says :—

"They differ, however, from one another in three respects, the medium, the objects, the manner or mode of imitation, being in each case distinct." (I. 3.)

It should be noted here that all these three do not differentiate fine arts from one another as one is apt to think from this passage. Aristotle takes the medium alone in explaining such a difference among the fine arts. The objects, which are 'men in action,' are, as I have already said, common to them all; but as these 'men' may "be either of a higher or a lower type," they serve for sub-dividing each of the fine arts. The third point of difference, the manner or mode of imitation, is applied by Aristotle only to poetry. It differentiates one kind of poetry from another. To sum up for our purpose—according to Aristotle, all arts are modes of imitation; all fine arts, imitative of 'men in action'; the art of poetry, imitative of 'men in action' having language for medium of expression.

Having in this way shown how in the Aristotelian view the art of poetry is imitative, I may now proceed to explain my contention against it. My opposition stands on two grounds. First, the function of a poet, is not at all imitation. Secondly, even if it be imitation it is not so characteristic as to form a definition of poetry. It is an indisputably true fact that the best or the only authority as to proper meanings of words is the long-continued use. An appeal to it convinces me that the re-production of a real thing in the ideal world can hardly come within the sense of imitation. Imitation implies the sameness, in a way, of the thing produced by imitation and the original; and whatever may be said against this, and how much so ever dissimilarity may be allowed to exist between an imitation and its original, the ideality of one thing and the reality of the other are certainly qualities that at once make the application to them of the term imitation impossible. Everybody that has eyes is impressed by many outward things and when afterwards he remembers what he has seen, he is, we know, forming, in his mind, images of the things seen. But nobody can say that he is imitating the things he has seen. The reason is this. Imitation requires two separate things—the original and its copy; and so long as we are moving in the imaginary world, we cannot get the second thing existing separately from

the original, *viz.*, the outward real thing. While I do not wish to go deep into philosophical and the psychological considerations, I should like to point out that by perception, remembering, thought, contemplation, imagination or invention, nothing is produced in our mind; nothing that can be compared with outward things. All these are so many activities of the mind; the mind brings us in a close relation with things either past, present or future, or real or unreal; things which do not abide in, have no contact whatever with, the mind. We may figuratively speak of a hundred things. But we should drop all figures when inquiring into the true nature of things. Now I say nothing is produced in our mind that is similar to outward things. All modes of knowledge are so many relations through which our soul is brought into contact with external things. We may perceive a fire or we may imagine a wild fire devouring the whole forest. The fire does not then with its physical form enter into our mind; nor another fire is produced there. Between the things we are conscious of and ourselves there is no direct connection but through the knowledge. We know things through the senses or otherwise. But the things remain where they are. When we speak of an imaginary world we mean nothing more than a kind of mental operation by which various natural things adjusted according to our will seem to us; and in which the mind is as clear of the things that appear as our eyes are of things we perceive. To be short, poetry produces in the mind of the hearer no such new things as can be said to be the imitations of the outward things; and therefore poetry cannot be imitative.

In another way too may be proved the unimitativeness of poetry. Here language comes for my support. 'Imitation' may be interpreted much more properly as 'doing the same' than as 're-producing a thing'. Thus we see speech is imitated by speech; action by action, dress by dress, countenance by countenance and so on. But when one, instead of doing the same thing as another does, says in his language that another is doing such and such things, all sense of imitation is gone. Now what is the function of the poet but to relate what his hero, real or imaginary, did or suffered? The poet does not do or act as his hero did or acted. By his imaginative faculty he brings before his mind's eye the life of his hero which may be wholly real, or partly real and partly worked out by imagination. Then he sees with his inner eye, the combined work of his imaginative, inventive, and thinking powers,

he being at that stage nothing more than a spectator of a stage play, and expresses what he sees there in a language that befits it for the name of poetry. There he stops. Nothing more is required of him as a poet. To express by language is not to imitate.

Now for the second, I say, even supposing that poetising is imitation, the latter cannot form the artistically essential principle of poetry. In the way in which I have explained the Aristotelian imitativeness of poetry, almost all speeches and writings may be, and rightly, called imitation. For they too excite our imagination, and through it, bring in, in our mind, images of persons whom they concern. Now the difficulty is that the distinction of poetry from historical and other treatises disappears; all being modes of imitation.

Here Aristotle would say :

"The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history; for Poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. The particular is—for example—what Alcibiades did or suffered." (IX. 2, 3, 4.)

Yes, let us accept for the time the 'true difference' between History and Poetry. Is my contention affected thereby in the least? No, not at all. On the contrary this passage of Poetics gives us to understand that Aristotle himself thought that imitation by itself is not such a characteristic principle of poetry as to make the latter in any way different from history. Is it not plain then, that to say, as Aristotle does, that imitation makes the poet is as absurd as to say that writing about something makes the poet?

It might be thought here that though imitation is not such a characteristically special feature of poetical art as to differentiate it from history, yet the definition of poetry given above may hold good if only imitation be qualified by the phrase 'of the Universal'; poetry is the imitation 'of the universal element in human life'. History imitates the particular, not the universal. But let us first understand what this universal means. Sir Philip Sydney has raised a question implying the undistinguishableness of poetry and history, both being imitative; and thus answers with reference to Aristotle's passage above quoted.

"Truly Aristotle himself in his discourse of poesy, plainly "determineth this question, saying that poetry is *philosophoteron* "and *spoudaioteron*, that is to say, it is more philosophical, and more "studiously serious than history. His reason is, because poesy "dealeth with *Katholou*, that is to say, with the universal consider- "ations; and the history with *Kathekastou*, the particular; now "saith he, the universal weighs what is fit to be said or done, "either in likelihood or necessity (which the poesy considereth in "his imposed names), and the particular only marks, whether "Alcibiades did or suffered this or that. Thus far Aristotle; "which reason of his (as all his) is most full of reason. For in- "deed, if the question were whether it were better to have a parti- "cular act truly or falsely set down, there is no doubt which is to "be chosen, no more than whether you had rather have Vespasian's "picture right as he was, or at the painter's pleasure nothing resem- "bling. But if the question be for your own use and learning, "whether it be better to have it set down as it should be or as it "was; then certainly is more doctrinable the feigned Cyrus of "Xenophon than the true Cyrus in Justin; and the feigned Aeneas "in Virgil than the Aeneas in Dares Phrygius." E.L.C., p. 18, 19. What in this passage Sir Philip Sydney means will become more apparent when we look into another passage of his which though much longer than this one, I may be excused for quoting.

"Now to that which commonly is attributed to the praise of "histories in respect of the notable learning is gotten by marking "the success, as though therein a man should see virtue exalted "and vice punished; truly that commendation is peculiar to "poetry, and far off from history. For indeed poetry ever set- "teth virtue so out in her best colours, making fortune her well- "waiting handmaid that one must needs be enamoured of her. "Well may you see Ulysses in a storm and in other hard plights; "but they are but exercises of patience and magnanimity, "to make them shine the more in the near following pros- "perity. And of the contrary part, if evil men come to the stage, "they ever go out (as the tragedy writer answered to one that "misliked the show of such persons) so manacled, as they little "animate folks to follow them. But the historian, being captived "to the truth of a foolish world, is many times a terror from well- "doing, and an encouragement to unbridled wickedness.

"For see we not valiant Miltiades rot in his fetters? The "just Phocion, and the accomplished Socrates, put to death like

"traitors? The cruel Severus live prosperously. The excellent Severus miserably murdered? Sulla and Marius dying in their beds? Pompey and Cicero slain then, when they would have thought exile, a happiness.

"See we not virtuous Cato driven to kill himself? and rebel Caesar so advanced, that his name yet after 1600 years, lasteth in the highest honour? And mark but even Caesar's own words of the fore-named Sulla (who in that only did honestly, to put down his dishonest tyranny) *litteras nescivit*, as if want of learning caused him to do well. He meant it not by poetry, which not content with the earthly plagues deviseth new punishments in hell for tyrants: nor yet by philosophy, which teacheth *Occidendos Esse*: but no doubt by skill in history: for that indeed can afford your Cypselus Periander, Phalaris, Dionysius, and I know not how many more of the same kennel, that speed well enough in the abominable injustice or usurpation. I conclude therefore that he excelleth history, not only in furnishing the mind with knowledge, but in setting it forward, to that which deserveth to be called and accounted good: which setting forward, and moving to well doing, indeed setteth the laurel crown upon the poet as victorious, not only of the historian, but over the philosopher: howsoever in teaching it may be questionable.

"For, suppose it be granted (that which I suppose with great reason may be denied) that the philosopher, in respect of his methodical proceeding, doth teach more perfectly than the poet; yet do I think that no man is so much *Philophilosophos*¹ as to compare the philosopher, in moving, with the poet.

"And that moving is of a higher degree than teaching, it may by this appear: that it is well-nigh the cause and the effect of teaching. For who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire to be taught? and what so much good doth that teaching bring forth (I speak still of moral doctrine) as that it moveth one to do that which it doth teach? For as Aristotle saith, it is not *Gnosis* but *Praxis*² must be the fruit. And how *Praxis* cannot be, without being moved to practice, it is no hard matter to consider." (p. 21 and 22). E. L. C.

Now it is clear that in the view of Sir Philip Sidney the universal is 'what should or what should not be' according to

1. 'in love with philosophy.'

2. 'not knowledge but action.'

moral philosophy. He would exemplify it thus: that 'the just Phocion and the accomplished Socrates should have been honoured' is the universal; but the historical fact that instead of being honoured, they were 'put to death like traitors' is the particular. Though we do not share the opinion that didacticism is opposed to the spirit of Poetry, we may accept the gist of Sydney's argument. But the question to be considered is whether Aristotle's words, "by the universal I mean how a person of certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity";—can bear this meaning of Sydney's. I think they cannot. But I do not wish to go any further in explaining why they cannot, than quoting a few lines from Butcher. He writes in his 'Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art':—

"Returning now to the discussion about poetry and history we shall better understand Aristotle's general conclusion which is contained in the words so well known and so often misunderstood. 'Poetry is a more philosophical and a higher thing than History'—where the *spoudaisteron* denotes 'higher in the scale', not 'more serious', for the words apply even to comedy, nor, again, 'more moral', which is quite alien to the context."

Now if we ask Butcher, 'If the moral precept is not meant here as Sydney thinks what then is your meaning of the universal?' his answer is, "a purified form of reality disengaged from accident and freed from condition which thwart its developments." For a clearer understanding of this, the following lines of his may be read:—"The real and the ideal from this point of view are not opposites, as they are sometimes conceived to be. The ideal is the real but rid of contradictions, unfolding itself according to the laws of its own being apart from alien influences and the disturbances of chances" (pp. 150-1).

And,

"Poetry, we say—following Aristotle—is an expression of the universal element in human life; or, in equivalent modern phrase it idealises life. Now the word 'idealise' has two senses, which have given rise to some confusion. Writers on æsthetics generally mean by it the representation of an object in its permanent and essential aspects, in a form that answers to its true idea; disengaged from the passing accidents that cling to individuality, and from disturbing influences that obscure the type.

What is local or transient is either omitted or reduced to subordinate rank; the particular is enlarged till it broadens out into the human and the universal. In this sense the ideal is the universal of the Poetics." (P. 368.)

This meaning given by Butcher too seems to me unsatisfactory. Thinking that "Aristotle's Poetics cannot be read apart from his other writings and that no author is more liable to be misunderstood if studied piecemeal",¹ and noticing an observation of Goethe that "it needs some insight into Aristotle's general philosophy to understand what he says about the drama, since otherwise he confuses our ideas" Butcher overworks with the universal of Poetics. 'Universal' is a term that transports the hearer at once into the region of philosophy and it was, methinks, only with a view to prevent such misunderstanding, that Aristotle went on to explain what he here meant by the word. Strangely, however, Butcher, the most thorough master of Poetics, has failed to grasp the somewhat hidden purport of these explanatory words of Aristotle and taken the term in the usual philosophical sense. Moreover the 'particular' which is mentioned here as an antithesis to the 'universal' seems to confirm the sense of the word. Now Aristotle's words are, as already quoted more than once—"by the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity." From these words the poetical universal is to be determined. So far as my study of Poetics goes, nowhere else can I find something said to warrant the above-mentioned meaning given by Butcher. When unstrained, these words would seem to mean exactly what Coleridge says with reference to this passage of Aristotle:

"I adopt, he says, with full faith the theory of Aristotle that poetry as poetry is essentially ideal, that it avoids and excludes all accident; that its apparent individualities of rank, character, or occupation, must be the representative of a class; and that the persons of poetry must be clothed with generic attributes, with the common attributes of the class; not such as one gifted individual might possibly possess, but such as from his situation it is most probable that he would possess."²

Having in view what Aristotle says elsewhere—"for tragedy is an imitation, not of man, but of an action and of life" (VI. 9.),

1. *Aris.*, p. 114.

2. Quoted by Butcher, *Aris.*, p. 195.

'what he imitates are actions' (IX. 9),—we have to interpret the passage in question as meaning that the universal (which it is the aim of poetry to express) is qualified speech or action; and the qualification is suggested by 'a person of certain type,' which naturally seems to be 'typical' (that is, common to all the individuals that are of the same type) which excludes individualistic. Then do the utterances of Coleridge—"that its apparent individualities of rank, character, or occupation, must be the representative of a class" not seem to be in full accordance with Aristotle's explanation of the universal? Butcher, while leaving us in utter darkness as to why the universal should be taken in the sense he assigns, criticises Coleridge's interpretation thus:—

"Some of these explanatory words themselves are, it must be owned, misleading. Such phrases as 'representative of a class', 'generic attributes', 'class characteristics which constitute the instructiveness of a character,' seem to imply 'a false view of the universal of poetry, as though the 'individuality' were something outside the universal and of no poetic account; yet, he says, 'the individual form' is 'uppermost.' One might think that the 'universal' was a single abstract truth instead of being all the truths that meet in the individual. The expression, however, 'such (attributes) as from his situation it is most probable that he would possess is true and Aristotelian. But how can these attributes be called attributes of a class?' (P. 196.)

Butcher here seems to me somewhat wanting in cogency. Not only there is nothing said in Poetics in favour of Butcher's sense of the universal, but there is much to show that it is quite against Aristotle's intention. After explaining the universal in his own way, Butcher writes (pp. 154) (as is already said):—"To seize the universal and to reproduce it in simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a reality already familiar through sense perception." If I rightly understand, this means that the universal which is the object of poetical imitation is a thing that men in general cannot perceive but through poetry. If so, the universal, though very clearly represented by the art, can hardly please an audience who, according to Butcher, are not already familiar with it. For, does Aristotle not say "for if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other cause" (IV. 5.)

Though thus Coleridge's interpretation of the word seems more plausible than Butcher's, even that I cannot persuade myself to accept. What are the accidents, one is apt to ask, that should be avoided and excluded by poetry and why should they be avoided and excluded by it? As regards the first question, while Butcher would satisfy himself by saying this much—

"At what precise point imperfections are to be regarded as accidental, abnormal, irregular; as presenting so marked a deviation from the type as to be unworthy of lasting embodiment in art—is a problem whose answer will vary at different stages of history, and will admit of different applications according to the particular art that is in question (p. 372)", Coleridge expresses his view in these words—

"Such as one gifted individual might possibly possess." As for the second, both of them think that the accident, if not eliminated, will obscure the universal as in our actual life and render the imitation inartistic and ineffective. All these are—I cannot help saying, following the dictates of my own reason—vain but inevitable wanderings of the critic's mind, which is given up to undue philosophising about poetry. I do not think that there is anything in this immense universe like accidental and hence unfit to be an object of the art of poetry. Anything and everything can be so beautifully delineated as to raise pleasurable feelings in our heart, if only the poet should be of a sufficiently superior rank. The very thing, which we discard and do not take care even to see because of its meanness, uselessness, and other such causes, will appear as pleasing as that which is great and majestic, when embellished and represented by poetical talent. "Poetry", says Shelley, "turns all things to loveliness. It exalts the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed; it marries exultation and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change; it subdues to union under its light yoke all irreconcilable things." (E. L. C. p. 195.) This all-embracingness of poetry is already expressed by our famous dramaturgist (of the tenth century) in the end of his Daśarūpa :

रम्यं जुगुप्सितमुदारमथापि नीचं

उग्रं प्रसादि गहनं विकृतं च वस्तु ।

यद्वाप्यवस्तु कविभावकभाव्यमानं

तन्नास्ति यन्न रसभावमुपैति लोके ।

Nothing is there, in the world, whether it be delightful or detestable, high or low, gross or elegant, occult or deformed, entity or non-entity, which, when touched by the imagination of poet and men of taste, does not become rasa.¹

[I should like to point out here in passing that विकृतम् is a misreading of विवृतम्, salient, not obscure, the opposite of गहनम् occult.]

It is very interesting to note that William Hazlitt, as if echoing Dhanañjaya's, has uttered the following words :—

"Poetry is only the highest eloquence of passion, the most vivid form of expression that can be given to our conception of anything, whether pleasurable or painful, mean or dignified, delightful or distressing." (H. L. p. 7.)

It should not be here lost sight of that Dhanañjaya ascends a degree higher than Hazlitt in adding that even a non-entity can be a fit subject for poetry (यद्वाप्यवस्तु). To restrict the range of poetry is to deny the possibilities of the inventive and imaginative power of transcendently high order of poets. It is not the office of the poet to seize the recondite and represent it clearly for us. It is rather the office of the philosopher. Most of what poets have hitherto represented is already known to men through other sources. This consideration leads me to conclude that it is a rule which governs poetry that the object of the art should be such as men generally are familiar with. John Keble, in his invective against Dr. Johnson, writes :

"He argues the point, first from the nature of poetry, and afterwards from that of devotion. 'The essence of poetry is invention; such invention as, by producing something unexpected, surprises, and delights. The topics of devotion are few.' It is to be hoped that many men's experience will refute the latter part of this statement. How can the topics of devotion be few, when we are taught to make every part of life, every scene in nature, an occasion—in other words a topic—of devotion? It might as well be said that connubial love is an unfit subject for poetry, as being incapable of novelty, because, after all, it is only ringing the changes upon one simple affection which every one understands. The novelty

¹ This is one of the many ślokas which are very incorrectly translated by George C. O. Haas; a list of which I have published in this Journal. (Vide J. O. R. M.—Vol. II part II—p. 142.)

there, consists not in the original topic, but in continually bringing ordinary things, by happy strokes of natural ingenuity, into new associations with the ruling passion." (E. C. E. p. 204.)

If poets sometimes give expression to a truth that has an air of philosophy, it is not because they, as poets, should find and express it; but because they wish to show the vastness and depth of their knowledge and think, and think rightly, that the expression of such a philosophical truth in a pleasant and attractive way would add to the grandeur of their works. Surely, poets themselves, if asked, cannot say that they, at a certain stage of their art, have to discriminate in their objects of representation certain elements as transient and accidental and therefore unworthy of their treatment, as opposed to the elements, permanent and inherent, which are in the sense of the critics the 'universal', the object of poetry. It is not because of their unfitness for poetical treatment, but because they are, though undoubtedly gems of poetry, yet of such a different hue and colour as render them incongruous with the other gems which the poet is going to string together in order to make a particular kind of poetical garland, that he ignores some aspects of the object of his representation, such aspects being reserved for treatment in another kind of poetry. As these critics have not distinctly illustrated the universal and accidental of things, I need go no further in disproving their views. Anyhow, it seems to me certain that Aristotle's use in Poetics of the word 'universal' could hardly be in the sense of generic attributes or purified individuality.

Now since I could not accept any of the meanings given by the critics, the difficult task is left to me of finding out the proper meaning of the 'universal' in Poetics. In illustrating the 'universal' of poetry, Aristotle says:

"In comedy this is already apparent; for here the poet first constructs the plot on the lines of probabilities and then inserts characteristic names." (IX. 5.)

Here lies hidden a truth of no inconsiderable value, which it is almost impossible to fully grasp for those who have not a fair acquaintance with the philosophy of words and sentences, as vehicles of ideas. Śābara, the famous author of the Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya says (I-i-24) that the *universal* is the sense of the word, the *particular* is the sense of the sentence. The word 'goes', taken alone, gives the idea of the action of going. But

add a subject to it, as in 'a man goes' the meaning of the verb becomes restricted. And it will be still more restricted if a proper noun be used to denote the subject, as in 'Rama goes'. Now the sense conveyed by 'goes' alone, unconnected with any other concept, is *universal* and becomes *particular* when it is related to Rama. Thus we see that the general idea of an action becomes particularised by its relation with a particular man; and the particularity of a man, it is well known to us, cannot be better brought home to our mind than through his proper name. So each and every action of man, viewed apart in itself, without any thought of its relation to its agent, is, in Śābara's sense—and I think I am quite right when I say in Aristotle's sense as well—'universal.' All that a poet should do to get at this 'universal' is to ignore the proper name of the man to whom the action he is going to poetise, belongs. This is what Aristotle means, when he says 'for here the poet first constructs his plot on the lines of probabilities'. Though, in this way, in order to shape the form of the universal, which it is the aim of poetry to represent, proper names are to be deleted, they cannot be altogether done away with. How is it possible to represent different characters without a name given to each, so as to distinguish them from one another? Only for the sake of convenience, and not at all for any purpose connected with the essential requirements of poetry, names are attached to characters. Aristotle also thinks in this way when he adds 'and then inserts characteristic names'.

When thus proper names are inserted, it is inevitable that the 'universal,' which alone, being represented through the medium of poetry, is the source of pleasure, somewhat loses its own form and assumes the appearance of the 'particular.' But the unimportance of the 'particular' in poetical creations may be proved in this way. Let us take a piece of poetry and change the name of every character in it. Can it affect in the least the charm of the piece? No, certainly not. When this is borne in mind we can well understand the full import of the words of Aristotle:—"Still there are even some tragedies in which there are only one or two well-known names, the rest being fictitious. In others, none are well known, as in Agathon's Anthens, where incidents and names alike are fictitious, and yet they give none the less pleasure. We must not, therefore, with all costs keep to the received legends, which are the usual subjects of tragedy. Indeed, it would be absurd to attempt; for even subjects that

are known are known only to a few and yet give pleasure to all." [IX. 7, 8.]

The audience, Aristotle thinks, need not have personal knowledge of the persons suggested by the characteristic names for the enjoyment of a stage play. But they (this view of Aristotle is expressed in a passage already quoted) should be familiar with of the action, the 'universal' of the play. Without it they cannot enjoy it. How striking is the correspondence between these words of Aristotle and the following line of Dhanañjaya:

त एव च परित्यक्तविशेषा रसहेतवः

IV. 39.

The same conditions of life (as referred to in the previous śloka, and not 'the heroines' as interpreted by Haas) being stripped of the particulars, form the contributory factors of rasa. Dhanika's explanation here runs thus: There, the words, Sītā, etc., leaving off the particulars such as the daughter of king Janaka, etc., denote women in general. What harm is there?

When it is established that the particular is in no way the essential part of poetry, and the universal only is the object of poetic representation, it goes without saying that poets are at full liberty to make their men and things all fictitious. But this licence for fiction cannot be extended beyond the names and the particulars suggested by them. Poets ought not to represent actions which are not generally known as probable. An action which is unnatural to human beings should not be delineated on the excuse of poetical fiction. For, being against the law of nature, it overpowers the mind at once and breaks off suddenly the smooth and continuous flow of pleasurable feelings awakened by poetic representation, thus jeopardising the very life of poetry. So Aristotle would say in his explanation of the 'universal' that the action should be according to the law of probability. As regards the law of necessity, I am one with Butcher in saying that it refers 'rather to the internal structure of a poem'.

Among the Indian Ālaṅkārikas too, there were some who held, like modern critics of the west, the view that the 'universal' of poetry is the concrete truth of the outward phenomena of nature. Ānandavardhana, in the fourth Uddyota of his Dhvanyāloka (p. 242 f.) criticises this view and rejects it, saying that if it is the aim of poetry to represent such 'universal' there can hardly be more than one poet in the

world, that 'universal' having been represented by the first poet. This reason of Ānandavardhana serves, apart from the words of Aristotle himself, to prove that the interpretation of the poetic 'universal' given by modern critics could not be accepted.

Having thus expounded the true significance of the 'universal', we may now take up the definition given above of poetry and consider whether it can serve to differentiate poetry from history. 'Poetry, we know,' says Aristotle, 'tends to express the *universal*, history the *particular*'. I think the 'particular' is almost fully explained when we explained the 'universal.' An action taken as pertaining to an individual is the 'particular'; 'the particular' is what Alcibiades did or suffered.' In poetry the action alone is the object of representation. As the action cannot be related without an agent, poetry makes use of the 'particular' through the name given to the agent. That 'particular' may be this or that, nay, even such as has never existed, only imaginary; but in history the 'particular' is everything. It is the soul of it. We cannot change the name of the historical person, while we can readily do in the case of the hero of a piece of poetry. If it is changed, it is no longer history. Imagination has no business with it. It must stick to the naked truth. Thus, it may be said, the difference between history and poetry is very clear—the former representing the 'universal' and the latter the 'particular.'

But this also seems to me untenable. It is quite impossible to represent the 'particular' without representing at the same time the 'universal.' Is it not an irrefragable truth of philosophy that the 'particular' can never exist separately from the 'universal'? Unless it embraces each and every particular, the 'universal' cannot be universal. The very sense of the 'universal' well considered convinces us of this fact. That being so, it needs little effort to show that, whenever the 'particular' is brought to view, the 'universal' cannot but come into view through it.

As in poetry, so in history, you may have the action universalised by getting rid of the idea of its relation to its particular personal agent. Since, thus, history too represents the 'universal,' the definition remains subject to the same fault with the 'universal' put into it, as without it.

To this objection, an answer may be attempted here. The poet first collects such incidents of human life as are suitable to the kind of poetry which he intends to produce, and then so

arranges them that every subsequent incident stands to a preceding one in the cause-and-effect relation and thus all of them make up one whole which is called "plot". "It clearly follows", says Aristotle (IX. 9.) "that the poet or maker should be the maker of plots rather than of verses." The historian has not any such task. He has not to trouble himself about selecting some incidents and rejecting others, after considering their probability, about the proper and orderly arrangement of them, about trying to find out suitable language for effectively expressing them. Only he records all the doings and sufferings of a man that come within his knowledge in the order in which he thinks they had happened. So the 'universal' of poetry is more philosophical and a far higher thing than the object of history.

But we think that this differentiation of poetry from history is not satisfactory. There may be a piece of history, as stated by Aristotle himself (IX. 9.), the incidents of which are in full conformity with poetic requirements. Let us suppose that it is represented both by a historian and a poet. Can there be any difference between their productions so far as their object of representation is concerned? We cannot say that one represents the 'particular' and the other the 'universal.' Neither can it be reasonably said that, though both relate both, yet one tends to express the 'particular,' and the other the 'universal.' One's tendency cannot make any change in the real nature of things. One may produce a certain thing for a particular purpose. But it may as well serve another purpose. So, it is, surely and necessarily, something else than the object of representation, that we should consider in order to frame a satisfactory definition of poetry.

Thus we have seen that three principles, according to Courthope, underlie Aristotle's Poetics, namely—

(1) that the function of poetry, as of all Fine Arts, is imitation, not instruction ;

(2) that the object of imitation in poetry is the 'universal' not the 'particular' ; and

(3) that the test of the justice of poetic imitation is the permanent pleasure produced in society by the work, not merely the pleasure felt by the artist in creating it ; and that the first two of these are of no use for the purpose of defining poetry. As

regards the third, I think it is only that principle that can enable us to frame a definition and I propose to consider it in the next chapter, wherein it will be clear that it is a principle in which Aristotle and our Indian Ālaṅkārikas seem to agree entirely. Meanwhile, I should say a few words as to why Aristotle so much extols the imitativeness of poetry, if it is not such an essential feature as would help in defining it—about a view which is held till now by all critics of all nations, and adopted by John Dryden in his "Preface to the Fables" in these words—

"The design, the disposition, the manners, and the thoughts are all before it ; where any of those are wanting or imperfect in the imitation of human life ; *which is in the very definition of a poem.*" (E. L. C. p. 65-6.)

Courthope and Butcher think that even before it was used by Aristotle, the word "imitation" was already current in popular usage in connection with poetical creations, and Aristotle accepted but interpreted it "anew." In the foregoing pages, I have said enough to show why the interpretation given by modern critics for the Aristotelian use of the term "imitation" is not acceptable. Whether the word was in popular usage long before Aristotle or not, it is unnecessary for us to enquire. As Saintsbury says, the word is, in the sense in which it is used in Poetics, very awkward. Nevertheless, the word is not without some highly commendable significance of its own. By giving so much importance to the imitativeness of poetry, Aristotle means to tell us that he would insist upon the fact that though poetical works need not be true in the historical sense of the word, yet they should be very true when representing "men in action," the 'universal.' The more exact the representation, the more perfect and beautiful the piece of poetry is. This is a secret of not a little importance. This was fully understood by almost all the ancient poets. So it is that the pleasure derived from their works is universal and permanent. Failing to grasp this fundamental truth and principle of poetic art, and carried away by an irrepressible desire to excel all other poets and by the erroneous notion that the life-giving, beautifying, originality of poetry consists in a new way of delineation, untrodden by anybody else, later poets in Sanskrit Literature began to hyperbolise to an unlimited extent, with the result that their poems are not much less difficult than the works on various śāstras. Śrī Harṣa's Naiṣadhacarita is a good example of this

kind of poetry. He himself says in the concluding verse of the 8th Sarga—

.....कविकुलदृष्टाध्वपान्ये महा—
काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते.....

The following is one of his verses I think, which induced him to boast of his poem, in the above strain, as “one that travels through the path, never seen by the world of poets”:

वैदर्भीकलिशैले मरकतशिखरादुत्थितैरशुद्धैः
ब्रह्माण्डाघातभग्नस्यदजमदतया ह्रीष्टतावाङ्मुखैः ।
कस्या नोत्तानगाया दिवि सुरसुरभेरास्यदेशं गताग्रैः
यद्गोप्रासप्रदानव्रतसुकृतमविश्रान्तमुज्जृम्भते स्म ॥

Naiṣadha. II. 105.

Aristotle would not allow such pieces to have the name of poetry. In the sense in which he uses the word, this verse is not *imitative*. We cannot see in the outward world the work of nature, the like of which is here represented. Consider side by side with the above verse of Śrī Harṣa, this half of Kālidāsa—

शृङ्गेण च स्पर्शनिमीलिताक्षीं मृगीमकण्डूयत कृष्णसारः ।

which is found in the third Sarga of the Kumāra-Sambhava. There is not any high feat of imagination in this half. Yet it belongs to the first order of poetry. The reason is obvious. In the Aristotelian sense, it is fully imitative. The office of poets, as that of garland-makers, is rather to arrange than to create. From my own experience, I have to conclude that immature poets cannot get at this truth. The following is a verse of my own (in my Rāmavarmodaya written about thirteen years ago, that is, in my twenty first year).

उत्थाय मेघाः सविधे समुद्रात्
यन्नारिकेलद्रुमकोटिघुष्टाः ।
निःशेषनिर्यातनवाम्बुपूरा
नैवामिबर्षन्ति परत्र किञ्चित् ।

Against the cocoanut trees of which (country, Kerala), clouds, rising up from the sea at hand, dash, and, having poured out all the water, rain nowhere else even to the smallest extent.

If I should be now asked to write a poem according to my poor ability, I do not think I can allow myself to write in such a

strain. Though possessed of extraordinary abilities and power of imagination, Śrī Harṣa and other poets of the later centuries were, since artificiality then reigned supreme, blind to the fact that it is a faithfully exact and simple, yet grand, description of the creations of nature, such as we find throughout the Rāmāyaṇa and the works of Kālidāsa, that gives long life to poetry. Probably Daṇḍī expresses the same idea on this point as Aristotle, when he writes in his Kāvyaadarśa.

लोकातीत इवात्यर्थमध्यारोप्य विवक्षितः ।

योऽर्थस्तेनातितुष्यन्ति विदग्धा नेतरे जनाः ॥

By the idea being expressed in a highly fantastical way, as though it is something ultramundane, cultivated minds are pleased, (विदग्धाः, an ironical term meaning *gaudas*¹) not others. (1. 88.) The following extracts also deserve consideration here, as being not only in full accordance with, but also explanatory to, Aristotle's view concerning the imitativeness of poetry; and they substantiate my interpretation of his theory :

“Oh nature and Jane Austen, which of you has copied from the other.”

(quoted by Courthope, Page, 292.)

“To hold mirror up to nature.”

Shakespeare.

आदिराजयशोबिम्बमादर्शं प्राप्य वाङ्मयम्. Daṇḍī I. 5.

“The image of the glory of ancient kings, through finding in speech a mirror,.....” B. C. V. P.

Now it remains for me to show what Aristotle means, when he says “he is a poet because he imitates” (quoted in the beginning). If all that has been said thus far by me is borne in mind, it would seem reasonable that the term imitation, as used by Aristotle, means not merely narration (which is common to history) but delightful and faithful representation, and we have no objection whatever to accept that such a representation by means of language “makes the poet”.

It is already explained that the objects of poetic representation need not be necessarily real in the usual sense of the word. In the multifarious phases of human life, it is quite possible that the “action” of some men may be such that a keen-sighted

१. विदग्धा इति गौडानाक्षिपति । Hrdayaṅgama.

poet finds in it a ready-made plot, and begins to treat it poetically. In this case we have not the least doubt as to the reality of the object of his representation. But when such a ready-made plot is not available, the poet himself creates one, picking up some incidents here and others there, and arranging them all in a suitable order. Since such a series of incidents taken as a whole has not actually happened, it is undoubtedly unreal. It is, however, poetically true. Even where the action is real, its reality is of no account in poetry. Poetic truth consists in the fact that the incidents and their sequence as represented in poetry are not against the laws of nature. All that is possible is poetically true. For "possible" implies that a similar thing has already happened: unless it is so, what is to be represented cannot be taken as possible. Aristotle says:—

"But tragedians still keep to real names, the reason being that what is possible is credible; what has not happened we do not at once feel sure to be possible; but what has happened is manifestly possible; otherwise it would not have happened."

"Possible" according to Aristotle, means "what may happen." From the above extract from his *Poetics*, it is clear that "what may happen" includes the real past action, that also being possible. Whatever is accepted as possible is to be taken, therefore, as a thing of nature; and wherever a thing or action that is possible is beautifully represented, we have an Aristotelian imitation there. So we cannot help saying that Hudson is somewhat rash when he adds in a footnote:

".....are to Aristotelean antithetical conception of it as in its essence one of the imitative arts. The Greek philosopher's theory really breaks down in his own hands, since, as he himself admits, the poet's business (he is thinking of the narrative poet¹) is to relate, not what actually happens, but what may happen."

Again, according to the rationalistic view, there are no gods and demi-gods; and yet poets represent them, their excuse being, in Aristotle's view, that they are "thought to be." The idea is that the poet has no business to enquire whether the Gods really exist or not. Men generally think that there are such superhuman beings and that the poet has the original for his imitation. For

¹ We do not know why.

it is not the human form alone, but men with their physical, mental, intellectual and imaginary operations, that nature creates. So what is thought to be is also a creation of nature or it may be taken for granted that it is possible. Hence it is an object of poetic representation, or imitation.

And again, though men, as a rule, are spiritually, and morally, to be short, in every way, imperfect, yet each man has his own ideal with respect to virtues, life, Government, and such other things. Religion and philosophy, while edifying people, mostly help them in forming such ideals. Sometimes poets begin to illustrate the religious and philosophical precepts, as Sir Philips Sidney says, in their beautiful and more convincing and attractive way, representing the ideal virtues as possessed by some extraordinary personalities. For the nations which are full of theological notions and historical legends and myths, it is not too much to conceive a man in ideal perfection. So, when a poet pictures some human personalities in somewhat superhuman forms, it should not be thought that it is all his own making and nothing of the kind could have been conceived by others.

The poet vividly represents what is vaguely conceived by the common folk. Unless it is so, the representation can be by no means pleasing. For, if what is represented be his own creation, quite unknown to us, "we cannot be sure that it is not an image of a monster". Therefore the better men, or, as Aristotle puts it, men, that are represented as they ought to be, are, like Gods, poetically true; and this representation may very well be called imitation in the Aristotelian sense. I would say this much in order to show that little value need be attached to Butcher's statement:

"A crucial instance of the inadequacy of the literal English equivalent 'imitation' to express the Aristotelian idea is afforded by a passage in Ch. XXV. The artist may 'imitate things as they ought to be.'"

If representation by language can be called *imitation* there is nothing here to render the term inadequate for conveying the sense in which it is used in *Poetics*.

Having said all that is necessary for our present enquiry, we should take leave of Aristotle here, though reluctantly.

THE PRESENT KALIYUGA

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Every Hindu has to begin every act with a declaration of his determination to do it which is called *Saṅkalpa*. The *Saṅkalpa* declares the date on which he is so doing. It specifies the year beginning from a certain point of time which may be called the Āryan era. According to that era, fifty years of Brahma's life has passed and the first day of the second fifty years is passing.

We have reasons to believe that the first fifty years of Brahma's life were counted at 24,000 years for every day. Even at that rate the era has counted $24,000 \times 360 \times 50$ years or 432 million years. The day of Brahma is the period when the first point of Aries begins from the same Rāśi again and is above 25,000 years correctly. So above 450 million years have passed since the beginning of the Āryan era.

A day or night of Brahma was divided into four yugas--Kṛta, Treta, Dvāpara and Kali. They consisted of 4,800, 3,600, 2,400 and 1,200 years with Sandhya and Sandhyamśa at the beginning and close of each yuga. The yugas were originally an astronomical period merely. They afterwards were given a different meaning which made the yugas 360 times longer. Dharma was said to be walking on four legs, on three legs, on two legs and on a single leg in these four yugas and so the Hindus were not willing to say that *kṛta* had begun when peace and order were obviously not prevalent.

When did such an interpretation come in and when was a different calculation introduced?—is the question which we are now going to answer.

The present calculation of the kaliyuga gives it 43,200 years or 360 times 1,200 years. An attempt was also made to multiply 1,200 by 1,000. The Purāṇas were intended to narrate Āryan

history and they give a clue to the change that was effected originally.

The present Kaliyuga was intended to begin from the Mahābhārata war and the Mahāprasthāna of Yudhiṣṭhira. The *kali* then was 1,200 years long and the next *kr̥ta* was proposed to be begun after a period of 1,200 years. The date also for the beginning of *kr̥ta* was fixed and the manner in which that peaceful *kr̥ta* was to be ushered in.

Three Books make mention of this event (1) The Mahābhārata, Vana Parva, Ch. 190 v. 91, (2) Viṣṇu Purāṇa, amśa IV, ady. 24, v. 102, (3) Śrī Bhāgavata, sk. XII, ady. 2, v. 23. The verse is the same, though there is a slight difference in the reading.

यदा चन्द्रश्च सूर्यश्च तथा तिष्ये बृहस्पतिः ।

एकराशौ समेष्यन्ति तदा भवति वैकृतम् ॥ Viṣṇu Purāṇam.

The Mahābhārata reads तिष्ये बृहस्पतिः प्रवर्त्यति तदा instead of the above reading. The Bhāgavata reads तत् instead of वै.

The four kinds of months, lunar, Sāvana, Solar and Stellar, coincide at the end of every five years. The seven grahas excluding Rāhu and Ketu coincide at the end of every sixty years. The Sun and the other planets begin from the same Rāśi after a period of 2,400 years owing to the precession of the equinox.

Row Bahadur C. V. Vaidya quoted the verse from the Mahābhārata in his 'Epic India' but confessed his inability to interpret it. We put forward our explanation before the first Oriental Conference at Poona and published it in the Kumbakonam College Magazine also. We are now fortified in our position by the three old commentators of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the Śrī Bhāgavata having accepted our interpretation as the hereditary one.

The conjunction of the Sun and the Moon occurs on every new moon day. The new moon day occurs in Puṣya in every Āṣāḍha month. The planet Brhaspati goes to Puṣya in Āṣāḍha every twelve years. But the *yuga* begins with all planets together and in the same Rāśi at the equinox. The equinox occurred in Āṣāḍha or Kāṭaka about $1,500 + (3 \times 2,160)$ or $6,500 + 1,500$ years ago or 8,000 years ago. The equinox occurred in Meṣa or Caitra 1,500 years ago and the equinox recedes in 2,160 years one Rāśi. Therefore *kr̥ta* was expected to begin 8,000 years ago and the

kali before that *kr̥ta* must have begun 8,000 + 1,200 years ago. Viṣṇucitta's commentary on Viṣṇupurāṇa—

चन्द्रादिग्रहणं सर्वग्रहोपलक्षणार्थं—सर्वग्रहयोगे हि युगम् ।

The *Kali* was expected to be a period of strife and confusion and a *śūdra* was seen driving a cow and its calf through the streets before Yudhiṣṭhira decided to set out on his Prasthāna. Similarly people expected that *kr̥ta* would be a period of quiet and order. Some how their ideas were not fulfilled. The confusion after the Bhārata war did not subside and they thought that the people were not orderly either. So they were not prepared to say that *kr̥ta* had come.

The present *kali* is said to be 5,000 and odd years old. The period between the date fixed for the beginning of *kr̥ta* and the beginning of this present *kali* included the reigns of Balarāma and Śrī Kṛṣṇa. They were reputed to be Avatārs of Viṣṇu. Therefore the people said that *kali* had not begun during their time. It was only after the passing of Śrī Kṛṣṇa that the people began to say that *kali* had begun. The present *kali* dates from the passing of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

यस्मिन् कृष्णो दिवं यातः तस्मिन्नेव तदाहनि ।

प्रतिपन्नं कलियुगमिति प्राहुः पुराविदः ॥

Śrī Bāghavata, xii 2. 32. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 4. 24. 113.

So long as Śrī Kṛṣṇa was reigning, *kali* did not dare to intrude. Therefore the period from the passing of Yudhiṣṭhira to the passing of Śrī Kṛṣṇa was considered as a part of the Dvāpara yuga. That is a period of 9,200—5,000 or 4,000 years. Therefore Śrī Kṛṣṇa lived 4,000 years after Yudhiṣṭhira.

Even at the time of Śrī Kṛṣṇa's demise the *kali* that came in was said to be 1,200 years long. When Yudhiṣṭhira passed away, the avatār that was expected to introduce the *Kṛtayuga* was Kalki and not Kṛṣṇa. The Kṣatriya and Vaiśya kings being now exhausted, the *Kṛtayuga* is now to be inaugurated by the God incarnating in a Brāhmin family. He acquires facility in the use of weapons, becomes the emperor, kills all Mlecchas and establishes order again. Mahābh. Ch. 190 v. 91-99. In the second stage as *kali* or *kalaha* did not end in 1,000 years, it was thought this was not the mere end of a day or night of Brahmā, but that it found Brahmā sleeping. Owing to Brahmā not being awake and active, things were in a state of perfect disorder and

decomposition called *Naimittika Pralaya*, which was to end in another *caturyuga* or night of *Brahmā* and was to be followed by fresh creation. ch. 189, v. 41, 48-9. Mārkaṇḍeya wandered through the wide waters which filled the whole world and found a child sleeping on a banyan tree. That child was the god Nārāyaṇa whose transition state (आभ्यन्तरशरीरं) Mārkaṇḍeya was permitted to see. The child opened its mouth and Mārkaṇḍeya went into his stomach. The third period of confusion deepening and prolonging itself brings Balarāma and Śrī kṛṣṇa on the stage. As these were represented to have lived in the *Dvāpara yuga*, there was no need to interfere with Mārkaṇḍeya's account of the end of *kali* as narrated to Yudhiṣṭhira. Kṛṣṇa is identified with the child on the banyan tree and the Pāṇḍavas appeal to him for protection. Ch. 188; v. 18; Ch. 189, v. 52-9. But the date fixed for the beginning of *kṛta* became useless and altogether unnecessary, though it was allowed to continue as part of the text.

After Kṛṣṇa's demise, the *kali* was expected to end in 1,200 years. There was another method of calculating time. The Saptarṣis moved over one nakṣatra along the ecliptic in one hundred years. They were at the birth of Parikṣit which is the same as the demise of Śrī kṛṣṇa in Māgha. In 1,000 years or so they would move over 10 stars and stop at Pūrvāṣāḍha. Then the Āryans wanted to say that the *kali* would end and *kṛta* begin.

तेन सप्तर्षयो युक्ताः तिष्ठन्त्यब्दशतं नृणाम् ।
ते तु पारीक्षिते काले मखाखासन् द्विजोत्तम ॥
तदा प्रवृत्तश्च कलिः द्वादशाब्दशतात्मकः ।
प्रयास्यन्ति यदा चैते पूर्वाषाढां महर्षयः ॥

Correspondingly the Maghada line of kings ruled for 1,000 years after the birth of Parikṣit. The 5 Pradyota kings ruled for 138 years afterwards. Thus 1,138 years passed after the passing of Śrī kṛṣṇa. The next were the Śiśunābha line of kings with Mahānandi as their last. The *kṛta* ought to have been calculated after 1,200 years. The Āryans did not dare to call it Kṛtayuga after that period. Some how they evaded. From Śiśunābha to Mahānandi a period of 362 years passed. Then Mahāpadma Nanda ruled. He exterminated the kṣatriyas, like another Paraśu Rāma. He was a son of Mahānandi by his concubine.

Till that time the Āryans entertained some hope of *kṛta* coming in. They gave it up at the time of Nanda. Śrī Bhāgavata says:—

आरम्य भवतो जन्म यावन्नन्दाभिषेचनम् ।
एतद्वर्षसहस्रं तु शतपञ्चदशोत्तरम् ॥ S. K. XII. ii. 25.

The commentator says on 1,150 years that it was said of some other thing which he was not able to specify. कयापि विवक्षयाऽ-वान्तरसंख्येयम् । He knows that the correct period is 1,498 or 1,500 years. We say that the text meant to speak of the beginning of *kṛta*.

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa reads—

यावत्परीक्षितो जन्म यावन्नन्दाभिषेचनम् ।
एतद्वर्षसहस्रं तु ज्ञेयं पञ्चाशदुत्तरम् ॥ II. V. P. IV 24. 104.

It talks of 1,050 years only though everybody knows that it must be 1,500 years. Therefore Śrīdhara says of 1,050 years, शुद्धक्षत्रवंशोपेतं ज्ञेयम्—न तु कालमात्रसंख्येयम् । But Viṣṇucitta who suspects nothing would read it पञ्चशतोत्तरं and so end all controversy.

That the authors of Śrī Bhāgavata and Viṣṇu Purāṇa wanted to speak of *kṛta* is brought out by another verse.

यदा मवाभ्यो यास्यन्ति पूर्वाषाढां महर्षयः ।
तदा नन्दात्प्रभृत्येष कलिर्वृद्धिं गमिष्यति ॥ Bhag. XII-2-31.
प्रयास्यन्ति यदा चैते पूर्वाषाढां महर्षयः ।
तदा नन्दात्प्रभृत्येव गतिर्वृद्धिं गमिष्यति ॥ V. P. IV 24. 112-7.

They ended by saying that *kali* grows stronger after 1,500 years. They effected this by multiplying 1,200 by 360. There was an attempt to multiply by 1,000. They said that 1,200 years were the years of Devas.

शतानि तानि दिव्यानां सप्त पञ्च च संख्यया ।
निश्शेषेण गते तस्मिन् भविष्यति पुनः कृतम् ॥ V. P. v. 115.

From the 1,050th year to the 1,500th year after Śrī Kṛṣṇa, people were in doubt whether *kṛta* would begin then, after 1,200 years called Kaliyuga. After Nanda, the doubt was set at rest. There was a saying that the Kṣatriya race came to an end after Nanda. नन्दान्तं क्षत्रियकुलम् । Now every body is agreed that *kṛta* is to come in after 4,32,000 years of *kali*.

1,050 years after Kṛṣṇa is about 3,900 years from to day or about 2,000 B. C. Mahāpadma Nanda came 450 years later or about 1,500 B.C. Kauṭilya lived about 1,450 B.C. and he betrayed the last of the Nandas and set up Candragupta Maurya as king. It was probably Kauṭilya that settled the age of *kali*.

The reason for continuing *kali* is obvious. *Kali* ceased to be thought of merely as an astronomical period. The reason is suggested in Śrī Bhāgavata.

तदाविशत्कलिलोकं पापे यद्रमते जनः । v. 28.

[कृतं] भविष्यति यदा नृणां मन आत्मप्रकाशकम् ॥ v. 33.

If the nature of the people is to determine the name of the period, then nothing can be fixed. What shall we do at the end of this 4,32,000 years of *kali* if the people continue to be bad? No *kṛta* can ever come in.

Really after Yudhiṣṭhira 9,000 and odd years have passed, 4,800 years will make a Kṛtayuga and 3,600 years will make a Tretā. Therefore more than 600 years have passed in Dvāpara yuga. This is the correct account according to the ancient Āryan reckoning.

PAṆḌITA GHANAŚYĀMA—A POET-MINISTER OF KING TUKKOJI (TULAJA I) OF TANJORE (1729-1735).

BY

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Ghanaśyāma is a prolific writer. His name is for the first time known to the Sanskrit-reading public through the 'Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts in South India' by Dr. E. Hultsch, Ph. D., who, in spite of his many-sided activities, has carefully given in No. III of his Reports the names of all the works of Ghanaśyāma and many useful extracts from his work. These extracts furnish accurate information regarding the date and the literary history of this learned poet. Except Ghanaśyāma's commentary on Uttararāmacaritanāṭaka, most of his works are not yet published; and almost all the Oriental Journals of to day are silent about them. My humble attempt in this paper is only to give a short sketch of his life and literary career, so far as I am able to gather from Dr. Hultsch's Reports and from the Jambunātha Bhaṭṭa Lāṇḍagai Collection of Manuscripts in the Tanjore Palace library.

Here I am tempted to observe that many of Ghanaśyāma's work, more than 100 in number, have perished by this time and some at least would not have come to the possession of the public but for the careful collection and safe preservation by the great Mahrathi Sanskrit scholar—Jambunātha Bhaṭṭa Lāṇḍagai of Tanjore, in whose name and memory many rare Manuscripts, including some of Ghanaśyāma's Sanskrit works¹, are now preserved in this Library.

¹ The following eighteen works of Ghanaśyāma are preserved in this Library :

1. चम्पूरामायणम्—युद्धकाण्डः ॥
2. शाकुन्तलसङ्गीवनी ॥

Ghanaśyāma was the favourite minister of king Tukkoji I of Tanjore (between 1729-35) the third son of king Ekoji alias Veñkoji, and the brother of the famous kings Sahaji and Serfoji I. The following extracts give a good summary of his personal history and his literary and other accomplishments :

1. यस्येशोऽग्रभवः पिता किल महादेवः स काशीप्रसूः

साधुः श्रेयसि सुन्दरी प्रियतमा शाकम्भरी च स्वसा ।

ससाष्टोक्तिलिपिप्रभुर्गुणनिधिश्चौण्डाजिबालाजिनः

पौत्रो यो द्वयवादिदलपवनो द्वाविशवर्षान्वितः ॥

[Prologue of Navagraha Caritanāṭaka].

2. आत्मा यः शिवयोश्चिदम्बरमहायोगीन्द्रशाकम्भरी-

भ्राता स्त्रीद्वयसुन्दरीकमलजः काशीमहादेवजः ॥

मन्त्री चोलमहर्षिपतेस्त्यधिकपञ्चाशत्प्रबन्धीकरः

वाग्देवी धुरि वावदीति स घनश्यामः कवीनां कविः ॥

[Verse 5. Bhāratacampūsañjivani].

3. प्रबोधचन्द्रोदयव्याख्या ॥

4. आनन्दसुन्दरीसट्टकम् ॥

5. मदनसङ्गीतभाष्यः ॥

6. दशकुमारचरितसङ्गीतम् ॥

7. कुमारविजयनाटकम् ॥

8. भोजचम्पूव्याख्या ॥

9. प्राकृतभाषामञ्जरी ॥

10. उत्तररामचरितव्याख्या ॥

11. चन्द्रालोकव्याख्या (very much worm-eaten).

12. विद्वत्सालभञ्जिकाव्याख्या—(प्राणप्रतिष्ठा)

13. प्रचण्डराहूदयदीपिका (A fragment only).

14. संस्कृतभाषामञ्जरी ॥

15. षण्मणिमण्डनकाव्यम् ॥

16. नवप्रहचरितनाटकम् ॥

17. प्राकृतसंस्कृतकाव्यम् ॥

18. प्रहसनम् ॥

3. आत्मा यः शिवयोश्चिदम्बरमहायोगीन्द्रशाकम्भरी-

भ्राता स्त्रीद्वयसुन्दरीकमलजः काशीमहादेवजः ।

एकग्रन्थकरस्य हन्त ! भणिति मिश्रस्य स व्याकरो-

दायौक्तीरवतंसयन्भुवि घनश्यामः कवीनां कविः ॥

[verse 14. Prabodhacandrodayasañjivani].

4 इति महाराजपदमहर्षि तुक्कोजिराजमहामात्येन मौनभार्गवकुलाकूपार-
चन्द्रचौण्डोबालाजिपौत्रेण, कौण्डिन्यगोत्रपारावारनिस्तुलकौस्तुभतिम्माजिबाला-
जिदौहित्रेण, काशीमहादेवतनूजेन, शाकम्भरीपरमहंसचिदम्बरब्रह्मानुजेन,
परदुष्करनवरसमणिपेटकचतुरचतुःषष्टिप्रबन्धीदशभाषाकाव्याष्टपदीपद्यवर्णविलसद-
न्यूनाक्षरमालिकार्यास्तवनकवनधौरन्धरीपारीणेन, गीतगाथासहस्रचतुष्टयचतुल-
दिव्यदेवीताटङ्कलिपिकल्पकेन, दुर्जनातिनिन्देन, सज्जनाभिनन्देन, सुन्दरीकमला-
जानिना, भगवत्पादप्रतिष्ठापितद्वैतसुधासमुद्राटनमहापीठेन, महाराष्ट्रमह-
त्तरपटलकोटीरहीरेण वश्यवचः—सर्वज्ञ—सरस्वतीनामत्रयमण्डितेन, घन-
श्यामपण्डितेन, शिवसाक्षिकसप्ताष्टवारपुरःप्रदेशप्रत्यक्षविभूतिरुद्राक्षधरप्रबोध-
टीकोक्तकथनोत्तरक्षणदृश्यकृष्णमिश्रविज्ञापनाबलात्कारतश्चन्द्रोदयगौरीव्रतनिशी-
थारब्धपरिपूरितप्रबोधचन्द्रोदयसङ्गीतनाट्यटिप्पणे, प्रथमोऽङ्कः ॥

[Colophon of the First Act in Prabodhacandrodayasañjivani].

His paternal grandfather was Caṇḍāji Bālāji who was described as the moon that rose up from the ocean of *Mauna Bhārgava* family. His maternal grandfather was Timmāji Bālāji who was praised by our author as 'the unrivalled kaustubha jewel of the great ocean of *Kaṇḍinya* family'. His father was Mahādeva and mother was Kāśī. He had one sister named Śākambhari and had an elder brother, named Cidambarayati in his fourth Āśrama. He paid a glowing tribute to his benevolent brother who settled at Devipāṣāṇam or Navapāṣāṇam in the front-view of the temple of Goodess Mahiṣāsūramardini near Rameśvaram, as evidenced by the following verse found in his Prabodhacandrodayasañjivani.

वन्दे ब्रह्मपरं चिदम्बरगुरुं पूर्वाश्रमे मेऽग्रजं

यस्यारामसरोऽग्रहारयुगधिष्ठानं सुसत्रं मति ।

श्रीरामेश्वरमार्गधाम्नि महिषाभिरुच्यसुरच्याः पुरो

देवीपट्टणतीर्थभाजि नवपाषाणस्थले शोभते ॥

He had two wives, Sundarī and Kamalajā or Kamalā, who, as literary ladies, played a prominent part in his literary career. He himself referred to them in one of the Maṅgalaśloka on the goddess *vāk*, in his famous commentary on the Viddhasālabhañjikā—

केयं दीप्तिरथैष कः परिमलः किं शिञ्जितं का मृदु
ब्रूतेऽसाविति सुन्दरीकमलयोः प्रश्रस्य या भाजनम् ।
दीप्रा कापि तडिल्लितेव पुरतोऽप्यह्वाय दृश्या च या
ब्रह्माणं जहती विभाति मयि सा वाग्देवता पातु वः ॥

His two wives successfully imitated his Viddhasālabhañjikā-Vyākhyā, known as Prāṇapratīṣṭhā, and jointly wrote another commentary on the same drama, in which, after the usual prayer, a list is given of Ghanaśyāma's Sanskrit works, more than sixty-four in number :—

गणेशचरितं (1) भाणः (2) षडाननचरित्रकम् (3) ।
युद्धकाण्डः (4) सटीकश्च (5) नवग्रहचरित्रकम् (6) ॥
सट्टकं (7) ससटीकश्च (8) वेङ्कटेशचरित्रकम् (9) ।
संस्कृता (10) प्राकृता (11) भाषामञ्जरी, कलिदूषणम् (12) ॥
सव्याख्यानं (13) डमरुकं (14) काव्ये प्राकृतसंस्कृते (15) ।
प्रसङ्गलीलावर्णव (16) वत् काव्यं षण्मणिमण्डनम् (17) ॥
एषां व्याख्याः (18, 19, 20, 21,) कुमारविजयं (22) डिमः (23) ।
व्यायोगा (24)—न्यापदेशानां (25) सहस्रं राजरञ्जनम् (26) ॥
जातिसंतर्जनं (27) वर्णमाला (28) शाब्दिकमोदनम् (29) ।
त्रिमठीनाटका (30)—न्यम्बाविजय (31) द्वैतभञ्जनम् (32) ॥
दोषाकरः (33) कुकविसंतापनं (34) च गुणाकरः (35) ।
सालभञ्ज्या भुवि प्राणप्रतिष्ठाऽन्यैः सुदुष्करा (36) ॥
समप्राकृतकाव्यार्थबन्धः (37) श्लेषार्थचित्तभाक् ।
अबोधकरवद्भागवतचम्पूश्च (38) टीकया (39) ॥
नलचम्पू (40) ह्रींश्चन्द्रचम्पू (41) रर्यत्तयात्मकः ।
भगवत्पादचरित (42) धातुकोशो (43) रसाणर्वः (44) ॥
अद्वैतबोधोऽ (45) नुभवचिन्तामण्याख्यनाटिका (46) ।
शाकुन्तलस्यो (47) तररामचरित्रस्य (48) च टिप्पणम् ॥

प्रबोधचन्द्रोदय (49) वङ्गोज (50) भारतचम्पु (51) वत् ।
कादम्बरी (52) विक्रमोर्वशीययो (53) वेंणीसंहतेः (54) ॥
प्राकृतायाः सप्तशत्याः (55) कविराक्षसपद्धतेः (56) ।
स्वपूरितमहावीर (57) चण्डकौशिकयो (58) रपि ॥
व्याख्या वासवदत्तायाः (59) स्थलमाहात्म्यपञ्चकम् (64) ।
नानाभाषास्वष्टपदीपदादीनां तु नो मितिः ॥

[Sundarikamaliyam—Commentary on Viddhasālabhañjikā]

They (Sundarī and Kamalā) justified the propriety of their writing a commentary on the same drama which was already commented upon by their learned husband, in the following terms—

कृता व्युत्पन्नसिंहेभ्यो नाथपादैरविस्तरा ।
प्राणप्रतिष्ठा या तस्या मूलस्याप्यर्थदेव या ॥
सुन्दरीकमलाभ्यां सा व्युत्पन्नानां सुबोधने ।
इयं प्रणीयते टीका चमत्कारतरङ्गिणी ॥

[Sundarikamaliya, available in this Library].

“Their work is intended only for ordinary people of average learning, while their Lord's work—Prāṇapratīṣṭhā, which makes the text full of meaning, is intended only for servants of a high order—व्युत्पन्नसिंहाः. Still they were afraid that their work would be an object of ridicule when it might fall into others' hands :—

व्याख्यैषा.....हासायैव भविष्यति ॥

Ghanaśyāma had two sons *Candraśekhara* and *Govardhana*. The former was known from his work—a commentary on his father's *Damaruka* as these verses show :—

वनश्यामस्य सुमहाकविशब्दजुषः कृतेः ।
कुर्यां डमरुकस्याहं टिप्पणं चन्द्रशेखरः ॥
जामातृशोधमत्राकुर्वन्निर्धातुविस्तराद्याखिलम् ।
डमरुकाचित्रावल्यां ज्ञेयं मत्तातपादरचितायाम् ॥

[Hultzst's Reports III. Page 66].

The latter *Govardhana*, a blind boy from his early days, was known as the author of a commentary on *Ghaṭakarpara's* work, where he highly eulogised his father in the following terms :—

1. निजजनकधनश्यामं शेषवचःप्रियमशेषशास्त्रज्ञम् ।
वन्दे यदत्तागमदृशा सुखसहं ममान्ध्यदुःखमभूत् ॥
2. मूढोऽपि गोवर्धननामधेयः पितृप्रसादादनवद्यविद्यः ।
सद्यः कविः सत्वरया तनोति सङ्क्षिप्तटीकां धटकर्परस्य ॥

Ghanaśyāma refers to one learned author *Sivarāmakṛṣṇa*, with great respect.

ग्रन्थो मे मित इह विस्तरे वृथा स्या-
द्वायत्र्यष्टकपठने बुधोऽलसो यत् ।
यल्लेखेष्वपि शिवरामकृष्णनाम्नां
यश्चायं वटुगणपाठने घनेच्छः ॥

[Uttararāmacaritasāñjivānī].

That Ghanaśyāma produced sixty four works in Sanskrit, twenty in Prakṛt and twenty-five in Vernaculars is evident from the verse in his commentary on the *Nilakaṇṭhacampū* :—

“संस्कृते या चतुःषष्टिसङ्ख्या, विंशतिसङ्ख्याका ।
प्राकृते या च भाषासु पञ्चविंशतिसङ्ख्याका ॥

That a prolific writer like Ghanaśyāma, who was patronised by King Tukkoji, and whose beautiful poetry was also well appreciated by the royal patron, had to suffer much in his later days is a pity indeed. He had to concentrate his mind upon God after the death of his royal patron and this is expressed in a pathetic way in the following verse.

आयुः किं शरदां सहस्रमथ किं दैवेन यदीयते
तन्नालं जठरस्य हन्त गिरिजाकान्तं शिवं चिन्तय ।
मत्काव्याणुविलङ्घनैकविमुखे तुक्कोजिराजे गतेऽ-
प्याश्रण्डालमनः ! किमिच्छसि पुनर्भाग्यं न लज्जा तव ॥

[Nilakaṇṭhacampūsañjivānī]

Ghanaśyāma's troubles in his later days may be accounted for easily. He was a great devotee of the Goddess Vāk—Sarasvatī—and his ardent devotion so completely blinded him as to believe that he was an incarnation of *Sarasvatī* herself. In this respect, he imitated Rājaśekhara who believed that he (Rājaśekhara) was the third incarnation of the great *Ādikavi Vālmīki* after Bhavabhūti and Bhartṛmenṭha (the author of *Hayagrīvavadha*). This blind belief had somehow a telling

effect upon him and on his works. He began to consider himself a matchless man of letters and a noisy note of vanity pervaded all his productions. In one of the introductory verses in his commentary on *Bhāratacampū* he set aside all the commentators except the learned Appaya Dīkṣita and the revered Mallinātha, as worthless on the ground that they all alike, like the fluttered runaways from the battle-field, observed a vow of silence in interpreting a difficult passage, while they made great noise in commenting on easy passages in the text:—

सन्त्यन्याप्पयदीक्षितं बुधवरं श्रीमल्लिथार्यम-
प्यन्यस्मै सकलाय सन्तु नतयो व्याख्याकरौघाय नः ।
काठिन्ये सति मौनवेगचकितः सौलभ्यकोलाहली
यो वैराटिरेवाचकास्ति समराद्धावन् प्रवीरो गृहे ॥

That his antipathy to the author of *Saṅkalpasūryodaya* was very great is evident from his express statement:—

प्रबोधचन्द्रोदयसैर्यजातसङ्कल्पसूर्योदयशोणदृष्टेः ।
प्रचण्डराहूदयकर्तुरेष बाभात्यहो ! श्मश्रुणि यस्य हस्तः ॥

It is mere childishness that he (Ghanaśyāma) finished his moustache against Vedānta Deśika as if to meet him in an open contest. His vanity and over-confidence reached a ludicrous climax in his endeavour to pull down even the great Kālidāsa—‘दशकृतिर्हो कालिदासोऽस्ति चेत्’. These statements did provoke the indignation of the learned public against our author and his intolerable conceit made for his fall in his later days.

In these circumstances, it becomes intelligible why *Vāñcheś-varasudhī*, ‘otherwise known as *Kuṭṭikavi*, the famous author of the *Mahiṣaśataka*, and probably an elder contemporary of Ghanaśyāma himself in the Court of Tukkoji (Tulaja I), is said to have satirised Ghanaśyāma and such others as *vr̥ṣalas* who had free access to the then royal court of Tanjore, in the following verse in the *Mahiṣaśataka* :—

‘नानाजिप्रमुशाहजीन्द्रशरभेन्द्रानन्दरायादयो
विद्वांसः प्रभवो गताः श्रितसुधीसन्दोहजीवातवः ।
विद्यायां विषबुद्धयो हि वृषलाः सम्यास्त्विदानीन्तनाः
किं कुर्वेऽम्ब कृषे व्रजामि शरणं त्वामेव विस्वावनीम् ॥

Virūpākṣa the author of the Śāradaśarvarī, a commentary on the *candrāloka* refers to Ghanaśyāma in the following extract :—

‘कुर्वन्ती स्वच्छमन्तर्जडमपि च घनाम्भोदवार्ता हरन्ती
चन्द्रालोकप्रबोधिनीखिलकुवलयानन्दसन्धानशीला ।
सङ्कल्पात्सत्कलाभृत्कृतपदशिरसः श्रीविरूपाक्षनाम्नः
प्रादुर्भूतप्रकाशा जगति विजयतां शारदी शर्वरी या ॥

(शारदशर्वरी—a ms. available in this library).

But all these did not put him out of spirit. He was fully confident in himself and in his matchless workmanship. His appeals and exhortations to the world at large resembled those of the great poet-critic Bhavabhūti who said in his *Malatīmādhava* :—

ये नाम केचिदिह नः प्रथयन्त्यवज्ञां
जानन्ति ते किमपि तान् प्रति नैष यत्नः ।
उत्पत्यतेऽस्ति मम कोऽपि समानधर्मा
कालो ह्ययं निरवधिर्विपुला च पृथ्वी ॥

(*Malatīmādhava* Act I.)

मद्ग्रन्थानवलोक्य सर्वमपि तच्छब्दार्थजालं मन-
स्याधाय प्रतिसंस्कृतैः कृतिलवं ये ये गुरुद्रोहिणः ।
कुर्वन्ति स्म करान्निजं प्रहरणं तेषां हृदि स्थापय-
त्यज्ञानां किल सम्पदां झटिति या सा शूलिनी पातु वः ॥
श्रुत्वा द्वित्रिबुधाः कृताः प्रमुदिता नो वात्र किं तावता
जम्बूद्वीपमिदं कियत्कृतिगुणग्राहा रसज्ञाः कति ।
वाग्देवी कवयाम्यहं मम चतुःषष्टिप्रबन्धीसुधा-
कूपारा भुवि निर्विषौर्वघटजापेया विराजन्यमी ॥
निन्द्यो निन्दतु दुर्जनो दशकृतिर्हा कालिदासोऽस्ति चे-
नैष ज्ञास्यसि(ति) चातुरीं मम चतुःषष्टिप्रबन्धीकवेः ।
आस्तां ग्राम्यकिटिश्वतुर्दिशजगद्भासस्य लिङ्गात्मनो
जानात्यादिवराह एव न पदोर्भावं भवानीपतेः ॥

(Verses 5, 7 & 8. *Prabodhacandrodayavyākhyā* Act I).

Ghanaśyāma's great renown as a poet is shown by the following extract found in the prologue to the *Navagraha-caritanāṭaka* :—

विश्वावसुः—(आकाशे)

यदन्यकविदुर्लभं यदपि संविधानोद्भवं
कुतूहलकरं जगत्पुनर्भवैकवेद्यं च यत् ।
तदस्मदतिविस्मयावहमनेकवस्तूज्ज्वलं
नवं किमपि चिन्त्यतामिति नवग्रहाणां मनः ॥
शास्त्रे भागवते पुराणपटले रामायणे भारते
सर्वैश्वर्यितचर्वणं कृतमहो किञ्चित्कवीनां गणैः ।
एवं सत्यधुना नवं किमपि हा वर्तेत किं वा यतो
भूयादन्वहमेव तत्रभवतां भूयान्प्रसादो मयि ॥

(नान्द्यन्ते)

सूचकः—(ससम्भ्रममाकाशे लक्ष्यं बध्वा) भो भोः छान्दसचमत्कारिन् !
किं ब्रवीषि ।

नमामि वरभाग्याय ग्रस्तदुःखापदं हरम् ।
चरणध्वस्तदारिद्र्यं रिपुघ्नं तण्डुलसेवितम् ॥
एतत्पद्यविद्यमानसप्तपदीपूर्वपूर्वाक्षरसम्मेलनघटितं यद्भवेत्तत्किमप्यभिनयेति ।

(प्रविश्य)

कालयुक्तिः—प्रिये ! नवग्रहचरितमभिनेतव्यमिति व्यादिष्टोऽस्मि
तत्रभवद्भिः ।

सूचकः—(स्वगतं) ननु सुप्रसिद्धमिदम् । (प्रकाशं) प्रिये ! सर्वज्ञ-
कविना ? । यस्येशोऽग्रभवः.....द्वाविंशवर्षान्वितः ।

(आकाशे) न हि तेन कृतम् । अपि तु घनश्यामेन ।
प्रहसनडमरुकनाटकसङ्ककाव्यद्विमञ्जरीभागान् ।
देवीताटङ्कलिपिं कृतवान् यश्चान्य(?) मिष्टशतचम्पूम् ॥

सूचकः—श्रुत्वा हृष्यति । (नेपथ्ये) न खलु घनश्यामेन कृतम् ; किं तु
कण्ठीरवेण । यः किल याचते नित्यम् ।

दत्त्वा ग्रामान्द्विजेभ्यः कृतबुधमखसात्कृत्य दन्तावलन्दान्
कृत्वा श्रीपौण्डरीकं रचितवनसरःसत्रदेवालयदिः ।

नीत्वा ख्यातिं प्रबन्धान् प्रथितरणयशा न्यस्य राज्येषु पुत्रान्
अन्ते संन्यस्य शम्भो त्वयि हृदिव वपुर्गाङ्गनीरेऽर्पयामि ॥ इति ॥

(प्रविश्य पटाक्षेपेण)

सिद्धार्थः—आर्य ! चौण्डाजिकविनेदमाहितमिति नः श्रुतम् ।

कालयुक्तिः—(स्वगतम्) किं गुखु भिण्णभिण्णो पवादो । (किन्तु खलु
भिन्नभिन्नोऽपवादः) (प्रकाशः) अजउत्त ! विससण कइणाकअंति किवअन्ती पवहइ ।

सूचकः—(साश्चर्यं स्वगतं) अहो कौतुकपरम्परा ! प्रिये ! शृणुमस्तावत् ।

सर्वज्ञ(कवि)चौण्डाजिकविकण्ठीरवा अपि ।

घनश्यामस्य जगति प्रथन्ते नामकीर्तयः ॥

In one quarter he was well-known as Sarvajñakavi, in another as Ghanaśyāma, yet in another as Kavi-kaṇṭhīrava and again in another as Caṇḍājīkavi. He was also surnamed Vāśyavacas and 'Sarasvatī'—वश्यवच(सर्वज्ञ)सरस्वतीनाम(त्रय)मण्डितेन—in the colophon of the first act of his Prabodhacandrodayavyākhyā. He himself made a pun upon his own favourite name 'Ghanaśyāma' by which he was known to posterity, in the following verse in his Uttarañāmacaritasāṅgīvana :—

तनुरुचि यो न श्यामः कविः कवीनां स यदि घनश्यामः ।

कवने कमनश्यामः किमसूयाभिर्मुधैव नश्यामः ॥

"If he (the poet) is Ghanaśyāma, he is not black in colour but he is a poet of poets because he is himself a श्याम (a cuckoo) which sings beautiful poetry. Why kill ourselves thereby in vain with jealousy?"

Ghanaśyāma was a good poet even in his twelfth year when he wrote his Rāmāyaṇayuddhakāṇḍa-campū, as may be seen from the following verse in his Yuddhakāṇḍa :—

यस्येशोऽग्रभवः.....

.....शाकम्भरी च स्वसा ।

तेन द्वादशवत्सरेण कविना चौण्डाजिपन्तेन च

श्रीमानारचितश्चिराय जयतु श्रीयुद्धकाण्डो मुदा ॥

In his Kumāravijayanāṭaka, he openly expressed his superiority to Rājaśekhara—a poet-critic of the 10th century—in the following terms :—

'राजशेखरश्च प्रगल्भते ।स खलु संस्कृतप्राकृतमात्रकविः ।

अयं तु सर्वभाषाकविः' इति ॥

Again in his Viddhasālābhāṅjikāvyākhyā known as Prāṇa-pratiṣṭhā, he ridiculed Rājaśekhara as a very mean author ; but as a literary man, he felt he ought to safely preserve at least one of Rājaśekhara's dramas—Viddhasālābhāṅjikā—by writing a good commentary upon it, just as people, through pity, look after the welfare of a helpless orphan :—

पञ्चाशीत्यधिकान्यदुष्करमहाग्रन्थाः पदोत्सारुणा-

त्रिग्रन्थीकरराजशेखरकृतिव्याख्यासु लज्जामहे ।

मादक्षा भुवि केऽनुभाविन इति स्निग्धा वयं लौल्यतः

पाल्योऽस्तस्य शिशुः स्थितैरिति नयादत्रानुकम्पामहे ॥

His poetry (style) is in keeping with his theme.

(1) Virabhadra speaks of his separation from his beloved Sati; the pathos is touching.

जानाम्येव समग्रमप्यविरलं तत्त्वार्थसारं तथा

जाने लब्धुमपि व्यथाप्रतिकृतिं सत्त्वप्रकारोन्नतिम् ।

जानाम्येव जनाय तत्कथयितुं विज्ञानमुच्चावचं

जाने नैकमहं बतानुभवितुं जायावियोगं पुनः ॥

वेदा एव कुतो यजध्वमिति हा वाक्यार्थमाविभ्रते

कृत्वा भक्तिमयीषु दक्षहतकोऽप्यारब्धसत्रं कुतः ।

बाला सापि कुतः पितुर्मखमदं मुग्धा जगामाग्रहात् ;

(विचिन्त्य) ज्ञातं मद्भिपदे तदेतदखिलं सम्पन्नमेवङ्गुणम् ॥

[Kumāravijayanāṭaka Act III, v. 7 & 8]

(2) Virabhadra enters the stage as the personation of Raudra-Rasa :

(ततः प्रविशति बद्धकच्छो रक्तरक्ताङ्गः श्मश्रुसमुल्लासकरः खड्गपाणि-

वीरभद्रः । विकटं परिभ्रज्य दन्तान्कटकटाकृत्य सरोषम्)

दोष्णा गां शकलीकरोमि नखरैश्चूर्णीकरोम्यम्बरं

दुर्दान्तं कबलीकरोमि (सह)साचामामि सप्तार्णवीम् ।

ऊर्ध्वं नागजगनयाम्यहमधः स्वर्गं करोम्यश्रमः

श्रीमद्वीमपदाब्जरेणुकरुणालेशाणुमात्रा यदि ॥

[Kumāravijayanāṭaka Act I, v. 14.]

Here we hear an echo of the *raudra* sentiment expressed by Bhīmasena in the Veṇīsaṁhāra in the following terms :—

मध्नामि कौरवशतं समरे न कोपात्
 दुःशासनस्य रुधिरं न पिबाम्युरस्तः ।
 सञ्चूर्णयामि गदया न सुयोधनोरु
 सन्धिं करोतु भवतां नृपतिः पणेन ॥

Our author was well conversant with all the canons of Sanskrit Literary criticism and he described his own poetry thus :—

श्रुतिसुखवचनामुदारवृत्तां
 ललितपदां सुखदां रसोर्मिलां च ।
 रुचिररुचिमुदीतशोभशय्यां
 कविगीतां कवितां विचिन्तयामि ॥

He was a prodigy and was a tireless writer. Many commentaries that he wrote were productions of one day or one night or even a part of it e.g., (1) शिवरात्रिचतुर्थयामारब्धपरिपूरितायां..... प्राणप्रतिष्ठायां प्रथमोऽङ्कः ॥ (2) भीष्मैकादशीनिशीथजागरण एवारब्धपरिपूरिते शाकुन्तल-सङ्गीतनाट्यटिप्पणे ॥ etc.

In his Uttararāmacaritasāñjivānī, Ghanaśyāma gave his horoscope which might enable the students of Indian Astrology to ascertain the intellectual and other attainments of our author :—

“लग्ने कीटे ज्येष्ठासनदलनिलयौ भूजकेतूजनुर्ह-
 र्यंशे काव्योऽथ नके क्रियघटककांशेषु सौम्येन चन्द्रः ॥
 सौरिर्मेषे तुलांशे वृषमिथुनदले सैहिकेयोऽथ जीवः
 कौलीरे सिंहभागे ह्यलिधनुनवमांशे यदीयोऽवतारः ॥”

श	रा				कु			रा
	राशि-	गु		श्री	बु			च
बु च	चक्रम्			घनश्यामजातकम्	सू	अंशक-		श गु
शु	कु के				के		शु	

One particularly notable feature in the horoscope is the occupation of the ninth house by the most powerful planet—

Guru, who was mainly responsible for the high prosperity and renown that our poet enjoyed in his lifetime.

In conclusion, it may be said to the credit of our author Ghanaśyāma that his poetry is simple, that his knowledge is cyclopaedic and his vocabulary is vast. He is one of the many later poets in whose hands the old Vaidarbhī style of classical poetry was revived in the South. Though at times, given to verbal puns and alliterations, he writes a very clear and pointed language. His independence in thought and in language and his unique position in the royal court of Tanjore as an able poet-minister, made him all-powerful in this temporal world; and for his renunciation of all worldly pleasures, his desire to do public good and his complete reliance upon God—for all these virtues he deserves to be remembered by posterity for all time to come.

DRAVIDIC NOTES.

BY

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I. THE FRONT FRICATIVES AND AFFRICATES OF DRAVIDIAN.

A. General.—The (Sibilant) fricative *s* and post-dental and palatal fricatives and affricates abound in Dravidian:—

	Initial.	Medial.
Tamil	... <i>śēru</i> (to join)	<i>kaśappu</i> (bitterness) <i>paccai</i> (greenness)
Telugu	... <i>tsūḍu</i> (to see) ... <i>cey</i> (hand)—	<i>kū(t)su</i> (sit) <i>osāgu</i> (to give)
Kannāḍa	... <i>cem</i> (red)	<i>hesaru</i> (name)
Malayāḷam	... <i>cāl</i> (channel)	<i>veśappu</i> (hunger)
Tuḷu	... <i>caḍu</i> (belly), <i>śēru</i> (to join)	rare ¹
Kui	... <i>sā</i> (to die), <i>sude</i> (river)	<i>nespa</i> (to fill)
Kurukh	... <i>cā</i> (to stink), <i>sel</i> (to push)	<i>asar</i> (to fear)
Gōṇḍi	... <i>coḍ</i> (to drop), <i>sī</i> (to give)	<i>gars</i> (to play)
Brāhūi	... { <i>cā</i> (to understand) ... { <i>sal</i> (to stand)	<i>bis</i> (to bake)

An examination of the above would show that the affricate *c* is rare in medial positions (except in Tamil and Mal. where it appears only in a doubled state *cc*.) Tamil-Mal. does not tolerate *s* initially or medially.

Initially *c* is frequent in Malayāḷam, Kurukh, Tuḷu, Brāhūi, while Kannāḍa shows it occasionally.

ś initially occurs only in Tamil, and here probably it represents only an older *c* (as the symbol in the native script shows).

1. Medial *ś* has in numerous cases turned into *dj* or *d* in Tuḷu.
2. For the reduplication *Vide* my paper on "Inter-vocal Plosives and Accentual Influence" in *Indian Antiquary*, June, 1929.

especially as Malayāḷam, (an off-shoot of ancient Tamil) preserves the value of *c* in initial positions.

ś medially is the normal sound of the single medial front fricative in Tamil and Malayāḷam, while Kannāḍa, Telugu and the Central and North Dravidian dialects show the dental sibilant *s*.

Telugu preserves both *s* (*ts*) and *c* initially, according as the following vowel is dorsal or front in character.

Tuḷu¹ shows freely *c* and *s* initially, while occasional variants with initial *ś* are also found.

I propose to discuss in this paper the relationship of these sounds and their possible derivation. Before doing so, let me record here an observation (based upon the examination of different families of languages), recently² made by *Pater Schmidt*, that it is probable that fricatives are, in the history of phonetic development, secondarily derived from the plosives.

One of the objects of this paper is to examine how far *Pater Schmidt's* conclusion may be justified in its application to Dravidian.

Preliminarily it may be noted that initial *c*, *ś* and *s* on the one hand, and medial *ś*, *s* on the other, found in the different dialects, are in many cases related amongst themselves in each of the respective groups. This is proved by correspondences like the following:—

	Tam.	Kui.	Gōṇḍi.	Kurukh.	Mal.
(to go, enter, etc.)	<i>śel</i>	<i>sal</i>	<i>sal</i>	<i>sel</i>	<i>cel</i>
(to die)	<i>śā</i>	<i>sā</i>	<i>sāi</i>	<i>khe</i>	<i>cā</i>
(√ may, to be changed)	<i>maśal</i>	<i>māsa</i>	<i>mas</i>	<i>massā</i>	<i>maśakka</i> (axe)

1. For explanations of the alternance of initial *t*, *s* and *h* in Tuḷu, see my paper on "The Secondary Velar Aspirate in Dravidian."

2. Page 286 of *Die Sprachfamilien und Sprachenkreise der Erde*, where *Pater Schmidt* compares the phonetic incidence of the fricative in various groups of languages and says: "Zusammenfassend lässt sich eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit behaupten, dass die ältesten Kulturkreise keine Reibelauten gekannt haben"; and since the oldest culture—spheres, are equated more or less with Language—Spheres, the secondary character of the fricative is indicated.

That in a large number of cases the sounds in each group are related, will be further clear from the following discussion.

B. The question of medial fricatives and affricates may be taken up at first, as it is easier of solution and classification than the problem of the corresponding initial sounds.

All medial fricatives are derivative in Dravidian:—

(a) They may have developed originally from a front glide *y* e.g. Tamil *paśumei* (greenness < *pay*); Kann. *basir* (belly —cf. Tam. *bayir*); Kui. *kasa* (to heat) < *kāy*; Gōṇḍi *mās* (to burn) < *vay*; Kurukh *pac* (to be hungry) < *bay*; Br. *bis* (to bake) < *biy*, etc.

(b) They are the palatalised resultants of original *t* under the influence of front vowels:—The *cc* of Tamil in the past tense affixes e.g. *kācc-*, etc.; the past affix *s* of Brāhūi (< original *t*); Kui causative *tiss* (to feed) where *ss* < old causal affix-*t*; Gōṇḍi Past bases like *guh*c (having seized) where *c* < past affix *t*, etc.

(c) An older *k* may also have been similarly turned into fricative in instances like following:—Tel. pr. affix *tsu* which is from original *k*; *arki* (nice) and *ariśi* (rice); etc.

(d) In the Central Dravidian dialects Kui and Gōṇḍi, *s* in some cases may be traced to the aspirate *h*:—Kui *rispa* (to settle down) where *s* < older *h*; Gōṇḍi *s* in the causative affix *st*, alternating with *ht*, e.g. *kist* from *kiht*, the causal of *ki* (to do).

This is certainly modelled on the Indo-Aryan alternance of *h* and *s*, as in *niḥ + kama = niṣkama*. *h* > *s*, is normally a change not native in Dravidian.

The medial fricatives in Dravidian are, therefore, all derivative.

C. So far as the initial sounds are concerned, the question of origin should be approached through the examination of forms that are cognate in meaning.

Tam.	Tel.	Kann.	Kui.	Gōṇḍi.	Kurukh.	Brāhūi.	Tulu.
(to die)	sā	sā	sō	sā	khē	kā	ā
(to go, enter etc.,)	sel	sel, sal	sal	sōṛ	sel, kā	kā	sal
(hill)	koṇḍa	kundu	sōru	sāru	cf. kuk(boy)	kur	surgu
(to join)	śuruṅgu	kuruṅgu	krōk	cf. kuṭ	kuḍ	kuṭṭi (to pound)	sūḍi (sheaf)
(to hang)	cūḍu, kūḍu	cūḍu	cf. kuṭ	tōkar (tail)	toṅg	tang	soṅju
(to sleep)	toṅgu	toṅgu	...	...	...	tugh (sleep)	sūnju
(to spit)	tūṅgu	tūṅgu	sunja	...	tup	...	supu
	tuppu	tupu	supu	...	sunḍyas (distoller)	tor (to show)	tu, su, hu
(✓ tag to be fit, etc.)	fi	cūḍ, (heat), tōr	tōj (to pear)	tāṛ- (to see)	tan	dagh	safte (flatness)
	tsaiṭe.	caṭte, taṭte, safte	tan	tagg (to wear fit)	...	...	...

It will be observed that the above-mentioned forms are closely related in form and meaning. In the first five the initial fricative (or affricate, as the case may be, of some dialects), corresponds to the back plosive *k* of others; while in the next five instances the correspondence is between *t* and the fricative.

This opens up a problem worth pursuing, viz., whether and how far the fricatives¹ in initial positions in Dravidian are traceable to *k* and *t*.

The problem can be conclusively proved only if

(a) it could be shown that *s* may not have changed to *k* and *t* in Dravidian ;

(b) the reasons inducing the change: *k* > fricative, and *t* > fricative are indicated ; and

(c) a sufficiently large number of instances of the change are given.

I. We shall start with the question of the relationship of initial *k* and initial fricative.

(i) Nowhere in Dravidian have we instances of an original fricative having changed into *k* under ordinary circumstances.

(ii) Initial *k*- under the influence of a front vowel freely changes into the fricative.

Kannada	Tam.	Brāhūi	Kurukh
(Small) <i>Kinna</i>	<i>sinna</i>	<i>cunak</i> ²	<i>sannu</i>
(red) <i>kem, cem</i>	<i>śuvappu</i>	<i>khem</i>	<i>kem</i>
(fire) <i>cicc</i>	<i>kāy</i>		<i>cicc</i>
	etc. etc.		

(iii) Initial *k*- followed by a dorsal vowel does not usually change into a fricative. No instances are available of the groups

1. The initial fricatives of a number of words in the central Dravidian dialects are traceable to the front on-glide *y* appearing before initial vowels of older bases (See I.H.Q., March and June, 1929).

2. The dorsal vowel -*u*- in the Brāhūi word represents older *i*- which, it may be noted here, is in many cases represented by *a*- or *u*- in Brāhūi. The alternance of -*i*- and -*u*- is common in the modern colloquial parlance of the South also : cf. *mū*- and *mī* (above), *tura*, *tira* (to open) etc.

Ko- or *Ku*¹ having changed in any of the dialects into the fricative.

The few cases of forms with *k* followed by the symbol *a*, that do show this change, have to be explained on the principle that Dravidian *a* is sometimes front in character [= *a*] and that it changes often into less open vowels. It is, therefore, likely that these cases should be traced to the palatalising influence of the front character of the immediately following vowel. This view becomes all the stronger when we note that some of the Dravidian dialects in such instances do show front vowels like *e* or *i* e.g.,

Brāhūi, *ka* (to die); Kurukh, *khe*, Central *sai*; Southern *śa*, *śā*, *sā* etc.

The conclusion, therefore, so far as initial *k* is concerned is that

(a) there are instances in Dravidian of the change : *k* > fricative under the palatalising influence of front vowels, and

(b) that when *k* is followed by a dorsal vowel it does not change at all.

II. Now, we come to the question of *t* and the fricative. This question has three aspects :—

(a) Whether *t* or the fricative is the original ;

(b) If the dental plosive is not original in some cases, whether and how far we can postulate a change like *k* > *s* > *t* ;

(c) if *t* is found to be original and the fricative to be secondary, what exactly the course of change from *t* to the fricative was.

(a) There is reason to think that initial *t* should have been original in a large number of cases, if we judge from the greater or lesser correspondence of forms in the various dialects e.g.,

Southern Dr. (Tamil, Tel., Kann.)	Central Dr. (Kui, Gōṇḍi)	Northern Dr. (Kurukh, Br.,) Malto
etc.,		
(to be fit) <i>tag</i> ; <i>tāṇ</i> (self)	<i>tan</i> (self)	<i>tāṇ</i>
(to eat) <i>tiṇ</i>	<i>tind</i>	Kurukh, <i>tin</i>

1. It should be remembered that instances like *kurugu*, *śuruṅgu*, should be explained, on the principle stated *supra* in the footnote, of the alternance of -*i*- and -*u*-, as due to the palatalising of -*i*- or some near front vowel. This fact is proved by the existence of cognate forms with the front vowel -*i*-, like *śir*, *śiruṅgu* etc.

(to open) <i>tiṛa, tuṛa</i>	Gōṇḍi, <i>tul</i> (to open)	Kurukh, <i>tisig, ture</i> etc.,
(scorpin) <i>tēl</i>	Gōṇḍi, <i>tiril</i> (centipede)	Br., <i>tēlh</i> (Scorpion).

In this connection we may note that the change of *c, ś, s* to *t* is admittedly common in the *colloquial* dialects of the South and particularly in Tuḷu. In adaptations of Sanskrit words with initial sibilants, *t* is substituted for the sibilant e.g.,

Tam.:—*tamayam* for *samayam*; *taṅgati* for *saṅgati*, etc., etc.

Tuḷu :—*tañci* for *sañci*; *tañja* for *sandhyā*; while these are Sanskrit borrowings, the following appear to be *native* instances: *tane* (of cattle to be pregnant) < *śane* < *kane* < *Kāy*; *tār* (to jump, cf. Tam. *śāṭu* < *√kā*) etc., etc.

This fact complicates the problem of the origin of *t* and the fricative of numerous native forms. How are we to determine which is original and which is secondary? The only safe course would be to examine if in a *SUFFICIENTLY* large number of dialects, and particularly alike in South, Central and Northern Dravidian, the *cognate* forms show *t* instead of the fricative, in which case a presumption arises as to its *original* character.

Let us take a few instances :—

(i) A large number of cognate forms from the base *tu, tī*, (light, etc.) appear with both initial *t* and the fricative in all Dravidian dialects. (*Vide* my paper on "The Linguistic History of certain Dravidian Words" in Vol. XX of the *Calcutta University Journal of Letters*).

Hence we are not unjustified in thinking (so far as our present knowledge warrants) that *t* is original in this instance.

(ii) *ta-g* (to fit, to be closely pressed, etc.) is a base with initial *t* which has numerous cognate forms in Sn., Central and Nn. Dravidian :—

Sn. :—*tag* (to become fit), *taṭṭi* (that which has become fit flattened), *tān* (self), *taṭṭuga* (spoon), *taggu* (to be humble), *tāng* (to assist) etc.

Central :—*tagg* (to be worn light), *tān* (self), *taṅgi* (sister), *tañji* (father), *tah* (to chip off) etc.

Nn. :—*dagh* (to measure), *tān* (self), *taṅkār* (to become oneself), *tambas* (father) etc.

initial *t*- therefore should be considered to be original in this case also.

Similar explanations could be given for a number of other cases also.

The next question for consideration is whether in any instances the change: *k > fricative > t* could be postulated. Here, of course, only if the secondary character of *t* is proved at first, can any plausibility arise as regards the postulate. The few native instances given above illustrative of the change of *s > t* in Tuḷu, fall under this class.

I give below a few other instances which raise the problem:—

Kurukh.	Brāhūi.	Central Dr.	Sn. Dr.
(to turn) <i>kirr</i>	<i>kur</i>	<i>sur, tir</i>	<i>sur, tir</i>
(to beat) <i>khall</i>	<i>kell</i>	Kui., <i>sah</i> (to tal (beat)	
(to move) <i>ka</i>	<i>ka</i>	<i>tar, sal</i>	<i>tar, sel, sār</i> , etc.
(to be full) <i>tumbu</i>	<i>kubēn</i>	<i>kūp</i> (to fill)	<i>kumi, tuṭṭu</i> , etc. (heavy)

The above are some instances of the possible correspondence *k: fricative: t*. They are very few; but few as they are, they do raise a problem which we cannot satisfactorily solve in the present state of our knowledge; the materials available are much too inadequate to enable us to come to any definite conclusion.

(c) Despite the question raised by the facts adduced in (b) above, one thing is clear :—initial *t*- should have been original¹ in a number of instances commonly found in Nn., Sn. and Centr. Dr. alike, and many of these original forms have also derivatives with initial fricatives.

What we have now to see is the course of change along which, in these cases, the original *t* may have changed into a fricative:

1. Nothing can be more misleading than to think that because there are instances of the change of *s > t* in the South, and a few cases of the possible change (*k > fricative > t*)—the initial fricative is original in Dravidian and that *all* cases of initial *t* are derived from the fricative. The determining factors are the following:—(a) the existence of *t*- in cognate forms of *numerous* dialects; and (b) the undoubted original character of *t*- in a large number of other forms which do not have alternative fricatives initially.

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(i) Under the influence of a front vowel, palatalisation of *t* to *c* or *ś* (and then a change back to *s* in some dialects) is possible :—

Cf. Tamil *tikku*, *śikku* (to be crowded, etc.), Tuḷu *cippale* (clamp), *cintu* (to burn, from *tī*), etc. Kui *sik* (to be scorched from *tī*), Brāhūi *cāē* (to understand—cf. Southern *teriy*), Kurukh *cind* (ashes, from *tī*), etc., etc.

(ii) So far as cases, where initial *t* with a following dorsal vowel has changed into a fricative, are concerned, there are three possibilities:—

(a) The original vowel may in some cases have been front in character—cf. the alternance of *-u-* and *-i-* above referred to in Dravidian; and note also the front value of Dr. *a* in certain positions.

(b) The change of *t* to a palatal fricative need not necessarily in all cases have been due to the influence of any palatal vowel; for the dental *t* may, by a slight rise in the point of articulation of the tongue, change with a slight leap to *ś*. In this respect, *t > ś* stands on a different footing from *k > ś*, owing to the greater proximity of the points of production for *t* and *ś*.

(c) The change may have been in many cases a direct fricatisation of *t > s*, and then *s* may have changed into *ś* and thence to *c* [cś.].

What exactly the process was in all those instances of original initial *t*—explained above as having subsequently changed into the fricatives,—we are not in a position to say definitively. The preference shown by Tamil, Kurukh and Malayāḷam for fricatives or affricates (as the case may be) with raised point of articulation, on the one hand,—and the common occurrence of initial dental *s* for *t* in Tuḷu and the Central Dravidian dialects, on the other, are noteworthy.

Conclusion.

(a) Certain instances of initial Dravidian fricatives are traceable to the palatalisation of an original *k*.

(b) Some Initial fricatives are also traceable to original *t*, either through the process of fricatisation or palatalisation.

(c) Medical fricatives are undoubtedly secondary.

(d) All things considered, therefore, it appears as if the initial front sibilants and fricatives (dental, post-dental and palatal, and initial affricates are not original in Dravidian but derivative.

II. ONE AND THREE IN DRAVIDIAN.

	ONE	THREE
Tamil	... <i>oru</i> , <i>ondru</i> , <i>ottrai</i>	<i>mū(v)</i> , <i>mūndru</i> , <i>mūnu</i>
Telugu	... <i>oka</i> (<i>tī</i>)	<i>mūḍu</i>
Kannāḍa	... <i>ondu</i>	<i>mūḍu</i> , <i>mūndu</i>
Malayāḷam	... <i>onnu</i>	<i>mūnu</i>
Tuḷu	... <i>oñji</i>	<i>mūji</i>
Kui	... <i>ro</i>	<i>mū</i> , <i>mūndi</i>
Gōṇḍi	... <i>uṇḍi</i>	<i>mūndu</i>
Kurukh	... <i>ori</i> , <i>oṇṭa</i>	<i>nubb</i> , <i>mund</i>
Brāhūi	... <i>asī</i> , <i>asiṭ</i>	<i>musi</i> , <i>musiṭ</i>
Malto	... <i>ori</i> , <i>oṇḍ</i>	<i>līn</i> (Indo-Aryan.)

The history of the forms for “one” and “three” in Dravidian sheds interesting light on the origin and character of the alveolar plosive *t* and of the spontaneous nasals appearing in Dravidian before sonant plosives.

(1) Tamil shows the most conservative form for “one”, in that *or* is constituted of the base *o* (one) and *-r* (from *ir*) the ancient Dravidian verb-forming and noun-forming affix (appearing in *tur*, to appear; *kūr* to sit; *kulir*, cold; *velir*, whiteness etc.)

ondru (one), the substantival form, is derived from *or* itself, the *ndr* group arising from stressed *r* which incorporates the alveolar *t* as *tr*, *t* subsequently having become sonatised into *-d* along with the production of the spontaneous nasal *n*.

This change is more or less analogous to the change of *kumbu* (heap) from *kuv* (to heap), *pāmbu* (that which rushes, snake) from *pāyvu*, *iṅgu* (to move) from *i-gu*, etc., etc. The plosive *t* in the constitution of stressed *r* was recognised, and the spontaneous nasal cropped up on the principle of accommodative ease which also led to the sonatisation of *t* into *d*.

An alternative explanation that might be suggested is that *ondru* arose from *or + t*, this *t* being traceable to the neuter demonstrative which is employed for the formation of neuter nouns. The following facts, however, militate against this possibility:—

(a) The change of *ondru* to *o-ijī*, of *mūndru* to *mūji*, and of *āru* to *āji* in Tuḷu is a uniform law in Tuḷu operating in all cases of *r*: *maje* (to forget-*maṛa*), *kaje* (blot-*kaṛa*), etc., etc.

(b) The change of *r* to *tr* in Tamil adjectival or transitival combinations cannot be explained otherwise than on the principle that stressed *r* incorporates the alveolar plosive *t*.

(c) The argument that, as *iraḍu* (two) and *ay-du* (five) show probably the affix -t-, the same affix may presumably have existed in *ondru* and *mūndru*, is answerable by the instance of *āru* (six) which shows admittedly no affix but yet changes into *āju* in Tuḷu and *sājgi* in Kui. A stage like *ādru* could be postulated for *āru* also though there are no separate forms for the ordinal and the cardinal here.

In Tamil *ottrai*, the voiceless character of the plosive was retained in a long form, and the spontaneous nasal was avoided as in many instances of other plosives in similar circumstances.

(2) Tamil *mūndru* similarly arises from *mūr* (which was extant in Old and Middle Kann). The colloquial *mūnu* is from *mūndru*, with the dropping of -d and -r.

(3) Kannaḍa *ondu* and *mundu* go back to *ondru* and *mūndru* respectively. The alveolar changes into the dental almost regularly in similar circumstances in Kannaḍa e.g., *pandri*, *pandi* (pig), *Kandru*, *Kandu* (calf), etc. Along with the change of the character of the plosive, the nasal also changes from an alveolar into a dental.

Kannaḍa *mūr* shows the old base.

(4) Telugu alone, of all the Dravidian dialects, fails to show the ancient formative affix *r* and its development in the form for ONE. *oka* is probably from the radical *o* + *k* (from *kei*, to do). cf. Tamil *o-kku* in which an older *r* may possibly have existed; similarly Tel. *oka* may probably be *or* + *ka* or it may be *o* + *ka*.

Tel. *mūḍu* (three) shows ḍ which represents the alveolar *d*. The alveolar changes in Telugu into the cerebral almost regularly e. g., the oblique endings of the so-called "irregular" nouns of Telugu.

(5) The Tuḷu forms are the results of a regular and uniform change in Tuḷu :—

(one) *oñji* < *ondri* < *odr* < *otr* < *or*

(three) *mūji* < *mūdr* < *mūtr* < *mūr*.

The equation : old Dr. *r* = Tuḷu *j* (through *tr*, or *dr*) is almost a law.

(6) Kui *ro* (one) < (*o*) *ro* < *oru* < *or*

For stress-displacement in Kui, compare a number of words beginning with *r* in Kui = *ris* (to burn < *eri*), *ri* (to set down < *iri*).

The substantival *ronḍe* (one) shows the stress-displacement and the change of *nd* into *ṇḍ*, the following *r* having dropped off.

Kui adjectival *mun* retains the nasal of *ndr*, *dr* having dropped out.

The substantival *mūñji* < *mūndru* < *mūr*. cf. for the change of *r* to *j*, Kui *pajji* (pig) etc.

(7) Kurukh *ort* is metathetical for *otr* (< *otr* < *or*).

onta may be compared to Kannaḍa *ondu*

nubb (three) shows *n* for *m* and *bb* for the old dorsal off-glide *v*.

The other form *mund* is comparable to Kann. *mund*.

(8) Gōṇḍi *uṇḍi* (one) shows the cerebralisation of *nd* in older *ndr*. Cerebralisation is frequent in Gōṇḍi, as in Telugu.

mūndu shows *nd* instead of *ndr*. For the neuter enunciative vowel -i, cf. Gōṇḍi *yēni* (elephant) *neli* (field), *puri* (insect).

(9) Brāhūi *asi* (one) and *musi* (three) are adjectival and *asi-ṭ* and *musi-ṭ* are substantival.

Two explanations are possible for these forms :—

(i) *asiṭ* < *ayit* < *ayitr* < *o(y)ir* < *o* + *ir*— and a similar change for *musiṭ*. *O* appears as *a* in Br. as illustrated by *maṇḍ* (lame—cf. Southern *monḍi*), *paṭṭak* (short of stature—cf. Kannaḍa *puṭṭu*), *khall* (to beat), etc. For the change of -y- to -s-, cf. Brāhūi *pas-un*, *bas-ing*, etc.

According to this explanation, -s- is from the hiatus-filling glide *y*, and *ṭ* is the cerebralised form of alveolar *t*.

In this view, *asi* and *mūsi* would only be differentiated variants of *asiṭ* and *musiṭ*.

(ii) *asi* and *mūsi* may be considered as original in Br., and *ṭ* only an affix conferring the substantival meaning; if so, the derivation of *asi* and *mūsi* would be similar to that of Tuḷu *oñji* and *mūji*, with this difference that while Tuḷu retains the original *o* and develops *j* (with the spontaneous nasal in the form for *one*), Brāhūi shows *a-* and *-s-*.

In this view, *ṭ* may also be regarded as an analogic intrusion from *iraṭ* (two).

The fact that none of the Dr. dialects shows a hiatus-filling glide *y* between *o* and the affix (*i*)*r* in the forms for ONE, would point to the latter explanation of the Br. forms as being more probable than the former.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

I

A NOTE ON

THE CÔLAVAMŚĀVALICARITRAM

BY

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Students of South Indian History will be particularly interested to hear that there exists in the Tanjore Palace Library, a rare manuscript known as "The Brhadiśvara Māhātmya" or "The Cōla Vamśāvalicaritram". This work is described as an extract from the "Bhaviṣyottara Purāṇam". The name "Brhadiśvara Māhātmya" is evidently because of the most important topic discussed within. The origin, construction and development of the Brhadiśvara temple known as "The big temple Tanjore" is described in detail. In and around this main topic, the history of the Cōla kings of Tanjore numbering sixteen in all and covering a period of nearly 112 centuries is narrated with a great wealth of detail, drawing particular attention to the chief events in each king's reign. The work is in 30 chapters.

Chapters I and II narrate the conversation between Pārvaṭi and Śvara regarding the resuscitations of the famous shrines and places of pilgrimage in the beginning of each Yuga after they had been destroyed in the Prajaya preceding.

In Chapter III are given the territorial divisions of Southern India, the resuming of the reigns of the kings that held sway over them, and in particular the history of Cōla kings, characterising them as great devotees of Śiva fired with a consuming love to practice all the meritorious deeds that are characteristic of a true devotee of Śiva.

Chapter IV deals in general with various kinds of charitable works carried out by the Cōla kings.

In Chapter V, we have the beginning of the history of the Cōla kings. Kulōttuṅga of the Solar race is referred to as the first of the line. The Lord (Īśvara) tests the devotion of Kulōttuṅga and his wife Kōmaḷa by appearing before them as a mendicant at midnight in need of alms. Pleased with the devotion shown by the couple, the Lord blesses them and assures them that till the 16th of their race, he and his successors would hold undisputed sway over the southern regions.

Chapter VI and VII deal in detail with the reign of Kulōttuṅga Cōla which is stated to have extended to 90 years. Kulōttuṅga Cōla is succeeded by his son Dēva Cōla.

In Chapter VIII, we are informed that Dēva Cōla married Soundarya Valli of the family of Kāmika and restored several temples during his reign of 60 years. He was succeeded by his son Śaśīśekhara Cōla who, with his consort Campakavalli continued the good works of his father during his reign of 70 years, the most important of them being the construction of a Grand Anicut above Śrīraṅgam.

In Chapter IX, we find that Śaśīśekhara Cōla was succeeded by Śivaliṅga who, with his wife Padmavalli held his court probably near Tiruvālūr paying his daily homage to the Lord Thyāgarāja there. We are also informed that his son Vira Cōla killed by accident a calf caught in his chariot wheels. It is stated that the mother-cow's groans attracted the attention of the king who, when informed that it was his own son who had killed the calf, immediately ordered that the real ends of justice should be met and therefore, the same chariot must be made to pass over his son's body in the presence of the aggrieved cow. The act was actually done and both the calf and the young prince lay dead, when a divine voice was heard to acclaim the greatness of the king in dealing out impartial justice, in appreciation of which the Gods themselves were pleased to revive the dead calf and the young prince. Śivaliṅga's rule seems to have extended to 6 years at the end of which he was succeeded by his son Vira Cōla, who reigned over the Cōla Country with his wife Hemavalli for as long a period as 87 years.

Chapter X begins with the story of the accession to the throne of Karikāla, the son of Viracōla. It was in Karikāla's court that the great Śaivite Philosopher Haradatta of Kaṇjaṇūr held the honoured post of the king's preceptor. It is stated that

the king was suddenly attacked with black leprosy. Smarting under it, the king sent for his chief preceptor Haradatta and asked him to advise him.

In Chapter XI, he is reported to have performed a big sacrifice for 40 days at the end of which the Lord Agniśvara, the titular diety of Kañjanūr appeared to him in a dream and informed him that the king's malady could be got rid of, if the king undertook a pilgrimage to the river Narmadā to bring a big *liṅga* of Śiva and build a temple and consecrate the image duly and fittingly in Tanjore.

Chapter XII deals with the narration of the dream by Haradatta to the king at Tanjore.

Chapter XIII deals with the preparations for the pilgrimage including the entrusting of the construction of the *gopura* to the famous sculptor Soma Varmā already well known to all by his exquisite work in the *gopura* of the Ekāmrānātha temple at Conjeevaram.

Chapter XIV narrates the bringing of the image from the river Narmadā.

Chapter XV deals with the story of the actual construction of the big tower. Even at the end of 12 years the foundation had not been completed. We are informed that Soma Varmā's own son who had come to visit his father after the latter's absence of 12 years found fault with the proportion of the base for the tower and advised the king to remodel it suitably. The father was convinced of his miscalculation. The father and son set to work together and constructed the tower.

Chapter XVI deals with the Kumbhābhiṣeka. The sacred *liṅga* was named Bṛhadīśvara and the goddess was named Bṛhannāyaki. The Kumbhābhiṣeka was celebrated on a grand scale.

We are informed in Chapter XVII that during the celebration of the Caitrotsavam on the 12th day, the king Karikāla bathed in the sacred tank Śivagaṅgā adjoining the temple and found himself cured of all signs of his black leprosy as soon as he emerged from the sacred waters. The king was immensely pleased as also his ministers, courtiers and the public. After a successful reign of 90 years, the king was succeeded by his son Bhīma Cōla.

Chapter XVIII deals with the rule of Bhīma Cōla who, with his queen Vidyullatā, the daughter of a Keraḷa prince, carried on

the administration for a period of 77 years continuing the acts of charity so dear to the Cōla rulers. He was in turn succeeded by his son Rāja Rājendra Cōla who married Kamalinī, the daughter of Kulaśekhara Pāṇḍya.

Chapter XIX deals with the reign of Rāja Rājendra Cōla extending over 78 years. He was succeeded by his son Vīramārtāṇḍa.

Chapter XX deals with the reign of Vīramārtāṇḍa, who with his queen Māṇikkavallikā, daughter of a Cēra prince held sway for 66 years. To Vīramārtāṇḍa is given the credit of reconstructing the Koṅkaṇēśa temple in Tanjore.

Chapter XXI deals with the story of the Koṅkaṇēśa temple.

In chapter XXII, we are informed, that Kīrti Cōla succeeded his father Vīramārtāṇḍa. Kīrti Cōla married Kamalinī, the daughter of Sūryaśekhara Pāṇḍya. Among his works of public benefaction, particular mention is made of the laying out of the river Kīrtinātī. Kīrti Cōla reigned for 49 years and was succeeded by his son Jaya Cōla.

In chapter XXIII we are informed that Jaya Cōla married Kāñcana Mālā, daughter of a Keraḷa prince and reigned for 60 years, revelling in acts of piety and public charity. We are also told that Jaya Cōla carried out vast improvements to the Bṛhadīśvara temple.

Chapter XXIV informs us that Jaya Cōla was succeeded by his son Kanaka Cōla. Kanaka Cōla married Campakāṅgī of the Vikrama race and reigned for 70 years.

In chapter XXV, we are informed that Kanaka Cōla was succeeded by his son Sundara Cōla. Sundara Cōla with his queen Citravallī, the daughter of a Cēra prince reigned for 60 years. Sundara Cōla had a daughter named Utpalavatī who was given in marriage to a Pāṇḍya prince. Various tests of Sundara Cōla's devotion to the Lord are narrated in detail. The story of how Sundara Cōla committed the heinous crime of murdering a brahmin unconsciously is also told.

In Chapter XXVI, the king's sufferings, mental and otherwise due to his heinous crime are narrated in detail.

Chapter XXVII deals with the details regarding the processes through which the king Sundara Cōla got rid of all the effects of his crime by worshipping the Lord Śiva in Madhyārjuna or the modern Tiruvadamardūr.

Chapter XXVIII narrates the story of Kālakāla, the son of Sundara Cōla. Kālakāla married Guṇavatī, the daughter of a Kerala prince and ruled for 70 years. The restoration of the temple of Tālavaneśvara during Kālakāla's time is narrated.

Chapters XXIX tells us the story of Kalyāṇa Cōla, son of Kālakāla. Kalyāṇa Cōla married Kalyāṇī, the daughter of a Pāṇḍya prince and ruled the Cōla country for 67 years. Kalyāṇa Cōla carried out great works of reconstruction. Particular mention is made of his significant contribution to the reconstruction of the Śrī Naṭarāja temple at Chidambaram. Kalyāṇa Cōla was succeeded by his son Bhadra Cōla who along with his queen Subhadrā reigned over Cōla country for 70 years. Towards the close of this chapter, we have a resuming of the reigns of all the sixteen Cōla kings with specific mention of their particularly brilliant acts of charity or devotion.

Chapter XXX gives a concise description of the several places of pilgrimage dear and wholly to the followers of Śiva.

Thus, this important manuscript deals with the reigns of the sixteen Cōla kings giving continued genealogy spread over a period of approximately 113 centuries. This is of course a purāṇic account. How far this is supported by the existing historical data is a matter for further investigation. In and through the purāṇic account, there lie embedded valuable tit-bits of historical information.

Any critical student of South Indian History will usually inform us that the great temple of Br̥hadiśvara was built in the beginning of the 11th century A.D., during the time of Rāja Rājendra Cōla. But the manuscript before us informs us definitely that it was built really during the time of Karikala Cōla, the grand-father of Rājārājendra Cōla. We are further informed that it was Jaya Cōla, the great-grand-son of Rāja-Rājendra Cōla who carried out extensive improvements to the Br̥hadiśvara temple.

My interest in narrating in detail the above story as found in the Manuscript before us is mainly to call the attention of the South Indian History to the existence of this manuscript, to enable them to shed more light upon the forgotten pages of the History of Tanjore.

II

A NOTE ON VAITAṆḌIKA AND AVYAPADEŚYA.

BY

R. NAGARAJASARMA, ESQ., M.A., L.T.

In the course of his review of my polemical pamphlet entitled "Romance in Indian Philosophy" appearing on pages 279 and 280 of the Journal of Oriental Research for July-October, 1928, and in the course of his contribution on "Recent work in Indian Thought—By Indian writers," published in the "NEW ERA" for December, 1928, Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Prof. S. Kuppuswamy Sastriar characterises me to be a "rising *vaitaṇḍika*," and observes that Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's critic, i.e., my humble self "nods in his remarks about the professor's rendering of the term "*avyāpadeśya*." In the course of this note, I beg leave to maintain that I have not nodded at all.

i

It has been suggested to me curiously enough, that the term "*vaitaṇḍika*" contains a sinister or a dubious compliment and its use is tantamount to damning me with faint praise! A friend of mine went to the extent of pointing out a passage in the "Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya," to the effect that "*vaitaṇḍika*" is a person to be hanged, drawn, and quartered "*vaitaṇḍika-vetaṇḍaḥ-nira-sanīyaḥ*." When the term was applied to me by a correspondent in the columns of the "Hindu," who endeavoured in vain to defend Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of the term "*Pratītya-samutpāda*" against my criticisms, I explained that the term "*vaitaṇḍika*" could be rightly applied to one who, while hiding from his opponents his own metaphysical theories, just finds fault with the latter's arguments, and as I made my position quite clear at that time, the correspondent was mistaken in applying it to me.

Prof. Sastriar now remarks that I successfully play the role of a rising *vaitaṇḍika* in my pamphlet. I take it as a compliment. I am aware that a popular usage has converted the term into a sinister appellation. Nobody need take any cognisance of that. In support of my contention that Prof. S. Radha-

krishnan is not acquainted with the original sanskrit texts, I have mentioned instances. I am not bound to develop my own philosophical doctrines in a pamphlet which is admittedly and avowedly polemical. When and if I feel any inward dynamic urge to undertake any constructive work, I shall certainly accomplish one, but failure to feel any such or respond to any such urge is hardly the justification why I should not find fault with the constructive work done by others.

Discussing the value and validity of *vitaṇḍā*, the author of "nyāyavārtika" writes : "*eke-tāvād-varṇayanti-niṣprajāna-dūṣaṇamātravāt—... Pakṣam-ya-na-sthāpayati-sa-vaitaṇḍika-ucyate...etc.*" (P. 16, Vindhyeswariprasad Edition of Vārtika.) I am sure Prof. Kuppaswamy Sastriar has deliberately used the term *vaitaṇḍika* in the śāstraic connotation, and that is certainly complimentary to me. Vācaspati-miśra follows suit. "*Tasmāt-vitaṇḍāpi-prajayānavatī.*" (P. 35 Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā, Benares Edition.) Madhva in his work "Kathālakṣaṇa" has explained that *vitaṇḍā* is a perfectly legitimate and logical weapon of polemics or controversy. There is an important recognition of the maxim that pearls should not be cast before swine. *Vitaṇḍāvāda* is the only go. As a character in *Tempest* says that the effect of having learnt language is to abuse the teacher himself, one might not be inclined to place one's philosophical doctrines before the public or before one's opponents lest the latter should scoff at them. So, a party to the controversy or metaphysical debate is at perfect liberty to confine himself to a purely destructive criticism or annihilation of the arguments of his opponent. Such a controversy loses nothing by being styled *vitaṇḍāvāda*.

I can mention another point. In the innermost orthodox circles of paṇḍits, a Mādhva is considered to be a *vaitaṇḍika* both by Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins. He repays the compliment with compound interest. To a Viśiṣṭādvaitī, Dvaitī and an Advaitī are *vaitaṇḍikas*. To a Dvaitī both the Advaitī and Viśiṣṭādvaitī are *vaitaṇḍikas*. When passions are stirred up, language is freely used. The Saṅkalpasūryodaya has some opponents in view when the term *vaitaṇḍikavetaṇḍa* is used! He who runs may read.

ii

Prof. S. Radhakrishnan renders the term "avyapadeśyam" into "inexpressible". With great respect to Prof. S. Kuppaswamy Sastriar, I think it necessary to point out that the translation is indefensible. Prof. Sastriar remarks (1) that it would be

easy to maintain from the point of view of the Tātparyacaryā, that Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's rendering of the term is not wrong, and (2) that it would not be less easy to maintain that I am needlessly creating a mist over one of the alternative interpretations of that term given by Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya. Let me deal with the two contentions of Mr. Sastriar seriatim.

What does the Tātparyacaryā establish? "*Tatra-nāmarahitam-avikalpakam-nāsti-iti-ye-vipratipadyante-tanmatamaṣaci-kīrṣurupanyasyati-bhāṣyakārah etc.*" (P. 82, Et. seq. Benares Edition. Tātparyāṭika.) There is an extreme view which seeks to hold that there is no form of perception, no form of awareness, no form of knowledge, without reference to a Śabda, a linguistic symbol. This view is to be refuted. Bhāṣyakāra wanted to secure the refutation. Tātparyacaryā mentions that the Bhāṣyakāra so wanted. For pucca, first-rate, sense-perception what is required is Indriyārtha-sannikarṣa, i.e., appropriate contact between sense-organ and object by means of the adequate stimulus as the modern psychologist would put it. Regressively go back to the first perception of the newborn babe to which the world is a big, booming, and buzzing confusion, which is also to be included in the definition as any other form of perception. In what sense is perception inexpressible? I quite appreciate the anxiety of the Bhāṣyakāra and Tātparyacaryā to establish the existence of Avikalpaka or the Nirvikalpaka, but in that type of nebulous perception, the noteworthy feature is that though there is the required contact with the object and the sense-organ, linguistic symbols do not function in any manner to describe or characterise the said contact. There may be overt description or may not. I shall put the matter in other terms. The modern psychologist asks "Is imageless thinking possible?" Very often we employ the verbal image. We do not stop even to conjure up the images in normal cases. They rapidly succeed one another in us. Names, linguistic symbols are of a later origin. Reference to them should not be incorporated in the definition of sense-perception. That is the central doctrine.

What sense does it make when it is stated that sense-perception is "inexpressible"? Prof. S. Radhakrishnan is complimented by Mr. Sastriar on his expository brilliance. Suppose a western psychologist or a logician reads the account of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan that perception is "inexpressible". What will he understand? Why inexpressible? Has the perceptual

cosmos been struck beautifully or pathetically dumb? Does it get vocal at all? If so when and under what circumstances? Analyse adult perception. Analyse the hypothetical first perception of the new-born babe. Contact between the sense-organ and some stimuli like sound, light, etc., there is. The contact guarantees perception. But later in life, either for purposes of communication or some other social exigency, form, quality, time, space, *qua* clothed in verbal linguistic symbols enter as factors in perception. The Sūtrakāra, the Bhāṣyakāra and the Tātparyacaryā are one in their anxiety to exclude reference to linguistic symbols from the definition of Pratyakṣa.

Jayanta examines a number of alternatives that are sought to be excluded from the definition by the term *avyapadeśya* into the details of which I do not propose to and need not in fact enter at all to show the untenability of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation. He points out that Vācaspatiśra's interpretation is not accepted by some.

In the light of the Tātparyāṭikā, I beg to submit it is impossible to defend Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation. The inexpressibility of sense-perception is a misnomer. The rendering is wrong, lock, stock and barrel.

Prof. Sastriar complains that I needlessly create a mist over one of the alternative interpretations of that term *Avyapadeśya* by Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya. In the present context, there is no alternative interpretation. If it is elsewhere, it is *nihil ad rem* to the present context. He concludes "*Tasmāt aśābdamarthajñānam indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam*." (P. 14. Calcutta Edition.) He is not offering any alternative interpretation at the given context "*śābdam prasajjyeta*." He raised the query and answered "*aśābdam*." The perceptual awareness though linked at definite stages with names, and linguistic symbols, these latter do not cause or produce the former. The latter at definite stages of adult linguistic growth do give rise to perceptions which have to be ruled out from the definition essayed by the Sūtrakāra. On page 87 of the Nyāyamañjarī, Jayanta after having discussed a number of alternative interpretations of the term *avyapadeśya*, and after having indicated or identified what concepts were exactly intended to be excluded from the definition by the insertion of the term *avyapadeśya*, from time to time, mentions that after all some would like to go back to a view championed by *jara-naityāyikas*, old decrepit, senile logicians, and reading between

the lines of the text, I am sure that the Sūtrakāra and Bhāṣyakāra were anxious to secure the exclusion of any reference to any linguistic system or linguistic symbols from the definition of sense-perception, the differentia of which is just what is caused by contact of object with sense-organs (of course *Avyabhicāri*).

Let me illustrate. Suppose a child a few months old is confronted with Bernard Shaw's beard. The form, the shape, the waviness of the beard will all be *perceived* by the child but there would be no realisation of the object *qua* Shaw's beard which is the result of training in linguistic symbols and imagery as the outcome of social existence. Contact of object with sense-organs is just what is necessary to constitute perception (of course *Avyabhicāri*).

It is possible to bring up a child on a lonely island and make it the monarch of all it surveys. No one speaks to it. Its physical and physiological wants are satisfied. It is bound to perceive the colour of an evening sky and hear the noise of birds. Sensations from external reality it would have, but, the form, colour, touch, smell, *et hoc* would not be designated with linguistic symbols. The reference to the latter should be excluded from the definition of perception.

Prof. S. Radhakrishnan writes "Vātsyāyana holds that an object may be perceived with or without the apprehension of its name." One asks, in utter despair, what if? Vātsyāyana's meaning on the other hand is, as I have explained, that, in fixing down the definition of sense-perception, and marking in clear relief the boundaries of connotation, you should restrict yourself to contact of the sense-organ with external reality, through the instrumentality of a specialised sensory structure and the adequate stimulus. For the life of me, I can never understand how anybody could come forward to defend Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of *avyapadeśya* into "inexpressible".

I plead not guilty to the charge of having created any mist! Creation of mist in the tropical tracts in which we live is by no means easy, or practical politics. If according to Prof. S. Kuppuswamy Sastriar's own showing, there is an alternative interpretation of the term given by Vātsyāyana, I should be exonerated from the charge of having created a mist with a view to obscuring a legitimate and logical interpretational issue. At any rate, I am

entitled to inquire why Vātsyāyana embarks on alternative interpretations. Are all the alternatives equally valid? If so, what may be the motive of multiplying them? Or is Vātsyāyana dissatisfied with one alternative and has suggested another?

Look at the question from any point of view or angle of vision you please; I find it impossible to admit that I have nodded in my remarks about the utter untenability of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of the term *avyapadeśya* as "inexpressible." Why on earth inexpressible? Is it inexpressible by the child that has a perception? Or is it by the adult? In my illustration, the adult who takes the child to Shaw knows, and he expresses that the child perceives the beard and terrified, bursts forth into a cry. The child itself when it masters the linguistic technique would "express" its perceptions in language. The inexpressibility of perception is thus a pseudo concept. It cannot stand a moment's scrutiny.

iii

Let me now conclude the note.

(1) *Vitaṇḍā* is a necessary form of debate, dialectic, or disputation. *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* are necessary even as *Vāda*. Otherwise the *Sūtrakāra* would not have mentioned them at all. *Vitaṇḍāvāda* comes in handy especially when one of the parties to the controversy, *i.e.*, *vaitaṇḍika* is not willing to reveal his own constructive theories. He may not choose to reveal them for a number of reasons. No agency can compel him to reveal them. If *vitaṇḍā* is necessary *vaitaṇḍika* has his place in the sun! He cannot be banned or exterminated summarily by anybody's fiat. A barbed fence is necessary to protect truth. *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* might be regarded such a fence (literally fence of thorny branches) (*Nyāyasūtra* IV-ii-50). I am at perfect liberty to take and I do take the term *vaitaṇḍika* applied to me as an ungrudging compliment paid to me by an eminent authority of the type of Prof. Sastriar.

(2) Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's translation of the term *avyapadeśya* as "inexpressible" is indefensible. Reference to linguistic system, linguistic symbols, technical terms, even designations like form, weight, pressure etc. should be excluded from a definition of *Pratyakṣa*—sense-awareness. The most appropriate definition is *Indriyārtha-Sannikarṣaṭpannam-Jñānam-avyapadeśyam* etc. Knowledge due to contact of object with sense-organ (*i.e.*, know-

ledge of object as it is, and *not* as it appears to be) is *Pratyakṣa*, sense-perception. If after a perusal of this note, Prof. Sastriar still thinks I have nodded, I am ready to take consolation in the eternal reminder "Homer nods!" By the way, may I point out that *Vācaspatimiśra* himself reveals a tendency to nod? On page 82 he does not include the term *avyapadeśya* as part of definition, and yet on the next page, he writes: "*Lakṣaṇagatena avyapadeśyapadena sūcitam.*"*

*While I readily appreciate the correctness of Mr. Sarma's interpretation of the word *Vaitaṇḍika* I cannot help differing from Mr. Sarma in the interpretation of the term *avyapadeśya*. Nor can I help thinking that Mr. Sarma still persists in nodding, while *Vācaspatimisra* nowhere nods. [S. K. Sastri].

III

RĀMĀBHYUDAYA.

BY

R. RAMAMURTI, M. A.,
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That the plays which have dramatized the story of the Rāmāyaṇa outnumber those that have not is a proposition, I think, to which every one may subscribe. This dictum is applicable not only to the world of current dramas but also to such forgotten dramas as linger in our memory through references or extracts in such comprehensive treatises as the Abhinavabhāratī, the Śṅgāraprakāśa etc.

The Rāmābhyudaya is one of the many "Rāma-plays" that exist only through references. That Yaśovarman, the patron of Bhavabhūti, was the author of this drama is plainly expressed by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, namely the Locana.

सन्ति सिद्धरसप्रख्याः ये च रामायणादयः ।

कथाश्रया न तैर्योज्या स्वेच्छा रसविरोधिनी ॥

Locana—

कथानामाश्रयाः इतिहासाः । तैः इतिहासार्थैः सह स्वेच्छा न योज्या । कथंचिद्वा यदि योज्यते तत् तत्प्रसिद्धिविरुद्धा न योज्या । यथा रामस्य धीरललितत्वयोजनेन नाटिकानायकत्वं कुर्यादिति तु अन्त्यन्तासमञ्जसम् । यदुक्तं "कथामार्गे न चाक्रमः" इति रामाभ्युदये यशोवर्मणा "स्थितमिति(?) (स्थिति-मति) यथा शय्याम्" ॥

(Dhvanyāloka—Locana, page 148.)

This extract is significant. Ānandavardhana observes that alteration in or deviation from, works like the Rāmāyaṇa is permissible only when it is in consonance with its predominant Rasa. As Abhinavagupta observes, Rāma, a Dhīrodātta, (धीरोदात्त) if pictured as a Dhīralalita (धीरललित), will certainly be

against the tone of the Rāmāyaṇa. In support of his statement Ānandavardhana quotes a metrical bit. "काव्यमार्गे न चा(ति)क्रमः" which Abhinavagupta not only identifies as that of Yaśovarman from his Rāmābhyudaya but also furnishes us with another foot of the verse, namely, "स्थितमिति (स्थितिमति) यथाशय्याम्". This verse of Yaśovarman which tells us that no unjustifiable deviation has been made from the story of the Rāmāyaṇa should certainly, as one can easily infer, be found in the prastāvanā of the Rāmābhyudaya.

The date of Yaśovarman has been already fixed by scholars at 713 A. D. Now we may reconstruct the plot of the drama from the following extracts :—

Rāmābhyudaya.

रामाभ्युदयादौ सीताप्रत्यानयनादेरिव । न हि तत्र अश्वमेधयागादेर्नायको-
चितस्य कविविवक्षितत्वमस्ति ।

(vol. II, page 491, A. Bhāratī.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये तृतीयेऽङ्के सीतां प्रति सुग्रीवस्य सन्देशोक्तिः—

बहुनात्र किमुक्तेन परेऽपि जलधेः स्थिताम् ।

अचिरादेव देवि त्वामाहरिष्यति राघवः ॥

(vol. II, page 504, A. B. Bhāratī.) (vol. II, page 485, Ś. Prakāśa.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये भयात्पोषक्षेपः

(vol. II, page 531, A. Bhāratī.)

यथा मायाशिरोनिक्षिप्ते रामाभ्युदये सचित्रं नेपथ्यम् ॥

(vol. III, page 13, A. Bhāratī.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये द्वितीयेऽङ्के

रावणः—प्रायः श्रुतमेव भ...यथा कलत्रसा...जापसस्तदपहार
एव...निरूप्यताम् । न च कलत्रापहरणादृते पुरुषस्यापरं परिभवस्थान-
मस्ति । तत्र च मारीचेन क्रियमाणं साहाय्यकमिच्छामि ॥

मारीचः—स्वामिन् ! जीवतो रामस्य परिभव इत्य... न खलु तापस
इत्यवज्ञातुमर्हति देवः । अन्यदेव किमपि वस्त्वन्तरं तत् ॥

रावणः—(सक्रोधम्) आः किन्नाम वस्त्वन्तरम् ! तन्मूढयुक्तैव क्षत्र-
बन्धोः परिभवमजीयत(?) कर्तुमिच्छन् मायासाहाय्यके निपुणतर इति येनासमर्थः ।

यश्चान्यत्तत्र वज्रप्रहतिमसृणितस्फारकेयूरभाजः

सज्जात्रैलोक्यलक्ष्मीहठहरणसहा बाहवो रावणस्य ॥

(vol. II, page 472, Ś. Prakāśa.)

यथा च रामाभ्युदये सीतायाः परित्यागेन अवमाननात् छलनम् ॥

(page 29, Daśarūpaka.)

नाम कोऽयं नाटकस्य गर्भितार्थप्रकाशनम्—यथा—रामाभ्युदयादिः ।

(P. 6-142, Sāhityadarpaṇa.)

अभिधेयगतं यत्तत्काव्यनाम्ना प्रकाशनम् ।

तन्नाम नाटकाद्यन्तं गर्भगाढोपसूचनम् ॥

यथा हि रामाभ्युदयं नाम नाटकमित्यतः ।

(page 210, Bhāvaṇṇaprakāśa.)

ब्रीजवन्तो मुखाद्यर्थाः परमेव प्रयोजने ।

लभन्ते यत्र संबन्धं तन्निर्वहणमुच्यते ॥

यथा हि रामाभ्युदये सुग्रीवश्च विभीषणः ।

कपयो राक्षसाश्चैवाभिषेकाभ्युदयं ययुः ॥

(page 221, Bhāvaṇṇaprakāśa.)

षडङ्गं दृश्यते तत्र रामाभ्युदयनाटकम्

(page 247, Bhāvaṇṇaprakāśa.)

मूर्खजनसन्निकर्षे हितमपि प्रभाषते यत्र विद्वान् ।

न च गृह्यतेऽन्यवचनं विज्ञेयोऽस्तत्प्रलापोऽसौ ॥

यथा हि रामाभ्युदये सीतापहरणोद्यतः ।

मारीचेन सहायेन निषिद्धो रावणः क्रुधा ॥

(page 242, Bhāvaṇṇaprakāśa.)

यथा रामाभ्युदये

तापसः—(आकाशे) भावः.... रामभद्रस्तिष्ठति । किं ब्रवीषि ?
तेऽस्या एव—पथिकजनमनोहरिण्याः पुष्करिण्याः परिसरे सीतया लक्ष्मणेन
च सह न्यग्रोधच्छायायां सुखोपविष्टस्तिष्ठतीति ॥

(page 325, Kāvyaṇuśāsana.)

तथा रामाभ्युदये प्रथमेऽङ्के वटोः कुचाभिनयमेव “प्रधानं वक्ष्ये”
इति सर्वत्र संबध्यते ॥

(vol. II, page 299, A. Bhārati.)

As in the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa*, we can easily infer the story in the opening act of this drama. We find that the plot of the second act consists in the abduction of Sītā and the schemes of Rāvaṇa. Hence the opening act, probably like the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa*, began with the history of the exiled Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā.

The plot of the play seems to be this. Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā lead a happy life in the forest. Rāvaṇa wants to carry away Sītā at the instigation of the disfigured Śūrpaṇakhā. He consults his friends and ministers.

Rāvaṇa starts the discussion by saying that since the abduction of one's wife means a consequential ignominy and shame for the husband, no other plan will be more retaliative than the abduction of Sītā. To accomplish his task, Rāvaṇa seeks the aid and alliance of Mārīca, thinking that he will readily respond to the royal request. His ardent expectation meets with a keen disappointment. Mārīca gives a dignified reply. He asks Rāvaṇa to be considerate when speaking of Rāma. He plainly and provokingly tells Rāvaṇa that to bring about ignominy on Rāma is an impossible. To hear plain truth especially when it exposes one's defect is always uncomfortable and Rāvaṇa after hearing this defence of Rāma lashes himself to fury, extols his own strength and thunders forth abuses on Mārīca. Mārīca finally yields with reluctance and Rāvaṇa achieves his desire by carrying off Sītā. This seems to be the plot of the second act.

In the third act Rāma and Sugrīva meet and pledge themselves to be friends for life. Sugrīva sends his monkeys in search of Sītā with a solacing message. In due course of time war happens and Rāvaṇa resorts to black magic. He creates by magic a living image of Sītā and kills it in the very presence of Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa. Even necromancy fails to bring about Rāvaṇa's success. Rāma, and through him righteousness, wins.

After returning to Ayodhyā, Rāma spends a life of unalloyed happiness but the slander of the public questioning the chastity of his wife makes him banish Sītā to the forest. Poor pregnant Sītā gives birth to twin sons in the hermitage of Vālmiki.

Rāma finds that life without Sītā is but an arid desert and hence under the pretext of an Aśvamedha sacrifice, as Abhinavagupta pointedly observes, tries to bring back Sītā. In this he succeeds and both are united. The monkeys and the rākṣasas headed by Sugrīva and Vibhīṣaṇa attend the coronation ceremony.

This then is the plot of the drama. The dramatist has deviated from the *Rāmāyaṇa* in that he has made the Aśvamedha sacrifice a device to bring about the union of Rāma and Sītā.

The term 'Rāmābhyudaya' is significant since it suggests the coronation of Rāma. It comprises six acts and the author

has admirably succeeded in presenting such a long story in such a short compass. The *Rāmābhyudaya* seems to be a high class drama since even Kuntaka praises it.

All the anthologies quote from Yaśovarman's *Rāmābhyudaya*. The verses so quoted number nearly ten and a reading of these verses make our hearts throb, nerves tingle and pulses beat. They are so realistic in their tender pathos, so natural in their plain appeal that they thrill our hearts, kindle our emotions, raise pleasure from the bosom of pain and sweep us on with force to the source and soul of eternal delectation, namely *Rasa*.

IV.

GHANṬAKA.

BY

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Ghaṇṭaka is a poet mentioned by Abhinavagupta in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. The following is the reference :—

श्रीशङ्कुस्तु अयुक्तमेतदित्यभिधाय अष्टधेति व्याचष्टे । तथा च
देवी कन्या च ख्याता अख्याता भेदेन चतुर्धा । कन्या तु अन्तःपुरसङ्गी-
तकभेदेन द्विधेति । घण्टकादयस्त्वाहुः नायको नृपतिरित्येतावन्मात्रम् । नाटका-
दाबुपजीवितं न तु प्रख्यातत्वमपि । तद्वेदद्वयादन्ये षोडश भेदा इति ॥
(vol. II, page 468, A. Bhāratī.)

It may be guessed that Ghaṇṭaka was an ālaṅkārika and differed from his predecessors. He might have set forth his views in some treatise. In the anthologies we find the following verse ascribed to him :—

धनुर्माला मौर्वी कणदलिकुलं लक्ष्म्यमबला
मनोभेद्यं शब्दप्रभृतय इमे पञ्च विशिखाः ।
इयान् जेतुं यस्य त्रिभुवनमदेहस्य विभवः
स कामः कामान् वो दिशतु दयितापाङ्गवसतिः ॥

(verse 82, Subhāṣitāvalī.)

This verse seems to be an invocatory stanza. Ghaṇṭaka might have tried his skill also in the realm of poetic creation.

The date of Ghaṇṭaka can be easily fixed. The extract from the *Abhinavabhāratī* plainly tells us that Ghaṇṭaka differs from Śaṅkuka's opinion as regards the number of Nāyikās (नायिकाः). Naturally he should have been posterior to Śaṅkuka and since Abhinavagupta refers to Ghaṇṭaka's views he should be prior to Abhinava. Thus the date of Ghaṇṭaka falls between the dates of Śaṅkuka and Abhinavagupta. He should therefore have flourished between 840 and 1020 A. D.

In III and IV above, the references to the *Abhinavabhāratī*, *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* and *Bhāvaṇṇaprakāśa* are all to the manuscripts of these works in the Govt. Ort. Mss. Library, Madras.

EDITORIAL.

In inviting the attention of the public to the newly started Department of Islamic studies in the Viśvabhāratī University under the able guidance of Dr. Julius Germanus, Professor of Islamic Studies at the Oriental Institute of the Royal Hungarian University, Budapest, who has been recently elected to the Nizam Islamic chair for Islamic studies, we are glad to observe that this department will stimulate interest in Islamic learning which has long been undeservedly neglected and will serve the cause of Islam in the best way possible. Apart from its literary value, the general benefit derived from such educational propaganda can in no way be exaggerated. The syllabus drawn up by the learned Professor as given below is comprehensive and affords ample scope to tackle the problem of Islamic studies in a satisfactory way. We hope that the good example set forth by the Viśvabhāratī University will be promptly followed by other academic institutions in India.

PROGRAMME OF ISLAMIC STUDIES.

1. **INTRODUCTORY COURSES.** Selected Arabic texts from the classics (6th century—14th century) with historical, philological, and literary commentaries.

2. **THE HISTORY OF ISLAM FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES.** Arabia before Muhammad. Muhammad and the Qur'an. The Arab Empire. The Abbassides. The spread of Islam to foreign countries. The Turks. Islam in India.

Sources of historical research. Comparative method and criticism of sources.

3. **RESEARCH AND SEMINARY WORK.** Methods of historical research illustrated by practical application to the history of Islam in India.

(a) Lectures on Islamic History will be delivered regularly. After every lecture a Seminary class will be held in which the sources for the period dealt with in the lecture will be critically examined. Advanced students and research workers will be given practical training in the critical examination of original sources.

(b) Separate Seminary classes will be held for the study and interpretation of literary and philological works.

4. **PERSIAN AND TURKISH TEXTS.** Advanced classes accompanied by Seminary work will be arranged for the study of Persian Turkish texts and sources.

5. **ISLAMIC LIBRARY.** An adequate number of standard books on Islam is being collected on a critical principle to serve the needs of students and research workers.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR STUDENTS AND RESEARCH WORKERS.

Students and research workers will be attached to the Vidyābhavana (Research Institute) at Śāntiniketan, and will enjoy all the privileges of membership of the educational institutions at Śāntiniketan.

RESIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND FEES. The usual inclusive fee for residence, light, medical attendance, and sports is Rs. 13 per month. If food is taken in the general kitchen, there will be an additional charge of Rs. 12 per month. Scholars may, however, if they so desire, make their own arrangements regarding food. Special arrangements regarding both residence and food may be made for advanced workers and research students. Reductions in the fees are also made in the case of deserving candidates.

LOCATION. Śāntiniketan is situated at a distance of 99 miles from Calcutta and 1½ miles from Bolpur, a railway station on the East Indian Railway.

Enquiries and applications for admission may be addressed to either of the following officers.

The Santiniketan-Sachiva,
P. O. Santiniketan,
Bengal.

The Karma-Sachiva, Visva-Bharati,
210, Cornwallis Street,
Calcutta.

THE CHANGE IN THE FORM OF TAMIL WORDS THROUGH METANALYSIS AND CONFUSION OF SCRIPT.

BY

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It may be of interest to scholars to note how some Tamil words have undergone change in their form through Metanalysis and Confusion of script.

1. Metanalysis.¹

Ku in place of *u* and *vice-versa*.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| (a) Urutiram (Skt. rudhira) | Kuruti (Paripāṭal) |
| Ucci | Kucci (Kamparāmāyaṇam) |
| Uruttal (Skt. rūpa) | Kuruttal (Vināyakapurāṇam) |
| (b) Kuḷarutal | Uḷarutal (Tāyumāṇavar) |
| Kulukkutal | Ulukkutal |
| Kulaital | Ulaital (Pattu-p-pāṭṭu) |

Ū in place of *kū*.

Kūtal (cold wind) ūtal

I in place of *ci* and *vice-versa*.

- | | |
|--------------|----------------------------|
| (a) Cippi | Ippi (Maṇimēkalai) |
| (b) Ilirttal | Cilirttal (Kamparāmāyaṇam) |

2. Confusion of script.²

Confusion between a consonant and a vowel consonant and vice-versa.

Correct form	Changed form
For Kavvutal (கவ்வதல்)	Kavavutal (கவவுதல்)

1. By Metanalysis is meant the analysis of words or word groups done in a way quite different from that done in a former age. This is possibly due to, as Otto Jespersen says, the ignorance of the person who uses it, of the real form of the word (*i. e.*) where it begins and where it ends.

2. It must be noted that the dots above க, ச etc. as க̣, ச̣ to distinguish pure consonants from vowel-consonants (கயிர்மெய்) and above எ and ஒ which originally represented the sounds ē and ō, as எ and ஒ to represent e and o were not used in palm leaf manuscripts; there was no difference between the lengthening mark in க̣, ச̣ etc. and (r).

THE CHANGE IN THE FORM OF TAMIL WORDS 277

Correct form	Changed form
Kaṇṇakam (கன்னகம்)	Kaṇṇakam (கன்னகம்)
(Skt. Khananakhā)	

Kaṇṇam (கன்னம்)	Kaṇṇam (கன்னம்)
(Skt. Khanana)	

Confusion of *ṇ* as in கா, சா etc., and *ṇ* or *ṇ* and vice-versa.

(a) Kavācci (கவாச்சி)	Kavarcci (கவர்ச்சி)
(Skt. Gavākṣi)	

Cāṭu (சாடு).	Caraṭu (சாடு)
(Tel. Tcāṭu)	

Aṇṭāṇṭam (அண்டாண்டம்)	Aṇṭaraṇṭam (அண்டாண்டம்)
(Skt. Aṇḍāṇḍa)	

(b) Ayar (அயர்)	Ayā (அயா)
Paravutal (பரவுதல்)	Pāvutal (பரவுதல்)
Caravaṇam (சாவணம்)	Cāvaṇam (சாவணம்)
(Skt. Śaravaṇa)	

Caraṇam (சரணம்)	Cāṇ (சாண்)
(Skt. Carāṇa)	

Carakam (சாகம்)	Cākam (சாகம்)
(Skt. Saraghā)	

Karaṇṭakam (கரண்டகம்)	Kāṇṭakam (கரண்டகம்)
(Skt. Karaṇḍaka)	

Kācaram (காசரம்)	Kācā (காசா)
(Skt. Kāsara)	

Karaṇṭai (கரண்டை)	Kāṇṭai (கரண்டை)
(Skt. Karaṇḍā)	

Maram (மரம்)	Mā (மா)
--------------	---------

Var (வர்) the root in the	Vā (வா) ¹
form varukirāṇ etc.	

1. At present vā is said to be the root meaning to come. Its forms in the present, past and future tenses are respectively varukirāṇ, vantāṇ and varuvāṇ. How 'r' is inserted in varukirāṇ and varuvāṇ is not explained. Dr. Caldwell says that vā and var are 'alternative roots' or different forms of the same root. But it seems to me that the root was originally var. Vantāṇ might originally have been changed form of varntāṇ where r was dropped. The corresponding root in Telugu is rā. It is generally seen that the initial syllable of the Tamil words are dropped in the cognate words in Telugu. Cf. Tamil avāṇ Tel. vāḍu. Besides there is a root val in Sanskrit which has the same meaning. Hence it is worth investigating whether var or val was one of the roots common to the parent Indo-Germanic, and the parent Dravidian language.

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Confusion between ca (ச) and ka (க) and vice-versa.

Correct form

Changed form

(a) Cañcayam (சஞ்சயம்) Cañkayam (சஞ்சயம்)
(Skt. Sañśaya)

Cāṭakam (சாடகம்) Kāṭakam (காடகம்)
(Skt. Sāṭaka) Kālākam (காழகம்)

Ticai (திசை) Tikai (திசை)
(Skt. Diśā)

Cīram (சீரம்) Kīlam (கீலம்)
(Skt. Cīra)

Cācaṇam (சாசனம்) Kācaṇam (காசனம்)
(Skt. Śāsana)

Cālūram (சாலூரம்) Kālūram (காலூரம்)
(Skt. Sālūra)

Camari (சமரி) Kavari (கவரி)
(Skt. Camarī)

Ucīram (உசீரம்) Ukīram (உகிரம்)
(Skt. Uśīra)

Kōcayam (கோசயம்) Kōkayam (கோகயம்)
(Skt. Gōśaya)

(b) Kuṭikai (குடிசை) Kuṭicai (குடிசை)
(Skt. Kuṭikā)

Confusion between cu (சு) and ku (கு) and vice-versa.

(a) Cukkilam (சுக்கிலம்) Kukkilam (குக்கிலம்)
(Skt. Śukla)

(b) Kuruṭtal (குருத்தல்) Curuṭtal (சுருத்தல்)

Confusion between a (அ) and ca (ச).

Amparam (அம்பரம்) Camparam (சம்பரம்)
(Skt. Ambara)

Aḷḷal (அள்ளல்) Caḷḷal (சள்ளல்)

Confusion between ma (ம) and ya (ய).

Cētiyaṁ (சேதியம்) Cētimam (சேதிமம்)
(Skt. Caitya)

Confusion between ṇa (ன) and ḷa (ள) and vice-versa.

(a) Uvaṇittal (உவனித்தல்) Uvaḷittal (உவளித்தல்)
Kaṇam (கனம்) Kaḷam (களம்)
(Skt. Ghana)

(b) Ḹam (ஈளம்) Ḹnam (ஈனம்)
(meaning spurge)

THE CHANGE IN THE FORM OF TAMIL WORDS 279

Probable confusion between ṇa (ன) and ṇa the symbol denoting ai in mai (mai) etc.

Correct form

Changed form

Uṇam (ஊனம்)

Ūmai (ஊமை)

(Skt. ūna)

The above examples were found out by my colleagues and myself in the Tamil Lexicon Office, in the preparation of the Tamil Lexicon published by the University of Madras.

If the standing word is a verbal noun ending in *ñ* and the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant, *u* followed by the respective voiceless consonant is inserted between them in *case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *uriñ + kaṭitū = uriñ-u-k-kaṭitū*; *uriñ + ciritū = uriñ-uc-ciritū* etc.

298. *Ñanamava viyaiyū mukara nilaiyum.*

U alone is inserted when the coming word commences with *ñ*, *n*, *m* or *v*. Ex. *uriñ + valitū = uriñ-u-valitū* etc.

299. *Nakara viṛutiya mataṇō rarrē.*

The same is the case when the standing word ends in *n* (as when it ends in *ñ*). Ex. *porun + kaṭitū = porun-u-k-kaṭitū*; *porun + valitū = porun-u-valitū* etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 297 and 298.

300. *Vērrumaik kukkeṭa vakara nilaiyum.*

In *case-relation sandhi* *a* is inserted instead of *u*. Ex. *porun + kaṭumai = porun-a-k-kaṭumai* etc.

301. *Verine viṛuti mulutun keṭuvali*

Varumiṭa nuṭaittē mellelut tiyarkai.

If *verin* is the standing word and is followed by a word commencing with *k*, *c*, *t* or *p*, the corresponding nasal is inserted between them in such cases where *n* is dropped. Ex. *verin + kuṛai = veri-ñ-kuṛai*.

302. *Āvayin valleḷuttu mikutalu murittē.*

The corresponding voiceless consonant also is inserted in the above cases. Ex. *veri-k-kuṛai*.

303. *Ñakāra viṛuti valleḷut tiyaiyū*

Takāra mākun vērrumaip poruṭkē.

If the standing word ends in *ṇ* and the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant (*k*, *c*, *t* or *p*), *ṇ* is changed to *ṭ* in *case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *maṇ + kuṭam = maṭ-kuṭam*.

304. *Āṇum peṇṇu ma : riṇai yiyarkai.*

The words *āṇ* and *peṇ* behave in the same way in sandhi as *a : riṇai* words (*i.e.*) there is no change. Ex. *āṇ + kai = āṇkai*; *peṇkai*.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 148 and 156.

305. *Āṇmarak kiḷavi yaraimara viyarrē.*

The word *āṇ* denoting a tree is of the same nature as the word *arai* denoting a tree. Ex. *āṇ + kōṭu = āṇ + am + kōṭu = āṇ-am-kōṭu*.

Note.—Cf. sūtra, 284.

G

Correction.

In Part ii of Vol. III at page 168, last line and at page 169, line 25 read III-iii-12 for III-iii-2.

306. *Vinçya varūñ kūyaḥ peyarvayī*
Nunṇaiyu murittē yallē cāriyai
Ceyyū marnūkiṟ polivarn kālai.

If the word *vin* that denotes space is the standing word and if it is followed by a verb, the increment *atti* is also inserted in poetry. Ex. *vin-ṇ-atti-k-koṭkum vaṇṇaltamarar.*

307. *Tolirpeya rellān tolirpeya riyaḷa.*

All verbal nouns (ending in *ṇ*) are of the same nature (as those ending in *ā*) (i. e.) if they are followed by words commencing with a voiceless consonant, a followed by the same voiceless consonant is inserted and if they are followed by words commencing with *ā*, *u*, *m* or *v*, *u* alone is inserted. Ex. *maṇ + kaṭitū = maṇ-ṇ-u-k-kaṭitū*; *maṇ + valitū = maṇ-ṇ-u-valitū*.

308. *Kiḷaipeya vellān koḷattiri pūlavē.*

If words ending in *ṇ* and denoting groups are standing words, there is, in general, no change in sandhi.

309. *Veṇṇumai yalvāḷi yeyne puṇṇavuppeyar*
Veṇṇumai yiyarkai nilaiyalu murittē.

The standing word *ey* denoting food is sometimes of the same nature in *non-case-relation sandhi* as in *case-relation sandhi*, (i.e.) *ṇ* is sometimes changed to *ṭ* if the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant. Ex. *ey + kaṭitū = eṭ-kaṭitū* or *ey-kaṭitū*.

310. *Muraṇey polirpeyar mutaliya nilaiyum.*

The change in sandhi when the verbal noun *muraṇ* is the standing word is the same as is mentioned before (i. e.) in sūtras 148 and 303. Ex. *muraṇ + kaṭitū = muraṇ-kaṭitū*; *muraṇ + kaṭumai = muraṇ-kaṭumai*.

Note 1.—The verbal noun *muraṇ* does not behave in the same way as other verbal nouns both in *case-relation sandhi* and in *non-case-relation sandhi*.

Note 2.—Cf. sūtra 307.

311. *Makara viṇṭi vēṇṇumai yāyir*
Kuvarak keṭṭu velleḷuttu mikumē.

If the standing word ends in *m* and if the coming word commences with a voiceless consonant, *m* is dropped and the

same voiceless consonant is substituted for it. Ex. *maram + tōl = mara-t-tōl* etc.

312. *Akara ākōram varūññ kālai*
Yiṇṇumicai yakara nīḷalu murittē.

If the coming words commence with *a* or *ā*, the 'a' preceding the final 'm' of the standing words is optionally lengthened (in *case-relation sandhi*). Ex. *maram + aṭi = marā aṭi*; *kuḷam + āmpal = kuḷā ampal* etc.

Note:—*ā* of *āmpal* is shortened to *a*.

313. *Melleḷut tuṇaḷu mōḷiyumā ruḷavē*
Celvali yarital vaḷakkat tāna.

There are words ending in *m* after which corresponding nasal also is inserted instead of voiceless consonant in *case-relation sandhi* when they are followed by words beginning with a voiceless consonant. Such words must be found out from usage. Ex. *kuḷam + karai = kuḷa-ñ-karai* or *kuḷa-k-karai* etc.

314. *Illa maraṇpeyar vicaimara viyarṇē.*

The word *illam* denoting a tree is of the same nature as *vicai* denoting a tree. Ex. *illam + tōl = illa-n-tōl* etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 244, 263, 279 and 283.

315. *Alvali yellā melleḷut tākum.*

M is changed to the nasal corresponding to the succeeding voiceless consonant in *non-case-relation sandhi*. Ex. *maram + ciṇitū = maraṇciṇitū* etc.

316. *Akameṇ kiḷavikkuk kaimuṇ variṇē*
Mutaṇilai yōḷiya munṇavai keṭutalum
Varaiṇilai yīṇṇē yāciri yarkka
Melleḷuttu mikuta lāvayi nāṇa.

If *akam* is the standing word and *kai* the coming word, *kaṁ* of *akam* is optionally dropped in the opinion of revered elders, when *ñ* is inserted before *kai*. Ex. *akam + kai = aṇkai* or *akaṇkai*.

317. *Ilameṇ kiḷavikkuk paṭuvaru kālai*
Nilaiyalu murittē ceyyū lāṇa.

If *ilam* is followed by *paṭu*, *m* is also retained in poetry. Ex. *ilam-paṭu-pulavarēṇṇa-kai-niraiya*.

318. *Attoṭu civaṇu māyirat tīṇṭi*
Yotta veṇṇu muṇṇavaru kālai.

If the word *āyiram* is followed by a suitable word denoting number, the increment *atti* is inserted between them (after *m* is

dropped). Ex. āyiram + onṛū = āyira + attū + onṛū = āyirattonṛū; āyirattonṛū etc.

319. *Aṭaiyoṭu tōṇṛiṇu mataṇō rarrē.*

The same is the case even if the word āyiram is preceded by a qualifying number. Ex. paṭiṇāyirat-tonṛū etc.

320. *Aḷavu niṇaiyum vēṛṛumai yiyala.*

If āyiram is followed by a word denoting measure or weight, the change in sandhi is the same as in *case-relation sandhi*. Ex. āyiram + kalam = āyira-k-kalam etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 311.

321. *Paṭarkkaip peyaru munṇilaip peyaru
Totaṅkaṇ kuṛukum peyarnilaik kiḷaviyum
Vēṛṛumai yāyi nuruṇiya ṇilaiyu
Melleluttu mikuta lāvayi ṇūṇa.*

If the third personal pronoun (ellārum), the second personal pronoun (ellirum), and the pronouns that are shortened (tām, nām and yām) are standing words, they undergo the same change in *case-relation sandhi* as when they are followed by case-suffixes, when m is dropped and a nasal corresponding to the following consonant is inserted. Ex. ellārum + kai = ellār-tam + kai + um = ellār-taṇ-kai-y-um; ellir-nuṇ-kai-y-um; taṇ-kai, naṇ-kai, eṇ-kai.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 189 and 192.

322. *Allatu kiḷappi ṇiyarkai yūkum.*

There is no change in *non-case-relation sandhi* (when the above-mentioned words are standing words). Ex. ellārum + ciṇiyar = ellāruṇ-ciṇiyar.

323. *Allatu kiḷappiṇum vēṛṛumaik kaṇṇu
Mellā meṇṇipeya rurupiya ṇilaiyum
Vēṛṛumai yalvaḷic cāriyai ṇilaiyātu.*

If ellām is the standing word, the change in both *non-case-relation sandhi* and *case-relation sandhi* is the same as when it is followed by case suffixes, except that the increment is not inserted in the case of *non-case-relation sandhi*. Ex. ellām + kōṭū = ellā-varṇu-k-kōṭum etc.; ellām + kuṇiya = ellā-k-kuṇiya-v-um etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 190.

324. *Melleluttu miṇiṇu māṇa millai.*

There is no harm if a nasal is inserted instead of a voiceless consonant (in the above case). Ex. ellām + kuṇiya = ellāṇ-kuṇiya-v-um.

325. *Uyartinaṇai yāyi nuruṇiya ṇilaiyum.*

If ellām is uyartinaṇai, the sandhi is the same as when it is followed by a case-suffix. Ex. ellām + kai = ellā-nam-kai-y-um = ellā-naṇ-kai-y-um.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 191.

326. *Numme noruṇeyar melleluttu mikumē.*

If num is the standing word, a nasal is inserted (instead of a voiceless consonant after the dropping of m in *case-relation sandhi*). Ex. num + kai = nuṇ-kai.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 311.

327. *Allatay maruṇkiṇ colluṇ kālai
Yukkeṭa niṇṇa meyvayī ṇivara
Iyyitai ṇilai yirukkeṭa vakara
Niṇṇal vēṇṇum puḷliyoṭu puṇarntē
Yappāṇ molivayī ṇiyarkai yūkum.*

In *non-case-relation sandhi*, u of num is replaced by ī, ī is inserted after ī and, the final m is replaced by r, but no change takes place between the standing word and the coming word. Ex. niyir kuṇiyir.

Note.—Though Tolkāppiyāṇār himself has mentioned the word niyir as the second person plural in peyariyal (Tol. Col. 188 & 190.), yet it is clear that he opines that it is the transformed form of num from the expression *nummeṇ ṇiripeyar* in the sūtra Nummeṇ ṇiripeyar viṇāviṇ peyareṇ—ṇammurāi yiraṇṭu mavarrīyal piyalum (Tol. Col. 143).

328. *Tolirpeya rellāṇ tolirpeya riyaḷa.*

All verbal nouns (ending in m) are of the same nature as those (ending in ṇ). Ex. cem + kaṭitū = cem-m-u-k-kaṭitū etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 297.

329. *Imuṇ kamnu murumeṇ kiḷaviyu
Māmuṇ peyaru mavarrō raṇṇa.*

The three nouns im, kam and urum are of the same nature as the verbal nouns. Ex. im-uk-k-kaṭitū, kam-m-u-k-kaṭitū, urum-u-k-kaṭitū.

330. *Vēṛṛumai yāyi ṇēṇai yiraṇṭu
Tōṇṇam vēṇṇu makkeṇ cāriyai.*

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The first two take the increment *akkū* in *case-relation sandhi*.
Ex. *im + kuṭam* = *imakkuṭam*; *kummaccāṭi* etc.

331. *Vakāra micaiyu makāraṇ kuṭukum.*

M followed by v is shortened (to quarter of a *mātrā*).
Ex. *nilam valitū*.

332. *Nāḷpeyark kīlavi mērkīlan tanna*
Vattu māṇmicai varainilai yinṇē
Yorru meykēṭa leṇmaṇār pulavar.

Learned men say that words ending in m and denoting star take the increment *āṇ* as mentioned before (in sūtra 248), drop their final m and take the increment *attū* before *āṇ*, when they are standing words. Ex. *makam + koṇṭāṇ* = *maka + attū + āṇ + koṇṭāṇ* = *makattār koṇṭāṇ*.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 126 & 248.

333. *Nakāra viṇuti valḷeḷut tiyaiyiṇ*
Rakāra māḥum vēṇṇumaip poruṭkē.

In *case-relation sandhi* the final *ṇ* of standing words is changed to *r* if the coming words commence with a voiceless consonant. Ex. *poṇ + kuṭam* = *por-kuṭam* etc.

334. *Maṇṇuṇ ciṇṇu māṇu mīṇum*
Piṇṇu muṇṇum viṇaiyeṇcu kīlaviyu
Maṇṇa viyala veṇmaṇār pulavar.

Learned men say that the same is the case in sandhi when the words *maṇ*, *ciṇ*, *āṇ*, *iṇ*, *piṇ*, *muṇ* and verbal participles are standing words. Ex. *atumaṇ koṇ kaṇṇērē* etc.

335. *Cuṭṭumutal vayiṇu mekaramutal vayiṇu*
Maṇṇaṇṇu nilaiyu miyarkaiya veṇṇa.

It is said that the same is the case in sandhi when the word *vayiṇ* preceded by a demonstrative root or *e* is the standing word. Ex. *avvayir-koṇṭāṇ*, *evvayirkoṇṭāṇ* etc.

336. *Kuyiṇeṇ kīlavi yiyarkai yāḥum.*

There is no change in sandhi if *kuyiṇ* is the standing word. Ex. *kuyiṇ kuḷām* etc.

337. *Ekiṇmāra māyi nāṇmarā viyarrē.*

Ekiṇ denoting a tree is of the same nature as *āṇ* denoting a tree. Ex. *ekiṇ + kōṭṭi* = *ekiṇ-aṇ-kōṭṭi*.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 284 & 305.

338. *Ēṇai yekiṇē yakaram varumē*
Valḷeḷut tiyarkai mikutal vēṇṇum.

Ekiṇ denoting other than a tree takes 'a' after it and a voiceless consonant is inserted after 'a'. Ex. *ekiṇ-a-k-kāl* etc.

339. *Kīḷaiṇṇeyā vellāṇ kīḷaiṇṇeyā riyaḷa.*

Words ending in *ṇ* and denoting groups are of the same nature as those (ending in *ṇ*) and denoting groups. Ex. *eyiṇ kuṭi* etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtra 308.

340. *Miṇeṇ kīlavi valḷeḷut turavē.*

If *miṇ* is the standing word, *ṇ* is optionally changed to *r*. Ex. *miṇ-kaṇ*, *mīr-kaṇ* etc.

341. *Tēṇeṇ kīlavi valḷeḷut tiyaiyiṇ*
Mēṇilai yottalum valḷeḷuttu mikutalu
Māmuṇai yiraṇṇu murimaiyu muṭaittē
Valḷeḷuttu mikuvāḷi yiruti yillai.

If *tēṇ* is followed by a word commencing with a voiceless consonant, *ṇ* is optionally changed to *r* as before (in the case of *miṇ*) or *ṇ* is dropped and the following voiceless consonant is doubled. Ex. *tēṇ-kuṭam*, *tēr-kuṭam*, *tē-k-kuṭam* etc.

342. *Melleḷuttu mikiṇu māna millai.*

There is no harm if a nasal is inserted (instead of a voiceless consonant). Ex. *tē-ṇ-kuṭam* etc.

343. *Melleḷut tiyaiyi viṇutiyo turalum.*

If *tēṇ* is followed by a word commencing with a nasal, *ṇ* is optionally dropped. Ex. *tēṇ + ṇeri* = *tēṇ ṇeri* or *tē ṇeri*.

344. *Irāṇ rōṇṇa miyarkai yāḥum.*

If *irāl* follows *tēṇ*, there is no change in sandhi. Ex. *tēṇ + irāl* = *tēṇ irāl*.

345. *Oṇṇumiku takaramoṭu nīṇṇalu murittē.*

It is possible (for the same *irāl*) to be preceded by *tt*, (in which case the final *ṇ* of *tēṇ* is dropped). Ex. *tē-tt-irāl*.

346. *Miṇṇum piṇṇum paṇṇuṇ kaṇṇu*
Maṇṇār colluṇ tolirpeya riyaḷa.

The four words *miṇ*, *piṇ*, *paṇ* and *kaṇ* are of the same nature as verbal nouns. Ex. *paṇṇu-k-kaṭitū* etc.

Note.—Cf. sūtras 297 & 298.

347. *Vēṇṇumai yāyi nēṇai yekiṇoṭu*
Tōṇṇa mokkuṇ kaṇṇeṇ kīlavi.

In *case-relation sandhi* the word *kaṇ* resembles *ckiṇ* not denoting tree. Ex. *kaṇ-ṇ-a-k-kuṭam* etc.

Note.—Cf. *sūtra* 338.

348. *Iyaṇṇeyar muṇṇart tantai muṇṇivariṇ*
Mutarṇaṇ meykēṭa vakara nilaiyu
Meyyolil laṇkeṭu marviyaṇ ṇeyarē.

If proper names ending in *ṇ* are followed by the word *tantai* denoting father, the *aṇ* of the standing word and the initial consonant of the coming word are dropped. Ex. *Cāttan + tantai = Cāttantai*; *Korṇantai* etc.

349. *Ātaṇum pūtaṇuṇ kūṛiya viyaṇṇoṭu*
Peṇarōṭ vakaran tuvarak keṭumē.

If *ātaṇ* and *pūtaṇ* are standing words and the coming word is *tantai* denoting father, the change in sandhi is the same as before with the addition that the final consonant and the initial vowel of the standing word and the coming word respectively are also dropped; (*i. e.*) *taṇ* of *ātaṇ* and *pūtaṇ* and *ta* of *tantai* are dropped. Ex. *ātaṇ + tantai = āntai*; *pūntai*.

350. *Ciṇṇaṇṇoṭu varuvali yiyarṇai yāṇum.*

If such words are preceded by adjectives there is no change (*i. e.*) no dropping of letters. Ex. *peruṇcāttan ṇantai*, *peruṇkorṇan ṇantai* etc.

351. *Appeyar meyyolil laṇkeṭu valiyu*
Niṇṇalu murillē yammey cāriyai
Makkaṇ muṇṇaitokūu maruṇki ṇāṇa.

Aṇ is dropped in such words (*cāttan*, *korṇan* etc.) and the increment *am* takes its place when the word denoting son is understood between the standing word and the coming word. Ex. *cāttan + makaṇ + korṇan = cāttaṇ-korṇan*.

352. *Tāṇum ṇēṇuṇ kōṇu meṇṇu*
Māmuṇṇai yiyarṇeyar tiripīṭa ṇilavē.

There is no dropping off if the words *tāṇ*, *ēṇ* and *kōṇ* are either followed by the word *tantai* or have the word denoting son understood after them. Ex. *tāṇ-ṇantai* etc.; *ṇēṇ-korṇan* etc.

353. *Tāṇyā ṇēṇumṇeyar ruruṇiya ṇilaiyum.*

If *tāṇ* and *yāṇ* are standing words, the change in sandhi is the same as when they are followed by case-suffixes. Ex. *tāṇ + kai = taṇkai*; *ēṇ-kai* etc.