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THE ARCOS RAID AND AFTER.

I.

ONE day, about six weeks ago, Sir William Joynson-Hicks called upon Sir Austen Chamberlain and said he proposed to raid "Arcos"—the Headquarters of the Soviet Trade Delegation in London—on information given him by the Secretary for War that a certain document missing from the War Office would probably be found there. Sir Austen replied by asking whether, if the missing document had been believed to be "in any business house in London entirely unconnected with Russia," a similar raid would have been proposed, and on being told that "certainly," said "very well, raid it." This was the account given by Sir William Joynson-Hicks, in his speech in the House of Commons on May 26th, of the origin and inception of the Arcos raid.

Last year after the General Strike in speaking on a motion for adjournment to discuss Russian propaganda in this country, Sir Austen said :

"When we consider what action we are to take, it will be clear to the House from what I have said, that we have no reason to be tender to the Soviet Government. We are under no misconception as to the way in which the Trade Agreement has been broken. We do not pretend that relations with a Government which acts in that way in defiance of the comity of nations and the obligations which one nation owes to another can be, I will not say cordial and friendly, but can be even cordial and correct. The only question we have to decide is whether in view of the situation in Europe, it is in our own interest to continue, with our eyes open, these diplomatic relations, or whether our interest would be better served by terminating them. . . .

"If the question to-day were, 'Shall we at this moment resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government?' I should answer it in the negative, but that is not the issue. The issue is, 'Shall we break off relations which have now existed for some time; shall we terminate an Agreement which has been in force?' I believe to answer those questions in the affirmative would be no good to us, would give us no weapon for fighting disorder or disloyalty or revolution within our borders, would create division where we seek union, and would in its echoes abroad increase the uncertainty, increase the fears, increase the instability of European conditions, which it is and ought to be our chief object to remove." (House of Commons, June 25th, 1926.)

Speaking on the same subject a few days earlier in the House of Lords, Lord Balfour said :

"It is one thing not to have relations and quite another thing to break off relations which you have. I am not sure at all that we ought ever to have gone into relations with Russia . . . but observe that there is a great difference between breaking off

relations and not entering into them, because the first of these two operations produces disturbances which may go far beyond the confines either of Russia or of this country. The whole of the industrial, financial, and economic world, on this side of the Atlantic at all events, is in a most sensitive and embarrassed condition. Nobody can doubt that it is a condition under which it will be the height of rashness, except for a really serious gain, to introduce a new disturbing element. . . .

" . . . Nothing is gained by these formal gestures which show that we greatly disapprove of people whose actions we cannot in any way control. It is an operation which carries with it no substantial advantages. It may give you the excitement at the moment of some effective proceeding, but it is utterly ineffective, it leads to nothing good, and unquestionably, if I may repeat myself, I do think the condition of the world, the condition at least of the European world, at this moment requires us to walk in all these international matters with a very cautious tread. . . .

" . . . Therefore, until it can be shown that some clear advantage is obtained by an alternative of our formal relations with Russia, I am in favour of leaving things as they are, having quite explicitly explained to anybody who cares to listen to our explanations that we are not dupes of Russian policy, having made it perfectly clear that we know what they desire, why they desire it, how they intend to aim at it, and by what means they intend to attain it. On our part, we are confident that, with this nation behind us . . . we have nothing to fear from the contrivances and intrigues of any nation under Heaven." (House of Lords, June 17th, 1926.)

A comparison of these extracts with the Home Secretary's account of the Arcos raid suggests certain questions. Did Sir Austen, with these weighty considerations in his mind, really decide that Arcos should be raided because "any business house in London entirely unconnected with Russia" might, in similar circumstances, be subjected to the same process? Did he foresee what the consequences would be when he gave his consent, and specially the complete rupture to which he would be driven by the logic of events, and if he did foresee them, did he take the steps which would naturally be expected from a Foreign Secretary contemplating the breaking off of relations with a foreign Power—consult the Cabinet, communicate with Ambassadors, sound other Governments before committing himself beyond retreat? Or is the truth merely that Sir Austen was taken unawares and pushed down the steep place by his colleague whose ideas about the Reds and the short and proper way of dealing with them have long been notorious? That is difficult to believe, but it is at least a possible inference from Sir William Joynson-Hicks' way of putting it. In any case, the suggestion that it was a mere police operation founded on the naïve idea that the missing document would be discovered in an Arcos safe can only with difficulty be credited by serious people.

Whatever may be the answer to these questions, the staging of this affair was in the highest degree unfortunate. The air of melodrama thrown over it, the projection of Sir William Joynson-Hicks to the centre of the scene, the crowning exclamation of Mr. Baldwin that it was the most popular exploit of his Government—all this was surely just what ought to have been avoided, even if it was imperative to break with Russia. The raiding of an institution which is even semi-officially connected with a diplomatic mission is not a pleasing incident; and our Foreign Office must have been aware that, in spite of its results, the precedent set recently in Peking has been watched with a good deal of uneasiness in Europe. For if the purloining of military documents, the tapping of ciphers, and the possession of information collected by secret agents is to be considered sufficient justification for a raid, which Embassy in which capital can consider itself safe? Moreover, the addition of the items discovered to the counts against the Bolsheviks did not aggravate the total indictment, but rather produced the impression that they had merely been doing what everybody does—which is very far from being the truth. All this, in fact, was unwise and unnecessary precisely because, if a breach was deemed necessary, the Foreign Office had abundant justification in its own archives, and because also, in that event, there was every reason why the Foreign Secretary, and no other Minister, should have both been and seemed to be the initiator of the policy.

II.

So far as formal justification goes, the case is not worth arguing. Let it be admitted at once that all the circumstances attending Bolshevism are irregular and abnormal, even pathological. According to all ordinary diplomatic standards, the problem from the beginning has been not how to cut the communications with Soviet Russia, but how in any way to keep touch with her. For she is governed by the strangest people the world has yet seen in high places, people whose behaviour, judged by these normal standards, is a perpetual paradox and provocation. They blandly avow that to overthrow the institutions of their neighbours is their dearest object in life, and at the same time expect and desire to be received as friends in these neighbours' houses. They preach the gospel of Communism to all the world, and at the same time humbly sue for the assistance of foreign capital in developing their own country. They even seem to think it strange that their activities should be resented. When the Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang-Kaishek turned on their emissaries in China, their leaders bitterly complained that he had stabbed them *treacherously* in the back at the very moment when they had all but succeeded in raising the Chinese proletariat behind his back. This may be taken as a brief epitome

of their attitude to the whole of the non-Sovietised, unregenerate rest of the world. Yet with it all they exercise a most singular hypnotic influence upon working people in other countries. The fact that they have made confusion and established tyranny in their own country does not in the least prevent admiring tributes being offered them by the Trade Unionists who profess to be democrats and champions of liberty in Great Britain. Not only Mr. A. J. Cook, but Mr. Clynes and Mr. Arthur Henderson are up in arms when they are touched. If the British Labour Party were in Russia, it would undoubtedly receive very short shrift from the heroes whom it admires from afar, but not being in Russia, it sees only the proletarian façade and forgets or suppresses the rest.

The story is both tragic and fantastic, rich in material for "anti-Red" leaflets. Yet, in spite of everything, and with its eyes open, the greater part of Europe has till now deliberately decided that contact should be maintained with these strange people; and for that purpose has invented a special kind of diplomatic technique, which for short may be called the technique of the blind eye. This was largely a British invention, and four successive Governments have adhered to it and defended it with vigour and pertinacity against the obvious superficial criticisms to which it was liable. Why have they done this? For the reasons indicated in the quotations at the head of this article, namely, that whatever the inconveniences of maintaining relations with Russia, the alternative of breaking with her was, in view of the general situation in Europe, a far worse evil, and that the nuisance of Bolshevik propaganda would not be abated but rather aggravated and inflamed by giving her new causes of quarrel. To many of us this has seemed to be one of the few wise and prudent things that have been done in Europe recently; and the question which now arises is whether there is any new and good reason why we should go back from it, and especially why we British should take single-handed action for that purpose.

If so, it has not been explained to us. Sir Austen Chamberlain has spoken vaguely of some change in world affairs which makes safe and wise what would have been dangerous and unwise last year, but all the known circumstances suggest that the British breakaway is specially inopportune at this time. Soviet propaganda is sustaining what are apparently crushing blows in China. There is, according to all recent accounts, strong dissatisfaction in Russia itself, of which Trotsky is the spokesman, at the squandering of Russian resources by Communist fanatics in remote countries. After a bitter struggle, the Moderates had so far gained ground as to procure the sending of Russian delegates to the Economic Conference of the League of Nations at Geneva, and these delegates had behaved on the whole with good sense. There seemed at length

to be a chance, that the Russian hostility to the League of Nations would be broken down. There was also the possibility that Russian trade with this country would be expanded in the near future—a consideration not wholly to be left out of account in the present state of British industry. Finally there is still the sensitive state of European politics described by Lord Balfour, in which almost nothing can be done by one Power to another without causing uneasiness and anxiety to the other Powers. If patience was the policy decided upon, all the reasons at this moment seemed to counsel its continuance.

But the reasons for patience go beyond these immediate expediencies. Russian Communism is all the time changing its form under stress of economic circumstances. It is wholly different now from what it was six years ago, and six years hence it will be even more different from what it is now. It would be rash to predict how exactly it will develop, but the one permanent result of revolution is likely to be in Russia, as in France, the establishment of a peasant proprietary making a solid foundation for a Conservative and Nationalist State. The Revolution may survive in a collectivist form of government, governing the urban part of the population in ways that will be called Socialist, but this is not likely to prevent the re-entry of Russia as an eligible partner for a European Alliance, or the revival of the old ambitions of Tsarist Russia—its reach out toward the warm water, its desire to command the Straits, its ambition to dominate the Slav peoples and so forth. Some of these things may already be seen pushing through the thin disguise of Bolshevik propaganda in China and the East. If in this interval of development and revival Russia is to be treated as a Pariah nation by the other Powers, she will undoubtedly at the end be a most serious menace to Geneva, Locarno, and all hopes of maintaining the League of Nations against the old tendency to split into two camps. To keep contact with Russia, to endeavour gradually to draw her into the concert of Europe, and to make her finally a co-guarantor with the Western nations of the general peace, must from this point of view be the aim of any wise statesmanship.

III.

The part which Russia plays in Europe, or will play when she is on her feet again, is far better understood in Paris and Berlin than in London, and it is to be observed that both the French and German Governments so far from following the British lead, have, to all appearances, been greatly disturbed and perplexed by it. The French Government has a lively recollection of the hopes that it built on Russia, and the German of the fears that she inspired in the years before the war. The parts may be reversed in the future, and Germany entertain the hopes and France the fears, but both know that it is idle to look into the future without reckoning with Russia.

It took twenty years from the Treaty of Frankfort to establish the Franco-Russian Alliance and during all those years the possibility of such an alliance was a nightmare to Bismarck. His failure to keep Russia in line with Austria in the League of the Three Emperors was the ruin of his policy and the wreck of all his plans for keeping France isolated. France may now reasonably look at the situation through Bismarck's eyes. Her security rests on Locarno and the League of Nations, but if that fails or wears thin, Germany in her turn may find an eligible partner in Russia. She has only with great difficulty decided to turn west and reject the "Eastern Orientation" which her Nationalist parties favour; and if she fails to find satisfaction in that policy, and Russia in the meantime is cut off from the Western Powers, what more likely than that she will again swing eastward and a German-Russian Alliance follow twenty years after the peace of Versailles just as a Franco-Russian Alliance followed twenty years after the Treaty of Frankfort?

These may seem remote thoughts to Sir William Joynson-Hicks with his eye on the *Daily Mail* or to Mr. Winston Churchill who believes in the virtue of the "short and effective word 'go'." It is understood both in Paris and Berlin that Russia won't go, and that no short and effective word will remove her from the map or relieve other Governments from anxiety about her next moves. If there were nothing else, there would always be Poland, whose position is frail and insecure and a possible source of danger to all her neighbours except on the assumption that Russia will be at peace with her and them. We may say in brief that every act of policy which pushes Russia outside the pale increases the difficulties of the nations within the pale. From their different points of view, it is equally important to both France and Germany that membership of the League of Nations should not require hostility to Russia. The prospect of a recovering Russia free to play the old game with a dissatisfied Western Power may please the German Nationalists who dream of a war of revenge, but it can please no one else in either Germany or France. To M. Briand it must be a point of capital importance to avoid any stroke which may throw Russia into the arms of Germany, and to Dr. Stresemann and those Germans who have staked their fortunes on Locarno, it is only less important that they should not be driven to the choice between Russia and the Western Powers. These are obvious considerations which must be in the mind of those who are thinking of this affair in European terms and we may assume that to have been in the mind of Sir Austen Chamberlain when he said last year that the action he has now taken "would create division where we seek union, and would in its echoes abroad increase the uncertainty, increase the fears, increase the instability

of European conditions which it is and ought to be our chief object to remove."

IV.

Let me return for a moment to Sir Austen's suggestion that there has been a change in the European conditions which renders safe and wise what last year would have been dangerous and unwise. This change, whatever it may be, is not visible to the naked eye of the ordinary observer. Comparing this year with last, there seems even to be a certain reaction from the mood of Locarno. M. Poincaré has shown signs of returning to his old attitude about the evacuation of the Rhineland; the Thoiry conversations have not gone forward; Signor Mussolini continues to keep nerves on edge. A year ago the other countries looked confidently to Great Britain to exert a steadying influence with its eye on the delicate balance of give and take, which can alone keep the Western Powers in any sort of concert. But this year there have been serious doubts whether the British Cabinet is in the state of control and self-discipline which would enable it to play this part. Mr. Churchill's splashing manifesto from Rome on behalf of Signor Mussolini had an immediate reaction on British and French relations and revived the suspicions that the British Foreign Office was backing Italy in Albania. We in England might say that it was only Mr. Churchill, but it is not believed in France that a British Chancellor of the Exchequer can deploy himself in this way without the knowledge and assent of the Foreign Secretary. And now when the Home Secretary is seen apparently forcing the hands of the Foreign Secretary, and when English newspapers proclaim that "the right wing of the Tory Party has seized complete control of the Cabinet," it is scarcely surprising if our neighbours in Europe begin to comment once more on the unaccountability of British policy and the apparent levity with which British politicians plunge into great affairs as an incident in their domestic politics.

It seems to me impossible to look at this affair in its wider aspect without coming to the conclusion that all the reasons which weighed with Sir Austen Chamberlain last year in resisting the demand of his party for a rupture with Russia were in full force this year and perhaps in even greater force this year than last. If to turn the blind eye was the higher expediency then, it is the higher expediency now. But the thing having been done, let us at least realise what its consequences may be, and seek, if we can, to make them as little harmful as possible. What threatens immediately is not war or anything like it; it is, if we are thinking of our own interests alone, only a concentration against us of Bolshevik hostility and propaganda which is more a nuisance than a danger. The elephant and the whale can fortunately, for the present, not get at each other in

any serious encounter. But for European purposes and eventually for our own security and peace, the estrangement and isolation of Russia are very serious things, and if it is our policy to cut the communications with her, then we are under a greater obligation than ever to pursue the Locarno policy with the other Powers, and so see that the Russian estrangement is not aggravated by their differences. Let us at least be clear on the one point that if Locarno fails, Russia will again be in a position to play a decisive part in the affairs of Western Europe, and that on the line we are now going, the success of Locarno is more than ever imperative. Miscalculations about Russia played a tragic part in the history of Europe before the war, and those who are thinking of peace have above all things to be careful that they are not repeated.

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I had written this article before the assassination of the Soviet Ambassador at Warsaw, while he was in the company of the envoy returning from London, had been announced. That is an incident which no Government could have been expected to foresee, but it has brought suddenly to light all the latent forces and animosities which make the prudent handling of this question so difficult. The anger justly kindled by the abominable reprisals in Russia throws us back into an atmosphere which is less than ever favourable to a cool estimate of the permanent factors governing policy towards Russia. Yet these weigh and will continue to weigh with our neighbours in Europe for the reasons which are indicated in this article. To us affairs in Poland and Eastern Europe are of comparatively remote interest, but Germany and France can never think of Russia except in East-European terms, and it is natural to them to look in Warsaw for the reactions of what is done in London. The Soviet charge against us of having planned a new crusade against Russia is an absurdity which will not be taken seriously in Europe, but the circumstances ought to remind us that other Powers have liabilities in this matter which cannot and ought not to be left out of account in our policy. It is more than ever necessary for the Locarno Powers to seek a common mode of action in their dealings with Russia.

J. A. SPENDER.

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE.

IT may be truly said that the League of Nations is the product of modern economic conditions, and that but for the growing interdependence of the nations the League could not and would not have been created. Nevertheless, this condition of interdependence which brought the League into being is not even yet fully recognised by the nations which still base their individual policies upon the theory of their economic independence and not upon the basic fact, which cannot be challenged, of their economic interdependence. This failure to admit what is indisputable is the main cause of the present economic difficulties which confront the nations with their attendant grave financial dangers.

If it be borne in mind that in pre-war days extreme nationalism in political affairs was the cause of the breakdown in international relations and of the world-wide war which ensued, it will be the more readily realised that the application of the same spirit to economic matters, although the nations have become so completely dependent upon each other for the means of maintaining their peoples, must, if persisted in, eventually bring about a world-wide business breakdown with consequences even more disastrous than those resulting from the political breakdown.

Had a policy of international co-operation been adopted in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the nations had already become interdependent in a high degree, and had the League of Nations then been created to carry out this policy, the peoples of the world would long since have realised the unity of their interests which has come about in consequence of the extraordinary changes that have been wrought in world economic conditions by the great inventions of modern times. Even the possibility of a world war in the twentieth century would never have arisen had there been any understanding of modern economic conditions. The slowness with which political thought adjusts itself to changing economic circumstances, however, rendered the formation of a League of Nations based upon international co-operation, not only quite impossible in the middle of the nineteenth century, but even made it impossible in the years immediately prior to the war when the nations were still more closely bound together by economic ties. It required the sufferings and the lessons of a disastrous war to cause the nations to adjust their political vision in some degree to the economic actualities which had existed for nearly a century and at last to bring into being a league in order to promote international co-operation. But, even since the war, with all its lessons, the nations have continued to be dominated by political theories which had weight when countries were isolated units and had to supply themselves from their own resources and from their own produc-

tions, but which have no value whatever in these days of intercommunication, of international trade, and of world production.

And this failure of political thought to adjust itself, even since the war, to the actualities of the time has accentuated the great disorganisation of business involved by war in these days of international dependence. The consequences of this condition of political ignorance, and of political blindness to the fundamental facts of modern life, are thus of the most grievous character.

During the war the belligerent nations were compelled to borrow abroad vast sums in order to purchase food and material necessary for their maintenance, and, at the same time, to sell that part of their foreign investments for which a market could be found, thus greatly disturbing the business equilibrium of the entire world. Since the war these nations have borrowed still greater sums from other countries in order to purchase what they needed for the maintenance of their peoples. And credit must continue to be created for this purpose so long as the business of the world is out of adjustment, and nations are unable to pay for what they need to buy, plus the interest they owe by sales of their own products and services.

But the amount of credit is now so vast that any further appreciable increase may be a matter of difficulty. Nevertheless, should additional credit cease to be available, great distress must ensue both in the nations that need to buy and in the nations that need to sell. As long as additional credit can be obtained, so long can present conditions continue and a general breakdown of business be averted. But it is now of supreme importance for the nations to realise without further delay the gravity of the situation in which they are placing themselves.

Under the most favourable conditions and with the most active co-operation of nation with nation, the situation would be highly dangerous and most difficult to adjust, but under existing conditions of international antagonism, when nations are creating every possible obstacle to the sale by other nations of the goods they need to sell in order to pay for the products they need to buy, and to honour their debts, the situation is an impossible one.

Moreover, when the world's credit situation is considered in relation to Reparations, the difficulties become still more obvious. How can nations pay great sums for Reparations, and for interest both on private and public debts, if they are not permitted to sell their products to other nations to the extent necessary to enable the payments to be made?

The difficulties of the present situation are thus four-fold :

- 1.—How can consuming nations continue to buy if they are unable to sell their products in exchange?
- 2.—How can producing nations continue to sell what they need

to sell if the consuming nations are unable to sell the goods they need to sell in order to make payment?

- 3.—How can credit obligations, both temporary and permanent, be met unless the creditor nations are prepared to accept payment in goods and services?
- 4.—How can Reparations be paid unless the nations responsible for their payment are permitted to sell to other countries enough of their products and services not only to make the reparation payments but to purchase necessities of life for the sustenance of their peoples?

At the present time payments for all these purposes are being made by the help of new credit, but inasmuch as this method cannot continue indefinitely, a breakdown both of business and of credit will become inevitable unless nations that desire to buy are permitted to sell, nations that need to sell are prepared to buy, debtor nations are permitted to meet their obligations by sales of their products, and countries compelled to pay Reparations can sell abroad enough of their products to make the required payments, and to purchase what they need to buy.

The growing danger arising from this situation has caused the business world much anxiety and the International Chamber of Commerce has been specially active in urging the Governments of Europe to reverse their policies. Its action, last autumn, was strongly supported by the great bankers and industrialists of Europe including those of Great Britain as well as by the leading bankers of the United States, in what is now known as the Bankers' Plea for the Removal of Restrictions upon European Trade. But it is to be greatly feared that the representations of such leading authorities would have been without avail had not the body which has been specially created to deal with matters common to the whole world also realised the gravity of the situation and the urgent need of action.

Whatever may be the consequences of the failure of political through to keep abreast of modern economic conditions, the hope that effective remedial measures may be taken before it is too late has been immensely strengthened by the action of the League of Nations in calling together a World Economic Conference "to investigate the economic difficulties which stand in the way of the revival of general prosperity, and the best means of overcoming these difficulties."

The Conference thus convened was of the most influential character and consisted of 194 members chosen by Governments, with few exceptions, attended by 157 experts drawn from fifty countries in all quarters of the globe, including not only countries which are members of the League, but non-members. And this great Conference after a most careful survey of world conditions has agreed upon a body of far-reaching recommendations and resolu-

tions which confirm the conclusions reached both by the International Chamber of Commerce and by the bankers as to the nature of the difficulties and the remedies to be applied. Thus, the President, in his general survey and summary of the work of the Conference, makes the following statement :

" As the starting point and angle of approach to the different problems, the Conference, as an international Conference, has felt bound to assume that international trade is itself to be desired ; that the exchange of products and services between persons either of the same country or of different countries is normally to the advantage of both parties ; that the greater the range of exchange of different products between those who, by their resources and capacities are best fitted to produce them, the greater is the general economic advantage ; and that international exchange of products best and most economically produced in different countries should therefore be regarded as the normal rule.

" There are practical limitations to the application of this principle in policy. But that international trade is normally and properly not a matter of victory and defeat, or profit of one at the expense of the other, but of mutual benefit, has necessarily been the basis of this International Conference."

No severer comment could have been made upon the policy of trade restriction which the nations have pursued in recent years and which combined with the war is so largely responsible for the world's present economic and financial difficulties.

The following declaration leaves no doubt as to the conclusions reached by the Conference :

" Whatever the particular subject under discussion, it became apparent from the facts and evidence presented to the Conference, that each nation's commerce is to-day being hampered by barriers established by other nations resulting in a situation, especially in Europe, that is highly detrimental to the general welfare."

Nor can the following be misunderstood even by the political world, which has hitherto clung so tenaciously to its antiquated traditional economic theories :

" In spite of the variety of questions raised, the diversity of theories, and the legitimate national sentiments of all those who took part in the discussion, one important and extremely encouraging fact has emerged, and having emerged has become increasingly manifest as the work has advanced. This fact is the unanimous desire of the members of the Conference to make sure that this Conference shall, in some way, mark the beginning of a new era, during which international commerce will successively overcome all obstacles in its path that unduly hamper it, and resume that general upward movement which is at once a sign of the world's economic health and the necessary condition for the development of civilisation."

The extreme nationalistic policies which have brought about existing dangerous conditions received from the Conference the condemnation which they justly merit :

" Any strictly nationalistic policy is harmful not only to the nation which practises it but also to others and therefore defeats its own end, and if it be desired that the new state of mind revealed by the Conference should lead rapidly to practical results, any programme of execution must include, as an essential factor, the principle of parallel or concerted action by the different nations."

Nor are the recommendations of the Conference on the " Present Tariff Situation " open to misconception, for the " Conclusion " to which the Conference has come is stated in explicit terms :

" In view of the fact that harmful effects upon production and trade result from the high and constantly changing tariffs which are applied in many countries ;

" And since substantial improvement in the economic conditions can be obtained by increased facilities for international trade and commerce ;

" And in view of the fact that tariffs, though within the sovereign jurisdiction of the separate States, are not a matter of purely domestic interest but greatly influence the trade of the world ;

" And in view of the fact that some of the causes which have resulted in the increase of tariffs and in other trade barriers since the war have largely disappeared and others are diminishing.

" The Conference declares that the time has come to put an end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite direction. The Conference recommends :

" That nations should take steps forthwith to remove or diminish those tariff barriers that gravely hamper trade, starting with those which have been imposed to counteract the disturbances arising out of the war."

Although it may be doubted if the reduction of tariffs here recommended can alone restore the world to a condition of equilibrium and thus prevent the business breakdown that will be inevitable if remedial measures are not taken, it cannot be questioned that such reduction would be a long step in the right direction. Moreover, it is abundantly evident that without the removal of existing tariff and other restrictions upon trade the other remedies demanded by the situation would be quite ineffective. Therefore it cannot be doubted that a general reduction in the customs tariffs of all nations is the most important of the various steps that need to be taken to restore the nations to financial and economic health, and one cannot over-estimate the value of the work done by the Economic Conference in placing the present economic situation so clearly before the world, together with such valuable recommendations for its readjustment.

Beyond the urgent necessity of repairing the injury to the well-being of so many nations caused by the late war and by the policies pursued in the nine years since the war, it is imperative that every possible measure shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of war. The measures that ought to have been taken in the middle of last cen-

tury as soon as the inter-dependence of the nations had become established must now be taken, on two grounds. The first is that the economic and financial measures now essential to the restoration of world prosperity cannot be effective unless there is the prospect—indeed, the certainty—of international co-operation for the prevention of war and the assurance of permanent peace, and the second is that war in these days, when nations depend so completely on each other for their power to support their peoples, places the whole world in grave economic peril.

The conclusions of the Conference on this matter are vital and far-reaching and when adopted should remove what may otherwise prove to be the main cause of war in future. The President's statement on "Economic Policies and Peace" should, indeed, be most carefully considered not only by everyone desiring the readjustment of the present economic difficulties but by all who desire to avoid future war:

"We have passed an important resolution stating our unanimous conviction that the maintenance of world peace depends largely upon the principles on which the economic policies of nations are formed and executed; that the governments and peoples of all countries should constantly take counsel together as to this aspect of the economic problem; and that we should look forward to the establishment of a recognised body of principles designed to eliminate the economic difficulties which cause friction and misunderstanding. The object of the Conference, as the original Assembly resolution made clear, was a twofold one. It has been concerned not only with the prosperity but with the peace of the world. This has been not only a special item on the Agenda but a point of view which the Assembly wished should be borne in mind throughout the discussion of particular problems. Economic conflicts and divergence of economic interest are perhaps the most serious and the most permanent of all the dangers which are likely to threaten the peace of the world. No machinery for the settlement of international disputes can be relied upon to maintain peace if the economic policies of the world so develop as to create not only deep divergencies of economic interest between different masses of the world's population, but a sense of intolerable injury and injustice. No task is more urgent or more vital than that of securing agreement on certain principles of policy which are necessary in the interests of future peace. And there is perhaps no question which, in comparison with its intrinsic importance, has had so little careful and collective deliberation. No single Conference can do more than make a beginning in such a task, but the ultimate results are incalculable."

If the League can now succeed in inducing the nations—governments, and peoples—not only to study, but to act upon the resolutions passed by the World Economic Conference of 1927, the further service it will render will be of infinite value to all nations.

GEORGE PAISH.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT.

UNTIL the end of last April little news had appeared in the English Press from Egypt, save reports of archaeological researches and discoveries. Living Egyptians were of no account, compared to mummied Pharaohs; their doings, opinions, and domestic affairs seemed to be hidden behind a careful smoke-screen, or else not deemed worth consideration.

Yet there have occurred, since the beginning of the year, incidents of absorbing interest to Egyptians of which nothing has been told in London. What has been read about the sensational lecture of Professor Sarolea at the Cairo University—and the universal scandal it created—of the questions of the Soudan Dam, of the Alexandria Municipality, and such like? As recently as this spring, a most interesting discussion concerning a series of historical events in 1914 filled the pages of the Egyptian Press for weeks, and is still being debated.

The correspondence started upon the death of Abâza Pasha, one of the leaders in the evolution of modern political spirit in Egypt. The newspaper-war soon led up to criticism of the circumstances that led to the proclamation of the Protectorate, when Rushdi Pasha was acting as Regent. Many political and well-known public personalities, such as Mortada Pasha, Shefik Pasha, and Sadik Pasha, who were at that time in Constantinople and kept diaries of what they saw and observed, contributed letters stating what had happened within their own knowledge. The idea was expressed that if Rushdi had acted differently, he could have averted the Protectorate. I can scarcely do better than reproduce a letter I received lately from an Egyptian on this controversy. He writes (I translate verbatim without comment):

"From all that has appeared it seems clear that the Khedive (Abbas II) made every effort to convince the British Authorities at Constantinople of the necessity for his return to Egypt. As to this, Rushdi published a number of letters he wrote as Regent to his Sovereign the Khedive, which show that the latter had no intention of staying away from his country, but that England, after some hesitation, ended by refusing to permit him to return. The British Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, ordered him to proceed to a residence that had been prepared for him at Naples, to which town his grandfather had been exiled, and would not allow him the alternative suggested by the Khedive of going to Switzerland.

"Out of all the correspondence it results that Rushdi Pasha did not inform the Khedive of what went on in Egypt, and neither obeyed the invitation of Abbas Pasha to visit him and give an account of events, nor sent a special delegate in his stead. To the criticisms of the Egyptian Press upon his attitude, Rushdi replied that he acted thus through fear that England, instead of

proclaiming a Protectorate, might annex Egypt, and put in an Indian Prince, on the throne of the Khedive. To this it was retorted, that in his *Memoirs of Twenty-five Years* Sir Edward Grey does not mention such a thought, and was averse even to the idea of a Protectorate. The lines that close Chapter 25 of the *Memoirs* show this. The Press correspondence, as a whole, leads to the conclusion that Rushdi exhibited great lack of foresight, and that another solution could have been found with the Khedive, instead of a Protectorate, which turned out the source of the difficulties that have since been encountered.

"Three or four hundred columns published in the papers on the attitude of the Khedive brought up another question concerning his dethronement. All the writers and political personages of that period have attempted to prove that Abbas II was in no wise hostile to Great Britain, and that he was in favour of the solution that circumstances have finally brought about. These witnesses and writers continue to assert that the F.O. merely followed the dictation of Lord Kitchener, who was a personal enemy of the Khedive. It is declared that in 1912-13 Lord Kitchener promised the Egyptian throne to Prince Saïd Halim, then Grand Vizier in Turkey; and others, in putting down their recollections of the attempt on the life of Abbas II at Stamboul, before the outbreak of the war, state that the attack was generally attributed to the instigation of Prince Saïd Halim. The papers are still going on writing on this subject, and I do not know when they will stop."

The facts so positively stated above by actors on the spot, which appear to have met with no denial, are of sufficient historical importance to merit proof or disproof. The deposition of Abbas II, and what followed in Egypt, radically affected the course of the war. He was informed on the 27th of September that he would never be allowed to return to Egypt, and actually, therefore, was dethroned at that date. Some clear and definite information as to the acts or behaviour of the Khedive that called for his exile would be welcomed in Egypt, and seems absolutely necessary.

Whether it be correct or not, the idea is prevalent in Egypt, that King Fuad is bent upon enlarging his own prerogatives at the expense of the rights of Parliament, and, considering how much he enjoyed his spell of freedom from all control, it is perhaps very natural that he should be so inclined. But the vast majority of the nation, with the same lively recollection, is equally anxious to permit no return to 1925—nor any exercise of extra-constitutional powers by the throne—of which already in its opinion the King has more than his fair share.

Until the change of Ministry in June, Lord Lloyd had held both the King and the Parliament on a string, and not a very long one. He merely has continued under the new status of Egypt the policy of Lord Granville, who informed the Khedive Tewfik, through Lord

Cromer, that in the choice of Ministers and other public affairs, when England tendered advice, she expected it to be followed.

Upon the resignation of Adly Pasha, who was continually being heckled and worried in the Chamber by the Extremist wing of the Zaghloulist majority, a new situation arose. The Parliament had been on its best behaviour in 1926. It seemed to have grasped the truth that Egypt has no time for Utopian ideas at present. All the sensible politicians, under the teaching of the Premier, Adly Pasha, who is not a Zaghloulist but a "Liberal Constitutionalist," like his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sarwat Pasha, were leaning towards a policy of realisation—a policy through which alone the Parliament and the country could reap the fruits they all desire. An essential part of such a policy is a frank understanding with England, without whose cordial co-operation nothing of lasting benefit can ever be realised in Egypt. It was hoped that the more obstreperous and ignorant Extremists would soon perceive this, or would be made to understand it by the better advised. It was not feared that Zaghloul Pasha would in any way encourage palpably false hopes. Though his name is still one to conjure with in elections, he must feel, now that he is an old man and not in the best of health, that he has no longer complete control of the Wafd Party, nor could he now carry with him the bulk of the Nationalists were he to attempt to force his old, unreasoning, anti-British, revolutionary policy. During the crisis that followed the resignation of Adly Pasha he showed no desire to take any leading rôle, and after failing to persuade Adly to reconsider his decision, was most earnest in using every possible argument to induce Sarwat Pasha to take Adly's place. This Sarwat was most reluctant to do, and it is believed that he only consented from fear that Lord Lloyd might advise a dissolution of Parliament.

Unfortunately, the result of the change of Ministry was soon apparent. Not that Sarwat Pasha was any weaker a Premier than Adly—rather the contrary—but he felt that if Zaghloul had not been able to prevent the Extremists from making the position of Adly almost impossible, he had no power or instrument to save himself from ultimately sharing the fate of his predecessor. Besides this, the public impression was that the Extremists would scarcely have been as audacious as they were, without outside influence and support. Applying the theory of *cui prodest*, the conclusion was that the Palace was pursuing its aim of bringing about a crisis to lead to the dissolution of Parliament. King Fuad is not credited with instigating the cabal, but the group of those who were disgruntled when Nashat Pasha's rule was terminated (and with it their political and administrative opportunities) is still in

existence, and they are ready to promise almost anything in order to have the Parliament dissolved and the Ittihadists return to favour.

The ejection of Adly Pasha was considered as a signal success for the Extremists, who at once abandoned all restraint, and commenced an open campaign against all British control, culminating in the endeavour to get rid of an English Sirdar for the Egyptian Army. They base themselves on the agreement arrived at with the Ministry of Yehia Pasha in 1923, when, pending the final Treaty to be one day signed, the British Government stated that in order to safeguard the "reserved point" touching Imperial and foreign interests in Egypt, England required control of Communications, Ports and Lights, Justice, and the European Section of the Ministry of Interior. The control was to be exercised by high British officials with competent staffs. British officials already in the Egyptian Service were either to be kept, or could resign with full pension rights, and extremely liberal compensation. They were to decide what they would do before April 1st, 1927, after which date the Egyptian Government would be free to dismiss, retain, or appoint any foreigner at its discretion. The question of the Egyptian Army had not entered into this discussion, and the Egyptians argue that they have a right, agreed to by England herself, to abolish the Sirdarate. This is very like a *reductio ad absurdum*. If the control of the railways, ports and light, etc., is necessary for the fulfilment of our responsibilities in Egypt, how much more so is the control, to some degree, of the Army? During the discussion in the Chamber, where disgraceful language was used against the English, Zaghloul Pasha did nothing to restrain the Extremists. This is taken officially to indicate that he has returned to his old uncompromising attitude of "England out of Egypt, bag and baggage."

It is extremely improbable that this is correct. Zaghloul Pasha is too astute not to have learned wisdom, and his tolerance of abuse of England is much more likely to arise from his consciousness that, in the actual temper of the Parliament, he could have no success, and would only bring upon himself some of the excited fury of the Extremists, and lose a portion of the general prestige he still possesses. Be that as it may, the question is a broader one than the position or action of Zaghloul Pasha.

When I was in Egypt last spring, I was daily visited by Egyptians of all classes, who were delighted to talk freely of their woes to an outside Englishman who could understand them. They had just gone through the year or so's experience of "Palace" rule, which followed the dramatic dissolution of the Parliament after a six hours' existence. The King governed through his favourite Chamberlain, Nashat Pasha, and everybody connected with the Palace benefited, until the arrival of Lord Lloyd.

During that period the Residence, with which Nashat was privately on the best of terms, interfered very little, and permitted almost any abuse, as long as it did not endanger public security or British and foreign interests. The sale of honours and places was openly practised to an extent never heard of before. As far as titles went, no great harm was done, if it pleased any man to pay thousands of pounds for them, but in the case of administrative posts the result was serious. The Government services were filled with Palace pets, and with individuals ready and able to buy places without much respect to capacity. And of course each official made haste to recoup himself, and a little over, by every sort of extortion. For some of the higher positions sums of £40,000 or more were notoriously paid. It is currently stated that at least two millions sterling was paid in this way—more indeed, in less than twelve months, than the Khedive Ismail collected in a reign of twenty years. The excuse offered was that the money was destined for the *Hashirat*, a royal charitable fund, but there does not appear to have been any considerable expenditure in charity in any direction saving that which begins and ends at home. When Lord Lloyd arrived he put an end to this by the instant dismissal of Nashat Pasha, who, however, was merely sent as Ambassador to Madrid, with salary and expenses larger than he earned as Chamberlain, but without his extra-official perquisites.

To give an idea of how the system was worked, I cannot refrain from quoting from my notes the story an indignant and fairly wealthy landowner told me. He was seized with the ambition of calling himself a Pasha and was prepared to set aside a piece of *Wakf* land valued at about £4,000, to attain the dignity. He related that he had first applied to a Minister for advice how to set about it. He was at once referred to another Minister, who sent him to a third, who recommended him to see the Grand Mufti. This pundit pointed out that it would be a troublesome business to cut out a piece of a *Wakf*, and counselled him to take money in his scrip, and interview Nashat Pasha. Accordingly he drew from the bank forty £100 notes, and placing them in a big open envelope, repaired to the Abdin Palace, in company with a reverend Sheikh as witness. He came straight to the point, but Nashat replied that the price of a Pashalik was now £6,500, which he had received the day before from X; and for a Beylik £2,500 to £3,000. Hoping that the sight of hard cash might prevail, he laid his envelope on the table and said it contained £4,000, which was all he could pay. Nashat Pasha, however, was obdurate, and with some relief the visitor quickly regained possession of his envelope, which he feared he might never see again, and departed with blessings to Allah. His narrative was most graphic and comical.

Feeling ran very high all over Egypt at the impossibility, in the absence of Parliament, of checking, or even questioning abuses, or rendering anybody officially responsible. Probably the real and principal reason was that the enormous mass and majority of the population saw themselves being exploited by a very small band, without any chance of a nibble at the loaves and fishes. This point of view was brutally put by one of my friends. I quote again from my notebook of February 17th, 1926. The speaker is a prominent and clever lawyer, and was one of the thirty who drew up the present Egyptian Constitution. He presumably represented the true attitude of nine out of ten thinking Egyptians to-day when he said :

" I preferred the old Legislative Assembly of Kitchener—one-third named by the Government and two-thirds elective. Egypt is not ripe for the Constitution that we elaborated, and it is absurd to talk about independence. In a crisis like the present, it is to the English that the Government looks, and Ziver Pasha is now taking his orders from Lord Lloyd. There is no such thing as a race of Egyptians, and therefore nobody can feel real patriotism, or frame a whole-souled patriotic policy. " Egyptians " are a mixture of Turks, Kurds, Lâzes, Syrians, Asiatic Arabs, Arabs of the Hedjâz, Tunisians, Moroccans, Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, and the rest. It is ridiculous to pretend that we could get on without the English. If ever England left Egypt, it would be either Turks, Italians, or Greeks who would replace her, and we should soon see the difference. There is nothing for it but to muddle on until we get into such a tangle that the British will be bound to set it right. Everyone of these parties and factions are much alike. What they all want is power for themselves and their friends, and to make what they can whilst they can. Of course the King, like all kings, wants to get as much power and money as he is able for himself. Why shouldn't he? Neither the King nor parties really care for the interests of Egypt above their own. It is the British who look after and can efficiently protect and foster these twin interests."

This may seem a cynical conception, but it probably reflects what most educated and intelligent men in Egypt think in their innermost hearts. The speaker was a supposed " Ittihadist " of the Palace Party, but he did not appear to have any very rooted political convictions.

When Lord Lloyd took Egypt in hand, as he did at once with characteristic self-reliance, he initiated a policy of *divide et impera* after the fashion of Abdul Hamid. The people were clamouring for elections and a Parliament, with a Ministry representing the majority and governing constitutionally under responsibility to the Chamber. Lord Lloyd immediately promised and provided all this, though the Residency was still traditionally haunted by a vague fear of Zaghoul Pasha. This apprehension was, and always has been, played upon by the Palace, which though obliged to sub-

mit in silence to the rout of Nashat with the best grace it could, has never ceased to labour for the ousting of the Nationalists. It would fain restore to office the so-called " Ittihadists," or Unionists, who were not able to win more than a handful of seats in the elections. In Egypt, more even than elsewhere, the seats of the mighty are too soft and the fruits of power too sweet to be relinquished without sorrow and a desperate fight.

At first things went fairly well to outward seeming, and Parliament under the Presidency of Zaghoul showed no hostility to England, nor did it for long propose a single measure calculated to offend British prejudices, or damage British interests. Of a truth, the Zaghoulists, with Adly Pasha as Prime Minister, had learned a lesson, and were far too wise to give any pretext for another dissolution, which King Fuad would have leaped at the chance of pronouncing at the slightest wink from the Residency. Both Palace and Chamber kept always one eye on Lord Lloyd. The Chamber went on slowly with such administrative and legislative measures as the Constitution allowed, but it was well aware of the intentions of the Palace if it caught them making any false step. In consequence Egypt was divided against itself, and an enduring and perpetual friction grew and waxed, not with the British, but between the Palace and the people.

Although there was a Constitution, the full development and operation of it, like that of the illusory " sovereign independence " bestowed upon Egypt when the Protectorate was abolished, depended and depends upon a satisfactory settlement of the four " reserved points," which is then to be embodied in a Treaty between England and Egypt. This Treaty is to terminate, once and for all time, the existing differences between the two countries, without leaving any future ground for undue British interference in Egyptian internal administration or affairs. It would thus make the " sovereign independence " as complete as is imaginable within the borders of Egypt. Furthermore, it would regulate through the Constitution the respective prerogatives of the Chamber and of the Throne.

At the time of Lord Milner's Commission, a suggestion was made for the conclusion of a Treaty or Pact with Egypt, to be signed by the British and Egyptian Parliaments. At that period the Egyptian Representative Assembly had no Constitution behind it authorising it to do such a thing. This Constitution is now in force. But the King is credited with a desire to negotiate and ratify the Treaty with England himself, whereas the Chambers are strongly opposed to any party but themselves conducting the business. They fear that the King may, by offering larger concessions to England, secure for himself extended personal prerogatives, and this is more than

possible. The Parliament considers that it could only negotiate with the approval and in the pure interests of Egypt, excluding the intrusion of any personal motives. From the British standpoint it might happen that we should be able to make a Treaty more advantageous to ourselves with the King than with the Parliament. But it may be asked whether we contemplate securing advantages from the Palace that might not be so easy to gain from the Chambers, or whether we merely want to be sure of safeguarding our own and foreign interests entrusted to us, and giving as full satisfaction as possible to Egypt? The professed aim of the Treaty is to create a contented country as a friend, protégé and ally. It is, to say the least, dubious if a Treaty negotiated without the consultation or approbation of the people would leave the country contented and free from seeds of future trouble.

It is difficult not to regret that the eventual Treaty was not negotiated immediately after the abolition of the Protectorate. The country was rejoicing at its freedom, and it would probably have been much easier then than it will be now. There were, however, several practically indispensable elements lacking—such as well qualified negotiators for one, though these might with diligent searching have been found. It must still be fresh in the minds of many how the ratification of the Vereeniging Treaty was postponed for years. It was not until Campbell Bannerman came to office, and made it one of the most urgent measures of his Parliament, that it went through. The result was a loyal South Africa in 1914, but it is appalling to think what might have resulted from having a hostile Boer population siding with Germany during the war.

The crisis on the army question should bring on negotiations on all other points, and lead up to the settlement, without which there can be scant hope of an untroubled Egypt. It will not be easy to satisfy everybody, but when England shows that she is ready to concede all that can reasonably be asked of her, and convinces the Egyptians that there is an irreducible minimum, the agreement ought not to take very long.

No apprehension need be felt of any serious hitch over the army question since Egypt has already learned the French axiom that *contre la force, il n'y a pas de résistance*. There are also plenty of sensible men in Egypt as well as fanatical irresponsibles, and Lord Lloyd is not likely to prove unequal to the occasion. At the time of writing, the cauldron is still seething, but it will soon boil down, and now that matters have been brought to a head, a certain relief should rather be felt that the eminently unsatisfactory and uncertain situation that has lasted too long appears in a fair way of being dealt with. It is sincerely to be hoped that this may be done without a dissolution of Parliament. We may be sure that neither the

Government nor Zaghloul Pasha will spare their utmost efforts to avoid what the whole country would regard as a catastrophe, and perhaps a first step towards a new Protectorate, or annexation. However much the Palace clique may have schemed for a dissolution, with the alternatives that now rise in the background, it must see that this is not the right moment. King Fuad himself will be equally averse to putting himself in a position of responsibility for what may ensue after a dissolution of Parliament. Especially as it would probably prevent his visit to England and the gain of advantages he then expects. And, lastly, Lord Lloyd, who is the *ultimo ratio* in Egypt, can hardly wish for a protraction and aggravation of the jealousy that exists between Palace and people.

Egyptians must recognise sooner or later that they can go too far, and that in reaching after the ell they may lose the inch. The hand that has given can also take, and if the patience of England is long so also is her arm. Nobody has ever gained by venturing to test either of them to the limit.

P.S.—Before this appears in print, there is every reason to believe that the Sirdar question will be dead and buried. *Requiescat in pace*.

The "crisis" has shown clearly the necessity for a general understanding if similar ones are not to be recurrent. The visits of Sarwat Pasha to Lord Lloyd must have shown the idleness of all apprehensions of danger which was never seriously threatened. Even the supposed machinations of Zaghloul were mythical, for he seems to have done all he could to assist the Government in bringing his unruly followers to reason.

The ghost of a dissolution is temporarily laid, though this cannot yet be asserted definitely, and the King may still be able to start according to schedule on his visit to England, leaving the Ittihadists to lament the bursting of the bubble that held their hopes of a new birth in Olympus.

A. HULME BEAMAN.

June 15th.

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES.

IN diplomacy as in every other branch of political action we are always left in doubt whether the man controls the event or the event the man. On any long view of past history nothing can seem more automatic and compelling than the diplomatic tradition of Governments. Minister after Minister sits at his desk in the Quai d'Orsay but whatever his political antecedents, whatever the complexion of his personal opinions and prejudices and instincts, he thinks essentially the same thoughts about the framework of French policy. Our Governments change less rapidly in England and the historian notes certain superficial alterations of political alignment, but the Foreign Office from generation to generation holds the same fundamental views about the Low Countries and India and the need for preserving a British Navy adequate to the protection of our commerce and our shores. Even violent revolutions do not efface these inveterate traditions. The authors of the Treaty of Versailles have been much criticised by their contemporaries. But who were those authors. Mr. Lloyd George or the ghost of Chatham? M. Clemenceau or the ghost of Louis XIV? Consciously or unconsciously the living men, each, as it so happens, of a strong, violent, and original temperament, were the vehicles of a tradition more powerful than any individual and implicit in the history of the nations whose interests they were called upon to serve.

And yet it would be idle to ignore the force of personality. The play of mind upon mind and character upon character is a large part of the game. To know the political personnel of the world, to take the measure of every important combatant in the arena is, as Bismarck knew, the best of all armaments for a Foreign Minister. Over and over again in diplomatic disputes awkward corners have been rounded by the tact of statesmen, or great difficulties created by their imprudence. To the end of time people will continue to ask themselves whether, if certain statesmen had acted otherwise, the calamities of war might have been averted. Certainly it is impossible to understand diplomatic history, even if we admit that it deals rather with the surface than with the foundations of things, without taking full account of the character and idiosyncrasies of the men who make it.

Who, however, are these men? In an excellent volume, characterised not only by industry and acumen but by great accomplishment of style, Mr. Cecil describes the leading British Foreign Secretaries from Castlereagh to Grey as "a modest contribution to the history of British diplomacy"; and his gallery of distinguished portraits makes delightful reading. But while it is true that British foreign policy is largely moulded by the statesmen who preside over

the Foreign Office, they do not work in isolation. The Crown, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the officials at the Foreign Office, the ambassadors furnish their separate contributions. Mr. Cecil does not ignore these influences. He is certainly under no temptation to disparage the political weight of the Sovereign in Foreign Affairs, and goes as far as to say that "any British King can, at will, become not indeed his own Foreign Minister but the first and best diplomatist in the national service." Of the Prime Minister we hear less, yet it is only rarely that the offices of Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister are united and, when the portfolios are in different hands, the Prime Minister has a great deal to say, if he chooses to say it, in the direction of foreign policy. The measure of his influence may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to define, for the confidential communications of the Prime Minister with his Foreign Secretary do not in general leave a trace upon paper; but we can hardly conceive of any time during the period covered by Mr. Cecil's sketches when foreign policy was not a continual matter for joint consideration between the Foreign Secretary and his Chief.

Then there are the British Ambassadors and the Foreign Office itself, with its vast accumulation of ripe experience, its long tradition, its skilled permanent advisers. These forces too, as Mr. Cecil recognises, are by no means negligible, though the telephone and telegraph have reduced the power of initiative enjoyed of old by such men as Stratford de Redcliffe and Lyons.

"We have lately," he writes, "been acquainted with all that is relevant in the diplomatic correspondence which passed through Lord Grey's hands in the critical month before the outbreak of hostilities. . . . We know without reserve what opinion of the aims and actions of the Central Powers Goschen was forming at Berlin and Sir Maurice de Bunsen at Vienna; in what manner Buchanan in Petersburg was dealing with a Foreign Minister whose diplomacy made Lord Cannock declare that 'one really does not know where one is with him'; and how the robust Bertie (is robust quite the right epithet?) beheld the international situation through the French windows in Paris. Nor is this all. The veil of the Foreign Office is itself raised so that we catch glimpses of the mind of the powers that prevailed there—of Nicholson's pro-Russian tendencies and of Crowe's anti-German leanings. Only one figure, more influential, it may be than either the Permanent or Assistant Under-Secretary of State, remains hidden still in obscurity—Lord Grey's official private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell.

All this is not put down in disparagement of Mr. Cecil's attempt to tell as much of our diplomatic history as he can through the lives of our Foreign Secretaries, for Mr. Cecil is quite conscious of the fact that he does not and cannot cover all the ground by the method which he has elected to pursue. What he has done, how-

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ever, was well worth doing, and permits us to hope that these attractive biographical sketches may some day be completed by a survey of diplomatic history in which the great forces moulding the fate of nations may be shown in their true proportions.

In the history of English diplomacy during the nineteenth century there has been one transaction so far transcending all others in importance that in a series of biographical sketches of our Foreign Secretaries its author would seem to deserve a predominant place. Yet Lord Lansdowne, the distinguished architect of the *entente* with France, an arrangement which, while it did not make the Great War inevitable, made it very difficult indeed to avoid, is disposed of in half a dozen pages while Lord Aberdeen, whose achievements as Foreign Secretary were nothing out of the common, receives the honour of an elaborate eulogium seven times as long. We are not disposed to censure this allotment of space seeing that Mr. Cecil's primary object is to describe character and that from this point of view he has conceived a special admiration for Lord Aberdeen, of whom he writes: "more than any foreign minister of his time or perhaps of any time since he represents an attempt to establish Christian methods in his conduct of foreign affairs." But that so much attention should be given to Lord Aberdeen and so little to Lord Lansdowne serves to illustrate the divergence between a history of diplomats and a history of diplomacy.

Though Mr. Cecil is primarily interested in his Foreign Secretaries as men and has brought rare gifts of sympathy and discretion to the interpretation of their characters, he does not confine himself to the personal aspect of politics. In this respect his treatment of such men as Palmerston differs from the method of Mr. Guedalla, who hardly appears to be interested in foreign politics at all, so intent is he on evoking the image and depicting the sentiment of one piquant situation after another. Mr. Cecil, on the contrary, shows a marked skill in appreciating the size and character of international problems and in criticising the manner in which they are handled. His treatment of the diplomacy of Lord Grey of Falloden, though offering some surface for criticism, is an excellent example of his method.

Perhaps he has not altogether avoided the common temptation of judging the past by standards of knowledge which were not available to it. Those who have sat in Cabinets during critical times know well how slender is often the body of information upon which urgent decisions may be taken, how many are the imponderables, how inscrutable the future, so that, though the debate may be able and tenacious and the case for the final decision may seem upon the available evidence to be strong, yet all the men round the table know that the decision is a gamble which may turn out ill.

Mr. Cecil is not perhaps always as indulgent as he might be to these necessary and not infrequent limitations to political omniscience.

The Belgian Settlement of 1839 is a case in point. To Lord Palmerston's admirers this treaty, reached after many years of anxious and difficult negotiation, appears to be a signal triumph of diplomatic art. Not so to Mr. Cecil. To the Catholic publicist, the blustering personality of Pam with his "patriotic effrontery" is far from agreeable, for Pam was very different from Lord Aberdeen, very different from Lord Cecil of Chelwood, and indeed a most unregenerate specimen of rich Anglo-Irish humanity. So Mr. Cecil points out what is perfectly true, that Pam's treaty was of no avail as a shield and buckler for the Belgians in 1914 and that it has not solved the question of the Scheldt. "A longer view, a wider survey of the whole situation might conceivably have preferred, after bringing Antwerp and the mouths of the Scheldt under some sort of international control, to allow the Belgians to work out their own salvation in a closer connection with France." We agree. A longer view, a wider survey would probably have led to this solution. But how could such a policy have suggested itself to a British statesman in 1839, with Waterloo not twenty-five years behind him, with France still universally regarded as the chief source of apprehension, and Germany a mosaic of discordant States? It may be true, that Palmerston followed, as Mr. Cecil says, the line of least resistance, but what other line could he have followed with a real chance of success? The criticism of the arrangement is only formidable if we judge it from the standpoint of recent events.

It will be seen from this illustration that Mr. Cecil is not afraid of challenging accepted verdicts, though with no undue tendency to paradox or iconoclasm. The estimates of statesmen in this volume with one unintelligible exception ("The Duc de Richelieu a wiser and a greater man than his namesake the Cardinal") differ rather in nuances than in essentials from those which are commonly entertained. Thus, if Aberdeen is put a good deal higher and Palmerston a good deal lower than is the present fashion, it is admitted that it would have been well for Aberdeen if his public service could have ended with his resignation of the Foreign Office in 1846 and that despite Palmerston's bluster and tactlessness he was one of the greatest of Prime Ministers. Again, if Mr. Cecil puts Castlereagh above Canning (differing here from Acton) it is because in his view Canning had "no clear sense of the unseen foundation of society and no regard for that common will towards a common welfare that forms the root of international civilisation." But had Castlereagh any such clear sense? And can the deep distinction between the two statesmen for which Mr. Cecil argues with so much grace and skill be effectively established? It is, of course, true that

Canning did not believe in such Continental conferences as might then be available for the solution of international differences. But was not this because the Governments of the Continent had been found by experience to be reactionary? Castlereagh regarded these congresses and conferences as a useful and necessary part of the machinery for liquidating the political heritage of a great war in which all Europe had been involved; but the problems with which Canning were faced were somewhat different. Whereas Castlereagh's aims were the reduction of France to its proper size and the resumption by Europe of its peaceful habits, Canning seemed to divine in the state of Europe the importance of the principle of nationality and the need for allowing it a freer play. No doubt the two statesmen differed in temperament and outlook, but the occasions differed also, and with the occasion the policies best adapted to deal with them.

It would seem that in his general estimate of Canning Mr. Cecil has been greatly influenced by what is undoubtedly the greatest blot in Canning's career, the seizure of the Danish fleet. "The psychologist," he observes, "will hardly take it to be a chance that one who all his life failed to appreciate the value of European solidarity and thought in terms of nations, should have caused his country to commit the most unsocial act in all her history." This is an interesting and ingenious observation, but can we claim any valid inference from acts done under the stress of war and its panics? It would be more consonant with what we otherwise know of Canning's character to suppose that if there had been a chance of a conference of Liberal Powers on the Continent Canning would have gone into it willingly enough.

This leads us to the consideration of what is the central and not the least interesting feature of Mr. Cecil's commentary on foreign politics. He approaches the whole question of international relations from the point of view of a religiously-minded Catholic who believes in peace and international co-operation and judges statesmen by the measure of their conformity to Christian principles in private and public conduct. It is, then, an irony of fate that the two statesmen for whom (Lord Salisbury being, of course, for family reasons excepted) Mr. Cecil seems to cherish the largest measure of esteem on the ground of their private virtues, should each have been responsible for bringing this country into a disastrous war. Let us freely concede to Lord Aberdeen all the virtues save hilarity and political courage. Yet he went into the Crimean War on behalf of the Turks, knowing that "every Christian man, woman, and child throughout the Turkish Empire must in their hearts pray for the success of the Tsar," and that this was "the great original sin" of the British position.

Lord Grey's position was a great deal more difficult than Lord Aberdeen's, for the understanding with France which he inherited from Lord Lansdowne implied a measure of loyalty to the French which was hardly compatible with the exercise of strict impartiality between the Triple and the Dual Alliance. In any case Mr. Cecil thinks Lord Grey's course was not flawless and that others might have handled the situation more firmly and so averted the final tragedy. We think, however, that Mr. Cecil has not, in his generally fair and always well informed estimate, given full weight to the cumulative impression made upon the mind of the British Foreign Secretary by the menacing growth of the German fleet or by the well advertised confidence of the German leaders (twice communicated to him by the Kaiser in person) that, were war to be declared, the German army would be in Paris in a fortnight. It was certainly reasonable to assume that the remarkable ultimatum to Serbia had been issued with the cognisance of the German Government and that it was intended either to compel Russia to accept a second disagreeable revolution in the Balkans or to force on a general war. Unfortunately the steps taken by the German Government were not, until it was too late, calculated to dispel this suspicion.

A heavy load of responsibility rests, as is now plain, with the Government of the Tsar. The Russians were all too prone to find in a European war an opportunity for the satisfaction of their ambitions in the Balkans. Mr. Cecil thinks that pressure should have been exerted in Petrograd to persuade the Russians to accept a German guarantee for the territorial integrity of Serbia on the understanding of an Austrian halt in Belgrade. But what compelling argument could Lord Grey have used save that under no circumstances could Great Britain participate in a war resulting from a Serbian quarrel? And how could he have used this argument, his relations with the French being what they were and his sentiment of loyalty to the Entente being what it was?

Another criticism of Lord Grey's policy has more weight. It is urged that long before matters came to a head

"the Foreign Secretary should have undertaken to remind his countrymen—publicly yet in such a way that the words should have seemed intended to be overheard not only in Germany but France—that the defence of Belgian neutrality was the paramount British interest in Europe, and that in this case only, saving that of Portugal, was Britain bound by treaty to engage in hostilities upon the continent. Such a declaration might not have prevented the Austro-Serbian quarrel, but it must at least have given the German Foreign Office ground for reflection in any subsequent treatment of Balkan problems and have made the British standpoint early familiar at home and inexorably plain abroad."

It is true that the Germans had been informally warned by Lord

Haldane in 1912 of the serious view which Britain would be likely to take of the violation of Belgian neutrality; but more was required. Occasion ought to have been taken to remind the country of its liabilities under the Treaty of 1839. Indeed, it would be a wholesome innovation if the Foreign Secretary should undertake at stated intervals to recall to the recollections of his countrymen the important international obligations which have been assumed on their behalf. What fraction of the electorate in July, 1914, knew how the country stood in relation to the Belgian Treaty? And what fraction now appreciates the contingent burdens which were imposed upon Britain at Locarno?

It is no part of Mr. Cecil's theme to deal with the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless he makes some disparaging allusions to it, contrasting it disadvantageously with the Congress of Vienna, and suggesting that Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, cannot reasonably be supposed to have concurred in its more objectionable provisions. Mr. Lloyd George does not, of course, enjoy Mr. Cecil's good opinion. Upon him, therefore, rests the onus of the peace so far as Britain had any hand in it. It is not disputed that the main responsibility for securing the interests of Great Britain and the British Empire at Paris belonged to the Prime Minister, and that after the surrender of the German navy had been obtained at the armistice, the representation of the Dominions in the League of Nations and the cession of many German colonies to Britain and her Dominions were promoted by his advocacy. It might, however, be inferred from Mr. Cecil's pages that the specific influence of the British Prime Minister in Paris was directed to the satisfaction of a crude vengeance upon a beaten foe. This is not so. It is true that the Prime Minister advocated the abolition of conscription in Germany, but as a measure to be followed by a general reduction of armaments. He resisted successfully the proposal to detach from the Reich some seven million Germans inhabiting lands on the left bank of the Rhine. He triumphed over the proposal to assign the whole of Upper Silesia to Poland irrespective of the wishes of the inhabitants. He fought a losing fight against a prolonged Allied occupation of German territory; and when the Treaty was ultimately signed it caused profound dissatisfaction to France as being too clement to the enemy. In effect it was too severe. The German criticism that the Treaty was on its economic side worked out departmentally and without regard to the cumulative effect of its provisions was well founded; but the economic side of the Treaty was the least important; for it was clear from the first that reparations, originally fixed at a fantastic figure by the Sumner Committee, would be scaled down to the measure of the economic capacity of the conquered to bear the burdens imposed upon them.

No historian will challenge Mr. Cecil's commendation of the courage and sagacity with which Wellington and Castlereagh helped to compose the distractions of Europe after the Napoleonic wars. "Theirs was no easy task. The feeling of the Prussians against the French was such as the French have returned in full measure and running over to the Germans"; and yet, despite these fierce hatreds, the two British statesmen secured for their beaten foe essentially generous terms. It must, however, be remembered that our aim then was to re-establish hereditary monarchy in France and to give to Louis XVIII, who had been our guest, a position as secure and consequently as little humiliating to Gallic pride as could be contrived for him. No such consideration operated in 1918. Nevertheless, save in the one article of reparations, in which the British Prime Minister was at fault, British influence was steadily and honestly thrown into the scale of moderation. Our statesmen were not always successful. Paris, still bearing the scars of big Bertha, was the venue, and the military hero of the hour and the great deliverer was not a second Wellington but a Marshal of France.

H. A. L. FISHER.

THE NEW WOMEN'S FRANCHISE BILL.

THERE seems a pause in the life of the proposed Franchise Bill giving equality to the sexes, and consequently the absurd attacks on young women have for the moment ceased. In my opinion it would have been better, when the Franchise was given to women, to have frankly recognised that citizenship on earth, as in heaven, knows no sex. That was too great an effort of the imagination, and a clumsy compromise, always dear to our nation, was effected, and only women, and not all of them, above thirty were enfranchised. That was certain to lead to the outcries which have arisen on both sides, the women desiring equal treatment, the men outraged at the idea of being outvoted.

When the agricultural labourer was enfranchised in 1884, much the same sort of thing was said about his probable vote as is now being said about women. If legislators ever turned the leaves of old Hansards, they might well blush when they read the diatribes uttered on the uneducated, uncaring, beer-loving sons of the soil. The destruction of everything stable was prophesied in "thus lowering" (the word extension was never used save by supporters) the franchise. It used to be said that it took the agricultural labourer ten years before he fully appreciated and used the rights of a free citizen. The Conservative who was most opposed found himself face to face with the fact, that for many a long year the Conservative cause was stoutly upheld by the new voters who had "lowered" the franchise. We must look at the mass of the people as a whole, and the changes which have been wrought in their conditions. In 1884 it was quite common to hear the argument that few of the agricultural labourers could read, and it was also alleged that many of them voted as their wives bade them. This may be fabulous, but at least it was as good as saying that they took their politics from the public-house. Bribery and corruption of the individual, not of the masses, has become a thing of the past, and the great factor in that change has been the education given by the State. When that great Act of Enfranchisement from Ignorance was passed, it was enacted that no child, whatever its sex, should exist without the elements of education. Where knowledge was concerned, the State refused to distinguish between the sexes. Everyone recognises what this has done for the people at large, but they mostly think of it in regard to the male citizen, and the advancement of women has very much escaped their notice.

It would be useless to detail all that has come to women, through schools elementary and secondary, and through colleges and institutions. Every woman has now educational opportunities

not inferior to the men, and parents who have spent equally on their education with their sons, except the sons, and the daughters who are sometimes too eager "to make good," to earn their own livelihood. They are put out in the world, and in that hard yet generous school for enterprise they have learnt much of public affairs, which before was kept out of their view.

Women are now part of the State, as valuable an asset in their own sphere as any other. The question of to-day is not how to separate the goats from the sheep, but how to use the whole people of the commonwealth. Have they used the vote, and how are they using it? is the question often asked and rarely answered. Whichever party loses an election, the loser raises the cry that the women all voted wrong. Large majorities usually mean that the mass of voters are of one way of thinking. On the whole, the women are influenced by the feeling of their households, that is to say the public expression accords with the family and its view. Even this cannot always be safely affirmed. It would be natural to suppose that where there is a woman candidate, the fact would make her acceptable to the women voters. That is not the answer given by political organisations. Rarely, at present, is a safe or even hopeful seat entrusted by any party to a woman candidate.

On the whole the temperament of women as it is developing is conservative, in the fullest sense of the word. The well-to-do citizens are apt to like things left alone. They do not care for excesses. Their interests lie in the home and the market place, cheap food, advantages to their children; and the most down in the world have often but one ambition, that their children should have a better chance than they have had. Let anyone watch the crowds of young women moving through our streets and stations to their daily toil, light-hearted, carefully dressed, self-reliant, and courageous, are they not the material out of which as good citizens are made as their contemporaries in age and status? What is the use of crying hysterically, "Flappers," and what truth is there in the cry? A man at twenty-one is often far behind his female contemporary, and we argue he develops later. Perfectly true, but why should he not wait for that development? It must also be recognised that the State gave to men the right to vote as illiterates; long before it enfranchised the women of thirty.

It is not on the inconsistencies of the past that we wish to dwell now. It is on the dawn of a new liberation that the attention of the nation is fixed. In their daily work men and women are meeting and mingling. The machinery of industry is constantly being levelled up, and the competition of women has not, as it was feared, lowered wages, but rather it has improved the status and well-being of all. Many of the misfortunes and disasters which were prophesied have

been proved false, and the electoral machine has been found elastic enough to beat the weight of the additional voters.

The Votes of Women have not aggrandised one party more than any other, it is impossible to tell how they have been cast : the only certain thing is that women, where there is a large majority, must have voted with that side. Why then is there this desperate agitation at the prospect of yet more "sex" voters? It may very justly be argued that it is too much to disturb the electoral machine. The present voters have not been sufficiently tried, and the rush of the new and inexperienced is a danger. All this may be argued, but the opposition really comes down to this : that the voting strength of the country will be in the hands of the majority, namely, the women. This is undeniable, and only formidable if we insist on thinking of it as a sex rather than a citizen vote. Women are in the majority in most places. They form the bulk of the Christian Church. They are more often than not in the majority in the home, in some universities, and in many trades. If we look at the situation with unprejudiced eyes, do we not see evidences that they are fitting into their new liberation with conspicuous ease, certainly for the good of their sex, and certainly to the good of the future race. Children are now being better born, more intelligently reared, better clothed, and have generally more chances in life.

Having for many centuries kept women in subjection, having treated them as privileged serfs, it is vain to expect that they will all rise to a sense of responsibility and the higher citizenship. The surprise is that the change has been effected with so little disturbance. Young men, it is said, must "sow their wild oats." Their privileges the law has long declared, and the follies of youth have never debarred them from citizenship. Can the differences between men and women be maintained in the face of a wide democracy? "People," whatever it used to mean, now embraces both sexes, and of late with astonishing rapidity the old laws have, in great measure, been abrogated. No longer are women "goods and chattels." They own their own property, and cannot in person or in goods be the property of any male.

We have seen how education has admitted their equality. In many cases it is proving them the superiors of their male competitors. Here is a quotation out of the summer number of the *University of Edinburgh Journal*. It is one specimen, but in how many records of university life must the same be written?

"One very interesting item in the statistics that deserves more than passing mention is the largely increased number of women in the University. Last year, out of 3,935 matriculated students, 1,191 were women. That is between one-third and one-fourth. In the Faculty of Arts more than one-half of the whole number were women. In Science and Medicine the proportion was, of

course, much less, but there is no Faculty, not even Divinity, which escapes the invasion.

"I have found to my surprise, that in the matriculations of this year the proportion of women to men is as much as one to two."

So writes the Principal of Edinburgh University, one who has ever been friendly to the education of women. Many of these young women are of the despised "Flapper age," and yet would any sane critic say that they are less capable than "the hooligan" of giving expression to their status of citizenship?

There is another serious danger in this carping and under-estimating the new force in democracy. If it is true that no man lives to himself, and that his individuality is a heavy responsibility, how much more true is it of women, who must propagate the coming race! The higher women are rated in the citizenship of the country, so much the better will it be for those who follow after. Democracy should concentrate on making the whole of the people realise their responsibilities. It is a useless crop, to sow in the mind of the young of their sex, that they are of no importance, and are too ignorant and foolish to be fit for life. Many a mother marries too young, and has children before she realises what their care should mean. But the wise adviser does not shout at her that she should not have done it, but does the best for her in the circumstances in which she is found. You cannot turn back the tide. You would not say to women: "Return to the status in which you were before John Stuart Mill wrote of the subjection of women." A wise State has educated them, and led them into equal rights, and has not abused their weakness.

So far, has the State any just cause of complaint? Have women not made good in every sphere of life? Are they not healthier? Are not their children better born? Have they not helped the nation in war and peace? There will always be the "foolish virgin," as there is the criminal boy, sources of anxiety to the State, but women are helpful in the difficulties of "juvenile crime," and would be more so if more recognised. "Trust the people" has an ever widening meaning, and the best hope of the future lies in the increasing sympathy and understanding of our great democracy. Let us fare forward into the unknown future confident and full of courage.

FRANCES BALFOUR.

THE GRACE OF GOD.

THE Grace of God is a distinctive conception of the Christian Religion: the most distinctive, for not only, in its full connotation, does it distinguish Christianity from all other Religions, but it is paramount throughout the whole realm of Christian thought and life. Indeed, for all Christians God is, above all, the God of Grace. Grace represents His highest gift and man's sorest need. In Grace the highest glory of the Divine character is revealed. Therein alike the motive and end, the process and method of the Divine dealings with mankind, are unveiled. Grace stands for the complete interpretation of Christ as He is made known in the spiritual experience of Christians; and since Christ is the Revelation of God "the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ" is the manifestation and pledge of the "Love of God" and "the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit"—a unity in diversity which reflects the Nature, as it expresses the operation, of God Himself.

By Grace is meant the favour of God as His supreme and steadfast attitude towards mankind. When account is taken, not only of the insignificance and frailty, but of the sinful unworthiness of man, Grace is seen to be allied with and made manifest in Mercy. The Grace of God reveals that His purpose for men individually is in keeping with the sublimity of His attitude towards mankind. Nor do the attitude and purpose of God exhaust the meaning of His Grace. It stands for His fatherly and ceaseless activity in the expression of this attitude and the fulfilment of this purpose. It is the unfailing energy, which bestows all spiritual gifts, satisfies all needs and meets all emergencies with a generous and resourceful helpfulness that makes its objects, not only superior to all the vicissitudes of life, but better and more blessed by reason of them. And all this, not by means of any merely external and accidental activity of God, but by reason of His free and full self-giving.

The Grace of God, then, is precisely the conception, born of experience, that in the supremacy, amplitude, and comprehensiveness of its meaning at once distinguishes Christianity from all other Religions, and realises to the full whatever elements of truth there are to be found in all of them. The classic religions of antiquity had only faint glimpses of it. They imagined "the Graces," the genial brightness of certain deities, the generous moods of others. They attributed the prosperity and success of certain men to the favour and helpfulness of some particular deity. But nothing more. Greek philosophy could discover every other Reason in the universe save the highest and sufficient Reason of a Personal God, who through the condescension of His self-giving bestows His own Truth, Beauty, and Goodness upon mankind, restoring them

when lost, and constituting the Universe to be the scene and instrument of their bestowal. Neo-Platonic and Oriental religious philosophy could conceive of God as the highest Reality, and of union with Him as the highest blessedness. Yet this apprehension and attainment were the end of human aspiration and striving, not of the active and condescending initiative and self-impartation of God. That the Divine climax of human attainment springs from the Divine overture, that man's knowledge of God is in reality God's knowledge of man, was a truth which only Christ could reveal.

Even the Old Testament, though, as will shortly appear, it supplied the presuppositions of the Christian doctrine, stopped short of realising the absolute and universal sovereignty, the full content and the unifying power of the Grace of God in its activity and effects. It knew much of the graciousness of God, of His "pouring grace into human lips" (Psalm xlv, 2) and radiant graces into human life, of His succour and deliverance in times of need, and, within limits, of His merciful forgiveness of sins. But it never reached either the unclouded and unqualified vision of Grace as the supreme and all-containing secret of God, or of its power to reconcile and subsume all other elements of His Self-manifestation or of its boundless resources for the redemption, and its equally boundless promise for the satisfaction of man. Still less did it discover the source of the graciousness of the Will of God in the inmost nature of His Self-giving.

The Christian Religion owes perhaps the introduction, and at all events the decisive prevalence and the determinative influence of the term "The Grace of God," to St. Paul. As a Concordance of the New Testament will show, it is only to be found in his epistles and (though with less prominence) in the writings of those who came closely under his influence. The one exception, the expression "the God of all grace" in 1 Peter v, 10, does not, for various reasons, invalidate this assertion. Hence, the full content of the term and the explanation of its predominance must be sought, first of all, in his experience and especially in his conversion.

The transforming experience that came to the Apostle on the way to Damascus was due to the appearance of Christ—to His appearance equally in sovereignty and in mercy. This appearance was a decisive intervention, an unspeakably wonderful overture. It was dramatic in its occasion, sublime in its spontaneity and urgency, wise and compassionate in the way in which it took advantage of and solved a spiritual conflict that had been brought to a head, apparently, by the witness and martyrdom of St. Stephen. It was amazing, not only in its forbearance, but in its unspeakable magnanimity. It revealed at once prevenient and sovereign control of the conditions, and resourcefulness in the exercise of mercy. It

transformed, in a moment, the attitude of the Apostle to Christ by revealing the attitude of Christ to him. This transformation carried with it, in the immediate sequel, the decisive transformation of St. Paul's experience and idea of God, and with this the transformation of his conscious relations with God. The magnanimity of Christ proclaimed the mercy of God, the forgiveness of sins. With the lifting of an intolerable burden came the emancipation of a new and exalted life. As the Apostle again and again expressed it, he died and rose again with Christ.

Nor was this all. The experience, just because it was not merely subjective but the saving deed of God, solved the difficulties which had hitherto perplexed his mind and overwhelmed his heart. The previous experience of St. Paul contained within itself unreconciled and apparently irreconcilable antinomies. An insatiable hunger after God was beset by the impossibility of reaching Him. The Law, with its innumerable prescriptions and endless implications covering the whole range of life, still more by the depth of its spiritual requirements, had laid upon him an interminable task, had excited an inner rebellion that could not be quelled, and had ended by producing a despairing sense of guilt and inability. Righteousness, the Way of Life, withstood, like the flaming Cherubim, access to itself, and thereby to God. Now, however, was "revealed a Righteousness of God from faith to faith" which was "the power of God unto salvation" (Romans i, 16, 17). The intervention of Christ had made acceptance with God—sonship—the starting-point as well as the goal. Therein the mystery of the Cross and Resurrection, of the Exaltation and Spirit, of Christ were explained as the reconciling and redemptive achievement of the Grace of God. Henceforth it was evident that Righteousness and Grace, instead of lying apart from one another and being in mutual collision, were harmonised under the hegemony of Grace; "that as sin reigned in death, even so might grace reign *through righteousness* unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Romans v, 21). And, finally, the Grace that had thus become manifest was continuous in its activity; perfecting the spiritual work it had begun, the perennial source of "gifts of grace," of all-sufficient succours and supplies. Thus the subsequent dealings of God became an ever fuller and diversified manifestation of the primal grace, which proceeded "from faith to faith." Finally, this experience of grace carried with it a universal implication. It compelled the Apostle to abandon the status and privileges of his Judaism and to take the way of a confession of sin and an acceptance of mercy, which are broadly human in their possibility. Hence it came about that through his own innermost experience "was this grace given that

he should preach *unto the Gentiles* the unsearchable riches of Christ."

1. It follows from all this that the conception of the Grace of God is primarily the interpretation of Christ and of the personal experience of Christ. It stands for the magnanimous and merciful beneficence of Christ, the manifestation of which began with His earthly ministry and has its consummate display in His heavenly activity. It issues in the continuous self-communication of His indwelling. It includes the pervasive and renewing influence of His Spirit, at once commanding and comradely, sanctifying and satisfying, controlling and emancipating. The exercise of Grace in all its gifts is traced back to the initial self-giving of Christ: "Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich" (2 Cor. viii, 9). This initial act of condescending self-giving culminated in the self-oblation of the Cross, whereby "the reconciliation" was provided as the free gift of God. All this is carried upward into the heavenly activity of Christ, downward—if it be downward—into the constitution and life of the Church, and forward to "the consummation of all things."

An additional word must be said in regard to the supposed connection of St. Paul's doctrine of grace with a rigid and, indeed, dreadful, doctrine of Predestination, which appears to operate apart from, and in diminution of the grace and sovereignty of Christ. Let it be said at once, that we owe the incubus of this doctrine to St. Augustine and Calvin, not to St. Paul, to a one-sided insistence upon isolated texts torn from his writings and not to his complete argument, and that the Theology upon which this rigid and forbidding doctrine has been reared, is permeated by conceptions and influences that are not Pauline, still less Christian. The *locus classicus* from which this doctrine has been drawn is Romans ix-xi, where the Apostle is dealing with the, for him, grave problem of the unbelief and consequent rejection of Israel, accompanied by the faith and consequent acceptance of the Gentiles. It is in the course of his argument in regard to this that St. Paul uses the figure of "vessels of wrath, fitted unto destruction," and asserts the right of God, like the potter, to make "of the same lump a vessel unto honour and a vessel unto dishonour" (Romans ix, 22-23). Yet this is by no means the conclusion of the matter, for he proceeds triumphantly to argue that "as ye in times past were disobedient unto God, but now have obtained mercy through their disobedience, even so have these also now been disobedient, that by the mercy shown to you they also may now obtain mercy." And he concludes that "God hath shut up all unto disobedience that He might have mercy upon all" (Romans xi, 30-32). Hence the will to show mercy is

supreme over and makes use of the temporary rejection, which prepares the way for the ultimately universal triumph of Grace. In the same sense the Apostle declares to Timothy that God "willeth," the strongest possible expression, "that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii, 4). Hence, while St. Paul is constrained by all the presuppositions of his Theology to magnify the sovereign right of God, yet he finds that even in the purpose and working of its sternest display God uses judgment as the instrument of mercy, and that both His wrath and the exercise of His power are the methods employed for the eventual victory of His Grace.

2. Yet if the doctrine of Grace owes its precise form to the unique experience of St. Paul, this experience rested upon presuppositions imbibed from the Old Testament, and would have been impossible without them.

The Old Testament revelation and experience of God is a vital structure, the constituent elements of which acted and reacted upon one another, the emphasis being thrown now here and now there according to the differing idiosyncrasies of the various writers and the differing situations, national, and personal, with which they had to deal. At the foundation lies belief, gradually coming to maturity, in the Unity, the Creative Sovereignty and the Activity, ceaseless and universal, of God. This belief, however, was much more than a mere cosmic philosophy. It sprang into being from the apprehension of the eternal perfection of God, the main stress being laid upon the ethical qualities of His character. The ethical perfection of God gave sublimity to His motives, steadfastness to His purpose, wisdom and trustworthiness to His ways. The cosmic order and the process of history were the result and reflexion, on lower yet coherent levels, of the unchanging consistency of the Divine character. Hence the inexhaustible resources of His Godhead were at the command of, and active in, the furtherance of the exalted ends of the spiritual perfection of God. Righteousness, therefore, was the outstanding mark of His perfection, righteousness His demand of men, the triumph of righteousness the content of His purpose and the end sought by His sovereignty.

Yet the Righteousness of God was the living expression and form, the very vesture, of His gracious and merciful condescension. "Also unto Thee, O Lord, belongeth *mercy*," says the Psalmist, mindful that the inhumanity of human despots was shown in their high-handed and careless injustice, "for Thou *renderest to every man according to his work*" (Psalm lxii, 12). Graciousness and mercy, therefore, were the supreme attributes of God as He came to be known to the Prophets. He used judgment as their instrument against wrongdoers, and to bring redemptive succour to the wronged.

In the light of the holy goodness of God, sin came to be recognised, not merely as a challenge to the sovereign will of the Almighty, but mainly as an offence against the character of the All-holy. It was, therefore, a contradiction of the beneficent constitution of the Universe, which, because it has been ordered by Goodness and Wisdom, using Power as their instrument, makes Righteousness both the means and the manifestation of life. To depart from the wisdom of righteousness is to love not life, but death (Proverbs viii, 36).

At the last stage of this progressive revelation Jeremiah was led to see that the distinction between the righteous and the unrighteous, while fundamental, was not, of necessity, final. Hence he foresaw the gift of a New Covenant.

"Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they brake, although I was an husband unto them, saith the Lord. But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people: and they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sins will I remember no more." (Jeremiah xxxi, 31-34).

Thus the culminating note of the Old Testament is upon the Fatherliness of God, and upon its final manifestation in plenary forgiveness and in spiritual transformation. And with the vision of His fatherliness and reconciling mercy came glimpses, at least, of its universalism. When "the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, all flesh shall see it together" (Isaiah xl, 5). The appearance of Christ to St. Paul, in fulfilling all these presuppositions and expectations, restored their evangelical splendour, which had faded, and so transcended it as to make "grace, mercy, and peace," henceforth, the characteristic and universally accessible gifts of "God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ."

3. The special experience of St. Paul, distinctive though it was, flowed as a tributary into the main stream of the Church's faith and life. He became familiar with the living tradition of the earlier Apostles, just as they became acquainted with the wonderful nature and reality of his knowledge of Christ. The centre and spring of all our Lord's influence over His disciples had been that He, as the Son, had showed to them the Father. Immediate knowledge of the Father had been the light of all His seeing, the spirit and substance of all His teaching. The whole realm of Truth, Beauty, and Good-

ness which He revealed was radiant with the glory of Divine Love. The very conception of Love was reborn through the creative illumination of the Personality and life-history of Christ. Hence the conception of Grace found its spring in the Fatherhood of God, its background in His Love. His Love found its expression and evidence in Grace; the Saviourship of Christ revealed the Fatherhood of God. His Fatherhood made Him, out of His sovereign freedom, the Seeker, the Saviour, the Satisfier of men. Neither His Will, nor His Power, but His Love became the true and sufficient explanation of a self-giving which seeks to impart His highest—His Truth, Beauty, and Goodness—to mankind, and in the redemptive exercise of this self-giving to restore that which had been lost, to perfect that which remains incomplete. Hence in Christ are displayed altogether different, higher and larger resources and methods than those of will and power. The Fatherhood of God is made manifest, not by forgoing the demands of His holy perfection, but by fulfilling them through the Sacrifice of His Triune Self-giving. Hence the summing up of the whole is that, "Herein is love: not that we loved God, but that He loved us." And the manifestation of this Love is Grace.

To come down from these heights to the subsequent controversies that have arisen as to the nature and working of the Grace of God is, indeed, a deep descent. Yet one or two of the main issues must be touched upon, within the narrow limits of space that are available. It is generally held that there is a fundamental and irreconcilable opposition between the Protestant and the so-called Catholic view, if not as to the conception of Grace in itself, at least as to the means and *media* that it employs. The Protestant declares that the Gospel—the proclamation of the Good News of God for the acceptance of faith—is the supreme means of Grace, and that it "makes" the Church. The Catholic holds that the Church, as a Divine Institution, is the storehouse and dispenser of Grace, through its appointed ministry and Sacraments. Thus broadly stated, and thus abstractly handled, the two conceptions seem to be mutually exclusive. Yet does the broad and abstract statement of either position do justice to the truth that is immanent in it?

Let us examine more closely the apparent antithesis. The Protestant holds to the position that "it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe" (1 Cor. i, 21). Yet while "the preaching" is instrumental and in that respect both primary and necessary, its value consists entirely in the content of what is preached, or proclaimed, and its saving result in such realisation of what is preached as issues in the constitution of the Church as the living and continuous home of believing men, in whom the Grace of God is being fulfilled through

all the means that it employs. Hence the content of the preaching is incarnated and perpetuated by its very nature in the Church. On the other hand, the Church as "the company of all faithful people" cannot, in inmost reality, avail itself of ministries and Sacraments to the exclusion of the preaching that should accompany and explain them to faith. Should the attempt be made, the very rites would themselves cry out in their attempt to be *verba visibilia*, as St. Augustine called them, and to reach the heart through the imagination, if not the reason, of faith. If this view be correct, then we may await in confident and patient expectation the eventual reconciliation in a larger and more truly spiritual whole of differences, which, while they are for the present serious, are exaggerated by the imperfect apprehension, and therefore misrepresentation, by both sides, not only of their opponents' position, but of what is really involved in their own.

Only the briefest mention can be made here of what are called the Means of Grace, of which the Sacraments are the chief. Their institution and observance satisfies a spiritual demand which is both earlier and more widespread than Christianity. "Sense—symbol—Sacraments," as Baron von Hügel has called them, at the very least, give objective expression to common faith in collective acts. They picture the meaning of that which, under certain conditions, they convey. They embody the sense that what we regard as the material world may be the meeting place of God and man, that God may actively approach men through the sanctification of material objects, in which both his Spirit and that of man combine to show forth that which is truest and inmost in the relations between them. Hence all faithful people are conscious of the Real Presence in the Eucharist. It is only when they employ a metaphysic to explain this experience, or select for special and sometimes exclusive emphasis certain elements of its many-sided content, that community of living experience is marred by controversies as to its mode.

The conception of the Grace of God, as representing, above all, the Saviourship and succour of His Fatherhood in Christ, became universal and predominant throughout the Christian Church because, primarily, it gave expression to that which is central in the revelation of Christ, and consequently central in the experience that comes from the knowledge of Christ. Within this realm it answers to the sense of inmost need and the consciousness of actual succour that attend the spiritual life of Christians from first to last. Yet there is, indeed, a wider and, in a certain sense, deeper foundation for the belief. While coming to complete manifestation in Christ, Grace gives the true expression and *rationale* of Godhead. The creative and ordering, the sustaining and spiritual sovereignty of God are only ultimately explicable as so implying His Self-giving,

that every approach of His creatures to Him springs out of and is responsive to His approach to them. In so far as Religion has failed to apprehend this truth and to be conformable to it, it has failed both to apprehend its own essential meaning and to discern the Sufficient Reason of the Universe. So far from Religion being the approach of "the alone to the Alone," it is the witness that in God "we live, and move, and have our being" as a society which rests upon, springs forth from and is informed by His Fatherhood. As St. Paul says, God is "The Father, from whom every fatherhood" (literally, every family-bond constituted by fatherhood) "is named"—that is to say, derives its essential nature, its *energeia*, its description.

While, however, the conception of the Grace of God stands for that which is most deepseated and universal in Christian experience, particular emphasis may be, and has been, laid upon these features of it which meet those spiritual needs that have been most imperatively felt by different types and temperaments of Christians. For St. Paul, as has been seen, the fundamental necessity was to be brought into right relations with God. Hence with him everything turns upon the Forgiveness of Sins, upon Justification, and upon Adoption, which, in fulfilling man's capacity for Sonship, gives a Divine and quasi-legal guarantee of its validation by the Righteousness of God. This Pauline predominance was revived by Luther and by Wesley. For the Greek Fathers, the most clamant needs were felt to be those of Divine illumination, of participation in spiritual and immortal life, of such a deep interfusion of the life of men with that of God, as could only be expressed by saying that the Son of God "became Man that we might become God." For St. Augustine, groaning under the unconquerable tyranny of sin, the most urgent necessity was that the sovereign Will of God should go forth to him in the enabling power of a new spiritual and moral life. The complete doctrine of the New Testament embraces all that is essential in these various demands, and does so by gathering all together under the supreme conception of the energetic, redemptive, lifegiving Self-impartation of God in Christ Jesus. And the comprehensive name for all this is Grace.

In conclusion, something must be said of the relations between Grace and faith. Fellowship with God is at once the highest and deepest, the largest and intensest, the most exacting act of Personality. In it, man comes to fullest self-realisation, by losing and so finding himself in God. And the organ of this fellowship which, in transcending the limitations, fulfils the possibilities, of selfhood is Faith. Faith is the most characteristic act of personality. Its very simplicity is its costliness. Every power of thought and affection, of desire and will, enters into its living apprehension, its trust-

ful self-committal, its practical expression. It carries hope and love, not only in its train, but in its very being. Its watchword is not "alone to the Alone," but "all to the All." And the Grace of God demands and is worthy of this faith. Nor can it dispense with it.

Yet the very fact that Grace demands and is worthy of faith, shows that Grace, alike in its nature and its working, must be in keeping with faith. This necessity has been set forth with massive thought and impressive reiteration by Dr. John Oman in his remarkable book on "Grace and Personality." Grace would not be Grace were it to suppress, instead of evoking, personality. Nor is personality amenable to compulsion from without, even though from without were from Above. Hence the activity of Grace and the activity of faith must become blended in an indivisible unity, which, while it magnifies God, realises man. "Faith is the gift of God" as is every energy and endowment of human personality. Yet its exercise is the responsibility of man. The inseparable union of Grace and faith is the mystic and mysterious secret of the transcendent immanence of God. The very receptivity of faith involves its highest activity. The quietude of its peace means the harmony of its many-sided exercise, the beatific reality of its discovery. Its fruitfulness springs from the perennial supply of its life-giving influence and inspiration. The gift of God calls for and calls out the activity of man. Faithfulness is the fuel of faith. Like the grain of mustard seed, faith grows from minute beginnings through the intense vitality that feeds its continuous exercise. Hence the threefold procession, "from Grace to Grace," "from faith to faith," "from glory to glory." Alike in its source, its process, and its methods, the sovereignty of God is revealed in the Self-giving of His Grace.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION IN FRANCE.

THE system of remuneration for employees of the large industrial concerns in France has recently been undergoing an evolution that is not generally realised in the world. At the end of the war there was a general appreciation by the more far-sighted "captains of industry" that the workpeople demanded a fuller and richer life than had been enjoyed heretofore. Further, the heavy casualties and the decrease in the birth-rate made the future of their country a serious problem, unless more children were born, and unless the infantile death-rate, which had been excessively high, could be substantially reduced. At the same time it was necessary to produce cheaply in order to compete with other nations. In order to meet all these problems a new system of remuneration has been developed. The flat rate of wages in France is very low. At the present rate of exchange highly skilled workers in the textile industries and engineering shops are not receiving more than five or six dollars a week. But added to the flat rate of wages there are cost-of-living bonuses, family allowances, and equivalents of wages in the form of housing provision provided much under market rates, of medical attendance, and of welfare benefits generally.

Wages have been steadily increasing in consequence of the depreciation in the value of the franc and the rise in the cost of living, and it is a tribute to the success of the new system that wages in France have been adjusted without any considerable industrial trouble. Generally it may be stated that the present daily rates of wages are about five times as much as the wages that were given before the war. Thus, for example, a man who is a skilled worker in the building, printing, or engineering trades earned on the average about 4.61 francs per day, in French towns exclusive of Paris, in 1911, and in 1924 22 francs. It should also be remembered that in 1911 the usual day was for ten hours, whereas at the present time an eight-hour day is general. In the French coal mines there have been general increases during recent months. It is difficult to give exact figures, for most occupations in France are paid by piece work, and, therefore, the earnings of the workers vary according to the capacity, the hard work and the opportunity. It is, however, obvious that the flat rate of wages, even with these recent increases, is so low that no Americans or British would accept such a rate. In fact, attempts made in 1923 to persuade British unemployed to accept work in French industrial establishments have been a failure.

Nevertheless in estimating the actual cash paid to French workers, it must be remembered that there have been temporary additions in the form of cost-of-living bonuses. Last year this meant about

one franc a day to the miners in the Northern coalfields. There has also been a continuous extension of the principle of giving an allowance for each child in a family. It is estimated that there are at the present time 3,500,000 workers in France who receive annually 1,017 million francs in addition to their wages in this form of family allowances. The system recognises the difference between the burdens placed upon workers who are unmarried and those who are married. It is a development from the payment during the war by the State of separation allowances to the families of those citizens who were mobilised in the army or the navy. Actually family allowances started some thirty years ago on the railways, but only since the war have they rapidly developed, and at the present time, by a law passed in 1922, all employers who tender for State contracts must pay family allowances at specified rates. These allowances differ in various industries. In cotton mills near Lille 50 francs are given each month for two children and 390 francs for a family of eight children. According to Mr. J. R. Cahill, Commercial Counsellor at Paris, to whom I am indebted for many of the facts contained in this article, far higher rates are paid by certain companies. For example, he states that one rubber company in a provincial town pays 75 francs a month to each of the first two children, and up to 1,020 francs a month for twelve children under sixteen years of age. I had the opportunity this summer of spending some time in the offices where these allowances are administered at St. Quentin, and was told that on the whole they are very popular with the workers. Bachelors, of course, do not welcome with enthusiasm a differentiation being made in the wages paid, but the married men, and especially their wives, find it extremely useful to have an increasing income as each baby arrives. It is having a pronounced effect upon the birth-rate. For example, in the Michelin works in 1921, 62 per cent. of the families of the workpeople had no children. The directors of this firm introduced better housing and gave substantial allowances, and in three years there were only 30 per cent. of the families without children, or a gain of more than 100 per cent. In 1921 only 7½ per cent. of the Michelin families had two children, whereas in 1924 20 per cent. possessed at least two children, an increase of nearly 300 per cent. Many other figures could be quoted which show that this system of extra payment according to the need of the worker rather than according to his output, supported as it is by the State which gives tacit encouragement to employers' organisations, has a direct effect upon natality and the better care of infants.

At St. Quentin it was also impressed upon me by the employers that they found the extra payment fully justified by the greater regularity and more efficient work of the man with a family. No

distinction is made between legitimate and illegitimate children, but where a man produces the necessary certificates that he is a father, he is automatically placed on the list for monthly payments. But the money is not paid direct to him, for experience shows that when this is done there is a danger of the larger part of it going to the nearest *café* or *estaminet*. Accordingly the money goes direct to the woman who has charge of the children, who may be a wife, or possibly a grandmother. The family allowance stops for a month if the worker changes his employer for any reason. This in itself encourages stability. An employee thinks twice before he throws up his job if he knows that for four weeks his earnings will thus be decreased. Figures given me on this point show that, since family allowances have been generally adopted by the State with regard to married members of its staffs, both clerical and manual, by departmental and municipal authorities, by the railway companies, by the engineering and textile trade, by banks and insurance companies, by rubber trades, it has undoubtedly encouraged workers to remain with the same firm.

The system is proving to be so successful that it is now being extended to the professions. Funds, for example, have been created by groups of solicitors from which are paid out allowances to their employees. Thus allowances have become an accepted and established system in France. There are some who urge that as their primary object is to encourage the birth-rate, the allowances should be paid by the State, but employers with whom I discussed this question are strongly of the opinion that any success that it may have had is due to the fact that it is on a voluntary basis. The trade unions which were at first in opposition, now realise that their members value these extra increments paid to family men; employers recognise that they assist production and promote content; while those who advocate social reform acknowledge that in this case the dictates of humanity and consideration for the burdens of parenthood have proved to be "good business."

Further, in order to augment wages and at the same time encourage natality and to ensure the stability and comfort of the workpeople employed, many of the larger industrial concerns in France have built houses and let them to their own employees at rents far below the normal. Many of these houses are grouped together in admirably laid out *Cités Jardins*. Recently I had the privilege of making a personal visit to some of these "Garden Cities," belonging to the Northern Railway Company. This Company, which suffered severely owing to the military traffic and damage during the war, has built some 12,000 houses in thirty-five different places since the armistice. All of these have a minimum of four rooms, and many of them five or more, and in these are lodged

at least 35,000 persons. I found that the larger cities at Lille, Déliverance, Lens, and Tergnier, reached a very high standard of lay-out, with broad roads planted with trees. Each house has been planned by one of the Company's architects, and is picturesque on the outside, and designed within for the convenience of the housewife and for the health of the family. Each has a garden, and there are also allotment gardens near at hand. The rent of a house with four rooms and a garden differs according to the locality, but it is possible to obtain a small house with four rooms for 720 francs a year, or about fifteen *cents* a week at the present rate of exchange.

The collieries too have spent money very freely on houses. I visited several garden cities belonging to the Company of the Mines of Anzin, which has expended upwards of 100,000,000 francs on the provision of houses for the miners. These are grouped in garden cities, on sites easy of access to the pithead, but in many cases screened by trees. They are models of modern planning. The Company of the Mines of Lens, all of whose pits and houses were destroyed during the war, which is now one of the greatest coal producing concerns in France, has built upwards of 10,000 houses. These are all on the site of the battlefield, and many of them are placed on the old foundations of the garden cities that were the pride of this part of France before the war. Other collieries also have spent capital freely on houses. The Company of Marles possesses over 6,000 houses; of Bethune, over 7,000 houses; of Dourges, over 3,000 houses; of Ostricourt, over 2,000 houses; and of Liévin, nearly 5,000 houses. Many other industrial undertakings, notably rubber, textile, and chemical, have also built their own houses, which are let at very low rents as compared with the normal rents of the district. In short the total of houses built during the last few years in France by employers exceeds many times over all those built by the State or the municipalities.

In addition to providing good houses, employers in France to-day are endeavouring to ensure that their workpeople should spend their leisure time happily and under healthy conditions. In one of the garden cities belonging to the Northern Railway I saw a vigorous football match in progress, while in another part of the local sports ground railwaymen were training their pet dogs to jump over certain obstacles in preparation for sports. In all the garden cities belonging to the railways as well as to the colliery companies that I visited, there were spacious and well-equipped central halls. During the day these were used by the pupils from neighbouring schools as gymnasias. Each of these halls possessed a large stage where the local musical society performed, and where regular plays and operas were given in which local residents took part. Once or twice a week cinema performances were given. In most cases there was a

buvette attached, where drinks, with the exception of spirits, could be bought, for in the garden cities "alcohol" is forbidden. I was also impressed by the extensive arrangements made to help mothers to bring up their children well. In every case, even in one small group of houses belonging to an isolated factory near St. Quentin, there was a dispensary and a room where expectant mothers, or those with babies, could obtain free medical advice. In many of the colliery and railway "garden cities" there was a centre where pure milk was placed in bottles after being sterilised, and supplied at cost price for babies. Every encouragement was given to mothers to bring their children once or twice a month to the doctor, and a prize was awarded at the end of the year, in one case amounting to ten francs per visit, to those whose attendance was regular. This premium was given by the Company, but in some departments similar financial assistance is provided out of public funds.

In the colliery districts the schools are paid for by the companies. At Lens, for example, the colliery company provides instruction for 5,000 children. It has built seven schools for girls, five for boys, twelve infant schools and other schools where older girls learn domestic economy, including cooking and dressmaking, and technical schools for the boys. The company also provide the salaries for 150 teachers. The miners and their families are given all these educational advantages, practically at no expense to themselves. It would be possible to extend this list in order to show the other social activities in French industry. The shower baths, for example, at the pitheads, and the magnificent baths provided by the Northern Railway are typical of the present appreciation in France of the value of cleanliness. The cost of all these social benefits is, of course, very large. The Managing Director of the Company of Anzin told me that in one year his firm had paid 3 million francs for free coal issued, 6.3 million francs for family allowances, 6.9 million francs for superannuation fund, 1.1 million francs for pension fund, and 1.9 million francs for contributions towards medical aid.

The work of administering all these social benefits has been complicated by the influx of foreigners into French industry. For example, at Lens, when asking my way, I spoke to a Pole, a Czech-Slovakian, and a Belgian, before I met a Frenchman. Above the door of a small *café* just outside Lens I noticed these words written, *Italien, Espagnol, Anglais, et Belge.* During the past few years foreigners have been arriving in France in increasing numbers, tempted by the opportunities of regular work and all the amenities offered. Italian workmen have come into the vineyards of Provence; Spaniards into the wine trade of Gascony; Belgians into the textile

mills, Czech-Slovakians into the beet sugar factories, and Poles into the iron and coalfields. But this influx of foreign workmen was stopped some months ago. In spite of the fact that alien nationalities have been rapidly assimilated, it has been found necessary to impose drastic regulations in view of the amount of unemployment among French workmen. Other considerations have entered into the matter. It is thought, for example, that the weakness of the franc last year may have been partly due to the fact that the foreign workmen remitted back a substantial proportion of their earnings to their own countries, notably to Italy, Poland, Spain, and Belgium. This amount was estimated to amount in 1924 to as much as 1,200,000,000 francs. Experience too is showing that the foreigners occupy much space in hospitals and public relief institutions, and there has, in consequence, been a demand for the medical examination of all immigrants. For this reason, the number of foreign workmen admitted has recently been strictly limited. We English must find it difficult to raise objections to this policy in view of the fact that French governesses, school mistresses, and clerks who wish to take up temporary employment in this country find it increasingly difficult to obtain the necessary permits issued by the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour. France has, in fact, taken a leaf out of the British book in raising barriers against foreign workmen.

This, however, is only one aspect of the industrial evolution that is taking place in France. Far more significant and more permanent is the steady increase in the amount of wages paid and the welfare benefits offered in order to attract the best type of labour, and to persuade men and women to remain on in the same factory or workshop. Employers in other lands might well study with some care the system now being developed by French captains of industry of giving remuneration for service, which includes not only cash, but good housing accommodation, free medical advice, open spaces, family allowances, and other social benefits.

B. S. TOWNROE.

THE NEW EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONS.

"CONSTITUTIONS for the Colonies" said Thomas Carlyle once in his most atrabilious mood, "are now on the anvil; the discontented colonies are all to be cured of their miseries by Constitutions. Whether that will cure their miseries or only operate as a Godfrey's Cordial to stop their whimpering and in the end worsen all their miseries may be a sad doubt to us." It may well be, however, that this same spirit of doubt, by a process of spontaneous generation, has found itself revived in the minds of those who are surveying, as from a watch-tower, the new Europe. When, for example, the news circulated in the West of what has too hastily assumed to be the proclamation of an unconstitutional dictatorship in Poland, there was a great deal of mournful searching of hearts. What was to become of the democratic constitutions that had been passed with a flourish of trumpets in the new European States? Was the Polish coup only the first of a series of movements among these States which would send them off in the same direction already trodden by Italy, Greece and Spain? In short, and the late President Wilson notwithstanding, is the European world not yet safe for democracy?

The case of Italy is hardly a case in point. There the original constitution was not a modern one and its emphasis on the powers of the executive made anything like a dictatorship very much easier and less significant. But in the case of the new States that rose on the ruins of the old Empires, there is a hankering after all the latest and most approved models. What are we to say, for example, of the Estonian Constitution, where the supreme power of the State is placed unhesitatingly in the hands of the people? Any minorities resident within the bounds of the Estonian territories are given the power to form autonomous institutions. There is no House of Lords. The Executive is a collegial one and it appoints one of its members to deputise as Head of the State. This collegial Executive, however, differs from that of Switzerland because it is elected by the Legislature, though not necessarily from among its own members, and it must resign when a vote of no confidence is passed on it from one cause or another. The Head of the State, therefore, is somewhat of the nature of a transient phantom and the people, who are the constant power behind the throne, exercise that State power (1) by plebiscite, (2) by their initiative in legislation, and (3) by the election of the State Assembly.

The Estonian Constitution is undoubtedly a brave document but it may be held that it is not quite representative. Estonia, after all, is amongst the smaller of the new nations, and it is not among the smaller of the new nations that the novel constitutions will be most

sorely tried. What about Germany, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia? On what models are built their Constitutions? How are they going to breast the coming tide? Let it be said at once that none of these States go as far as Estonia in their conception of the functions of Head of the State. Indeed, it was the first effect of recent events in Poland to give considerably more power and prestige to the chief executive officer. Formerly the Polish President, elected on the French model, had no right of veto, and though the *Sejm* could dissolve itself by a two-thirds majority, the President could only dissolve the *Sejm* with the concurrence of a large majority of the Senate. In practice, however, such a majority was impossible to obtain. Through the operation of Proportional Representation the manifold groups coalescing into two parties made any commanding majority unattainable, and reduced the Head of the State to a position of comparative impotence in this especial regard. The German President, on the other hand, as he is elected directly by the people, has more power; and in certain cases he may carry the issue to the people by ordering a Referendum. In Czecho-Slovakia there is still more extensive power granted to the President, probably owing to the influence and prestige of the first President, Masaryk. The latter can report verbally or in writing to the National Assembly on the state of the Republic. He recommends to their best consideration any measures which he deems necessary and useful. He summons and dissolves the Chambers of Deputies. He appoints and dismisses the ministers. He cannot, however, rid himself of the representative and legislative assembly and pass ordinances free from its approving control. It is definitely laid down that the Houses of Parliament must meet twice a year, and from this mandatory rule of the Constitution, there is no escape.

Indeed, it may be affirmed of the Constitutions of Germany, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia that they are each Parliamentary Governments. Parliament in all is supreme. In Czecho-Slovakia there is even a notable provision for a Committee to sit in the intervals when Parliament is in recess. Article 54 of this Constitution provides for the setting-up of such a permanent Committee—two-thirds from the House of Deputies and one-third of the Senate. This Committee is to be elected by the favourite device of Proportional Representation and, provided that there is a majority within its own ranks in favour of a certain course, it possesses competency in all matters falling within the legislative and administrative powers of the whole Parliament. To this permanent Committee of the Czecho-Slovakian Parliament there answers in some more limited respects the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the German *Reichstag*. The latter Committee has the privilege of sitting between sessions of the *Reichstag* and even after the end of the legislative term. Its

sittings are secret, unless it decides otherwise by a two-thirds vote. Neither is it a mere aspiration on paper; for it has already met and it was certainly consulted in regard to the Dawes Report. Stories there, indeed, have been of confidential information straying out in an untimely fashion from its secret conclaves; but then there is no human institution absolutely news-tight—not even the innermost sanctum of a Government department. Nor is the Committee left alone in solitary single-blessedness. It has a twin companion, the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Representative Body. This may also meet between the sessions of the *Reichstag* and is declared to have been founded to protect the Republic against the menace of a *Putsch*. If any one of these Committees disapproves of the policy of the National Ministry, a special session of the *Reichstag* must be called at the request of one-third of its members.

To the extent then that Parliament is kept well in front, there is a continuing source of criticism of the acts of the Executive. Parliament, too, in all these new States except Finland, Estonia, and Czecho-Slovakia, means an orthodox two-chambered legislature. Neither Germany, Poland, nor Czecho-Slovakia, however, show any particular affection for a Second Chamber veto; and the common device is to rid the Upper House of any excessive enterprise or virility by confining its members to men or women of more advanced age elected by distinctly older voters. In Czecho-Slovakia the Senate consists of 150 members not younger than forty-five and they are elected for eight years by voters over twenty-six. In Poland, where there was a great deal of controversy in the Constituent Assembly over the proposal for a Senate, the Second Chamber is now elected by voters over thirty in *Voyevodships* or districts by universal, secret, direct, equal, and proportional voting. The members of this Senate must be over forty years of age and the number of Senators is equal to one-fourth of the *Seym* or Lower Chamber of the legislature.

In Germany the *Reichsrat* or Upper House represents the *Laender* or constituent States whilst the *Reichstag* represents the *Reich* as a whole. Prussia has not her old power to block legislation she dislikes, because in the new *Reichsrat* of eighteen *Laender* with a gross total of sixty-six votes, she can only muster twenty-six. It is further provided that half of the twenty-six representatives of Prussia may be appointed from amongst the provincial authorities while the power of appointment is vested in the ministries of the different *Laender*. The consent of the *Reichsrat*, too, has to be asked for the initiation of legislation by the National Ministry, but if the Upper House proves obdurate or disagreeable, the Minister need not altogether stay his hand. All that he has to do when he introduces his measure into the *Reichstag* is to submit along with it

the dissenting opinion of the *Reichsrat*, leaving the so-called Lower Chamber to attach what value it will to this dissenting opinion. The National Ministry must also introduce into the *Reichstag* any Bill which the *Reichsrat* has initiated, but if the Ministry disapprove such a Bill, they may do something towards killing its chances by submitting along with it certain of their critical observation. The *Reichsrat* has also a suspensive veto over Bills passed by the *Reichstag*; and if, after the Bill has once again been submitted to the *Reichstag*, no agreement is reached, the President may within three months submit the matter to a Referendum. If, however, the *Reichstag* is so strong on the subject that it overrules the veto of the *Reichsrat* by a two-thirds majority, the President shall either publish the Bill in the form adopted by the *Reichstag* or order a Referendum. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority of both Houses; but the *Reichsrat* may demand a Referendum on such an amendment of the *Reichstag* if the *Reichstag* has adopted it in spite of its objections. In such a situation, however, the Constitution only asks that the final draft of the amendment shall be approved by a bare majority of the qualified voters. The Referendum is thus always kept decently in the background, but in a battle between the two Houses, the honours would be mostly in the hands of the *Reichstag*.

Obviously a primary care in all these elaborate checks and counter-checks is to secure that there shall be real government. John Stuart Mill held that though Free Trade was everywhere theoretically valid, yet there might be a case for Protection when an infant colony desired to give a start to its infant industries. And, in the same way, it may be theoretically the most progressive course to give supremacy to the legislature, yet if the result of this advanced thought is to paralyse the Executive, the new Constitutions might not ultimately stand the test. For the new States government and real government is a necessity. Some of them had conflicting codes of law to develop and reconcile. All of them were faced with enormous demands of economic reconstruction. Unlike Soviet Russia they could not simplify their problem by incorporating in their respective Constitutions an article containing a list of the disinherited, those, as it is quaintly put, who "enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for." They had to reconcile the diverse interests of all sorts and conditions of men and groups. How was it to be done?

It was in Poland where a crucial test of the stability and elasticity of the new Constitutions was most prominently applied. The young Polish Parliament from the very first had an extremely difficult task. With the exception of Poznań, the whole country had been devastated by many contending armies. Several currencies circu-

lated within its bounds. It had five judicial systems. Its deputies had some of them been members of three different Parliaments and had been accustomed to form all kinds of different political groups. The number of these groups was often exaggerated by foreign critics but, such as they were, they constituted a singular source of instability and weakness. For long periods a Gordian knot of Parliamentarism was cut altogether and Poland was governed by extra Parliamentary Ministries formed of experts and economists. The Parliamentary Ministries only flitted, like ephemera, across the constitutional stage. There were also, however, the different racial minorities, which did not, as they have done in older countries, melt insensibly into the surrounding population, but maintained themselves as comparatively separate; and when it is further remembered that the efforts of all these different interests and groups were multiplied by the universal adoption of Proportional Representation, then it may be conceded that a case had arisen when Mills' Economic Canon might well be transported into politics with the necessary revisions and modifications.

As has been shown in the earlier part of this paper, the Polish Constitution, unlike that of Czecho-Slovakia, gave its Head of the State no right of veto. Neither could he dissolve the *Seym* unless with the concurrence of an impracticable majority of the Senate. Indirectly this helped to induce a spirit of irresponsibility in the political groups, for if they had no fear of dissolution and the necessity of re-election, they could afford to adopt the Kilkenny cat method of perpetuating their quarrels. The first effect of the Pilsudski coup then was to direct the attention of the whole Polish *Seym* to the necessary modifications in the direction of strengthening the initiative of the Executive. The first proposal for amendment was naturally to give the President of the Republic the power of dissolving the *Seym*. Such an amendment seemed absolutely imperative in the circumstances of the case. So article 26 of the Constitution of March, 1921, was remodelled to empower the President to dissolve the *Seym* and the Senate on the proposal of the Council of Ministers by means of a message which set forth the reasons for such a step. At the same time it was added that the President could only take such a step once for the same reason. It can thus be understood how careful the *Seym* was to surrender no necessary attribute and thus to retain unimpaired the legislative supremacy in the new Constitutions; and when it is remembered that the President was still deprived of the power to veto legislation, it must be conceded that on this point at least the new Constitutions had remained four square after a critical test.

A second series of amendments needs, however, closer examination. These sought to make the President the real head of the

Executive by giving him the power of making administrative orders have the force of laws. Such proposals met with a large amount of discussion and objection in the Polish Parliament and it was generally conceded that not to conflict with the spirit of the new European Constitutions, its operations must be limited to what was imperatively necessary in order to meet the country's economic and legislative demands. Such amendments were not to conflict with the supremacy of Parliament. They were to be carefully defined as to the subjects which might competently come within their scope. And they were even, so far as the full operation of their provisions were concerned, to be further limited in time; so that, when the state of things which seemed to necessitate them had ceased to be troublesome, these extraordinary powers would automatically be withdrawn.

The final result was that Article 44 of the Constitution was amended by an additional paragraph giving the President the power to promulgate such orders having the force of laws between the dissolution of one *Seym* and the meeting of another; but besides this addition, a special law dated August 2nd, 1926, was passed, although it was not incorporated in the Constitution, giving the President power to promulgate these orders between the sessions of the present *Seym*. This means that the latter class of powers only hold good to the end of the year 1927; and that, as regards both classes, they lose their validity if they are not presented to the *Seym* fourteen days after that body meets or if, having been so presented, they are rejected by that body. In the second place, as has already been remarked, these powers were only granted for special purposes, and these special purposes were carefully defined and particularised. There was (1) the re-organisation and simplification of the State systems of administration and legal codes; (2) the regulation of social legislation such as the Insurance Act; and (3) Budget Reform and economic adjustment generally. Quite a number of subjects were withdrawn from its domain, including (1) local administration; (2) the regulation of law relating to the calling of conscripts; (3) taxes, loans, land legislation and tariffs; (4) State debts; (5) commercial treaties and those that involve territorial changes. In the third place it was clearly understood that, despite these special powers, the responsibility of the Government to the *Seym* remained untouched. The present Ministry in Poland was formed independently of Parliament and yet in the last resort it has to justify its acts in the Parliamentary forum.

It is impossible to test all the possibilities of the new European Constitutions within the course of a single article, but some few words must be devoted before closing to the appearances of Functional Representation in the new Constitutions. The State is not

now regarded as the be-all and end-all of sociological advance. Alongside of it and claiming a share of the loyalties that were formerly reserved to it are innumerable combinations and associations that steadfastly assert their rights to a sufficient place in the sun. This is especially the case in the field of economics and industry. The Polish Constitution has a section providing that "a special statute will create in addition to territorial self-government, economic self-government in the individual fields of economic life, namely Chambers of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry, Art and Crafts, hired labour, and others, united into a Supreme Economic Council of the Republic, the collaboration of which with State authorities in directing economic life and in the field of legislative proposals will be determined by statutes." The German Constitution demands that "workers and employees shall be called upon to co-operate with employers and on an equal footing in the regulation of salaries and working conditions, as well as in the entire field of economic development of the forces of production." In order to realise this pious aspiration, a whole network of Workers' Councils and Economic Councils are created and these are dovetailed into the framework of the territorial state.

Not much as yet has been done to realise these ambitious designs: in Germany there are only Workers' Councils and a provisional Economic Council of the *Reich*. But enough has been realised to show the possibilities of the new European Constitutions and to suggest that they have come to remain, when all is told, the ruling forces of the future. They are not, as Carlyle thought in his pessimistic mood, a mere Godfrey's Cordial which will leave the whimpering child worse than before. They are the leading lines of that large and calculated scheme which will sustain the resolution of the young pioneer as he guides his weary steps from youth to manhood.

J. H. HARLEY.

PAUL VALÉRY: DE L'ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE.

IF it be true that the great French symbolist movement of 1880-90 should be closely connected with the progress accomplished in the musical culture of a public for whom music has become almost synonymous with religion, the new movement of which Paul Valéry is the father, though it may be the offspring of symbolism, is even more closely connected with the philosophic and scientific movement of the twentieth century. If M. Valéry's poetics have been accused of hermetism and of preciousness, this is because they seek to express certain psychological shades, certain affective subtleties which have hitherto been neglected in poetry. M. Valéry's great master, Mallarmé, trusted almost entirely to verbal music for directing his readers towards the shadowy realm of inner life. Valéry, though he follows closely his mentor's rules, aims at still further enlarging the power of poetry till it shall become a weapon of perfection, a will for power. There is nothing of the green-room atmosphere about him, nothing of the colourless madrigalist who makes insipid everything with which he comes in contact. "The true condition of the true poet," he says, "is utterly distinct from the state of dream. I see in it voluntary researches, suppleness of thought, the soul's consent to the continual restraint of sacrifice."

The same hard tone, unsparing towards himself, is to be found in all Valéry's poems, prefaces, lectures, or essays. His attitude has been called "intellectualist." The epithet is used at once to label and to slay. "Voluntary" would have been a better word. The will must be constantly on the alert if we are to strive after a beauty which is ever growing freer from all sentimental or romantic attraction, freer from every relativity.

"The real genius," says Valéry, speaking of Leonardo da Vinci, "is he who can rediscover the law of continuity which eludes the average man, he who can discover the relations and connections between things." Shelley would not have spoken otherwise. But where shall we seek the poet or sage who can discover the universal law which shall explain the universe? In the meanwhile, till this happy day dawn let us take refuge in exercises wherein every psychological phenomenon, psychic or not, can be substituted one for another. Directly our most intimate movements are observable they join on to all observed things: "Colour or pain, remembrances, expectations, and surprises, this tree and the fluttering of its foliage and its yearly variation from its shadow as well as its substance, its accidental attributes of form and position, the very distant thoughts it recalls to my distracted mood . . . all things

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substitute themselves one for another—may that not be the very definition of things?"

Therefore let us set to work and weave straws, practise our exercises. Paul Valéry gave his *Jeune Parque* in 1917 as a mere "exercise," an imitation in parts of Mallarmé's finest work. The human heart, the human conscience which is the real Being, can never be filled—it is always there, insatiable, despairing, setting itself most subtle, most poignant problems. Poetry then, in so far as it is the most perfect, is the only true, durable, deathless thing. But what is this poetry in which the soul (for M. Valéry, willingly or unwillingly, is a spiritualist) increases its depth, its scope, and its perfection?

If we study M. Valéry's prose and verse we are led at once into the realm wherein, as he says, "images melt and fade away." "Mille femmes font mille choses. Mille flambaux, mille péri-styles éphémères, des treilles, des colonnes." In his *Soirée avec M. Teste*, there is a striking instance of this relation-vision:

"Une immense fille de cuivre nous séparait d'un groupe murmurant au-delà de l'éblouissement. Au fond de la vapeur brillait un morceau nu de femme, doux comme un caillou. Beaucoup d'éventails indépendants vivaient sur le monde sombre et clair, écumant jusqu'aux feux d'en haut. Mon regard épelait mille petites figures, tombait sur une tête triste, ouvrait sur des bras, sur des gens, et enfin se brûlait."

That is the art of symbolic prose, a very tissue of multiple meanings, in which order is born of disorder itself. But why use symbols? Because not only can things be substituted one for another since they emanate from a same principle, but also because they are the pictures of the soul's most precious experiences. Only the saint, the hero, and the poet experience either the desire to suffer not only in themselves but for all suffering militant humanity, or the fear of an angust Nemesis which crouches in the depths of an unhappy soul. Saint, hero, poet are the brothers of the universe suffering from its own self-insufficiency. Our myriad symbols are the masks of the Cosmos, man's business is to create myriads more.

Such, at least, is our interpretation of M. Valéry's thought. If we be wrong, let him enlighten us and, indeed, as we write the date of his long promised visit to these shores is drawing near. This poet of the Inner Life owes us a new *Imitation*, the aspects, soul states, and prayers of a restless anxious heart confronted with the impassive eternal universe.

Although Valéry has never yet given us his definite views on the question of divinity, his lyrical states are absolutely religious for the very reason that he wishes to introduce light and duration into the mobility of the mind's affairs, for the very reason, too, that he

needs something to lean upon in this imponderable world wherein he dwells. The heroic pathos of the *Cimetière Marin* or the *Jeune Parque* lies in the fact that the soul in the exalted state produced by its own lyricism, in its deepest urge, abandons itself to the urge of the universe, and so realises what is a pure spirit. Valéry ranges himself here among the great original family of neo-Platonists. Once we have reached this point we hardly need to ask what true poetry is according to Valéry. He must hold that poetry is the movement which the mind invents for its expression, and instead of being logical and sentimental like the greater part of French poetry, it will consist in the discovery of the relations of things to one another and to the universe. It will be a series of fugitive illusions and like a series of dreams, for dreams lead us into the kingdom of deepest realities.

If Valéry sets out from the point at which Mallarmé lingered too long, he certainly penetrates further into the shadowy lands of the subconscious which governs us. *La soirée avec M. Teste* is the ideal biography of Mallarmé. This Teste who is so alive and at times so commonplace, who has killed the automaton within him, Teste whose life seems so moderate and is yet so heroic, who has attained the mastery of his thought, who "dies without confessing," and who prefers to fame the satisfaction of knowing himself to be unique, makes up a perfect portrait of the "master" of the Rue de Rome.

Any serious study of Valéry ought to comprise an equally serious study of Mallarmé. Those critics who make mock of Mallarmé and his famous gatherings in the Rue de Rome are thereby answered. Valéry's conception of Mallarmé and through Mallarmé of literature determined his conception of life, his philosophy. The somewhat cavalier tone in which he treats philosophical problems in his Preface to *La Connaissance de La Déesse*,* should not blind us to the deep earnestness with which he studies the delicate intricacies of our logical or philosophical machinery. What interests him supremely is the play of mind or of chance. Therein he is indubitably a forerunner. It is into this labyrinth and the convolutions of the brain that he leads his M. Teste or the author of the *Cahiers* (who is himself). He sought in Leonardo da Vinci, but found in Mallarmé, that true central position of the philosopher waiting like a spider in the middle of his web for the idea-flies to arrive. That comparison is more apt than may at first appear, for Valéry, like Mallarmé, does wait for inspiration from an outside world, and perception with him plays a most important part. "I can only arrive at

* "Philosophy, once you rid it of things vague and refuted, can be summed up in five or six problems apparently precise but fundamentally indeterminable, deniable at will, which are reducible to linguistic quarrels, and whose solution depends upon the manner in which they are written." (Preface, p. 15.)

the literary application of the mind by the consequence, the effect of external circumstances and scarcely ever through my movement. . . . Works appear to me, I must confess, as the dead residues of the Creator's vital acts."

It is curious to see this deliberate passivity of the mind side by side with Valéry's ambition to be a kind of walking encyclopædia, to become conversant with all the affairs and sciences which animate and thrill the world. That is doubtless why he reverts to Mallarmé's point of view and studies profoundly the problems connected with language, language being the open-Sesame to the treasure-caves of the universe. The problem he finds most interesting and most fertile in subtle artifice is that of those words whose faculty it is to imply many different objects. This problem is connected, of course, with that of perception, since the part to be played by the disinterested mind is to allow the body to perceive all natural objects and then link them up as it will. Hence the difficulty of Valéry's poetry for the ordinary reader. Instead of admitting commonplace associations into his poems, he binds together images which are startlingly disconcerting :

L'insecte net gratte la sécheresse . . .
L'argile rouge a bu la blanche espèce . . .

The reader best prepared to appreciate this style is the Englishman who knows his Meredith. Meredith, indeed, is pre-eminently the writer who succeeds in joining words and concepts which might well be astonished at finding themselves in each other's society. *The Amazing Marriage* is a good label for this procedure of style, than which none is more admirably fitted for changing the aspect of the universe and altering the situation of our horizon. To succeed in this it is necessary only to have genius.

Genius or no, the symbolist school deserves well of France. Valéry's generation, offspring of the philosophical and musical schools of France and Germany, of Hegel as much as of Condillac, of Schopenhauer and even of Nietzsche, was profoundly convinced of two things : the poverty of human thought ceaselessly overthrowing whatever it touches, and of the infinite possibilities of music. In a world of pure appearances thought could know only itself, and lacerated itself upon the thorns of logic. The mind created only to destroy ; amid the desolation language rose and towered above the ruins—and with language, music. This explains the symbolist school's love of words for words' sake, and the importance they attached to language problems and to those suggestions of dream and reality called up by the mere marshalling of words. Literary history proves them to be right. Why do we still read Homer or Virgil, if not for the sake of the value we attach to their very words and the musical modalities they represent ?

The desire and power to sing in view of musical effects (for music engenders countless feelings), the desire and power to sculpture with subtly chosen words the reality all around us, which is after all but a thing of dream and fantasy, this verbal sensitiveness which laughs at prosaic thought and even at grammatical bonds, exists in Mallarmé to a most remarkable degree. It is to be found in even greater proportions in Paul Valéry though blended with other elements.

The two poets' fundamental belief in themselves is profound : the poet cannot be mistaken. Divine poetry is infallible and always intelligible. Its so-called obscurity is that of the oracles of former days. We must consent to swallow extraordinary doses of poetry. Every word is sacred, in every word there palpitates a life independent of all other lives. The poet who feels this must reveal it at all costs : so Mallarmé, at the close of his life, was content to describe a window, a deserted room, a piece of wreckage on the sea.

In the eternal silence around us the poet sings like the nightingale in the dark woods and as he sings, whether he will or no, he sings his surroundings : forests and streams, the hills and sky which have become incorporated in his person. Nature is obliged to play her part in his verses ; and whereas philosophical systems break down because they are the product of reasoning, the poem has immortal life since it is sustained by the great whole whence it sprang. The poets have always intuitively known this truth but the nineteenth century emphasised it through its scientists—Darwin at their head. That marvellous mimicry which makes every being reflect its surroundings, which makes every being around every other being become closely linked to it, which thus suppresses all boundaries, barriers or hard confining lines—is to be seen in the suppression of punctuation so dear to Mallarmé, or in the constant change of time signature among modern composers. There is thus no definite termination of any line, word, rhyme, or bar of music. Meaning and sonority are infinitely perpetuated down the long dark corridors of our minds and thus awaken mysterious echoes.

Paul Valéry clings to punctuation more than his master, perhaps because he is even more subtle. "What," he asks, "can be more mysterious than clearness?" Also Valéry speaks to a larger public. More tragic, more dynamic than Mallarmé, he would wrestle with eternity, he is not ashamed of showing off his muscle, he feels he is master of his own strength :

C'est là mon fort, c'est là mon fin.

He loves to concentrate himself, to sum up in a few precious lines the depths of a metaphysic ; he is thus entirely following the tradition of those seventeenth and eighteenth century poets whom the

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textbooks call minor, but who, since the lettered loved them, are immortal.

Mallarmé never asked very much of life: indeed, if we are to believe the testimony of one of his disciples, he played with the idea of suicide. Valéry seeks consolation for the tragedy of his thought in a voluptuous didacticism. That brings us to the very essence of his æsthetic. He has expressed it in various ways but always with the same vigour, no one can doubt his sincerity. It was dubbed at first eccentric or false, yet it followed the Malherbe tradition: *Poets are not born, they are made*. With Malherbe and his school technique held supreme sway, but the old Norman poet has not the least metaphysical subtlety. For him the rules of poetry were rules like the rules of bridge or lawn tennis, there was no need to chatter about being or non-being. For Valéry technique is a part of metaphysics: I am not free to think as I please, but I am necessarily what I am, I may become what I think, or what the mobile changing universe makes me think. The idea underlying *La Jeune Parque* or *Le Cimetière Marin* or *Narcisse* is really the question of "grace," the fortuitous gift of the poetic faculty, the question of freedom and of the soul's destiny and nature.

Critics, who have called Valéry a Hegelian, or a Bergsonian, might just as well call him a neo-Jansenist. The labels mean little beyond the fact that this poet is intensely pre-occupied with philosophical problems. Faint praise after all, since any well constituted soul must have its haunted moments. Which is exactly what the enemies of this philosophical poetry declare: they have been deliberately incurious to discover to how great an extent this eagerness to lift nature's veil is contained in the poet's inner being and his very conception of Poetics. Valéry believes that the poet's thought is regulated by exterior form and that in reality there is no logical succession in ideas since we are at the mercy of chance.

This is quite a new interpretation of Boileau's famous "*Souvent un beau désordre est un effet de l'art*." In any case Valéry risks the paradox in order to revert to the ancients' conception of poetry. Then poetry was the art of a cult, that is to say, it was a ceremonial technique before it became an art of culture. Cult and culture are merged in Homer, Virgil, or Dante—the *Iliad*, the *Aeneid*, and the *Divine Comedy* are Mass Books.

The world exists, but it is chaotic, and, as it could not exist merely for itself, it must exist for the glory of poetry, that is, of Beauty and Truth. This is, of course, the famous concept of "pure poetry" so passionately discussed by men of letters for the past few years, and long before l'Abbé Brémond carried it into the heart of the Academy—the expression "pure poetry" has long been understood to mean poetry deprived of every artifice of oratory, lyrical poetry stripped of all rhetoric.

Not in vain had Taine attacked the French Classics and reproached them with their love of long speeches. The few Frenchmen who knew English literature well declared that the English poets alone were acquainted with pure poetry. Mallarmé, who was a teacher of English, preached this doctrine ardently. He was the first—and let this be remembered to his eternal honour—to write poems which, taking for their starting point a single object, suggest a score of others, and that by his use of myriad-faceted words. Criticism is wrong to call these poems puzzles—in a puzzle the pieces fit into one another—but Mallarmé gives us a mosaic in which every stone can have a score of positions and shapes.

This conception is naturally acceptable to Valéry, who believes that the logic of the mind can never be the mirror of vast eternal nature—our mind prefers the simple, and we are the most complex product of nature. On the other hand, Mallarmé was too rigidly fixed in the pessimistic attitude of the philosopher who answers the vacancy of the divinity, not with silence, but with the vacancy of a poem. Valéry emerges from the void or at least from this belief in universal void. Poetry must exist, it does exist.

To express oneself is to impoverish oneself, thought Mallarmé. The human mind must shut itself in its ivory tower. But Valéry realised that he had to leave his Belvedere. "Man exists to be spent by others and by himself." Such is the vigorous message he has for us. No romantic attitude of the poor melancholy solitary man on a rock contemplating a vast waste of conflicting waves. There is in Valéry a man of action who would not hesitate to take part in the contests of the forum. While Mallarmé retires into his bejewelled shell, Valéry shakes himself and scatters diamonds and pearls. He clings to the universe with all his might, his poetry is an endless colloquy between poet and universe, and between poet and reader. I would wish to end this study on that note. The most striking, most enthralling part of Valéry's work is his union with life and thereby with the questions it raises. Esoteric as he is, his wish is to have an exoteric doctrine. After reading his Preface to the *Connaissance de la Déesse* we realise clearly that after having found "the supreme and wonderfully retarded flower of culture" he grieves at not being able to make the general public worship it. He is ready to renounce the "pride of never being satisfied" in favour of that other pride of being understood by the man in the street.

G. TURQUET-MILNES.

ITALIAN OPERA.

IT was in Florence, on the evening of October 6th, 1600, in celebration of the marriage of Maria dei Medici with Henri IV of France, that the *melodramma*, or earliest form of opera, made its first appearance with *Eurydice*. The words were by Rinuccini, the music by Jacopo Peri, and the greatest artistes of the time took part in a performance which astonished all by its novelty, fine music, and excellent execution.

As in all timid and uncertain beginnings, Peri and Rinuccini were not fully aware how exceptional a form of art it was to which they had given birth. Peri's *Eurydice*, and, a few days later, Caccini's *Ratto di Cefalo*, owed their being to a gathering of scholars and musicians known as the Florentine Chamber. These used to meet, towards the end of the *cinquecento*, at first in the house of Count Bardi, and later in that of Jacopo Corsi, to evoke the poetry and music of Greece, allured by the very mystery of that ancient art, that were little by little being brought to light. But from the idea of an imitation of classical beauties largely unknown and even undeveloped, sprang a new art which in the course of three centuries has been developed, enlarged, transformed, till it has become one of the most potent attractions and means of artistic culture—the opera.

The informing principle of the tentative of the Florentine primitives was to accompany and accentuate the spoken verse of the play by a musical recitative that would enhance its dramatic value, render the dialogue more significant, and bring out the lyrical motifs. Thus the ground-work of the music was the solo recitative, and lyrical effusions or musical episodes were rendered by swifter modulations which marked the beginning of the *arioso*, and brief synthetic choruses commenting the state of mind of the public. The instruments were few and their effect limited, their sole function being to accompany. The ideal of the early Italian composers was to obtain the fusion of these three elements, the verse, the musical recitative, and the instrumental accompaniment—an ideal brought to its sincerest and most significant expression by the genius of the age, Claudio Monteverde of Cremona, whose *Orfeo*, his greatest work, was performed at Mantua in February, 1607. From the irregular chant he evolved the first intimations of melody; with him music began to throw off its subjection to the spoken verse and to interpret emotion; declamation with musical accompaniment was on the way to become an art in itself and the spoken drama to yield place to the music-drama.

From Florence this early form of opera spread immediately to the chief cities of Italy, and very soon it is possible to notice differences of conception, style, and tradition. Hardly half a century later one

may speak of the various schools, Venetian or Roman, Florentine or Neapolitan, each the prelude to new and special developments. But the wave of innovation did not stop at the frontiers of Italy; it spread abroad, still maintaining its Italian character, so that towards the middle of the seventeenth century Italian poets, musicians, instrumentalists and singers were to be found in Paris, Vienna, Munich, Warsaw, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and London.

The founder of the French Opera was a Florentine, the famous Lulli. Already, in 1645, Cardinal Mazarin had caused Sacchini's *Finta Pazza* to be performed in France, and soon after l'Abbé Perrin obtained permission to instal *Académies d'opéra sur le pied de celles d'Italie*. Lulli, who was born in Florence in 1632, had been brought to Paris by the Duc de Guise to amuse Mlle. de Montpensier with his songs, but thereafter he had been reduced to the kitchen to amuse the cooks and servants with his fiddle. By a lucky chance his talent was recognised and Louis XIV protected him. He wrote the famous *Divertissements*, and ballets, and various *intermezzi* for Molière's comedies, and came to be appointed manager of the theatre of the *Académie Royale de Musique*, since 1699 known as the Opera. From that moment Lulli gave himself up to the stage, writing many remarkably beautiful operas, following in the footsteps of the great Monteverde but adapting himself to the impulse of the age in Paris.

The whole of the German world of the seventeenth century felt the influence of Italian Opera, which was the first to be performed in the German theatres. German composers writing for the theatre never deviated from the Italian pattern. Even Handel, who was born at Halle in 1685, with all his personality remained, as far as the theatre was concerned, largely on Italian lines, and on coming to England was announced as "Signor Handel, a famous Italian composer."

In England two Italian musicians had introduced musical displays known as masques at the beginning of the seventeenth century and various Italian operas had been given in London. Later on the Royal Academy of Music was founded, with the intention of instituting an Italian theatre, and to this end not only Handel, who passed as an Italian, but Bononcini and Ariosti were summoned to London. Lawes set Milton's *Comus* to music, but above all the great Henry Purcell, who lived between 1658 and 1695, revealed a most pure vein of melody and individuality of style; his greatest work is *Dido and Æneas*. Yet here, as in Poland and Russia, Italian Opera remained absolute master. The new musical gospel had spread triumphantly throughout Europe. The type of the opera of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was Italian.

On its first appearance the opera still showed traces of the classical influence of the Renaissance, ideas and sentiments being sought in

ancient history and mythology. Jacopo Peri's first tentative work was called *Daphne*, his opera was *Eurydice*, and the greatest exemplar of the age was Monteverde's *Orfeo*—an auspicious choice, for Orpheus was a fitting patron for this most seductive of human inventions in which poetry, music, and scene met. And the scene became a complex of arts, among which painting and the dance played no small part. The aim was an artistic synthesis. The sentiments, however, set forth in pastoral idylls and grandiose or tragic episodes of classical legend, save in a few lyrical or pathetic moments failed to stir the human emotions of the general audience. It was in the nature of the embryo opera, after its first appearance, to become too external, even to the point of departing from its true character. And the more stage convention and superficial sentiment prevailed, the further the music, or rather, the singing, diverged from the meaning of words and scene, attaining an independence and predominance excessive and illogical.

The period, however, of this dramatic retrogression and melodic evolution saw the birth and development of comic opera or opera bouffe, which dealt with the more ordinary vicissitudes of human life, and interpreted the common emotions of the crowd, while maintaining a more perceptible link between words, scene, and music.

Serious classical opera was born in an aristocratic and cultured Florentine club, but opera bouffe arose among the typically sentimental and light-hearted people of Naples. It is true that in both Rome and Florence the first accents of musical comedy had been heard, deriving from the madrigal dialogues, but opera bouffe was born and reached its full brilliance in Naples in the *settecento*. There had been many attempts among the early masters to set laughter and jest to music, but the man whose genius could give them life was Giovan Battista Pergolesi, whose *Servant Padrona*, performed at Naples on August 28th, 1733, marks the real beginning of opera bouffe, which was to remain wholly Italian. Other masters in this genre were Niccolò Piccini, with *Cecchina o la Buona Figliuola*; Domenico Cimarosa, whose masterpiece is the *Matrimonio Segreto*; Giovanni Paisiello, who invented the semi-serious or comic opera, of which the typical example is the famous *Nina Pazza per Amore*; Rossini, with the immortal *Barbiere di Siviglia*, which has a fitting counterpart in Donizetti's *Don Pasquale* and the *Elixir d'Amore*.

Another type of dramatised music, born in the *seicento* in Rome, was the oratorio. In this scene and action are lacking, and the narrative, interlaced with musical dialogue and lyrical song, is predominant. It arose out of the religious *laudi*, airs rhythmically harmonised sung in the Oratories—prayer and meeting halls usually attached to churches—according to a custom introduced in the second half of the *cinquecento* by St. Philip Neri, the great Floren-

tine Saint who lived in Rome and founded the Order of the Oratory. The first to set the spiritual dialogues to music was the famous Animuccia, one of the reformers of sacred music, but the true type of oratorio was the creation of a Roman, Giacomo Carissimi (1605-1674), who infused into it warmth of feeling, together with power of expression and simplicity of form.

The eighteenth century closed with a characteristic battle fought out in Paris between two different types and conceptions of music—the Italian, represented by Niccolò Piccini, and the German, represented by Christopher Gluck. The Parisian public was divided into *Piccinistes* and *Gluckistes*, and the struggle went on for years, during which both contestants produced various operas of merit. The victory, as far as musical reform was concerned, remained with Gluck, whose *Iphigenia in Tauris* represented the opening of a new era, while with Piccini that of the uncontested predominance of Italy came to a worthy close. Paris and France as a whole, however, remained for some while longer under Italian influence, represented by Luigi Cherubini, author of the famous *Medea*, whom both sides recognised as a man of genius and to whom Beethoven wrote: "Vous resterez toujours celui de mes contemporains que j'estime le plus." Another Italian who dominated Paris during the Napoleonic era was Gaspare Spontini, Piccini's pupil, whose *Vestale* remains a masterpiece of art and inspiration, broad in treatment and ardent with passion.

But the time had come when the Italian type of dramatic music, which as *melodramma*, opera bouffe and oratorio had spread over the world, had to give way before the creation of national music. This happened at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the simultaneous vogue and evolution of romanticism in art and of the ideals of nationality and the principles of liberty.

Before going further it will be well to enter more deeply, from the æsthetic point of view, into the form and spirit of this type of art. When the primitives would clothe with musical notes a drama on the stage, or a jocose comedy, or simply the narrative of a religious drama—the three fundamental types, music-drama, comic opera, oratorio—their basic ideal was to give higher relief to the sentiments and dramatic action. In the Middle Ages song had been principally religious, the collective voice of the nameless multitude that raises its prayer to God in the ardour of faith, or the more intimate emotions of joy and pain. The tune was only a *melopœia*, a rhythmic chant which aided the memory without troubling the prayer. Its office was subordinate and restricted, but solemn and majestic nevertheless, intertwined with the rites of the mysteries, broken by deep intimate silences. An irregular rhythm predominated, without accentuated outbursts of melody or showy declamations to

trouble its essential mysticism. The Gregorian chant is a pattern of religious singing, and it has outlived all infiltrations and aberrations.

But art has its requirements. First descant (pregnant, for all its aridity, with unexpected developments), then counterpoint, were to lay the foundations of that vocal polyphony that Palestrina in Italy, and, later, Bach in Germany, were to carry to summits of expressiveness that only genius can attain. Art, however, does not confine itself to the sublime moments of communion of earth with heaven; it expresses also human life in its manifold variety, with its passions and sacrifices, its ideals and its realities, and of all these music is a faithful and impassioned interpreter.

And while sacred song is above all the collective expression of the manifold voice of human hearts, and has as its base the chorale, folk song is above all individual, telling of the love or grief of one, and tending to the union of men severally. Folk song also derives from the melopæic chant, long, dolorous, mystical, like that of the peasants and shepherds of the East, sung in starry nights, or dreamed under the whiteness of the moon; and it passes into an amorous duet as though to twine grief with life and love with death. Song hallows the sign of love and pain; the nuptial song, the duet of love, summons the lullaby, the cradle-song, and this is linked with the lament for the dead, the chorus of all, wondering, nameless, sorrowful, believing. This folk-song becomes the basis of a music common to all peoples, but which each expresses according to its temperament. At first the song of a family, it becomes collective, as in the patriotic or war song, and expresses the joy of physical life, as in the dance, or the emotions aroused by Nature, as in the bucolic or pastoral chorus.

The *monody* or song for one voice, carried from the lips of the people to those of the troubadours and meistersingers in the late Middle Ages, made the round of courts and marketplaces, while the narrative chant served the ballad singers who told of Roland and Arthur. Only with the Renaissance and the awakening of classical thought and the search for artistic form, did the monody outgrow the folk-song stage and become an artistic expression, spreading till it ousted choral and counterpunctal song, and became melody. Then was the moment of its victory.

Melody, that divine daughter of art, is the natural development of the chanted monody. It is built on a rhythmic movement, not free but measured, forming a regular period usually on a quaternary basis, with thesis and arsis, and expressing a personal and therefore intimately lyrical state of mind. Melody was for music what in modern languages rhyme is for verse. Low and Church Latin had a presentiment of rhyme, as the hymns and liturgical sequences show, and it was more perceptible still in the first stammerings of

the Romance tongues. From assonance verse passed to rhyming couplets, to combinations of rhymes—triplets, quatrains, stanzas, sestinas, sonnets, octets. Rhymed verse reigned supreme. In the same way melody permeated all music, even that of the Church, laying the foundations of harmonised singing in two, three, and four voices even in the choruses and choral finales, till all musical expression became melodic.

As in all things new and beautiful, exaggerations, errors of taste, the tyranny of the multitude, could not be avoided, and all the more that melodic singing grew up with dramatic music, when in every city in Europe there was a race to open theatres and perform operas. Melody stole to the heart and flattered the ears, and was easier of understanding than counterpunctal choruses or musical declamation. The melody was a song, *il bel canto*, folk-song raised to be an art, a fine and exquisite art, and it was loved for its own sake. People went to the theatre for the development of the melody and the full throated song, and applauded. They went to Church, and here again too often they went for the suave, prolonged seduction of the melodic singing; prayer nearly stopped to give place to artistic enjoyment. And since the solo only pleases when the singer has a good voice the artist came to be indissolubly associated with the melody, whether he sang in the theatre or in Church. And the singer, applauded for his voice and art, wished to show off his merits and powers still better, till instead of having to suit himself to the melody the melody was written to suit him. Shakes, trills, held notes, the whole gamut of excess of virtuosity, at the time of the decadence took on extraordinary and incredible development. Opera, like Church music, deteriorated through the exaggerated triumph of melody and the artist and of singing for singing's sake. The drama came to be divided into "pieces" which had definite features known as *airs*, *cavatine*, duets, *terzetti*, quintets, *finales*. Rigid rules guaranteed their parts to the artists, so that not one of the three or four principal singers should miss the solo in which his fine voice and artistic ability could have full scope. There was no longer any correspondence between the words and sentiments and the music, nor any dramatic continuity, nor musical unity.

During this period when melody predominated a necessary element of opera had been developing—the orchestra. Little by little a more characteristic type of instrument had evolved. The violin, which was to lead the orchestra, was invented by an Italian in the middle of the sixteenth century, and found its great genius in Archangelo Corelli of Fusignano; while another Italian, Sammartini, was the creator of the pure symphony. The theatrical accompaniments from simple became complex, musical commentaries that here and there won independence in preludes, interludes, and over-

tures. Little by little the accompaniment came to make a necessary and effective third, co-operating in the opera with verse and song.

Gluck's reform sought to turn the singing into a commentary of the words, as the Florentine Chamber had conceived it, to take from each part its independent role and make of the stage action the predominant and synthetic centre. This ideal was never attained, and till the Wagnerian reform melody continued to dominate. Nevertheless excesses of virtuosity were outgrown, a greater unity was obtained between music and action, the orchestration was developed. The result was the opera of the nineteenth century.

When in 1816 the curtain of the Argentina Theatre of Rome fell on Rossini's *Barbiere di Siviglia* amid sonorous hisses a great innovation had been achieved—the fusion between melody, words, and orchestration. An immortal masterpiece that was to dominate the stage of the world had appeared. The old opera bouffe had reached its fullest expression, and at the same time modern opera had been born, while melody, its old aberrations over, had achieved dramatic potentialities only to be realised in the nineteenth century.

What Rossini's *Barbiere di Siviglia* is for comic opera his *William Tell* is for serious opera. In this drama is carried to an incomparable synthesis, with a most moving melody, a highly developed orchestration, and most sincere and effective polyphonic singing.

The swan of Italian dramatic melody was the Sicilian Bellini. His melody is the purest, the broadest, with long vibrant periods, a continuous reinforcement of harmonious waves of sound, intimately dramatic, lyrical, moving, and profoundly true. Wagner, who despised the melodists, made an exception for Bellini, who produced two masterpieces, the *Sonnambula* and *Norma*.

One of a pleiad of lesser Italian composers was Donizetti of Bergamo, a prolific author who sought to equal *Norma* with his *Lucia di Lammermoor* and the *Barbiere di Siviglia* with *Don Pasquale*. But the singer of the new Italy in the fateful period of the *Risorgimento* was Giuseppe Verdi, a champion bestriding old and new, who, without abandoning melody, of which none knew better the dramatic values, gave the orchestra in some of his operas a part almost equal to the voice parts, creating a truer balance by the symphonic development, but establishing the drama in its unity and potentiality as point of focus. No other musician had his theatrical sense. In his early period, from *Oberto di San Bonifacio* to the *Battaglia di Legnano*, he is still in the orbit of Donizetti. But the three operas that were to reveal his romantic personality and dramatic sense in their entirety were *Rigoletto* (1851), *Il Trovatore*, and *La Traviata* (1853).

And to Verdi's genius age brought renewal and rejuvenation, so that as an old man he approached modern thought and feeling and

created immortal works. *Aida*, daring in its stagecraft, effective singing, truth of feeling and dramatic effects, can be said to close the cycle of Verdi's romanticism while opening that of a new type of dramatic music, more in harmony with present-day feeling. In this the melody, while remaining the foundation of Italian Opera, is bent to a closer expression of the mind, and becomes harangue, invective, clamour, speech, enthusiasm, humour; blending with the words, it now dominates, now serves them. Such in great measure is *Othello*; here and there are traces of mannerism, but rarely. The whole opera is permeated with a new spirit by which music and drama form a perfect whole. Throughout Act IV, Othello's jealous fits, Desdemona's anguish, Iago's perfidy are felt through the shuddering of the strings and the restrained or outpouring song. But complete perfection was attained by Verdi's last work, his portrayal of *Falstaff* (1893). The music is still Italian, the singing is singing, but all is fused into a natural musical commentary, of which the vivacity, simplicity and colour have incomparable beauty.

The nineteenth century opens with the jovial, sonorous, whole-hearted laughter of the *Barbiere di Siviglia* and closes with the humorous, bitter jesting of *Falstaff*. Both are masterpieces, not of Italy only but of the world, showing humanity in its reality and weakness, in its aspirations and disillusionments, with laughter greeting its frailties and gladdening its rejoicings.

While in Italy the opera that dominated Europe was thus evolving, Germany had created a national music in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with four mighty geniuses, Bach, Handel, Mozart, and Beethoven. But in spite of the tentatives of Gluck and Weber Germany had failed to create a national opera. This task awaited another Titan, Richard Wagner, who, returning to the original idea of the Florentine Chamber and Gluck's tentative, sought a three-fold reform of the opera, technical, dramatic, symphonic. Melody had created the opera divided into pieces; the realistic or historical drama in its lyricism had exaggerated emotions, and the orchestra, dominated by the voice parts, had never reached its full symphonic efficacy. Wagner turned to the symbolic drama, the typical and humanised expression of sentiments rather than actions, static more than dynamic, less human than divine. He turned to the melopæic chant, dramatised but not lyricised, for the expression of the words, while building on the polyphonic orchestration as the synthetic expression not so much of the words as of states of mind and stage action; hence the technical necessity of the *leitmotif* for the musical individualisation of the personages, and to give them not so much a stage life as a musical life. Verdi's synthesis through the dramatisation of the singing Wagner achieved by dramatising the orchestral polyphony, and thus created a unique type, drama, poem,

symphony, never before seen. Wagner's influence on modern music has been more potent as regards his symphonic and polyphonic conception than his dramatic or technical process.

In another camp stand the French impressionist school of which Debussy was chief. They seem to have returned to the idea of the primitives, using Greek modes, breaking up the musical period till it pants, quivers, sighs, giving to the notes the subtle insinuating voice of things silent and feelings unexpressed.

Another notable influence on the opera has been that of Russian music. Folk music, fantastic, sonorous, intimate, wild, untamed, emotional, it began by turning to account the Italian and German currents, till it acquired a personality of its own and projected it on the Western world.

The "young Italian school," to-day no longer young, felt the influence of Wagner's power, of Debussy's suggestiveness, and, finally, of Russian colour. The new Italian theatre was thus tempered, but never abandoned *il bel canto*, nor wholly deserted melody. The man who maintained his individuality, powerful and complex even though incomplete, was Boito, with *Mephistopheles* and *Nero*. Others had a vogue, achieved successes, aroused hopes—but never produced real works of genius. Puccini was agreeable, graceful, elegant. His music is suggestive and clearly defined, but his musical process is always the same. Mascagni has more inspiration, more vivacity, but neither balance nor power of characterisation; his personages are not individualised musically. Puccini's *Manon* and *La Bohème* and Mascagni's *Cavalleria Rusticana* are their most important and popular works, and have often gone round the world. There is a pleiad of Italian masters writing and composing. The music is there, there is facility, there is feeling, and art, but there is neither musical personality nor force of genius.

Among modern Italian composers Perosi is worthy of notice; he had his hour of European fame at the beginning of the twentieth century. Through him the oratorio was brought back to life, while he attempted the fusion of drama and liturgy, orchestra and voices. There are many other names—Giordano, Cilea and Franchetti, Zandonai and Respighi, and, before them, Coronaro and Catalani, and Wolf-Ferrari, who restored the opera bouffe, and others, living or only lately dead. These names are dear to the Italian public, but not one arouses enthusiasm and confidence as the man to give new life to operatic music, or the genius who in a given moment can interpret æsthetically the soul of a people and send art forward on its tireless way.

LUIGI STURZO.

THE OPIUM SITUATION IN INDIA.

THE public in England is, we are told, not interested in the opium question, and such interest as was aroused by the Geneva Conferences, and by the declaration of policy with regard to export made by the Indian Government in February, 1926, appears to have died away again. It is probably true that no such major issue now presents itself as is likely to command popular attention; the Geneva Conferences, and even more the publicity they caused, have resulted in the steady development of small but unmistakable movements in the direction of restriction in the opium-smoking countries outside China, and the situation is in general such as to provoke the interest only of those who have given special study to the subject. It is, however, to be remembered that there are few aspects of British policy in the world which have more inveterate critics abroad than that which concerns opium. Indian policy has been in the forefront in all the discussions, and while it is a pure illusion to imagine that there is such a thing as a "British policy" which includes, let us say, the opium policy of India and that of Singapore, yet few foreign critics appear to believe this.

It may, therefore, be worth while to set out, from a strictly non-official and indeed critical standpoint, the present opium policy of the Government of India, and to survey the progress made and the issues still to be faced. There are two separate questions, that of export policy and that of internal regulation. With the former the Government of India is exclusively concerned and the provincial Governments (virtually only the Government of the United Provinces) only in so far as the interests of cultivators are affected. With the latter the provincial Governments are primarily concerned, and the Government of India in so far as problems common to the whole of India present themselves.

I. EXPORT.

It is a matter for profound satisfaction that the long history of the export of opium from India bids fair soon to be finally closed. Lord Reading, speaking at the opening of the Council of State on February 9th, 1926, made the following statement:

"My Government have recently had under their consideration the adoption of a new policy regarding opium which is in accordance with the trend of opinion in a number of other countries and also with the views which have been freely expressed in some quarters on different occasions in India. We have very carefully examined the new obligations undertaken by us under Article I of the Protocol to the Convention of the Second Opium Conference at Geneva to take such measures as may be required to

prevent completely, within five years from the present date, the smuggling of opium from constituting a serious obstacle to the effective suppression of the use of prepared opium.

"As a result, we have come to the conclusion that to fulfil our international obligations in the largest measure, and to obviate complications that may arise from the delicate and invidious task of attempting to sit in judgment on the internal policy of other Governments, it is desirable we should declare publicly our intention to reduce progressively the exports of opium from India, so as to extinguish them altogether within a definite period, except as regards the exports of opium for strictly medical purposes. The period to be fixed has not yet been finally determined, as before arriving at a decision it is necessary to consult the Government of the United Provinces regarding the effects that the resulting reduction in the area cultivated with opium will have on the cultivators in that province.

"We further propose to discontinue altogether the system of auction sales of opium in India as soon as the agreement for direct sales now being negotiated with the Government of French Indo-China is concluded. My Government hope, at an early date, to move a resolution in both Chambers of the Legislature in order to give members of the Legislature an opportunity of expressing their views on these important proposals."

The undertaking contained in the final sentence of Lord Reading's statement was duly fulfilled, and eventually the period for progressive reduction, ending in the extinction of the traffic apart from export for medical purposes, was fixed at ten years. The export of opium from India will therefore cease in 1935. The auction sales in Calcutta have been discontinued.

The motive behind this declaration is explicitly stated. The Government of India is not to be regarded as having taken this step because it regards the smoking of opium in certain territories adjacent to China as immoral or reprehensible. On these issues it has expressed no opinion, though it has expressed itself very strongly against the smoking of opium in India. The reason for the present change in policy is, as Sir Basil Blackett said in the debate in the Legislative Assembly on March 10th, 1926, that the Government had to choose between this policy and coming into conflict with the policy of other Governments. "They felt that they would have (in the latter event) to set themselves up to some extent as examiners of the policies of other Governments. . ." That this is an accurate reading of the situation is shown by the fact that export to both Persia and Macao had been stopped in the preceding year owing to the smuggling of opium out of those countries. The Government of India, in short, has decided to make a clean job of it.

What the effect of this policy will be on the continued smoking of opium in the territories where it is temporarily continued under the Hague Agreement, it is impossible yet to say. That it must have an effect seems undeniable. Consider the situation in a country like

the Straits Settlements. Singapore got its opium from India. As the opium imported under League of Nations certificate from India gradually decreases, Singapore will have either to reduce her consumption more or less *pari passu*, or get more opium from somewhere else. From whence can she get it? The answer is easy, from Persia or from Turkey. There is an immense production in China owing to the lack of any stable central government in that country, but the whole opium crop in China is illegal and Chinese opium presents to Singapore a problem in smuggling, not a source of legitimate import. The opium produced in Turkey has a very high morphia content, and we believe that it is not much used for smoking, its medical value being great.

Persia has not had a good record in the matter of opium, for extensive smuggling of opium out of Persia has taken place. Her representatives, however, stated at Geneva that if other crops could be profitably produced in place of opium, Persia was prepared to reduce or even to extinguish her production. A Commission was appointed by the League of Nations to aid the Persian Government in the study of this problem, headed by Mr. Frederick A. Delano of New York, and this Commission has recently presented its report. The Persian Government has also published its views on the report, which are almost startlingly in advance of what had been expected. It is proposed to reduce the area under poppy cultivation by 10 per cent. per annum after three years (the position to be reconsidered after reduction has taken place for three years), and to exempt from land taxes for a period of five years the areas diverted from the cultivation of the poppy to that of substitute crops. It is proposed also to give preference in the granting of agricultural loans to cultivators who divert part or all of their land from poppy cultivation to substitute crops. These proposals of the Persian Government mark a notable advance, and there appear therefore to be substantial grounds for hoping that Persia will in a few years cease to be a considerable source, as she is now, of supply to the opium-smoking countries.

The new Indian policy is being copied, it would appear, and those were probably not wrong who regarded the Viceroy's declaration as likely to mark a new epoch in the history of the opium trade. Further evidence is seen in the action of the Straits Settlements Government in establishing a reserve fund against the time when the opium revenue (on which at present the Government relies for 45 per cent. of its resources) disappears. This fund began with an initial sum of 30,000,000 dollars, and we believe that 10 per cent. of the annual revenue is to be set aside to augment it. Ultimately, of course, the colony will have to resort to fresh taxation. It is plain therefore that a rapid fall in opium revenue is contemplated,

and one of the points to which public attention might well be directed in England is the extent to which opium from other countries than India is brought in, if at all, to maintain consumption.

II. INTERNAL POLICY.

The traditional policy of the Indian Government has drawn a sharp line between opium-smoking and opium-eating. The former has been unequivocally condemned, and undoubtedly Indian opinion concurs in the condemnation. Opium prepared for smoking may not be sold in India, and opium-smoking must not be carried on in groups larger than such a number (three or four) as may be specified in each province. Opium-eating has always been adjudged by Government, following the views of the 1893 Royal Commission, a relatively harmless habit. Here again Indian opinion does to a certain extent coincide with the official attitude, but by no means entirely. The eating of opium by old people is widely regarded as a harmless indulgence, but many who take this view would regard it as a deplorable habit in a young man. In Bengal "opium-eater" is a term of derision connoting general unreliability and shiftiness. The man in charge of a licensed shop in Calcutta on being asked whether he himself ate opium blandly remarked: "Oh no, Government only employs men of good character."

The official attitude is contained in such documents as the well-known dispatch of Lord Hardinge's Government in 1913, and in other statements made in agreement with it. "Opium is extensively used for non-medical and semi-medical purposes in some cases with benefit and for the most part without injurious consequences; . . . the non-medical uses are so interwoven with the medical uses that it would not be practicable to draw distinction between them." "Opium is in virtually universal use throughout India as the commonest and most treasured of the household remedies accessible to the people." The fact that the provision of medical men still falls far below the needs of the vast Indian population is further urged as an argument against the abolition of the free access of the people to opium.

It may be safely said that no one who read the Government defence of the use of opium in India would have any conception of the actual facts revealed by official figures. One conjures up an image of a moderate, evenly distributed consumption, greater in the villages and remote parts than in the cities and towns. What are the facts?*

The index figure laid down by the League of Nations for a satisfactorily low consumption of opium, in terms of pounds per 10,000 of the population per annum, is 12. The average for India is 24. But it is when we come to the figures district by district that the reality of the situation becomes plain. Assam has had the highest

* The figures quoted are taken from a paper which was before the Legislative Assembly in 1925.

figures for any province in British India. One district in the valley of the Brahmaputra shows a figure (in the same terms as above) of 474. Yet other districts in the same province show figures as low as 2.

Bengal shows figures in nearly all districts far below even the League standard. Calcutta, however, has a figure of 287, while all the districts with low figures (eleven below 6 and eighteen below 12) are rural. In Bihar and Orissa there are, similarly, strictly defined areas where the consumption leaps high above the average. Nine districts show figures below 10, but Balasore shows 110, Puri 60, Cuttack 50. In the United Provinces the average is 13, and many districts are far below it. But Benares shows a figure of 64, Cawnpore of 58, and Lucknow of 39. The Panjab with an average of 23 has fewer districts in which the consumption is really low, though seven districts do not rise above 12. But Ferozapore is 120, Lahore 80, Ambala 53, Jullandhar 46, Amritsar 42 and so on.

Bombay Presidency shows high consumption in the cotton areas and in Sindh, low consumption in Maharashtra, with high figures in industrial centres. Ratnagiri, for instance, a rural spot south of Bombay, shows a figure less than 1. But Panch Mahals gives 125, Broach 102, Ahmedabad 88, Kaira 72, Bombay itself 84 (all these are in the cotton mill region), and in Sindh we find Hyderabad with 104, Karachi with 93, Sukkur with 94, and so. In Maharashtra the only high figures are Poona with 72, Sholapur with 70, and Ahmednagar with 46. In the Central Provinces there are no very high figures, twelve districts range between 46 and 20, six are below 17, and in the Berars three districts, Amraoti, Akola, and Badilana show 60, 66, and 70 respectively. Madras shows the most remarkable disparities. In the Tamil country of the South no district rises above 7, except the Nilgiris where the figure is 42. It is therefore true to say that so far as Tamilnad goes there is no opium problem. But in the Telugu country along with some low figures we find Godavaria with 135, Ganjam with 45, and Kistna with 40.

Burma has its own problem, for opium is strictly forbidden to all Burmans in Upper Burma and permitted only to registered consumers in Lower Burma. But Indians get it, and so do, in large quantities, Chinese. We find a provincial average of 57, with Rangoon 218, Mergui (where the tin mines are) 295, Tavoy 131, seven districts between 111 and 84, fourteen between 69 and 41, with only three not above 12. Burma, it may be said, has in addition to the Chinese problem the largest smuggling in all India to fight.

It does not seem possible to doubt, in the face of these figures, that two propositions can be advanced about the Indian situation with equal truth: one, that there is in a very large part of India no over-

consumption at all, and a condition of things revealed to which the Government apologies truthfully apply; the second, that there are some half a dozen districts where there is very definite over-consumption indeed, and that these are not, in the main, districts to which the official defence of the consumption of opium applies at all. They are in several cases industrial regions, or big cities, where it is the merest trifling to suggest that "household remedies" account for any large part of the totals consumed.

Why these high figures are found in some places is simply not known. Guesses are made, both by officials and by private persons interested in the subject. That babies are extensively doped in the industrial areas (and indeed very widely elsewhere) no one denies. Pilgrim centres like Puri and Benares have an obvious excuse to offer. It is said that maritime areas like the Godavari delta have a large consumption because of the prevalence of malaria. Opium is of no sort of use against malaria, but even if a popular belief to that effect were taken into account, why are the figures for malarious Bengal so low?

Obviously the case is one for inquiry. It is difficult to view with equanimity the placid calm with which Government spokesmen refer in defence to the report of the Royal Commission of 1893, a document which was criticised from the time of its publication, by Lord Morley among others, and is now unattainable except in the dustier corners of the largest libraries. One is tempted to think that the authority of the Report has grown in proportion to its inaccessibility. What is of more importance is that the science of toxicology has made very considerable strides since 1893, and that a growing feeling exists that the relation of opium-eating to the spread of epidemics needs to be studied afresh.

It was widely hoped that the statements made in the Assembly on behalf of Government, to the effect that a new enquiry into the subject might be held provided the provincial governments approved, would result in a new study which would set the whole matter forward as nothing else could do. But this has been finally refused, in a Gazette published in June, 1926, to which attention may be briefly directed.

The Resolution of Government, contained in the Gazette No. 25, published at Simla on June 19th, 1926, records the considered opinion of the Government of India on the subject of the consumption of opium in India. The resolution begins by referring to the proposed abolition of export, renews the condemnation of opium-smoking reminds us that the Government of India (as distinct from the Provincial Governments) derives no financial benefit from the internal consumption, and mentions the matters which had been in the autumn of 1924 specially brought to the attention of the Pro-

vincial Governments. These were (1) the possible co-ordination of policy in the different provinces with regard to the selling-price of opium; (2) the possibility of dealing with the areas where consumption is exceptionally high; and (3) the need for investigating the giving of opium to young children. The answers of the Provincial Governments show that they are awake to the need for the assimilation of prices to a common standard to avoid smuggling from one Province to another, but some are even more awake to the danger of smuggling out of the Native States if the price is fixed too high. One may say here that no final dealing with this problem can possibly omit from the view the Native States, some of which, as those in Malwa, have for centuries been among the chief opium-growers. The problem there is, of course, in part financial. That the production in the Native States is a serious menace to limitation of consumption elsewhere no one who has made any first-hand study can possibly deny.

On the reduction of consumption in the "black spots" the letters are unconvincing, and the attitude of the Governments as officially revealed is far from reassuring. Reference is made to the decreases already secured, and to the smuggling difficulty, but there is little to show that the situation is to be faced in any vigorous way.

The giving of opium to children is admitted to be widespread, to be not unknown anywhere except possibly in Burma and parts of Assam and Bengal, and it is agreed that it should be discouraged. But it cannot, we are told, yield except to public opinion and the process of education.

A new enquiry is definitely refused. The Provinces have not asked for it, it would have to be a Royal Commission, and there is held to be no case for so comprehensive an enquiry.

It is not infrequently the case that Government in India, being apparently unwilling to seem to concede anything to public agitation, does in private what publicly it refuses to do. There are signs that a more vigorous enquiry into the excessive consumption in the areas above referred to is being undertaken than the Gazette would lead one to infer. A resolution of the Government of Bengal, dated May 12th of the present year, deals with the excessive consumption of opium in Calcutta and its suburbs and in the industrial districts, not far from Calcutta, of Serampore and Barrackpore. A committee is appointed consisting of two officials and two non-officials nominated by the Calcutta Temperance Federation; its function is to find out why the consumption is excessive, how far the opium is used medicinally and how far as an intoxicating drug, how far the consumption is really an evil, how far the drug is given to young children, and what methods can be employed to reduce consumption.

This represents a real advance. If such an enquiry were set on foot by each Provincial Government in the areas where consumption is gravely excessive, it would not be difficult to arrive at secure and tested information as to why the excess is found in these areas, and how it can be reduced. Nothing will ever be done as long as general statements about the "Indian" use of opium continue to be made. If the vast areas in which there is no excess use may be taken as typical of India, as they certainly may be, it is surely obvious that there is no case based on "Indian conditions" for the excess use, and the plain duty of Government is to find out the reasons for the local excesses and to abolish them. They must be removable, for they cannot, as we have shown, be based on the necessary exigencies of Indian life. Incidentally, we may remark that the Bengal Government have now taken 60 lbs. per annum per 10,000 of the population, on the instruction of the Secretary of State for India, as a suitable norm for India. It is true that the Bengal "black spots" are far above even that figure, but it is hard to see why a figure should be chosen not only five times as high as the League of Nations indicates for countries which have a fully organised medical service, but actually two and a half times the Indian average!

Nevertheless this Bengal resolution marks another real advance. The Government of India *Gazette* did, to the certain knowledge of the present writer, act as a deterrent in both official and non-official quarters from a drastic dealing with the subject. Nor is this surprising, when one contemplates the satisfied tone in which the document is written, the contempt it shows for a "medical and scientific" use, and the refusal to face the logic implicit in the official facts themselves. If, in spite of this, the Government of India will privately incite the Provinces to make the enquiries that are so sorely needed, we shall not grumble at them.

The greatest advance of all has been made in Assam, where the Assam Government has decided to prohibit opium altogether within ten years from 1926. Assam had, in the valley of Brahmaputra, the worst opium areas in the whole of India. There is every hope now that the combined forces of Government and of popular opinion will suffice to rid the Assamese of this old curse of their race.

Reference has been made to the Native States. Indian cables of May 29th give news of a successful Conference held between the Government of India and thirty-three of the States concerned in the opium traffic. A committee is to be appointed, on which the Indian States will be represented, to visit the States in which poppy is grown and through local enquiries to investigate the whole subject, including the smuggling of opium out of the States into British India and for export, and the possibility of ceasing poppy-growing in

the States entirely. The States would then buy from the Government of India factory at Ghazipur as the Indian Provinces do, and the entire Indian crop thus be brought under control of the Government of India. The committee is also to enquire into the extent of opium consumption, the manner in which opium is manufactured, the physiological effects on the consumer, and the extent to which it is administered to infants. If these proposals are carried out there can be no doubt that another great advance will be made, for it is entirely impossible to effect any radical reduction in opium consumption in British India so long as large and comparatively unchecked production is going on in the States, with the necessary consequences of extensive smuggling.

In conclusion, let us summarise the situation. First, we have the very welcome and far-reaching decision to abolish export within ten years except for purely medicinal purposes. This decision finally removes from India the discredit which has so long attached to her as the principal exporter of opium. It should also give a powerful stimulus to the opium-smoking countries to proceed more rapidly with their plans for the decrease of consumption.

Second, we have a situation revealed in India itself which plainly calls for the examination of certain areas and the adoption of special measures with regard to them. The least that should be expected is the requirement that the names of buyers should be recorded in the shops, for this alone would give some indication of the groups or classes to whom the excess is to be ascribed. Better, and inevitable if there is to be effective reduction, is the plan of rationing opium to confirmed users, whose names are on a list which after a certain time will not be enlarged. This is the plan in Burma (for Burmans) and in Ceylon. It is, we believe, to be adopted in Assam.

The essential condition of progress is the awakening of public opinion. No one can deny that the Provincial Legislatures have been asleep on this subject. The Assembly has seen some most valuable debates, but there have been virtually none in the Councils. If in bad areas Government will not make the investigations needed, then they must be made by private bodies. So far, the opium question in India has not been badly mixed up with party political issues, and there is no reason why the process of study and investigation, if reasonable official backing is given to it, should not lead us to the point where India will be as careful to guard her children from the poison of opium as England or Japan.

WILLIAM PATON.

WHEN WOMAN RULED—AND LOST.

IT is queer to reflect that our current reference to the "Old Man in the Moon" accurately portrays the first religious cry of primitive humanity, when woman ruled. The question of matriarchy is not a popular theory in the patriarchal state, but now the problem of our early beginnings has been solved. The verdict is that primitive society was matriarchal, and the evidence lies in three colossal tomes of Robert Briffault, who calls his book *The Mothers*.^{*} This work, by a doctor who is also a biologist, is one of those creations that will assuredly constitute a stage in our history of knowledge. It is not only huge in size and evidence, it is astonishingly moderate in judgment, and doct without being doctrinaire.

The story that the author unfolds is of thrilling interest. He reconnects history; filling up some of the strange gaps which have baffled the ingenuity of erudition, re-writing our evolution, explaining not a few historical mysteries from the time when the first woman looked up at the moon, and recognised her lord and god. This is, so to speak, a discovery. Why the moon in preference to the sun? To us it seems paradoxical that the moon should rank higher than the sun, and it is a difficulty which has cheated many learned men in the field of social anthropology. Briffault shows us the way—through biology, not through sentiment. First, we have to divest ourselves of the notion that savages thought as we do; or sought philosophical explanations in their deities; or *reasoned* about facts and phenomena. Quite the contrary.

Biologically, the male appears late in organic evolution—he is a kind of after-thought, his specific quality being friction or variation: the same rule applies to humanity. The first human power was instinct, and as the maternal instinct would naturally be the strongest and the most apparent, so early society was built up on the mother, who, in order to preserve her position and her progeny, created the clan which constitutes the first social group in all civilisations, and is from all the evidence always of a matriarchal character. The clan is held together by matrilineal marriage, and here again the rule is universal. This social condition gave to woman the *potestas* of the family, precisely as is the case with animals; and not only the fact of possession but the juridic right of marriage vested in the clan—female bond. Man did not matter paternally in early times. Marriage was the bond of union between the woman and her group, thus the children took the mother's name, all property was maternal, the mother-in-law was the "head" of the clan, and man feared and trembled before her.

Of course, agriculture had hardly begun. Man was a hunter. He did not know his issue. He was his wife's visitor, and slept

^{*} Allen and Unwin Ltd. 3 vols.

wherever he could find shelter. He was, in short, an awful outsider because he did not work or produce, he only hunted, hence he owned nothing, least of all his wife, who was inalienably attached to the clan together with her children. And such was the origin of the exogamous marriage system which is still found to-day in vast sections of the globe, yet till now has never received a satisfactory explanation.

To go back to the moon, for the moon is the clue to Briffault's discoveries in social history. His book is far more than a re-assertion of matriarchy; it elucidates a great blank in our understanding of social sentiment and behaviour. Once we grant that instinct was the primitive controlling force, the moon seems almost to explain itself. The sun just shone, it vanished at night; but the moon was queer, it was watery, it had phases, it was rhythmic, periodic; it died and it rose again. Two things about it would inevitably have struck the primitive woman as she sat under a tree and nursed the baby. First the moon had periods, exact periods; secondly the moon was a marker of time, was in fact the calendar, and when a sufficient number of wives had talked over these matters the result was inevitable; the moon was credited with magic properties, as the supreme magic, and such was the origin of the first religion—moon-worship.

Women naturally divined an uncanny similarity between themselves and the pale rhythmic moon; thus, as the moon became the source of all magic and the supreme deity, so women, who also were periodic, became the first magicians, or first priestesses, and the founders of religious sentiment. The point to grasp is that in those days people did not seek philosophical explanations in nature. Primitive man did not deal in abstractions; he saw only concrete conceptions and purposes. In the days before agriculture man did not worship symbols. All natural phenomena were held to be positive sources and instruments of practical power. Symbolism only began when belief in the actual operation of magical forces was fading away. The moon to pre-agricultural society was the real magic, the actual cause of woman's functional life, of gestation and of pregnancy, and so quite naturally in woman's eyes this magic creature was phallic man, "old Adam," the raper, who started life. In the patriarchal state the idea is inverted; it is woman who was the first sinner.

The moon had associates. One the serpent, no doubt on account of its phallic shape; the other the hare, which latter animal has played a peculiarly continuous part right through religious history, and even to-day the Easter hare figures in German religious celebrations. To primitive woman the moon was magic, because it looked so mysterious and watery, because it was the only clock and the

regulator of rain, life, death, and immortality, and of the sex functions of woman. Automatically out of moon-worship there grew the system of exorcisms, sacrifices and precautions or tabus which characterise all civilisations—nearly all of which can be traced back to lunar worship, including the Sabbath or moon phases. In this view Briffault strikes at two theories which have gained popular credence: "animism" and "nature-worship." His explanation is so simple that it would seem inevitably correct. People in early days did not reason or speculate. The force was instinct—woman's instinct; even to-day women are singularly uninterested in abstract thought. The lunar idea is still widely prevalent. In the Highlands girls were wont to refuse to be married except when the moon was at its full. The notion that the moon reveals to girls their future husband is universal. We still regard the moon as exercising an influence upon the weather. Thus the moon was the cause of life, of time, of water, of vegetation, of destiny. And Briffault has made another discovery; namely, that Lunar divinity was universally triune, clearly derived from the waxing, the full, and the waning moon. The snake and the hare and the moon are one trinity, and both animals have passed into modern theology. The sacred number similarly became three from the earliest times. In China it took the form of a three-legged bird; in India of a three-wheeled chariot; in Greece of a three-legged tripod, etc. This theme is universal and goes back to days long before agriculture. The evidence shows that the moon was clearly the first human religion or magic-worship.

The serpent's magic obviously derives from its habit of sloughing its skin; thus, like the moon, it died and became alive again. In early days the serpent was the spirit of immortality, and characteristically it became the reverse, or the depriver of human immortality, when man had gained power over woman and the "Magic" order had become patriarchal. The patriarchal state started with agriculture, or to be more exact with the pastoral state. It was not the apple, it was the ox, the herd, that was the true cause of the fall of woman. So long as man was merely a caveman she controlled, for she alone owned, and she had the magic, the law, the children and the beasts. But when woman began to keep oxen, man took charge, for animals were his faculty, as hunter. Thus he became an owner, a capitalist, and, finding he had powers, he naturally began to make use of them. With the foundation of the pastoral community man came into his own. He introduced a new force—reason as against the instinct of woman. In a word, individualism, as against the strictly communal condition of the matriarchal social constitution. The effects of this individualism, this new force, inevitably partook of a sex character as the strongest instinct of the male. His oxen

gave him a purchasing power, and he proceeded to use it to purchase woman. As time went on he became more and more obtrusive and acquisitive. He saw, as a herdsman, the merits of the sun. He began to change the sex of his deities, and so the sun became the chief god, because the changes of the seasons in an agricultural order had become more important to man than the lunar cycles which did not affect him or his flocks. In this way the primitive ideas were gradually reversed. Man struck at woman through her magic. Her pantheon became male; the moon became discredited, a female, and the new theology became solar, male, individualist and symbolic. By the time the father of the family had made his appearance, agriculture was in full swing and man had become the aristocracy, the priesthood, and the magic. This is clearly the explanation of incest, polygamy, and polyandry, and the strange and hideous customs commonly found among savage peoples. The women, pressed by the man, had to make concessions. They did not mind how many wives a man had, provided they could preserve the motherly features of the clan. And this was their downfall—they had no sex morality. Early woman did not refuse sex, she only selected her man. Virtue was unknown. Soon man acquired power, having the oxen. He took wives and concubines. He then turned his attention to magic. Having discredited woman's magic deity, he began to discredit "magical" woman.

The patriarchal state became everywhere synonymous with woman's subjection. The "moon-witch" was forbidden to touch magic; woman became the great patriarchal tabu—a tabu which has persisted up to quite recent times. The revolting witch-hunts which disgraced modern Europe directly derive from this tabu. Similarly with the savage cruelties practised upon woman, which still constitute the theological law right through the East; in India, in China, in Islam, in Africa. Among many peoples even to-day women are mangled, deformed, and sexually degraded for the specific purpose of keeping them in subjection, and perhaps the strangest thing about it all is the cheerful acquiescence of the women towards these tyrannies, even when the Hindu widow is expected to burn herself over her husband's body.

Briffault's discoveries about the moon have led him to a whole range of other discoveries which reveal the astonishing continuity of thought in the history of religious belief, not the least significant being that the cross—the sign of the cross—was clearly a lunar cosmic symbol, and is to be found universally in many civilisations long before the Christian era. It figured as the "ankh" of the Egyptians, who wore it as an amulet or pendant. In Ancient Egypt the matriarchal state endured till late Grecian times, and here the strange continuity in religious theory can be traced with startling

precision. There is the trinity—Isis, Osiris, and Horus; the eye of Horus, which figures so prominently, represents the moon. And though a revolution took place when the priests of Heliopolis imposed a solar theological system upon Egypt, Briffault claims that the old primitive lunar cults were never displaced in the hearts and minds of the people. Isis remained the great (moon) deity; she was, of course, Astarte, and her cult endured for many centuries into the Christian era. There is this remarkable fact: Briffault shows the manifest identity of Egyptian religion with the primitive conceptions of the rudest races in Africa—a fact which no doubt Egyptologists will consider with interest.

All solar cosmogonies in reality derive from re-interpretations of the magic powers originally associated with the moon. They have but a "slender connection with cosmological ideas." That is to say, the male solar mythologies were man's answer to woman's primitive lunar magic. They were consequently not so genuine as woman's earlier beliefs, for they partook of the nature of emblems and symbols, in contradistinction to the old female deities who were the actual causes of human actions. Hence the male solar theologies never ousted the female lunar cults; they became fantastically intermingled. Thus paradoxically it was not woman who invented mysticism, it was man. It grew out of his sex solar symbolism. In short, man's solar theogonies were not the actual gods but the visible emblems of the gods. The male solar symbolism did not arise upon or out of foundations of actual belief. They were artificially reconstructed upon an inverted sex basis to explain and consolidate the rule of man, and to discredit the female lunar superstitions. Mysticism owes its origins to that political confusion.

There is nothing new—that might stand as the conclusion of Briffault's great work. He shows that the history of religion presents a startling and unbroken sequence, and that the original female moon worship passed into and through patriarchal religions of all civilisations, and in all degrees of culture with a directly traceable uniformity. The names became changed; the sex was changed; the interpretations were changed, but the original forms persisted and became incorporated by almost imperceptible gradations into the most exalted concepts of theology. The primitive moon-gods of the African Kingdom became blended with the male abstractions and speculations of Greek Jews and Judaising Greeks, and the lore of the sacred "thrice-great Thoth," or moon, "merged into the theosophy of Hermes Trismegistus and the symbolic system of gnosticism," which ultimately was to become "in Christian Egypt the warp and woof of the doctrinal forms of Christian dogma."

This contribution to the history of social evolution will assuredly

exercise scientific thought for a considerable time, and there will be not a little controversy. It explains much which has hitherto defied explanation—incest, the Egyptian love-poems of women, moon-worship, phallic idolatry, and the strange uniformity of religious symbolism that once so astounded Jesuit missionaries amongst savage peoples. By eliminating sentiment, by rigid adherence to biological principle, Briffault has been enabled to pierce the mists of the past and furnish some of the missing links in our store of knowledge. He strips history of sentiment and discovers a perfectly simple, connected and continuous progression starting from the primitive force of instinct—of life which took the form of matriarchy; of fear which took the form of magic. He shows us why women first ruled and why they lost, and how it was that man automatically acquired the ascendancy. Not by force, but by peace, by work, by economic authority, by controlling her "magic." Man, the individualist, the "variation" of biology, introduced reason, and he has never looked back since. In truth the shepherd was man's saviour, for patriarchy opens with the pastoral state. Briffault's book breaks new ground, stimulating, clarifying, and directing. Right through the ages we can trace the great uniform influence of sex upon which all symbolic beliefs have been founded, thereby making the slow process of civilisation the easier to understand. Always the maleficent moon bars the way: he who originally controlled, and as a secondary female deity still emotionally, symbolically, and theistically controls the Mothers—and the other sex.

ISIS.

BLUFF.

AMONGST birds parental affection, involving care of the young, is very strong so long as the young are feeble and unable to look after themselves; in most species, so soon as the young are independent and thus competitors for food or territory, it wanes, and may even be replaced by active hostility. During the period, however, when the family requires attention the old birds exhibit certain histrionic traits which give the impression of intentional, intelligent behaviour. They are, whether consciously or unconsciously, attempts to mislead or deceive. In most cases the actions take the form of feigned disablement, of inability to escape with speed, the object being to entice a dangerous enemy—man, or some predacious mammal or bird, from the neighbourhood of eggs or of still feeble young. The habit is seldom developed in those species which habitually nest in trees, hedgerows, or bushes; probably it is unknown in birds that nest on cliffs, and amongst powerful, raptorial or otherwise predacious kinds. The most perfected examples of deceit are to be found amongst birds that nest upon the ground, and the actors are not of one class or family, but of many: it is the fact that the nest is on the ground, where danger is greater than in an elevated site, that renders the habit useful. When young are in danger the habit is more frequently resorted to than when eggs only need care.

The reed-bunting nests low down in undergrowth, usually amongst aquatic vegetation; if suddenly disturbed it will squat along the ground with spread and quivering wings and drooped, expanded tail. Probably no other passerine bird so frequently adopts the ruse, though many—larks, yellow buntings, wagtails, and pipits for example—frequently nest on the ground. As with many other avian characteristics variation may be individual as well as specific; no species invariably shams, nor, in those species which frequently employ this artifice, is the rule without exception. Undoubtedly many birds exceptionally or as a regular habit attempt to deceive when guarding young, but I propose merely to mention a few of the cases which have come within my personal experience, where, indeed, I have watched the actors and marvelled at their skill.

The expressive verb, to squat, is now used by most ornithologists when describing these eccentric performances, though, strictly, it means splashing along water; it is Scottish in origin. Burns uses it in his "Address to The Deil":

The cudgel in my nieve did shake,
Each bristl'd hair stood like a stake,

When wi' an eldritch stour, quack—quack—
Amang the springs,
Awa' ye squatter'd, like a drake,
On whistling wings.

Doubtless the original meaning was the flustering, splashing attempt to find safety of a wounded bird, or the hurried rush along the water of flappers which had not yet gained full strength of wing. Now it is applied to what is very far from being an attempt to escape, for it is rather an attempt to deceive the observer—whether human or otherwise—into the belief that the actor is seeking safety but owing to disability is a possible victim. As in nearly every case the bird behaves exactly as it would do were it really wounded, the use of the word is justifiable. Mallards, when wounded, certainly squat, but they will also dive, though diving for food is not the usual habit of any of the surface-feeding group of ducks. Young mallards in down will run along the surface if alarmed, holding wide their flightless wing stumps, with, in fact, their arms extended; but they will, when hard pressed, dive and swim for a few feet under water; there is no invariable rule for their behaviour. The mature duck—Burns likens the devil to a drake, so probably he was thinking of a wounded bird—makes no attempt to dive when she is squatting. She wishes to be seen and heard, to attract attention whilst her brood finds safe retreats. Teal are accomplished deceivers; the duck will fly to and fro, with expanded tail depressed so as to scoop the water, and wings thrashing the surface at every stroke; all the time she repeats a loud quacking call, very different from the musical whistles of the amorous males. She takes a few wing strokes, then drops to the water, then rises again as if it were great labour, and until the young are well hidden in the aquatic belt, she will pass over the water in front of us again and again.

As a group the wading birds are the most accomplished bluffers, though by no means all perform with regularity. Indeed, some of them do not appear to have developed the habit, and trust more to an early and silent departure from the nest area, when the protective colouring of eggs or young may conceal them from inimical eyes. The snipe, it is true, sits tight, but, as at all times, in such a crouching position that it can spring clear and shoot up into the air; then it calls attention to itself by its call as it dodges from side to side, rising steadily. When it has ascended well above gun-shot it will wheel high overhead, and from time to time slide down on open wing, drumming, as it does during courtship; its warm brown nestlings, with frosted down-tips, are very difficult to find as they crouch, silent and motionless, in the thick herbage.

The lapwing, quick at detecting our approach, is, as a rule, up in

the air before we are anywhere near its young. It does not spring from the nest, but at the first suspicion of danger runs silently for many yards before it takes wing. It gives a call of admonition which the young understand, and very obediently they remain still until they hear the "all clear." But the lapwing will bluff, even when not suddenly startled. Once, in Wales, I came across an apparently disabled lapwing dragging a broken wing across a pebble ridge; she squealed in an agony of terror when we took a few steps towards her, and then, still trailing one wing, entered and swam laboriously across a tidal gutter some six or eight yards wide. When we turned to look for the crouching young, the bird rose, and altering note as well as behaviour, wheeled wailing above us.

The golden plover is another bird which usually runs from the nest and keeps at a distance from her property, trusting that the warned young will remain hidden in the waste of ling or other moorland plants. They do, as a rule, for few nestlings are more difficult to discover unless they have been marked down from a long way off. The old birds stand on some distant eminence, usually on the skyline, and monotonously repeat a single plaintive note. Nevertheless, this bird has perfected the art of deception, and can sham more effectively than many of its congeners. In the Shetlands I watched one bird deliberately pretend to die. She had been dragging her distorted and apparently mangled body in front of me, and trying to induce me to give chase; when I followed for a few yards she struggled to a moss-hag, where she suddenly spread her wings and collapsed, her head hanging limply over the edge. Had I continued to advance she would have soon recovered, but I stood still to watch developments. After a few minutes she raised her head, gave a most heart-rending squeal, and again perished, but as this failed to move me she suddenly came to life, ran towards me piping and again began to tumble about. This is the only instance in my own experience of a bird shamming death, but Mrs. Brindley (Maud Haviland) tells of a dotterel she saw on the Yenesei which lay as if crucified when it was trying to delude her, and Mr. Guthrie-Smith in his *Bird Life on Island and Shore*, gives an entertaining account of the behaviour of the New Zealand pied stilts, when he visited a colony. The birds died "in companies," but, he adds, they were rather particular to select a comfortable and not too stony spot on which to perish.

Alteration of behaviour was shown by a common sandpiper which nested within a couple of feet of a used track beside a Cheshire mere. The first time that I saw the nest it contained three eggs, and the bird, which was sitting, scuttled off, squealing, to the water's edge; it crossed a narrow creek and then, still squealing, began the broken wing performance. Four days later it was

sitting on the full clutch, but this time it slipped quietly away, hiding as much as possible in the long grass, but when about five or six yards from the nest, spread its tail, dropped both wings, and ran, squealing, with a yell that reminded me of an alarmed starling. However, when it had run for a few yards it stopped and apparently quite naturally began to feed. A week later, when I again visited it, its behaviour had changed, for it ran silently along the track to the water, and flew right away without any demonstration. Unfortunately further observations were prevented, for some passer-by failed to see the nest and trod on the eggs.

The ringed plover is a frequent shammer. The usual method is to tumble about exactly like a bird which has been shot, then it will run with expanded and depressed tail and trailed wings, squealing dolefully, and every now and then fall on one side and wave a wing in the air. The behaviour of the bird depends upon the acuteness of its anxiety. It was on an Anglesey beach that I noted variation in the behaviour of the young, and in their parents a variation which depended on the state of the tide. When the tide was high the young birds were on shingle, where they dropped motionless immediately their parents gave an alarm signal; there they were effectively concealed by the surrounding pebbles. But at low tide the little birds rambled about near the water's edge, and were, in consequence, exposed to view on the sand. When they were on the shingle the old birds flew round, calling, or stood, bobbing with indecision, but did not squatter; but when the exposed position on the sand made it necessary for the young to run to some weed-covered rocks before they dared to squat, the old birds were greatly excited, and employed every trick they knew to draw our attention. It appeared to me that the warning call differed according to the location of the young. I may have been mistaken, but the fact remains that the young dropped at once, or ran for several yards before they dropped, according to the nature of their surroundings. When I caught one of the little ones on the shingle it piped freely, but the old bird was less excited than I expected. She ran along the beach and pretended to stumble, but did not fall or drag her wing.

Frequently a ringed plover will shuffle or scrape along on its belly with both wings raised; but trailing one wing and beating the air with the other, as if attempting to rise with one wing injured, is the most frequent ruse. The expanded tail, when the bird is running away from the observer, shows the brown central tail-coverts and the broad sub-terminal band in striking contrast to the white of the remainder of the tail. An unusual performance which I saw at Scolt in Norfolk was waltzing; the bird ran a few steps and then turned round once or twice, then ran on, and waltzed again, and continued this run and dance for many yards.

In Holland I watched many avocets. Their acting differs from that of those birds which try to look as if they were incapacitated by a broken wing, but it has the same intention, to make one follow the old bird whilst the young ones seek cover. The avocet is a conspicuously white bird with strong black markings, calculated to attract the eye when the bird with hunched back and widely extended wings runs from the observer. Parallel black lines show on the back and bars on the open wings, which are held in a bow, with the tips brushing the ground. The bird is long legged, yet it runs when deceiving in a crouching attitude, with the legs strongly bent, the tarsi almost on the ground: the head is held lower than the shoulders, but the neck is bent so that the long, delicate, up-curved bill is clear of the herbage. As the bird runs it moans as if in distress, and hesitates every few moments whilst it shivers its wings and indeed its whole plumage, but when it is on the wing, flying round in anxiety, its call is a pleasant *klu-eet*. The Dutch call it *kluit*. If the ruse fails to draw the intruder from the vicinity of the young, the old birds will change their tactics, and running for a few feet, rise and fly above him with dangling legs, stooping with threatening bill, but always being careful not to come too near.

This sudden change of behaviour is characteristic of the Arctic skuas, gulls and non-waders. These skuas nest in colonies, and when we approached some of their colonies in the Shetlands, we were greeted by a chorus of cat-calls. That is the only word for the strange feline calls of the excited birds—*mee-er*, or *mee-ow*. Then some birds began to tumble about, perhaps half a dozen at once, whilst other flew round yelling. When they bluff they change the note, and squeal as if in agony, the bill being wide open all the time. A bird would rise, take two or three heavy flaps, and fall, squealing, on its breast, in frenzy beating one or even both wings in the air. When, however, we were nearer to the nests, with their beautiful buff-downed young, the old birds ceased to pretend that they were wounded, and tried to convince us that they were savage and strong enough to drive us away. They attacked boldly, dangling their legs ready to strike, dashed at our heads, and with a scream and a peculiar ripping sound of wings, banked smartly so as just to miss striking. We were never struck, although many people have experienced a blow, which is, apparently, delivered by the back of the toes. The great Skua is even more determined-looking in its threatened attacks, but we did not see it pretend that it was injured; it is a large, savage-looking dark gull, and frightens many people away from the vicinity of its nest.

The hen partridge will occasionally squatter when her brood is in danger, and once I was attacked by an unusually plucky bird. I had stumbled amongst her brood and she sprang again and again

at my legs like a game-cock. The nightjar, a bird which lays eggs on, rather than nests on, the ground, is an occasional bluffer. One which we startled from its young flew up to a branch, lay along it with tail spread, and waved its wings on either side, alternately and not both at once. In all these elaborate performances the birds give the impression of being disabled, and consequently at the mercy of an enemy; they strive to lure the enemy, or imagined enemy, away from the spot where the eggs or young are endangered. But with some other birds the bluff is more passive, an attempt to give the idea that the old bird is indifferent to the presence of an enemy, and has nothing hidden that it need be anxious about. Oyster-catchers are masters of this pose of indifference. They will stand for hours within sight of the spot where the young are crouching, and even pretend to sleep, tucking their blunt, long, orange-red bills into their scapulars, but keeping an eye open all the time; they will walk sedately, always at a distance, pecking at objects in the grass or on the rocks, and will stop to preen. Whilst I have been quartering the ground for young which I knew were there and later discovered, the two old birds stood on a turf wall fifty yards away or more, and behaved as if they were unaware of my presence: yet whenever a gull passed, they flew after it, mobbing it with loud cries of *pic, pic, pic*, until it was beyond the danger zone. Did they reason that an attack on a man might prove that there was something to be protected, but that a gull was always a dangerous foe, on the lookout for helpless victims?

Another pretence of indifference I have already mentioned when speaking of the common sandpiper, is the habit of feeding or pretending to feed when in reality the bird is all anxiety. This habit is so well established that it is shared by young lapwings, ringed plovers and other juvenile waders, as well as by the adult birds of this group. When young birds in down have been handled and released they will run as fast as their legs will carry them, but every now and then they pause, dip the bill to or near to the ground, and then run on. They either peck at something or pretend to peck. It may be that this pecking is not bluff at all, but is an uncontrollable reflex action. The bird may see some edible or apparently edible object, and so immediately and unconsciously do its muscles respond to the nerve stimulus from the eye that it cannot help an involuntary dip towards the object.

The death feigning of the golden plover and other birds mentioned is an exceptional development of the habit of deceit. Death feigning is not confined to birds, indeed it is much more usual in other classes of animals. So regular a habit it is with certain American opossums that the expression "playing 'possum" is used for all such sham. I have had no experience of this habit amongst reptiles,

though it is said to be employed by blind-worms and snakes, but I have seen it in the batrachians. The subject was a large female frog which had, evidently, recently emerged from her winter retreat; she was sitting, apparently alert, when I touched her. Immediately she flattened herself out, raised her fore limbs above her head, and pressed the back of her hands on her half closed eyes. There she remained, refusing to move, or to croak when I suddenly touched her flanks. Dog-fish frequently sham. When trawling off the Scottish and Welsh coasts I have seen many dog-fish stiffen themselves, usually in a contorted position, and lie as if dead. The fishermen, who do not love dog-fish, are not deceived. One that I caught on a hook doubled itself until the tail pressed against the head, and it required considerable strength to straighten its rigid body. We then tethered it by a loop over the caudal fin and put it over the side of the boat, where it drifted, apparently dead, for some minutes, then suddenly shook itself free and escaped.

The wood-louse dropped, and rolled into a ball,
Touched by some impulse occult or mechanic,

says Tom Hood, but it is not every wood-louse that can curl into a ball; that is the habit of the genus *Armadillidium*, which, like the mammal from which it gets its name, the armadillo, our hedgehog, and the pill-millipede, *Glomeris*, gain protection by presenting to an enemy an armoured or spine-clad surface only when they retire within themselves. This is no more feigned death than the retreat within the shell of the snail or the hermit-crab.

But there are crustaceans—some of the crabs for instance—which do sham if in danger, and very many insects share the habit. Certain moths and beetles, if touched, at once close the wings and draw in the limbs, falling as if dead, and many caterpillars curl up and drop, lying perfectly still for a long period; the reason is that most insectivorous birds and mammals prefer living to dead and dry insects. They will not touch one that is dead or appears to be dead; indeed, reptiles and batrachians watch for movement in their victims before they attack. Several spiders will drop with indrawn legs and lie inert if threatened. In certain cases this sudden cessation of movement may not be a conscious or unconscious attempt to mislead, but be due to nervous shock; indeed, there is every reason to believe that the comatose condition which we will call fainting is not unknown amongst other vertebrates than man, though we have no evidence that it exists in any invertebrates. Canaries and other cage-birds have been known to fall from their perches when a hawk made an ineffectual dash at the cage, and though they may die from shock they can, as a rule, be revived or may recover after a few minutes. Mammals too can be frightened into a cataleptic state by the presence of an hereditary enemy. This leads to

another problem, which has, in some instances, relationship to the one we are discussing—the alleged mesmeric power of one animal over another.

Snakes are supposed to “ fascinate ” or mesmerise their victims, dragging them by the power of their steely eye until they are within reach. It is true that a stealthy cat sneaking up to a bird, or a fox fixing its eyes on a domestic hen, may so paralyse the desired victim that it cannot escape. In its terror it loses power of motion. But this is very different from a basilisk glare which draws the victim against its will into the waiting maw. In these instances the fascinator, even if it has no occult powers, does not pretend that it is what it is not; but the stoat and weasel attempt to fascinate the rabbit in quite another way. They frisk and tumble about before their desired victim, and behave as if they were anything but bloodthirsty little carnivores, and the rabbit squats gazing at their eccentric performances, and may even approach to make closer investigation. If it suddenly finds a lithe brown animal gripping it behind its ear it has no one to blame but itself and its own stupid curiosity.

Pretence may be the unconscious simulation of some other animal or of an inanimate object, but that, again, is different from the deliberate attempt to deceive. The advantage gained by a bird or other animal when it “ freezes ” or remains still if its colour or form is in harmony with its surroundings, is very great; nowadays we talk about camouflage, we used to call it protective resemblance. The geometer caterpillar stiffens itself when at rest and looks like a twig, but no one but an extreme anthropomorphist would say that it tries to look like a twig. The chi moth is wonderfully concealed when it rests on a grey stone wall but remarkably distinct on a dark barked tree; the merveil-du-jour is practically invisible on lichens but very plain on a dark background; the peppered moth, whose dark phase is, at any rate in the northern counties, now commoner than the type, is an even more interesting example. The south country entomologist argues that it has become dark to gain protection when resting on smoke-begrimed walls and trunks, but as a matter of fact this black insect is far more conspicuous than the speckled form that it has replaced. In none of these cases does the insect select its resting place with any eye to colour or suitability of environment. It has no consciousness of the advantage of its colour scheme or simulation.

But amongst birds, where there is a similar advantage to the crouching young if their pattern and colour harmonises with surroundings, there is evidence of choice. Why did the little ringed plovers crouch at once on the Anglesey shingle but run until they reached suitable cover when they were on the open shore? In a

park, surrounded by a loosely built limestone wall, I experimented with many young lapwings. I lay hidden until a number were running about, and then suddenly rose. If the young ones were near a deep drain they dropped into it and remained still; if they were beside a clump of thistle or ragwort they squatted instantly, but when they were well out on the exposed grass at the moment that I showed myself, they ran to the drain, to a suitable clump, or to the stone wall, where they pushed their silly heads into a crevice and remained like the proverbial ostrich, imagining that they were hidden.

To return to the problem of the actual pretence of injury, including rare instances of death feigning, though refusing to accept all death shamming as intentional, there is in every action of the birds suggestion of conscious behaviour, a deliberate and intelligent attempt to mislead. Upholders of purely mechanistic action will admit that there is this suggestion, but maintain that it is purely reflex, the response to certain stimuli—mainly the threat against the welfare of the brood—and that it is a habit which has been evolved because of its benefit to the species, either slowly through survival, or by some sudden variation in habit that has proved to be beneficial. It is the ancient unsolved quarrel about instinct and reason. If the bird acts instinctively, unconsciously, we are still faced with certain difficulties. How did the habit originate? Did some wounded birds save the lives of their offspring by, when striving to escape, luring an enemy away? If so, we must admit that any birds which imitated the performance showed remarkable understanding. If this habit of injury feigning is so great an advantage, why do not all ground-nesting species develop it? Why do some individuals sham and others refrain, and why does one individual pretend on one occasion and not on another? That the performances are due to intent to mislead and not to nervous shock is supported by the behaviour of the bird immediately the cause of the excitement is removed; it returns at once to normal occupations. When a shamming bird has lured an enemy far enough away it rises with a cry which in many cases sounds almost exultant.

After watching these strange avian "bluffs" for many years—quite twice as long as the lives of some who make very decided assertions about their meaning—I am bound to admit that I am still in doubt as to whether they are intentional, intelligent, reasoned actions, deliberately performed to deceive, or that the bird acts instinctively and unconsciously. I had come to the conclusion that intelligence plays a very important part, satisfied that we know very little about avian psychology and cannot judge it by our own, and that, like every other attribute or faculty, reason has been evolved and had an infancy. In these actions was evidence of primitive reason. But

when I had decided to side with the intelligent rather than the mechanistic school, I had a staggering experience, not with regard to this particular trait. What staggered me was a privately-taken and exhibited film of that well-known avian tragedy, the infant cuckoo getting rid of its nest fellows. That the cinema can play tricks everyone knows, but this particular film was one of many on the same subject taken by my friend M. Adolphe Burdet, who has made special, scientific study of the life of the cuckoo. The well known but no less interesting and extraordinary habit of the blind, unintelligent, newly-hatched cuckoo of throwing its fellow-nestlings out of the nest has been filmed before; it has been watched and photographed many times. Everyone who has witnessed the performance agrees that the behaviour of the infant cuckoo is nothing more than an inherited instinct, undoubtedly advantageous to the cuckoo as a species. Yet anyone who has actually seen it must admit that the action is diabolically deliberate. The cuckoo is blind, one cannot call it helpless, and it certainly does not look intelligent, yet when it has heaved its bedfellow to the rim of the nest, it does not cease its efforts but struggles and pushes until the unfortunate nestling falls clear. In each of M. Burdet's records the persistence of the cuckoo was plain.

The particular film which made me pause was one taken in his own garden, and showed a sitting redstart. The bird was brooding three or perhaps four of her own young and an alien cuckoo. She was uneasy, shuffling as if uncomfortable, and presently, just below her beak, appeared one of her own limp and feebly struggling infants urged upwards, hoisted up, by the young cuckoo. She paid no attention when the young one, her own child, was pushed on to the edge of the nest, nor when, after some difficulty, the cuckoo heaved it over and it slithered helplessly to its doom. Then the cuckoo sank beneath her breast, shortly to repeat the performance with a second and then a third victim. Once, to get leverage as it struggled backwards at the nestling redstart, which was precariously balanced on the nest rim, the little cuckoo stretched up a skinny wing like a hand, and pressed against the indifferent foster-mother's bill. And during the whole tragedy that strange mother paid no attention even when, one after another, her own young were hurtling to their death immediately below her beak. It is true that there may be variation in the behaviour of mother birds, and it is possible that the bird may have been slightly uneasy on account of the whirr of the camera. Yet she was unable to reason, to grasp the meaning of the tragedy, or, indeed, to realise that anything out of the common was taking place. A mature mother bird, usually supposed to be assiduous in the welfare of her young, allowed them to be destroyed without making any effort on their behalf. Yet the actions

of the cuckoo which had had no experience, no instruction, had every appearance of deliberate intention for its own advantage. When a mature bird fails to see and understand behaviour which is not quite normal, is indeed so indifferent and stupid, whilst a newly-hatched young one shows unconscious intelligence, can we safely say that the apparently intelligent actions of other birds are what they seem?

When we can unravel this, perhaps the greatest of the cuckoo's secrets, far greater than how it places its egg in a nest—the secret of how and why the infantile cuckoo behaves as it does—we shall be on the high road towards understanding many of the strange problems of avian psychology.

T. A. COWARD.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN GAMAX.

THE break between Great Britain and Russia had been threatened for some months. Yet the breaking point was curious and unexpected. On Thursday, May 12th, a contingent of Metropolitan and City Police raided the offices of Arcos Ltd. in Moorgate. The building known as Soviet House contained the headquarters of the Russian Trade Delegation as well as of Arcos Ltd., although Sir William Joynson-Hicks hardly appreciated that fact when he sponsored the raid. Public interest was immediately excited. On Friday morning, May 13th, the Whitehall spokesmen explained the matter in something like this way: In the course of their normal business of watching for illegal activities the police had for some time been collecting what casual evidence they could find of surreptitious propaganda emanating from Soviet House under the cloak of a trading organisation. Early in the week beginning May 8th they had accumulated what they regarded as adequate evidence to justify a warrant for searching the Arcos premises. A warrant for search was applied for in the usual way. The point emphasised was that the initiative came from the police. Scotland Yard, it is true, consulted the Home Office, and was assured by Sir William that there was no political reason against the raid. The raid, therefore, was carried out. As might have been anticipated, the Arcos officials made difficulties, and refused to hand over the keys of the safes, two of which, they said, were the property of the Trade Delegation, and were, they claimed, diplomatically immune. The police, therefore, on Friday, May 13th, had recourse to oxy-acetylene apparatus and pneumatic drills. The operations continued over the week-end. It then became known that the police were searching in particular for a missing War Office document. On Monday, May 16th, Sir William Joynson-Hicks announced in the House of Commons that the missing document had not been found, but that it was hoped to discover evidence bearing upon it in the papers that had been found. He asked for a postponement till the following Thursday of his promised statement about the nature of those finds. When that Thursday arrived, he asked for a further postponement till the following Tuesday. That request was hardly surprising, for it was clearly Sir William's business to find something worth finding, if only to justify the raid.

It was not clear what part the Foreign Office took in the matter. There was reason at first to suppose, not only that Sir Austen Chamberlain had not been consulted, but that when the news of the raid reached him, he was somewhat embarrassed. It argued an almost total eclipse of the imagination that Scotland Yard and the

Home Office could be content with the notion that the Arcos raid was a purely police affair of no diplomatic consequence. The Foreign Office bravely and loyally tried to delude itself into thinking that British diplomacy was not affected. The strong suspicion none the less persisted that Scotland Yard and the Home Office had forced the hand of the Foreign Office at a moment when British diplomacy had special reason for wanting sleeping dogs to lie. The British Government were just escaping by accident from the anti-British commotion in China. Moreover, the Foreign Office, whose business is diplomacy, has the sense to be shy of emotional disturbances at any time.

The question of diplomatic immunity had been raised by the officials of Soviet House. Even apart from the juridical aspect of that question, no one with a sense of humour could imagine that diplomatic relations with Russia could be reconciled with raids on official Russian premises in London. Before the Arcos raid was completed the Cabinet were forced to consider the fundamental question of British relations with Russia. Even Sir William, whose qualities seem somehow not to manifest themselves intellectually, gave his tacit support to the general feeling that the issue had at once shifted from the Home Office to the Foreign Office. On May 13th the most that Sir William could state in the House was this: "I cannot answer a question as to the exact portion of the building where the Trade Delegation is. I shall have further information in regard to that on Monday." He made no further contribution to the subject worth recording.

On May 12th Mr. Rosengolz, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, sent a long Note to Sir Austen Chamberlain in which the only interesting passage made the point that the British Government had violated the Trade Agreement. The raid, he argued, had been carried out "in spite of the fact that, in accordance with the Trade Agreement of 1921, the premises of the Trade Delegation, being the offices of Mr. Khinchuk, the official trade agent of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain, enjoy diplomatic immunity." Mr. Rosengolz thereby presented to Mr. G. Locker-Lampson an easy retort. On May 13th Mr. Locker-Lampson contented himself with denying that the Trade Delegation enjoyed diplomatic immunity. That was literally true, if irrelevant. No serious person ever imagined that Mr. Khinchuk in Moorgate Street was on the same diplomatic footing as Mr. Rosengolz in Chesham Place. The real point at issue, which was missed by Mr. Rosengolz, was the particular immunity expressly conferred on the Russian Trade Delegation by the terms of the Trade Agreement, an agreement which at the time of the raid was still a binding instrument. Clause 4 of the agreement stipulated that the trade representatives "shall be at liberty to

communicate freely by post, telegraph and wireless telegraphy, and to use telegraph codes under the conditions and subject to the regulations laid down in the International Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg, 1875 (Lisbon Revision of 1908)." Clause 5 stipulated that "Either party may appoint one or more official agents, to a number to be mutually agreed upon, to reside and exercise their functions in the territories of the other, who shall personally enjoy all the rights and immunities set forth in the preceding article and also immunity from arrest and search, provided that either party may refuse to admit any individual as an official agent who is *persona non grata* to itself or may require the other party to withdraw him should it find it necessary to do so on grounds of public interest or security." The implied argument of Mr. Locker-Lampson that the "immunity from arrest and search" applied only to the persons of the Trade Delegation and to such papers as they might have in their pockets, and not to their files or safes, illustrated the pass to which the Foreign Office had been driven by Sir William Joynson-Hicks's action.

On May 18th Sir Austen Chamberlain circulated as a written reply to questions in the House of Commons the following statement which finally disposed of Mr. Rosengolz's irrelevant point about diplomatic immunity: "Some confusion has arisen owing to the fact that Mr. Khlopliankin, Mr. Khinchuk's predecessor, was not only official agent under the Trade Agreement, but also Commercial Counsellor to the Soviet Mission. It was only in his latter capacity that he was entitled to diplomatic privilege. The official agent is only entitled to the privileges provided for in the Trade Agreement; commercial attachés to the diplomatic missions in London are, of course, entitled to diplomatic privilege. On December 8th, 1926, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires requested that the name of Mr. Khinchuk should be inserted in the diplomatic list in the place of Mr. Khlopliankin, whose duties as chairman of the Soviet Trade Delegation Mr. Khinchuk had taken over. I replied that, as Mr. Rosengolz did not state that Mr. Khinchuk occupied any post on the staff of the Soviet Mission, I was not in a position to give directions for the inclusion of his name in the diplomatic list. On February 4th, 1927, Mr. Rosengolz addressed a Note to me in which he stated that he assumed that Mr. Khinchuk would be accorded all the rights and immunities enjoyed by official representatives of other foreign Governments in Great Britain. To which I replied on February 16th that he would be granted the same privileges under the Trade Agreement of 1921 as have been enjoyed thereunder by his predecessors in the office of Trade Agent."

The Cabinet's decision to break off relations with Russia was taken and announced on May 24th. It had taken a week of the

Cabinet's time to reach the decision. A week was not too long for it, because the decision involved a complete change in the theory and practice of the Government's Russian policy. Sir Austen Chamberlain, it seems clear, was faced with the personal alternatives of resignation or acquiescence. His resignation would have done no good, and he acquiesced. He thereby did violence to his own convictions, as expounded by himself over a period of nearly two years. His Russian policy had been consistent. He recognised, as all fair people recognise, the rottenness of Russian diplomacy and the crooked disloyalty of the Russian Government to the spirit of the Trade Agreement and to the idea of normal diplomatic relations; but on the balance of good and bad he had deliberately formed the opinion that it was wiser not to break away from Russia. On June 25th of last year he said in the House of Commons: "All Europe is perplexed and harassed by economic and social problems. It is subject to political uncertainties and a sense of political insecurity which react upon economic conditions in a disadvantageous manner. And it must be the object of statesmanship in all countries to alleviate and, if possible, to remove these difficulties. If we broke off diplomatic relations with Russia we should not only introduce a new and disturbing issue into British domestic policy, but we should introduce a new and disturbing issue in Europe." Lord Balfour, speaking in the House of Lords on June 17th, 1926, on the same subject, said that it would be "the height of rashness, except for really serious gain, to introduce a new disturbance where disturbance was sufficiently great already."

The technicalities of the break were of little consequence, but some sticklers for form were no doubt surprised that in the muddle produced by Sir William and his policemen the procedure for a rupture as laid down by the Trade Agreement itself was ignored. In the case of a rupture due to an alleged breach of the agreement by the other party it was stipulated that first of all the offending party should be given the opportunity of explaining or of remedying the default. No one expected the British Government to give the six months' notice stipulated as the normal method of terminating the agreement, but an abrupt notice of termination was inconsistent with the alternative method prescribed by the agreement. An attempt was made by official opinion in London to explain away that inconsistency by recalling Sir Austen Chamberlain's Note of last February, in which, according to the official British view, Russia was thereby invited to "explain or remedy their default." As Russia never answered that invitation the view of the Government here was that no further formality was needed to break off the Trade Agreement. In his Note of May 27th to Mr. Rosengolz, Sir Austen Chamberlain accordingly implied that his

Note of February 23rd had given the Soviet Government an opportunity, "in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Trade Agreement, of 'furnishing an explanation or remedying the default'." Clearly Sir Austen was now concerned to put a complexion of correctness on the Government's termination of the agreement without formal notice. That complexion however was wholly artificial and unconvincing. The February Note never mentioned Article 13 of the Trade Agreement, nor quoted the words "furnishing an explanation or remedying the default." Some people wondered why the Government did not now give the formal notice, which would have delayed the break for, say, one week. The reason was, no doubt, that the protracted business of scrutinising the Arcos finds left no time for formal notice because the "strong" men of the Cabinet, Sir William and his friends, had made up their minds to announce the break with Russia on Empire Day! Those strong men achieved their magnificent object. The going was heavy, and the Cabinet's sense of humour was smothered. No reasonable person at the best of times could expect Sir William to see the funny side of anything, but it is sad that his type of mind should be a factor on which for the moment the interests of this country are dependent. The Die-Hards, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Mr. A. J. Cook, Lord Birkenhead, and the rest, do their damage from lack of humour and intelligence. They may be sincere, but Heaven save us from sincere people who have no sense of humour!

Volumes of explanations, diatribes, protests, recriminations and what not were spoken and written in London and in Moscow during the merry month of May. On May 24th Mr. Baldwin made the long Government statement announcing the break. He recapitulated the evidence of Russia's unfriendly activities, amid loud Ministerial cheers—the irony of which was lost on him and them—and announced that, subject to the approval of the House, the Government would "terminate the Trade Agreement, require the withdrawal of the Trade Delegation and the Soviet Mission from London and recall the British Mission from Moscow." Again the Ministerialists cheered, thereby displaying their impartiality in enthusiasm. On the same day the Government published its "Russia No. 2 (1927). Documents illustrating the Hostile Activities of the Soviet Government and Third International against Great Britain" (Cmd. 2874). That White Paper afforded lurid reading and confirmed us in what we knew before, that Russian propagandists were doing all they could to damage Great Britain. As Mr. Lloyd George said, there could be no difference of view about the evidence: the difference was about the action taken. On May 26th Sir Austen Chamberlain made his speech, traversing the same

ground as Mr. Baldwin, but his effect was that of a man who feels uneasy. The way in which he defended the change in policy that had been thrust upon him by his colleagues in the Cabinet was not impressive. Mr. Clynes in debate had recalled Sir Austen's former arguments against the policy now adopted by the Cabinet. Sir Austen answered: "Mr. Clynes has recalled the words I used earlier this year when I was seeking in spite of all that had happened, to preserve diplomatic relations . . . and when I urged that we should not break, and he asks, 'Why break now?' I think the real question should be, 'Why not before?' Why not, with all this information before us, with these constant and flagrant breaches of the understanding, and of diplomatic courtesy and friendly relationships, have severed these relations long ago? If we had thought only of British interests, if we had thought only of our own protection, we should have done so. If I pleaded with earnestness, with passion, to the House not to force that decision upon us, but to give the Soviet Government yet another and another chance to mend their ways and to realise the hope that Mr. Lloyd George entertained when the Agreement was first signed, and which Right Hon. Gentlemen opposite entertained when they recognised the Soviet Government—if I did all that, if in pleading so I used exaggerated language, do not blame me for it. At least it shows how honest was my endeavour and how long and how patiently I pursued it." It would be odd if, in his heart, Sir Austen felt satisfied as he thus lamely begged the question.

The real importance of the break was to be found in its aftermath. The people who have a highly developed taste for dog fights heartily approved the Cabinet's action. It is easier to find cause for quarrelling with people or nations than to build up good relations. Sections of the British Press emulated sections of the Russian Press by indulging in unadorned abuse. While Moscow wrote and spoke of British "brigands," "barbarians," "sharks," "murderers," and the like, a London evening paper wrote of Moscow as "a sink of iniquity." That was one result of Mr. Baldwin's reaction from his own slogan of "peace in our time." The Russian Press quoted only the offensive part of the British Press, and ignored the serious newspapers. Similarly, Mr. Rosengolz allowed himself to make certain charges against the British police which were not borne out by the facts. He made those charges verbally in conversation with Sir Austen Chamberlain during the course of the Arcos raid, but immediately after the interview Sir Austen caused them to be put down in writing. The sort of charge made by Mr. Rosengolz was that the women employed in Soviet House were searched and submitted to other personal indignities by the male police who carried out the raid. Such a charge was grossly untrue, but the

fact of its having been made illustrated the sort of depths to which the argument about Anglo-Russian relations had been reduced. Sir Austen Chamberlain refused even to answer Mr. Rosengolz's allegation, but it was too late for an exercise of pride.

What the good Europeans are afraid of is the psychological effect of what has taken place. Anglo-Russian relations it is true, have been unsatisfactory during the whole post-war period. Even in 1924, when a Labour Ministry was in office in Great Britain, there was no real understanding between the two countries. Up to now, however, the antagonism has been latent and subject to a restraint imposed by the formality of friendly relations. It is not unnatural to fear that in the future, freed from all restraint, the destructive people in both countries will be given their head.

Since the present British Government came into power at the end of 1924 bad luck has conspired with bad management on both sides to produce the catastrophe we now witness. It must, however, be admitted by all fair students of affairs that the ill-will has been mainly contributed by Moscow. The relationship between Great Britain and Russia has been abnormal. When the Trade Agreement was drawn up in 1921 the preamble made a specific reservation about the regulation of political relations. The preamble was to the effect that "peaceful trade and commerce" should be resumed at once "pending the conclusion of a formal general peace treaty between the Governments of these countries by which their economic and political relations shall be regulated in the future." Similarly at the beginning of 1924 when Mr. MacDonald's Government recognised the Russian Government *de jure* the reservation was again made that normal diplomatic relations could not be resumed until the Political Agreement foreshadowed by the Trade Agreement had been concluded. The British diplomatic representative in Moscow, and the Russian diplomatic representative in London, were, therefore, given the provisional title of Chargé d'Affaires. The appointment of Ambassadors was delayed until the Political Agreement should be concluded. When in the summer of 1924 Mr. MacDonald's Government attempted to negotiate a political treaty, the main object was to restore normal relations and to proceed to the appointment of ambassadors. That attempt was broken in the back by the General Election at which Mr. MacDonald's Government was replaced by the present Government of Mr. Baldwin. The first act of the new Government in London was to reject the draft treaty drawn up by Mr. MacDonald. Thereby began a retrograde movement in Anglo-Russian relations which has continued ever since. Bad luck soon began to contribute its part. Mr. Rakovsky was left in quiet isolation at Chesham House and for lack of work to do in London was transferred to Paris.

For a long time Chesham House was left without an official head. Finally Mr. Krassin was appointed to London but was delayed by illness from taking up his post. When he did arrive in London only a few weeks of life were left for him. His death was Fate's contribution to Anglo-Russian estrangement.

When the rupture was announced, British traders began to wonder how it would effect their interests. The Trade Agreement itself stipulated that "as from the date when six months' notice of termination shall have been given under this Article the only new transactions which shall be entered into under the agreement shall be those which can be completed within the six months. In all other respects the provisions of the agreement will remain fully in force up to the date of termination." That means that contracts entered into before the notice of denunciation was given are valid, but that no further contracts can be made unless they can be carried out before the date when the agreement lapses. At the end of May Mr. Rosengolz sent a further Note to Sir Austen asking that the staff and directors of the various Anglo-Russian trading organisations be allowed to stay on and liquidate those organisations. His Majesty's Government spurned the request and merely reminded Mr. Rosengolz of the terms of the Chamberlain Note which broke off relations, and which gave ten days' notice to quit to those Russians whose presence in London would not longer be tolerated. The Russians, therefore, departed on June 4th. That was the end of one chapter.

The next chapter opened at once. On June 7th Mr. Rosengolz was standing on Warsaw station talking to Mr. Voikoff, the Soviet Minister to Poland, who had gone to meet the Berlin-Warsaw express on which Mr. Rosengolz was travelling en route for Moscow. A young Russian Monarchist, Boris Kowerda, shot Mr. Voikoff dead, and then explained that he had done it from patriotic motives. Mr. Voikoff had played a leading rôle in the assassination of the Emperor Nicholas and his family in July, 1918. The Royal Family had been taken to Ekaterinburg in the Urals, and Mr. Voikoff, being a Commissar of the town, took part in the organisation of the murder, and being Commissar of supplies, found the petrol wherewith the bodies were burnt. The assassin was now assassinated. Moscow at once burst into accusations against the British Government, and by mental gymnastics traced the origin of Mr. Voikoff's murder to London. Those gymnastics were an example of what good Europeans had feared. A reign of terror was started in Moscow. Twenty Royalists were executed in cold blood on palpably trumped up charges of espionage and of having been in relationship with British officials in Moscow. Other executions followed. As the British officials in question, Sir Robert

Hodgson and his colleagues had, in the meantime, arrived in London, Moscow's fantastic accusations could be readily answered. For six years the British representatives in Moscow had kept themselves severely to themselves precisely because they knew that to have any acquaintances in Moscow would be unfair on those acquaintances and because they themselves were compelled in self-defence to take precautions against the State Political Department, known for short as the O.G.P.U., formerly the Cheka. It was a firm rule made by the British diplomatists in Moscow to have no Russian relations whatever except with the Russian officials with whom it was their business to deal. The secret service of the O.G.P.U. was so widespread and so panicky that the British official quarter became a watertight compartment. In spite, however, of such extreme precautions the O.G.P.U. discovered something to report. It was inevitable that when so many Government spies were paid to discover evidence of "counter-revolutionary activity" they would necessarily discover something if only to justify their own employment. It was said for instance that the British diplomatists in Moscow would even refrain from asking a railway porter about the times of trains, for fear the O.G.P.U. should send a note to headquarters reporting British spying into the Russian transport system for information to be used in case of war. The Russian secret service agents permeated the whole life of Moscow and produced an atmosphere of nervous apprehension which was best endured in silence. On his return to London Sir Robert Hodgson decided that he should answer Moscow's outrageous allegations and therefore issued a detailed statement (*Observer*, June 12th) which ran thus: "Allegations emanating from Moscow of illicit practices by members of the British Mission in Moscow, which have recently been repeated in the British Press, cannot be allowed to pass without challenge. They are contained, so far, in three pronouncements, namely, a speech by Mr. Rykoff, an official communiqué from the Soviet Government, and a report printed in the evening papers of June 10th, announcing the execution in Moscow of twenty persons, of whom four are stated to have been spies in British employ. Mr. Rykoff quotes in full a letter addressed by Mr. Preston, in Leningrad, so long ago as 1924, to Mr. Jerram, a member of the staff of the British Mission in Moscow. The letter alludes to a request received from the Department of Overseas Trade by Mr. Peters, asking for information regarding the possibilities for selling 'fine chemicals,' in Russia. Mr. Preston not understanding the expression 'fine chemicals,' asks Mr. Jerram to explain it to him. He adds that he is afraid of employing 'Russian birds' for collecting the information demanded by the Department of Overseas Trade, as he fears that they may expose themselves to being 'hanged, drawn, and

quartered by the State Political Department for spying.' In other words, Mr. Preston anticipates that, should he ask Russians to help him in obtaining information on what is obviously a perfectly innocent matter, they are liable to be treated as spies and summarily executed.

"The question arises, were Mr. Preston's apprehensions justified? Mr. Rykoff proceeds to show by the examples which he quotes of G.P.U. justice that they were. He mentions the case of 'Peshkoff,' a former officer of the Kolchak army, and one Filin, shot for supplying information on military matters to Mr. Charnock, of the British Mission. Peshkoff—who, incidentally, was never an officer in the Kolchak army, but had civilian employment at Omsk in Kolchak's time—had been an officer in the Imperial Russian Navy. On the arrival of the British Mission in Moscow in 1921 he was put into contact with Sir Robert Hodgson, an old acquaintance of his, by a woman of the name of Dahl, who was a secret agent of the G.P.U. and had been in Siberia in the Kolchak time. Temporary employment was given to him by the representative of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company in Moscow. Shortly afterwards he was arrested, together with his wife, and a large number of other persons, on a charge of having organised, under Sir R. Hodgson's instructions, a counter-revolutionary movement in Siberia. Sir R. Hodgson sought the assistance of Mr. Karakhan, who most courteously promised to look into the matter. The whole charge was shown to be a mare's nest. Peshkoff and the other persons involved were set at liberty, and nothing further was heard of the matter. Peshkoff returned to his employment with the C.P.R., and, being a capable and hard-working man, was most useful in organising the firm's office. He remained in their employ till May, 1925, when he again was arrested. The nature of the charge against him was never transpired till now, though it was generally suspected to be what Rykoff declares it to have been—espionage for the benefit of Great Britain. The accomplices whom Mr. Rykoff mentions were friends of Peshkoff, for whom he had found employment in the C.P.R. office. It stands to reason that, after the Dahl affair; (1) Peshkoff was the last person in Russia who was likely to work as a spy for Great Britain, and (2) the last person to whom Sir Robert Hodgson was likely to apply for information. In fact, though the acquaintance between the British Mission and Peshkoff was maintained, it was deliberately confined to a minimum in order to diminish the risks of criminal significance being attributed to it. The accusation quoted by Mr. Rykoff, that Peshkoff and his friend were engaged in espionage work, is utterly and entirely without foundation.

"Even more fantastic is the case of Filin. He was a young officer

in the Red Army, whose wife was a friend from childhood of Mrs. Charnock. He had a post immediately under the Revolutionary Military Council, and in that capacity was doubtless in a position to procure information on matters of military importance. It was precisely for this reason that Mr. Charnock kept away from him and avoided any dealings with him which might conceivably compromise him. He met him in all some four or five times during the five and a half years the Mission was in Moscow, and then only in company. On no occasion did he discuss military matters with him. It is only now that the nature of the charge on which he was shot is revealed.

"With the accusations launched by the Moscow communiqué, it is unnecessary to deal at length. Allegations that Mr. Vice-Consul Waite was involved in plots to blow up the Kremlin and the Grand Theatre, etc., are so grotesquely absurd that no good purpose would be served by attempting to disprove them. They are on a par with other charges made against the British from time to time by the Soviet Press of having organised the Pilsudski *coup d'état* in Poland and the overthrow of the Lithuanian Government, of attempting the destruction of the Leningrad Water Works, of planning to seize the islands of Dago and Oesel in the Baltic, conspiring to murder Reza Shah, and so on *ad infinitum*.

"The list of persons reported to have been shot by the Political Police on June 9th demands more detailed comment. Vladimir Evreinoff was in the Imperial Russian Diplomatic Service, and was stationed at Teheran. He lived in England for some time after the war, but returned to Russia about 1923. He was given a post in the State Bank in Moscow. He was in touch with the British Mission, which he visited very occasionally. Sir Robert Hodgson was particularly careful not to encourage relations with him since his antecedents must inevitably render him suspect to the Soviet authorities. It is absolutely untrue that he acted as a spy for the British Mission. Of Lytcheff nothing is known. Mr. Charnock has no one of the name among his acquaintances. Of 'ex-Captain Koropanko' nothing is known. Sir R. Hodgson was acquainted in Siberia with an officer of a very similar name whom he met once in the house of a mutual friend in Moscow. He never saw him again. In fact, the officer in question refused under any condition to renew his acquaintance. I know no one of the name of Mazurenko.

"Allusions have been, and doubtless will again, be made to so-called 'confessions' made by persons arrested by the State Political Department. These 'confessions' must be treated with the gravest mistrust, for the G.P.U. officials habitually endeavour to wring admissions from their victims by threats or by promising to release them on condition they sign statements dictated to them.

Similarly, they employ the most abominable measures of compulsion to induce people to act as their agents. Among other cases of the kind may be mentioned that of Louise Koch, a maidservant of the British Mission, who, on the premises of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was threatened with life imprisonment unless she acted as informer on Sir R. Hodgson, and with death if she revealed to him the fact that she had been approached. It is unnecessary to demonstrate that the information supplied by agents recruited in this manner is entirely valueless."

Sir Robert being withdrawn from Moscow, it was necessary for the British Government—for even the present British Government recognised that its interests would have to be watched at Moscow—to find some foreign Power that would provide a substitute for Sir Robert. There are twenty-two Powers who have diplomatic representatives in Moscow. Only four of them are big Powers, namely, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. There were obvious difficulties in the way of British diplomatic interests being consigned to the care of any big Power, especially when that Power might happen to be a commercial competitor. Both the German and the French Government would enthusiastically have undertaken the responsibility, if asked to do so. Already German traders viewed with satisfaction the fact that the bulk of British trade dealings with Russia would in the future have to be conducted through German intermediaries, themselves competing for the contracts. After the London raid important departments of the Arcos organisation were moved from London to Hamburg.

Norway was the country chosen to supply a diplomatic intermediary between London and Moscow. The position, therefore, is that whenever the British Government wants to protest about anything to the Russian Government it will have to do so via the Norwegian Government, unless it adopts the method of Press statements; and the Russian Government, in view of the emptiness of Chesham House, will have to answer, if it wants to answer, via the German Government. Germany has undertaken to represent Russian interests in London.

AN EMOTIONAL BUBBLE IN EGYPT.

At the end of May the British Government was faced with still another crisis in its foreign policy. After the Anglo-Russian break, and, as some thought, as a result of it, Anglo-Egyptian relations went wrong. The sudden tension was the more remarkable because Zaglul Pasha during the past few months had been more than usually conciliatory towards Great Britain. The new crisis began with an urgent despatch from Lord Lloyd to his Government reporting what he regarded as a possibly serious recrudescence of anti-

British agitation on the part of the Zaglulist Nationalists who wield a large majority in the Egyptian Parliament. The particular new evidence on which he was understood to have laid most stress was that the Egyptian Parliamentary War Committee had framed proposals for submission to the Egyptian Parliament which, if adopted, would abolish the Sirdarship and make of the Egyptian army a force readily available for the political purposes of the Egyptian Government. In London some doubt was felt about the nature of the manœuvre thus reported. On former occasions, it was remembered, the Zaglulists had "tried it on," and there were those who diagnosed a Zaglulist desire to discover how the British Government would react to an Egyptian scare at a moment when it had taken a step in its Russian policy which was generally interpreted as an act of weakness. The immediate reaction in London was a desire to find out how far the Cairo agitation represented a considered policy or a definite tendency. Lord Lloyd was therefore instructed to deliver to the Egyptian Government a Note in which that Government was asked in effect whether it intended to respect the existing diplomatic arrangements and to co-operate with the British Government in carrying them out. As a routine measure the Admiralty at the same time ordered three battleships, the *Barham*, the *Malaya* and the *Royal Sovereign*, to proceed from Malta to Egyptian waters. The common deduction was made that the British Government had decided on a demonstration. The deduction was wrong. The negotiations between Lord Lloyd and Sarwat Pasha might at any moment result in an Egyptian repudiation of the existing arrangements, and it was therefore considered necessary to have forces on the spot in case a demonstration were in that event to be decided on. Such a movement of ships is a commonplace measure dictated by the traditional principles of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty; but China, Russia, and Egypt provided evidence of a state of jumpiness in British foreign policy. The Note delivered by Lord Lloyd reminded the Egyptian Government of the British attitude to the still unsolved Egyptian problem pending the settlement of the four "reserved points." The British Government based its policy on the *status quo* which gave to Great Britain the responsibility for safeguarding all the foreign interests involved in those four points. The London argument was that if the Egyptian army became a political instrument of the Egyptian Government instead of the "sanction" behind the police force, having as its exclusive purpose the keeping of order and the protection of life, Great Britain would be unable to meet her responsibilities. Moreover, the point was made in London that after the 1924 murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar of the Sudan, no further risks of the like kind could be taken. Importance was attached to

the fact that the post of Sirdar of the Sudan was combined with that of the Commandership-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, an arrangement on which the British Government firmly insisted as the only means of meeting its responsibility. The Government, therefore, decided to force the issue by inviting a clear "yes" or "no" from Cairo about its attitude to the *status quo*.

Effective use was at first made by the Zaglulist politicians of the British warships. The Cairo correspondents of certain English newspapers telegraphed messages in which they described the British Note to Egypt as an "ultimatum." It was not in any sense an ultimatum. No situation had arisen in Egypt to which an ultimatum could be relevant. Some concern was felt in Whitehall because the correspondents above alluded to had no doubt uncritically accepted the inspiration of Zaglulist propagandists, who naturally were not averse from the British Note being represented as worse than it was, especially when the misrepresentation was given by English writers in English newspapers. The British Note was designed only to force Sarwat Pasha's hand.

British policy had not changed since 1922. The British declaration contained in Lord Curzon's Note of February 21st, 1922, was, therefore, in effect the instrument about which Sarwat Pasha was invited to declare himself. After stating that "the British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign state," that declaration proceeded: "the following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt: (a) the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (b) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference direct or indirect; (c) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; (d) the Sudan. Pending the conclusion of such agreements the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact." While the British Government insisted on safeguarding the Sirdar's competence both in the Sudanese army and in the Egyptian army the Egyptian Government was reminded that Great Britain had always recognised that Egypt's material interests in the Sudan must be respected and even guaranteed. Those interests are mainly her share of the Nile water and the satisfaction of any financial claims she may have against the Sudanese Government. The fact that since the murder of Sir Lee Stack in 1924 no formal appointment of his successor had been made, and that the Egyptian Government had never formally recognised the position first of Huddleston Pasha and later of Spinks Pasha, who,

with the title of Inspector-General, carried out the Sirdar's duties, was not regarded by official opinion in London as relevant to the issue.

The Egyptian crisis ironically recalled Colonel Wedgwood's recent investigations in Egypt. Colonel Wedgwood was a member of Mr. MacDonald's Cabinet. Early this year he suggested that the Egyptian problem should be solved by Great Britain's retaining the Suez Canal and a strip of land seven miles deep to the west of it, and by Italy's being invited to take over the responsibility for foreign protection in the rest of Egypt. Colonel Wedgwood then went to Egypt. On his return he announced that the highest Egyptian politicians with whom he had discussed his proposal stood aghast and declared that they would go to war rather than submit either to Italian or to French protection. Colonel Wedgwood's wind being taken out of his sails, he made a revised suggestion. His new hypothesis was that Egypt wanted British protection; well then, he said, why not make of it a commercial instead of a diplomatic problem? Why should not Egypt pay the British Treasury, say, £3,000,000 a year for protection? His new proposal was discussed seriously in the Egyptian press.

The Egyptian answer to the British Note of May 30th fulfilled the expectation that the Egyptian Government would avoid clinching the issue, and would take the opportunity of reviewing Egyptian grievances while shunning the point at issue. One result of a week's negotiations was to show that London and Cairo were at cross purposes. The Egyptian argument begged the question. During the early part of this year Anglo-Egyptian relations appeared to have improved. The sudden recrudescence of Wafd agitation was explained by Wafd apologists as due in part to a tactless speech of Lord Lloyd's in which he referred to King George's interest in the welfare of the Egyptian people. Why good will on the part of King George, a symbol of Great Britain, should excite a sense of grievance in Zaglul's extremists was a little puzzling. The Wafd apologists, however, were frank enough to explain that Wafd mentality is super-sensitive about Egyptian independence, and self-consciously misread Lord Lloyd into implying that King George in some way held sway over Egypt. They further argued that Egyptian independence was a sham unless the Egyptian Parliament controlled the Egyptian army. What they forgot was that their first step should logically be the settlement of the "reserved points." Shifting their ground they next pointed out that the War Committee had never made any proposal for transferring the authority of the Sirdar to the Minister of War. Only two members of the committee had proposed it; it had not been adopted by the committee; even if it were to be adopted by the committee it would

have to go first to the Finance Committee, then to the House of Representatives, then to the Senate, then to King Fuad; and, it was added, the lack of funds would bring it to a full stop when it reached the Finance Committee. The potential periphrastics of the War Committee's potential proposal were, however, beside the point. The point was whether Sarwat Pasha still honoured the terms of the 1922 declaration. The cross purpose consisted in this, that Wafd opinion argued that the theory of Egyptian independence had not been put into practice, whereas on the other hand the British Government, committed as it was by the 1922 arrangement to the fact of Egyptian independence, continued to uphold the 1922 proviso that legitimate trade and Imperial interests should be safeguarded. As seen from London the position was that the moment the Egyptian Government gave the required guarantees by settling the reserved points, effective independence for Egypt would follow. The only attempt, however, that had been made by Egypt to settle the matter had been made by Zaglul Pasha in 1924 in so uncompromising a style that even Mr. MacDonald rejected his proposals. At the end of last year Zaglul, by giving his support to Sarwat Pasha, seemed to indicate a certain softening of outlook, but no action followed.

The Egyptian answer to the British Note of May 30th being unsatisfactory, it was decided by the British Government that Lord Lloyd should be given a chance of reaching a private agreement with Sarwat Pasha. As the original British Note had elicited a friendly but elusive answer from Cairo, Lord Lloyd was instructed to present a further memorandum in which the British Government in a friendly spirit invited the Egyptian Government to answer its former questions. The tone of the Egyptian answer was conciliatory, but in substance merely promised that the Egyptian Government would consider the British demands. That was not enough. Lord Lloyd encountered some difficulty in inducing Cairo to argue the same point as the British Government, and it took him a week to persuade Cairo to put the horse before the cart and to agree to discuss the reserved points before discussing the relation between the promise and the fact of Egyptian independence. After refusing for some days to discuss the problem in that order, Sarwat Pasha on June 14th apparently decided to have done with the quarrel. He formally accepted the British contention and agreed to recognise the British Inspector-General's competence as unimpaired. Lord Lloyd, therefore, was entitled to the credit of having kept down the inflammation and soothed the Egyptian Government into an agreement.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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THE ORGANISM OF THE STATE.*

Sir John Marriott has a lucid and extremely attractive prose style, and the fact is a matter of moment in estimating the value of this definitive work on the practice of government at which he has laboured for so many years. Apart altogether from its intrinsic merits, which are great, the form of presentation, and the judicious and judicial outlook, and the gentle art whereby nationals (such as Mr. Root) criticise their own institutions, make *The Mechanism of the Modern State* a delightful and absorbing work.

It is, of course, true that Sir John Marriott as an historian, a politician (in the Aristotelian sense) and a practical administrator, has necessarily a concrete point of view. He does not look at the State as a jurist or as a philosopher, or even as a professor of history would look at it. He is not concerned with the State as an organism, though he recognises it as an institution with innumerable functions, as something which emerged when the forces of feudalism had been subdued by centripetal tendencies. The ancient

* *The Mechanism of the Modern State: A Treatise on the Science and Art of Government.* By Sir John A. R. Marriott, M.P. Two volumes. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 42s. net.

world knew nothing, we are told, of the Modern State. That is a very large assumption if we also assume with Sir John Marriott that the modern State is an intermediate form between the City State and the ancient empires. It must not be forgotten, however, that those empires were an integration of city states, that feudalism is a phase in the development of both city states and empires, that the relationships of centralised power and feudalism is written right through the uprising of nations—Mexico and Peru are examples—that democracy and representation are as implicit in the tribal stage as in the Modern State. It may be, indeed, suggested that the Modern State is only distinguishable from other organic phases of tribal development if we limit our conception of feudalism to the feudalism of Europe and our conceptions of centralisation to western examples of kingship and bureaucracy. If a wider range is taken the Modern State is—apart from the modern manifestations of science—a normal development that can be paralleled in Asia and America. The Aztec Confederation, the Iroquois Confederation, and various tribal groupings on a great scale both in Asia and Africa show at work the same organic processes of growth from the kinship to the State as existed in the European phenomena that cover the three thousand years from the date of the Aryan tribal dispersion to our own time.

These processes are all subject to quite simple laws of social motion of which both Sir Robert Filmer and John Locke in their apparently antagonistic points of view had some inkling. Filmer was right in building up the State from kinship, Locke was right in saying that the State is a self-protective organism. There is a higher unity that combines these truths, and had it been realised in the seventeenth century, when the Modern State took actual form, the tragedies of modern European history and the domination of the unscientific opinions of Locke and Rousseau might have been avoided. For one thing, the conception of a nation or a nation-state as a group or group of groups inspired by a common ideal—the British ideal, for instance, of ordered freedom—might have emerged earlier. Aristotle lived in a tribal age and fully understood the scientific aspect of the problem which Filmer and Locke groped after when he declared that a state was “an association of clans and village communities in a complete and self-sufficing life.” Moreover philosophy based on incorrect premises would have been avoided and the errors of Macchiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Fichte might not have disturbed the processes of social growth and the automatic balancing of power.

However that may be, the organism of the state and the conception of sovereignty have reached a complex stage to-day, and it is well to have the mechanism of the organism described in the lucid

periods of Sir John Marriott, since future developments must largely turn on the understanding of the mechanism as well as on the appreciation of the processes of growth and of conscious interference (developed from the primeval custom to change custom into modern legislative efforts) which underlie a group life that is organic and not mechanical. For the purposes of studying the mechanism of the organism, Sir John Marriott has done what Linnæus and Cuvier and the formal botanists and zoologists have done in another sphere of organic life; he produces constitutional forms and categories and then proceeds to examine in detail three so-called democracies: Athens (which became an Empire and failed simply because the Aryans were not the Sumerians), the Swiss Confederacy, that familiar group of groups which still adheres to the old tribal method, and the United States of America, which again is a group of groups with almost Athenian tendencies, waiting for its Pericles, and in the meantime collecting the art-treasures of Europe and never thinking at all about the inevitable Alcibiades and the Sophists. Sir John Marriott next considers “the salient characteristics of English Political Institutions, and the historical development of that species of democracy to which the label of Responsible Government has been attached, alike in Great Britain and in the Overseas Dominions of the British Crown.”

Here again we get a group of groups which is far nearer to Rome than to Athens, supported as it is by a stately system of law and by the principle that the main object of the State is to protect and safeguard the imperfect aspirations and status of the individual. The so-called Roman and British Empires, it may be suggested, represent the true line of organic development from purely tribal times. The ancient empires of the east, Sumerian, Babylonian, Persian, the empires of the west, ancient and modern (whether tricked out as the scarlet woman of democracy or not) are not in the true line of organic development. They are Nature's experiments that have failed or are doomed to failure. Rome was hampered by the *damnosa hereditas* of slavery and decayed from the heart. The British Empire has flung off at home and oversea that fatal product of customary feudalism, and if it can but educate its people into the elastic and indistructible discipline of humanism it should survive as an organic league of nations. The detailed material supplied by Sir John Marriott should be closely studied by those who desire to think about the future of our Empire. We are shown the unitary government of England, the evolution of parliamentary democracy (and on this point the almost unconscious return to the mediæval system of local government in the late nineteenth century should be kept in mind), we see the evolution of colonial self-government in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and

the wonderful process by which the political groups became unified into federalised systems, and we are shown the process, still in progress, of the organisation and mechanism of an integrated Empire. The first volume closes with a detailed account of the structure of government in the Modern State, principally dealing with England, but with frequent comparative studies of parallel institutions in what are called (perhaps the term is open to criticism) "typical states of the modern world." The method is essentially analytical, and if criticism inevitably arises from comparative study it is scientific criticism undertaken to aid the understanding of British institutions. The art of criticism is not always so kindly. In some hands the surgeon's scalpel tends to become the weapon of the brave or medicine-man. In the embittered fields of unicameralism and bicameralism, senates, second chambers, constitutions, the referendum, the initiative, Sir John Marriott moves serenely. He is not a Gallio, and indeed cares very much for all these things, for the processes of procedure, the dreary but fundamental methods of finance, systems of representation, the proportional representation principle that has at last cast the Irish nation into a state of political coma (an achievement beyond compare).

The second volume deals in detail with the history and the function of the executive (and here again the main body of the work deals with England though it is illustrated by foreign examples), the judiciary, local government, federation and devolution, while an essay on the party system foreruns an epilogue in which the education of the citizen is discussed with some prophetic enthusiasm. The young citizen must be trained, says Aristotle, "by habit and education in the spirit of the Polity." Sir John Marriott considers that we have, despite educational shortcomings, entered into the spirit of the Polity in the best way. But surely there is, even with our growingly efficient educational system, one thing lacking. The Romans made the basic laws of the community a school subject. Law in some form or another should be taught in the schools. The elder school child should understand the main principles of the society into which he or she is born. It is only in such knowledge that the growing citizen can fully attain to the British principle of ordered freedom. Sir John Marriot gives an account of extraordinary clarity of the English legal system, and the passages on the Problem of Personal Liberty should be studied by all students. There is perhaps an omission as to the universality of the Rule of Law. Acts of State are in certain circumstances not cognisable in the courts, and it may be that in such cases remedies may be sought in vain. The structure of the State perhaps makes this inevitable. But the struggle to give justice to the individual is a perennial fruit of the English Tree of State. Sir John Marriott refers to the upgrowth

of the mediæval Chancery jurisdiction to meet flaws in the application of the strict rule of law, but the effort goes further back. Only in quite recent days Dr. Bolland has shown that the King's judges before the days of the Chancery exercised equitable jurisdiction in all parts of the country. The Rule of Law has been from the first and is, despite the growth of a rather haphazard system of departmental (not administrative) law, the true *differentia* of the British State.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

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WORDSWORTH AND HIS SISTER.*

Miss Catherine Macdonald Maclean has done good service to literature by her series of essays entitled *Dorothy and William Wordsworth*. It is a charming record of a brother and sister. Robert Browning would have called it "Giving and Getting," for what the one lacked the other gave. There was an amazing affinity between these twin spirits, a love that emptied itself in giving. The love and insight of Dorothy Wordsworth wove itself into the poetry of her mighty brother. The "Lucy Poems" are doubtless drawn from Dorothy:

"She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years."

Shakespeare's tribute to the earthly beauty and variety of Cleopatra:

Age cannot wither, nor custom stale. . . .

is, perhaps, the counterpart of his tribute to spiritual beauty which is not dimmed by human frailty:

And she hath smiles to earth unknown;
Smiles, that with motion of their own
Do spread, and sink, and rise;
That come and go with endless play,
And ever, as they pass away,
Are hidden in her eyes.

Dorothy Wordsworth's records of her travels are always delightful reading, no detail escapes her, yet she never misses the *tout ensemble*. The major and the minor comprise the perfect whole, with never a touch of egotism. Her prose is in this the counterpart of William's poetry. Such a sister deserves remembrance, and Miss Maclean accords it with no unstinted pen.

The latter essays in this volume deal with the poetry of Wordsworth. Not since the present writer had the privilege of listening to the late Dr. Philip Wicksteed's University Extension lectures on Wordsworth, has there appeared a clearer analysis or a truer appre-

* *Dorothy and William Wordsworth*. By C. M. Maclean. Cambridge University Press. 6s. net.

ciation of the Poet and his poetry. Miss Maclean deals with modern depreciation of Wordsworth's work and does not resent the criticism, but she feels that this depreciation comes generally from those who only know his poetry in part, and that part often not the best, especially when isolated from the whole. A Wordsworth anthology can never be satisfactory, or truly represent the Poet. Some of the poems suffer from being hackneyed, and were stale before they were understood. "Poetry cannot be tested like a chain. If the strength of a chain is according to its weakest link, the strength of poetry is according to the best of what it offers," and Wordsworth's best will endure, because life, simple human life and its eternal verities, are his theme, and he illuminates his them with a poet's vision, and where vision is there is *life*.

Dorothy Wordsworth reveals her brother more intimately than any outside biographer could possibly have done. In Miss Maclean's first essay on the poet "in the Workshop," she opens the door to the inner life, and shows her brother wrestling with poetic expression, "busy at his task morning, noon, and night." Ill satisfied often with what he had written, the poet wrote and rewrote, waiting often on inspiration. Dorothy writes in March, 1802: "I left Wm: and while he was absent I wrote out poems. I grew alarmed, and went out to seek him. I met him at Mr. Olliff's. He had been trying, without success, to alter a passage—his "Silver How" poem. He had written a conclusion just before he went out: While I was getting into bed, he wrote 'The Rainbow.'" A later entry in the diary, May 14th of the same year, shows that the poet was still troubled over the wording of "The Rainbow." "William very nervous. After he was in bed, haunted with altering 'The Rainbow.'" We feel, as we read Dorothy's diary, the dependence of poetry on inspiration: "My Master calls me, I must not say no." This last enigmatical word of Kent in "King Lear" is the word of all poets. As the author of this essay says: "Wordsworth served a master who would brook no tarrying, who like Jehu drove furiously in his chariot, and whose words were symbols flung upon the air as he passed, and to be transcribed ere they had faded into the winds. Those who wait upon inspiration know well that the terms of their service brook no rest and no delay." Wordsworth was always fearful of the vision passing from him, as in the "Immortality Ode":

Whither is fled the visionary gleam?

Where is it now, the glory and the dream?

but before it had passed "the poet," as Miss Maclean says, "had done a poet's work."

The essay on "Poetic Diction" is of great value.

Wordsworth reminds a world divorced from poetic reality, that "the language of poetry is one and indivisible," whether for

the moment it speaks in words tumultuous and sublime, or whether it "singeth a quiet tune," whether it measures its rhythms according to an accepted pattern, or whether the harmonies it creates are as little susceptible of formal measuring as the harmonies of the spheres.

It is impossible to know Wordsworth in part. It is the unity of his work that he is always emphasising; from the loftiest imaginings to the simplest flower that blows. The parts are always related to the whole, and the poet soars from the lowliest to the highest almost in a breath, lest the vision fade. He was for ever reaching out to "a land of far distances" beyond the mountains of his home, as all who have the vision must. Miss Maclean is to be congratulated on a work that brings this gifted brother and sister into the light of common day transforming that light for each reader with the beauty of essential poesy and love.

S. DE M.

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THE WANDERING SCHOLARS.*

Miss Waddell collected the material for this learned and most attractive work in Paris during the two years in which she held, as a member of Lady Margaret Hall, the Susette Taylor Fellowship. But her study of the *Vagantes*, the wandering scholars and inheritors of the pagan learning, "the classic tradition that came to its wild flowering in the rhyming Latin lyric of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries," began earlier at Somerville College. The theme, apart altogether from its political implications (for certainly the *Vagantes* played an early part in the disintegration of the mediæval church) and its place in the pure history of literature is one of intense fascination. The phrase "wild flowering" of the mediæval Latin lyrics is peculiarly happy since classical Latin is a gardener's flower and in the earlier vernacular Latin we find the wild stock—even perhaps the rhymes—that the late lyrics made so attractive. Latin, indeed, was very much alive in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and in that period, as Miss Waddell says, "the sacred canon of classical Latin is not yet closed." We may doubt, however, whether it was the language of the courts. It certainly was not in England except for formal writs. The language of the courts was Anglo-Norman. But, at any rate, the church continued not only to teach but (*pace* the great Gregory and his successors of that kidney) enjoy the classics. It is true that Alexander's grammar, the *Doctrinale*, which continued as a curse to childhood for unnumbered generations, was the beginning of the

* *The Wandering Scholars*. By Helen Waddell. With Illustrations. Constable. 21s. net.

end, but by that time Petrarch, who at any rate was a realist and not a Ciceronian, was in sight, and Dante was presently to give an apotheosis to the vernacular.

The classical or pagan tradition ends, in a way, with Ausonius, who lives again in these pages, and that curious spring-time which sometimes comes in autumn is made living for us in the history of Latin literature. But it is, as autumnal flower-time is, the twilight of the gods, the forerunner of winter and the dark days. Yet who shall say that the seventh century is dark? It opens with the still living but ancient figures of Fortunatus, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville; Virgilius Maro the grammarian is in Toulouse quite unconscious that something like an end to literature if not to grammar is at hand. But the Irish, unreasonable as ever, chose this moment for their Golden Age and scattered themselves in the winter-time and made winter gardens of literature. Moreover, they were cheery folk, and it is difficult to understanding how they have adjusted themselves to a dry America a thousand years after the time when they made most of the drinking songs and cheered the heart of Charles the Bald, grandson of the Mighty Charles. One jest of John Scotus Erigena deserves to survive. "What is there between *Sottum* and *Scottum*?" said King Charles to Scot one cheery night. "The breadth of the table, Sire," said the latest or the earliest of the Grecians. The coming of the Normans ended much merriment for the time being and possibly ended the famous Irish scholar, Sedulius of Liège himself, who had chanted Sapphics in defiance of the wild men of the North and perhaps to keep up his ebbing spirits. That the tenth century is not totally dark Miss Waddell makes clear. It is now early February not late October, and the buds begin to appear with almost the fresh mysticism of the elder tree that grows green in bitterest weather or of golden jasmine that gilds sunny walls when winter seems at the worst. The tenth century, as revealed by the wandering scholars, is something like February and perhaps the sun is Gerbert, both as Sylvester II and in earlier days. The treasures of learning are touched with mysticism, but there are scholars and good ones. The eleventh century saw spring established. The Italian scholars, the mighty Lanfranc and his kind, made a renaissance possible in Normandy, and to that revival England owes perhaps everything in law and literature and exact scholarship. But Miss Waddell is on the lookout for the spring birds.

It is towards the end of the eleventh century that one recognises the beginning of the craze for verse, which is almost universal in the twelfth, just as in Elizabethan England any man of breeding was expected to know what to do with the music sheet set down before him after dinner. The verse was of two sorts, the scholar's verse in the classical metres of Hildebert and Alphanus of Salerno

and the school of Liège, and the *Cantilena*, the *rhythmus*, which the young men sang at the corners, "pleasant," says dear old Telbald de Vernon who wrote the *St. Alexis*, "because of its sound like a bell." They all wrote it, *en pantoufles*: even the great Bernard himself in his youth at Cîteaux. He was guilty of great ease and proficiency in it, as Abelard's indiscreet terrier, Berengarius, reminds him: and by the end of the twelfth century, the writing of rhyming verse was absolutely forbidden to the members of the Cistercian Order: its associations were too dangerous.

All this makes the mind turn to the English wandering university scholars with their licences to beg, who travelled along the roads, roads that pilgrims made possible, to and from Oxford and Cambridge and wrote verses for weddings and christenings on the way in many a little village where the vicar made them welcome. It was in those days, before the Black Death, a real spring-time and men (and women, Marie of France and others) could sing in Latin that was almost vernacular, French of Stratford Atte Bowe which was truly vernacular, and even in the despised tongue of the English. The troubadours are in sight among the birds of spring.

But it is not only singing birds that are about. There are the masters of deeper music, the humanists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and of those with their deep philosophic insight we read much in these pages. St. Bernard who wrote songs in his youth saw, in philosophic and mystic reverie, God Himself. These great men laid a new basis of intensive thought. John of Salisbury to Roger Bacon, with all the intermediate phases of humanism and thought and indeed of literature, represent a great phase of Anglo-French intellectual relations. The value of the wandering scholar is the link of international scholarship in the affairs of men. This delightful book gives us a broad and scholarly grasp of a great impulse or unconscious movement that lay behind the revival of letters, and despite its many sadnesses and badnesses it has an essential nobility that recalls the mad, glad Elizabethan days.

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THE NEW PRAYER BOOK.*

The new or alternative or composite Book of Common Prayer which will soon come before Parliament is necessarily very much in the minds of those who realise the history and the significance to the religious moral and social problems of our time of the Church of England. At this moment the Bishop of Oxford's Notes on the subject come with peculiar aptness. He is a preacher and writer who knows his own mind and is not at all swayed by party feeling

* *Notes on the New Prayer Book.* By Thomas B. Strong, Bishop of Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1s. net.

or by the expediency that sets agreement above principles. The result of his outlook is a statement on the subject of the Prayer Book that raises the controversy as to form above the din and dust of the tilting yard. He examines the proposals in a purely judicial spirit and bases his support of the proposals on a singularly fair statement of the historical position. So far as the machinery of revision is concerned he emphasises the fact that this is no hasty or revolutionary process. It is some thirty years since Sir William Harcourt raised the question of the lawlessness of the clergy especially in the matter of ritual. The discussion ended in the appointment of the Royal Commission in 1904 on Ecclesiastical Discipline. That body in 1906 unanimously recommended that Letters of Business should be sent to the Convocations instructing them to make recommendation. "A series of Committees of both Convocations (and since 1920 of the Church Assembly) has been at work and the result is now before the Church." The Commissioners have found that :

The law was not accurately observed anywhere in the Church of the day : and it found the cause of this not merely in the disloyalty or perversity of individuals, but in the gradual failure of the law to correspond with the circumstances of a new age. This is not in itself a startling suggestion. We can scarcely imagine the chaos there would be in civil life if we were governed now by the laws in force in 1662. . . . I think that the terms of the Letters of Business would have covered a revision of the Prayer Book such as took place in 1661. If that plan had been followed—and for my own part I think it would have been the right one—we should have had again one use throughout the whole Realm and the Prayer Book of 1662 would have been superseded. A different method has been followed. The Prayer Book has been considered over and over again by a variety of committees, and the result is a Composite Book, containing the old Prayer Book almost complete, and, dovetailed into it, a variety of suggestions which no clergyman is bound to adopt but which do relax the extreme rigour of the existing Law.

Dr. Strong at once raises the issues involved in these permissive deviations from the Old Prayer Book :

If the variety of ritual expresses divergencies of thought on deep and fundamental issues, can that go on rightly within the area of a single Church? And if it does so prevail in one Church does not that mean that that Church has no settled clear opinion or message? Ought not a Church to have some one clear, sharply defined doctrine which it presses upon all without doubts or qualms or qualifications? I think that you will admit that these are fundamental questions, and that they are raised by the proposals for Permissive Deviations from the Book of 1662.

Dr. Strong proceeds to consider "these very difficult" points." He shows that there have been, ever since the time of the Reformation, three parties in the Church of England : one favouring "the more

drastic kind of severance from Rome which obtained upon the Continent"; another that has always declined to condemn ceremonies *merely* on the ground that they were pre-Reformation; a third moved (though not in the violent Continental fashion) with "the spirit of inquiry and innovation." The Low Church, the High Church, the Broad Church have always been in evidence, and despite pamphleteers and party newspapers they have not rent the Church of England in sunder. Dr. Strong accounts for the fact by his belief that "deep down in the minds of English churchmen there is the conviction that the various points of view cannot do without one another." He illustrates the view by the relevant fact that the same thing undoubtedly happens in the party system in politics. "At election time each party declares the hopeless incompetence of the other or others. Yet, if representation of only one party appeared in any given Parliament, everyone would rightly regard it as a disaster." One might go further and say that if this happened the united party would dissolve very soon into the natural elements of Radical, Liberal, and Conservative. In Church and State alike we recognise and tolerate differing opinions. Now Dr. Strong thinks, and rightly, that this is something more than compromise for the sake of muddling through.

My contention is that the way of the English Church is profoundly different. A works with B, not because he is ready to sacrifice, here and there, fragments of the truth as he sees it; but because A sees that the truth that he has grasped will never be complete without the truth that B has grasped. This is not a method of sharing the truth in the interests of convention or anything of the kind: it means getting nearer the truth by recognising its comprehensiveness.

The "comprehensiveness of the Church of England" is the theme on which the Bishop of Oxford lays special emphasis. Any Christian Society must relate Christ crucified, risen, and ascended to a loving God and a redeemed humanity. But to different types of mind this means different things. To one it means forgiveness of sin and access to God; to another it means a sacramental life and Church fellowship, to another it means that all this stands or falls on the history and philosophy of the Church. It is Dr. Strong's view that none of these is sufficient :

It is not merely a matter of personal conviction, though no religious life is complete without personal conviction. It cannot be bound within the limits of sacramental acts and ordinances, yet man's life being what it is, composed of body and soul, it is inevitable that his religion will require sacramental forms: the notion of activity, that is merely spiritual and needs no expression in matter, human life being what it is, is a chimerical notion. And just because it is one of the most distinctive features of Christianity, that in it God enters into and claims dominion over

all the life of man, it cannot isolate itself from all the efforts of his mind to explain and test for itself the various elements of his experience. In the sense that it includes all these points of view Christianity must be comprehensive. It arises, not out of a body of thought or lofty speculation, but out of a Life, so essentially human, and so transcending humanity, that it strains all the categories of human expression to describe it. Different minds will always be drawn by different aspects of it, and there will always be within a Church really constituted to be its witness a considerable amount of divergence of opinion . . . it needs minds of many sorts to convey the witness of a really Catholic Church.

Dr. Strong believes that such consideration is necessary to any right discussion of the new Prayer Book which in his view expresses the same diversity in unity as the existing Prayer Book. "The old Prayer Book claimed to assert the unique authority of the Holy Scripture: the real value of Sacraments: the right to revise and restate old opinions, however authoritatively asserted: and the new Book does the same." He rejects the charge that this tendency is in the direction of the Church of Rome, but quite frankly declares that "the indiscriminate rejection of anything and everything which has a parallel in the Roman system is unhistorical." The Romanism, against which the Church of England protests is found "in an attractive but false ideal of truth." Dr. Strong protests against the ideal that "truth must, of necessity, be precise, definite, and must claim universal assent . . . this ideal prevails only in the more abstract forms of science." In fact it does not prevail there. It only prevails where premises are ascertained and the form of logic is agreed. What is Proof, is an even harder question than what is Truth. But if there is error in the belief that Truth can be arrived at *ex cathedra* there is error also in the belief that Truth can be arrived at by the search after a Common Denominator. The Bishop of Oxford moves towards a middle view:

The mind of the Church is continually, as it were, under probation. In all ages there will be doubts and questionings. They will be settled slowly by careful thought and reflection upon the faith as it has come down to us, by careful weighing of the meaning of the Articles of the Creed, by careful study and criticism of new knowledge and new ideas.

Truth is like the rainbow. It can never arch the observer.

The service of Holy Communion is, of course, the centre of criticism and Dr. Strong echoes the views of all when he says that it is "a misfortune that this particular rite should be so constantly associated with controversy." But this fact "must be faced." Are the new proposals "a concession to the Roman view of things," a concession to the Doctrine of Transubstantiation? The use of the Church of England has hitherto been to avoid the issue by declining

to translate the promise of Christ into metaphysical language "or from building up inferences upon such interpretations." There can be no doubt (though Dr. Strong does not deal with the practical issue) that wild and ignorant clergymen in the Church of England, to whom the metaphysics of the schoolmen are a closed book, have gone beyond the mediæval use of Rome (only adopted in 1215) and plunged into the strangest materialism in the most spiritual of all services. Will the New Book check these grave practices? The Bishop of Oxford evidently thinks that it will have this result, since he declares that "the changes now proposed in the Canon, so far from remodelling it on Roman lines, definitely preserve the doctrinal principles which have governed the Church of England in regard to the Holy Eucharist." The new regulations to meet the demand for more frequent communion "are consistent with the history and the traditional doctrine of the Church of England."

But how, if the wild men in the Church of England continue practices, the materialism of which Rome itself would disclaim? Does the New Prayer Book create a real system of Ecclesiastical Discipline, or are parishioners still to be driven from their parish churches by the persistence of wild practices that are not consistent with religion, philosophy, or common sense? That practical question will be asked in the House of Commons but it is not asked by the Bishop of Oxford. Surely, before the Measure leaves the Church Assembly the question of Discipline should be settled. To-day the machinery of discipline is difficult to operate, with the result that men disloyal to their ordination vows—disloyal in a sense that would ensure their expulsion from the professions of arms, of medicine, and of law—are enabled to draw stipends in defiance of their flock and of their spiritual superiors. Does the New Prayer Book enable discipline to be enforced? If it does not the House of Commons will rightly reject the Measure.

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THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE.*

Dr. Marett, the Reader in Social Anthropology in the University of Oxford, attacks the theory, put forward by Professor Elliot Smith and others, that the essential elements of civilisation originated in Egypt. This theory was accepted by the late Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, who declared in 1915, in view of the discovery of a form of mummification in Torres Strait corresponding in many details to that found in Egypt,

I no longer hesitate to believe that the group of customs and beliefs forming the complex most suitably known as megalithic

* *The Diffusion of Culture: The Frazer Lecture in Social Anthropology*, 1927. By R. R. Marett. Cambridge University Press. 1s. 6d. net.

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developed in Egypt and spread thence to many parts of the world where we find evidence of its existence at the present time.

This was, of course, not an inevitable inference, but in the then state of knowledge it was not an unnatural deduction. Dr. Marett seems to admit the possibility of Egyptian influence but he complains of the effort to raise "upon the narrow basis of a single identification, however plausible, a towering structure of loose analogies as top-heavy as an inverted pyramid." This is rather rough criticism, and it is right to deprecate, in these purely scientific matters, harsh words. Dr. Marett complains that Professor Elliot Smith has criticised severely and unreasonably Sir Edward Tylor and Sir James Frazer, and then adopts an even fiercer method. The days when scientific thinkers criticised each other with bludgeons were supposed to be dead, and it is a matter for regret that such methods should be revived. It only confuses for the public the terribly complex issues of social anthropology.

But Dr. Marett is certainly within his rights as a critic when he states that "the attempted generalisation is on the vastest scale. It is what Bacon would term an *axioma maxime generale*; such as is legitimate only when it serves to correlate a number of *axiomata media* which lend themselves to proof in detail." Dr. Marett does not consider that the Egyptian school has done this: "instead of decisive facts, the bulk of the so-called evidence seems to me to consist merely of a mass of preconceived opinions." On the other hand the building up of evidence must be a slow business, and though the advocates of the Egyptian theory are convinced of its truth, yet in our present state of knowledge the setting out of a working hypothesis is all that any theorist can in fact claim. No doubt Professor Elliot Smith would abandon the Egyptian theory if the evidence against it is conclusive to his highly-trained mind, but it is perfectly scientific to set forth a working hypothesis and accumulate by slow degrees the evidence in support of it. This hypothesis is in itself not unreasonable. It only becomes unscientific when it becomes a dogma of faith, and it is certainly not reasonable to call a hypothesis a dogma unless the author of the hypothesis declines to accept contradictory evidence.

Dr. Marett objects, apart altogether from any special centre of dispersion, to "an all-sufficing diffusionist method" only in so far as it seems to take sole and entire charge of the study of man. There is, for instance, the region of psychology. Psychology must play a part in any right appreciation of the study of man. But the suggestion that the "mental processes of the pre-dynastic Egyptians" are other than ours is a little difficult to understand. Man is man anywhere in any age. Intellectual capacity varies in degree but not in kind. This is true in any age; and in the placing of

one age in contrast to another it is no doubt fair to suggest that the average intellectual capacity is lower in the earlier ages (though this is by no means certain), but it is not fair to suggest that the intellectual capacity is different in kind or even to suggest that a tribe in what may be regarded as in a low grade of intelligence may not possess men or women of very great intelligence. The Greek race still in its tribal stage and not many centuries after the Aryan settlement produced almost the greatest intellects that the world has known. The modern mind may quite reasonably measure itself against the mental processes of races remote in time and humanism. But man being man the processes of history are not arbitrary. Man determines his fate, and his humanism is the effort to survive in group formation. It is the orderliness of these processes that makes it impossible to regard history as arbitrary, and makes it probable that great streams of population from some centre of dispersion represented a cumulative tradition of safety and humanism. Whether Egypt was his centre of dispersion or Arabia, or (ultimately) South-East Asia, does not matter. What matters is continuity in the human methods of securing safety and social life. Such a doctrine of diffusion of culture might possibly satisfy both Dr. Marett and Professor Elliot Smith.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Sir George Paish's book, *The Road to Prosperity*,* contains a great deal of knowledge and wisdom in a little over one hundred pages of large print. As a lifelong student of economic phenomena and as the chief organiser of the famous Bankers' Manifesto, he speaks with authority on the troubles of Europe and the way out. His theme is the need to increase purchasing power, and his prescription is to knock down the tariff and other barriers which prevent men from trading and profitably exchanging their goods. Now that the political atmosphere has begun to clear, at any rate in Western Europe, there is urgent need of "a financial Locarno." A brief survey of the leading countries of the world convinces us that not one of them, whether victorious or vanquished in the world war, is in a satisfactory condition. Even the United States would be gravely affected by the collapse in Europe's buying power which our author expects if we do not mend our ways. In the long series of brief chapters none is more arresting than that on Russia, whose future is boldly declared to be more assured than that of the rest of Europe, and infinitely more assured than that of Germany, Austria, Italy, or even Great Britain. Russia is, indeed, at the heart of the trouble. It is the lack of Russian supplies of food and raw material that is in no small degree responsible for the present difficulties of Europe. Were they available, Europe would be able to make payment for them in manufactured goods. The chapters on Inter-Allied Debts and Reparations are particularly valu-

* Benn. 6s.

able, for they teach us to look beyond figures and phrases to facts. The receipt of so many millions looks well enough in the national budget; but the man in the street forgets that the effort involved in the payment impoverishes his customers and diminishes their demand. The two great creditors, England and the United States, would do much better, argues Sir George, to foster the purchasing power of their debtors than to squeeze them dry. What is true of inter-allied debts is equally true of reparations. Reparation payments seriously reduce the buying power of Germany, and therefore the selling power of every country whose goods usually find a market in Germany. They are, indeed, in no small measure responsible for the trade depression in so many continental countries and in Great Britain. In a word, we cannot eat our cake and have it too. In an interesting Foreword Sir Josiah Stamp reminds us that we have now fortunately the Economic Section of the League of Nations and the International Chamber of Commerce, both of which are busily engaged in combating the rival absurdities which live lusty lives in isolation.

* * *

Professor Laski's thoughtful and suggestive study of *Communism** in the Home University Library, appears at an opportune moment; for, whatever we may think of the Arcos raid and its consequences, none of us can afford to ignore the new and menacing phenomenon of Bolshevism in Russia. It is the supreme merit of this little book that the author treats it seriously, takes the trouble to understand it, and relates it both to the thought and to the experience of the modern world. After an introduction on the evolution of doctrine and organisation our author passes in successive chapters to the consideration of the materialist conception of history, the economic system, the theory of the State, and the strategy of Communism. On all these topics he writes with critical detachment, for nobody could be less temperamentally attracted to the rigidities and crudities of Marx and Lenin; but behind the repulsive and frowning façade of Communism he finds the irresistible demand of the human spirit for a more equal distribution of the good things of life. That far-reaching social and economic transformations are inevitable in the near future he is no less convinced than the orthodox Communist; but he believes that the changes can be made by the ordinary processes of democracy, and that reform by way of revolution, which the Communist demands, is certain to do more harm than good. Most Communist writers, he quietly reminds us, immensely over-estimate the simplicity of politics; and most revolutionists, we may add, have a very hazy idea of the difficulties of reconstruction. The strength of the Communist movement lies in its expression of mass needs, its weakness in its scorn for the individual. Marx, like Rousseau, set out to be a great liberator, but his disciples have shown themselves as ruthless in the hour of their triumph as any king or capitalist. "It is a commonplace of history," writes Professor Laski, "that power is poisonous to those who exercise it, and there is no special reason to assume that the Communist Dictator will in this respect be different from other men. That wrong can be wiped out with wrong is a gospel to which we are not entitled to resort until we despair utterly of civilisation; and when we have resorted to it, it is probable that there will be no civilisation of which

* Williams and Norgate. 2s.

to despair." Parliamentary Government, like other human expedients, is disappointing; but it is preferable to social war with its certainty of hideous carnage. We close this volume of argument and analysis with a heightened conviction that the Communist spectre can only be banished by the removal or drastic diminution of the evils to which it owes its alluring appeal.

* * *

In *China and the Powers** Mr. Henry Kittredge Norton supplies us with an up-to-date, readable, and authoritative survey of the gravest aspect of the complex problem of the Far East. Readers of his earlier work on the Far Eastern Republic do not need to be reminded of his first-hand knowledge, his calm judgment, and his penetrating insight. In 250 pages we find all the essential facts and considerations needed for an understanding of the present crisis. The relations of England, Russia, Japan, and the United States to China have chapters to themselves, which are preceded by a general survey of "Foreign Rights and Chinese Protests." Valuable as are these pages, even more interesting chapters are those which analyse the social, intellectual and economic forces which are changing the outer and inner life of the vast nation. Mr. Norton explains, in detail, the reasons for the dislike of the foreigner; but he emphasises the fact that for the most urgent problem which China has to face, that of over-population, the "foreign devils" are not responsible. The economic revolution, he points out, once begun, must proceed, and the cure for the existing distress is not the expulsion of the foreigner but co-operation with him, and the introduction of new supplies of foreign capital. The only ways of escape from the widespread poverty, often amounting to wholesale starvation, are the cessation of reckless breeding and the systematic exploitation of the vast natural resources of the country. The destiny of China would seem to be in the hands of the students, largely trained abroad, whose combination of idealism and inexperience is skilfully depicted. The Republic, we are told, is little more than a name; yet a return to absolutism might bring peace but not prosperity. The moral of this wise and suggestive volume is that it is the duty of the Powers to assist in every possible way the peaceful development of a hard-working but bewildered nation during a time of peculiarly painful transition.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Madame Aino Kallas, wife of the Estonian Minister, already so well known to English readers by her volume "The White Ship," has given us two more of her striking stories in a work entitled "Eros the Slayer."† Once again, though employing the form of fiction, she uses historical material, and these tales of love and death enable the reader to visualise the society and outlook of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the distant Baltic lands. Madame Kallas writes with extraordinary power, and the grim themes with which she deals leave an ineffaceable impression on the memory. The translation by Alex Matson from the Finnish original reads very well.

* The John Day Company, New York. 1927.

† Jonathan Cape. 6s. net.

Mr. A. Neave Brayshaw, the author of various works on the Friends, has republished his attractive volume entitled "The Quakers: Their Story and Message,"* originally issued in 1921. A chapter on early Quakerism in America and the work of William Penn has been added, and it is made clear that in early days the Friends had a good standing with the natives, and every effort was made to carry on these friendly relations in dark and difficult days. The story of their quiet and influential religious force is one to ponder over, and the subject has a growing interest, as this edition and Dr. Rufus H. Jones' forthcoming work on "The Faith and Practice of the Quakers" (to which Mr. Brayshaw generously refers) testify.

Mr. D. L. Murray's volume on "Disraeli"† is an individual impression of the great statesman and literary man. It is attractively written in four books: Youth, Struggle, the Waiting Years, Attainment. In the third book occurs the phrase: "he looked on politics as the theatre for great and impressive dramas not for the plodding execution of set programmes." That seems not wholly true. Disraeli had an intense dramatic sense but he could and would also see things through. On the other hand the outlook of Gladstone on Disraeli and Disraeli on Gladstone in 1852 is neatly set forth though, perhaps, with some exaggeration. Mr. Murray declares that soon after Disraeli's death "it grew clear how personal the whole triumph had been. . . . No creative breath had passed through forms and institutions; no body of ideas, no creed remained to germinate." Few will agree who study the history of democracy. Disraeli created the Tory Democracy and it survives as successive elections show.

Historical students all over the world will welcome the appearance of "The Economic History Review,"‡ edited by E. Lipson and R. H. Tawney. The first large volume, published in January, 1927, with good print and stout paper forms an excellent advertisement of the enterprise, and should encourage readers to become members of the Economic History Society, of which this journal is the organ. Sir William Ashley's suggestive address on the Place of Economic History in University Studies, and Professor Gras's Rise and Development of Economic History makes an impressive opening. The latter by itself renders the volume worth buying and keeping, and it is supplemented by a no less admirable survey of Recent Work in French Economic History of Professor Henri Sée who has himself worked with conspicuous success in this field. The more technical articles, the documents, and the reviews, combine to make this volume a precious boon to scholars and students.

In the American Revolution considered as a social movement§ Dr. Franklin Jameson approached the creation of the United States from a new angle, and throws a flood of light on an event usually regarded from the political standpoint alone. The little book, consisting of four

* The Swarthmore Press. 3s. 6d. (5s. cloth) net.
† Ernest Benn, 16s. net.
‡ A. C. Black, 10s. 6d.
§ Humphrey Milford. 7s.

lectures, contains a mass of unfamiliar material which enables us to understand how the American revolution, like other great upheavals, produced results which were not contemplated and often not desired by its authors. It encouraged the tendency to a democratic suffrage, limited the area of slavery, swept away the remnants of feudalism in land tenure, and gave the common man an importance he had never possessed before. The last lecture traces the growth of religious equality and the disappearance of established churches, whether Puritan or Anglican. It would be difficult to overpraise the suggestiveness of this book, the ripe fruit of life-long and reflection.

The sixth edition has been issued of Dr. Rafael Sabatini's work entitled "Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition: a History."** The first edition was published in 1913 with a second edition in the same year; two editions followed in 1924, another in 1925 and now the present edition. The author sees in the life of Frey Tomás Torquemada the story of "an abstract genius presiding over a gigantic and cruel engine" of his own perfecting. "We may observe its cold, smooth action, and trace in this the awful intelligence of its architect." "Untouched by worldly ambitions, he seems at once superhuman and less than human." The author bases his work in part on the material collected by Juan Antonio Llorenti (1756-1823) sometime Secretary-General to the Holy Office.

To-day women writers are legion; they write on art, on science, on literature, on a myriad of subjects, and their sex is no longer a surprise. Therefore it is peculiarly interesting to read of those other women of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries who strove, and succeeded, to rise above the approved idea of the educated gentlewoman, and thus laid the foundations of that recognised intellectual equality which men and women now enjoy together. Mrs. Charles Masefield in her very interesting book † "The Story of Fanny Burney: Being an Introduction to the Diary and Letters of Madame d'Arblay," portrays not only Fanny's life and the many famous people she knew and met, but shows very clearly that her sex made no difference to the homage paid to the at first unknown author of "Evelina." It is true that "the Blue-Stockings" had opened the doors for women thinkers and writers, but they were mostly persons who could hold their own in debate and conversation; they could not prepare the way for the diffident Fanny Burney, who did not court popularity and fame. Yet despite sex and diffidence, her writing and personality made their mark in an age famous for its literature, and played their part in the coming of the novel.

Mr. Charles W. Budden in "English Gothic Churches: the Story of their Architecture,"‡ has written a book "to assist the tourist in his rambles round these relics of bygone England." The travelling student may check the architecture of almost any old church by using this book. "I have arranged the chapters that they might serve as a ready guide to the discovery of the actual period to which any part of an old building may belong. At the same time I have

* Stanley Paul. 12s. 6d. net.
† Cambridge University Press. 5s. net.
‡ B. T. Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

tried to show the purpose underlying architectural forms, and to trace their development through the ages." The book is produced and printed in the most excellent style, and the many photographs are delightful examples of an enthusiast's art: an enthusiast who can write the English tongue.

Mr. Sydney R. Jones, in "Touring England by Road and By-way,"* gives the reader and would-be tourist "a series of specimen tours to act as a finger post to the diverse scenery and features of old England. Mr. Sydney Jones has studied by car, cycle or afoot these tours, and he seems to have come hot-footed from them, and he has illustrated them delightfully in this exquisitely produced book. We are taken on a Canterbury pilgrimage, we see the Constable country, the middle and far West, the Midlands from the Avon to the Wye, the Eastern fens and wolds, the Northern moors and lakes and dales. Mrs. Sydney Jones has added to the value of the work by her careful maps. If the would-be tourist must stay at home he can revive old memories with this book in hand in a sunny London garden.

"Poems (1914-1926)"† by Mr. Robert Graves is a volume that forms the first collected edition of this pleasing poet's work. Some familiar pieces are deliberately omitted as they appear in anthologies, but on the other hand a number of unpublished poems are included. The poems are often full of charm. The lines on John Skelton should send many readers to that terse, delightful, old-time poet:

He struck what Milton missed
Milling an English grist
With homely turn and twist.

Old John you do me good.

The War-poems have a terrible vigour of their own and should be read by those who are beginning to forget the horrors of war. The unconquerable hope stands out in "The Legion," the Legion ragged through much necessary recruiting.

The Legion is the Legion while Rome stands,
And there same men before the autumn's fall
Shall bang old Vercingetorix out of Gaul.

They did, but not that autumn. Some of the later poems recall Browning, and that is no harsh criticism.

The publication should be recorded of a Study by the American Library Association, entitled "Libraries and Adult Education,"‡ containing methods and suggestions that may be tried or adopted by librarians which have been proposed by a Commission, that has surveyed for this purpose the field of adult education in the United States.

* B. T. Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

† William Heinemann. 7s. 6d. net.

‡ The Macmillan Company. 10s. 6d. net.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

NEITHER friends nor foes can think that the Government has either improved its position or enhanced its prestige by its action in regard to the reform of the House of Lords. The discussions which have taken place since the Lord Chancellor's speech revealed not only dissensions within the Party but differences within the Cabinet itself. On June 20th, Lord FitzAlan initiated a debate upon a mild and innocuous resolution declaring

"That in view of the long-standing declarations of Ministers that reform of the Second Chamber of the Legislature is of urgent importance to the public service, this House would welcome a reasonable measure limiting and defining membership of the House and dealing with the defects which are inherent in certain of the provisions of the Parliament Act."

Little more was expected than a discussion of a Debating Society kind. The Lord Chancellor, however, sprang a surprise of the greatest importance to the country when he outlined early in the discussion the legislation which was in the mind of His Majesty's Government. The whole of the matter of the House of Lords reform is always complicated, as it is difficult to separate the two questions of its constitution and its powers. Those people who are most anxious to increase its powers are generally the most ready to abandon the hereditary principle. Those, on the other hand, who wish to maintain the House of Lords in its present form generally admit that its powers cannot be increased. The most important proposal made by the Lord Chancellor was, of course, that which referred to the constitution of the House. He foreshadowed a reduction in the numbers of the House to three hundred and fifty members, including Royal Peers, Lords Spiritual, Lords Legal, and hereditary Peers elected from amongst themselves with an addition who were to be nominated by the Crown. These elected and nominated Peers, as well as the Bishops, were to hold their seats for a term of years to be fixed by statute, but to be eligible for re-election. All Peers were to have the option as to which House they would choose to sit in. Elected Peers and Bishops were to sit for twelve years, one-third retiring every fourth year. Obviously, this scheme was a mere outline and demanded a great deal of additional information before it could be looked upon as complete. One novel proposal is that which deals with nominated members who were to be selected on the advice of the Government of the day for the same period and on the same conditions as the elected Peers. There was no definite statement as to the proportion they were to bear to the nominated Lords of Parliament, and more than one question was put to the Government on this matter. Lord Salisbury told us on the last day

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of the Debate that he anticipated that the hereditary Peers would be in a large majority.

Little reflection was needed to show how great were the implications of the principles which were laid down. No one could regret the permanent absence of Peers who absent themselves regularly from the House—those who exclude themselves by custom may well be excluded by law. But an alteration of this kind in the constitution of the House involves the disappearance of the Royal Prerogative to create Peers in such a number as will give the Government of the day the power to secure the passage of its measures. The Liberal Party secured the passage of the Parliament Act itself by the use—or threatened use—of this prerogative, and could not possibly agree to its abrogation. The Government were insistent enough in their assertion that they did not intend to repeal the Parliament Act itself. What they said in this matter agreed with the policy of Lord Oxford and Asquith, whose name will always go down in history as the Prime Minister who secured the passage of the Act. It is an important landmark in the political history of this country. That Act contains two main principles. The first is that it shall be within the power of the Government of the day to pass proposals to which they attach importance into law within the lifetime of a single Parliament. The second is contained in the Preamble which provides that the House shall be founded on a popular and not on an hereditary basis. Indirectly—though not directly—the proposals of His Majesty's Government might very easily have led to the total repeal of the Parliament Act. If at some future time another Government were in power they would be able with the concurrence of a Conservative majority in the House of Commons to repeal the Parliament Act altogether. Subsequent administrations, whether Liberal or Labour, would then have been in a worse position even than we were in 1911. The Royal Prerogative would have gone and there would have been no power to create a sufficient number of Peers to pass any measure into law which was objected to by the House of Lords. With these alterations we should have been condemned to wait for a period of four or eight years before any opportunity occurred for re-electing a sufficient number of Peers to sit in the new chamber.

We must remember that no Liberal can look upon these proposals as being the beginning of the controversy. We can never forget what happened between 1906-1910. The Liberals with an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons brought in to the House of Lords, one after another, bills which had been discussed at the General Election and for one or two years before. Important measures were rejected, other Bills were altered and weakened, provisions to which we attached importance were cut out. If there

was a Scottish Bill before the House, the night train brought down a number of Scottish Peers to discuss the Bill and vote against the Government. If there was an Irish Bill, then the Irish mail was full of Irish Peers who came once more to vote against the Government. Quite apart from any other alterations which have been discussed by the House of Lords, there is one of a voluntary character to which I think attention might well be given. It is that Peers should not vote upon measures in which they are financially interested. I think I felt at the time—as I feel now—that it would have been much better if these Peers, while reserving to themselves the right to plead their cause, should have refrained from voting for the Bills which affected themselves. It would merely have been carrying out a provision well known in local government and would have gone far to establish a reputation for independence for the House. It really is a great mistake that individual members should constitute themselves both judge and jury in cases in which they are the defendants.

There is, of course, one serious defect in the House of Lords at the present time, which is particularly urgent in its need for reform. It is the representation of the Labour Party in that House. The nine or ten members who constitute the Labour Party are not only few in number but extremely unrepresentative of that Party for which they speak. Lord Haldane, a lifelong adherent to Liberal traditions, utters occasional opinion in direct contrary to the views of the Labour Party; Lord Parmoor, who for nearly as long was a prominent and reactionary member of the Conservative Party, has only been a Labour man since he took office in 1924; Lord Chelmsford, a Conservative, who makes but rare appearances in Parliament, does not care to conceal his differences from the Socialist Party. He it was who was responsible for those five fatal cruisers which exposed the hypocritical pretence of pacifism by the Labour Party. Then there is Lord Thomson, who was made a Peer in 1924 in order that he might be Secretary of the Air Department, and had been a soldier all his life, spending his time both in Court and camp. Soldiers regard him as a good politician and politicians look upon him as a good soldier.

It is really only to Lord Olivier, a lifelong member of the Fabian Society, that we can look for whole-hearted understanding of the principles which brought them to the House; Lord Delawarr, a sincere and single-minded Peer, has had but a short time in public life; Lord Russell, for many years a well-known Liberal, possesses the finest intelligence upon the Bench; while the tale is made up by Lord Kimberley who bears a name honoured in Liberal politics, Lord Muir Mackenzie, a mute and venerable ex-civil servant, and Lord Gorell, their last recruit.

Even a slight perusal of these names shows how inadequately the Socialist movement is represented in the House of Lords. It is not only in numbers that this representation is defective. The most important sections of the Labour Party are not represented in the House of Lords at all and the discussions which take place are vitiated by this defect. The points of view both of Labour and Socialism are most inadequately expressed, and real efficiency in the House will never be attained until something has been done in this matter. The difficulty is to know what to do and how to do it, but that something must be done in order that the House of Lords may in this matter take a useful part in public life is evident to anyone who considers the matter. Never was there a front Bench so devoid of a Parliamentary sense. The House of Lords is distinguished as having few rules of order. The absence of these rules is a great convenience to Peers, but more especially to the Opposition. The abuse of this privilege really shows a lack of sportsmanship which is bitterly resented throughout the whole House. No party was so well treated when in office as was the Labour Party. It is, therefore, the more stupid on their part to create unnecessary prejudice against themselves in the House. They have everything to gain by a greater regard for the traditions of the House, and to persist in antagonising the House in this way is a real mistake in tactics.

I will not go into the vexed question of the practical measure which might be taken in order to secure the reform of the House of Lords. For many months Lord Bryce's committee considered the matter. There was no authority greater than his, or so large a knowledge of either past or present constitutions. He was fertile in suggestion and tried his best to arrive at a unanimous conclusion. This proved impossible, and in the end his conclusions were forwarded to the Prime Minister in the form of a letter from himself as being those which would be the most likely to command general support. Complete unanimity, however, was far from having been gained. I believe that the only way at present is some arrangement by which the House of Lords should be elected by the members of the House of Commons. The Liberal Party is pledged by the Parliament Act to a House based on the popular as opposed to the hereditary principle. This same principle must dictate the solution of the other question which was raised during the Debate.

So much for the proposals as they affected the constitution of the House; but there were other alterations suggested dealing with the powers of the House. Ever since the passing of the Parliament Act the Conservative Party has feared that matters of great importance should be tacked on to money bills and be passed into law over the heads of the House of Lords. The Bryce Committee considered the matter at great length, and they also recommended that

the House of Lords should have power to deal with matters affecting local rates. The Government proposed to follow the recommendation of the Bryce Committee in this respect, and also to provide the Speaker with the assistance of a Joint Standing Committee of the two Houses who should decide on both these matters. Finally, Lord Cave proposed that the provisions of the Parliament Act by which bills can be passed into law without the consent of the House of Lords in the course of a single Parliament should not apply to any bill which alters the constitution or the powers of the House of Lords as set out in the Parliament Act. Just as the will of the House of Commons must prevail in any dispute between the two Houses so also must the House of Commons prevail in any dispute as to what constitutes a Money Bill. If at any time a joint committee, such as that recommended by the Bryce Committee, is set up, it must be made clear that there shall be a majority from the House of Commons upon that committee. In the Debate which took place in the House of Lords, I expressed the opinion that the position of Speaker would be strengthened if something was done in this matter; and I find a very general agreement that, provided the principle already stated is adhered to, some arrangement of a joint committee is not objectionable.

On the Debate on the vote of censure in the House of Commons it really is not necessary to say very much. The Conservative Party had already made known their objections to the proposals. The Government was somewhat surprised at the strength of the opposition shown by the Liberal and Labour Parties. Mr. Baldwin executed, however, a skilful strategic movement to the rear protesting that the scheme was very tentative and that nothing would be ultimately produced that did not command the general consent of the Conservative Party.

The failure of these suggestions involves one real disappointment. I had hoped that we might have given the fullest possible recognition to the position of women in this respect. All women who are Peeresses in their own right should have equal authority to elect and to be elected or nominated for the new Assembly. The failure of these proposals seems likely to postpone this very desirable reform for some time.

An independent Liberal leader, Lord Arran, had put down an amendment to Lord FitzAlan deprecating the introduction of any bill dealing with the matter until the electorate had expressed its opinion. The Liberal leaders were not responsible for the terms of this amendment, and for my own part I should have preferred a resolution deprecating the passage of any Bill. It is evidently clear that just as a General Election was held to secure authority for the Parliament Act, so also a General Election would be very desirable

before the passage into law of any other change in the constitution.

The introduction of a Bill without the intention of passing it into law has, of course, some advantages over Resolutions. The clauses would put into precise language the vague proposals which were adumbrated by the Lord Chancellor. Details are important. We were not, as already said, told what was the idea of the Government as to the proportion which the nominated members were to bear to the elected members of the new House. The voting on the resolution was not without interest. From the moment that the Lord Chancellor had intervened in the Debate no one had paid much attention to Lord FitzAlan's resolution. The proposals of the Government had sprung to the forefront not only in the Debate itself but also in the public interest. The voting though technically on Lord Arran's resolution was really concerned with Lord Cave's suggestions. It was approved by one or two of the *Diehards* in Debate, but when we came to vote upon Lord Arran's amendment, fifty-four voted with him and two hundred and twelve voted with the Government. What, however, is remarkable is that there were some forty-nine or fifty Peers in the House who absented themselves without voting, while in the minority there were a number more who voted not because they approved of the amendment but because they disapproved of the Government's scheme. Lord Midleton intervened at the last moment trying to persuade the House that the votes which were to be given in the division were no more than votes for or against Lord FitzAlan's motion. That, however, was not the general effect of the division, which included all the Peers who took any active part in the work of the House as well as many of those who are usually known as backwoodsmen. Great pressure was brought to bear upon Peers to vote with the Government, and even officials of the Court made an unusual appearance. None the less it is quite clear that the Government proposals have failed to secure support even among their own followers, and very little more is likely to be heard of Lord Cave's suggestions. Liberalism standing on its own historic ground and attacking the position of Privilege has achieved one more victory for the people of this country.

BEAUCHAMP.

THE LIBERAL REVIVAL.

OF the five most recent elections Liberals have won three. In the fourth they were beaten by less than two hundred, and their poll increased considerably. In the fifth, though third in the poll, they alone increased their vote. Such encouragement was badly needed, but surely is the harbinger of greater and wider success. Ever since the armistice Liberalism, by which I mean a continuous, reasoned, and gradual advance to betterment in all humanistic interests, has been in great peril. On the one hand the social and economic hardships endured in ordinary life by the rank and file of the Allied European armies and revealed to each other during their four years of association was in strong contrast to that of overseas contingents drawn from a world where class distinctions did not exist, and natural resources were still largely virgin. Those who had suffered listened eagerly to those who knew nothing of such sufferings, and on their discharge engaged with enthusiasm in any and every attempt to rid themselves of a social system which seemed to be the cause of the extremes of luxury and poverty. Over a great part of Europe such attempts were made, and many of them were temporarily successful, to realise a new system of life and social relationship. Necessarily, perhaps, these revolts against custom and tradition were often accompanied by cruelty inflicted and hardships endured, as well as by the formation of strange political and social relations. These have still to stand the strain of economic failure or distress.

On the other hand, the enthusiasm which lighted up the supposed avenues to new human happiness cast deep shadows on the minds of those who derived their wealth, or livelihood, or social position from the existing state of society. Alarmed by the social chaos and economic ruin caused by the revolution in Russia, their indifference to the new hopes quickly changed to alarm and hostility, which was enhanced by the reproduction in Hungary, in lower colours no doubt, of similar excesses. The conservatism innate in most peoples was reinforced by the timidity and scepticism of the many who sympathise with suffering and desire improvement as long as it costs them no effort, involves them in no danger or even hazard. To all such, as well as to the reformers, there seemed no room for moderate councils and for moderating influences in the turmoil of change and resistance, in the clash of civil war between authority and revolt, in the strife of have and have-not. We can hardly blame any who held such opinions, wrong though we knew them to be, and injurious as everyone is now finding them to have been. In Great Britain they were made manifest by the practical effacement of the Liberal Parliamentary Party, whose numbers were rendered

negligible, and whose influence was almost extinguished. Their short-lived resuscitation in 1923 was due far more to the economic refusal of the electorate to accept Mr. Baldwin's remedy of Protection as against unemployment, than to its political acceptance of the Liberal leader or programme. The inability of the party to understand this phenomenon, and their refusal to recognise it, led first to their instalment of a Labour Government, secondly to the insolence with which they were treated by that Government, and thirdly to their practical elimination at the election of 1924. The open renewal of their internal differences accentuated their impotence in the House of Commons. Their survival and relative importance in the Lords is an ironic reminder of the history of the party in 1790-1830.

It was not until the apparent transfer of direction and control from Mr. Baldwin to the Home Secretary and Lord Birkenhead, culminating in the three successive deficits of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the country made up its mind to a change of government no matter of what other complexion. Several synchronous events gave an opening at this juncture to a revival of Liberalism which before had seemed neither desirable nor perhaps possible. Lord Oxford's ill-health led to his withdrawal from active politics and the party controversies which had centred round his name began to lose force and to subside. Sir Herbert Samuel shortly after the completion of the Palestine governorship had accepted the Chairmanship of the Coal Commission. The subsequent Report is generally believed to have been mainly his work. Its moderation, scope, and practicability re-established his reputation with the public. The promise of the Government to implement the terms of the Report, and their subsequent failure to do so, was only matched in public opinion by the failure of the miners' leaders, at the end of the great strike which they had themselves engineered, to secure for their followers either wages or conditions as good as the Report envisaged. The Government and Trade Union leaders alike lost ground, the author of the Report gained credit for himself and the party to which he declared himself still firmly attached.

The selection of Sir Herbert Samuel as Chairman of the new Organising Committee of the Liberal Party was subsequently made, not only with the approval of the whole party, but in accordance with general expectation and assent. All felt that the machine would be efficiently handled by one who had shown himself to be a good departmental administrator at the Home Office, in Parliament, and in Palestine. An impartial selection of candidates could well be made by one whose absence from England during party squabbles had left him free from all personal equations, while parliamentary experience and distinction gave authority where it was badly needed.

It was, indeed, a further piece of good fortune that a parliamentary vacancy at Leith gave an immediate opening wherewith to test the efficiency of the new organisation and the confidence of the party in its reunited power. The withdrawal of Wedgwood Benn from Parliament and his resignation from Liberal association had been and is a matter of sincere regret to us all. His cheerful good temper in adversity, his wit and assiduity were all assets to the party in and out of Parliament; and the transfer of his allegiance to Labour was regarded with very different feeling from the loss of others who could be named. In reality he never did a greater service to Liberalism than in fixing the date of his resignation. That resignation gave Leith the opportunity of showing Mr. Benn that, much as it undoubtedly liked him, it loved Liberalism more. Leith showed the path, and set the pace to Southwark, and Southwark lit the lamp for Bosworth. Though the fiery torch was not fully responded to at Westbury or at Brixton, yet a substantial increase in Liberal votes at both elections gives us reason to believe that the fire is still spreading, and the country will soon be ablaze. It is then well worth our while to analyse the reasons which are influencing the minds and actions of the millions of voters who now form the electorate of the country: why they are dissatisfied with the present Government, what do they want for themselves, and how do they think the country should be governed? It is not, I believe, a difficult task to give an accurate and impartial answer to each of these questions.

The electors are discontented because this Government, like every other Government, have raised hopes of betterment of trade and employment which they have not fulfilled, because they have been quite unusually extravagant in public expenditure, and because their lack of skill and want of prevision have involved the nation in the greatest industrial dispute ever known to us. Their faults have been magnified by a promise of "square dealing" which was followed not by fruitful and impartial intervention, but by the introduction and passage of a measure which the bulk of Trade Unionists regard as a blow levelled at the heart of organised Labour. Their misdemeanours have not been lessened by the payment, before the dispute, of a vast subsidy to both disputants, which prolonged the cessation of work, and disorganised the public finance. The Government have suffered therefore from the controversies they have failed to allay as well as from those they have needlessly provoked. They have grievously misunderstood the temper of the world, national or international. They have not, indeed, been afraid of striking out new lines, but these new lines are far more in accord with the temper of 1920 than with the atmosphere of 1927.

Abroad the password is Geneva, and the countersign Locarno,

but when the curtain is lifted the negotiators are apparently seen to be busy on something suspiciously like the Balance of Power. The fault, of course, is not all theirs, but a strong and determined lead at the beginning of their reign would almost certainly have produced a quieter temper in European Governments than is apparent to-day. For a very strange development of national desire has shown itself on the Continent. In many countries dictators are enthroned because their citizens are wearied at the attempts of politicians to entrench themselves, their friends, and their views in permanent power regardless of the real interests of their country. Sometimes as in Russia or in Spain the dictator dispenses with parliamentary forms, sometimes as in Italy or in Portugal he is half draped by them, sometimes as in Germany, or perhaps in Hungary, a republican government is in office, not because most Germans or Hungarians are republicans, but because a monarchist ascendancy would certainly cause disturbance. France is governed through, and by, the same feeling. The peoples want peace and stability and public economy, and they will get it how they can. The method matters nothing, the result is all important.

Here the Government have misinterpreted the election of 1924, just as Liberals did that of 1923. The vast majority of 1924 was due partly to a very fortunate allocation of votes cast, but mainly to a fear of Labour extremists and possible experiments, and not at all to admiration of an Administration which the electorate had repudiated twelve months before. In the earlier part of 1925, Mr. Baldwin seems to have realised this, but of late the Government, having lost its balance, is using an unreal and now evaporating majority to propose and pass legislation which shall enable them permanently to disarm their opponents. There is, of course, no question of their power to do so with all legality. The present majority in the Commons is obedient, the permanent majority in the Lords is subservient. By their means the enactment of the Trade Unions Bill is assured, but while its introduction has not aroused that display of proletariat anger on which the Labour Party had relied, it is highly significant that at every subsequent election (save the Scottish Universities) Government votes have diminished. The anti-Government vote has more than correspondingly increased and seats have been lost as well as votes. Notwithstanding such adverse expressions of opinion, the Trade Unions Bill has been followed by an official statement that Reform of the House of Lords is to be taken up in a manner which will at once nullify the Parliament Act, and prevent its future re-enactment. This statement and its reception by the Press and the constituencies has been so little friendly that a halt has apparently been called while consultations are being

held. Official approbation of the Government proposals has meantime been afforded by the Central Conservative Council.

We then are well entitled to examine these proposals as they have already been formulated, and as they reveal the Conservative mind. First and foremost the hereditary element is to be continued, and to predominate perpetually, in a House which can never again be enlarged. There are to be representatives, not of religion generally, but of the Established Church alone and of the Bishops in particular. There are to be Law Lords and Royal Princes, classes which to an ordinary mind seem especially debarred from expressing political opinions. Finally, there are to be members nominated by the Government of the day, some of whom are to represent political opinion other than that of the Government itself. It is obvious that here are far-reaching changes indeed. The King's prerogative of creating peers whom he summons automatically to Parliament disappears—and with it goes a Prime Minister's power of forcing, with the Sovereign's assent, through a recalcitrant chamber, measures which he regards as of vital importance. Such representation as is, half contemptuously, accorded to Liberal and Labour opinion will depend on a Conservative ministry's opinion of the desirability of the individual Liberals' or Socialists' presence. The opposition so nominated might be deliberately kept as weak as possible. The power of Speakers of the Commons to decide as to money bills is to be abrogated, and the veto upon the imposition of rates is to be restored.

The Parliament Act is by the formal declaration of its authors, the Liberal Government of 1910, admittedly incomplete, and completion is long overdue. I myself am of opinion that in a State where political parties are very highly organised and transference of support in Parliament by members is practically impossible, and where no written Constitution exists which a Supreme Court of Law prevents a Government overstepping, a strong Second Chamber is an absolute necessity. But to command authority such a Second Chamber must exhibit a responsible origin, and a strict impartiality of criticism. No one can pretend that the Lords if "reformed" on the lines proposed can conform to either condition. The changes to be made would leave control of the future Second Chamber to the hereditary element therein, an element which for a century has been increasingly reactionary. Such control subordinates the elected to the non-elected Chamber, it reduces the British House of Commons in the twentieth century to a position little different from that of the Irish House of Commons in the eighteenth century. That assembly was at liberty to pass any legislation it liked, but its enactments had no validity until they had been ratified by the Privy Council, of which the House of Lords had complete control. An armed revolt in Ireland was the only way by which the Irish House

of Commons shook itself free from this restriction. The precedent may be followed in England from below if the necessity has been created from above. Ex-Lord Chancellors in 1927 can be as eloquent, as fiery, as masterful as ex-Lord Chancellors in 1827 and in 1730, and yet may be found to be as dangerous and short-sighted advisers as history now recognises their predecessors to have been. An oligarchical buffer between a static and a progressive society cannot endure. It can only be a dam strong enough to gather the waters into a flood, which when it breaks through lays the whole country in ruins.

As regards Labour, the leaders apparently want a weak Second Chamber, but what the leaders acclaim to-day the authoritative back benchers repudiate to-morrow. These same back benchers have made their view quite clear. When, if ever, their turn for Government again comes, there must be no delay between enactment of legislation by the Commons and confirmation by the Sovereign. A bare majority of the Commons are to be supreme under Labour, just as a bare majority in the Lords are to be supreme under Conservatism. The former would depend for its orders on the wishes of the Trade Union Congress, and the latter would receive its instructions at the Carlton Club. It is as well to remember that this is no fanciful picture of a possible future. It is merely a reminder of a quite recent past.

We, who are above all things a party created by parliamentary institutions and dependent for our life on their continuance, cannot but hope that the bulk of the people of this country share our belief in constitutional government by a freely elected First Chamber drawing its authority from the electorate alone, but assisted by the impartial revision of a Second Chamber truly representative of all interests in the community. If our convictions are so shared by our countrymen and women, now indeed is the opportunity for Liberalism. The issue has been deliberately reopened. The challenge can only be taken up by ourselves. Our past declarations justify and enforce upon us an immediate engagement, and the result should not be doubtful.

I served myself upon the Bryce Committee which considered all possible kinds of Second Chamber. There was a general desire to set up a revising body which should be representative of general opinion, should enjoy a continuous corporate existence with a fairly lengthy tenure of individual membership, and by combined experience and authority keep a check on too reactionary as well as on too revolutionary legislation enacted by the House of Commons. The means of arriving at such a result were divergent. I was one of a small minority of two or three who thought that direct election in large constituencies would provide members of adequate character

and calibre who would escape local intrigue and personal canvassing. A vote being taken at the beginning of our inquiry, our colleagues overbore us. Had it been postponed till the end I have good reason for thinking that we should have had a considerable majority. For there was found to be no reality, no substance, no longevity in any other system. Fancy franchises of royal descent, legal position, dogmatic belief, hereditary social position, are a frail barrier against popular passion, violently but temporarily agitated. They may, they probably will, provide serviceable, and even brilliant, legislative talent in individual cases. But all modern Second Chambers save two lead a precarious and uneasy life. In most instances, as in Canada, their life is only prolonged because the incoming Minister knows that as vacancies arise he will be able to make things as unpleasant for his successor as they have been for himself. Only in the U.S.A. and in France is the Senate respected, powerful, useful, and elected. The former is directly, the second indirectly chosen, but because they are chosen, not self-selected, nor nominated, still less hereditary, they function with the minimum of friction and intervene with the maximum of benefit.

I should like in conclusion to turn for a moment to the Trade Unions Bill. The Government contention that they do not wish or intend to destroy Trade Unionism is probably true. What they desire is to emasculate it. The Socialists, who are bent on making organised Labour the dominant power in the State, resent the Bill as an obstacle to their plan of making such Labour subordinate to their political control and subservient to their political ambitions.

Liberals believe that neither the impotence nor the autocracy of organised Labour can be of advantage to the State. The inventive power of man wresting from nature her minerals and her secrets, designs and completes vast constructive enterprises dependent upon innumerable trades employing thousands of workmen. To finance such undertakings banks are amalgamated, industrial and commercial firms are combined. A corresponding combination of workmen of necessity arises, and in the interests of the employers as well as of employed a standardisation of working conditions must be reached. When the bargain is struck some one on both sides must be able to give an authoritative assurance that the bargain will be kept. This can only be done when discipline prevails, and it will not prevail unless penalties can be imposed and be enforced.

To destroy the authority of Trade Union leadership would be to provoke chaos in industry. We should utilise rather their power and influence for the extension of commerce by recognising and legalising them. There is far less difference between the personnel of capital and labour than is generally known. A great firm the other day stated that it had 42,000 workmen and 35,000 shareholders.

Mr. Runciman has given figures showing that 1,800 millions of capital is distributed amongst 15 million owners. There is, of course, duplication of ownership, but is it really much of an exaggeration to say that the employees own the ships, the banks, the railways, and the shops which their masters exploit for mutual benefit? As taxation progressively redistributes wealth, and as owner, employer, and employed become indistinguishable, capital will recognise the necessity for authoritative Labour spokesmen, and Labour will have learnt the lesson of the responsibility of power. It is the function of Liberalism to teach both sides simultaneously their duty to the country. It is the opportunity of Liberalism that neither side has yet learnt that the alternation of power is disastrous, and the simultaneity of its responsible exercise can alone restore health to trade and commerce.

Of education, of housing, of agriculture, of economy, much could be written. Until peace in industry at home permits its expansion, and understanding of the other man's requirements distributes its profits equitably, the national exchequer will be unequal to the calls upon it for such social requirements. But moderation in political strife, which has too long been silent, has now effectually broken that silence, and by her return to prominence on the stage of Westminster we may hope for an era of domestic peace, which is the prelude to public economy and through economy ultimately to reform.

CHARLES HOBHOUSE.

THE SITUATION IN ROUMANIA.*

WITHOUT taking too seriously the perversely naïve conviction of the Bolshevik Government that Britain, in conjunction with Poland, is plotting war upon Russia, we may admit that since the Anglo-Soviet rupture the position both internal and external of Russia's two Western neighbours, Poland and Roumania, has acquired additional importance in the eyes of the West. Since Marshal Pilsudski's *coup d'état* in May, 1926, conditions in Poland have markedly improved. But in Roumania the situation is obscure and difficult and deserves close attention. Those who know it most intimately are the first to describe it as extraordinarily incalculable and to be prepared for sudden surprises.

The time has come to point out quite frankly that the chief elements of uncertainty are King Ferdinand's grave state of health and the difficulties which surround the succession to the throne. The hard fact which underlay the fall of the Averescu Government was the fear of the Liberals lest an elderly General with mildly Fascist leanings and confused ideas in foreign policy should find himself in power at the moment of the King's death and should use that power to establish a virtual dictatorship. The misdeeds of previous Governments had come home to roost. General Averescu obtained the Premiership in the spring of 1926 because it was assumed that he would serve as a convenient stopgap for the Liberals, who had lost all popularity in four years of office, and that Mr. Bratianu would continue to control affairs from the background. But Averescu and his chief lieutenant, Mr. Goga, as Minister of the Interior, had learnt all too well the Liberal methods of "making" elections: and having stamped a huge artificial majority out of the ground and thus having a subservient Parliament at their back, proceeded to develop an independent policy. Last April, when the King's illness was complicated by pneumonia and his recovery was not expected, General Averescu went a stage farther and was concerting measures which would give him exclusive control at the critical moment. All the prefects received confidential instructions, by which, as soon as news of the King's death should reach them, they were without delay to transfer their authority to the nearest commanding officers in their districts. But the secret was betrayed to the Liberals, who took care that it should come to the ears of the King: and he at once made it clear that the Premier no longer possessed his confidence, and that an attempt should be made to form a "national government" of concentration, on lines somewhat similar to that which was so successfully formed in France during the "Crisis of the Franc." But

* This article was in type before the news of the death of the King of Roumania reached London.

while there can be little doubt that the King's own motive was genuine concern for his country's future and that his decision represented a real effort of will for one in such precarious health, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that most of the party leaders merely looked upon "the national government" as a convenient phrase to cover their own ambitious designs.

Averescu naturally had no desire to share office with his Liberal rivals, who on their side acted on the scarcely veiled principle, "*Ot  toi que je m'y mette*": while the National Peasant Party, after bitter past experience, could hardly be blamed for regarding the proposed co-operation as a trap for the unwary. But the King's wishes could not be ignored, however much he might be suspected of acting under Liberal influence. Averescu, therefore, went through the solemn farce of proposing that he himself should form a "national government," and for the moment this suggestion had to be accepted, since no one could pretend that the leader of what was at the moment numerically much the strongest party, was not qualified for membership in a government "of all the talents." But in reality his exclusion was just what all his rivals most wanted: and when he invited the leaders of all the various parties and groups to meet in committee and discuss the best means of co-operation, they took full advantage of this tactical blunder. At the appointed hour the only persons who put in an appearance were Mr. Cuza, the anti-Semite leader—a fanatic who has done much mischief in recent years, but who as a politician can hardly be taken seriously—and Mr. Iorga, the distinguished historian, who has latterly been the chief of a small isolated group. The Liberal and National Peasant leaders were conspicuous by their absence, and the project thus ended in farce.

It was next proposed that in the new Cabinet all leaders of the front rank should stand aside and only send their delegates. General Averescu could not help seeing through so transparent a man  uvre, and made one last attempt to convince the King that the existing Government was quite satisfactory and need not be changed. But all to no effect. A memorandum in these terms was left at the royal hunting lodge in Scrobistea: but within a few hours the Minister of the Court, Mr. Hiott, presented the Premier with a document bearing the royal signature and nominating Prince Barbu Stirbei as his successor, and formally requested him to countersign what was in effect his own resignation. For while Averescu was still irresolute, the Court and the Liberal chiefs had acted, and it was decided that the best solution would be a "neutral" cabinet, in which Bratianu, Averescu, Maniu, and Vaida all alike held aloof and left their parties to be represented by persons of secondary importance, under a Premier who had no direct party ties. Stirbei fulfilled this condition admirably. As an intimate friend of the Royal Family, he had

worked for years behind the political *coulisses*, without ever exposing himself in public: on the other hand, as brother-in-law of the Bratianus, he was eminently acceptable to those who were really pulling the strings of the whole action.

Faced with so sudden a decision, General Averescu signed and fell from power. Whether he was seriously contemplating a *coup d'  tat* and lacked the necessary resolution at the end, or whether his enemies have libelled him in order to hasten his ruin, is still regarded by some as an open question. Certain it is that those about the new Premier reckoned with such possibilities, and were in such haste to secure the reins of office that they were afraid to leave their predecessors in power even during the few hours required for negotiation between the various eligible groups. At the time many well-informed persons in Bucarest believed that Averescu was on the point of issuing warrants for the arrest of Bratianu and other party leaders: and there is no doubt that the new Premier, with more than half the portfolios in his gift still unfilled, sent some of his friends to take over and hold through the night the all-important Ministries of War, Interior and Finance, and only proceeded next day to discuss with the National Peasant Party the terms of their inclusion in the Government. By the evening of June 6th he had composed a not unsatisfactory Cabinet of Liberals and National Peasants, supplemented by a few individuals such as Mr. Argetoianu and Mr. Lupu, whose political influence is greater than their lack of following might suggest. No time was wasted. Parliament was at once dissolved, and new elections were ordered for July 7th.

At first it was widely believed, even among the initiated, that the new Government represented a genuine effort, on the part of both the Premier and the King, to secure co-operation between the two chief political elements in the State—the Liberal and National Peasant parties. Events have abundantly proved that only these two parties really count, and that Roumania is nearer to a revival of the two-party system than any other continental country. It is generally admitted that the People's Party, as created by General Averescu, having no root in the electorate and only representing a few individuals like the General himself in the old kingdom and Mr. Goga in Transylvania, could be virtually wiped out, if the corrupt weapons to which it owed its majority were turned against itself. Again, it is generally admitted that the National Peasants—representing the old radical nationalism of pre-war Transylvania and the young emancipated peasant democracy of the old kingdom—would carry all before them, if absolutely free elections were to be held. But it is also recognised by most impartial observers that the Liberal Party, though unpopular among the masses, has a great tradition behind it, has the most experienced and resourceful leaders in a

situation none too rich in political talent, and is the chief steadying influence at a moment of uncertainty when conservative tactics are essential alike in home and foreign policy. The war and agrarian reform destroyed the old Conservative boyar party, and its place has been taken by the Liberals, who have found a substitute for the landed interests by concentrating urban, financial, and industrial interests so far as possible in their own hands.

If this be an accurate estimate of the three parties, it follows that a coalition between the Liberals and the "Tsaranists" would have almost the entire country behind it—the more so as such small fractions as remained outside the big parties, and notably the Magyar and German minorities, would (perhaps almost necessarily) have also given their adhesion. And, indeed, for a short time it seemed as though such a combination was genuinely desired both by the Court and by the real makers of the *coup*, as tending to distribute as widely as possible the responsibility for the very delicate situation which is bound to follow a change on the throne. But the surprising ease with which General Averescu's regime was overthrown rendered the Liberal chiefs sanguine, not to say arrogant. The Tsaranists, who at the moment of crisis seemed essential allies because they were known to have the backing of the masses, very soon became embarrassing rivals, because of their democratic programme, and above all, their demand for "clean elections." The reasonable Tsaranists on their side realised that their negative attitude in recent years had injured their prestige, that this was not the right moment for insisting on a radical fulfilment of their programme, but on the contrary, one for disproving to the Crown the anti-dynastic tendencies so often laid to their charge; and further, that they must be prepared to forego the full advantages of their own popularity in the country, and for the sake of a political "Freuga Dei" must leave to the Liberals many more seats than would fall to them, if all official pressure on the electors were removed. In a word, they recognised that the existing franchise—with the semi-Fascist arrangement assigning a surplus to those who obtain 40 per cent. of the votes and then deliberately penalise the minority vote—was on this occasion the chief obstacle to agreement, since narrowly Liberal interests and really free elections were incompatible.

Hence an electoral cartel was inevitable, and to this the Transylvanians and Tsaranists consented, because they accepted at their face value the arguments in favour of a national government put forward in the name of the King. But it soon transpired that Mr. Bratianu's idea of a cartel was that the Liberals should assign to their Tsaranist allies 100—or at most 110—seats out of a total of 387, and that the selection of individual Tsaranists for Cabinet rank should lie in the hands, not of their own leaders, but of Bratianu himself.

On this basis agreement was manifestly impossible, and the brief farce of the Stirbei Government was ended, when Bratianu ordered the Liberal ministers to resign. For it at once became apparent that Stirbei lacked either the will or the strength to test the real feelings of the country by free elections, and had simply been acting as a stop-gap for his brother-in-law. He now resigned, and on June 21st the King entrusted Mr. Ionel Bratianu with the formation of a purely Liberal Cabinet. The Liberals were thus free to make elections according to their own approved methods, and in due course secured 75 per cent. of the seats. They are thus entrenched once more in office, and apparently ready after all to assume sole responsibility for the impending dynastic crisis. It remains to be seen how long they will be able to control the popular forces which they have yet again contrived to muzzle.

In one sense the situation is now clearer. There are only two parties that really count—the "Liberals," who have replaced the old Tories, and the "National Peasants," of whom the Transylvanian wing may be described as Liberals and their peasant allies of the Old Kingdom as Radicals. It undoubtedly committed several prime blunders in the last few years—notably in refusing, out of pique towards the Liberals, to attend King Ferdinand's coronation, and latterly in its attitude towards Prince Carol. But in the recent crisis it has proved its readiness to co-operate in constructive work, has regained much of the ground it had lost in public opinion and has restated its programme on admirably sane lines. It remains to be seen how much longer it can be excluded from power by Camarilla methods.

This record of political intrigue is presented, not for its own sake, but as illustrating the utterly artificial basis of Roumanian political life. The war brought three fundamental changes—national unity, land reform, and universal suffrage. Of these, the first has raised Roumania from a minor to a secondary power in Europe, ranking immediately after Poland and Spain; the second, by satisfying the land hunger of the peasant, has removed all danger of a revolution from below and rendered Roumania immune from Bolshevism, despite the proximity of Russia; the third has provided the nation with the means of democratic self-expression. But a franchise is of very little use until the electors have acquired the necessary political experience: and the party leaders, with the connivance of the Crown, were not slow to adopt the new instrument to their own ends. The general elections of 1922, of 1926 and now of 1927, have been shameful travesties of the popular will, and the methods employed completely throw into the shade the worst elections of the old Hungarian regime in Transylvania. Those who overthrew General Averescu, ostensibly to prevent a dictatorship, and with professions

of legality on their lips, will do well to reflect whether they are not themselves undermining all faith in constitutional and parliamentary government, and whether such tactics can be repeated without establishing what would be a dictatorship in all but name.

This, however, really depends on what may be called the great note of interrogation in Roumanian politics to-day. Under the constitution the initiative for the nomination or dismissal of ministers lies with the Crown, and during the thirteen years of his reign King Ferdinand has four times exercised this latter power in the most drastic manner—in 1918, when the collapse of Germany enabled Roumania to undo the Treaty of Bucarest and the Germanophil Marghiloman Cabinet was replaced by Bratianu and Take Ionescu; in 1921, when the Transylvanian leader, Dr. Vaida, was dismissed by telegram at the very moment when he was absent in London engaged on highly successful negotiations with the Entente; and in 1922 and 1927, when General Averescu was twice driven from office to make way for the Liberals. On the first occasion an utterly abnormal situation obviously had to be met by abnormal measures: but on the other three, though the legality of the royal act could not be questioned, the spirit of the constitution was strained to breaking point and the whole prestige of the Crown was staked. What will happen when the initiative lies, not with King Ferdinand I.—whose name is linked for ever with the crowning achievement of Roumanian unity—but with Regents lacking in personal prestige and acting in the name of a boy born in 1922? Is it conceivable that they will ever dare to take such drastic action? Is it not far more probable that during the long minority the initiative of the Crown will come to lie with the Premier (or whoever is the strong man in a particular Cabinet), and that long before King Michael reaches an age for ripe political action, the change will have become irrevocable? Believers in constitutional and democratic government will be apt to regard this as a blessing in disguise, but, of course, only on the assumption that future Cabinets genuinely represent the wishes of the majority, and do not rest upon a faked franchise.

Meanwhile, it is useless to disguise the fact that the prospect of a Regency—and for a period which cannot end sooner than 1940, even if the young king comes of age at 18—is viewed with apprehension in many quarters and is nowhere popular. This is not merely due to the motley composition of the Regency*—for that can be changed, and, indeed, may be changed before the necessity arises—but to scepticism as to its durability so long as an alterna-

* Prince Nicholas, who only left Eton four years ago, has no political ideas or experience and is mainly interested in motor cars; the Patriarch, who has unhappily lost the prestige which ought to attach to his high office; and Mr. Busegan, Judge of the Supreme Court, who is a very eminent jurist and a man of spotless reputation, but has never played any part in politics.

tive exists in the person of the boy's father. No one in Roumania has any illusions left as to Prince Carol—I have heard very eminent Roumanians describe his behaviour as that of a traitor to his dynasty and to his country. But that does not prevent many people from regarding his eventual return as inevitable, even while admitting that it would probably bring speedy ruin upon the monarchical idea. The scandals associated with Prince Carol are far more than the escapades of an exuberant youth. The effrontery with which he insisted, last spring, that he should not merely bring back Madame Lupescu with him, but that his outraged and blameless wife, Crown Princess Helen, should simultaneously be expelled from the country, is in itself enough to prove him to be completely lacking both in balance and in those moral qualities without which royalty cannot stand the strain of modern conditions.

It is unnecessary to point out that legitimist principles have no hold upon the Balkans, and that thrones are regarded from a purely utilitarian angle. At a time when the Obrenovitch rulers of Serbia were compromising their country before Europe by their unprincipled behaviour, Roumania acquired corresponding prestige from the model Court of King Charles and "Carmen Sylva." It is not either to Roumania's interest or to the interest of the monarchical idea in Europe that the throne of King Charles and King Ferdinand should be filled by a new and inferior edition of King Milan. Everyone must regret the cruel necessity that forced King Ferdinand to proclaim his heir's exclusion from the succession; but it is difficult to question the wisdom of his decision. The Regency is not a satisfactory solution, but it is a lesser evil than the possible alternatives, namely, the accession of Carol or a military "Putsch," or the proclamation of a Republic; and it is to be hoped that the statesmen of Roumania will from the first set their minds to the crucial problem of educating the young Prince Michael to be worthy of that most exacting of all professions, the profession of a King.

Enough has been said to indicate how complex and how incalculable are the problems which face the new Bratianu Ministry. In one respect at least—namely, in foreign policy—its advent may be greeted without reserve, as making for stability. One of the contributory causes of General Averescu's fall was the alarm which his flirtation with Fascist Italy has aroused, and the intense annoyance of Roumanian public opinion when that flirtation was so promptly followed by Signor Mussolini's rapprochement with Hungary. Mr. Bratianu, on the other hand—however intransigent he may have been as his country's chief delegate to the Peace Conference—stands irrevocably committed to the Paris settlement (and, of course, especially to Trianon and Neuilly), to friend-

ship with France and to the consolidation of the Little Entente as a prime factor of central European policy. So long as he is in power there is not the slightest danger of any reversal or modification of this policy with its corollaries, the defensive alliance with Poland and a maximum of reserve towards Soviet Russia. Moreover, the selection of Mr. Titulescu—a disciple of the late Mr. Take Ionescu and, for the last five years, Roumanian Minister in London—as Foreign Minister is a guarantee that this policy will be interpreted in a conciliatory and pacific manner, in full accord with the principles of Geneva, where he is a familiar and sympathetic figure. In home politics he does not belong to the Liberal party, and, indeed, is identified with a financial policy which differs widely from the distinctly xenophobe and ultra-protectionist methods pursued by Mr. Vintila Bratianu as Finance Minister from 1922 to 1926. It is therefore hoped by many that his acceptance of office means that the Liberals are about to tone down their exaggerated economic policy, and also that once their majority is assured to them, they do not wish to push matters to extremes, and would even like to come to terms with their "Tsaranist" rivals, to tide over the anxious period of the Regency's assumption of power. Unfortunately, experience has shown that they are not ready to treat on terms of equality. In any case, it is clear that Mr. Titulescu, after deliberately keeping away from party politics for nearly six years, would hardly have entered them now unless the King had made an irresistible appeal for his help, and unless Mr. Bratianu had offered some assurances of moderation. And it is sincerely to be hoped that the influence of one of the very few statesmen who is trusted by all schools of thought, will not be squandered prematurely. For even if, as is to be feared, it is too late for him to produce a compromise between the two main parties, he may in the near future be required to fill the part of a political "Highest Common Factor."

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

THE INDIAN POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE.

ONE of the things which most strongly impressed me during my term of office as Secretary of State for India was the consistently partial and, in effect, misleading character of the information habitually purveyed to the British public with regard to Indian politics. I still continue to receive the like impression, comparing the aspect in which the facts of the political atmosphere are presented by the Indian correspondents of our newspapers as well as by Ministerial spokesmen in Parliament, with the actual state of the case as accessible to any constant reader of Indian journals and reports of public debates and through the unanimous testimony of Indian visitors to this country of responsible position and character.

The effect of this partiality and incompleteness is, whether intentionally or not on the part of those responsible, to diffuse a shallow and mistaken complacency in regard to the expediency of giving early consideration to the shaping of a statesmanlike course towards further constitutional reform, and a disposition to procrastination. This is observed by Indians, who suspect the British Press, as a whole, of bias against the Nationalist cause; and at best cannot fail to impute ignorance and prejudice to the British community who are fed with this imperfect information.

Complaint cannot reasonably be made on account of reserve and lack of precision in the utterances of Lord Birkenhead and Lord Winterton. They are not purveyors of news—they are the administrators of a Conservative policy, and are discreet, from their point of view, not to go any further than they are obliged towards raising expectations of action, or in any way to indicate any prejudgment of questions which Parliament has prescribed to be dealt with by the Commission provided for by the Government of India Act. But my feeling about the attitude of the Press, whose business it is to purvey news, was reinforced lately by two long special articles in *The Times* from its Delhi correspondent, purporting to review the present significance of the balance of opinion in India. These articles were conspicuous for the judicious nullity with which they succeeded in filling three large-print columns. The only marked character they exhibited was one of tendentious suggestion that there is no need for British opinion to be in any hurry to trouble itself about the future of the Indian constitution, more especially now that Communal friction has developed between Hindus and Moslems.

In this article I can only deal with one of the aspects in regard to which the facts of the Indian political situation are habitually burked by Press commentators. There is resolute obscurantism with regard to the results of experience in the working of the Provincial Councils created under the Montagu-Chelmsford Dyarchy Scheme. This ex-

perience was carefully examined in 1924-25 by a Committee under the able chairmanship of Sir Alexander Muddiman, Secretary for Home Affairs in the Indian Government. The best that the official members could say for the constitution may be summed up in Sir W. Marris's phrase, which *The Times* correspondent quoted, that it was working, but working "creakily," rather indicating that all that is required might be a slight lubrication of that constitution, and that if it had been worked with good will there would have been no "creaking." The unofficial members of the Committee and the great majority of the witnesses who were examined by it convincingly pointed out inherent defects which had rendered it impossible to regard that constitution as an experimental school for Parliamentary Government, which is precisely the character in which most people in England are led to suppose it was meant to be regarded. It is not honest to represent or to allow it to be believed that that Committee's findings amounted to anything less than a proof that the Provincial Dyarchy system was not suitable for the purpose thus conceived of, and cannot be allowed to remain in operation after its ten years' term expires consistently with any reputation for good faith on the part of the British Government. I have little doubt that Lord Birkenhead and the Indian Government recognise this; but the pretence is blandly maintained that there was not very much wrong with that constitution, that if it had been given a fair trial there would have been no cause for complaint, and that Indians have not given it a fair trial and are therefore responsible for any failure alleged.

This part of the critical attitude which is professed or allowed to remain accepted on behalf of the present Government, and which is constantly inculcated by commentators in our Press, is mischievously misleading. It is notorious that in the first Council-period the new constitution had the best possible chance of being used for effective work that friendly co-operation could have given it, because the non-co-operators abstained from Council-entry and the men elected were really sifted out as politicians who were prepared to co-operate. And within the possibilities of the situation they actually did a substantial amount of good work. It is true that the constructive policies of the Ministers were hampered by lack of funds: and doubtless, had more money been available, the new constitution might have acquired less discredit. But those who refer to this consideration in extenuation of complaints made of it, would be very far wrong in assuming that either those co-operators who went into the Councils, or the non-co-operators who stayed out, or the Swarajists who went into the Councils in 1923, or the responsive co-operators who went into the Councils who have gone in on the last elections and conditional co-operators satisfied with the Dyarchical constitution provided the Ministers of the transferred departments had had enough money to spend:

because the sorest point about finance really is that so long as finance is a purely official subject ministerial responsibility is illusory.

The "Statutory Commission" to be appointed not later than 1929 is expected to form a judgment whether Indian politicians have shown themselves capable of being entrusted with further responsibility, or deserving of that indulgence by amiable and responsive co-operation with the Government in working the Dyarchical constitution. The demand that they should have satisfied such a test is galling to Indian reformers, who claim self-government as a right, not as a concession to submissive behaviour. Mr. MacDonald, Colonel Wedgwood, I myself, and other Labour Party supporters of the Indian National Movement, have not minced our words in criticising the futile tactics of the Swarajist Party in their attack on the constitution: but those tactics form no demonstration of incapacity for public administration, which is a different thing from political campaigning. And although public-spirited Indians might have been better advised to make the best of a bad job by entering and taking office in the Councils, their doing so would have often placed them in unsatisfactory and even humiliating positions, to which they might well say it was not worth their while to expose themselves. For the fact which is of most importance about the Dyarchy is that an elected member, by accepting Ministerial office, both accepts responsibility, or at least has it imputed to him, for things for which he is not responsible, and becomes identified with the Government, and therefore exposed to the criticism of his own Party members, who are elected and must necessarily under present conditions act as an Opposition. How could co-operation and responsible Party leadership be combined in such circumstances?

These considerations I have already tried to make clear in this REVIEW (May, 1925); and quite recently, in addressing a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association, Sir Frederick Whyte, late President of the Indian Legislative Assembly, endorsed and confirmed them. He said:

"Sir William Marris says that the present system reduces the efficiency of Government without developing any sense of direct responsibility in policy: and although he does not draw the conclusion which we must draw from that statement, he points us towards it: that, even at the cost of a change in the efficiency of Government in India you must prosecute the development of the Indian constitution along the lines that have been laid down, and that only by so developing it will further progress be made."

With regard to the question of co-operation Sir Frederick Whyte bore witness that throughout his five years in India

"there was, in the Legislative Assembly, more evidence of co-operation than there was of non-co-operation. I do not mean by that to under-estimate the importance of Gandhi's movement

of non-co-operation, but I think evidence drawn from the character of the non-co-operative movement is hardly valid for the purpose of the test of the Secretary of State; we must look to the behaviour in the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly on occasions when a sense of responsibility was peculiarly needed in order to carry on public policy.

"Now in the first three years of the life of the Legislative Assembly, evidence of a desire to co-operate was always there; and evidence of the failure of non-co-operation to achieve its political purpose—if it had one—accumulated daily. There in the Legislative Assembly you had an Indian opposition face to face with a Government of alien origin, and nevertheless supporting that Government in the imposition of new and highly unpopular taxation to the extent of some thirty-one *crores*. That must be taken as evidence of co-operation, satisfying also the other criterion laid down by the Secretary of State, namely that of responsibility.

"Our view of political co-operation in India has often been obscured by such incidents as the controversy between the Legislative Assembly and the Viceroy over the imposition of the Salt Tax. Now the Salt Tax is politics, not economics, in India. Discussions on taxation proposals in the Legislative Assembly led to disagreement, and there were many disagreements, but on the Salt Tax alone did disagreement compel the Viceroy to exercise the exceptional power he possesses under the Constitution. *Now what appears in the (British) Press about all this is usually the excess of political agitation*, and we must not be diverted from the consideration of the main body of the evidence by the fact that on certain outstanding controversial questions the Legislative body chose to take what may be called an irresponsible part. In the main the Assembly recognised the importance of Indian credit and voted for measures to sustain it.

"On the Legislative side the result varied: but I certainly observed during the five years I was there a progressive increase in the sense of responsibility in which the Legislative Assembly approached questions of public policy. On other issues, such as the executive action of the Government, of course, there were very hot disputes regarding the control of agitation which might eventually lead to crime, but that must always be a bone of contention between the Nationalist Party and a Government owing its sovereignty to an alien source.

"Whereas in other countries the development of what we may call a democratic constitution leads inevitably to the formation of parties based on definite conflicts of social or economic interest, those parties have not arisen in India for this reason—that overshadowing all economic and social problems in India there is the constitutional problem, and until the constitutional problem has reached its eventual form, you will find that political expression is confined to lines of constitutional agitation, and consequently programmes of social and economic reform such as Assemblies elsewhere, inevitably take second place. . . . *You ask for responsibility in the preamble to the Government of India Act, but the manner in which you have given responsibility*

tends to place before those to whom you have given it an object of prior concern, that is, the endeavour to secure greater control over the affairs of their country."

When Lord Birkenhead said in Parliament that it was in his opinion far from being proved that the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution had been a failure, and when Lord Reading on the same occasion spoke warmly of the good work that had been done under it, they may have spoken, in the sense in which their language applied, quite justifiably. But the really relevant point is not whether that constitution has been found workable as a transitional machine for carrying on the government, but in what degree it has served, or can be regarded as having been suited to serve, the purpose which the Government of India Act in its preamble implies that it was intended to afford, of testing the qualifications of Indians for responsible democratic institutions. Indians, as I have said, feel offence at the condition of such a test being prescribed: I do not discuss their feeling: what I wish to emphasise in this connection is rather their contention, which the Muddiman Report and Sir Frederick Whyte justify, that that constitution was not framed so as fairly to afford such a test. When the statutory Commission is appointed, the reference to it will doubtless be framed in accordance with the intention of the Statute, and it would be absurd to volunteer here any argument either as to the considerations to which it should have regard, or as to what should be the future form of the Indian constitution. But I do think it important to call attention to the strong belief which is entertained by many, if not most, Nationalists, that the transitional constitution was intended as a trap and designed to offer a test which it would be easy, if not obligatory, to say had not been satisfied. That any such perfidious intention was entertained by Mr. Montagu or Lord Chelmsford or was imagined by Parliament is, it need hardly be said, unthinkable in this country. But in any case the appeal made by the Munshi Iswar Saran, M.L.A., speaking after Sir Frederick Whyte to the Empire Parliamentary Association, must be admitted reasonable:

"Whatever you do, do not give us any more examinations in India. Those examinations upset us a great deal. We are constantly thinking of the examinations we have to sit at. We have one coming in 1929. Whatever you do, give us a Constitution in which there shall be provision for automatic progress. Do whatever you like—I am not going into the question of what you will or should do—let there be controversy, let there be dispute, but after all that let us settle down to work. If you do not do that, just as, as Sir Frederick has said, all the time we have been anticipating 1929, so we shall begin to anticipate again: we are not going to change our nature in 1929. If you say that in 1939 there shall be another examination, we shall say, let us have the examination now: but if we find that an Act has been passed which makes provision for definite progress, and after all

controversy is settled once and for all, we shall say, 'Here we have got it. Let us settle down and do really solid work'."

Whenever the Statutory Commission is appointed its constitution and the form of reference to it must be such as to give no excuse for any suggestion of a suspicion that it is intended to "plough" its Indian examinee. For there still prevails among the foremost Nationalists of all sections in India an obstinate scepticism as to the sincerity of British statesmanship in its often professed purpose of guiding India into the position of a self-governing Dominion. The causes of this scepticism are many and various; but in so far as the corporate and continuous assurances of British Governments can be regarded as representing the will of this country, it cannot be regarded as warrantable. The purpose has been declared on behalf of all political parties, and all that impedes its progressive achievement is the difficulties involved in the transition to self-governing institutions. Those difficulties, no doubt, may appear more formidable to Conservatives than to Labour or Liberalism. But no intelligent or well-informed man in this country can possibly doubt the good faith in which the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution was set up. The Diehards bewail and denounce it because they know it was genuine and its effects irrevocable. And yet that constitution was pilloried in the manifesto of the Swarajist Party for the elections of 1923 as knowingly intended to secure the continuance of the subjection of India to British exploitation. The charge is intrinsically absurd; and Indian leaders weaken their own power by entertaining such errors.

But it is important to realise why the charge is made. From the point of view of Indian Nationalists the constitution is seen as a fantastic concoction elaborated by academic publicists for the purpose of affording the appearance, without any reality, of an advance towards responsible government. I have pointed out one conspicuous aspect in which it appears illusory; and it is the admitted fact that in those Provinces in which it was used with most comparative success and in the least illusory manner this was only achieved by ignoring the letter and the intentions of the constitution as framed. But the more general aspect in which it is viewed, and very naturally, is this. Here, its framers appear to have said, is a constitution which will allow the (semi-responsible) Ministers of certain departments the appearance of pursuing a popular policy with the support of elected Councils, subject (as said) to limitations of finance over which they have no control, and also so long as the Councils do not vote in a manner which embarrasses the Government. So soon as they do this the Government has the power to take its own course, both in the Dyarchical Provinces and also in the Legislative Assembly. Thus, say Indians, the constitution was framed and has acted

to enable the Government, whenever it considered it necessary, to go on exactly as it had gone on before, executing the policy it determines upon in its bureaucratic conclaves. And if it is not expressly made by the Act a condition of further advance towards a more democratic system that elected persons shall have accommodately and complaisantly interpreted their public duties precisely as the Government desires; that, at any rate, is the impression produced not only by the writings of the publicists of the Diehard Press, but even by the utterances of the Secretary of State himself.

If, on the contrary, there had been a real desire to assist India towards a form of self-government congenial to her temperament, the framing of the constitution would not have been undertaken as Indians allege not unreasonably it was, from the starting point of the necessity to ensure the carrying-on of Indian Government on the lines on which it has been established by British rule, and with the paramount and not dissembled resolve to maintain the Imperial military and bureaucratic organisation. What impressed Indians, perhaps, most forcibly was the reluctance to Indianise the army and the Indian Civil Service: a reluctance flashed into definite formulation by the metaphor of the "steel frame," immortalised by the irrepressible rhetorical aptitude of Mr. Lloyd George. If Mr. George had said "strait waistcoat" he could hardly have earned for his Government a more unfortunate imputation of impenitent Diehard psychology. Unquestionably the scheme was intended to guarantee, for the period of its operation, the maintenance of British control; and whenever any conflict arose it proved its efficiency for that purpose. It would have been a very rash—unjustifiably rash—experiment had it not done so. But a life of ten years for what was genuinely meant by its authors as a preparatory experiment was surely no excessive allowance for caution. Nevertheless, say Indians, if you had meant what you said you would not have started your thinking on lines designed primarily to safeguard your power: you would have tried to approach it from the Indian point of view, and would have asked those who have devoted their lives to the struggle for Indian National freedom on what lines *they* would advise the establishment of a constitution which would maintain that stability and security in Indian affairs, for which they are as keenly concerned as Britons can possibly be.

Hence arose the demand formulated by the Swarajist Party in 1923 and substantially endorsed by Resolutions of the Assembly in February, 1924, and September, 1925, that a convention "adequately representative of all Indian, European, and Anglo-Indian interests should be invited to frame, with due regard to the interests of minorities, a detailed scheme for reform of the constitution." Hence also the preparation, by the Indian National Convention,

of what is known as the "Indian Commonwealth" Bill (to which some members of our Labour Party have put their names), framed in accordance with what those associates consider to be the national spirit of Indian institutions. The Indian National Congress and the Swarajists (the two connections are now practically combined as "the Congress Party") have never accepted and endorsed that particular Bill: but all sections of Indian progressives—that is to say, practically all intelligent Indians interested in politics—emphatically concur in the position on which that Bill is founded, namely, that if there is to be any hope of an acceptable new constitution, it must be one framed by consent among Indians, and in accordance, primarily, with Indian ideas. And conversely that no acceptable scheme can hopefully be expected to be devised by any Commission imbued with any presumption in favour of the ideas of a Conservative Parliament or of the India Office or of the Government of India and its bureaucracy as at present constituted.

Since the death of Mr. C. R. Das the Swarajist Party has been continuing the process which he was already initiating of liquidating its commitments to the principle of non-co-operation which the party adopted under the influence of Mr. Gandhi. During such a process of strategic retreat no very conspicuous showing of policy can be made on during the last three years is that the prominent politicians in regard to Indian Reform have come very much closer together, and that although no very vehement or spectacular demonstration, such as those of the non-co-operation movement or the Swarajist manifesto of October, 1923, has come into evidence, the forces acting in furtherance of constitutional reform are stronger and weightier to-day than they ever have been. The responsible political leaders of the Hindu and Moslem communities will be found capable, as they are sincerely desirous, of arriving at a concordat, as they have done before, which will safeguard those essentially political rights of the latter upon which there is naturally such resolute insistence. Neither community sees that political difficulty in the excesses of religious fanaticism about which British-Indian journalists persistently express prophetic concern on their account. The constant harping on "communal riots," the constant complacent reports of dissensions among Nationalist groups, which form the staple of Indian Press news, continuously feeds Indian suspicion that there is an organised Press policy of prejudicing British opinion, in advance of the judicial deliberations of the Statutory Commission, against any recognition or even understanding of Indian Nationalist demands.

Mr. Gandhi has withdrawn from intervention in political tactics: but he is still the repository of the most formidable latent forces.

Any judgment of his as to the ethics and integrity of British power in its dealings with India is capable of swaying that of millions; and if the developments of the next two years do not do more to satisfy Indian feeling as to our sincerity than the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (well intentioned as they were) succeeded in doing, there may be worse trouble in India than followed the Rowlatt Acts and Amritsar. The immediate cardinal test of that sincerity, in the judgment of all organised Indian political parties appears—from their repeatedly formulated demands—to be the willingness of the British Government to invite Indians to propose a concerted scheme of progressive reform before the Statutory Commission gets to work.

Expectations and rumours have recently been current that His Majesty's Government was intending immediately to appoint the Statutory Commission to reconsider the Indian Constitution. The Swarajist and other Indian Nationalist parties exhibit a certain degree of disinclination that this course should be taken. They distrust the quality and temper of a Commission that may be appointed by the Government which they believe to be unsympathetic to their cause: and they suspect that there may be an inclination that the Commission should engage in its survey at a moment when distrust of the future of self-governing institutions for India has been fomented by the continual advertisement of the Hindu-Moslem dissensions. They are also disinclined to have the settlement of the future constitution of India controlled by a Government whose policy at home has so conspicuously been devoted to entrenching their own views of what is healthy for the State by repressive legislation against industrial or political combination, and by altering the constitution of their own country with the purpose of strengthening the resistance of the House of Lords to democratic encroachments. But even if these ideas can be imagined likely to influence His Majesty's Government in this particular matter, it would be idle to suppose that any objection on that account to the early appointment of the Commission would be likely to have any influence towards postponing it. Such objections are, however, founded, in my opinion, on too short and too superficial a view of the possibilities in regard to the next step in development. It is strongly arguable that under present conditions, and especially in view of the effect of the Muddiman Report, it would not be right or prudent for any Government, taking a straightforward view of the situation, to defer till the last possible moment the appointment of the Commission, whilst those who would prefer that the final settlement of the new constitution should not take place until after a change of Government may, I think, be fairly well assured that it is hardly conceivable that any revised "Government of India Act" can be passed within the term of the present Parliament.

OLIVIER.

ITALY, JUGO-SLAVIA AND THE ADRIATIC.

THE present situation in the Near East and particularly in the Adriatic is in some directions comparable to the conditions prevailing in former times. The Italo-Jugo-Slav crisis of March and April last, and the temporary rupture of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Tirana a few weeks ago, were no doubt serious in themselves. But the real gravity of these matters is unfortunately represented by the fact that such actualities constitute indications of the strained position existing on the East of the Adriatic—a position depending largely upon the developments of the last few years.

Before the world war the Balkan Peninsula had been correctly styled "The Danger Zone of Europe"—largely because of the international rivalry which had existed for years concerning the then future domination over many of the localities in question. In certain directions the events of 1914-1918 modified and in others they prolonged the conditions of pre-war days. From the former standpoint, though for different reasons, Austria-Hungary and, at least temporarily, Russia have disappeared from the diplomatic arena. Moreover, with Turkey greatly reduced in size and with her neighbours exhausted by prolonged wars, the dangers of conflicts in these directions have been reduced. On the other hand, the splitting up of the Dual Monarchy and its replacement by the larger Rumania and Jugo-Slavia and by several smaller States, have extended the Balkanised area to most of Central Europe. In addition, some of the older elements, perhaps attired in different clothing, still exist, and many new factors have entered upon the scene. For instance, even if such statements may appear pessimistic to those who have not studied the situation upon the spot, it is clear to one who has just visited the territory in question that the former rôles occupied by Russia and by Austria-Hungary are now practically filled by Jugo-Slavia and by Italy, that the jealousy between these countries is both acute and dangerous and that, whereas the subjects in immediate competition between them are not the control of the entire Balkans, they are each directly and immediately interested in the general position in the Adriatic and in the status of Albania.

In order to understand the present relations between Italy and Jugo-Slavia, it is necessary to remember that prior to the disruption of the Dual Monarchy, the Austrian Government usually supported its Croatian against its Italian subjects, the Hungarian Administration assuming more or less the opposite policy regarding those respective populations. Further to the south and in territory which was Turkish until 1913, Italy and Austria-Hungary were also in competition, but here both these parties had an additional even if

then a minor rival in Serbia, who fought the Balkan wars principally in order to secure an outlet to the lower reaches of the Adriatic. The Serajevo murders and the summer of 1914 therefore found that, whilst generally speaking the Slavs and the Italians of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were respectively pro and anti-Austro-Hungarian, the Serbians led the way in the European conflict largely for the purpose of obtaining advantages denied to them in the preceding year. On the other hand Italy, who had refused to allow Austria-Hungary to take her suggested action against Serbia in 1913, and who was still a Member of the Triple Alliance, was desirous of liberating her co-nationals and of improving her position on the other side of the Adriatic. The consequences of this were that when Valona had already been occupied (December, 1914) and when Italy had secured concessions under the Treaty of London (April, 1915) she entered the theatre of hostilities fighting side by side with Serbia. But it soon became clear that the claims of the two peoples would be difficult of adjustment and, notwithstanding the conclusion of the Pact of Rome (April, 1918), the Adriatic problem was one of the most complicated questions which came up for solution during the entire life of the Peace Conference.

The provisions of the Treaty of London, which left Fiume for allotment to a new Croatian State, and foresaw the possible splitting up of Albania, were upset by the more or less unexpected coming into being of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and by the adoption of the principle of nationalities. Moreover, whereas in one sense the whole Adriatic question formed, and still forms, a single matter, the ownership of Fiume and the distribution of the northern part of the littoral and the integrity of Albania are two more or less distinct propositions. In one way these conditions have been and are answerable for preventing a general adjustment of the rival claims by a balancing of the losses suffered in one area against the gains secured in another, and they are partly responsible for the protracted conversations which followed the world-armistice.

Prior to the San Remo meeting of April, 1920, when d'Annunzio had already established himself at Fiume, the negotiations rested more or less directly in the hands of the Peace Conference. It was, however, then arranged that Italy and Jugo-Slavia should enter into direct communication, and after the former country had first sought and later not only returned the mandate for but vacated the whole of Albania except the island of Saseno, a treaty was signed at Rapallo in the ensuing November. Under that agreement she resigned her claims to the Dalmatian coast (except as to Zara, and to several of the islands), and the two parties recognised the independence of Fiume, the suburb of Sushak becoming part of Jugo-Slavia. In November, 1921, the Conference of Ambassadors defin-

itely fixed the frontiers of Albania and arrived at its still more important decision that, in certain circumstances, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan would instruct their representatives on the Council of the League to recommend that Italy be authorised to maintain the integrity of that country. Modifications were made in the Rapallo Treaty of Santa Margherita in May, 1922, the Fascist Government came into power in the following November, and fifteen months later (January, 1924) a new arrangement was signed in Rome. It recognised the incorporation of Fiume by Italy and it gave to Jugo-Slavia full sovereignty over Porto Barros and the Delta, but neither this agreement nor any subsequent arrangement has really overcome the disappointment of the Croat-Slovene element of the Jugo-Slav population, who coveted Fiume, or satisfied Italy, who has gained little on the mainland of the Eastern Adriatic.

The last three and a half years, that is the period since the conclusion of the Rome arrangement, have witnessed two developments or series of developments which have played their far-reaching rôle in the creation of the situation existing to-day. The first is bound up with the Northern zone, that is, the Dalmatian and neighbouring areas, in connection with which Italy and Jugo-Slavia signed what is generally known as the Nettuno Convention in July, 1925. That arrangement was intended to adjust various questions connected with Fiume and Zara, to regulate the position of the respective minorities, and to settle certain features of the property expropriation in the districts under discussion. But largely owing to internal difficulties and particularly as a result of the Croat opposition towards certain privileges to be secured by the Italian population, the agreement failed to secure ratification when it came before the Belgrade Chamber in May and June, 1926. But if this development was and is the cause of serious annoyance in Italy, where the Nettuno Convention was proclaimed as a diplomatic success, a series of Albanian events have given rise to grave misgivings in Jugo-Slavia and, with the advent to power of Fan Noli as Albanian Prime Minister (it is said with Italian support), in June, 1924, the renewed struggle for domination in Albania, which is still in progress, really began. Six months later Ahmed Bey Zogu, who had been a refugee at Belgrade, returned to Tirana under the auspices of Jugo-Slavia, his opponent, Fan Noli, taking refuge in Italy. Subsequently, although it is probable that the Albanian President was not personally committed to a pro-Italian policy before he left Belgrade, the facts remain that, in spite of home complications, the agreement for the Albanian National Bank was arranged during the first half of the year 1925, and that this agreement was practically accompanied by a convention providing Albania with an Italian loan of £2,000,000 for employment upon public works.

Whilst it is unnecessary to go into the details of these arrangements, it may be advisable to remind my readers that the capital for the Bank has been provided almost exclusively from Italian sources, and that this Institution, in which Italian employees predominate, is possessed of far-reaching rights and powers as to the monetary system and other financial questions bound up with the affairs of the Albanian State. Through the loan and the Society for the Economic Development of Albania, Italy also exercises wide influence, since even if the Government possesses a more or less free hand as to the employment of the money available, Italian firms enjoy a preference in regard to any contracts where their tenders are not higher than those furnished by the representatives of other countries. Moreover, as no secret exists that the Commission which sits in the Bank for the purpose of examining all tenders is composed partly of Government and partly of Italian representatives, there seems cause for believing that when Italian interests are threatened a reason is found, either to send back the tenders furnished by firms of that nationality for revision or to reject the estimates supplied by rival houses on the basis of the quality of their materials or of some other defect. To summarise, therefore, although the President's surrender of the Monastery of St. Naum to Jugo-Slavia in 1925 seems to infer that he would still have been willing to accept favours had they been forthcoming from Belgrade, there is no doubt, whether he understood their meaning or not, that the concessions signed by Ahmed Bey Zogu shortly after his return to power placed Albania financially and economically in the hands of Italy, and this upon terms which are decidedly arduous for the former country.

In June, 1926, Baron Aloissi, the then Italian Minister at Durazzo, whose prestige appears to have corresponded with that of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein, a former German Ambassador at Constantinople, proposed to Ahmed Bey Zogu an agreement tantamount to the Albanian recognition of the special position granted to Italy by the Conference of Ambassadors in November, 1921. This suggestion, which became public property, was declined by the President. It is rumoured that the Government of Rome declared to a friendly Power that its Representative had acted without instructions, and, with Ahmed Bey perhaps in a friendly attitude towards Jugo-Slavia, who once more failed to give him any encouragement, there was a distinct reaction against Italy, a reaction certainly suggested by what was the almost complete failure of an entertainment given by the Bank at Durazzo last September. But after a change had taken place in the British diplomatic representation in Albania, and after Sir Austen Chamberlain had met M. Mussolini at Leghorn on September 30th, a very serious revolution occurred in November. No reliable information exists as to whether either or both the Jugo-Slavs,

desirous of ruining the position of the President, and the Italians, wishful of forcing him more into their hands, were directly or indirectly mixed up in events which nearly led to the fall of Scutari. But in any event the rising was the cause of serious alarm in Tirana and the direct and immediate consequence was the signature, within a few days, of the now well-known Pact of Tirana. Although registered at Geneva, that document, with its references to Italian support for the political, territorial and judicial *status quo* in Albania, has been and is the cause of real, even if unnecessary, alarm in Belgrade. That alarm was increased by the immediate resignation of Dr. Ninchitch—the Jugo-Slav Foreign Minister—who had already been criticised at home for his policy of friendship for Italy, and who, perhaps naturally, resented the conclusion of a Treaty, about which he felt that he might have been given preparatory information.

The above facts suggest the nature of the Jugo-Slav-Italo Adriatic situation as it existed at the beginning of the present year. In order to be a settlement from the standpoint of Jugo-Slavia the various arrangements, made since the armistice, clearly presupposed and necessitate the absolute freedom of the Adriatic throughout its length, and the entire independence of Albania within its complete frontiers, as recognised by the Ambassadorial Conference. Alternatively it was and is essential for Italy, who has conceded a good deal in the Upper Adriatic and who has no military forces upon the mainland of Albania, to feel confident that the integrity of that State is not to be threatened by Jugo-Slav intrigues, and to assure herself that if Albania cannot be under the domination of Rome, Italian influence shall be at least as strong as any other on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. Thus, if the crisis of March and April was brought about by the Italian statement that Jugo-Slavia was preparing to disturb the peace of Albania, and if the complications between Albania and Jugo-Slavia, which arose at the end of May, were caused by the Albanian arrest of a man said to be employed by the Jugo-Slav Legation at Tirana, the true basis of the actual danger lies in deep-rooted and often legitimate mutual suspicions and in a reciprocal belief in statements which are either exaggerated or without actual foundation.

To deal first with the Italian case. If the Jugo-Slav Government sent orders, as I believe it sent orders, to its military commanders at Skoplje and Serajevo, authorising them to bring their weak units, actually located on the Western and Northern frontiers of Albania, up to a sufficient strength in trained men to enable them to meet and to localise any possible trouble there, such measures were precautionary, and they did not and do not mean that Jugo-Slavia, who is not ready for war and who appeared to me to be pacific in her policy perhaps on that account, had then any hostile military intentions

towards Albania. On the other hand, whereas to-day official Belgrade recognises the necessity of an independent Albania, all classes in Jugo-Slavia hate even the name of Ahmed Bey Zogu, largely because they argue that he accepted their hospitality and original assistance and then played them false. For these reasons, whereas the attitude of the actual Belgrade Government has no doubt been correct, it seems undeniable that, until quite recently, unofficial Jugo-Slav support had been given and that intrigues had been carried on perhaps in Albania and certainly among the Albanians usually domiciled or now refugees in Jugo-Slavia. Such a policy, clearly actuated by a desire to overthrow the existing *régime* at Tirana, is naturally well known in Rome. It is not legitimate, and unless the strictest measures are taken to terminate such happenings the statesmen of Belgrade will be guilty of contributory negligence in case of further and unforeseen trouble.

But if the Jugo-Slavs are therefore responsible for some of the renewed difficulties, and if their *Chargé d'Affaires* was decidedly blameworthy for his distinctly undiplomatic language and for his too hasty departure from Albania early in June, they, too, have cause to suspect the future attitude of Italy. It is, of course, absurd to suggest, as is sometimes suggested in Belgrade, that Albania swarms with Italian troops in disguise, or that the wording of the Pact of Tirana constitutes a definite proof of the Italian intention to intervene in a purely internal struggle and merely for the purpose of maintaining Ahmed Bey Zogu in his present position. Nevertheless, the Island of Saseno, which lies at the entrance to Valona Bay, and which has a material significance in the lower Adriatic, is not only in Italian hands, but there is reason to suppose that it has been heavily fortified. Italian influence is paramount in Valona, where the approximately 350 Italian subjects have their Fascist organisation. The Italian Consulate there is one of the largest buildings in the whole country. Italian uniforms arrived for the local garrison in the spring, and statements were made to me in reliable quarters, though these were impossible of confirmation, that a certain Italian organisation has provided itself with a considerable supply of Red Cross stores. And then going somewhat further afield, and in addition to the above-mentioned Bank Concession and Loan, upon which no actual interest has so far been paid, it may be interesting to note that the Geographical Institute of Florence is now making a survey of the country at a charge to the Albanian Government which is relatively nominal. Lastly, whereas it is hardly necessary to mention the prolonged presence of the Italian Red Cross in and around Durazzo in connection with the earthquake in that district, or the Italian purchase of a few formerly German-owned aeroplanes, the fact that Italy enjoys three concessions for oil, two of which are

indirectly if not directly in the hands of the Government, certainly gives to that country a more than passing interest in Albania.

Whatever may be the ultimate interpretation to be placed by its stronger signatory upon the Pact of Tirana, it is not unnatural, therefore, that such developments should be the cause of anxiety in Jugo-Slavia, who fears an Italian attempt to regain the position which she lost in 1920 and to establish the complete control of the Adriatic by the occupation of its eastern coast. Albania would not prove an adequate or satisfactory field for the accommodation of a surplus Italian population, and, therefore, unless that country were intended as a stepping-stone towards wider conquests, it seems inconceivable that the Government of Rome proposes active military intervention in support of the present Tirana *régime*, partly because, were Ahmed Bey Zogu's position to become so critical as to require direct assistance, it would hardly suit Italy to increase her unpopularity with his political opponents. If this suggestion is justified, then the attitude of Rome will be largely governed by the existence of the earlier conventions regarding the National Bank and the Loan—conventions probably quite as important as the more famous Pact of Tirana. At the moment these are financial matters but, whatever may be the broader attitude of Italy towards the Adriatic Question, the future protection of the economic position is unlikely to escape the attention of the Government of M. Mussolini. It therefore seems possible that Italy, now the avowed friend and protector of Albania under the Pact, and as a result of the attitude assumed by her towards Jugo-Slavia in March, will allow her *protégé* to increase her indebtedness without an early protest. Or it may be that the Government of Rome will endeavour to safeguard its financial position by the occupation and administration of the Albanian Customs, which are pledged as a guarantee for the interest on the loan. Whilst the selection of the former course, coupled with a display of tact, might tend to allay the local opposition towards the Italian penetration in Albania, the adoption of the latter would probably lead to a counter move by Jugo-Slavia upon Scutari.

To revert to the broader issues under discussion, the present and the future appear to be possessed of two real dangers. The position of and in Albania is such that a situation may arise in which neither Italy nor Jugo-Slavia could be expected to remain passive, and in that case one or both these countries might intervene with or without the consent of the Powers or of the League of Nations. Alternatively, if the existing diplomatic strain between Rome and Belgrade continues, sooner or later some untoward speech or action may create a breach too wide to repair. Jugo-Slavia, where armaments have not yet been brought up to date, and where war would therefore have been inopportune in March, then wisely maintained an attitude of

calm. Italy, whose representatives upon the spot proclaim the harmless meaning of the Pact of Tirana, was equally conciliatory at the time of the Serbo-Albanian crisis of May and June. But whereas Rome has signed a Pact of Friendship with Budapest and whereas she has a Treaty with Rumania, whose annexation of Bessarabia has now been recognised by M. Mussolini, the Little Entente has undoubtedly been consolidated by the first of these developments and by the return of M. Bratiano to power in Bucharest. Czecho-Slovakia, under the wise influence of her veteran President and of Dr. Benesh, is certainly desirous of peace, but she recognises that armaments are Jugo-Slavia's alternative to the freedom of the Straits of Otranto and she, like France, is no doubt prepared to help to supply the need. The relations between Serbia and Greece may not be cordial, and Bulgaria may secretly not be sorry to witness the discomfiture of her western neighbour, but the Governments of Athens and of Sofia each realise the merits of the principle of the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, and neither of them would welcome the advent of outside control in Albania.

A perusal of the foregoing pages will perhaps have brought my readers to the reluctant conclusion that in many ways the magnitude of the present danger recalls that which existed in the years 1908 and 1909 when diplomacy succeeded in postponing war. A repetition of such developments as occurred before, and in, the year of 1914 and of a world catastrophe, though one must hope upon a smaller scale, can only be avoided by an acknowledgment of the present problem and by a definite attempt on the part of all concerned to arrive at its early solution. As the intervention of the League under prevailing circumstances might be possessed of dangerous consequences for that body and for Europe in general, perhaps the most obvious solution of the immediate difficulties is to be found in an official declaration by M. Mussolini that the terms of the Pact of Tirana do not imply his interference in a purely internal Albanian struggle, and in an undertaking that the Belgrade Government will ratify or, at any rate, endeavour to secure the Parliamentary ratification of the Nettuno Convention. With regard to the broader and all important issues discussed above, a real settlement of the Adriatic problem can best be achieved by a reciprocal Italo-Jugo-Slav recognition of the respective difficulties, by concessions on both sides, and by a joint guarantee that each party will loyally observe the existing *status quo*. Such adjustments of the present and wider controversy would give to Jugo-Slavia the security to which she is entitled and they would leave to Italy a means to the peaceful and undisputed development of the local commercial field, which is of material value to her.

H. CHARLES WOODS.

THE CAUSES AND EXTENT OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY.

THE remarkable developments which have taken place in America since the war in the direction of greatly increased activity in the fields both of internal and external trade is worth detailed investigation. While our trade is nearly 20 per cent. less than pre-war, America's external trade is 37 per cent. greater than pre-war. The causes no doubt are numerous, and many have been operating over a long period, such for instance as the immense natural resources of America; the fact that there are no internal customs frontiers between the forty-eight States which compose the United States; the fact that they have a vigorous, energetic population, working steadily with those natural advantages as a basis; the fact that this great area, when first occupied by Europeans, was almost unoccupied by any considerable population, thus providing immense scope for newcomers in the development of its great resources. According to the testimony of successive travellers throughout the last century, Americans have been hard workers and good workers.

But all these advantages were possessed before the period with which we are dealing, the period which has elapsed since the end of the Great War. While all the other countries of the world are slowly seeking to attain pre-war conditions in their trade and development, which none have yet reached, the United States has forged ahead very rapidly. In considering what are the causes which have led to this great progress in recent years, I should place in the front rank the increased and increasing efficiency of labour. The output has been enormously enhanced in many of the great industries, such as the iron and steel industry, the automobile industry, and others.

One of the chief factors in bringing about this increased efficiency and providing an adequate field for the absorption of its products at a rapidly expanding rate is the achievement of industrial peace between labour, capital, and management. The change has been so great in these years that it was described as revolutionary by one of the highest authorities in Washington. A fruitful co-operation of effort is now taking place, the limitation of output by the men has ceased, antagonism between labour and management and capital has now receded into the background, and occupies a comparatively small field. In the great advancing industries it no longer exists. A more intimate and personal relation has been achieved between management and labour. Labour has ceased to be regarded as an inanimate implement, and is taking its proper place as a human agency, with all its complicated range of motives,

desires and aspirations. Continuous close contact between management and labour is settling in detail grievances as they arise. The initiation and working of improved methods, the saving of waste, the quickening of interest on the part of all parties, have contributed to the effective production of goods or of services.

Another great factor is the establishment of prohibition. There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that this is responsible for an increase of 10 to 15 per cent. in the output of industry. Monday is now reported everywhere to be a whole day in the factories, no longer a broken one. Men are in better health and are more interested in their work. New aspirations have been created. Everyone aspired to possess and in many cases was able to acquire an automobile, a healthier way of spending any savings than in acquiring drink.

This leads me on to another factor, and that is the existence of the automobile and its extensive use by working men and in business. So far as the personnel of business is concerned, the automobile has greatly added to the mobility of labour. Men have been able to pass from one part of the country to the other with much greater ease and rapidity than was ever possible before. The number of days in which it is impossible for builders to work owing to frost and climatic conditions have been very largely reduced. The possession of an automobile by the working man has other repercussions and has led to greater contentment. A good second-hand automobile can be acquired for about £10, and payments can be made by instalments. It is no longer necessary for the working man to live in the centre of large cities, for he is able to go from fifteen to twenty miles away into the country. There he can purchase land at a comparatively reasonable figure and start his house and pay for it on the instalment principle. His wages are sufficient to pay his instalments regularly and to enable him at the same time to live in comfort; his whole outlook is changed, he becomes a proprietor, with the many interests associated with the possession of property and its development. The mental outlook is enlarged by the power now possessed of visiting a very much larger area than was open to him before. One of the striking sights to the visitor to the United States is the large number of automobiles parked around every factory, or building in course of construction, or works of any kind, and owned by the men who are engaged in that work. All this has accelerated the rate of production in America, and has encouraged saving. A man once having begun to purchase on the instalment system is urged by his desire to meet his obligations to save an adequate amount, and it has generally been found that he will and can do so if he has the opportunity.

Another cause of the increased productivity of labour is the fact

that America now possesses more ample capital. The various industries are able to supply their men with mechanical devices for saving labour, and so increasing efficiency. There is no hesitation on the part of the men to accept the use of these labour-saving machines. In fact, they appreciate the value of their wellbeing and their working to such an extent, that in some industries the labour organisations have instituted research work in order to be able to understand the technique more thoroughly, and thus to make suggestions to the management for the improvement of the various processes on which they are engaged. The American Ambassador recently stated that behind every one of the 20,000,000 working men in America, there is £1,200 of capital, which is used to add to his efficiency. On the average every one of these 20,000,000 is supplied with four horse-power of machinery equivalent to the power of forty men. The possession of ample capital is largely due to the stupendous savings which are now being made in the United States, both on the part of working men and other interests. This means that there is ample capital to employ existing labour and to give further employment to the increased population which comes into production every year. The process of saving has been greatly accentuated by the lightness of taxation as compared with European countries.

Another cause of prosperity and of high total production is the fact that the population of the United States is increasing rapidly, and this offers a continuously expanding market for the producers of goods. Between 1915 and 1925 there were added to the population of the United States 16,000,000 persons, a population equal to the whole populations of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland put together. This increase has offered an immense stimulus to the working plants in America. American trade is much more largely composed of home trade, as compared with external trade, than is the case in England. The American home market after the war had not contracted at all, but had expanded, and had been stimulated by the immense production created by the demand of Europe for American products during the war. American manufacturers at the end of the war had an increased home market for the absorption of their products; whereas for England, so largely dependent upon foreign trade, the foreign customers in Europe were reduced in purchasing power by at least 20 per cent., and still further immobilised by the high tariff walls erected everywhere, with decrees of prohibition of imports and many other barriers. While the countries of Europe were restoring their plants to a peace footing, the American manufacturer was able to go forth and supply Europe's customers at once with many of the articles they needed. This gave a powerful stimulus to American foreign trade. America

had suffered neither in men nor in resources to anything like the extent and proportions in which the European countries had been made to suffer by the war. She was therefore able to start right away to expand her industries. Henry Ford tells us that the day on which the armistice was signed was the day on which he ceased war work and began peace work. In England we know that many plants continued to run on war contracts long after the war was over.

It has been possible for America to carry out a remarkable policy of meeting depression by a reduction in prices. In Europe manufacturers sought to recoup themselves for high costs and small demand by raising prices, thus still further limiting the number of their customers. When the slump came in America after the war, the question there also was how to meet the situation. Mr. Ford has graphically described the difficulty in which he found himself in this respect; but he boldly took the course of making a big cut in the price of his cars, and in the first year found that he had sold twice as many cars as in the previous year, and had made a greater profit. This example is being followed in America to-day, where great corporations have grown up, in which the management is the supreme authority of the three partners, labour, management, and capital. Management, after making sufficient profits to secure adequate capital, does not seek to make further profits by raising prices, but seeks rather to extend the demand for its products by reducing prices, and thus keeping larger and larger units employed. In this way it renders a great service to the community in supplying it with goods at lower prices.

The attitude of the great American Federation of Labour has become highly favourable to the co-operation of labour, capital, and management in a fruitful partnership for the highest production. Work is not regarded by its leaders as it seems often to be regarded in England, as an evil and the less of it the better. In America it is regarded as the necessary condition for the full development of man's character and powers, and for his happiness. It is a high privilege and advantage to have an opportunity of doing a good honest day's work, with an adequate and increasing remuneration, and with the sense of rendering a service to the members of the community. There is the growing feeling in America that a man best serves his fellow members of the community not by setting out to make a great fortune and then retiring and devoting his life to objects of public service and philanthropy, but rather by perfecting his own business methods, caring for the workers in his own works, affording them opportunities of healthful work, advancing position, and better conditions.

It was striking to see in America to what an immense extent

the active use of brawn and muscle and sweat was being saved, and heavy, arduous and monotonous toil was being carried out by machinery rather than by human means. The human brain was being placed in larger and larger control. In this connection the continuously expanding use of electricity is very striking. It is being made available at low rates and in enormous quantity all over the country. A great study is being made of transmission of energy to a distance and at a greatly reduced cost, so that large plants can supply greater and greater areas. The elimination of hand labour in the great ironworks of the South, which have recently been established at Birmingham, Alabama, is very striking. Almost every process is carried out by automatic appliances, the operations of which are controlled by levers, which are the sole means of intervention of the labour of the hand.

As I have already indicated, the contentment of labour with its position and possibilities is one of the greatest if not the greatest cause of the increased efficiency of output. The achievement of this contentment is largely aided by the manner in which the interests of the men are being associated with the interests of the business and works in which they are being employed. This takes many forms, but they all lead in the same direction—to enable men to realise that their own personal effort will help them personally, if the business or enterprise in which they are engaged flourishes. In some cases extra incentives are offered to men for a larger output. A normal rate of pay for a normal output having been established, any increase above that output is a measure of the increased remuneration which will be paid to men engaged in that process. This is a very powerful stimulus to men to do their best in such industries. The extra incentive, particularly where it is applied to the principle of teams associated in work where a number of different processes end in producing some object which is used as the measure of that effort, has been a most powerful cause of the astonishing increase in the efficiency of the men in the great automobile industry. Since 1914 the increase in output per man in that industry has enormously risen, and is now three times what it was in that year!

In the railways similar results have been achieved by associating the men with the management in committees for the purpose of saving waste, improving processes, making suggestions for improvement and dealing with grievances. The increase of efficiency of labour on the railways is calculated to have been no less than 40 per cent. since 1909. Mr. Hoover was able to make the remarkable statement in his annual report for 1926 that the railways, handed over by the Government to private enterprise in 1920 with 1,999,000 men, were now employing 1,783,000 men, and at the same time were dealing with 15 per cent. more traffic, a powerful testi-

mony to the increased efficiency of the men. In this connection it is interesting to recall that the great American Telegraph and Telephone Company has 57,000 of its employees as shareholders holding stock to the value of \$170,000,000.

This remarkable development in America has been secured without the sacrifice of liberty, and has been done entirely on individualistic lines. The full energy, activity, and enterprise of the individual have been enlisted in the cause of progress. No hampering legislative limits have been placed upon these energies. The American Federation of Labour declares that it does not ask its members to what religion they belong, to what Party they belong, or for whom they vote, for it secures their complete freedom in this respect. Mr. Green, the President of the American Federation of Labour, said recently :

“The American Federation of Labour is a sound, influential force in behalf of tolerance, and in the defence of religious and political freedom. No law in the American Federation of Labour either abridges or denies the right of its members to belong to any church or denomination or to vote with or affiliate with a political party, nor is there any rule which can be invoked that would interfere with the free exercise of these rights which we hold to be inalienable.”

We see then that the Unions in America have avoided becoming the instruments of any political party, have looked after the interests of their members as the first object, and have not indulged in the game of politics. They have made enormously greater progress in securing for their members higher wages, better and more progressive conditions, than anything which has been attained by political action or by Labour unions such as we have seen in England in recent years.

There can be little doubt what the working men would choose as between the two methods, on realising the facts. It was recently pointed out that the plasterers who receive 1s. 10½d. per hour in London receive in New York 10s. per hour. Yet the total cost of building in New York is just about the same as the total cost of building in London, a great testimony to what has been achieved by the methods employed in America to give efficiency to labour, and to what an extent it has benefited labour itself. More and more working men will come to ask why they should maintain political unions which have not risen to the opportunity of working whole-heartedly for the improvement of the conditions of their members, but have rather wasted their money and energy on politics, instead of doing as the unions in America have done : getting down to business, giving effective help and advice to their members, co-operating in their own interests, in the interests of

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business and in that of the community, to make possible a fuller, richer, and more contented life for their members.

When we come to the question of the extent of American prosperity, there is no doubt that so far as the industrial side is concerned it is very great. Wages have risen not only to a war level, but beyond it, and far beyond pre-war. The index figures for the wages of operatives in the State of New York for last December reached 238 as compared with 100 pre-war and 228 the highest during the war. The number of automobiles in the United States has now reached the figure of about 22,000,000. Savings of the working men are going up by leaps and bounds. America is lending money all over the world. Her people are receiving the highest real wages in the world, after making allowance for the greater cost of living. It is difficult, indeed impossible, to find an exact measure of the relative prosperity of America, but we discover some indication in figures such as follow. The population of America, about 115,000,000, is using 44 per cent. of the whole production of the world's lead, 55 per cent. of tin, 57 per cent. of copper, and 75 per cent. of rubber. These are arresting figures. A comparatively small population is using more than half the total world's production of these essentials, and this is a striking testimony to the extent of American prosperity.

It is true that one section of the population is not quite so prosperous, and that is the farming section. There appear to be three reasons for this. In the first place the stimulation of food production owing to the war had led to a great expansion, and with the recovery of the countries devastated by the war in Europe there has been less demand for the products of the United States. Then again the high prohibitive tariff of the United States tends to make high costs for the farmer, but does not raise his prices for corn, meat, wheat and cotton, which are settled by the world's prices. But the tariff also does him a further injury, by making it impossible for many of the goods of Europe to enter the United States, though these goods are the only means Europe has of purchasing the food products and cotton of the United States. Trade balances are exhausted, and gold is going into America from Europe. The situation, therefore, is strained, and Europe, for her purchase of food and cotton, must seek any other market which will take her goods rather than come to the market of the United States which is refusing her goods.

There is also a difficulty which has affected the farmers of the United States as well as the farmers elsewhere in the world. After the war deflation has led to falling prices. In a market of falling prices the farmer is always hard hit, because his returns lag so far behind his outlay. In the case of agricultural products this lag is about fourteen months. He makes his outlay at to-day's prices,

but in fourteen months in a falling market his returns will be governed by the lower prices. About one-third of the population of the United States are still directly interested in agriculture. Owing to the unfortunate position of the farmer there is a large migration now going on into the towns from the countryside. Many farms are being completely abandoned. Weeds are taking possession to an alarming extent. On my recent visit to the United States it was very depressing to see the enormous extent to which couch was taking possession of the fields owing to the impossibility of keeping them clean with the high cost of labour. As I have already pointed out, the index figures for labour had risen in the State of New York to 238 pre-war, but the prices of the farmers' produce has fallen to 133 pre-war. This is a measure of the farmer's difficulties in being able to utilise adequate labour.

The position of the United States at the present time has been won by the scientific application of mechanical aid to increase human effort, by the solution of the problem of the fruitful combination of labour, capital, and management, by the maintenance of the largest Free Trade area in the world as such, so that the products of this immense territory are freely exchanged throughout the whole of it. The population is all at work. The best minds of America have chosen the career of industry as the best opening to them and as affording the greatest scope to their genius and their energies. The scientific investigation of the relations which ought to prevail between labour, management and capital, and the discovery of a method of progress for the amelioration of these conditions, have immensely aided in achieving the remarkable results which are now to be seen.

The Government has refrained from interfering with matters which can best be conducted by private enterprise. The Labour unions have left politics alone, have studied the legitimate interests of their members and have advanced them to an enormous extent. The spirit of enterprise of the old pioneers still exists in large measure. Great openings are offered to men of energy and resource. The sight of men rising rapidly to positions of importance and power in industry tends to satisfy the ambitions of those who would wish to do likewise. The opportunities are there as soon as they are ready to avail themselves of them. The spirit of freedom and independence has been preserved. The characteristics of individual energy, enterprise, and initiative, which used to be regarded as peculiarly valuable Anglo-Saxon qualities, have been left, unhampered by Socialistic influence, to the free and full play of their activities. Fruitful co-operation in industry has led to high wages and high productivity, high wages have encouraged large consumption, large consumption has encouraged large output.

Large saving has come about through fruitful expenditure. The expenditure on drink has been eliminated from the expenditures of the working men, who instead are acquiring solid and tangible things with the consequent increase in trade activity.

There is one factor to which I have not alluded and which must not be lost sight of, and that is the successful working of the Federal Reserve Bank system. This has been effective in preserving America from the dangerous financial crises which used to affect her, and has given a stability to her financial structure which she has never possessed before. Its services were great in time of war in securing her finance, but they have been still greater in time of peace in the direction which I have indicated and in the safe provision of adequate finance for her expanding trade. America has succeeded in securing a wise administration on the part of those entrusted with the various duties of the Federal Reserve Bank's organisation, and notwithstanding the immense inrush of gold and the accumulation of gold deposits, inflation has been avoided, and a great part of this gold has been deliberately sterilised. At the same time such an immense accumulation of gold is not without danger, and is certainly a useless expense, as the sterilised portion can earn no interest and is only a cost to its possessors. A serious problem remains to be settled, namely, how to stop this inflow of gold and enable the existing surplus to be diminished by being put to some fruitful use. It also points very directly to a reduction in the high tariffs of the United States. It is certainly an interesting fact that the two most backward countries in Europe, Russia and Spain, are the countries which have similar high tariff walls to those which the progressive people of the United States have built up around themselves, actuated by the fear of competition—a truly strange phenomenon in a country of immense natural resources and possessing in its methods of mass production the most powerful weapon to meet competition which the world has ever seen.

P. A. MOLTENO.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE: AN ADDRESS.*

JUST when the British Empire, under the vigorous guidance of Chatham, was laying its foundations firmly on the mighty waters, a great and epoch-making work on the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* appeared in England from the pen of Edward Gibbon. From that day to this, historians and political philosophers have disputed as to the causes of that decline and fall. It would be untrue to say that there is complete agreement on the answer to this great question, or that any exhaustive answer has been given to it. But a general concurrence of opinion sums up the reply as, "corruption and disorder at the centre and atrophy at the circumference"; though there is much dispute as to the origin of these immediate causes. We are, apparently, safe in pointing out that neither of these causes threatens the downfall of the British Empire.

The foundations of the British Empire, unlike those of the Roman Empire, were not laid by statesmen or officials, but by the independent action of individuals. The heroes of colonial enterprise in Britain were the bold spirits of the Elizabethan Age, the discontented Puritans who fled from the persecutions of Laud, the broken and ruined Cavaliers of the Civil War, and the Highlanders driven from their mountain fastnesses by the suppression of the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745. On the whole, their rulers were rather glad to see them go, and gave them charters under which, from the very first, they exercised in their local affairs a large amount of self-government. Until the course of the Civil War in Britain threw the management of colonial affairs into the hands of the House of Commons of the Long Parliament, such Imperial Government as existed was exercised by the Privy Council (whereof a fragment remains in the Judicial Committee of the present day); and it is plausibly suggested by the latest, and certainly not the least profound, of English historians, that the seeds of the quarrel which finally led to the revolt of the thirteen American colonies were sown in that period of abnormal and somewhat super-heated politics. Whilst there can be little doubt that the separation of the thirteen colonies from the Mother Country was a necessity, if the British Empire and the United States were each to work out its gigantic destiny, it is a matter for profound regret, and perhaps lasting evil, that that severance was effected under conditions which left behind them a bitterness and lack of sympathetic understanding, of which we feel the effects to the present day. But the incident has at least en-

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graved upon the minds of British statesmen a conviction of the evils of over-much interference with distant dependencies, by which the British Empire has gained enormously.

The second stage in the building of the British Empire was undoubtedly raised by the forces of the Crown in the long series of wars which, with little intermission, filled the eighteenth century. The long-standing quarrel with Spain, to break the monopoly established by the fantastic Bull of Alexander VI (1493) in the Southern Seas, begun in the Elizabethan Age, warmly taken up by Cromwell in his expeditions to the West Indies, and carried to its conclusion in the war of the Spanish Succession, added many a Crown Colony to the Empire; while the growth of French power, which substituted, for the decaying might of Spain, the aggressive policy of an enemy nearer home, led to the duel between Clive and Dupleix for the control of India, and secured Canada for the British Empire. Incidentally, it also wiped out the Dutch possessions on the eastern seaboard of North America, which intervened between the Puritan colonies in the north and the Cavalier colonies in the south, and thus paved the way for the American Revolution.

But, long before this brilliant epoch in the expansion of Britain had run its course, a great change had come over the government of England, a change pregnant with immense importance for the future of the Empire. The rivalry between Crown and Parliament, the great issue of the Civil War, had been settled by a compromise peculiarly English, perhaps impossible elsewhere than in England or among English-speaking people. In truth, neither the Crown alone, nor the Parliament alone, was capable of governing satisfactorily a people like the English, proud of their long tradition of individual freedom, yet firmly attached to ancient institutions and by instinct profoundly conservative and law-abiding. What was wanted was a combination of the two powers, which while preserving the dignity, the sense of responsibility, the capacity for decisive action, and the personal character of the monarchy, should give free scope to popular demands. This combination, known to us as the Cabinet System, was evolved during the same eighteenth century which, while it was a series of almost unending wars abroad, was in Britain an era of almost unbroken peace, threatened only by the brief Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745.

The story of the evolution of the Cabinet System cannot be told here. Luck had much to do with it; the fear of civil war assisted it; perhaps English common-sense and hatred of extremes counted most of all. The humorous feature of the situation was, that the nation had lived under this new system for nearly half a century

without knowing it, and was startled and sceptical when Burke revealed its nature in his great philosophical pamphlet, *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*, when the system was being vigorously assailed by the policy of George III. The victory of the new system was ultimately assured by the resolute conduct of the younger Pitt, who not only rendered a repetition of the ill-starred attempt of George III impossible, but, by his famous appeal to the electors in 1784, taught the House of Commons that not even an elected House could defy the national will. Neither must it be forgotten that, shortly after Pitt's death, the devoted efforts of Wilberforce and his friends wiped out from the standard of the British Empire that stain of slavery which it had inherited from the Roman Empire, first by the elimination of the slave trade, not only within the British Empire but, mainly owing to the efforts of Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna, from the policy of Europe; finally, of slavery itself throughout the British Empire, as the first work of the Reformed Parliament. It is pleasant to remember that in this noble breach with the traditions of ancient Rome, England was backed, not only by Scotland, to which she had become united in 1707, but by Ireland, which she had, much against Ireland's will, incorporated in 1800.

Thus the third stage of the British Empire, built by the overflowing of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century into the vast unoccupied spaces of Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, was a stage of freedom, as neither of its predecessors had been. Is it surprising that the British Empire should have entered upon its third century of existence with a prospect of permanence which its great prototype had failed to realise, or that, with the rapid disappearance of corruption and disorder at the heart, in the Reform era which quickly followed, the two evils which, as we have seen, destroyed the Roman Empire, should have ceased to threaten its successor?

Nevertheless, the British Empire had dangers of its own to meet, which had already cost it dear. The free emigrant who had learned at home how to curb the power of Kings, was ill-inclined to submit to the orders of a distant Government office which, as he not unnaturally believed, knew little of the wants and difficulties of a struggling frontier population thousands of miles away. A truly wise policy had done much to reconcile the conflicting interests of the two white races which, in Canada, faced each other across the Ottawa. The French *habitants* of Lower Canada had, indeed, no desire for democratic institutions, being the offspring, not of Revolutionary France, but of the France of the *ancien régime*—orthodox, feudal, accustomed to be governed by seigneur and bishop, and desiring only to be left to the peaceful pursuit of agriculture and

the practice of the Catholic faith. They had been wisely secured in their religion and their civil law by the far-sighted policy of Pitt. But the rapidly-growing population of Upper Canada, restless and ambitious, hemmed in between the Ottawa and the Great Lakes, across which they faced the republican spirit and rivalry of the expanding United States, were in no mood for paternal government.

To these restless colonies went, as Governor-General, in 1838, Lord Durham, one of the great protagonists of the Reform struggle in England: and his epoch-making Report of the following year is one of the great constitutional documents of the Empire. Briefly put, it recommended, as the cure for colonial restlessness, the application of those very institutions which had reconciled authority and freedom in England in the preceding century, viz., the establishment of an Executive of Ministers who should be indeed the King's servants, but who should hold their offices under the continual criticism of a representative Colonial Parliament, who should only hold them with the goodwill of the popular House of that Parliament, and whose ultimate fate should depend on the approval of an electorate which, with each broadening of the electoral franchise, became more nearly identified with the will of the community. The adoption in Great Britain of this truly original system of government, necessarily impossible in the ancient empires in which the principle of representation was unknown, had already had the wholly unforeseen effect of raising immensely the prestige and stability of the Crown, which thus, unlike the puppet Emperors of ancient Rome, the sport of Palace intrigue and provincial faction, of the Prætorian guards and the legions, steadily developed as the one permanent personality in government, and as the impartial arbiter between contending factions. It was not merely to complete that happy result, by establishing the Crown as the great symbol of Imperial unity, but to free the colonists from the galling interference, in their every-day affairs, of distant officials and party politicians, and thus immensely to reduce those opportunities for friction and misunderstanding which had lost the British Empire its first and fairest colonies.

To appreciate the courage and the sympathy which led the statesmen of the United Kingdom in the 'forties to sanction this momentous step in Imperial history, we must remember that it was not only opposed to every tradition of Imperial rule, but that it was taken in the face of two very real and obvious dangers peculiar to the situation in Canada. On the one hand, the expansionist tendencies of the United States rendered the relations between the Republic and its northern neighbour peculiarly delicate; and the gift of self-government to British North America was not unlikely to lead to "incidents" which would gravely complicate the diplomacy

of the British Foreign Office. On the other, there was the deep suspicion of the French inhabitants of Lower Canada lest the union of the two provinces should undo the work of Pitt, and subject them to the ideals and institutions of an alien and more numerous race. Happily, the persistent efforts of Castlereagh to delimit the Canadian border to the south, and to draw the line between the expansion towards the Pacific of the rival English-speaking nations, secured, not merely a temporary, but, some twenty-four years after his death, a final victory; so that even the famous slogan, "fifty-four forty or fight," which carried James Polk to the Presidential Chair of the United States in 1844, passed away like an evil dream, leaving a century of peace along an invisible and unfortified line of three thousand miles.

But the tact of Lord Elgin in getting the new system to work in Canada, and the ultimate solution of the racial problem of Canada by federation in 1867, also justified the supreme act of faith which, in the middle of the nineteenth century, launched the British Empire on a new career, and created an entirely new phenomenon in the history of the world. For the New Model of Government passed rapidly from Canada to Australia and New Zealand, from Australasia to South Africa, and in these last days has even been applied, though with reservations suggested by difference of circumstances, to British India, Malta, and Southern Rhodesia—latest of all, to that sister-island whose unhappy relations with Great Britain had long been the despair of statesmen of all parties, and the great blot on the fair picture of British freedom in the eyes of the world. It is odd, perhaps, that this mighty overflow of freedom and self-government should have replaced, for those communities which have most completely received it, the old-fashioned name of "Colony," which most truly described them, by the term "Dominion," more properly applicable to military conquests, while reserving the old name of "Colony" for those dependencies which, in actual fact, are the fruits of conquest. But the Briton is gloriously indifferent to the niceties of language, being of the opinion of that mediæval "Emperor" who proudly boasted: "Ego sum rex Romanorum, et supra grammaticam."

Save for the serious, but, happily, brief intermission of the South African War, the third stage of the British Empire had been built in time of peace; and the generous policy of the Government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1906, in advising the grant of self-government to the recently conquered provinces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, had it was hoped, and as, indeed, ultimately proved to be the case, healed what threatened to be a dangerous breach in the unity of the Empire. But there were many, not alone among the ill-wishers of the Empire, who doubted whether

the structure built up in the last half of the nineteenth century would survive the shock of a hostile attack from without. The ordeal of the Great War demonstrated, beyond a doubt, that a modest building on secure foundations is safer against earthquake and tempest than a grandiose structure built on the shifting sands of discontent and grudging submission. The highly-organised, but autocratic Empires of Central and Eastern Europe fell to pieces under the strain. The self-governing nations emerged intact.

To few statesmen in history can it have been given to reveal to the world such a magnificent rally to an Imperial flag as that which the declaration of war in the early days of August had evoked, and which was briefly described, in simple and dignified words, by Lord Crewe in his speech in the House of Lords on September 9th, 1914. From the frontier of Afghanistan to the lands beyond the Southern Cross, the free communities of the British Empire—Dominions, Crown Colonies, and Protectorates alike—spontaneously placed the whole of their resources, to the last man and the last shilling, at the disposal of that Crown which was the symbol of their unity. Enough was revealed by after events of the policy of the enemy, to make it clear that he would have gone to any length in bribery and promises to disrupt that unity, in the existence of which he professed to disbelieve. It is perhaps to the credit of his intelligence that he made no open attempt to do so; preferring instead to work by underground channels which, though they caused some embarrassment in detail, made no serious impression on the solid rock on which the Empire is built.

For, as the strain waxed fiercer, stronger and stronger became the irresistible tide which set toward the heart of the Empire, bearing upon its bosom the wise counsels and courageous sympathies of the vigorous communities which held the ramparts of the outer walls, bringing the inspiring optimism and ready resource of the prairies, the bush, and the veldt into the anxious counsels of Downing Street. Enormously during those fateful years was the mutual admiration of the Mother Country and her gallant children increased. Witnessing the solid heroism with which the citizens of London and other great cities of the Old Country endured the nightly horrors of air attacks, and all classes in the land set their teeth and squared their shoulders as they read the ghastly lists of their dead and wounded sons and brothers, the Ministers from overseas, who had braved the perils of the mine and submarine to come to the Empire's help, ceased to think of Britain as a land of sleek comfort and outworn social prejudices. The dwellers at the heart of the Empire, who learned the wide views and practical sagacity of the Ministers from Overseas, and watched the splendid regiments

from Canada and Australasia marching through their streets, realised, as never before, the existence of a Greater Britain, one with them in spirit and ideals, with the same profound respect for law and justice, but ready, as they were, to die, if need be, for the cause of freedom. They knew that no Act of the British Parliament, no compulsion from above, had brought these free men to the aid of their distant kin. Is it any cause for wonder that, as the years went on, the pressure from without only strengthened, instead of dissolving, the ties which bind the Empire together, that suspicions which sprang from ignorance disappeared, that deep speech around camp fire and in humble homestead dispersed mutual misunderstandings, and that out of all these grew a resolve to face the future together, not as rulers and ruled, but as brothers bound by the common interests and aspirations of one great family of nations?

It has long been the habit of the English-speaking peoples to act first and sum up the results afterwards. To a philosopher this habit may appear deplorable; but it may be of the essence of democracy, which must work by instinct rather than by long-thought-out plan. Happily, where the instinct is sound, the results are often admirable. And it so happened that as, during the war, the self-governing nations of the Empire came to know one another better, and even foreign nations better, they slid, almost unconsciously, into the practice of dealing with one another, and even with foreign countries, without formal diplomatic relations through the central Government. Such steps, if deliberately proposed in time of peace, would have horrified the older generation of diplomats, and been regarded by them as fatal to Imperial unity. Unquestionably, they raise difficult problems in the international world, which will have to be handled with care. But the representation of the Dominions at the Peace Conference of 1919, and in the League of Nations, rendered it impossible for the old forms to be insisted on after the peace; and the new forms threshed out by the Imperial Conference of 1923 were merely a recognition of existing facts. Time does not permit of their description here; it is sufficient to say that, while according to each Dominion the right to negotiate separate treaties with its partner Dominions, and even with foreign Governments and Heads of States, care is taken to prevent any one of them being bound by the action of its fellows without its free consent, and to give to each a knowledge of the plans of the others, so as to afford it an opportunity for friendly representations in the interests of both and all. The practical step necessary to give effect to this precaution had in effect resulted from the frequent meetings of the Prime Ministers of the Empire during the progress of the war;

and the formal agreement entered into in 1918, that each of the Dominion Premiers might communicate directly with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, instead of, as formerly, through their respective Governors-General and the Colonial Office, also merely registered accomplished fact. The separate constitution of a Dominions Office in London under a separate Secretaryship of State in 1925, set the seal on these new arrangements.

Thus the Report of the Imperial Conference recently concluded, epoch-making as it is, is, so far as the Imperial Constitution is concerned, rather a record of achievement than a resolve to achieve. Like the famous Petition of Right, just three hundred years ago, it refuses to admit that it desires a change in the law; it claims only a solemn affirmation of rights already acquired, and a recognition of the consequences resulting therefrom. Happily, the analogy stops there; for there is now no hostile power against which the forces of freedom are gathered in array, but a gracious monarch bidding God-speed to the deliberations of the Conference, and extending a royal welcome to the statesmen of the Empire. The Conference itself has summed up the present position in words to which the emphasis of italics is given in the Report:

"They" (Great Britain and the Dominions) "are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

And to this declaration, we may be sure, there comes the response from the hearts of all the peoples of the Empire, in tones far different from those which coldly replied to the Petition of 1628: "*Soit droit fait, comme il est désiré.*"

In conclusion, it seems obviously desirable to anticipate two criticisms which this brief account of the work of the Imperial Conference may be expected to produce. We have heard a good deal of the Dominions; but the Dominions and the United Kingdom do not alone constitute the British Empire. What of British India, that Empire within an Empire, and what of the many Crown Colonies which include the vast populations of Ceylon and the West Indies, as well as other communities of lesser size and wealth? Again, what is likely to be the attitude to the new British Empire of the world outside its borders?

It is, of course, unnecessary to remark that British India and the Crown Colonies, though not enjoying the full self-government of the Dominions, are, with trifling exceptions, far removed in political status from the autocratically governed provinces of the ancient

Empires. The elaborate reforms introduced into the government of British India so recently as 1919 are still being worked out, and are due for revision in a few years' time. Obviously, therefore, it would have been unwise to bring them into discussion at the Conference. But the interests of British India were specially safeguarded by the presence of the Secretary of State, a great Indian territorial landowner, and a high official of the Viceroy's Government. The interests of the Crown Colonies and the Protectorates were advocated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whose desire to develop the vast potential resources of those communities of which he is, in a special sense, the trustee, is well known. Needless to say, the deliberations of the Conference were, in legal phrase, "without prejudice" to the legitimate aspirations of these communities towards further control of their own affairs, already considerable in many cases; while in the numerous non-constitutional discussions of the Conference, on economic, educational, defence, communication, settlement, scientific research, health, and other problems, they were continually envisaged. Even the Mandated Territories, entirely new features of the political world, in which three of the Dominions share the responsibilities of the Home Government, were by no means overlooked; though they form, strictly speaking, no part of the Empire. It was, indeed, in these many varied topics that the discussions of the Conference, for reasons stated above, were more novel and forward-looking, even than on the great subject of Imperial relations, which, as we have seen, had largely been settled by the facts of history. A glance at the numerous Reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees which dealt specially with these non-constitutional problems, recently published in official form, will show that the Conference was no oligarchy of superior authorities, sharing out between them the control of an inferior world, but a body of men of broad sympathies and far-sighted vision, planning for the spontaneous development of all the units which make up the Empire.


Even to a Briton, this vast collection of communities, of many races, religions, and tongues, ranging in civilisation from the mechanical elaboration of the Industrial Age to the primitive simplicity of the shepherd's hut and the ryot's barn, with a population far exceeding that of any other political aggregation, past or present, in the world's history, save, perhaps, China, must present a picture so full of diversity and apparent want of uniformity as to be incomprehensible without prolonged study. To the foreigner, it must be infinitely more bewildering. He is told that the whole British Empire owes allegiance to a single ruler, and, at the same time, that each part of it has its own government, which, in at least half-a-dozen conspicuous cases, is independent of central con-

trol. Can we be surprised that he suspects this arrangement to be a clever device for giving the British Empire a plural vote at international conferences? He asks for a copy of the official document containing the rules which govern this vast aggregation, and is told that there is no such thing. And yet he knows that, on a recent and unforgettable occasion, the whole of these loosely-compacted communities spoke with one tremendous voice, though he cannot identify the trumpet through which that voice shook the world.

The British Empire fits into no accepted category of political institutions. It has discarded the ancient bogey of sovereignty, without which, we have long been told, no State can exist. It is not a Republic; for it proudly acknowledges an hereditary monarch. Though it is, unquestionably, no longer a Unitary State, it claims to be a Commonwealth, that is, an entity designed to preserve and further the common weal or welfare. But welfare is an end in itself, while political institutions are merely means to that end. The British Empire is not even a federation; for, at any rate for the present, it has declined to delegate irrevocably any common powers to a specific body or person. The saying attributed to a profound and sympathetic student of British affairs, Alexis de Tocqueville, that "the British Constitution does not exist," is doubtless true in the sense in which he intended it; though we must remember that Tocqueville was a child of the French Revolution, perhaps the most dogmatic expression of political philosophy ever offered to the world. And the essence of dogma is that it regards progress, in certain directions at any rate, as closed; while, in politics at least, the Briton has been ever a pioneer. And, just as in the days, now three hundred years ago, when, with a whole New World opening before him, with its unknown dangers and its unlimited possibilities, the island adventurer set forth to build a new Britain in the lands and seas beyond the setting sun, so the Briton of to-day sets forth in the same spirit to build up a new Commonwealth, whose watch-words shall be freedom, peace, and prosperity for all.

But if, as a final word, I am asked what, in the future of the British Empire, is to take the place of that reliance upon military force which was the unstable foundation of the old Imperial unity, I would reply in two words: "sympathy and knowledge." Of the former, I have already said somewhat; and it is not easy to describe or analyse it. For sympathy is a spiritual force, and the spirit, like the wind, bloweth whither it listeth; ye hear the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh, or whither it goeth. Let us only be thankful that it is here, and each do his best to increase it. But, though I know little of physical science, he would be dull indeed who did not realise that every decade, almost every year, brings to birth

some new triumph of scientific achievement which may well play its part in solving the problems of Empire. With electric cables, airways, wireless telegraphy, long-distance telephones, and even television, at their command, is it fantastic to imagine that the future statesmen of the Empire, though they cannot, at a moment's notice, meet together in a room in London, or Ottawa, or Canberra, or Capetown, may yet hold deep counsel in an hour of emergency, actually noting each other's words, hearing each other's speech, and even seeing each other's faces? Would not the chief difficulty be to prevent unauthorised "listening in"? EDWARD JENKS.



ELECTIONS IN THE IRISH FREE STATE.

THE method of voting used in electing a Parliament is one of the important factors shaping the political history of our day. In no small measure it determines the fortunes of parties and of statesmen, the party complexion of parliament and of the government, the character of fiscal and other legislation, the trend of foreign policies. A comparative study of the methods of voting used in post-war elections, tracing their influence on human affairs, would be a fascinating task of incalculable value to political science. As a small contribution to this work, it is proposed in this article to examine the proportional system used in the Irish Free State for three general elections and to contrast it with the single-member system of Great Britain.

Let us begin by describing the proportional system used in the Irish Free State. Each county, generally speaking, is a constituency. Monaghan returns three members, Clare returns five, Dublin eight, and Galway nine, the number varying with the population. In each constituency, whatever the number of members, the elector has only one effective vote; he votes by placing the figure 1 against the name of the candidate he likes best; he may express as many additional choices as he desires by placing the figures 2, 3, and so on against the names of other candidates. The elector's vote is credited to the elector's first choice. The additional choices come into play only if the elector's first choice has more votes than he requires for election, or if, in the course of the counting of the votes, this candidate is eliminated from the contest as being at the bottom of the poll. The additional choices prevent the vote being wasted; they serve as instructions from the elector to the returning officer as to how the vote is, if at all, to be transferred. Every candidate who polls a defined proportion of the votes is elected. This proportion, which is the smallest that makes election certain, is called the quota. In the election of one member, the quota is one more than half; in the election of two, one more than a third; in the election of three, one more than a fourth, and so on.

The first P.R. general election took place in 1922, when terrorism was widespread. Before the election a pact was arranged between Michael Collins and De Valera, representing the pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty wings of Sinn Fein. It was agreed that the members of the then existing Dail, whatever their views on the Treaty, should be nominated as the Sinn Fein candidates in the constituencies for which they already sat. Under the single-member system this pact

would have controlled the election. Few, if any, independent candidates would have faced the risks involved in a personal contest with a nominee of the pact. The opinion of the country would have remained unknown. The deadlock over giving effect to the Treaty would have continued.

The proportional system had a double effect. First, it smashed the pact. Take County Galway as an example. The nine sitting members for the County were nominated as the agreed Sinn Fein candidates. Under P.R., with several representatives to be elected together, the candidates are brought less sharply into personal opposition one with the other. An independent non-Sinn Fein candidate challenged the panel. This forced an election over the whole county. The electors put the figure 1 against their first choices, and this method of voting revealed whether they preferred a pro-Treaty or an anti-Treaty candidate. Elsewhere Independent, Labour or Farmer candidates ventured to stand. A large majority of the first choices were for pro-Treaty candidates; the elector's wishes, revealed by P.R., made possible the functioning of the Provisional Government. Secondly, having made an election possible, P.R. gave fair representation to majority and minority alike.

Compare this Irish P.R. election with the British election of 1918. Prior to the British election a pact was entered into, as in Ireland. Sir George Younger and Captain Guest discussed the terms privately. Captain Guest asked that 150 constituencies should be reserved for Coalition Liberal candidates; Sir George Younger replied "Take your 150." The electors of Great Britain knew nothing of this arrangement until three years later; the single-member system left them helpless. Five and a half millions voted for the Coalition, and four millions against. The four millions were deprived of the services of their leaders as well as of their due share of representation. At a time in the world's history when soberness of view, expressed within Parliaments, would have been of the utmost value, the single-member system silenced the minorities almost completely.

The second election in the Irish Free State took place in 1923. The Provisional Parliament had been engaged in framing the Constitution. The peaceful character of this election was the subject of universal comment. The result endorsed the verdict of the election of 1922; it brought out the steadiness of the people in respect of the Treaty; and this revelation of steadiness gave confidence to the Government and to the nation, assisting the new State in its progress towards stabilisation. These two P.R. elections were held in quick succession; two elections took place in Great Britain also in quick succession, in 1922 and 1923. The figures for the British elections were:

Great Britain: General Elections 1922 and 1923.
Contested Borough and County Seats.

Party	Votes		Seats	
	1922	1923	1922	1923
Conservatives ...	5,381,433	5,394,295	296	216
Other Parties ...	8,781,438	8,882,687	251	337
Totals ...	14,162,871	14,276,982	547	553

In the first of these elections the Conservatives, with a minority of votes, obtained a substantial majority of the seats; in the second, each of the parties secured a share of the seats that was almost strictly proportionate to the votes. The votes were distributed over the country in a different way, but the figures show that the total numbers of the seats contested and of the votes recorded were about the same in both years, whilst the Conservative poll also remained almost unchanged. The steadiness in voting in Ireland in two successive years was reflected, under P.R., in a similar steadiness in representation; under the single-member system it was made clear that a vital change could take place in the representation without any change in the totals of the votes.

In 1924 the British system gave an overwhelming majority of seats to a party which polled less than half the votes. Great Britain is now looking forward to a fresh election. No one can say whether the result will correspond with the votes, as in 1923, or whether, as in 1918, 1922, and 1924, the views of the nation will be distorted. Nor can anyone foresee the party character of the distortion, or whether the distortion will be serious or insignificant. The single-member system is an electoral machine the results of which it is beyond the power of a nation to control.

Let us proceed to a more detailed examination of the Irish election held in June, 1927. There was much uncertainty as to the trend of public opinion. The Government had been in office for four years; it had done excellent work, but, to use the words of President Cosgrave, it had trodden upon the corns of many. There was much dissatisfaction. Would it outweigh appreciation of the work done? In any case, there were present all the elements making for a swing of the pendulum. Few were confident as to the result. I ventured, however, upon two prophecies: (1) that most of the outstanding personalities would be re-elected; (2) that representation would be in reasonable correspondence with the votes polled. Both prophecies were fulfilled.

Every member of the Government, save one, was re-elected. Mr. de Valera, Mr. Johnson of the Labour Party, Mr. Baxter of the Farmers, and Mr. Redmond, were also re-elected. They were not re-elected automatically; they were elected by the votes, mostly first choices, of the citizens. Nor was there any automatic re-election

of the old members of the Dail; there are many new members. But under P.R. the electors retain for service, if they so wish, the nation's strong personalities. The single-member system often bludgeons these out of public life. In Canada, in October, 1925, Mr. Mackenzie King and eight of his colleagues were thrown out; eleven months afterwards Mr. Meighen and six of his colleagues were defeated. The fairness of the representation can be illustrated both from individual constituencies and from the national totals. County Dublin may serve as an example; to compare the result in this county with that in an English county, say Kent, is illuminating:

County Dublin—1927. (Proportional representation.)			County of Kent—1924. (Single-member areas.)		
Party	Votes	Seats	Party	Votes	Seats
Government	22,685	3	Unionist	245,913	15
De Valera	16,012	2	Labour	101,703	0
Independents	15,989	2	Liberal	62,540	0
Labour	9,623	1			
National League	3,844	0			
Sinn Fein	1,937	0			
Totals	70,090	8	Totals	410,156	15

In Dublin all parties secured representation with the exception of the two smallest groups, each with less than half a quota of votes. In Kent, Labour with four quotas, Liberals with two, were suppressed. In Great Britain large tracts of the country are monopolised by one party; so also in Canada. The single-member system created a brick wall in Ireland between the north and south; P.R. has destroyed the possibility of any new division between east and west; every county returns a mixed representation.

The figures for the whole nation were:

Irish Free State General Election, 1927.

Party	Votes	Seats won	Seats in proportion to votes
Government ...	314,684	46	42
De Valera ...	299,626	44	40
Labour ...	143,087	22	19
Independents ...	139,679	14	19
Farmers ...	109,114	11	14
National League ...	84,048	8	11
Sinn Fein ...	41,436	5	5
Ind. Republican ...	9,215	2	1
Clann Eireann ...	5,567	0	1
Totals ...	1,147,356	152	152

The three large parties each secured a few seats more than their due share. The Farmers, the National League, and particularly the Independents (who were in no sense a party) fell short. The ex-

planation is simple. The supporters of the smaller parties and of the various Independents were in many counties too few to elect their man; their second choices became effective and these were often for candidates of the larger parties.

Three successive general elections under P.R. have shown that opinion in Ireland towards the Treaty is remarkably steady; that parties secure representation very nearly proportionate to their votes; that the larger parties gain slightly; that there is no suppression of large bodies of opinion; that an Independent is returned if he represents a considerable section in his constituency. In counties Donegal, Monaghan, and Dublin, Independents represent the old Unionist minority; these citizens are brought into association with the life of the new State through representatives of their own choosing.

What would have happened under the single-member system? Mr. Kevin O'Higgins expressed to me the view that the existence of Farmer, Labour and other pro-Treaty groups prevented the Government from getting an absolute majority. It was more generally held that these groups acted as safety valves, enabling citizens who were dissatisfied with the Government to vote pro-Treaty without being compelled to vote for a Government nominee. Mr. Johnson, the Labour leader, had no doubt that Labour electors would, in the absence of Labour candidates, have voted against the Government. Even under P.R., anti-Treaty representation increased from 46 to 51. Clearly, there was more than a possibility, many said a certainty, that a single-member system would have swept away many additional members of the Government party. One point deserves special consideration. The *Irish Statesman* said, "The success of Labour was the brightest spot in the election. It was a clean victory, won . . . by the admirable record of the Party in the Dail." Labour is in a minority everywhere; its twenty-two members come from eighteen areas. Under the single-member system Mr. Johnson and the whole of his colleagues would almost certainly have been defeated.

There are already some indications of the influence of P.R. on the functioning of the new Dail and of the Government. The *Irish Times* (June 24th) wrote:

"The changes in the fifth Dail will be changes of manner and method rather than of measures and we predict that they will be changes for the better . . . the forthcoming debates will reveal a novel temper of moderation and compromise."

The Political Correspondent of the *Irish Independent* (July 1st) said:

"Two days of active parliamentary work show that the system has . . . its advantages. . . . The front Government bench has enjoyed the breezy exchanges . . . between Farmers and

Labour. . . . The indications are that there will be more plain speaking from the non-Government benches on affairs of State than ever before. A two-party system would be unlikely to produce such a useful type of debate, and it is also probably true that many advocates of the system would soon regret the change if it could be introduced at the will of the House to-morrow."

So far the Dail. As to Government, Mr. Cosgrave, with the approval of the Dail and of the nation, continues in office. The other pro-Treaty groups are not necessarily hostile, always voting against the Government; they express important elements in the national life and add to the value of Parliament. It is already being suggested that the Government may function for another full term. There is no reason why it should not do so. It would not be human if it did not make mistakes, but, when fresh elections come, P.R. will make possible any adjustments in representation that the nation desires without impairing the steadiness so markedly shown in respect of the Treaty. The single-member system would introduce uncertainty, undermining the national credit.

No one party has secured an absolute majority in the Dail, and therefore, say some critics, P.R. has failed. But the single-member system, when used in France, in Germany, in Holland, and in other countries, likewise failed to give an absolute majority to any one party. To-day, it does not give an absolute majority in many of the British Dominions. It failed to do so in Great Britain in 1923; it will probably fail again at the next election. Democracy is confronted with a problem which is arising from the new political conditions of our day. It is a universal problem and the old theories of government are inadequate for its solution. P.R. helps by introducing elements of order and steadiness; representation in accord with opinion is assured. Statesmen, recognising that with P.R. new elections will produce similar results, are dealing with this problem in the light of the current requirements of their country. In Belgium there is a government of all three parties; in Germany a government of several parties; in Sweden and in the Irish Free State a government of a single party.

The shooting of Mr. O'Higgins, so much to be deplored, is a reminder that the civil war has left behind it bitter memories still unappeased. Nevertheless, the progress that Ireland has made is remarkable. P.R. does not promise a millennium, but, in elections and in the organisation of representative institutions, it tends to replace passion with reason. Under this system the Free State has progressed from widespread terrorism in 1922 towards a true parliamentary régime in 1927. This record is in itself a triumphant vindication of the political philosophy that seeks to establish rational foundations for parliaments.

JOHN H. HUMPHREYS.

A NOTABLE SWISS NOVELIST.

AFTER the days of Jean Jacques and Madame de Staël, the spring of romance seemed to run dry in La Suisse Romande. Geneva provided distinguished historians, philosophers, theologians, scientists and certain minor poets, but the domain of fiction was left without worthy representatives. No one took us into those tall stone terrace houses with their green outside-shutters and mansard roofs. No one unlocked the big gates of those well-kept miniature parks, enclosing country houses with little towers and terraces and high *perrons*, and wrought-iron balconies and railings, and a profusion—but always a trim profusion—of mauve wistaria and white acacia, and rose-red geranium. No one introduced us to their capable châtelaines, or to the men who, morning after morning, issue from their portals to labour in the neighbouring banks and offices and university. No one showed us delicious pictures of a blue lake and misty mountains, and made us feel that, like the landscape distances of certain Venetian and Umbrian painters, these backgrounds gave a meaning and significance to the human figures in the foreground.

M. Jacques Chenevière thus possesses a very great advantage. He has been able to supply a want, long, if dimly, felt, alike by his compatriots and by foreign readers.

Not till the spring of 1926 did he find his real public and his proper *genre*. Previous to the appearance of his notable *Messagers Inutiles* he was better known in Paris than in Geneva, and his French environment influenced his characterisation, though not his conceptions. Both were distinguished and unusual. Among the heavy crop of fiction which sprang up after the war, reproducing it, rooted in it, blood-tinctured by it, Chenevière's first romance, *L'Île Deserte*, stood out, a clean strong plant, uncoloured by patriotism, unspotted by political animus. It was essentially the product of a neutral land, rooted and grounded in pure fancy, yet discovering fruits of ripe psychology.

Desert Islands have caught the inward eye and served the purposes of novelists from the remote times of Defoe to the day before yesterday of Rose Macaulay; Chenevière, however, not only uses novel and highly up-to-date machinery, but he evinces an uncommon interest in his puppets' return to civilisation. They descend upon their fertile isle in the Pacific by means of a parachute, despatched from an aeroplane endangered by violent contrary winds—two *naufragés*, of opposite sexes and opposite characters; the man simple, brusque, sincere; the woman complex, sophisticated, essentially a *poseuse*. Their mutual relations, and their respective reactions to the primitive life of the island, and then to the ultra-civilisation

of Paris—where, to the disgust of the man and the delight of the woman, they are interviewed and lionised—are depicted with a delicate satire, a psychological acumen and a picturesqueness of phrase which assured the immediate success of the book in France, and gave a fair promise of the author's future development.

Perhaps his public were a little disappointed with his longer romance, *Jouvence ou la Chimère*, which appeared in 1922. In it, Chenevière elaborated a fantastic and arresting theme; a theme which might have been conceived by H. G. Wells, who would certainly have invested it with more scientific *vraisemblance*, though with less human pathos. His protagonists—again a man and a woman of contrasting temperaments—are introduced to us in a laboratory at Amsterdam. Françoise Meriel, after a stormy youth, has found serenity and satisfaction in scientific work. Nivard, the man, has never been young; he is a mere "intellectual," with a great power of application. They have aided Lerta in his search for a compound capable not only of arresting but of effacing the ravages of time in the human frame. On the eve of the final experiment, the Master dies, leaving to his pupils elaborate instructions and solemn injunctions. Loyal to his memory they inject themselves with the liquid they have named Lertine, and after prolonged sleep complete renovation of their tissues is effected. They feel, and appear, young people of two and twenty. Lerta had enjoined secrecy, caution and delay in the publication of his discovery; and obedience to his instructions compels his pupils to conceal themselves from previous acquaintances. Their former close companionship becomes, under their new conditions of life, irksome and impossible. Rejuvenescence moreover works diversely on the two sexes. The woman is intoxicated with a restored *joie de vivre*; the man exults in an infinite extension of the time and power to amass knowledge. Mademoiselle Meriel travels; moving on when new-made friends become inquisitive; associating chiefly with people of her own apparent age. But between her and the love of youth and maid stand old memories and her strange secret; with her Marpessa's reason for refusing union with a god is inverted; she is cut off from marriage with one "who would age beside her." She comes to envy the mother, the grandmother, the aged, the feeble.

Nivard, as the years pass, is brought by other roads to feel the curse of unnaturally prolonged juvenility; his learned *confrères* treat him as a youngster; his knowledge appears stale and unprofitable. He fears to make known the discovery of Lertine till he can also announce an antidote to its effects, and he fails to discover one. He and Françoise Meriel, unique specimens of humanity, are again and again thrown back upon one another, but the fear of transmitting their fatal characteristic prevents their union. We leave

them mutually pledged not to commit suicide singly, since the survivor would be left in terrible isolation, and trusting faintly in the "larger hope" of a God who watches over, and limits, the existence of his creatures.

In order to convey to the readers the horror which grows on the two old-young people as the years pass on, a succession of experiences must of necessity be related. Nevertheless, *Jouvence* is needlessly and tediously drawn out, and much of the diaries and dialogues might be cut. On the other hand, one would gladly have a few more of the graceful little *paysages* drawn with a few simple touches, which anticipate the lakeside pictures of the *Messagers Inutiles*. Chenevière brings his errant heroine to the shores of Lake Lemman; and a twilight at Ouchy and a glowing autumn afternoon at Vevey are backgrounds for the most poignant episodes in her long career.

In 1924 Chenevière published four short stories under the collective—and rather misleading—title *Innocences*. The fourth story is the least satisfactory. The third, *Elsie*—the name of an English dancer in Paris—has much delicate sentiment. The second, *Bonshommes de Neige*, perfectly conveys the atmosphere, at once healthful and corrupt, of a palatial winter sports hotel, "where it is as hot as the Riviera at midday, and where they dance as one does at Montmartre."

The first story, *Les Principes de Tante Aurore*, is the gem of the collection, and a gem of the first water. Delicate in conception, vivid in characterisation, it has a delightful *mise-en-scène* in an old Provençal house and garden, where Tante Aurore dwells with a faithful woman servant and an old henchman, neither of whom has ever travelled further than Tarascon. Tante Aurore, with her fine wrinkled skin, her bright blue eyes, her measured speech and quaint graceful phrases, is dignified, almost intimidating, in spite of her dowdy gown and grey woollen shawl. A very old maid, her heart keeps fresh and green a youthful romance, nipped in the bud by parental prudence and that formidable French institution, the *conseil de famille*. She has a penchant for her nephew and godson, Philippe, who now and then receives from her "a nice little cheque" or quaint gifts in kind, which keep alive in his memory the Provençal garden which had been the Eden of his childhood. She addresses him invariably as "mauvais sujet," for an embittered spinster cousin occasionally brings back from Paris quite groundless stories of his "wildness." From no other relatives does she receive news of the family, since her wealthy bourgeois brother-in-law, Philippe's father, writes her down an eccentric, and "dismisses her from his mind as completely as though she were already dead and buried." He indeed forgets her so completely that he does

not send her an announcement of his son's marriage—an omission which has curious consequences.

Sitting in the sunny garden under the "great" fig-tree (which seems to have grown so much smaller since Philippe's childhood), she tells him that she had at first been indignant when she received his note asking if he and Lison might pay her a little visit.

"At first I said to myself I would not answer your letter; then that I would say 'Come, but come alone.' And then I thought it was dear of you not to forget a lonely old woman who has always loved you. I have had my dreams, my regrets; and the spring is so beautiful this year—the violets perfume the evenings. And I said: 'Let them come, both of them. Who will know, or be worse for it?' Only remember I have my own principles. Don't talk to me of your 'wife'; don't lie to me, or you will make me forget my folly of the spring—my last spring, perhaps; my whim to receive you here, *petits coupables*, among my flowers."

So Philippe is forced to tell his lawful wife that Tante Aurore receives her as his mistress; and Lison, at first virtuously indignant, fortunately possesses a sense of humour. She acquiesces in the illusion of Tante Aurore, and acts her rôle to the amusement of her husband. Days of love in idleness pass by, uncounted, full of sunshine and enchantment, both for the young couple and for the aged romantic who gloats over their happiness. Only Celeste, the maid, who had nursed Philippe as a child, is uneasy as she notes her mistress's failing strength. One evening the doctor is sent for, and after his visit, Tante Aurore, stretched on her long chair, has a long talk with the *mauvais sujet*. She tells him she is leaving her little property to him, as "a place to be happy in." Next morning when Celeste opens the shutters Tante Aurore lifts herself to smile on the new day, and falls back on her pillows, dead. "Lison," said Philippe, holding a little warm hand, "it would be better not to tell the secret of Tante Aurore." Lison reflected a moment; then said with childish fervour: "No, indeed. Because people might not understand, and one would not for the world have anyone laugh at her."

Neither the charm of *Les Principes de Tante Aurore* nor the skillful development of fantastic hypotheses in *L'Île Deserte* and *Jouvence* had prepared Chenevière readers for the fine technique of his *Messagers Inutiles* published in the spring of 1926. The diffuseness and occasional prosiness of *Jouvence* have been replaced by a condensation, a rapidity of movement, an apparent simplicity, which make it impossible to give a satisfactory *résumé* or adequate impression of the book. Every phrase reveals a fresh aspect of a character, or of the crisis which occurs in the limited, artificial society in which Chenevière's *dramatis personæ* move and have their being. This crisis—the love of a man for his sister-in-law, their flight together from Geneva to Rome, their divorce and marriage—might

seem the theme of a *roman passionnel*, but Chenevière's purpose is not to study the emotions of the *revoltés*, but to show the effect of their revolt upon an onlooker. To this end he makes frequent and effective use of dialogue, and as we read some of his admirably-constructed and highly emotional conversations, we wonder if his next success may not be scored as a dramatist.

The *Messagers Inutiles* has an uncommon and arresting prologue. We are taken to a Boy Scouts' Camp among pine woods above Lake Lemman, and we watch two Scout sections—the Kangaroos and the Beavers—collecting wood, fetching water, making fires, boiling their soup, under the supervision of the instructors. The conversation of these young men, Pellerin and Darel, introduces us to the protagonist of the book, Daniel Mercier, the Scout-master, who arrives late, and is received with enthusiasm. He is as happy in the camp as are the boys. He reads Kipling to them as they sit round the fire after supper, makes the youngest recite the Scout Law, and lies down to sleep beside them.

In Mercier's veins is the blood of hard-working country folk. But his self-made father had been an esteemed theologian, a University professor, and Daniel reveals his ancestry by a certain rusticity of bearing and abruptness of speech, combined with that nobility of expression which is produced by intellectual superiority and moral rectitude. He is a hard worker, the friend and the pride of his beloved widowed mother; and a born educator. It is his joy to feel himself useful to children, "so many of whom have no one to help them." His religious beliefs are vague—confused rather than clarified by his theological studies; but he has a few strong convictions. To be sincere and self-respecting, to abstain from causing suffering or inconvenience to others, to reject the easy path of dalliance, to prefer hardness, "ce que nous rend plus fort," these have become his rules of conduct. He is "un mystique de la droiture," but none the less sociable and affectionate. As a child without brother or sister, he had attached himself warmly to certain of his schoolmates—and in democratic Switzerland there had been nothing to prevent him from forming close friendships with boys whose circumstances differed widely from his own; and in whose houses he had "learned the influence of tradition."

Among these are the Lavigny brothers, tall, good-looking, athletic, similar in appearance, but unlike in character. Horace, the younger by some years, is timid, dependent, without initiative. Marc, the elder, is the "strong, silent man," whose business, or businesses, are extremely flourishing. He has "married well," too; but Paulette Sauvallon is as empty-headed and hearted as she is elegant and pretty. She is a curious contrast to her younger sister Myriam, and never "gets on" with her. A tomboy as a child,

when she fished and bathed and boated and walked with "the boys," in adolescence Myriam became serious and intellectual, and acquired a certain "proud dignity which inspired respect." She took her degree at Lausanne University; she worked as a librarian in England; and she broke off an engagement considered entirely suitable by her family. Her frank, independent, ardent nature makes her a square peg in the round hole of a prosperous, conventional home, where "no one ever does what is not done." Her father—learned, able, benevolent, pompous, and formal in manner—is a respected pillar of Genevoise society. Her mother is a fine woman, stately and well-dressed even at the breakfast table, charitable and kindly according to her lights, an admirable mistress of the family mansion which is her appropriate setting.

In this mansion, Lullinges, with its broad terraces, its well-kept gardens, its enchanting views of the blue lake, the entire family is gathered for the summer, and there they are joined by Horace Lavigny (Madame Sauvallon's godson), who is on holiday from a Swiss bank in Paris.

With consummate skill, by means of tête-à-tête conversations between the new arrival and his old friends, combined with glimpses of the family dinner-table, of re-unions on the sunny terrace for tea, of saunterings through the moonlit garden, M. Chenevière makes us intimately acquainted with the characters and sentiments of his *dramatis personæ*, and leads us to perceive the under-currents of these seemingly placid existences. Gradually, but not too completely, he prepares us for the storm which bursts upon Lullinges—for all the commotion which follows the flight of Myriam and Marc. The latter was well-known to have a business call to Milan. The former was ostensibly going to friends who had rented a chalet in the high mountains. Carelessly, before the family assembled on the terrace in the evening dusk, Marc suggested that he might take his sister-in-law part of the way in his car, and she quietly accepted the offer. The fugitives as they left Geneva posted letters to Madame Sauvallon, and Horace. Marc declares that he and Paulette have never loved. He and Myriam have long been unhappy. She leaves absolutely pure to begin a new life.

The bomb-shell reveals the characters of the family in which it has burst. Paulette is lachrymose, pettish, spiteful; she refuses to desire or even contemplate the fugitives' return. The parents are momentarily overwhelmed, then indignant, then preoccupied with measures for avoiding scandal. Horace is shaken and pathetic. He seeks for Daniel, who will tell them all what to do. Mercier is touched by the confidence his own loyalty inspires. He—the least apparently concerned—is the only one interested in the psychological aspect of the crisis, the only one filled with solicitude for a

girl who appears to be wrecking her life. It is agreed that he and Horace should pursue the guilty pair to Rome and attempt their conversion.

They are, of course, Useless Messengers. Marc and Myriam declare that their flight has not been caused by sudden and hasty passion, but by dislike of concealment and hypocrisy, and that they are leaving no broken hearts, inflicting no irreparable wounds. Not yet does Myriam realise the truth which is the pivot of the novel, that "the consequences of any act are sometimes seen most clearly by and in spectators." Their first glimpse of "Love naked and unashamed" combined with the glamour of Rome at once affects the Messengers. Horace is irritable, intimidated. He is thrown back on a long-standing flirtation with a girl of "his own set," Clarie Alliseau, "une vraie jeune fille pure et tendre," so different altogether from this strange, radiant, brazen Myriam. For the first time, too, Daniel appears unsympathetic. There is constraint between the friends. Daniel is in fact profoundly perturbed. The Scoutmaster, who has taught his boys "on ne transige pas avec la ligne droite," has been overwhelmed by the aspect of triumphant passion; his *morale* seems dissolving in the voluptuous softness of a Roman summer. He tramps the maze of ancient streets; and when, in the evening, his hotel porter hands him two letters from Geneva, he realises that he is separated from it by something more than a twenty-five hours' journey. A demand for advice from an old Boy Scout, and an offer of a coveted post in a great educational establishment, suddenly appear preposterous.

The post is declined soon after his return to Geneva: for "to guide others one must see clearly, and I do not know where I am myself." The little rift widens between Daniel and Horace as the latter drifts towards a conventional marriage; and the spitefulness of Paulette, and her parents' satisfaction at discovering that a divorce is imminent in another of the "best" families of Geneva, fill the *Messenger Inutile* with disgust. Contrasted with the smallness of these outwardly correct lives, the courage of the *révoltés* seems magnificent. It gives the measure of their worth. Persons whom Virgil would have consigned to the iron sway of Rhadamanthus, "those who dared a monstrous sin and attained to what they dared," gradually assume heroic proportions in Daniel's mind. His sense of moral values is completely confused. He quits Geneva and finds a situation in a publishing house in Paris.

Three years later Mercier journeys to Rome again. Marc has offered him a post: Myriam has written: "Rome is lovely in September." The two are "properly" married. Marc's affairs called him to the United States a few weeks after their flight. Myriam remained alone in Rome: the divorce proceedings went quietly

through. The families Sauvallin, Lavigny and Alliseau, grateful to the *révoltés* for their unexpected discretion, have ceased to view them with bitterness.

Daniel Mercier, entering the Marc Lavigny's flat with considerable emotion, finds there the placid domesticity and bourgeois comfort he had seen in Horace's new villa on the outskirts of Geneva. Marc and Myriam across the dinner-table recommend him to marry exactly as Horace and his Claire had done.

Alone with Marc he alludes to his former visit. Marc points out that though "one certainly cares a great deal about something for which one has risked everything," yet storms and cataclysms are not essential to happiness; and "all that is past and done with." Alone with Myriam he cannot help alluding again to that event of three years ago, "which had revealed to him a person he had not known before," a person who had become himself. Myriam is aghast at discovering "how much harm one may do without knowing it." She and Marc "had done a mad thing once; but revolt is only a crisis." "Life takes hold of one again, and forces one back to common sense." The sadness in her voice, the flush on her cheeks, are for Daniel a sudden revelation and a hope. He loves this companion of his youth, this girl he had respected, this *révoltée* he had condemned. He draws her close to him, he feels her heart beating against his. Then she gently pushes him away. She has seen that "*tout passe*," and she tells him that by and by he and she "will think of each other quite differently," that it is not she "whom he seeks, but an illusion."

Back in his mother's flat in Geneva, Daniel is sought for by one of his former Scout friends, who comes to tell him he is in love with the sister of another ex-Boy Scout. She is a sweet girl; the two families would be pleased. Daniel, after asking a few questions, suggests that Pellerin "does not love enough to risk the adventure of matrimony." And then, speaking haltingly but with arresting earnestness, he adds:

"Don't forget this—I don't say it only in reference to love—what you call love—but it seems to me a truth to be borne in mind, always: It is not only ourselves, or those obviously connected with us, who have to bear the consequences of our actions, but sometimes people about us, mere onlookers, whom we never think about at all. And they have no protection from us, and they cannot complain or even let us know what we have done to them. Don't forget this ever."

The interview with this clean, wholesome boy, who belonged to his old work, who had looked up to him, reacts beneficially on Mercier. He feels that experience has at least given him additional power to help the young, and that he can still enjoy their company.

In the nick of time he is again offered an important educational post ; and this time he accepts it.

The book ends with a slightly cynical sketch of the christening of the infant son of Claire and Horace in the Maccabees Chapel of Geneva Cathedral, and of the fashionable reception which follows the religious ceremony. The newly-made " citizen of Geneva and of the Kingdom of Heaven " becomes a centre of family reconciliation. Marc tips the nurse, and Myriam kisses the child. The brothers exchange amiable platitudes ; the sisters compliment each other on their looks and their clothes. Paulette is congratulated by the guests on her approaching marriage, and Daniel on his recent appointment as sub-director of the Institut Romand. M. Sauvallon makes a speech, and *sotto voce* asks Daniel if he thinks " everything has gone off well." The Marc Lavignys offer him a lift back in their car. He accepts ; and as it rolls along he laughs " quietly and without bitterness." " What amuses you, Daniel?" asks Myriam. " Everything," he replies, " most of all myself."

" He laughs quietly and without bitterness " : this is precisely the gesture of the author, as he rings down the curtain, and puts away his puppets ; the re-instated couple, the deserted wife, the conventional parents, the timid brother, the " useless emissary " who has passed through spiritual *bouleversement*, disillusionment, disgust, to a temper of amused tolerance, beneath which we discern the shaping of the " firmer mind."

LAURA M. RAGG.

A THEOLOGY OF PARADOX.

THE theology that characterised the nineteenth century was the theology of Liberalism. It took many forms, from the Modernism of Loisy and Tyrrell in the Roman Church to the various groups of Broad Churchmen in Anglicanism, and the emancipated speculation of the " religionsgeschichtlich " school in Germany. But it held throughout that Christ must be studied in relation to all our knowledge, both of the documents and of the history of Christianity, and to all that psychology and science can tell us ; only through varying conceptions of the truth can we arrive at truth itself.

The war destroyed our easy complacency in human judgments of value. Life for vast multitudes on the continent (to an extent which we in England find it hard to understand) became a mystery and a horror. Men were no longer at home in the world, but strangers and pilgrims in a desert. Towards the close of the war appeared Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, one of those books which are felt immediately to be saying what everyone is waiting to hear. God, in all genuine religion, so it affirmed, has been felt to be something absolutely different from His worshippers. His holiness (His fundamental characteristic) means the impossibility of approaching Him. The very thought of Him fills us with awe and a kind of weird creeping fear. In support of this, Otto could point to the beliefs of primitive peoples, to Durga in India or the Eumenides in Greece, to the terror inspired by Jehovah in the Old Testament, and even in many passages (usually dismissed somewhat lightly) in the New. Yet this mystery, like other terrible things, draws us even while it frightens us. It fascinates or bewitches us. A bridge over the gulf is thrown from the other side. God draws man, shrinking yet acquiescent and even eager. Man is " divinised " (to use Otto's rather cumbrous term) ; and becomes united with the wholly dissimilar and transcendent divine.

There were many reasons for the popularity of the book. It appealed to the interest in ethnology and anthropology which had become almost a passion in many quarters in Germany as in England. It synchronised and co-operated with the very natural reaction in those dark years against the confident rationalism which had been the gospel of Germany to Europe. But for the more serious minds who turned to Otto with enthusiasm, the book was a challenge to Liberalism. It expressed all their half-unconscious dissatisfaction with that easy-going attitude. " We do *not* reach God," it taught them to say, " by easy stages. We do *not* know what He is ; we never can know, until He comes to seize us in His mysterious grasp."

In 1918, the first year after the publication of the first edition of Otto's book, appeared another work which also produced an

instant effect in Germany, Karl Barth's *Epistle to the Romans*. Barth had been for seven years a pastor of the German Reformed Church at Safenwil in Switzerland. He has been subsequently professor of Reformed Theology in Göttingen and Münster. The book is not a commentary in the ordinary sense. In fact, the author's refusal to pay any attention to the usual topics of historical, literary and textual criticism, has made his reviewers, accustomed to the "scientific" work of most German professors, very angry; and his habit of assuming that his views are also the views of Paul is perhaps more appropriate to the pulpit than to the study. He does not acknowledge Otto as a leader; his system must have been forming in his mind long before he could have read Otto's work; but thought and language suggest Otto on almost every page.

His general position can best be understood if we start from three statements which, in one form or another, meet us constantly. (1) God is entirely different from ourselves, and we have no means of approaching Him. (2) His sphere is wholly distinct from ours; and to reach it (if we could) we should have to leave wholly behind us the world we know. (3) All things are from God. The initiative is His. We are helpless. As so many propositions, these may not appear very startling. Indeed, it would be difficult to deny them. But Barth will allow no complementary truths. Instead, he insists on drawing from his statements all the deductions of which they are capable. As living in a sphere wholly apart from God, we are all sinners. The wrath of God abides on us. Our life is one long death. We can only escape if God Himself, august and terrifying as He is, breaks in upon us and forces us to die to our present existence, that we may live. He meets our "Yes" with an eternal "No"; and until we can echo His "No," we cannot pass from our death on this side to the only true life on that. Barth's theology is thus, as he and his friends have called it, a theology of crisis. There is no gradual advance to salvation. "Yes or No; which? Decide on the instant!" It is also a theology of paradox. Life there is death here. While (and because) God is infinitely removed from us, He comes to us; and at the moment when we know ourselves to be sinners, plunged beneath His anger, we are saved.

The "comparative method" is thus of no value. Truth is "positive" (a favourite word of Barth's) or it is nothing. Barth (like many of his opponents) claims to be a follower of Luther. But the Luther whom he follows is the earlier Luther: the Luther who, at Rome and Erfurt, was overwhelmed by the majesty of God; who knew that all human righteousness was as filthy rags, who lay helpless beneath the dark cloud of God's just anger, and who, by faith, was saved just when he knew himself to be a guilty, lost and undone sinner. It was not the Luther who (as Barth holds) became

later on unfaithful to his first clear vision; who began to lay stress on vocation in this life, and on the accomplishment of the service of God in the service of his fellow-men, who taught the church to look for support and authority to the State, or who inspired the genial piety which would gradually entice society into obedience to the Sermon on the Mount.

But there is a later thinker to whom Barth often appeals, and whom he perhaps understood far better. The Danish theologian, Søren Kierkegaard, has been almost unknown in England, as in Germany; but Barth's influence has already begun to re-direct attention to one of the most pathetic and haunting figures of the earlier half of the last century. Born in 1813, Kierkegaard was the son of a small landowner, a Moravian of a deeply religious and melancholy temperament, who was already at his son's birth an old man. The father made the boy his close companion, and destined him for the church. But the boy was haunted by the thought of some sin he fancied himself to have committed; he tore himself from an engagement to a beautiful girl who might well have made him happy; and in later life, while he wrote assiduously, he became more and more of a recluse, known by his contemporaries in Copenhagen only to be misunderstood and ridiculed. He died in 1855, a voice crying in the wilderness.

The whole contention of his life, as a recent biographer has remarked, might be summed up in three words, inwardness, individuality, and paradox. No human aims could have any meaning, he felt, for one who was really religious. Official Christianity, as he called it, was not Christianity at all, for it wholly misunderstood God, and the "infinite qualitative difference" (the phrase constantly recurs) which separates God, the wholly unknown, the Being without predicates, from His creatures. This leads to the paradox that in Christ we must see at one and the same time a person who, like other human beings, embodies in Himself the principle of autonomy and self-direction, and also a being who, as God, personifies the opposite principle, of heteronomy, or devotion to another. In Christ these two "qualitatively different natures" are united. The barrier is impassable; yet it is passed! Suffering, again, becomes "a mysterious *incognito* of blessedness under the conditions of our life in time." His very solitude, his unhappy love-affair, the attacks made on him in the press and by the church, only helped him, as he thought, to press deeper into the meaning of Christianity, and to discover the secret of pain. It was his work to be a sacrifice in the cause of true religion. And God Himself, Who was love, was yet his mortal foe.

Ideas like these, coming to life again in the mind of Barth, will perhaps explain the special appeal made to Barth by the Russian

novelist Dostoievsky, or rather by a striking passage in Dostoievsky's well-known novel, *The Brothers Karamazoff*. The author daringly describes an interview between Jesus, once more incarnate on earth and promptly made a prisoner, and the "Grand Inquisitor" before whose bar He is summoned. Jesus, as once before Pilate, stands silent; but the Inquisitor attacks Him at once, as ignorant and impracticable. "You have imagined," he says in effect, "that you could bring freedom to men, that you could bid them choose and struggle and conquer. Vain hope! How little you know that this gift of yours would be their destruction, that they would fling themselves on one another till their greed and hate had killed them all. How much wiser is the church which takes from them their freedom, assigns them their duties, leaves them all they could ask of opportunity for their own pleasures, and keeps them, and the world, at peace." That is exactly how Kierkegaard thought of his ecclesiastical opponents; and that, Barth constantly suggests, is how the wisdom of man opposes itself to the ruthless "No" of God.

Barth, however, is no recluse. He has made himself the leader of a movement, and the members of his group, Gogarten, Brunner, Thurneisen, and others, by the vigour of the replies which they have aroused, as well as by their own combative and provocative tone, have shown that they mean to challenge our modern Protestant and "liberal" thought at its centre. A few quotations may make this clearer. "Even in Jesus, God is known as the unknown God." "In the message of religion there can be no announcements about the godlikeness or the transformation into the godlike of men, but the message of a God who is utterly different, of Whom man, as man, will never know or have anything." "His universality results from the fact that every mouth is stopped and the whole world is guilty before God."

Yet the very unknowableness of God shows that there is nothing more knowable, more positive. Man is in sin. Sin is theft from God, a wanton overstepping of what Barth calls the "death-line" drawn between man and God, man's refusal to be simply the creature. And sin continues in spite of and even because of any goodness and morality in man. Such goodness is merely Pharisaism; and even the mysticism which prides itself on being silent before God is no better. "The veritable crisis in which religion reveals itself comes about when, at the moment we say 'God is not here; we can go no farther; we have reached all known limits,' God meets us." One is reminded of John Nelson's famous "Lord, damn or save!" Thus, despair itself must be recognised as religious—"active, combative, the reverse of pious, the religion of Psalm xxxix, Job, Luther and Kierkegaard, the religion of Paul." "When we listen to Jesus we do not see only flesh and sin, but, above and beyond, the Judge

who, at the moment of condemnation, absolves. He is just, and He shows Himself just, at the moment when we dare the leap into the void. If we believe in Jesus, the justice and the justification of God are shown in the impossible possibility." This is the meaning of the cross; it must always be a "scandal" till we make that leap. "It is people who are interested in religion, not the mass of the unconcerned, the parsons and their friends, not the thieves and souteneurs, the church, not the cinema, the theological faculty, not the irreligion of the medical profession, the religiously-minded socialists and activists, not capitalism and militarism, books like this book, and not the literature of worldly frivolity, that lie open to condemnation." "The divine possibility of religion is never and nowhere human possibility." Man's dereliction is his acceptance. Once let him try and save himself, and he is lost.

It is easy to recall Pauline expressions of which the above is intended to be an exposition. But does Paul let the matter rest there? The Protestant, knowing his Luther, would reply, "No, the sinner must have faith; without faith, he can receive nothing from God." But here Barth makes a significant addition to the well-known words in Romans which are the foundation-stone of Protestantism. "Boasting is excluded, by the law of the trustworthiness (*Treue*) of God. Man is pronounced just through the trustworthiness of God." This "law" is explained as "the place where only God can hold us, where everything but God disappears, the place which indeed is no place, but only the moment when man is moved through God, when man gives himself and all that is human over to God." And this explains the meaning of grace. The grace of God consists in His not judging, because judgment is already pronounced. "In the very knowledge of what it is, which the evil conscience possesses, is the unheard-of possibility of a (never and nowhere 'good' but) comforted conscience." Thus, Barth says, Paul maintains grace with Luther and Dostoievsky as against the Franciscans and Tolstoi. It means divine impatience, refusal to be satisfied. It is the foe of every *interim*, even of the most indispensable. It is the axe laid at the root of the good conscience, such as modern Lutheranism does its best to cultivate.

Again, love to God, Barth says, is not a matter of obedience, of a slow approach—a progress to infinity, as Kant would have it; nor is love to our neighbour a matter of neighbourly feeling, kindness, or the sedulous discharge of the duties of one's calling. Nor is it "a matter of social service, of anti-alcoholism, anti-militarism, and generally of a Christian life in the world." This is to bring God from eternity back into time, or, while pretending or hoping to set Him on His throne, to set ourselves there. Salvation means a new relation of the individual to God and therefore to man; therefore too, it does

not mean practical devotion to a series of good causes. One may be permitted to ask whether this second "therefore" is correct; and whether devotion to God must exclude the endeavour to bring about the state of things which He must desire. Barth would ask, in reply, "How do we know that He desires it?" Would Paul?

There is, however, another aspect of Barth's position which can best be seen in his later work, *The Resurrection of the Dead*. This is an exposition of 1 Cor. xv, which, Barth holds, is really central for the teaching of the earlier chapters in the epistle, as well as for the whole of Romans, Philippians, Colossians. "It is not eschatology but a methodology of the Apostle's preaching. It deals with the meaning, the very nerve, of the preaching as a whole, of the Whence? and Whither? of the path of man through life."

Barth has no interest in the criticism of the resurrection narratives. He treats them as cavalierly as he treats the accounts of the Last Supper. To do anything else, he says, "would be to try to know the Lord after the flesh." "The Lord Himself is the tradition; and Paul does not attempt to prove or demonstrate the will of the founder of the meal, he attests it." "If the resurrection of Jesus were a single miraculous event, and not the revelation of the essential miracle that God works on men, if it meant simply 'Christ has been raised' and not the resurrection of the dead, then this single miracle would not be true. Christ would not have risen, and those whom we lovingly speak of as 'fallen asleep' would be lost. Life and death would be meaningless." The resurrection is thus another description of God. The majesty of God is the theme of the whole epistle; not least of this chapter. "The resurrection is not an event in time; it is always *here*. If we receive its gifts, we live in that spiritual order which is eternal." And yet, Barth hastens to add, we must wait for it. Hope is ours and not sight. "There is no more complete and powerful and joyous present tense of God than that which lies in the eternal future."

Probably few who have ever really felt or willed or loved are ignorant of this contrast between what is in time and what is out of time. The prolonged labour in the achievement of some cherished aim, the deep emotion stirred by some noble musical composition, the surrender of one's individual aims in a passionate affection, will make us conscious of the infinite. Moving along a narrow path, we can still see the whole course and meaning of our journey, as from above. To the religious man, all this is even clearer. He knows, or can know, that he is justified by faith, if Paul is not mistaken, and that he is risen with Christ. Does he need the assurance that a certain unique and inconceivable event took place at a particular spot outside Jerusalem before sunrise on a given Sunday morning in

spring? Barth, as liberal in this respect as the most liberal of his opponents, thinks he does not. Is he right?

In reading Barth, we are watching a re-emergence of what, in the world of theology, we call Calvinism, although Barth clothes it in the language of Luther. But Calvinism, or the idea of an unalterable will applied to human affairs, is older than Calvin, and passes outside the limits of theology. It has moved men most powerfully at two great turning points in the world's history: when the whole fabric of Roman civilisation, falling in ruins beneath the hammering of the barbarians, turned men's eyes to the immovable city of God in the heavens; and when a startling chain of discoveries, scientific, geographical, literary and æsthetic, all revealing to men that they were living in a new world, forced them to ask, What of the relation of this brave new world to God? In the fifth century began the great movement by which the ancient world, and its faith, subdued its conquerors. In the sixteenth began the movement which broke the power of Spain in the Netherlands and Tudor and Stuart absolutism in this country, and which, thwarted and turned aside in France, at last made itself felt from end to end of the continent of Europe. Is the twentieth century to see a reappearance of this belief in the unalterable will of God? If not, what remains for the future? Calvinism has always been the inspiration of the few rather than the many; and it has always made little of other truths which, to the rest of Christendom, are as the breath of life. But if the world is to be saved at all, will it be saved by liberal theology with its still wide intellectual prestige, by the autocracy of the "grand Inquisitor" of the Vatican with its expanding hopes and claims, or by the conviction that God alone matters, and that He is ever confronting the world, with its savage and greedy and incredulous or even despairing "No," by His calm and unalterable "Yes"—the conviction that while the kingdoms of this world, held in the grip of the evil one, are already and always passing away, the laws of God are and for ever will be the only certain and abiding things in the universe? This is the question that Barth would force us to answer.

W. F. LOFTHOUSE.

POPULATION AND POLICY.

IT is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the problem of finding outlets for the surplus population of Europe is the crux of international politics to-day. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, writing in *The Observer* an appreciation of Professor Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs*, makes the following significant statement:

"One of the most baffling and prolonged unsettlements of the war is contained in the distribution and local pressure of population. The peace settlement upset the industrial economy not only of States but of continents and hemispheres, and its effect is seen in prices, competition, budgets, destitution, as well as in emigrant legislation. We have only begun to nibble at this question of population and are only thinking of it from narrow nationalist points of view. In that way it cannot be dealt with. . . ."

For some time writers on Imperial questions have urged the necessity for a more systematic emigration policy as between Great Britain and her dependencies. No less urgent and imperative is the need for collaboration in the matter of emigration policy on an international basis. It is true, the task seems wellnigh hopeless when measured by the standards of national rivalry and racial exclusiveness which are known to obtain in the Old World and the New. Yet a great deal can be accomplished by wise statesmanship and education of public opinion through the Press, and before the broad outlines of the situation are blurred by violent national irritation there must be a whole-hearted attempt to reach some measure of international agreement.

The terms of the conflict are plain. Speaking generally, emigration countries press for as many outlets as possible for their emigrants, the best possible conditions for them and the retention of their national status, so that at least they have a moral hold over them while they are abroad. Immigration countries, on the other hand, are determined to reserve their right to admit as many or as few immigrants as they choose, and when their selection has been made, to be allowed to assimilate in time this welcome influx of population. A comparison of statistics shows that, on the whole, the impetus given to emigration from Europe by the social conditions created by the war has *not* been checked by the restrictive immigration legislation of the United States. At the same time the reduction of openings for emigration for those countries which are not rich in colonies is very considerable, and the problem is one demanding earnest attention and far-seeing statesmanship.

Hitherto the international Parliament at Geneva has refrained from any pronouncement on questions of emigration and immigration, and the spokesmen of the nations have let it be understood that the cognate problems of over-population, unemployment, and migra-

tion movements are matters of domestic policy, with which the League of Nations as a political entity is not concerned. That this is a polite fiction is patent to any student of international affairs, but, as long as Germany remained outside the comity of nations, not to speak of the United States and Russia, it was perhaps the wisest course to pursue. Now that Germany has taken her place with the other nations of Europe at Geneva, and since both Germany and Italy may be expected to bring forward the subject at the Economic Conference, presumably this "taboo" will be raised and sooner or later the delicate problems of population which contain in themselves the root causes of war will have to be thrashed out in friendly conference or public debate.

And although official diplomacy has remained silent and has made no serious attempt at international co-ordination of policy, that does not mean that nothing has been done by way of ventilating these really vital problems in an international atmosphere. In the spring of 1924 Signor Mussolini, seeing that at Geneva everyone's hands were tied, improved his opportunity and took the initiative in convoking an international Conference of emigration and immigration countries at Rome. This was in no way intended as a slight on the League. It was a step which Signor Mussolini was in a position to take because Italy is the country with the largest emigrant population, has the greatest number of nationals residing abroad, and has set up the most complete and elaborate organisation for the protection of emigrants. In the absence of any international committee of organisation the Italian Commissariat of Emigration in Rome undertook the preparatory work and the machinery of the Conference was voted a model of efficiency. The representatives of fifty-nine nations including Germany and the United States met together on the Capitol, and discussed proposals calculated to lead to an effective international settlement of outstanding difficulties in the ebb and flow of migration. The Conference had no power to draw up collective conventions, its purpose was to enunciate the fundamental principles on which individual Governments should proceed as regards legislation and administration and at the same time to promote direct understandings between any two or more of the countries concerned. Discretion rather than courage was the order of the day, and such questions as the American quota system were *a priori* excluded from the agenda as being purely matters of internal policy, but even so there was more than one lively passage-of-arms, and taken altogether the Conference did little more than emphasise the extreme delicacy of the issues involved. In technical matters such as the transport of migrants, health regulations, sanitary inspection, protection of women and children, etc., the experts found common ground. But on all the controversial points such as the legal status of emigrants,

their equality with nationals of the immigration country, colonisation and land concessions, the spirit of co-operation proved to be a will-o'-the-wisp, and no substantial measure of agreement was achieved. Nevertheless the proceedings brought to light a mass of valuable material, and the response to the Italian Government's initiative was considered sufficiently encouraging to warrant a decision to establish a permanent committee with power to convoke a second conference in 1927. (The latest information is that the Committee has decided to call a second Conference not for this year but for the spring of 1928, and that this Conference is to take place in Cuba—presumably with a view to enlisting the support of the saner elements in American public opinion for any proposals affecting the quota system).

The exclusion *à priori* of political issues was perhaps inevitable in the welter of European politics in 1924, but the promoters of the initiative will surely recognise that an International Conference on Emigration and Immigration must always be barren of consequences as long as Government responsibility, the prime factor of effective international intercourse, is not involved. A second Conference held under the same auspices is not any more likely to further the cause of international co-operation, and it seems reasonable to suppose that every effort will be made to bring these vexed questions within the ambit of Geneva and official foreign policy as soon as possible. I propose, therefore, to illustrate from our own case and more particularly by a survey of the special needs and preoccupations of Italy, the range and scope of some of the problems which have to be solved.

Great Britain's problem, stated in the simplest terms, is essentially one of distribution. There is a considerable surplus population in the Mother Country and there are extensive under-populated areas in the Dominions, besides good opportunities for emigrants in small numbers in the Crown Colonies and other dependencies. From a strictly national standpoint, then, our emigration policy must be directed to encouraging Englishmen of all classes to emigrate and settle abroad so as to obviate the dangers of over-population and alleviate economic hardship in the British Isles. That such encouragement should be needed may seem strange in a people whose sons have for generations readily undertaken the task of building up an Empire and colonising the most unlikely parts of the world. Armchair critics are indeed prone to attribute the decrease in the volume of emigration from this country to a weakening of the spirit of initiative, but they fail to take into consideration the changing economic and psychological factors. Conditions have changed decidedly since the days when for a public school or University man emigration was a happy-go-lucky voluntary enterprise which could

be abandoned at any time and for any reason without serious consequences. When a man knows, however, that he may have to seek employment in the Colonies for fear of not finding an opening at home, he will hardly see emigration in the light of a glorious adventure or set about it in the spirit of the early pioneers. The same holds good *mutatis mutandis* in the case of families in more reduced circumstances. Before the economic stress of the last twenty or thirty years, due as much to over-population as to the upheaval caused by the war, such families were disposed to try their luck abroad and helped to form the population of the Dominions and the Crown Colonies. The majority found conditions which suited them and settled there, a minority returned home sadder and wiser perhaps, but at least knowing that it would be only a question of time for them to find their niche in the home life. There is and must be a profound psychological difference between those emigrants and desperate men who are constrained to resort to emigration under the shadow of unemployment.

That the stress of economic conditions accounts to a large extent for the falling-off in emigration figures is confirmed by the report of the Commission appointed to examine the effects of social legislation on migration movements. That report was the occasion for a discussion at the Imperial Conference as to whether it might be possible to frame social legislation which should be identical throughout the British Commonwealth. As regards its effect on the particular problem of this country, however, the Commission, while recognising that the dole *may* act as a deterrent, considered that any such measures are of secondary importance, and declared it to be an economic law, borne out by our own experience, that emigration statistics follow closely the barometer of trade. When a country's trade is in a healthy state and expanding year by year, emigration flourishes and *vice versa*.

This explains then the present unsatisfactory response from the Mother Country to the needs of the more youthful members of the British family. Recent experience goes to show, however, that the adjustment of population within the British Commonwealth is largely a matter of clear thinking and round-table conferences. This is what places us in a privileged position among emigration countries. Time after time friends of mine in Continental countries have impressed upon me that ours is an easy task when compared with the magnitude of the problems with which other European countries are faced. At the same time, our "domestic" arrangements do not exempt us from actively participating in any international work on emigration questions which is going forward. On the contrary, Great Britain has a vital task to perform in her capacity as a Continental power. British foreign policy will deserve

to be the arbiter of European peace, continuing on the trail blazed by Locarno, only in so far as our statesmen and responsible opinion show a sympathetic appreciation of the problems of population which beset other European Powers, especially Italy.

A country like Italy has in the past preferred to encourage her workers to make good abroad rather than to be a drain on the country's resources at home. In this way before the war successive Governments staved off the consequences of demographic pressure. It is estimated that there are some nine million Italian nationals who have settled down in other parts of the world. Those who have a stake in the country, as the saying goes, return to Italy from time to time, but the majority rely for their moral and material security on the protection of foreign Governments. In many cases they form, with the tacit approval of those Governments, self-contained communities, which, as a rule, need no propaganda from the home country to be acutely conscious and jealous of their "Italianità."

The position of Italians in France coupled with France's lack of emigrant raw material for her colonies raises an issue which may at any time inflame relations between the two countries, and presents just such a problem as would be most satisfactorily settled by open discussion at Geneva. The immigration of Italians into the districts of the South and South-West of France is regulated by treaties, in which the French Government undertakes to let the immigrants profit by the social legislation framed for the benefit of the French working man. There are whole districts in which the population is composed almost exclusively of Italians, who have bought or hired land and have settled down comfortably with their families on French soil. By courtesy of the French Government they are free to lead their own life and are bound by the closest ties to the Commissariat of Emigration in Rome. The latter organism carries out faithfully the nationalist emigration policy of the Fascist Government, and the uncompromising attitude revealed by some recent ordinances has caused alarm among patriotic Frenchmen. The French Government has always counted on a large number of foreign immigrants becoming Frenchmen in the next generation, and as long as the Italians, for instance, were forced to send their children to the French schools and were unable to obtain credits from the French banks, there seemed some grounds for this hope. The latest activity displayed by the Italian Government in the application of its "dopo-lavoro" policy to Italians abroad (vide: *The Times*, February 5th and 10th, 1926) goes to show that the French will be asked to make still further concessions.

That public opinion in France and Italy is fully alive to the importance of this conflict on a point of private international law—namely, the legal status of emigrants—is clearly shown by the

storm of controversy provoked last year in the Press by an article in *Le Temps*—"En Tunisie, les fourmis de Sicile"—in which Pierre Mille, the well-known writer on colonial questions, brought up the old question of the Italian population of Tunis. In this French Protectorate there has always been a considerable Italian element consisting mainly of farm and mine workers from Sicily, and in 1896 the French and Italian Governments signed a convention by which these settlers and their descendants were to be allowed to retain their Italian nationality indefinitely—whereas in France the rule is that the foreigner born on French soil acquires French nationality unless he makes a specific declaration before he is twenty-one in favour of the nationality of his father and takes steps to have this option duly ratified. Pierre Mille concluded his article as follows:

"Tunis is a Protectorate. It is part of the French 'imperium.' Therefore Italians born on this French soil, sons and grandsons of persons also born on French soil, cannot remain Italians for ever and ever. This situation cannot go on indefinitely, it is an inadmissible infringement of the rules of our jurisprudence and of international law. The convention which regulates this state of affairs can be denounced at any time after three months' notice has been given."

This statement of fact was, of course, interpreted in certain Italian circles as a threat and as a prelude to Government action. A writer in the *Corriere d'Italia* was at pains, however, to re-assure his fellow-countrymen that the danger does not lie in any hypothetical denunciation of the 1896 Convention. What may give cause for alarm in Italy, he declared, is that during the last few years there has been a marked increase in the number of Italians who have of their own accord taken out French naturalisation papers. Moreover, the numerical superiority of the Italian element is now seriously challenged. It is obviously in the interests of France that the various European elements in Tunis should be fused in the French crucible and so swell the number of those who count themselves French citizens. With this end in view every effort is made to attract workers and settlers from those countries whose nationals—unlike the Italians—have shown themselves to be more readily assimilable. Polish workers, for instance, a type of immigrant which has made good in agriculture, mining and industry in France, are encouraged to go and settle in Tunis in ever greater numbers.

I have stated that the vital questions which lead to bad blood between emigration and immigration countries may be grouped under two main headings, the legal status of emigrants on the one hand, and the question of their equality with nationals of the immigration country which receives them: on the other hand, the question of colonies and land concessions. Whatever we may think of the wisdom or unwisdom of the intransigent attitude taken up

by the United States, European countries are obliged to accept the consequences of the Percentum Limit Act, as long as that country holds aloof from the system of international politics of which Geneva is the keystone. Not only, then, must the problem of the Italian settlers in Tunis and in France itself be solved on the basis of the *status quo*, but also some process of adjustment is imperative with regard to the colonial expansion of the Great Powers, not excluding Great Britain, who benefited by the Peace Treaties.

Article 13 of the Pact of London provided that in the event of any extension of the colonial possessions of France or England those two countries should recognise Italy's full right to claim appropriate compensation in the way of colonial territory. The outcome of this compact was the Milner-Scialoja Agreement of 1920 and the Convention signed in July, 1924, for the cession of Jubaland. Last year this district was linked up definitely with Italian Somaliland. Nevertheless, there is a widespread conviction in Italy that the Italian delegation to the Peace Conference ought never to have come away without some more tangible contribution to Italy's colonial domain. The anti-German bias given to Fascist foreign policy for a time last year was incidentally the occasion for an agitation in connection with the re-distribution of mandated territories which seemed likely to follow upon Germany's entry into the League. Hardly a week passed without an inspired article in the Press pointing out that there could be no question of making any change in favour of Germany—until and unless the Great Powers attended to Italy's grievances and natural aspirations.

In the years before the war the German colonies were under-populated, and so far from showing high emigration returns in ratio to her expanding population Germany was absorbing the energies of her people in her vast and steadily increasing industrial enterprises and in actual fact was welcoming a number of immigrants. In the same way Italy is now going through a period of general agricultural and industrial progress, and Signor Mussolini has work and to spare for the many willing hands which are building up Greater Italy. Even so, the lack of raw materials in the country explains why the need for other outlets for the teeming population (still increasing at an average rate of half a million a year) is the constant concern of all thinking Italians—and undoubtedly this must also be the first consideration in any attempt at an international settlement of emigration problems.

There are certain facts about Italy which must be faced by the outside world as they are now being considered from all possible points of view in Fascist Italy itself. In the world to-day the demand for colonies has for its mainspring the economic factor, it is first and foremost a question of demographic pressure. For

Italy the primary need is therefore what the Germans call "*Siedlungskolonien*"—colonies in which Italians can settle in masses, and thanks to similar conditions of soil and climate can live much the same life and do much the same work as in the home country. On the other hand, there is an equally pressing need for territories of a very different stamp which may yield mineral resources and raw materials unobtainable for reasons of soil and climate in Italy itself. In this type of colony European settlers are only found in limited numbers, and the work of exploitation and development of the local resources is carried out by the natives under European supervision. There exists and must exist an antinomy between these two forms of colonial expansion, the one requiring homogeneity of conditions, the other postulating heterogeneity. Great Britain has the good fortune to possess dependencies of both types, and in this our country is an object of envy to Italians.

Even assuming that the question of the transfer of certain mandated territories can be amicably settled at Geneva, the fact that these territories (tropical districts in Africa) belong almost to the second category, i.e., colonies where European settlers are few, leaves Italy's major problem unsolved. And there can be no question of a transfer of the A. Mandates—Iraq, Syria, etc.—because the whole conception of the Mandates system is based on the fact that these territories are to become autonomous and self-governing States in course of time. Yet when we think that almost half the territory of the world is composed of colonial possessions in some form or other, surely some means of relieving the demographic pressure of the Old World can be devised at a round-table conference.

As regards Italy, apart from the question of colonies, the solution of her immediate difficulties may be found in the establishment of a mammoth insurance company in Brazil which will give the emigrant there a much-needed guarantee of security, so that labour and capital may be attracted for the exploitation of Brazil's vast agricultural and mineral resources and that country may come to be, like the Argentine, a home from home for millions of Italians.

Englishmen reading the accounts of Signor Mussolini's triumphal progress last year through Tripoli and Libya may be disposed to discount the glowing terms with which Il Duce contrives to stimulate enthusiasm for a militant colonial mission. Yet it is as well to reflect that such rhetoric has an abiding effect on the youth of Italy, which is all on fire with dreams of expansion and a Pan-Romanism no less grandiose and in the last analysis no less dangerous than those of that Pan-Germanism which the World War was fought to destroy.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

CREATING FORESTS IN BRITAIN.

AFTER a sleep like unto the slumber of a Rip Van Winkle, broken only by the burst of activity set up by the cry of "British Oak for British Ships" immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, and the persevering efforts of the devoted few who have done their utmost to keep alive the practice of forestry in the British Islands, the conscience of the nation was at last awakened to the importance of afforestation by the dire necessities of the four years following the calamity of 1914. It could hardly be otherwise; British imports of forest produce, mainly timber and wood-pulp, had before then mounted to over 45,000,000 tons yearly with a relatively negligible home production, and in the emergency there was none but the privately-owned landed estates to bear the weight of the felling axe, for of the three million acres of woodlands in Great Britain, the State owned but a paltry 2.4 per cent. With financial stringency looming inevitable, to expect the British landowner to continue to bear the burden of timber production, even on the entirely inadequate scale of past years, would evidently be to expect too much and the truth of these apprehensions was soon proved.

The average landowner can no longer afford to plant, and, moreover, the combined influences of heavy taxation and easy investment in trustee securities at 5 per cent. have induced many owners to part with their possessions in land. The disposal and break-up of estates, a movement which still continues, provided additional and weighty arguments in favour of State afforestation, and with the publication in 1918 of the Report of the Acland Committee the stage was set for the appearance of a Forestry Bill. The measure was passed through both Houses of Parliament by consent of all shades of political opinion and became law in August, 1919. Under this Act, forestry commissioners were at once appointed and, with a small but keen staff, the work of creating new forests in the British Islands was commenced. It is proving a task of engrossing interest to all concerned.

A first necessity is suitable land for the conduct of planting operations, and for economic reasons such land must be neither too good nor too poor for silvicultural purposes. To avoid the formation of small "forests" with the attendant high cost of management, a policy of expansion from every newly established centre is being pursued wherever local circumstances permit. In this way an original acquisition of three thousand acres of heath land in East Anglia in 1920 has already grown by further leases and purchases of adjacent lands to an afforestable total of thirty thousand acres. Elsewhere in Great Britain areas of twelve, fourteen, and fifteen thousand acres respectively have been built up and many smaller operations are in being.

Land for the creation of the new national forests is being acquired either by purchase, or on long leases, by negotiation in the usual way. A difficulty which at once arose in connection with trust estates has been met in the recent Law of Property Act, tenants for life being now enabled to lease their lands for afforestation for terms of 999 years. *Primâ facie* suitable areas are sought out and treated for wherever owners will negotiate. The definite areas are then surveyed with regard to transport, markets, meteorology, slope, aspect and exposure; the ecological and geological features receive detailed attention and a complete series of soil tests is taken. The result is a very thorough assessment of the silvicultural possibilities of the area under review, upon which the purchase price of the land, or the annual rent which can be paid per acre, is determined. There has been no occasion to call into use the powers of compulsory acquisition contained in the Forestry Act of 1919.

Newly acquired lands are allocated to the various purposes to which they are suited, i.e., plantations, nurseries, and forest workers' holdings, and not unusually it is necessary, by reason of dangerous exposure to prevailing winds or other adverse circumstances, to classify parts of an area as unplatable. In broken and mountainous districts, the planting limit has also to be laid down, but all diminishing factors are fully discounted in the original survey. Topographical survey follows and areas are marked out into suitably sized compartments, varying in size with the nature of the ground, from about twenty to forty acres in extent, with intervening roads and rides for inspection, exploitation, and fire-protection purposes. A "working plan" which is drawn up prescribes the general procedure to be adopted in creating and managing the forest; the acreage to be planted annually; the order in which the compartments shall be dealt with and the species of trees to be employed. Fencing and draining are at once put in hand in preparation for planting, the former being simplified where stock has not to be contended with, for in such situations a light rabbit-proof fence can be erected at a cost of under one shilling a yard including all material, haulage, and labour. Stock resisting fences are proportionally more expensive and cost, according to circumstances, from one shilling and sixpence to two shillings a yard. Fencing against deer is, as a general rule, altogether too costly for practical purposes and it is cheaper to accept the risk of damage than to attempt to exclude these animals from the new plantations. Rabbits and hares must be exterminated prior to planting, but in these days of rabbit-infested districts the receipts from the marketed rabbits usually cover the cost of killing out the pests.

Surface vegetation, if at all rank, has to be burnt off or otherwise removed, and the most effective method of soil preparation yet

devised is the ploughing of single furrows and the insertion therein of the plants by means of the "L" notch. By a specially designed implement, capable of ploughing two furrows at once at the desired distance apart, and drawn by a tractor, this form of soil preparation can be performed at a cost of five shillings an acre where the ground is fairly level and free from large stones. Where a complete carpeting of natural vegetation occurs and ploughing is not practicable, it is necessary, to avoid undue competition for what may be a limited supply of moisture and to secure aeration, to remove the surface growth in spaced patches by the spade or mattock. Four feet six inches is the spacing now generally adopted, except for poplars and certain conifers such as the Douglas Fir, closer planting having been abandoned as needlessly expensive.

Experience points more and more directly to the use of small plants, and both seedlings and transplants are utilised. Seedlings are drawn direct from the nursery seed-beds, while transplants may have been moved one or more times in the nursery lines prior to the final lifting for planting out. Seedlings are, of course, the cheapest plants to use and on the lighter lands, where weed growth is moderate, they are being planted out extensively at the two-year stage. Transplants may have been variously treated, and one-year seedlings, transplanted once, are known as "one plus one" or "one plus two" transplants according to the number of years they are left undisturbed after the first transplanting. Two or even three year old seedlings are transplanted, and may be moved again one or more times before they are given their final home in the plantations and a number of permutations and combinations in treatment and nomenclature are possible. The object of transplanting in the nursery is to induce proper development and adequate root-fibre to assist the young trees to withstand the check consequent upon the final planting-out.

In the present rapidly expanding state of affairs, the movement of large quantities of plants each season is unavoidable and transport is fraught with its own risks and difficulties. Lifting from the nursery, bundling and packing, demand the greatest care and the plants should be placed en route at once. Upon arrival at their destination, they should be unpacked immediately, the bundles untied and the plants "heeled in" at the earliest moment. In transit frost can be very fatal, and, in mild weather, fermentation aided sometimes by tight bundling and packing can kill or hopelessly devitalise large numbers of the young trees. It has been amply demonstrated that the cheapest method of planting is to notch the plants in ploughed furrows. On light land, this operation can be carried out efficiently by piecework at as low a cost as sixpence a hundred plants, but supervision must be closely maintained. The

work is quickly mastered by men accustomed to handle a spade or indeed by any intelligent workman. Other methods are a little more costly, but the price paid for planting seldom exceeds one shilling for a hundred plants unless the nature of the ground is specially difficult. The piecework system has been adopted in all possible cases greatly to the benefit of the workers and of the State. The whole art of the operation of planting lies in the insertion of the young plant to its natural depth in the ground; disposing of the roots in as natural a position as possible; and sufficiently firming the soil around the newly planted tree. Pit planting has seldom been resorted to, but with large plants or stiff soils this method is necessary now and then. The protagonists of autumn *versus* spring planting will probably never quite settle their differences. The truth is that the extreme variability of our insular climate entirely precludes anything in the nature of dogmatism on the point, and even the capricious Corsican pine can be planted from October to April with success and failure for any one month very evenly balanced from year to year.

The programme for the first ten years covered by the Act is mainly one of conifers, and it is proposed to form one-tenth only of broad-leaved plantations in this period out of a total scheme of one hundred and fifty thousand acres. This, however, is only a beginning, and the 1,770,000 acres which represent the ultimate objective of the Acland Committee offer ample scope for the planting of as high a proportion of broad-leaved trees as may prove desirable. Of the conifers, Scots and Corsican pines, Norway and Sitka spruces, European and Japanese larches and Douglas fir are the species of which use is being made. These are generally planted pure but European larch is, on suitable ground, planted in mixture with ash or beech or both of these trees. Beech is also introduced into the coniferous plantations where conditions are favourable, being, as is widely known, a valuable soil improver. The common silver fir and the Weymouth pine are, unfortunately, barred on account of susceptibility to insect and fungoid pests. Of the broad-leaved trees, endeavours are being made to extend the range of the sessile oak as a measure against the oak leaf roller moth, whose larvæ have done so much harm in recent years. This oak is indigenous to the western and south-western parts of Britain, and its earlier flushed leaves are much more resistant to the appetite of the caterpillars than are those of the pedunculate oak. Poplars, including the vigorous hybrids, are being planted and they are wonderfully quick timber producers.

Throughout the ensuing spring, the newly made plantations are much at the mercy of the weather. May droughts are a frequent source of anxiety, and beyond firming-in loose and wind-rocked plants little can be done. Weed growth needs to be kept in check

and weeding, especially where bracken grows strongly, is an item costing up to twelve shillings an acre according to the nature of the growth and the number of times a plantation has to be gone over in the season to keep the leading shoots of the trees free to develop and ripen off. Where losses occur the filling in of the blank spaces is deferred until after the second year; unnecessary replacements are thus avoided, for many plants, seemingly dead after the first summer, are found to grow away from below in the second year. Plantations in ordinary circumstances should require no further elaborate attention until the thinning stage is reached.

The risks and dangers by which silviculture is beset are, however, manifold. Fire is an ever present dread, and in early spring the dead flag of the last year's grasses and weeds is often in an extraordinarily inflammable state. Open fire lines, belts of the more non-inflammable hardwoods, and organised patrol, are the counter-measures. Drought is a natural phenomenon to be borne with as philosophically as temperament permits. Frost is a severe handicap to tender species, while snow can be protective or injurious according to circumstances. However, observation can off-set adverse climatic conditions to a great extent, and dangerous exposures to prevailing winds and liability to frost are generally to be detected. Foes from the realms of zoology, entomology and mycology are legion; so much indeed is to be seen and heard of the pests to which tree-growth is subject that it is comforting to reflect that plantations do survive and flourish.

The plants necessary for carrying out the work are all raised in State nurseries. Nursery ground should be reasonably fertile, and the deeply-rooted idea that the forest nursery ought to be located on the poorest type of land in the vicinity in order that the young trees may be hardened at the earliest stages to the conditions likely to be experienced later, is an entirely fallacious one. The digging, lining out, and as many other nursery operations as possible are done by piecework. Except the poplars, which are raised from cuttings, all the forest trees useful in Great Britain are raised from seed, supplies of conifer seeds being drawn from the continent of Europe, North America, and Japan. Seeds of a few broad-leaved species also come from North America, but seeds of most of the common hardwood trees can be gathered at home. Cones of Scots pine and, in smaller quantities, of other conifers are collected at home also and the seed extracted in kilns. Several tons of seed are sown annually and, for the past year's programme, some sixty million young trees have been grown.

Part and parcel of the forestry scheme is a permanent settlement of forest workers and their families on the afforestable lands, a branch of the work in hand holding wide possibilities for good.

Forest Workers' Holdings are being brought into being, each with ten acres of cultivatable land, a cottage and suitable buildings. Not more than eight hundred pounds may be spent on the cottage and equipment and nearly all are being built, or adapted from existing structures, by direct labour, well within this figure. The present aim is to create five of these holdings for each thousand acres of plantations; they are essentially part-time holdings and the forest workers are guaranteed not less than 150 days' work in the forest in each year at the current wage for agricultural labour or local piecework rates. In suitable districts fruit growing is encouraged and market garden crops are valuable; in most parts of the country the goose is expected to prove a useful adjunct, and conditions in the new East Anglian forests favour the raising of turkeys. The holdings are usually suited to the keeping of stock, cows, goats (under control be it said), pigs, and sheep, although sheep are not everywhere adapted to local circumstances.

The holdings are let at economic rents based on the cost of formation to carefully selected men, who are required to reside in their holdings and who, with the standby of work in the forest, have every opportunity of making their stand-by holdings pay and permanently of improving their positions in life. On the basis of a fair day's work for a fair day's pay, every effort is being made to lead these forest workers to identify themselves with the forest in which they dwell and to realise their part in the creative work which is going forward. In the past, close association with the ancient forests of Great Britain invariably bred an intensity of feeling for their woodland homes amongst the forest dwellers which has survived even to this day, and it is believed that, if carefully recruited along the lines upon which a start has been made, these forest workers will re-act to their environment in the same way and prove an asset of the greatest value in the work of creating, conserving, and ultimately of exploiting the new forests of the nation.

W. L. TAYLOR.

THE "BOOMING" ARCTIC.

THE Arctic regions of north-western Canada are in the throes of a great trade boom. It is not due to any increase in the value of land in this far northern territory of the Dominion, but to the demand for furs, principally those of the Arctic or white fox. The area concerned stretches for a distance of a thousand miles from Herschel Island to Fort Brabant in Prince Albert Sound, on West Victoria Land. At the latter point we find the farthest north trading-post in the world. It was established in 1923 to trade for furs with primitive Eskimos—the tribe known as the Copper Eskimos. As the summer of 1926 marked the greatest activity so far in this Arctic boom, which has been gradually increasing during the past eight years, some reference to this remarkable trade expansion in the Arctic regions is appropriate.

As already stated, the boom owes its inception to the demand for the skin of the Arctic or white fox. The returns from the pelts of this animal alone in the last four years have averaged £250,000 annually. The gathering of these skins has resulted in the penetrating of the western Arctic in an easterly direction, as far as Victoria Land by the Hudson's Bay Company as well as by small independent traders and schooners. The pioneer and most active firm, of course, has been the ancient and experienced Hudson's Bay Company. In addition to its long established post at Herschel Island, the Company has built a string of posts over the territory eastward for a thousand miles. The first of these is at Shingle Point, on a sandspit fifty miles from Herschel. The second is Baillie Island, established in 1915. It is a low-lying islet, 228 miles east of Shingle Point. The best trapping in all the "civilised Arctic" is around this last-named place. By "civilised Arctic" is meant territory where the Eskimos have almost entirely adapted themselves to the white man's mode of living. Long distances stretch between each post. The third in the vast new territory is at Bernard Harbour, a trading station situated on the low barren mainland 400 miles farther eastward. This was established by the Canadian Mounted Police in 1917, and the Hudson's Bay followed in 1918. In the same year the Great Company opened a post at Kent Peninsula, 100 miles farther east. In 1923, Fort Brabant was erected in Prince Albert Sound, West Victoria Land, by the visit of the auxiliary schooner *Lady Kindersley*, which was later lost by being caught in the ice, the crew narrowly escaping with their lives. The chain of posts was extended in 1924 to Cambridge Bay on the south-east corner of Victoria Land, 186 miles from Tree River, and to King Williams Land, 100 miles east of Cambridge Bay. An idea of the vastness of the region can best be gathered by a careful examination of a map of that portion of the Arctic.

From this it will be seen how steady has been the expansion. Though the entire chain of posts represent the erection of only a score of buildings, nevertheless the progress can fairly be said to be rapid; it actually deserves the title "boom" when the distances, danger to ships, and isolation of this vast island-dotted polar sea are taken into consideration. The mere item of lumber alone to build the chain of posts is an enormous one, for lumber costs about £200 a thousand feet by the time it is transported to these icy regions.

Bernard Harbour marks the beginning of the Copper Eskimo territory. This tribe actually represents the Stone Age state of man. Yet already, with only a couple of years' contact with the traders, these primitive people are using canvas tents in summer, cooking their food in sheet iron stoves and shooting with modern rifles, all of which has been made possible to them in exchange for white fox furs.

The most wonderful change, however, is to be found among the people dwelling in the vicinity of Herschel Island and the other posts westward of the land of the Copper Eskimo. The *per capita* wealth among them is almost unbelievable. Practically all of it is the result of earnings in the last ten years through the expansion of the white fox fur trade. These Eskimos have been changed from nomadic hunters of caribou and seal into trappers. In their new commercial enterprise they go far inland, living on the farinaceous food of the white man, wearing his clothes, and at certain periods of the year dwelling in wooden huts, all of which is detrimental to them as a race. According to the figures of Captain Munn, an authority on the Canadian Arctic, the Eskimo population of the Mackenzie River delta, which was 2,000 in 1896, is now only 200, while the entire Eskimo population of the Canadian Arctic is estimated at only 4,500. The Eskimos, in fact, are a dying race. Nevertheless, the few remaining are enjoying prosperity and luxury. Many of the young men own fast gasoline schooners, modern rifles, tents, gramophones—in short, nearly all the commodities and luxuries of the white race.

The history of the adoption of gasoline schooners is one of the outstanding facts about the boom. These vessels, from 28 to 45 feet long, are built far inland at the city of Edmonton, in the prairie province of Alberta, to the order of the Eskimos, and then floated on their own power to the Arctic via the wonderful inland waterway system formed by the Athabasca River, Lake Athabasca, the Slave and Mackenzie Rivers. The Eskimo, who a few years ago was paddling a skin boat, is now a skilled gasoline engine mechanic. And he has his ship fitted out with every modern assistance to navigation. To-day the average Eskimo boat owner's expenditure for gasoline is more monthly than he formerly earned in a year.

So great was the growth of trade in this western Arctic that by 1925 the Hudson's Bay Company outfitted a large steel steamer in order to carry the amount of provisions and trade goods required by the fur posts. This steamer, the *Baychimo*, in 1925 steamed farther eastward into the newly-opened Arctic than any steel vessel of large tonnage had ever done before. The risk was tremendous and the obstacles to be overcome were many.

In the Arctic the action of the ice does not permit the building of wharves for a large vessel to tie up alongside. Furthermore, the water is so shallow in the vicinity of the posts that a ship has to anchor several miles off shore at each settlement. To cope with this problem of landing cargo, the Hudson's Bay Company ship carried two large scows on deck, and a gasoline launch to tow them. This method of overcoming the difficulty meant, of course, a large additional expense in rehandling cargo. To enable the vessel to get into the Arctic once a year and visit all the posts already mentioned and bring from them the collected fur in the same season before the polar pack closes down, feverish haste is necessary. So the crews often labour twenty-four hours at a stretch through freezing summer blizzards and howling gales. Extra crews of Eskimos are carried, each man being paid four shillings an hour working time. The Eskimos, being the only available labour, are more powerful than any Union, and have learned their economic value.

Most of the posts are in a treeless land, and coal, at £60 a ton, has to be brought from Vancouver. Owing to the loss of the auxiliary schooner, *Lady Kindersley*, the post manager at Fort Brabant was two years without seeing a white person. At this point the ice does not go out until August, and then only for a month.

With the yearly ship's time so precious, the furs at each post are made up into bales ready for shipping long before the steamer is due. The skins are pressed into bundles of from 100 to 125, and each bundle is covered with burlap and sewn securely. Each bale weighs approximately seventy pounds and is worth £800. On board the ship the fur is stored in specially constructed small rooms lined with tin to keep out the moisture. The fur is taken to Vancouver and thence rushed east to Montreal, New York, or London. In the Arctic the independent trapper gets £6 per skin. All Hudson's Bay post managers and assistants are permitted to trap for the Company during the winter and get £4 per skin. The members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are allowed to trap, but not trade. They sell their fur to the Hudson's Bay, or send it to the outside world where a higher price prevails. At the present moment of writing, white fox fur on the Pacific Coast markets commands from £8 to £8 10s. per skin.

The Hudson's Bay Company has been the chief fosterer of this

Arctic boom, and has earned enormous profits, in spite of the loss of one ship worth about £400,000. So rapid has been the growth of the Arctic trade that in the summer of 1926 the Company, in addition to the large steamer *Baychimo*, purchased the historic schooner *Maud*, formerly owned by Amundsen. In this ship the famous explorer attempted to drift to the pole, but was forced to abandon the effort after three years. The *Maud*, having been so carefully prepared for icy seas, makes a valuable addition to the Arctic trading fleet. It has been re-named *The Baymaud*.

The enormous profit made by trapping, or trading for white fox, though little known in the outside world, has attracted a few adventurous independent traders, while various individuals dwelling in the Arctic have recently made tidy fortunes. In the region around Cape Bathurst, a native missionary named Billy Kemetsena, the best trapper of the region, has cleaned up £8,000 in the last six years, enabling him in 1926 to purchase a trading schooner of his own. A young white boy named Johnson, aged only nineteen, in the winter of 1924-25 made £2,000. An Eskimo, known among the whites as Allan, is, however, the most outstanding example of the Arctic plutocrat. From a few years' trapping and trading he has been able to build himself a fine house on the Mackenzie Delta, and another small house, for occasional occupation, at Herschel Island. He paid £1,200 recently for a forty-foot schooner built in Edmonton. He owns the best money can buy in the way of field glasses, rifles, and canoes. He has two gramophones, several suits of white man's clothes, and is also worth £2,000 in hard cash. His new mode of life may injure his health, perhaps, but neither he nor any of his successful companions would change back to the old days of igloo dwellings. Besides a score of other native men who have become independent, many white residents in the Arctic, such as Mounted Police and Hudson's Bay men, have done well financially.

The regions giving rich fur returns around Bernard Harbour, Tree River, Kent Peninsula, and Cambridge Bay, are now being trapped. But around Melville Island, King Williams Land, and the Queen Maud Sea, lie vast areas that are veritable trappers' paradises as yet hardly touched. Even richer is the land of the primitive Copper Eskimos around the North-West passage, and it is to these latter regions that independent small traders are likely to go in the coming years of the "booming Arctic." Already two ex-members of the Mounted Police have taken up trading and trapping in the western Arctic.

The most interesting expedition so far is that of the schooner *Nigalik*, outfitted by two former employees of the Hudson's Bay Company, Messrs. Clarke and MacGregor, men experienced in fur-trading by years of dwelling along Coronation Gulf. The *Nigalik*

is seventy-two feet over all, specially constructed with a steel frame overlaid with ironbark to withstand ice pressure, at a cost of £8,000. It has a seventy-five horse-power engine, and carries sails. It is so arranged that it can easily be operated by two men, and in an emergency by one. The stout little craft is outfitted for five years, and may possibly make Arctic history; for, after cruising around the Bothia Peninsula, the navigators are going to attempt running the famous North-West Passage going eastward. This Passage was run for the first and only time from east to west by Amundsen in his remarkable voyage of discovery. Since then the Passage has not found any other man sufficiently daring to accept its challenge. The *Nigalik* cruise is being made for purely trading purposes, yet if the ship succeeds in getting through the North-West Passage it will be a notable event in Arctic navigation.

The most romantic story of all regarding quick fortunes made in the "booming Arctic" is that of the two De Staffany brothers. Five years ago these two trappers from Montana penetrated the Arctic *via* Edmonton and the Mackenzie River route. They had less than forty pounds between them. In the autumn of 1925 they came out of the Arctic on the Hudson's Bay Company's steamer *Baychimo* with furs which they sold for £20,000.

Undoubtedly, the Arctic boom will increase when such fortunes lie ready for the making. The trapping regulations are not severe. American trading vessels are not allowed to trade in these Canadian Arctic waters beyond Herschel Island. But an independent American can get a special permit to trap on Canadian soil. The same applies to men of other countries. Any foreigner, by becoming a naturalised Canadian, may take a trading vessel into these western Arctic seas, provided the ship is entered under Canadian articles. A Canadian subject may trap without a licence, but is required to pay four shillings for every white fox skin taken. For white skins the traders give such things as flour, tobacco, tea, sugar, milk, fancy biscuits, white man's clothes, pots and pans, guns, ammunition, blankets, steel spear heads, hooks and knives, and many other things both useful and useless. Gramophones are in great demand and command a high price. Telescopes are much prized by the Eskimos, and a cheap pair of field-glasses sometimes sells for as much as £15.

The western Arctic is the greatest and the last practically untouched field for fur in the world to-day. Here, and here probably alone in all the earth, fur can still be bought for a small value in trade goods—white fox fur in particular, which in the outside markets of the world brings £6 to £9 a skin. No wonder the Arctic is "booming!"

FRANCIS DICKIE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

NAVAL DISARMAMENT.

THE Conference on Naval Disarmament, which resulted from a proposal of Mr. Coolidge, began at Geneva on June 20th, and was adjourned on July 14th. Interesting work had been done, and a measure of agreement reached about the limitation of certain smaller types of ship, namely, destroyers, submarines, and non-fighting craft. The stumbling block was the problem of cruisers. The cruiser that is used for fighting purposes in war was naturally the main subject of discussion in an attempt at naval limitation. If agreement could not be reached about cruisers, it was recognised that any agreement there might be about other craft would be of little practical importance.

The clash of opinion which exercised the Conference was in the main a clash between the United States and Great Britain. Inasmuch as the Governments of those two countries had in advance been genuinely anxious to reduce naval expenditure, and by the same process to reduce the general danger of war, it argued a melancholy shortage of common sense that they could not at the first attempt agree on the means of effecting the ideal which they thus held in common. Expressed in the shortest way, the issue between the United States and Great Britain was that the United States wanted to establish a maximum ratio defined only by the amount of total tonnage, whereas Great Britain wanted to deal separately with two types of cruiser: one the battle cruiser and, two, the smaller cruiser which is used for the defence of trade routes. Great Britain submitted that the pacifist object would be best attained by a limitation of the cruisers whose exclusive purpose is that of war. There was clearly something to be said for that argument. It was a fair criticism on the American proposal that if a scheme of limitation by total tonnage had been agreed on, it was reasonable to expect that America would build up to the maximum of her tonnage in big battle cruisers, and that Great Britain, to maintain her fighting parity, would have to do the same, and would thus be left with no tonnage for the small cruisers needed for the protection of the trade routes. America wanted only the big type of cruiser, whose uses are offensive. Great Britain wanted both the offensive and the defensive type, and would have been content to establish fighting parity with the United States—that is parity in fighting cruisers—on condition that each power should be at liberty to build as many of the defensive small cruisers as she needed. It would thus be possible for the Powers to build *pari passu* if they wanted to. Great Britain, therefore, while ungrudgingly conceding the principle of parity, did not agree that parity could be achieved by Great Britain's enforced copying of an

American programme suited to American, but not to British, purposes. America, not needing small cruisers, in effect proposed that the limitation should be effected wholly in small cruisers. It was at least arguable that such a plan would in practice be a limitation, not of the means of war, but only of the means of defending British commerce.

The American initiative which led to the Naval Disarmament Conference started in the "fall" of last year. The "White House spokesman," who was universally assumed to be Mr. Coolidge, made a statement on September 3rd of last year to the effect that if Europe refused to disarm, as Mr. Coolidge wanted Europe to disarm, the United States would build an invincible air fleet. That was an act of what one might call benevolent blackmail. It was obvious that America, having had the intelligence to keep out of the Great War till it was nearly over, and then to capture the trade and wealth which Europe had made herself incapable of retaining, was in a position to build as many invincible air fleets as she chose. European opinion, therefore, was sensitive to the threat, so sensitive that Mr. Coolidge on September 7th protested that he had not meant anything of the kind, and was firmly opposed to any building programme either of air or of sea craft which might stimulate competition. According to the *New York Times* he gave it as his further view that "even if the 5-5-3 ratio applied to aircraft and other auxiliaries as well as to capital ships, or if there were any other treaty limitation on the relative strength of the Powers in auxiliaries, he would be disposed to keep the American strength in each class below the ratio in order to avoid incitement of competition." That statement caused eagerness, President Coolidge was prepared to stabilise America's strength in cruisers below the parity level with Great Britain and below the 5-3 level with Japan. Mr. Coolidge went even further, and propounded his belief that disarmament was a matter of urgent necessity, both for the reduction of national expenditure throughout the world and for the prevention of future war. He thereby, in common with most philosophers, reversed a pre-war maxim thus: *si vis pacem para pacem*.

President Coolidge's sincerity was put to the test in January of this year, when he had to make a stand against Congress over the naval estimates. He won at the outset to the extent that the Naval Appropriation Bill was made to include no provision for the building of the three cruisers authorised in 1924, as well as to reduce the expense of naval cruising. The "Big Navy" group thereupon took up the challenge, and by mobilising a coalition of Republicans and Democrats carried through the House on January 6th an amendment providing for the building of a rigid dirigible at a cost of

\$200,000, thereby defeating one of the President's express wishes. That group went on to propose an expenditure of \$450,000 for laying down the three cruisers, but the President was able to stimulate his supporters into defeating that proposal. In the Senate, however, the "Big Navy" party was stronger. They carried a proposal for spending \$1,200,000 as the initial expense of the building of the three cruisers. The clash between the Senate and the House was, therefore, referred to a compromise committee.

The President meanwhile continued his propaganda, which Congress had undertaken to support, for naval limitation. In his Message to Congress he announced that he was sounding Europe on the project of a naval limitation conference. His Note, which was presented on February 10th to Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, suggested that the problem of the limitation of sea armaments should be considered separately from that of land armaments. He went on to suggest that those four Powers should authorise their representatives at Geneva "to negotiate and conclude" an agreement for a new limitation of naval armaments by extending the Washington ratio of 5-5-3 to all the auxiliary types of ships not subject to the provisions of the Washington Treaty, with the proviso that the ratio applicable to France and to Italy should be left to be decided by the Conference.

Mr. Coolidge had his own difficulties, one of which he alluded to in that part of his Note in which he drew attention to the real danger of an intensified competition in armaments. "There has appeared," he wrote, "a sentiment urging naval construction on the ground that such construction is taking place elsewhere." The "Big Navy" group in the United States found such an argument useful for its grim purpose.

The French Government sent a prompt answer to Washington. Those who remembered the French predilection for submarines and the obstinate obstruction caused thereby at the Washington Conference had to admit, deplorable as they found the admission, that they were not surprised at the French answer. The French Note, dated February 15th, started with the conventional preamble which French diplomacy normally adopts when it reacts unfavourably, and expressed the satisfaction of the French Government that it found itself in full accord with the United States Government, so far as the ideal of the American proposal was concerned; and went on in an unruffled strain to refuse that proposal. France gave four reasons why the proposal might, according to the French view, endanger the work already started at Geneva for the general limitation of armaments. Those four reasons were: (1) The authority of the League of Nations would be weakened if the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference were deprived of an important part of

its programme, and a special conference limited to a few Powers were set up. (2) A special agreement between the five great Naval Powers might be admissible for capital ships; but all the navies of the world were concerned with lighter craft. (3) Disarmament should be treated as a whole and not in detail, and naval disarmament could be brought about only by each Power being allotted a definite tonnage to distribute as it pleased among battleships and light units. The American proposal, it was contended, would ignore these two guiding principles of French policy. (4) It was unlikely that a new Conference would be any more successful than the Rome Conference of 1924 in inducing the Powers not represented at the Washington Conference to adopt the principles there agreed upon. The French Government accordingly suggested that the American proposal should be submitted to the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, at Geneva.

Italy likewise refused the American invitation. The Italian Note in its turn was prefaced by an expression of Italy's desire to co-operate in international efforts for the organisation of peace, and called to witness the participation of Italy in the Washington Conference. It proceeded to protest against an alleged implication of Mr. Coolidge's Note that Italy was engaged in any important programme of naval building, the Italian estimates for new ships amounting, it stated, to only \$13,000,000. It then developed the argument that the limitation of armaments, if it was to be successfully attempted, must be comprehensive and universal; and ended by a submission that Italy's geographical peculiarities made it impossible for her to commit herself to naval limitation. Italy, the Note explained, was dependent for supplies on three sea routes, namely, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles. Her Imperial problem, the defence of her own coastline and of her own lines of communication with her possessions in the Mediterranean, were cited as a further difficulty against the acceptance of Mr. Coolidge's proposal. Italy, therefore, rejected Mr. Coolidge.

The Japanese answer was published on February 19th. Japan accepted Mr. Coolidge's proposal, but suggested that the Conference should not open before June 1st, so that full preparation might be made. The Japanese Government, in accepting the principle of naval limitation for financial as for other reasons, nevertheless stated that it would not accept as applicable to the smaller ships the 5-5-3 ratio established at the Washington Conference for capital ships.

The British Government made it known that it welcomed Mr. Coolidge's initiative, but did not at that time go into any detail of the problem to be discussed.

France and Italy having refused, and Japan and Great Britain having accepted, Mr. Coolidge's invitation, the question arose whether

Japan, Great Britain, and the United States should hold the Conference by themselves. Before that question was resolved, Mr. Coolidge's domestic struggle with the "Big Navy" advocates revealed the strength of his opponents. The clash between the Senate and the House which was referred to the arbitral committee decided in favour of the Senate. The sum of \$450,000 was therefore appropriated to enable work to be begun on the three disputed cruisers, and Mr. Coolidge had also to sign a Bill for elevating the guns on the Oklahoma and the Nevada. It was reported in the American Press that it was further proposed to raise the turret guns on thirteen of America's eighteen first-line battleships during the next few years. Whether such a proposal would tally with the Washington Treaty may give rise to some controversy.

Mr. Coolidge, in spite of those rebuffs, never wobbled over his Geneva adventure. It was arranged that the three Powers should hold their Conference. They thereby engaged their prestige in a public venture on which the whole cause of disarmament throughout the world might largely depend. The Conference met at Geneva on June 20th and the three delegations put on the table the proposals of their respective Governments.

The American proposal in effect was that no change should be made in the prevailing limits to the size of ships, but that the three Powers should agree to limit their total tonnage in each class of subsidiary ship—cruiser, destroyer, and submarine—to conform to a 5-5-3 ratio. In practice that would mean that the United States and Great Britain would be allowed from 250,000 to 300,000 tons, Japan 150,000 to 180,000, in cruisers; Great Britain and the United States 200,000 to 250,000, Japan 120,000 to 150,000, tons in destroyers; Great Britain and the United States 60,000 to 90,000, Japan 36,000 to 54,000, tons in submarines. By the American proposal the total tonnage for cruisers would apply to all "combattant" ships between 3,000 and 10,000 tons; the total tonnage for destroyers would be applicable to all destroyers between 600 and 3,000 tons, having a speed greater than seventeen knots; and the submarine allocation would apply to all submarines. The essence of the American proposal therefore was its "global" criterion.

The Japanese proposal was that the present relationship between the three Powers, as indicated by the actual number of vessels built and being built, should be stabilised; that henceforth none of the three Powers should be allowed to embark on any new building programme, and that all future construction should be confined to the replacement of the ships included on the ratio thus determined.

Both the American and the Japanese proposals wore the appearance of simplicity, the Japanese having the apparent merit of precluding any future increase in the scale of expenditure, but not, on the other

hand, involving any reduction. The American delegation at once reacted against the Japanese proposal on the ground that the existing distribution of naval strength placed Japan above the 5-5-3 ratio in these smaller craft.

The British proposal was complicated. It started from the hypothesis that the main reductions in armaments should be attempted by a reduction in the size of ships and guns, and that the naval strength of the three countries should be rationed on the basis of the reasonable needs of the three countries. In detail the British proposal would work out thus: the life of capital ships should be extended by six years; the life of 8-inch gun cruisers, destroyers, and submarines should be prescribed; the future size of all battleships should be reduced, and their guns reduced from 16 inches to 13.5 inches; aircraft carriers should similarly be subjected to limitation of size and of the size of their guns; destroyers should be limited to 1,700 tons for flotilla leaders, 1,400 tons for others, all guns limited to 5 inches; that torpedo boats and coastal motor boats should be limited to 400 tons in size and to 3-inch guns. So far as cruisers were concerned, the British proposal was that the present Washington ratio be stabilised in the case of 10,000 ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, the three Powers to agree on their respective strength of such cruisers: but in the future all cruisers should be limited to 7,000 tons and to 6-inch guns. It was stated in the British proposal that the British desire for the total abolition of submarines was untenable in view of the French and Italian craving for submarines, but Great Britain proposed that submarines should be divided into two categories, the large type (up to 1,600 tons for long range action) and the small type (up to 600 tons).

The British proposal was the most detailed and the most technical. It was therefore assigned to the expert investigation of the Technical Committee of the Conference. It was more clearly directed than either the American or the Japanese proposals towards the reduction of naval expenditure and towards the reduction of belligerent strength. The British budget on its expenditure side would be saved some £50,000,000 a year by the extension of the life of capital ships alone, and the other suggested reductions would save like sums.

While the technical committee made its technical investigation into the rival plans, and incidentally kept the wolf of plenary disagreement from the Conference door, certain French and Italian influences, chiefly French, occupied themselves in the highly mischievous pastime of foretelling disaster and propagating enthusiastic arguments why the Conference should fail. The big steel interests of the United States heartily approved of French mischief, as did the "Big Navy" group of American Die-Hards. Big Steel was allied to Big Navy for the transparent reason that a Conference failure,

leading to an intensification of competitive naval armaments, would bring grist to their mill. If it be hard for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, it must be harder for a human magnate, dependent for his greatness on the increasing manufacture of armaments, to take a large view of human happiness. Some men achieve greatness and wealth by doing good work, some by doing harmless work; the armaments manufacturer by the tearing to bits of the maximum number of his fellow men. It needs a mind in which the humour and the pity have been thickened and deadened, before a man may become an armaments magnate.

After four weeks of technical disagreement at Geneva, the full disagreement to which the Conference was drifting became publicly known. British opinion saw the danger that the rigidity of the American plan might exclude the possibility of compromise, the American proposal itself being unacceptable to the sincerest pioneers of naval disarmament in this country. Good work was done by the Technical Committee towards an agreement on destroyers and submarines, but the "global" criterion for cruisers as postulated by the American plan could not be honestly accepted by any British naval expert. It could not be denied by the American naval experts that the small cruiser was of little use for war purposes—a minute difference in gun calibre being enough to decide what cruisers could take part in any given battle—but American naval experts clung to their "global" slogan. The British argument was that if cruiser tonnage were to be rationed *en masse*, the United States would be able to build exclusively the biggest cruisers, and that Great Britain could maintain her fighting parity only by doing likewise. Such a result would be a parody of Mr. Coolidge's purpose. That Great Britain, who wanted mainly small cruisers for the defence of trade routes—cruisers ex-hypothesi useless for war—should be forced by an American "disarmament" proposal to build offensive cruisers which she did not want, and thereby be unable to build any of the defensive cruisers she did want, would be to open the skies to the laughter of the Gods. We who live in this particularly fatuous period of the world's history have to endure the spectacle of the world's chosen representatives helplessly failing to translate into practice the honest and simple wishes of their weary peoples.

While Geneva was heading for failure, Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons. "Our delegation," he said on July 11th, "went out there (that is, to Geneva,) with a carefully thought-out plan for the future limitation of naval armaments, and the efficacy and extent of the proposals which we are prepared to lay before the Conference may be measured, perhaps, by this single fact, that for years to come they would mean a reduction, adopted by others

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following the same example, on the naval expenditure which we would otherwise have to incur of a sum nearer £50,000,000 than £40,000,000. . . . To my mind, and to the mind of our Government, the question of total tonnage is by itself insignificant, and a decision on total tonnage and that alone would by itself be ineffective either to check armaments or to secure further limitation. Unless some further limitations are to be put upon the number of ships which have the most aggressive character, which are the accompaniments and parts of the great fleets, then the mere total limitation of tonnage would lead, not to a reduction of naval competition, and not to a reduction of expenditure, but would involve all the parties in still further extension and still further expenditure. . . . We can only move with other Powers. We reduced our army without waiting for anyone else. Immediately on the conclusion of the armistice, without waiting for the conclusion of peace, we brought the size of our army to what is nothing more than the bare military police required for the purposes of such an Empire as ours. It is unthinkable to us that we should enter into competition with the United States of America in a new race of armaments. We do not attempt to suggest, without criticism or objection from us, that in any class of vessel they are not entitled to the parity that their needs require. For our part, we seek only to secure the special protection which is vital to an Empire so peculiarly situated as ours, on the lowest scale that we can arrange with other naval Powers, so that all our burdens and efforts may be lightened, and that the menace of war, with big armaments, may be removed. We must recognise, and I am sure that others will recognise, the difference between an Empire such as ours, which is scattered over every sea and divided by wide oceans, and the position of Empires which are practically self-contained, and whose communications in war would be unmenaced even although they were engaged in a great struggle. We in this country not merely desire trade as others desire it, not merely desire protection as others desire it, but we whose supplies are only sufficient for seven weeks' consumption, and our people, have to think how we could live, not how we should starve, if our sea communications were interrupted. . . ."

A plenary session of the Conference was held on July 14th, having been postponed from July 11th because of the assassination of Mr. O'Higgins in Dublin. Mr. Gibson presided. Mr. Bridgeman first gave a long account of the British attitude to the problem, in the course of which he said :

" . . . When we drew up our programme for further limitation of armaments—and . . . this programme had been carefully considered long before President Coolidge issued his invitation . . . what was the situation which we felt had to be faced? Two things

were uppermost in our minds. First was the fact that in 1931, if the Washington Treaty persisted, we should have to commence the building of capital ships of size and cost which we had become convinced were unnecessary and incompatible with the true spirit of disarmament. . . . The other and more pressing consideration was that we found ourselves, owing to having accepted at Washington the 10,000-ton limit for future cruiser construction, launched on a programme of these powerful and expensive vessels of which the end was not even in sight so long as there was no limit to the number of these powerful ships which any country might maintain. . . . One of the main features (of the British proposals) was the prevention of competition in offensive armament by laying down definite maxima for individual ships in each separate category both in tonnage and armament. These maximum figures were in no case higher than the figures now prevailing, and in many cases considerably lower. On April 5th, 1927, at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission, you, sir, were reported as saying on this subject :

" ' We believe that the maximum size of each category should be prescribed, also the maximum calibre of gun, because we are convinced that we cannot go wrong if we deal with tangible and visible characteristics rather than complicate the problem by dealing with characteristics that are not openly visible to all the world that cares to see.' This is profoundly true. Total tonnage is like a pie. It may be a very good thing, but it all depends on what is inside it. . . ."

" It must be remembered that the object of the Conference was to prepare the way on naval matters for a general agreement on disarmament by the League of Nations, which would comprise other countries besides the three represented to-day. Without such limits no country can know with what force it has to compete, because one country can use its tonnage for building large ships, which, if numerous, would have an aggressive character, and so impose upon others the necessity of doing the same. If our proposals were accepted, a definite reduction in the offensive power of every type of vessel would be established for the future. The initial cost of each capital ship would be reduced by one million pounds, of each cruiser by over half a million, and many thousands would be saved annually on cost of maintenance, and the same may be said in a lesser degree of smaller classes of ship. I very earnestly hope we shall agree to the lowest maximum sizes in our scheme. If not, the only agreement we can reach will be one which does not decrease but actually might increase the offensive strength which now prevails. Now I come particularly to the case of cruisers. In your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, you said : ' Our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security,' and

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later, 'we are prepared to discuss the question of tonnage fully, frankly, in the light of our legitimate needs.' We were in cordial agreement with those sentiments, and we took them to mean that the legitimate needs of each country were to be stated by that country. We have long been at work considering what was compatible with our security. We have stated before, and we state again, that as we have only a few weeks' food supply in Britain at any given moment, we depend for our very existence on free passage on the seas . . . as the transport of our food and raw materials and our inter-Imperial trade also depend on safe passage over oceans which separate the different parts of the Empire, we are, owing to their distance apart, more dependent than any other nation on uninterrupted communication by sea. . . . In our original proposal we offered to agree to a ratio similar to the Washington ratio for capital ships being applied to cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, and we are prepared to refrain from laying down any new cruisers of this size until that ratio is reached, and to stop building any more of these large cruisers after that stage has been reached. In smaller cruisers we have not disputed the claim of the United States to an equal number with ours or of Japan to such number as are necessary for her defence. But we desire to limit their size and their armament to 6-inch guns, so that they may be defensive and not offensive weapons. In reply to this we are asked to accept a limit of total tonnage to which, as I have said, we have no intrinsic objection provided we know how other countries are going to use their tonnage.

"We were, however, alarmed when at one time the figure of twenty-five large 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-in guns, was suggested as a possible requirement for America with the possibility of a further number of smaller cruisers with 8-inch guns. At the same time we understood we were to agree in advance to a total tonnage of 400,000 for cruisers. What would this mean for us? We are to agree to an arbitrary figure to represent the force necessary for our security without even knowing the character of the cruiser fleets of other nations. . . . These large cruisers with 8-inch guns represent an enormous superiority over 6-inch gun cruisers in offensive strength—a superiority of at least two and a half to one. This proposal therefore puts us in the position of accepting not parity but definite inferiority in offensive power unless we abandon the number of cruisers we regard as essential for protection of our Imperial communications. . . . What, again, does this proposal mean in the cause of disarmament? It admits the possibility of a huge increase in offensive strength of the fleets of the world over the strength which exists to-day. It would be a strange outcome of the Conference called for limitation. It is not parity with America that is troubling us. We have not raised any objection to that. Nor are we troubled

by the proportion to which Japan would be entitled. It is our own security with which we are concerned and our power in future to protect our sea communications against hostile raids, of whose disastrous effects we have such bitter experience in war. . . . If therefore no further progress is possible on the lines which we have proposed with regard to cruisers, and as we are all of us most desirous of reaching an agreement, we will gladly consider other suggestions. A few days ago another idea was mooted—that we should investigate the possibility of agreeing on a definite building programme which could be embodied in an agreement of this Conference. It would be a maximum programme for each country and would be subject to limitation of maximum individual tonnage. It would enable each of us and the world to see exactly what was the most that any of us could build and the characteristics of different ships up to the time when the revision of the Washington Treaty had to take place. It would be the form of limitation most closely resembling the scheme adopted at Washington, and it comes near to our original notion that we could agree on each other's needs if they were frankly stated."

Viscount Ishii then stated the Japanese case of which the following is a summary :

"With regard to the cruiser class, the Japanese were prepared in a spirit of co-operation to make every possible concession and to exert their utmost endeavours to arrive at a solution satisfactory to all. With regard to the destroyer class, they had already arrived at a settlement with the American and British delegations by receding in some degree from the original position taken up concerning maximum unit tonnage and the replacement-age for destroyers and flotilla leaders. With regard to submarines, the Japanese Delegation thought it proper to propose that small vessels for purely local defence should be exempted from limitation. That a country like Japan needed a great number of such vessels was obvious. Nevertheless, animated by the desire of conciliation, the Japanese had consented to drop what they considered a just and reasonable demand on their part. The Japanese were confident that all the delegations were resolved to continue in the same spirit and work for a happy solution of the cruiser question. The first step towards that end was to discover a definite basis for discussion. The American proposal suggested a global tonnage between 450,000 and 550,000 for service auxiliary strength for the United States and Great Britain. The Japanese would naturally like to take the lower figure as the starting point. They, therefore, proposed 450,000 tons for America and Great Britain and about 300,000 for Japan, thus representing a reduction all round of 30 per cent. in ships built, now building, and projected. They were gathered there to effect the limitation of naval armaments and thereby to reduce the burden to the

taxpayer. One of the best ways of meeting this difficult situation would be by agreeing to a drastic reduction in the number of 10,000-ton cruisers in this way: Ten or less each Great Britain and the United States, and seven or less Japan. A further means of alleviating the difficult situation might be found through some arrangement by which each nation might be allowed to retain vessels in excess of the allotted tonnage or those past the replacement-age under certain conditions and within certain limits in order to enable a nation to possess an additional number of ships needed for specific purposes."

That statement of the Japanese feeling on the subject was remarkably harmonious with the British principle.

Mr. Hugh Gibson, the head of the American Delegation, spoke next. He agreed with Mr. Bridgeman and Viscount Ishii in the earnest hope that an acceptable agreement would be reached. "The cruiser problem," he said, "presents the greatest difficulty, and if it could be solved we should quickly reach agreement on the numerous secondary questions which must be settled before we can draw up a treaty. We are desirous of agreeing to a genuine limitation of all classes of auxiliary craft, and we have suggested certain tonnage levels in various categories as a basis of discussion—namely, 450,000 to 550,000 tons in cruisers and destroyers, but we are ready to go still lower if this course is agreeable to the other Powers." Mr. Gibson then defined the American position: "It is our belief that our naval needs were already recognised in the drawing up of the Washington Treaty, and the soundness of this theory has been proven by practice. Another fundamental point is that any agreement can only be just if it constitutes a genuine limitation, preventing the evils of competitive building, allaying international distrust and suspicion and limiting the burdens of taxation. Our task is therefore by mutual sacrifices to reach a limitation which will attain the end which we all have in view—namely, lightening the burdens on taxation and putting an end to competitive building. In our opinion, the fairest method of limitation is that of total tonnage by classes. I feel confident that all my colleagues at this table will repudiate with equal vehemence the thought of a conflict between us. We believe that we can leave each country free within a carefully restricted tonnage limitation, upon which I trust all can agree, to build in each class as it may see fit." "It had been made abundantly clear by the American delegation," he continued, "that the number of maximum-sized cruisers desired would be dependent upon the total tonnage agreed upon." He combatted the suggestion that the 10,000-ton cruiser had been forced upon the world by American insistence. "The first American construction of such vessels," he said, "had not begun until 1926, several years after other navies

had initiated their construction." "We have not yet completed," Mr. Gibson declared, "and we shall not complete till 1929, one single vessel of this class, and we have no programme, authorised or appropriated, commensurate with the programmes nearing completion elsewhere. . . . We feel that we are in such close agreement with the Japanese regarding the cruiser class," he said, "that we could find a basis of agreement with them, but that is not enough. If some basis can be found mutually acceptable to the British and Japanese, I feel it will be possible for the American delegation to make the agreement complete. The agreement of the three Powers is worth more than any technical advantage, and the mutual confidence and feeling of security of such an agreement is of more value than any number of guns or ships."

The Conference then adjourned. As this paper was printed, the issue was in suspense. One of the oddities of that plenary meeting on July 14th was that Mr. Gibson, while protesting that America had built fewer fighting cruisers than Great Britain or Japan, refrained from accepting the principle that the maximum of such cruisers should be established on a low level. A treaty of the kind attempted had for its object the limiting of future building programmes. If America had in fact built few, why should she hesitate to accept a low standard for the future?

AN ANGLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON WAR CLAIMS.

The text was published on June 1st, in the form of a White Paper, of the correspondence in which was embodied the terms of an Anglo-American agreement about war claims. The agreement consisted of a common-sense cancellation of claims on both sides so that no money will pass either way across the Atlantic.

During the period 1914-1917, when the United States was a neutral, Great Britain performed certain services to American ships—salvage, the sale of stores, petrol, and other commodities, repairs in ports—which were not paid for. After deducting the value of corresponding services rendered to British by American ships, there remained a balance on the British side which represented the British Government's cash claim on the United States. Last year Senator Borah proposed that the British Government should be invited to pay compensation to those American citizens who had suffered losses from the blockade operations of the British navy. Negotiations, therefore, took place, with the highly innocent result above recorded. Claims and counter-claims were simply allowed to neutralise each other—a feat of arithmetic which, indeed, corresponded on a fair estimate with the claims involved. The importance of that solution is that it removes the tiresome and perhaps mischievous possibility of American citizens demanding arbitral

reatment for their blockade claims, a possibility which might have irritated Anglo-American relations.

The United States Government now agreed, in return for the British Government's waiving of its cash claim, to undertake that she would make no further war claims whatever on Great Britain. It is well to have some finality in one aspect of war reparation. The cash balance standing in Great Britain's favour will be used as a sinking fund by the United States Government for the settlement of American claims. It will, however, be open to any discontented American claimant to bring his case before the British Prize Court, although no serious person anticipates such an event. The amount of money involved in the settlement is some £250,000,000 on each side. The settlement will be all the more beneficial because American and British commentators can claim with equal justification and equal satisfaction that each side has scored over the other. The United States Government considerably reduced the figure at which the Borah claims originally stood. That Government is now committed not to present any further claim through the diplomatic channel, not to request arbitration on behalf of any American national claiming compensation for alleged loss caused by the alleged excessively severe application of the British blockade.

The following official statement was issued by the British Government: "On May 19th, 1927, Notes were exchanged at the Department of State in Washington putting into effect an agreement between Great Britain and the United States for the settlement of certain inter-Governmental and private claims arising out of the late war and heretofore unadjusted. The two Governments approached the problem from a practical point of view, and have been animated throughout their negotiations by a common desire to find a national solution without sacrificing any question of principle on either side. The result of their efforts has been not only to provide a satisfactory disposal of outstanding claims, but also to remove permanently from the field of diplomatic controversy questions which, if permitted to remain unsettled, might have arisen later to embarrass the cordial relations now happily existing between Great Britain and the United States of America."

The White Paper was a document of six pages entitled "Treaty Series No. 14 (1927). Notes exchanged between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States of America, regarding the disposal of certain pecuniary claims arising out of the recent war" (Cmd. 2877). Its contents consisted of a letter from Mr. Kellogg to Sir Esmé Howard, dated Washington, May 19th, 1927, in which was described the agreement that had been reached, and a letter from Sir Esmé to Mr. Kellogg repeating that description. The important passages in the agreement were:

"Article 1.—With the exceptions stated in Article 2 hereof, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Government of the United States agree—(1) That neither will make further claim against the other on account of supplies furnished, services rendered or damages sustained by it in connection with the prosecution of the recent war, all such accounts to be regarded as definitely closed and settled. (2) That neither will present any diplomatic claim or request international arbitration on behalf of any national alleging loss or damage through the war measures adopted by the other, any such national to be referred for remedy to the appropriate judicial or administrative tribunal of the Government against which the claim is alleged to lie.

"Article 2.—Nothing contained in the agreement shall be construed to annul, alter, modify, or in any way affect the rights of nationals of either Government, or to prevent the presentation of diplomatic claims based thereon, in respect of—(1) The use of inventions by the other Government in connection with its prosecution of the war. (2) Damage caused by, or salvage services rendered to a vessel belonging to the other Government."

A NEW BALKAN QUARREL.

On June 7th there came the whiff of a new Yugoslav-Albanian "incident." There was, however, little fear that it could lead to serious international complication. The immediate facts which produced the incident are simple and, except at one point, non-controversial.

An Albanian interpreter, employed by the Yugoslav Legation at Tirana, was arrested by the Albanian police on a charge of espionage. The Yugoslav Government peremptorily demanded his release on the ground that he was employed by them, and therefore diplomatically immune from arrest. The Albanian answer to that contention was that M. Juraskovitch, the dragoman in question, was an Albanian subject, did not even live in Tirana, did not appear in the Yugoslav diplomatic list, and had never been reported to the Tirana Government as being employed by Belgrade. The Albanian Government refused to release the prisoner, Belgrade precipitately broke off diplomatic relations, and the Albanian Government sent an informative memorandum to the League of Nations.

The controversial point in the story was that, according to some French accounts, which in this context obviously did not provide the best authority, the Albanian Government had decided to release M. Juraskovitch, but suddenly hardened as a result of unspecified external inspiration. The suggestion was that the sudden hardening led to the diplomatic rupture, and that the mysterious inspiration came from Rome. The Roman part in the story might superficially

appear plausible, but its plausibility was out of date, and conflicted with the most reliable information available. Signor Mussolini was more likely to play the sheep than the wolf after the last Albanian crisis. On that occasion he was shown that any Albanian problem must ultimately be referred either to Geneva or to some other tribunal on which both German and French influence would in practice preponderate. Signor Mussolini is credited with intelligence or cunning enough to appreciate such a situation. It was therefore not hard to believe the informed people who told us that Rome, in fact, did not stiffen Ahmed Zogu's front to the Yugoslav demand, and who advised us to expect Signor Mussolini to appear in the rôle of peace-maker rather than of mischief-maker in that particular field at that particular moment. Another of the nervous stories that circulated needs only to be told to be dismissed. It appears that a conference of Balkan Communists lately took place at Constantinople. It is said that, both China and Great Britain being at the moment unpromising fields for Communist agitation, the Constantinople Conference hit on the stratagem of an Italo-Balkan misunderstanding as a likely means of stirring up the trouble that Communist activity relies on. How such Communists may have induced the Albanian police to arrest M. Juraskovitch was left to one's imagination.

London was not as concerned about the Albanian-Yugoslav rupture as Paris appeared to be. The vigorous use made of it by the Paris Press caused some slight surprise in London. Paris began to speak of Franco-British intervention on the big scale. The British view of the matter, however, continued to be that the arrest of a minor official by the Albanian police was not an event of first-rate diplomatic importance, and that the only serious harm that could be done would be done by an exaggerated representation of its importance. So far as London was concerned all that happened was that the British diplomatists discreetly refused to do anything at all. British diplomacy tried to calm the excitement by belittling it. The French interest in Yugoslav affairs was equally pronounced when the former Albanian crisis arose, and the French anticipations of British intervention were then equally beside the mark.

July 15th, 1927.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

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BARON VON HÜGEL'S LETTERS.*

The publication of the Second Series of the late Baron von Hügel's Addresses and Essays on the Philosophy of Religion has been quickly followed by that of Selected Letters from his voluminous correspondence. The collection is prefaced by a remarkably interesting and illuminating memoir of the Baron by the late Mr. Bernard Holland. This narrative is of great service not only in linking up the miscellaneous correspondence to which it is the introduction, but in giving a connected account of the events and movements which called forth the most important of the Letters. Yet the memoir is more than a connective narrative, for it supplies a vivid portrait of the man by one who enjoyed the great privilege of his friendship. Hence the volume before us is an illuminating companion to Baron von Hügel's more formal treatises. His correspondence reveals the spiritual and intellectual processes by which his beliefs became fixed and eventually found expression at great cost in his *Mystical Element of Religion*, and in his philosophical essays.

The Letters have immense value and interest in themselves, for many of them are the laborious products of sustained thought on the highest level. Baron von Hügel spent himself lavishly upon his

* *Baron Friedrich von Hügel: Selected Letters, 1896 to 1924.* Edited with a Memoir by Bernard Holland. J. M. Dent 21s. net.

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friends, sparing no effort in giving them his support, guidance, and sometimes criticism in common endeavours and in meeting their difficulties with a sympathy that called all his highest powers into full play. Hence his correspondence exhibits in all its richness a remarkable personality in which true saintliness, profound philosophy and human sympathy—at once broad and deep, tender and virile—were wonderfully combined. It is hard to say whether the devotional, the intellectual, or the human interest is predominant in this volume, for it is most rarely compact of all three. Throughout the whole of the letters the Baron preserves, often under the stress of difficulty, the balance between the spiritual, the intellectual and the institutional interests of religion, dealing with the complexity of his problem with a remarkable mixture of clear-sighted confidence and unfeigned humility.

Probably most readers will consider that the chief interest, both of the Memoir and of the Letters, is to be found in the story of Baron von Hügel's relations with the Modernist Movement in the Church of Rome and with its outstanding leaders, Loisy and Houtin in France, Murri in Italy and, above all, Tyrrell in England. For a long time and to a long distance Baron von Hügel travelled with this company, narrowly escaping ecclesiastical censure. Yet in the end his spiritual and mental attitude became clearly distinguished from theirs as the Letters show. He was saved from going to their lengths by the stress which he laid upon what he called the "given-ness" of Divine Revelation, the "creatureliness" of the true attitude to God, and the "costing-ness" of Spiritual Religion. All these sprang from the "Otherness" of God. Hence he remained a loyal though broad-minded son of the Roman Church, and welcomed even the trials of his position as a salutary discipline of his faith and character. It is impossible to do justice either to the Letters or to their author in this brief notice. The volume is a precious and permanent memorial of one of the greatest Christian saints and thinkers of our time.

J. S. L.

REPARATIONS.*

Carl Bergmann's *The History of Reparations* will be diligently studied by economists all over the world as the first full and authoritative account of the various phases of a long and disastrous dispute; but it should also be read by those who desire to understand and to aid the reconstruction of Europe. It is a story of the conflict between political passion and economic facts, in which the latter at last have won at any rate a partial victory. In this desperate struggle the author played throughout an active and honourable part as the chief

* *The History of Reparations*. By Carl Bergmann. Benn. 21s.

German expert, and fully deserves the warm tribute to his tact and ability in the interesting Foreword by Sir Josiah Stamp. Dr. Bergmann naturally writes from a German standpoint, and criticises with restrained severity what Stinnes on an historic occasion denounced as "the madness of the victors." In an early stage of the discussions he was treated as if he was before a court-martial, and the description of the Spa Conference enables us to visualise the tension of that stormy meeting. He denies that the German Government ever attempted to wriggle out of their obligations, but he is never afraid to confess and to lament its mistakes in tactics. The Treaty of Rapallo, for instance, was thoroughly sound; but its signature at the very moment when Mr. Lloyd George was fighting M. Poincaré was midsummer madness. Passive resistance to the invasion of the Ruhr was also inevitable; but Cuno's handling of the crisis was singularly inept.

The line of demarcation throughout these pages is not between Germany and the Allies, but between the friends and foes of a rational co-operation for the good of all concerned. On the German side the great figure of Rathenau receives most admiration, and it is interesting to learn that, though he signed the Treaty of Rapallo, he did so with serious doubts and only by instruction of his Government. On the side of the Allies Lord D'Abernon, Lord Bradbury, and above all the authors of the Dawes Report, are praised as they deserve. With the fall of Poincaré in May, 1924, the supreme obstacle was removed, and commonsense was at last allowed its way. The final solution of the problem of Reparations, however, is still to seek, for it has not yet been determined what Germany's total contribution is to be, nor over how many years payment is to spread. In a final chapter the author proposes a plan for fixing and paying off the debt by means of a gigantic loan.

* * *

NATIONAL CHARACTER.*

Dr. Ernest Barker chose as his theme for the Stevenson Lectures which he delivered in the University of Glasgow in the winter of 1925-26 an extremely controversial subject, since in any discussion of "National Character and the Factors in its Formation" terms have to be defined which are capable of various definitions. It is true that if we define a nation as a large and highly organised group of persons with a common ideal we can evade many of the difficulties that Dr. Barker has to face when he tries to separate the idea of a State and a Nation and declares with a dogmatism that other writers

* *National Character and the Factors in its Formation*. By Ernest Barker, Principal of King's College, London. Methuen. 10s. 6d. net.

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It is not nations which make States; it is States which make nations," a view that can be defended from the outlook, maps, of modern European history but is palpably incorrect if seen in the light of the ancient Empires of the East or the tribal empires of the New World.

But after all, for the purposes of ascertaining what National character is, and what are the factors that have influenced and are influencing it, it is perhaps sufficient to assume that a nation is a highly organised group. "To see how nations have become what they are may be the best way of discovering how they can make themselves other than what they are; and to know the instruments and the processes of our making during the past may throw some light upon the problems of our development in the future." That is Dr. Barker's broad outlook. He is in particular studying English tradition, and declares with truth that "a national tradition is a spiritual fact," and a study of its making is a study of one of the greatest achievements of the human spirit.

Jacob's ladder was based on earth, and so we are shown the material factors first and pass to the spiritual factors. "A race, as a race, is a physical fact." Dr. Barker does not use the wordryan. He prefers to write of the varieties of what he (with others) calls the Nordic stock that settled in this country in successive layers. All this is very controversial. All that we know with certainty is that a Neolithic stock was here before the successive tribes of the great Aryan dispersions from a European centre settled in Britain. The word Nordic is likely to confuse these comparatively simple facts. We have amongst us a small but very definite Neolithic stock, especially in the south-west of Britain and Scotland, and imposed upon these are successive layers of tribes that formed one definite stock in the Carpathian plains. No doubt our national character must be based on this racial combination which has remained practically stationary for nearly nine hundred years. Modern immigration may have affected the British stock, but the probabilities are that it is so fixed as to defy the modern intermixture of foreign Jews and Gentiles. The British stock is the basis of the nation, and it is certain that Dr. Barker, whatever his views as to the origin of the stock, is right when he says that it is necessary to preserve the stock by adequate measures of public health.

The geographical factor is of great importance. We have unique resources and a physical environment that should preserve the British stock in these islands.

Our danger is not a failure of national resources: it is rather that we should let the ardour of our energy and the curiosity of our initiative be dulled, and that we should permit the appetite for work, which was once our native quality, to drain itself away in a round of amusement, or to sink into the repetition and routine

of a mechanical industry, uninspired by a free spirit of co-operation, and only disturbed by industrial struggles and "crises."

In fact, despite many outward signs of pleasuring, which is all to the good, since all work makes Jack a dull boy, the British people work harder than ever they did, though they do not proclaim the fact to the world. The world of finance knows the fact. It is carefully registered in the rate of exchange. The British people are perhaps rather tempted to relax effort after the vast and continuous strain of the Great War. The aptitude for work is with us, but we do not advertise the fact and are best pleased when Dr. Barker and others (and especially Germans and Americans) speak of this aptitude in the past tense.

The same thought applies to the economic factor. Population is not increasing at the old rate or at the rate that some unmarried clergy regard as essential. But on the other hand the standard of humanism and humane-ness is rising rapidly, and mothers no longer boast of having "buried twelve." It is true that the universally higher standard of comfort involves harder work for all, but on the other hand rural life is being marvellously developed and the trend townward is being replaced by a rural drift, while all the towns are healthy in a measure unknown in any town fifty years ago. The organisers of trade and industry are becoming educated and more sensible, and though the aftermath of the Great War has brought a decade of strikes and lockouts, this probably has been the symptom of a healthier economic outlook and of a demand for conditions better suited for production on a great scale.

Women have come into their own at last, and as women are the economists of practically all the households of Great Britain it is all to the good that the economists should have power. Dr. Barker says that "the numerical preponderance of women may to some extent soften national manners, and it may help to command a greater respect for women's work and women's claims; but it is hardly likely to lead to any further or more far-reaching results." It is impossible to agree. There is a vast field for common work between men and women which will be better done if women set the standard of work as they tend to do in that field. There is a vast field for work that women only should do, and that will be better done than when men attempted to do it. Men will be restricted to men's proper work, and that fact will have far-reaching results. The new economics make for closer intercourse and exchange between social grades. The man or woman who is good at, let us say, the higher mathematics, has now full opportunity to exercise his or her gifts whatever the grade that he is born in. On the other hand, young men of the richer grade, who have particular gifts for mechanical work, can now take to it without any consideration of class distinctions. The strike of

May, 1926, showed that. There will always be "classes" that are determined by economic considerations, but the classes will freely mingle on the principle that all the world is now open to the talents, and each man or woman is free to adopt the course of economic life that attracts him or her.

Dr. Barker goes on to describe "the growth of a national spirit." We are told that "the life and action of the modern State becomes more and more complicated." That is not so certain as it seems to many theorists. We are reaching the limits of complication, and are turning, by ingenious adjustments of local government, to simplicity again. The real trouble was in days when local government was not organised or had become non-existent. Over-worked central departments involve far more complications than is the case under a system of skilful devolution. We are on the road to real simplicity by devolution of function. It is only the theorists, who talk a good deal of nonsense about sovereignty, that hold the other view. The men who are working the machine see a new era of true scientific simplicity in sight. That is the tendency of the British national spirit, a demand for efficient simplicity in administration.

The national character, at any rate in the British Empire, has come to demand that, and to demand a growing standard of self-sacrificing citizenship. But if this is the case, law and government will tend in the same direction, the direction that Bentham fought for. The British stock has given the spirit of Bentham what he asked but not in the way that he asked. The Constitution and the Common Law survive and flourish amazingly, but they have been adjusted to meet the new demands of national character. Religion again comes into the demand for practical simplicity. The British people were never so religious as to-day, or so moral, and they were never so anxious to hide the fact. Dr. Barker declares that "the Churches have still a work to do for the nation—a work no less arduous, and no less embracing, than any they have attempted before." That is true, and the Churches seem to be recognising the fact and realising the necessary relationship of religion and social service. The weak point at the moment is the hesitation of educated young men to enter the various ministries. That is British. They fear that they have the vocation and that their hesitation is a sign of it. The Churches must work hard in future and, not least, to play their part in the new education which is doing much to-day to emphasise the best sides of British character throughout the world.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE WINCHESTER CUSTUMAL.*

Mr. J. S. Furley in his new publication from the Winchester records strikes rather a new note. The Winchester Custumal, thought to be lost so far as the Anglo-Norman text was concerned, was found in 1852 among the records in the muniment room of Winchester College by the Rev. J. Gunner, a Master of the College. It is written in a beautiful script of the second half of the thirteenth century and the decision to make the text available for English use with an adequate translation was very wise. There are in existence two mysterious English versions in the City archives of the late fourteenth and the early fifteenth century and these, with the earlier Anglo-Norman version were printed at Bonn, with some critical comments, by Dr. K. W. Engeroff in 1914. His view that the Anglo-Norman Custumal is not the original custumal but that the two English translations come from an earlier original which came into being as a complete whole in the reign of Henry II "as the expression of a civil independence due to the two charters that Henry granted to the City," is almost certainly wrong. The custumal is an unsystematic document, and though it is certain that the text here printed is derived from an earlier text upon which the English versions are based as Dr. Engeroff says (the omissions in the first English version make this clear) yet it is also clear that the Custumal was built up bit by bit as occasion arose, and Mr. Furley rightly asserts that "had the Custumal been drawn up at one time the arrangement would have been more systematic."

The date of the Anglo-Norman text here printed may be earlier than 1275 when a certain procedure incorporated in the custumal was forbidden by Statute, but this law was not always obeyed, and Miss Bateson has suggested 1276, the year when King Edward I restored the City Constitution, as a possible date. The lost earlier custumal may possibly be dated at the beginning of the thirteenth and even in the twelfth century. If this is so, and Mr. Furley accepts this position, we are facing borough conditions of about the date of Magna Charta in a city then very ancient. Does the custumal of that date give some indication of the age of the Winchester community?

If so, a full history from the administrative side of Winchester is in sight since the Black Book of Winchester (edited by Mr. W. H. B. Bird) and Mr. Furley's first book, issued in 1923, on the City Government in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the custumal carry the student from early times until the year 1550. The history, then, that lies behind the custumal is very important. The custumal opens with the statement that the ancient usages "were observed

* *The Ancient Usages of the City of Winchester: from the Anglo-French version preserved in Winchester College.* By J. S. Furley, with Glossary by E. W. Patchett. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 7s. 6d.

in the time of our ancestors." The Constitution of the City is complex. There is first "the Commonalty." This body is not defined and it is probably tribal. It joins with "the Twenty-Four" in electing the mayor. It elects the two bailiffs from four men whom the mayor and the Twenty-Four elect. Moreover, the Twenty-Four are clearly elected by the Commonalty from among themselves. The mayor is an official, and probably a twelfth century official, who represents the people but whose appointment has to be confirmed by the Crown. The sheriff has been displaced, the king has no reeve in the city as he must have had in the earlier centuries. In London there was the king's reeve in the seventh century and that may have been because London belonged to the King of Kent. The bailiffs are elected by a curious combination by the Twenty-Four and the mayor or the Commonalty, and they definitely represent the king. These provisions are obviously later compromises to secure the royal authority in the absence of the king's reeve or sheriff. If we assume, as the age of the City makes imperative, that Winchester was tribal, such compromises would rapidly follow the Saxon Settlement.

But what signs are there in the custumal of a tribal city? The royal franchises are perhaps significant of the City from the tribal point of view. On the other hand, the power of any member of the Twenty-Four to make distress on "foreigners" suggests that the Twenty-Four had a special tribal importance and possibly represented the kinships that made up the tribe. The Twenty-Four seem to hold the secret of the early history of the City. The relationship between the Twenty-Four and the Commonalty is also of importance. Local taxation (tallages) was assessed by six men, three from the Twenty-Four and three from the Commonalty. That seems to point to an earlier compromise between not the king and the city but the tribe and its leaders. Now these six men had to administer funds raised from the Four Houses into which the Gild Merchant was divided. This division into Houses may not impossibly be related to the four kinships that are not uncommonly the bases of tribal structure. In Winchester the town or city structure was older than the Gild and it seems quite possible that the Gild adopted the older kinship structure. If the tribe originally consisted of four kinships the Twenty-Four would consist of six men from each kinship or House, and it is possible that the six men who assessed the tallages represent the kinships. These speculations are, of course, not suggested by Mr. Furley, but they are designed as a suggestion as to the obscure origin of the Twenty-Four and similar bodies which, in fact, exist in varying numbers in all the ancient towns of England. Winchester has clear traces of the kinship origin of the community. The writ in the City Court

known as the writ *de rationabili parte* is evidence of the kinship structure. The doctrine of equal partition between certain relations, "brother with sister, uncle with nephew, aunt with niece," is evidence of the weight of kinship in the social life. The procedure of "Stakement," a court process that delayed adverse possession, is very early and full of interest. It seems not improbable that it was imposed by the Germanic settlers on an earlier form of personal remedy. All these questions are difficult, and it is only by the method of trial and error that some basic conclusions can be arrived at.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE NATURE OF ART.*

The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford last May by that learned philosopher and historian of philosophy, Professor Alexander, should arouse somewhat heated discussion in both philosophic and artistic circles. It would not have satisfied Herbert Spencer, who affiliated Art with Play, it would not have satisfied Wordsworth, who had his own view of the practical significance of words, and it would not have satisfied Aristotle, who appeared to think that the Noble, the Beautiful or the Good is a goal at which we aim, deliberately and consciously. Now Professor Alexander declares that there is a specific æsthetic emotion and that it is not merely "ordinary feelings or attitudes towards the subjects of Art in a certain condition of refinement and complication." Moreover, he holds with Mr. Bradley that (for instance) poetry is "a world by itself, independent, completed, autonomous." The importance of this point of view is that, if it is true, it adds a new reality to the reality of things, to the totality of objectivity. Beauty, nobility, goodness are added to the sum of things. But it does not seem to follow that this new world is necessarily a product of a special instinct. Professor Alexander's thesis is that

"the æsthetic impulse and the æsthetic emotion which goes with that impulse, and is part and parcel of it, are an outgrowth from the instinct of constructiveness, and are that impulse or instinct when it has become first human, and next, contemplative. Accordingly I should describe or define the beautiful as that which satisfies the constructive instinct when it has reached the stage of contemplation."

The nightingale does not (we are told) sing for the love of singing—this is a pure, perhaps necessary, assumption. If he did so sing he would be an artist, a musician. It is also assumed that between animal constructiveness and artistic production there is an intermediate stage of technical effort "in which constructiveness remains practical but is humanised for a purpose." It is assumed—a negative assumption for which there is some evidence—that the animal has

* *Art and Instinct*. By S. Alexander. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 2s. net.

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no purpose but merely follows an instinctive ordinance, though in some higher mammals a transition stage has been observed, a stage short of purpose. It is very difficult and perhaps unnecessary for Professor Alexander's argument to accept so dogmatic a view. But in any event man looks before and after and longs for, and seeks with a definite purpose for, what is not. Technological constructiveness has arrived. The analogous animal instinct is curiosity, and we are told that "truth may be properly viewed as the satisfaction of humanised curiosity." In the intermediate technological stage phenomena (Professor Alexander uses the much abused word *Nature*) is viewed as something to be understood "not as a field for the creation of fresh objects," though these may result.

Now the next stage, we are told, is the adding of man's personality to observed phenomena. The man of science endeavours to eliminate himself, the artist adds himself to the scene that he observes. The Poet is (as the word signifies) the Maker. The craftsman is essentially practical, the artist is essentially contemplative and adds himself to the phenomena in order to achieve something that exists for its own sake and not (apparently) as part of the order of things that would exist if the artist had never come into existence. Professor Alexander deals specially with poetry, and asks the question that has been asked in all the long centuries since poets began to *Make*: "How do words get diverted from their practical use, and become enchanted? How does the magic get in?" Now the poet is not, as a poet, a grammarian. He does not regard the words theoretically. "He makes an artistic and not a scientific use of them." The answer given to the question, "How does the magic get in?" is "the constructive excitement itself which attaches the words to the artist and detaches them from their practical issues." It is apparently suggested that the poet's personality works on the inevitable lines of a pre-human instinctive creature and that an ordinance produces, by a train of constructive activity, the magic order. "The poetic excitement of constructiveness seems to satisfy the poet himself." Presumably, therefore, it is something outside of or at any rate independent of the poet's personality or will-power, which makes the poet say what has to be said.

The constructive instinct then becomes artistic when it ceases to be practical; and it ceases to be practical when it is pursued for its own sake, and the constructed object, in our case the words, is used as the satisfaction of the constructive passion itself. The passion takes possession of its object and lifts it out of practical consideration.

It is a curious position. Professor Alexander assumes the existence of a "constructive passion" which selects the poet's words for him, not at all unlike the constructive passion that makes the beaver build his dam. "He sings spontaneously as the bird sings,

and he is not occupied with words in the sense that he thinks out the words to express his ideas." Professor Alexander does not illustrate this from the art of music where notes have order but no human meaning. Does the constructive passion here build up the noble Houses of Music that are among the greatest of artistic achievements? Is there spontaneity in the region of order, are the notes used for their own sake merely as means "by which the constructive passion is assuaged"? Frankly, such a position can only be adopted with great hesitation, great doubt. Spontaneity is not, it would seem, a necessary aspect of great poetry or great music, and in fact a written score gives to the great musicians as much satisfaction as a performance in the region of sound. It seems untrue to say that either words or notes cannot be parted from the appropriate sounds.

Professor Alexander's thesis, most delightfully produced and full of essential poetry itself, is not in fact wholly satisfying. On the one hand we are told, as is most true, that "Art is serious, not play but work, not mere exuberance but a vocation." On the other hand we are told that the artist "sings and builds because he must." No doubt that too is most true. But there is an inconsistency between the two truths (if Professor Alexander will forgive the use of the word "truth") if we assume that they are based on the existence of a specific æsthetic instinct aloof in a region of personality that has subjected all other instincts to its will. The value of work is work that is freely given. There is not value from the point of view of personality if the work is a task imposed, as it is assumed that it is imposed by instinct on the beaver. If it is a mere instinct that is operating, then the addition to the sum of realities is not actually an addition, since it is an automatic process inherent in the ultimate instincts. If Art is not the product of a special impulse or emotion but is the fruit of the conscious effort of the human personality to draw out of itself what is essentially noble and beautiful, man is a greater being than the being who by chance possesses some special emotion and gives its fruits to the race of men. If Art is a product of man's conscious effort to rise beyond his present limitations and his passions, it would mean that man is realising the purpose that God implanted in him through a long heredity. The theory of an artistic instinct, impulse, or emotion as the source and sole begetter of all forms of art has not inherent in it this far greater conception of man. The theory, moreover, detracts from the essential simplicity of things. It would be an exception from a broad rule of things that explains from one procreative motion or act of will outside the temporal series the varied phenomena within the temporal series. The theory seems to assume creative acts within the temporal series without the agency of human will. That seems inconsistent with the reasonableness of things, and places man on a far lower level than any Aristotelian would admit.

J. E. G. DE M.

JEWISH HUMANISM.*

The title of this attractive book is a misnomer. We may talk about the legacies of Greece and Rome to the modern world, though it is rather a foolish term, as the ancient world had no conscious intention of benefiting either Europe or America. But in the case of the Jews the term is misleading altogether since, apparently, the Jews are still with us and are still contributing to the wealth of the human race, as some of the learned essays in this volume show. In his Prologue the Master of Balliol rightly says that the book "is concerned therefore with something which is not strictly a legacy but rather gifts which a living community has in the past given to civilisation." It is true that Dr. Lindsay says that what we have received from Greece, Rome, and the ancient Jewish race are "strictly legacies," but that is, of course, exactly what they are not. If legal language must be used we are next of kin in an intestate succession. The book presents in excellent form "the contribution that has come to the sum of human thought from Judaism and from the Jewish view of the world." It would have been better if the title had expressed this. The term "Israel" in this connection is somewhat precious.

Sir George Adam Smith puts into striking form the facts as to the great literary and the supreme religious genius of the Hebrews. Indeed, in both religion and literature they are realists, and if that realism lacks subtlety it strikes to the very heart of things. That perhaps is why the combination of Greek thought and Hebrew faith made Christianity irresistible to the thinking world. It has to be remembered that the Jew at his source was very near to nature. He was an agriculturist and a fighter before he became a trader and a financier. It is possible, indeed, that his relationship with finance was due to his exclusion by the mediæval Christian world from any other region of trade. Mr. Edwyn Bevan points out that in the ancient world "the Jews had no special reputation as financiers or usurers." When Greek became the mother tongue of the Jews they brought their realism to the aid both of philosophy and trade. Philo, Mr. Bevan points out, "uses philosophic terms and ideas for a homiletic purpose. His interest is in a particular kind of religious experience, emotional experience." He did not need a rational explanation of the universe. As a Jew there was an explanation within in his nature, the explanation of one creative and sustaining God. When in the eighteenth century Jews began to seek a rational

* *The Legacy of Israel: Essays* by Sir George Adam Smith, Edwyn Bevan, F. C. Burkitt, R. T. Herford, A. Guillaume, Charles and Dorothea Singer, Rev. Canon Box, W. B. Selbie, N. Isaacs, L. Roth, A. Meillet, Laurie Magnus, C. G. Montefiore. Planned by the late I. Abrahams and edited by Edwyn R. Bevan and Charles Singer. With an introduction by the Master of Balliol. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 10s. net.

explanation the result was rather disastrous. Professor Burkitt takes the point that "the Christian Church did undoubtedly believe in the reality and eternal significance of Time. Right or wrong, wise or foolish, it is part of the debt of Christianity to Judaism." That is the true aspect of Jewish philosophy, frank realism: the succession of events to the Jewish mind is as unanswerable as the existence of a Force beyond the temporal series manifesting a Divine Purpose. Those who deny these two Jewish assumptions are to-day scarcely up to date, for, after all, the doctrine of relativity is not inconsistent with such assumptions and may richly confirm them in an age when we at last realise as a scientific fact that matter is not material and reality is really real.

Dr. Travers Herford makes the important point that Judaism has meant everything as a sustaining and incorruptible force in the life of the Jews themselves. "The Jews found the only freedom for the higher life of the spirit in the synagogue and probably even more in the home, the Holy of Holies for the Jew in all ages of his wandering." This is to say that the Jew preserved the tribal or kingship conditions that make for racial preservation. The race that does not do this perishes. It is the strength of the Aryan as well as of the Semite peoples. The danger for the Jew, in a future when persecution will die away for ever, will be the relaxing of these racial safeguards in his eagerness for the fleshpots of Egypt. The racial tradition should prove a safeguard, but the danger very definitely exists. To the Aryan Christian the danger is less imminent simply because he is, on the average, less ambitious than the Jew and more content with simple things. The family tie is, therefore, more easily maintained, and especially in the fact that in the average Aryan Christian there is no reaction from ages of persecution.

But the gift of the Jew *inter vivos* to modern civilisation or humanism is, whatever the future may bring, a rich one. Dr. Charles and Miss Dorothea Singer, in a very lengthy and learned chapter, bring out the vast value of "the Jewish Factor in Mediæval thought." The subject is one that deserves the closest attention, especially as the writers make it clear that this factor is very difficult to formulate. But that the factor is real is obvious since "the Jewish carrier represent perhaps the most continuously civilised element in Europe." That fact tells its own wonderful story. The figment of "East is East and West is West" is dismissed curtly enough. There are, it is true, deep distinctions between the Aryan and the Semite but the reactions between them have always been singularly fruitful. If it were not so the English gift to India would be vain, and the Christian religion in Europe would itself be vain. It is of the greatest use to have set out in detail the reactions in humanism other than religious humanism, that the appearance of the Jew in

Europe effected. But to all this elaborate investigation and the story of the influence of the Jew on scholarship, on law—the influence of the Jew on the Common Law of England is perhaps overstated by Dr. N. Isaacs, an American lawyer—on modern thought, the student will turn with eagerness and find considerable satisfaction in the reflection that the Jew, despite ages of persecution, has been able in the sequence of events to bring his realistic humanism to the aid of a world that was realistic in action rather than in theory. The whole book is one to stimulate thought, and the modern Jew, too much immersed in his new freedom, has as much to learn from it as anyone.

* * *

A PAULINE JOURNEY.*

In the introduction to this interesting book Sir Henry Lunn gives his reasons for undertaking the "Voyage round the World": first to lecture on behalf of the Committee of the League of Nations Union, and secondly "to do something to bring the united forces of all Christian Churches behind the League of Nations." He and his party arrived in New York on February 17th, 1926. He was entertained by the Union League Club, and gave a lecture on "the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787" at the Sulgrave Manor Institution. He also preached at Brooklyn in the church of Dr. Parkes Cadman, and gives an interesting account of the wide organisation of Trinity Church with its vast income running into six figures. The situation caused by the passing of the Act for reunion of the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational Churches by the Ottawa Parliament prevented Sir Henry Lunn from holding a meeting on Church Unity; but by the invitation of the Bishop of Montreal he addressed a large representative audience in that city on the Locarno Pact and the League of Nations. Temperance Legislation seems more successful in Ottawa than in the States. A Government Commission have the entire control of liquor. The new law came into force on May 1st, 1921, and has proved highly successful in reducing bootlegging and illicit manufacture. The hotels cannot sell liquor, anyone in a hotel wishing to drink must go to the Government Store and buy for themselves. The result appears to be satisfactory.

Leaving Ottawa the party visited the Niagara Falls and went on to Buffalo, where Sir Henry preached in the cathedral by the invitation of Bishop Brent. It is only possible to outline this interesting and valuable tour. Everywhere Sir Henry met eminent and interesting people of all kinds and addressed large audiences of all denomina-

* *Round the World with a Dictaphone.* By Sir Henry Lunn. Ernest Benn. 10s. 6d. net.

tions. In Toronto he met the three leaders of the United Churches of Canada and held a meeting at the Cathedral Chapter House. He addressed the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association at Chicago and also preached in the Episcopal Church. Arriving at Vancouver in March, after a delightful run through the Rockies, Sir Henry found a full programme which included a sermon in Christ Church Cathedral, a speech at the Women's Canadian Club and an address to the university students. On April 7th the party sailed for Honolulu where they visited a Buddhist temple, the priest being a former Anglican clergyman who joined the Roman Catholic Church and finally found rest as a Buddhist priest. There is a young men's Buddhist Association run on the same lines as the Y.M.C.A. An interesting account is given of life in this beautiful island. The whole population is English-speaking though the Japanese and Chinese also speak their own tongues.

After a pleasant voyage the party arrived in Auckland on April 25th and were met by the representatives of the Council of Churches and League of Nations, and a full programme was arranged for the period devoted to New Zealand. Rotorua was visited and the travellers were fortunate in seeing the Whakarewarewa Geysers in activity. From Wellington the party passed on to Sydney and Sir Henry Lunn was invited by the Archbishop to preach in the cathedral, and the same evening he preached to a large audience at the Methodist Mission. Sir Henry gives interesting accounts of Australian life and has amusing stories to tell on divers subjects. He passed from Sydney to Melbourne, from Melbourne to Adelaide. In each city he preached in the cathedral and gave many lectures. The party, after a tour replete with incident, at last embarked at Fremantle for England. The photographs in the book are full of interest, some being of real beauty, and they illustrate a volume that has a measure of apostolic significance. One misprint must be noted: Mr. Ramsay MacDonald never stood for Greenwich.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Dr. Paul Knaplund's *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy** is a valuable addition to our knowledge of a great statesman. Basing his researches on the Gladstone Papers at Hawarden and the official correspondence preserved in the Record Office, the Wisconsin Professor describes the stages of thought and experience through which Gladstone passed in relation to the problems of the British Empire. His father owned slave plantations in the West Indies, and his appointment as Under-Secretary for the Colonies in Peel's short-lived ministry in 1835 increased his interest in the colonies, on which he proceeded to write an unfinished treatise printed in the appendix

* Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

to this volume. "It took years to overcome the bias of his youth," writes Dr. Knaplund; but though he does not rank with Lord Durham, Charles Buller, Gibbon Wakefield, and Sir William Molesworth, he was gradually converted to their ideas and became their most influential exponent. By 1850, we are told, he was a true colonial reformer, by which our author means that he realised that the Empire must be held together by sentiment, not by force, by love, not by laws. The last two chapters describe the colonial policy of Gladstone's premierships with discriminating approval, and the Majuba Settlement is rightly declared to be an act of courage, not of cowardice. One of the chief merits of this interesting book is its proof that "Gladstone's great fight for Home Rule was an endeavour to extend to Ireland the system which had proved so eminently successful overseas," and a natural consequence of his long-standing advocacy of colonial autonomy. The volume closes with a brief reference to the Imperial Conference of 1926, which defined Great Britain and the Dominions as "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status." Professor Knaplund's volume furnishes ample proof of his contention that Gladstone "must be reckoned among the great architects and builders of the Commonwealth of Nations."

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This life of Sir Albert Hastings Markham (1841-1918)* by the Misses M. E. and F. A. Markham is a succinct account of the notable and characteristically English sailor who played an active part in naval life in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, including a big part in the *Alert* expedition to the North Pole in 1875-6, and who flew his flag as rear-admiral and second in command in the Mediterranean in 1892-3. Admiral Markham was on his flagship the *Camperdown* on Thursday, June 22nd, 1893, when the Mediterranean fleet, on its annual summer cruise under Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, left Beyrout for Tripoli. The terrible disaster to the *Victoria* happened as a result of Sir George Tryon's signals directing both columns of the Fleet to turn inwards with the object of anchoring the Fleet in the open roadsteads off Tripoli in such a way that the ships in each column would be in a reverse order in two lines running northward from the respective flagships *Victoria* and *Camperdown*. When Admiral Markham saw the signal he said to the Flag-Lieutenant (Lieutenant Bradshaw) "it is impossible, as it is an impracticable manœuvre," and ordered him to keep his signal "at the dip" to indicate that it was not understood, and directed a message to the Commander-in-Chief by semaphore asking him whether he wished the columns to turn as indicated. But before this could be done Admiral Tryon semaphored: "What are you waiting for?" and the manœuvre proceeded. Admiral Markham soon saw that he was bound to collide with the *Victoria* which continued to turn in, and ordered the captain of the *Camperdown* to go full speed astern with the starboard propeller to decrease her angle of turning and later ordered full speed astern with both engines. It was too late, and "the stern of the *Camperdown* struck the *Victoria* on her starboard bow and crashed into the ship almost to her centre line." The *Camperdown* was fortunately able to disengage but the *Victoria* heeled over to starboard and disappeared. With a smooth sea 29 officers and 262 men were saved, but Sir George Tryon, 21 officers and 366 men

* Cambridge University Press. 15s. net.

were lost. At the court-martial Admiral Markham was acquitted from blame "for carrying out the directions of the Commander-in-Chief in person" though the Court much regretted that he did not "carry out his first intention of semaphoring to the Commander-in-Chief his doubt as to the signal." The Admiralty, three months later, repeated the regret in a Minute and stated that "the Rear-Admiral's belief that the Commander-in-Chief would circle round him was not justified by the proper interpretation of the signal." The authors of the book very rightly criticise the Minute as wholly unfair. Sir George Tryon's dominant personality made disobedience to the signal impossible. Admiral Markham tried to give a reasonable interpretation to a signal made by the greatest living expert at manœuvres. Sir George Tryon after the accident said: "It is my doing, entirely my fault." This terrible disaster left a deep mark on Admiral Markham's life, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that the most eminent sailors of the day declared that they would have done exactly as he had done. In 1903 he attained the rank of full admiral and in 1906 retired. He offered his services in August, 1914, but had to content himself with work at home which he conducted till his death on October 28th, 1918. Throughout his long and active life he displayed "the quiet virtues of a Christian gentleman" and was a worthy representative of the greatest service in the world.

* * *

The author of this comprehensive volume of Breton folktales* has done good service to all who are interested in this undercurrent of history as we may call it; for on folktales hangs much of the literature of our own, and other countries. Without some knowledge of folklore, much would be lost, not alone in respect to the enjoyment and understanding of the finest and best literature, but to the knowledge and insight it affords of the nation or people that the literature enshrines. The folklore that we have grown up with is part of our inheritance. At first it comes as tales at our nurse's or mother's knee—more probably at the former, for the humbler folk carry it on from generation to generation—wondered at, believed in, never doubted, linking the possible with the impossible in child-like fashion. Then as the years go by, we cling to these tales, cherish them, enrich them, till they become one almost with our faith. The undercurrent that we started with has a deeper current still, for all folklore is based on religion, or worship in some form or another of a deity who is to be pacified or appeased, that evil may be averted. Folklore may well be divided into three stages, first the oral, then the written legend, and lastly, tradition. Considering, therefore, how we, even in these latter days, are enveloped in tradition, it behoves us to know something of the mysterious source from whence it springs. Mr. Johnson, in this book, has collected a vast amount of Breton folktales hitherto unknown to many students of the subject on both sides of the Channel. The author deals with the legend of Ker-Ys, Sea-lore, Death and the Beyond (in the concluding chapter) in a most interesting fashion, and by this means greatly helps the understanding of the psychology of the Breton mind and its unswerving devotion to its country and its saints, Little Britain and its Cornish Fathers.

* *Folktales of Brittany*. By W. Branch Johnson. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

The second volume of Dr. Frederick J. Powick's admirable "Life of Our Beloved Mr. Baxter," as Archbishop Tillotson called him, is now issued under the title *The Reverend Richard Baxter Under the Cross (1662-1691)** and takes us from the date of his message to Margaret Clareton on September 10th, 1662, some months after he laid down his ministry in anticipation of the Act of Uniformity, to his death in Charterhouse Yard on December 8th, 1691. His death followed six years after his imprisonment in the King's Bench Prison after an amazing trial before Lord Jeffreys who was insulting enough to say: "I know how to deal with saints as well as sinners" and to compare him with Titus Oates, then standing in the pillory in New Palace Yard. Archbishop Tillotson wrote of this monstrous case, "Nothing more honourable than when the Rev. Baxter stood at bay, be-rogued, abused, despised; and never more great than then. . . This is the noblest part of his life, and not that he might have been a bishop. . . . God lead us all to this spirit and free us from the worldly one that we are apt to run into." Lord Jeffreys is said to have desired that Baxter should be scourged, but his colleagues overruled him, and he was fined and committed to prison till he paid the fine. The company that gathered round Baxter at the trial and his general reputation made sterner penalty impossible. Moreover, it is not at all impossible that Lord Jeffreys meant merely to frighten the party gathered in the Court. The mystery of that strange but able judge has not yet been cleared up. The trial in respect of the publication of the *Paraphrase* and its alleged attack on the Church of England is in a sense typical of Baxter's long years "under the Cross." He loved the Church of England and conformed, as far as possible, and strove to avoid separatism. The whole story is well told and in days when the interest in Baxter has revived, should be widely read. Baxter himself is always readable. His little book *Now or Never* should be re-published.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Mr. Aylward M. Blackman's translation of Professor Wilhelm Spregelberg's lecture on "The Credibility of Herodotus' Account of Egypt in the Light of the Egyptian Monuments,"† delivered at the fifty-fifth Congress of German philologists and schoolmasters at Erlangen, will be welcomed by English-speaking scholars. Mr. Blackman gives a few additional notes to the lecture, the verdict of which as to the credibility of Herodotus is distinctly a favourable one, especially with regard to his statements on history. "That he actually was in Egypt cannot be doubted by any sane person" though his sojourn frequently took historical romances for actual historical truths. Perhaps he saw, however, into the tribal truth behind the romance though Professor Spregelberg does not apparently favour this view.

* Jonathan Cope, Ltd. 15s. net.
† Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 2s. 6d. net.

Dr. Herbert Danby, a residentiary canon of St. George's Cathedral, Jerusalem, in his book, "The Jew and Christianity: Some Phases Ancient and Modern of the General Attitude Towards Christianity,"* gives the reader "what may fairly be regarded as representative statements at various stages in the history of Christian-Jewish relations and, as far as possible" he sketches "the general conditions out of which those experiences of opinion arose." Thus we have an account of these relations in the first century, in the Talmudic Era and early mediæval times, from the period of the crusades to the eighteenth century and at the present time. The book has a wide range. It does not spare the Christian persecution of the Jews in the Middle Ages and later times: but, in fact, the Mediæval Jew had a maddening contempt for Christianity. But the Christian has not been a follower of Christ in his relation to the Jews. That Dr. Danby makes clear and pleads for a nobler attitude.

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It is necessary to record the publication of a volume entitled "Descriptive Economics"† by Professor R. A. Lehfeldt of the University of Witwatersrand and Johannesburg in a new series of "introductory volumes" entitled "The World's Manuals." Dr. Lehfeldt in his introductory volume "gives a plain account of the facts, unmixed with theory." His experience of the lecture-room suggests that it is well to go through such a description before embarking on analysis: hence this book, which is based on a course of lectures given for some years past. The volume deals with farming, manufacturing, transport, commerce, finance, Government and industry. It should lay a sound basis for thought in the man who tries to think for himself.

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"A Reference Library: English Language and Literature."‡ The English Association Pamphlet No. 66 has now gone into a deserved second edition. The object is "to provide material and suggestions for the formation of the English section of a School, Training College or private Library." The list (with titles, publishers' names, number of volumes and prices) deals with works and criticism on them, drama, anthologies and selections, translations, literary history and criticism, "works of reference, history of the English language, grammars, etc." Only books of literary value, or of influence on English literature, or markedly contributing to the history of theory of English literature or language are included. Living authors are excluded, children's books and school text books are excluded. Anglo-Saxon texts and grammars are also excluded, but the Introduction names books on the beginnings of the study. This pamphlet should go far towards forming a sound literary judgment in students and general readers.

* The Sheldon Press, Northumberland Avenue. 2s.

† Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d. net.

‡ Humphrey Milford. 2s. 6d. net.

The first volume of "Eusebius Bishop of Caesarea: The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine,"* translated with an introduction and notes by Professor H. J. Lawlor and Mr. J. E. L. Oulton, should attract many readers, and not only specialised students of ecclesiastical history. The volume now produced contains a translation of the ten books of the famous "Ecclesiastical History" for the main part following the Leipzig text of E. Schwartz (issued between 1903 and 1909), and also a translation of two recessions of the "Martyrs of Palestine." The style of Eusebius is wearisome but his matter is very important, so that the Dean of St. Patrick's and Mr. Oulton have endeavoured to give "as readable a translation as is consistent with a strict regard to accuracy." The translation in fact is far more than readable. Mr. Oulton is responsible for the translation of the Greek text in Volume I and Dr. Lawlor for the Introduction and Notes which comprise Volume II, but each has criticised the work of the other. The criticism is delayed until Volume II appears. A curious small point shows how studies overlap. Eusebius tells us that it was an ancient custom for the Ethiopians to be ruled over by a woman (Book II, 2, 1). The fact indicates Sumerian influence.

* * *

Canon Auster of York under the title "Our Holy and Our Beautiful House"† has gathered together various "York Minster Historical Addresses." The Archbishop of York in the preface pays a merited tribute to the author: "Chancellor Auster has been an honoured member of its Chapter for forty years. His researches in the antiquities of the Minster have been a labour of love, and in these sketches he has presented some of the results of his labours in a picturesque and popular form." He adds that many visitors will welcome "a guide so vivid and sympathetic as the Chancellor, as he opens out to them these glimpses of old days in the life of one of the great Churches of Christendom." This praise should bring this excellent book into the hands of all tourists who visit this wonderful House. The volume is edited by Mr. Nayan Little.

* S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

† S.P.C.K. 5s.

THE MEANING OF LIBERALISM.*

A NOTICEABLE feature of this Summer School is the recognition of the fact that the boundaries between old Party divisions have become hopelessly confused—not lost, but confused. There are people who consider themselves Tories, who when you come to talk to them, not in public but in private, strike you as being almost as good as Liberals, whilst there are professed Liberals who when you come to talk to them seem worse than Tories.

The old definitions of Parties in this country, when you examine them, lie buried in the dust of forgotten, far-off things, of historical events that happened long ago: Cavalier and Roundhead before the Revolution of 1688, and Liberals and Tories after the happening of that dismal occurrence. We have had a great number of Revolutions since the arrival of Dutch William at Torbay and the Act of Settlement of 1701. In my own lifetime there have been at least three, and if my father's span of life could be added to my own, at least half a dozen Revolutions, far more remarkable in their political and social consequences than the old Civil War and the change of dynasty in 1688.

David Hume, *magnum et venerabile nomen*, in an Essay published in 1742, defined a Tory as follows: "A Tory since the Revolution may be defined as a lover of Monarchy, though without abandoning liberty, and a partisan of the House of Stuart, and a Whig may be defined as a lover of liberty, though without renouncing Monarchy, and a friend of the Protestant Succession." These definitions, though agreeably reminiscent of much history, are of small use to us in 1927. We are all, whatever we call ourselves, loyal to the throne, and hate, with personal aversion, the very idea of a President; but these great twin doctrines of Divine Right and Passive Obedience, that once sanctified the lives of the holiest and most learned members of the Church of England, have never been so much as mentioned in the prolonged discussions now taking place as to whether the Act of Uniformity in Public Worship should or should not be repealed.

And as for Liberty, which Hume's Tory never wholly abandoned and Hume's Whig professed to love (though without renouncing monarchy), men's conceptions as to what True Liberty means have undergone such alterations as to demand a complete re-handling of that mighty theme. It may well be that men are not agreed what True Liberty means and involves, but it means more and involves much more than was dreamt of even in Milton's philosophy.

We should not cut ourselves adrift from English history. To do

* A Valedictory Address delivered at the close of the Liberal Summer Session at Cambridge, August 4th, 1927.

so would be to deprive ourselves of the excitement of watching when the jade will repeat herself, as she still at rare intervals is accustomed to do, particularly after great wars. The troubles that follow treaties of peace are very like each other. But, speaking generally, old party names and distinctions are of small assistance to us at this epoch.

The frame of mind of a true instinctive Liberal to-day demands a faith, a well-tempered faith, not indeed in the perfectibility of Man, but in the historic fact of Human Progress : meaning by that dubious expression an ever-increasing sensibility to human and animal suffering all the world over, a hatred of oppression whether of mind or body, a passion for freedom of thought and expression of thought, and a generous desire to contribute towards a future, however far off and ill defined, when cruel, mutilating distinctions between one class of the community and another shall be mitigated, and if possible abolished. Of course, I know well enough that Human Nature being the compound she is, there will always be some people who cannot help becoming, despite all the efforts of Chancellors of the Exchequer, multi-millionaires, just as there are others who will insist, preach to them as you may of the glories of independence, in becoming paupers. But for all that, I think a really good Liberal may be permitted to cherish the ideal of a nation where there should be neither multi-millionaires nor paupers—for can it be denied that both classes are, in some at least of their manifestations, mighty offensive?

I must add another symptom of a true Liberal frame of mind : an utter detestation of One Man Rule, whether the hero appears to descend from the sky like an Apollo with a knife ready to skin poor Marsyas alive or, as is more likely nowadays, ascends like Vulcan armed with a sledge-hammer from some grimy pit of Labour. In either case we loathe, abominate, and repudiate him.

Descending to particulars, I will go on to say that a good Liberal (particularly if he does not mean to be a candidate at the next Election) avoids the use of shibboleths and the well-worn epithets of the platform, whether by way of compliment or abuse. Get *behind* your epithets and don't plaster your luggage with labels. A word has lately come into general use, borrowed from the Vatican, though misapplied, a curious word and one I greatly dislike—the word *propaganda*. It is sometimes (in order to excite laughter) described as Literature. Now the necessity of circulating political argument is very obvious, and it is never easy to distinguish between a persuasive tract and an argumentative treatise. Once upon a time I was the Head of the Liberal Publication Department, and I dimly remember the difficulties of the post, particularly during a General Election. Still, even in my worst days, I felt there *was* a difference between *Persuasion* and *Propagation*.

And now as I am on language I will seize an opportunity, which probably will never again occur to me, to express my dislike of two other words constantly cropping up in argument. One is "surely" and the other is "must." I am old enough to have practised as a junior barrister before a very great Judge, the late Sir George Jessel, a famous Master of the Rolls, and one of the alertest intelligences that ever adorned the English Bench. He taught me to avoid the word "Surely." If ever you employed it in argument he fell upon you like a cartload of bricks. "Surely," he would exclaim in tones of withering contempt, "Surely is no argument. Whenever I hear Counsel employ it, he tells me that he knows he is on thin ice and will soon disappear underneath it." And yet it is still amusing to count how often, let us say in one single letter to *The Times* from some puzzle-headed correspondent, lay or cleric, you will find this confession of weakness staring you in the face. Avoid it. There is usually no occasion to advertise your weakness.

The other word is *Must*. We *must* have this. We *must* have that. Slums *must* disappear. War *must* never be allowed again, either in the trenches or in the air. Whenever I hear this word *Must*, I am reminded of the old-fashioned Eton Headmaster who told his boys : "Boys, you must be pure in heart or you will never see God!" and added, "Boys, if you are not pure in heart, to-morrow I will flog you." There is unhappily no *must* about these things, though we get the floggings all the same.

This sounds simple enough, so I will at once plunge into the depths and inquire what is the true attitude of the Liberal Frame of Mind to what is called Socialism! Our first duty is to find out what it means on the lips of those who preach it to-day. The taxpayer already knows a good deal about it. All taxation is destined either to provide means to maintain Society in times of peace or to destroy Society in times of war. But apparently taxation in modern usage means more than this. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, whom we hope to see next Session thumping as vigorously as ever one of those Red boxes which have so often ruined the styles and sapped the intelligence of so many distinguished politicians, has lately urged upon his followers in the Labour Party to condescend to particulars and tell us what they mean by Socialism to-day.

Politicians should remember we are not *all* M.P.s. A good many of us cannot spare more than ten minutes a day to reading the newspapers. We are interested in heaps of things outside the workings of the Constitution. Why! there were 60,000 of us only the other day watching a pack of dogs chasing an electric hare; and yet all these people (except the dogs and the electric hare) have votes, and are deeply interested in what is meant by Socialism. And besides the sportsmen there are the people in banks and shops, scholars and

students, pursuing science and literature and the arts and crafts, all of whom have little scraps of property and are eager to know what exactly Socialism means as a reformatory process intended to be immediately carried out.

The country as a whole is ripe for Reform, not only political, but social and financial, but it wants, eagerly wants, to get behind shibboleths and the cries of a syndicated Press. People want to be let into the mysterious secrets of the future and to be taught the true significance of Words, and not left to pick up what they can from badly reported and hastily read Parliamentary debates or from the noisy skirmishing at Trade Union Conferences. Education has made some strides forward in the last twenty years, and the Library and the Reading Room are running second and third to the Evening Paper. Subjects, when considered gravely, lose most of their predatory horrors. There was a time not so very long ago when the utterance of the two words "Capital Levy" sent a shudder through Villadom; but the Villadom of to-day is more frightened with the present condition of its trust investments in railway stocks and coal shares to have a shudder left for a distant future.

The notion, in itself the agreeable notion, that Death Duties are paid by the deceased millionaire, who is left lamenting as he crosses the Styx over his rifled fortune, will not bear close examination. It used to be thought that when a multi-millionaire fell dead in Threadneedle Street the news was at once transmitted to Mr. Winston Churchill, who immediately appeared on the scene and proceeded to rob the corpse of a couple of millions, and carry them off to the Treasury. It is not true. The dead man goes off into the next world as naked as he entered upon this one, and it is his brood of beneficiaries who are despoiled.

The Income Tax, that most hateful of imposts, year by year preys upon the living and annually reduces the capital the poor author was trusting to live upon when his public had found him out. If therefore it was thought, after full argument and discussion, a better plan to lop off some of a man's accumulations at stated and fixed periods, instead of gambling on his death, there is nothing in the proposal to excite more than the usual horror of Taxation. It is not *contra bonos mores*. In the same way our present laws of inheritance and sub-division of property on death, are no more than the conclusions of such human wisdom as has been expended upon them, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that they will remain unaltered to the end of time. But why should we wait until a badgered Chancellor of the Exchequer, once a year, seeks to expound to us the *rationale* of Taxation? The democracy should assert itself not only at the Polls but in the Schools. This is one reason, and the main one, for this Summer Session. The House of

Commons is a famous historical Institution, but it is not a School of Economy either in Theory or Practice, nor is it a Chemical Laboratory. And yet Economy and Inventive Chemistry are the things best worth cultivating just now, if we are to hold our own.

The Nationalisation of all, any, and which, of our industries is a subject with which by this time we ought to be fairly familiar. All practising lawyers, land surveyors, agents and auctioneers, a goodly company of men, have long had at their fingers' ends the clauses of that really noble and revolutionary series of statutes comprehensively known as "The Land Clauses Consolidation Acts," under the provisions of which enormous undertakings of a national character, armed with compulsory powers to acquire what they choose for their purposes, have transformed the fair face of our Motherland. And in addition to these Acts, by virtue of the provisions of the Limited Companies Acts, in themselves a mighty revolution in trade, millions of people have become Capitalists and carry on or employ, without feeling the responsibility of Employers, every kind of industrial and financial business. The differences between these huge undertakings and great companies acting in combination, and what is called Nationalisation, though important, are not in themselves so revolutionary as the Acts of Parliament just mentioned.

If 10,000 people subscribe for 10,000 ten-pound shares in a mill or factory, each ten-pounder is a Capitalist as if he were the owner of the whole £100,000. And if it was thought wise and prudent and possible for the Nation to acquire the railways and coal mines and to pay for them either under the terms of the Land Clauses Acts or some modification of them, the Nation would become a gigantic capitalist, and would proceed to nominate bodies of Directors at comfortable salaries. For who would have it in his heart to sweat a National Director? Can you not see him in the mind's eye alighting from his car at the door of his palatial office, suitably clad, either in summer garments or winter clothing, with a cigar in his mouth and looking very much like an old railway director or coal magnate? If it should happen that owing to foreign competition, or road transport, over-production, rate of wages, disputes with workmen, and so on, the National Capital employed in any taken-over industry could pay no dividend, why then, of course, the shareholders, that is, the taxpayers, would have to go without a dividend.

All this sounds familiar enough. If the Nation took over the railways and coalfields without paying for them, thereby reducing large portions of the community, old men, women and children, to want, the undertaking might get a good though not a fair start; but no such proposal as this is seriously made by anybody, and the only cause for anxiety any existing shareholder would have would

be whether the National Stock issued to him in lieu of his holding in the acquired undertaking would be as valuable in the stock market, say, ten years after its issue, as would have been his original holding if no such nationalisation had taken place.

Railway stocks and coal shares do not stand where they did, and as already suggested, many a timid widow living hardly on her life interest in trust investments, is more frightened about their fall in the market to-day than they are of the advent of Mr. Snowden and his friends some time hence. These questions of Nationalisation, as and when they arise, are of the utmost importance, but they are not of a kind that need frighten good Liberals from their moorings. The good of the country as a whole, and a firm determination not to be humbugged into the belief that any nation can disregard economic laws with impunity, should be enough to keep us clean, and as sweet as politicians have any right to expect to be kept in a world that is neither clean nor sweet.

I am now very near the end, but there is still something in my Pandora's box. The soul of Liberalism is Liberty. The soul of present-day Toryism is a General Tariff. For the moment the Tories are hardly allowed to ask for what they honestly want. They are kept on very short commons. Still, they nibble, nibble, nibble, and look forward, hardly hopefully but still earnestly, for a time when Mr. Baldwin's pledge will no longer hamper their actions or shackle their tongues, and when they will be free to preach the Faith that is within them.

We are not, however, concerned this afternoon with the Tory frame of mind, but with our own. Does the love of personal liberty, which is the pulse of the Liberal machine, throb as fiercely as once it did in Liberal breasts?

I remember sixty-eight years ago the publication of John Stuart Mill's small book on Liberty. I was too busily engaged in 1859 in the perusal of Fennimore Cooper's *Last of the Mohicans* and in *Tom Brown's School Days* to read this treatise at that date on my own account; but as I happily came at the tail-end of a large and very argumentative family, accustomed to discuss everything at meal times, ceremonies I rarely missed, I recall, as if it were yesterday, the turmoil and excitement the book occasioned, and how by many persons, some of whom had been born in the eighteenth century, it was denounced as both anarchical and atheistic. And it would, I am sure, by these people have been dubbed and damned as Bolshevikistic, had that word been then added to their vocabulary of vituperation. Others professed themselves to be greatly shocked by the author's venturing to criticise certain of Her Majesty's Judges for their rough treatment of any witness who refused to kiss the greasy copy of the New Testament, reeking with the germs of past

perjuries, when proffered to them by the officer of the court; whilst quiet Erastian folk disliked a disrespectful way of referring to the Established Church which, once it had abandoned the bad practice of fining non-attendants on Sunday at the Parish Church a shilling a head, seemed to them all that could reasonably be expected of a Christian Church.

But there were others, thousands of them, who hailed "Mill on Liberty" as an Evangel of the Faith of Liberalism. It was a test book in 1859. I took my copy down the other day from a top shelf where it had long lain undisturbed, and opened it quite by chance on a passage to which I now invite your attention; and whilst I read it I beg of you to keep asking yourselves these two questions: First, how far do I agree with it? and secondly, how far have we travelled along the path of declension? What Mill foretold would be our fate unless the Liberals of 1859 asserted more vigorously than they were doing the claims of Personal Liberty. This is the passage:

"What has made the European family of nations an improving instead of a stationary portion of Mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another, they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success. Europe is in my judgment wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. . . . Two things are necessary conditions of human development, namely, Freedom and Variety of Situations. The second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing. The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods, different trades and professions, lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them. Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are as nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the higher. Every extension of Education promotes it, because Education brings people under common influences and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvement in the means of communication promotes it by bringing the inhabitants of distant places

into personal contact and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes. A more powerful agency than even all these in bringing about a general similarity among mankind is the complete establishment in this and other free countries of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State. As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude gradually become levelled, as the very idea of resisting the Will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a Will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians, there ceases to be any support for Nonconformity, any substantive power in society which is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public."

"The combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value, and to see that it is good there should be differences even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanted to complete the enforced assimilation. The demand that all other people should resemble ourselves grows with what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily becomes unable to conceive diversity when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it."*

It may, I think, be admitted that since 1859 we have learnt to discuss what Mill called the Claims of Individuality somewhat more closely and dispassionately than Mill was able to do. But is there not a tendency more and more to confound what we call the State with the social organism? Mr. Brailsford in his little book, so well worth reading, which he calls "*Shelley, Godwin and their Circle*," insists upon the danger of this tendency. The Movements now called respectively Fascism and Bolshevism, however different in their origin, are alike in this, that they both openly repudiate and vilify the claims of Individuality and glorify and exalt what they call the State, meaning by that the Government they have captured. Anyone who repudiates their conceptions, whether Fascist or Bolshevik, is a traitor and an outlaw, and is treated as an obnoxious animal either to be murdered or imprisoned for life.

Another movement, not yet completely organised, would regiment all the ranks and occupations of social life, and anyone who rebels

* See *Mill on Liberty*, 2nd edition (1859), pp. 130-133.

against this discipline is a *Blackleg*. Traitors against the State—or Blacklegs against Society—how can the love of Liberty live in either climate? It cannot. Yet if Liberty perishes and the just claims of individuality are disallowed there is an end of Liberalism and all that appertains thereunto, including this Valedictory Address.

AUGUSTINE BIRRELL.

THE LIBERAL SUMMER SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRY.

I.

THE Liberal Summer School, which held its seventh annual session at Cambridge in the first week of August, has become an established institution. It holds a place of its own in contemporary politics, and its proceedings are watched with interest not only by Liberals but by members of other parties. This year its meetings aroused even more interest than usual, because they were expected to foreshadow the results of an elaborate industrial inquiry which was initiated at the Summer School of the previous year, and which may possibly have some influence upon the future policy not of the Liberals only, but of other parties.

If this should happen, it will not be the first time that the proceedings of a Summer School will have influenced policy. In 1922 its discussions produced the first outline of a policy on coal which was later developed in "Coal and Power" and endorsed in its main features by the Royal Commission of 1926. In 1924 it put forward a detailed scheme for the establishment of widows' and orphans' pensions, and of contributory old-age pensions at 65, which was later adopted, with only minor changes, by Mr. Baldwin's government. In 1926 it made proposals for the taxation of inherited wealth; and, according to the political correspondent of the *New Statesman*, which is the organ of the Labour intellectuals, this idea was "picked up" by the Labour members of the Blanesburgh Committee and "added to the armoury of Labour." The same writer has stated, as a reason for giving special attention to the Summer School of 1927, that "politicians of other parties are looking forward to the results of this searching [industrial] inquiry with much interest. . . . The younger Conservative members tell me that they intend to go through the Liberal proposals with a tooth-comb to see if they can seize on any items for their own use."

In short, the Liberal Summer School, in spite of its short life, its unpretentious designation, and its wholly unofficial character, counts for something in contemporary politics. How has this come about? What does the Summer School stand for? What part does it play in the Liberal revival? What weight is to be attached to the industrial inquiry which its organisers have been carrying on, in conjunction with some of the leaders of the Liberal Party and with representative business men and Trade Unionists? It is perhaps worth while to consider these questions in advance of the publication of the report on the inquiry, which is expected to appear in the autumn.

II.

After the war British Liberals were bewildered and disheartened. Not only had the once powerful party been split by the events of 1916 and 1918; the programmes of the pre-war period were either exhausted, or seemed irrelevant to the problems of the post-war period; Liberalism appeared to have nothing very definite to offer to a generation which was full of discontents and expectations; and the more ardent spirits, who had been the driving force of the party, were passing over by thousands to the Labour Party, which at any rate claimed to have a definite ideal. It looked as if the Liberal Party would be reduced to a mere remnant of traditional loyalists, without any definite aim. There were indeed many thousands everywhere who could not be content, in a period of momentous change, with the timidities of Conservatism, yet could not swallow the formulæ of Socialism or the dictation of Trade Union organisers. But they had no clear ideas as to the lines on which they wanted to advance. No enthusiasm could be aroused by mere negations of the attitudes of other parties, by mere opposition to protection and to Socialism, or by the assertion that an undefined "middle course" between "reaction" and "revolution" was the line of safety—especially as Conservatism no longer meant reaction, and Labour was anything but revolutionary.

Accordingly there arose a demand that there should be a clear definition of what the party stood *for*, and not merely of what it stood *against*, in the new post-war world: a demand that the leaders should not only define a policy, but preach it. Mr. Asquith (as he then was) tried to meet this demand in the striking series of speeches which he made during the Paisley election. They never received the attention they deserved, nor were they accepted as a satisfaction of the demand: perhaps because they were necessarily couched in generalities; perhaps because not even Mr. Asquith could probe single-handed all the problems of the new age. The National Liberal Federation tried its hand, drawing up a series of resolutions on industrial policy. But they had an abstract and academic air. Nobody paid much attention to them. No leader tried to preach them in the country. The clamour for "a policy" still went on.

There were many, and there are still some, who countered this demand with the assertion that it would be a tactical blunder to define any policy beforehand. Let us take our stand, said these wise-aces, on Liberal Principles, which need no definition. Let us trust to the inevitable reaction against the existing government to bring us into power, as we have always done in the past. When we are in power, we shall find plenty of things to do. If we announce beforehand what we are going to do, our rivals will steal our ideas; and if we propose anything drastic, we shall frighten and alienate those

who might have voted for us. Those who argue in this way forget that we have passed out of the era of the two-party system, when the "outs" could always count upon profiting by the mistakes of the "ins": the reaction, when it comes, is likely to favour those who stand for clear and definite ideas. It was found that perorations about undefined Liberal Principles were heard with impatience by all but the dwindling band of hereditary Liberals. Others angrily or contemptuously asked "What are you going to do about this problem or that?"; and, receiving no answer, concluded that the orators had no ardour for the reform of any particular abuse, had not thought about the problems that were vexing us, and could offer no solution for them. This conclusion made it seem plausible to assert that Liberalism was dead.

There is this much truth in the contention of those who object to the definition of policies beforehand, that responsible leaders have seldom committed themselves in advance to detailed schemes of legislative or administrative reform, because they have always been aware of the practical difficulties in which they might thus be involved; they have also always known that an electorate, when it comes to vote, likes to have clear-cut issues, and by preference a single issue, before it. For these reasons the practical politician instinctively distrusts detailed projects or Newcastle programmes. On the other hand, the thinking part of the community (which ultimately leads the rest) has in the past always had a pretty clear notion of the attitude and policy which a particular party was likely to adopt, and this general notion, rather than the authoritative pronouncements of party leaders, has usually determined its allegiance. It has derived this general view as to the character of parties not so much from the speeches of political leaders as from the stream of discussion that goes on endlessly in the Press, and from the innumerable unreported speeches of minor party men. The Press and the platform have usually drawn their inspiration from some coherent body of thought which has not been controlled by or wholly identified with a party organisation, though in sympathy with it. It was not by the enunciation of programmes or policies by Lord Melbourne or Lord John Russell or Lord Palmerston or even Mr. Gladstone that nineteenth century Liberalism was driven forward in its constructive work, but by many currents of spontaneous opinion, Liberal in sympathy but independent of official party control—the teachings of the Benthamites and the economists, the agitation of the Anti-Corn Law League, the aspirations of Exeter Hall, the claims of the Trade Unions, the gradual awakening of a social conscience through such inquiries as those of Charles Booth. These spontaneous movements, external to the official party organisation, and often disliked by it, provided the real driving-force of

the Liberal movement during the great century of its achievement down to the Great War. Apart from them, if Liberalism had waited for the official pronouncements of party leaders, and had possessed no other sources of inspiration, it would have done nothing.

The weakness of post-war Liberalism has been mainly due to the fact that these sources of inspiration had almost dried up. Above all, there was no coherent body of constructive Liberal thinking comparable to that which the Benthamite school had once supplied: there was no co-operative group of thinkers and inquirers able to give body and form to the vague aspirations of the mass of Liberals. During the first years after the war it seemed as if active political thinking and resolute questing for paths towards a better order were to be found only on the Labour side; and for that reason the awakened social conscience, now more restless than it had ever been, looked to the Labour Party for the expression of its vague aspirations. This did not mean that Liberalism was extinct, but only that its bearing on the problems of the new era was not being made clear. The sentiment of the most progressive elements in the nation was in no sense Socialist, and still less Conservative; it was still essentially Liberal, and became more and more so as it escaped from the influence of the war. But it could not recognise its own Liberalism, because there was no recognisably Liberal school of thought in which it could find satisfaction.

III.

In the summer of 1921 half-a-dozen people, sprawling upon a Herefordshire lawn and talking about these things, came to the conclusion that what was needed for a revival of essential Liberalism was neither a series of authoritative pronouncements by party leaders, nor a series of resolutions of the kind that can be adopted by big delegate conferences, but a stimulation of co-operative, exploratory thinking by people whose training and experience enabled them to make useful contributions. It did not seem to be enough that individuals should write books or articles, or make speeches. The essential thing was discussion and criticism, and the submission of ideas to the judgment of all who were alert enough and serious enough to take part in the process of discussion. So they worked out the idea of the Summer School, in which papers should be read, on political and social problems, not by politicians, but by men who might be regarded as experts on the side either of scholarship or of practical experience; and in which all who chose to take part in discussion should be free to do so. They knew that many of the best minds engaged in the study of the economic and political sciences were in fact Liberals, though not active politicians; and they planned to provide for them at once a nucleus and a platform.

The plan was launched with the cordial approval of Mr. Asquith, who warmly concurred in the view that it should be kept aloof from any direct connexion with any party organisation: if it was to succeed in its aim, the work of the School should be, not to formulate official party programmes, but to stimulate inquiry and discussion, and to create a growing body of living thought out of which programmes and policies would naturally spring. The School has never had any connexion with the party machine, or drawn a penny from the party funds. From the first it has been directed by a group of men who have worked intimately together, and who have drawn into close association with themselves many scholars and publicists of various types. They have not confined themselves to arranging programmes of individual lectures: they have had constant meetings for discussion, to clarify their own minds; and the most important papers submitted to the Summer School have usually been the outcome of full co-operative discussion beforehand. In that way a real coherence has been given to the proceedings of the School, and a common outlook and a common body of opinion have been gradually shaped. This has been felt by those who have attended the annual sessions. It accounts for the real enthusiasm which has been aroused among the more progressive Liberals, especially of the younger generation. They have realised that they were not merely listening passively to a series of lectures by more or less eminent persons, but were assisting in the definition of a new body of constructive Liberal thought. It has not perturbed them that other parties have sometimes borrowed the ideas thus wrought out. What concerns them is that there should be a coherent body of Liberal thought, contributing to mould the nation's policy. If other parties are influenced by this body of thought, so much the better—so much the greater chance that the nation's future will be shaped on Liberal lines. They are not ashamed that the Liberal Party should become what a Conservative newspaper has called it, "a sort of university for politicians."

It would, of course, be absurd to exaggerate the influence of the Liberal Summer School. When all is said, it is a modest organisation, though it has enlisted the services of some of the ablest political and economic thinkers of our time. It does not presume to define the policy of the party, which is the affair of the party as a whole; it only tries to state problems and to suggest solutions, which may afford the raw material for policies. It directly influences only a small proportion of the members of the party, and in many quarters is regarded with suspicion as the rallying-point of academic theorists. But in a modest way it has genuinely contributed to the revival of Liberalism by helping to destroy the illusion that Liberalism was an outworn creed which could give no help in solving the problems of to-day.

IV.

From the first the Summer Schools have been pre-eminently, though not exclusively, concerned with industrial problems; both because we have manifestly reached a critical point in our industrial history, and because the whole character of our civilisation must depend upon the way in which we organise our industrial relations. The first school, at Grasmere in 1921, and the last, at Cambridge in 1927, were wholly devoted to these questions, which also occupied much of the attention of all the intervening schools. But as the discussion proceeded, it became plain that much more solid and systematic study was necessary than the ordinary methods of a Summer School made possible.

Meanwhile the work of exploration and investigation had been taken up, in another way, under the leadership of Mr. Lloyd George, who had set up a series of inquiries, first on coal, then on rural land and on urban land, which were generously supported from his political fund. This made it possible to carry out investigations on a far more elaborate scale than could be contemplated by a group of much occupied men unequipped with large financial resources. In these inquiries some of those most actively connected with the Summer Schools naturally took part; the coal inquiry, in particular, was closely related with the work previously done on that subject by the School. These inquiries, conducted in an objective spirit by a party out of office and not expected soon to win power, have been a new thing in British politics. Like the Summer School movement, they have been an essential element in the revival of Liberalism as an effective constructive force in our national life. What more natural than that the two movements should join forces, to explore the supremely difficult problems of industry? When the land inquiries were completed, Mr. Lloyd George offered a substantial sum of money and the services of a secretariat to the Committee of the Summer School, in order that they might carry out an industrial inquiry. The whole process and methods of this inquiry have been completely under the control of the Summer School Committee. They have enjoyed the help of men of great political experience such as Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Herbert Samuel, and of many experts, theoretical and practical, who have served upon various committees; they have had the wholtime service of a staff of trained economists. They have sent commissions of inquiry into foreign countries. They have collected an immense mass of material. And, after a year of strenuous and intensive work, they have framed the main lines of a report which will, it is hoped, be published in the autumn of this year.

It would plainly be improper to indicate, at this date, anything more than the general character of that report, which is still in an inchoate form, and has yet to undergo searching and many-sided

criticism. Obviously there can be no suggestion that a report constructed in such a way represents the official programme of a party. It cannot be more than a contribution to the definition of policy, upon which the regular organs of the party must decide. But it must be considered as a coherent whole, not as a mere series of detailed suggestions.

An inquiry into the condition, prospects and organisation of British industry, at this critical stage in its development, ought to deal with a series of great questions, and at the present stage it must suffice to indicate broadly what these questions are.

I. In the first place, we must get away from the barren controversy between *laissez-faire* and Socialism, neither of which, as ordinarily conceived, has any bearing upon the actual facts, or any relevance to the possibilities of the near future. We must face clearly the fundamental questions of what the State can do and ought to do, and what it cannot do and ought not to attempt, in the sphere of industry. If we can give clear answers to these questions, we shall have gone far to give an intelligible basis to national policy, which is at present guided by no clear principles.

II. In the second place, we must very frankly face the grim facts of the present situation, the decline of our staple industries, the stagnation of our export trade, the sorry plight of the mining industry, the terrible figures of unemployment, the shrinkage in the supply of capital for development. We must ask ourselves whether these facts represent a permanent change in the direction of our trade, and (in so far as this is true) how we can deal with the situation. What are we to do with our surplus of labour? Are we making the best use of our resources, material and human? In what ways can we strengthen ourselves to meet the strain, and adjust our methods to the needs of a new era? This is a formidable series of questions, to which nobody can give a cocksure answer, but which it is essential that we should explore.

III. In the third place, is there anything wrong with our system of directing and organising industrial production? The wide diffusion of shareholding in big concerns, and the practice of "spreading risks" by distributing one's fortune in a multitude of concerns, have made the control of the shareholder wholly unreal, and put into the hands of directors an irresponsible power. How can this danger be dealt with? The growth of gigantic corporations or combines, often quasi-monopolistic in character, has made some sort of regulation or control indispensable. How can it be provided? There has been a very rapid growth of public or semi-public concerns, which are often anything but efficient. How can they be improved? Our dwindling supply of capital is often unwisely directed, while essential projects of national development are too

often starved. What can be done to rectify this? Is the State performing all the service it might perform to guide and assist industry? Here again is a group of extremely difficult and important questions upon which both thought and action are needed.

IV. In face of an unexampled crisis in our industrial fortunes, the nation is divided by acute conflict between Capital and Labour. Is it possible to substitute organised co-operation for conflict, and if it is, on what conditions? What are the facts and what are the causes of industrial unrest, and how can it be cured? Can the just and legitimate demands of Labour be satisfied in such a way as to bring about not a decrease but an increase of productive efficiency? These are pivotal questions, affecting not only our productive power, but the well-being of our civilisation. They have engaged the attention of thousands of inquirers. What has Liberalism to say about them? May it not be that all this *malaise* which afflicts every industrial society is ultimately due to the fact that industrialism has brought about an unhappy divorce between work on the one hand, and ownership and responsibility on the other? Can this divorce be healed? Can the worker be given an appropriate share of responsibility, and an effective share of control over the conditions of his work without impairing the efficiency of management? Can he be given, in any real sense, a share of ownership? It is charged against our society that it is divided between a small class of owners, who live by owning, and a huge class of workers who labour for the enrichment of the owners; and though this is an exaggerated statement, it has the sting of truth in it, seeing that 76 per cent. of our adult population own among them only 7 per cent. of the nation's wealth, while less than 7 per cent. own over 81 per cent. of our total capital. Can we pretend that a society in which such a state of things exists is healthy? Can we see any way to an amendment of it?

These are all profound and searching questions, by which we are challenged at this critical moment in our industrial history. Many attempts have been made to deal with one or another of them. But they are all mutually dependent. Nobody has, as yet, seriously tried to treat this complex of problems as a single whole. If the Liberal Industrial Inquiry in any degree succeeds in doing so, it will have rendered an immense service to our generation, even though at one point or another its treatment may seem—as it is sure to seem to various bodies of critics—rash or inadequate or insufficiently developed. Its value will lie not so much in the parts as in the whole; not so much in the ingenuity of particular proposals as in the sweep and range of its outlook, and in the courage with which it addresses itself to a vast series of interrelated problems at a crucial moment in social development.

RAMSAY MUIR.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE COOLIDGE CONFERENCE.

THE Conference to which President Coolidge gave his name was the logical development of the one which preceded it at Washington. The Washington Conference had resulted in the limitation and reduction of two classes of ships, the first-class battleship and the aircraft carrier, and these results, which were to be applied over a period of years, had already produced considerable relief to the taxpayers of the countries concerned. In Great Britain the relief gained in this way during the past five years is estimated at between sixty and eighty million pounds. The intention of the Coolidge Conference was to broaden the work begun in 1923 and by reaching agreement as to the principles of building in regard to cruisers, destroyers and submarines in particular, to establish a basis for reduction and economy in all classes of vessels which lay outside the scope of the first agreement.

So far as practical results are concerned and notwithstanding the fact that it has had all the advantage of the atmosphere of Geneva, the Conference has turned down "an empty glass." After weeks of difficult and anxious discussion by the experts, after all three parties have consulted on more than one occasion with their respective Governments, after the British delegation had actually suspended the Conference by returning home to consult with the Cabinet, it has been found impossible to enter into a written agreement on any single point which marks an advance on 1923.

The disappointment affects a wider circle than the actors at Geneva. The shock of this negation has disturbed every Foreign Office: the policy of understanding and agreement among nations has received a setback: the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations itself and the hopes of general disarmament are challenged. The man in the street in New York, Tokio and London alike finds the language of cynicism most suited to his mood. Only the armament firms and their allied companies in all three countries have gained as the result of the Conference.

The official reasons for the breakdown have been published in the Press of the world. The radio has broadcast the several versions over three Continents. There is one word heavily charged with fate; it is the word "cruisers." So far as other naval vessels go some agreement seems to have been possible. From the point of view of the moment it seems a pity that such agreement as was possible on other matters was not saved in permanent form from the wreckage of the Conference. With regard to submarines and destroyers some measure of agreement seemed likely. In the matter of the further restriction of first-class battleships, which

lay formally outside the present discussions, an agreement appeared quite feasible. But on the issue of cruisers neither personal reputations, the unlimited use of the London, New York and Tokio cables, recurrent consultations of experts, flying visits to Downing Street and repeated Cabinet meetings, nor the basis of an Anglo-Japanese understanding, have availed a scrap. Great Britain through its experts wants a relatively large number of 6,000 or 7,500-ton cruisers: America through her experts says she has not much use for the small cruiser and wants a free hand with the 10,000-ton cruiser. Both make out a good case based on their respective needs. Indeed, starting from the premises which the naval experts on both sides used, these conclusions are inevitable. This conception of what Great Britain needs and what America needs gave rise to claim and counter-claim, issuing finally in deadlock and complete failure.

Seen in its larger aspect this cruiser question not only represents a steady battle for some years between the naval experts of Great Britain and America, but is an excellent illustration of the conflict of policy which exists between the two countries and which in so obvious and sensational a way endangers the peace of the world. For do not let us be under any illusion that because we speak a common language war between us is unthinkable. We had war in 1776 when we spoke a common language; we had war in 1813 when we spoke a common language. There was incessant friction between Great Britain and America from 1914 to 1917, though America joined the war on the Allied side. The fact of a common language we can thank Providence for, but by itself it is not enough to build the bridge that makes for peace in the Anglo-Saxon world. The fact is that the forces controlling the British Admiralty and the British Government find the new world in which they are compelled to live a thoroughly disagreeable one. In the pre-war days the struggle of the British Admiralty to maintain a two-power standard with the neighbour to whom she is nearest in blood and tradition on the Continent provided in all conscience a sufficiently strenuous period. From 1900 to 1914 the British naval experts had no rest as they scanned the waters of the North Sea. The confining of the new and astonishing German navalism within the shackles and limits of a 2-1 standard gave them year by year all the employment they required. The race with Germany began with the same professions of friendship that we now make for the American people and the American people make for us. In those old days we discovered that an astonishingly large part of our spiritual culture and our religious life had its home on the other side of the North Sea. The blood relationship between the Royal houses was in those days assumed to be the amplest guarantee against the arbitrament of war. The world-war destroyed this 2-1 standard with the German navy. In

its place there emerged on the one hand the standard of armaments established for Germany by the Peace Treaty of 1919, which was declared to be, and still is, the only example to which the world can refer for general disarmament, and, on the other—even with the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow—the rise of the American navy. If the carrying out of the Kaiser's motto, "The future of Germany lies on the water," is to be described as meteoric, what are we to say of the new phenomenon? At a single bound America claimed and the Washington Conference accepted—none of your 2-1 standards, but equality in principle with that one naval power which for three hundred years has pursued her purposes in all the seas of the world, has vindicated herself as "Mistress of the Seas" against all comers, and has built up the British Empire. It is this new rivalry that the British Admiralty resents.

The Coolidge Conference has done one thing with unmistakable force. It has shown mankind that the American Government will stand no nonsense with regard to the British Navy. They intend that the principle of equality which was established in the Washington Conference shall, so far as they are concerned, become a reality down to the last detail.

It is less than a year ago that Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, declared that we must retain some superiority in cruisers. The Coolidge Conference has torn that last reservation of the British Admiralty to shreds. It is this fact, and the reflections which grow out of this fact, which are still dominant in American thought and in the American Press. "Every Senator," writes *The Times* correspondent at Washington, "with whom it has been possible to discuss the question recently, seems to have the fixed idea that the desire of the British Government to 'police neutral commerce' in time of war is the rock upon which the Conference has split." (August 5th.) No one who has followed the Conference and read between the lines can avoid the conclusion that the naval experts on each side, like the directors of a couple of competing business firms, have been using every possible device to maintain points of advantage for their own side. That, indeed, is their job.

The real fact is that we have to give up, so far as we can see, for all time, the policy which for three hundred years has been based on the conception of the British Navy being Mistress of the Seas in perpetuity. We have to make up our minds to live in the same limited world and use the same finite seas with a navy that is in detail the equal of our own and which potentially can become much greater than our own. Such a change is, in fact, of the nature of a revolution so far as British naval policy is concerned, for hitherto we have spelt "security" in terms of unquestioned sovereignty of the seas. For all these years we have wielded sea-power, what-

ever its consequences on other nations, with a monopolist's hand. That monopoly is ended. Now we must work out a new conception of security in which that authority and power are shared by others. It is on the way in which we face up to this issue that depends whether the Coolidge Conference is to be the prelude to a naval rivalry which will make the already ancient Anglo-German rivalry seem no more than the play of a child, or whether the petty and cantankerous, though strictly logical, arguments which have risen to the surface in the Coolidge Conference are to yield place to a new conception of understanding and agreement which will mark a new era and give a new meaning to the international service of the British Navy in the modern world.

There are certain elements in the present situation which are not without hope. In the first place, the "Big Navy" argument for security received a striking condemnation at the Conference. Lord Jellicoe said in evidence before the Conference on July 15th that during the late war 114 cruisers proved inadequate to hunt down three disguised German raiders until they had accounted for 289,000 tons of British and Allied shipping, and drew a graphic picture of the difficulties of the British Admiralty during the war in spite of the 114 cruisers they had available. The plain, obvious conclusion to be drawn from this illustration is that security sought through cruisers when it has to be faced with competition in terms of equality is brought to a *reductio ad absurdum*. The obvious way to security here is for Great Britain and America to get together and make the best possible agreement for a drastic cutting down. Three British Admirals, Admiral Mark Kerr, Vice-Admiral Drury Lowe and Rear-Admiral Allen, declared "there is no strategical obligation for a capital ship to be a large and costly vessel. We worried less about security in the days when a capital ship cost £500,000. There is no reason why we should not get back to something like that scale to-day—always provided, of course, that the reduction is proportionate and uniform and binds other nations." (*Manchester Guardian*, July 18th) And what is true of capital ships is true of cruisers and every other class of naval vessel.

For the "Big Navy" idea of security must be substituted the security which comes from the outlawry of war and an all-in arbitration treaty. When Sir Austen Chamberlain in a recent House of Commons speech expressed the view that war between this country and America was outlawed in the heart and soul of every citizen, he was but making reference to the large body of religious, moral, economic, and cultural likeness which underlies the life of the two peoples. Out of this common life, suggestions like that of Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador in London, to make war impossible between the two peoples except as the result of a plebiscite

and to rule out war for one hundred years by mutual agreement, come as a natural response to the dangers of the present situation. The proposals for an "all-in" arbitration treaty which would definitely outlaw war, a movement which is spreading so significantly and at so rapid a rate on both sides, is an expression growing out of this solid reality. The failure of the experts at Geneva is a challenge to the two peoples to enter into a new covenant together.

In the third place, it is remarkable that throughout the whole of these discussions at the Coolidge Conference no reference whatever was made to the standard of naval disarmament established under the Peace Treaty of 1919 for Germany and her Allies. The 1919 naval standard of disarmament fixed the number of first-class battle-ships at six and their maximum size at 10,000 tons. Cruisers were limited to six with a maximum tonnage of 6,000 tons. The only other vessels allowed were twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo-boats of 800 and 200 tons respectively. Submarines were entirely abolished. One of the reasons for the failure of the Coolidge Conference was its "other-worldly" character. It has taken no account of this important fact of naval disarmament established by Treaty in 1919 as a condition precedent for other nations. It is a simple fact that the struggle round the 10,000-ton cruiser, which resulted in breakdown, was a struggle about a vessel which Germany is forbidden to build. We may take it for granted that no naval conference of the future will really serve the cause of limitation or disarmament, which does not take account of the facts and treaty obligations of the existing world. From this point of view we can rejoice that, notwithstanding the failure of the Coolidge Conference, the naval standard established for Germany by the Peace Treaty and with definite obligations for other nations still remains intact and in operation. To the obligations the British Admiralty presented Nelson's blind eye. But a temporary blindness of convenience does not dispose of these obligations.

Finally, in taking stock of the elements of hope in the present situation there is the promise of three nations, and it may be five, to come together in 1931. In the struggle of peace or war between the nations, time is both the warp and the weft of the conflict. Events hurry on with ever greater speed. We require, therefore, to bestir ourselves as a people proportionately to the failure that has been incurred and the risk that has inevitably been run. The failure should teach us to enter with a new spirit and with larger and more generous plans the remaining stages of the struggle to achieve a measure of general disarmament through the League of Nations Conference at Geneva in the course of the next months. The issues of Disarmament, Arbitration, and Security, raised to great world issues in the Geneva Protocol of 1924,

may have taken on a new significance by 1931 through their urgent discussion in the coming months. In this way we shall have not only a more mature and informed public opinion on an issue of momentous gravity, but we may reasonably hope by 1931 to have a new Government in this country. Let us dare to believe that national opinion will by then have shaped a Government which will carry us far beyond subservience to naval experts who still think in terms of nineteenth century "Mistress of the Seas" diplomacy—a Government which, in co-operation with the people of America and the League of Nations, will carry the task of creative politics to new issues and a new setting. For let us be clear: we have entered upon a period when we have to determine anew the uses to which sea-power can be put. The American challenge pales the late Kaiser's into insignificance. The freedom to do, in peace and war, with naval power what a British Government wants, is ended. Enters America the equal partner. It was the late Mr. Bryan who said in the world-war that restraints upon American commerce had to be tolerated because America's naval forces were not then equal to those of the Western Allies. Those restraints—the consequences of the *British* freedom of the seas—will be tolerated no more. An American Admiral wrote in Brassey's Annual in 1924 that the "Freedom of the Seas"—"an old-time slogan of American foreign policy"—involved certain principles as to the right to free use of the seas and highways of commerce. "These all went glimmering during the world-war, but the United States has taken to heart its lesson."

Here we put our finger on the cause of the breakdown. "British" Freedom of the Seas, with all its unfreedoms for other nations, has come to the end of its course. Peace, disarmament and international co-operation alike demand the birth and the practice of a new kind of freedom. For the freedom of the monopolist, many think that the next step will be the freedom of a partnership—wherein America is the newcomer. That would mean giving up the right of private war as between the two countries and a revision of naval law and usage, in peace and war, as between the two partners.

President Wilson, dreaming of a wider and more inclusive partnership, thought of Freedom of the Seas as meaning that the seas should "only be closed by international agreement for the enforcement of international Covenants."

The breakdown has come because the two Powers concerned clung to the ultimate right of private war with one another and because we maintain the right of private blockade. The breakdown can be overcome by giving up these rights and vesting them in that Society of Nations which lives at Geneva in the flesh and whose spirit held captive the heart of America's World-War President.

RENNIE SMITH.

JAPAN IN WORLD HISTORY.

E NGLAND, America, Japan! For anyone born, as I was, before Japan actually came on to the map of the modern world and when her people were still cut off by draconic laws and penalties from intercourse of any kind with foreign nations, few things seem to illustrate more vividly the ceaseless tide of change which sweeps the human race along on the current of time than the intimate association of her name in this year of grace, 1927, with that of the two great naval powers of Europe and America in an international conference dealing with so vital an issue as Naval Disarmament. I happened too to have been reading just now a very interesting little volume lately written by an American student of Japan, Mr. A. B. Scherer, on the romance of her history, and it has set me thinking about the still more wonderful romance it discloses if, instead of confining our attention as we are apt to do to the national evolution of her people within their remote island home, we link it up with the great world movements which have been shaping since the Middle Ages and are still shaping the relations and destinies of East and West, and note how Japan has affected and been affected by them.

It was the great Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, who brought back with him to Europe from the court of Kublai Khan the first tidings of Japan—Zipangu, or, as the Venetians pronounced it, Jipangu. The story as he had heard it told at Peking was of a mysterious island towards the Rising Sun, of untold wealth, with inexhaustible stores of gold and pearls and precious stones, "the roofs of the King's gorgeous palace," Marco Polo writes, "plated with gold as we cover houses or more properly churches with lead, and the ceilings of the halls of the same precious metals, and many of the apartments with small tables also of pure gold considerably thick." And the Japanese themselves were wonderful people, for when the mighty Mongol Emperor dispatched an immense force across the sea to conquer "Zipangu" and annex it to his dominions they had attacked and destroyed the great Chinese armada—and, be it noted, just in the very same waters in which six centuries later Admiral Togo in 1905 attacked and destroyed the great Russian armada, his order of the day humbly affirming, in accordance with the immemorial traditions of Japanese ancestor-worship, that the spirits of the defenders of the ancient realm would rise up to assist the defenders of modern Japan! Marco Polo's travels were by land, but they served nonetheless to stimulate the enterprise of the hardy Western navigators who were soon to explore uncharted seas in quest of a new ocean highway to the fabled East. Columbus, at any rate, is known to have studied Marco Polo, and when he sailed from Europe in 1492

it was "Zipangu" he was bent on finding. He found America instead, and the long hand of coincidence was never to be longer than when some 350 years later an American Admiral sailed in turn for the same islands of which Columbus had been in search, but sailed with a modern fleet and compelled old Japan to throw her chief ports open to intercourse with the Western world, which she had long and successfully, but not however always, denied, and become modern Japan.

It was not her first contact with the West. Just fifty years after Columbus instead of discovering Japan had stumbled upon America, three Portuguese mariners were driven ashore by a great storm on the Satsuma coast, the first Europeans that ever trod Japanese soil. The people of Satsuma, with the hospitality and curiosity common to most Japanese, treated them kindly, and the reports which they carried back to the settlements already established by Portugal in and beyond the Indies, after Vasco da Gama had for the first time turned the Cape of Good Hope, were so encouraging that within the next few years more Portuguese adventurers set forth to seek their fortunes in Japan. Then hot foot on the traders there followed the great missionary, St. Francis Xavier, whose apostolic zeal met with the most enthusiastic response. Christianity quickly caught such a hold of Japanese nobles and people that in the course of the following century it seemed at times to be likely to sweep the whole country. But, as in our times, the political discords of Europe reacted decisively on Japanese history, and those discords were then rooted in religious dissensions. The Portuguese represented Catholic Europe; the Dutch, who were their chief rivals, Protestant Europe, and the latter found a strangely opportune ally in the one Englishman who happened in those days to have drifted to Japan. Will Adams, the shipwrecked mariner whose letters have survived as quite invaluable contributions to our knowledge of old Japan, became a great favourite and trusted confidant of the mighty Shogun Hideyoshi to whom he taught "jeometry" and "mathe-matickes," receiving from him in return a fief and the rank of a Samurai, together with a Japanese wife. With all his tolerance in matters of religion Hideyoshi took alarm at the political intrigues carried on by many of Xavier's meaner disciples and successors and the troubles they were, not always unjustly, charged with fomenting amongst his people. The Englishman imbued him with his own Protestant hatred and suspicion of all "Romish" priests and their followers and urged him to expel them from his realms, as many of the greatest sovereigns in Europe had already done. It may well have been the Englishman's advice that turned the scales and led to the first of the successive measures of repression and proscription which resulted later on under Iyeyasu and Iyemitsu in the

expulsion of all foreigners and the extirpation of the native "Christian rebels," and finally in the drastic decrees which made it penal for any Japanese to hold or seek any intercourse with foreigners or even to build any ships capable of taking the sea, except for purposes of coastal fishery.

Thus for about two centuries Japan remained hermetically closed against contact with the outer world, except that a tiny little window was kept open in the Bay of Nagasaki where a few Dutch ships were allowed to come and anchor once a year and trade with Japanese merchants, though only under the most humiliating conditions. But for people so alert of mind and with such a keen love of knowledge as the Japanese the intellectual stimulus once received from the Western world never entirely died away, and during the eighteenth century keen young students often succeeded in procuring, at great risk, foreign books, chiefly scientific, smuggled in by the Dutch traders. A monument of their industry and ingenuity has been preserved in a Dutch work on anatomy interleaved with a rough translation evolved out of the letterpress to the plates and illustrations. In the first part of the nineteenth century the demand for Western learning became so great that the official ban had to be gradually dropped, and in several schools instruction was actually given on Western lines by self-taught Japanese teachers who had never seen a foreigner, let alone a foreign country.

Unlike China who, even after foreign intercourse had been forced upon her, retained all her hatred and contempt for the Western world, the best minds in Japan were thus already leavened with Western knowledge, and the wall of self-imposed isolation was being stoutly undermined from within, when the American fleet came to breach it from without. There was still a long and fierce struggle to be fought out between the progressive forces and those that stood in the ancient ways before the "Restoration" of the Imperial Power, overshadowed for centuries by the military Shoguns, and the voluntary surrender by all the great Daimyos of their long-descended feudal rights—as dramatic an act of self-sacrifice as the annals of any ruling caste have ever afforded—marked the inauguration of a new era in which Japan was not only to enter into the modern world but to exert a profound influence upon the whole course of contemporary history.

Englishmen are more often tempted than others may be to see the mysterious ways of Providence in the long procession of events which have led the British Empire to its present high estate among the nations of the world. The temptation is never more excusable than when one studies closely the reaction upon Europe, and the British Empire in particular, of the emergence of Japan as a great Power in the Far East, just when the fall of Bismarck and the

"new course" proclaimed for Germany by a headstrong young Kaiser heralded a momentous change in the political relationships of the chief European powers. During the preceding twenty years whilst the old German Chancellor had been chiefly concerned to consolidate by the more peaceful methods of diplomacy, though with a mighty army always in the background, the new German Empire he had welded together with blood and iron, Japan had been absorbed in the tremendous task of transforming a feudal Asiatic state into a modern one, and equipping herself as rapidly as possible to hold her own in the modern world of which she had so long and stubbornly refused to admit the existence. Bismarck, with his eyes always fixed on Germany's position in Europe, had steadily discouraged the more ambitious schemes of colonial expansion which had begun to find influential supporters in Germany, though at first chiefly as an outlet for her fast increasing industrial and commercial activities. The Kaiser's restless eyes wandered further afield. Germany must have "her place in the sun" and, later on, "wield the trident in her mailed fist."

Japan had been at pains to maintain amicable relations with all Western nations. She had sent a great many public and private missions abroad, but mostly to study modern conditions, and she had borrowed impartially from different countries the foreign advisers and teachers whose assistance she needed in the new "Era of Enlightenment." The only controversial questions she had raised were in regard to the "unequal" treaties, as the Chinese now call them, which had been imposed upon her just as they had been imposed upon China, guaranteeing "extra-territoriality" and other privileges in restraint of sovereign rights within the concessions and settlements assigned for foreign residence and trade. But Japan adopted the right way to obtain the revision of those treaties by putting her own house in order and showing that the need for them no longer existed, with the result that in 1894 England entered into negotiations with her and gave the lead to other Powers in the gradual substitution of equal for "unequal" treaties to the benefit of all concerned. Apart from a short punitive expedition to Formosa in reprisal for local piracy, it was only in relation to Korea, which from the most remote times had been a bone of periodical contention between Japan and China, that the relations between Tokyo and Peking had been occasionally strained. If Japan had been disposed to resent the more aggressive assertion of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, she had also been watching with no little anxiety the steady expansion of Russian power across Siberia towards the Pacific Ocean where she had even been compelled to cede to Russia her rights to the Kurile Islands.

By 1894 the re-organisation of her army and navy and her

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grievances in Korea had reached a stage which seemed to her to allow and justify military action for the protection of her national interests. To the amazement of the Western world, still obsessed with the idea of the immense latent power of China, an unbroken succession of Japanese victories on sea and on land brought the old unwieldy Empire to its knees, and by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17th, 1895) China had not only to recognise the complete independence of Korea, but to pay a large war indemnity and to cede to Japan the island of Formosa, and, more important, a maritime strip of Manchuria on the Liaotang Peninsula with Port Arthur, the naval stronghold fortified by China to defend the Yellow Sea and the waterway to the Home Province of Chihli and the Chinese capital. Then, for the first time, events in the Far East had an immediate and tremendous repercussion in Europe. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was a definite check to Russia's ulterior ambitions in building the great Trans-Siberian railway to the Pacific. The Chinese negotiator had been aware all along that she would oppose the cession of the Liaotang Peninsula. That France would support Russia was to be expected. But the *fait nouveau* was, that Germany, who had hitherto played a subordinate part in the Far East and always professed great goodwill towards Japan, suddenly joined with Russia and France in summoning Japan to renounce with the Liaotang Peninsula the most cherished fruits of her victories.

The secret of that *fait nouveau* must, moreover, be sought not in the Far East but in Europe. The non-renewal of Bismarck's "Re-insurance" Treaty with Russia had been so far the Kaiser's most sensational departure from the old Chancellor's policy, and had led to a Franco-Russian rapprochement soon followed by an actual alliance between the Tsarist Empire and the French Republic, which was just what Bismarck had always dreaded. Berlin still hoped that it would remain a platonic *liaison*; but when the German Government became aware that Russia was determined to take a decisive step in the Far East, and that France meant to move with her, it took fright at the prospect lest joint action should follow in which the guns of the Russian and French fleets, opening fire together in grim earnest, might invest the new Dual Alliance with an irrevocable and formidable reality. So Germany joined in, as at least she was careful to hint at the time at Tokyo, not out of hostility to the Japanese, but to hang on to the coat tails of the Russians and the French and keep them within the bounds of an innocuous naval demonstration. Whether that was all that the Wilhelmstrasse had in view may be doubted. For, though Japan had to yield to the menacing pressure of the three Continental Powers, the Kaiser, at any rate, was soon casting about for more

substantial results, and Germany proved no more backward than Russia in claiming her reward from China for having secured for her the retrocession of her Manchurian territory. Even before Russia secured a lease of Port Arthur from Peking in 1898, Germany had occupied Kiaochao and secured with a lease of that port a privileged position in the Shantung Province, nominally as atonement for the murder of two German missionaries in 1897.

This started the great game of grab and the battle for financial and railway concessions in which all the European Powers took a hand at Peking until the Chinese kaleidoscope was violently shaken up by the Boxer rising in 1900. Japan had been biding her time since the blow dealt to her by the three Continental Powers after the Shimonoseki Treaty, and only in Korea had she betrayed her determination to maintain the ascendancy for which she had fought against China and to resist the attempts of Russia to undermine her influence over the wretched Korean Court, whose gross corruption and incompetency left it hopelessly at the mercy of both its Japanese and its Russian neighbours, in spite of the proclaimed independence of the Korean kingdom. Japan and England had at the same time been gradually drawn nearer together by England's refusal to join in the coercion of Japan and the very conciliatory attitude she had been the first to adopt in the matter of "Treaty Revision," and perhaps still more effectively by the growing and often acute antagonism between British and Russian interests throughout Asia from Constantinople and Teheran to Peking and the Pacific. When the siege of the Peking Legations by the Boxers led to the dispatch of large international forces by the chief European Powers and America and Japan to restore order in Northern China, it was between the Japanese and the Anglo-Indian contingents, with the Americans as runners-up, that co-operation was most cordial and effective. They were the first on the spot to relieve the Legations, and they were at one in resenting the arrogance of the large German force which the Kaiser had speeded with an even more than customarily bombastic exhortation to teach the Chinese an enduring lesson, but which had arrived on the scene too late for anything but "punitive expeditions," unnecessarily cruel and vindictive, into the interior far beyond Peking. Diplomatically Germany tried to sit on the fence between the policy of appeasement coupled with reasonable penalties for the past which England, America and Japan were agreed to pursue, and that of sheer conquest to which Russia was openly diverting her own forces in Manchuria. France continued, somewhat shamefacedly, to back up her Russian ally.

The Boxer crisis and its aftermath subsided, but they left the relations between Russia and Japan vastly more strained than before

in Manchuria as well as in Korea. A conflict between the two Powers seemed to be already inevitable. It was again the European situation that turned the scales in the Far East. The Boxer crisis had occurred whilst England was engaged in the South African War. Frequent uncertainty as to the maintenance of neutrality, in few cases ever benevolent or trustworthy, by some of the Great Powers of Europe, and the prolonged strain of a war which made an unexpected call upon the resources of the whole British Empire, had convinced some of the leading British statesmen, and above all Joseph Chamberlain, whose influence in the Cabinet and the country was then very great, that the time had passed for a policy of mere "splendid isolation," and, in spite of the dubious attitude of Germany and the bitterness of German public opinion during the Boer War, the proposal which the Colonial Minister had unsuccessfully made during the Kaiser's visit to Windsor, soon after the outbreak of hostilities in South Africa, for an alliance between Germany and Great Britain to which he had originally hoped that America would accede, was renewed when the end of the war was thought to be in sight. Confidential negotiations were carried on for some time between London and Berlin, and in the course of them it was the Germans who were the first to suggest an alliance between England and Japan in order to meet the British objection that, by her refusal to include the *status quo* in Asia within the scope of the Anglo-German agreement then under discussion, Germany deprived the alliance of the countervailing advantages which England would look for in that continent from a treaty by which the two Powers would reciprocally be bound to defend the *status quo* in the three other world-continent. These negotiations ultimately fell through, and mainly on that point.

But the pourparlers initiated between London and Tokyo were carried on independently of Berlin, and the first treaty of definite alliance concluded in peace time between the British Government and any foreign power for centuries past was signed in London on January 30th, 1902, and it was concluded with an Asiatic power which had not been in existence fifty years earlier. It failed to avert the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904, as Russia, more and more firmly entrenched in Manchuria since the Boxer troubles, was not deterred by it from pursuing a policy of undisguised provocation in Korea, and it may even have encouraged Japan to take up the Russian challenge, as although the Treaty did not bind us to go with her into the war so long as she was fighting Russia alone, it did bind us to go to her assistance if another power joined hands with Russia. Fortunately that need never arose. The German menace had induced France to draw nearer to us, and she was not prepared to go beyond a neutrality which she perhaps

strained as far as she could in Russia's favour. Germany, who had consistently encouraged Russia in her policy of Asiatic adventure in order to distract her attention from Europe and weaken her military strength, was quite content to let her stew in her Manchurian juice. President Roosevelt, whose sentiments were for some time divided between sympathy with Japan and fear of her becoming too great a naval power on the Pacific, confined himself to doing yeoman's work towards the close of the war in smoothing the way for the Peace Conference which ultimately brought the two belligerents together at Portsmouth. England had certainly no cause to regret the blow dealt by Japan to Russian ambitions in Asia which had long been regarded as the greatest danger that threatened our Indian Empire, though the Japanese victories served also to stimulate amongst Indians the spirit of revolt against Western ascendancy which a new and still confused sense of nationhood had already begun to arouse.

But amongst the results of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese war there is one which is apt to escape attention, though it is, perhaps, the most momentous of all. The Russians—even the poor weak "Nicky" to whom "Willy" never tired of playing the tempter—at last realised that they were sacrificing security in Europe to the will o' the wisp of Asiatic aggrandisement and that the only real enemy Russia had had was not Japan's ally in London, but the false friend in Berlin who, as the shrewd Witte said, had "pushed her into the swamp," and had tried, though vainly, to embroil her with England in the wild Dogger Bank scare. Instead of repelling, as she had always hitherto done, any British suggestion for a comprehensive understanding in regard to Asiatic affairs, Russia, in a more chastened mood, was at last ready to enter into negotiations with a will to agree, and just as England and France had removed all the old causes of colonial friction by the Agreement of 1904, so the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 terminated, at the chief danger-points in Asia, the persistent antagonism which had kept the two great European Powers that were both also great Asiatic Empires profoundly divided throughout the nineteenth century. The greatest obstacle to co-operation in case of need between England and Russia was thus removed under the pressure on Russia of events which Japan had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about on the other side of the world; and not only did the need arise for it in the most urgent shape when Germany plunged the world into war in 1914, but the value of Russia's co-operation, especially during the first months of the war, in diverting, if at terrible cost to herself, a large part of the German forces from the Western front, should not be forgotten simply because Tsarist inefficiency and the triumph of Bolshevism paralysed her arm before the war came to an end.

Again there can be no doubt that it was the memory of Germany's hostile intervention after the Shimonoseki Treaty which, more than any other consideration, determined Japan's prompt participation in the Great War. It had rankled far more deeply, because it had been more unexpected and seemed more gratuitous than that of Russia and France. The Japanese ultimatum summoning Germany to surrender Kiaochow, which she had converted into the great naval stronghold at Tsintao, was itself a skilful paraphrase of the ultimatum which in 1895 had summoned Japan to give up the Liaotang Peninsula. Japan was in no way bound to come into the Great War on the side of the Allies, and, if she had not, the naval situation all over the Pacific would have been almost immeasurably more difficult whilst German cruisers were at large there. Only the other day the British representatives at the Naval Conference rendered once more a well deserved tribute to the great services rendered by the Japanese navy when they helped to run down the *Emden* after she had so long successfully raided the Indian Ocean; when they provided escorts for the Australian contingents on their way to Europe, as they did later on in the Mediterranean during the worst days of submarine warfare, and when they patrolled not only the Pacific right across to the South American coast, but the Indian Ocean as far as the Cape and played an important part in driving Admiral Spee's squadron down to the Falkland Islands and final destruction at Sturdee's hands. It is worth noting, at least, as another instance of the way in which Japan has been linked up with all the most momentous occurrences of recent history, that, though Germany on that occasion took Japan's name grossly in vain, she had the hardihood to try to align her together with Mexico against the United States in the notorious Zimmermann dispatch which, with its promise to Mexico of the recovery of the ancient Mexican provinces of the American Union, did much to enlighten the public conscience in the United States and to bring about their entry into the war with all its decisive consequences.

May we not, therefore, legitimately trace back the romance of Japan's history as a world-power from the most fateful events of our own times through the more obscurely intervening centuries to the far-off days when Marco Polo brought home the first tidings of her existence, and Columbus set sail in quest of "Zipangu" and discovered America instead?

VALENTINE CHIROL.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE VIENNA DISORDERS.

NO one—least of all, perhaps, the Viennese themselves—finds it easy to explain the troubles which fell upon Vienna from a cloudless sky on Friday, July 15th. Perhaps that is why those who like to lay all the ills that flesh is heir to at the door of Moscow seized upon the facile and totally inaccurate explanation of "Moscow Plots." In the course of my work as special correspondent of *The Times* during the French occupation of the Ruhr and the Separatist disorders of 1923-1924, I saw an exceptional amount of street fighting, yet I found it hard to set down on the following day a logical account of the events of "Bloody Friday" in Vienna. This much is certain, that up till the moment when bullets and stones began to fly, no one had intended violence. Police headquarters, with which I was in close touch throughout, never questioned for a moment the spontaneous nature of the outbreak. There is little in the way of plotting, conspiracy or espionage in Vienna of which the political police are unaware. One of their highest officials assured me that the only suggestion of Moscow influence was to be found in the incendiarism. "Revolutionary communism teaches its disciples," he said, "never to miss an opportunity of sustaining public disorder by incendiarism. That is foreign to Vienna. The rapidity with which paraffin and rags appeared at the Palace of Justice suggests that a few revolutionary communists remembered their text-books when they saw trouble afoot, but that is all."

I myself met the demonstration marching around the Parliament House at shortly after 10 a.m. It was orderly, but angry, and anxious to make somebody realise the fact. The decision to strike and demonstrate was spontaneous and the usual arrangements of the Socialist leaders were incomplete. Very few of the "Republikanische Schutzbund"—a strong body of drilled and disciplined workmen who wear uniform and carry sticks—were at their usual place at the side of the procession. Before the Parliament House the demonstrators halted, uncertain, obviously leaderless. The head of the procession had apparently got broken up, though no one could see how. The lined faces of the older workmen in the crowd looked anxious; the younger men and the factory girls were angry, and jeered at the imperturbable line of police protecting the building. Suddenly one saw in the distance a detachment of mounted police ride through the tail end of the procession—apparently an unnecessary lapse from the tact usually characteristic of the Vienna police. At once there was wild confusion, some shouting "They're riding us down—to the rescue!" In a crowd demonstrating against the acquittal of three Nationalists who had fired on a Socialist demon-

stration at Schattendorf, in the Burgenland, killing a war invalid and a little boy, such a cry aroused particular fury. Others cried "Stand Fast," others "March On." Passing ahead of this part of the procession which was fast disintegrating into a crowd, I found that its head behind Parliament had already degenerated into a mob, though it still contained many women and children. Men had begun to gather stones and to split off staves from the planking which road-repair workers had left everywhere to hand. In a moment there was a sabre charge of mounted police down one side street, while down another came an extended line of foot police, their revolvers held threateningly before them. Whether stones and staves or bullets flew first, it is impossible to say. The crowd hurled everything on which it had been able to lay its hands and scattered, the police firing rapidly. Several men dropped dead close to me. No sooner round the corner and under cover than the mob rallied, gathered more missiles, and ran to take the police in the rear. The rioting was already a revolt against the methods of the police.

There is no need to detail the preceding or subsequent events. In the course of an earlier attempt to invade the University (which is regarded as the centre of reaction), a conflict arose in the course of which a well-known desperado fired a shot at the police, who returned the fire, killing a man standing by him and wounding others. This is officially declared to have been the first blow struck. When incendiarism began, the police resorted to volley firing into the crazy crowds, at first with revolvers and then with rifles. The latter did terrible execution, especially as soft-nosed bullets were employed. The police, who were perfectly frank throughout, told me that in the grave emergency they took the ammunition which was to hand, including the soft-nosed bullets intended for target practice.

I have dwelt on my personal experiences, not because they are of any value in apportioning the blame for the tragedy, but because they have some bearing on the background of the disorders in so far as they indicate the temper of the crowd. Though the fighting was bitter on both sides, the essential elements of a revolutionary attempt were lacking. The "class-justice" cry arising from the Schattendorf verdict caused the Palace of Justice to be attacked; three Clerical and Nationalist newspaper offices were set alight; several gunshops were plundered for weapons, but there was very little looting, though there were plenty of big shops and many homes of the wealthy within easy reach. The disorders never lost the general character of a demonstration against "class justice" turned to violence through an accidental clash with the police; it was a gigantic crowd of ordinarily sober workmen maddened by the sight

of dead and wounded comrades, shot by the police in a desperate attempt to extinguish the rising flames of revolt, but, in the workmen's eyes, shot down like "proletarian dogs" because they had dared to protest against the previous shooting of workmen at Schattendorf. To appreciate their state of mind, one must recall the treatment of the Social-Democrats under the Monarchy; the flames of their bitter anger were assiduously fanned by extremists. Yet the disorder was so localised that a foreign diplomat complained to me later that, in the adjoining city district, he had no hint until six p.m. of the battle which had been raging all day within a ten minutes' motor ride from his legation. Some English friends of mine have a flat close to the police-station in the Lichtenfelsgasse which was burnt out early in the morning. When the mob invaded their house in search of the police who had defended themselves to the last cartridge and then fled from the burning station, my friends—two ladies and one gentleman—threw open the door of the flat and invited the rioters to satisfy themselves that no police were concealed there. Having done so, one of the mob asked if he might have—a wash! My friends passed round cigarettes and glasses of water; thus refreshed and thirsting now only for the blood of the police, the men bowed and retired; just after, they caught a policeman in the street and killed him instantly.

One last picture. A week ago, I walked through the "battle area." Beneath bullet-splashed walls and riddled windows, and before the gaunt ruin of the Palace of Justice, hawkers were doing a brisk trade with foreign tourists in photographs of the actual disorders. Inside the burnt-out shell of the police-station, a dozen perspiring policemen were sitting on the benches; a fat sergeant was making entries in his records at a table, which was the only uncharred piece of wood within sight. Through the room and around the sergeant's table passed an endless procession of workmen and their wives in their Sunday best, surveying with blank amazement the destruction which they or their fellows had helped to effect, and exchanging jests with the police. The latter took a genial pride in explaining "all about the war, and what they fought each other for." That is Vienna—unquenchable, personal, *Gemütlichkeit*, liable to temporary eclipse only by political passions which a politically unschooled race has not learnt to control. The tourist traffic is already in full swing two weeks after the disorders, because it is so obvious that Vienna is not a disorderly city but a city inexplicably stricken for one day with grave disorders.

Viennese good-temper is not merely traditional; it lies at the root of the Viennese character. How was it then that this city, which had an almost bloodless revolution in 1918 when other European capitals were given up to mob violence, should have been the scene

of the savagery of July 15th? Some of the blame must be laid at the door of the weather and of the road-making contractors who unwittingly supplied the ammunition. A good thunderstorm at any time before mid-day would have cleared the streets. A great deal more lies at the door of the Allies, who so reconstituted Central Europe as to give a sound economic basis to every State except Austria. The international aspect is outside the scope of this article, but I would draw attention to the fact that Austria is not merely an economic, but also a political anomaly. It is hardly conceivable that Vienna, with its large proletarian population which was so wretchedly housed and generally neglected under the Monarchy, will ever desert the Social-Democrats who have given them decent houses, magnificent baths and recreation grounds, and, by taxing the luxuries of the well-to-do to the limit of economic possibility, have accumulated funds for exemplary welfare work which has given the poorest a place in the sun of this city of outward splendour and gaiety. Yet the country has been so mutilated by the Treaty of St. Germain (most cruelly of all by the loss of the fertile fruit and wine districts of South Tyrol with its German population) that Vienna, now a federal state as well as a capital, contains one-third of the population of the country. The remaining two-thirds are mainly "Black"—i.e., Clerical—entirely loyal to the Church and filled with loathing for Socialism both as Catholics and as peasants. This state of affairs produces a deadlock in Parliament and stalemate at elections, destroys all sense of the reality of politics, and leaves the Socialists and Clericals, each of whom realises that the most potent arguments can effect little alteration, to fall back on obstruction and abuse.

Much has been written in England of the violent language of the Socialist Press and of some of the Socialist leaders. The accusations are well-founded, as a glance at the Vienna papers shows at once. Equal prominence has not been given to the fact that this violence can easily be paralleled in the writings and speeches of the other side. As often as I heard men in the crowd on Friday cry out bitterly "Why have we no weapons against the police bloodhounds?" I heard others say, "If only the police had machine-guns to mow down this *canaille*." Yet despite the glaring defects of democracy in Austria, and just because of the weakness of this tender plant, it deserves the same assiduous support from liberal thinkers in England as is greedily afforded to reactionary Hungary by the adherents of fascism and dictatorships. In an increasingly reactionary Europe, no outpost of democracy should be left unsupported.

I am obliged to turn from the political aspect of the disorders, though much more might be written under this head, in order to

deal with another one which has largely escaped attention. The institution of trial by jury in Austria is seriously threatened by the intrusion of Viennese *Gemütlichkeit* into the jury-box. The weak-kneed reluctance of Austrian juries to bring in a verdict of "guilty" in murder cases—despite the fact that since the Revolution there has been no death penalty—the inexplicable mildness of many judges, and the endless loopholes for escape afforded by the law, especially for those accused of murder, have undermined popular confidence in the justice of the courts. If the normal workings of a murderer's brain are disturbed by drink, lust, or certain obscure disorders known to psycho-analysts, he is usually interned in an asylum, where he has only to satisfy a fresh set of psycho-analysts that he is not a hopeless lunatic, to obtain his liberty. When, as in the Schattendorf trial, political questions are involved, it is not difficult to understand why Socialist speakers and writers, burning under a sense of "class justice" which they believe affords them no redress, use inflammatory language. It was the pent-up passions of a crowd protesting against the immunity of Nationalists who had shot down workers which were released when the first shots cracked on Friday, July 15th, and workmen dropped dead and wounded in the street. In point of fact, of course, it has been established by the police that the first shot came from a desperado, but the crowd can hardly be expected to have seen that, as the exchange of shots was practically simultaneous.

Whether or no political motives influenced the jury in the Schattendorf case, there have been countless amazing verdicts in the last two years which have shaken popular faith in the administration of justice. It may be illuminating to summarise a few of them; though the crimes might have been committed in any country, the method of dealing with them is peculiar. On March 10th, 1925, a student named Otto Rothstock, an anti-Semite and fascist, carried out the cold-blooded and carefully-planned murder of a Jew named Hugo Bettauer. The latter was the editor of a number of salacious publications of the type tolerated in Paris, Berlin, and many other European capitals beside Vienna. Rothstock declared that, in the interests of youth, he felt it his duty to exterminate this pestilential Jew. He was found "guilty," but "incapable of reasoning" at the moment of the crime. He was interned in an asylum, but released last May as having recovered his reason.

The case of Wimpassinger, the butcher, and that of Fraü Grosavescu, the wife of the operatic tenor, are non-political, but emphasise the moral weakness of Viennese juries. Wimpassinger was discovered by a policeman in January last dropping the neatly-dismembered portions of his late wife's body into the Danube. He admitted killing her with a hatchet, but said that he did it in self-

defence because she had threatened to throw a bottle at him. He was found "not guilty" and discharged. He was recently sent to prison for being concerned with another man in a lesser breach of the law. A Viennese cartoonist aptly depicted him sitting disconsolate in his prison cell and muttering, "Fool: Why did I not simply murder him?"

The Vienna Press has criticised a number of recent astounding acquittals, but without great acumen. One leading newspaper, for example, urged that as an inducement to jurymen to do their duty and return a verdict in accordance with the weight of evidence, they should be given a voice in determining the sentence, since they could hardly be expected to run the risk of the judge imposing a severe punishment in a case which awakened their compassion.

The wife of a Salzburg railwayman named Wedl murdered last January her husband's illegitimate child of four who lived with them, under circumstances of indescribable brutality, which she very calmly depicted in court, adding, "I certainly meant to kill him—the child was worthless, anyway." She was found not guilty of murder, but was sent to penal servitude for three years for manslaughter.

The last case which I wish to cite is not one of murder, but is interesting for its political flavour. Alexander Weiss was for ten years the editor of the *Abend*, a scurrilous boulevard paper of communist tendencies. It was constantly filled with libellous denunciations of industrial leaders and financiers (there is no law of libel in Austria worth the name), apparently by virtue of the proud motto on its front page—"Where one is stronger—always on the side of the weaker." At his trial for blackmail in January last, however, it was revealed that although he was paid a salary of £300 a month, Weiss had actually staged these attacks on the "oppressors of the poor" in order to blackmail them, and had extorted enormous sums for years. He was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment, of which he has served not one day. He has just been accorded for the third time a "postponement of sentence for three months." Meanwhile, however, he has not been hiding his light under a bushel, but has become editor and part proprietor of three Nationalist and Fascist newspapers, in which he reviles the Social-Democrats and the "proletariat" as heartily as in the *Abend* he slandered the "bourgeoisie." The Social-Democrats call loudly for an explanation of the failure to carry out the sentence of last January.

Three lessons emerge from the welter of bloodshed of July 15th. First, that the Powers which arbitrarily created this unwillingly independent State of Austria cannot escape responsibility for any misfortune which may befall her, while for selfish reasons they continue to deny her the right of deciding her own political future.

Secondly, that unless the two big political parties, the Christian Socialists (Clericals) and the Social-Democrats will make a tremendous effort to restore the vanished decencies of political controversy, the atmosphere will remain electric and liable to a fresh discharge. It is hard to imagine a coalition government comprising the party of the Catholic Church and the disciples of Karl Marx, though that would be ideal for the country. But the Socialists already fear lest their "Left Wing" should go over to the Communists; it was that fear which led to the early breaking-off of the protest strike after the disorders. There is now a danger that they may proceed to extremes to hold the waverers, particularly if the Clericals press the advantage which the events of July have given them. Fortunately, there are slight signs of a desire for compromise all round at this moment, and it is to be hoped that the Communists—at present weaker in Vienna than anywhere in Europe owing to the achievements of the Socialists and the practical advantages of membership of their party—will not become "*der lachende Dritte*."

The third lesson is the most important but, involving as it does something like a change—at least a stiffening-up of the national character—it will be the hardest to put into practice. It is that Viennese kindness and soft-heartedness have no place in a jury-box, and that the law must be so strengthened as to restore to every citizen the assurance that the enemies of the common weal will be left no loophole of escape from just but exemplary punishment. Never was the cruelty of misplaced kindness more terribly demonstrated than when one hundred persons perished and hundreds more were terribly wounded because the Tscharmann brothers were spared all punishment for the Schattendorf shooting. The prayer of every Austrian patriot, like that of every one of the millions of friends of this charming, gifted, and sorely-tried little people, must be that which since the days of the Plague of 1679 has been said daily in the Cathedral of Saint Stephen's, for a strong, cleansing wind to blow through the streets of Vienna—*Vienna ventosa aut venenosa*.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA.

WHEN we speak of a country as being developed or undeveloped, we usually mean that its countryside has or has not been intersected with railways, that minerals are or are not dug for within its boundaries, in fact that it does or does not form a link in the industrial and commercial world. Thibet is presumably the supreme example for an "undeveloped" country, and in applying the phrase to it we explain automatically what development means to us. The Thibetans live unconscious of their lack of development; so far as their vision takes them, they are getting the best out of their country by producing goats and Buddhist lamas and having no contact with the outside world, and if Thibet is a blank space on the map of the commercial-universe, Throgmorton Street and Manchester are equally blank on the map of the Thibetan universe. That is an undeveloped country, not only in the industrial sense, but also in the sense that the people are content to remain in a state of stagnancy, with no thought whatsoever of improving their lot in this world. It would be rash and foolish to blame them for their attitude, and if the attitude of the people of China were the same, the present Chinese situation would be the simple one it is often stated to be, that of an imposition of western industrialism on an ancient country by superior force. But their attitude is nothing of the kind. Every Chinese is willing and ready to profit from the trade China has with foreign nations, and everyone coming in contact with that trade is better off for it in one way or another, and it is chiefly in this sense, that of improvement in the people's lot, that I wish to examine China's foreign trade relations and their effect on her development.

If we turn to our China Year Books, we can read of the imports of Manchester cotton, of Kerosene oil, and cigarettes, and the exports of silk and tea and beams, of the vast tonnage of ships passing through Shanghai, of the value of land in the International Settlement; and we can read of the coal mines, of the cotton mills in the Yangtse Valley, and of a few thousand miles of railway. But we can also read of civil war and tuchuns, of presidents imprisoned and deposed, of new governments and anarchies, of anti-foreign outbreaks, anti-British outbreaks, general strikes, Bolshevik influences, armed robberies and murders, and the Three Principles of Sun Yat-Sen. These are queer phenomena to accompany the successful development of a country. Where once the soldier was despised, where once the mandarin was honoured for his learning and, despite his corruption, was the father of the people, you find to-day the soldier all-powerful, the classics forgotten, and public office for sale.

Ninety-four years ago, the first step was taken in the course which changed the whole nature of China's foreign relations and helped to destroy the Empire, and for this reason it is interesting to recall conditions as they were a hundred years ago, when foreign influence was negligible. The step I refer to was the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly. The trade between England and China was originally restricted to the Company's ships; other ships could only trade between China and India, and then only by the Company's licence. American ships could trade as they pleased, and because of this, and because "free trade" (in the old sense) was in the air, the monopoly was done away with. This was the beginning of China's struggles with outside powers, for it brought the Empire into direct contact with a sovereign power alien to itself. Hitherto the Company had been responsible for the good behaviour of the traders (not a heavy responsibility) and for policy, and since a company cannot claim to be on equal terms with an Empire, the question of equality had not been raised, and the few diplomatic missions that had reached China from abroad had not impressed the fact of their nation's independence on the government. But henceforward there was to be a stronger force interested in China than China knew of, and the ignorance, contempt and unfairness shown by China were to lead to many troubles.

But a hundred years ago this step had not been taken. The Emperor Tao Kwang was trying to raise the Empire out of the corrupt state into which it had fallen in the previous reign, not guessing it was never to leave that state, and foreign trade was only a minute, though very lucrative, point of interest. The great days of the dynasty were not so far behind that they could not possibly be revived, and China was still the one state, the one source of power, the one point of contact with heaven. There were rebellions, but rebellions are not such startling rarities in China, and the government was stable. Power, however, was not so strongly lodged in the Emperor as it ought to have been. The Emperor appointed the officials, and to some extent he controlled them, but the officials and the gentry—men of official class, whose power in their native provinces has always been great—came nearer independence the further their districts were from Peking. It was a bureaucratic feudalism.

Revenue was collected in the traditional Chinese way—the official collected all he could, and dispatched to Peking whatever was demanded from him. In theory the sum demanded from him was a minimum, and he was supposed, in theory, to send more if possible, but he never did send more. The people, however, paid many times this sum. A tax of 100 per cent. on any commodity would excite no comment, unless it were in wonder at the tax-collector's moderation.

The actual amounts levied are not known, but out of them the official would pay the customary honoraria to those above him, the equivalent of wages to those below him, support a swarm of dependents and make himself a rich man.

This system made for stability, for with trade so heavily taxed it was difficult for any but the officials to acquire wealth. At the time of which we are speaking, there did exist some very rich merchants in China—the thirteen merchants of the “Co-hong” at Canton, the only people entitled to deal with the foreign traders direct. But these were called on so often for enormous contributions, and were in general so heavily taxed, that bankruptcy was common amongst them. Apart from these it would have been difficult to find any great wealth in China that was not the wealth of officials, and it followed that there were no rivals in the trading classes to the power of the officials. When we reflect how many revolutions in the west have been caused by the rivalry between the aristocracy with their privileges and the merchants with their riches, we understand a little why it is that successful invasions and rebellions did not upset the ancient polity of China. Rebellion came from the hungry or from the barbarian without, rather than from powerful subjects, for the only powerful subjects of the Empire were those to whom the Confucian classics and philosophy were most familiar and most dear, those most interested in the stability of the system.

It requires no sage to see that trade could scarcely develop under such conditions, and it was further hampered by the Chinese habit of “squeeze,” of taking a little from any money transaction passing under one's nose. This has never been considered a shameful practice, or confined to any particular class. The Chinese have great powers of concentration on the matter in hand, being apparently absorbed in it to the exclusion of other interests, and though this makes them valuable as workers, it also makes them short-sightedly indifferent to the long view. They are further intensely individualistic, and apt to ignore the public welfare, having in fact no other welfare at heart than that of themselves and their families. The officials of the Empire were compelled by their position to take longer views than the ordinary citizens could take, but their vision was limited, they knew nothing of any economic laws, and the insecurity of their tenure made them more anxious for “squeeze” whilst it was within their reach than they might have been had their appointments been permanent, and in any case there was always the pressure of their dependents' hunger or greed pushing them forward.

And when we remember the great extent and huge population of China, the insignificance of foreign trade, and the great obstacles to

the internal trade, it is not surprising that labour was cheap and poverty universal. The population of China is kept on the increase by the practice of ancestor-worship. Every man ministers to the spirits of his ancestors, and raises sons that his own spirit and those of his fathers may be properly attended to when he is dead. The importance of having sons is so great that early marriage, polygamy and enormous families are essential elements of Chinese life. The checks on the unlimited growth of the population are automatic. In the small insubstantial houses of the towns and villages the people are crowded together, and they are almost as crowded in the homes of the rich. There is no sanitation worth mention, and to western noses the smells are at first intolerable. All the diseases of the world are common, and cholera, dysentery, small-pox, and other loathsome pestilences take their yearly share in combating the evils of ancestor-worship, being reinforced periodically by the more sweeping remedies of famine and flood.

One of the worst consequences of poverty and starvation is that normally peaceful peasants are driven to banditry or piracy, whichever is the more convenient, and are ready to join in any rebellion or other disturbance for the sake of the loot. A hundred years ago piracy and banditry and rebellion were all common, and the terrible Taiping rebellion, which reduced the congestion in China by as many people as would make a nation in Europe, was soon to begin. The Empire was in decay, and the symptoms were those of an impending change of dynasty. Yet, difficult as life was, the Chinese people worked on, and the hardy survived.

That is the China of a hundred years ago. Since then foreign trade has multiplied itself hundreds of times, and thousands of foreigners have taken up residence under privileged conditions, though they are not allowed to live outside certain ports unless they are missionaries. Under foreign guidance railways have been built, mines have been dug, factories opened, and companies formed. China has been brought into closer contact with the west through the introduction of steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal, and the Chinese themselves own many steamers. Enormous manufacturing and distributing firms have been formed by foreigners in China, employing many thousands of Chinese, and paying them more money than they can earn in Chinese employ. Similar Chinese firms have been formed on foreign models by the hundred, though naturally they are not so huge, and Chinese cotton mills and silk filatures and factories are all over the country. Electric light and telephones have penetrated far into the interior.

The treaty ports are not merely residential. They are the distributing centres for the foreign trade, but in the south Hong Kong is the chief centre in normal times. Great cities have thus grown

up at Shanghai and Hong Kong, the chief centres, and at Hankow and Tientsin, the next in importance, and they have been able to grow up because in each case both foreign and Chinese merchants have been given full play, instead of being hampered at every turn by the absurd demands of officials, and the Chinese have benefited enormously. The names of Chu Pao San, Fu Siao En, and Sir Robert Ho Tung of Hong Kong may not be familiar in England, but they are names of importance in China, and only the most prominent of the names. Rich Chinese abound in the different concessions and in Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, anywhere that is safe from the monstrous taxation and squeeze of the interior of China. Besides the factory owners, the bankers, the landowners, and directors of big companies, there are the "compradores" (the broker-cashiers of foreign firms), the dealers in foreign goods, the owners of large departmental stores, the importers and exporters, men of varying degrees of wealth, not only where there are concessions, but in the smaller ports as well. The congregation of foreigners in the larger ports attracts Chinese traders to supply them with food and other normal wants, Chinese servants to look after them, gives employment to thousands of coolies as carriers or as factory hands or messengers or watchmen, attracts thousands of traders to supply the wants of their fellow-Chinese, and all these are richer from their connection with the foreign trade.

And it is not only the population of the treaty ports that has benefited. All over China there are men who are wealthier from being the agents of foreign firms or dealers in foreign goods, or through their share in banking or transport. All over the country are to be found evidences of greater prosperity, and the Chinese have more money to buy from one another with than ever they had before. It is premature to say that the merchant is becoming the man of power in China. All Chinese are timid, and the rich Chinese especially so, but it is safe to say that the merchants of the treaty ports and the different chambers of commerce exercise an increasing influence on the affairs of the towns they live in, a sign that the power of the gentry and the officials is on the wane.

Foreign trade has developed under certain conditions. The attempt to trade under Chinese conditions ended in war, the Chinese being anxious to trade but having no notion of reciprocity, and as a result China was compelled to concede something approaching the terms on which trade is carried on in the west. Freedom from extortion, judicial fairness, and the opportunity to buy and sell in the open market are taken for granted in the west, but in China they were only secured after three wars and numberless diplomatic struggles, and even yet are only secured to a very limited extent.

The first is secured by the fixed tariff, the second by extra-territoriality, and the third by the treaty port system, and people in England who criticise the treaty port system should remember that it is a system restricting the activities of foreigners and not restricting the Chinese. All that was gained by the wars in that connection was the opening of ports other than Canton to the residence of foreigners wishing to trade.

From the treaty port system has developed the concession and settlement system, by which waste land is leased at the different ports for foreigners to build their houses on and manage their own affairs. The history of how these places developed and how the Chinese came to settle in them by the thousand is very complicated, and it is enough to say that they now form oases of western civilisation in the midst of China. That they do not represent some aspects of civilisation as well as they do others is regrettable but natural, and that some of the concessions belonging to countries with minute interests in China have been abuses of the system is more regrettable still. But the best of them do at least provide examples of good government, and give commercial freedom to all who trade in their limits. Talk of rendition is so much prattle at the present time, especially when it is only the best governed and least abused of them that are aimed at, as has happened so far. The Chinese have their grievances, but the existence of foreign concessions is not one of them. The factories and the headquarters of all the important Chinese firms are in regions under foreign protection whenever it is possible for them to be so, and it comes as one of China's Gilbertian surprises to discover that the most rabidly anti-British of all Chinese corporations, a firm which is well known for financing anti-foreign movements in the ordinary course of trade rivalry, has its principal factories at Hong Kong and none in the interior of China.

Yet, in spite of all this development under foreign protection and foreign guidance, the trade of China remains lamentably small. China's contribution to the world's commerce remains hopelessly out of proportion to her share of the world's population and the world's resources, and the only reason for this we can suggest is that she has taken no action of her own initiative, though she has been willing enough in general for action to be taken, or at any rate willing enough to draw profits. The picture we drew of China a hundred years ago was dismal enough, but it is not so dismal as the picture we might draw of China outside the treaty ports to-day. We have said that all over the country are to be found evidences of greater prosperity, the result of foreign trade relations, but it would be wrong to expect the foreign trade, so small as it is, to change the face of China unaided, and all within one hundred peaceless years.

Had there at any time been any patriotism in the country, had the rulers been able to see beyond the confines of their own purses, we might have seen some effort made to keep pace with the new growth fostered from abroad, but there has been none. A hundred years ago, we said, the great days of the Manchu dynasty were not so far behind that they could not possibly be revived, but we cannot say the same of to-day. The dynasty itself is gone, and in its place are three sole legitimate governments, each one the only representative of China's national aspirations and Chinese thought, and to-morrow there may be six. So far not one of the governments has in any way improved on the Manchu Dynasty. Their officials are more corrupt, have lost the literary tradition, and show no loyalty to any person or principle. Most of them have bought their offices from the general in control of their province, and when that general is driven out, as he usually is in the long run, they will do their best to buy office from his successor. The long standing official practice of "Make your pile quickly, then run," has been accentuated. Taxation is as monstrous as ever, and officials are as rich, and nowadays it is easier for them to keep their riches, for with the aid of modern transport it is possible for them to reach a foreign concession or Japan in safety. In the old days they might more readily be degraded or have their goods confiscated or lose their heads.

Famine and floods continue, but rebellion has given place to civil war. For years this most useless and wasteful warfare has run on, because there is no person or cause to command loyalty, because every man fights for himself. Such a statement is sweeping, but I see no reason to qualify it. Of late there has been an appearance of unity on the side of the Nationalists, but it is difficult to believe this will last very long. They have been united by a common hatred of the North and of the foreigner, by the guidance of Russia and by the exhilaration of success. That there is real as distinguished from hysterical patriotism amongst them I do not doubt, but it is odd that they should immediately split into hostile halves on gaining control of the wealthy Yangtse Valley. One would have expected the evils of Russian influence, of Messrs. Eugene Chen and Sun Fo, to have been discovered sooner by the intelligent and disinterested statesmen of the Nanking Party.

Whether there is a cause or not, the civil war goes on, and the evil is not so much the fighting as the possession of arms, which carries with it absolute power and absolute ruthlessness. The prosperity conferred by foreign trade is a great advance, but it is nothing beside the general poverty of China, and to this poverty, to the famines and the banditry that make so much of life pass in misery in China, are added the devastation, the looting and the rape caused by the passing soldier. But, as in the time of rebellion,

so in the time of civil war, the people go on with their work and the hardy survive through their incredible patience.

A reasonable objection occurs to me. We have shown that China has benefited from the foreign trade relations, and that so far as she has developed she has done so with the aid of those relations and not through her own efforts, that the economic ambitions of her merchants have found their fulfilment only under foreign protection. But are we going to be satisfied with economic development? There are aspects of commercial civilisation that no one desires to take root in China, and there is danger that if trade alone is fostered by the foreigner, China will have to undergo the ugly and depressing period of industrial revolution that we and other western nations have still to recover from. The efforts of missionaries to educate the nation and to introduce western religion have not led far, because the teachers have often been rather stupid people, and because the diversity of Christian sects is rather puzzling to the Chinese mind, by nature bewildered in face of anything new, and suspicious of anything connected with foreigners.

Nor can we say that the average student returning from abroad, especially from America, seems to have gained much from contact with the west. For every Chinese educated at a good university, for every Chinese with a sound understanding of some vital element of our civilisation, there are a hundred educated at cheap universities, whose knowledge of western civilisation is limited to its unworthiest examples, to a timidly vulgar attitude towards women, a belief in swagger, a pathetic faith in a democracy which has no relation to Chinese life, a confused notion of sovereignty and the equality of races, a little information of textbook quality, and a burning sense of injustice stimulated by a still more burning sense of inferiority.

There is danger in fact that western influence may rob the Chinese of their better qualities, their industry and patience and their filial piety and sense of breeding, and substitute for them nothing worth having. That indiscriminate education is undesirable has been well grasped by the British Boxer Indemnity Commission, which has recommended various means of introducing the intellectual and other non-materialist elements of our civilisation to the notice of China. The development that comes by way of trade is fundamental, but it is a blind development, and needs to be supplemented. And it is to be noticed that trade provides the means of development rather than development itself. Chinese civilisation has been stagnant for a very long time, and though the waters may be stirred by foreign influences, it requires action on the part of the Chinese themselves to make them flow in any definite direction. Those who have come much into contact with the Chinese in China

under Chinese conditions realise that tradition is too strong, the country too large, and the atmosphere too conservative for a little textbook learning to alter the life of a single Chinese, or for a few well-educated men to transform Chinese civilisation. But in the meantime we need not suppose that Chinese civilisation is going to remain as it is for ever. Some day, we dare not prophesy when, China is going to be more settled than she is at present. I do not for a moment believe that she will then take all the burdens of her own development on her own shoulders; but whether she does so or not the truth will remain, though doubtless unacknowledged, that her development proceeds from and through the relations she has with the trading nations of the west.

THOMAS HOLLONS HOLLAND.

THE PRESENT GENERATION.

THERE has been a good deal of stocktaking about the present generation. The Church Congress have lately debated the whole matter with, as far as one can judge, more heat than light, while recently perturbed headmasters and head-mistresses held a grand inquest on the subject, with results that could be more or less foreseen: one does not depreciate one's own products. There has also been a certain amount of sporadic sniping in the Daily Press by anonymous correspondents like Large Employer, Bewildered Parent, Disgusted Sexagenarian, and others whose names we know so well.

Like the poor, the present generation are always with us, and just as opinions of the poor vary from the Tennysonian dictum of regarding them as bad in the lump to the soap-box orator's *cliché* of their being a sort of exclusive and inexhaustible reservoir of all the nation's virtues, so have opinions of the younger generation, especially in their formative years, been equally diverse. At one extreme we have had the old-fashioned belief that the child is a potential criminal, and nothing but the right environment on quarantine lines can prevent his evil nature coming out. At the other extreme we have had the Rousseau dogma that he is born good, and that anything that goes wrong with him is the fault of his environment. But the orthodox "die-hard" believers in original turpitude are a diminishing number, and modern anthropology and psychology have played havoc with the tenets of undiluted Rousseauism. In fact it is probable that the majority of thoughtful people to-day believe the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes, environment and heredity having each its contribution to make to the child's development.

The problem of forming an estimate of the present generation is complicated by the fact that the younger generation of to-day is not entirely a normal one. Every teacher will agree that the war has left an indelible mark on the mind and temperament of practically every child who lived through it. From a physiological and mental standpoint one might almost describe the present generation as a slightly shell-shocked one. And from the broad spiritual point of view, the war has been equally devastating. At the head of the present generation are tens of thousands of young fellows who went to the war and on their return discovered that they had to start at the bottom of the ladder, while those of their contemporaries who stayed at home had entrenched themselves in the more "cushy" jobs. Many thousands of girls are equally embittered. They feel that in giving up their time to nursing and other good works during the war, they have been robbed of the enjoyment of the best years

of their lives, let alone the involuntary spinsterhood to which they are condemned by the colossal slaughter of potential husbands during the war.

If the present generation may be regarded as comprising the members of both sexes from eighteen to thirty, that is, those who have left school and have either attained the comparative freedom of college or the complete freedom of everyday life, then I think the present generation and especially its elder members may be a somewhat disillusioned and disgruntled generation. It is a commonplace that the generations have always found it hard to understand one another, but at the present time this difficulty has been intensified by the wholesale destruction during the war of the intermediate generation, the men of, say, thirty to forty-five, who in normal times would have served as a buffer and "go between" between the present generation and the older generation. The loss of these "middle men" (in every sense of the word) has seriously upset our social stability.

The profound dissatisfaction of the present generation finds a further background of discontent in the failure of the older generation and pre-war civilisation either to avert the war or to reap its supposed fruits. Hence the universal slump in authority in every branch of life, with impatience of all tradition in religion, hatred of convention in manners and customs, and general contempt of technique in all the arts—coupled with a sort of fierce determination to build up everything *de novo*. Nothing shows this better than the literature which the present generation admire and produce, which is essentially a literature of revolt. It doubtless has its good side in its burning desire to have done with shams of all sorts, and to this extent it is in a true sense moral, even if its criticism of life is mainly destructive and negative rather than positive or constructive. But it finds little room for those finer qualities of generosity and self-sacrifice which are, one believes, the cement of every stable civilisation. And this renunciation of the higher ideals accounts for the almost pathetic condition of many of the younger generation who, having jettisoned all conventions and codes, are now boxing the compass in their efforts to steer by the will-o'-the-wisp of instinct alone, or, rather, by that of their instincts: a state of mind which, with its complete deliquescence of reason and tradition, may be philosophically described as a sort of one-sided Bergsonism, *παντα ρήι*. Could, for instance, anything be more typical than H. G. Wells' latest novel with its new gods, Selfridge and Northcliffe, as saviours of society?

In no sphere is this decline in authority more marked than in that own education fifty years ago with that of the present day. We were of family life, as may best be seen by making a comparison of our

brought up under a regime of absolute monarchy, when it did not degenerate into tyranny, whose leading maxim was "little children should be seen and not heard," coupled with a decalogue or, rather, a hectalogue, of "Thou shalt nots." The parents of the next generation have seen themselves transformed into constitutional monarchs, while their children have enjoyed many rights and privileges with a considerable diminution in the rota of duties. This particular form of parental government is by no means extinct. But the parent of to-day, especially in the upper classes, seems to have further lost in prerogative; and in some cases would appear to be in considerable danger of becoming little less than a *roi fainéant* in his own household. During the holidays the home is converted into an hotel in which the children entertain their friends, who are, not infrequently, unknown to their elders. Parental respect is a rapidly decreasing quantity. Father and mother are lucky if they are addressed as nothing worse than "Pop" and "Mop" or "Old Bean," while the slogan P.P.P. (poor papa pays) is sufficiently indicative of the plight of that unfortunate person. The most successful parents seem to be those who take on, as it were, a new lease of life and try to grow up again with their children. These "twice born" alone seem likely to be able to bridge the natural gulf between themselves and their offspring. For the others, the distance between the two parties is not one of milestones, but of leagues.

In the working classes there has been the same decline of parental authority, and one not infrequently hears of parents who have no control over their children. In fact if working class parents have one particular fault, it is that they are probably too indulgent to their children. This, no doubt, is due in part to the laudable desire to give them a better time than they themselves had. One is often amazed to hear from teachers what children have been able to extract from their parents in the way of pocket-money, sweets, and treats—but whether this generosity is always realised by the recipients is a more doubtful matter.

There is, in fact, a growing doctrine among some of the younger generation that parents, being responsible for their existence, are responsible for everything else connected with them, while entitled to no rights of their own. In a recent debate, the Hardwicke Society decided that children had no duties towards their parents. Without taking this decision too seriously, it is none the less a sign of the times. It apparently makes the rights of Posterity supreme—the very reverse of the Irishman's standpoint. According to the new creed, *he* would have to do everything for Posterity, just because Posterity had done nothing for him. Curiously enough this *deferred* responsibility is really a literal reversion to the morality of the beasts that perish, where the calf has no duties to the cow or the cub

to the she-wolf—a *bestial* morality, in fact, in more than one sense of the word.

In all classes again there has been a marked lessening of respect for the older generation, which if it continues seems to threaten a gradual reversion to the ideals of the savage towards the aged. It is not indeed suggested that the latter should be employed to supplement the family menu, although the idea has been humorously put forward by Mr. Aldous Huxley, but there is a growing tendency to get rid of them by shunting them into so-called "Homes" and institutions run by private initiative or by the State. This phase is particularly noticeable among the lower classes.

Another growing danger to which the present generation is exposed is the universal speeding-up tendency of the age. Our grandparents' existence was timed to the rhythm of the stage-coach, our fathers' to that of the steam-engine, our lives and those of our children are regulated by the speedometer of the motor car; and it would seem as if the lives of our grand-children are likely to be keyed to the vertiginous throb of the aeroplane. No wonder Tagore speaks of the strained and restless features of the Western races. Possibly in another twenty years the ordinary definition of a Westerner will be a person who can't keep still, which Lucretius long ago noted as typical of the degenerate Roman of his day. A still more serious danger seems to be the growing tendency to short-circuit infancy, childhood and boyhood, and make adolescence a hotch-potch of all the ages—an evil from which the younger members of the present generation have suffered and are suffering. Hence the frankly futurist "make-up" of some of our modern young men, who combine the irresponsibility of youth with the cynicism of age. There is a tremendous need to-day of someone to get out a new map of life, delineating for each age (eighteen, thirty, forty-five, sixty, or seventy-five) its particular passions, pleasures, and dangers—its rights and its duties. Naturally every age sums up and includes the age that precedes it, but in the present welter and chaos of things far too many small boys under sixteen smoke and too many men over sixty jazz. Happily the growing importance attached to hygiene and keeping fit provides an antidote to these physical excesses. The nation is slowly but surely growing a *physical conscience*, as the establishment of school clinics, school doctors, and National Health Insurance shows. The movement has long affected the County and Municipal Schools. It is at last influencing the public school, with its somewhat mediæval views on sleep, diet, and prevention of illness.

While in the smart set at least emancipated woman, owing to some degree to the extraordinary rapidity of her emancipation, seems inclined to sow her wild oats, man in the upper and middle classes is getting more temperate. Most of these women have been edu-

cated privately or in private schools, in which the discipline is often lax, and the children work as hard or as little as they please. Such girls have acquired neither the tradition in *esprit de corps* and self-control that the boys of their class absorb in the public schools, nor the training in public spirit and hard work that their less wealthy sisters got in the County and Municipal Schools. On the contrary, to quote a catchword of modern psychology, they seem to be suffering from an ego-centric complex.

Dean Inge recently quoted the saying that the top of a glass of beer consisted mainly of froth, the middle of the beer itself, and the bottom contained the dregs. Until a far larger number of such girls go to schools of the public school type, so long will the frothy girl at the top contrast unfavourably with the girl from the municipal school in public spirit and a sense of responsibility. It is the former again who seems to find in pedigree dogs, especially of the toy dog variety, an adequate substitute for pedigree babies. In fact, the rapidly decreasing birth-rate of the upper and middle classes seems to vary inversely with that of the rapidly increasing canine population. The only thing one can say is that the keeping of dogs entails a certain amount of physical exercise on the part of women, and so is superior to the more stuffy consolation of Victoria spinsterhood—the keeping of cats. No doubt even the girl at the top will find that, if she is to preserve the healthy comradeship of the sexes, which is one of the outstanding features of to-day, she is not so likely to do so by cocktails and excessive cigarette smoking as by keeping herself fit to share the outdoor life of the opposite sex. This increasing comradeship of the sexes, in spite of its dangers—and every innovation has its dangers—is the brightest spot in the present generation.

The frank camaraderie of the sexes has come to stay. If it presents for the moment certain real dangers owing to the large surplus of women which sets men at an unhealthy premium, it will, one feels sure, right itself in the long run. Women are *par excellence* the makers of conventions, and once the present race of girls have become acclimatised to their new-won freedom, they will gradually establish the necessary "taboos" for the protection of themselves and of Society, whose real makers they are. Mere man all by himself can only organise it on the lines of the mining camp, the barrack-room or the cloister. It was woman in this country who invented the withdrawing- or drawing-room as a refuge from male communion, and her greatest triumph has been to drag man after her into the spider's parlour where she could tame him at leisure. Again, one has only to compare the state of things in France, just after the French Revolution, when two-thirds of the children of Paris were born out of wedlock, with that of (say) France, to show

that whatever libertinage may exist to-day is likely in the long run to diminish under the pressure of the most profound of all instincts—that of race preservation, of which woman is the supreme depository.

Do the present generation work as hard as their predecessors? No doubt there has been a great deal of "Ca' canny" in the past and there still is in many trades, but one rather fancies that in spite of such cross-currents as Poplarism, the ravages of this particular form of sleepy sickness (the clear result of the ill-treatment of labour in the past) are on the decline, and that if labour could be assured of its fair share of the rewards of industry in the future by means of profit-sharing or other devices, the malady would largely disappear. Again, from the other side, we hear a great deal about long lunch hours and liberal week-ends among employers. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of truth in all this, but brain work is not to be measured by hours alone, and recreation (in the sense, not of pleasure-seeking but of replacing energy expended) is one of the main arts of life. It is true there is a greater love of pleasure than before, but is it an unmixed evil if that pleasure-seeking is, in part, a form of reaction against the speeding-up tendencies of the age? In any case, what one thinks has not been sufficiently noticed is the great improvement that has taken place in the quality of the pleasure sought. The cinema may not be high art, but it is distinctly better than slowly getting drunk in a "pub." The trip to Margate may not be highly educational, but it is much superior to the bean feast. Certainly with the spread of universal education, the competition for any kind of job is far keener than before the war. The County-school-trained pupil has become a formidable competitor and is making good everywhere. One's own belief is that boys, at least in the middle and upper classes, are keener on getting something to do; this is confirmed by a recent address on the subject by Sir John Fergusson to the Incorporated Secretaries' Association. In fact, one is not sure whether, in some cases, they are not too eager to get on, and the *arriviste* spirit is certainly much in evidence.

There has been of recent years a great outcry against sport, and sport no doubt in some cases has been overdone, while the wave of betting that has swept over the country since the war is certainly a disquieting symbol. But sport and even the talk that goes on about it is no bad thing in moderation, and I hope that the war and the general strike have taught us in this matter to look below the label. Sport is really often a safety valve, and, like the weather, a safe topic. In many instances the Englishman talks sport to keep his mind off unpleasant matters, not to say real worries. Just as he only grumbles about minor matters; but when things are really serious he is not only dumb about them, but, like our prisoners in the worst German camps, makes a point of appearing specially cheer-

ful. Nearly every Englishman is a sportsman and even the convict in this country responds to the idea of playing the game, which accounts for the fact that in no other country are the relations between the police and the criminal classes so comparatively friendly.

A still more thorny question is that of the religious beliefs of the present generation. It must, one thinks, be conceded that organised religion of every kind, though its inner vitality is *probably little impaired*, has lost its hold, at least temporarily, on a large mass of people, possibly because these fundamental truths require re-statement in modern language. Conversations with young fellows now at the university lead one to think that the number of those who believe that they have some benefit to derive from attendance at college chapel amounts to a far lower figure than that of one's own time at the 'varsity, when at least three-quarters, one would say, felt that some spiritual benefit was or might be derived from it, although their notion of what particular blessedness might thus result was Mesopotamian in its vagueness. Again, there has been during the last fifty years a distinct drop in the intellectual standard of the clergy (compensated, no doubt, by the development of other valuable qualities). This drop is clearly shown by the fact that the college livings which were once fought for among the senior dons can often now only be filled with difficulty by university passmen. The brains of the country do not seem for the moment to be going into the church. It is curious to note that the Church of Rome seems on the contrary to possess a subtle attraction for the Chestertons and other intellectuals, apparently weary of the perpetual flux of the modern time spirit and anxious to come to an anchor somewhere.

Yet it would, one thinks, be a great mistake to regard the present generation as irreligious. Certainly they are more tolerant; whether their tolerance takes the form of a good-humoured indifference towards organised religion, or, in the case of the more thoughtful, of seeing good in more than one religion. This latter form of tolerance has probably been unconsciously fostered by the churches themselves, who have of recent years come far closer together in face of the common enemy—communistic atheism, not to mention their more subtle foes, the spiritualists and dabblers in numerous esoteric religions. England has never been an island of saints, but for bringing his unwritten religion into the daily practice of life, in his love of fair dealing and fair play, in his group loyalties, in his regard for the under-dog, in his Samaritan-like kindness to the unfortunate, even when a stranger, in his hatred of cruelty, in his forbearance and good temper under difficulties, in his readiness to forget injuries, the Englishman of the present generation seems just as true to type as ever.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

A FORDIAN ASPECT OF AGRICULTURE.

NO commodity is of more universal importance to the public than milk, yet of late attention has been so engrossed in the coal industry that the consternation which is now prevailing among British milk producers has escaped the public notice. Milk was said to be the farmers' last bulwark against bankruptcy, and now that bulwark, too, has been swept away on the tide of falling prices. The terms of the annual contract, which was imposed upon farmers in October last, are the worst since the war; under them the price now paid for liquid milk has fallen below the cost of production on about 90 per cent. of the farms in the kingdom. Further, wages are rising steadily, and the recent Milk and Dairies Order, some of whose clauses are already in operation, adds considerably to the cost of producing an article which—as has been said—is in most cases already being sold at a loss. On the face of it that is not a promising prospect. It will readily be appreciated that if an article is sold for less than the cost of its production, there are only two doors open to the producer. One is that of bankruptcy; the other is to overhaul methods, and to decrease the costs of production.

Happily it is a merciful dispensation of Providence that for every occasion, no matter how calamitous, there always arises a man equal to that occasion—though, unhappily, the prophet is not always heeded. So it is in this crisis of the dairy farmers. Those of them who have the ears to hear may yet find salvation in the system of Mr. Boutflour.

This remarkable man has now been touring the country for some years, preaching with an overmastering energy and enthusiasm the crusade of scientific milk production. In the methods which he preaches there is nothing that has not long been known to science; but Mr. Boutflour's genius of vivid exposition, his exhilarating energy and faith in what he preaches, and above all, the wholly new and original viewpoint from which he approaches and applies well-known scientific facts, are beginning to arouse revolution in the milk industry. Henry Ford has placed on record that, when he wishes to simplify the making of some article—glass, for instance—he puts a man in charge of the new operation who has no previous knowledge whatever of the subject, telling him to think out a process from the first beginnings. Similarly Mr. Boutflour, in evolving his system, has departed entirely from the old traditions by which our farmers have so long been held paralysed.

Very briefly, his system enables the average dairy farmer to double his output of milk. The farmer must record the yield of his cattle; he must weed out the poor milkers—and no farmer can possibly know how much a cow milks during her lactation without

recording; he must "steam up" his animals for six weeks before they calve; and he must, in winter, feed about fourpennyworth of cake or meal for every gallon of milk, and in summer the same for every gallon over three of each cow's yield. And, most important, in conjunction with this balanced rationing he must milk three times a day. The cow is fortunate in possessing four stomachs, and the foundation of Mr. Boutflour's system is that the second or business stomach cannot deal with more than $33\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. of dry matter in the twenty-four hours. It is on that fact that his system of compounding an economic ration is based. Space does not permit here an excursion into detail; suffice it that his system is in no way elaborate, and can be employed by any person of ordinary intelligence and character. It has been practised for some years on the writer's farm. Put at the lowest figure it results in an increase of an average of 300 gallons per cow in the herd.

Let it be supposed that these figures are applied to a farm of round about 100 acres, carrying, say, 30 milch cows. The increase will be 9,000 gallons: worth, at present prices, £450 in the year. Deduct one-third of the sum for feeding stuffs and extra labour, and it will be seen that even so small a farmer is in credit by £300 on the year above the margins of ordinary farming practice, and this is without instancing other benefits which there is not space here to enumerate. Mr. Boutflour has demonstrated to the farmer in practicable and profitable form the maxim that, as production increases, cost of production decreases. And he has done more. He has pointed the way to illimitable prospects in British dairy farming.

First it is necessary to examine these potentialities in their widest aspect. Faced by starvation prices, many farmers, who know not the Boutflour system, are ready to cry *capevi*—or, at any rate, to cut down their milk production and to turn to other lines. It may be said without hesitation that such a course is utterly mistaken. It has been shown above that it is still possible for the individual farmer to make a profit by scientific methods: but the question is a far wider one than of mere individual profits, since it profoundly affects the country as a whole. If the Boutflour system were in universal application, the milk supplies of the kingdom would be doubled. "And what good would that do us?" asks the farmer. "The price of milk would fall still lower. We should only be still deeper in the mire."

On this point, if on no other, the milk producer and the milk retailer are in agreement. The retailer, through his organisations, defends the terms which he has imposed on the producer for the current year on the score of a large surplus of milk. He argues with force and some show of reason that during the war milk rose to a price artificially and indefensibly high; that, as a consequence, innumerable farmers, whose localities and vocations were totally unsuited to

milk production, were tempted into that most lucrative branch; that the process of turning over to a dairy herd from other farm practice is a slow growth of years; that to-day, the process having reached maturity, there are many hundred thousands of gallons of milk being produced above the amount that can be absorbed by the population; and that in consequence they, the retailers, have left on their hands immense quantities for which they have contracted with the farmers, but which they can only dispose of at a loss. The producer and the distributor are unanimous, then, that a further increase in the milk flow would only mean an aggravation of their difficulties. No argument, we are convinced, could be more erroneous.

To survey the question in a clear light, it is necessary for the farmer to regard milk from two separate aspects: first, as an article for liquid consumption, sold by him wholesale, straight from the cow; secondly, as a raw material, of the very highest value, for further manipulation upon the farm itself. Cognately, the distributor should hold in mind the fact that whereas in America the daily consumption of milk is five pints per head of the population, in Britain it is only one and a half pints per head: and the corollary that, if the consumption of an article so essential to the health and vigour of a race is comparatively so low, the reason must be, not that there is a surplus in the country, but that the price of milk to the public is still too high.

But to return to the Boutflour system. Before surveying the wider aspect, it will be instructive—even as Aristotle began his consideration of a commonwealth in the family—to observe its effects in operation on an individual farm. The first effects on the writer's farm were these: under the system of three-times milking an additional hand was employed for approximately every hundred acres (and if that figure were applied over the kingdom's total pasturage, it would make a remarkable reduction in the numbers of the unemployed). Secondly, every hand engaged in it gets an additional two shillings a week, although his hours are actually no longer. Thirdly—and very desirably—every hand has a whole day off during the week. Fourthly, such quantities of feeding-cake are used that the land is greatly enriched in its fertility. When the system had been running for a while, it was found that the average yield of the herd had risen from just under 600 gallons to rather over 900 gallons. There was now more liquid milk than was necessary to pay overhead charges and running costs. The question of converting the surplus into materials of higher profit was considered. Calf-rearing was not practised in the locality, since it was positively pronounced to be uneconomic. Calculation—and subsequently practice—proved that calf-rearing is a matter of sacrificing sixpence to-day to gain half-a-crown in two years and nine months' time. Calf-rearing, of course,

entailed butter making—the calves suckling their dams for a fortnight, and then being fed on separated milk and a cream substitute.

Butter being similarly pronounced uneconomic, not an ounce of home-made English butter could be bought in the locality, though that locality is one of the country's richest dairylands—every gallon of milk being sold raw to a sweet factory. The demand for this farm butter immediately exceeded the supply, although its price was considerably higher than that of the imported article. Avenues were then explored by means of which butter could be made profitably in excess of the amount necessitated by the number of calves being raised. It was found that the value of new milk fed to pigs in conjunction with pollard amounted to 1s. 3d. a gallon; whereas the contract price paid by distributors was 1s. 1½d.; but that a yet more profitable and a more satisfactory compound from the butcher's point of view was 1 gallon of separated milk to 3½ lbs. of a mixture of 70 per cent. barley meal and 30 per cent. middlings.

Accordingly more butter and cream were made in proportion to the maximum amount of calves and the maximum amount of pigs that the acreage would carry: with, of course, a corresponding increase in the amount of labour employed. Still the demand for butter grew, notably among the farm workers—to whom it was sold at the current prices of imported butter—and further profitable methods had to be devised. Milk and separated milk are the cheapest and among the very best of foods for poultry raising, poultry fattening and egg production. Incubators and brooder houses were installed; large laying-houses of straw were erected at a negligible cost on a plan propounded by the Poultry Instructor to the County Council; the "tail" wheat and oats assumed a new value; poultry, including turkeys, geese, and ducks, became proportionately the most profitable branch on the farm; and still more labour was employed. Since there was now a maximum head of poultry and pigs running in the paddocks, the next course, in order to derive full benefit, was to plant these out with sound and profitable fruit stocks. The fruit has not yet come into profit, but it is computed by experts that when it does so, it should in an average year at least pay the rent of the farm. Collaterally, on the arable acreage, forage crops were introduced by which the head of stock carried on the farm could be materially increased; and now that farm may be said to be up to capacity, both in the amount of labour employed and the amount of stock carried.

This is an example of the expansive impulse on a single farm emanating from milk to spare. It is, in fact, a return to legitimate farming—to dairy farming as it used to be, and still should be, universally practised. Extraordinary war prices debauched British dairy farming. Those facile prices converted the dairy farmer

into a "cow keeper" pure and simple. He milked his cows, put out his churns for collection on the road, drew his fat cheque, and there was an end of it. Life was too easy; and the evil still lingers. Those who made their fortunes then are still "marking time" on the fortunes which they made. A drive through the western dairy lands will tell its own tale. It will show rich pastures on which there are grazing exiguous scrub herds, milking four and five hundred gallons, where they should be milking a thousand. It will show fine breeding pastures, with scarcely a home-grown beast upon them, being grazed only by foreign cattle. It will show homesteads with scarcely a pig on the place, without a churn or cheese-tub in the dairy, with only a few old uneconomic fowls on the dung-heap—the "perk" of the "missis"—with ancient, unfruitful trees in the paddocks, with a minimum of labour on the pay list. It will show in every dairy village the Gilbertian spectacle of shops filled with imported butter, cheese, bacon, and eggs. It will show very few farms working up to 40 per cent. of their capacity—farms which, if they were factories, must long since have been bankrupt. And it will show farmers grumbling vehemently against their union because the price of milk has fallen again. Yet these lands are the raw material of the country's food supply. On beholding them the ethical question of stewardship must rise very forcibly to the mind.

Henry Ford revolutionised industry when he set out to find, not at how large a profit, but at what absolute minimum of profit, he could sell a not altogether essential article. The reflux of profit was overwhelming. Within a few years he found himself employing many millions of men. From its own vitality the making of his motors rapidly expanded into the ownership of related lines of business: aeroplanes, coal mining, coke manufacture, by-products manufacture, lead mining, iron mining, foundry, steel manufacture, tool making, machinery manufacture, car, truck, and tractor manufacture, glass, leather, copper wire, Fordite, textiles, batteries, generators, paper, cement, automobile bodies, Johanssen gauges, electric power, filtered water, flour, motion pictures, hospitals, farming and stock raising, radio, printing, photography, forging, flax growing, steam turbine, electric locomotives, logging, saw mills, body parts, dry kilns, wood distillation, products of hydro-electric power, railroads, sea-going ships, lake ships, tractors and automobiles. These are some of the things which have been brought within the focus of constructing the Ford car. Paying unparalleled wages, Ford has done so much for America by the production of by no means the loveliest thing that runs on wheels. What could not be done, then, by an application of his principles to a bedrock essential commodity like milk? I submit in all seriousness that if the British farmer, taking advantage of the Boutflour system, would

direct his energies, not to how dearly, but to how *cheaply*, he could sell his milk, something of a similar miracle would be wrought in this country.

It must be repeated that by "milk" is meant, not merely liquid milk, but its ultimate conversions into bacon, pork, butter, cheese, casein, poultry and eggs; which articles are an integral part of proper farming. An instance illustrative of this is to be found in the pig slump of 1924. After the war a great number of persons took up pig farming, *quid* pig farming. In such cases the pig alone had to bear rent, rates, all overhead charges and running costs. Soon the market was glutted, the price of meals turned against the pig-breeder, and he rapidly went out of business; because, with such heavy costs, it was impossible for him to undersell the foreign exporter. But, even in that depressed period, the general farmer who ran pigs as an integral part of his business managed to make a profit on them.

Let it then be imagined that the Boutflour system is in universal practice over the country. The output of milk is doubled. Its price immediately falls. The farmer's pristine easy living is gone; he knows exactly how many millions of pounds of dairy produce are imported from other countries—countries some of which do not buy a ha'porth of anything from us; and he knows that now he must undersell them in the home markets or go out of business. He is impelled at last to the ultimate resources and capacity of legitimate farming. And shortly he finds to his great surprise that his turnover and profits have grown out of all knowledge.

And what is the effect on the country at large? Clean, fresh, wholesome milk and all dairy produce is so cheap as to be available abundantly in the poorest homes, so that the health and physique of the nation is materially improved. Old mills and new are working overtime to cope with the immense demand for feeding cakes and meals, employing numerous hands. Ships are building and putting to sea to bring the raw material to the mills. Motor and rail transport is stimulated by the increasing traffic of these commodities. More factories are coming into being to deal with the pork products. There is increasing business for butchers, grocers, implement makers, chocolate manufacturers, bankers, insurance agents, auctioneers, tax-collectors—in short, as in America, a wave of expansive impulse to every form of business which goes to make up an organised state. More, the countryman still finds work and a wage on his native soil; the weight of the dole is lifted off the shoulders of industry, and the cost of living falls so low that those who are on the starvation line have come to be comparatively prosperous. This, we repeat with one eye on America, is no visionary Utopia, but a perfectly practical and possible proposition.

Not the least attractive part of the picture is the day's holiday a week for the farm worker. On a farm in this locality is a worker who had not had a day off, week days or Sundays, for sixteen years, and when he was given one, his idea of spending it was to go and earn a little "baccy" by working on a neighbour's garden.

The operation of the Boutflour system must call for some added responsibility and enterprise on the farmer's part, but not more so than that of anyone directing any other commercial or industrial concern. In these days "co-operation" is held out to him as the panacea for all his ills. From that view experience has inclined us to dissent. The British farmer is not co-operatively constituted. Further, an agricultural co-operative concern requires the farmer to hold a certain number of shares; to buy or sell, or—in some cases—to buy and sell, all his stuffs therefrom and thereto; while it pays him a small dividend on his shares and promises him an unspecified bonus on his transactions at the end of the year. Experience shows that it rarely or never pays this bonus. It therefore compares unfavourably with a sound joint stock company. Now the balance sheet of a sound company generally shows among its assets certain investments at a lower rate of interest in gilt-edged securities. Similarly, in our view, the best form of co-operation is for the farmer to buy with some of his profits shares in sound companies supplying his raw material and distributing his products. That is to say, in cake mills and in dairy firms. He would then get something back "both ways" through the medium of organisations which, unlike his own amateurish co-operative societies, have a long record of experience and stability behind them. In this way producer and distributor would work more amicably together, to their mutual advantage; and it is possible that certain of the big distributing concerns might facilitate the buying of their shares by farmers as permanent and genuine investors.

Against the prospect which we have outlined, it may be argued that this would tend to eliminate that most valuable asset to national stability, the smallholder. This is undoubtedly so. He could not survive an era of mass production. Yet as a set-off it may be said that the smallholder's life is the most toilsome of drudgeries; his is a sixteen hour day, seven days a week; and it is possible that he would find more congenial, more lucrative, and less anxious opportunities in the management side of the larger concerns which would arise.

Those who know him will agree that the British farmer is the very best of good fellows; and, considering the hardness of the times, one of the most charitable. He is in many respects the victim of circumstance. It is to be hoped that his sons, living in more troubled, more progressive times, will embrace this oppor-

tunity which, in the person of Mr. Boutflour, is knocking so loudly at the country's door, so that, in Thomas Mun's words: "The private gayne may ever accompanye the publique goode." Old records make it clear that in past centuries the squire was an expert farmer and his wife and daughters were expert in the dairy. Were these to revert, too, to skill and activity in their hereditary profession, the auctioneer's hammer would not be knocking down wholesale the old homes of the country. Possibly minds more powerful and penetrating than ours may apply themselves to a subject so important in the common weal. At present our dairy farming, in Baconian phrase, may be set down as wanting. Yet beyond the mists there lies a bright and clear prospect. Perhaps there is need only of a commanding hand to lead the way.

A. A. H. BEAMAN.

THE HIGHER-SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF MIND.

SCIENCE cannot be relegated to any particular strata of thought, nor hide-bound to any solitary dimension. It is an utterly false conception to limit scientific inquiry to one field or area of investigation. There is no limitation to knowledge in a unified sense, and if a limitation appears to occur, it is owing to the abridgment of human thought. Einstein taught that we may pass from the finite to the verge of the infinite, and yet remain within the compass of ordinary intellectualism. He demonstrated that truth when his formula of relativity was found to be in perfect agreement with his concept of thought. It is along this higher dimension that I desire to probe into the deeper aspect of mentality.

It is not intended in this paper to submit the view of a metaphysician. Metaphysics are still outside the purview of modern science, but we may reach the metaphysical realm without indulging in vague and shadowy concepts that have no reality in significance or meaning. It is possible to postulate a thesis which may be reduced to the platform of logic and experiment in any scientific laboratory. If reality can be introduced into what has hitherto been regarded as merely a whimsical concept in the dream-mind of a philosopher, then scientific thought will be ushered into something more solid than a vague field of speculation.

A positive junction will one day be reached between the domain of metaphysics and the realism of modern science. There must be a bridge between the finite and the infinite, and while we cannot cross far into the region of the latter, there are sufficient data to permit us entering the borderland and partaking of further knowledge in the universe of scientific research. Sir Oliver Lodge is already a pioneer in this direction. He is a modern savant who refuses to be limited to a speculative field of survey, and who is steadily amassing fact and detail in affirmation of his belief that the human mind is psychical both in substance and in essence.

Scientists have proceeded far beyond the last atom of materialism, for energy holds a content that is ultra-material in significance and apparently psychical in origin. Scientists arrived at this reality when they discovered that ether remained intangible and ghost-like, resolving itself to no set of rules devised by a physicist, permeating every laboratory in the land, upsetting the ordinary table mathematics, and remaining without logical definition. Scientists have been puzzled for years by the immanence and permanence of the ether, for not merely does it represent the common denominator of thought, but it is regarded everywhere by science as the unknown quantity. No scientist has ever explained the intangibility of ether,

and no laboratory student has ever reduced it to a final analysis. It evades the clearest definition of natural law, yet it forms a definite link in the occult laws of the universe. The ether lends credence to the supposition that scientists have stumbled across a spiritual law in the great Cosmos of Space, and this brings us back to the query if only natural laws exist? Scientists call them natural laws because they are the only laws which they have recognised. They have assumed practical shape in their practical imagination. They have tested and analysed these natural laws, and they have yielded to their tangibility of thought. They have not defied analysis. They are so conceited over their knowledge of natural laws that they think no other laws exist. Yet why should they preclude the possibility of a spiritual law?

Every scientist is not a materialist, but when we start talking about etherealism or a force beyond natural law, a few scientists will conclude we are suffering from shell-shock or a deranged mentality of some kind. It is difficult for these individuals to believe we are sane, and it is hard to be unfriendly towards them, because we know their pet hobby is solids, or substantialities. Their facts are all concrete and in the mass. There is nothing elusive about their terms of reference. They are all definite. We can get them to work out any sum for us with mathematical precision, but start talking to them about O, and the unknown quantities, and they will look about immediately for a warder and a padded cell.

But when the unknown law defies analysis, and when it cannot be subjected to the test of any mathematical formula, then Sir Oliver Lodge, and other earnest students after knowledge, climb to the heights of discernment and try to view such phenomena from the abstract standpoint of mind, and this brings us at once to the vast misconception which seems to exist with regard to mind. This is the scope of my present inquiry. Every medical man and pathologist will inform us that there is absolutely nothing unknown about the human brain. But here is the question I wish to ask. Do our medical scientists know everything about the mind and brain of the human entity? If so, what about the suggestion advanced by an American psychologist in a recent *Lancet* that the medical profession should undertake a "systematic, scientific study of the dying hour"? Is there not a deeper meaning attached to the suggestion of the American thinker? Is there not implied the idea that the human frame in the penultimate moments of mortality is more susceptible to a psychic reading than at any other period in physical existence? Can our medical men during the "dying hour study" not detect a higher range of mind-power than is present during ordinary mentality? It is a big surmise, yet the possibility of further scientific knowledge exists, and no field of mental survey

can be left unexplored in the great vista of human progress and scientific discernment.

We are told by science that the human mind has three distinct states of thought : conscious, sub-conscious, and unconscious, and a lady theosophist the other day informed us that every human being has a supra-conscious intelligence. I agree with that fourth classification, because I can still find scientists who affirm that there is such a state as the transcendental realm, and I believe this exists on the borderland of the infinite or psychical plane. The Oriental and the mystic are more familiar with this transcendental state than the average European, but that is because we in the Western world have not developed the psychic quality of mind. This brings us back with a rush to sensory perceptions, for while we acknowledge we have five senses, metaphysicians infer that we have a sixth sense, and many occult thinkers imagine we have more than six. I am aware that there is another division of mentality which is not influenced by sensory perception, namely, the subjective intellect, and Sir Oliver Lodge at the last meeting of the British Association made the amazing pronouncement that Reality was not approached through the evidence of the senses! He inferred, in other words, that Reality is only reached through the media of the psychical, and I venture to state that this leading scientist is on the right track in making such a profound assertion.

This brings me back to a careful examination of the human mind and its composition. My contention is that the human mind is entirely isolated from the brain. I believe that the mind acts, up to the point of physical death, in conjunction with the brain, but at the metamorphosis of death the mind lives on. The mind has no death. Neither has it beginning nor end, for we are all part of the Supreme Mind, and the Supreme Mind is eternal. That is, the grey matter of the brain acts concurrently with the human body, and suffers decomposition with the human body, but the brain is merely a functional attribute of the physical ego. It is this duality of thought that differentiates us from the brute creation. The instinct of the animal is so positive and self-assertive as almost to suggest that the animal has reasoning power, but the instinctive intelligence of animal creation is merely the resultant force of acquired habit, although, apart from habit, science will admit that the power of instinct, even in the most insignificant animal, is often uncanny. Take, for instance, the recent demonstration of the rat who persistently breaks through fourteen different locks in order to get at a piece of cheese. That suggests reasoning power, and even reflection, but the latest admission from a psychologist is that this apparent phenomenon is merely the result of repetition and habit. It may be classified in a similar analogy to the lion who steals down every

night to the moonlit waters of a lake simply because lesser animals come there at that time to drink! There is a clear line of demarcation between instinct and intelligence, for instinct can be developed and trained, but the most highly cultured instinct cannot be classified as intelligence. It comes within a different category. Again, every animal is absolutely content with its own environment, and no animal has reached that stage of self-consciousness where it can place its relationship with that of other animals. Man is entirely different. Man, as a human entity, is anything but satisfied with his particular environment, and the constant aspirations of his soul bring him wider and wider apart from the instinctive cravings of the animal. Man developed self-consciousness right at the beginning of his separate creation, and he not only finds it possible to distinguish his superiority over all animals but he has been able to discover his correct place in the universe. Man can identify himself with his Creator!

It is even logical to ask if man has two separate mentalities. The reflection might at first be waived aside as absurd, yet reflection and deeper thought will convince us we are wrong. The brain, for instance, is an attribute of the mind, but we cannot regard the mind as an agent of the brain. The mind is psychical; the brain is purely physical. But being handicapped in a finite sense by the flesh, we cannot do without the brain, nor the grey and white matter composing it, but it is a mistake to imagine that all our reasoning powers come through the media of the brain. To be candid, the brain is purely functionary. It carries through the dictates of the mind, it translates the language of mind into the vehicle of thought, but before thought takes expression in brain form, the mind has already conceived both the thought and the idea. When the thought is conveyed to the brain, the physical attributes of this organ act like telegraph wires; the idea is sent out along different physical channels, and the psychic element of the mind is transfused into the materialism of physical thought. The brain is the tunnel of the mind, and becomes inoperative without the command of the mind. If the brain is so material, how then can it become the instrument of something so spiritual as mind as we conceive it? But when we look at a great painting, or listen to the words of some wonderful oratorio, the manifestation of beauty is found neither in canvas nor in words, but merely through the media of these agents, and in this sense the brain is but the agent of the mind! It is a fundamental error to conceive of the brain and the mind as a single unit, for the brain dies at the decomposition of physical matter, while the mind lives on. As a matter of truth, we know on a physiological basis that the brain is entirely changed every seven years, and any physiologist will inform us that every segment of brain matter, every corpuscle,

every drop of blood is entirely changed within this definite period of time. Some physiologists go even farther and state that the physical metamorphosis occurs every five years. Then how do we reconcile this wonderful physical phenomenon with memory and mind? That is, we know that a man of seventy can frequently recall what happened to him when he was only seven, which indubitably proves that the mechanistic and evolutionary theory of the mind is all moonshine! The brain, it is true, may proceed from sensation to perception and from perception to conception, but the original dynamic of all these physical factors is found in the mind, which is neither transitory nor ephemeral, but eternal in essence! Memory indeed is the first great link in the supposition that man is immortal, for the mind of man is linked to the eternal Mind of the Universe!

The brain cannot function without the mind, and when we speak of a deranged mind, we mean, in reality, a deranged brain, for the mind itself cannot be deranged. This explains why insane persons often act in a lucid manner. The interval of perfect sanity is the luminance of mind interacting through the deranged brain, but when the physical part of the brain refuses to act in a proper manner, it is impossible for the mind to be correctly mirrored through the region of the brain. There are odd flashes of mind intellect, but not consistent flashes, and the mind becomes overshadowed so long as the brain is physically impaired.

This paper is not intended to be a deliberate attack on the recognised principles of evolution, but it denies the validity of the Darwinian conception with regard to human creation. After all, it has never been definitely proved that man is an animal. If we have really descended from the animal state, no professor has ever informed us how he arrives at that deduction, nor has he ever explained if it is only a Darwinian theory or if he regards it as a biological fact. There has been a tremendous controversy in the past round the subject of man and his supposed ancestor. The delightful fiction known as the "missing link" was admitted by Haeckel to be not only unknown, but never destined to be found. The evidence concerning the "human ape" (*pithecanthropus*) is still so precarious that—eliminating the fragmentary Java skull (almost certainly an ape's, but of which fresh specimens were dug up by their original discoverer, M. Eugene Dubois) and the Neanderthal specimen (probably that of a degenerate man) and the Piltdown skull (a fragment of fragments so elusive that Professor Fairfield Osborn takes opposite sides in successive editions of his work)—the only actual hints of a "missing link" that we possess are possibly the single Mauer jawbone found at Heidleberg, and the simple canine tooth found to fit the jaw of Piltdown. The Taungs skull, a more recent find, has never satisfied leading biologists.

If we get down to bedrock, we shall find that no biologist, evolutionist, or university professor has ever linked up man to the animal state. There has always been that missing link, and the more we ponder over the chasm of difference, the wider becomes the distinction between man and the animal. This is particularly so with regard to the mind, and in relation to the higher range of the mind. The startling distinction between instinct and mind demands the hypothesis that there is no rigid continuity about evolution. This break in the law of animal evolution will account for the strange and constant reversion to type. If the Darwinian concept is correct, then thousands of the intermediary type must have existed, yet all we can produce are the Taungs skull and the Neanderthal specimen, and the latter is only *remotely* supposed to belong to that of degenerate man! Contrary to surmise, everything concerning man is not based on experience. Man, to a certain extent, is the result of his own environment, but what gave man his wonderful psychic and spiritual nature, what originally gave man that curious instinct to worship? That instinctive desire was not based on experience. Indeed, that instinct to worship did not exist with any animal, and we have definite proof of this fact. Evidence of the spiritual has been traced down the ages to our remotest ancestors, yet the same evidence has been strangely lacking in animal history. The missing link has never been supplied on the basis of analogy.

This brings us to the theory of evolution itself, and we are inclined to ask, in the most rational manner, if we are justified in relying upon one absolute law of evolution? Does the entry of man upon the great stage of creation represent a definite break in the continuity of evolution? Do we perceive in the psychical nature and composition of man something to justify the belief that there may be a psychical law of evolution in addition to the recognised physical law? Man is a spiritual unit from the beginning of creation. Does this mean that instinct and mind formed a junction at the dawn of human genesis? If Science will agree to the postulate of a Supreme Being, it is difficult to limit the Author of Creation to one distinct law of evolution. Or do the two laws of evolution to which we refer, psychic and physical, merge into a third evolutionary principle when man denies that the animal is his natural prototype? If there is only one rigid law of continuity in the age-long chain of evolution, how can we explain that every animal but man is content with a natural environment? Why is man, alone of the evolutionary species, subject to these passionate desires of his psychic nature, and why has no scientist been able to harmonise this psychic element in some human duality that will not refute the recognised law of evolution? This is something within the purview of metaphysical surmise; this duality of "psyche" and "matter" has still to be explained in

terms of human science, and it is along this realm of psychical evolution that great minds like Sir Oliver Lodge are travelling. Professor Eddington cannot even see a boundary line between matter and spirit. He maintains that there is no clear line of demarcation. That is a profound statement. It certainly tempts us to ask if spiritualism is a science or a cult? We hardly imagine that those who treat it in the latter respect have discerned much farther than the three-dimensional theory of the universe. Yet there is a fourth dimension, and it may be Relativity. If so, that suggestion would at once introduce the psychic quality of mind, for Einstein advanced his mind into some transcendental state before formulating his famous "Theory." After perusing *Raymond: Life and Death*, it is difficult to imagine how the scientific aspect of spiritualism can be ignored. We want something more than abstract speculation about so profound a subject, and it would seem that Sir Oliver Lodge has developed his thesis along intelligible lines. He rules out the personal aspect in the presentation of fundamental facts, and it is difficult to see how a man of his discernment can be duped by a formula. On the other hand, do we understand the mental capacity of mediums when they are subject to these strange psychic states of control? Is there some super-activity in their unconscious state, and can they penetrate the minds of those attending the seance? Is thought-transference more a plausibility under psychism than under any form of auto-suggestion? Is it more amenable to hypnotism or mesmerism? At any rate, mere orthodox cognition from the Churches will not establish spiritualism as an actual possibility. Radical minds—and, in a sense, we are all rationalists—demand investigation, scientific analysis, proof!

There is a further aspect of mind power to which I should like to refer in this paper. A book has recently been published by Messrs. Williams and Norgate entitled *Nature, Thought, and Personal Experience*. The author, Rev. W. Tudor Jones, M.A., Ph.D., is a well-known Unitarian minister residing in Bristol. The work is worthy of profound and critical study. It deals with the progressive development of man's mental state. The author puts forward the conception that man can enter this ultra-dimensional thought-sphere of his own free will and by a process of mind culture. He places profound emphasis upon brain development, which proves that he has not ruled out the Darwinian theory of evolution. But although I admit that occasionally a super-figure like Einstein can reach this higher-dimensional range, it would seem from this book that the heights of mind-power are reserved for a few intellectuals. This, of course, is absurd. That, in my judgment, would be a very autocratic conception of human evolution. What about the lowly shepherd and the common artisan? What about the depths of their

psychic thought and the content of their spiritual nature? Neither the shepherd nor the artisan may have the mental attainment of the savant, yet I contend they are as legitimately entitled to enter this higher-dimensional range of mind and spirit as any modern Dean Inge or ancient Socrates. That is, I rigidly adhere to the belief that the psychical plane of mind is within the boundary of science to fathom and unravel, and unless our scientists enter the deeper recesses of the human mind they are making no real advance towards the heights of civilisation and progress.

In this search for Reality, I am inclined to reject the Darwinian theory that man evolved from the animal state, and I submit the hypothesis that man is not merely human but divine, that man's true personality is the mental or spiritual part of him. The fact that man is governed by mind is conclusive evidence that he has no relationship with the animal, for blind instinct is not governance, and to be ruled by mind is vastly different from being controlled by the instinct of an animal, while the deeper we go into the psychology of human nature, the wider becomes the chasm between the highest type of animal and the lowest specimen of the human species. If the theory of evolution is complete with regard to man, why has evolution come to a final stop? Is there no greater prototype in the vast world of creation than man? Why is there no steady, onward, progressive sweep of evolution after it evolved man? I submit that evolution is a cycle of progressive and retrogressive change, and that, as regards mankind particularly, there must have been evolution within evolution. In other words, man was a distinct creation, apart from the animal species. I do not maintain that he deserved such special creation, nor that he was vainglorious enough to feel he was entitled to any special favour in the law of evolution, but simply because, in the mysterious mind of the Creator, it was resolved that man should be made in the image of God. For that purpose there was an absolute interruption in the ordinary law of evolution. I contend that the chasm is entirely mental or spiritual, and everything depends upon what is our conception of mind, for I believe that ultimate reality, in the last analysis, is Mind. Evolution, of course, has proved a vital force in history, and the greatest intellectual treat is to trace, step by step, the wonderful progress of evolution right down the ages. Yet when we enter the demesne of human destiny, when we introduce the human ego, and attempt to show that there is no vital dissimilarity between man and the animal species, then, in the last analysis, the chain of reasoning breaks down, simply because the links in the theory of evolution are not complete. After all, there is no shame in being a traditionalist, and it is not a case of being laughed at by certain materialists for our amazing ignorance. It is simply because, for the present, the

mystery of our genesis is unfathomable, and all the biologists that ever lived have never been able to make it otherwise. And I am inclined to the view of the writer who maintains that, when we rule out the supernatural and the miraculous, we are not merely dislodging the foundations of religion, but we are destroying faith—and we cannot afford to destroy faith.

The continuity from animal to human intelligence has never been proved, which means that there is a missing mental and psychological link as well as a missing biological link. It is natural for every intelligent individual to look for continuity in the scheme of evolution, for man is a rational being, and he desires some kind of foundation upon which to rest his mental deductions and hypotheses. Continuity in evolution seems a plausible thing, and when a few leading scientists apparently confirm the Darwinian concept, the average man is partly convinced that the evolution formula is correct. But the chain of continuity snaps when we come to explain the spiritual consciousness of man. "No sane man," states Sir E. Ray Lankester, "has ever pretended, since science became a definite body of doctrine, that we know or ever can hope to know or conceive the possibility of knowing whence the mechanism has come, why it is there, whither it is going, or what may be beyond and beside it which our senses are incapable of appreciating. These things are not 'explained' by science and never can be." This means that the mind of man is the most wonderful thing in God's creation, for it is not merely finite in conception and degree, but, fully developed, it possesses possibilities that verge upon the infinite. Unless man develops his mind in conjunction with his physical powers he only looks at life through a smoke-stained glass. It is wrong to argue that because man has developed his mind above the instinctive desires of the animal that he is eternally linked to the brute status. Man cannot soar to any great moral or spiritual height if he is bound hand and foot to an animal prototype, or if he is tied to the conviction that he is only an advanced specimen of the animal species, and continually to postulate that man is an animal has a degrading influence upon the human soul. But when we convince a man that his individuality is separate and distinct from that of the animal, then his mentality leaps to a higher dimension, and we make him understand once and for all time, that he is not eternally allied to the brute forces of creation. Man is highly sensitive about his definitive allocation in the scheme of creation, and merely to regard him, in his best moments, as a kind of superior brute is to place an exceedingly low estimate upon his finer spiritual powers, and tends both to lower and to degrade his ethical sense of values. When the ethical sense is fully developed to a high spiritual range, then he throws overboard all those materialistic fallacies about a brute genesis, and he goes forward on the grand march with his own soul. JAMES CORBETT.

THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM.

THE Armenian problem has suffered much from the fact that so little attempt has been made to deal with it as a whole. Different groups of people have taken up separate portions of it, each pressing for support for their own scheme, and this has created an atmosphere of confusion and bewilderment that has helped to prevent the formation of a public opinion on the necessity of dealing adequately with present conditions. If any progress is to be made, it is essential to consider the condition and needs of Armenian refugees wherever situated as parts of a whole problem.

There are three main schemes at present under consideration :

1. The Erivan scheme, to meet the needs of those who are refugees in Greece, Bulgaria, and Constantinople, which is directly under the League of Nations and its High Commissioner, Dr. Nansen.
2. The Syrian settlement scheme, under the Refugee Department of the International Labour Office, in co-operation with the Mandatory Power.
3. The settlement of a relatively small number of selected refugee families in South America, also under the International Labour Office.

It will be clearly seen from the following account that these schemes for settlement in South America, in Syria and in the Caucasus are in no sense rival but are complementary. It is proposed to transfer to Erivan those who are now homeless and living under governments which have treated them with great generosity, but are not willing to keep them as permanent inhabitants. Those who are to be colonised in Syria are at present living in conditions quite unfit for human beings, which constitute a danger not only to the Armenians, but to the Syrians among whom they dwell.

It would seem as if there might be much to gain if the Assembly of the League this year would appoint one authority to deal with all schemes for the welfare of Armenians wherever situated. A gift or a humanitarian loan made to such a committee under the ægis of either the League or the International Labour Office could be used for the needs of the settlement of Armenians wherever found to be possible, and when the money advanced for this purpose was repaid by the Armenians, it could be used again for their help elsewhere. If on it were represented the League itself, the International Labour Office, any Government willing to participate in the provision of funds, the International Red Cross and the various voluntary societies now working for Armenians in the different countries, it should command the confidence not only of Govern-

ments but of all who have been striving to obtain help for the Armenian people.

There is a fourth category through which the needs of the Armenians are being met, viz. : the philanthropic and missionary bodies of various countries who rescued and provided for thousands of orphans, and whose heavy commitments for the future of these young people, now growing up, naturally absorb a large proportion of the sums subscribed for Armenian relief. A committee of this kind might encourage the inclusion of the present inhabitants of the orphanages in schemes for colonisation, who as they grow up will be valuable members of such communities.

At the end of the war, the scattered remnant of the Armenian people, buoyed up by promises from the victorious Allies who were grateful for help given, had dreams of independence and a national home for all their nationals under the shadow of Mount Ararat. They thought the end of their tribulations was at hand, and it is not to be wondered at if, in some cases, in the reaction from suffering and oppression, their national aspirations took on exaggerated forms. Their bright dreams for the future soon faded, as year after year at the Assembly of the League of Nations so little was done for them, in spite of the persistent and determined efforts of their valiant protector Dr. Nansen. In 1924 he reported that in their diminished territory of Erivan, where twelve hundred thousand of them were at home, there was room to receive another fifteen to twenty-five thousand of their refugees scattered through Greece, Bulgaria, and Constantinople, if part of it could be drained and irrigated, and he asked the League to draft a scheme. The Assembly of that year agreed to the appointment of a committee of experts, who reported to the Sixth Assembly in 1925 a sound and workable scheme, which, however, had the great disadvantage of being costly in outlay.

Nansen pleaded for an international loan, but the securities were not considered good enough, and last year when the British Government's attitude of disapproval became clear, all that the Assembly appeared able to do was to set aside an insignificant sum to permit Dr. Nansen or his representative to make efforts to raise the funds from private sources in Europe and America. The task was a hopeless one from the outset, but Dr. Nansen, undaunted, brought forward this proposal in a new form at the meeting of the Council in June of this year. He said that he had the assurance of the Government of Erivan that if the sum of £300,000 (towards which he has promises of £100,000) can be raised for the cost of transport and settlement of the Armenian refugees now in Greece and Constantinople, they will themselves raise a loan and carry through the necessary irrigation schemes.

This proposal is to be brought up at the September Council meeting, after examination by the Governments, and therefore may possibly come before the Eighth Assembly.

Now Erivan, the present national home of the Armenians, is a little country of between nine and ten thousand square miles, of which at present about 3,400 are capable of cultivation, the rest being mountainous or marsh land which would be very fertile if drained and irrigated. As there were in 1925, 1,260,000 inhabitants, an average of 364 to the inhabited square mile, it is clear that it is utterly impossible to add to the numbers that are trying to exist there without first preparing the land to keep them. The conditions for Armenians in Erivan appear to be considerably more favourable than was feared would be the case. Their religious freedom is not interfered with, and when last autumn this little Republic suffered severely from earthquake, almost all the Soviet Republics sent help, amounting in all to some two million roubles. Whatever may be felt about the Soviet Government of Russia, it must in justice be acknowledged that it is the only Government which has come to the help of the Armenian people, the annual deficit on the Armenian budget being covered by it.

Armenians sent to South America tend to be those who have had a good education and so are more able to adapt themselves to very different conditions. Some of them have a certain amount of means. The reports show that a very high proportion of the advances made by the Refugee Bureau from the revolving fund are repaid, and the following letter from an Armenian girl in Buenos Aires gives an interesting picture of their adaptability and also of their solidarity with one another :

The condition of my nation here is pretty well. The great part have found work in the factories, some of them have a box of instruments needed in shoemaking, and go to the ships to mend the sailors' shoes. Oh, they have jolly stories to tell us, how they did speak English with them. Believe me, they only know to call "shoe mak, ha much, and una hav (half), dos hav, tres hav!" Some of them have special shops, but this kind of people once were working in the factories and when they have had enough capital they have begun this way. Anyhow, everyone is earning their living and also is able to keep some away for future use. More than this which I found interesting, those who are from the same country or village have special societies. Every society has their secretary, treasurer, and the one who is responsible for the writing letters and the conditions of the meetings and society. Every member pays as much as he can. My brother is paying one and a half for him and half peso for me, right from the beginning. The money is used for the needy ones bit by bit and the rest is put to the bank. In future, this will be a great use for the needy ones of our village people in Syria. At present they cannot send to Syria, but a few weeks ago they had

a letter from two of our village people who wanted to come here from Brazil and on their way got into difficulty, finished their money, so at once a letter has been written and fifty peso had been sent to them. Always a hope for future.

Unfortunately the number that can be absorbed is limited, but it is at least satisfactory to know that good hope for the future waits for those who go to Latin-America.

In Syria the French have been faced with the Armenian problem ever since the conclusion of hostilities, and their efforts to deal with it are not sufficiently known. There have always been special ties between the French nation and the Lebanon from the days when the Christian inhabitants of Syria, afterwards called Maronites, who like the Armenians adopted the Christian faith in very early days, welcomed the Crusaders from France, many of whom are said to have settled there afterwards and intermarried. When the French arrived there after the Armistice in 1918, they found conditions of frightful distress. In addition to the normal populations of Christian and Moslem Syrians who had suffered from the war, there were thousands of refugees from the Turkish massacres and deportations. In Beirut children and old people were dying of hunger in the streets. During the last two months of 1918 and the year 1919 the French Government spent seven million francs in feeding the populations. For the next two years, while it was still hoped to establish an independent Armenian State, France expended forty million francs in repatriating the Armenian refugees to territories in Cilicia and Anatolia and a further five millions in 1921 in works of assistance such as rebuilding schools, orphanages, etc.

Then in December, 1921, the agreement of Angora put an end to this hope and tore up afresh the roots that the Armenian people had begun to grow in the farms and lands they had cultivated, fled from, returned to, and built up again. Terrified by the prospect of abandonment by the Powers who had given them protection, they fled once more. Thousands went over the border or crowded on to the ships which put hastily out to sea to carry their burdens to some haven of refuge. Some of the ports refused to receive them, but many landed at Beirut; and when the French took over the mandate for Syria they were faced with the additional burden of a hundred thousand refugees crowded mainly into three huge camps at Alexandretta, Aleppo, and Beirut. At the end of the year 1923 when the exodus may be considered to have ended, the expenses to the French in connection with it are calculated to amount to fifty million francs, of which food absorbed 40 per cent., transport 40 per cent., medical 4 per cent., lodging and miscellaneous 16 per cent. These sums do not include the enormous amounts raised in America by the American Red Cross and Near East Relief, which are estimated by Dr. Duguet for the latter alone at over eleven million

dollars.* The main part of their work, and that of the English societies for the help of Armenians, was the care of the thousands of children whose parents had perished, and who, but for this care, must have died of starvation.

The history of the succeeding years is that of a long struggle against appalling physical conditions of overcrowding in insanitary quarters, semi-starvation, and disease. In Aleppo, where the surroundings were less intolerable, indomitable courage and perseverance have succeeded in making a self-supporting existence for most, thanks in some measure to the assistance of Societies for the help of Armenians in many countries which have made large contributions. The Armenians themselves have built little houses, churches, and schools, and a good stone hospital with maternity wards is being built by the Armenian Red Cross. In Aleppo also Miss Karen Jeppe has carried on her beneficent work for women and girls, and from this camp were literally led forth by her the two first groups of colonists who have successfully settled at Tel Armen and Tel Sarmen.

The situation in Beirut and Alexandretta is very different. In the latter place especially, the marshy surroundings of the town on which the camp stands give rise to virulent malaria and the refugees there are decimated by it. Their miserable huts literally standing in water are unfit for human habitation. In Beirut the dangers from overcrowding and insanitary conditions are a constant menace. Plague broke out in one part of the camp last year and only the energetic action of the French Sanitary Authorities prevented an epidemic.

Since the coming to Syria of M. Ponsot as High Commissioner the Mandatory Authority has taken the whole refugee problem in hand and has, with the help of the International Labour Office, evolved a systematic plan for dealing with it. A large proportion of the Armenians are cultivators and came from lands resembling parts of Syria that are uncultivated at present. By placing these families on the land they will become self-supporting, and will also enrich by cultivation the country of their adoption. Dr. Duguet estimates that about 28,000 of the 40,000 who need assistance are agricultural, while about 12,000 are artisans used to town life. For these latter it is proposed to create suburbs in the neighbourhood both of Beirut and Alexandretta. Satisfactory plans for dwellings have been made and those for Beirut are already begun. The scheme has been drawn up in the closest co-operation with the Refugee Bureau of the International Labour Office and the International Red Cross, whose help was invoked by M. Ponsot at a very early stage. He showed his desire for co-operation with all those who are willing to help,

* Report published in the International Red Cross Review, May, 1927.

in welcoming the appointment by the International Labour Office of a sub-committee for Armenians in Syria to administer the funds, upon which are represented the British and other voluntary societies.

The first colony under this scheme, of about 200 persons, was placed on a large farm area near Tyre, and if they are able to get in their harvest, they expect to pay back this year three-quarters of the sum which was advanced to them for the cost of settlement. Two large farms in North Syria, capable of supporting 100 families, have been bought, and there is more very rich land available as soon as there are funds to irrigate and drain it and erect the necessary buildings. All the work is to be carried through on the system of the revolving fund. The refugees will be allowed to pay off the original cost year by year, so that at the end of a certain number of years land and houses will become their own and the money advanced will be available for further help for Armenians needing it. The reports of the whole scheme show a most careful survey of the situation from the points of view of fertility, health, and security. With regard to the first of these, an expert has been over the lands, and gives his opinion that they are really good, some for cereals, others for cotton, fruit, silk-worm cultivation, etc., according to position.

The question of freedom from malaria is a serious one, as it is practically endemic in Syria and the Lebanon. The French sanitary authorities, however, have made a very minute and careful survey from this point of view. They report entire freedom from it in two of the mountainous farms acquired and a small amount in other parts which cultivation of the land will undoubtedly diminish. It must be remembered, however, that the cost of large supplies of quinine must be included in colonising schemes, and further that malaria—which sometimes appears to be more violent in the first season in a new place—may hinder the getting in of the first harvests and so make the repayment of advances slower. Education of the people in anti-malaria precautions and the organising of the children into troops of scouts to clean up stagnant pools and ditches, as has been done with such marked success in some of the refugee villages in Macedonia, would be a very valuable move.

The question of security has also received careful attention. The proposed colonies are all near the main roads; a considerable proportion of the population of these parts is Christian, so that religious difficulties are not so likely to arise; and it is the opinion of the authorities that there need be no anxiety for their safety.

The difficulty of the colonisation scheme is its necessary initial cost. For the whole scheme £120,000 is estimated as the necessary outlay, of which £25,000 has been contributed already by the French authorities and is intended for use in the Lebanon. Another

£10,000 is either in hand or in sight from Nansen's revolving fund and the British and Armenian Voluntary Societies, leaving £85,000 still to be raised. The British Government would undoubtedly have the backing of a large and increasing body of public opinion in favour of help being given for the settlement of Armenian refugees. Now that bodies like the Church Assembly, the Society of Friends, and the League of Nations Union with its half a million members are active in support, we may hope that our representatives at Geneva may be instructed to offer financial assistance to any approved measures which will help to make them self-supporting wherever they may be found.

So much for the present needs, which are urgent. What the future will bring forth for the Armenian people is still dark. Whether the little country of Erivan will in time become the national home of their dreams remains to be seen, but all those who are working to help them must echo the resolution passed by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations that, until an Armenian national home can be established, every possible facility should be given to the refugees to establish themselves in productive employment in other countries so as to maintain and safeguard their national existence. While States members individually have made considerable efforts, so far nothing very substantial has been done financially by the League for the Armenians. Is it too much to hope that this year at last the representatives of the nations at the Assembly may decide that the time has come to act?

EDITH M. PYE.

THE PRESENT IMPORTANCE OF THE REFORMATION.

IN the present religious position of Europe—and especially of England—how are we to regard the heritage handed down to us from the Reformation? We live in strange times, with strong new spiritual, social, and political movements around us on all sides. Study of the records of the past, however, should lead to a conclusion very different from a pessimistic one. Critical and complicated though the problems—spiritual as well as temporal—of our own times are, they are not more so than others in former days have been. Indeed, they are far less so than some. So great were the calamities in the early centuries of Christianity, that it was confidently believed that the “last age” was near. “The end of this present world,” said Pope Gregory the Great, “and the kingdom of the saints, which will never come to an end, is at hand. But as the end of the world draws near, many things are about to come upon us which were not before, to wit, changes in the air, and terrors from heaven, and tempests out of the order of the seasons: wars, famines, pestilences, earthquakes in divers places, which things will not, nevertheless, all happen in our days, but will all follow after our days. If, therefore, you perceive that any of these things come to pass in your country, let not your mind be in any way disturbed; for these signs of the end of the world are sent before, for this reason, that we may take heed for our souls” (Gregory’s letter to Ethelbert, King of Kent).*

Three centuries after Gregory, we meet an equally grim condition of affairs. “The great empire of Charlemagne [was] going to pieces. . . . The barbarians too had begun their assaults from without. In England and in Ireland the Northmen had already begun the work of demoralisation by their savage inroads. . . . In 836 they had sailed up the Rhine, burning and destroying as far as Nimeguen. . . . What the Northmen were to the Northern Seas, the Saracens were to the Southern Seas, of Europe. In 831 the latter had secured a hold of Sicily, and before the middle of the century they had appeared before the walls of Rome. When the strong arm and the clear head of Charlemagne were taken away, the causes that were to produce in Europe the anarchy of the close of the ninth, and most of the tenth, century were free to run their course unchecked.”†

Thereafter, Europe passed through centuries of mingled feudal development, ecclesiastical consolidation, wars amongst various Christian princes, struggles of popes and emperors, long-drawn conflicts with the Crescent: until the establishment of the Turkish power in the Imperial city of the East.

* Bede, *Eccles. Hist.* (Sellar’s ed., 1912), p. 71.
† Mgr. H. K. Mann, *Hist. of the Popes* (1906), ii, 95-96.

“It would be difficult,” says Dr. Pastor,* “to describe the terror of Western Christendom on learning that [Constantinople] . . . had fallen into the hands of the infidels. Men felt the event to be a turning point in the history of the world. . . . All common action on the part of Christian nations was crippled, and Stamboul became the smouldering centre of discord that it still continues to be in the Eastern question of the present day.”†

Meanwhile, however, there had been, in the very heart of the Christian Church itself, the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417): Popes against Popes or anti-popes. The consequences of that series of events—coming as it did at a time when the world of Europe was calling loudly for reformation of political and religious evils—are beyond calculation. The authority of the Papacy was shaken to its foundation. Thereafter we enter upon the era of the modern world: the Renaissance, the Reformation, the triumph of nationalism over mediæval theocracy. If our age, then, is confused and in turmoil, it is not more so than, perhaps not so much so as, many another age which has preceded it: and that is so whether we look at secular or at religious affairs.

Yet our own times are grave, from whatever aspect we regard them. In regard to the Christian faith, the ancient separations of East and West—and the old though not less obstinate ones in the West itself—show small signs of being remedied, though there are efforts to that end (as there always have been, indeed). One thing is clear: these problems cannot be approached usefully except from a strictly objective historical point of view. It is impossible, of course, for any man to divest himself so completely of prejudice as to see things solely in a clear light of pure truth. The ideal can be set before one, however, and the effort can be made to attain it to the greatest possible extent. From that point of view we shall see the ecclesiastical growth—and disputes—of Christendom as concerned, it is true, with doctrine valued for its own sake as Revelation; but we shall see that growth, and those disputes, as always intimately bound up with the racial and economic tendencies of the various nations or groups of peoples. The early growth of the Papacy itself was conditioned largely by the weakness of the western Emperors and the savagery of the northern invaders. Moreover, in later stages of that growth, it is difficult to exaggerate the influence of the fact of the separation which existed between the Eastern Church and the West. The Papal autocracy was thus unchecked by any counter-balance from the Oriental Patriarchates.

“Photius, Hincmar of Rheims, and [Pope] Nicholas I, all three contemporaries, light up the dull anarchy of their age by learning,

* Dr. Ludwig Pastor, *Hist. of the Popes*, trans. by Antrobus (1891), ii, 270-271.
† Pastor, *ib.*, i, 141-142.

force of character, and some of those qualities which entitle men to rank in universal history. Had they been united, France, Rome, and Constantinople might have offered a far-shining and formidable front to the Mohammedan, who was exacting tribute from Italians and Greeks; the Norsemen would have been subdued by a civilised world at peace within its borders; and centuries of confusion need not have vexed mankind."* The secular ambitions, the political and economic needs, of politicians and ecclesiastics looking at things from personal points of view, contributed largely to perpetuate schisms, and to increase both Christian and Moslem autocracy by relieving the former from wholesome checks and the latter from effective resistance. The very antagonism of the Popes and the Eastern Christians was a main occasion of the successes of Islam in Europe; yet, so unable were even the greatest minds at the time to realise the facts, that the most chimerical projects were entertained. "The zeal of [Pope] Pius II was unaffected, and continued till his death, which indeed it contributed to hasten. He was even enthusiastic enough to fancy that his exhortations might work on Mahomet [II], and in a remarkable letter (1461) he exhorted the Sultan to be baptised; promising in reward for his compliance to salute him as Emperor of the East, and to confer on him by right what at present he held only by force!"†

In such circumstances of economic, political, and social pressure grew up (together with intense spiritual enthusiasm rendered all too narrow by those very causes) the Roman ecclesiastico-temporal unity, which was first impaired by the Great Schism of the West in the fourteenth-fifteenth century, and which was broken beyond repair by the Reformation of the sixteenth. "The Reformation was not the work of a day. Its foundations were laid deep in the nature of things. Its roots lay in the ages. Its causes were the co-operation of the thoughts of many thinkers and the events of many years. . . . It was not accidental; it was providential."‡ Western Europe, in the Middle Ages, was in theory, and largely in practice, a semi-theocracy, in which a dominant clerical power claimed over-lordship of all rulers. The results of those claims (which the historian sees as a natural product of their age) eventually became so intolerable as to produce the revolution which we call the Reformation. It is four centuries since the storm broke; our age is so different from that which saw the outburst, that we fail to realise its implications. What is the meaning, to us now, of the Reformation? Probably the grave importance of that question can be realised by none so vividly as by those who have known both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism

* Dr. W. Barry, *The Papal Monarchy* (1902), p. 128.

† Dr. T. H. Dyer, *A History of Modern Europe* (1901), p. 90.

‡ Rev. Dyson Hague, *The Church of England before the Reformation* (1807), p. 218.

from the inside, as the present writer has; and who therefore have felt by intimate personal experience the vital conflict of principles which is still going on. In order to realise it, we must get down to first principles.

Let us take the Roman Catholic view first. "The Reformation," says the *Catholic Encyclopædia*, "[is] the usual term for the religious movement which made its appearance in Western Europe in the sixteenth century, and which, while ostensibly aiming at an internal renewal of the Church, really led to a great revolt against it, and an abandonment of the principal Christian beliefs"; whereas, but for that revolt, the Church would have remedied, of its own initiative, such evils as existed: "Gradually, however, and largely owing to the variously hostile spirit of the civil powers, fostered and heightened by several elements of the new order, there grew up in many parts of Europe political and social conditions which hampered the free reformatory activities of the Church, and favoured the bold and unscrupulous, who seized a unique opportunity to let loose all the forces of heresy and schism so long held in check by the harmonious action of the ecclesiastical and civil authorities." "The authority of the Holy See had also been seriously impaired, partly through the fault of some of its occupants and partly through that of secular princes. The Pope's removal to Avignon in the fourteenth century was a grievous error, since the universal character of the Papacy was thus obscured in the minds of Christian people. . . . There were also serious administrative abuses in the Papal Curia. . . . In princes and governments there had meanwhile developed a national consciousness, purely temporal and to a great extent hostile to the Church. . . . The Renaissance and Humanism partly introduced and greatly fostered these conditions. . . . A general renewal of ecclesiastical life, and a uniform improvement of evil conditions, beginning with Rome itself, the centre of the Church, were not promptly undertaken, and so it needed only an external impulse to precipitate a revolution, which was to cut off from the unity of the Church vast territories of central, and almost all northern, Europe. . . . The denial of the Divinely instituted authority of the Church, both as regards doctrine and ecclesiastical government, opened wide the door to every eccentricity, gave rise to the endless division into sects and the never-ending disputes characteristic of Protestantism, and could not but lead to the complete unbelief which necessarily arises from the Protestant principles."*

"Protestantism," said Count Joseph de Maistre, "philosophism, and a thousand other sects, more or less perverse or extravagant, having prodigiously diminished truths among men, it is impossible mankind should continue long in the state they are in at present.

* Prof. J. P. Kirsch, in *Catholic Encyclopædia*, XII, 700, 701, 702, 710.

They are in agitation and labour, they are ashamed of themselves and are seeking, with an indescribable convulsive energy, to make head against the torrent of errors, after having abandoned themselves to them with the systematic blindness of pride."* "The true and Catholic reformation, long desired but delayed by many difficulties, was," says another Roman Catholic authority,† "taken up and successfully accomplished by the Council of Trent (1545-1563)." In short, the Reformation was, in this view, not a normal stage in progress, but a perverse rebellion against an authoritative rule to which the sooner we go back the better. That theory is of a Church (secure in infallibility), which is our teacher of divine truth, as against an erring world; and of such movements as the Reformation as being revolts from the One True Church: exaggerations and rebellions which contrast with, and illustrate, the Church's own divine life and power of recuperation. Yet we have it admitted, by the Catholic authors themselves, that the evils were in the very bosom of the Church. They were not merely in the sinful world outside: they were in the very highest places of the Church. Consider the facts: the Popes and anti-Popes‡ during the Western Schism: the cessation, during that time, of the Church from being visibly a unity; the evils in "Rome itself, the centre of the Church"; the logical *impasse* raised by the fact that the Council of Constance declared Councils to be above Popes, while a later Council (that of 1870) has decided to an opposite effect (and who can decide which was right, save by begging the question?).

We thus see that analysis does not bring us to a picture of a visible, infallible, Roman Church, securely teaching an erring world ("*securus judicat orbis terrarum*"); but rather of a Roman Church which is itself part of that erring world, and open to the arguments, as to fallibility, which apply to that world. The development of the Papacy is far too clearly natural and earthly, and the reaction from its autocracy was too inevitable and needful, to be explainable on the theory we have quoted, fascinating though at first sight the theory seems, or has seemed, to many of us. The truth is, the Reformation, even when we allow for all its attendant evils (which were not more than those existing in the bosom of the Roman Church itself), was an inevitable, necessary, and beneficent stage in the religious and secular growth of Europe: and, by its effects, in that of the world. No historical student will depreciate the great part

* *The Pope*, translation by Dawson (1850), p. 26.

† Addis and Arnold, *Cath. Dictionary* (1917), p. 718.

‡ It must be borne in mind that it is still a disputed theological question as to which of the Papal claimants, in the Great Schism, were legitimate. In short, it is still open to doubt who were Popes and who were pretenders; all that can be said is that "apparently the time is at hand for the formation [on that subject] of a decision, if not definitive, at least better informed and more just." (Professor Salembrier, in *Cath. Ency.*, XIII, 541). This does not solve anything!

which the Papacy played in forming Europe. "Wherever the Church failed, barbarism supervened in the Dark Ages [410-1066]."* "The Popes educated the monarchy of Europe in its youth; they literally *made* it."†

There is great truth in this: the Papacy, inheriting the sceptre of Imperial Rome, and wielding it with a spiritual sanction, was needed if mediæval Europe was to survive. Yet the eulogies of Belloc and De Maistre need qualification. The Papacy was not in any sense—spiritual or secular—serenely apart from, but was a *part* of, Europe, and its effects were a mingling of good and bad. In regard to England, for example, Innocent III not only annulled Magna Carta, but "A supplementary Bull, of one day's later date, reminded the barons that the suzerainty of England belonged to Rome, and that therefore nothing could be done in England without papal consent."‡ For generations this conflict, between the Crown of England and the excessive claims—regarded, however, as essential by the Popes themselves—of the Papacy, went on until the accident of Henry VIII's matrimonial difficulties brought in 1534 the separation which nearly came in the reign of Henry II, and which was certain sooner or later. The events of many previous generations show that to be so. "From the Norman Conquest downward, the Pope had never taken tax and toll in England without more or less protest, and except under conditions. . . . Throughout the whole mediæval period there is a constant record of struggle between King and Pope, with the maintenance of which, whatever influence we may ascribe to the character of successive monarchs, the existence of free institutions had much to do. . . . The struggle of Rufus and Henry I with Anselm, the struggle of Henry II with Becket, the Constitutions of Clarendon, the Statute of Mortmain, the Statute of Provisors, the Statute of Praemunire, all mark as many epochs in this uninterrupted warfare."§

The absolute necessity for an abandonment of the mediæval theory of semi-theocracy, if science and beneficent progress were to take place—and the absolute necessity of maintaining in our own times the Reformation's repudiation of that semi-theocracy: these are clear from the mere knowledge of what its claims were and are. Plausible and even fascinating, the special Roman appeal is to the human craving for certitude. "A priest is not airing his own private sentiments or opinions when unfolding Christian doctrine, but is the official spokesman of that Church which was, by a special act of creation, set up by God to be the organ of His revelation to men. His voice is the voice of the historic Church of Christ, of the primitive

* Hilaire Belloc, *Hist. of England* (1925), i, 142.

† De Maistre, *The Pope* (trans.), p. 276.

‡ W. C. McKechnie, *Magna Carta* (1914), p. 46.

§ Charles Beard, B.A., Hibbert Lectures on *The Reformation* (1883), p. 307.

Church, of the Church of the Apostles, of the Apostles themselves who drank in their instruction from the very lips of Jesus Christ Himself."*

By accepting this standard, we become, it is said, *certain*. As an enthusiastic recent convert says: "Some men will say to you: 'Who told you that?'—'God.'—'How?'—'Through His Church.'—'Prove it.'—'I believe it.' And that will suffice. . . . God has told me this through His Church; I believe it. Let that be the formula of your personal *credo*."† "The certitude of the fact of Revelation must be in keeping with the firmness required by Faith. . . . [It must be] a certitude excluding all doubt and fear of error—a certitude sufficient to place a reasonable man under the *obligation* of adhering to it": though it is admitted that "the proofs of the fact of Revelation may admit of *unreasonable* dissent";‡ (italics the present writer's).

An obvious logical objection at once confronts such a theory. A supernatural illumination of the individual soul is a personal fact in each case, and has no necessary relation to any infallible Pope or body of teaching clergy. Indeed, it would even seem to lessen the need for such. However, we do not here wish to press merely theoretical difficulties (though that one is worthy of note and is too often overlooked). What is here to be emphasised is a radical social defect of the Roman theory. Building on the assumed certitude of faith in Roman doctrine (a matter essentially personal in each man's case), it goes on to make social claims which imply that *the State* can have certitude even as an individual can! This implied assumption is at the bottom of all the trouble.

It must not be supposed that the doctrine of the famous Bull, *Unam Sanctam*, issued in the early fourteenth century by Boniface VIII, has been abandoned: that teaching being that "under the control of the Church are two swords . . . the spiritual and the secular . . . ; the spiritual is wielded in the Church by the hand of the clergy; the secular is to be employed for the Church by the hand of the civil authority, but under the direction of the spiritual power."§ In its essentials, this is merely the usual teaching of Roman theology, and—in less unveiled wording, but with unabated logic—has been reaffirmed in our own age by, for example, Pope Leo XIII, who said thus: "Although, in the extraordinary condition of these times, the Church usually acquiesces in certain modern liberties—not because she prefers them in themselves, but because she judges it expedient to permit them"—she would (said

* Bishop H. G. Graham, *What Faith Really Means* (1914), pp. 12-13.

† Mde. H. Mink-Jullien, *The Ways of God* (trans. Goldschild; 1925), p. 124.

‡ Wilhelm and Scannell, *Manual of Catholic Theology* (1890), i, 120.

§ Prof. Kirsch, in *Cath. Ency.*, XV, 126.

¶ Encyclicals *Arcanum Divinæ* (1880) and *Sapientie Christianæ* (1890).

that Pope) "in happier times exercise her own liberty." "Since, then, the profession of one religion is necessary to the State, that religion must be professed which alone is true, and which can be recognised without difficulty, especially in Catholic States." "Union and concord should be maintained between them [the Roman Catholic Church and the civil power]: each, in its own sphere, being supreme; with this condition: that, on those questions which are of common right and authority, the secular power should depend on the heavenly power." "If the State's laws are clearly opposed to the Divine law, or if they command what is against religious duties; or if they violate, in the person of the Supreme Pontiff, the authority of Jesus Christ: then indeed it is a duty to resist—a crime to obey."

Clearly, the teaching of the Church to-day comes no way short of that of Innocent and Hildebrand; and of that teaching this is true: "If once it be admitted that the Church, represented by the Pope, possesses a directive power over the civil ruler, and may take cognizance of his acts judicially in case of alleged error, the independence of the two principles, however affirmed in words, is in fact overthrown. Such a prerogative is capable of indefinite extension. It may be [indeed, constantly has been and is] so exercised as to be a means of perpetual interference with the ordinary administration of civil affairs."* The only difference between now and the Innocentian and Hildebrandine times is that the political condition of the world does not allow such claims to be put into force on a great scale; and that fact is due to the Reformation: meaning, by "the Reformation," not any particular school of theology, but the movement away from mediæval theocracy. The effect of such claims on the tranquillity of States was seen throughout the entire Middle Ages. The Peace of Westphalia, which in 1648 ended the Thirty Years' War, marked the definite repudiation of them by modern statesmanship. Pope Innocent X, in the Bull *Zelo Domus Dei*, condemned all clauses in the Treaties which were inimical to Roman claims. Those clauses, however, were vital to the whole Peace. "The phrase of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), *cujus regio ejus religio*, i.e., the religion of the prince is the religion of the land, sums up the secular reply to the ecclesiastical order."†

The revolution which began in 1517, in short, was consummated in 1648. In State affairs it meant the right of communities to develop on lines of free progress to the best of each nation's ability. But it meant (gradually and faultily though this was realised) an immense change as regards the citizen also. Consider the position of *the individual* in the theocratic age. The claim of the Roman Church

* Rev. W. H. Jervis, *Hist. of the Church of France* (1872), i, 56.

† Dom Bede Jarrett, O.P., in *Cath. Ency.*, XI, 454.

is that no one can be justified in relinquishing belief in her doctrines. "Heresy is a sin because, of its nature, it is destructive of the virgine of Christian faith," and both heretics and apostates "incur excommunication, reserved *speciali modo* to the Sovereign Pontiff. They incur, moreover, the note of 'infamy.' "* Applied in a social sense—and it can have no other sense at all—this led logically to heresy-laws, to the Inquisition and the *autos da fé* in Europe; to the *Writ de comburendo hæretico* and the stake, in England. The Reformation did not free us from that all at once. The Reformers were only men, after all, and could not free themselves from the ideas of centuries in a moment. For a time they adopted those very methods in some degree. But the principle they acted on, in revolting from the mediæval theocracy, was a principle destructive of those methods in the long run; for it appealed to the free soul. The Reformation vindicated modern individual freedom, and its maintenance is needful to the continued vindication of that freedom.

Against this fact an ingenious plea has been put forward by Mr. Hilaire Belloc, in a preface to Mr. Hoffman Nickerson's book on *The Inquisition*. After all, argues Mr. Belloc, the Inquisition, at the worst, was akin to our modern bureaucratic State. "Had you presented to the early thirteenth century the spectacle of the whole male population medically examined, registered, and forcibly drafted into a life where a chance error might be punished immediately by death or by some other terrible punishment . . . had you sketched for him our universal spy system whereby a strong modern central Government holds down all its subjects as no Government of antiquity, however tyrannical, ever held them down; could you have shown a man of the thirteenth century all this, he would have felt the same repulsion and horror which most modern men feel on reading of the Inquisition, its objects and its methods."†

This special plea seems based on very strange logic. It assumes that, if the "man of the thirteenth century" had had a prevision of our modern evils, he would have been seeing something into the evils of which the Catholic system, in which he himself lived, would not have developed. Yet, after all, if we, now-a-days, have "examinations," "registrations," "terrible punishments," "spies," etc., the principle underlying such things is surely not such as would have been very much abhorred by a mediæval Church policy which involved torture ("the question"), serfdom, feudalism, the stake, and secret denunciations! Had Europe's religious unity with Rome remained unbroken, what probability is there that we should not have had, not our own evils only, but those evils (or many of them) wedded to an all-pervading spiritual despotism—that conjunction

* Dr. J. Wilhelm and Prof. A. Van Hove, in *Cath. Ency.*, VII, 257, and I, 625.

† H. Nickerson, *The Inquisition* (1923), p. 16.

being horrible indeed? "It was not the fault of the Church that the secular power admired and imitated the methods of the Holy Office; but it is surely a calamity that it should have been able to find in an ecclesiastical tribunal a system which must seem to every fair-minded man to-day so abhorrent to the whole spirit and tenor of the Christian Gospel."* The Reformation, then, was, and still is, necessary because the exaggerated development of the Roman claims was such as to make them intolerable if imposed upon the world at large. "The abuses under which Christendom groaned were too inveterate, too firmly entrenched, and too profitable, to be removed by any but the sternest and sharpest remedies."†

In these days, when Christian reunion is so earnestly a subject of thought and effort, these facts cannot safely be obscured or forgotten. It is an error to proceed on the assumption that the ideal to have before us is that of a centralised theocracy. After all, it is not true that there is no medium between autocracy and anarchy. If, then, there is such a medium in temporal things, why not also in those of the spirit? The Papal assumption—that Christianity must needs have a despotic earthly governance—led to results which necessitated the Reformation. The way to Christian progress will not be the way of "undoing the Reformation." It will be by going forward, not backward: by following out the intellectual and spiritual liberty the Reformation gave to us, and by combining it with ever-increasing new knowledge and breadth of Christian wisdom.

J. W. POYNTER.

* A. S. Turberville, *Mediæval Heresy and the Inquisition* (1920), p. 242.

† Dr. H. C. Lea, in *Cambridge Modern History* (1907), i, 691.

FRENCH CHILDREN'S MAGAZINES.

THESE seem to be many more monthly and weekly publications for children in France than there are in England. They crowd the bookstalls, and are eagerly bought. Their contents are interesting, and illuminative of child-psychology and child-nature in the land which, though so near to us, is yet far removed in thought and outlook and sentiment. The first thing which strikes a stranger is the cheapness of these magazines. Also there are many more for girls than for boys. The young girl in France is very carefully and jealously guarded until the age of fourteen, when all things become possible to her. With adolescence there are no more secrecies and reserves. For her there is provided a most excellent weekly magazine at the very low price of thirty centimes, i.e., *La Semaine de Susette*. It contains twelve closely printed pages of subject-matter, and it is profusely illustrated. The drawing of the pictures is always charming, and generally extraordinarily good. Indeed, in daintiness and a certain ease and grace of outline, they far surpass the pictures in English children's magazines, but the colour is bad. In her weekly budget, Susette is always given a crude frontispiece, and is also encouraged to form her sense of humour upon a highly-coloured funny page which is not the humour of an English schoolgirl.

In 1926 Becassine in Bretagne with "Son Oncle et leurs amis" do wondrous deeds which go on cheerfully from week to week. Poor Becassine is always a figure of fun with her clogs and huge umbrella. It is easy to see that her adventures might be numerous, but Becassine is laughed at and mobbed whatever she plans or carries out. For example, in England a harmless woman asleep in a public park would not be surrounded by a rude crowd of mockers "des gens qui souriaient en la voyant affalée sur son banc." They would have too much to do, and public opinion would be against such a joke. Yet demure Mademoiselle Susette is encouraged to think such behaviour truly admirable and most humorous. In other ways Susette's morals are carefully considered. The stories all point out the joy of virtue and its great reward. Colette staying with grand friends is "très ennuyée" at the idea of meeting a cousin of her father's who is only "vieille fille pauvre et modeste." She behaves like a snob, for "sa sottise vanité souffre cruellement." It was dreadful to be in the luxurious motor of grand friends and to have such an encounter. But all is changed when the despised cousin spreads a feast in her humble abode for the aristocratic party. Then Colette flings herself into her relative's arms: "J'ai eu un vilain mouvement, mais je m'en repens." Unfortunately even the guileless Susette must observe that Colette's repentance was prompted by greed.

Barons with castles haunt the serial story, where a small girl of high degree insists upon visiting the poor and the humble in her spare time. "Il a fallu d'abord employer toutes sortes de ruses"; but the ends are supposed to justify the means, and the Baroness relents. Lessons of kindness to birds and animals are prettily illustrated. Francine saves a family of water-wagtails from that cruel lad, Jean Pierre, who contrary to all laws of our juvenile courts is told by the officials, "Tu vas avoir au moins six mois de prison." By the way, Francine knew a lovely little poem about that long-tailed water-wagtail:

"Elle semble, la belle,
Une maitre de chapelle
Blanc et noir."

It is amusing to find that the universal and professional Aunt, who gives such sage advice to girls and children in many English magazines about food, toilet, and love affairs, survives in France, and is to be found in *La Semaine de Susette*. She is very moral, and gives much good advice in her weekly "Lettre d'une Tante." At the beginning of the long holidays Susette and her friends are abjured to work. Holiday tasks evidently still haunt French schools. "Une heure d'étude prise sur une journée entière est bien peu de chose," cries the Aunt, but probably to deaf ears. Like all the English professional aunts, she is philanthropic and tries hard to extract money from rich little Susettes for "malheureux bambins." For 200 francs she points out such a needy infant can be given "six longues semaines d'air libre, de distractions et de bonheur." Very eloquent waxes the good aunt about this project: "Privez-vous un peu pour donner à leurs yeux fiévreux, à leurs lèvres pâlies la couleur et le bel éclat de la santé." We feel sure that many a little Susette responded.

Under a column marked "La Petite Fille bien élevée" much advice is bestowed on Susette how to comport herself in all kinds of positions. "En voyage" she is exhorted to be a perfect model of decorum. How English parents would hail the possession of such a Susette—one who when late for a hotel repast "marche à petits pas sur la pointe des pieds." On wet days this little paragon "écoute la musique, lit sa Semaine, feuillette les albums." More than that, "elle prend son ouvrage," and wonder of wonders, "fait un cache-nez pour son frère, confectionne un coussin pour sa maman." No wonder that she is "admiration de tous pour sa discrétion, sa réserve correcte, et sa parfaite éducation," but oh, what a Susette!

Her feminine curiosity is stimulated to watch for characteristics in her friends which The Sybille informs her accompany certain Christian names: *Vivianes*, for example, are clever, lively, refined, reasonable and good, but soft and lazy; *Xavières* (who abound in

Central France) have great spirit and enterprise. They are also distinguished, eloquent, and artistic; *Mathildes* are imperious and dominating, nervous and impressionable; *Armandes* are mystics, but also obstinate and proud; *Mireilles* (a name of Provence) are gay, bright, lively, good-humoured . . . and so on. Another Aunt, Tante Rolande, wrestles with the handwritings of many small *Susettes* and tries hard to deduce character therefrom. Poor lady, she is often hard pressed, and evidently dares not criticise unduly. But even *she* has to admit often, "Je ne vois en elle que beaucoup de cœur et de goût." Sometimes she adds "La bonne volonté," and in one case even hints that the child might be "un peu paresseuse."

We can see that the high-born *Susettes* who are schooled and drilled by these good aunts during their holidays would not be allowed to take in *Lisette* (distinctly less aristocratic) which appears every Sunday and gives its readers sixteen pages for 25 centimes. Again the line illustrations are full of grace and charm, and though the colour is crude it is bright and artistic. This is a "Journal des Petites Filles," who have to be satisfied with such small jokes as a worthy and stout *Bonne* posting a birthday letter to her cousin without an address. Morality is again strictly inculcated. Jacqueline had been promised "une récompense" for hard work by an old grandfather who is delightfully described: "Il sourit dans sa barbe blanche." Like every French child her heart's desire was a little donkey of her very own, "un tout noir aux yeux vifs." Just as she was buying that treasure with the reward of virtue, the home of the *vieille* Micheline is destroyed by fire, and when Jacqueline hears the cries and lamentations of the old woman there is no hesitation. She acts at once. "Elle lui glissait dans les mains la grosse somme destinée à l'achat du petit âne." Grandpapa, in a velvet coat and grey trousers, and a crowd of smart relations stand admiringly round to watch the deed. Cecile, *enfant gâtée*, is the heroine of the serial, and it is almost refreshing to hear she is bored by good deeds. In fact, "elle s'acquittait de ces devoirs de charité avec une telle indifférence." But indifference ends in such insolence that dire results follow. Thus is *Lisette* instructed in philanthropy and good manners. Even in a garden good advice dogs the unlucky *Lisette*. She cannot look at roses without being exhorted by Maman in a veritable sermon. "Les petites filles," says that admirable parent, "sont comme les belles roses: elles ont besoin d'être souvent redressées." *Lisette* is also abjured to wear a befitting garden costume "cependant pour vous permettre de caresser Médor le bon chien,"—or it is time she made preparation for the gay life as she becomes "presqu'une jeune fille" and takes an interest in her clothes.

Fillette is yet another cheap magazine for small girls, and is full of adventure and fun for 25 centimes a week. It is more racy than either of the others, and both the serials treat of wonderful escapes

and escapades. In one, *Liliane*, "fille de pauvres pêcheurs," is so like the princess Elsa, that Meloir, "mauvais ministre en profite pour la substituer à cette dernière au moment du danger." One can see what wonderful and fearful possibilities arise from such a position. In the other serial, "Fleur d'Avril," we have the adventures of a child kidnapped by acrobats. But the wonder and delight of *Fillette* are the number of full page picture-stories. Of these there are no less than six every week, and most of them are charmingly illustrated with much spirit and grace. Betty, captured by brigands in the heart of Paris, is taken to the river, and there a scoundrel proceeds to dispose of her. "Il la lance de toutes ses forces dans le fleuve." We see Betty gagged: Betty falling: Betty struggling in the water: and when all seems lost, and we give up hope, lo! a rescuer "un pauvre chien qui errait sur la rive." Little French girls must have strong nerves if they never dream of these realistic scenes. The adventures of Chien Brownie are very enchanting, and he is a much finer character than his mistress Choupette, who rather cruelly, and most mischievously, robs an old lady of her pet parrot Coco. French children are a bit crafty and cunning if we are to believe these stories. For even smaller "Fillettes" than the ones who wish to gloat over murders and crimes, there are sweet little picture-stories of shepherdesses and fairies with dainty line illustrations full of vigour and character. It is curious to find a real horror of the times before the Revolution reflected in many of these childish magazines. Again and again the French child is reminded of her good fortune not to be living "au temps des rois où parfois la misère était grande."

But we must not forget the boys. *Pierrot*, "journal des garçons," is a most excellent magazine, and the price is again only twenty-five centimes. Every illustration is excellent, and one remarks that a dog or a horse or a donkey is to be found in most of the pictures, and very delightfully are they drawn. French dogs bristle with character and are evidently very dear to their boy-owners. We have many a peep into French country life in those long holidays when everything is planned for the delectation of the children. For in France the children reign supreme and are cared for every minute during those endless summer days. *Pierrot*, who is a kind of god-father to many young nephews, opens every number with good advice, but it is healthy, breezy advice. He may lament over "quelques fautes d'orthographe" in the letters sent to him by the boys. He may even call them "très vilain," but he has nothing but praise for the lad who turns to and helps with the harvest on the farm of his *grand-mère*. How proud that youth is of his work and how un-English of him to write, "Le soir j'étais très fatigué."

As often happens in English magazines, the boys are not so surfeited with adventure as the girls, and their jokes are somewhat far-

fetched. "Un Brave" was Jean. "Il se croit extrêmement brave." In fact, to an admiring and charmingly drawn group of "petits cousins et cousines" he gasses and boasts, but this hero is not pleased to go to bed and is terrified at the awful sight of "deux pieds dépasser sous le rideau." Indeed, at once he becomes "plus mort que vif." The household is roused, "les domestiques arrivent armés jusqu'aux dents," headed by Uncle "revolver au poing." When the shutter is lifted "les pieds de voleur" turn out to be only "une paire de chaussures." Rather a chestnut dished up! but placed on a very dainty dish.

The serial stories are very moral and high-toned, but distinguished by a great love of animals. Little José with the dog who has "la patte cassée" plays the hero in rescuing it from the hands of tormentors. Laurent, giving up all "ses projets d'avenir" to keep his mother, is helped by a faithful horse and a delightful dog. Old and faithful servants seem to abound in rural France, and are taken as a matter of course. Again and again they appear in the illustrations in neat peasants' caps. Under the title of *Amusette*, jokes are rather stale. Here is a sample:

L'examineur: Qui fonda Carthage?

Le Candidat: ? ? ?

Un Souffleur: Didon.

L'examineur: Eh bien?

Le Souffleur: Didon. Didon.

Le Candidat: Dis donc! dis donc! Mais que faut il que je dise?

It seems curious, if true to life, that a prompter or *souffleur* should be allowed in the examination-room.

Besides a good uncle there is "un Ami Pierrot," who answers letters and also gives good advice. One correspondent who signs himself "Diable au corps" is mildly reprov'd by that good *ami*. "J'accepte votre pseudonyme mais dites-moi pourquoi vous l'avez choisi." *Gros Blanc* owns to a distaste for Red Indians and demands stories like those of Jack London. The poor *Ami* sighs as he points out, "c'est difficile de satisfaire tout le monde." Another boy, and he must be a sentimental ass, rejoices in the pseudonym of "Étoile brillant dans les ténèbres." In an English school that would never be forgiven nor forgotten.

La Jeunesse Illustrée caters for both boys and girls at the price of 30 centimes, and consists entirely of full page illustrated stories, two of which are coloured. The subjects of these stories are very varied. French country life, French colonial life, Red Indians, cow-boys, and historical subjects are all used in turn, and the illustrations in their endeavour to be funny are rather a failure; but again we are reminded of the essential difference between French and English humour. "Le Duel de M. des Ormeaux" takes place "sous la Régence, à l'époque de ces fortunes fabuleuses réalisées parfois en

quelques jours." Here the illustrations are excellent and every costume is true to period. The duel between the young bloods dressed in brocade and lace is most exciting—"Alban, le brave, tomba sans un cri," but is rescued by a grand and unknown uncle. There is a very amusing picture where the uncle and another man are embracing Alban with much fervour before allowing him to kiss the fair *Amânce* for whom he had fought the duel.

We feel sure that *Le Petit Illustré pour la jeunesse et la famille*, being only 25 centimes, is often bought by the workmen for their children, for it also contains stories for the elders. Here is one. Agenor and Philibert, adults, being much bored by a seaside holiday, find a bottle containing the following thrilling message: "Qui que tu sois, toi qui trouveras la bouteille, prends le bateau—et file à toute hélice ou je t'envoie—tu y trouveras un trésor inestimable." Agenor shouts with glee like a child, "à moi le trésor; J'y cours," but not a word to poor Philibert! Agenor encounters "une bête de dimensions inconnues." Oddly enough the huge whale "le regardait sans malice avec ses yeux grands," but it was a different matter when it opened its mouth. Then the brave Agenor disappeared, to be met by a man who demanded "deux mille francs" for saving him.

Dungeons and chains form a large part of the history of Robin, "le hardi jongleur," but *Trompette* is a sweet little story for children where Floremond is rewarded for saving a poor hen from a fox. Not only does that obliging fowl reward him with an enormous egg, but it eventually becomes "un coquelet" which is a friend and comrade for Floremond. Some chevaliers demand the *coquelet*, and when refused ravage the little garden. (This is rather a commentary upon the manners before the Revolution.) However, Cocorico then lays diamonds in the place of eggs, and prophesies that the humble Floremond will be given "la fille du roi" in marriage. There are enough adventures and love stories packed into *Illustré* to make it excellent reading both for *papa*, *maman*, and *les enfants*.

Cri-Cri et La Croix D'Honneur is another cheap family coloured illustrated paper, but here we have real horrors—knives, pistols, murders, shipwrecks, dungeons, thefts, detectives galore. It is curious to note how great a part the sea and the shore play in all these cheap magazines. Probably these magazines are also eagerly read by those who live so far inland that they have little chance of going to the seaside.

So we find that with the exception of *La Semaine de Susette* all these French magazines for the young suit rich and poor alike, and are cheap enough to be bought by all classes. It is a sign of the times. Another more ominous sign is the absence of any definite allusion to religion in every one of these magazines for children.

CONSTANCE SPENDER.

YOUNG AFGHANS ON TREK.

WHEN Colonel Keen was demarcating the Anglo-Afghan frontier in 1921, a Kabul Sirdar of considerable importance told me that a closer union between Afghanistan and Great Britain would paralyse the fear of war in Central Asia, and hoped that the new Indo-Afghan frontier might be a link instead of a barrier. Later I heard a similar opinion expressed in London. But many competent observers of the Asian High Policy both in the East and the West aver that if that pious hope is to assume a reality, then it is necessary that both countries know more of each other, and approach their common interests with greater sympathy.

The consideration of these facts was never so necessary as it is to-day, for a rapid shifting of scenes in Asia may well imperil the peace of the world if European nations, and especially England, continue to stand aloof, watching and wondering over the plethora of events which has stirred up the very soul of the changing East. Furthermore, Great Britain's "break" with Russia has opened another avenue of thought to those who, believing in the evil influences of the Bolshevik propaganda in Asia, fear its intensification in the Middle East on its march towards India. And in the midst of it all stands Afghanistan, recognised by England, it is true, as an independent kingdom, yet merely tolerated as a distant "friend." Almost the same sentiments prevail in Afghanistan. But to me it seems little short of a political tragedy of our time that two neighbours should remain so remote, when the advancing circumstances of the world demand a closer connection and a more intimate approach between the people of this country and those of my own, especially at a time when political drama of the rising, revolting East will be enacted in and around the Kingdom of Kabul.

When I think of H.M. Amir Amanullah of Afghanistan, I cannot but recall a date which stands out prominently in the recent history of my country. One fine morning, not so many years ago, the Amir's Body Guards were drawn up in front of the Palace in Kabul. Young officers galloped their horses through the lines shouting Turkish commands to their men, motor-cars clamoured at the gate as a few privileged elders of the city by the garden railing watched the parade. Anon a silence pervaded the scene. "Alla Hazrat, Amir Sahib," shouted the Chamberlain. The respectful quiet of the moment was awful, one could hear one's heart beat as the stout, well-dressed, middle-aged monarch Habibullah of the God-gifted Kingdom of Kabul stepped out from the main door of his palace. He walked slowly between the rows of soldiers. A number of Sirdars, high officials and Court hangers-on, followed

and watched him enter the car which was about to take him to Lughman, where he was bound for a little rest and some *shikar*. That parade, that gorgeous spectacle, is vivid in my mind as the last phase of him. As we all know, he never returned to his capital, but rests for ever at Lughman. Does it not show what lay behind the scenes?

As the news of H.M. Habibullah Khan's death reached Kabul, the whole city was plunged into deep mourning; for, despite his many drawbacks, the late King was loved by an influential section of the nobles. Indeed, towards the latter part of his reign, the late Amir more truly represented the vested interests of the nobility of his country than the Afghan nation. Nor did his visit to India stand him in good stead, for ever since his return from Hindustan both his power and prestige were on the downward course, till an assassin's bullet laid him to eternal rest. Mourning though there was, it remained only superficial with those who mattered in Kabul, and busybodies were bestirred. Was Afghanistan to be precipitated into one of those internecine wars which visit that country at the close of an Afghan monarch's life? There was great fear of it. But, paradoxical as it may appear, on this one occasion Afghan history did not repeat itself, for H.M. Amanullah jumped into the arena, realising that while the country was still reeling under the impact of the blow, he must act instantly, decidedly, and firmly. As events showed, that quick decision which he put into practical form, saved an internecine struggle, and secured for him the throne into the bargain. The triumph of Ghazi Amanullah is not entirely due to the Anglo-Afghan war of 1919, which many Jingo Imperialists believe to be the case, for he had won the hearts of his people long prior to that affair, even before his father's death. He was always a hero of the man in the street, for he had realised that public opinion among the Afghans was crystallising.

On ascending the throne of a new Afghanistan, he continued to bestow attention on popular aspirations, and perceiving that the people were fretting under the yoke of the nobles, he yielded to the rising tide of Afghan public opinion. He emphasised the view—which disgusted the nobility—that he was the representative of the masses, a king risen out of the humble ranks of his kinsmen. Again, he owes his further popularity to the fact that, being only a third son of his father, he had the good fortune not to be born an heir to the throne, and he thus escaped the hothouse upbringing of would-be Amirs of Afghanistan. His appreciation of the rights of the people coupled with his unaffected and plain manners account for his success. He goes about disguised at nights in the streets of Kabul to examine the conditions of the life of the poorer people. He is the idol of the army, and since he has given orders that the general meeting of the tribesmen of the Eastern districts of his country

shall take place every year, when all matters appertaining to the moral and material interests of the clansmen are to be discussed, he is looked upon as a champion of a representative form of government. He is devoting a great deal of thought to matters educational.

Yet Amir Amanullah has not been alone in transferring old Afghan scenes, for two very significant personalities have loomed large in respect to the new Afghanistan. One of them, Sirdar Mahmood Baig Turzi, immediately after the proclamation of Afghan independence, was entrusted with the work of the Foreign Office at Kabul. And could one have imagined that an Afghan noble living in exile in the Levant and married to a Turkish lady, was one day destined to be both the Foreign Minister at Kabul and the father-in-law of the King of the Afghans? In his leisure hours this veteran politician of Afghanistan still keeps up his pursuit of writing fiction in his inimitable Persian style.

The other figure of considerable importance is General Nadir Khan, once the Commander-in-Chief of Afghan forces and till recently Afghan Minister in Paris: like Mahmood Baig Turzi, he was also an exile in India at Dehra Dun till his revered father was permitted to return to Kabul. General Nadir Khan has the rare distinction of being both a diplomat and a man of the sword. During his term of office at the head of the army, people stigmatised him as cruel to the core, but he was cruel because he was engaged in a cruel game. The analogy in this respect between his reputation and that of the late Amir Abdur Rahman is close, for when the Amir was asked as to whether he did not rule with an iron hand: "Yes, I do so," he is said to have replied, "because I rule an iron people." Nadir Khan's case is similar, for one cannot afford to have a kind heart when one goes out to kill or be killed. No three men in Afghanistan have so filled the drama of action of their country within living memory as have H.M. the Amir, Turzi, and Nadir Khan. They will have an enduring place in the Middle-Eastern history of our times.

Old conditions do not obtain in Afghanistan to-day, notably in the practice of the art of Government at Kabul, and in the efforts of H.M. King Amanullah Khan to have modern education imparted to his people. It has, for instance, been acknowledged that in order to bring Afghanistan abreast of the times, European methods of instruction are to supplant the Mosque institutions as primary schools. The scope of the Habibiah College at Kabul has been considerably enlarged for the study of arts, whilst the military academy in Herbia is attracting the cream of the Afghan race. Apart from various Government-aided village schools and travelling instructors, a great deal of attention is also being bestowed on adult education: and recently a school of Political Economy has been organised for

the members of the diplomatic service. Young Afghan boys are also receiving training at Kabul under German and French tutors, so that when their turn comes to proceed abroad for further education, they may profit by following lectures in European languages. A large number of advanced students are already studying at Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Moscow, and more will be sent as soon as these return after graduation. A few have also been sent to England.

At every public gathering the Afghan King makes special appeal to his people for educational advancement, but in spite of its obvious advantage, this educational policy is frequently called in question. Some Afghan observers still look with grave concern at the rapid pace of modernisation in their country, contending that an abrupt abolition of conservative traditionalism would lead to chaos. In support of this idea, the case of the last Khost rebellion is cited, with the suggestion that a liberal outlook, which characterises the attitude of the present King, is not suited to the imagination of the older section of his subjects, and that it was due to the promulgation of the Nizam Mama, or the new modernised laws, that acute embarrassment was created for the Kabul Government. It is further added that the education of students in Europe is at present beyond the Afghan purse, boasting little more than fifty million rupees annually; whereas less than one-third of what is expended on European education would provide for their educational requirements in Kabul itself, through the engaging of foreign professors which would afford an equal amount of training. Nor is this all, for a sharp attack has been made on the veneer of the West which Afghan boys might acquire without absorbing all the virtues of Europe. When young men of impressionable age return home, it is said, there is a fear that they may bring foreign ideas with them, which may be quite alien to their native environment, and may even challenge the existing order of things in Afghanistan. The criticism is interesting, though not a little unjust, for it is indisputable that if Afghanistan is to hold its own against the surging tide of the world's economics, its sons must arm themselves with the best weapons to withstand modern competition; and whatever its past history, the requirements of a new era cannot allow Afghanistan to keep its doors barred and bolted to the world without, nor permit the people of that country to remain in "splendid isolation."

But whilst the Gargantuan thunder of Western drums is endeavouring to drown the conservatism of the Afghans at Kabul, one should go into the country of the Amirs, Maliks, and Khans, away into the uplands of Panshair, not far from Kabul, to see the true sons of old Asia. In a small village nestling amidst the hills and glens, observe life as it is: "the life of life," as Shelley puts it. You will see a heavy, almost dreamy-eyed Afghan, working away in

his field. Sleepy he may look, yet you would be loth to call him an indolent fellow, for on examining his fertile fields you would be convinced of his industry. It is not entirely due to nature that flowers bloom in his garden. As a traveller, you have only to ask him the name of his village as you pass the field where he is working, and from that moment you are his guest. That is the traditional idea of hospitality of the Afghan. After putting you at ease in his house, the farmer takes you out to show you the bazaar of his village.

You see one shop here, another there, a roast-meat seller and a jeweller, perhaps, occupying neighbouring shops, both benefiting by it, because it is believed to be the practice of Afghan jewellers, who know the psychology of their countrymen, to invite their customers first to a huge dinner before showing them the jewels; the jeweller is right in thinking that a hungry Afghan is not a good customer. A little farther on you may see the saddlemaker, and next to him a cutlery seller, and then a dry-salter and druggist combined. Presently you come to a teashop where sits squatting the "wise man" of the village, the oldest man living, who is looked upon as a great sage, and whose advice is sought in all matters, from a dread of Russian invasion, to the broken leg of a nomad's horse. Picture, then, to yourself a certain man of about seventy, wonderfully tranquil in motion as in speech, a man of high honour to all seeming, so slow of speech that he may just vouchsafe one reply to every three questions, one who never speaks at all till you have spoken, who never falls into a passion, who never laughs, whose every third word will convey either some Afghan saying or point of Islamic philosophy. Picture to yourself all this, and you have seen an Afghan village sage sitting at a teashop.

In the evening at your host's house, you will find men of the town assemble to make your acquaintance as one who has come from far-away lands. The conversation will range from religion to politics, then to the conditions of the local crops, and to cattle lifting. Then the green tea is brought, and is handed down to you as you sit, one cup after another, a third, a fourth, ten or fifteen, till you invert your cup over your saucer which is a signal to the servant that you do not want any more. This is hardly over when the white cloth is spread, and dishes of dried fruits and sweets are placed on it. The more you can eat, the greater will it please your host, otherwise you will be rewarded by unpleasant looks, and perhaps not invited to spend a week with your host in your lifetime again. The rest of the evening will be spent in hearing the Afghan "nay"—or reed—the music of which is decidedly the best in Central Asia; and so do the old and the new jostle along in the God-gifted Kingdom of Kabul.

IKBAL ALI SHAH.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE NAVAL LIMITATION CONFERENCE.

THE record of the depressing attempt to agree on a naval limitation treaty was taken in last month's CONTEMPORARY up to July 14th, when a plenary meeting was held at Geneva to register the fact that agreement had not so far been reached. At the end of that meeting, however, Mr. Gibson made what some people expected might prove to be an important statement. "If some basis," he said, "can be found mutually acceptable to the British and Japanese, I feel it will be possible for the American Delegation to make the agreement complete." That statement was interpreted by the British and by the Japanese Delegation as a hint that an Anglo-Japanese compromise proposal might solve the difficulty. Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil therefore remained in Geneva for another week. They discussed the matter with Viscount Ishii, and had no difficulty in handing over to their respective experts the work of formulating in detail an Anglo-Japanese plan. Such work was easy because the British and Japanese plans with which the Conference had originally started were based on a harmonious principle, the principle namely of stabilising building on the established basis of individual needs. There had been no serious divergence of view between the Japanese and the British Delegations throughout the Conference. By July 19th, the Anglo-Japanese proposed compromise had been drafted and submitted to the Governments in London and in Tokio and to the American Delegation at Geneva. Its main purport was to concede the American demand for a "global" criterion, but to restrict that criterion to the 10,000-ton cruiser class and to reserve to each of the parties the right to retain a certain number of obsolete or small cruisers in order to meet their special purposes. Such an arrangement would have enabled the British Government, for instance, to maintain a special reserve of obsolete cruisers wherewith to defend the trade routes of the Empire in peace time.

When the news of that Anglo-Japanese agreement became known the French Press reacted in an odd and unaccountable manner. The attitude of the French Press throughout the Conference threw a melancholy light on the familiar disharmony of people in the mass. Where two or more are gathered together, a frequent result in this imperfect world is unnecessary bad blood. Why French opinion should take a delight in the failure of a conference which might mean the difference between peace and war at some future date seems a hard question to answer. The Paris commentators, however, consistently and with palpable alacrity, prophesied failure from the first day of the Conference, and proceeded day by day to hunt

for Anglo-American disagreements such as might justify their apocalyptic pessimism. When the British and Japanese Delegations produced an agreed plan which promised to rescue the Conference from failure, the French commentators affected a profound surprise and a hardly concealed displeasure. Such, however, is the facility and the fertility of mischief that those Paris commentators wasted little time in regrets, and proceeded to a further phase of activity. They at once diagnosed that the agreement between Mr. Bridgeman and Viscount Ishii foreshadowed a renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance and an eventual war, distant or near, between the United States on the one hand and Japan and Great Britain on the other. The psychological gymnastics wherewith the French Press construed an Anglo-Japanese agreement into an Anglo-American war were, however, a little too grotesque, and instead of frightening Mr. Gibson, Mr. Bridgeman, Lord Cecil, and Viscount Ishii, provided them with the first occasion for mirth that they had experienced since the whole gloomy business began. Whatever might be one's view of the futility of three Powers such as Japan, the United States, and Great Britain failing to agree on a plan which they each wanted, no serious person ever contemplated the possibility either of a renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance or of an Anglo-American war. Another Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ruled out of the question by every section of both British and Japanese official opinion, if for no other reason than that such an event would precipitate the process of competitive building in naval armaments such as it was the very hypothesis of each of them to avoid. It might be argued that the collective governmental spirit in Washington, in London, and in Tokio revealed a singular poverty in intelligence, but even three governments which could haggle and boggle over an agreement which they each desired could hardly drop to the level of producing by sheer stupidity the very opposite of what they desired. At any rate, it seemed clear that there was no danger of their object being defeated by a renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The Anglo-Japanese compromise proposal was put on the table at 10 Downing Street on July 19th. It quickly became known that the British Cabinet endorsed the work of the British Delegation at Geneva. The merit of the plan from the British point of view was that while it gave to America the satisfaction of a global criterion for the only type of cruiser that had any belligerent value, it would enable any one of the three parties to retain obsolete or small cruisers *pari passu* with each other, whereby the principle of parity between the United States and Great Britain would not be affected.

It would, thereby, satisfy a British need which was not an American need, namely, of cruisers which are useless for war but good enough for policing trade routes. The United States had never

wanted any cruisers other than fighting cruisers, and Congress therefore had refused to vote any money for any cruisers except fighting cruisers. Mr. Coolidge was thereby placed in a difficult position. He gave a general impression of being genuinely pacifist in motive, and the only method he could find of reconciling his conscience with his Congress was to suggest that Great Britain should follow America's example by agreeing to build no cruisers but fighting cruisers. As Great Britain did not want fighting cruisers, and did want police cruisers, she could not fall in with Mr. Coolidge's suggestion. Viscount Ishii made it known, at the same time, that Japanese official opinion would never agree to any arrangement which gave to Great Britain less than parity with the United States in fighting strength.

A British Cabinet discussion took place on July 22nd, when the full report of Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil had been submitted. Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil had returned to London for the purpose. It was made clear as a result of that meeting that the Cabinet and the Admiralty were agreed about the necessity of standing out for full belligerent parity—that is full parity in 10,000-ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns—with the United States; and that in so far as the United States insisted on an arrangement which would involve a large number of 10,000-ton cruisers, and refused to diminish the size of the guns from an 8-inch to a 6-inch calibre, Great Britain would be compelled to keep pace. Some people with an historical turn of mind recalled that Mr. Gibson's exposition of American policy at Geneva hardly tallied with the principles enunciated by Mr. Coolidge when he first suggested that the Conference be held. Last autumn, when he had been reported as having threatened Europe that the United States would build "an invincible air fleet" if his proposal for a naval limitation conference were not accepted, Mr. Coolidge indignantly repudiated the report, and added spontaneously that, far from contemplating any programme of competitive building, he would be prepared to leave America's strength in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines even below the 5-5-3 ratio, if such restraint could help the cause of disarmament. By contrast, Mr. Gibson's interpretation of American policy would, in the British and Japanese view, force Great Britain to build more fighting cruisers than Great Britain wanted, and would thus diametrically conflict with Mr. Coolidge's purpose.

The interruption in the Geneva Conference and the deliberations of the Cabinet in London were the occasion for some further mischief for the idle hands to do. After its exaggerated exploits of the week before the French Press fortunately ceased to count as a serious mischief-maker.

Perversely enough, however, sections of the American Press

and even sections of the Japanese Press proceeded to fill the breach. Some concern developed in Whitehall as a result, especially of certain misconceptions current in the American Press. The main point of misconception was the curious one that Great Britain was responsible for that part of the Anglo-Japanese compromise proposal whereby a 5-5-3 ratio in 10,000-ton cruisers would be established on the basis of the maximum number of such cruisers which would be allowed by the 590,000 ton maximum. It was true that such a proposal would force both Japan and Great Britain to build more of such cruisers than they contemplated, and that such a result would be a gross travesty of the purpose of a conference ostensibly designed to reduce naval building. But the whole object of British policy had been to persuade Mr. Gibson to agree to a smaller maximum in the big class of cruiser, and it was only because Mr. Gibson had not seen fit to agree that Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil reluctantly consented, in drawing up the Anglo-Japanese compromise, to concede Mr. Gibson's demand. To hold Great Britain responsible for an American programme combated by Great Britain, and in the end conceded against the grain by Great Britain, seemed to be an unnecessary misreading of a simple fact. The British difficulty about the American proposal for a total tonnage criterion was precisely based on the assumption that the United States, not wanting small cruisers for the defence of trade routes, would use her allotment to the full in the building of big fighting cruisers, and that Great Britain, to maintain her belligerent parity, would be reluctantly forced to build as many of such cruisers as the United States. That prospect, deplorable as it would be, would have been due not to British policy, but to the failure of British policy to win the approval of the United States.

In view of such misunderstandings it was decided by the British Cabinet that a governmental statement should be made to dispel them if possible before Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil returned to Geneva. Mr. Bridgeman had expounded British policy clearly enough at the plenary meeting of the Conference held on July 14th, and Sir Austen Chamberlain had made a subsequent statement in the House of Commons. Many of the commentators, however, although commenting on so serious a matter, appeared themselves not to be serious enough to base their comments on the original sources of information, which were readily accessible to them, but on distorted secondhand hearsay. Sir Austen Chamberlain made his promised statement in the House on July 27th. Oddly enough, he started from the premise that it would be "improper" for him to make any detailed statement about the British proposals, although he proceeded to make a long statement which emphasised the purpose of British policy and which lost nothing by the curtail-

ment of detail to the minimum. The essential passages of what he said were the following: "The invitation of the President of the United States of America to take part in a Disarmament Conference was understood by His Majesty's Government to be based on his desire to develop the policy of the Washington Conference by diminishing yet further naval expenditure while maintaining national security. With this twofold end His Majesty's Government are in complete agreement, and they desire to measure the merits of every proposal by the degree to which it furthers this twofold end. It is on this principle that they have proposed to diminish the size and armament of battleships, while leaving unaltered the numbers fixed at Washington. It is for this reason, also, that they suggest limitation in the number and armament of large fighting cruisers on principles similar to those adopted at Washington for battleships. This proposal, like the first, would greatly diminish national expenditure without endangering national safety.

"The questions connected with small cruisers are of a more complicated character. The strength of fleets can be stated in figures, and compared with precision. Their primary function is to fight other fleets, and, speaking broadly, they can easily be compared with each other. No such simple way of looking at the subject is possible in the case of small cruisers employed for police purposes in times of peace, and necessary for the protection of the lines of communication in time of war. Geographical considerations cannot be rationally ignored. It can hardly be denied, as was clearly stated by us when accepting the President's invitation, that such vessels are of vital necessity to an Empire whose widely-scattered parts are divided from each other by seas and oceans, whose most populous parts are dependent for their daily bread on sea-borne trade, and which perish if it fails to protect its external trade.

"It has to be noted, further, that the sea routes on which Britain depends for her existence lie largely in narrow waters bordered by other States. This is not the case with the United States of America, whose most important lines of communication lie either on land within her own frontiers, by sea along her own coasts, or in the great oceans. These circumstances received due consideration at Washington in 1922, and have not lost any of their importance. But it is hardly necessary to say that His Majesty's Government, while urging the special difficulties due to Britain's geographical position, are far from claiming the least right to dictate any small cruiser policy to other Powers. They accept the general principles which, as they understood them, underlie the President's policy that no maritime Power should maintain a larger navy than is required for its own security. To translate this into figures is, for the

reasons already given, far more difficult in the case of small cruisers than in the case of the larger types of surface vessels. - Anything resembling the *quasi*-permanent formula adopted at Washington for battleships is quite inapplicable to vessels designed for purposes which not only may, but must, vary with the geographical and economic position of the several Powers concerned. It becomes even more inapplicable when strength is estimated in terms of gross tonnage, without reference to numbers or armament. Two nations each possessing 100,000 tons of battleships may be regarded without serious error as being (so far) equal in fighting power. No such statement can reasonably be made about two nations one of which has ten cruisers of 10,000 tons, while the other has twenty cruisers of 5,000 tons. It all depends upon circumstances, though naval experts would probably agree that, if it came to fighting, the more numerous but smaller vessels would stand but a poor chance against their more powerful but less numerous opponents. If so, the country which for any reason was obliged to distribute its available tonnage among smaller units would be at a permanent disadvantage compared with one which was able to adopt a different scheme. There would be nominal parity, but real inequality.

"This is, of course, merely an illustration. But it suffices to explain why, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, no provisions open to this kind of criticism should be given the international authority already possessed by those parts of the Treaty of Washington which deal with strength and numbers. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary arrangement about the immediate future of cruiser building. But the British Empire cannot be asked to give any such temporary arrangement the appearance of an immutable principle, which might be treated as a precedent. Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the British Empire of maritime equality, a consummation which His Majesty's Government are well assured is no part of the President's policy."

Speaking the night before, at a dinner given by the Pilgrims to certain American editors visiting Great Britain, Lord Birkenhead emphasised an essential point. "If war were declared to-morrow," he said, "if the approach of commerce were denied to these islands, we have material for exactly seven weeks' subsistence for our population. Is anyone in the world going to say there is a country in the world placed in a position comparable to ours?"

Mr. Bridgeman and Lord Cecil returned to Geneva on July 28th. The policy they were instructed to advocate had been reviewed and confirmed in all its detail. It was not generally appreciated that the British preparation for this particular Conference on naval dis-

armament had been thorough in quality and prolonged in time. Ever since 1921 such a subsidiary conference had been anticipated. The British proposals produced at Geneva this year were the result of several years of work on the part of British Government Departments, including the Treasury. The figure of seventy cruisers for the whole purposes of the British Empire was, for instance, a carefully calculated minimum. Those commentators who asked why fifty-two cruisers should have been regarded as enough in 1923 and why seventy should be demanded as a minimum in 1927, had forgotten a Government statement made in the House of Commons on March 12th, 1923, when it was explained that, owing to exceptional financial circumstances, the Government was deliberately running a risk by abandoning its standard of naval security. It was further explained, on that occasion, that the circumstances were regarded as transient, and that the moment they returned to normal, the fleet would be restored to its standard strength.

Arriving in Geneva on July 28th Mr. Bridgeman at once conferred, first with Viscount Ishii, and then with Mr. Gibson. An official statement was issued which recapitulated the position as then established, and for the first time officially disclosed the precise nature of the British proposals in their final form. Those proposals in effect restated the Anglo-Japanese compromise plan of the week before. The statement ran thus: "The delegation met this afternoon and resumed the discussions which had been interrupted by the return of the British delegates to London. Mr. Bridgeman communicated the attached proposals, which, subject to certain modifications, follow the lines of those which were under consideration at the last meeting of the delegates. It was agreed to hold a plenary session of the Conference on Monday next (August 1st).

"The British proposals in respect of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines for incorporation in a treaty to remain in force until 1936, referred to above, are as follow:

"(1) The combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines below the age limit for replacement is not to exceed:

(a) For the British Empire and U.S.A., 590,000 tons.

(b) For Japan, 385,000 tons.

"(2) In addition, each Power may retain 25 per cent. of the tonnage given in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) in vessels over age.

"(3) Age limits before which replacement cannot take place:

10,000-ton cruisers	...	...	...	18 years.
Other cruisers	...	...	...	16 "
Destroyers	...	...	...	16 "
Submarines	...	...	...	13 "

"(4) The following vessels over 6,000 tons to be retained in their respective fleets:

" British Empire. —Four Hawkins class, carrying 7.5-inch guns. The York, carrying 8-inch guns. Two Emerald class, carrying 6-inch guns.

" United States. —Ten Omaha class, carrying 6-inch guns.

" Japan. —Four Furutaka class, carrying 8-inch guns.

" NOTE. —The general intention of this proposal is to provide for the retention of existing ships which, though still in full efficiency, fall neither within the 10,000, 8-inch class, nor the contemplated class with a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and maximum armament of 6-inch guns. The British delegation, recognising that this proposal would leave the United States of America with no 8-inch gun cruisers in this class, are prepared to agree to the construction by the United States of America of vessels which, in the opinion of the naval advisors of the three delegations, would equalise the strength of the British Empire and the United States in this class.

" (5) All other cruisers to be divided into two classes :

(a) 10,000-ton cruisers.

(b) Smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and mounting a gun not exceeding 6-inch in calibre.

" (6) 10,000-ton cruisers to be limited in number :

For British Empire and United States ... 12

For Japan 8

" (7) Maximum standard displacement for flotilla leaders to be 1,850 tons and for destroyers 1,500 tons. Flotilla leaders and destroyers not to carry a gun above 5-inch.

" (8) That of the total tonnage in the destroyer class, 100 per cent. may be used for vessels of 1,500 tons and under, but no more than 16 per cent. of the total may be used for the flotilla leader class—i.e., vessels above 1,500 tons, and limited to a maximum of 1,850 tons.

" (9) Submarines to be divided into two classes :

Class (a) 1,800 tons down to 1,000 tons.

Class (b) maximum 600 tons.

Submarines not to carry a gun in excess of 5-inch.

" (10) The maximum tonnage to be devoted to submarines of either class of whatever age to be as follows :

(a) British Empire and U.S., 90,000.

(b) Japan, 60,000,

of which total tonnage not more than two-thirds may be used for Class (a) submarines.

" (11) Except for the restrictions imposed in paragraphs 6, 8, and 10, the total tonnage allocated to be used as each Power thinks best."

That was a clear scheme, which, however, became quickly involved

in a cloud of pessimism due to American official inspiration. A plenary meeting of the Conference was due to be held on August 1st, and was commonly expected to register the final failure. As a result of a message from Mr. Coolidge, Mr. Gibson asked for a postponement of the meeting so that the British proposal could be further examined. The revised date decided on for the meeting was August 4th. The interval was spent, not in any convincing attempt to rescue something from the wreck, but in a general manoeuvre for the tactical ground on which to accept failure. One of the last positive contributions of the American delegation was the drafting of a proposed political clause to be inserted in the treaty, running thus :

" In the event that, prior to December 31st, 1936, any one of the contracting parties shall consider that the tonnage allocation in the cruiser class has been utilised by any other of the contracting Powers in a manner to call for an adjustment of the total tonnage allocation of that class, such High Contracting Party may at any time, subsequent to January 31st, 1931, and upon six months' prior notice, convoke a meeting of the Powers parties to the present Treaty with a view to ascertaining whether such an adjustment can be made by mutual agreement. In the event that no agreement is reached at such a conference, any of the High Contracting Parties may give notice of the desire to terminate the present Convention, and this notification shall be effective within one year after the receipt thereof by the other parties to the Treaty. In such an event the Treaty shall terminate with respect to all the parties thereto."

An astonishing proposal! It clearly revealed that the American Delegation had definitely abandoned all serious interest in the Conference. Even the suggestion, made in the interval between August 1st and August 4th by the Japanese Delegation, that at any rate a " naval holiday " be arranged, made no impression, because America's mind was made up. The purpose of such a " naval holiday " would have been to stabilise building and thus prevent competition in the period to 1931, when the existing Washington Treaty is due to be revised. Yet it baffles commonsense to fathom what conceivable objection there could be to a proposal whereby Great Britain and Japan should agree not to exceed their present building programme as already authorised in return for America's agreeing not to exceed the British total in the auxiliary vessels, which were the point at issue.

The Naval Limitation Conference met for its last session on August 4th and merely announced its failure. Mr. Gibson, as Chairman, read a jointly agreed epitaph thus :

" In pursuance of the suggestion of the President of the United States, the plenipotentiary delegates of the President of the United

States, of His Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan met at Geneva on June 20th to consider the limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

" Meetings have been held from that date until August 4th, during which period the delegates and their advisers have considered in detail various methods of effecting this object. On many important questions provisional agreements have been reached, certain of which are embodied in the annexed report of the Technical Committee of the Conference. These points of agreement relate particularly to the limitation of destroyers and submarines, and it was only when the Conference took up the question of the limitation of the cruiser class that difficulties were encountered. These difficulties proved to be of a character to render it desirable to adjourn the present negotiations until the respective Governments have had an opportunity to give further consideration to the problem and to the various methods which have been suggested for its solution.

" The American Delegates presented the view that within total tonnage limitation, which they initially suggested should be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and the British Empire and between 150,000 and 180,000 tons for Japan, each of the Powers should have liberty to build the number and the type of vessels which they might consider best suited to their respective naval needs, with freedom, subject to the limitation of the Washington Treaty, to arm these vessels as they saw fit.

" The British Delegates, whilst putting proposals tending to a limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, have opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone on the ground that the largest ship and the heaviest gun permissible must inevitably become the standard. They desired, first, a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers; and, secondly, the establishment of a secondary type of cruiser of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons carrying guns of a maximum calibre of six inches. The British delegates contended that the establishment of this type would alone enable the British Empire, within a moderate figure of total tonnage, to attain the numbers which it regards as indispensable to meet its special circumstances and its special needs.

" The Japanese Delegates presented the view that no total tonnage level should be fixed which would affect a real limitation of auxiliary naval vessels. As for the question of the 8-inch gun cruiser, while the Japanese Government could not agree to any restriction as a matter of principle, they had no difficulty in declaring that, provided a tonnage level of 315,000 tons for auxiliary surface vessels were fixed for Japan, they would not build any further 8-inch gun cruisers until 1936, except those already authorised in existing programmes.

" Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made and the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British Delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American Delegates for the lowest possible total tonnage limitation with freedom of armaments within such limitation, subject to the restriction as to armaments already set by the Washington Treaty.

" Faced with this difficulty, the delegates have deemed it wise to adjourn the present Conference with this frank statement of their respective views, and to submit the problem for the further consideration of their Governments, in the hope that consultation between them may lead to an early solution.

" Further, the delegates agree to recommend to their respective Governments the desirability of arranging between the signatories of the Washington Treaty that the Conference to be called pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 21 of that Treaty should be held earlier than August, 1931, the date contemplated under the terms of that instrument, in order that any decisions reached by such a Conference may come into force before the capital ship construction programme commences—namely, in November of that year.

" In making these recommendations, and in submitting this statement of the points of agreement as well as of the points on which agreement has not yet been achieved, the delegates desire to place on record a statement of their conviction that the obstacles that have been encountered should not be accepted as terminating the efforts to bring about a further limitation of naval armaments. On the contrary, they trust that the measure of agreement that has been reached, as well as the work that has been done in clarifying their respective positions, will make it possible, after consultation between the Governments, to find a basis for reconciling divergent views and leading to the early conclusion of an agreement for the limitation of auxiliary naval vessels which will permit of substantial economy, and, while safeguarding national security, promote the feeling of mutual confidence and good understanding."

Before that statement was read, each of the three chief delegates had made a final review of the policy for which they stood. The content was well enough known already, but the chastened tone of regret which marked the closing speeches of Mr. Bridgeman and Viscount Ishii contrasted with the unfortunate polemics of Mr. Gibson, who, moreover, having the last word, made his controversial points dogmatically and without the possibility of being answered. He made mistakes of fact, both about the circumstances of the Conference and about naval technicalities, such as would have been

unlikely had the American delegation prepared for the Conference with the same care and for the same length of time as the British delegation had spent on it. One of Mr. Gibson's mistakes was important enough to draw a public correction a few days later. Mr. Gibson misquoted a statement made by Lord Balfour at the Washington Conference and interpreted it as meaning that the whole purposes of the British Empire could be adequately served by 450,000 tons of cruisers. Speaking on August 6th, 1927, Lord Balfour quoted the actual words he had used in 1922, which were inescapably precise in laying down that the 450,000 tonnage referred exclusively to battle fleets and their auxiliaries for battle purposes and took no account of police needs. Mr. Gibson's point in asking why 450,000 tons should have been regarded as enough in 1922 and why Great Britain should want more in 1927 for the whole purposes of the Empire was, therefore, surprisingly misleading. Lord Balfour's words in 1922 were:

"They have (that is, the American Government), as we think rightly, taken the battle fleet as the aggressive unit which they have in the main to consider, and in the battle fleet you must include those auxiliary ships without which a modern battle fleet has neither eyes nor ears, has little power of defence against certain forms of attack, little power of observation, little power of dealing with any equal foe to which it may be opposed. Taking these two—that is, the battleships and the cruisers—as really belonging to one subject—namely, the battle fleet—taking these two, the battleships themselves and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to the battle fleet, we think (that is, the British Government think) that the proportion between the various countries is acceptable. We think the limitation of armaments is reasonable. We think it should be accepted. We firmly believe that it will be accepted."

As if to make clarity still clearer, Lord Balfour, in another speech made at the Washington Conference, emphasised the subsidiary needs of the British Empire, specifically emphasising the point that Great Britain was always within seven weeks of starvation and depended for replenishment on supplies from abroad. By contrast with Mr. Gibson, an American official, namely, Mr. French, Chairman of the House Naval Committee, fully agreed with Lord Balfour's point. In presenting the naval estimates in the House of Representatives on January 4th of this year Mr. French showed a sympathetic understanding of the British case. Only two of his typical sentences need be quoted. "The people of the Great Britain," he said, "depend, and must depend, upon the outside world. Their dependency is for food, it is for clothing, it is for structural material, it is for fuel, and especially fuel oil. Great Britain must maintain open to her ships the lanes of the sea. To do

this Great Britain must have naval bases, and Great Britain more than the United States is in need of types of ships such as cruisers that are swift and of the widest radius of action."

It seems an odd perversity that made the American Delegation at Geneva refuse to understand or even to recognise the British case, when it was sympathetically recognised and understood by important sections of American official thought. It seems a worse perversity that Mr. Gibson, demanding a concentration on fighting cruisers, would not even consider a reduction from 8-inch guns. A naval limitation conference which breaks down on the insistence by one delegation of maximum fighting strength and maximum guns when the other two want to reduce both, especially as the one delegation referred to represents the country which suggested the Conference, is a phenomenon which cannot be explained by reason. It is so gross as to suggest the hope that time will chasten the unreason and that a better experience may be in store on a future occasion.

THE SCANDINAVIAN TREATIES OF CONCILIATION.

Mr. Eliel Löfgren, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has written a book which makes a good contribution to the important subject of international conciliation and arbitration. He has a distinguished reputation as a lawyer, was a former legal advisor to the Swedish Foreign Office, and has represented Sweden more than once at the League of Nations Assembly. His book is called "The Scandinavian Treaties of Conciliation and Arbitration and their Place in the International System of Justice" (*De Nordiska förlikningsoch skiljedomsavtalen i deras ställning till det internationella rättssystemet*) and is published by Messrs. Norstedt & Söner, Stockholm. The Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland, have of late years been conspicuous for their advocacy of arbitration as a method of settling international disputes. Sweden has taken the initiative in much interesting work to that end. During the war a Swedish-Danish-Norwegian Committee was formed, on a suggestion of the Swedish Government, to draw up a scheme for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Its recommendations made their contribution to the preliminary work which went to the framing of the League Covenant in 1919. Scandinavian proposals have led to certain amendments of the Covenant in recent years, and it was a Scandinavian suggestion which led to the Assembly's resolution of September 22nd, 1922, which recommended certain rules for the guidance of Permanent Conciliation Committees.

Having thus played a prominent rôle in the early educational stages of the European movement towards treaties of arbitration and

conciliation, the Scandinavian countries were among the first to put those principles to the test. The Swedish Government in the spring of 1924 organised at Stockholm a conference of the Scandinavian States whose purpose was to put into practice the Assembly Resolution of September, 1922. The conference succeeded in its object, and on June 27th, 1924, a series of conventions was signed by the participant States. Those conventions stipulated that a Permanent Conciliation Committee should be formed by each combination of two States, that it should consist of five members, to be appointed by each party—on the condition that only one of the two be a national of the State concerned—and the fifth jointly appointed by the two parties. The central provision of the conventions was that any dispute not settled by the direct diplomatic method or not submitted to the Permanent Court at the Hague should be referred to the relevant Conciliation Committee; that the committee should investigate and report within six months, and suggest a solution.

In the winter of 1925-1926 the Swedish Government took the further step of concluding a series of arbitration conventions: with Norway on November 25th, 1925; with Denmark on January 14th, and with Finland on January 29th, 1926. The principle of those conventions was that any dispute which had not been referred to the Hague and not settled by the Conciliation Committee should be referred unreservedly to a court of arbitration, which, failing an agreed alternative, should be constituted in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907. The Hague arrangement is that each party to the dispute appoints two arbiters out of a list proposed by the signatory powers of the Hague Convention and those four members then appoint a fifth. It is the business of the Court to pronounce judgment in accordance with the principles of international law and "*ex aequo et bono*." The parties agree to accept the Court's decision as final. The Scandinavian conventions were thorough in their provision for contingencies. A dispute is not necessarily closed even after it is formally settled and the settlement accepted by all parties concerned; for there may then arise a dispute about the real practical meaning of the settlement, about its interpretation, or about its execution. In such a case the Arbitration Conventions provided that the new point of dispute be again submitted to the same court which pronounced the decision. It was provided that the conventions continue in force for twenty years, and that they be automatically and indefinitely renewed unless denounced two years before the end of any period.

Those conventions and their relative value to the general system for the pacific settlement of disputes are the subject of Mr. Löfgren's book. He analyses the different types of conventions for conciliation and arbitration which had been concluded up to the time of the

Locarno Treaties and examines the value of the League Covenant in the general principle of such conventions. One of the interesting points he makes is that the Scandinavian method of organising peace differs from the Locarno method in that it aims at an unconditional instrument of conciliation and arbitration. He submits that any system of arbitration must be obligatory before it can be reliable, and that obligatory arbitration is nothing more than the application of the principle of membership of the League. "We do not entertain" he adds "any exaggerated ideas of the value of our efforts for the final attainment of these objects as long as the great powers have not universally entered upon the same road. For our own part we have found ourselves so much less prevented from taking this step as in our position it has not implied any considerable sacrifice to relinquish the right to administer justice, without the support of arbitration, by means of the sword. The right of the first may be useful to the big, but is of doubtful value to the small."

Mr. Löfgren makes a hit at the League's handling of the Åland problem when he writes: "It is, moreover, the express will of the Scandinavian States and of the States co-ordinated with them to have their political disputes (i.e., non-judicial controversies) settled by peaceful means, that is in the last resort by arbitration, and not by the political expedients of a League Council over which the great Powers actually predominate."

Scandinavian commentators claim that the Scandinavian countries have arrived at the stage where they are competent to settle their own disputes pacifically without the help of the League of Nations. Whether an ideal which thus supersedes the Geneva ideal may not be over-reaching itself will be a subject of controversy; but the alacrity with which Scandinavian opinion makes the point is a sad commentary on what happened at Geneva in March, 1926.

DR. MASARYK AGAIN PRESIDENT.

Dr. T. G. Masaryk has again been elected President of the Czechoslovak Republic. Europe, therefore, retains for another seven years one of its reliable assets. President Masaryk has come to be taken for granted. On June 11th he delivered his Presidential Message to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly and Senate. His Message made healthy hearing, and would have made healthy reading in the midst of European disharmony; yet the British Press unanimously ignored it. The evil that Europe does lives and flourishes in its Press; the good is held to be less exciting. Some of President Masaryk's passages therefore are here rescued: "And now," he said, "after the world war, close consideration is given to the great changes in society which have come into existence everywhere and which again are regarded by some

as a definite, by others as only a partial, decay, while others welcome them as signs of regeneration and resurrection. I myself regard the fall of three great Empires and the foundation of new States as a sign of progress and regeneration. Even in a Bedouin's wretched tent you will find simple philosophers of history and politics, reflecting on the consequences of the great war to Europe and other parts of the world. 'Your Europeans,' they often say, 'are falling, and Asia and Africa are about to occupy your place.' And so while on my journey, in my capacity as President of a new State, I was constantly led to the question as to what keeps nations healthy, what guarantees the stability and permanence of their States and themselves, what, in fact, constitutes the true welfare of nations, what ensures a constant progress and settled existence for them. Every statesman, every politician and every political party, and in fact everybody to whom the destinies of his own nation, and thus also of other nations, are not indifferent, must discover for himself what is 'the one thing necessary' for nations and States (as Komensky formulated it), what is not needed, what harms them and leads them to destruction. During the agitated period of the Thirty Years War Komensky continually reverted to the problem of the decay of States and nations. He left us a small treatise on the happiness of nations, and in the decline of his life—by a chance at the same age as myself—he defined the 'one thing necessary' for the life of society and State. He attached the greatest importance to religion and morality for nation and State, and mentioned seven kinds of obstacles and confusions detrimental to the welfare of the people: a multitude of rulers, a multitude of laws, many interpreters of statutes who bewilder the public courts, a multitude of external ceremonies which obscure the true basis of affairs, contempt for laws and the infringement of them, which is called taking into account things as they are, the mutual jealousy of rulers, and finally, open wars and bestial savagery. Translated into the terminology of to-day, this is a justifiable criticism of many aspects of present conditions. . . . Democracy must assert itself not only within, but also without. In foreign politics also argument must suppress violence and deceit. The world, as Palacky was well aware, is becoming centralised. No State, no nation can live without agreement and co-operation with its neighbours and other States. Smaller States, we ourselves in our geographical situation, cannot safely continue without the sympathy of neighbours and other States—our *raison d'être* must be acknowledged and respected by the world. Our policy must be a world policy."

August 15th, 1927.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

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ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY.*

The publication of selected *Essays in Philosophy* by the late Professor James Ward, prefaced by a memoir of him written by his daughter, will be widely welcomed and will amply repay careful study. Professor Ward had himself contemplated such a publication and made some preparation for it. His purpose has been admirably carried out by his literary executors, Professor W. R. Sorley and Professor G. F. Stout.

The volume contains twelve essays delivered at intervals throughout a long course of years. Hence, as the editors say, "they form part of the Author's philosophical biography"; at the same time possessing "a certain characteristic unity." While containing a general account of the philosophical point of view and tracing the history of philosophy, the essays contain both penetrative criticisms of particular philosophical systems and careful accounts of the present position of philosophical speculation. They expound a philosophic standpoint which is consistent from first to last, and is sustained to the very end with unabated vigour and grasp of thought, as both the essays on Einstein and Epistemology (X) and the masterly study of Kant (XI) sufficiently show. While addressed to more or less learned societies, the essays may be termed "popular" and should be read with interest and comparative ease by all who are concerned either with philosophy in itself, or with its relation to religion on the one hand, and to the sciences on the other. Throughout the volume perfectly lucid expositions are brightened

* *Essays in Philosophy*. By James Ward, with a Memoir of the Author by Olwen Ward Campbell. Cambridge University Press, 1927. 16s. net.

by striking and pregnant aphorisms, which are the outcome of profound reflection.

Those who are acquainted with Professor Ward's *Principles of Psychology*, still more with his Gifford Lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism* and on *The Realm of Ends*, will be familiar with the point of view which the essays expound and illustrate in a slighter way. Professor Ward was a searching and unsparing critic of the excessive pretensions both of Naturalism in Science and of Absolutism in Philosophy. His standpoint in regard to both was that of a spiritual philosopher equipped with and making use of a careful, comprehensive and discriminating psychology, which he had himself done so much to develop and establish. His philosophical starting-point, therefore, was his recognition and insistence upon the reality of the finite personalities, which are the *datum* of psychology. From rigorous interrogation of the contents and characteristic activities of consciousness, he drew the principles by which his philosophical speculation was guided and informed. Personalities—their connotation and eventual purposiveness in pursuit of the good—became the light of all his seeing, since they are the realities of which we have the closest vision. These personalities with their characteristic and world-creating activities Naturalism could not explain and Absolutism must not explain away. What was involved with such personalities, thus amply recognised and carefully studied, it was the task of a spiritual philosophy—that is, of a philosophy which takes full account of them—to explore. The words which Professor Ward applies to Kant (p. 342) are true of his own endeavour. It was “to interpret the world in terms of ourselves, and here more especially to orientate the natural from the standpoint of the spiritual.”

The interest and value of the volume are increased by the memoir of her father, which is furnished by Mrs. Ward Campbell with an admirable combination of appreciation and discrimination. The earlier portion makes painful reading, for it is the record of a spiritual tragedy, of the way in which James Ward won emancipation from the harsh and repellent narrowness of his early Calvinistic upbringing at the cost, not only of his Ministry, but of his membership of the Christian Church. This result was brought about, in part, by the intolerance of a minority in and beyond the Congregational Church in Cambridge, but also by a certain proud and impulsive sensitiveness, on his part, which characterised him throughout his life. Hence it came to pass that in the crisis of his life he set out as a lonely, sorrowful, and yet heroic venturer to seek the rediscovery of the spiritual world and the much-needed reformation of thought about it, apart from the Christian Church instead of within its borders. Yet he returned eventually from his great

voyage to justify and elucidate the essential spiritual presuppositions upon which the Christian religion rests. In his case Faith had “removed mountains” (see Essay I) and the last essay in this volume, that on “Faith and Eternal Life,” is a noble exposition “by one whom you must regard as an outsider” of much that is loftiest and inmost in the experience that the Christian religion has brought to birth.

J. S. L.

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MACEDON.*

The publication of the sixth volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History* almost synchronises with the death of the man who planned it. This is not the place to attempt an estimate of the tireless and fruitful historical labours of Professor Bury, but it is desirable to reprint the note that the surviving editors have been able to place at the end of the preface.

On June 1st Professor Bury ended a life of brilliant achievement inspired by a single-minded devotion to learning. From the time when he prepared the general plan of this work, his erudition and wisdom as Editor-in-chief have guided our counsels, and we would place on record our personal sense of loss at the death of the most sympathetic and generous of colleagues.

It was fitting that Professor J. B. Bury should die at Rome, if it was destined that he should be taken from us at a time when historians could ill spare a force that tended to save research from mere mechanical registration. His name will always be associated with Gibbon, who perhaps influenced him overmuch, and with Rome and with New Rome. To the present volume he contributes the chapter on Dionysius of Syracuse whom he regards “as the ablest and most important Greek statesman between Pericles of Athens and Philip of Macedon. By the originality of his ideas and the daring of his schemes he stands apart from all the rulers of his time and was the pioneer of a new age in which the conditions of the world would be transformed.” When he died in 367 B.C. he had marshalled the Aryans against both the Semites and that strange race the Carthaginians, from whom he practically wrenched his Sicily, and in a real sense opened up the way for a Roman Italy, that is to say for a European polity that Greece could never have achieved. Yet he did not spurn the humanism of Athens and it would be interesting to read his lost tragedy, *The Ransom of Hector*, which was

* *The Cambridge Ancient History*. Edited by J. B. Bury, G. A. Cook and F. E. Adcock. Volume VI. *Macedon* 401-301 B.C. 308. net. *The Cambridge Ancient History*. First Volume of Plates. Prepared by C. T. Seltman. 258. net. Cambridge: at the University Press.

awarded a first prize at the Lenæan Festival. It may have been poor stuff that the Tyrant of Syracuse thrust upon the trembling Athenian world, but, as Professor Bury says, "it is difficult to believe that it would have been awarded the prize at Athens if he had not some mastery of technique and could not write correct verses." However that may be it was clearly his own work, for he celebrated his victory with an unusual bout of intemperance that caused his death.

The new volume traces the world environment from which Macedon, coming into prominence in the last years of Dionysius, sprang and tells at full length the story of Philip and his mighty son. Persia's expansion into Europe had been definitely stopped by the fortune of war at Salamis and Plataea; but Greece had not the political instinct to form a buffer empire. Three great Greek States instead successively played for power. The ascendancy of Sparta even with the aid of Persia was short-lived, the freedom that Thebes wrung from Sparta was a magnificent phenomenon but it led no whither, while a revived Athens, though able to form in 377 B.C. the Second Athenian Confederacy, a union that at any rate showed some vigorous sparks of statesmanship, never made it effective on the mainland. The Naval League was for a time effective but "the grasping policy of Timotheus killed the Second Athenian Confederacy as surely as Pericles' and Cleon's overbearing attitude had killed the First. For a second time the Athenian protectorate played over into a tyranny." In only one decade from the day in August 371 B.C. when the Thebans broke the Spartan line at Leuctra we see "the final failure of city-state imperialism on land and sea." A new Greece was in the making.

The Persian occupation of Egypt had been broken by revolt at the end of the fifth century and by the founding of the twenty-ninth and thirtieth native dynasties, "the last dynasty of native Egyptian kings to rule the whole land." This last dynasty was founded in 378 B.C. and lasted till 343 B.C., when Persian control was resumed. Ten years later Alexander occupied the delta as a preliminary to his attack on Persia and founded the new city of Alexandria-Rhacotis. "With the foundation of Alexandria the ancient history of Egypt ends, and that of the new Hellenistic Egypt, ruled by Greek pharaohs from the Greek sea-city and in continuous connection with the Mediterranean world, begins." Another phase of the environment amid which the great Macedonians pursued their imperial polity was the coming of Judaism and the appearance of a Semitic people, in the heart of the Persian Empire, that were destined to crystallise for all races the conception of unity in things human and divine. New forces were everywhere. Philip succeeded his brother Perdicas III in 359 B.C. In Thebes he had already learnt

from Epaminondas new military conceptions, and Hellenic culture was not unknown in Macedonia where the royal house was partly of Hellenic stock. Philip at once broke the power of his northern neighbours, probably at Monastir, and his armies (unlike the Greek forces) were regular armies, while he developed a sound economic position that was of immense importance in the coming conflicts with Athens and Persia. Thirteen years of obscure Grecian struggles—the Sacred War, the Olynthian War made notable by the speeches of Demosthenes—ended with Macedon becoming the leading power in the Greek world. A final struggle with Athens became inevitable, a struggle that ended with the victory of the Macedonian trained troops of Chaeronea. Philip was wisely merciful to Athens and formed a Greek League with the Amphictyonic Council as the inter-State judicial tribunal and as a goal a joint campaign against Persia.

The murder of Philip in 336 B.C., Mr. Pickard-Cambridge rightly declares, was "the end of the strongest of the few strong men who had appeared on the stage of Greek history since the end of the Peloponnesian War." But he was more than a strong man. He had a political instinct which was denied to the greatest of the pure Greeks. The triumph of his enemy, Demosthenes, would have meant at the impossible best a prolonged revival of the City-State. Philip pointed, as Dionysius had pointed, to a polity that was fulfilled by Rome. Amazing as were the achievements of Alexander and far-reaching as were the results of this crash of the Aryan into the Eastern world, probably the conceptions of Philip have had more effect on the history of mankind. But of the greatness of Alexander there can be no doubt.

Mr. Tarn points to Napoleon's opinion of his generalship. He was, as Mr. Tarn says:

A master in the combination of various arms; he taught the world the advantages of campaigning in winter, the value of pressing pursuit to the utmost, and the principle of "march divided, fight united." He marched usually in two divisions, one conducting the impedimenta and his own travelling light; his speed of movement was extraordinary. It is said that he attributed his military success to "never putting anything off." He understood absolutely how to keep his men's affection, and though their morale broke at the Beas, he had maintained it intact during eight strenuous years. He discovered the value of amusements in this respect, and held athletic and musical contests at every important halting place. . . . The truth is that his success was too complete. Perfect success invariably looks easy; but had a lesser man attempted what he achieved, and failed, we should have heard enough of the hopeless military difficulties of the undertaking. Did Crassus or Anthony find the invasion of Persia easy?

As a statesman we know less of Alexander. Death forbade him to complete his reorganisation of the East, but what he achieved in the way of the organisation of his vast empire seems to place him among the very greatest of statesmen. He used the material to his hand and transformed it: the mighty Roman method. He was the greatest of all city builders. Twenty-five cities at least sprang from his hand and he is said to have founded seventy.

Hardly was he dead when legend became busy with his terrible name, and strove to give him that world-kingdom which he never sought in life. Around him the whole dream-world of the East took shape and substance; of him every old story of a divine world conqueror was told afresh. More than eighty versions of the Alexander-romance, in twenty-four languages, have been collected, some of them the wildest of fairy tales; they range from Britain to Malaya; no other story in the world has spread like his.

And the man was all the while greater than the wildest romance ever dreamed.

When he prayed for a union of hearts and a joint commonwealth of Macedonians and Persians, he proclaimed for the first time, through a brotherhood of peoples, the brotherhood of man. . . . The torch Alexander lit for long only smouldered; perhaps it still only smoulders to-day; but it never has been, never can be, quite put out.

Mr. Tarn's chapters on Alexander and his work are certainly the most attractive parts of an attractive and very learned volume. Mr. Cornford's essay on the Athenian Philosophical Schools, Dr. Barker's paper on Greek political thought and theory in the fourth century, and the essays on Greek art by Professor Beazley and Greek architecture by Mr. Robertson, will attract a variety of students or general readers, while the remarkable volume of plates prepared by Mr. Seltman will, indeed, rejoice all archæologists. The technical production of that volume is excellent and is a very admirable and essential adjunct to this great history.

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SIR JOHN MACDONELL'S LECTURES.*

It is nearly six years and a half since Sir John Macdonell died. In 1920 he had retired from the Quain Professorship of Comparative Law, a chair in the University of London that he had held with distinction for some nineteen years, and these lectures, edited by his son-in-law, Professor R. W. Lee, were delivered from that chair in the years 1911 to 1913. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in his admir-

* *Historical Trials*. By the late Sir John Macdonell. Edited by R. W. Lee, with a Preface by the Right Hon. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 10s. net.

able preface to this volume tells something of the story of Macdonell's laborious and fruitful life. He was born in 1845 at Brechin, the second son of a clever and scholarly family. His father was a Highland Roman Catholic, his mother a Protestant. In school life he was greatly influenced by an Aberdeenshire teacher, the Rev. George Stewart. At the University of Aberdeen he attained first-class classical honours, and he was destined to manifest great linguistic powers. Lord Shaw points out that he "appeared to use Latin, French, German and Italian not only with facility but with a very acute power of gathering from these sources matter relevant to any broad juridical survey." At an early date he turned to journalism, to economic and legal authorship, and eventually to the English Bar, where he did well and in due course became a Master of the Supreme Court and the Kings' Remembrancer. He was a brilliant Civilian, and on his knowledge of Roman law and its history (which was recognised by the honorary doctorate conferred by his own university) was based his remarkable range of knowledge of legal systems. Lord Shaw places him "in the first rank of the jurists of his time." His industry was remarkable.

At the busiest time of a tireless life he found time to contribute constantly to *The Times* on the great legal and literary questions of the hour, and was a constant contributor to *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*. He was a founder of the Society of Comparative Legislation and its Journal contains innumerable contributions from his pen. He was one of the most brilliant prose writers of his time, and his style indicated the depths of knowledge from which he drew. One of his last labours was the chairmanship of the Attorney-General's "Committee of Inquiry into the responsibility of Germany for Crimes by its Armed Forces on Land and Sea and in the Air." Lord Shaw rightly declares that this Committee involved extraordinary research and industry, and writes, "The Report was framed. Shall it ever see the light? Perhaps not. And this may be well: although history in a later age may grow restless over this oblivion." In fact, the Report was more than framed. It was completed, printed, signed and bound in blue-book form. At the last moment the Report was withheld from publication and neither Sir John Macdonell nor Sir Arthur Peterson ever received any recognition of their labours. When Sir John Macdonell retired from the Law Courts he was seventy-five years of age, but he actually resumed practice and wrote some important opinions. However, his health was broken, and he died on March 17th, 1921, to the deep regret of innumerable friends, and not least of the band of younger men who looked upon him as their master in the fields of legal research.

Sir John Macdonell left behind him a very substantial number of manuscripts on legal or quasi-legal subjects, many of them being

the text of his lectures as Quain Professor. It has long been hoped that some of them might see the light, and not least his lectures on Private International Law which he himself had been tempted to publish. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the present volume is but a first instalment of his ripper work. A volume of collected essays from various periodicals should also become available. Whatever he wrote threw a flood of light on the subject with which he dealt, and essays that he himself had passed for publication would be of value to the social historian concerned with the forces that were in operation in the twenty years before the Great War.

In the present volume Sir John Macdonell ranges over a great historical field, and his charm of style and depth of knowledge enlighten the reader's view of a series of historical phases. The trials include one classical theme, the trial of Socrates, and it is to be regretted that he did not also deal with some of the great Roman trials which his knowledge as a Civilian made him particularly competent to discuss. Lord Shaw points out that in the account of the trial of Socrates, as in the majority of the trials considered in the volume, the conclusion is reached that the trial was no trial at all. Socrates was not in a worse case than others in mediæval and almost modern times. Perhaps he was not in worse case than some persons who have been tried in the United States of America since Sir John Macdonell's death. Lord Shaw writes :

This upsetting of true judicial process, or rather the substitution therefor of organised political hatred under the semblance of judicial forms, this is the broad fact which these pages bring forth—fact upon fact, to the complete satisfaction of every fair mind. Problems, for example, of De Quincey in the last generation and of George Bernard Shaw in this generation on the subject of Jeanne d'Arc could not be more convincingly confirmed. But it is well to have here before us the record of her Re-Trial, practically by the same authorities, and to note how in cooler blood and more accessible to shame they expunged the first trial from the Records of Justice. Another instance where, alas! no official Re-Trial has helped historical matter. As to Mary Queen of Scots, the paper in this volume (I have gone over a good deal of this ground) does, I think, justly bring to shame the prejudices of both Kingsley and of Froude; and I agree with every word of Macdonell's conclusion.

Sir John Macdonell sums up the chief facts in the proceedings :

A commission issued which virtually assumes her guilt; proposals to poison her; these not carried out; the substitution of the semblance of a trial before a court composed in the main of officers of State; no witnesses called against her; no precise charge formulated; refusal to assign her an advocate; refusal to let her have access to her papers; letters put in evidence against her, but no evidence given of their authenticity; no proof of their actual delivery to her; confessions or admissions used without

the production of the persons who made them, as she demanded; disregard of the provision of the 27th Elizabeth as to two witnesses. What is to be said of it? Mr. Hosack speaks of it as the "most disgraceful of all the judicial iniquities which disgrace the history of England." I am inclined to think he is right.

Lord Shaw in his comment adds "So am I." But does the matter end there? No one can doubt that the unfortunate Queen had a travesty of a trial and that, by hook or by crook, Elizabeth and her ministers were determined to end the peril to which, they honestly believed, the person of Elizabeth and the English State were subjected while Mary lived. If Mary was guilty of acts that amounted to treason under the Act of Edward III it is possible to hold that substantial justice was done despite the travesty of the trial. The preliminary issue was this, was Mary triable at all? Now curiously enough the Attorney-General's Committee of 1918, of which Sir John Macdonell was chairman, had to consider a similar issue, and he held that there is no rule or usage exempting from criminal jurisdiction foreign sovereigns who have invaded the country of another sovereign. The case of the Emperor William if he had fallen into the hands of the Allies was closely similar to that of Queen Mary. The Commissioners who tried Queen Mary held practically the same view as that held by Sir John Macdonell in 1919. The Crown in 1576 ought to have had the courage to try the Queen for high treason and not to have acted by a special Statutory Tribunal. The case against Mary was not illusory. The Babington plot of 1586 contemplated a revolution, the death of Elizabeth and the placing of Mary on the throne, and that Mary knew of designs against the rule of Elizabeth is clear. Suppose the case had been tried during the late war as a case of High Treason, would Mary have been acquitted? Every effort would have been made by the Crown to link Mary with the Babington conspiracy. According to the modern rules of evidence that was not done at Fotheringay, and the case against Mary was not proved in our modern sense of the term. But those who regard Mary's letter to the Prince of Parma—apparently unknown at the time of the trial—as strong evidence of guilt, may well say that the case against Mary would have been better prepared to-day than it was in 1586. The brutal proceedings of 1586 should not blind the mind as to the real issue, was Mary a party to a conspiracy against the State? That issue has never been decided by historians. Sir John Macdonell frankly declares that the case against Mary was conclusive if the alleged letter to Babington from Mary of July 17th, 1586, was genuine. He merely says that the authorship was not proved, and the best evidence of these letters was deliberately suppressed. On the other hand Mary apparently did not repudiate her alleged letters to Babington: "I deny them not; only show me a

single word in them about Elizabeth and then I shall allow your right to prosecute me." It is impossible not to sympathise with Mary in view of her helpless state, her brilliant efforts, and the brutality of her judges, but it is by no means clear that a modern English jury would not have found her guilty if the case had been presented in a perfectly regular manner. Under the modern procedure the Queen could not have risked declining to give evidence, and under cross-examination her relationship with Babington might well have been revealed. That there was some correspondence between her and Babington is undoubted, and a modern jury might have taken the gravest view of this fact.

Sir John Macdonell shows in succession other proceedings that bring out the fact that high or low politics, civil or ecclesiastical, fail in point of justice. We see it in the case of the Knights Templars, of Jeanne d'Arc, of Bruno, Galileo, Servetus, in the cases of Queen Catharine of Aragon and Sir Walter Raleigh. These political trials horrify the mind and perhaps illustrate the political straits of the prosecutors. The trials for witchcraft and the general eyre in Auvergne are on a different footing. The latter, "Les Grand Tours d'Auvergne," the seventeenth century survival in France of royal jurisdiction to quell local injustice, a survival exactly similar to the English general eyres of the thirteenth century, provide the only example in this book of the administration of true and swift justice. It is true that the swiftness of royal justice in Auvergne foreran by a century or more the great Revolution. Sir John Macdonell seems to see in the necessity for these trials premonitions of revolution. But that was not the case in the English parallel instances of the general eyres. Sir John Macdonell's volume on historical trials is not, of course, intended to disparage the even hand of justice in England in cases other than those where political passions or needs weighed down the balance. On the whole in England, and indeed in most parts of Europe, justice was done as between suitors, and as against ordinary criminals, though no doubt it tended to become slow as procedure grew more complicated. The famous case that forms the subject of the *Ring and the Book* shows that at the end of the seventeenth century, in distraught Italy, substantial justice was done even in a case where feudal passions ran high and the Church was confronted with great difficulties. It would have been of interest had Sir John Macdonell, with his great knowledge of the Civil and Canon Law, dealt with this remarkable case.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE FIRST CHRISTIANS OF BRITAIN.*

The author of this book deals in some detail with the introduction of Christianity into Britain, and weighs the evidence carefully. He feels that it was first disseminated by the Roman soldier, since wherever the Roman army pushed into alien lands there are traces of the new religion. Commerce also played its part. Merchants and individual soldiers brought the news of Christ to the countries in which they trafficked or fought.

It was only ten years after the Crucifixion that the Emperor, Claudius, sent his General, Aulus Plautius, to conquer Britain, and for this purpose he provided four legions of the Army, the 2nd, 9th, 14th, and the 20th. In these legions there is no doubt that some of the soldiers had heard of the new Prophet, as reported in Rome, and how Pilate was recalled to answer for the tumult under his governorship.

The military methods of the Romans, in sending the fighting men of an invaded and conquered country into another territory which was already under Roman dominion, and setting them over the conquered people, was a means of depriving each country of its military strength, and the opportunity of patriotic rebellion. "Roman legions were thus accompanied by bodies of auxiliaries, or troops, raised from the various subdued nations." From Tacitus and other historians, and by stones inscribed in memory of foreigners found in Britain and in other lands, this system is clearly demonstrated, and shows not only that British troops were taken into all nations under Roman sway, but that troops of many foreign lands were stationed in Britain, all "united to subject Britain to the Roman yoke." By this means the teaching of Christ must have permeated many countries, some of which the Apostles had visited; we suspect from the Epistle to the Romans (xv, 21), the Muratorian Fragment and Clement that St. Paul visited Spain. Archaeology also brings its evidence of the early Christianising of Britain. The discovery of inscribed crosses is significant. But more important even than the cross—which was largely used in ornament by the heathen in this and other countries—was the discovery of the monogram used to describe Christ, the *Chi Rho*: "two Greek letters X(Ch) and P(R) one imposed upon the other, formed the mystic sign of a believer in the Saviour at a very early period" and was "known as the *Chrisma*, and used by the faithful shortly after Apostolic times." The use of the *Chrisma* were abandoned after the edict of Milan in 313, and ended in Britain, at any rate, with the departure of the Romans in 409, so that British examples of the *Chrisma* are not later than the fourth century. We know, indeed, from Tertullian,

* *The First Christians of Britain*. By J. Charles Wall. Talbot & Co. Price 8s. 6d.

writing about the year 208, that Christianity had spread widely in the British Isles before that date. He writes: "Parts of Britain inaccessible to the Romans are subject to Christ." Professor Gwatkin points out that Christian traders must have reached Ireland and Caledonia before Tertullian's time. Moreover Origen writes of British Christians before 250.

The author of this book explains the different theories as to the origin of the Church in Britain. Joseph of Arimathea was credited with the introduction of Christianity into Britain for many centuries. In later times its source was regarded as Ephesine or Petrine, that is to say the episcopal succession was received from St. John at Ephesus or St. Peter at Rome. There is also the Gallican theory, which suggests that the Church in Britain was a daughter of the Church in Gaul. The Pelagian heresy naturally obtained some footing, as Pelagius was probably a Briton, and just before the Pagan onslaught Germanicus came to check the error.

Mr. Wall touches on the vexed question of the date for the observance of Easter which divided the advocates of the opposing theories. At first the British Church was in accord with the rest of the Church at the time of the early councils assembled in the years 314, 325, 347, and 359. The last recorded contact between the British Church and Western Christianity was in 455 when (according to the *Annales Cambriæ*) the British Church adopted the cycle of eighty-four years then used by Rome. The later Roman cycles (the Victorian of 532 years and the Dionysian of nineteen years) came too late. The Britons, owing to their internal miseries following the Anglo-Saxon invasion, remained in ignorance of the improved computation for Easter (which was received in Rome from Alexandria) and refused to admit the decision of Augustine, whom the British Church deemed an intruding foreigner. Eventually the British Church recognised the more correct date for Easter accepted in the Western Church.

The chapter dealing with monasticism is particularly interesting. The main system in the British Church was monastic; the secular priests, who were in a minority, were married. The missionary work in the British Isles proceeded from the monasteries. The rule of life of the Celtic monks was not an easy one: obedience, much labour, little food, and corporal punishment. The Celtic monastic schools were of a high order. The Celtic Church devoted itself to the study and exposition of the Holy Scriptures. In the early days of Christianity in Britain an old Latin version was used as quoted by St. Cyprian, A.D. 258. British scholars, with their thorough classical knowledge, compiled a British and Irish version from the old Latin text, from which the Books of the Apocrypha were excluded, and what is curious is, as Mr. Wall points out, "The

passages of scripture in the writing of some of the Britons and Irishmen agree with no other version either before the time of St. Jerome or with the Vulgate." It was a *British Version* as St. Chrysostom says.

Enough has been said to show what an interesting book concerning the introduction of Christianity into these Isles Mr. Wall has produced. The rapid progress which the Church made in the face of persecution, its martyrs, its missionaries, its monasteries, and in later times its church buildings and even the furniture of the churches, are all described with a facile pen. It is a popular book which should lead to the study of the detailed chapter in the *Cambridge Mediæval History*, the very substantial work on *Christianity in Early Britain* by the late Dr. Hugh Williams, and Canon Taylor's volume on *Celtic Christianity in Cornwall*.

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SER MARCO POLO.*

Here is the English text of the book—one of the greatest romances in the world, and like the best romances essentially true—that Marco Polo, son of Nicolo Polo and nephew of Maffeo Polo, dictated in a Genoese prison—the Palazzo San Giorgio perhaps—to Rustician of Pisa, in Italian, and Rustician took down in French. That was in the year 1298-9, and it was printed in 1477 and enlarged from apparently authentic Polo material by Ramusio, a Venetian scholar, before 1560. The book is the story of the travels of the Polo family in Asia between 1260 to 1295, an amazing story. It first got into the English language by Frampton's translation of a Spanish version of an Italian translation of the original French text. Then in 1625 Purchas produced an English paraphrase of Ramusio's enlarged text; two hundred years later (in 1818, to be exact) Marsden supplied a full translation; a scholarly English edition followed in 1844, while in 1871 came Sir Henry Yule's standard English text, and on this edition the present version is based, the proper names being given in a consistent form, and Book IV, (dealing with "wars among the Tartar princes and some account of the northern regions") in full—it is summarised in Yule's text—from Marsden's version. Professor Parks' text indicates in square brackets the passages added by Ramusio.

The facts underlying the book can be briefly stated. The Polo family, Venetian merchants, had a branch at Constantinople in the great days of the Eastern Roman Empire, and another at Sol-

* *The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East*. Edited with an Introduction by George B. Parks. The Macmillan Company. 5s. net.

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daia, the Crimean port. Nicolo and Maffeo Polo in 1260 went from Constantinople to Soldaio and ventured on a trading trip into Russian Tartary, visiting Sarai on the Volga and passing up the Volga for some 700 miles into the latitude of Moscow. In the meantime war broke out behind them, and not daring to seek the Black Sea they boldly followed the caravan route which carried them past the Caspian sea to the desert of Turkestan and the famous oasis city of Bokhara. There they traded for three years, and in 1265 they attached themselves to a government mission that was passing through Bokhara from Persia on the way to Peking. A year and a half of travel found the brothers at the court of Kubla Khan, the famous Mongol emperor, and he gave them Tablets of Gold as passports and they became the imperial messengers from the Great Khan to the Pope. In 1269 they arrived at Acre and thence passed home to Venice. Two years later a new Pope, Gregory of Piacenza, sent them back with messages to Kubla Khan and they arrived, and with them Nicolo's son, Marco Polo, in 1275, and were greatly welcomed by the Emperor. The young Marco was specially favoured and became the ruler of a Chinese city and was sent by sea on a mission to India. Seventeen years later, in 1293, the Venetians were impatient for home, and they escorted a royal young princess to her marriage in Persia. They went by sea to the Persian Gulf and the journey took two years, and it was another year's journey to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and home. Their story rapidly became current, and the legend is told of jewels hidden in the travel-worn garments of the Polos. Presumably something of it all got into writing which was used by Ramusio, but it was not until 1298, when Marco was captured by the Genoese, that the story was, as we have seen, committed to writing in a formal way.

Professor Parks says that the story "seems at first to be dull reading." But certainly that is not the case on a second reading, if it is read with any knowledge behind the reading. The poet Coleridge after reading Purchas' version in 1797 at once grasped the immense literary significance of the narrative, and began, though he never finished, his superb poem, "Kubla Khan."

In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
A stately pleasure-dome decree:
Where Alph the sacred river ran
Through caverns measureless to man
Down to a sunless sea.

And 'mid this tumult Kubla heard from far
Ancestral voices prophesying war.

This is taken from Chapter LXI of the first book. Xanadu is Shangtu, the summer palace of Kubla Khan. The sacred river Alph

seems to have been suggested by the river that disappeared from the lake in the palace park of Canbalac (Peking), "the capital city of Cathay."

The picture drawn of Kubla Khan (1216-1294) (the grandson of Jenghis Khan) gives the impression of a man of the calibre and the idealism and the essential justice of Alexander the Great. The picture is not overdrawn and bears the impress of truth. But the record is a romantic one: it might serve for any one of the great conquerors and organisers of empires. Many of the touches describing the life of the people which perhaps seemed absurd to the contemporaries of Marco Polo, are plain practical truths.

It is a fact that all over the country of Cathay there is a kind of black stones existing in beds in the mountains, which they dig out and burn like firewood. If you supply the fire with them at night, and see that they are well kindled, you will find them still alight in the morning; and they make such capital fuel that no other is used throughout the country.

Coal at this date was in use, though in sparing use, in England, but it is news that it was in general use in China in the thirteenth century.

Professor Parks' brief notes add to the enjoyment of the narrative. The extent of the rule of Kubla Khan may be measured by the fact that his orders were published in Mongol, Chinese, Persian and Arabic as well as in the Turkish and Tartar tongues. It is interesting to note that Marco Polo gave to Europeans the name for the highest region of Asia.

And when you leave this little country [Wakhan] and ride three days north-east, always among mountains, you get to such a height that it is said to be the highest place in the world. And when you have got to this height you find [a great lake between two mountains and out of it] a fine river running through a plain clothed with the finest pasture in the world. . . . The plain is called Pamier, and you ride across it for twelve days together, finding nothing but a desert without habitations or any green thing, so that travellers are obliged to carry with them whatever they have need of. The region is so lofty and cold that you do not even see any birds flying.

But it would be possible to quote without end from a narrative that illuminates all travellers' stories of Asia and finds its confirmation in the elucidation of history that modern travel and discoveries have made possible. The historical value of Marco Polo's work is at last fully recognised and his mistakes can be assessed. But there is another value to the work. It is full of the romanticism that lies behind all the greatest of European literature. It was written in the age of the troubadours and is a noble example of the method by which history became enshrined in legend.

THE DEPOSITED PRAYER BOOK.*

This autumn will see the revised Prayer Book before Parliament for acceptance or rejection. There is a considerable volume of opinion among the laity against the new proposals, despite the fact that they have been accepted by overwhelming majorities in the Church Assembly and the Houses of Convocation. To what extent the Church Assembly is representative of the laity of the Church of England is very uncertain. In many cases the rector or vicar controls the elections to the parochial church council. A parishioner who disagrees with his ecclesiastical views in many cases is not re-elected. It, therefore, does not follow that the House of Commons will follow the views of the parochial church councils.

The House of Commons will have another difficulty. The whole of the long struggle for a revised or alternative Book of Common Prayer dates from Sir William Harcourt's attack on the clergy who had broken their ordination vows. The House will ask, How will the alternative Prayer Book alter the position? Will it be easier for the Bishops now than thirty years ago to compel recalcitrant clergy to obey the law? The Archbishop of Canterbury is convinced that the Bishops are determined to enforce the provisions of the new Rubrics and there is no reason whatever to believe that the Bishops will not be wholeheartedly anxious to do so. But the House of Commons will ask, Can they do so without a new Measure simplifying the procedure and enabling the Bishops to prevent the institution of clergy to livings that have no traditional sympathy with the advanced Anglo-Catholic movement, and, secondly, removing from their livings clergymen who are notorious breakers of their ordination vows? One of the abuses at the present time is the practice of patrons with advanced Anglo-Catholic views to appoint to vacant livings (with congregations who have been familiar with a strictly medium service) men who think that the normal service should be turned upside down, that the old Morning Service should be rushed through with only a nominal congregation in twenty or twenty-five minutes and be followed by an elaborate imitation of the Mass. If the Bishops allow this sort of propaganda to continue—with the inevitable result that the practice of church-going is killed for nine-tenths of the parishioners—the New Prayer Book is not likely to have the good effect that it might have. Before Parliament passes the Prayer Book Measure the Archbishops should be asked to introduce Measures enabling the Bishops swiftly to enforce the new Rubrics.

Professor Relton in this book on the New Prayer Book draws

* *The New Prayer Book: being a course of lectures delivered at King's College, London, by eight lecturers representing various schools of thought in the Church.* Edited by Rev. Professor H. Maurice Relton. With a Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury. George Allen and Unwin. 2s. 6d. net.

attention to the second section of the Prayer Book Measure which enables the Bishops, after consultation with the parochial church council and the minister of the parish, to make such orders as he thinks best as to legal changes in the service under the Measure. "These orders shall be final." What does this mean? How does it affect clergy who claim to control the services and in fact conduct services for which the Measure does not provide? Professor Relton says that Section 2 means that:

If what he [the minister] does, or contemplates doing, meets with the opposition of a majority of his Church Councillors, the ultimate reference is not to be his own autocratic decision, but the final word rests with the Bishop. There is thus a real limitation to the minister's powers in this matter, a limitation expressly introduced into the Prayer Book Measure to safeguard the interests of the laity.

But surely this is an overstatement of the effect of the section which only refers to "changes authorised under this Measure" and to disputes "with regard to such changes." Changes altogether outside this Measure and altogether illegal are not touched. The Bishops and the laity have apparently only such remedies as they have always had, remedies which the Bishops for years past have largely declined to use.

Professor Relton pleads for "an Anglican Armistice" and rightly. There is undoubtedly room in the Church of England for a wide range of views represented by the "High," "Low" and "Broad" Church, and the Deposited Prayer Book provides in an honest way for the possibility of the full expression of all these views. What there is not room for in the Church of England as by law established is any party that is using these views for the purpose of promoting either Calvinism or Romanism. There is a definite gulf fixed between the Anglican Church and these Churches. At the present time there can be no doubt that the Anglo-Catholic party, in certain cases, is deliberately overstepping the gulf in the direction of doctrines that are explicitly condemned by the Reformation Settlement. "Comprehensiveness implies fellowship and a readiness in that fellowship for mutual forbearance and toleration in our relations one with another." This absolutely sound position is infringed with violence by many of the Anglo-Catholic clergy who, by the eccentricity of their conduct, drive out of the parish churches thousands of worshippers who have been accustomed to the order of the Book of Common Prayer as ordinarily understood. "The old idea that people must all worship alike . . . must now give place to our modern effort after 'unity in diversity' both in our approach to truth and in our expression of it." The advanced Anglo-Catholic, however, still insists that "people must all worship

alike" in his fashion, which is not the fashion of the vast bulk of English-speaking people.

Professor Barry insists, and rightly, that the Deposited Book provides no "new theology." The Book admittedly in all fundamental respects represents what is best in the modern outlook on spiritual life from the points of view of the Anglican Church. The opponents of the new legislation are not really attacking the Book but the alleged fact that the Book alone will not secure peace. That is the real difficulty with many of the laity who are disappointed that, despite the fact (pointed out by Mr. A. S. Duncan-Jones) that the Book restores some of the ancient notes of the Church, the changes do not guarantee peace and do not provide a swift sanction against deliberate disloyalty. Parliament presumably will approve the Prayer Book Measure, but it will be sanctioned more heartily and with less opposition if there were an assurance from the Archbishops that machinery will at once be invented to deal swiftly with those who move outside of the elastic limits allowed by the Deposited Book.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

It has long been known in Western Europe that the treatment of her racial minorities by Roumania is deplorable; but never before has there been such a devastating exposure as in M. Zsombor de Szasz' massive volume, *The Minorities in Roumanian Transylvania*.^{*} The author was once a member of the Hungarian Parliament and of the Austro-Hungarian Delegations; but even when we have allowed for his bias there is a mass of detailed documentary evidence in this book which will convince every reader of the general truth of his argument. "Nowhere in Europe," he writes, "is the incapacity of a people to assimilate modern Western political ideas or to organise its Government accordingly more manifest than in Roumania. . . . It is the constantly recurring characteristic of Roumanian policy to destroy old institutions and civilisations with a view to bringing down the entire population to the same Balkan level." This indictment is pressed home by a long series of chapters exposing the cruelty of the police, the corruption of public officials, both high and low, the persecution of the Jews, the intolerance towards all Christian Churches except the Greek Orthodox, the degradation of the judiciary and other abuses. The heinousness of the crime against the Transylvanian minorities is enhanced by the fact that the Roumanians, when themselves a minority in Hungary, used to cry out against the tyranny of the Magyars.

The New Germany,[†] by Ernst Jäckh, is a striking little book of 100 pages, with an introduction by Professor Alfred Zimern, who tells us that the three lectures which it contains were delivered at the Geneva School of International Studies in 1926. Dr. Jäckh is well known as

^{*} Grant Richards. 16s.
[†] Oxford University Press. 5s.

the biographer of Kiderlen-Wächter, as one of Germany's leading publicists, and as the founder of the Institute of Politics at Berlin. If these lectures express the dominant mind of post-war Germany, the author's country and the world are to be congratulated, for no work published in Germany in recent years breathes a more ardent spirit of democratic internationalism. Though writing without a trace of bitterness, he condemns and renounces the irresponsible autocracy of the Imperial era, and hails with delight "the real political revolution" not of November but of October, 1918, when Prussian militarism was evicted by the civil power. The volume is enriched by many personal touches, based on direct knowledge of the leading figures on the public stage, among them Hindenburg, Rathenau, Stresemann, Schacht, and other builders of the new democracy. The work begun at Frankfurt in 1848, declares Dr. Jäckh, was confirmed and completed at Weimar in 1919. At last Germany is both united and free. It is a hopeful, sincere, stimulating and attractive little book.

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In *Home Life in History*^{*} the authors of this book have made British social life and manners live again in story form from pre-Roman days, B.C. 200 to the present time. To reconstruct, or to give in any way a full picture of Celtic civilisation is not yet possible, as the data is uncertain and the lack of unity in the country precludes accurate historic continuity. That the ancient Britons were not savages is proved by their knowledge of arts and crafts. Architecture indeed was undeveloped, and their houses, beehive huts of wood or stone, were of a rude type. The history of a single family starting with a tribesman named Doli is the form in which the Home Life of Britain is traced from the earliest times, his descendants, from age to age, supplying all the details which go to form a panoramic or moving picture of Britain through the centuries. Doli is described as a man of position and wealth derived from trading. Barter and exchange were usual in Celtic times, although the early Britons possessed a rude coinage. Agriculture flourished in parts of the country; but trade and often war were the staple industries. Tribal war was frequent throughout the land. The second chapter passes from B.C. to A.D. and the Romans are in possession of the land. They find the Britons a stubborn and resentful people, and with great difficulty administer the country. In 80 A.D. a descendant of Doli saw the result of Rome's power in the *Road*. Shall we of the twentieth century see in the air, another and a grander road bringing into unity all the nations of the earth?

Rome brought a civilisation which the Saxon and the Dane could not wholly kill, and which found new life with the Norman. It is alive to-day in law and order. Caesar dies, but his spirit lives on. Mr. Gloag has personated a passing pageant, not always a cheerful one, but it is the burdens men bear (like the legend of the birds and their wings) that raise them aloft. England has passed through many vicissitudes, as the descendants of Doli bear witness, but the stubbornness of which the Romans complained has stood them in good stead, and will continue to do so, if the Briton will to himself be true.

^{*} *Home Life in History. Social Life and Manners in Britain from 200 B.C. to A.D. 1926.* By John Gloag and C. Thompson Walker. Illustrated by A. B. Read, A.R.C.A. Ernest Benn. 12s. 6d. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Mr. F. W. Hirst's *Safeguarding and Protection** tells a familiar story with the mastery of detail and the lucidity of exposition which we associate with the author. No living economist has a deeper intellectual scorn for the fallacies of protection, or a more profound conviction of the political and moral importance as well as the economic value of Free Trade. The longest and most useful chapter in this little book is that on Safeguarding Procedure and Practice; but most English readers will also find much that is new to them in the chapter on The American Customs Union, in which the plight of agriculture is vividly described.

* * *

Miss Eleanor C. Price's excellent volume entitled "Stories from English History,"† originally published in 1924, has now been included in the "Told Through the Ages" Series as was her earlier volume, "Stories from French History." These stories illustrate every phase of the history of Britain from pre-Roman times to the battle of Waterloo. In a sense, a volume of this type is designed to create not only an interest in history but in the ideas that history has worked out. It is therefore educationally sound since interest and idealism are the twin forces that give education reality. The stories are most attractively written and not least the account of Waterloo told after dinner by a young officer who was in the fight, to his uncle, a country rector.

Dr. Helmer Key's "The New Colonial Policy"‡ is a continuation of his "European Bankruptcy and Emigration" published in 1924. The distinguished Swedish publicist reiterates his conviction of the necessity for wholesale emigration to transoceanic lands in order to create new markets for European exports. He is oppressed not only with the sufferings of post-war Europe but with the menacing spectre of over-population. The book has been worked up from a series of articles, and its structure is rather loose; but it is written with power and knowledge, and the case for dealing with overcrowded countries before an explosion occurs is proved up to the hilt. The two practicable remedies are declared to be emigration and birth-control.

Miss Jean Marian Matthew has "arranged" "The Pilgrim's Progress"§ by John Bunyan in a very competent fashion for the use of children, and the edition is illustrated by many charming illustrations by Mr. H. J. Ford. As a rule the process of tampering with the text of a classic is to be discouraged, but the purpose here is plain and reasonable. Miss Matthew states, and truly, that "many children have been hindered from reading 'the Pilgrim's Progress' by the long conversations, setting forth the various points of doctrine, with which the story is often interrupted. In this edition these have been left out as far as possible, and John Bunyan's beautiful allegory true for all time remains undisturbed in his own words." Bunyan would certainly have disapproved but, after all, it is the story and the allegory in their superb English that have kept the book alive and, in fact, children skip the doctrinal conversations. This notice, though, belated of an excellent book is necessary.

* R. Cobden-Sanderson. 7s. 6d. † George G. Harrap. ‡ Methuen. 7s. 6d.
§ S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

LIBERALS AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT.*

ALMOST all great political movements are inspired by two motives in combination—the idealist and the practical. Read the literature of the anti-Corn Law campaign, for example, and you will find it permeated by the aspiration for a loftier social order and for peace and goodwill among nations; but emphasising also the need for the lower cost of production, cheaper exports, larger profits, and better wages, which Free Trade might be expected to bring. Recall again the movement for women's franchise; it sought political liberty for its own sake, as an essential element in the dignity of womanhood; at the same time it appealed for support among working women on the ground that it would result ultimately in better conditions of employment, in a general improvement in their economic condition. Or take the summons to the British nation at the outbreak of the Great War; men were asked to make sacrifices for the sake of the sanctity of treaties, of supporting the public law of Europe, but also for the sake of safeguarding British trade from future attack, of maintaining the freedom of the seas, on which the livelihood of our whole population ultimately depends.

And it is right that this should be so. We are creatures compounded of spiritual needs and material. We have our intellectual and moral life and our animal life:

Magnificent out of the dust we came
And abject from the spheres.

Our politics, if they are to tally with the conditions of our nature, must always have a dual character: they must have regard at once to the ideal and to the practical. Both Liberalism and the Labour movement possess this dual quality.

NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM.

The Liberalism of the nineteenth century carried on from earlier times the love of political liberty for its own sake which had been woven into the course of English history. It stood for religious freedom and equality. It stood for international friendship and co-operation. But it advocated also, and achieved, a number of measures of social reform which closely touched the daily lives of the people. They were measures improving the working conditions in factories and mines, improving housing, and environment generally, establishing a universal system of national education.

Meantime, among the working classes, the Labour movement was active and growing. The trade unions made an idealistic appeal—like the friendly societies to which they were closely akin—to the spirit of brotherhood, and sometimes to the sanctions of religion.

* The Inaugural Address at the Liberal Summer School, Cambridge, 1927.
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Their effective programme was economic. They were combinations to raise wages, to shorten hours, to improve working conditions in general. On this dual basis they aroused a keen enthusiasm and enlisted a great body of self-sacrificing voluntary service. The two movements—Liberalism and Labour—proceeded concurrently.

The influence of the *laissez-faire* doctrine led the advocates of both to believe that, so far as many economic matters were concerned, the sphere of industrial action and the sphere of political action were separate. But almost all the Labour leaders were Liberals in politics, and almost all sincere Liberals wished well to Labour. There was a consciousness of an essential identity of purpose. Liberalism freed the trade unions from the legal restrictions that bound them. And it extended the franchise, as rapidly as the standard of education of the people and the restraints of the existing Constitution allowed, so that the working people might express their needs in Parliament.

PARLIAMENT OPENED TO THE WORKERS.

Until the extension of the franchise took place, Liberalism bore the appearance of a helping hand extended from above, the Labour movement that of an incessant, restless striving below. Then, in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, and in our own day, two new factors of profound importance appeared. The door of the House of Commons was opened to the working classes through the establishment of a general suffrage and the payment of members. And the theory of *laissez-faire* became discredited.

This last had the effect of breaking down the separation between the political and the industrial spheres. The Labour movement felt free to pursue its aims along the path of political activities. Liberalism felt free to help it, through legislation and administration, to a much greater extent than had previously been thought legitimate.

The decline of *laissez-faire* had the effect also of making possible the advent of a great new political theory, that of Socialism—again claiming to be both idealist and practical—offering a way of escape from the gross evils of the existing industrial system, and serving as a unifying force for a political party. The discrediting of the individualist theory had the effect, further, of bringing some degree of discredit upon Liberalism, since the principal defenders of the one had been among the best-known advocates of the other.

At the same time, numbers of the working people were dissatisfied with the Liberal Party as the agent of progress. They thought that it was dominated by the influence of men of wealth, who used their position in the inner councils of the party to restrain its activities to a minimum. When they saw many of the leading local employers, with whom they had been in frequent conflict on indus-

trial questions, taking a prominent part in a political movement which purported to be acting in the interests of the workers, they became sceptical; they were ready to respond to a call for independence, for the creation of a political organ which should be their own. The Labour Party came into existence, and in a period of little more than twenty years grew to such strength that, for a time, it was able to instal in power a Ministry drawn from its own members, aiming at the execution of its own policy.

This short historical survey enables us to see how it has come about that, although the essential purposes of the Labour Movement are included within the aims of Liberalism, two separate agencies are engaged in promoting them, with a consequent weakness in the presence of forces that are opposed to both—the forces of Conservatism. It will assist us also in arriving at a conclusion as to the right course for Liberalism to take in the existing situation.

LABOUR MOVEMENT AND LABOUR PARTY.

A distinction is to be drawn between the Labour movement and the Labour Party. The party has secured the adhesion of the trade union organisations, and it therefore appears as though the two were identical. But this appearance is illusory. The members of the unions are less than one-third of the total number of manual workers. Even among the members of the trade unions an appreciable proportion do not support the Labour Party. The Labour movement affects all workers. The Labour Party includes only some. Further, although at the outset the Labour Party was a body of working men, aided no doubt by a certain number of sympathisers from other classes, it has fallen in course of time under the control, to a large degree, of such sympathisers. Many of the leading members of the party belong to the landlord or capitalist classes, and have not sprung from the movement.

The party, again, aspiring to authority in the government of the country, necessarily finds that the sphere of government is far wider than the sphere of industrial politics. The Labour Party is under the obligation to form opinions, and to be ready to take action on a large variety of subjects—international, imperial, commercial, agricultural, financial—which are only indirectly connected with Labour questions. There is no integral connection between these opinions and actions and the aims of the Labour movement. They need not command the support in any degree of men and women who strongly sympathise with the industrial aims, and be active in the support of the Labour movement itself.

Lastly, and most important of all, the Labour Party has declared itself distinctively Socialist. Its practical policy is directed by the principle that the State should own and control the means of pro-

duction, distribution, and exchange. It sees there its economic ideal. It tells the people that when that ideal is attained, and only then, will the evils from which they suffer find a remedy. But the Labour movement is not necessarily Socialist. It has its own ends in view, and it might pursue them by this means, or by other means, as practical experience might show to be best.

Because these distinctions exist between the Labour movement and the Labour Party, there is no incompatibility in Liberalism continuing to find itself in general agreement with the one while it is at variance with the other.

TWO FORMS OF SOCIALISM.

It is the last of the points that I have mentioned, the identification of the Labour Party with Socialism, which is the principal barrier. Because an uncontrolled individualism is wrong it does not follow that Socialism is right. In reaction from *laissez-faire*, searching for some other broad, dominating principle, some thinkers too hastily accepted a generalisation which fuller inquiry shows to be unsound.

Socialism has its two forms, broadly described as the Continental and the British, or the Marxian and the Fabian. The form of Socialism which was originated by Karl Marx, and with which modern Communism is closely akin, turns upon two cardinal ideas; they have been summarised as follows by Mr. Zimmern:

The first is "the materialist conception of history"—in other words, that human history is not a record of moral effort but of a blind conflict of economic forces. The second is "the doctrine of the class struggle"—in other words, that this economic conflict has always, of necessity, taken the form of a struggle between rich and poor, between those who hold the keys of economic power and those who are deprived of the control of the instruments of production.

The first of these ideas is a variant of the fatalistic view of politics. It is a piece of pure mediævalism—the construction of general principles out of data that are imagined and not ascertained, the treatment of abstractions as though they were realities.

The second idea, the necessity for class war, is as crude as it is costly to the community and cruel to both the parties. No doubt where there is injustice there must be effort to secure a remedy, and wherever interested persons stand as defenders of the injustice there must be controversy, and there may be struggle. But no ground exists for a comprehensive theory that class conflict is of the essence of every society in which industry is not nationalised. There are those who believe that in the international sphere war is inevitable and perhaps beneficent. The Marxian Socialists are among the most eager to combat this doctrine. But while they are the keenest advocates of international solidarity they are also the keenest advo-

cates—until a complete revolution has been brought about—of internecine strife. Obsessed by the idea of conflict, they think that if the cleavage is not perpendicular between countries it must be horizontal between classes; condemning international war with indignation, they promote class war with all the greater fervour.

THE ENGLISH FORM OF SOCIALISM.

The form of Socialism which has found a certain measure of support in English-speaking countries is different and less theoretic. We hear little of blind economic forces, or of a class war inevitably arising from the course of history. Nationalisation is advocated as a practical means of securing concrete results. If public authorities were to conduct industry, the public, it is urged, would be better served, and with less waste of effort, than is the case under private enterprise; the workers, by hand or by brain, would retain for themselves a larger share of their product. The success of services that are already carried on by the State or by local authorities, in Great Britain or elsewhere, is quoted as an example and an incentive. In them no profit goes to individuals who contribute no labour; the wastefulness that springs from competition is avoided; employment as a rule is regular, and conditions are fixed with regard to the general interest and not to the interest of private employers. Socialists draw the conclusion that similar results would follow in other cases. Based upon these instances they formulate a principle. All that is needed is to apply that principle generally; then the evils that are notorious in our present system will disappear. Relying upon the normal methods of public discussion and decision by the electorate, they seek to persuade the nation that here is a panacea.

In the great debate that has followed, every citizen is called upon to form his conclusion and to take his stand. For my own part, having had opportunities that are in some ways exceptional of watching the working of both socialised and private industries, I may be permitted to express the clear conviction which I have formed, that it is altogether unsafe to assume that success in the industries which are already under public control argues that the same success would follow if the principle were applied generally.

The conditions are not the same. Where an industry is mainly of a routine character, subject to few fluctuations from physical or economic causes, its methods changing but slowly over a long period of years, public management may be adequate. These are the conditions in the Post Office services, and often in land transport. They apply, in some degree, in retail trade. But they do not apply in the great staple industries of the modern world—iron and steel, ship-building, shipping, textiles, chemicals, and the rest. They apply even less in the minor industries which provide for the

rapidly changing requirements of an advancing civilisation. They apply least of all in the occupation which gives the largest employment of any, in agriculture.

SOCIALISED INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS.

It must not be forgotten also that the industries at present socialised are not self-contained. They are intimately united with the larger world of competitive enterprise. They usually obtain from it their appliances; they imitate from it new methods of manufacture or of service; not least important, their managers have been trained in the business world, are often supervised or advised by business men, and are judged by the business standards of efficiency. Under the Socialist system there would be no such world, no such men, and no such standards.

It is one thing for success to be attained by a small number of socialised industries, while they are surrounded by a hundred others, under private enterprise, from whose methods and results they may profit. It is another thing to assume that the success will necessarily continue when all are brought on to the same basis.

What is known as the classic political economy was accustomed to group the elements of production under the headings of land, labour and capital. In the discussion of Socialism, labour and capital fill the stage. But there is another factor, which the economists class as subordinate to capital, but which is of vital importance. It is management. With it may be included invention. These are essential. Unless there is efficient management, industries languish. The managers are few in number compared with the workmen, or with the shareholders and their directors; they are less heard of; in the great labour disputes they are not protagonists, but without them there is failure. Just as the body requires in its food not only the bulk constituents, the starches, the proteins, the water and the rest, but also those subtle elements, lately discovered, minute in quantity but indispensable in function—the vitamins—so does the economic body need management. Management, one may say, is the vitamin of industry.

But it does not present itself as a matter of course. Of the right quality it is hard to get. Private enterprise itself continually fails to secure it. Then, however, a remedy appears; the particular undertaking weakens and dies; it yields place, in the stress of competition, to others which are more efficiently directed. The process involves loss and perhaps distress, but in the end the interest of the community is served. In public enterprise this does not happen. If inefficiency occurs it may continue; it may not even be recognised that it is inefficiency. For there is no such thing as an absolute standard of efficiency; it is always relative. In a Socialist

world there would be no basis of comparison. The result, in course of time, might be stagnation.

It is obviously essential in industry that the men who are capable of directing successfully should be placed in positions of control, and should then be stimulated to use their capacity to the full. Private industry in the long run effects both these purposes, by the method of trial and error, of profit and loss. Can public industry effect it by the method of election of councils and selection of officials?

CIVIL SERVANT AND INDUSTRIALIST.

Between the civil servant and the business man or industrialist there is a well-marked and well-known difference of type. It appears in every country and in every age. No ingenuity of organisation can give to the official the qualities of initiative and energy that distinguish the born leader of industry. Even if, by good fortune, the capacity were sometimes to appear, the conditions that must attach to work in the public service would hinder its being used with effect. All expenditures by an official are met from funds, which, in one form or another, are in the nature of public funds. The taking of financial risks is of the essence of progressive industry; the avoidance of financial risks is of the essence of public management. The two are hard to reconcile.

To all this it is answered that the business of very large companies, or of industrial combines, also tends to become officialised. The staff of a great railway company is recruited and organised in much the same way as the staff of a Government department; directors, it is said, often regard their shareholders' money in much the same way as civil servants regard the money of the taxpayer. The difference would be small between one of the vast amalgamations of modern industry and the same enterprise under the direction of a public authority. The transfer would be easily made; the step would be short; so far as methods of production were concerned, the world would hardly be conscious of the change.

It may be that in particular cases these contentions are sound. In the instance of the railway service, for example, nationalisation would involve no great alteration. But in other cases, while it may be true that officialism has in fact been introduced, it does not follow that this has been a benefit in the past, or that it will endure in the future; still less that it should be imitated generally.

Undertakings on a very large scale have certain economic advantages, but they are often unwieldy; they sometimes prove unstable; the development of their staffs into a bureaucracy, which is quoted as an example, has proved a weakness; some of them have already collapsed under their own weight, or through their failure to enlist or to retain the high ability that is needed to conduct with success

such vast and varied operations. It is far too soon in these days to consider it established that great combines are destined to be the standard form of industrial organisation, or that their existence in certain industries points the road to the socialisation of all.

Nor is the parallel so close as has been represented between large-scale enterprises and Government departments. It is not the outward form that matters, but the pervading spirit. Commercial men are usually willing to run risks; they spend capital on new processes which may ultimately prove economical, though not immediately; they produce new articles on the chance that they will create their own demand; in a score of ways they incur expenditure in the hope, though not with the certainty, of reaping profit; their shareholders' capital has been subscribed on that understanding.

But this is not the atmosphere that prevails in a Government office or in the committee-rooms of a Town Council. The trustees of public funds must put safety in the first place. Expenditure that is speculative is illegitimate. Few are willing to take the responsibility of risking large losses, which would have to be met ultimately from the rates or taxes.

So we are bound to anticipate that, if the general rule in industry were to be ownership and control by public bodies, the outcome, in course of time, is likely to be retrograde. There is likely to be a slackening of energy, a lessening of initiative, a want of nimbleness in making the adjustments that are required by physical or economic variations.

A SOCIALIST FALLACY.

It is sometimes assumed that if the present organisation of industry were changed the faults that attach to it would necessarily disappear. The existing system has grave evils; Socialism would change the existing system; therefore Socialism would cure the evils—so runs the argument. But there is a fallacy here. The system may be changed and yet the evils remain. They may be indeed intensified. If the forecast is correct that a socialised system will be lacking in enterprise and efficiency, they would certainly be intensified. The saving made by eliminating a profit-making class might be far outweighed by an increase in the cost of production due to worse management. The foreign trade, on which a country such as Great Britain depends for its very life, and all countries depend in greater or less degree for their prosperity, would dwindle, and shrink perhaps to small proportions. Poverty and unemployment, far from disappearing as foretold, would in that case become more widespread and more intense.

Suppose that in any two existing countries, with similar populations and resources, one were to socialise its industries and the other

to pursue a policy of social reform, it is at least probable that, after a generation, it would be the latter which would enjoy the higher standard of prosperity and culture, which would show the larger diminution of misery.

TWO WAYS OF CHANGING CONDITIONS.

For if it cannot be assumed as certain that the evils which attach to the existing system will disappear if the system be changed, so also it cannot be assumed as certain that the evils will remain if the system be not changed.

An impartial observer may record the conditions in some typical district in an industrialised country. He may describe the mean, crowded town, with its foul river and its smoke-laden atmosphere; the squalor of the slums; the irregularity of employment; the poverty of the people, although they work all the hours of daylight and more; the exhaustion of the women; the excessive rate of infantile mortality; the absence of any worthy amusements; the ignorance and the drunkenness. He may contrast all this with the easier conditions of an earlier age, or the present comforts of a leisured class. He may draw the conclusion that nothing short of a revolutionary change will work a cure, and take Socialism for his creed.

And yet it may happen that another observer, coming to the same district fifty years later, may find that, without Socialism, everything has been changed. The slums have gone, the sites are built over, perhaps, by spacious factories and workshops; the atmosphere has been freed from smoke through the adoption of new methods of heat and power; the river is protected from pollution; not far away garden villages, such as are now springing up here and there in almost all countries of Western Europe and in America, have been built, with well-planned houses of good design, broadly spaced, surrounded with grass and trees, provided with libraries, concert-halls, and playing-fields; a reasonable working day has been established, and playing-fields; a reasonable working day has been established, with fixed holidays; wages have become adequate and work is regular; systems of social insurance provide against the graver misfortunes of life; in education a fair standard prevails, with a prospect of steady development; the changed conditions are reflected in the physique and character of the people.

Such a change would be brought about by the activities, along different lines but to a common end, of the State, local authorities, employers, workpeople, teachers, social workers of all kinds. To effect it steadily, piece by piece, is a greater service than the hasty application, in a mood of bitter indignation, of principles that are comprehensive without being well considered, in the hope that somehow good will come. For it is unsafe to assume that conditions are ever so bad that a wrong policy, applied with energy and enthusiasm, cannot make them considerably worse.

SOCIALISTS AS ALCHEMISTS.

So far as the organisation of industry is concerned, the conclusion is that we need not be partisans of a universal system of public management, any more than of a universal system of employment by individuals. There is room for a gradation of units. The individual employer, the private company, the public company, a combination of companies, the co-operative society, the public utility society, the company or combine subject to special legal regulations, the statutory board, the municipality, the State—any one of these may be, in a particular case, the best agency for conducting a manufacture or a service. Experiment and experience will indicate the choice.

The alchemists of the Middle Ages set out to discover a Philosopher's Stone, which, by a single process, might transmute all metals into gold. They failed, for there can be no such stone. But in the effort, discovering many unsuspected things, they laid the foundations of modern chemistry. Socialists are the alchemists of our politics. They have sought for a single principle that would convert all that is base in industrialism into something noble. They have not found such a principle, for none exists. But, animated by a splendid purpose, they have helped to inspire the world with a new zeal and a more real sense of the needs of the age. They have helped to destroy old errors. They have pointed the way to new forms of useful common action.

The fact remains that the Socialist principle is an unsafe guide in practical politics, and so long as the Labour Party ties its fortunes to that principle, so long will it be impossible for thinkers who have no faith in it to throw in their lot with that party. Believing also that the Socialist scheme is not likely to command the assent of the nation, but that if it were in any degree put into practical effect it would fail, and so would lead to a bitter disillusionment, Liberals have the duty not to surrender the guardianship of the cause of progress into the hands of politicians whose basic theory is wrong and who, therefore, can only bring that cause to disaster.

There are other differences. The Labour Party is not likely to be a careful trustee of the national finances. Further, it is to a large extent under the influence of a wing of extremists, whom, in a time of dangerous crisis, it might not be able to control. And its constitution tends to rob the Parliamentary representatives of the constituencies of their independence, and to place them under the control of outside bodies. All these are deterrents for men of Liberal mind from casting in their lot with the Labour Party.

A POLICY FOR LIBERALS.

I suggest that, in these circumstances, the right policy for Liber-

alism to adopt in relation to the Labour movement is to continue the policy that it would have adopted if a separate Labour Party had never come into existence. Its policy should not be made more drastic than the conditions would justify, in the hope of competing with the Labour Party's programme; nor should it be allowed to become enfeebled through the fact that many of those who care most deeply for social reform have joined the other organisation.

It should recognise clearly that our civilisation is disfigured by grave defects, that it is permeated with discontent, and that the discontent in the main is justified. The unprejudiced mind is bound to arrive at these conclusions—that poverty is widespread; that it causes immense unhappiness, a tragic suppression of capacities; that it is not, for the most part, the fault of the poor; that we cannot, without deserting our moral duty, silently accept it as a permanent element of the social system. The attack upon poverty, and upon evil social conditions in general, must be the chief objective of our efforts.

Laissez-faire and Socialism being both recognised to be false guides, the obligation rests upon us to develop a policy of social Liberalism which will divide into its several parts the vast problem with which we are confronted, and devise the particular means by which the solution of each can be approached. Already in the great constructive Parliaments of 1906 to 1914 this task was being undertaken. The spirit that was at work took shape in the National Insurance Act, in old age pensions, the Trade Boards Act, early closing, miners' eight hours, the Housing and Town Planning Act, the Trade Disputes Act, the safeguarding of child welfare, a series of reforms in the penal law, and a readjustment of the burdens of taxation. It would have been manifest also in the sphere of temperance if it had not been for the effective defence of the financial interests of the liquor trade by the House of Lords.

PROBLEMS TO BE DEALT WITH.

The call is now to take up the task at the point where it was laid down. And first to frame a series of measures for dealing with the questions that in these days are ripe for solution. A vast group of problems has demanded investigation in a fresh spirit: The distribution of the product of industry; the workers' share in controlling the conditions of their own employment; the development of the national resources, with special relation to the question of unemployment; the diffusion of the ownership of property; all these in their bearing on the establishment of peace in industry.

Then in another sphere, the land question in town and country, and the special problems of the coal industry; the questions again of education and of temperance—here is a great expanse of political

subjects, difficult, urgent, of vital importance to the nation, on which Liberal inquiries have been busy, exploring the country, testing the ground, planning the roads of advance.

That the measures to be proposed will fulfil many of the legitimate purposes of the Labour movement I am certain. Whether they will command the support of the Labour Party as an organisation I do not know. That is not our concern. Our duty is to frame a policy that is sound, and to gather once more a party that will be effective to promote it. With efficient organisation, vigorous propaganda, and a body of able, active, and acceptable candidates at work in almost every constituency in Great Britain, the industrial and social policy of Liberalism will be effectively brought before the people for them to accept or to reject.

PARTIES AND INDIVIDUALS.

It would be, of course, an error to regard the political forces in a democracy as though they were definitely organised in great armies, of fixed membership, moving as self-contained units, and the Labour Party in this country as one such unit, which will either support the Liberal programme or oppose it; or to suppose that the only question to be considered is whether or not the leaders of the two bodies should enter into some combination or alliance with one another. That would be a false reading of the situation.

The dominant factor is the individual voter. It is true that in a great number of cases the voter who is a trade unionist surrenders his personal judgment as a citizen, and out of loyalty to his union votes for whatever political party a majority of that union may have decided to support. But these cases form a small minority of the whole body of the electorate, and a minority that is probably dwindling rather than increasing. The average man and woman votes according to personal conviction. The electorate is not to be envisaged, then, as though it consisted of three vast armies with their distinctive characteristics and separate disciplines, but rather as though it were a great reservoir, which at a general election will be drawn off through three channels, each drop of water having the unique property of being able to choose for itself the channel down which it will pass.

The aggregate vote of each party has varied by millions in the last four general elections. It may well vary again by millions in the next. A multitude of voters have given their suffrages to Conservatism or to Socialism because the Liberal Party seemed to be ineffective. Let it show itself strong, active, united, conscious of the task incumbent upon it, informed as to the means for accomplishing that task, and it will draw to its channel a volume of support greater, perhaps, than its most sanguine dreams may now anticipate.

CONCLUSION.

I would end by recapitulating in a summary form the main ideas that I have endeavoured to convey:

Liberalism and the Labour movement share the quality, which is possessed by most great political movements, of being at once idealist and practical; each has its spiritual aspect and its economic aspect.

Through the nineteenth century the influence of the *laissez-faire* theory led the two movements to regard their spheres in the main as separate, but they were in general sympathy and more or less in alliance. The decline of that theory, coinciding with the wide extension of the franchise and with the enactment of payment of members, brought about a change, and the Labour Party took its rise as a separate political force.

A distinction is to be drawn between the Labour movement and the Labour Party. Liberalism may continue to be in general agreement with the one while it is at variance with the other. The divergence is chiefly due to the fact that the Labour Party has identified its fortunes with the theory of Socialism. That theory is a hasty generalisation which can no more stand criticism than the opposite generalisation of an uncontrolled individualism.

The adoption of a Socialist system could not be relied upon to cure the notorious evils of our present society; nor must it be assumed that the retention of private enterprise would mean that those evils would remain uncured.

Liberalism has the duty, therefore, to persist in its policy in relation to the Labour movement without being diverted from its course by the advent of the Labour Party.

The work of the Parliaments of 1906 to 1914 indicates the spirit in which the tasks of the present day will be approached. Those tasks have regard especially to the distribution of wealth, the control of the conditions of employment, the diffusion of the ownership of property, the development of the national resources, the use of the land, both urban and rural, and the conduct of the coal industry, together with the questions of education and temperance.

Whether the Labour Party as a body will support the Liberal policy on these matters is not the question of prime importance. The chief question is whether the policy is sound, and whether the individual elector will recognise that it is sound.

Our duty, then, is first to fashion the policy wisely and well, and next to present it to the people so that it may be understood, and with the assurance that a powerful Liberal Party can be relied upon to push it through in spite of obstacles in front and hindrances behind.

And for my own part I entertain an expectation, although I feel no certainty, that this course will lead, some day and somehow, to a restoration of the old alliance between Liberalism and the Labour movement, to the lasting advantage of both. HERBERT SAMUEL.

GENEVA AND LEAGUE POLICY.

THIS article was planned, and largely written, during a holiday abroad among a people devoted to peace. On my return I first heard of the resignation of Lord Cecil, a resignation which should open a new chapter in the understanding of British policy at Geneva. Lord Cecil holds an exceptional position at Geneva. In his statement to the Prime Minister he summarises his objections to the Government policy with frankness and dignity. Apart from the special matters which he mentions he leaves no doubt of the broad principle on which his objections are founded. He takes his stand by those who hold that the great purpose of the League of Nations, as defined in the Charter of the Covenant, is not merely to give a chance of averting war on the failure of conciliation or diplomacy, but to create among the Member States a sense of assured security, by a common agreement to accept obligations not to resort to war, but to submit disputes to third party impartial decision. It is on this basis that, among the nationals of the more civilised communities, law and justice have been established, and the reign of right has taken the place of the violence of force.

Unfortunately, the rejection of the Protocol in the statement made on behalf of the Government to the Council of the League in March, 1925, is founded, not merely on the futility of the proposals to give security, but on the suggestion that fears, which spring from deep-lying causes of hostility, whether groundless or not, cannot be effectually laid by even the most perfect method of dealing with disputes, by the machinery of inquiry or arbitration. The answer is: this was not the view of the Delegates to the Geneva Assembly in 1924 from the Member States of the League, as was shown by their unanimous resolution to recommend approval of the Protocol principles at Geneva in 1924, and has been made clear on many subsequent occasions, notably in the recent debate at Geneva. Lord Cecil further emphasises his objection to the ministerial declaration against the whole principle of the Protocol by pointing to the failure of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, and to the absence of any effective advance towards a general reduction of armaments. The statement in answer by the Prime Minister suggests the main lines of the Government defence. The Prime Minister quotes an extract from a statement made by the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Geneva, "Successive administrations in Great Britain, with the full approval of the self-governing Dominions, have not only favoured arbitration in theory, but they have largely availed themselves of it in practice." This sentence is not reassuring. Differences have arisen at Geneva, not on the desirability of arbitration, which is common ground, but on

the desirability of amending the terms of the Covenant of the League which relate to arbitration, so as to include all international disputes without exception. On this issue, the only issue involved, the Government has consistently objected to make any concession, refusing to enter into any treaty for all-inclusive arbitration, or to re-open at Geneva the general question. International opinion as expressed at Geneva does not support the Government contention. But for the opposition of the British Government, a World Conference on Disarmament would have been summoned, on a basis acceptable to the majority of Member States, with a promise of ultimate success. Before the late Debate at Geneva a correspondent in a letter from there sent me an extract from the *Journal de Geneve*, under the guarantee of well-known initials, as expressing the general view of the Assembled Delegates. It summarised the position shortly:

" Bien que non ratifié, le Protocole existe. Il suffirait que le gouvernement Britannique changeât pour qu'il reprît toute sa valeur. S'il a besoin de revision on pourrait l'amender alors, sur la base d'idées précises et avec l'espoir d'une ratification prochaine. Par contre, une revision du Protocole dans les circonstances actuelles nous inspire plus de crainte que d'espoir. Ne vaut-il pas mieux attendre des jours meilleurs qui viendront certainement."

It must not be forgotten that the primary question brought before the Assembly of 1924 was Disarmament. It was felt that the time had come when the Member States should endeavour to make effective the obligations for a reduction of armaments contained in Article 8 of the Covenant, and in the promise made to the German representatives at Versailles before the signing of the Versailles Treaty. There was no lack of enthusiasm at Geneva, and, if the Protocol involved risk, it was a risk in a great cause, and the principle received unanimous approval. It was the first occasion on which the Prime Minister of France, or of Great Britain, had been present, and their speeches gave promise that there was no difference of opinion, as between France and Great Britain, which might not be adjusted by frank explanation and a sincere desire to promote a friendly understanding. Then followed the memorable resolution proposed by the British Prime Minister, seconded by the Prime Minister of France and unanimously adopted by the Assembly, bringing hope of an effective advance towards the suppression of aggressive warfare, the only condition on which a Christian civilisation can be permanently stabilised.

In his speech at the Geneva Assembly advocating all-inclusive arbitration, the British Prime Minister said: "An essential condition of security and peace is justice. Justice must be allowed to speak before passion. That is arbitration." He added subsequently: "The

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history of the world is a history which shows that the nations always ready for war are always at war, and that the one is absolutely, essentially, and organically connected with the other. History is full of the doom of nations which have trusted that false security." The Prime Minister of France spoke in similar terms. He said: "Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament are the three main columns in the Temple which you, my colleagues, are called upon to erect," and added, "we earnestly hope, therefore, that one of the acts of the Fifth Assembly will be to accept the principles of arbitration which will once again settle our difficulties, since henceforth the aggressor will be the party which refuses arbitration." It is only the acceptance of arbitration, as an all-inclusive remedy, that enables a competent definition of aggressor to be framed, making it possible to denounce aggressive warfare, as an international crime, or, in other words, to declare the outlawry of aggressive war. Throughout the negotiations at Geneva, which eventuated in the framing of the Protocol, M. Briand, inspired by a deep feeling of the horrors of modern warfare, used his great influence to promote a system of all-inclusive arbitration, saying: "France is honoured in adhering to the Protocol, and for myself I repeat that the most memorable event in the whole of my political career is that I have come to this platform to bring you my country's adherence to the Protocol, and her signature." On subsequent occasions M. Briand has expressed the same broad view, regretting the difficulties which had forced him to take refuge in something smaller, and to be content to reach regional agreements between the countries most directly exposed to the risk of conflict. The Protocol was signed at Geneva by M. Briand and the Delegates of nine other Nations. When he made the declaration of his intention to sign the Protocol I drafted a short statement and passed it round for the consideration and approval of my colleagues. It contained the declaration that, though the British Delegation had not the competent authority to sign at Geneva, it was prepared, unhesitatingly, and with all the influence at its command, to recommend to the British Government, and Parliament, the acceptance of the proposed Protocol for signature and ratification.

The British Delegation were throughout in cordial agreement at Geneva in 1924, and in constant communication with the Delegates from the Dominions and India, as well as with the Home Government and the Foreign Office. There were anxious moments during the negotiations. Difficulties, however, are more than half solved when the parties concerned desire not to create barriers, but to promote understanding. It was found possible to frame the Protocol within the principle of the Covenant, and so as to be capable of being drafted in terms of amendment to the Covenant. This feature

of the draft, and the limitations thereby imposed, have not been adequately appreciated. It was part of the final resolution, unanimously adopted, that a joint committee of jurists should be appointed to draft the necessary amendments. No one would suggest that the details of the Protocol are incapable of improvement, and the drafting of amendments to the Covenant would have enabled a reconsideration of details, and, at the same time, assured that the effect of the Protocol was more widely understood. As British Delegate to the Council I was asked to appoint the British member of this Committee. I had obtained his assent to nominate a jurist of great international knowledge and experience, but before the appointment could be affirmed there was a change of Government. It was a term of the Protocol that the Optional Clause of the Statute of the International Court of the Hague should be adopted and the whole proposal was to become null and void unless within a specified time a plan of disarmament had been carried out. The closing speech of M. Motta, the President of the Assembly and of Italian-Swiss nationality, ended by comparing the work of the Assembly of 1924 to the progress of humanity in the person of Dante climbing up the mountain of purification, and closed the Session by quoting the last words of the Purgatorio—" *Puro e disposto a salire alle stelle.*" This was the high-water mark of achievement of international co-operation for peace, a short-lived triumph at the time, but containing principles of far-reaching application if a world peace settlement is to become a reality. At the late Assembly at Geneva M. Motta, President of the Swiss Confederation, renewed his declaration, made in 1924, in favour of the Protocol, reminding the opponents that without the latter there would have been no Locarno. This is the more important since the present Government refused even to consider the proposal, made by the Swiss Government, for adopting a system of all-inclusive arbitration between Switzerland and this country.

It is difficult not to be influenced by the constantly repeated party slogan that the Labour Party in their foreign as well as in their home outlook are mainly influenced by class and party considerations. This form of criticism has some element of that half truth which is the worst form of no truth. A similar criticism could be supported against other party organisations in this country. I desire, however, to say definitely and distinctly that the Labour Government when in power was no less desirous of maintaining a national standpoint, in foreign and League matters, than other parties have been when in power. Patriotism and loyalty are as much concerned with national restraint as with national assertion, and national honour is as much involved in observing international service as in pressing national claims. The

Meeting of the Assembly at Geneva in 1924 was immediately followed by a General Election. Lord Grey, Lord Cecil, and Professor Gilbert Murray entered a plea against bringing League questions into the turmoil of party politics, a plea which I cordially supported. Although the Labour policy at Geneva should be kept free from the spirit of political party friction, it would be absurd not to recognise that, in the larger political outlook, it involves political questions of primary importance, of greater importance than any other questions at the present time. Lord Cecil has not stated the case too highly in his letter of resignation to the Prime Minister, and it is incumbent on all who desire a stabilised international peace settlement, to protest against the treatment which has been accorded by the present Government to the Geneva policy of September, 1924, and to make every effort to bring about its reinstatement. It is not the fact that this policy has been negated by public opinion, either in this country or in the Dominions. I have urged more than once that there should be full disclosure of the communications which have passed on the subject of the Protocol between this country and the Dominions, but this request has consistently been refused. The same refusal was the answer of the Home Government to the request for publication by the Canadian Parliament. There was no abler representative of the Dominions at the Assembly in 1924 than M. Dandurand, the Canadian Delegate, and there is considerable evidence to show that Canada is not only not unfavourable to the signature of the Optional Clause, Section 36, of the Statute of the International Court, but strongly in its favour. This would be a first step towards a recognition of the Protocol. Of India it is sufficient to say that Lord Hardinge was first delegate in 1924. Consternation was, however, created at Geneva in March, 1925, not so much by the unconditional rejection of the Protocol, as by the reasons adduced in the statements of the Foreign Minister, to which reference has already been made. The statement contained on this question in the Report of the late Imperial Conference is not convincing—"that it was at present premature to accept the obligations under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice." This does not support the allegation of Imperial disruption. The recent speech of M. Dandurand at Geneva should put an end to the reiterated argument of a common Dominion opposition to the principle of all-inclusive arbitration. M. Dandurand's view accords more nearly with what appears to be the general opinion in this country, than with the policy of the present Government. He is reported to have said, in his plea for peace, that Canada was in general agreement with the principles of the Protocol, considering the risk of being nonsuited by arbitration was less than the risk of war.

It is more pleasant to refer to the Treaty of Locarno. In spite of its limitations and omissions, it denotes a desire, so far as this is possible within a regional agreement, to create a new spirit of peaceful neighbourliness between France and Germany. To this Treaty Great Britain became a guarantor against aggressive warfare on the Eastern frontier of France, a guarantee of the first importance to France, and naturally regarded by France as a compensation for the failure of the original proposal for a joint guarantee by this country and America. It is not difficult to see the weak points in the Locarno Treaty. It still seems doubtful how far it will promote a permanent peaceful understanding between France and Germany; but it contains a germ of hope that Western Europe will hesitate to destroy its higher civilisation by internecine warfare. So far, however, it has not gone far to promote disarmament. It is regrettable that it has not been accompanied by the recall of all foreign troops from the Rhineland. The occupation, so long as it lasts, is a menace to friendly intercourse, and perpetuates a sense in Germany of inequality in treatment and of distrust in her national honour. No one doubts the value of bringing Germany into the League, a movement urgently pressed by the British Delegates to the Assembly at Geneva in 1924. There is every reason to hold that the entry of Germany into the League, with a permanent place on the Council, would have been brought about without delay, if the Protocol had been accepted and ratified in this country. Before leaving the history of the Protocol two further facts should be added as illustrative of its wide-reaching importance. Viscount Grey, whose opinion on foreign affairs is entitled to exceptional weight, supported its main principles in a generous speech at Croydon, before its rejection by the Government. The Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union, in every sense a non-political body, unanimously adopted in October, 1924 a resolution which warmly approved the principles underlying the Geneva Protocol, and congratulated the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations on the great advance towards permanent peace achieved by the general recognition that "arbitration, security, and disarmament go hand in hand." The resolution further expressed the belief that it was vital that this great opportunity should not be lost. I offered more than once to give to the present Government a full account of the experience of the British Delegation at Geneva, but the offer was not accepted. This is, in no sense, a personal question. If international matters are to be treated apart from the spirit of party, it is essential that a national representative should be heard and his experience utilised, before a new Government comes finally to an adverse decision.

Although no question is of greater moment, to the future of world peace, than a general reduction of armaments there are a number of

questions closely related to this main issue, which cannot be dissociated in any general consideration of League policy. These questions are political in a broad sense. Their treatment essentially depends on the policy of the Government for the time being. Foremost among them is the attitude of the Government towards the Council and Assembly at Geneva. The confusion brought about on the occasion of the meeting of the Assembly, especially convened to sanction the entry of Germany into the League, with a permanent place on the Council, is a matter which will not readily be forgotten. It is not an isolated event, but an instance of a tendency to place diplomatic negotiation in front of open discussion at Geneva. The result was that the Session of the Assembly was closed without submitting to it the matter for which it had been especially convoked. To endeavour to determine, in previous negotiation with one or more governments, the election of Council Members, whether permanent or not, is to treat a world Assembly containing a number of the foremost Statesmen in the Member States with scant respect. It may be assumed that there would be no repetition of the unsatisfactory procedure then adopted in the election of the Council; but the suspicion has not been avoided that the present Government is more interested in adjustments based on the pre-war principles of diplomacy, than in a loyal determination to further a League procedure in which the Delegates of all the Member States can take a proportionate interest. It was said not long ago by the correspondent of a powerful paper at Paris that the League Council's chief usefulness lies in the fact that the formal questions to be debated, however important they may appear to respective protagonists, really form the screen behind which the real work goes on. If this were to become the normal practice at a Meeting of the Council of the League, it would denote the failure of the true intention of League procedure, and might not improbably result in the further withdrawal of Member States. There is real danger in negotiations begun before the Council or Assembly meet, to be continued in the train and elaborated in hotels and gardens. No one would say that some measure of diplomatic negotiation is not of advantage, but there is a clear distinction between such negotiation and settled diplomatic adjustments which deprive the Member States, acting through the Assembly, of a fair opportunity of effective criticism on questions which involve the future of peace or war.

The failure of the Government policy in China is a notable instance of disregarding League methods and League control. Both this country and China are members of the League and also members of the Council. It is not denied that the dispute of this country with China comes within the words and intention of Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Covenant, under which a dispute could be submitted

either to arbitration or inquiry and report. The dispute relating to concessions, settlements, and treaty terms was eminently of a character for impartial inquiry. The question of extra-territoriality originated in a desire to promote industrial intercourse for the benefit of both countries. No doubt the conditions in China raised difficulties, but a Delegate from China had been recognised as a member both of the Assembly and of the Council, and, if this country had followed the ordinary course of League procedure, any objection should have come, not from this country, but from the Southerners in China. Had this step been taken I do not doubt that the resources of the Council would have been sufficient to meet the position. There is no need to assume that a difficulty would have been raised by any section in China. China has suffered from militarism consequent on the supersession of civilian by military governors. The sending of foreign troops to China necessarily increases military influence. No one for a moment would desire that British Nationals in China should be placed in risk without the protection of the Government, but this risk need not have arisen if the disputes had been referred at the outset to Geneva for settlement or inquiry. The result has been a maximum of loss to our trade interests in China, and an illustration of ineffective and costly interference.

The resignation of Lord Cecil reminds me of his speech at Trowbridge on January 28th. His objection to bringing the dispute, which had arisen between this country and China, to the Council of the League, is founded on the chaos brought about by the dissensions of the military chiefs. He stated that the only hope of bringing the matter before the League of Nations would be if the Cantonese were themselves to desire it, and that in that case, whether the Cantonese represented the Government or not, our own Government would be only too glad to get the matter transferred to an atmosphere where a real settlement could be arrived at. I cordially agree with this statement, with the exception of throwing an obligation on the Cantonese which, in the first instance, should have been recognised as an obligation on this country. Every step in the China policy shows the injury of an aggressive military policy to international industrial intercourse. This is emphasised when, as in the case of China, a new spirit of national independence has arisen, which must necessarily take some time to consolidate and bring about a stable Government.

What of the future? Is it the destiny of our race and people to take a foremost part in strengthening the security for a world peace? I do not doubt that all parties, both in country and Empire, seek this end, but we pursue differing ways, and are not agreed on the best road along which to travel. Our common object is world peace, not only in our time, but for the blessing of future generations. I

heartily support the suggestion of Mr. MacDonald for conference and consideration. No way has so far been explored, except to follow the example by which national security has been obtained in the more civilised countries, substituting law for force, and an equal right to strong and weak to have their disputes decided by impartial decision. This is the method adopted in the Covenant, handed down from the time of Grotius, and explicitly stated in the philosophy of Kant. The Protocol is nothing more than the extension of the principles embodied in the Covenant, capable of being expressed as an amendment of the Covenant, and within the terms of the Covenant articles. If the proposal had been carried out of drafting the Protocol as an amendment to the Covenant, much misunderstanding would have been avoided. No doubt the Protocol, like the Covenant, does constitute a further step in the development of international law, thus, to quote the terms of the Covenant, "promoting international co-operation by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments."

PARMOOR.

THE EIGHTH ASSEMBLY.

FINIS coronat opus, and it is in a sense courting disaster to attempt to estimate the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in an article which must of necessity be written when the Assembly has barely run half its course. Yet such first impressions may have their value as bases for a comparison between the Assembly's earlier promise and the results that may have been harvested by the time these lines are in print.

The Assembly opened with no very exalted anticipations. The faith of the more ardent supporters of the League had been shaken by the unexpected resignations, first of M. de Jouvenel in France and then of Lord Cecil in Great Britain, and rumour, fortunately mendacious, had it that another delegate hardly less prominent was threatening to follow the same course. In addition to that, in the fields on which the League's activities are for the moment most concentrated, a cloud had been cast over the whole future by the failure of the three-power Naval Conference, a result which, in the view of men who were by no means pessimists, made an immediate continuation of the League's disarmament efforts little less than futile. And beyond all that, the delegates of the smaller states unquestionably came to Geneva with a sense of grievance against the greater. To put it in a sentence, they felt that the Locarno powers were trying to run the League. If anything had happened to confirm that impression the effect on the whole future of the League of Nations would have been grave. For whatever ground there may or may not have been for the suspicion of the intentions of the greater powers, the essential fact was that the suspicion existed and that it was seriously undermining the confidence of the lesser states in the League. Finally, the Assembly promised to be dull. There was no outstanding item on the agenda. There was no new state applying for admission. There were, so far as was known, no new personalities of any consequence attending as delegates. Three weeks of useful but uninspiring routine work seemed to be in prospect.

The first week's sessions in the sombre Salle de la Réformation put a new complexion on the outlook. That week was devoted, as is customary, to a general discussion of the work of the League in the preceding year. The speeches are usually rambling, and delegates from distant countries feel it necessary to come with vivid protestations of their devotion to the League and highly-coloured descriptions of what their governments have done to give effect to League principles. This year, for some reason not quite easy to divine, there was a new note of reality in the debates. The League, which even its best friends had suspected of contracting sleeping-sickness, was showing itself vital, virile, and constructive. The first note

struck was that of independence. The smaller powers, it seemed, had abandoned any disposition to show themselves subservient to the great. M. Hambro, chairman of the Norwegian Chamber of Deputies, won general applause by his vigorous criticisms of the hotel conversations of the Locarno powers, of the proposal to reduce the number of Council meetings in the year, and of the failure of the majority of the members of the League to sign the Optional Clause of the statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland, a new figure at the Assembly, startled delegates—and the British delegates in particular—by moving on the first day of the general discussion that the general principles underlying the Geneva Protocol should be studied afresh.

When one of M. van Blokland's countrymen was reproached with the failure of his Foreign Minister to consult with Sir Austen Chamberlain before advancing such a proposition, he received the answer, "We are Dutchmen, not Poles." That observation had reference to another Assembly resolution which after long incubation emanated from the Polish delegation. In its original form it called for a denunciation of war as an instrument for the settlement of any international dispute. But the Polish delegation, unlike the Dutch, imparted their intention to the representatives of Britain, France and Germany, with the result that the resolution was cut about and whittled down and stiffened up again for about four successive days before it finally reached the Assembly platform. It should be added in fairness to the Poles that their Foreign Minister, M. Zaleski, who was to have taken charge of the resolution, was detained at Warsaw by illness, and his deputy at Geneva stood at an obvious disadvantage as an intermediary between the Foreign Ministers of the three Great Powers on the spot and his own chief at the distant end of a telegraph line. But the Polish resolution, like the Dutch, was in its way an evidence of an impulse widely diffused throughout the Assembly to take one more constructive step for the stabilisation of peace in whatever direction way might open.

The level of speaking in the general discussion was high. An unexpected note of optimism and confidence was sounded throughout, except in the rather curious speech of M. Politis, the able jurist who, after two years' absence from the Assembly, was once more in his place as representative of Greece. M. Politis shared with Dr. Benes the distinction, if distinction it be, of authorship of the Geneva Protocol, and it therefore came as something of a shock to the Assembly to hear the Greek delegate contending, amid loud applause from the British benches, that any resurrection of the buried Protocol at the moment was inopportune. The metaphor is perhaps hardly justified, for M. Politis insisted that the Protoco-

was not dead but only sleeping and that one day it would reappear in all its fullness, a prediction on which he founded his appeal against any attempt to reconstruct it by stages. The injunction around which his peroration centred, the word *Attendez*, was again loudly applauded by Sir Austen Chamberlain, though it is rumoured, perhaps mendaciously, that what the speaker really wanted to wait for was a general election in Great Britain. There were not wanting cynics to point out that Greece was a candidate for election to the Council, and that the British Empire commanded seven votes, while another comment of the same order was supplied by a French publicist, who observed, "Ce n'est pas un discours dramatique; c'est un discours drachmatique." A few days later M. Politis took the opportunity in committee to explain that he favoured a much less passive policy than his speech had implied.

The most notable pronouncements of the opening week were naturally those of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Germany. They were striking as much by reason of the variety of the themes as of the personality of their authors. Dr. Stresemann, who spoke first, made a speech that was everything a speech in the Assembly should be. He characteristically laid special stress on the Economic Conference, which he declared had greatly facilitated the conclusion, for the first time in sixty years, of a commercial treaty between Germany and France. He rounded sharply on critics of the League and he gave earnest of Germany's loyalty to it by announcing that he was about to sign the Optional Clause of the Statutes of the Permanent Court. That is an important step, for Germany is in effect the first great power to sign the clause, since France's signature in 1924 was dependent on the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol, and the authority of the Court itself will be materially enhanced thereby. M. Briand was equally optimistic, and while he approved the past was feeling tentatively toward the future, for the passage in which he contended, using the Greco-Bulgarian dispute as illustration, that the difficulty of defining aggression could be met by branding as aggressor the party that refused to arbitrate, did not at the time attract the attention it deserved. Sir Austen Chamberlain struck a very different note. His speech, characteristically Conservative even more than characteristically British, gave little pleasure to the Assembly, nor can it be supposed that he thought it would. He felt it necessary to define once for all the attitude of the government of which he is a member, and he did it in language which was perhaps intentionally uncompromising. The Foreign Secretary will accept no fresh obligations, but he was anxious that the Assembly should understand that if a crisis did arise Great Britain would do whatever might reasonably be expected of her. That doctrine is good enough for Englishmen, but

it can hardly be expected to be good enough for countries who look at Britain from across the sea. We have disarmed considerably, said Sir Austen, and therefore cannot be reproached with failure to achieve a new disarmament compact. We have frequently arbitrated, even though we will not pledge ourselves to arbitrate. We have done much for the security of Europe at Locarno, but we can enter into no general obligation. The speech was frank, and as such it evoked approval. But its tone was unhappily keyed, and its general effect appeared to be to rule out Great Britain's co-operation in any new constructive approach to a solution of the security problem.

So much for the clearing of the ground by the opening speeches. What emerged by the time the delegates settled down to detailed work in the six commissions into which the Assembly annually divides itself was that almost every State in Europe, except Great Britain, was driven irresistibly back to that trilogy of which we heard so much in 1924—arbitration, security, and disarmament. They were the spontaneous expression of the sentiments which all the smaller States of Europe share. The League is concentrated particularly at the moment on the disarmament problem, but as one of its protagonists in that field, M. Paul-Boncour, insisted, whenever it got seriously down to discussion of disarmament the inevitable problem of security overshadowed everything. If the States could be sure that the League would save them from war, then and only then would they disarm in earnest. For all Sir Austen Chamberlain had said in a rather far-fetched passage about gaps and passages being necessary for breath and movement, the gap in the Covenant whereby certain wars are recognised as legitimate is a very real obstacle to the reduction of armaments. That was what underlay the original Polish demand for a denunciation of all war, not merely of aggressive war, and the subsequent appeal of the Dutch delegate, M. Loudon, for the omission of the word "aggressive" from the Polish resolution as amended. It may be wise to avoid so far as possible reference to the specific Geneva Protocol, but the Protocol was the outcome of sentiments prevailing throughout the continent of Europe, and what the present Assembly has revealed is that those sentiments are as strong as ever to-day after three years have elapsed, and in spite of the refusal of Great Britain even to discuss the Protocol principles. But arbitration must be discussed; so must security; and so, of course, must disarmament. And if the ultimate result is a series of conclusions strangely resembling those of the Protocol, there may be some virtue psychologically in bestowing on it another name.

It seems altogether unlikely, at the moment these lines are being written, that the Assembly will reach any final results this year. The time is too short. The Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Vander-

velde, was undoubtedly right when he appealed for a study and discussion of the problems so that solutions might be worked out which it must be left to the peoples to apply. Sir Austen Chamberlain's conclusion was precisely the opposite. He wanted all discussion of the Protocol dropped, since it would only reopen barren controversies that could lead to no result. That attitude is hopeless. When the bulk of the continent of Europe is working out a constructive plan (though it is important to recognise that Germany has some reserves and Italy probably more) it is worse than futile for a single power not merely to oppose the general view but to attempt to stifle those discussions which at Geneva of all places in the world are calculated gradually to reconcile opposing standpoints.

At all events the discussions, in spite of Great Britain, are going forward. The first endeavour is to extend and consolidate the processes of arbitration. Here again the community of thought is notable. On two successive days in the Assembly arbitration was dealt with by the delegates of France, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Canada. M. Briand, on the morrow of the Permanent Court's decision for Turkey and against France in the *Lotus* case, affirmed that in spite of its adverse judgment, which his country would, of course, unquestionably accept, his faith in the processes of arbitration was as strong as ever. Sir Austen Chamberlain pointed out that the immediate effect of the League Council's decision in the dispute over the Irak frontier was the opening of friendly and successful negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey. M. Motta, the Swiss President, pointed out that arbitration agreements which in 1924 had numbered 120 had risen in 1927 to 220. And Senator Dandurand declared that in spite of the fact that Canada had lost vast tracts of territory through arbitration decisions, her belief in the principle of arbitration was ineradicable. The Assembly is clearly anxious to do something to make arbitration more universal and more effective. One step is to define more clearly than has yet been done the classes of cases suitable, respectively, for arbitration and for settlement by the Permanent Court of International Justice. The latter aim will be largely achieved if and when the majority of the States of the League have signed the optional clause, thereby undertaking to submit to the Court any strictly legal disputes in which they may be engaged. Another proposal is the drafting by the League of a model arbitration treaty which might be adopted, with or without special modifications, by States desiring to conclude such treaties with each other.

Another still more deserving of study is the general treaty submitted by Dr. Nansen, whereby any States which chose would bind themselves in the last resort—i.e., if the League Council failed to

settle their dispute—to go to arbitration and abide by the verdict given. This pledge covers political, or non-justiciable, cases only, any disputes of a purely legal character going to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as they must always do if they arise between States which have signed the Optional Clause in the Court Statutes. And it may be assumed that any State prepared to accept universal obligation would already have taken the lesser commitment of accepting the universal jurisdiction of the Court in justiciable cases. Signature both of the Optional Clause and the new Universal Arbitration Treaty would therefore rule out war altogether between States which contracted the double obligation, just as it is ruled out between France and Germany by the Locarno agreements.

It is not intended to attempt to carry the Nansen Treaty through to its final form this year. It may indeed be remoulded or abandoned altogether. Resolute application to the task of exploring the possibilities of the Covenant and developing action based on its provisions to the fullest limit may show that after all the clauses drafted by President Wilson and Lord Cecil and the rest at Paris are proof against more eventualities than has yet been realised. The significance of the new proposals lies elsewhere. All that has been suggested at Geneva this year is of value almost more as an evidence of tendencies and desires than as material for a new fabric of jurisprudence. The anxiety to throw up new and insurmountable barriers against war is unmistakable, though the attempt may be too quixotic to find any early fulfilment. Europe may be unquiet, but no one who was at Geneva last month can doubt the earnest of Europe's desire for a peace stabilised, fortified and assured.

In regard to disarmament, the affirmation of resolve has been striking, though progress toward the working out of details is slow enough. Germany, of course, as a State disarmed already, is pressing strongly for the honest fulfilment by League members of their obligations under Article VIII of the Covenant, and a declaration even more forcible than Dr. Stresemann's on that point was made by Count Apponyi, the veteran Hungarian statesman. M. Paul Boncour, as leading member of the League's Preparatory Commission, will not admit that results have been disappointing. The reservations made by various States to the draft convention prepared by the Commission are in his submission less serious than had been supposed, and certainly the failure of the Naval Conference can in no way be laid at the door of the League. That, by the way, is a point which many speakers were anxious to emphasise.

But still the security problem remains, a fatal obstacle to any full achievement in the disarmament field. How is that problem to be solved? We, says Sir Austen Chamberlain, have done our

part in solving it at Locarno; let other nations do the same elsewhere. Locarno, say the majority of Assembly speakers, was simply a localised Protocol; let us aim at one general agreement that will make Locarnos everywhere. Between those two currents of thought the Assembly is still contending and no conclusion this year can be expected. Nor, indeed, is a conclusion this year to be desired. The League must not stand still. Sir Austen Chamberlain's appeal for abandonment of discussions on the Protocol, or even the principles of the Protocol, is not to be entertained, but time must be given for discussions to bear their fruit. In particular, an important school of delegates, headed by M. de Brouckère, is insisting that since the Protocol in its original form is not to-day practical politics, the first thing to do is to study the full implications of the articles of the Covenant—which every State has accepted without reserve—and ensure that they are given their fullest force, particularly in the field of security. Such a study, conscientiously conducted, may lead us far. It might, indeed, lead us round the Geneva Protocol, instead of against it, by roads which even the constituent States of the British Empire would be prepared to take. However that may be, it is necessary for any conscientious chronicler of facts to insist that the dominating feature of the Eighth Assembly is the demonstration of continued faith in the Protocol. It is useless for Great Britain merely to say that because Great Britain will not endorse it the Protocol is dead. So far as unanimity is required for its adoption that may be so, but no one can take any clear view of European politics who fails to realise that rightly or wrongly, for better or worse, the outstanding fact as regards the external politics of most of the countries of Europe is their unabandoned resolve to see the principles of the Protocol realised.

To take full account of that is not, as some strange-inspired commentators have suggested, to write oneself down as denizen of a world of illusions. True realism is to recognise facts and build on them as best one may. The League of Nations, of which over fifty States are members, has before it one triple and dominating problem, that of arbitration, security and disarmament. No one has affirmed that in more categorical language than Sir Austen Chamberlain. At least four States out of every five agree on one particular solution of the problem. It does not lie with the fifth to say simply "I disapprove and so the scheme is dead. Let there be no more talk about it." That is not the method of the League, nor an attitude befitting States who have pledged themselves by treaty to promote international co-operation as their foremost aim. Great Britain has no positive proposal of any kind to make. She has distinguished herself so far by turning down other people's. Let that policy be justified or not, there is nothing to be said for the doctrine that

Britain's ban must be followed by dead silence. States alike in their zeal for the prosperity of the League of Nations and anxiety for the settlement of its triple problem differ on methods of procedure. The difference may be a serious one, but opposing views can only be reconciled by constructive discussions and explanations at Geneva. It was never more true than in this connection that the supreme value of the League is its permanence, which enables it to hammer and hammer away at problems until it solves them. To bang the door, to refuse all compromise or concession, even to shirk the discussions out of which agreement might emerge, is not an attitude that reflects particular credit on a State whose fundamental loyalty to the League is not to be called in question.

H. WILSON HARRIS.

A CENTURY OF MODERN GREECE.

ON October 20th Greece will celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the battle of Navarino, to which she largely owed her independence. Great preparations are being made to commemorate the event in a manner worthy of the occasion; a set of special postage-stamps, including three bearing the heads of the British, French and Russian Admirals, Sir Edward Codrington, De Rigny and Heyden, is being issued, and the "Byron Committee" in London has organised an exhibition of Philhellenic relics at the Greek Legation. The Greeks feel that, as political events prevented the celebration of the centenary of their War of Independence in 1921, that of Navarino is the most appropriate moment for rejoicing over their century of freedom, which really dates from the destruction of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets in the twice historic bay, known to classical scholars as Pylos, but for modern historians the name is derived from the mediæval Avars.* We may best consider the importance of the battle in history by a review of the progress of Greece during the succeeding century. For Navarino was remarkable not so much for what it destroyed, as for what it created: from the conflagration of the Turco-Egyptian ships arose the phoenix of Greek freedom.

The godparents of the nascent Greek State were grudging of their christening presents. Their object was to amputate Turkey as little as possible by granting Greece a niggardly frontier, outside of which lay the most numerous and richest portions of the Hellenic race. In vain did the future King of the Belgians, Leopold I, to whom the Greek crown had been offered on these conditions, protest against a delimitation which left Crete to Turkey. The disregard of his protest by the Powers resulted in a series of Cretan insurrections which disturbed the peace of the East, cost Greece large sums for the maintenance of refugees—the chief cause of her national indebtedness before the union with Crete in 1912—and diverted to foreign adventures energies which might otherwise have been better employed in improving conditions at home. In 1869, as in 1830, the same mistake was committed; European diplomacy preferred to "skin and flim the ulcerous place" instead of using the knife; temporary remedies postponed a drastic solution. When foreign critics express disappointment at what modern Greece has achieved, when they draw imaginary pictures of what might have been, they usually omit to mention the territorial handicap imposed upon the new State at the start. Great Britain, whose policy towards Greece has been unfavourably criticised by a recent French historian, can at

* Cf. the author's note on *The Name of Navarino* in his *Essays on the Latin Orient*.

least claim to have made amends by the cession of the Ionian Islands in 1864. But the British, like the French, official attitude towards Greece has wavered between a desire to assist the Greeks and a fear of offending the Turks. It is difficult for a Great Power to have two favourites in the Near East.

But the errors of the three "Protecting Powers" were not confined to territorial questions. From the first Greek politics were envenomed and complicated by the interference of the British, French and Russian Ministers in Greek internal affairs. Even before the capital had been moved to Athens from Nauplia in 1834, that charming little town had become a hotbed of international intrigues, just as Durazzo was the theatre of Austro-Italian rivalry under the Prince of Wied in 1914, or as Tirana is that of Italo-Yugoslav jealousy now. The early part of Otho's reign was occupied by the schemes and counter-schemes of the "English," "French," and "Russian" parties, the *Barlaïoi*, *Moskomángai* and *Napistai*, as they were nicknamed. Dawkins, the first of the sixteen British Ministers accredited to Greece, was a born intriguer, as we know from the character of him drawn by several observers; his successor, Sir Edmund Lyons, a sailor rather than a diplomatist, pursued what he considered to be British interests with a "quarter-deck manner" which irritated his French colleague. The historian of the French Archæological School of Athens openly avows that the foundation of that institution in 1846 was due quite as much to the desire of counteracting British political influence as to that of prosecuting learned research. The then French Minister, the Corsican Piscatory, told the young archæological students that he considered them as an auxiliary force of his Legation. Kolettes, the exponent of the national dress and the national idea, and the most powerful political leader of Othonian Greece till his death in 1847, was avowedly the *protégé* of France, where he had been Minister, just as Mavrocordatos, the frock-coated Phanariote who had been with Byron at Mesolonghi, was the man of England, and Metaxâs the nominee of Russia. But in the interest of the country, as Finlay, himself a landowner, pointed out, it was more important to have roads than a pro-British Premier.

It is possible after the lapse of two generations to consider the personality of the first King of Greece with equanimity. Otho was neither a statesman nor a despot. He was an ordinary man, who, according to his own confession, had mistaken his vocation, but who worked with intense love of his adopted country and unflagging industry at his profession. His indecision, his love of details, his inability to seize large issues, above all, his childlessness, led to his overthrow in 1862 by one of those bloodless revolutions common in Greece. His Queen, the spirited but tactless Amalia, has left a

lasting memorial in Athens in the Royal, now National, Garden, which she planted with immense labour as a pleasant oasis in the "thin soil" of Attica. No royal couple ever travelled over their country so thoroughly, and that at a time when Greek travel was very difficult and accommodation scanty. But "the deaf Bavarian" was not the man to govern the lively Hellenes, even if he had not incurred the enmity of Palmerston, and Amalia that of Napoleon III. For a new generation, the product of the University, founded in 1837, had arisen during the twenty-nine years of his reign. Shrewd old Kolokotronis had pointed first to the University, then to the Palace, with the remark: "This building will eat up that building." Epaminondas Delegeorges, the chosen leader of the so-called "golden youth" of 1862, had taken the place formerly occupied by the heroes of the War of Independence, who had mostly supported the throne of Otho.

The second dynasty witnessed what had been denied to the first—the expansion of Greece. After the Ionian Islands came Thessaly and the district of Arta in 1881, Macedonia, Western Thrace, the rest of Epeiros, Crete and all the Ægean islands except the fourteen occupied by the Italians and Imbros and Tenedos, the guardians of the Dardanelles, still held by Turkey, but on unfulfilled conditions, as the net result of the Balkan and European wars. Even after the loss of Eastern Thrace, Imbros, Tenedos, and Smyrna, with its *Hinterland*, as the result of the disaster in Asia Minor, Greece to-day has an area of about 49,200 square miles, or a little more than double of what it was in 1912, and rather more than what it was in 1914 after the two Balkan wars. Moreover, the gain in quality has been as remarkable as that in quantity. Salonika was the second largest city of European Turkey; it is now the second capital of Greece. It is rapidly arising from the ruins of the fire of 1917; it has been endowed with a University which, under the Rectorship of Professor Soteriades, himself a Macedonian, will not be a mere copy of that of Athens, but will encourage those practical studies needed for the development of Macedonia and Thrace. An annual fair is held there for the advertisement of the latest agricultural implements and machinery among the peasants. By the acquisition of Kavalla and Xanthé Greece has gained the two most valuable tobacco-plantations of Europe; what was "Turkish" is now Greek tobacco, and the port-dues of Kavalla form an important asset in the budget. American capital has been introduced, and loads of tobacco are transported across the battle-field of Philippi to the United States. Volo, before 1881 a small town, has become a big city, the centre of the jam manufactory, and the fine gulf, which saw the launch of the *Argo*, is visited by the British fleet and may serve as the

starting-point for Egypt. Thanks to the exchange of populations and the Asia Minor disaster, the loss of European territory by the Treaty of Lausanne has been amply compensated by the greater density of the population on Greek soil. There has been no census since January 1st, 1921, but the population of Greece is estimated at 6,374,000. Here, too, the quality, as well as the quantity, has increased. Many refugees were skilled workmen, who brought with them from Asia Minor arts and crafts, such as carpet-making, unknown in Greece before. "Turkish" carpets, like "Turkish" tobacco, are now produced in Greece, whence they are sold to London and New York. The numerous agriculturists among the refugees have already doubled the cultivable area of Macedonia, which during the five centuries of Turkish indifference was left largely undeveloped.

Besides, what Hellenism has lost in extension in Asia Minor it has gained by concentration in Europe. The Greek disaster in Asia has solved the wearisome Macedonian question, as far as Greek Macedonia is concerned. Before the exchange of populations there was a large percentage of non-Hellenic races there; now, the Greeks form 88.8 per cent. of the whole; the Bulgarians and Turks have practically disappeared, and the Jews of Salonika, though an important, are a diminishing body. Indeed, Greece, as a whole, has become much more homogeneous; for the only remaining Moslems are the Turkish peasants of Western Thrace, whom everyone wished to retain, and the Chams of Goumenitsa, in Epeiros, the future submarine-base of the Greek navy. The nomad Koutso-Wallachs are withdrawing before the invading refugees, so that politicians need no longer rack their brains over the conflicting "statistics" of half-a-dozen propagandas in Macedonia. The Albanian element, long established in Greece, has become amalgamated with the Greeks, and the two first Presidents of the Republic had Albanian blood in their veins. The 40,000 Armenian refugees, who have been unloaded upon the already over-strained resources of the country, it has been proposed to transport elsewhere. The Turkish-speaking Greek refugees will soon have learned Greek, which their children acquire easily.

Few people realise the great improvements in communications achieved in Greece during the second half of the century under review. The Finlay library in Athens contains the invitation-card to the inauguration in 1869 of the first Greek railway—a British undertaking—that which united Athens with the Piræus. One of the shrewdest Athenian bankers doubted whether it would pay; since its electrification and extension to the heart of the capital, its almost constant service of trains scarcely suffices for the passenger-traffic, and "strap-hangers" are as common as on our Under-

ground. But Finlay himself waxed sarcastic over "the dream"—which has now become a reality—of a through service of trains between Calais and the Piræus. Trikoupes, one of the greatest statesmen of the nineteenth century, developed the railway system of the Peloponnese, despite the usual opposition of vested interests. In that part of Greece the only link now missing is that between Tripolis and Gyttheion *via* Sparta—a journey now covered by public motors. Finlay described, in one of his letters to *The Times*, how an Athenian in the early years of George I would take three days to reach the Lacedæmonian capital. Now he leaves Athens in the morning and arrives in Sparta in time for tea, or for what passes as such in the Spartan *menu* of to-day. In 1893, the opening of the Corinth Canal, the dream of Nero, quickened communications with "Europe," despite the narrowness of the cutting and occasional landslips. But, in 1916, the opening of the last link of the railway connecting Greece with "Europe"—that between the end of the Vale of Tempe and the Macedonian railway system—at last put Athens into rapid communication with the rest of the world. Letters from London are now delivered in Athens on the morning of the fourth day after their dispatch; Belgrade is only thirty-six hours distant, and the transit will be further diminished when part of the Greek line has been relaid. Of these facilities the omniscient "Baedeker" knows nothing; for him Greek history ends in 1909, the year when the contemporary history of Greece began, and his "practical hints" to travellers would lead them to believe that places, now accessible by motor-cars (of which there are 7,000 in Athens alone), can only be reached by mules. Greece still lacks in the way of communications a railway between the east of the country, especially Macedonia, and Epeiros. Joannina is completely isolated, alike from Macedonia—whence, however, a line is projected—and from the terminus of the little North-Western Railway at Agrinion, which railway in turn has no connection with any other Greek line, but starts from the sometimes (as on the occasion of the centenary of the sortie of Mesolonghi in 1926) inaccessible landing-place of Kryoneri. Roads, too, need improvement, although the Greek chauffeur will motor over a ploughed field, if necessary, for example, to the temples of Nemesis at Rhamnous. The abolition of the boatmen's monopoly in Greek ports, naturally with proper compensation to the boatmen in proportion to their age, would facilitate tourist-traffic, which should become a source of considerable revenue to a country possessed of great natural beauty, besides its unique antiquities, and blessed with a winter climate superior to that of the hackneyed Riviera.

All these things and more besides depend to a certain degree upon politics. Greek business men see this so clearly that they implored the late "Œcumenical" Government to make up its

differences for the sake of national trade. In Greece, as in England, the initiative of individuals has done more for material progress than governmental action: the Man, as Herbert Spencer said, has been more efficient than the State. Most public institutions in Athens are the creation of self-made men; the English public-school, opened at Spetsai in September, is the foundation of a local millionaire: the time would fail to enumerate the benefactions of Mr. Benakes. But, nevertheless, frequent changes of government have an injurious effect upon business. Political instability is exaggerated abroad, and the fall of a Ministry in Athens becomes a "revolution" in London! Twice in the history of the last hundred years, in 1877 and 1927, an "Œcumenical" Government has been formed of the leaders of all parties, amidst general approval; and, though the second broke up on August 11th, after eight months, owing to the differences between Mr. Tsaldares, leader of the "Popular" or advanced Royalist party, and the other chiefs over the question of the National Bank, the "Ministry of Wide Concentration," which was speedily constructed, includes all parties except the extreme Royalists and the handful of Communists. With the exception of the three retiring members of the "Popular" party, the other Ministers remained under the invaluable Premiership of Mr. Zaïmes, whose function in public life it has always been to come to the rescue of the ship of State in heavy weather, when no other captain would inspire the confidence of the crew. Especially important was the continued adhesion of General Metaxâs, chief of the party of "Free Opinion," composed of moderate Royalists. The "little Moltke," who drew up such a marvellous plan for taking the Dardanelles, has shown by his spirit of compromise since he entered the "Œcumenical" Government that he is an exception to the rule that great soldiers make poor politicians. His influence as a Minister has always been on the side of moderation, and his Republican colleagues have found that they can work with him. The collaboration of the politicians has had the natural result of calming party animosities in the public; and, if Mr. Venizelos adheres to his self-denying ordinance of remaining a private citizen, "reconciliation" should make further progress.

How does Greece stand to-day in relation to the three Powers who accidentally liberated her at Navarino? Russia, then the special protectress of the Orthodox Christians, the only one of the three prepared to go to war against Turkey as in 1828, is now out of the picture. For the bloated Russian Legation with its huge staff exists for Bolshevik propaganda rather than political influence. Besides, from 1770 to 1878, from Orloff's expedition to the treaty of San Stefano, Greece had many disillusionments from Russia. France has undoubtedly rendered great services to Greece; but French policy has oscillated between Philhellenism and Franklin-Bouillon, who

bartered away Greek gratitude for a mess of Turkish pottage. Great Britain has made serious mistakes, and the Parker blockade of 1850 on behalf of Don Pacifico and that of 1886 made us temporarily unpopular. But to-day, despite official hesitations and lack of imagination in the past, England is the most popular of the Great Powers in Greece. The Greeks appreciate and understand better than most foreigners the British psychology, and a visit of the British fleet to Greek waters is the best, the only, form of effective British propaganda. The British Naval and Police Missions and the British vice-chairmen of the Refugees' Settlement Commission have been further national assets, and the model behaviour of our soldiers in Macedonia is gratefully remembered. Austria is no longer a Great Power. Of the new Powers which have arisen since Navarino, Italy is that which most concerns Greece. While their official relations are "correct," the old "brotherhood," of which much was written during the Libyan war of 1911-12, will not be restored so long as Italy remains in possession of the Dodekanese and persistently Italianises those islands. She thereby suffers from the comparison of the far more liberal British administration of Cyprus. Nor is the comparison with England alone; Austria, with whose methods Italians used justly to contrast their own, has granted to the Slovene minority of Carinthia scholastic autonomy under Slovene teachers and managers, such as Italy denies to the Greeks, who form the overwhelming majority of the Dodekanesian population. Leros is a valuable naval base; but a cordial collaboration with Greece might be worth more than a fortified Leros. Of a great Serbia, now stretching down to forty-eight miles from Salonika, no one dreamed in 1827. Yugoslav friendship is invaluable to Greece, and a Greco-Yugoslav alliance would be the best guarantee of Balkan peace. Moreover, it is important to Yugoslavia, now isolated, for France is far away, Italy is near and hostile, Hungary dubious, and Albania likely to become the apple of discord between the two Adriatic Powers, both anxious to assume the part which the old Austria played there. Bulgaria is temporarily disarmed, with Albania Greek relations are friendly, and Turkey, the great Balkan Power of 1827, has now retreated into a corner of the peninsula and almost ceased to be a European State. So long as the Œcumenical Patriarchate, now *magni nominis umbra*, remains in Constantinople, it will be at the mercy of Turkey, as we saw in 1924.

Thus, in spite of territorial and internal difficulties, four wars, two civil struggles, and several bloodless revolutions, Greece has made substantial progress in these hundred years. The Greece which Admiral Codrington saw through the smoke of Navarino bears little resemblance to that which his grandson visits this month.

WILLIAM MILLER.

PRINCE MAX OF BADEN.

WE have had long to wait for the testimony of Prince Max of Baden, but we have not waited in vain. His original intention, he tells us, was to write an apologia, rebutting the charge that he was in large measure responsible for the German collapse. Second thoughts proved best, and he has turned the long years of enforced leisure to good account. His *Erinnerungen und Dokumente* (Reminiscences and Documents), a massive volume of nearly 700 pages, takes high rank among the notable books produced by the War, and will be studied so long as the human family retains an interest in the greatest of its quarrels. It is at once a storehouse of material of the highest importance and a revelation of the author's attractive personality. It is, moreover, admirably written.

The name of Prince Max will be for ever associated with the last distracted weeks of Imperial Germany, and the main value of his work lies in the fully documented record of his Chancellorship. But few of his readers are likely to blame him for devoting a full half of his space to the anxious period which preceded his rise to power. Only against the background of irrevocable decisions and events is it possible for him to explain the situation which confronted him in the autumn of 1918, or for us to understand what manner of man was the physician who was called to the rescue of the Fatherland in its darkest hour. On the outbreak of hostilities the heir to the Baden throne was on the staff of the fourteenth army corps, but in the first autumn of the war his health compelled him to leave active service. On regaining his strength he joined the Red Cross and devoted himself henceforth to the care of prisoners. The camps in Baden, he reminds us, were never censured, and indeed it is clear from his narrative that it was not the prisoners in Baden alone whose plight was alleviated by his efforts. He pays a generous tribute to his helpers in Sweden and Switzerland, to General Friedrich, the head of the Prisoners' Department in the War Office, and to the Kaiser, who on one occasion, at the instigation of the author, allowed gravely wounded French officers to return to France before the German officers, for whom they were to be exchanged, had reached the frontier. Deliberate cruelty, he is convinced, was extremely rare, and nothing occurred in Germany to compare in horror with the fate of the German prisoners who perished in thousands on the construction of the Murman railway.

The humane activities of Prince Max brought him in touch not only with foreign suffering but with foreign opinion. In his own conversations with prisoners of different nationalities, and through his family connections with Russia and elsewhere, he learned what

the enemies of the Central Powers were thinking. He had never been, and he never became, what the world calls either a pacifist or a radical; but he was a kindly and thoughtful man, to whom the violent passions of war were temperamentally uncongenial. It was impossible for one in his position not to occupy himself with the problem of how the struggle could be brought to an end, and after the hopes of an early triumph had melted away he convinced himself that a moral and political offensive was no less necessary than the maintenance of the troops in the field.

The resolution of the Entente, as he learned from the prisoners and the Press, was strengthened by the belief that Germany had deliberately provoked the war, was waging it with unexampled savagery, and was fighting to impose her yoke on a defeated world. The moral offensive which he desired should combat these delusions, and Germany should endeavour to put herself right with neutral and moderate opinion. The unprovoked attack on Belgium had roused the sentiment of the world against her, and the plight of the Belgian people steeled the arm of millions of men and women who knew nothing of the origins of the war. In this respect, at any rate, there was no difference between the majority and the minority in England. "If England is to retain a shred of honour," declared Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in Parliament in 1916, "she cannot consent to a peace involving the loss of the slightest particle of Belgian sovereignty." Prince Max was penetrated by the conviction expressed by Bethmann-Hollweg in his historic speech of August, 1914: "We have done wrong and we must make it good." From beginning to end of this volume no note is so repeatedly sounded as the necessity of an unequivocal declaration by the German Government that Belgium should be completely restored. We may almost go so far as to say that the whole of his story is dominated by the problem of Belgium. For if the violation of her neutrality was the main cause of the British determination to fight to the uttermost, so the determination to treat her as a mere "pawn" in the peace negotiations nerved the British people—the special guardian of Belgian interests—to further struggle and sacrifice.

The efforts of Prince Max and the group of publicists with whom he worked to obtain a satisfactory declaration on Belgium were as fruitless as those to avert the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare at the opening of 1917. The Chancellor was in close accord with the author on almost every question, but he was too weak and too timid to impose his will. He disapproved the decision which involved the belligerence of the United States and the almost certain loss of the war; but he convinced himself that his resignation would still further increase the overweening authority of the Generals, and he lingered on for a few months with waning prestige. "I

must confess," writes Prince Max, "that the events of January, 1917, destroyed any uncritical reverence for the directors of our fortunes. Where was the far-sighted will? I was appalled at the disproportion between statesmanlike considerations and military necessities." Yet the fall of Bethmann seemed to the author at the time, as it seems to him in retrospect to-day, a national catastrophe.

The appointment of Michaelis, who had rendered useful service as Food Controller, was obviously a temporary expedient; for no one had ever dreamed of him for high office, and his political mediocrity was promptly revealed. Moreover, he was an annexationist, whereas the famous Reichstag Resolution, which synchronised with his elevation, demanded a peace without annexations; and he was opposed to the democratisation of the Prussian franchise, which far-seeing men demanded both on internal and external grounds. It was at this moment that many eyes began to turn towards Prince Max. "On every side was disappointment and melancholy. Nothing was so characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere as the universal search for the successor of Michaelis. I was pained and surprised by the question that was now and again addressed to me—whether I would not accept the Chancellorship. I put off my questioners with a smile, but I must confess that these inquiries aroused within me an excitement by which I was myself astonished." He left Berlin in order to avoid the suspicion of intrigue, and his cousin, the Grand Duke of Baden, expressed a wish that his heir should not in any case accept the post; but the tragic mistakes of commission and omission which ensued strengthened the demand for Prince Max, and diminished his shrinking from a post of crushing responsibility.

Meanwhile the situation went from bad to worse. A golden opportunity was lost when the Pope, in August, 1917, pressed for a clear declaration on Belgium. Kühlmann, the Foreign Secretary, declined on the ground that Belgium was "the best horse in his stable," though Ludendorff had, however grudgingly, been brought to consent, and the feeble Michaelis was no obstacle. When the majority parties shortly afterwards declared that the Chancellor must go, the Kaiser was advised to appoint Prince Max, but replied that he could not take as his chief counsellor a junior member of the princely clan. The aged Hertling was installed in the Wilhelmstrasse, and drifted helplessly along in the swirling current of events. The famous letter of Lord Lansdowne, demanding a revision of Entente war-aims and implicitly inviting a similar revision from the side of the Central Powers, was left without an official reply, though Prince Max responded in the First Baden Chamber. A third costly error was the refusal of the Bolshevik demand for plebiscites in the countries severed from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The preparation of the grand offensive in the spring of 1918, in the opinion of Prince Max and his collaborators, so far from rendering diplomacy superfluous, increased the desirability of stating the aims of Germany in a manner which would strengthen the home front and perchance weaken the resolution of the foe. "Power alone cannot safeguard our position in the world, and the sword alone cannot smite down the moral opposition with which we are confronted. If the world is to reconcile itself to our might it must feel that behind it stands a world-conscience." This line of thought was elaborated in a long Memorandum entitled *Ethical Imperialism* drawn up on the eve of the offensive, presented to the Kaiser and the Chancellor, and reproduced in these pages. At a moment when almost all his fellow-countrymen were expecting a final decision, he argued that complete victory was impossible; that Germany's allies might fall away; that England would never compromise on Belgium; that there was a middle way between victory and defeat; that a clear declaration on Belgium might possibly bring a Lansdowne Ministry and a negotiated peace; and that if the present opportunity was neglected it would never recur. He now adds that Metz might have been restored to France in exchange for colonial compensation.

The moment passed, and for a brief space the voice of compromise and concession was drowned by the thunderous acclaim of Ludendorff's victories. Peace, however, was no nearer, and Prince Max argued that the tide might turn and that the wonderful opportunity to negotiate should be seized. So little indeed was he dazzled by the military advance that on May 19th he extracted a promise from Ludendorff that he would inform the Government before he launched his final offensive, adding that then would be the time to make peace. "Stop before you bring your last horse out of the stable." Kühlmann's famous speech a month later, which cost him his post, let out the secret that the German leaders no longer expected to dictate terms; but the opportunity of calling Prince Max to the Foreign Office was lost and Kühlmann was succeeded by a mediocrity. With Hertling and Hintze in nominal command the ship of State continued to drift towards the rapids.

The military events of August 8th, the "Black Day" in the annals of the German army, convinced Ludendorff that peace must be sought; and Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who had shared Prince Max's scepticism as to the great offensive, advised an immediate peace offer including the compensation of Belgium and the conditional cession of French Lorraine. Prince Max, on the other hand, believed that a change of Government would do more for peace than a peace offer. Hertling did nothing, and in the second week of September the author wrote to offer his services to the

Kaiser. "No one in his senses could believe that I acted from ambition." His name and programme, he believed, would tend to division abroad and union at home, and he added significantly that it was the last chance for the rescue of the monarchical idea. The Kaiser replied that their views were much the same, and that he was acting in the sense of the Prince's letter. After this polite snub there was nothing for it but to wait till the situation grew even more desperate. Bulgaria capitulated, and on September 30th Hertling was forced to resign. The post was offered to Payer, the Vice-Chancellor, who, in declining, recommended and secured the appointment of Prince Max.

The new Chancellor took office on October 1st, and held it till the revolution of November 9th. We already knew a good deal about the inner history of these hectic weeks from the memoirs of Payer, Erzberger and Scheidemann, the papers of Conrad Haussmann, the White Book on the Preliminaries of the Armistice, and Ludendorff's replies. Not until now, however, has the veil been completely lifted by the principal actor in this tragic drama. In the light of these richly documented pages we can reconstruct the emotions of every day and almost of every hour. It is a story of nightmare, almost of martyrdom, in which the author's only comfort can be that he did all that was possible in a situation that had already passed beyond a Chancellor's control.

The Prince took office as the head of the first Parliamentary Government, resting on the support of the so-called majority parties—the Catholics, the Democrats and the Socialists—but he was denied the privilege of freely choosing his colleagues. He desired Ebert as the chief representative of the Socialists, but was compelled by the party to accept Scheidemann. Again, he would have preferred almost any Catholic leader to Erzberger, who, however, was forced into the Cabinet. Consolation was found in the affectionate loyalty of the two Wurtembergers, Payer, who remained Vice-Chancellor, and Haussmann, while Solf, the new Foreign Minister, had been his fellow-worker in the campaign for Ethical Imperialism. The strain of stormy days and sleepless nights was intensified by a sharp attack of influenza. Few statesmen can have found the cup of power so bitter to the taste.

Unlike Michaelis and Hertling, the new Chancellor entered on his task with a programme to which he had given prolonged and anxious thought. Its chief items were democratisation at home, the revision of war aims, and the determination to fight to the end against dishonourable terms. "The last thing you need expect from me is a peace offer," he remarked to his sister, the Duchess of Anhalt, with whom he was staying when he was summoned to Berlin. But it was precisely this step which he was instantly com-

pelled to take by a decision reached at Headquarters on September 29th. After the fright of August 8th, Ludendorff had recovered something of his equanimity, but seven weeks later he was overcome by a far more serious panic. On the instigation of their despairing adviser, the Government resolved to inform President Wilson that it accepted his Fourteen Points and to beg him to arrange an armistice.

On hearing of this momentous decision, which toppled over his whole political programme, the new Chancellor decided to resign, and it was only after an agonising struggle that he was persuaded to remain. He requested Hindenburg's opinion in writing, and the Field-Marshal confirmed the opinion of Ludendorff. Bombarded by appeals from the military leaders and his own colleagues, the Prince consented on October 3rd to sign the appeal which he was unable to prevent. The bitterness of the decision was increased by the experience of the following weeks, in which the front held and Ludendorff recovered his nerve. But when once the request for an armistice had revealed both to the enemy and to the German people the plight of the German army, there was little hope of resisting any conditions which the Entente might decide to impose. "I thought I had been summoned at five minutes before twelve," wrote the disillusioned Chancellor to his cousin, the Grand Duke of Baden, "but I found it was five minutes after." The shadow of what he then thought and still thinks to have been a ghastly blunder darkens the whole narrative of his chancellorship. It was his melancholy fate to bear the public responsibility of a step which had been taken without his knowledge, and to be unable to explain to his countrymen that it was condemned by no one more bitterly than by the statesman whose signature it bore. His relations with Ludendorff had been friendly, and the General appears in the earlier chapters of this volume less politically intransigent than in some other books; but the Prince lost all faith in him after the fatal Council at Spa, and he learned of his dismissal on October 26th with relief. "For me he remains the great Commander and the great man till September 29th. On that day there was a tragic collapse—of his confidence in the army, his sound sense, and his nerves." It is scarcely necessary to add that from these pages, as from every other work on the world-war, Hindenburg emerges as a great gentleman and an unselfish patriot.

The author relates in detail the military and political discussions which accompanied the drafting of the various notes to President Wilson. His own fixed intention was to go to the utmost limit of compromise, but to summon the German people to a desperate effort if the armistice terms appeared unendurable. His aim was approved by Headquarters and by most of his Cabinet colleagues,

but the current was sweeping along at such a pace that the pilot could no longer control the course of his ship. No German desired to accept dishonourable conditions as the price of peace; but whereas the Government and Headquarters regarded a superhuman national effort as the only alternative to a humiliating surrender, it dawned on the nation that there might be an easier way of escape. President Wilson had repeatedly declared that he was at war with a system, and his October Notes hinted with almost brutal plainness that the Kaiser's power, if not the Kaiser himself, must go. It was not only in the Socialist ranks that the demand for his abdication arose but in the circles of the bourgeoisie represented by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. At first there was but little thought of a Republic. The sole preoccupation was to remove a formidable obstacle to the peace which the sorely tried army and the scarcely less sorely tried people believed to be in sight.

There are no more dramatic pages in this striking work than those which describe the efforts from various quarters to persuade the Kaiser to abdicate, and the story of unheeded warnings reminds us of the closing weeks of the reign of Nicholas II. Here was a new complication for a distracted Chancellor. His constitutional ideal was a compromise between the quasi-autocracy of the Bismarckian model and the effacement of an English king. The Kaiser was to part with most of his prerogatives, but he was not to become a *roi fainéant*. Within the limits of the constitutional changes which were hurried through the Reichstag during October there would still be room for the personality of the ruler to make itself felt. Moreover, though these limitations were intensely distasteful to the Kaiser, Prince Max believes that he would have continued the loyalty which he displayed to the short-lived experiment of October, 1918. The Chancellor was a monarchist by conviction no less than by birth, and from the moment that the demand for abdication was raised he exerted himself to the utmost to save both the ruler and the throne.

The key of the situation was in the hands of the Socialists; for if they officially demanded abdication and were rebuffed, they would withdraw from the Coalition, and the Government would fall. There was no majority for a Government of the Right, and the Prince declined to rule without the support of organised Labour. In this predicament he urged Scheidemann and Ebert to avert or, if that proved impossible, to postpone a formal demand. The Socialist leaders consented, and the breathing space was utilised in attempting to persuade the Kaiser to save the Monarchy in the only manner in which, as it was now becoming clear, it could be saved, namely, by abdication. The endeavours, which are vividly described in these pages, proved fruitless; for the two men who might have forced a

decision were for different reasons unable to act. Hindenburg firmly refused to advise the step, and warned his master that the army might go to pieces if it were taken. The Chancellor, again, as a friend and a relative, declined to force his sovereign's hand by a threat of resignation or to cut the knot by anything in the nature of a *coup d'état*. His conscience forbade him to go beyond persuasion, and persuasion became increasingly difficult when the Kaiser left Potsdam for Spa against his advice. Evidence and emissaries were sent from Berlin, and the telephone and telegraph wires were kept busy; but the interview in which the Chancellor hoped he might reconcile the Kaiser to the great renunciation never took place. Stronger arguments were needed, and stronger arguments were soon to be supplied.

On November 6th General Gröner informed the Chancellor that an armistice must be requested within three days, and on the home front the mutiny at Kiel was the beginning of the end. The sailors had no stomach for the great naval battle to which they were called by Admiral Scheer, and of which the Chancellor, as we might expect, was not informed. The flame of revolt spread over the country like a prairie fire, and the Socialist leaders in Berlin, no longer able to hold back their forces, informed the Chancellor that, unless the Kaiser promptly abdicated, a revolution was inevitable. The monarch had declared that he would only yield to force, and even when, on October 8th, the Chancellor telephoned "Your abdication is essential to avert civil war," he refused to move. The threatened revolution in Berlin had been held back from November 8th till November 9th, and on that historic day it was a race against time. At 9.15 the news was telephoned from Spa that the Generals had resolved at once to inform the Kaiser that the army would not support him in a civil war. At 11 the news arrived that the Kaiser had resolved to abdicate, and that the formula would reach Berlin in half an hour. Meanwhile the workers were pouring into the streets, and the deposition might be proclaimed at any moment. When the half hour elapsed without the promised formula from Spa, the Chancellor vainly endeavoured to reach the monarch by telephone. As a last chance of saving the monarchy he announced that the Kaiser had decided to resign; that the Chancellor would only remain in office till the questions involved in the resignation of the Kaiser, the renunciation of the Crown Prince and the institution of a Regency were settled; that he intended to propose to the Regent the appointment of Ebert as Chancellor and the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage. This declaration was known in the streets at mid-day, but it was too late to affect the course of events. A deputation headed by Ebert demanded the transfer of power to the Socialists, and the Prince had no choice but to transfer

the Chancellorship. "Now we must deal with the Regency question," he added, to which Ebert replied, "It is too late." At 2 p.m. Scheidemann proclaimed the Republic from the Reichstag building. A few minutes after the declaration arrived from Spa, in which, however, the Kaiser abdicated as Emperor, but not as King of Prussia. The crazy formula was worthy of the ruler whose shortsighted obstinacy had frustrated the efforts of the last of his Chancellors to rescue the throne and dynasty. *Quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*

The same evening Prince Max went to bid farewell to the new Chancellor, and the following conversation ensued:

Ebert: I implore you to stay.

Max: To what purpose?

Ebert: As Reichsverweser (Administrator of the Realm).

Max: You are negotiating with the Independents, and with the Independents I cannot work.

At the door the Prince turned and said: "I commend the German realm to your care." The Chancellor replied: "I have given it two sons." Of such men the German nation should be justly proud. Had the advice of Prince Max been taken, or his services requisitioned in good time, his country might be to-day a constitutional monarchy, and the map of Europe might present a different face.

G. P. GOOCH.

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF ISLAM.

THE trouble with which international diplomacy is confronted at present in the East comes from two distinct though parallel sources: Chinese Nationalism and the nationalist movement which is spreading among the Mohammedan peoples of Asia and Africa. The Chinese crisis has reached the acute stage when armed forces are needed in support of diplomacy. The Islamic trouble has already outlived that stage, and has now so quieted down that in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Tripoli and Morocco, methods of peace can be successfully applied. But Islamic Nationalism is, nevertheless, by no means spent or on the wane, and the turn it will next take is a matter of general importance, because the nationalist movement among Moslems continues to develop and ripen side by side with the nationalist agitation in the Far East and in India, and because 200 millions of combative Mohammedans, of whom 49 live in Africa, are camped, from the Atlantic to Constantinople and the Philippines, geographically and historically, on the lines of communication between Europe and Asia.

These circumstances impart a particular interest to the questions: What is the Islamic outlook in this matter? and with whom, eventually, are all the Mohammedan peoples or some of them likely to side: with the Far-Eastern Nationalists who clamour for economic liberty and political independence impelled by their extremist followers, or with the white men of Europe and America who still command in Asia and Africa? Recent happenings have drawn to these questions the attention of Western public opinion which now has leisure to examine them in all their bearings. In the following pages the situation is discussed chiefly from a historical point of view.

ISLAMIC POLITICS IN THE PAST.

Before the Great War Islamic politics was not a topic of general interest; it was watched and studied only by a limited number of specialists and governments. The last despotic Ottoman Sultan, Caliph Abdul Hamid (1876-1908), had tried various forms of pan-Islamic propaganda in order to make his Caliphal authority accepted by all Mohammedan peoples; but in spite of the building of the Hedjaz railway for Moslem pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, exclusively by a combined effort of Mohammedan capital and labour, he failed. Thus Islam only twenty years ago was still a congeries of primitive and backward nations, peoples and tribes, possessing one traditional faith but not all obeying the Caliph of Constantinople, and differing in race, nationality and language. Some of these Islamic peoples were even unaware of each other's existence, as, for instance, the Mohammedans of Bokhara and those of the Philippines. Besides, the political value of all Islamic countries was in

those days lessened by the fact that none of them was really independent. The biggest of their number, the Ottoman Empire, had been placed under the tutelage of the "European Concert" by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Persia, though nominally free, was divided into spheres of influence by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, while all other Moslem lands, including Chinese Turkestan, were colonies, protectorates, or provinces belonging to various neighbouring States. In this way the affairs of the Moslems of those countries had become a matter of the interior policy of their masters: Great Britain, France, Russia, China, Holland, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United States. And no one thought that this situation of the peoples of Islam could or should change.

AN EFFECT OF THE GREAT WAR.

But a great change was at hand, in consequence of the World War and some of its collateral developments. For the first time in history the white nations of Europe were unable to settle their differences in battle without the help of alien races. Germany began by securing the alliance of the polyglot Ottoman Empire and by trying, unsuccessfully, to stir up through the Sultan-Caliph a pan-Islamic religious war or *djehad* against the Allies. These replied by marshalling against Germany numerous levies of their exotic and Mohammedan subjects from Asia and Africa. The immediate consequence of these events was to split Islam into two hostile belligerent camps. Then, after the Great War, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and in other quarters, a network of fully independent Islamic States came into being: Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia under a new local Mohammedan dynasty, Hedjaz with Mecca and Medina under their Wahabite conqueror, and Yemen. Several more Islamic countries became formally independent: Iraq, Egypt and Albania. Others, with a Moslem majority of inhabitants, became mandated territories under the League of Nations, as Syria, Palestine and certain former African possessions of Germany. The international situation of the other Islamic peoples under foreign rule, mentioned above, remained unchanged. But a generous and increasing measure of municipal and political self-government was conceded to the Moslems and Hindus of British India; France became kinder to her Mohammedan subjects; and even Italy proceeded to introduce a semblance of representative government in Tripoli. Also a certain degree of formal autonomy was granted after 1917 to some Islamic and other ethnical units in the Caucasus and Central Asia. No reforms, however, reached the Moslems of China who, in Yunnan, Kashgar, Chinese Turkestan, and Kouldja had cut themselves loose from the Chinese Empire during the Taiping rebellion and had led, for over a quarter of a century, a separate

political existence. Kashgar prospered under the rule of Yakoub Bek, who was recognised by the Sultan-Caliph of Constantinople, and received British and Russian envoys.* The province of Kouldja was occupied by Russia, and loyally retroceded to China by the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881, when the Government of Peking had re-established its authority in these parts, and after the refractory Moslems had been allowed to remain and settle within the new Russian local frontier.

PRESENT SITUATION.

This progressive evolution in Islamic life coincided with what Viscount Grey of Falloden described to the House of Lords in his speech of July 6th, 1925, on the Moroccan question, as "a great decline in the prestige and authority of European civilisation." This decline cannot be denied, and is due in part to certain peculiarities of the Great War and its aftermath in Asia Minor. For more than four years Moslem warriors fought on European battlefields shoulder to shoulder with Europeans, and learned to know the latter as they are, without the glamour of legendary prestige. They saw that the white men could be splendid fighters and heroes, but in the eyes of their Islamic comrades they were no longer the demi-gods before whom thousands of "natives" used to fall down in the dust. Besides, Mohammedan, Asiatic and African troops were taught by the Allies to beat regular white German troops in fair fight. And they soon began to feel that they were able to do it, and even to beat some of their white teachers. This happened again in Morocco, Syria, and especially in Asia Minor, when the Mohammedans opposed Greek invasion and domination. For four centuries the European Powers had conquered and subjugated almost the whole world, thanks to their energy, spirit of enterprise, and technical superiority. To-day, after agreeing to the Covenant of the League of Nations, these Powers seem to have entered upon a new period of inter-racial history: that of gradual emancipation and of "equal opportunities" for the small and great peoples of every colour and faith of our globe.

THE TWO FIRST PAN-ISLAMIC CONGRESSES IN CAIRO AND MECCA.

This liberal tendency was taken advantage of by Mohammedans to meet for the first time in pan-Islamic Congresses in Cairo and Mecca in 1926. The Cairo "Caliphate" Congress, to which Turkey abstained from sending delegates, had to decide what to do about the Caliphate which, after being vested for 500 years in the House of Osman, had been suppressed by the present Turkish Republican Government. The following resolution was unanimously voted:

* Mr. Forsyth in 1870 and 1873, and Captain Kouropatkin in 1876 (later Russian Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief against Japan in 1905).

"The Caliphate cannot at present be established. The Caliph must possess certain essential qualifications: he must be powerful so as to make religion respected and to see that the Koranic teachings are observed by all Moslems. This could be achieved of old, because Mohammedans formed an individual unit under the same sovereign and the same Government. Now the Moslem world is made up of a great number of lands, independent of each other and obeying different laws. Each country is jealous of its independence and would not admit of being dominated by any other. Besides, these various countries do not possess political independence. Thus, if a Caliph were designated, he would lack the necessary authority. Consequently it was resolved that henceforth and temporarily the personal religious authority of the Caliph is to be exercised by the Congresses which must meet frequently in each Islamic country keeping continually in touch with the Cairo Committee of the General Congress, and by the future yearly pan-Islamic Congresses of Cairo."

The Congress which met soon after in Mecca and on which Turkey was represented, re-established and improved the pilgrimage of Moslems of all countries to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina which the Great War had interrupted. This pan-Islamic assembly served also to sanction the conquest of Hedjaz achieved shortly before by the Wahabite Moslem fanatics under Ibn Saoud, who has succeeded, however, in winning the unanimous approval of his more moderate and Westernised co-religionaries.

AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS.

CULTURAL ISLAMIC NEWS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE PHILIPPINES.

After the experience and closer pan-Islamic intercourse of the last three or four years, Islam stands to-day at the parting of the ways. Its pre-war mute subservience to Western authority and influence is at an end, as also the bugbear of a pan-Islamic religious war or *djehad*, because such a war is impossible without a Caliph to declare it and unfurl the green standard of the Prophet. But many Islamic peoples are starting resolutely on the road to national revival and political independence. The way is shown them by Turkey and Afghanistan, who have both achieved their national, ethnical and territorial unity and attained real independence. Their present Governments are now concentrating their efforts on their inner reforms, and wish to live in peace with all their neighbours.

The Kingdom of Afghanistan is becoming at present the most progressive Islamic State of Central Asia. It imitates in this respect rejuvenated Turkey. An Afghan Minister-Plenipotentiary resides in Angora, Afghan officers study in Constantinople. Roads, railways, aeronautics, manufactures and trade are being actively pushed forward and encouraged by the Ameer's Government. An eminent and enlightened Turkish lawyer has been engaged by that Govern-

ment as legal adviser in Kabul, and the Court of the Ameer is to be reorganised on European lines with Turkish help.

At the same time unexpected news has arrived from the Philippines, the most Eastern and remote outpost of Islam. A Mohammedan intellectual man of note arrived lately in Constantinople from the Philippines on his way to Europe, with interesting narratives about the numerous Moslem natives of his country. They follow, it appears, with great interest the evolution and progress of Turkey. They rejoice at the remarkable successes achieved by the Turkish nation, and have decided to erect a statue to President Mustapha Kemal, whose name they have given to a big high school founded in Manilla. The public flock with enthusiasm to admire pictures of Turkish life, Turkish official ceremonies, and reviews of Turkish troops. The spirit of independence is advancing among the natives. The Nationalists are acquiring great political power, and the people believe that the time has come to claim from the U.S. Government the political independence it solemnly promised to grant those islands when they were ripe for self-government.

A NEW ASPECT OF PAN-ISLAMISM.

The reforms which Turkey is actively introducing and which strike and charm the imagination of many Eastern Moslems, are systematically and resolutely Occidental. Thus the new civil code which now regulates the private, social and family life of the Turks; their marriage, property and inheritance is the Civil Law of Switzerland, more modern and progressive than the Code of Napoleon. And this far-reaching reform, prescribing monogamy and advocating the rights of women, is welcomed by the majority of the Turkish people as greatly preferable to the antiquated and cumbrous Koranic law or *Sherryiat*. In this direction no turning back from such Western innovations or from many similar ones is possible. Here Turkey takes decidedly the lead, without, however, any wish or ambition to put herself at the head of any religious or lay pan-Islamic movement. The Angora Government is no longer either revolutionary or bellicose. And both Kabul and Angora know full well that their economic needs and interests can be secured and developed only on the plane of international friendship and amity, by means of Western science, capital, and modern technical methods, and through peaceable negotiations and agreements. But the success which accompanied Turkey's achievements is attractive, and when the delegates of Islam meet again at their periodical assemblies which began in 1926 the example of Turkey, even without any particular effort on her side, will be favourably discussed and, probably, more and more followed. Thus it will no longer be the fanatical, uncouth, mediæval pan-Islamism of yore, which brought Caliphal Islamic armies to the gates of Vienna in 1683, that Occidental diplomacy will have to face and deal with, but a new

Westernised and modernised pan-Islamism with a new psychology and possibly with a more or less united front, demanding for Islamic peoples "National rights and political independence," the latest watchwords of the Philippine Moslems and also of the insurgent Druses. I must add that the "Yellow Peril" itself appears no longer in the guise of wholesale destruction of Western culture by fire and sword as was symbolised by the Emperor William, during the Boxer Rising, in his picture of the danger threatening the peoples of Europe. The danger proceeds now from advanced Nationalism propounded and practised on modern and radical European lines.

THE DIE IS NOT YET CAST.

All that can be said so far of the present political outlook of Islam in connection with the trouble in the East may be expressed briefly as follows:

1. There is as yet no united pan-Islamic front for or against Chinese Nationalism.
2. No pan-Islamic religious war or *djehad* is possible in the absence of a Caliph.
3. In the eyes of the Koranic Law which makes Islam a "religion of conquest," all Taoists, Shintoists, Brahmanists and Buddhists, i.e., all Chinese, Japanese, and Hindus are, like fetishists and animist savages, *idolators* who must be converted to Islam or destroyed, and not tolerated like Christians and Jews who "possess the Book" (the Bible). How strong Islamic animosity towards such infidels is even to-day is shown by the scenes of violence and bloodshed which occur periodically in India between Mohammedans and Hindus. And the same feeling is also very acute in Chinese Turkestan.
4. The political treaties concluded by the Turkish Republic with her neighbours, including Persia, as also with Afghanistan and shortly with Yemen, are not aggressive, their aim being to avoid for Turkey international entanglements. And Turkish public opinion, while inveighing on principle against "bourgeois imperialism," is unanimous in declaring that "the Turkish Nation is busy only with assuring an era of international progress," and that "neither the Nation nor its Government has anything to say in the struggle waged by Chinese Nationalists." As to the League of Nations, the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Press only the other day in Angora that "Turkey is far from wishing to adopt an attitude of hostility towards that Institution."

5. The die is not yet cast: old ideas and new are active within Islam. Its political outlook is still uncertain and will depend to a great extent on the statesmanship and diplomacy of Europe and America.

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THE CENTRAL AREA OF AFRICA AND THE MANDATE PRINCIPLE.

THE political suggestion which I have ventured to put forward in this article chiefly concerns the central area of Africa, "Black Africa," let us say, which is mostly unfit for white colonisation. The ordinary man does not need to be told by experienced explorers that the ancient isolation of Africa is now being rapidly broken down by the latest inventions in transport, and Cobham's recent magnificent flight over Africa has served to remind us of this. While formerly merely a patchwork of half-explored spheres of influence founded on European rivalries, it is to-day a vast area, every part of which is known and is sensitive to world-wide influences. I shall show that the economic changes taking place within this central area, which approaches South America in size, must be met by political re-adjustments; and I believe that to secure uniformity it may be necessary for all the Powers concerned to accept the principle of some world-mandate for the administration of their tropical possessions. Present suggestions must necessarily omit reference to the complicated racial problems of the African countries bordering on the Mediterranean, also of the Sahara and of the South African Union.

The extent of this central area, which is the greater half of Africa, must be defined by the frontiers of the States involved rather than by latitude lines; but roughly the fifteenth degree of latitude on either side of the equator is some guide as to its size. It may be stated to be a belt across Africa whose depth is about two thousand miles and average breadth about the same between the Atlantic to the West and the Indian Ocean to the East. It is mainly a well-watered plateau rising to Alpine heights in Ethiopia (Abyssinia) and East Africa, cut by a few deep river valleys and by rifts which helped to form the great lakes. Its shore consists of a narrow coastal fringe of sandy desert or malarious mangrove swamps. It is probably the most populous half of Africa, and racially the most homogeneous.

The important point is that just now, besides railway extensions, it is receiving a network of motor routes, air routes, and wireless; and these services will require chains of repair-shops, stores with spare parts, garages, even small factories, also aerodromes and hangars. Hutted camps, growing into villages, will arise, where a few white men will control squads of artisans of all nations, and masses of black labour. The present Asiatic or African forces, even under white officers, will be insufficient to keep order without a stiffening of white troops. These must mostly be recruited from Europe, for no white man in his senses would try to raise and educate

his family in such places, so there would be no foundation for white militia; hence, any political measure likely to increase the factor of safety, while keeping expensive white troops at a minimum, is worthy of consideration. Thirty years' Indian experience has shown me that the small force of white soldiers permanently allotted to our great Dependency could not keep order, as it does, without the backing of one of the best Governments that has yet been devised, sympathetic to the people with an impartial legal code. If the half-dozen of European nations which have seized territories in Africa hope to control them under the coming conditions by the haphazard methods of the past, founded on European jealousies, they will fail.

The present awakening of the central area can be illustrated by what was going on as recently as three years ago in the Angola Colony, Portuguese West Africa. The Atlantic harbour of Lobito Bay with its jetty, alongside which ocean steamers can go at all tides, was the starting point of the Benguella Railway whose rail-head has now passed the great bend of the Cuanza river about 350 miles inland, and twice that distance more will eventually bring the line to the copper mines of Katanga within the southern border of the Congo Free State. Katanga, in the very centre of Africa, connects with the railway systems of South Africa, the railways of Tanganyika, the Congo, and also with the Uganda Railway. Simultaneously a network of motor roads is being constructed on which I saw great gangs of black navvies working at high pressure, when travelling by ox-wagon in Angola in 1923. It is a sample of the road systems which are being made all over Africa. When those systems are finished, they will tap for the Benguella Railway the back blocks of three of the States named. It must be remembered that two men on a five-ton lorry have a carrying efficiency, in food-tons, five hundred times that of two native porters. Lorries will penetrate everywhere where porters were formerly the only transport. This railway will, in bringing trade to the Atlantic, shorten by some thousands of miles of land and sea transport the length of the present routes by South and East Africa, also saving much in Suez Canal dues. In the healthy hills of the Angola interior I saw extensive cattle ranches and was allowed to visit an aerodrome which was sending a regular air post to the capital, Loando, at the coast, three hundred miles away.

There is still much to be done legally in "Black Africa" in protecting the African from outside influences such as the labour troubles of South Africa, gun-running and recruiting in the North, colour disagreements, political agitation from Asia and from across the Atlantic, and reactionary attempts by some Powers to exploit the African. We thought we had done for ever with the disabilities

of Africans as compared with other races the world over, when the Imperial British East Africa Company, of whose inaugural exploring expedition I happened to be a member in 1888-89, took over the Arab village of Mombasa and the old Portuguese fort, by treaty, from the Sultan of Zanzibar; and the British Government stopped slavery finally at its source. This chartered Company thus laid the first brick of the great edifice which is now Kenya Colony, Uganda, and the Uganda railway linking them. As late as 1897 old customs had not died out, for in that year, near Harar, I saw Somali youths and girls being marched roped together into Ethiopia, said to be going into permanent servitude. Fighting had occurred, and with them were mules loaded with hundreds of rifles of dead Ethiopians to be locked up by chiefs and re-issued to the armies.

But the old bad days are gone. To-day it is, however, through European Governments that rather reactionary measures against the African are sometimes taken. In the Great War of 1914 they were used both in Europe and Africa. When looking at war memorials in every hamlet in Europe one's sympathy also goes out to those black men of Africa who lost their lives in a quarrel about Alsace-Lorraine which did not concern them. In the kraals, news of the loss of a son has the same crushing effect as in a labourer's cottage in Flanders. Conscription of labour, of course, has sometimes to be resorted to in peace time but it is only justified when the villagers are directly benefited by the results. But one of the worst reactions towards race-slavery on a great scale is the attempt, by some political parties, to prevent Africans from rising by their brains and energy to the higher paid jobs, in which they would compete with the white artisan.

The danger in want of agreement between European countries on what should be a common policy has brought terrible hardship on the Ogaden Somali tribes, at the back of, but outside, the British Protectorate of North Somali-Land. When exploring, for the Indian Government, the Ethiopian frontier of Somaliland in 1891-2, I visited Gildessa and found the Ethiopian custom-house piled high with modern rifles brought in chiefly by European traders dealing in wines. These rifles, among other destinations, were used on the Ogaden raids. I was present in Ogaden in 1893 when a mullah was preaching against Ethiopia, and I was, as guest of the tribe, invited to the fantasio given in his honour by 500 horsemen. After it was over a crowd of men and women followed my camel, plucking at my riding boots, begging me to get the British Government to expostulate with Ethiopia.

Their trouble was that these tribes, 250 miles inland, which depended on the British coasts for imports of Indian rice, Arabian dates, and American calico, were forbidden by the British Govern-

ment to import a single rifle. They said, either get us protection or let us buy arms with which to protect ourselves. The matter was, of course, reported, but they were beyond our border and the gun-runners were working through the seaport of a friendly European Power, so, I think, nothing could be done. Had all the Powers of Europe kept to one policy about arms importation the terrible tragedy, then in full swing, among scenes I shall never forget, would have been avoided. Eventually the Ethiopians have pushed their border up to the line of Italian Somaliland and the Ogadens have been, I believe, cut into two sections.

Further north, the wild Somali coast had a bad reputation when we took it over in 1884, owing to the cutting out of disabled ships and murder of crews, and also to a former attack on Speke's caravan on Berbera beach by robbers. But that bad name was soon falsified; our surveys were everywhere well received and by 1893, four hundred miles inland, wild guides would accept from any Englishman a piece of paper for payment, waiting for the next trade season to hand it to men of a caravan of camels going to the coast, confident that it would be cashed at the coast administrator's office. Then came the Mad Mullah campaigns, and, almost worse, home "Party Politics." War bills were heavy. Somaliland was used by successive Governments as a stick to beat the Opposition with; though the Mullah was generally kept at bay and protection given at any time during a period of twenty years, yet at one time economy was tried, our own coast tribes were cut up in spite of the efforts of our officers, and I heard that Somali women stoned the detachments as they marched to the pier. It is only fair to say that cruel pest, the Mad Mullah, was finally disposed of in 1919.

Racial groupings of tribes have not been much considered in the delimitation of boundaries, founded on the rivalries or friendships of Europe. The flagrant absurdity of this is shown clearly in the present five Somalilands, a French, Ethiopian, Italian, also a British North Somaliland; and with Italian and Ethiopian Governments between it and North Somaliland, a Southern Somaliland which has been absorbed by Kenya Colony; yet these sections, only three being actually shown on the map, lie over one continuous country, inhabited by one highly intelligent, naturally civilised and rich, homogeneous race, of the same simple Bedouin habits, an all-pervading Mohammedan religion, a common speech, living under five alien Christian administrations. Africa can show other bad cases and, as education spreads, trouble will result.

Another danger is that in Europe there is much fresh talk of pegging out claims in Africa for surplus European populations. We, in Kenya, have as clean a record as history can show, for we took over lands depopulated by the marauding Masai. What is to be

feared is that the cry for colonies might take the form of endeavouring to introduce white peasants on land long tilled by Africans.

Some day the question will arise as to how far African military training is desirable. France employed Senegalese in Europe, Britain and Germany employed Africans in East African campaigns, and we had a labour corps in Flanders. They have all seen the technicalities of modern war. One begins to visualise their more extended use in Southern Europe, even for labour in peace time; it is likely eventually to bring about a general interchange between the two continents, and the survival of white blood, as such, might be threatened. White people elsewhere, notably Brahmins and Rajputs who formerly entered India from the north, seem to have been affected by interchange with the brown people they found already there. Africans are not so decadent as some Europeans and Asiatics. They are a virile race. Although centuries behind the orientals in civilisation, they have nothing to learn in what is called "character" as apart from book education.

In the control of the tropical belt of Africa the white man, who cannot permanently exist except at the higher levels, has not in the long run the ghost of a chance of being the only dominating element. Medical science is powerless to alter the deleterious effect of a hot climate on the white races and their descendants. Men of pure African blood will arise in Africa itself, men with the virility of Lobengula, with education added, who, natural public speakers, as are all African chiefs, will interest themselves in politics. Then, like the people with African blood who are said to be buying up blocks of houses in New York, they will educate their own professional men to look after them. African chiefs have been enterprising in character through history for good or evil; such men as Chaka, Lobengula, Tippoo Tib, had their talents for ruling been turned in the right direction, might have been useful to our civilisation. In Ethiopia we need not, for great men, go further back than Menelik II, his nephew Ras Makonnen, and Ras Tafari, Makonnen's son. It was an interesting experience when, as a member of the Rennell Rodd Mission to Menelik, I dined with a thousand officers of his household. That assembly of Ethiopians represented what would at home be the Cabinet, Lords, Commons, Privy Council and so forth, in the presence of the Negusa-Negust, their Emperor. I well remember the fine old African statesmen, their dignity, the decorum and etiquette of that Court; which brought home to me the fact that Africans are capable of rising to very high responsibility.

In the civilisation of to-day, which is one and indivisible the world over, the forward races are trustees for those that have fallen behind. It is a far cry from Africa to long civilised India; but human nature

being much alike, methods that have had success in India might be used with advantage in Africa. We keep order in India with a handful of white troops only because there is one supreme government with laws uniform for all races in the huge peninsula. In a long Indian service, short periods of duty in Public Works Secretariats and with two great municipalities and several district boards, opportunities have been given me of observing our methods of control. The system of administering about half the country directly, and the other half under Indian rulers having the advice of political officers appointed by the Supreme Government, is excellent.

I know the Africans intimately, having sometimes been quite alone with them "on trek" for periods of a year at a time; and I believe that if the six European Powers wish to continue to keep order permanently in tropical Africa they will save themselves a lot of trouble by resorting to the Indian plan. For Maharajahs write paramount African Chiefs, for Rajas write lesser Chiefs, even for District Boards write tribal elders with a white chairman, and the thing is done. For Supreme Government write a Council in Europe of the six or seven interested Powers; acting with the help of a council in Africa of their black dependencies to which Ethiopia and Liberia should be parties. African chiefs can easily be turned in the right direction, away from jealousies and war.

The great question for tropical Africa, then, is a certain measure of uniformity of control in Europe for the whole area, and some measure of cohesion between the various African States themselves. It looks as if it might pay Great Britain, Portugal and Belgium to hold at least the tropical parts of their African possessions under some sort of mandate with the backing of the whole world, instead of arousing its jealousy and opposition. Portugal owns some of the best harbours, but is sometimes short of funds; Spain's possessions, with one small exception, are outside the tropics.

The position of Ethiopia is peculiar, and is somewhat analogous in Africa to that held by Switzerland in Europe. Save for a slightly Jewish strain, Ethiopians of all classes are much more typical of Africa in feature, colour, and general physical appearance than are the members of the Mohammedan tribes, Soudanese Arabs, Somalis and Gallas living on their borders, whose more slender bodies and better features remind one of Orientals. Ethiopia, with its feudal system and religious liberties, its conservative early Christian Church, its more progressive State, represents the highest achievement in organisation yet attained by tropical African races. Much of its climate at high levels, and its landscapes of green downs, or forests of cedar, juniper or larch, remind one strongly of Switzerland or of England. As in Switzerland, the country belongs to its

peasants and farmers who will never part willingly with their excellent title-deeds.

If Ethiopian frontier Generals do not periodically raid the neighbouring tribes, Ethiopia will be a haven of neutrality among African States; and, like Switzerland in Europe, it should be upheld in its integrity for ever. In Ethiopia, white men are welcomed as honoured guests or as paid purveyors of scientific improvements, but never as masters. While its mountains are defensible, and its army is strong for defence, its aggressive powers are somewhat discounted by the possession of a weak commissariat, for in the wild, arid country below, away from its fertile mountains, meat has to be driven "on the hoof" and grain has to be carried by mules. Its army has an ancient organisation with a hierarchy of efficient generals, and has during the last thirty years been adapting itself to modern arms.

Among memories treasured by me, as a member of the Rodd Political Mission, was the sight of the review, and the march for ten miles, over the elevated green plains of Shoa at some nine thousand feet above the sea, of 25,000 Ethiopian troops. As they moved to the sound of flutes, the prevailing colour impression was that of white togas dashed with an oblique band of red, short white drawers, and, like the Assyrians of the poet, a great deal of black or dark purplish mantles and gold-edged lion or leopard skins, gold-plated and silver-plated shields and gold inlaid rifles, and dark velvet scabbards ornamented with gold, of all the chiefs and officers of consequence. There were foot soldiers in companies, and cavalry of chiefs riding together on good horses or riding-mules, richly caparisoned. Three of the Ethiopian generals whom I knew privately as their guest when on three visits to the country, made a great impression on my mind. Two were Fitaurari or advance-guard frontier generals, the third was Ras Makonnen, with whom I spent a week in 1893 at Harar, and who afterwards visited England. He was an excellent host and a man of native refinement and ability by any standards. The visit of his son the Regent, Ras Tafari, to Europe, is fresh in people's minds.

In consultation with European statesmen, while keeping their independence, Ethiopians would no doubt be ready to reform anything old-fashioned, like the cruel forms of punishment for criminals, especially as, in a feudal country, what people at the top say, counts; and visits to Europe are becoming fashionable among Ethiopian chiefs. They can afford to come, and their visits should be encouraged in every way. It was a good thing when, in 1897, Britain decided to keep a representative at Adis-Abbaba permanently, and another good thing when Ethiopia joined the League of Nations. I believe Ethiopia would be willing to join consultations

with other States of tropical Africa in discussions likely to secure more uniformity in the control of the whole area. On the whole, Christian Ethiopia in Africa, like Switzerland in Europe, is powerful enough to be a useful friend, but would be an expensive and troublesome opponent if its ownership of its land, or its political integrity, were in danger.

I have tried to show that the present system of control of most of the States of the Central African area by several European Powers, founded as it is on the balance of power in Europe, is too weak a system unless considerably modified to be able to meet the shock of the sudden awakening and general education of the Africans that is coming. I believe the system would be stronger if the European Powers concerned could be induced to accept some sort of special mandate from the League of Nations for the administration of all their tropical possessions; also, that a further addition to strength would be, if representatives of all the six or seven African States within the area, and including Ethiopia, could often meet in consultation on purely African questions, on the lines of those consultations which have already taken place between the British dependencies of East Africa. They could be subject to arbitration of differences by the League of all nations. Further, the legal codes of African States seem to require revision so as to include some uniform laws, common to all, on such questions in which all are interested as the importation of arms, enlistment of Africans, African labour regulations, and tribal and racial boundaries. Such a system as is here sketched would for "Black Africa" raise the principle of mandates in Africa above all chance of national jealousy and help to clear the air should any redistribution of African Mandates ever come up for discussion.

H. G. C. SWAYNE.

THE PROMISE OF PARTNERSHIP IN INDUSTRY.

I MEAN that sort of partnership which can be enjoyed during the whole period of industrial service by those who feel that they are intelligent and respected workers in an undertaking and sharers in the results secured by the joint efforts of all engaged in it. There are many successful schemes of co-partnership and profit-sharing. Such, for example, are those which have long obtained as full co-partnership in many of the largest gas companies. These, it may be said (as is partly true), are monopoly businesses. The co-partnership which has been in operation since 1892 in the well-known woollen cloth firm of J., T. and J. Taylor, Batley, may be due to the good heart of Mr. Theodore Taylor. Through it, with at least as good cash wages and as good conditions of employment as the best other firms, has been allotted as labour's share as much as £600,000.

The Co-operative Productive Societies, always an interesting study, were at one time the most promising instances of co-partnership. The capitalist employer was eliminated and the capital provided by the workers. This principle was, and is, capable of great extension. Kettering and Leicester are the towns where most of these undertakings are found to-day. The printing trade seems to offer special inducements. The Master Printers' Federation has with the greatest care recently prepared a memorandum on profit-sharing and employee-shareholding. To-day development is called for in the great and small undertakings throughout the country which are carried on as ordinary businesses.

Since the death of Sir George Livesey, the founder of co-partnership in this country, to many people the name of Lord Leverhulme, or of Lever Brothers, typifies the idea of co-partnership, while to others there was a "paternalism," or "prosperity-sharing," about his scheme. Unfortunately, with all its benefits, it has attracted a good deal of criticism. Lord Leverhulme's words, however, are well worth recalling:

"I believe that it is impossible to produce the necessary propelling power in human beings, unless you give some individual motive, incentive, and ideal of their own, which will encourage them during all the weary hours of monotonous work. . . . To maintain an active progressiveness and an ever-ready alertness during the whole of that period, my experience proves to me, cannot be done with the wage system alone."

Take the well-tried scheme of Bryant and May, constantly attested by Mr. G. W. Paton, the Managing Director, who says he cannot urge too strongly the need

"to consider at once the question of giving the workers some share in the results of the business in which they labour . . .

Labour is entitled to a good wage, but so also is Capital (i.e., interest and dividends on money invested); thereafter there should be a sharing of results, and any further amount which it is decided to distribute should be divided between Capital (shareholders) and Labour (employees), and this can be carried further by making arrangements whereby the employees may become shareholders in the business."

Hans Renold, Limited, Chainmakers, Didsbury, have a most interesting organisation in connection with their co-partnership, while there is the very long record of profit-sharing achieved by the well-known firm of Clarke, Nickolls, and Coombs, with a distribution since 1890 of £585,000, an addition of 17 per cent. to wages. The growth of the movement is shown in the post-war schemes of Rowntrees of York, Colmans of Norwich, and the Brush Electrical Engineering Company, of Loughborough. The latter is worthy of close attention as being one of the best thought-out schemes of modern times.

The opinion of Mr. Seeböhm Rowntree is particularly valuable, as he and his firm have only recently become convinced of the advantages of profit-sharing. These advantages he summarises. They appeal to one's sense of what is fair and reasonable. A profit-sharing scheme, if soundly conceived and liberal in character, gives labour and management a sense that they are working under fairer conditions than the normal ones. In a business worked on profit-sharing lines the management is in a much stronger position in relation to the workers. "Profit-sharing," he concludes, "is a sound principle, and when given a really good chance it usually succeeds. A good many schemes have failed because they have been ill-conceived."

The chief reason why profit-sharing schemes have not become more general is, I believe, a misunderstanding of the causes of certain notorious failures. These failures were due either to the want of careful preparation and all-round consultation, or to the attempt to start profit-sharing schemes on a false foundation. Profit-sharing is no substitute for full wages and the best working conditions, but something in addition, and only likely to prove successful if so added. Co-partnership, of course, includes profit-sharing, but provides as well for the profit-sharer to invest in and share in some way in the conduct of the business. From co-partnership the full benefits are to be derived.

The extent of co-partnership is not fully seen in actual schemes, though examples are so useful and so highly valued by practical men. It is the growth of the idea which is so evident, the idea which is finding expression in countless directions and applications; for example, in the speeches of chairmen at shareholders' meetings, and in numbers of small businesses of which no record can be obtained.

The word "partnership" is on our lips. Something of the sort is struggling for utterance in almost every speech of the Prime Minister. Viscount Grey has boldly declared for partnership in industry. Many labour leaders have embraced it, even if as a Party Labour is suspicious. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has written:

"How to bring the mass of the workpeople into co-operative touch with the management has to be settled by each industry in a way to suit its special conditions. I believe in the development of the Works Committee, the constant consultation between managers and workmen's representatives, the candid disclosure of the state of trade, costs of production, plans for development, the balances of profits and losses. From a regular meeting round a table will grow up the habit of co-operation and goodwill. If these meetings are called only when there is some trouble to adjust, they will remove nothing of the fundamental causes of friction. And the employers must play a straight game, and make their workpeople feel that they are partners in spirit and in fact."

The Royal Commission on the Coal Industry, be it remembered, while discussing the objections, expressly recommended co-partnership.

"We suggest that by suitable legislation colliery undertakings generally should be required, within a stated period, to adopt schemes providing that of all profits hereafter distributed above a standard dividend upon the existing capital, whether the distribution to ordinary shareholders took the form of extra dividend or of bonus shares, a fixed proportion should be reserved as shares to be issued to employees, having regard to the service rendered by them. . . . Under this suggestion, the employees will benefit by the prosperity of the mine where they work, not by an addition to wages, but by obtaining a share in the capital. This is desirable, partly because any possible addition to wages through sharing distributable profits would necessarily be small and often temporary, and partly because the object is to *give the workman a permanent interest in the undertaking*." (My italics). (Report of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry 1925, pp. 141-142.)

The Association of British Chambers of Commerce Special Committee appointed to investigate industrial unrest has just reported. The Report includes this statement: "The fundamental principle underlying any future legislation should be that the employers and workers are equally concerned as *partners in industry*."

Co-partnership has a history into which I need not go. It should come with a new appeal in an age which has seen more concern about unrest and dissatisfaction with industrial conditions than preceding ones but which is more ready to face up to its problems, because it is more reasonable and more generous, and because if it does not do so there can be little in the future for any of the parties in industry.

The proceedings on the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill in Parliament may have interrupted some of the negotiations for a better understanding and not improved for the time the chances of industrial co-operation. But whatever happens to that measure the problems will remain for those in industry themselves to solve, and it may become clearer than ever that the best contribution can be made on the spot by just such means as Co-partnership provides.

Co-partnership is not, of course, the only solution for unrest, but until some better method can be shown of enlisting the interest and support of all those who are engaged in an enterprise, and of recognising such interest and support by giving them a share in results and some voice in the management, co-partnership is entitled to more investigation than it has hitherto received. Its application on a much wider scale is urgently pleaded for. Employers do not resort to it, it may be said, because it is not welcomed by organised Labour. Labour does not seek it because it does not assist official propaganda, or because it suspects what is offered as a gift, or chooses to regard it as hostile to Trade Union solidarity. Really official Labour has not been too candid, in view of the declarations of Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Clynes, Mr. Pugh, and other leaders. But, as the *New Statesman* says: "Someone has to start the ball rolling; what is wanted is not a word but a deed. And the first step, it appears to us, clearly rests with the employers; for they alone can create the confidence that they are prepared to embark on a new policy in their relations with labour."

Employers must exercise patience and make preparation. Let them remember the early disappointments of Leclaire, the French founder. Whatever is done should not be presented as a gift, though the necessary impetus is needed at the start. The essentials (and they have been followed in the Brush Company's Scheme) are consultation beforehand with all interests concerned, with organisations of employers and of employed, as well as with actual employees of the firm. By such discussions alone can a scheme be evolved which will have a good chance of survival in bad years as well as in good. The first essential is not, as might be supposed, the ability to offer an immediate share of profits. As Mr. Theodore Taylor says: "In all things the spirit rather than the letter is of chief importance. The spirit will find the form; the form cannot produce the spirit."

Co-partnership is to be resorted to because it is just and expedient. What call is there for fundamental change to-day in the relations of Capital and Labour? The means are to hand by which the necessary evolution can take place. But it may be necessary to observe that co-partnership is concerned with the internal economy of a business and, of course, has nothing to do with what is obviously the greater problem, how to capture the markets. It is

fortunately therefore not involved in any political controversy, in regard to tariffs or otherwise. Amongst the supporters of co-partnership are those of all schools of politics. But anything that brings peaceful and harmonious conditions into industry must tell in favour of efficiency. Businesses which can rely upon regularity and smooth running must be in a better position to secure what they require from outside. The establishment of a spirit of goodwill, an adjustment of earnings, means of consultation amongst the parties engaged—all this tends to clear away what ought never to have existed, as peace succeeds to war. We are in unrest, and we have to get out of it. There is a challenge to our system of business management, and we have to justify it or show a willingness to modify it.

Mr. C. T. Cramp said the other day that: "He believed it was possible, even under Capitalism, to make industry so efficient that when it was taken over by Socialism they would find themselves better off instead of worse." That "taking over" may or may not come. Meantime we have to get through to-day. And it has generally happened in our conservative country that great changes have been brought about by degrees. There are few reforms that cannot be had through patience and reason. Who are the chief sufferers if a wrong remedy is applied? A shock to our industrial system may be more serious than one to our political system. Even a revolution in the State may take place without much danger to the ordinary lives and fortunes of the majority of the people. An industrial upheaval or stoppage, a shock to credit, affects to-morrow the lives of all our citizens, stops the flow of the life-blood of the community, and may imperil the welfare of the coming race.

The mere talk of "peace and goodwill" will take us nowhere. Let us reject military terms in industrial matters. Goodwill we always need as an atmosphere in which to work out better conditions. Peace, as the result of defeat or of a harsh bargain, or as a period of sloth and inertia, we do not want. What we do want is understanding and co-operation between all the parties in industry, based on a recognition of facts and common needs and aims, with the security of a fair share in all its activities and in the final results of industry for those engaged together in it—and all this with a view to a more energetic and enlightened pursuit of whatever business we are engaged upon.

War and industrial unrest unfortunately attract more popular interest than peace between nations and harmonious conditions between those engaged in industry. Hardy, in *The Dynasts*, makes the Spirit Sinister say: "War makes rattling good history, but peace is poor reading." And so the strike, the lock-out, the angry remonstrance, the defiance of leaders, "slogans," fill our news-

papers. The conditions of settlement, the discussion of means by which disorder may be prevented in future—all this is "poor reading." And so the concerns of peace, the effective adjustment of differences, are left to the few. Ignorant of things, we are too often indifferent to them. Nor do we trouble to inquire as to the machinery, the enterprise, the organisation which keeps us regularly supplied with light and heat, with the milk or the newspaper . . . till something goes wrong, which soon entails the sufferings of the many. There are a few days in which the novelty of the situation is found entertaining to all. Our young people "rise to the occasion," the classes assume the functions of the masses, old uniforms are brought out and new officials bustle about, the patience and regard for order of "our wonderful people" are duly expatiated upon. But unless the period is a short one, we begin to gird at the profiteers, become profoundly anxious as to the waste, speak of the next Budget and of the loss of contracts abroad, and a few even listen for a time to the counsels of those who desire to get learnt from the hard conditions some lesson which shall avoid these disgraceful misunderstandings for all time. When the jolt is over, through surrender, sacrifice, or compromise, and things resume their normal course, we are too apt just to resume ours. Peace becomes "poor reading," and the real problems of peace and co-operation remain unfaced.

These problems concern not only those who are directing or working in our great industries. They concern us all. There are many causes of unrest, and one is indifference, extravagance, unconcern in the ordinary public; the sight of gross ostentation in some while many go in want. These problems acutely concern shareholders—women as well as men—who may suffer from them, and in any case ought not to be silent receivers of dividends without any regard for the conditions under which they are earned. Politically the State wants active and intelligent citizens; industrially the business nation wants more conscience in all who direct, carry out, or share in the results.

In politics we no longer recognise the dictator. When wisdom, it may be of the few, avails for the advantage of the many through their perception and acquiescence we probably have the best government obtainable. But it is not in the assumption of superiority, by ignoring opinions and refusing a voice to others, that this acquiescence is brought about. Only through education, through reason and the recognition of what abilities and competence really are, applied to the task before us, are understanding and mutual respect attained. This position may have been reached in the political sphere; the habit of accepting the decision of a majority until the time comes to challenge it by the same methods has so

far in this country defeated all revolutionary propaganda. Something like this is needed in industry which shall give stability to industrial relations. Many of us are no politicians, and think we lose nothing by standing all our lives outside politics. But none of us can stand outside business, where we must have freedom and opportunity. Politics and industry have their bearing upon one another, but should not overwhelm one another. Our forefathers were concerned for civil and religious freedom more than for the industrial system. To-day we are concerned for sport, for entertainment, for ease, rather than for religion, politics, or industry. He probably confers a greater benefit on humanity to-day who helps to make for happiness and contentment in the industrial daily life than he who adds to the political rights and privileges of a people. To secure this an increase of interest and effort is needed in all.

Dissatisfaction with industrial conditions cannot be removed by a piece of legislation or by the act or concession of a few individuals or of a class. We cannot call upon "the Government" to do it. The demand for improvement in conditions, for a "square deal," implies much more than wages or hours. It is something affecting the status of the worker. We ought to be glad that it is so, for it indicates growth; the demand is to be treated as an adult and no longer as a child; the claim is for the whole body of workers and not for a ladder for a select few. Such a demand for better conditions from reasonable, competent, deserving, educated citizen workers must be met, and met in our time.

Employers who have no system of taking their employees into any sort of share in results are lagging behind and not doing their best to cultivate the goodwill they desire. Profit-sharers should become co-partners, and co-partners should in due time have some voice in the management—be it through co-partners' committees, or as shareholders, or in highly organised schemes through electing directors. In America great advances have been made in the direction of shareholding by the workers. It is one natural result of high wages. Some of the greatest advances of co-partnership as we understand it have also been made there.

Let me conclude with a summary of the aims and objects of the Labour Co-partnership Association, which has existed as a non-party propaganda society for many years, to promote co-operation between employers and employed, and to expound the principle that workers shall share in the profits, capital, and management of the business in which they are employed. Co-partnership has no antagonism to any existing organisation, either of employers or of employed. It starts with good Trade Union conditions and wages. Realising the great variety in the character and size of businesses, and that the same methods of applying the co-partnership principle would not be suitable in all of them, the Association advocates the

introduction into any particular business of any method suited to that business which has the effect of giving to those who work in it a sense of partnership in the undertaking and a personal interest in its success.

While advocating the adoption in each case of as complete a co-partnership scheme as possible, the Association welcomes any approach towards co-partnership as a step in the right direction. If it is felt that a bonus distribution is as far as some firms can at present go, the Association would like to see the distribution accompanied by a method for imparting information, encouraging education, and forwarding a greater common interest in the business. But as soon as practicable there should be a scheme for the conversion of the cash bonus, or part of it, into shares or stock in the business itself, or for investment in a provident fund. A business which is large enough and so organised as to employ outside capital should make the necessary arrangements to enable its employees to invest, either from the share of profits or savings, or both sources, in its own shares, whether ordinary or of a special class created for that purpose. The employees' funds so built up will not only be a means of advancing the status of the employees, but will have a steadying effect upon the capital of the particular company, and afford a much-needed contribution towards the accumulation of capital for enterprise.

The Labour Co-partnership Association lays particular stress on the educational value which attaches to all forms of Co-partnership. The workers are given an insight into the first principles of business economy. Expectation is aroused, emulation is stirred up, and the co-partnership meetings afford opportunities for the expression and interchange of opinion. Profit-sharing, purchase or distribution of share capital generally, fuller knowledge and the interchange of experience and ideas, have already led in many businesses to a more complete stage of co-partnership in which employees contribute directly and in a representative manner to the management.

In an age which is calling out for "peace in industry," and is full of general if not vague proposals, I suggest that co-partnership is a definite proposition, but not limited to any particular scheme. It can be applied to the particular needs of any business, but it will serve the interests of that business and of general industrial harmony best if given the fullest possible opportunity. There is no business, however small or complicated, in which the spirit of partnership cannot be given some opportunity of working effectively. No partner is a waster, or allows his associate to be one. "Our business" becomes a common object of pride and success. As the spirit is always more important than the letter, now is the time to begin, even if there are no immediate profits to share.

F. W. RAFFETY.

THE AMERICAN RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS.

IN his speech on the 23rd of June on the occasion of the centenary celebrations of University College, London, the King took the opportunity to refer to the munificence of a great American Foundation, thanks to which a sum of £118,178 has been allocated to enlarge the endowment of the Departments of Pharmacology, Anatomy and Physiology of that College. This is not the first occasion on which institutions, members of London University, have received support from this source, although the most conspicuous bequest has been to the University itself, when Rockefeller group added to the Government grant of £125,000 a sum of £400,000 for the purchase of the Bloomsbury site. The interest of Englishmen in these American Foundations has been further aroused by the generous gift of \$150,000 by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial to the University of Cambridge for the purpose of establishing a chair of Political Science.

In his annual report for 1926 on the work of the Carnegie Corporation, its director, Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, states the aspirations of those responsible for the organisation of the work of these Foundations. First, they hope to provide for a substantial increase in funds available for research of a fundamental nature, and, secondly, they hope to encourage and indeed educate, through co-operation between experts and "potential founders" in the planning of philanthropic projects, persons capable of establishing Foundations even of moderate size. Hence advantage will be taken of the experience of those who have studied the technique of making effective for the public good the resources of charitable bequests, while the donors will have the satisfaction of "providing wings for human beings with ideas."

Dr. Keppel's report assumes, and not vainly, the existence of many men of wealth trained, or ready to be trained, in the duty and art of giving, and who regard, like the rich men in ancient Hellas, the performance of their "liturgies" as a public benefit and a private honour. The Federal Government of the United States, by exempting charitable bequests from taxation, has prudently encouraged an attitude of generosity sufficiently marked in the American character. There already exist, according to a recent compilation, one hundred and twenty-two American Foundations for scientific and social work, most being located in New York, of resources ranging from a million dollars or thereabouts to the \$165,000,000 of the Rockefeller Foundation and the \$125,000,000 of the Carnegie Corporation. These Foundations are, almost without exception, undertaking work on a national scale, and many of

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them are financing operations, in some cases through the League of Nations, of a scope limited by no national boundaries.

The earlier Foundations, such as those of Mr. Andrew Carnegie, bear the character of private gifts on a large scale, or else, like the Carnegie Relief Fund founded at Pittsburg in 1901, are closely connected with the large industries of the donor. Mr. Carnegie, as a boy, observed the satisfaction which his father and four other weavers derived from their small joint library of books; Mr. Carnegie, as a man, scattered public libraries all over the world. His bequests, which sprang from free-will and individual discretion, are marked by the personality and gesture of a Magnifico. It was Mr. Carnegie's intention that the Corporation should merely take his place, lending aid to whichever of his other charitable activities might stand in need of support, and "they shall best conform to my wishes by using their own judgment." It is only recently that the Carnegie Corporation has come to pursue the calculated policy of concentrating its funds upon the maintenance of specific objects, rather than that of making general contributions.

The Rockefeller Foundations mark a new stage in the task of using immense fortunes effectively for the benefit of humanity. The notion of the millionaire benefactor, a Croesus of wealth, a Mæcenas of munificence, living on as an incorporated spirit after death, has been abandoned, in the case of these funds within the lifetime of Mr. Rockefeller, senior, in favour of a system of administration less closely connected with the purely personal interests of the donor. The largest Rockefeller benefactions have ceased to be bound up with the educational work of the Baptist Church of which the Rockefellers are members, and are the issue of carefully planned investigations by the officials of the Foundations into how and where the money can best be applied. Is it desired to encourage backward education in the Southern States? The method which has been adopted is not that of endowing schools, but of inquiring why the Southern farmer has been too poor to endow his own schools. The shrewd investigations of experts supported by the Rockefeller General Education Board fixed upon the boll-weevil as the worm in this particular rod of Solomon, and Southern education was aided by demonstration farms to show that cotton could be raised protected from the ravages of the boll-weevil.

The Rockefeller Foundation is not the only one of the benefactions of Mr. Rockefeller, senior. The General Education Board operates independently, and the International Education Board and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research are also distinct organisations. The Health Section of the League of Nations has recently gone on record as thanking the Institute for its international services in the cause of medicine. In this work, so far as the United States

are concerned, the Milbank Fund has co-operated with distinction.

In memory of his wife, Laura Spelman Rockefeller, a further Foundation generously endowed by Mr. Rockefeller was incorporated in 1918. Besides many other activities, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial has rendered possible the undertaking of elaborate child-studies and investigations into the training of children. Here its work links on with the valuable research into educational methods carried out under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund, founded by Mrs. Harkness.

In all, the Rockefeller benefactions during the past ten years have amounted to approximately 500,000,000 dollars. The Carnegie funds have been used especially in connection with activities not only humanitarian but humanistic—such as the encouragement of the study of the fine arts, the endowment of libraries, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—but, not unnaturally, in view of the difference of early methods, the Rockefeller enterprises, equally international, have been turned towards research in the natural sciences, and especially in the field of medicine. "The promotion of the well-being of mankind throughout the world" is approached from the side of biology rather than from that of literature and international law.

As yet no Foundation bears the name of Mr. Henry or of Mr. Edsal Ford, but there is a possible significance in the recent declaration of the Fords on the subject of the increase of leisure hours as the next step in the improvement of industrial conditions and in far-sighted business, and in Mr. Henry Ford's expressed belief that war arises from the envy of over-populated and under-paid countries against those in which a higher standard of living prevails. These declarations appear to indicate that the Fords, if they weather the present crisis in their industry, are more likely to endeavour to promote the war against war by an international investigation of the social factors adverse to the maintenance of a high standard of living and of contentment within the borders of States, than by building abroad a new Palace of Peace.

The work of "social diagnosis," especially in New York City and its immediate neighbourhood, has been the especial undertaking of the Russell Sage Foundation (1907), which, by its singleness of purpose, has accomplished results out of all proportion to the relative meagreness of its 15,000,000 dollars endowment. Under its auspices a Committee on a Regional Plan of New York will, before long, provide the city with better guidance in the complicated problem of its growth than that with which any other metropolis has hitherto been favoured. The task which this Foundation has set itself is to "gather data that can be made available for the solution of social problems." The surveys of Pittsburg and Springfield made

under the direction of the organisation are pioneer attempts to gather such information in a systematic fashion. The difficulty of the work of the Foundation lies in the fact that, while exact knowledge in the field of physics has become attainable on a vast scale during the course of the last five centuries, the systematic collection and analysis of facts bearing on social organisation and the study of social structure are still new tasks hindered by the same prejudices which impeded the natural sciences when they broke away from the tradition of the Schools.

It is still true, as in Francis Bacon's day, that only too few will exclaim: "God forbid that we should give out a dream of the imagination for a pattern of the world." But the resources which are behind these great Foundations encourage the hope that the advance of the social sciences, at least on the side of exact investigation, will be more rapid, despite their complexity, than could be that of the natural sciences in the centuries following their re-birth in the modern world. This prospect was encouraged by the establishment, in 1923, of the Social Science Research Council, on the model of the National Research Council, which is composed of representatives of the learned societies working in the field of the physical sciences. The Social Science Research Council is composed of representatives of the national associations of economists, political scientists, sociologists, statisticians, anthropologists, historians and psychologists. The purpose of the Council is "to promote the interests of scientific research in the field of social inquiry, particularly in cases where problems overlap the boundaries of one or more of the special fields. Social science is promoted by the study of methods of social research, by consideration of special problems in this field, and by co-ordination of scattered types of inquiry which otherwise would be independently pursued." Besides awarding Fellowships, in order to enable pieces of individual research to be carried out, the Council has itself undertaken to support investigations into the problem of migration, especially in its economic aspects and as revealed statistically, of crime, of the negro question, and of the social changes which have taken place concurrently with the operation of Prohibition. The Council has no endowment of its own, but usually draws the resources for its investigations from the Foundations. Hence the wealth at the disposal of these bodies, thanks to the munificence of donors brought up in the American tradition of giving, is administered subject to the guidance in methods of expenditure of trained staffs, and in general accordance with suggestions founded on the professional knowledge of experts in the various fields of learning.

The Foundations, with their international outlook and studious avoidance of self-advertisement, offer an example to the world of the happy employment of great wealth in trusteeship for the public

good. They pleasantly combine a helpfulness not impotent in practical expression, the efficiency of a great technical organisation, and something of that modesty of demeanour and dislike of publicity which has characterised one of the greatest of these modern donors since the days when, as "young Mr. Rockefeller," he was a Baptist clerk whose parents lived in a small "frame" house in an up-state township. Their encouragement by the State and Federal Governments of the United States, which exempt charitable donations from the gross taxable amount of annual income, has been peculiarly farsighted. The Christian Church has always enunciated the doctrine that wealth is a trust. The weightiest justification of the present economic order is that the individual, rather than the State, is the best administrator of that trust. A country which imposes taxes for charitable purposes practises the precepts of Socialism; a country whose citizens can be relied upon to give munificently to public objects manifests the principles of private property to the best advantage. That, in the words of a recent will bequeathing £20,000 to the University of London, "inherited wealth may, indeed, morally harm the recipient" is not a common sentiment, but that such wealth carries a social obligation is something which, in a healthy condition of public opinion, is generally regarded as indisputable. The State which encourages the performance of the obligation gives the best evidence of its belief that great private wealth, administered with public spirit, is a benefit to the community.

The Foundations, have, however, another significance besides their demonstration of how private wealth may be used, as in the age of the English college builders, for the public good. There can be little reasonable doubt that, as the century proceeds, the part played by the expert in the complicated work of administration of a modern state will grow more important. The epoch of slapdash amateur legislation by gentlemen at Westminster or Washington, long threatened by Cabinet and Administration, bids fair to be over. The task of effective law making is rather comparable to that of a physician prescribing, after diagnosis, for an ill than that of giving juristic expression in the imperative mood to the arbitrary will of some sovereign and omnipotent people. But the danger of expert government is notoriously the danger of bureaucracy, with its departmental interests, its scant respect for the common man and its function of acting under the direction of political and party ministers. Probably the best guarantee for the future that professional government will not be inconsistent with an independent public opinion lies in the multiplication of these Foundations and research agencies for the study of social questions, at once influential, expert and detached. To the student of political development, they constitute one of the most interesting facts on the horizon of this new age of technical efficiency and scientific method. GEORGE E. G. CATLIN.

DRAMATIC SILENCES.

ἡ λέγε τι σιγῆς κρείττον, ἡ σιγὴν ἔχει.—EURIPIDES.

THE highest thoughts, the deepest feelings, are those for which no words can be found. The stars are eternally meditating on the glory and handiwork of God; yet, so the Psalmist assures us, they have no speech nor language; their voice is not heard. And so with our puny selves. Who can find phrases for the emotions stirred in him by listening to the Ninth Symphony, or who, watching the sea as it breaks at the foot of the crags, does not echo the confession of the poet, that his tongue cannot utter the thoughts that arise in him? St. Paul, awaking from his beatific vision, refrained from telling what he had seen, not only because it was unlawful, but because it was impossible. How often have we not all felt, in our little measure, what Wordsworth felt in his "high hour of visitation," the sense of communion with things so wonderful that even thought is not? Our lighter feelings we may perhaps describe; our noblest or our deepest, never. Perfect joy is always "perplexed for utterance," and perfect grief is dumb. When Saturn wakes, in his shady vale, to the overwhelming realisation of lost dominion, he sits tranced into the silence of a stone. When we, like ancient Israel, are confronted with some tremendous and decisive choice, we, like ancient Israel, "answer not a word," for all words are unequal to the magnitude of such a crisis.

Poets, it is true, whose business it is to express emotion, even the keenest, through a verbal medium, often attempt by turns of metaphor and simile or other indirections to compel words into an unnatural mould, and force them to strive after an unattainable end. As a painter represents grief or joy by the face, or a sculptor by an attitude, so a poet, who has scarcely any other means than words, tries to convey in words what can adequately be conveyed only by silence. Thus Milton, describing the agony of our first parents when aroused from their dream of false bliss, does, indeed, tell us that :

Silent, and in face

Confounded, long they sat, as stricken mute :

and, when Satan beholds the fellows of his crime, he remains long unable to speak : but, obedient to the laws of art, the poet, after a pause, gives both to Adam and to his great enemy words for their emotions. We may be sure that the silence was in the reality longer than it is in the description, and the speech, when it did come, more "constrained" and more broken than it is in the poet's translation of it. And so when the poet's vision is of things yet deeper than grief. Dante, for example, strains his mighty powers to describe the glories of heaven and the rapture of the blessed, and all but succeeds. Mystics like Blake and Boehme have tortured words into a kind of ecstasy in order to make us see what they see. But the

dramatic poet, though he also often makes his effort when it is certain the character he represents would have been content with the unspoken feeling, yet from time to time perceives that the boldest metaphor, the loftiest rhyme, is totally inadequate, and lets his heroes speak by silence. In his desire to make all clear to his hearers, he may say what would never have been said; but now and then he wisely refrains. And it is remarkable that the poets who have oftenest thus refrained from words are precisely those whose power of verbal expression is such that one might think nothing was beyond them. But they, better than others, know the limitations of speech; and, though they speak as no other men speak, are silent when they reach the point beyond which speech would fail. Employing as it were a sublime aposiopesis, they stop short. Like Moses when contemplating the infinite mercy of Jehovah, they say, "And now, if thou wilt forgive their sin—" and add not a word. It is with a few of these silences that I propose to deal in this short paper.

Perhaps the sublimest work in the world is the Book of Job; and to my mind the most impressive passage in that most impressive poem is the one which describes how the three friends lifted up their eyes from afar off and knew him not; wherefore they sat down with him upon the ground in majestic Oriental sorrow for seven days and seven nights, and none spake a word, for they saw that his grief was very great. Not till the seven days and nights were past did Job open his mouth, and, with deliberation informing his intolerable agony, utter the passionate yet measured curse against his day. What thoughts must have passed through his mind during those long speechless hours!

In the Icelandic Kristni Saga we are told that at the great and decisive debate as to whether Christianity should be recognised or not, when things had come to such a pass that the country seemed likely to be split into two opposing factions, the Lawman Thorgeirr "laid him down in the sight of all, and spread a cloak over his head, and lay thus the whole day and all night, and the next day till the same hour." This symbolic silence calmed the warring chiefs, and brought peace into the assembly: the next day Thorgeirr rose, and summoned all men to the Hill of Laws, where he gave his decision, to which they all hearkened. But had he not been silent, they would have refused to listen when he spoke.

Discovering then, perhaps by actual experience, the dramatic value of silence, the greatest writers have, as we said, availed themselves of it. Even a Shakespeare, at certain crises, has felt that he has no words which can express the situation as forcibly as none at all. He knows, for instance, that while Regan and Goneril can be voluble enough about their "affection" for their father, Cordelia can only love and *be silent*: and he knows that other emotions,

if as strong as Cordelia's love, must be silent too; and therefore, more than once or twice, he "commits" the expression of such emotions to "waste blanks." It is for the actors and the readers to lend these blanks the meaning with which the poet intended to charge them. We know that Aeschylus, also, was partial to this kind of speechless eloquence; and unfortunately not always, possibly in part through some failure of the actors, did it gain due appreciation from the audience. The *Medicean Life* tells us that in the *Libe*, through two whole acts, the heroine sat by the tomb of her children, with her head muffled, uttering not a word; and in the *Ransom of Hector* Achilles, after a line or two addressed to Hermes, at similarly muffled. It is clear that this bewildered the audience; and the biographer himself is of opinion that it was unintelligible and uninteresting. Nay, even Aristophanes, though an ardent admirer of Aeschylus, seems to have been fretted by it. We may well believe, indeed, that with nothing better than masked and muskined figures through which to work, Aeschylus was straining his resources of his art beyond their capacity: and the regular presence of a κωφὸν πρόσωπον, whose business it was to say nothing, and to which the audience was accustomed to pay little attention, may have hampered him yet further; for the audience may have been unable to tell at a glance which was the protagonist and which the speechless gesticulator with whom they were familiar. Yet it is probable that such scenes would have produced their full effect upon a people less given to the vocal expression of emotion than the Athenians. Had they, for instance, been performed before Arabs or Norsemen, they would have been duly appreciated.

But in one or two scenes, which have fortunately come down to us in full, Aeschylus achieved, and still achieves, an undoubted and a memorable triumph. In the first of these, be it noted, he ascribes this silent endurance to a supernatural being, and in the second to one who, though human, is yet inspired. But the strangeness to the Athenians would hardly be mitigated thereby; the examples of Ares and Aphrodite in the *Iliad* are not the only ones that might be adduced to show that to the Greeks a stoical impassiveness in their gods would seem as remarkable as in themselves; and the effect of these scenes, whether in the way of repugnance or in that of admiration, must have been very great. In any case we may well believe that no writer before Aeschylus would have thus ventured. When the two monstrous demons, with the reluctant Hephaestus in their train, arrive at the trackless and ultimate deserts of Scythia, to perform their dread task, it is Kratos and Hephaestus who speak: the victim utters no sound. The horrible crucifixion is carried through; we hear the reverberation of the hammers and the clanking of the chains; from the "Awful Sufferer" we hear nothing.

Hephaestus sighs over the agony he is constrained to inflict upon a kindred god: "Ay me, Prometheus, I grieve for thy woes; unwilling shall I nail thee, unwilling also, in indissoluble chains to this man-shunned crag": but Prometheus does not answer. Finally the savage Kratos gives vent to a parting taunt: "Falsely do the gods call thee the Far-sighted One; much foresight, methinks, wilt thou need to loose thyself from bonds like these"; but to taunt, as to compassion, the Titan is dumb. Not till the sound of the footsteps has died away in the distance does he break out into his cry to the divine æther and the swift-winged winds to look upon his pain. To us this silence has always seemed one of the sublimest things in literature: it is as if we were watching, in very truth, something more than human. It is like the vision of Eliphaz: "A Spirit passed before my face; it stood still but I could not discern the appearance thereof: *silence, and I heard a voice.*" Yet we must not forget that the Greek audience would *expect* a cry like that of Ajax, and would wonder why the chief actor remained as dumb as Bia. Only later would they, perhaps unwillingly, confess that the poet had done right to disappoint them.

Almost as lofty as this, and even more overwhelming as more pathetic, is the silence of Cassandra in the *Agamemnon*. Arriving with the King in the chariot, and fully conscious of the doom that awaits both him and her within the walls of the palace, she stands like a prophetic statue, motionless and tongueless. Yet from her very stillness there passes into the Chorus, and thence into the spectators, a horror of great darkness, so that they "mutter dimly, vexed in soul, and naught expecting ever to unfold from a breast on fire." To the mockings of Clytemnestra she answers nothing, hardly indeed seeming to hear the words; "her mood is as of a newly-taken wild beast, as yet unused to captivity." When the queen has departed in anger, and not till then, she starts from her trance, and, scenting the yet unshed blood within the house, pours forth a torrent of foreboding words in which the coming tragedy, though described in dim prophetic imagery, is all too clearly revealed.

There is no scene in Shakespeare that calls for a silence so sublime as these. He moves more closely to the earth than Aeschylus, and we must not expect from him, in this sphere, flights quite so daring. Yet more than once he avails himself of the chance, when it offers, of avoiding words; and perhaps, as we have hinted above, the more visible play of his actors' features gives him certain advantages, *on the stage*, over Aeschylus; nor, of course, has he to contend with the confusion that might be caused by the presence of a *persona muta*. But his characters are on a less lofty plane than those of his great predecessor; and, as silence is the special language of the starry gods, he found fewer opportunities, among his very human kings

id princes, for the use of this divine dialect. On one occasion, deed, in his prentice days, he made a conspicuous failure. The lence of Silvia, in the *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, is not only gratuitous but stupid. But later he learned his art; and, as Iacaulay pointed out, the silence of Hamlet in the first court-scene, ough not equal to that of Prometheus, is yet very fine. The King pens with a long address, explaining his marriage to the Queen, nd dilating on the conflict in his mind between grief for his rother's death and the sense of duty to his kingdom. As he speaks, e watch on Hamlet's face the emotions—loathing, contempt, distrust, doubt—all clearly written for us to see. The King then turns o Laertes, and, learning his desire to go to France, gives him permission. Hamlet's face now expresses a kind of scornful envy of he young man, who for trivial reasons can leave a court for which ie is fitted, but in which the Prince, despite his hatred of it, is compelled to remain. Yet he utters no word; and even when Claudius directly speaks to him, his first speech is an "aside"—that is, not a speech but a thought: and his answer, when he is at last compelled o speak, is of the briefest. This is, indeed, "fine"; and it is the actor's business to make it finer still.

Of a slighter and more obvious kind is the silence of Macduff when he hears that his wife and children have been murdered. Unfortunately the scene in which this occurs is one of the *dullest* and feeblest in the whole of Shakespeare's works; and we cannot be sure that, if Shakespeare had been in a more inspired mood when he wrote it, he would not have made it more impressive. The effect is almost ruined by Malcolm's amazing tactlessness and want of sympathy: so much so, indeed, that our indignation against the Prince almost drowns our feeling for the bereaved father. Shakespeare well knew that sorrow like that has no words; and we can hardly believe that, at his best, he would have allowed Malcolm to wring words from a sufferer to whom silence is the only possible consolation. We are reminded, in a fashion, of the garrulous little maid in *Guinevere*, who, like many another babbler, harmed where she would heal: the Queen, bowed down upon her hands, silent, is thinking of her sins and their results, when the little maid, who brooks no silence, breaks it and enhances the misery.

More moving is another silence in the same play. When the mirth has been displaced, and the good meeting broken by Macbeth's "admired disorder," when the guests have all departed, and the ghost itself no longer threatens to return, Lady Macbeth, realising her shattered hopes and the crash of all her illusions, sits on, herself shattered, an image of stone, for what to the audience seems hours, and what is, in "reality," half the night. Macbeth himself strides restlessly to and fro; she moves no muscle, and

appears hardly to breathe. It is a stillness that forebodes the coming quiet of the tomb. At length it is broken. "What is the night?" asks the husband; and the answer comes, as if a corpse had spoken, brief, monotonous, and hollow like a ghost's. "Almost at odds with morning, which is which": as her life is thenceforward to be at odds with dissolution. Six more brief words are spoken, and then, in "You lack the season of all natures, sleep," she utters the last waking words that ever leave her lips. To "sleep" the pair go off; but for her it is a sleep in which the past is always re-enacted, and from which the waking is to be an eternal slumber. That long silence, followed by a score of words, is one of the most penetrating effects that Shakespeare ever achieved.

When we turn to the quite different silence of Hermione at the end of *A Winter's Tale*, the parallel is rather with Euripides than with Aeschylus. This is a silence which, as far as Leontes is concerned, has already lasted sixteen years: and it is only right that she should remain upon her pedestal, voiceless and moveless, a little longer. It is right also—so intolerable is the wrong done to her—that though she submits to the embrace of her husband, and even, perhaps, embraces him in return, she should yet have no words for him. When she does speak, it is to Perdita alone, for whose sake only she has forced herself to live. Nothing could more eloquently declare the judgment of the poet on the poor creature whose crime, though forgiven, could never be forgotten. It may be—but a decision in this case is somewhat difficult—that the similar silence of Alcestis on her return from the grave marks in like fashion the judgment of Euripides on the conduct of Admetus, a husband whose selfishness, justly pilloried by his father, is nearly as bad as the insane suspicion of Leontes. It is true that Heracles ascribes the silence to a religious motive: "'Tis not permitted thee to hear word of hers until her consecration to the gods of death has been loosed, and until the third day dawns"; but Euripides was quite capable of introducing such a scruple for the sake of his orthodox hearers, while meaning something altogether different for the "intelligent" to whom he really addressed himself. Far more than Pindar, Euripides spoke words *φωνάντα σιννεοῖσιν*. At any rate, whatever be the poet's true motive, the silence is far more vocal than any speech could have been.*

Equally noteworthy, though conveying a very different signifi-

* It is hardly necessary to do more than allude to the silence of Iphigeneia at her sacrifice, when, says Aeschylus (*Agamemnon* 233) she lay "as in a picture," *ὡς ἐν γραφαῖς*. The poet tells us she wished, or tried, to speak, *προσεννέπειν θέλουσα*. But the speechless anguish of Agamemnon in the *Iphigeneia in Aulis*, where the author makes him veil his face to hide his tears (Iph. Aul. 1550) *δάκρυα προήγεν δαμάτων πέπλον προθείς*, is said to have suggested to Timanthes his famous veiled figure in his painting of the sacrifice. Whether this part of the play is by Euripides or another is, I believe, doubtful.

cance, is the silence of Iago when his villany has at last been revealed. He has, in a sense, achieved his aim; Othello has been ruined and Desdemona killed, but through the action of a being whom he had despised too utterly to take into account, he has failed to secure his own safety. As Bradley says, he had never meant his plot to be dangerous to himself; and, even when it proved to be so, he fancied that, his secret being shared with his wife alone, whose character he was convinced he knew, he was still safe. But when it dawns on him that the despised creature, in her love for her mistress, means to betray him, he is moved to anger, it is true, and to utter astonishment, but also to self-contempt. He is struck, like Achilles, in the one place where he is vulnerable; his intellectual pride is shattered. He, who thought he knew human nature through and through, has been mistaken as to the person he ought to have known best. He is not, as Bradley truly says, of a supremely intellectual type; but it has been his "grounds of faith" that he is so; he is as firmly convinced of his mental greatness as ever Malvolio of his repute; and the realisation that he, Iago, has made this clumsy blunder, has become the "geck and gull" of his own wife, is a tremendous blow to his self-esteem. He feels, we need not say, no remorse. But he does feel self-disgust, sudden, intense, overwhelming—and "From this time forth I never will speak word." That he will keep his vow we may be sure, despite the tortures with which Gratiano threatens him. To exhibit on his face the thoughts which chase themselves through his mind, "more fell than anguish, hunger, or the sea," is the actor's task; and an almost superhuman task it is.

There are two, or perhaps more, occasions on which this silence occurs in the extant plays of Sophocles, and in each case, by the mouth of the Chorus, the poet draws attention to it. It is perhaps by this simple device of a chorus-speech that Sophocles avoids the failure, if such it can be called, of Aeschylus: for we do not hear that in *his* case the audience complained of unintelligibility. In that terrible scene of *Oedipus the King*, in which Jocasta learns the full horror of her position, she does indeed speak, but it is to say that she will never speak again; and immediately she rushes out to seek in death a release from her agony. The Chorus then says, "Wherefore has she gone, O Oedipus? I fear that from this silence evils may break forth!" Similar is the case of Haemon in the *Antigone*: when his father has sentenced Antigone to death, even in the bridegroom's presence, the young man cries:

Nay, not in my sight! Never dream thou this!
Nor near me shall she die! Nowhere on earth
Thou with thine eyes again shall see my face;
and the Chorus again emphasise the words;

The man, O King, in wrath hath rushed away:
Young hearts like his in pain wax desperate.

In each of these cases the doomed one rushes out to silence after a speech of his own; but in the two following he listens, without a word, to a long speech of another, and *then* goes forth; a situation more strictly parallel to those we have considered above. Somewhat later, in this very play of *Antigone*, Haemon's mother Eurydice listens in speechless anguish to the Messenger's long story of her son's death. The Prince has gone to the inmost recesses of Antigone's tomb, and like Romeo bewailing Juliet has clasped her waist and sorrowed for his bridal's ruin, lost in Hades.

Then that ill-starred one,
Wroth with himself, plunged then and there the blade
Deep in his own side; and, ere sense had swooned,
Embraced the maiden with his failing arm:
And, grasping out the last sharp gust of breath,
Dashed with the bloody spray her pallid face.
Clasping a corpse, a corpse he lies: in halls
Of Hades is his bridal consummated.

To all this the mother listens speechless; not till the last word is uttered does she rush out: and here again the poet is ready with his explanatory chorus:

What would'st thou guess from this? The queen is passed
From sight again, naught saying, good or ill.

Messenger.

Yea, I too marvel: yet I feed on hope
She means to stir her maidens to the keening:
Not void of wit is she, that she should err.

Chorus.

I know not. Ominous this silence more
To me than had she uttered bitter cry.

Very similar is the scene in the *Trachiniæ*, where Deianeira hears from Hyllus the dreadful story of the death of the hero she loves, and by her own fatal error: a story ending in a terrible denunciation. "May the wrathful Erinys take vengeance on thee! 'Tis lawful that thus I pray, for thou art no more my mother, and hast cast away, thyself, all mother's claims." Once more the Chorus:

Why dost thou part in silence? Seest thou not
That silence speaks thee conscious of thy guilt?

We see thus that Sophocles, though so great, was less far removed from his audience than Aeschylus; with all his genius he was a typical Athenian, and understood what Athenians required. Even when he did not give them the vocal sorrow which they expected, he told them why he refused it, and saw to it that they understood.

Far finer, to our mind, than any of these Sophoclean silences is
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that of Phaedra in the *Hippolytus* of Euripides, which, it is worth while to observe, is due to a deliberate afterthought. As Professor Gilbert Murray points out, in the first recension of the play Phaedra actually declared her love; and this more obvious treatment of the theme was preferred by both Seneca and Racine. "But Euripides in his second thoughts reached a far more austere and beautiful

: his Phaedra goes to her death without having spoken one to Hippolytus; she has heard him but has not answered." is still more noteworthy in that Euripides, like Sophocles, well that his countrymen liked to bewail their griefs aloud, and e of his lost plays made a speaker say, like Malcolm, that w should have words. But here he gives his hearers not what wanted, but what he himself felt that nature demanded. When urse has betrayed the fatal secret, the Queen tells the Chorus:

No way I know but one, to die with speed—
Sole cure for these my woes:

efore she can depart, Hippolytus bursts in, furiously upbraids the nurse, and not sparing Phaedra herself. To all his words dra listens, but says nothing. There is, indeed, nothing that s can say. When Hippolytus has departed, but not till then, ous out her feelings to the impersonal chorus: which is like etheus telling his woes to the deaf winds and the dumb air.

eed hardly adduce more of these instances.* But I must for a ent dwell on one, the most impressive of all, which is to be l as the climax of every Shakespearean tragedy, more speaking the long harangues of the *Deus ex machina* which close so y Greek plays—the silence of death. When all has been said can be said, and when our feelings are too painfully harrowed tterance, that Silence descends upon the scene, and fitly closes

When utter and crushing sorrow has finally dumbbed even loquence of Lear, when the dagger of Othello has reconciled him e world and reunited him to Desdemona, when Brutus has at made peace with the ghost of Caesar, when Cleopatra has ned Antony, we want no more words. A few obituary lines may cited by survivors; an epitaph may be read over Coriolanus, or umphant pæan sung over Macbeth; but it is the corpses that ally speak to us, like Abel, after death. What we, the hearers readers, are feeling, can be rightly spoken by no living tongue, an the poet, however eloquent, add anything by means of words. ry Elizabethan tragedy really ends with the last words of alet, "The rest is silence."

E. E. KELLETT.

efore leaving Greek plays, however, we may notice an effect very similar lence—that gained by the *absence* of Ajax and of Philoctetes while the ctive pairs of plotters speak outside. Both heroes have been silent long and recognise that they are silent still; although they are not visible on the stage ake their dumbness vocal.

LOS ANGELES.

"THE wonder city of the world," its inhabitants call it, and they believe it is, too. It merits the description in one respect at any rate—its astounding growth. It was only a little Mexican *pueblo* of adobe houses, sheltering some 1,500 people, though it had contested the honour of being the capital of California under the Mexicans, when in 1847 the Americans took possession. It was chartered in 1850, and increased steadily. In 1876 the railway from San Francisco reached it, and thereafter it grew at an accelerating pace. It is hard to credit, seeing what Los Angeles is to-day, that only fifty years ago was railway communication opened with the Central Pacific.

Four years later there was a population of 13,000. It was still only a country town, deriving its importance from its functions as market and distribution centre for the scattered ranchers of Southern California. Then in 1885 it was linked direct with the East through the Santa Fé system. A land boom on a gigantic scale began, stimulated by one of the most intense "railway wars" of the period. The development of Southern California proceeded by leaps and bounds. Los Angeles had reached and passed the 100,000 mark in 1900. Thereafter it continued to break records in expansion. At the 1910 census the population was 319,200; at that of 1920 it was 576,700, challenging the supremacy of San Francisco on the Pacific Coast. Then started the biggest boom of all. In the next five years the population increased to 1,150,000. Meanwhile dozens of thriving towns had sprung up in the surrounding country, on the alluvial plain some thirty miles broad between the mountains and the sea, bringing the aggregate population of Los Angeles County to more than two millions.

Various causes have contributed to this phenomenal expansion, but those of the greatest effect are plain. First there are the natural conditions—a most salubrious climate, with a perennial summer sun and brilliantly clear sky, a profusion of flowers and fruits, magnificent scenery. In a normal year the sun shines on 350 days, the average summer temperature is not above 75 degrees, and the rainfall is concentrated into a few torrential downpours between November and February. Because of the climatic conditions, it was very nearly an ideal place for the cinema industry, where films could be taken out-of-doors on all but a few days in the year, the wonderfully beautiful and varied scenery being an additional advantage. The great increase of cinemas throughout America not only acted directly upon the growth of Los Angeles by producing a colossal boom in the industry and attracting thousands of workers of all kinds. Los Angeles supplies 80 per cent. of the

world's cinema films. It also advertises Southern California everywhere in the States and indeed over the world, by fascinating pictures of its charms, associating the country with romance and gaiety. So that after the war, when there were a great many Americans with bulging purses looking for a holiday place, thousands of families naturally travelled to California. They were not disappointed in it as a playground. They discovered that its diversity was uniformly delightful. "The owner of a motor-car can," it was said enthusiastically, "in half a day have a choice of a dozen varieties of climate; he can be grilled in the narrow streets of the business quarter of Los Angeles, he can bask in warm, salty breezes on the beaches at Redondo or Hermosa, and he can enjoy sub-arctic cold on the snowclad summit of Mount Lowe. There are not a dozen days in the year when it is impossible to play golf or lawn tennis; the cost of clothing and shelter is automatically reduced by the climate, and coal bills are unknown." Such glowing reports drew more and more from all over the States, but especially from the Middle West, as that immense area lying between the Mississippi and the Rockies is popularly designated. A great many stayed: those who had made their pile, to whom this paradise appealed as a perfect home for their remaining years; those who had accumulated capital to provide a satisfactory income, eked out by fruit-growing or one of the other delightful and profitable occupations possible; those who, determined never to go back to wet and cold, searched and found means of livelihood to enable them to remain.

Then there was the swiftly increasing economic importance of the city, the industrial and commercial development providing work for hundreds of thousands of newcomers. The chief stimulus to this development was the opening of the Panama Canal. This has transformed the transport routes of the whole of North America in a manner few perhaps realise. It has converted Los Angeles into a great port, market, distribution centre. The city has risen to its opportunities with a response lacking nothing of American business daring and hustle. It possessed no port. The shore line was nearly twenty miles from the centre of the city. There was just this line of the shore, a lagoon, a long bank of mud covered by the tide, and a pond wherein frogs made music at night. The receding tide left about two feet of water in it. It was a harbour not for ships, but for weird-shaped little sea-animals and small fishes.

Los Angeles proceeded to build a harbour, not the harbour of any ordinary sea-port, but one of the biggest harbours in the world. A colossal breakwater was constructed over two miles long, stretching out into the open sea like an inverted letter L. In the area behind, protected from the surges of the Pacific, men and machinery were eventually toiling, dredging channels and basins, erecting

quays and wharves, locks and bridges, huge stores and cranes, all the paraphernalia of a great port. Everything was planned from the first to secure the highest degree of efficiency and convenience in the system of waterways, sheds, railway lines, and so on. The port of Los Angeles is not, like most other great ports, the result of slow expansion, additions being made from time to time. It has the very valuable advantage of having been planned as a whole. A start was made on the harbour works in San Pedro Bay in 1898, but most has been accomplished during the past twenty years. Los Angeles, twenty years ago a tenth-rate American port, is now second in the United States in cargo tonnage handled. It has raced past such famous ports as New Orleans, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston. Only New York remains to beat, and the people of Los Angeles believe that that is only a matter of a few years. Already in intercoastal traffic New York is surpassed. The people of Southern California are confident that their miracle city is destined to displace New York as the premier commercial centre of the continent, the economic metropolis of the richest country on earth, to become the greatest port in the world, the focus of the most extensive and prosperous industrial region.

There is nothing fantastic about this prophecy, considered in the light of the progress of the last twenty years. A few statistics help us to realise this. The table below shows the increase in the value of exports by sea.

Year.	Value of Exports in dollars.					
1912	...	...	...	...	...	236,000
1917	...	...	...	...	...	3,037,000
1922	...	...	...	...	...	18,844,000
1923	...	...	...	...	...	34,500,000
1925	...	...	...	...	...	71,000,000

The next table shows the increase in the gross tonnage and the value of all the cargo passing through the port.

Year.	Tons.	Value in dollars.	
1914	...	1,682,000	45,000,000
1921	...	4,296,000	188,000,000
1924	...	26,500,000	643,000,000

In 1925 the value reached 670 million dollars, second only to the port of New York.

Industrial development has proceeded on a similar scale. The third table shows the increase in the value of the total output of manufactured products.

Year.						Value in dollars.
1900	...	...	...	...	...	15,133,000
1905	...	...	...	...	...	34,814,000
1910	...	...	...	...	...	68,000,000
1915	...	...	...	...	...	109,000,000
1920	...	...	...	...	...	788,653,000
1924	...	...	...	...	...	1,202,677,000

In 1900 there were about 150 factories; in 1924 there were 5,700 with an annual payroll of 300 million dollars. The salubrity and stability of climatic conditions conduce to the constant efficiency of labour. The bank clearings have increased 700 per cent. during the last twelve years, and now approach 800 million dollars. Property is assessed on a 50 per cent. basis, yet the total assessment is now over 1,500 million dollars. The total of Los Angeles County is about double this. The phenomenal industrial expansion does not mean that agriculture has declined or remained stationary. On the contrary it has extended hugely, the value of the products of Los Angeles County being in the neighbourhood of 500 million dollars a year, more than that of any other country in the United States.

There are 150 steamship lines calling regularly and frequently at Los Angeles. More than 6,200 ships enter and leave in a year. There are sixty-five ocean lines, connecting directly with a hundred chief ports in fifty countries of the world. Yet in 1918 only six foreign steamship lines called at Los Angeles. Plans are being completed for an immense extension of the harbour. The break-water is to be extended four miles to the south, and the harbour of Long Beach, the flourishing city of some 150,000 inhabitants adjoining, is to be annexed, the whole being formed into a vast unified port and terminal, with double the present capacity. Not only Long Beach, but Pasadena and the other swiftly growing towns around are destined eventually to be absorbed in Los Angeles.

The economic advantages of Los Angeles are various and full of promise. There is the vast and ever-growing market which it is best placed to supply. Across the Pacific live two-thirds of the whole world's population, in lands where a great demand for American products has arisen and is rapidly growing. The gain in distance and time, the relative cheapness of sea transport, are factors which other industrial areas have no means of neutralising. Then there is the coastwise trade from Alaska to Cape Horn. Los Angeles is the nearest important port to Mexico and South America, where swift economic development creates a huge demand for American products. Moreover the Panama Canal places the manufactures of Los Angeles on an equality in competition with all those coming from more than about 150 miles from the Atlantic coast. Goods can be delivered as cheaply to anywhere in the whole wide

world from Los Angeles as from anywhere else in the States more than 150 miles from the sea. What the Panama Canal has meant to Los Angeles may be judged from the fact that 35 per cent. of the freight passing through travels to or from the city. It is, with the exception of San Diego, necessarily the first possible port of call of a ship sailing west through the canal, the last of one sailing east.

There still remains to be taken into account the vast hinterland of Los Angeles, all the area west of the Rockies and south of Oregon, packed with immense potentialities now beginning to be exploited on a large scale. This region used to turn eastward both for markets and for sources of supply. It is turning more and more westward to California. Los Angeles is situated with regard to raw materials equally favourably as to markets. In the 'nineties very rich oilfields were discovered, and now more than one-third of the total oil production of the United States comes from an area of seventy miles around the city, which is the natural centre of the region, with thousands of wells within its boundaries. Southern California produces about one-fifth of the world's petroleum. What has been said of the extent of the markets of Los Angeles is true also of her sources of raw materials. The same vast regions can be tapped. There are the hardwood forests of Mexico, Central America, Indo-China, the rubber plantations of the East Indies, the coffee plantations of Brazil, Java, and Central America, the silk farms of China and Japan, the copra of the Pacific Islands. There is the great hinterland, including the Colorado River basin. This area now supports less than 10 per cent. of its potential population. Its development may be said to have only just begun, yet already it has an output of nearly half the wool, for example, produced in the United States, with more than half the beans, beet sugar, and fruit. It grows a fifth of the barley and a fifth of the beef of the States. So one might go on. According to one estimate the area contains a third of the potential water-power of the United States, colossal this is. By the erection of a huge dam on the Colorado River its exploitation on a proportionate scale is commencing. It is calculated that the consumption of hydro-electricity will amount to 7,000 million kilowatt hours annually in five years' time in Southern California.

The supply of water in an area of such infrequent rainfall presented a problem which Los Angeles has solved by building an aqueduct to bring water 260 miles from the High Sierras. A river was brought across deserts, over valleys, through mountains, to supply the domestic and other needs of over a million people, with a surplus to irrigate more than 200 square miles and satisfy all the demands of industry, while the fall in level was taken advantage of to generate electricity. Now there is a plan for diverting a part of the Colorado River and bringing it 270 miles to Los Angeles, in an aqueduct carrying 1,500 cubic feet per second.

Los Angeles suffers from some inevitable consequences of its marvellously rapid growth. Thousands coming from widely different environments, of many races, with their own habits and prejudices, form not a true city, as yet, but a vast agglomeration. Public spirit and civic co-operation are not conspicuous features among the mass of the people. The social organisation has not kept pace with the increase in numbers, and evil influences are so much the stronger. Educational influences are lacking. Mr. Hearst is purveyor-in-chief of the journalism, and the culture of the city is mostly that of the "motion-pictures" and the Sunday supplements. The volume of crime is sometimes exaggerated by journals in the envious East, but it is really appalling. "Hold-ups" are still usual events of the day, and a murder a week is common. But the crime has certainly decreased, and an appreciable increase in the strength of public opinion and the resolution to enforce law and order is slowly bringing reform. The tales of vicious orgies associated with Hollywood have some basis, no doubt, but only a small fraction.

While the population is so mixed, native Californians being almost negligible in numbers, the core is sound. It is made up of native Americans from all the States in the Union, but the majority from the Middle West. They have brought their ideals with them. These ideals, satirised so mercilessly by many contemporary American novelists, held up to scorn by Mr. H. L. Mencken, are not the highest ideals, but they do include a certain minimum of the essential virtues. Then the largest section of the population apart from native Americans consists of immigrants of British blood, who have flocked in from Canada, Australia, and elsewhere until in 1925 it was estimated they constituted 10 per cent. of the population of Los Angeles County. There are thousands of Germans, of Italians, of Scandinavians. There are Japanese and Chinese for cooks and gardeners, Mexicans and negroes of various degrees for heavier work. But however cosmopolitan, the core of the population is American and British.

Southern California, with its many attractions, is a rival to Canada and Australia as a destination for a surplus population of British blood, a serious rival which ought to be taken into account by Imperial statesmanship. In many respects the country can offer to immigrants so much more than British lands overseas that sorely need British population not only for their development but to preserve their British character. It can offer a magnificent climate, a natural environment hardly to be matched, the prospect of quick prosperity. It does not demand that immigrants shall be pioneers or agricultural workers, or shall adopt a national social code, as Canada and Australia are apt to do on pain of being more or less condemned. The significance of Los Angeles and what it stands for is profound.

ANTHONY CLYNE.

THE ENGLISHMAN ABROAD.

WHEN we speak of "an Englishman abroad" we do not mean merely one who, for a shorter or longer period, has left his native land, for, however distant the country which an Englishman visits, or in which he resides, he may nevertheless not be "abroad" there, but at home. Inheritor by colonisation or conquest of nearly one-fifth of the globe, he has many homes from home. He is not "abroad" in Australia, New Zealand or Canada, nor even in India, for in these countries he is either one of a community composed mostly of men of his own race, or he occupies a definite and responsible position as an official, trader or missionary. And yet he has only to make a comparatively short journey to France, Switzerland, or Italy to be, in a special sense, "abroad," for there, less constrained by a sense of personal responsibility, he can devote himself more entirely to his own amusement and "let himself go."

The phrase may also be said to have a limited application in point of time. Englishmen have, of course, always travelled on the Continent, but it is only in comparatively recent times, say, in the last seventy years, that, with the great extension in facilities of travel, they have become common objects of notice and criticism. They no longer go abroad as single spies, but in battalions. The travelling Englishman of to-day is a very different person from his predecessor in the eighteenth and even in the first half of the nineteenth century. There was no travelling public, there were no Pullman cars or Cook's tourists when, in 1739, Horace Walpole started on the Grand Tour, or in 1758 when Lady Mary Wortley-Montagu settled in Venice and cultivated Italian society. In those days the English traveller was essentially an aristocrat. His journey was a sort of royal progress. He came not so much to see the country as to visit people of a social position similar to his own or to study special objects of interest. He was sure of respect even if he did not invite liking or sympathy. With the advent of tourist agencies and charabancs the distinction of English travellers has almost ceased. To some extent, of course, travellers are still differentiated by wealth and luxury and the deference which these command. But when foreigners think of the English they naturally think of the type which they are most accustomed to see. They judge of a nation by individuals, and the great majority of such individuals are tourists.

To all Englishmen, and still more to Englishwomen, the Continent makes powerful appeal. The attractions of climate, scenery, health, amusement, sport, or what not, are indeed irresistible, and to leave our own country occasionally has become almost essential to

happiness. And this feeling has in recent times been intensified by facilities for travel, by the expensiveness of English life, by the great increase of wealth or, at least, of money to spend, amongst the English lower-middle class, and by the general rage for excitement and amusement. It is, no doubt, a great thing for a people like the English, keen, strong and active, eager to see and enjoy, oppressed with the restrictions, in space and accommodation, of their own country, to be able to spread themselves broadcast over a foreign land and to find therein an outlet for their superabundant energy. In our own country the provision of "open spaces" for the enjoyment of "the people" is one of the problems of modern life. The Continent and, in particular, certain portions of it, are our biggest "open space," and "the people" in this case are our tourists abroad whose ways and manners give cause, sometimes, for the same reflections and criticisms as the behaviour of excursionists at home. In both cases there is a tendency to waste paper and litter, actual or moral.

Amongst the many possible inducements which may lure an Englishman abroad there is one which is, as a rule, curiously lacking. He goes to see the country and whatever distractions it may offer. He does not go to see the inhabitants. Frequently his object is to meet his own countrymen who, united by a sense of nationality and the pursuit of common pleasures, are inclined to be more amiable than they are at home. Nor has the Englishman abroad any desire to speak the language of the country, if this can be avoided. The few dozen words and phrases which he carries about with him suffice for his material wants. Why should he speak the language of foreigners when foreigners so often speak his own language better than he can speak theirs? A plausible, but fallacious argument. Even a superficial tourist pays a penalty for his ignorance by the blunders which he commits and the dishonesty which he invites. The more serious traveller, anxious to learn something of the interesting and characteristic sides of a country, pays a still heavier penalty. There can be no real knowledge of a country without a knowledge of its language. Hotels, restaurants and guide-books can teach us little about the real mind and thoughts of a people. These are more likely to be revealed in a casual conversation with a road sweeper or a peasant woman in the fields than by a tour round all the *châteaux* of Touraine. The fact is that the average tourist is altogether out of touch with foreign thought. He cannot as a rule even read the newspapers, and if he could, they are not, as with us, a daily mirror of opinion on common and familiar things. The impressions, therefore, which a tourist receives and which he gives are mainly through the eye, not the mind. His attitude is determined by his own preconceptions. It is true that the lines of Gold-

smith's "Traveller" no longer apply to him: "Pride in their port, defiance in their eye, I see the lords of humankind go by." He is not proud or defiant. Such qualities are out of date, and would seriously interfere with his travelling arrangements; at the same time he retains certain English characteristics. He is self-contained and self-centred. He remains an entity, an element which does not combine easily with other elements. This is not necessarily to his discredit, for the characteristics of a strong nation are not easily fusible. They require a certain amount of heat of which the degree varies. More heat is required in case of an Englishman than of a German or Frenchman. Heine has unkindly remarked that it takes a very long time to know an Englishman, and when, with much effort, you have got to know him, you find that it was not worth while. As against this it may be said that access to the friendship of foreigners is not, as a rule, made easy. They are not given to hospitality, their family life is mostly a closed book; they prefer to see their acquaintances out of doors rather than at home.

The aloofness of the English traveller abroad, though no longer marked by pride or disdain, not infrequently takes the form of conceit expressed, not in words, but in action. The idea that, for an Englishman, what is good enough in his own country is good enough abroad, that his appearance however singular, his clothing and manners however loud, are his own affair and not the concern of foreigners, is deeply ingrained in the British and in the American tourist. He is not content when abroad to be one of a crowd. He feels it due to himself to be noticed, and the means by which he attracts notice are not always pleasing. But indifferent as he may be to the feelings of foreigners, he is not indifferent to the impression which he produces. He remains self-conscious. He is quite aware that his peculiarities are noticed, and he is proud of the independence of spirit which makes him indifferent to criticism.

Foreigners, though they are apt to dissemble their love, have never been slow to appreciate the sterling qualities of the English race. They have, it is true, taxed our country from time to time with various unamiable qualities, such as selfishness, arrogance, nay, even rapacity. We are less concerned now with such perennial charges than with the impression created and the influence exerted by the average Englishman abroad. What are the directions in which this influence is mainly felt at the present day? They may be said to be five in number.

English Individuality. That England, divided only by a narrow strait from the rest of Europe and compounded of various elements drawn from the Continent, should for a thousand years have developed and maintained an individuality so distinct from that of her

nearest neighbours, is one of the remarkable phenomena of history. England, though geographically in Europe, has not till very recent times been of it. Her national characteristics and political development have separated her by a barrier greater than that of the sea from other nations. To the foreigner the English people, geographically so near and psychologically so distant, have remained and, in spite of the levelling tendencies of the modern age, still remain in some respects, an enigma, not only as regards our national institutions, but the idiosyncracies of Englishmen in general. For Taine, as for Voltaire and Montaigne, a voyage to England was a voyage of adventure. Their discoveries were as novel and startling as any which they could have made in an island of the South Seas. And in point of character there has always appeared to be something peculiar and eccentric in an Englishman. This applies even to so closely related a people as the Germans, whose impressions used to be summed up in the current phrase "Gecker Engländer."

In contrast with the eccentric mentality attributed to Englishmen are their physical characteristics. There has never been anything mysterious about them. All foreign observers from Gregory the Great, to whom English slave-children at Rome seemed *non Angli sed Angeli*, to the author of *La Supériorité de la race Anglosaxonne*, have paid tribute to the physical attraction of the English race, and the truth of this general verdict is, generally speaking, evident in an Englishman of the best type. We like to think of him as of one whose well-cut features, shapely limbs, healthy complexion and intelligent, virile look, mark him out amidst whatever foreign race he may find himself.

English honesty. The Englishman abroad is credited and, as a rule, rightly credited, with the very valuable characteristic of honesty. In money matters and business engagements his word is accepted as his bond. Most English travellers have experienced the faith of a foreigner that an Englishman is a man who sweareth to his neighbour and deceiveth him not. This trust is a great possession which it is incumbent on us to keep inviolate.

Sport. In sport, a word now of universal adoption, the physical qualities of the Englishman, and with them his unique capacity for organising and playing games, have exerted a vast influence on the Continent, as throughout the world. He ranks as a sportsman *par excellence* to whom almost all forms of athletic competition owe their inception and terminology. Though his hegemony has to some extent been challenged, he remains by temperament as well as by physical characteristics *primus inter pares*. Into the playing of games he has imported the priceless moral quality, born of an innate love of justice, of fair play, a conception which no other race has ever carried to such perfection. To "play the game" is in England

a sacred word, and in Europe and America is, under English influence, becoming so more and more. The development of sport, now so enthusiastically encouraged by most European nations, has unfortunately not always followed the best lines. Not only in the virtues but in the vices of sport, such as professionalism and speedomania, the foreigner has followed English initiative. The French, in particular, have fallen victims to the delusion that athletic excitement and a mere rage for motion, unaided by nourishing food and good sanitary conditions of life, can improve the physical stamina of a nation.

Dress. In dress also the Englishman has, so far as men are concerned, been instructor to the world, not only in peace but in war. The English tailor still reigns supreme. He not only has, thanks to our wool merchants and weavers, the finest material in the world, but in adapting this material to the body he displays taste and judgment little short of genius. During the Great War we taught foreign armies how to dress efficiently and neatly. If a French or Spanish officer looks smart and workmanlike in his khaki uniform—for a foreign private soldier seldom looks smart—he owes it to us, though he may be reluctant to admit the fact. But there is another side to the picture. If we have set a high standard to foreign armies in military equipment, the example which the Englishman abroad has given in civilian attire is in many ways deplorable. A coat and pair of trousers of discordant pattern, a rainbow waistcoat, a pouching knickerbocker suit, descending so far below its natural limit, the knee, as to resemble a woman's skirt, a soiled and indented slouch hat or demure travelling cap, and, last, but not least, the eternal briar pipe—these have become, under English tuition, characteristic features in the outfit of the modern European male.

Manners. At the present day when the travelling English public consists so largely of tourists, it would be unreasonable to expect that English manners should make a favourable impression on the Continent. We are, of course, still largely under the delusion that modern education must necessarily produce refinement of feeling and manners, but daily experience proves the reverse. The inevitable tendency of modern mass-travel is to produce uniformity of manners—often bad manners—and it must be admitted that the influence in this respect of the English and American tourist has been distinctly deleterious. The very prestige which, for other reasons, we enjoy abroad has induced foreigners to imitate and adopt what they would formerly have condemned. In former days, when the words gentleman and lady were of more account, to suck a pipe while in conversation with a woman would have been considered outrageous, as outrageous as for a woman to speak to a

man with a cigarette dangling from her lips. The English tourist is, as a rule, kindly and well-meaning, but he is deficient in the sensibility which enjoins consideration for the feelings of others. Otherwise he would be incapable of scattering pennies amongst the crowd as he is leaving a French port or of exulting audibly in a French shop over the fall of the franc. He much underrates both the intelligence of the foreigner and his capacity for resentment. Even men of the people can recognise lapses of taste, and resent them as offensive to their natural sense of decorum. Of such critics was the French 'bus conductor who, observing some lady visitors with more conceit than clothing, swaggering along the pavement of a small provincial town, ejaculated bitterly, *Le monde est pourri*.

Amongst European countries there is none in which Englishmen, and no less their womenfolk, are more at home, and are, consequently, more inclined to display their idiosyncracies than in Switzerland. And it cannot be denied that the enormous and increasing influx of English, not to mention American visitors, has done much to vulgarise and desecrate some of the fairest spots in that beautiful country. Places in which but recently the grandeur of nature blended so charmingly with the simplicity and repose of man now reek with the fumes of petrol oil, and resound with the shriek of the jazz-band. We can indeed imagine that the spirits of the great mountains, as they hear the wild halloo of the tripper, must be seized with a shudder which even the soothing voice of the Swiss innkeeper is impotent to allay. The problem of amusements for the million has become an international one and is in Switzerland, the common playground of the world, of peculiar acuteness. In a country where there are no Hampstead Heaths or Cup Ties to segregate the multitude, an invasion by hordes of tourists bent on wringing the last drop of enjoyment out of surroundings which they take by storm rather than visit must necessarily be something of an outrage both to Nature and to man. In this, no doubt, as in other matters, the many will be served, but English tourists who are wont to take their pleasures with so masterful a sense of proprietorship would do well to remember that the privileges which they enjoy are deserving of peculiar reverence and such as no money can either repay or replace.

We may, in conclusion, consider for a moment to what extent the foreign visits of British tourists are calculated to influence what may be called our personal relations with other countries. Whether a mass fraternisation, if that were physically possible, between two nations would promote the cause of international goodwill, is very doubtful. The bounds of race and nationality are too deeply set. The importation into France of tens of thousands of Italian workmen has not been productive of mutual esteem. Both England and

France used before the War to teem with German visitors whose extensive and peculiar knowledge of both countries did little to kindle affection for their inhabitants. There is nothing in mass travel, in the rush of sight-seeing, or in railway stations which is specially conducive to the milk of human kindness. The truth is that the monster excursions of the present day provide no means of gaining either a real knowledge or the friendship of foreign populations. One crowd cannot say to another crowd, like Mr. Dowler to the Pickwickians, "I like your looks; they please me. Gentlemen, your hands and names. Know me." It would not occur to a foreigner to welcome an influx of tourists as an opportunity for cultivating good relations with another country. France, indeed, is at the present time inclined to make the sojourn of strangers more difficult by an increase of taxation, and she will, no doubt, pursue this policy up to the point of marginal utility. The only question is where this point lies. A member of the Chamber of Deputies, alarmed by some ominous quacks from the golden goose, has recently insisted on the danger of killing the bird. In other words, he regards the reception of strangers as a business transaction representing an important asset in the national budget. The British tourist cannot hope to be loved for himself, nor can he affect international issues, but he can, by exhibiting abroad the best qualities of his race, help to create a moral atmosphere favourable to the work of the Statesman.

CHARLES COPLAND PERRY.

NAVARINO: 1827-1927.

IT is something of a coincidence that at least three of the most epoch-making battles in sea-history have been fought in the month of October. Thus, Lepanto in 1571 represented the definitive superiority of the Cross over the Crescent in the Mediterranean. Trafalgar in 1805 finally disposed of the bogey of a Napoleonic invasion of Great Britain. And Navarino, in October, 1927, confirmed and consummated the ultimate discomfiture of the Ottoman menace to Europe and completed the independence of Greece. Eleven years previously, Lord Exmouth's bombardment of Algiers had triumphantly reasserted British supremacy in Mediterranean waters.

Among the little band of distinguished British sailors, soldiers, and civilians of fortune who had rallied to the Grecian cause—Hastings, Gordon, Church, Dundonald, Byron, Trelawney—none had succeeded in "making good" in what was an ill-conducted and thoroughly unsatisfactory warfare; whilst Byron died a few weeks after his landing upon the soil of Greece in 1824. Finally, the tragic epic of the leaguer of Mesolonghi stirred the great Powers to some kind of action—at a time when, we are told, the Greek treasury was reduced to a sum of sixteen piastres! The Treaty of London was signed on July 6th, 1827, between Great Britain, France, and Russia (after a visit to St. Petersburg by the Duke of Wellington), its object being the "pacification of Greece." The Sultan Mahmud II. having unhesitatingly rejected the provisions of that document, a combined Anglo-Franco-Russian fleet was dispatched to Greek waters.

Its command was entrusted to Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, one of the hardest-bitten of Nelson's captains and commander of the *Orion* at Trafalgar. He had served as a lieutenant in Howe's flagship the *Queen Charlotte* on the "glorious First of June" (1794), when, indeed, left without orders at the crisis of the battle, he so distinguished himself by firing the lower-deck guns that Howe's flag-captain exclaimed, "I could have kissed you for it." After Trafalgar, Codrington fought continuously in Europe and in America until the peace of 1815. Of his sons, Admiral Sir Henry Codrington was distinguished at St. Jean d'Acre and in the Baltic and General Sir William Codrington commanded in the Crimea after Lord Raglan's death and General Simpson's retirement; while his daughter became Lady Bouchier.

Sir Edward's task was not exactly a sinecure. Apart from the circumstance that under his command were ships belonging to two nations that had been at war only a dozen years before, his slightly ambiguous instructions provided that he should open fire upon the

enemy fleet only in the last resort. These orders he nobly adhered to in the teeth of the utmost provocation, and he undertook no hostile operation until fired on himself. We shall see how he was requited.

With his flag in the *Asia* of 3,500 tons, he had at his disposal two other English battleships (*Albion* and *Talbot*) and four frigates, four Russian battleships and four frigates under Admiral Heyden, four French battleships and one frigate under Admiral de Rigny. At the head of this slender force—slender, that is, in view of the magnitude of his task—he found himself opposed to a vast Turco-Egyptian armada of no less than sixty-five vessels. (Egypt at that time provided a substantial proportion of the naval and military armament employed against Greece.) This formidable flotilla lay at anchor in the harbour of Navarino. Codrington met the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Ibrahim Pasha, in personal conference, when the latter solemnly promised to permit no further act of hostility pending orders from headquarters. The terrible Turk promptly forfeited his pledged word by permitting his troops to continue their deadly work on shore.

It was now "up to" Sir Edward Codrington, who had already frustrated more than one attempt of the enemy fleet to quit the bay. That fleet had adopted a crescent-shaped formation, garnished with fireships at either end and not wholly unreminiscent of the plan by means of which Admiral Brueys had hoped to deal with Nelson's ships at Aboukir. Convinced by this time that action was inevitable, rather than the thankless experiment of a blockade 'mid the rigours of winter in the Archipelægo, Codrington calmly sailed into the little bay on October 20th, 1827. Frowning and heavily-armed forts on shore were prepared for co-operation with the opposition fleet. But Codrington simply directed the squadrons under his command to anchor, ship by ship, each alongside an adversary, while assigning his lighter craft to deal with the fireships that threatened to be such a menace. For his own part, the Admiral anchored the *Asia* so as to deal directly with the Turkish flagship. At the same time strictest orders were issued prohibiting any firing unless fired upon first. It must have been a beautiful and inspiring sight, as the wooden walls of the combined fleet, surmounted by their piles of snowy canvas, made ready for "the last fight of the old navy." The signal for a breach of the peace was not long delayed. The *Dartmouth* (Captain Fellows) having dispatched a boat with a request for the Turkish fireships to remove to a slightly safer distance, she was fired upon and several casualties occurred in the boat. Next moment, needless to say, the battle of Navarino had begun.

Yet, curiously enough, the Egyptian Admiral, Moharrem Pasha, notified Sir E. Codrington (also by boat) that it was his intention to

keep the peace and not to open fire; but, upon the Allied commander courteously replying that in such case he also would not fire, the British boat was attacked and her lieutenant shot dead. . . . It was already late in the afternoon. By way of immediate sequel, the Egyptian flagship was reduced to a mass of wreckage in rather less than twelve minutes. A still worse, if slightly more prolonged, fate awaited the Turkish flagship. Although she and half-a-dozen of her consorts concentrated their guns upon the *Asia*, the fusillade from the latter was so stupendous and persistent that the Turk was stated to have had all but two hundred killed or drowned out of a complement of 850 men and officers. Codrington himself was in imminent danger throughout. Being an exceptionally tall and fine figure of a man, he was selected as target by the enemy sharpshooters, but, appearing to bear a charmed life, he escaped with a broken watch and rents in his cocked-hat and uniform.

In the course of a four hours' combat, English, French, and Russian vied with one another in deeds of derring-do. It must also be admitted that the Turks and Egyptians fought steadily and well; but from the very start they simply had not a chance, and their boasted fireships turned out an unmitigated failure. Practically all of them blew up in succession, as did most of the ships of the flotilla itself—in fact, as Sir Edward wrote in semi-humorous vein, "we have had some thirty-seven beautiful explosions." A pleasing diversion was afforded by the conduct of the little *Hind*, tender to the English flagship. Like Lord Charles Beresford's *Condor* at the bombardment of Alexandria in after years, she took up the rôle of a line-of-battleship, eventually emerging from the fray in a semi-sinking condition and with 50 per cent. of her little crew *hors de combat*.

It was long before the era of smokeless powder, and towards the close of the conflict the smoke was so dense that it became difficult to distinguish friend from foe. In fact, Codrington in his despatch admitted that he "attempted to make the general signal to cease fire; but as fast as the flags could be attempted to be shown, either the men hoisting them were killed or the means by which the signals were to be displayed were shot away. I then tried to dispatch a boat with this object, when it was found that we (the *Asia*) had no boat that would swim; an attempt by hailing to get one from the *Genoa* was equally unsuccessful, and I was obliged to give up the attempt and leave things to take their course." But there remained no doubt about the completeness of the victory!

The small harbour of Navarino—it is only three miles in length by two in breadth—was literally covered with the wreckage of the enemy ships, upwards of thirty of which were destroyed off the face of the waters. It is a remarkable circumstance that, as compared with their loss of upwards of 7,000 men, the Allied fleet's casualties

amounted to a few hundreds only, whereto the heaviest proportion fell upon the British squadron—75 killed and 197 wounded. The only important English officer killed was Commodore Bathurst. The firing on our side was a model of coolness and precision, and the personnel of all three squadrons beyond reproach. Navarino was, of course, a typical example of an epoch-making battle fought without a declaration of war and before the ambassadors of the Powers had quitted Constantinople. It was said, indeed, that the lives of Christians in that capital would have been in dire jeopardy if the blood-thirsty Janissaries had still been in existence; but a short while previously the Sultan had rid himself of the menace of that famous, or infamous, fighting force by means of a wholesale massacre.* The world of Christianity heard the news of Navarino with feelings and sentiments of joy and gratitude; but it pleased the government of the day in England to regard it with considerably less enthusiasm. In the words of the historian Edmund Ollier:

"The Duke of Wellington characterised the destruction of the Turkish fleet as an 'untoward event,' and to many others it appeared obvious that the power of Russia would be enhanced to the extent that Turkish power was diminished. General Jackson, when President of the United States a few years later, told the English Minister at Washington that England and France had helped to aggrandise Russia by bad policy, and that they would some day weep tears of blood for aiding her at Navarino: a prophecy which may be fairly said to have been fulfilled in the Crimean War. The words 'untoward event,' together with an expression of regret at a collision 'wholly unexpected by His Majesty' (George IV), occurred in the Royal Speech at the opening of Parliament in 1828, at which time the Duke of Wellington had become Premier. England and Russia, almost immediately after the battle of Navarino, withdrew from the war if war it can be called; but France landed an army, which compelled Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate the Morea in September, 1828."

On the other hand, Lord John Russell emphatically declared in the House of Commons that Navarino "was as honest a victory as was ever gained by any Power from the beginning of the world," whilst Alison† somewhat theatrically stated his opinion that "never since the defeat of Hasdrubal by the Consul Nero on the banks of the Metaurus had such a sensation pervaded the heart of a nation—everyone felt as if he himself were delivered from captivity or death."

And what about the brave Admiral Codrington himself? As a matter of course he was awarded the Grand Cross of the Bath, in addition to receiving decorations from the French and Russian Governments; but the ludicrous episode of his recall ensued almost

* 23,000 were slain and executed, 20,000 banished, and the Janissaries were abolished by decree of June 17th, 1826.

† *History of Europe*.

immediately from the Duke of Wellington's "untoward event" speech. In a measure, this recall for having acted too precipitately(!) was almost as futile as the supersession of Rodney at the time of his great sea-victory in 1782 for not having (as it was believed at home) brought the French fleet to action. Codrington's daughter, Lady Bouchier, published in 1873 a two-volume biography of her father, in which she included his own narrative and defence, proving beyond dispute that he certainly had not exceeded his instructions in Navarino Bay. Sir Edward represented Devonport in Parliament from 1832 to 1839. In the latter year he accepted the appointment of Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, having two years previously attained the rank of Admiral of the Red. He survived until April, 1851, passing away at the age of exactly eighty-one. He was, therefore, almost the last of our naval heroes of the Napoleonic wars.

The spacious foreign policy of George Canning had brought about the pact of London with France and Russia that indirectly led to the battle of Navarino. Unfortunately, however, Canning's untimely death occurred almost immediately afterwards, otherwise the course of events in the Near East would have worked out "with a difference." It is necessary to add a word or two concerning the repeated attempts that have been made, from time to time and by several nationalities, to recover treasure-trove from the Turco-Egyptian wreckage at the bottom of Navarino harbour. Such efforts have never been attended with success, and on the whole it is unlikely that specie to any appreciable amount formed part of the outfit of the Ottoman Armada.

PERCY CROSS STANDING.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GENEVA, THE PROTOCOL AND ARBITRATION.

BEFORE the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations opened in Geneva on September 5th the general expectation was that the session would be dull and uncontroversial. The probable subjects of discussion appeared to be so devoid of sensational interest that those commentators who make it their habitual and admirable business to build up the League's prestige began to explain that the strength of the League lay in its quiet routine rather than in its attempts to settle urgent and dangerous problems. No sooner, however, had the delegates met each other than an unexpected "atmosphere" developed. The dullness disappeared. The representatives of the small States quickly broke into what may be fairly described as a "revolt" against the Great Powers, and concentrated their resentment against Great Britain. Sir Austen Chamberlain became unpopular among the small states represented at Geneva.

It would be rash to dogmatise about the causes which led to that state of affairs, but most people are inclined to the belief that the failure of the three-power conference on naval limitation and the subsequent resignation of Lord Cecil from the British Cabinet were powerful contributing causes. Mr. Gilbert Murray, in a letter which was published in *The Times* on September 1st, made a convincing diagnosis of one element in the circumstances that produced the revolt when he wrote: "No one who is well informed accuses the British Government of bad faith or of militarism. Not in the least. What we do say is that it is not taking the necessary steps to convince other nations of its good faith and its devotion to peace." Suspicion of Great Britain's wholeheartedness in pursuing the League ideal was certainly felt by most of the small States, and the fact that such suspicion existed was in itself important. The decisive evidence was the concurrence of the disinterested Scandinavian States with the other small States of Europe.

The "revolt" at Geneva took the form of renewed agitation for the adoption by the League of the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, and for the signing by the Great Powers of the so-called "Optional Clause," Clause 36, of the Statute of the World Court. The agitation became so intense that it produced a palpable anti-British propaganda at Geneva. "England is the obstacle!" became the slogan of all the disappointed Continental supporters of the League. On September 10th, therefore, Sir Austen Chamberlain addressed the Assembly in a speech which was not only defensive in spirit but outspokenly frank in its statement of what the British

Government could do, and what it could not do, for the League. In one part of his speech he combatted a complaint made earlier by Mr. Hambro, the Norwegian delegate, against the alleged secret manoeuvres of the Big Powers within the Council of the League. That complaint itself had been unfortunate, and its refutation was easy. The present criticism on the behaviour of the Big Powers at Geneva is not mainly on the score of their secret diplomacy. Sir Austen's main impression was made when he delivered his view of the Polish proposal for a revival of the 1924 Protocol. He outlined what Great Britain had done for European security and for the League, and exclaimed: "You ask us to do more. Could not some of you do as much before pressing us to go further?" He flatly announced that the British Government could not enter into any more commitments, could not guarantee any more frontiers. "You say it is not enough. You invite us to take for every country and for every frontier the guarantee which we have taken for one by treaty. If you ask us that, you ask us the impossible. Our strength, great as it may be, is not equal to the task with which you would charge us. If I held out to you the hope that we can undertake such extensive obligations I should deceive you. If we were to undertake in the present state of the world and at this time such extensive obligations, we could not keep them. You do not know what you ask us. You are asking nothing less than the disruption of the British Empire. I yield to no one in my devotion to this great League of Nations, but not even for this League of Nations will I destroy that smaller but older League of which my own country was the birth-place, and of which it remains the centre."

It was recognised by serious students of diplomacy that Sir Austen's frank declaration presented a sharp and difficult corner for the League to negotiate. There were those who criticised Sir Austen on the ground that he had merely encouraged the suspicion felt by most of the small States in Europe. There were others who maintained that his outspoken warning to those who had formed unlimited expectations of what the British Government might do would have a salutary effect. Every one, however, who took the trouble to understand either British policy or the Continental criticism of British policy agreed that a gulf had been fixed between Great Britain on the one side and the small nations of Europe on the other, which, if not bridged, was in danger of becoming wider and ultimately of damaging the efficacy of the League itself. The emergency was caused by suspicion, which is always dangerous, whether well founded or not.

Those Continental statesmen who had had a long experience of British diplomacy were not alarmed by the statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain. Unfortunately most of those who congregate

at Geneva or who contribute to European affairs from their respective capitals are unfamiliar with the British style. It was perhaps a fair criticism on the statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain that he did not attempt to remove the current misconceptions about the objects he had in view. Essentially there is no conflict between the objects of what Sir Austen described as the smaller League of Nations, namely, the British Empire, and the larger League which centres in Geneva. They both pursue peace as an end and genuinely try to practise conciliation and arbitration as a means. Why, therefore, did the apparent conflict arise? Why has the British Government steadily refused to sign Article 36 of the Statute of the World Court? Why has the British Government refused to accept the principle of full arbitration with any country in the world, even, for instance, with Sweden and with Switzerland, between which countries and Great Britain there could be no conceivable cause of dispute? Those continental commentators who seriously try to answer that question have to admit that their confusion is increased by the knowledge that in practice the British Government during the last seven years has used arbitration for the settlement of its own disputes with other countries in a larger measure than any other single Government in the world, whether a member of the League of Nations or not.

It would be better that continental opinion should at any rate understand the reasons which dictate the British hesitation to accept compulsory arbitration as a matter of principle. In the statement he made at Geneva Sir Austen Chamberlain contented himself by submitting that the composition of the British Empire presented difficulties which were not encountered by unitary State organisms such as for the most part exist in Europe. That argument, however, explained less than half of the real difficulty. It is true that according to the continuous view of official British opinion it would be impossible for the British Government to accept a League of Nations' decision on any matter affecting the countries of the British Empire in their mutual relations. It would also, according to the same view, be impossible to accept a League decision on an Egyptian or an Indian problem, if for no other reason than that it would be impossible to obtain anything like a fair or unprejudiced verdict about such problems. When, for instance, the Egyptian Government, after the murder of Sir Lee Stack, appealed to the League of Nations, the British Government in a Note to the League dated November 19th, 1924, refused to admit the validity of such an appeal, and concluded that "H.B.M.G. are unable to admit that the Protocol, if signed by Egypt, will enable the Egyptian Government to invoke the intervention of the League of Nations in the settlement of matters absolutely reserved by the Declaration to the discretion of H.B.M.G." Still more decisive, however, is the con-

sideration that the points of contact between the British Empire and the world at large are cast in so many different places, with so many different peoples of varying degrees of civilisation and of judicial development, that the kind of dispute that arises from such contact would hardly lend itself to judicial arbitration at the Hague. When, for instance, in the spring of this year the British Concessions at Hankow and at Kiukiang were handed over to Chinese jurisdiction, the juridical difficulties that arose were precisely due to the incompatibility between the Chinese and the Western standards of legal right and wrong. How, therefore, would it be possible for the British Government to refer such matters to a decision by a League of Nations Court based on a Western system? There are, moreover, potential disputes with Russia arising out of complications in the Middle and Far East which might be subject to a similar qualification.

It is possible, so some realists think, that a solution of the difficulty might be reached by the British Government making use of those provisions of the Statute of the World Court which enable any State to sign the Optional Clause with whatever reservations the signatory might choose to impose. The Statute provides that States may accept Article 36 "unconditionally, or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain Members or States or for a certain time." If the British Government frankly stated that it could not accept compulsory arbitration in matters affecting, for instance, British relations with Egypt or China, it might then go on to specify which countries it could deal with on the basis of compulsory arbitration. That would be an advance. What seems to be needed is a frank and businesslike exchange of views on the practical possibilities.

Those who seriously analyse the main Protocol principle must admit the force of the familiar British argument about the difficulty created by the lack of American participation in the League. When the British Government signed the Covenant in 1919 it did so on the assumption, the soundness of which there was then no reason to suspect, that the United States would also be a signatory. That assumption, however, was falsified by the event. Yet no British Government has ever contemplated a repudiation of its obligations under the Covenant, even though Article 16, if logically applied, might produce the grotesque danger of war between Great Britain and the United States. Sir Austen has often protested that he refuses to be logical in politics. Every British Government since the war has made the League of Nations the foundation of its foreign policy. The thin ice of Article 16 has been recognised, but the risk has been taken. That Article prescribes that "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15 it shall *ipso facto* be deemed

to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not."

It is clear that in practice such a procedure would be unpractical for Great Britain. Suppose, to take a ridiculous hypothesis for the argument, that Sweden became an aggressor State. The British navy would automatically be obliged to prevent the United States from trading with Sweden. If it carried out that obligation, the British Government would thereby have declared war on the United States. As a means to universal peace such a procedure would be unconvincing. The main British objection to the 1924 Protocol was that it would dot the "i's" of an arrangement of which it were better not to dot the "i's"; and the British Government deliberately decided that the tightening-up of an admittedly imperfect instrument of universal peace would best be effected by the kind of piecemeal guarantee that was signed at Locarno rather than by an attempt to secure the peace of the world in a single jump, which demonstrably would court the risk of defeating its object.

Granted, however, the soundness of that particular British argument, there are those who still do not follow the British argument for refusing to sign even with reservations Article 36 of the World Court. What conceivable objection could there be to a British surrender of the right to make war with Switzerland or with Sweden? There has been no war between Great Britain and Sweden for a thousand years. Is there any sense, any ideal, in doggedly claiming the right to have a war with Sweden? Those who argue that Sweden might be leagued with another enemy are answered by the fact that the undertaking of Article 36 is or can be made reciprocal.

When in the spring of 1925 the British Government rejected the Protocol idea, its action was not wholly destructive, for it adopted and pursued the alternative idea, which led to the Locarno Treaties. Sir Austen's argument, which was presented to the Council of the League on March 12th, 1925, mainly rested on the fear that the Protocol would increase British commitments without achieving security. "The fresh emphasis laid upon sanctions," he said, "the new occasions discovered for their employment, the elaboration of military procedure, insensibly suggest the idea that the vital business of the League is not so much to promote friendly co-operation and reasoned harmony in the management of international affairs as

to preserve peace by organising war, and (it may be) war on the largest scale. . . ."

That argument, which Sir Austen still upholds, is not universally accepted even by British students. The *Manchester Guardian* of September 14th of this year published a symposium of views from Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Lord Parmoor and Mr. Gilbert Murray, in which each of them combatted the Chamberlain diagnosis of the Protocol. Mr. Murray had sat both on the committee which advised on the original Covenant and on that which drew up the 1924 Protocol. His view of the Protocol idea in its bearings on the Covenant is therefore of special interest. He makes one or two specific points which have not been fully appreciated by those who interpret the Covenant as imposing new obligations. "At present," he writes, "the Covenant guarantees the protection of the whole League—by means of the economic boycott, the blockade and its consequences—to any member who may be the victim of unlawful attack. The Protocol proposed to restrict this protection to those members who had already reduced their armaments to the degree required by the League. And the general obligation was not to operate at all until there had been general disarmament."

His next point is that "the obligation on each member was defined and limited. Under the Covenant, 'when any member resorts to war in disregard of its covenants,' all other members of the League undertake immediately, etc. Under the Protocol each member was invited beforehand to state to the Council what it could and what it could not undertake, while agreeing to co-operate 'loyally and effectively' to the degree permitted by its special circumstances."

Logically it is arguable, as Mr. Murray, for instance, argues, that the effect of the Protocol would be to release Great Britain from a vast but vague commitment, and to substitute a limited but clearer commitment. Logic, however, is rightly distrusted by those who have a long practical experience of affairs. In these matters a vaguely-informed horse-sense is often a more trustworthy guide than the most detailed and scholarly analysis of the facts. To many minds the decisive objection to the Protocol idea is that it tightens in some respects an obligation to go to war and broadens the contingency which might put the obligation into practice. The important thing always is to avoid war. Once a war is started its results are incalculable, and the maximum damage is certain. Sanctions therefore are always in danger of defeating their object. War as a means of preventing war is a dangerous paradox. It is true that the Locarno principle was based on precisely such a sanction: but the difference between Locarno and the Protocol is that Locarno envisages a specific danger spot, while the Protocol generalises danger

spots. One is rightly distrustful of a generalised obligation to undertake sanctions unless the obligation is generally shared by the whole world. The fact that the United States and Russia would lie outside the scope of the Protocol is to many minds a final argument against the Protocol. The Locarno idea by contrast is not affected by the United States or by Russia.

The very commonsense which makes the British Government distrust the Protocol idea turns against that Government's attitude to arbitration. If *ex hypothesi* the objection to the Protocol is that it opens doors to warlike action, why does the British Government refuse Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court which closes doors to war? It is against commonsense to argue that an obligation not to go to war, made reciprocally by any given number of States, can increase the danger of war. Herr Stresemann's announcement made at Geneva during the 1927 Assembly that Germany will sign Article 36 shows that the German Government has understood that simple point quicker than the British Government has understood it.

When the small States draw the conclusion that the British refusal of Article 36 amounts to a determination by the British Government to retain the right to make war as the ultimate lever in its foreign policy it is difficult for an Englishman to give a convincing answer. One of the arguments made by official British opinion against the suggestion that Clause 36 should be accepted with reservations is that there could be no practical good in accepting a general principle unless it could be generally applied. Certain groups of States in Europe have accepted far-reaching obligations for arbitration among themselves. That is regarded in London as an excellent, but an easy step forward, because the problems involved are of a nature which lends itself to such treatment. In fact, however, the British Government has gone as far as any European country in the application of that principle, for at Locarno it accepted the principle of arbitration as operative among the European group of powers which have a common problem. Now it would be impossible, as has been shown above, for the British Government to undertake to settle all its problems with, say, China by compulsory arbitration because of the incompatibility between Chinese and Western law. The British diplomatic scope abounds in the like dilemmas produced by differing civilisations, temperaments and standards of right and wrong. If the British Government signed the Optional Clause for operation with, say, Switzerland—a step which, of course, could be taken—it would be faced (according to the official view) with the necessity of making invidious and dangerous distinctions, and would be merely trying to particularise a general principle. Its existing diplomatic method, it is claimed, achieves precisely that object, yet avoids the emphasis which would make distinctions invidious.

Such is the argument one hears in Whitehall. It cannot be denied that there is reason in it. Yet the choice appears to lie between the two evils of offending some States by making an invidious distinction and creating suspicion among all the small States. The balance of commonsense would seem to be on the side of signing Article 36.

THE COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES.

As one of the spectacular and dramatic functions of the League of Nations is to nip in the bud any danger of war, considerable interest attaches to a report recently made by Sir Eric Drummond on the practical efficacy of Article 11 of the Covenant. Two questions were put to him by a Committee of the League Council, namely: On what occasions has the Council been summoned to deal with international crises? What steps were taken in each case? His report ran thus: "The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Covenant lays down that 'should any war or threat of war arise the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.' This provision of the Covenant has been utilised on two occasions by Members of the League:

"(a) On May 31st, 1920, Persia, following up previous communications, asked for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider acts of aggression on the part of the Soviet Government. This appeal was communicated to the Members of the Council, and the meeting took place on June 14th.

"(b) On October 23rd, 1925, the Secretary-General received a telegram from the Bulgarian Government asking, in conformity with Articles 10 and 11 of the Covenant, that the Council should be immediately summoned to consider the situation created by the entry of Greek troops on Bulgarian territory. The Secretary-General took immediate action in accordance with the duty laid upon him by the first paragraph of Article 11, and summoned the Council, after consulting the President, to meet in Paris on October 26th.

"The second paragraph of Article 11 provides that any Member of the League may bring to the attention of the Assembly or the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace.

"No special provision is made in this paragraph in regard to the summoning of the Council, but there have, in fact, been certain occasions on which Members of the League, in asking the Council to consider a given question under the terms of that paragraph, have requested that a special meeting should be held in order to avoid delay.

"(a) On August 12th, 1921, M. Briand, in his capacity of President of the Allied Supreme Council, asked that a special meeting should be held to make recommendations regarding the fixing of the

frontier in Upper Silesia. The meeting took place on August 29th.

"(b) On November 7th, 1921, the British Government asked the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to summon a meeting of the Council to consider the situation created by the advance of troops of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on Albanian territory. This request was at once communicated to the Members of the Council and a meeting took place in Paris on November 18th.

"(c) On October 14th, 1924, the British Government asked for a special meeting of the Council to consider the situation on the frontier between Turkey and Iraq. This request was at once communicated to the Members of the Council and the meeting took place on October 27th."

In each of the cases, except one, mentioned by Sir Eric the Council met within a fortnight of the sending of the request for a meeting. Sir Eric expressed the opinion that "There is no reason to doubt that the meeting could have been held much more promptly had the situation appeared to necessitate this." In one case, that of the Greco-Bulgarian incident, a real danger of war was averted, but the Enquiry Commission which investigated the incident drew attention to the fact that if the communication addressed by the President of the Council to the Greek Government had arrived half an hour later than it did arrive, war might have broken out. The question of improving communication of every kind to meet specially urgent crises is, therefore, at present engaging the attention of a Committee of the Council.

AGITATION AGAINST TREATY OF TRIANON.

The advantages of defeat over victory in a great war have been often illustrated during the last half-dozen years. Propaganda on behalf of a defeated nation is always certain of easy sympathy from masses of people who know nothing about the facts, but find exercise for their sense of sportsmanship by championing the cause of the "under-dog." The expert propagandist knows how to exploit the human aversion from kicking a man when he is down. They can exploit it so cleverly that they turn it imperceptibly into a desire to kick the man who is up. The defeated nations, whether Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey, have been the darlings of gods and men since 1918. Great Britain having on paper "won" the war and having in reality suffered as the result of the war more than all the defeated nations put together, gets the worst of all worlds.

This summer the campaign on behalf of Hungary was renewed, and made some impression on the masses of people aforesaid. Moreover, it is much easier to prove that the Magyar minorities in Slovakia are oppressed, than it is to prove that the Czechoslovak Government is behaving reasonably well. The average Englishman,

who since the war has had about a quarter of his entire earnings confiscated by the British Government, could make out a case of oppression against the British Government with far more cause than can any Magyar in Slovakia against his Government. The diplomatic facts of the post-war Hungarian propaganda are well known to students of diplomacy. The only interesting new fact is that Lord Rothermere has publicly identified himself with Hungary's cause and has with some pointedness been advertising alleged Hungarian grievances and alleged Czechoslovak shortcomings. Articles have appeared in the *Daily Mail* in that sense. Lord Rothermere sent a long telegram to Dr. Benesh summarising his complaints. Dr. Benesh answered in a short but courteous telegram declining to be drawn into controversy.

So far, the episode contained little of real interest. Opinion in Great Britain normally takes little interest in these stereotyped propagandist campaigns, and there was nothing remarkable about the enthusiasm produced in Budapest or the concern produced in Prague and in Bucharest. Suddenly, however, a new complexion was put on the matter by the publication in the *Daily Mail* (September 8th) of a letter that had lately been written by Mr. Lloyd George to a Hungarian in Budapest. The said Hungarian, it appears, had privately interviewed Mr. Lloyd George at San Remo in April, 1920. In August of this year the same Hungarian wrote to Mr. Lloyd George on the subject of the Treaty of Trianon and of Hungary's grievances. Mr. Lloyd George in answer recapitulated his familiar views about the 1919 Settlement, while expressly refraining from committing himself on the particular point. His letter first of all made the natural preamble about British goodwill ("British opinion realises to the full that neither the Hungarian people nor their Premier was responsible for the catastrophe of 1914, but that they were dragged into it by motives which, in themselves, were honourable to both; and therefore the sentiments of Britain, which have always been friendly to the countrymen of Louis Kosuth, were not embittered even by the events of the Great War"). He next safeguarded himself against taking sides in the particular controversy ("The grounds on which I base my answer to your letter must be regarded as those of principle rather than of fact. Without investigation I cannot pronounce an opinion on the question of whether border populations of almost exclusively Hungarian character were, as you assert, ceded against their will by the Treaty of Trianon to the States of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia"). For the rest his letter was as good an answer to the prevailing agitation as could be desired by anyone who takes a reasonable view of the various peace treaties. His chief remaining sentences are perhaps worth quoting, because of the extraordinary effect they

had in Central Europe, an effect which illustrates the tremendous prestige which Mr. Lloyd George retains. They were: "I agree, however, that the protests in the Czech Parliament of a body of twelve Hungarian deputies returned from the border-zone thus detached from Hungary furnish a strong *prima-facie* case for inquiry in this matter. I was not a member of the conference that settled the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, and therefore I am not cognisant of the grounds upon which existing frontiers were determined. But speaking in reference to the whole of the Treaties of 1919-1920, I can state emphatically that their authors never claimed for them such a degree of perfection that they held them to be immutable. . . . We all distinctly contemplated the possibility of certain clauses and provisions of the Treaties themselves being made a subject of discussion, adjudication, and possible revision by the great tribunal set up in the first clause of these Treaties—the League of Nations. Peace in Europe can endure only if based on justice to all nations alike."

The League of Nations is the obvious and fair answer to all such propaganda. It happens that on certain questions of internal policy in Great Britain Mr. Lloyd George had lately received the support of the *Daily Mail*. Early in September a representative of the *Daily Mail* went to see Mr. Lloyd George, and in the course of other conversation is understood to have asked him his view of the Treaty of Trianon. Mr. Lloyd George thereupon is understood to have restated his general principle, and in a friendly way to have shown his visitor a copy of the letter he had written to the Hungarian correspondent. On being asked if the *Daily Mail* might publish the letter, he naturally consented. Immediately it was published, the newspapers of Central Europe on both sides of the controversial boundary jumped to the conclusion that Lord Rothermere's campaign was now being supported by Mr. Lloyd George. There is nothing in the facts to support such a view, but the interesting thing is that although British opinion continued to be unmoved by the *Daily Mail*, the importance of Lord Rothermere's campaign was magnified out of all recognition by opinion in Central Europe, merely because a noncommittal letter of Mr. Lloyd George's had been dragged in by the *Daily Mail*.

GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA, AND CHINA.

News from China has taken a steadily diminishing place in English newspapers during the summer months. China has in that time been returning to a more normal state. English popular interest in Chinese chaos, which is an unfortunately normal condition, has died in proportion as Russian influence has been eliminated. Whatever

may be thought of Russian agitation on grounds of high diplomacy, there is no denying that life is duller when the Russian note is *piano*. A combination of circumstances have damped the ardour of the Russian agitators. The ejection from London of the representatives of the U.S.S.R., an indignant outcry from Paris against Mr. Rakovsky's participation in a revolutionary manifesto, the failure of the "Nationalist" Government in China, all damaged the self-confidence of Moscow's agitators. Mr. Rakovsky, who was unwise enough to take part in a puerile attempt to seduce French troops from their allegiance, had to be repudiated by Mr. Chicherin. There were those who argued, with some plausibility, that the renewed campaign of execution at Moscow of alleged foreign spies was merely an attempt to counter the possible effect on Russian popular opinion of Russia's waning prestige abroad.

The advocates of world revolution, however, found it more and more difficult to persuade themselves that their efforts were worth while. The climax was reached on September 16th, when Mr. Eugene Chen, the former Foreign Minister of the Hankow Government, who was then in Moscow, made a gloomy statement to a body of journalists, to the effect that the Nationalist Government had ceased to exist as a serious political factor in China. "Before its betrayal by the Nanking and Wuhan (i.e., Hankow) militarists" he was reported to have declared, "the Kuomintang made the whole world realise that Chinese Nationalism is a new force in Asia, with which foreign Imperialism will have to reckon. To-day the position is different. Nobody fears or respects the Kuomintang any longer. The new political system which the Nanking and Wuhan militarists are trying to build under the flag of the Kuomintang will be a kind of super-Tuchunate, no different in essentials from the Peking model." By an eloquent coincidence Mr. Chen's confession synchronised with a new and unfamiliar kind of propaganda that began to trickle from Moscow. Rumour spread that an attempt was about to be made by the Government of the U.S.S.R. to reopen relations with the British Government, it being naïvely suggested that so bold a step would not be taken till after the annual October celebrations. The question whether Moscow really imagined that the time was opportune for a renewal of negotiation with Great Britain is less important than the fact that Moscow thought it necessary to fly the kite.

The story of the British Government's attempt to combine a liberal policy with an adequate protection of life and property in China was taken up to the end of April in this section of *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* for June. Sir Austen Chamberlain had stated in the House of Commons on May 9th that the Nationalist Government of Wuhan had become "little more than the shadow of a name," that it was not

proposed to continue the diplomatic controversy with Mr. Chen about the Nanking outrages, that the British Government would continue its liberal policy but reserved "full liberty of action as to the future, and, in particular, in respect of any further outrages which may be perpetrated on the British flag, British Nationals and British property."

The next development, which was the inevitable sequel of Sir Austen's statement, was the withdrawal from Hankow of the British representative, Mr. B. C. Newton. He left Hankow on May 17th. In the letter which conveyed his intention to the Nationalist authorities he explained that the British Government had been forced to the conclusion "that my retention as representative of His Majesty's Government at the seat of a régime so totally incapable of discharging the responsibilities of a civilised Government is both useless and undesirable." Mr. Chen promptly issued a statement in which, true to the propaganda which he normally emitted, he blamed the Shanghai Defence Force for the whole trouble in China.

For the rest the main interest in Chinese events was internal. The only exception perhaps was that in the early days of June the British, Japanese, and American troops prepared to defend the Legation quarter in Peking, and concentrated a defence force in Tientsin. Those measures led to a supposition that the foreign Powers were extending their operations beyond the strict confines of their various concessions. That was not the case. Care was taken to maintain diplomatic correctness. By the "final Protocol" of January 14th, 1901, which followed the Boxer outbreak, and which was signed by the Chinese plenipotentiaries, it was agreed in one clause that there should be a fortified Legation quarter with guards in Peking, and in another that the foreign troops should have the right to defend the communications of Peking with the sea. Tientsin is the key to those communications. Preparations were made on a big scale for the defence of Peking and Tientsin. By virtue of the 1901 Protocol even France sent two infantry battalions and one battery of artillery to reinforce her share of the international garrison maintained at Peking and Tientsin. The French forces arrived in the third week of June. On June 9th the British forces at Tientsin were reinforced by the arrival of the Second Battalion Border Regiment; 2,000 American marines with artillery and tanks arrived soon after, and thereby brought the total of America's forces in Northern China up to 3,000, a still later addition bringing it up to more than 4,000. The Japanese forces for action at Tientsin were increased by 2,000. The preparations thus made to keep open the communications between Peking and Tientsin recall the ironic fact that in 1900 the Legation quarter in Peking was saved by Russian troops.

From the beginning of June, however, foreign anxiety in China

steadily grew less. Steamers resumed their trade along the Yangtse without naval escort, for the firing on steamers had ceased. British residents were allowed to return to Hankow, provided they kept within the confines of the settlement, and to Kiukiang and Wuhu, provided they kept to the neighbourhood of the river frontage. The British Commander-in-Chief made a journey to Hankow and back in the early days of June and reported that he saw 43 merchant ships trading on the Yangtse, of which 27 were British, 8 Japanese, 3 American, 2 French, 2 German and 1 Norwegian.

The chaos in China settled down to a haphazard war between the North and the South, which was hardly affected by the split in the southern or Kuomintang forces. In spite of the re-entrant civil war between Nanking and Wuhan the southern forces continued to add to their conquests. A rival Nationalist Government was firmly established at Nanking. A new government was formed in Peking, and General Chang Tso-Lin was made commander-in-chief of the northern forces. Various negotiations took place between various generals without any apparent purpose or any apparent result. The loss of prestige by Mr. Chen and his Wuhan comrades merely put an end to the violent phase of xenophobia. As if from sheer weariness and pointlessness all serious fighting ceased in China at the end of June. In the House of Commons on July 27th Sir Austen Chamberlain admitted that "in the present chaotic state of affairs in China and the complicated intrigues that are apparently taking place between the leaders of the various factions, it is impossible to give a clear summary of the situation." Probably General Chiang Kai-Shek himself hardly knew at various times whether he had concluded an armistice with Marshal Chang Tso-Lin, whether he was on speaking or fighting terms with Wuhan, whether Wuhan was still Communist or not. On June 18th martial law was declared in Hankow; Communists and Labour agitators were arrested; the extremist members of the Wuhan government resigned; Mr. Borodin and the other Russian "advisers" of the Wuhan government left for the comparatively quieter diplomatic front in Kiukiang. A little later Mr. Borodin was back in Hankow, and it was rumoured that Nanking and Wuhan were again reconciled. What the truth is no one can tell except that China has settled down to a routine of complacent muddle, and that foreign trade is beginning to improve again. There is only one China in the world.

THE BIAS BAY PIRATES.

Another outrage has been committed by the notorious pirates of Bias Bay, and another raid has been carried out on the homes of the pirates by ships of the British Navy. Bias Bay is a baffling but

interesting problem, and continues to exercise the ingenuity of those who want to maintain order on the high seas of the Far East.

The latest outrage took place on September 1st, when a Chinese steamer flying the British flag was seized by twelve pirates who shot the captain and the chief engineer, and piloted the ship to a creek in Bias Bay, where they were met by another band of pirates. The ship was then looted and allowed to continue its journey. On the same day four British gunboats and an aircraft carrier proceeded to Bias Bay and a landing party went ashore. The party was met by one of the senior residents of one of the pirate villages, who courteously pointed out to them the houses where, he said, the pirates lived. Those houses, five in number, were then burnt to the ground, and another chapter in this singular history thus ended. Whether the houses pointed out by the elder were the most heavily insured, or housed the informant's own particular enemies or rivals, it would be difficult to establish, for the affairs of Bias Bay are a mystery. A similar British raid had been carried out in the spring of this year, but it had little deterrent effect, because a Bias Bay pirate is not much impressed by the loss of his house, by contrast with the far more valuable profit he makes from piracy.

Bias Bay extends some twenty miles into the Chinese mainland from a point forty-five miles north-east of Hong-Kong. On the west side of the Bay there are many small islands, and at the extreme north-east corner there is the Fan Lo Kong Creek. On the sides of that creek are some small villages inhabited in all by some ten thousand people, who ostensibly pursue the innocent and even beneficent occupation of farming. Their farming, however, is less serious as agriculture than as camouflage. The menfolk of those apparently peaceful villages derive their main interest and their main profit out of life by piratical exploits which would win the admiration of any schoolboy. The difficulty of dealing with the Bias Bay pirates has always been that it was impossible to know which of the peaceful farmers of one day had been the pirates of the day before.

The method of operation has generally been for a scratch crew to be collected for a particular act of piracy, immediately after which the crew would disperse to the fields with their various shares of the loot. The act of piracy generally follows a certain routine. The said farmers book passages on a given ship whose journey passes somewhere near Bias Bay, and when the ship is near Bias Bay those Chinese passengers by a concerted plan produce their weapons, hold up the ship's crew and force the captain to proceed to Bias Bay. The ship is there looted, and then released, the pirates at the same time dispersing with the loot. Such outrages are frequent. They average about one a month. Their victims are impartially chosen from ships

of all nations, British ships being the favourites because they often have attractive cargoes.

In 1925 a British expedition consisting of naval, military and police forces, and acting jointly with Chinese forces, undertook punitive measures against the Bias Bay villages, and as a result, the piratical exploits were slightly diminished. After the Cantonese Government, however, extended its jurisdiction northwards so as to include Bias Bay, those piratical outrages were intensified. Protests were made by the British Government to the Cantonese Government, and early this year Canton carried out certain measures against the villages on the west side of the Bay. The pirates, however, seemed not to be much impressed thereby, and the outrages continued. In March of this year, therefore, the British Navy again took a hand in the matter.

On or about July 21st, however, another haul was successfully carried out by the pirates. A Norwegian steamer bound from Hong-Kong to Saigon was boarded at Hong-Kong by a party of Chinese passengers who at five o'clock the following morning attacked the captain and officers separately and individually. Any victim who showed fight was shot. The second officer, who was on the bridge, and the captain, who was in his cabin, were both shot, the latter being seriously wounded. The ship was then piloted to Bias Bay, where some £3,000 worth of loot was removed in the familiar way. On leaving the ship, the pirates informed the officers that they might save themselves the trouble of sending aeroplanes because they would find nothing.

Bias Bay, therefore, remains a problem. It is difficult to deal with because pirates, by their nature, have a taste for an adventurous life, and the burning of a village is only of passing value as a deterrent. On March 19th, Mr. Teichmann, the Chinese Secretary of the British Legation at Peking, went to see Mr. Chen at Hankow, but Mr. Chen could suggest only that the British Navy should permanently station a battleship in Bias Bay to intercept the periodic victims. Such a solution of the problem would be unpractical. No Chinese authority is capable or willing to maintain order in Bias Bay. It is impossible for passenger ships in Chinese waters to refuse to carry Chinese passengers for fear that they might be carrying pirates in disguise, for most of them necessarily are Chinese. It must be accepted as one of the curiosities of the day that a band of pirates can live in security on the Chinese mainland, and can carry out their piracy with impunity in the neighbouring seas, although they and their work and the places they live in are known to everyone concerned.

September 16th, 1927.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

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THE CREATOR SPIRIT.*

Canon Raven has made an interesting and important contribution to Christian thought in his recently published volume *The Creator Spirit*,* which emphasises the substance of his Hulsean Lectures of 1926-7, and his Noble Lectures given at Harvard in 1926. The book is important, primarily, on account of the point of view which is maintained by the author with great earnestness and eloquence, but also because Dr. Raven is equipped for his task by extensive studies in theology, and still more in biology, psychology, and philosophy. Moreover, as he explains, he has reached his present outlook through a process, not only of independent thought, but, above all, of spiritual experience and of intellectual conflict. The reality and intensity of this experience are patent in the glowing ardour of his style, especially in the concluding chapters on Mysticism. If, from time to time, he seems to proclaim rather than to reason, to affirm rather than to argue, this feature, while in some respects a drawback, is explained by the circumstances and is also useful for the practical purpose he has in view.

Canon Raven has been brought to his Theological standpoint by being compelled frankly to face the problems set by the modern mind in general, especially as it has been affected by the Great War, and in particular by recent biology and psychology. He has been helped

* *The Creator Spirit*. A Survey of Christian Doctrine in the Light of Biology, Psychology and Mysticism. By Charles R. Raven, D.D. Martin Hopkinson and Co. 8s. 6d. net.

to his conclusions by the powerful influence of the writings of Professor Whitehead and of the doctrine of "Emergent Evolution" as set forth by Professor Lloyd Morgan. On the more strictly philosophic side his outlook and conclusions have been greatly affected by Professor James Ward and by Professor Bosanquet. Yet his point of view is securely his own, he has carried all the contributions he has received from all these quarters up into the realm of Christian Theology by independent thought, and he sets out to effect a changed and enlarged outlook in Christian thought and practice, which, in many quarters, is urgently required.

Briefly stated Canon Raven's task is to bring Christian people to appreciate the religious significance of the natural universe, to apprehend the wholeness and inter-relatedness of the spiritual and natural realms, together with the unity of the Divine operation throughout, and in the light of all this to abandon the undue limitations of dogmatism and institutionalism in religion. In particular, he justly criticises the sharp distinctions drawn both between natural and revealed religion, and also between creation, redemption, and inspiration. For him, following Professor Lloyd Morgan, the spectacle of evolution unfolds itself in the successive stages of life, mind, and spirit. Mysticism, or direct consciousness of God, is the culmination, and every man has within him both the beginnings and the promise of the developed mystic experience. Hence the book deals successively with the problems of biology, psychology, and spiritual experience, on the basis of the author's doctrine of the Spirit and the Godhead, and with a view to transcend the conflict between science and religion.

The book is timely and well-documented, full of interest and suggestiveness. It should be widely read. Avoiding details, and forbearing to ask for more than is offered, we have only two criticisms to offer; the first of minor, the second of greater, importance. As to the first, it would seem to one who is not a biologist that somewhat excessive importance, from the theistic standpoint, is attached by Canon Raven to the inheritance of acquired characteristics and, therefore, to the apparently conclusive discrediting of Weismannism. No doubt, this latter hypothesis was used as a support for the doctrine of material determinism. As such it caused distress to Canon Raven in his early years, and its defeat brought to him a happy release. Doubtless, also, the non-inheritance of acquired characteristics would greatly affect the influence of education and environment upon the improvement of the human race. Yet, while the practical work of Christians would be affected, in so far as they rely upon certain presuppositions of biological progress, it seems unnecessary and even rash to conclude that thereby the foundations of Christian Theism would, to any extent, be under-

mined. For, after all, the *data* of Theism are furnished by the spiritual consciousness itself, and could not be set aside by any knowledge of the means by which it comes into being, even if the physical concomitants were found to exist in some originally fixed and perpetually transmitted germ-plasm.

The second criticism is as to whether the title of the book and the Theological explanation of it given in chapter I, do not hinder somewhat the unifying process Canon Raven is seeking to carry out. By all means let Christians widen their conceptions of the activity of the Spirit—alike as the originating source and as the directive energy, working throughout the Whole to that highest manifestation of which the Christian Church is witness. The fact that the use of the New Testament writers restricted the operation of the Holy Spirit to this highest manifestation does not justify the conclusion that they sought to contradict the wider and lower use of the Old Testament. By all means also, let it be shown that the true Divine creativeness is to be found in love, and not in mere will. The two may, perhaps, be reconciled in the old definition that "God is the Will to all Goodness," for this is simply energetic and purposive love. Yet the activity of the Spirit should not be taken, even for a moment, out of that Trinitarian wholeness, upon which Canon Raven sometimes insists. In particular, it should not be separated from the Logos Doctrine of creation through and unto the Son, to the discredit of the latter. Nor should the sphere of the Spirit in Creation and of the Son in Redemption be separated from one another, as though these were two parallel activities of God, one through the Spirit and the other through the Son. It is pretty certain that Canon Raven cannot contemplate such separations of Divine agents or activities. But his title and some of his expressions suggest it. Perhaps also he may some day complete his task by essaying to work out consistently the unity in distinction between creation and inspiration, on the one hand, and redemption on the other.

J. S. L.

THE ASCENT OF MAN.*

The publication of the first volume of this attractive and valuable series almost coincides with Sir Arthur Keith's Presidential Address to the British Association on the Descent of Man, an address which declared that "the fundamentals of Darwin's outline of man's history remain unshaken." Sir Arthur declared:

So strong has his position become that I am convinced that it can never be shaken. Why do I say so confidently that Darwin's

* *The Corridors of Time. I. Apes and Men.* By Harold Peake and Herbert John Fleure. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 5s. net.

position has become impregnable? It is because of what has happened since his death in 1882. Since then we have succeeded in tracing man by means of his fossil remains and by his stone implements backwards in time to the very beginning of that period of the earth's history to which the name Pleistocene is given. We thus reach a point in history which is distant from us at least 200,000 years, perhaps three times that amount. Nay, we have gone further, and traced him into the older and longer period which preceded the Pleistocene—the Pliocene. It was in strata laid down by a stream in Java during the latter part of the Pliocene period that Dr. Eugene Dubois found, ten years after Darwin's death, the fossil remains of that remarkable representative of primitive humanity to which he gave the name *Pithecanthropus* or Ape-Man; from Pliocene deposits of East Anglia Mr. Reid Moir has recovered rude stone implements. If Darwin was right, then as we trace man backwards in the scale of time he should become more bestial in form—nearer to the ape. That is what we have found. But if we regard *Pithecanthropus* with his small and simple yet human brain as a fair representative of the men of the Pliocene period, then evolution must have proceeded at an unexpectedly rapid rate to culminate to-day in the higher races of mankind.

Sir Arthur points out that the descent was more complex than Darwin thought, that the welter of extinct fossil forms show a zig-zag line of descent, the body or bones developing from the ape in different forms in different regions. The earlier Pliocene period shows creatures that might be apes or men, while the still older Miocene period, "the heyday of anthropoid history," shows many kinds of great apes whose teeth show the ancestral forms of human teeth. Sir Arthur gives true man "the respectable antiquity of about one million years."

What does all this reasoning come to? A million years means about 30,000 generations. The suggestion apparently is that the highest type of man that we know, let us say, Isaac Newton, was evolved as the result of 30,000 generations of men who could look around them in the human sense, "look before and after and long for what is not." Let us assume that there was a common ancestry for man and the anthropoid ape. Man's body and physical structure must have come from somewhere, must have been the fruit of some original germ of life, and it is not in any sense derogation to the dignity of *homo sapiens* to suppose that we can trace the way. Mr. Peake and Mr. Fleure in their fascinating book give, so far as research can give, the line of inheritance, and it is interesting to know that evolution, in much the Darwinian sense, is implicit in the folklore of many peoples.

These learned authors trace the course of life—that essential and inexplicable mystery—in the biological record from the Primary or Palæozoic era. At the end of the Upper Palæozoic era we get verte-

brate animals, and with the Mesozoic era we reach the age, the amazing age, of reptiles and the dim beginnings of mammal life. This introduces the New Age, the Cainozoic era, the recent age of mammals: the Eocene phase giving us the lemur (forerunner of monkeys and apes), while in the next phase the Oligocene, the pure monkey, appears, and in the next, the Miocene age, we find that at least three genera of monkeys have arisen.

It seems probable, in fact almost certain, that man of some kind was in existence in Pliocene times, and, as we shall see later, a claim has been made that a tool-fashioning animal, to which according to our present definition we must accord the courtesy title of man, existed at a period which is claimed by some to belong to the close of the Miocene period. . . . The records of the rocks have already yielded us an outline of the story of our earth for a long period, a period which must be reckoned, in all probability, as something very considerably over one hundred millions of years; the last million years of this period include the greater part, if not the whole, of the story of man.

Now what was the process of evolution? These cautious authors say that "in the first place the fact of changes of forms of life under the influence of processes is demonstrated beyond controversy, but the processes themselves are difficult to elucidate." It is becoming ever clearer that there is some response to environment,

and that these responses accumulate in successive generations and so lead to the great changes that are familiar to every student who has caught a glimpse of the pageant of life through the ages of the past. Progress of thought has for years been tending towards a fuller appreciation of the sensitiveness of the organism in its growth and activities to the circumstances under which it has to live but we must carefully avoid a too crude determinism which might see the changes in the organism as the inevitable results of outside influences. It must be remembered that the environment only presents to the organism opportunities or difficulties; the organism may cope with the situation in many different ways . . . we may say that variation, as between individuals, is universal, and arises from many causes only dimly understood as yet. It is seen not only in the characters of the adult but in the processes of growth, in the amounts of available energy, in the whole being, not only as a complex structure but also as a working concern.

This summary largely presents the stage at which the theory of evolution stands at the moment, and that stage seems something a good deal subtler than the bare statement that Darwin's position has become impregnable. Mr. Peake and Mr. Fleure agree that the Darwinian idea that those forms of life which are less capable of self-preservation have usually been eliminated is sound, and claim a growing recognition for the idea that "the organism, especially

during growth, is very sensitive to change, and that the adjustments made in it somehow affect not only their possessor but also his descendants."

Nor can we from these ideas enunciate any propositions that may reconcile, in the long run, those that feel that there is at present a deep gulf between thinkers who base themselves on the impregnable rock of evolution and those who base themselves on the impregnable rock of revealed religion. Mr. Peake and Mr. Fleure do not enter into this question, but in view of the considerable discussion that has followed Sir Arthur Keith's address it is not unreasonable to point out that there is not a necessary gulf between the religious and the scientific view. If we assume (merely for the purpose of argument) the existence in relation to the whole range of sentient and non-sentient phenomena of a self-conscious Being of infinite power, the source of the causal series, and premise that it is His purpose to create beings that partake of His nature and character, the whole evolutionary process as we know it seems to follow as an inevitable result of the postulate. No doubt it may be argued that the process may have arisen in some other way quite unconnected with any creative source. But however that may be the postulate would lead to the process. That is plain enough, since a being that is to partake of the nature and character of the Creative Force could not be created *per saltum*, since it would lack the fundamental character of the postulated God, namely, Freedom. Now we find at every stage of evolution that the evolving being has freedom of choice. Whatever else we know about evolution we see a process where the organism has power of choice, and Darwinism proclaims the fact that those who choose wrongly are sooner or later eliminated. Moreover, the result of this power of choice is cumulative, for good or for evil, and the choice becomes more and more difficult as the organism becomes more and more complex. There are failures everywhere. Free will is having its play and experimental species appear and disappear. The predecessor of man is striving sub-consciously to become man, and there must have been innumerable experiments that failed, but the cumulative effort slowly tells until there comes a moment when self-consciousness is at work and the evolving being looks before and after and sees that it is part of an ordered universe. Man has come, and the physical hunger to reach a goal (sub-consciously conceived) under the operation of freedom of choice becomes a spiritual hunger looking on all sides for guidance, and a mutual hunger consciously devising ways and means of progress. Such a conception is consistent both with religion and science, and behind it is a purposefulness outside the temporal series.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE LAST SUPPER.*

The Hulsean Professor of Divinity at Cambridge has been well advised to publish this acute analysis and comparison of the New Testament texts relating to the Last Supper. Dr. Barnes' aim

has been to consider Christ's own acts and words on the Last Evening and through them to discover the meaning which He Himself attached to the Lord's Supper. Many scholars in Germany and elsewhere have maintained that Our Lord delivered bread and wine to the Apostles without any intention of founding a rite for the use of His Church. I have tried to show in the following pages that this position is not supported by the earliest documents, i.e., those contained in the New Testament. I believe it to be historically true that Our Lord instituted, and commanded us to continue, a Memorial of His Death.

Dr. Barnes takes the following points: The Lord's Supper was a brief Sacred Supper for Christ's immediate followers which took place within the limits of the meal which we call "The Last Supper." . . . The Last Supper was not itself the great Paschal meal . . . but rather an anticipation of it not completely carried out. To anticipate the Feast to some extent was in accordance with Jewish religious practice.

There are three independent authorities: Luke xxii, 14-19, as given in Codex Bezae; Mark xiv, 22-25; and St. Paul's account given in 1 Cor. xi, 23-25. St. Paul's account precedes St. Mark's by ten if not by twenty years. The Apostle believed that he was passing on a primitive tradition. "He belonged to a race whose pride it was to pass on traditions unaltered." Dr. Barnes adduces a fourth authority:

The tractate of the Mishnah called *Pēsāhim*, and specially chapter ten, which describes the proceedings to be followed on the night on which the Paschal lamb was eaten . . . we can hardly doubt that the Mishnah represents in general the practice which prevailed in Our Lord's time. And though, as we hold, Our Lord did not live to eat the Paschal lamb on the Great Day of the Feast, yet the nearness of the Passover coloured the chief acts and words which belong to the Last Supper. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Paschal meals, as described in *Pēsāhim* is the solemnity of THE FOUR CUPS OF WINE. Each of these cups has a significance of its own.

Over the second cup "a significant scene was enacted." The son of the house was required to ask "wherein does this night differ from all other nights?" and the father in his answer dealt with the meaning of the terms "Passover," "Bitter Herbs," "unleavened bread."

Obviously this is the point at which Our Lord's own explanation

* *The Last Supper and the Lord's Supper: A Lecture delivered at the Divinity School on Friday, November 26th, 1926, by W. Emery Barnes. Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes. 1s. net.*

of the meaning of the loaf and the cup which He held would be most appropriate. Instead of giving to His disciples (or His sons) the old and formal explanation, He gave an altogether new meaning to the unleavened bread and to the wine. He told them of a new sacrifice for which He Himself was to be the victim, and He called for a new celebration of a new event to be made.

After his analysis of the texts Dr. Barnes asks, "May we not believe that on the first occasion *two* cups (and not one only) were delivered? This suggestion is made because the cup of Luke xxii, 17 bears a different message from that of Mark xiv, 23-25. The second passage refers to sacrifice and the shedding of blood, while the first simply looks forward to the Coming of the Kingdom of God." He further points out that the common text of Luke asserts two cups, and "though the text is a conflation, the fact asserted may be true." The Jewish Christians laid special stress upon the wine for which they gave thanks before they made mention of the Bread (*Didaché* § 9) but the Pauline Christians laid special stress on the Broken Bread, and so there is a very early distinction of emphasis. But the present point is as to the significance of the words and acts of Christ Himself.

We conclude then that Our Lord gave a new meaning to a portion of an old rite, which occupied a central place in the life of His people. We do not say that He founded a wholly new rite. Those who find it difficult to believe that Jesus of Nazareth would institute a sacrament with outward signs need not hesitate to accept the story as St. Mark and St. Paul give it with a Paschal background. Form and matter lay ready at the Lord's hand, and nothing is more natural than that, as He stood on the threshold of departure, He should ask His Disciples to "remember" Him. In His humanity He desired to be not forgotten, as Son of the Father He willed that His Mission to the World should be continued and furthered through Remembrance. . . . As long as the world lasts, the Church has the duty of testifying that her Lord died for mankind.

* * *

SPANISH LITERATURE.*

It was as long ago as 1898 that the late Mr. James Fitzmaurice-Kelly issued his valuable volume entitled *A History of Spanish Literature*, which in 1901 was translated into Spanish and is now in its eighth Spanish edition, and in 1909 was translated into French. In 1913 Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly recast his work and issued it in French, and this version formed the basis of the new Spanish *Historia de la literatura española*, and of a German translation issued in 1925 after the death of the author on November 30th,

* *A New History of Spanish Literature*. By James Fitzmaurice-Kelly. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

1923. The present volume is a distinct work representing Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly's researches and corrections up to three days before his death. It concludes with a useful chapter estimating the progress of Spanish literature since 1868. The attainment of an ideal history of Spanish literature was the goal of his life, and it is fitting that Mrs. Fitzmaurice-Kelly should have called in the aid of M. Foulché-Delbosc and others to secure a final and definitive text.

To the English student Spanish literature has two points of view: first the value and charm of a great literature that can be traced back to the twelfth century in a form that makes the student realise that some centuries of vernacular verse must have preceded the earliest extant texts. The second point of view is the influence on English literature. Spanish is a romance-tongue derived from the vernacular Latin that the Roman conquerors imposed and which survived the Romans, the Goths and the Moors. The form of transformed Latin which survived was that spoken by the men of the southern and central provinces conquered by the Arabs. Castile gave its language to Spain, though various dialects and kindred languages survive, and notably Portuguese and Catalan.

It is not strange that we cannot trace behind the twelfth century any literary remains in Spanish apart from purely dialect survivals in the shape of folk-songs. By the opening of the eighth century the Arabs had fully conquered the south, and Arabic for a time became the tongue of literature. Even the conquered people read their Bible in Arabic. It was, however, the Church that helped to revive the Spanish tongue and give it literary force. The oldest dramatic composition in Spanish apparently is the *Auto de los Reyes Magos*, which was probably derived "from the Gallo-Latin service used in Orleans at the Feast of the Epiphany." This is a twelfth-century poem. But the *Poema del Cid* cannot be much later, if later at all. It is the earliest extant example, dating probably from the mid-twelfth century, of epic work, and is an echo of the struggle against the Arabs. The Cid was Ruy Diaz de Bivar, who fought both against and with the Arabs, and was called by the Arabs Sidi or Lord. A terrible fellow to his enemies for the time being, "he became in the popular imagination the heroic representative of victory, patriotism and religion." The poem that survives is almost certainly only the latest of several recounting the exploits of this somewhat doubtful hero. A more interesting early poem is the *Roncesvalles* fragment, the Spanish early-thirteenth century version of the legend of Roland, in which Charlemagne finds his dead heroes in the pass of Roncesvalles. There is true literature in the great Emperor's bitter lament over his warriors, "Who will advise me now, an old, unhappy man?"

Atal viejo mecquino, que lo consejarede?

Spain, we are told, "has been exceptionally unlucky as regards the preservation of her early literary monuments." The great Spanish libraries almost certainly have something still to yield, but the *Roncesvalles* shows that by the end of the twelfth century, long before the recovery of Cordova from the Moors, Spanish literature was soundly based. The language was not dead, and as the Arabs were conquered even they adopted the Castilian tongue. Indeed, it is astonishing to be told that "beyond some hundreds of words the greater number of which comprise technical terms, their own speech left no impress on the Spanish tongue." Was this the case also in southern Portugal? Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly declares that "Spain's intellectual debt to the Arabs has been grossly exaggerated." However this may be, Europe's intellectual debt to the Arabs is only now beginning to be realised.

The early growth of Spanish prose is a feature of Spanish literature. In the mid-thirteenth century the personal efforts and the influence of Alphonso X of Castile in the compilation of his chronicles and in translations from the Arabic gave a sanction to the general use of the Castilian tongue. He was a scholar and a literary man, he organised learning, and the use of the vernacular was his strength. The use of the tongue for romantic writing came almost at once, and before the end of the thirteenth century we see in *El Cavallero Cifar* a forerunner of *Don Quixote*.

Spanish literature never looked back. The fourteenth century was a period of growth both in prose and verse, and Juan Ruiz (1283?-1350?) set the standard of a great literature. He gives us

A panorama of the strange society of his tumultuous period. And he paints people as he saw them, in the true spirit of exact Spanish realism. He shrinks from no transcription—whether it be of Moorish dancers, of depraved priests, or libidinous nuns, painted Jewesses, great ladies or the sun-burnt daughters of the plough. Ruiz has no *penchant* for moral excellencies in his characters, but he has a morality of his own, and this consists in rendering his vision of existence with convincing fidelity.

The Romances of the fifteenth century and perhaps earlier, the *Romancero* or ballads, based on the old popular *Cantares de gesta*, were of immense popularity, and indeed the struggle with the Arabs provided endless romantic material. These were truly poems of the people, but they delighted all classes, and even to-day "in Spain itself scholars and artists scour the countryside to pick up vestiges of romances from old simple folk who know scarcely anything else." The search for folk-lore poems is, however, world-wide to-day, and not least in England itself. The time is coming when a comparative school of literature will find in the comparison of romances a new field of history and of international links.

The basis of all that followed is to be found before, in the fifteenth

century, definite Italian influence began to play its part in the upgrowth of formal Spanish literature. Juan de Mena (1411-1456) travelled in Italy and returned to Spain "full of ambition to latinise his own language and to imitate Dante, a wish always fraught with unhappy results." The Italian influence was hardened by the introduction of printing. That invention widened the range of literature and, in fact, by its aid the popular romances acquired a new vogue in literary circles. The printing press gave to the world in 1508—the unique copy is in the British Museum—a strange and famous work, *Amadis de Gaula*. Who was the author? Garci Rodriguez de Montalvo, the editor, declared that he had written the fourth book and modernised the first three books. The work is mentioned in a Spanish translation of the *di Regimine Principum* of 1350. A Portuguese origin had been asserted and had been apparently disproved, but recently the theory has been revived, since a poem in the second book of *Amadis* has been identified as the work of Joan de Lobeira, who died in 1285. The old theory attributed the *Amadis* to a certain and apparently imaginary Vasco de Lobeira. It is curious that the old name should have cropped up again, and Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly is inclined to give Portugal the benefit of the presumption since the Arthurian legend was better known in Portugal than Spain, but he does not consider this *Amadis* an original poem, but one worked up from a patchwork of French texts. Whatever the origin may be, the text is "the standard handbook of Knight-errantry," with love as the inspiration of Knightly deeds. The *Amadis* is living and "superbly human" and, incidentally, "eminently Spanish." It was read because "it opened a window on the infinite, the unknown, the marvellous." Cervantes (the slaughterer of the old sham knight-errantry) admitted that it was the best of all books of its kind, while Du Bellay wrote:

Tant que le monde demourra
Le lai d'Amadis ne mourra.

The work was the fruitful mother of the innumerable romances that Cervantes slew. One of the various writers of imaginative and absurd chivalry was Feliciano de Silva who survives in the irony of Cervantes. This very period produced the amazing romantic comedy known as *La Celestina*, which was printed at least as early as 1499 at Burgos. The unknown author takes a very simple theme:

The growing passion of Calisto for Melibea, the opposition of her parents, the means taken to overcome this opposition, the tragic ending of Calisto who is killed by accident, and the final suicide of Melibea. And all these episodes give the author the opportunity of calling up a whole crowd of personages of the lower orders, bullies, shameless servants and other figures tragic, charming or repulsive. Among those picturesque creatures stands

foremost the diabolical *Celestina* who has become one of the great protagonists of literature leading up to the repulsive figure of the nurse in *Romeo and Juliet*. The author lacks taste and measure; but he has a pitiless eye for human weakness. One feels in the very crudity of his presentations that he has the living model always before him. He supplies us with a counterpart to *Amadis de Gaula*. In *Amadis* are portrayed the lofty aspirations of a section of society under the influence of the chivalresque ideals. The *Celestina* makes us acquainted with the lower passions and vices of this same society.

These two great works—for in the history of literature they are great—have their significance for the historian of English literature. An adaptation of the *Celestina* was published as "a new commodye in English" by John Rastell (the brother-in-law of Sir Thomas More) before 1536. Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly thinks that Shakespeare was acquainted with the English version of *Celestina*. It may have been so, and it "may well have counted for something in the treatment of that other immortal couple, *Romeo and Juliet*." But what is perhaps more important is that we seem to see the influence of both the *Amadis* and the *Celestina* on the author of *The Faerie Queene*. Spenser was in some touch with Spanish literature. He possessed the work known as *Lazarillo*, not wholly incomparable with *Celestina* in its gallery of folk, and it is not likely that he missed the Spanish comedy that More's brother-in-law printed. Moreover, the Italian influence that more and more pervaded Spanish literature, and not only in the introduction of the pastoral novel, in Spenser's time might well have added to the attraction of it to the English poet.

The reactions from the books of chivalry to the novels of low life, which perhaps commenced with *Celestina*, gathered force with the sixteenth century, as *Lazarillo* shows. Good literature and prose abounded as the names of Garci Lasso, Luis de Leon and Diego Hurtado de Mendoza attest, but Italian influence in the sixteenth century killed, apparently beyond resurrection, the Spanish spirit and originality in poetry. "From that day to this," we are told, "most Spanish poets of distinction have written in Italian metres." Spain reserved her originality for drama and romance. The great period of Spanish drama almost coincides with the English period. Juan de la Cueva (1550?-1610?) of Seville blazed the way of realism that Lope de Vega and Calderon followed, and brought in what Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly calls "the Golden Age." The period immediately following the disastrous defeat by the English of the Spanish Armada—the Greek parallel may be noted—is the most glorious in Spain's literary history.

She produced men of genius like Cervantes and Quevedo whose romances and satirical tales were read all over Europe; and a

she produced other men of genius like Lope de Vega and Calderon, whose plays supplied the dramatists of Italy, France, England, Holland, and Germany with the material for an endless succession of comedies, Spain may be said to have had for a long while a monopoly of the literature of entertainment. Her great writers were undoubtedly men of singular independence and originality; their work adds point to the saying that Spain is not quite in the European current of thought.

The truth is (*pace* Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly) that the Moorish conquest contributed an indelible Asiatic element.

Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly gives an attractive account of Cervantes and his work. In the darkest days of his life he produced his *Don Quijote*. It was begun in 1591 and was attacked by Lope de Vega before its publication. But it was an instant success. It was translated into English by Thomas Shelton as early as 1612. Cervantes substituted a new chivalry for the old. That was his great achievement. The old chivalry had become wholly unreal, and Cervantes gave it a contemptuous *coup de grâce*, but he pictures a new chivalry, the chivalry that new weapons of war had begotten. Mr. Fitzmaurice-Kelly in his admirable account of this immortal book, with its vigorous realism, does not take this point, which indeed is often overlooked. "The prose-epic of Spain" would be less than an epic if it did not create a vivid conception of the immortality of true chivalry. It was a famous example of Spanish realism in literature to create by the very fact and method of destruction a new and immortal chivalry in the place of the pathetic framework of a noble but evaporated creed of love and service. Perhaps a century or less before Cervantes wrote ladies wept at the thought that *Amadis* was dead. The story of *Amadis de Gaula* could still touch the heart. Cervantes grasped the significance of this dropping of warm tears and showed its universal significance.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

IRISH COMEDIES.*

Mr. George Shiels has written two amusing Irish comedies entitled "Professor Tim" and "Paul Twyning." They were first produced in the Abbey Theatre, Dublin, "Paul Twyning" in 1922 and "Professor Tim" in 1925. The latter is beyond question the better play both for reading and acting. The original cast in both plays is much the same, though "Professor Tim" scored a success by the acting of the talented actress, Sara Allgood, as Mrs. Scally.

"Professor Tim" is a comedy in three acts, and the action of the play takes place on the same day and thus preserves the famous

* *Professor Tim and Paul Twyning. Comedies in Three Acts.* Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London. 7s. 6d. net.
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"unities." Peggy is the daughter of Farmer John Scally, and his wife Briget—she is the better man of the two—who rules his family, especially her husband, with a rod of iron. Peggy is secretly engaged to Hugh O'Cahan, the owner of Rush Hill which is to be sold by auction that afternoon. Peggy is ironing in the kitchen, Hugh has come to bid her goodbye, she breaks off the engagement, and returns him the jewellery he has given her, bought with the money from the sale of a mare and her foal in more prosperous times. Peggy knows he needs money, now he is about to be sold up. Hugh flings the packet across the kitchen, and tells her to give it to Joseph Kilroy, a neighbour of whom he is jealous. Hugh has been "going the pace" and she taunts him with it. He leaves her and goes out singing. Peggy proceeds with her ironing, shaking the tears from her eyes, "He might have kissed me just once." Mrs. Scally comes in sneering at O'Cahan for leaving Peggy in the lurch. Her mother announces that her brother, Professor Tim, has arrived in London from the Far East, and may be expected any minute. Whilst they are talking, Mr. Kilroy, the Rural Councillor, and his son Joseph, call on their way to the auction. Joseph forces his attentions on Peggy and they go out, leaving the elder folk alone to discuss Joseph's prospects. He has that day come into his inheritance of a thousand pounds and his parents propose that Peggy shall be his wife. Mrs. Scally, in true Irish form, insists that Mrs. Kilroy shall call on them at six o'clock that evening. Mr. Kilroy has it in his head to buy Rush Hill Farm at the auction for the young couple, but bargains that Mrs. Scally shall stock it for her daughter.

During the discussion O'Cahan stalks in, and there is a "devil of a row" followed by the entrance of Professor Tim, an oldish man in seafaring clothes, and evidently a toper. O'Cahan recognises him. His sister Briget is stunned at his appearance and O'Cahan accuses the Professor of liquor, which he denies. "No, Sir. I'm a strong temperance man, a bit of a temperance crank, in fact. Accidents by land and sea, and soda water." [*Chuckles.*] He announces to his sister Briget that he has come home for a rest: "I'm awful tired." Mrs. Scally does her best to eject him, without success. The Kilroys are arriving and Mrs. Scally cannot face them with her beggarly brother, of whom she has boasted, so she leaves the room. Peggy lends her uncle three pounds, and induces him to go with her to the old kitchen. Mrs. Scally comes back, and sinks on a chair exclaiming, "Oh, Lord above! Am I to be persecuted and afflicted off the face of the earth? O why do You permit these people—on and all of them—to make my life a misery? Why, why?"

The second act opens at Rush Hill, where Moll, the housekeeper is tidying up the place for the auction. A most amusing scene fo-

lows between O'Cahan, Paddy the old groom, and Moll. Paddy has a scheme of his own whereby to make the Kilroys pay for Rush Hill beyond their means. With Moll's help he dresses as a country squire and runs up the bidding and Rush Hill is eventually knocked down to Councillor Kilroy. How "Professor Tim" gets the whip-hand of them all, and reinstates Hugh O'Cahan at Rush Hill Farm with Peggy Scally as his wife, is well told, and the Irish humour is delightful. The Irish accent is not overdone, sometimes, indeed, the reader feels that there is hardly strong enough brogue for the country folk, but with the Irish Players there is no lack of it on the stage. London needs some pure comedy to balance the tire-some methods of the modern stage, and Irish humour is a welcome change from wretched French farces, artificial comedies with gross *motifs* or anæmic American "revues." The literary and dramatic links between Ireland and England seem to grow stronger day by day.

THOMAS ARNOLD.*

Dr. Campbell in this volume of the Great English Churchmen Series has produced a very attractive work which estimates, with a very sure touch, not only the place of Thomas Arnold as an educationist, a thinker, and a combative Churchman in his time, but the influence, direct and indirect, of that great man on the practice and the form of many problems of our own time. There is indeed room for such a book, since Dean Stanley's biography of Arnold was definitely addressed to an audience "wholly other in its conventional assumptions from that to which the majority of English-speaking people belong at the present day." Dr. Campbell's book is not a biography but an effort, and a very successful effort, to place the great Headmaster of Rugby School in his true relation to a world that he in so many unseen and indeed unconscious ways did so much to mould.

Thomas Arnold was born at West Cowes in the Isle of Wight on June 13th, 1795. He became a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, in 1815. He married Mary Penrose in 1820, and left Oxford to take up private teaching at Laleham. He was appointed Headmaster of Rugby at the end of 1827, and began his work in August, 1828. After tremendous efforts as a schoolmaster and a controversialist, he died suddenly and in the zenith of his moral and intellectual powers on June 12th, 1842, at the age of 47. It is not difficult to estimate the significance of Thomas Arnold to the England of our time. He believed in the special destiny of England, and perhaps Dr. Camp-

* *Thomas Arnold.* By the Rev. R. J. Campbell. Macmillan. 6s. net.

bell is wrong in his idea that a "disillusioned generation" resents this view. The present generation believes in the special destiny of England to lead the world into the paths of pleasantness and peace, though perhaps they hesitate to express the belief with Arnold's frankness. Arnold believed that England could be made a Christian State in the real sense of the term, and held therefore that admirable form of Erastianism which declares that all Christian bodies should share in the government of the State. He believed that there was to come a struggle between Christ and Antichrist. Dr. Campbell declares that Arnold never came under the influence of Romanticism except to some extent on its poetic side, and this is no doubt true if we define with Dr. Campbell Romanticism as a tide "on which the bark of Tractarianism managed to float." Arnold was so remote from the revival of Laudism that Newman doubted if he was a Christian at all. In fact, Arnold was a great lover of Nature, and in that sense he was a romanticist as well as a realist.

We are told that "he remained comparatively untouched by the still greater factor of the new mentality which characterised the nineteenth century, the portentous advance of physical science." How could he be otherwise than untouched? He died in 1842 before the new science had passed out of the specialist monographic stage, so far as mathematics was concerned, while science in our sense had attained no foothold. The great struggle between so-called science and so-called religion, a rather foolish display of dogmatics on both sides, had not begun before Arnold died. Had it come in his time Arnold might have taken part in a struggle that was and is mainly about words, but he probably would have watched the dust in the arena with a smile. He had, however, controversies enough on his hands. Five years after his appointment to Rugby his pamphlet entitled *Principles of Church Reform* aroused a good deal of feeling. He held that Christianity as a religious and moral revelation is fully set forth in the New Testament and nowhere else, but that the Church is on a different footing, an institution intended to enable man to give expression to the truth of Christianity.

I look to the full development of the Christian Church in its perfect form, as the Kingdom of God, for the most effective removal of all evil, and promotion of all good; and I can understand no perfect Church, or perfect State, without their blending into one in this ultimate form.

He held that the world is made up of Christians and non-Christians, and that only the Christians should be the privileged members of a Christian State. The Church is co-extensive with the nation. That view may seem absurd at the moment, but Arnold's views in the long run have an awkward habit of coming true. If the time is coming when Christianity gets a hold of the nation as it

had in the Puritan times it is not absurd to believe that a new Cromwell would insist on the Christian structure of the State. Arnold was not a Latitudinarian, though his views did not appeal to Newman or his Oxford contemporaries, but he held that the term Christian had wide extensions and included all who believed in Christ. He was prepared to go far to make England, as he made Rugby, "a place of Christian education." He was very thorough and did not spare the rod at Rugby, and there is no reason to suppose, had he been placed in the position of Cromwell, that he would have spared the rod elsewhere. To regard the Church and State as one may seem an absurd ideal to a Church that has failed to attract the masses, but if the masses find Christ, as the mediæval masses in fact found Christ, the union of Church and State—though not necessarily the Church as we now understand it—would be inevitable.

Arnold in fact was no absurd visionary. He did not expect to achieve his ideal in his own time. He was content to state and secure the acceptance of the ideal, and certainly some steps have been made to secure this acceptance in the eighty-five years since his death. He based all his hopes on his personal loyalty to Christ.

His loyalty to Christ was the determining factor in all he said and did; it was uncompromisingly personal, and as such took precedence of all institutionalism whether national, ecclesiastical, or academic. Unless this fact is clearly grasped we do not possess the key to Arnold's mentality. All Christians, he maintained, were in virtue of their individual allegiance to Christ already morally one, and only needed to make their essential unity explicit—hence his insistence on the principle of comprehension without compromise. He held that to aim at uniformity of dogmatic belief was not only futile but beside the mark; granted the prior allegiance to Christ it was not necessary, and if persisted in could only become a factor of strife and division.

Arnold's views at first and for a long time received no support from either Church or Dissent, Liberals or Conservatives, and attacks followed which he quietly ignored, and in the meantime he fought the Tractarians and realised quite early that Newman must go over to Rome. At last, after 1838, he began to regain favour, and Oxford sought to have both his advice and himself. His steady force was telling up to the time of his death. He was always uncompromising in principles as witness his adhesion to the New University of London and his secession when he found that religion was barred. He asked for the recognition of Christianity without sectarianism, and as he could not get it he severed his connection with a great and growing institution. In the field of elementary education he stood sternly against the Liberal view that religion and secular education should be entirely separated. Dr. Campbell

frankly says that "Arnold was entirely right, and the Nonconformists who were largely the means of disputing his proposals were entirely wrong." To-day, indeed, Arnold's view of the essential unity of religion and secular education is gradually permeating all religious parties. Dr. Campbell has an interesting chapter, not perhaps wholly satisfying, on Arnold's work at Rugby. He certainly would have had no sympathy with the methods of the late Mr. Sanderson at Oundle School, and indeed the leading educationists of our own time do not regard these methods as sound. What Arnold did at Rugby was to make the school his "cure of souls." Since his day every headmaster or headmistress has that conception at heart, if they are worthy of their calling. The public school spirit is the product of this ideal, and to-day that spirit is spreading into every school in the land.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Mr. William Park's volume, *The Truth About Oscar Slater*,* brings before the public once again the terrible case of Oscar Slater, who was condemned for the murder, on December 21st, 1908, of an aged lady at Glasgow and, though reprieved in view of doubts about his guilt, is still to-day in prison in Scotland. If Oscar Slater is innocent, as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle as well as many trained lawyers believe, it is one of the unnecessary tragedies of the Scottish judicial system. The man was convicted on evidence of identification of apparently the most slender kind by a majority verdict—nine votes against six. It may be said with confidence that no English jury would have convicted him. The man was reprieved from the capital sentence at the last moment in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence and is still in Petershead Convict Establishment serving a life sentence. In 1914, Lieutenant J. T. Trench, a Scottish police officer of great repute, conversant with the case, brought new and vital evidence before the Secretary of State for Scotland, who at once appointed a Commission of Inquiry. The Commission sat in secret and appears to have been of the most unsatisfactory kind. The report merely said that the statement of the officer had been carefully inquired into, and nothing was done. Mr. Park's extremely able statement of the case for the defence appears to be overwhelming but, of course, there may be an adequate answer to his case. It is the case for the defence and the case which could not be put forward in 1909 as the evidence was not then available. There is the evidence, for instance, of Mr. Duncan McBrayn, which apparently was known to the police at the time of the trial but not to the solicitors for the defence. His evidence apparently sweeps away the police evidence of identification on which Slater was convicted. This evidence was given to the Commission in 1914 but was not commented on in his report, though if it in fact was suppressed by the police it was a matter for the gravest comment. Mr. Park's case for the defence is so complete and convincing that, if

* The Psychic Press, 2, Victoria Street, S.W. 3s. 6d. net.

view of the doubt involved in the majority verdict and the action of the Crown in remitting the capital penalty, a new inquiry seems to be absolutely necessary in order to set at rest a question that goes to the very heart of national confidence in the criminal law. If Slater was innocent no one is safe from a police determined to secure a conviction at any cost. It may be that the answer to Mr. Park's case is that there has been a thorough investigation, other than the Commissioner's Report, which has convinced the legal advisers of the Crown that there has been no miscarriage of justice. If that is so the public have a right to a statement to that effect in the House of Commons. There can be no doubt that the public conscience for many years has been disturbed by this case. The fact that the Crown has taken no definite action seems to indicate that the legal advisers responsible for cases such as this are satisfied. But a full inquiry is desirable. If Slater is innocent a terrible murderer has been loose all these years and that alone is a disturbing fact. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's introduction to this book will be read with interest. He has laboured hard on behalf of the convict and it is to be hoped that his able and disinterested efforts will have some effect. Sir Arthur's allegation that Lieutenant Trench lost his place in the police force and his pension as a result of having brought the case before the Secretary for Scotland (after obtaining a guarantee against victimisation) must be capable of some explanation. These things do not happen in a civilised society.

Among the publications of the Institute of Politics which meets annually at Williamstown, Massachusetts, and has already done much useful constructive work, none is more striking than Professor Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's volume, *The European Situation*.* The distinguished author, himself the director of the Institute for Foreign Policy at Hamburg and the editor of an important journal devoted to international politics, surveys the problems and discontents of our time with sterling qualities both of head and heart, and his little volume deserves wide attention for its deep knowledge, insight, and sanity. In these eloquent lectures to an American audience the Professor reveals his attractive personality and presents his ideas in a manner well calculated to win sympathy and understanding from hearers and readers. He is, as we all ought to be, both a good patriot and a good European. Not the least interesting of his chapters is that entitled, *The German Archives*, which describes the origin and illustrates the importance of the vast collection of documents from the German Foreign Office concerning the period from 1871 to 1914 of which the author was one of the editors. The whole book breathes a spirit of practical idealism. "To make the world safe for peace we need a deeper knowledge of the other nations' body and soul, of their thoughts and their dreams, than commercial intercourse can give us. . . . Politics have to be made a religious service for every one of us."

The late Mr. Charles Lethbridge Kingsford, whose death all historians have deplored, left *Additional Notes to a Survey of London* by John Stow,† to his masterly and profoundly learned edition of Stow's

* Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. Two dollars.

† Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 2s. 6d. net.

famous work. It is nearly twenty years since that edition was published, and since 1908 much new material, "notably through the completion of the Calendars of Mediæval Patent Rolls and of the City Letter Books," has become available and much has been written on London history. These notes, as was the case in the edition of 1908, "are designed chiefly to supply references to sources and modern works of authority where further information may be found." Many references are to Mr. Kingsford's *Historical Notes on Mediæval London Houses* (published in the London Topographical Society's *Record*, Vols. x-xii). The Additional Notes give a little further information as to Stow himself. His great-grandfather has probably been traced in a John Stowe, a London tallow chandler. We already knew that the grandfather was Master of the Tallow-Chandlers Company in 1506. Some additions are made to the list of Stow's "Collections," and manuscripts in various libraries have been identified as having belonged to Stow. The new Notes provide a good deal of new material towards the task of planning accurately mediæval and Tudor London, a task in which historians of London are now in a position to do much new work. The planning of London century by century backward from the present time in an orderly scientific fashion will give us at last Roman and pre-Roman London. The placing of the original churches is a special problem. Mr. Kingsford considers that St. Mary "Niewechurche" of 1104 was without doubt St. Mary Woolchurch. Mr. Kingsford notes that "the St. Sithia whose name occurs in connexion with English churches is probably to be identified with Santa Zita of Lucca, and not with St. Osyth, as some have supposed. St. Bennet Shorhog is called St. Citha in 1422." He also notes the pleasing fact that the old name "Petty France" (beyond Westminster) is now restored. Many old London names should be restored in the new buildings of the City and Westminster.

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Dr. the Rev. Principal A. E. Garvie has contributed an introductory chapter on the Value of Bible Study to the first volume of a series entitled *The Quest: A Course of Study Outlines for Bible-class Leaders** prepared by a sub-committee of the Religious Works Committee of the Y.M.C.A.'s. He writes: "To get as near to your Bible, as God in his providence and by his inspiration gave it by men to men, we must not merely read it, putting our own meaning into what is written, but we must study it with all the aids scholarship gives us in order that we may discover all that it was intended by the authors, and by God through them, to mean . . . in such things as the interpretation of historical documents, the fixing of the meaning of a word, the decision about a date, the proof of authorship, literary character, or historical value, spiritual discernment cannot take the place of accurate knowledge . . . it is, however, a false assumption that the scholar cannot also be a saint or a seer."

* National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s Inc., Tottenham Court Road, W.C.1. 18. net.

THE ECONOMY OF HIGH WAGES.

I WANT to speak of economy in a broad sense. The term is too often used as if it simply meant saving, or doing without; but we know that its original meaning was house-management. Now, the true function of the housewife is not to hoard, or even to cut down expenses, though each of those proceedings may sometimes be necessary. It is to use or spend wisely whatever resources are at her disposal, whether of materials, or labour, or purchasing power, for the benefit of the whole household. She must think of the future as well as the present: she must learn by experience: she must consider the varying needs of different individuals, and she must beware of favouritism.

Our national economy with regard to wages is a matter which concerns us all. Do we not all agree that it should be determined in the interests of the community as a whole, and not in that of any particular class? Moreover, do we not agree that it is in the interests of the community that all grades of workers should receive reasonable living wages, and that they are not all receiving such wages to-day? At the beginning of this century I estimated, after a very careful investigation in York, and a comparison of the results with those obtained by other investigators—notably the late Charles Booth—that one-ninth of the working classes in England were living in primary poverty. In other words, even if every sixpence of the total earnings, whether of parents or children, were put into the family purse, even if—not a very probable contingency—the menu were based on scientific knowledge of the dietetic values of different foodstuffs, and were more rigid than the menu of prisoners or paupers—even if not a penny in the twelve months were allowed for "luxuries" such as a newspaper, a tram-fare, a postage-stamp, or a glass of beer—the total family income would still be inadequate to maintain the household in physical efficiency. It was a terrible conclusion, but one to which the facts inevitably led. And more than half this primary poverty was directly due to low wages.

The recent investigations of Professor Bowley and his co-workers have shown that a substantial improvement has been made in the quarter of a century which has elapsed. Nevertheless, I am confident, from a study of such figures as are available, that hundreds of thousands and probably over a million of our fellow-citizens are still living in primary poverty, much of which is the result of low wages, and not of such accidental causes as illness or unemployment. Very many more are living close to the poverty line.

This state of things is a tremendous challenge to every true patriot—a challenge which rings out all the more insistently when we contrast the lot of our unskilled workers with that of similar

workers in America or in the British Dominions. On whom does the responsibility rest for seeking to raise the standard of life among British workers? I submit that it rests primarily upon those in control of industry, and that they should shoulder it on their own initiative, without any outside pressure; and I want to examine this point of view in a matter-of-fact manner, without any mock heroics or Utopian enthusiasm.

I think that we employers have rather lost our way, and have forgotten just what part we play in the life of the nation. The necessity for working at a profit, in order to safeguard our very existence, has so obsessed us that profit-making has become our principal objective, and we are rather inclined to tell anyone who reminds us of the fact that our work is primarily human service, that he is talking sheer sentiment, and that industry can be run on no such basis. But the truth remains that industry is human service when it is engaged in producing goods or performing other tasks which are of advantage to the community, as are the vast majority of the goods which it produces and the other tasks which it performs.

I should like to dwell on this point because it is fundamental, and a great many of the troubles from which we suffer at the present time arise because it is forgotten. We all realise that if farmers and agricultural labourers the world over were to "down tools," human life could not continue. Clearly, then, their work is absolutely essential to others, as is the work of the miller and those who are preparing necessary foodstuffs. In a climate such as ours, the same statement holds good of the coal miner and the builder. But surely it holds good also in the case of those who are producing goods or providing services, which, though advantageous to mankind, are not indispensable to physical existence! It is largely the amenities of life which distinguish a civilised community from a primitive society, and without them we should descend to the condition of savages. Whatever adds to life's fullness and significance, whatever ministers to our love of beauty or gives us wholesome pleasure, is really a communal asset.

Why does not this thought more largely govern the policy of those who are responsible for the direction of industry? Why is their attention very often more actively directed to the monetary rewards of industry than to its real purpose? I think it is largely due to two reasons. First, a business man must always work up to a balance-sheet. He must show clearly at the end of every year whether he has worked at a profit or a loss. For the most part, he is using borrowed capital, and he is responsible to the shareholders for seeing that it is not lost. Moreover, he must earn a sufficient profit to attract whatever fresh capital may be required for the

development of his business. But this necessity for keeping a watchful eye on his balance-sheet tends to make him imagine that the balance-sheet is all-important, and he forgets that the profit he earns is only a reward for service rendered.

Another reason is that modern business and commerce are very complex, and very frequently the persons providing the service come into no direct contact with the persons whom they are serving. This is not the case with all industrial workers, though it is true of the vast majority; nor is it as a rule true of professional men. A doctor or a teacher can never fail to realise that his work is communal service, and the village blacksmith or the village builder is constantly reminded of the same fact. But the manager of a cotton mill in Lancashire may not have the faintest idea what will be done with any particular piece of the material he produces. Thus, it is much more easy for him to forget that his work serves humanity than if he saw with his own eyes the use to which his product was put.

Industry will never be in a thoroughly healthy condition until all those engaged in it realise much more keenly its true significance. This applies to the rank and file workman just as much as to the employer. So long as the employer on the one hand, and the worker on the other, allow their minds to be dominated by the desire to serve their own personal interests, there can be no true co-operation in industry; and yet, without co-operation we can never rise to a level of national wealth which will make it possible to provide adequately for all our citizens. Employers will tolerate a comparatively low standard of efficiency if only they can secure profits by paying low wages; and workers will give to their job just as much thought and energy as will safeguard them against losing it, and not a fraction more.

For these reasons, it is fundamentally important that those of us who are engaged in industry should remember that our real task is to serve the community and that our profits or wages are not the all-important objective, but are rewards for services rendered. If we could get this idea implanted in our minds, we are most of us good enough citizens to desire to serve our country as well as possible. Such a desire dignifies our whole conception of industry, and gives us a completely fresh standpoint. The man who wants to serve his nation is bound to recognise, sooner or later, that not only must he provide useful commodities, but that the methods he adopts in their production must be governed by the national interests, and that the wealth produced must be distributed between Capital, Labour, and the consumer on terms which are in accordance with national welfare. An employer will then ask whether the wage level in his industry is one which can be defended from

the national point of view, and the workman will ask whether the energy and intelligence which he is devoting to his work are such as satisfy his sense of what is due to his country.

It may be said that all I have written is purely quixotic and beside the mark in the discussion of what is really an economic question, and that there is no room in business for such considerations as I have put forward; but it seems to me that to adopt this view is absolutely fatal. No one would suggest that broad-minded considerations of national welfare should be ignored in determining our national policy. Can it, therefore, be seriously maintained that they can rightly be ignored in determining the policy of industry, which is the very heart of national life? Unless both employers and workers are prepared to give adequate consideration to the national welfare when they formulate their attitude towards industry, the future before England, as an industrial country, is dark indeed!

I am particularly anxious not to "preach" to my fellow-workers. But I do want us to face up to the fact that there has been a strong tendency among us all, both in the ranks of management and those of labour, to strive too insistently for the achievement of personal ends, forgetful of the part that we are playing in the life of the nation. Thus, instead of fixing our attention primarily on a common objective, we have drifted asunder, each group seeking its own, and we have suffered severely for our sins! In the five years ending with 1926, more than two hundred million days were lost through strikes and lockouts. But this represents only a minor part of the total loss to the nation arising from the lack of cordial co-operation between Capital and Labour. If only it were possible to measure the latter loss, we should be staggered by the figure. It would be a striking answer to those who say that business must be conducted purely on business lines, and that there is no room in it for ethical considerations.

It may be argued, however, that England has grown to industrial greatness although, in the past, workers and employers have thought first of their personal interests rather than those of the community, and that the very countries whose material prosperity we desire to approach have made good on similar lines. Does this not prove the truth of Adam Smith's contention that the community is best served when everyone is seeking to do the best for himself? I would reply to such a criticism that, owing to causes which it would take too long to enumerate, England will find it much more difficult in the future to maintain a foremost position in the markets of the world. Her old standards of efficiency will not suffice. She could adopt wasteful methods in the past, and still compete successfully with other countries; but that is no longer the case. We *must* cut production costs, and if we do not want to cut

wages we must eliminate the tremendous waste arising from lack of co-operation. New countries, like America and the Dominions, with vast and largely unexploited natural wealth can afford to indulge in a great deal of quarrelling between employer and employed, and still succeed. We cannot.

This brings me to the second part of my subject. Hitherto, I have sought to answer the question "How far is it reasonable to ask employers and workers to give a very definite place to considerations of national and human welfare in determining their industrial policy?" Now, I want us to consider how that welfare can best be promoted. It will simplify the matter if, for the moment, we limit ourselves to the question of our own national welfare. There will probably be general agreement that our most urgent need is to reduce the present volume of unemployment. A need only second in importance, which, if possible, should be satisfied at the same time, is to raise the standard of life among the masses of the people. What makes the problem appear so baffling is that apparently these two aims are inconsistent. That is to say, at first sight, it would almost seem that our unemployment can only be reduced by the wide acceptance of a lower standard of life; and that alternatively, the effect of giving a higher standard of life to those employed will be to increase the numbers of those unemployed. These two propositions, of course, are based on the undoubted fact that the chief source of our present difficulties is the loss of our export trade, the volume of which depends mainly upon the prices at which we can afford to sell abroad. Is this a true dilemma, or is there a way out? I want to suggest that the dilemma is only apparent, and that there is assuredly a way out, though we must tread warily if we are to find it.

We may clear the ground by excluding altogether one possible course, namely, that of merely raising money wages without any corresponding increase in output or reduction in other costs. This would inevitably result in a corresponding increase in prices, which would weaken our position in the international market, increase our unemployment, and at best leave those still employed no better off than they were before. There is no hope in this direction.

The alternative at the other extreme is to reduce money wages, leaving output and other costs unchanged, and to pass on the wage saving in reduced prices. This is a course for which at first sight there is something to be said. In the first place, it would undoubtedly lead to some early, and possibly substantial, increase in export sales. Moreover, it is urged that if home prices were at once reduced to the extent of the wage-saving, the volume of home sales would be as great as before, and that the net result would be increased employment at the same standard of life. I submit, how-

ever, that in practice the effects would not be so favourable as those who advocate this course imagine; indeed, taken as a whole, they would not be favourable at all. In the first place, while a reduction in wages in the export industries would lead for a time to an increase in sales abroad, this would soon tend to be countered by corresponding reductions in prices by our foreign competitors, which would restore the previous equilibrium.

Secondly, the fall in home prices would only come gradually and partially. Manufacturers, dealers, and retailers would each seek a share of the new margin for themselves, and would only yield it under pressure of competition, and then possibly only in part. Meanwhile, the cut in the income of the wage-earner would be immediate, and the quantity sales of goods in the home market would fall, leading to overhead charges per unit proportionately higher, and tending to heighten prices. To a certain extent this reaction would be counterbalanced by increased sales for export, but production for foreign markets amounts only to 30 per cent. of our total production, and therefore there is not likely to be a net advantage on the whole proceeding. But with falling prices and falling sales confidence and enterprise would be checked, and the usual symptoms of trade depression would emerge, including costly industrial conflicts over wage reductions. Moreover, even though eventually the full reduction in wages were passed on in the price of home produced articles, the wage-earner would be worse off for at least two reasons. First, wages represent only a proportion of the total cost, and therefore the percentage of reduction in prices would be necessarily less than that of the reduction in wages. Secondly, the reduction in home wages would not affect the cost of production of imported goods, which form so large a proportion of the goods we consume.* With the exception of a small number of manufactured goods, the price demanded by the foreigner would remain the same. Nor would the worker's house-rent be affected.

Thus, the irresistible conclusion to which we are led is that a national policy of mere wage reduction is a policy of despair. It is doubtful whether on the whole it would really reduce unemployment, either in the short run or the long run, while it would undoubtedly make for a lower real standard of life for the working classes.

Is there any alternative course offering more favourable prospects? In my judgment there is only one, namely, the all-round increase of our national and industrial efficiency. What is needed to

* Our foreign trade figures for 1926 were as follow (to nearest million pounds):

	Food, Drink & Tobacco.	Raw Materials.	Manufactured Goods.	Total.
Imports	530	...	...	1243
Re-exports	26	393	315	126
Exports	50	74	25	652
		47	538	

restore our trade position is a reduction in our prices and, therefore, in our costs of production, arrived at without reduction of the worker's real weekly income, and, if possible, simultaneously with an increase in that income. These aims are not incompatible. There are other costs than those of labour where there is room for reduction. But, furthermore, labour costs are not synonymous with wages. That is a truism which only needs to be stated to be accepted, and yet how often we act with no clear appreciation of it! As employers we are faced with the necessity for a reduction in our labour costs. We may obtain that reduction in our particular business equally well by a cut in money wages or by an increase in output per wage-earner employed, and we tend to take the former course as the easier and more immediate. But we tend to forget that our wages represent the purchasing power available for the goods of other industries. What we all really require, whether from the standpoint of the nation's or our own prosperity, is to combine high wages with a reduction in labour costs secured by improved methods, improved machinery, plant and lay-out, and better relations between employer and worker, resulting in more cordial co-operation and a greater *per capita* output.

If, while maintaining the amount taken away in wages at the end of the week, our great export industries reduced labour and other costs by sheer efficiency and united effort, they could afford to lower prices, and thus effect an increase in sales abroad, leading to an immediate increase in employment at home. The increased volume of sales would bring about a reduction in overhead charges per unit, making possible a further reduction in price and a further increase in employment. Simultaneously, the larger purchasing power of workers thus taken out of the ranks of the unemployed would result in an increased demand for goods produced at home which again would create more employment. Meanwhile, in the sheltered trades, a similar increase in efficiency would lead to a gradual lowering of prices with a consequent further absorption of the unemployed, and before long the standard of life of the whole community would have risen. At present we are in a vicious circle of unemployment and high costs, through which we must break. Lowered wages and prices, with the present output, mean a malignant spiral leading to a lower standard of life. Increased output per head, with lowered prices and maintained or increased wages, means a beneficent spiral, leading upwards to more employment and higher standards. That is the true economy of high wages.

I am not arguing that it is always a mistaken policy to lower wages. Sometimes, as after the war, there is a complete change in the level of all values, which must be reflected in wages. Some-

times an individual industry may be out of adjustment with industry as a whole, and a change in the level of its wages may be inevitable. Sometimes a trade slump comes so quickly, or is so severe, that if industries are to be saved from bankruptcy, or at any rate from crippling financial stringency, an instant remedy must be found. A wage cut acts at once, but in common with some other restoratives, it provides a momentary relief by creating a fresh danger. In a country which is primarily industrial, prosperity can no more be maintained by general wage-cuts than physical vigour by pick-me-ups. Sheer emergency alone justifies the use of either.

To the utmost extent, in their own ultimate interests as well as in those of the nation as a whole, industrialists should meet the situation not by wage cuts but by increasing their efficiency and by doing their utmost to eliminate waste. We have factories in this country which are as efficiently managed as any in the world, but we also have countless factories which, judged by any reasonable standard, are not efficiently managed, and quite a number are badly managed. Every such factory is a drag on industry. Because it is inefficient, the employer cannot afford to pay high wages—and in consequence his workers have a low purchasing power, which tends to depress industry generally. An efficiently-managed factory may have as low a production cost as one which is badly managed, and yet it may be paying wages 25 per cent. higher, and thus doing its share in developing the home market. Yet, if other factories are inefficient, it gets no "come back." It is building up purchasing power for their goods, but they are not reciprocating. What England needs to-day is not only efficiency here and there, but efficiency all along the line.

But higher efficiency means, among other things, a higher output of wealth per worker—doing with nine men a piece of work which previously required ten men. Will not the immediate effect be to throw men out of work, and will there really be any increased purchasing power among the workers as a whole? This argument was used by the workers who so fiercely resisted the introduction of machinery in the cotton industry a century ago, and it is not surprising that they should have used it, for undoubtedly it contains a certain amount of truth. But two things must be said. First, if ten men are doing a job which could and should be done by nine, then, to all intents and purposes, that tenth man is already "on the dole," though the "dole" is larger in amount and is being paid by means which cripple industry much more than if it were paid through the National Scheme of Unemployment Insurance. Secondly, the pursuance of the policy advocated will lead to an increase in demand for labour in ways already suggested; that is to say, first, in a direct increase in sales abroad, secondly, in the manu-

facture of the new machinery and plant and kindred work involved in increasing efficiency, and thirdly, in the increased home demand which will eventually develop.

The history of employment throughout the industrial era demonstrates quite clearly that men definitely liberated to take up new work are, sooner or later, re-employed; otherwise the rapid growth of machinery would have led to a constantly growing proportion of unemployed workers, and it has done nothing of the kind. Thus, although undoubtedly a general spring-cleaning in industry, and the determination on the part of every employer to raise the efficiency of his factory to the highest possible point, would cause substantial dislocation, this would only be temporary, and conditions would not only settle down, but be greatly improved. As a matter of fact, however, there is no prospect of this sudden and universal action. The most we can hope for is that a constantly increasing proportion of inefficient employers will realise their inefficiency and determine to mend their ways. The trouble with them at present is that they are unaware of their own shortcomings. So long as they can manage to make a living, they are quite prepared to follow the old lines. It is these men who are a menace to British industry. Really efficient employers, representing possibly 25 per cent. of the whole, are keenly alive to every chance of increasing their own efficiency, and are continually striving after some higher ideal. But, as I have explained, they are handicapped by a deadweight of inertia among employers, who simply wish to be let alone, and who have never realised the relation between high wages and a vigorous home market.

Now let us consider, very briefly, some of the conditions which must be met if we are to achieve industrial efficiency. In the past there has been a tendency among employers, fully alive to the importance of attaining a high degree of efficiency in their factories, to devote their attention almost entirely to its material aspects. They have not been sufficiently alive to the enormous waste arising from lack of cordial co-operation between Capital and Labour. As I have said, I do not believe that this co-operation can be secured unless employers measure success not only from the standpoint of their balance-sheet, but from that of the welfare of the community. Such men will place among their aims the securing of a high standard of life for the workers. High profits, if arising from underpaid labour, will be accounted by them as a proof of failure rather than success. If once an employer can convince his workers that it is a definite part of his policy to consider their welfare quite as carefully as he considers his own or that of the shareholders whom he represents, then he has laid the foundation for co-operation. But if by his actions he demonstrates that he is out to serve the ends of Capital regardless of the welfare of Labour, the workers will pay him back

in his own coin, and the very atmosphere will be created which has led to the loss of two hundred million working days through strikes and lockouts in the last five years. Such action on the part of employers is not only bad citizenship, but it is bad business.

Yet, to hold right views regarding the part that industry should play in the national life will not alone suffice to secure the co-operation of the workers, though it is an essential preliminary. Other things are needed, and among these I would give a prominent place to imagination. The employer who desires the cordial support of his workers should put himself in their place, and ask on what terms he would do his level best for the business in which he is engaged. We employers are inclined to forget how sensitive a thing is the labour force in a factory. We study with meticulous care means of securing the precise reactions required from the materials that we use, and we are no less anxious to secure the highest degree of efficiency from our engines and machines. We know that we must attend to every minute detail; not only each machine, but each part of a machine, must be handled with expert care. It must be oiled at the right time with just the right amount and the right kind of oil, and not a speck of grit must be allowed to get into any of its bearings. It must not be subjected to too much strain, and to keep it in perfect fitness we employ highly skilled engineers, whom we do not regard as qualified for their work until they have undergone years of study. A valuable machine has as much expert supervision as a Derby favourite!

But when we come to Labour, which is infinitely more delicate than the most delicate machine, more sensitive than a thoroughbred race-horse, our scientific methods give way to crudity. If we have an Employment Department, and in the majority of cases we have not, it is often regarded as a very unimportant part of the Works organisation, and staffed accordingly. Again, though we feel that our workers should certainly show *esprit-de-corps*, we have never taken the trouble to tell them what the factory really means, and explain the significance of the job they are doing in relation to the whole. I remember being horrified a few years ago at my own lack of imagination, when I learned that a man who had been working with us for thirty years, and who was asked to take a message into one of the most important rooms in the factory, less than a hundred yards from where he sat, had never even entered it and did not know where it was. It began to dawn upon me that I was quite unreasonable in expecting all the workers to be keenly interested in a factory which they had never really seen! We have since rectified our error to some extent by showing all the employees over the works, and the result has been very substantially to increase their interest in the business.

Again, employers expect the workers to understand what to us

is an elementary commonplace, that we must work at a profit, and that we must distribute, year by year, dividends sufficiently high to attract whatever capital may be necessary for the development of the business. But have we explained to them how a business is financed, or have we left them to the mercy of the Marxian orator? If we have taken the latter course, can we wonder that they fail to understand the necessity of making a profit? It may be urged that it is practically impossible for an employer to give instruction of this kind to the workers. I can only reply that I know factories where it has been done, and in which the workers understand, as clearly as the employer, that until Capital has earned a sufficient sum to keep the business financially sound, there is no fund out of which wages can be advanced.

A third condition of full co-operation is to be much more open with the workers with regard to the financial condition of the business, and the problems with which it is confronted, such as the state of trade and the character of the competition to be met. If orders are not forthcoming because our prices are too high, the workers should be informed of it and asked to help us in reducing costs. But unless we are really willing to put all the cards on the table, we shall not get very far. Personally, I have not the least doubt that industry has suffered enormously in the past, and is suffering to-day, through the mistaken policy of keeping the workers in the dark with regard to the vital facts of the business in which they are engaged. If we really want co-operation, we must treat them as co-operators and not as servants, and there can be no true co-operation between two parties when the really vital facts are withheld from one of them. I am sure that any risk involved in being perfectly frank as regards the state of the business is insignificant compared with the advantages to be derived from such a policy. However, we cannot discuss these matters with thousands of workers. As a rule, they must be discussed with elected representatives whom the workers trust, though very considerable advantages are to be derived from occasional mass meetings. I have myself experienced the advantage of addressing thousands of workmen (500 at a time) regarding business conditions, and telling them just what we expected from them, and why.

In our quest for efficiency, and for means of lowering the cost of production without lowering wages, I should be inclined to give the first place to securing genuine co-operation between Capital and Labour, and that is why I have been trying at some length to show the importance of the right attitude towards industry, not only among employers but among workers. This is absolutely fundamental; and neither Works Councils nor Welfare workers, nor even Profit-sharing schemes, will avail unless the underlying spirit

is right. But in securing the right spirit, the initiative must be taken by employers, because of the position which they hold in industry.

I cannot in this article even mention all the other important steps which should be taken to secure efficiency. But I cannot refrain from referring to the work of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, to illustrate how much can be done in lowering production costs. This Society has sent its expert investigators into a great variety of factories, and everywhere they have been able to effect important economies. The Reports speak of increases of output on specific operations of 28 per cent. in a motor car works, of 33 per cent. in an oil refinery, of 10 per cent. in a department of a bank, of 50 per cent. in a slate quarry, and of 40 per cent. in a chocolate factory. Traffic in a woollen mill has been cut down by 75 per cent. This kind of work can be multiplied indefinitely, and I doubt whether there is a factory in England in which important economies in the cost of production could not be made by the application of similar methods.

I should like to conclude with a practical suggestion. Has not the time come for the establishment of a British Management Association? I sometimes wonder whether employers realise that England is the only important industrial country which has no national organisation for the study of improved methods of industrial management. There is, of course, an American Management Association. In France, Germany, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, Austria, Spain, and Russia, there are national bodies for this purpose, often co-ordinating many specialised institutions, and in some cases receiving large financial support from the government. It seems curious that in a country like England, which is so anxious to retain or to re-capture her position as the "Workshop of the World," it has never been thought necessary to establish such an organisation. Of course, we have trade organisations of one kind and another, such as the Federation of British Industries and the National Confederation of Employers' Organisations. But their objective is different. The object of a Management Association is to study the art of management and the underlying sciences on which that art is based, to consider the different means of lowering production costs and of increasing efficiency; and to find out how to establish the right relations between Capital and Labour. There has recently been established in Geneva an International Management Association whose object is to form a link between the different National Associations, so that knowledge developed in one country may be rapidly transmitted to the others. Unfortunately, there is no body in this country which can be affiliated to the International Organisation.

B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE.

GENEVA AND AFTER.

WRITING in last month's CONTEMPORARY REVIEW on the League of Nations Assembly at a moment when the discussions at Geneva had only run half their course, I guarded myself so far as seemed possible against the dangers necessarily inherent in interim judgments. The time for such judgments is now past. The Eighth Assembly is over. The decisions and resolutions then in process of incubation have been formally adopted, and on the basis they furnish, the League will address itself in the next twelve months to the various problems the Assembly delegates had under consideration.

Of these by far the most important is disarmament. The term itself needs both expansion and definition. No one, of course, is talking at Geneva of the abolition of armies and navies. The programme is first limitation and then reduction, or better still limitation and reduction simultaneously, and it is more convenient to use one word for that process than half a dozen. That on the side of definition. On the side of expansion, it has long been a commonplace at Geneva that to talk of disarmament means inevitably talking at the same moment of arbitration and security. "Disarmament through security, security through arbitration": that, as Sir Austen Chamberlain observed at Geneva in 1925, is the common platform of the whole League of Nations.

The Foreign Secretary's declaration is worth recalling to-day, because there is a tendency in some quarters to associate the Arbitration-Security-Disarmament trilogy inseparably with the Geneva Protocol. That is a profound mistake, and it is significant that Sir Austen's speech, from which the passage just quoted is taken, was directed specifically to convincing the Assembly of the hopelessness of expecting an endorsement of the Protocol by Great Britain. At the Eighth Assembly this year the vitality of the Protocol idea has in spite of that been remarkably demonstrated. Almost every speaker from a continental country, and many from Latin America, insisted that the Protocol was and must remain the ultimate goal, even though immediate attainment seemed impossible. Great Britain was alone in the emphasis with which her spokesmen denounced the mere proposal to rediscuss the principles on which the Protocol rested.

Not the least striking of many demonstrations of the growing self-confidence of the League provided by the Assembly discussions was the general resolve that this apparently irreconcilable conflict of views should not be allowed to frustrate the universal desire for agreement—and not for mere paper agreement but for agreement pointing to definite action. That resolve in fact triumphed. The

debates in the Third Commission, where the disarmament problem was hammered out in all its phases, revealed a steady and progressive reconciliation of opposing schools of thought, culminating in a resolution which gave the progressives the desired assurance of advance and at the same time dispelled the misgivings of the Conservatives. To put the matter personally, M. Paul-Boncour for France, Count Bernstorff for Germany, and Lord Onslow for Great Britain, were equally satisfied with their joint handiwork. And the Protocol disappeared from the foreground.

That being so, it is necessary to examine closely the lengthy resolution in which the programme of action in all three fields, arbitration, security and disarmament, was embodied. But the proposals must be seen against the right background. Important as they are in themselves they are only part of a larger whole. The League of Nations is slowly raising its barriers against war, and not much more can be said yet than that it has made aggression a more perilous adventure for any State than it once was. Even the mere paper provisions of the Covenant count for something in that process, though most of them have never yet been put to the test. Take the much-discussed Article XVI, for example. A State in aggressive mood may think the prospect of disinterested League members combining actively for the defence of the victim to be remote. But it is a contingency that cannot be entirely dismissed. Economic and financial measures might at any rate be put in force against the aggressor and shatter all his most careful calculations. The possibility of that would not deter an ambitious and confident Government from a campaign in which all the odds looked like being on its side, but where the issue was more doubtful the impossibility of being certain that the League would not interfere might be enough to tilt the balance in favour of peace.

To say that is not to claim much for the League. Nor should more be claimed for it in honesty so far than that, by slowly adding brick to brick, it is laying the foundations at any rate of a dyke that will some day resist the tide of war. Every "all-in" arbitration treaty signed between a pair of States is so much gained. Such a treaty may be broken or evaded, it is true, but that is none too easy to-day with the League Council taking hold of a situation the moment it looks dangerous and ready to mobilise the public opinion of the world against any disputant deliberately repudiating his obligations. Every demilitarised frontier zone, or detachment of neutral observers in a dangerous area, make the detection of aggression a little easier, and therefore the peril of aggression a little greater. Every halting step in the direction of lower armaments diminishes suspicion and hostility, even though a uniform reduction leaves nations as capable of facing each other in the field as before.

It is rather as a new step, or series of new steps, in that gradual process that the decisions of the Eighth Assembly must be regarded, than as any swift or revolutionary leap into the unknown. Even the full adoption of the Geneva Protocol would hardly be that, for the main purpose of the Protocol was to reaffirm, more than to enlarge, the obligations of the Covenant. It is quite certain that there can be nothing precipitate about the League's progress towards extended arbitration, towards fuller security, towards more radical disarmament. The danger is all the other way. Too many opposing interests have to be reconciled, too many conflicting ideas have to be blended into some kind of synthesis, for anything like rapid progress to be possible. Step by step, year by year, the League will have to move forward towards its goal, and even a disarmament conference, if it meets and to a large degree achieves its purpose, will probably mean little more in the first instance than a general agreement that armies and navies shall at least never exceed their present level. Some reduction, no doubt, may be hoped for even at the outset, but if there is in prospect a series of disarmament conferences to be held at regular intervals of perhaps five years, then the process of reduction will be continuous and its beginning may be merely limitation.

Even that, however, is looking a good deal further ahead than the Eighth Assembly. The problem there was to devise some plan of action which would satisfy Great Britain by confining itself to the provisions of the Covenant and abandoning the Protocol altogether; which would satisfy France by laying stress on the inseparable connection of the problem of security with the problem of disarmament; and which would satisfy Germany by pressing forward the actual technical disarmament discussions and avoiding all suspicion that disarmament was being side-tracked under plea of concentration on security. The three principal Locarno Powers were not, of course, the only States to take an active part in the Geneva discussions. Men like Dr. Benes of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Loudon of Holland, M. de Brouckère of Belgium, made invaluable contributions to debate, but the main schools of thought are sufficiently typified by the views pressed by the British, French and German delegations respectively, the French having by far the largest body of League opinion behind them, in the emphasis they laid on security.

The resolution in which these divergent, or at any rate sharply distinguished, views found expression is remarkable for the success with which it weaves almost all that is essential in the contentions of the different States into a programme of positive action. The Third Commission had before it a Dutch resolution calling for a re-examination of the principles of arbitration, security and disarmament; a Norwegian proposal submitted by Dr. Nansen recom-

mending the preparation of a general "all in" arbitration treaty which any State might sign that would; a French resolution laying stress on collective action by League members for the creation of material security; a Finnish proposal for the mobilisation of financial assistance for a State made the victim of attack; and a Polish resolution constituting a new condemnation of aggressive war for the settlement of international disputes and a new pledge by League members to settle such disputes by strictly pacific means. The two latter fall into categories of their own. The value of a declaration such as the Assembly ultimately made on the motion of the Poles is a matter of opinion, though men like Briand and Stresemann took the view that there was, at any rate, some moral and educational advantage in a formal reaffirmation by statesmen now actually in office of what are, after all, the essential principles of the Covenant. The resolution and the endeavours certain delegates made to strengthen it were of interest in another aspect, as betraying a certain undisguised sympathy with American ideas on the outlawry of war.

The Finnish proposal which had received the blessing of the League's Financial Committee and was openly approved by Sir Austen Chamberlain is another of the single bricks added one by one to the anti-war fabric. It provides in brief that members of the League shall pledge themselves in advance to guarantee jointly (each State being responsible only for its own percentage) any loan which a State made the victim of sudden attack has to raise at short notice for defence purposes, the guarantee, of course, becoming effective only if the loan is issued with the approval of the League Council and under circumstances declared by the Council to warrant such a course. The motive of the proposal is to save a small State whose credit is not such as to enable it to arm at short notice from the necessity of piling up heavy reserves of arms and munitions in time of peace, but the effect would obviously be also that every State which had given its guarantee would have an additional interest in preventing circumstances from arising which would require them to honour their pledges. The guarantee involves no deposit of funds and is limited to the annual amortisation and interest payments in the event of the borrower's default.

The general disarmament resolution contains a section giving approval to the Finnish proposal, but the essence of the resolution lies elsewhere. It is too long to quote here in full, but attention must be called to certain features. The preamble, taken mainly from M. Paul Boncour's first draft, emphasises the importance of "the political conditions calculated to ensure the success of the work of disarmament," and proceeds to embody a proposition which is notable from the fact that it was accepted unreservedly by the

British Delegation. For that reason it is worth quoting textually: "being convinced that the principal condition of this success is that every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its security by means of its own armaments and should be able to rely also on the organised collective action of the League of Nations."

Then follow the specific recommendations. The first advocates the progressive extension of arbitration by means of special or collective agreements; the second urges the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to complete its technical work as soon as possible, so that the actual conference can be thereupon convened; the third provides for the creation of a new body similar to the Preparatory Commission charged with studying "the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security by means of its own armaments, and should be able to rely at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement."

Some importance attaches to the instructions given to this new commission, which will not come into actual being till November, particularly in view of the part played by the British Delegation in framing them. The problem that faces the commission is to be solved, in the unanimous opinion of the Assembly, along three lines:

- (1) By action by the League, with a view to "promoting, generalising and co-ordinating" arbitration agreements between States.
- (2) By the systematic preparation of machinery to ensure the immediate and effective execution of the obligations incumbent on League members under the Covenant.
- (3) By the conclusion of agreements between groups of States, without prejudice to their obligations under the Covenant, involving definite but limited commitments; and, in this connection, by assurances given by individual States to the League Council of the amount of armed assistance they would be ready to provide to support the Council's decisions "in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region."

This last provision, singularly enough, is Great Britain's special contribution to the resolution. Sir Austen Chamberlain, of all men, is the author of the proposal that, so far from keeping its commitments vague, a State shall actually tell the Council precisely what it is ready to contribute in ships and men in the event of a conflict breaking out. The explanation lies in the words "in a given region." Great Britain, that is to say, would inform the Council that in the event of a conflict breaking out on the Rhine frontier it would support the Council against the aggressor with all its forces, thus incorporating its special Locarno commitments in its general League obligation. The assurance might, indeed, possibly go a little further, for as the Foreign Office documents just published

by Dr. Gooch and Major Temperley remind us, Great Britain has other commitments—towards Portugal—which could quite well figure to her credit in an offer of assistance to the Council, constituting a British lead in a rather unexpected direction.

What the Assembly resolution indicates as a whole is a tendency to approach the arbitration and security problems regionally rather than universally. Sir Austen Chamberlain, naturally, is a profound believer in the Locarno method. He is satisfied that Locarno has secured peace in western Europe, and what he wants to see is similar agreements elsewhere—in the Balkans or Central Europe, to take obvious examples. The difficulties here are considerable, and it is by no means to be assumed that the regional method is in fact better than the universal (using the word universal of the continent of Europe west of Russia), but the Assembly has accepted the British thesis for the present and is to give the British doctrine a fair trial. At all events there is no talk of new commitments, except such as States may voluntarily take on themselves, as Britain in fact did at Locarno. The possibilities of the Covenant are to be fully explored, as they should be, but opponents of the Geneva Protocol may rest satisfied that even the French have been convinced that nothing can be gained and much lost by pushing on down that road at this juncture. To concede that involves no abandonment of belief in the merits of the Protocol on the part of those who hold such belief, but the League has to advance where it can advance as a united body, and it is clear that it can only go forward at present on the basis of the Covenant. Even to follow the Covenant to the end may carry it far.

By its full acceptance of the disarmament resolution Great Britain, like every other Government represented at Geneva, has incurred definite moral obligations. It is not possible to go to the League Assembly to recommend arbitration treaties, security agreements and disarmament measures to all the world except the British Empire. It is no doubt true that Sir Austen Chamberlain had and has not any conscious intention of doing that. But it is equally true that his speeches and actions make him look very much as if he had. Take arbitration. At Locarno Sir Austen presses the fullest form of comprehensive arbitration on France and Germany, and those two countries have in fact, largely at the instance of the Foreign Secretary, pledged themselves to settle any and every dispute between them without war. Is there any reason why Great Britain should not, by precisely similar agreements, wipe out the possibility of war between herself and France, and herself and Germany? And will not a continued refusal or omission to do anything of the kind go a long way towards justifying the obvious comment about precept and example?

Take security. Here the situation is no doubt more difficult, and there is some ground for Sir Austen's appeal not to be pressed on this point because "what you are asking is nothing less than the break-up of the British Empire." But this British Empire problem will some day have to be examined a little more closely. The Empire was invoked again by Sir Austen as a difficulty in the way of arbitration, for the Empire was not a "unitary State" that could bind itself lightly. All that is true, but Continental observers can hardly refrain from remarking that concern for the Empire constitution did not restrain the Foreign Minister from embarking on the tremendous commitments of Locarno, and that this unitary Empire which can only act as a whole commands seven separate votes in the League Assembly, and by virtue of them, and them alone, has just got one of its members, Canada, elected to a seat on the League Council.

Take, finally, disarmament. Here again the intentions of Great Britain may be blameless. Everyone does, indeed, give us credit for the wholesale reduction of our military forces. But it is next to impossible to convince the average League delegate that a programme of the increase of our cruiser fleet to seventy, even combined with limitations on size, represents any fierce enthusiasm for real reduction, and difficulties made by Great Britain on the Preparatory Commission over such matters as the limitation of armaments budgets confirm that impression.

This is worth emphasising because everything depends now on the spirit in which the new programme the League has set before it is approached, and almost as much on the personalities of the British representatives on the Preparatory Commission and the new Security Commission. The full extent of the loss involved in Lord Cecil's resignation is only realised when it comes to considering who can succeed him on the Preparatory Commission. And now a Security Commission has to be staffed as well. Both these commissions are created to achieve definite results, and it will not be for the British member of the latter, for example, to declare, as Sir Austen Chamberlain did in the Assembly, that Great Britain has probably arbitrated more important questions than any other country, but that there are difficulties in the way of entering into general arbitration agreements. If that is the final British attitude it becomes a little indelicate to continue to emphasise the value of the arbitration agreement treaty pressed on France and Germany at Locarno, and continually held up by Sir Austen Chamberlain as an example to every other State—with the exception of Great Britain.

The arbitration question must, of course, be approached with proper circumspection. There is need for a clear definition of the limits of arbitration—a definition that will dispel the anxieties, for

example, of Australians concerned about immigration problems, or strategists alarmed lest somehow arbitration should change the status of the Suez Canal. There may, moreover, be some States with whom for special reasons we should feel unable to conclude a general arbitration treaty. But that is no reason for not concluding one in quarters where no such difficulties present themselves. And in particular the signature by Germany of the Optional Clause of the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice brings once more into unhappy relief this country's continued refusal to do the same. Here again certain reservations (in the matter of maritime law in time of war) may be necessary and have always been recognised to be reasonable. They present in themselves no obstacle to the signature of the clause—a step which while its direct effect might not be far-reaching, would do much to strengthen the authority of the Court and the principle of the application of law in that still limited sphere in international affairs where legal rulings are admissible.

In view of the strength of feeling in the Eighth Assembly in favour of the Geneva Protocol, it is no inconsiderable concession (albeit a necessary one) to the protests of Great Britain that all idea of contracting any commitments outside those embodied in the Covenant should have been frankly and cheerfully dropped in the interests of conciliation and constructive action. For it is to constructive action that the Preparatory and Security Commissions are meant to point the way. So far Great Britain has put on plenty of brake where its Delegation believed brakes to be needed. The duty of co-operation with other members of the League requires it now to recognise that an accelerator has its functions too.

H. WILSON HARRIS.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL YEAR.

AMERICANS may reasonably hold that the most uneventful of recent Administrations ought to end in a political contest more interesting than any since the campaign which carried Woodrow Wilson into the presidency fifteen years ago. And Mr. Coolidge himself has made a notable contribution to this result. After some months of calculated prospecting, with the Administration newspapers doing everything possible to encourage the idea that the President would be renominated next June, there came the announcement made by Mr. Coolidge on August 2nd at his summer retreat. The single sentence was treated as matter for almost unlimited speculation—"I do not choose to run for President in 1928." No announcement could well have been plainer; but its terms were so startlingly at variance with the tone of the Washington dispatches of the preceding months and with the elaborate machinery of publicity in which Mr. Coolidge had been enveloped throughout the vacation that the Press, and especially the Republican journals, found it almost impossible to take the words as they stood. Mr. Coolidge, it was pointed out, had fallen into the vernacular of his native region, Vermont. "Do not choose" would probably have a significance not understood elsewhere. The phrase might mean that he had decided not to seek re-election; or more probably, some argued, he was intending to convey that he would not run of his own choice, but would not be averse from accepting the renomination if it were pressed upon him, as a large number of Republicans believed that it would be. There followed a debate which spread over the whole country, Mr. Coolidge, characteristically, preferring not to contribute a word of elucidation. The incident belongs to past history, and it is not worth while going over it here in detail. But I offer my own reading of it in a few words, since I am persuaded that it is important for the understanding of the President and his career.

Mr. Coolidge is altogether what is meant in America by a regular Republican, orthodox according to the standards of the political machine. His advance in public life was made possible by his steady adherence to those standards, and it was to be assumed that he would approach the end of this Administration with a complete readiness to retire, according to established practice, into private life. A third presidential term has no place in the American scheme of things. The builders of the Republic were decisively against it. Washington's decision was reinforced by Jefferson and by several later Presidents. The supporters of General Grant in 1880 were powerless against the tradition. Roosevelt alone defied it, and came to grief. In Roosevelt's case the argument was exactly similar to

the one which, until three months ago, was being employed on behalf of Mr. Coolidge: namely, that the strict third-term issue was not involved, since in each of these two instances the first Administration covered the unexpired term of a president who had died in office. Mr. Coolidge, like Roosevelt, had been elected President once only; hence, it was contended, there could be nothing improper in his receiving the nomination again. Nevertheless, it was recognised that the popular objection might prove to be tenacious, and at any rate re-election in 1928 would mean that Mr. Coolidge was destined to exceed the eight years beyond which the greatest Presidents had not gone.

The evidence, I think, goes to show that Mr. Coolidge himself was until midsummer of a divided mind. The two-terms rule had, of course, his full approval as a matter of constitutional practice. He was well aware that a decision on his part to challenge it would involve a heavy risk. But he seems to have been persuaded that the risk was at least worth considering. This was the only possible explanation of the machinery of advertisement created for the long summer vacation—a combination of press correspondents, photographers, and moving-picture men, built around the President in the hills of South Dakota. The choice of a resort in that North-Western State was open to the same political explanation. Mr. Coolidge did not know the West; it was thought desirable that the West should know something of him; and he submitted himself, we must assume with extreme reluctance, to an extravagance of publicity transcending anything hitherto attempted. A few weeks of this experience, however, led Mr. Coolidge to his decision. American political affairs inevitably look very different in a Western setting from the abstract picture of them that is framed in Washington, and by the beginning of August Mr. Coolidge had come to a clear realisation of certain facts. He observed, no doubt, that the unpopularity of his Administration in the agrarian West had not been exaggerated. He could not refuse to see that among the politicians of his own party there was a growing hostility to the present régime; and undoubtedly he came to believe that the popular feeling against a third presidential term would be exploited to the utmost, by Republicans no less than Democrats, if he were to allow the Coolidge-for-1928 movement to continue.

By the time that political activity was resumed in Washington in September the situation had become decidedly clearer. In general the Press has accepted the President's statement in its obvious meaning. To begin with, many of the Republican newspapers had taken the line that, although Mr. Coolidge did not choose to run, it would be necessary for his party to "draft" him for extended service; but this form of comment was not seriously repeated after

the politicians began to assemble in the capital. It was now taken for granted that Mr. Coolidge had removed himself from the field. It was remarked as significant that the Hearst Press, which had been foremost in pressing the renomination, was the first to forecast the withdrawal, and was now energetically engaged in preparing a clear field for the campaign. The autumn, accordingly, opened with the emergence of the customary, and very miscellaneous, company of presidential possibilities on the Republican side.

It would be waste of time at the present stage to dwell upon the probabilities of Republican party politics. There is an interval of more than seven months before the nomination of the candidates, and that is long enough for many turns in the situation, and especially for changes in the relative standing of the half-dozen men between whom at present the chances appear to be distributed. The Republicans, as it happens, are more fully provided with what used to be called "presidential timber" than they have been for a good many years past. Several of those who are already either active in preparation for next summer or else are receiving powerful backing have been named in previous years. Thus, Mr. Frank O. Lowden came within sight of the nomination in a year when no candidate labelled Republican could have failed. Mr. C. E. Hughes went to sleep on the night of the 1916 election in the belief that the prize had fallen to him. Mr. Herbert Hoover was assured by many of his friends in 1920 that by coming to a certain hasty decision he had thrown away a nomination that must have been the prelude to election. On the other hand, Vice-President Dawes, who has said that he is not a candidate, is the first holder of his present office since Roosevelt to be seriously thought of for the Presidency, while Mr. Nicholas Longworth, Speaker of the House of Representatives, owes his prominence in the list of aspirants partly to his success in Congress and partly to his family connections.

It is generally assumed that the strongest of the regular politicians on the Republican side—those, that is, who are accustomed to work in with the machine—is Mr. Lowden, a former Governor of Illinois. He would carry easily the States of the industrial Middle West and he has been assiduously cultivating the farmers' vote in the prairie States. The dissatisfaction of the Western farmers with the Coolidge Administration is one of the outstanding facts of the present situation. They are resentful because of the Government's failure to achieve any measure of farm relief and its alleged complete subservience to Big Business and monopolist industry. For some time before the publication of Mr. Coolidge's decision the opinion prevailed that Mr. Lowden was his most dangerous rival in the party. The signs of the moment, however, do not point in his direction, notwithstanding his considerable popu-

larity and the efficiency of his organisation. He belongs to the generation and the political conditions which produced Warren Harding, though he is on a higher level of intelligence than that most unfortunate President. America to-morrow may demonstrate that the day of this order of politicians is over. But the chief practical objection to Mr. Lowden is his age. American opinion is against the election of an elderly President, for it is obvious that the weight of the office is becoming too great for the strongest physique. Countries keeping to the forms of democratic government will be compelled to face the question of the individual burden that is imposed upon the elected head of a great Government. And in the meantime it would seem to be unlikely that the Republicans of the United States will be disposed to nominate a man who would be close to his 70th year upon entering White House.

I doubt whether anyone, however near he might be to the central counsels of the Republicans, would care to make a definite forecast in regard to Mr. Hoover and Mr. C. E. Hughes. These are the two most distinguished names in the party, if we except that of the veteran Mr. Elihu Root. The position of Mr. Hughes is especially interesting. As a Justice of the Supreme Court in Washington he had been out of politics for several years when, in 1916, he was induced to leave the bench in order to oppose President Wilson. The United States was still neutral; the defeat of Wilson was averted only by the votes of California in the electoral college, and they were lost to the Republicans by one of those little blunders upon which, repeatedly in times of supreme crisis, the course of history appears to turn. Mr. Hughes became Secretary of State in the Harding Cabinet, and six years ago took his place among the prominent statesmen of the world by virtue of his chairmanship of the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament. In 1925 he retired from the Cabinet and, as the country thought, from political affairs. Asked recently whether under any circumstances he would be willing to accept the Republican nomination, he replied that he was too old. Mr. Hughes is 65. The public had come to look upon him as an Elder Statesman, nor were the politicians inclined to remember him as one with whom they might have to reckon again. The Republican Party, however, is controlled by a small number of very powerful men, and one of these, frequently described as the most powerful man in Washington and in the United States, has declared that the Republican choice in 1928 should be Mr. Hughes. Since this is the declaration of Mr. Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, upon whom Mr. Coolidge could rely without reserve so long as he was in the running, we must infer that the ex-Secretary of State is a likely candidate, and if likely he is formidable. Mr. Mellon and his allies in the Repub-

lican National Committee can open the way for him, and Mr. Hughes is perhaps the only American public man in the mid-sixties whose age would not be deemed an insuperable objection. He adds the advantage of a vigorous physique to a record of public service which furnishes the campaign managers with all they need as the basis of an electoral appeal.

The position of Mr. Herbert Hoover, on the other hand, is most curiously problematical. In 1921 he entered the Harding Cabinet as Secretary of Commerce, a post which he has held ever since and has greatly enhanced in national importance. His acceptance of Cabinet office, after seven years of public service, most of it voluntary, as Food Administrator in America and director of relief in Europe, was a noteworthy incident. The combination of Hughes and Hoover was the redeeming feature of an Administration the cost of which in commonness and corruption is not yet fully measurable by the American people. It was a natural inference that Mr. Hoover was not preparing for long and arduous labour in Washington without a clear purpose in regard to a political future for himself. As Secretary of Commerce he has devoted himself in large part to the problem of waste in industry, and particularly to the simplification of standards and processes in manufacture. This is a service of remarkable value, and the record of his department's success in a virgin field of administration makes a fascinating story. It is no wonder, then, that the reputation of Mr. Hoover on the higher levels of the American business world should be far greater to-day than it was when he took office; but there is another side to this matter. Mr. Hoover's work in the Cabinet has tended, the whole of it, to augment the influence of a department in Washington, and with it the authority of the Federal Government. But, roughly speaking, all America is at present in revolt against the expansion of the federal power. In the United States there is always resistance to the centralising forces, with which Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt were alike associated; and that resistance was never stronger than it is in these days. Republican speakers are as emphatic as the Democrats on the question; Mr. Coolidge himself is a "States' rights" man. It is, therefore, extremely doubtful how far his unequalled reputation as administrator and initiator could be counted as an asset for Mr. Hoover in the approaching campaign. Meanwhile, however, he has made personal conquest of a vast new territory. The terrible Mississippi floods of last spring carried desolation over an enormous area of the South. The ruin has involved a task of restoration far beyond the resources of the stricken States. Assistance from Washington—engineering, medical, and other—was demanded, and was at once forthcoming. A national fund was subscribed, and as usual the

administration of relief fell to Mr. Hoover, the one American with a world-wide reputation in this field of statesmanship. The President himself characteristically kept in the background. He is not given to imaginative action. It is true that the relief fund was started with an appeal from the White House, but the amount named by Mr. Coolidge was relatively small. The magnitude of the disaster was not at first fully realised in Washington. Indeed, it was suggested that if the President had called for fifty million dollars, instead of ten, the response from the country would have lacked nothing in promptness and generosity. In some other respects also Mr. Coolidge's decisions with respect to the floods were open to criticism. There was no special appropriation of funds from the Federal Government. Such appropriation would have required a vote of Congress, and that would have involved a summer session of both Houses. The President was emphatically opposed to the plan. He is not on cordial terms with Congress; he is disinclined to call the Houses together in special session for any purpose, and he held that the Southern States concerned should with the aid of the voluntary funds be able to grapple with the work of relief and restoration and so carry on until the regular meeting of Congress in December. There is undoubtedly a case to be made out for this mainly negative policy on the part of the Administration, but it has had the interesting result of creating for Mr. Hoover a great renown throughout a wide tract of the South where hitherto the personality of a candidate for the Republican nomination has never aroused the smallest public interest. To-day in the region of the Lower Mississippi the name of Hoover has a magical potency.

Nevertheless it should not be inferred that Mr. Hoover's chances of securing the nomination are high. As matters at present stand they are not. Effective candidates for the Presidency have invariably been politicians. There is, indeed, no instance to the contrary since General Grant. Woodrow Wilson was not an exception. As a politician he was a late-comer; but his experience as Governor of New Jersey, though very brief, was a thorough piece of political education, so that the presidential campaign had neither terrors nor difficulties for him. Mr. Hoover is not a politician. His mind is singularly non-political. He has no place among the astute and ruthless managers of the Republican party machine. He is simply not their kind of man. It is hardly possible to envisage him as an ally of theirs. He has a special and powerful organisation of his own, widespread though of indefinite character, which, it is believed, could draw upon the support of a very large number of men and women—and especially the army of club women—who have been devoted to Mr. Hoover since the days of wartime fervour when the Food Administration, under his silent autocracy, revolutionised the

habits of the American people. In the system of the United States, no doubt, anything is possible. But I think it is generally agreed, at this distance from the date of nomination, that the acceptance of Mr. Hoover by the "hard-boiled" delegates of the Republican convention would be little short of a miracle. On the other hand, the nomination of Mr. Hughes would be a relatively easy matter—given, of course, agreement among the half-dozen commanding men in whom the final authority would seem still to be vested.

I turn now to the opposing side—very briefly in this article, for the sufficient reason that the dilemma of the Democratic Party in respect of next year's election can be discussed at present only in relation to the challenging figure of Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York State. He is not an ordinary politician, nor can his relation to the Presidency be discussed as though it were a matter of indifference whether he or any other member of the Democratic Party is to run a year hence against the Republican. "Al" Smith is a portent in the history of the United States. If the Democrats should adopt him as their champion next summer they will by that action make a breach in the tradition which has ruled the national affairs of the United States from the foundation of the Republic. Governor Smith is a Roman Catholic and an opponent of Prohibition. Whenever his fitness for the highest office is debated it is always his "wetness" and his faith that are fastened upon as the distinguishing marks of his candidature; but, as a matter of fact, the national prominence of "Al" Smith is portentous, as Mr. Walter Lippmann especially has pointed out,* upon the broader social ground. Hitherto it has been taken for granted that every candidate for the Presidency must be of the original Anglo-Saxon stock, unmistakably sprung either from the old governing order of the Eastern States or from the pioneer communities of the Middle West, whether modified or not by such influences as those which shaped a Grover Cleveland, a McKinley, or a Warren Harding. Both parties have adhered to the tradition. Until "Al" Smith was put forward by the northern Democrats in the last presidential campaign, no politician belonging to the newer American element, representing the immigrant citizens of the great cities, had ever attained a standing in public life such as to imply eligibility for the headship of the Republic. The extraordinary bitterness of the conflict over "Al" Smith in the Democratic convention of 1924 arose, it is needless to say, in great part from the antagonism of Southern delegates fighting as Protestants and as Drys; but we shall miss no small part of its significance if we omit to take note of the growing fear in rural and small-town America of the immense

* See *Men of Destiny*, by Walter Lippmann. New York. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927.

conglomerate cities, with their still unassimilated masses of industrial workers, mercantile middlemen, and subdivided professionals, overwhelmingly "non-Nordic" and cherishing, as it is believed, conceptions of life altogether subversive of the social and religious faith once for all committed to "the founding Fathers." Governor Smith is American: to the European observer he appears marvelously American. But to a vast multitude of Americans over the continent he is first of all a New Yorker of the East Side: a citizen of the metropolis which, as they all say, is not America; the representative and the admired favourite of a great section of the American people looked upon by the older stock as alien, inferior, and in a variety of ways suspect.

In many quarters, and with the utmost confidence, it is being predicted that the Democrats will be compelled to nominate Governor Smith. Mr. W. G. McAdoo, his direct opponent in 1924, has withdrawn: he had no alternative. "Al" Smith's supporters argue that, since every group in the party will be resolved to avoid a wrangle such as that which almost destroyed them in the last convention, the two-thirds majority must accept their candidate. And Democrats of every shade are coming round to the view that the first essential is for the party to nominate its strongest man. But of course it cannot be predicted that the Democrats will choose Governor Smith, although his strength in the party has increased in a notable degree within the past half-year. He himself is known to be hesitant. He is aware that his candidature would bring the Catholic issue into national politics for the first time in the United States, and no serious public man can be indifferent to so momentous a fact as that. There can be no third-party-movement of any consequence in the coming election, and this means that 1928 will be what Americans call a Republican year. If the Democrats run Governor Smith the contest is certain to be one of extreme interest and extreme bitterness. If they do not, judging by the evidences available twelve months before the polling, they might almost as well concede the victory to the Republicans in advance.

Not many Presidents have been so little concerned as Mr. Coolidge with outstanding foreign affairs, but in the present year he has been especially associated with one international problem of the highest import. Mr. Coolidge is genuinely interested in Disarmament. To a statesman of his habit and tradition swollen armaments are a gross absurdity, and, since he has no legislative plans but is anxious to maintain and extend his reputation as an administrative economist, he went into the Geneva Conference for the reduction of naval armaments with the purpose of doing his best towards an agreement between the three Powers. I have no space here for even the briefest discussion of the official American

position or of American opinion on the British demands, but I call attention to one or two significant matters largely overlooked in the British Press. First, there is the question of the tactics adopted at Geneva by Mr. Hugh Gibson and his colleagues. They were objected to as being inflexible, and as implying that the preparatory work had not been thoroughly done in Washington. English critics forget, or perhaps do not know, that American envoys at international conferences are strictly delegates. They carry exact instructions, and are empowered only, as the saying goes, to sign on the dotted line. They do their work in the shadow of the United States Senate, and under the pressure of a public opinion that is suspicious for many reasons, and most of all nowadays because a powerful section of the American Press, since the War and the Peace Conferences, has been hammering in the notion that American ambassadors and special commissioners are babes in the hands of the shrewd and unscrupulous diplomats and Foreign Ministers of the Old World. And the newspapers that say this, and say it incessantly, have for the past five years asserted that the United States was worsted at the Washington Conference of 1921-2.

This is serious enough, but in the long encounter at Geneva there was something more serious still: something which the British people have so far not come near to understanding. Several of the ablest English correspondents at the Conference took the line of describing the conflict between the British and American delegations as unreal. There was no unreality whatever in the issue. It was simple, definite, unavoidable—although, I admit, it was not emphasised. As I see it, the issue has two main aspects. The first is plainly revealed in the figures relating to battleships and cruisers. Rear-Admiral Magruder, in his celebrated attack upon the U.S. Navy Department last month, wrote that as an immediate result of the Washington Agreement the total of American capital ships afloat had been reduced from 56 to 18. Add to this that it is impossible to set forth, from any point of view, the comparative cruiser strength of the two Powers without showing Great Britain as occupying a position of striking superiority, and we need have no difficulty in understanding why Mr. Bridgeman's expositions of Britain's policy and building programme could not be made convincing, let alone agreeable, to the American Press. America must be equal: but what of the price? The American demand for parity is essentially incontrovertible: the principle was established in the Washington ratio. And when Mr. Coolidge declared, upon the breakdown at Geneva, that the acceptance of the British formula would result in larger navies than those at present borne by the nations, he said the one thing which the vast majority of the American people wished the President to say.

The second question involved here is that of maritime policy.

Since the War, and since the Washington Conference, our country has enjoyed her old-time naval supremacy. Britain still controls the seas. She controls them, as we are all entirely convinced, with pacific intent; and, the League of Nations being now custodian of the international conscience, we are further convinced that in future the power of blockade must and will be most carefully limited. But the United States is not a member of the League. President Wilson, at a crisis of the Great War, ventured the prediction that in future wars there will be no neutrals. The American public does not believe that. On the contrary, American politicians and naval authorities are given to estimating the possibilities in the event, let us say, of a Baltic blockade by Britain or the League. The American marine, they point out, lies at the mercy of the dominant fleet; the makers of the Versailles Treaty did not provide for neutral commerce in wartime; the freedom of the seas is a doctrine which it was deemed expedient to forget. These things are present to the American mind; and behind the puzzled and angry debate over statistics and programmes at Geneva was the resolve that the maritime situation of 1914-17 cannot be allowed to recur.

In his speech to the American Legionaries in London on October 7th the Prime Minister commented upon the circumstance revealed by the Naval Conference, that Britain and the United States can disagree on a matter of the first importance, and after the most exhaustive argument, without sign of a quarrel. That is the remarkable and most encouraging fact of to-day. We do well to rejoice in it. But let us not fall into the error of thinking that the cause of the dissension is transient or unreal. Between the two peoples it is fundamental, and by positive agreement it must be removed.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

NOTE:—This article is concerned specifically with the political outlook in the United States. But I conceive it to be almost impossible for a European observer, writing in 1927, to discuss the present situation without making some reference to the momentous affair that was brought to a tragic conclusion in Charlestown prison, Boston, on August 23rd. The case of Sacco and Vanzetti was noticed by the British Press only in fragmentary fashion during the long delay after the trial. In the final stage it became a matter of grave international moment. A very large section of American public opinion was deeply resentful that this should be so; but nothing is more certain than that an incident of this character cannot be treated as a merely domestic affair. The simple fact that the Government of every country was required to take special measures for the safety of American public offices is in itself sufficient proof of the accuracy of this statement. I note here three points which, I think, all impartial students of the Sacco-Vanzetti record would wish to emphasise among others. They are: (1) that the report of the Lowell Committee, upon which the refusal of the Governor of Massachusetts to grant a pardon or a new trial was largely based, omitted to deal with certain portions of the defence evidence that was of manifest importance; (2) that no European criticisms of the Massachusetts judicial system could be more severe than some of those appearing in leading American journals; and (3), that the agitation on behalf of the condemned men which influenced the Press of Europe was not the work of Radicals or Reds. It was that conducted by a group of Americans, including many Massachusetts citizens of the highest standing. Their carefulness, persistence, and self-sacrifice, in a cause which they deemed to be one of strict law and justice, made a general and deep impression.

S.K.R.

FRENCH PROBLEMS AND THE ELECTIONS.

THE French Parliament has reassembled after a vacation passed in electoral preparations. From now onwards until May of next year everything done in France by the politicians will have a definite electoral purpose. It is one of the drawbacks of Democracy that a considerable proportion of Parliamentary time is wasted or worse than wasted. In France the Deputies are elected for four years. At least the first year is always spent in settling down. The fermentation of the polls does not immediately cease, and newcomers take some months to learn their business. On this occasion, after 1924, when the Socialists and Radicals ousted the Moderates, they kept up their zeal for renovation, which, however, expressed itself only in verbal excitement, for two years. There comes a middle period which is normally fruitful. Sometimes it lasts for two years. In the present case it has lasted about a year. Then the fourth year begins, with its party calculations and its manoeuvres for position. Thus at best only half the Parliamentary period can be effective.

M. Poincaré, easily the most important French statesman since Thiers—whom he resembles in many ways—professes to ignore the purely party strife. He is, indeed, not interested in the labels which the Deputies choose to put upon themselves. By long experience he knows that they signify nothing. It is a remarkable fact that the last Parliament, which was supposed to be composed of members of the Bloc National, supported M. Briand and M. Poincaré as Prime Ministers when once it found itself; while the present Chamber, which is supposed to be dominated by the Radicals, chose, when once it found itself, the same M. Briand and the same M. Poincaré as its Prime Ministers. The so-called colour of the House may matter for a few months. The Bloc National at the beginning accepted a party man like M. Millerand. The Bloc des Gauches at the beginning accepted a party man like M. Herriot. But the colour fades, and eventually Bloc National and Bloc des Gauches alike prefer men who are neutral as politicians—such as M. Briand and M. Poincaré. Nothing amuses me more than the efforts of British correspondents to put M. Briand and M. Poincaré in political opposition. Personally they differ immensely, but politically they resemble each other like two brothers.

If M. Briand could have his way the next Parliament would be nicely balanced. It is precisely when there is no real majority that M. Briand is sure to be called to one of the highest posts in the Government. As for M. Poincaré, he is bitterly reproached because he will not favour any party and washes his hands of these

electoral preparations. For seven of the most critical years in French history he was an admirable President of the Republic, and in some sense he is now France's Honorary President. He is neither a man of the Right nor a man of the Left. He stands above parties on the platform of national unity. Below, the Deputies can fight each other if they please, provided they do his bidding on the essential issues. If he is allowed, he will carry on until the elections and will in no way try to influence them. It was because of this indifference for the results of the ballot that he was replaced in 1924. Will he again be replaced because of his non-committal attitude in 1928? In any event, it may be taken for granted, he will not raise his little finger to decide the elections. That is why the Radicals in his Cabinet are not anxious to upset him. If they overthrow him they will bear the blame for their own dreadful blunders, and will also bear the blame for the inconveniences of the Poincaré system of heavy taxation. M. Poincaré's weakness is his political neutrality, but it is also his strength.

His own views on electoral methods happen to be known. He would prefer the multiple-member constituency with some measure of proportional representation. Yet he did not prevent the Deputies from passing a Bill this year which brings a reversion to the much-condemned single-member constituency. There was, of course, a great deal to be said against the alleged proportionalism which was practised, but it would have been easy to have improved the *scrutin de liste*. The Socialists were pledged to proportionalism, yet in a spirit of opportunism they, with the Radicals, chose to go back to the *scrutin d'arrondissement*, which has been likened unto "stagnant pools." The argument in favour of single-member constituencies is that the electors know whom they are electing; but against this are the possibilities of collective and individual bribery. The single-member constituency encourages the policy of the parish pump. The candidates make a local appeal. In the large towns the evil is less, but in France the countryman is over-represented and his interests may quite conceivably be contrary to the needs of the nation. The argument for large-area constituencies, in which lists rather than candidates confront each other, is that the electors pronounce on programmes, not on persons. It must be confessed that the list system was spoilt by a complicated machinery of quotients and averages. It was not simple enough and was often unfair. In 1919 it gave the Bloc National an excessive representation, and in 1924 it falsely secured a majority for the Bloc des Gauches. Now the Bloc des Gauches, believing that the tables will be turned upon it, changes again to the uninominal system.

On a straight fight I believe the Moderates would win in 1928. But there is the second ballot. On the second ballot all kinds of

combinations are possible. The second ballot is necessary unless one of the candidates obtains more than half the votes cast. To win he must have an absolute not merely a relative majority. When there are more than three candidates a second ballot is probable. Let us roughly say that for practical purposes there are only five groups of French politicians. At the extreme Left are the Communists. Then come the Socialists. The Radicals follow as a sort of Left-Centre. Then there are the Moderates under various names as a sort of Right-Centre. Finally there is the Extreme Right. The question for the Radicals is whether they should join forces with the Socialists or with the Moderates. The Socialists, though detesting the Communists, are electorally capable of voting for the Communists in certain contingencies. Let us assume that in a given constituency on the first ballot the Moderate is leading, and is followed by a Socialist, with the Radical third, the Communist fourth, and the Conservative fifth. If on the second ballot the Radical retires in favour of the Socialist, then the Socialist will probably be elected. If, on the contrary, the Radical is ahead of the Socialist, the Socialist votes may be cast for the Radical on the second ballot. Even the Communists might be induced to vote for the leading Socialist or Radical; and in by-elections both Radicals and Socialists have lent their strength to the leading Communist on the principle of "No enemies on the Left!" But in view of the Bolshevik scare, and in view of the financial situation, many Radicals advocate a bargain between Moderates and Radicals by which they would help to elect each other. These Radicals are afraid of Communism and are suspicious of Socialism. M. André Tardieu, the ablest of the younger French politicians, proposes a Centre Party excluding Communists, Socialists, and Conservatives—a Centre Party which would be unassailable.

It is too early to be dogmatic. Certainly there are signs that the Bloc des Gauches is being reformed. But its record has, especially in finances, been so bad that it is still doubtful whether the Radicals will risk facing the country in the old formation. The Radicals were badly led by M. Herriot and M. Painlevé. My own political tendencies are known and I make this statement with regret. Fine promises have not been kept. Stupid errors were repeatedly committed. Another factor making for uncertainty is that the candidates, whether sitting Deputies or newcomers, have had to find fresh constituencies for themselves, and nobody can yet gauge the local influences. We may, however, briefly glance at some of the larger questions which will be placed before the country.

The franc has not yet been stabilised. But in fact it remains steady at 124 to the pound. It can technically easily be held there, and it will be remembered that this is about the figure I myself

suggested when efforts were first made to save it from slipping over the precipice. The accumulation of gold reserves and other securities makes the franc impregnable to any frontal attack. It might, of course, be slowly undermined if there were again a slump in confidence. Why then does not M. Poincaré legally fix the franc? There are several reasons. The first is doubtless political. It would be unwise to provoke controversy on this subject before the elections. There are Frenchmen who think that the franc should still be improved stage by stage, and there are others who believe it is already too high. Experience alone can determine what burden France can stand—for the partial restoration of the franc does impose a very heavy burden on the taxpayer. The franc is worth twice as much as it was when M. Poincaré took office. This is excellent in itself, and is still more excellent when one considers that if there had not been amelioration there would have been disaster, and to-day the franc might have been worth nothing at all. Yet there are items in the Budget, notably those which are connected with the service of the debt, which cannot be compressed whether they are expressed in francs worth 200 to the pound or 100 or 50. These items account for more than half the Budget. Let us put them in round figures at twenty milliards. Now it is obvious that the taxpayer who can furnish twenty milliards for the service of the debt while the franc is at 124, certainly could not furnish twenty milliards if the franc were at 50 to the pound. In other words, France's tax-paying capacity is conditioned by the value of the franc. I think M. Poincaré is, on economic grounds, right to experiment a little, and to watch the effect of the 1928 Budget on taxes and trade before he finally makes up his mind.

So far as I can judge—and I have taken advantage of the summer vacation to question people of all classes in the provinces as well as in Paris—there is comparatively little outcry against the increased taxation. On special points there are complaints, but the work of M. Poincaré as a whole is understood and approved. Demagogues will do their best to arouse indignation. I am sorry to notice that even the group around M. Caillaux, which formerly called for heavier taxation as the only way of dealing with the problem, are now accusing M. Poincaré of having unnecessarily taxed the country. At the same time others are clamouring for increased social expenditure. The gloomy prophets laid great stress on the economic crisis which they declared would accompany the amelioration of the franc. There was in fact merely a momentary diminution of trade and a relatively innocuous increase of unemployment. But industry and commerce, after the slight set-back, successfully surmounted the obstacle. The lions in the path were found to be chained. Nevertheless, it is possible that the coming winter will be harder

than last winter. Prudence should be shown. Possibly M. Poincaré does not need such a recommendation: he is inclined to be over-prudent.

The question of the French debts to the United States and to England is again becoming acute. This too is a matter that M. Poincaré would like to postpone until after the elections. It was at first thought that a settlement was an essential preliminary to monetary stability. There was widespread opposition to the ratification of the debt agreements, and it appeared that M. Poincaré would come to grief on this rock. Either he would insist on ratification and would fall, or he would leave the matter in abeyance and therefore be unable to carry out his financial programme. His ingenuity was equal to the demand made upon it. He obtained the approbation of Parliament for the provisional payment of the annuities due under the agreements without asking for immediate ratification. I do not doubt that for next year consent to further provisional payments will be given, and that the United States and Great Britain will be satisfied for the time being with this solution.

It will be for the new Parliament to face its responsibilities.

The judicious are never impressed by effusive sentimental manifestations. M. Briand is a past-master in the art of staging dramatic representations which serve his end. It was, of course, M. Briand who first occupied the Ruhr, but since then he has come to stand in the eyes of the world as the apostle of peace. There is no doubt whatever that he has persuaded himself of the efficacy of loud-sounding but meaningless speeches, of luncheons in rustic inns, of pleasure-trips in steamers, of accolades on railway-stations. In this he has been given practically a free hand. If he has lately not pursued the Locarno policy smoothly, it is not because M. Poincaré or any other Minister has been plotting against him. It is because unpleasant facts, which he would ignore, occasionally become too much for the French to swallow without demur. Certainly the reaction against Locarno has set in, and although nobody proposes to revert to the Ruhr policy, and although nobody proposes to upset the specific accords of Locarno, yet the logical results of Locarno cannot emerge as easily as was at one time supposed. Hindenberg boldly repudiates Germany's war guilt. Stresemann publicly approves of the Marshal's discourse. The ex-Kaiser sends a congratulatory message. Generally there are signs of a reawakening Germany insisting on fair treatment in no cowed spirit but with a touch of the old aggressiveness. French generals report pessimistically on the military situation in Germany. Nobody suggests that Germany means to rely on force in the near future, but everybody feels that Germany no longer intends to be bullied. The French do not quite know how to behave in these circumstances. There was a moment

when they would have agreed to the evacuation of the Rhineland nine years after the war, instead of after fifteen years in accordance with the Versailles Treaty. But that moment has passed. The French are perplexed. Hence the perfectly unreal and stupid though grave disputes concerning the precise number of men who may be withdrawn from the Rhineland. The Rhineland armies are ludicrously useless. They could be ejected in a few days if Germany chose to assert herself. These foreign soldiers, who pretend to keep a population in subjection on its own territory, are a constant humiliation for Germany and a standing provocation to racial animosities. Yet neither France nor England is sensible enough to decide whether she means to practise coercion or solicit co-operation. Germany is stronger than she was and therefore concessions are made to her, but on the whole French feeling is less favourable towards Germany than it was a year ago.

In regard to the League, too, French scepticism has increased. The resignation of Senator Henry de Jouvenel simply called attention to the waning faith of the French not in the League idea but in the League as it has developed. To-day it is regarded chiefly as a conclave of Foreign Ministers belonging to the Principal Powers. There is no particular reason, it is urged, why Sir Austen Chamberlain, Herr Stresemann, and M. Briand should meet in Geneva. They could meet just as easily in Paris, in London, in Berlin, and impose their will on Europe. Whether we like it or not, these three Ministers are beginning to look like would-be Dictators on the Continent; and though they use the League to some extent, they appear really scornful of a League which is composed of Smaller Powers whose wishes are not consulted. It is true that the Smaller Powers can let off a little steam in the Assembly once a year, but the Big Nations are in practice supreme. This at least is the criticism made in France, and the recent failures of the League to consider subjects which vitally touch the Great Powers, and the virtual collapse of attempts at disarmament, have unquestionably produced a slump in League stock. M. Briand is not wise in repeating so often that the League stopped a threatened Greco-Bulgarian war. It would certainly have been stopped had the League never existed, and repetition of this poor boast provokes recollections of far too many occasions on which League authority has been defied. The case of the League was recognised to be so desperate in France that in September a special mobilisation of journalistic apologists was commanded, and in the end something of the League's prestige was temporarily restored. But it is time that convincing evidence of the League's earnestness were given. Otherwise it will soon become impossible for the French people to interest themselves in it, or to believe that it offers a substantial promise for the future.

I think it better, as one of the earliest friends of the League, to speak thus frankly instead of indulging in the usual self-deception.

All this implies that in the foreign field France is less enthusiastically "advanced" than she was. The star of M. Briand does not shine so brightly. Its paling is due, not, I repeat, to gratuitous interference with his designs, but to the natural reaction, induced by disappointments, from the generous days of 1924, when M. Herriot set out to change the face of the world. Nowhere is this reaction seen better than in the recrudescence of the anti-Russian campaign. That campaign is indeed inspired by oil magnates and illiberal politicians and discarded diplomatists. But the point is that it succeeds. A few months ago, when Great Britain led the way, it could not have succeeded. One cannot defend Rakowsky on technical grounds. He has veritably committed a breach of the Ambassadorial code. It might have been better had he retired at once, and have thus removed the pretext for a tremendous agitation. As Ambassador he should not have signed a manifesto advocating mutiny in the army and civil war in the country to which he was accredited. Still, the incident was declared closed by the French Government on September 3rd, and it would not have blazed up again had not the real aim been to break off relations with Russia. After all, it was known three years ago that a Russian Ambassador must necessarily be a Communist, and Rakowsky's successor, if he has a successor, cannot, broadly speaking, think differently from Rakowsky. Diplomatic relations with a country do not imply approval of its Government: if they did, then we should constantly be dismissing Ambassadors and inviting Ambassadors as political opinions fluctuate. France, as I see things, could not be too rigorous in her suppression of Bolshevik plots and propaganda in the country, but the person of the Ambassador, as representing an immense country which will endure through all vicissitudes, should be sacrosanct. Liberal France accepts a Nuncio from the Vatican. She accepts an Ambassador from Italy. She is nevertheless opposed to political Catholicism and to Fascism. It is surely folly not to place institutions and countries which exist, far above the particular phases of them which we may like or dislike. Doubtless at the elections much will be heard of the menace of Communism.

Another awkward problem arises for France in the shape of the Franco-American tariff quarrel. The last of the Legionnaires had not left the shores of France, vowing eternal friendship, when the acrimonious debate began. The United States has been loud in recommendations of a Franco-German commercial agreement. Europe has been told to break down its internal walls. Now France concludes a treaty with Germany by which Germany is given commercial advantages in return for similar advantages to France. The

United States immediately asserts that Germany is favoured to the detriment of America. The French reply that if this be so they are willing to give America precisely the same advantages. They except, however, a *quid pro quo* from America. America answers that she has nothing to give in return. The use of the tariff for bargaining purposes is immoral. Discrimination between the goods of different nations is contrary to American ethics. America claims the right to erect the highest tariff walls, but she excuses them in that they are not raised or lowered against or for any particular country. She denies the principle of reciprocity. How can France possibly accept the egotistic American demands? If she does she must give the same privileges to every other country, and the whole purpose of the tariff, as it is conceived in Europe, will be thwarted.

These are only a few of the outstanding difficulties of France. There are others which will make the declining days of the present Parliament unusually lively, and will, for the most part, present themselves in their acutest form to the new Parliament. Rarely have French elections been so important, and the period preceding the elections is pregnant with possibilities which will call for the exercise of the highest qualities of statesmanship of M. Briand and M. Poincaré.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

HOW WE LOST THE WAR WITH TURKEY.

THE armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, signed in the roadstead of Mudros on October 30th, 1918 on board the British warship *Superb*, by the delegates of the Sublime Porte and Admiral Calthorpe, imposed upon the Turks no serious conditions as to disarmament and demobilisation, nor penalties against the leaders of the "Union and Progress" party that had been the strongest advocate of the alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. From this we may infer that at that particular time the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which afterwards became the policy of England, was far from being intended. This will only surprise systematic minds of French or German formation, that is to say, reasoning and logical minds which never can take into account that the rapid changes which are so often attributed to the so-called perfidy of Albion are in reality due to no other cause than the rough-and-ready empiricism and improvisation which are a part of the British political make-up.

Some days after the armistice, England, France, and Italy decided to entrust the guarding of their interests in Turkey to three High Commissioners. The Englishman was Admiral Calthorpe, the Frenchman was Admiral Amet, who commanded the French squadron in the Levant, the Italian was myself. In reality, at that moment of the apparent destruction of all Turkish authority, and pending the negotiations of the Big Four in Paris, our task was rather that of governors. We had at our orders the squadrons in the Bosphorus and the military contingents on shore. We organised an administration, a guardianship of order, and the revival of the Allies' banking, educational, religious and other institutions which had been destroyed or closed during the years of war. The three High Commissioners held their meetings once a week, in their respective embassies by turns, each time under the presidency of the Master of the House. The Serbian, Greek, Roumanian, and other representatives, following each other to Constantinople, presented themselves before us as before a Supreme Local Council, and our administration was carried on without too many national rivalries. Our harmony and loyalty were constant. At first my two colleagues were inclined to think that I was too lenient in my dealings with the Turks; that I showed, perhaps, a little too much regard for the conquered Sultan; that, personally, I was too cordial towards the former Grand-Viziers and other personages of the Empire, who little by little came out of their hiding places; that I did not sufficiently ignore the Sublime Porte. I am sure that during the first weeks of that winter (1918-19) the two Admirals, in the bottom of their hearts, must have put down this weakness of mine to my unfor-

fortunate quality of civilian. But they were men full of good sense. Little by little they felt that I was guided by higher reasons, by the conviction that Turkey was far from dead, that she was only temporarily down and that, if we pulled the rope too tight, she would escape from our hands; that we might remain masters of Constantinople, but should be masters of a wonderfully empty house; that the active forces of Turkey would retire deeper into Asia, out of our reach, and that, once there, they would turn against us.

This situation and these anticipations I had, from the very first, communicated to my Government. I informed it that I could only serve my country by acting on these ideas, and that I would interpret its silence as implying approval of my line of policy. I could not expect much more than silent approval, for my conception of the potential situation of the Turkish people excluded those projects of Asiatic partition that were being entertained in Paris, in which it was sought to interest the Italian Government.

The Sultan, weak and uncertain, violent in little things and cowardly in serious matters, was the typical descendant of a dynasty that is condemned and whose rôle is ended. He had chosen as Grand-Vizier Ferid Damad Pasha, who, as the title "Damad" indicates, had married one of his sisters, Princess Alidé. Ferid had studied at Oxford, and was, to all outward appearance, a very successful copy of an English gentleman. In reality, nothing and no one in official Turkey showed the slightest sign of life or strength. Those who, in London, tried to persuade Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon that they could in future do anything they liked in Turkey had reason to believe that they were right. Now and again I saw—and did not conceal the fact—the few men who afterwards made up the ruling class at Angora, Mustafa Kemal amongst them, who, as the hero of the defence of the Dardanelles, was already popular amongst the Turks. I felt that these men were speaking the truth when they declared their ability to maintain their independence in Asia, whither they were already inclined to withdraw.

When, therefore, on May 12th, 1919, Admiral Calthorpe invited his French and Italian colleagues to the British Embassy to communicate to them instructions from the Conference of Paris with regard to the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, I, for my part, was convinced that the affairs of the Entente would take a very bad turn in Turkey. But our instructions were categorical and nothing could be done. The landing was what it was bound to be, what, at the meeting of the High Commissioners, I had expressed the fear that it would be: a fightless yet bloody operation whence issued, wounded to death, the party whose violence could only appear to have been successful to those who could not see through appear-

ances. Greece was doomed from the day she planted her flag in Smyrna.

On the landing of the Greeks, the Turkish troops had at once withdrawn into their barracks. They acted thus by order of the Grand-Vizier who, not from treachery but from weakness, and meaning well, had sent emissaries to Smyrna advising resignation and giving assurances that the Greek occupation would only be temporary. Moreover, there were not, in Smyrna then, any of those *fedais* (the sacrificed) who became, at a later date, fanatics to the death in the Turkish national cause. Who then fired from the barracks the first shot which let loose the massacre? My informers assured me at the time that it was a Greek *Agent Provocateur*: it is probable; not, certainly, in consequence of political instructions from Athens, but owing to the folly of some Greek commander who wanted to fight an easy "battle" and win a still more easy "victory." However it may be, if up to then there had been hopes of finding a solution equally acceptable to everyone, after the Smyrna landing it was too late. Mistakes in politics, as in moral life, beget mistakes.

The Sublime Porte had previously been guilty of the imprudence of sending Mustafa Kemal away from Constantinople by giving him a command in Asia. He was near Sansun when the news of the occupation of Smyrna reached him. He summoned the people together and made a speech which moved them to tears. An English officer, who was in the district, dispatched a telegram to Constantinople demanding the immediate recall of the young general. The Sublime Porte was invited by us to issue such an order: with the forms that it had inherited from Byzantium, Mustafa was cautiously invited to come to Stamboul only to discuss the general situation. A trait still more Byzantine, friends or prospective friends from the Sublime Porte itself warned him urgently that the summons was going to be dispatched; and he who had not yet decided to break with the capital, it may be from a patriotic sentiment, set out on a tour of inspection towards Erzerum and thus avoided the necessity of ignoring an order from the Sultan, an order that, so to speak, never reached him.

Probably, with a certain amount of political decision the situation might still have been saved. But, in Paris, at the Peace Conference, everything conspired to increase mental confusion. The French, engrossed as they were by their situation on the Rhine, were not inclined to oppose too plainly the English on a part of the chessboard less vital to themselves. It was the same with the Italians, preoccupied exclusively in their turn with the Adriatic question. The English—the English were Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon!

"Nobody admires more than I do the late British Prime Minister's rare qualities of intuition and rapidity of action. During the war, in his quarrels with the generals he was always right: as when he wished to break the enemy mass by driving into Austria with a gigantic Anglo-Italian effort, a conception due primarily to the regretted Italian patriot Bissolati. Even in the French strategy he was frequently right. But West is West and East is East. And Mr. Lloyd George, in the West, had learned to know by himself. Moreover, he, a "frock" as Sir Henry Wilson mockingly called the civilians, was suspicious of the general views of the "brass hats." In the East what he believed to be the military truth was put before him by another "frock," M. Venizelos. M. Venizelos was, and is, also a very remarkable man, and had powerful excuses for having miscalculated the forces at work in the East. He dreamed a great dream, the idea of a Greater Greece which had consoled so many generations of Greeks during centuries of slavery and misery. He hoped to realise it with the help of England, who seemed to him all-powerful. The fatal error was committed and, since no one wished to acknowledge it, the situation throughout Turkey, beginning at Constantinople, grew worse. An English Intelligence Service, composed of specialist officers, took over all the political and police control. The blunders which these specialists committed contributed in part to shake occidental prestige.

But may I point out, in parenthesis, that those blunders of the British political police increased my old admiration for the real traditional British frame of mind? I realised, *ab absurdo*, that what alone makes British moral force is the life in freedom and fair play for everybody, and that they fail when they change their ways. On March 16th, 1920, General Milne, commanding the English forces, occupied all the important positions in the capital, the War Ministries, and the telegraph and post offices, and ordered the arrest of several dozens of senators and deputies. A state of siege was proclaimed. A few days later, the Sheik-ul-Islam, who was completely under British influence, issued the Fetva proclaiming the Nationalists of Angora to be rebels and excluding them from the Moslem community. The reply was not long delayed.

On April 23rd, 1920, the National Assembly in Angora inaugurated its labours with solemn prayer, and elected a Grand Council to which it entrusted the carrying out of its decisions. Mustafa Kemal was the soul and real head of this council. A few days later the Grand Council transformed itself into a Provisional Cabinet, the word "provisional" being merely employed to show that the Nationalists had no intention of giving up Constantinople. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was Bekir Sami Bey, a Mussulman of the Caucasus, who, the year following, represented the Government

of Angora at the Supreme Council in London. The politics of Angora became decisively xenophobic, embracing in its hatred both English and French. It was the consequence of the facts already known at Angora which were later to result in the stillborn Treaty of Sèvres. The Italians alone were not ill-treated—the effect of the attitude of peace that I had adopted from the beginning.

Mustafa Kemal had armed bands raised at once. Behind them he rapidly organised a serious army. The stronger he grew the more the Turks turned to him. The very officials of the Sublime Porte longed in their hearts for his triumph. To the Turks the end was henceforth plain. It was only a question of time. One point only remained uncertain: the decision of the Allies, who, in April, 1920 at San Remo, had ended by accepting the hard English terms of peace. On the eve of San Remo, in March, Lord Curzon said: "The effective strength of Kemal has been overestimated; he is not as important a factor as some assert," and, by this general phrase "some" he referred to me, who, now in Rome, continued to advocate a policy of peace with Turkey. Moreover, in June, after San Remo, Mr. Lloyd George declared in a great speech that Greece alone was capable of "taking the place" of the Ottoman Government.

At Hythe, towards the end of June, Mr. Lloyd George had a meeting with M. Millerand. M. Venizelos offered England, whose military situation in Turkey had finished by becoming dangerous, the collaboration of all the Greek forces. His plan provided for the swift march towards the interior of Anatolia of a well-equipped army of 90,000 Greeks, who would cut all Kemal's lateral communications and compel him to retire into the interior where his forces would be dissolved. The French Prime Minister was resigned rather than disposed to accept the project, being pushed thereto by general diplomatic considerations and by the pre-occupations which the Turks were causing him on the Cilician-Syrian frontier. But the consent of Italy was necessary; and for the purpose of obtaining it a meeting of the Supreme Council was held at Boulogne immediately afterwards. I had just taken the direction of Italian foreign policy, and went there to represent Italy. Apropos of the projected Hellenic invasion of Anatolia, I declared formally that it would be a very grave mistake, and that if it were desired to redouble the life and strength of Turkish militarism and Nationalism, that would certainly be the best way to ensure it.

A month afterwards, we met again for the Conference at Spa (July, 1920). M. Venizelos presented himself there, for the last time, to urge his proposal before the Supreme Council, and to have his way. The Council was composed of Mr. Lloyd George, M. Millerand, and myself. M. Venizelos set forth his reasons for being certain of

success. I was the only one who replied, opposing his argument by showing the danger that Greece would run, and I finished my reply with these very words: "My only regret is that the attitude of Italy should be attributed to want of sympathy or even distrust towards Greece. I feel myself, on the contrary, inspired by sentiments of deep concern for her true interests. No peace is good that is not a peace tolerable to both sides. The Greeks in gaining too much risk losing everything. I am quite sure that in this hall there is at least one person who feels the deep sincerity of my words, and that person is M. Venizelos."

When I had finished speaking I felt that rare pleasure that one never experiences from the applause of crowds and parliaments. I looked at M. Venizelos and saw from the expression of his open and intelligent face that he had appreciated the deep sincerity of my words, and that, if only for a moment, the impression had come upon him that some day they might prove too true. But the die was cast, and everybody knows in what a tragic fashion it ended for Greece two years later.

The Conference which met in London in February, 1921, should have opened the eyes of the most confident. What did we see there? The delegation of Imperial Turkey, of the Sublime Porte, was headed by a venerable man respected by all, Tewfik Pasha, who had been Grand-Vizier many times. The delegation from Angora was also there, headed by their Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bekir Sami Bey. The British Government refused to receive the latter by itself, for fear of thus according Angora a sort of official recognition. To the astounded eyes of the Occidentals there appeared one morning, in perfect harmony, and sitting on the same bench, the two delegations who were supposed to hate each other, as those engaged in civil strife know how to hate. In our eyes, in English eyes, the venerable Tewfik Pasha had changed into the head of all the Turks; it was not enough; he asserted his position of chief solely in order to yield the word to Bekir Sami Bey, who was the only spokesman on the side of the Turks, either of Stamboul or Angora. At this moment of the Conference, M. Briand and I tried to use our influence over the Turks to make them adopt a moderate attitude. Bekir was ready to understand that he had everything to gain by showing himself more willing than the Greeks to place his cause in the hands of an impartial arbitrator. The arbitration was decided at last. It was to take place after a careful inquiry on Anatolian territory.

When Great Britain, France, and Italy proposed and accepted an inquiry, it was in effect to acknowledge that the authors of the Treaty of Sèvres had been ill-informed, and that it was necessary to begin again from the beginning. This deprived Angora of all

reason for intransigence and opened a future way for all possibilities. So it seemed still possible soon to secure a tolerable peace. But three months later the situation again grew worse. The Greeks had rejected the Commission of Inquiry, and decided to resort to arms. Beaten at first, they succeeded, in the summer of 1921, in occupying Afium-Karahissar and Kutaja. The front held firm for a year, but in August, 1922, the reconstituted Turkish army destroyed the Greek front and occupied Smyrna. King Constantine lost his throne. Great Britain, France, and Italy interposed between Turks and Greeks. The result of four years of blunders, illusions and excessive pretensions was the Armistice of Mudania on October 11th, 1922, by which Europe was obliged to consent to the re-entry into Constantinople of the Nationalists and to that of the Turkish Government into Eastern Thrace: in short, the complete return of the Turk into Europe. The Treaty of Lausanne only served to accentuate the end of all European privilege.

Chance willed that I should take part in the negotiations that preceded the Armistice of Mudania. I was no longer Minister of Foreign Affairs, but Ambassador in Paris, and as the negotiations took place in Paris, whither Lord Curzon had come, it was we three, Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and myself, who had to deal with the question. I shall never forget the sad confession that Lord Curzon made to me one afternoon in a room of the Quai d'Orsay. Proud as he was, he owned, to his credit, honestly, that he had made a mistake, and that it was the man he was addressing who, for all his apparent excess of conciliation, had best tried to guard the interests of the West. Such regrets, however, are useless in politics, meritorious though they may be in moral psychology. What then was wrong during the post-Versailles period with the Oriental policy of England, at other times and on other occasions so generous and farsighted? Simply this, in my opinion: to have believed for a time that, by dealing a mortal blow to the Turkish race, the cohesion and spirit of resistance of the Moslem world would be broken everywhere. The best traditions of British history ought to have made it plain that the problem of establishing, or—better—re-establishing British influence in the East cannot be a simple problem of force. And this is true for all the Easts, near or far; and for the Oriental policies of every country, not only Great Britain.

SPORZA.

THE FREE CHURCHES AND THE NEW PRAYER-BOOK.*

I.

IT is with a certain reluctance I have chosen this subject. For one thing, I would far rather discuss the more vital issue of the position and prospects of evangelical religion in the land. Also, I reviewed last year the Lambeth Joint-Conferences; and if I take up a second time a topic connected with the Church of England, the impression may be given that we suffer here from an Anglican complex—an impression which a glance at our *agenda* paper will show to be entirely mistaken. But I can hardly avoid this subject at this moment. To those who think that it is not our business, I shall say only this. The proposition that any section of the community has not the fullest right to deal with any matter which is on the floor of Parliament; that any section of the religious community has not the right or even the duty to discuss any matter of vital concern to the future of religion in the country; that we of this Federal Council, who have been formally and officially invited by the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament to express our opinion on the Prayer-Book Measure, should not do so, and do it publicly if we see fit—that is a proposition which we do not accept, and, indeed, it requires only to be stated in order to be its own refutation. Perhaps, at the outset, it should be made clear that, inasmuch as opinion in the Free Churches on this question is by no means unanimous—as it is not unanimous within Anglicanism or in the nation—this address, even though given from the Moderator's chair, does not in any way commit the Council to agreement to what is said in it. The Council will express its mind on the matter in its own way if it sees fit.

I.

It is necessary, in the first place, to refer to our relation to the stage which the discussion of the Prayer-Book Measure has now reached—that, namely, of Parliamentary Sanction. For it is said to us from various quarters that, whatever may be our view of this book, surely as Free Churchmen, standing for the independence of the Church from civil control in spiritual things, we cannot be party to Parliament interfering in so essentially a spiritual matter as the character and forms of public worship. Should we not be willing to concede to our Anglican brethren that spiritual liberty which we prize for ourselves; and therefore say that, in this issue, the voice of the Church and not the voice of the State should be determinative and final? This is said to us; and a plea of this kind always must

* The Moderatorial Address delivered to the Federal Council of the Evangelical Free Churches of England, meeting in London in September, 1927.

and should appeal to the instincts of every Free Churchman. Certainly, for myself, I think I may be allowed to say without presumption that I do not need to be taught the principle of the spiritual freedom of Christ's Church, in the most noble modern struggle for the vindication of which I had a humble part. Nevertheless, I cannot agree that this principle quite applies here. The Prayer-Book Measure is brought in under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, commonly called the Enabling Act. This Act gives important powers to the Church Assembly; but all powers so given are explicitly stated to be "subject to the control and authority of His Majesty and of the two Houses of Parliament." The procedure under the Act is as follows: Parliament receives from the Church Assembly measures affecting the internal affairs of the Church of England. Then the Ecclesiastical Committee examines these, and reports on each "as to its expediency, especially with relation to the constitutional rights of all His Majesty's subjects." Finally, Parliament, while it cannot amend any such Church Measure, has reserved to it the final say, and may either reject it or pass it—the passing taking the form of an address to the King for its sanction.

Now, in the middle of the procedure thus prescribed—and I should add that this Act was promoted by and prepared at the instance of the Church—to raise the plea of spiritual freedom will not do. High and sacred principles are not to be resorted to in order to help either churches or individuals to escape or evade contracts they have made. It may be said that I am treating this too much in the spirit of the parliamentary lawyer, and am not giving sufficient regard to large considerations of an historical and moral kind. I am far from being insensible to these large considerations in their appropriate place; and, if I were writing a treatise on Church and State in England, the historical and moral aspects of the subject would certainly not be omitted. But we are dealing at present with what is the position of Parliament in respect to a certain statute under which procedure is being taken: that position is what I have stated. The Church itself agreed to the giving to Parliament the final decision, and to attempt now to discredit its decision is what, in another sphere, is described as "not cricket." I add that if the Church of England will begin openly and at all hazard stand for complete freedom in spiritual things from State control—as the Scottish Church has done*—we should applaud that; and we should be able then to salute our

* As ill-informed letters appear at intervals in the Press, claiming that in this matter the English Church should be regarded as having the same liberty as the Scottish has, it may be well to point out the essential difference in the two cases. Under the English Assembly (Powers) Act, all powers are, as has been said, "subject to the control and authority of His Majesty and the two Houses of Parliament." Under the Church of Scotland Act (1921), it is declared that "this church" has from "its Divine Head," the "right and power, *subject to no civil authority*, to legislate and to adjudicate finally, in all matters of doctrine, worship, government and discipline in the Church," etc. (The italics are, of course, mine.)

Anglican friends as fellow high Churchmen indeed. But that was not done in the Enabling Act, which, certainly, lengthened the cable and gave the Church more sea-room—but you cannot lengthen a chain without clanking it. This Act is what we have to do with in the present case. I conclude, therefore, unhesitatingly that as Free Churchmen we need not have any scruples about Parliament's control over the passing of the Book.

II.

I pass from this to the larger and more complicated question, which is—not whether Parliament *can*, but whether Parliament *should* reject the Book. As has been said, under the terms of the Enabling Act there is no power with the legislature to amend: it must either pass or reject. We, however, here are not faced with the responsibility of that definite and serious alternative. We are entitled to state our views of the issue more generally, that these may count for what they may be worth in the final decision. In what I shall say I hope I shall not speak from any merely sectarian or party point of view. I desire to look at the subject not only broadly, but also with a genuine sympathy towards the effort of the Church of England to enrich its services and to adapt them to practical needs and to religious sentiments which have grown up since the times of the making of the existing Prayer-Book. It is unnecessary to say that about far the greater portion of the new or, as it is called, “deposited” book, everyone is agreed, and over it no difficulty arises. But with this—whether necessarily or not, or wisely or not—have been associated features which undoubtedly do give rise to acute controversy and grave apprehension. Under the Enabling Act, it is in the power of the Speaker of the House of Commons to divide a measure coming from the Church Assembly, “if he is of opinion that the measure deals with two or more subjects which might more properly be divided.” I take it that this means subjects incongruous with one another, but it is not for me to decide. But we here, certainly, make a division. There is a great deal in this new book of which we can whole-heartedly approve; but there are things in it which cannot but call for anxious scrutiny from all who care about reformed doctrine and evangelical religion, and it is these things we must discuss here.

III.

We are entitled, of course, to look at the question on its merits and from our own point of view. We need not, therefore, be much influenced by the somewhat pathetic appeals which appear from time to time bidding people be “loyal to the Bishops” or accept the majorities in the Church Assembly. For myself, who am no wild Anglo-Catholic bolshevist, but a sober Presbyterian constitutional

ist, I am rather disposed to have regard to ecclesiastical authority, when it really is authority. But I am not able to recognise the voice of the English Bishops as very decisive, not to say final, for, in so many matters and in this matter in particular, that voice has been—I trust the original application of the expression does not make its use here unseemly—*varium et mutabile*. To give a single but relevant example, the Anglican episcopate to-day as a body produces this book: within living memory, the Anglican episcopate—not, of course, the identical Bishops—supported as a body the Public Worship Regulation Act. This may show a progressive mind, but it shows also an authority too mutable to command an uncritical obedience. As to the majorities in the Assembly, they are entitled to carry their weight; nevertheless, it is the duty of Parliament to consider further how far these are really representative of the mind of the Church as a whole and of the nation. We, therefore, need not be much influenced by considerations such as these, but must try to decide the matter on grounds which are deeper and larger.

IV.

One consideration which, if not paramount, certainly, to the mind of any Churchman or any Christian, is primary, lies in the fact that the rejection of this book would manifestly be something not less than a disaster to any prospect of peace and progress in the Church of England, and would create in that Church a situation of a very grave character, the effects of which on religion—I am not thinking of any merely political effect—no one can estimate. Now our Anglican and especially our episcopal friends must pardon me if I say frankly that the fact that the alternative to the passing of this book is a most dangerous chaos is a fact not to the credit of the rulers, present or past, of the Church. It amounts to the confession that they have let the Church get into uncontrollable confusion; and the retort is obvious—why have you so ungoverned the Church as to let it get into such a state? I think, therefore, that when bishops tell us the alternative is chaos, they should do so in a becomingly chastened tone of voice. But, wherever the blame lies, this is the situation. Now we Free Churchmen are not illwishers towards the Church of England. The time has long passed—if, indeed, it ever existed except in the hearts of a few bitter sectarians—when non-conformists had a kind of vested interest in that Church's troubles and disabilities. On the contrary, we “pray for the peace of Jerusalem” in the Anglican branch as well as in our own branches of the Church Catholic. We are—or we should desire to be—catholic-hearted churchmen who, over even high ecclesiastical barriers, feel we are one body in Christ, and “whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it.” We must approach the question in this

spirit. And I, for one, will not consent to support a line of action which would gravely injure the peace and prosperity of a sister church—unless that course is imperative in loyalty to truth and duty.

Do, then, the actual changes—the controversial changes, I mean—in the new book amount to such a flagrant treachery against truth as to make this course, however disastrous in its consequences, to be thus imperative? This question we must now answer.

v.

In trying to answer it, not in any party spirit but justly, let us realise that the point is not whether we approve of these changes, doctrinally or otherwise. Probably most, if not all, of us here do disapprove of them. I cannot now discuss them in detail, but I shall mention one, which is crucial and of which our disapproval is deep and grave. In our view—at least in my view, and I think you will concur—Reservation is full, not only of danger, but of error. The doctrine in it is wrong: on which I here content myself with quoting Bishop Gore, who says that “the only sort of abiding which the New Testament suggests” is “the indwelling of Christ in the members of His Body.” Its sacramental principle is wrong; for the “Real Presence” is *Christ-in-His-Sacrament*, whereas the elements are but a part of the Sacrament and not the Sacrament itself, and those who have lost the perspective of truth here are—as I have called them before and call them again—not Sacramentarians but elementarians. Its devotional idea is, if not inevitably, at least very easily wrong; for it leads many minds straight to that unscriptural and unspiritual “localisation”—I know the theologians’ refinements of language which dispute this, but I know also the practical effects—of which an illustration is the remark of members of an Anglican sisterhood, which desired the restoration of the practice in their chapel, that “we used to have Jesus with us here.” And the ground of it is wrong; for it is, in part, the “stress” laid by many on “the obligation of the priest to celebrate fasting,” which is a worse than unscriptural position, and would make it actually obligatory on Christ’s servants to depart—I repeat, *obligatory to depart*—from the example of their Master who, “after supper,” celebrated the first eucharist. If Reservation is wrong in ways such as these, no appeal to personal feeling or even to tradition can make it right. I think I have expressed our view unmistakably.

But this is not quite the question. We must deal justly with the actual book. And when we look at the actual book, we must admit

that the most serious doctrinal errors and practical abuses connected with this subject are—at least in words—guarded against carefully and explicitly. Reservation is to be “used for no other purpose whatsoever” than the communion of the sick; and the sacramental elements so reserved—erroneously described as “the Sacrament so reserved”—cannot be “brought into connection with any service ceremony.” Someone will at once say that this is delusive and will not be observed. That is a different point, with which I shall deal presently. For the moment, we are looking at the book. So far as its terms go, reservation is an “extended communion”; and, further, the Church is careful *not* to accept any doctrine implying adoration. We may still think that even this guarded permission is both unnecessary and full of peril; but, if we deal fairly with the terms in the book, we cannot say it is a denial of reformed doctrine. Something of the same kind can be said of the other much controverted feature of the book—the new prayer of “consecration” in the alternative Communion Service. This prayer is, in part, more evangelical and is certainly less Roman than the corresponding prayer in the old book; and, while it contains words into which can be read—and will be read—the doctrine of a “substantial” change in the elements, these words may also be taken to mean that the Bread and Wine are made to be to us the Body and Blood of Christ in spiritual virtue and effect. This ambiguity is characteristically Anglican. It may or it may not be worthy of an *ecclesia docens*. But the most that can be said about it from the point of view of reformed doctrine is that it admits inferentially what the existing liturgy omits intentionally. I am not trying to make a case for these alterations. I am simply aiming at being fair to this book, which contains things I greatly dislike, but one must be fair even to things and people one dislikes. And the general result I arrive at is that, if we are concerned only with the terms of the book itself and if these terms are to be faithfully observed, then it cannot in fairness be said that here is such a specific denial of reformed doctrine and evangelical religion, as would demand uncompromising opposition.

I say this—with which, I know, some will disagree—because to say otherwise seems to me not just to the actual book. But now I further say that we have to deal with more than the actual book. We have to deal also with the situation. Indeed, the carefully chosen terms of the book may hide from us—I am not suggesting they are deliberately meant to do so—existing and operating facts and forces behind them. And because we have to deal with a situation as well as with a book—with facts as well as with words—the degree of acceptance which I have indicated must be accompanied by a qualification which is essential, and which I now go on to explain and emphasise.

VI.

The real danger in this whole matter for reformed doctrine and for evangelical religion lies less in the new Prayer-Book itself—in the terms of its alternative services and in its rubrics—than in how it will be used and to what it will lead. This book undeniably makes very great concessions in directions which a large section and probably the majority of the nation view with apprehension. Is it to be a limit—I do not use the word “final” for, of course, nothing human is final—and will it be accepted and maintained as such? Here is a question which to many people who are most reluctant to be forced into an attitude of hostility to the passing of the book—and I think not a few of us here count ourselves among such—is of real seriousness, and the Anglican authorities will make a mistake if they do not realise that upon solid and adequate assurances being given on this point depends the support to the passing of the book of a not inconsiderable section of opinion—and it may be much larger than I know—in Parliament.

It is significant that this question, which at first was dismissed somewhat cavalierly, is now being treated seriously. In the Church Assembly both Primates dealt with it at length, and the Archbishop of Canterbury made upon it a definite declaration. “You may,” he said, “take it from me that the bishops will require obedience to the new rules and will do their utmost to secure it.” The Duke of Devonshire and others have, in a letter to *The Times*, quoted the declaration as if it should satisfy everyone and settle the matter. But with the greatest respect for the Archbishop—whom, I need not say, we all here hold in honour, and for whom, I will add, some of us have, as I think he knows, a very deep personal regard—a public anxiety of this definite character can hardly be satisfied merely by such a general statement. We have perfect right—indeed, remembering how Anglican bishops’ efforts to “require obedience” have often been met, we have reason as well as right—to inquire what this “utmost” will mean. I find little in the way of answer to this in the Archbishop’s speech, which, first, holds out a prospect of some future measure on the reform of ecclesiastical courts—a complicated and contentious subject, any proposals on which have an uncertain future, and, in any case, are not ready to meet the emergency which may arise in a few months—and, secondly, speaks generally of discipline as “remedial rather than penal.” Similarly the Archbishop of York spoke of “encouraging a general loyalty to the principles of law and authority”—which is excellent, but obviously stops short just at the difficulty. No one is calling on the bishops for “threats”—least of all, threats of civil penalties. But have they any agreed mind and purpose in this business? I have no desire to be unfair—and I shall be glad to be cor-

rected if I am—but I cannot say otherwise than that the impression left on my mind by these two speeches is that, however sincere in the matter the speakers may be (and that, of course, one does not for a moment question), the bishops are simply hoping and praying that disobedience will not be extensive or infectious, and that, as a matter of fact, they have no immediate settled policy about maintaining the new order. If this be the case, I must take leave to say that the Archbishop’s declaration is somewhat empty. There is no indication—though here, again, I shall be glad to be corrected if in error—even that the bishops are going to act together as a body, which is, obviously, the primary and essential thing; for, if irregularities and illegalities are to be refused in Norwich and resisted in Birmingham, while smiled upon in Truro and winked at in London, the result will be simply discipline *pour rire*.

VII.

For such reasons I am compelled to say—and I say it with regret—that this question has not been sufficiently and satisfactorily answered. Let me restate the question thus: has the nation solid and adequate assurance that the new order which it is asked to sanction will be faithfully kept, and that its limits will be effectively and uniformly maintained? I desire to appreciate the fact that the problem, owing to the widespread lawlessness which has been allowed to grow up, is a difficult one; and I do not wish to be inconsiderate of the bishops’ difficulties. But it is just this widespread lawlessness which also makes the matter one not to be evaded. In view of the known situation within Anglicanism, it is futile to dismiss such a question as “a confession of fears,” and it is foolish to minimise it into no more than that “here and there may be recalcitrants.” The question should be steadily pressed till it is sufficiently answered. It may be that the Anglican authorities resent its being pressed. They should not look on it in that way. On the contrary, here is really a matter of fair dealing with the nation—it is not too strong to call it a matter of honour—which they should meet willingly. I put it thus. The presentation of the Prayer-Book Measure to Parliament by the Church Assembly is of the nature of proposing an agreement or concordat with the nation. Now, it will hardly be disputed that there would be little likelihood of this being accepted if there were not in it very distinct limits to ritual practices. The Church knows that. Well, if this be so and if the Church knows it to be so, surely, in urging the nation to accept the book, the Church is morally bound to be both able and ready to undertake that these safeguards will be maintained as *an integral part of an honourable agreement*. The bishops should not present the book unless they can see that its terms are kept—especially

those terms without which they know the nation would not pass it; if they can and will see to this, there need be no difficulty in their giving the nation assurances about it. There need be nothing here to resent; and I have confidence that the worthiest and most responsible mind of the Church will recognise this and respond to it.

Meanwhile—and it shall be my last point—there is a responsibility resting on Parliament. It is for Parliament—which is the trustee of the nation—to see that the nation, in thus giving its consent to this measure, has such guarantee. I am, of course, aware that the official act of the legislature is limited to a “yea” or “nay,” and that the passing of the book cannot have conditions attached to it. But Parliament is the members of Parliament—Lords and Commons. They are entitled to satisfy themselves in what way seems right before voting for the book. And it is with deliberation to say that a Member of Parliament—whatever may be his personal sympathies doctrinally or ecclesiastically—owes it to the nation, of which he is a representative, to secure the clearest and strongest assurances of which the matter permits that, in trusting to these ritual safeguards, the nation is not being deceived. I go the length of adding—and I would say it to a member holding Lord Hugh Cecil’s ecclesiastical views quite as much as to one holding those of Sir William Joynson-Hicks—that, as a representative of the nation, he is not only entitled but bound to make this a condition of his support of the sanctioning of the Prayer-Book Measure by Parliament in the name of the nation.

VIII.

I must close. I have felt it a responsibility to speak publicly on this critical and difficult subject, but it is one I could not, in the position I here occupy, evade. I have tried to discuss it as fairly as possible, and to reach conclusions for no other reason than that they are just. The conclusions I have reached are three, and may be summed up thus:

(1) Primarily, we are, as Christians and Churchmen, concerned about the welfare of any branch of the Church; and we should, therefore, take no action which would injure the peace and progress of the Church of England—as the summary rejection of the new Prayer-Book manifestly would—except on the strongest grounds of faithfulness to truth and duty.

(2) As regards the book itself, while there are things in it of which we, as evangelicals, gravely disapprove, it is not possible with fairness to say that its use would subvert the character of the Church of England, *provided that it is faithfully adhered to as the limit of what is not only permissible but permitted within the Church.*

But (3) this proviso is essential; and, inasmuch as the nation certainly would not sanction the book without the limiting safe-

guards explicitly stated therein, it is at once a matter of fair dealing on the part of Church and a matter of duty for members of Parliament to see that substantial and sufficient guarantee is given to the nation that the limits thus safeguarded will be effectively maintained, if and when the book is passed into law.

These are considerations which I venture to suggest as not unworthy in their motive, not unfair in their terms and not unreasonable in their demands. They may not be sufficiently militant to satisfy those who maintain that our one duty, as Protestants, is to denounce and to defeat this book; on which I shall make the single remark that such a line of action, if successful, might prove a pyrrhic victory for Protestantism. But whether or not the line which I have taken in this address is all that some who have so patiently listened to it might desire, my last word is one which will find an echo in the heart of every member of this Council. Whether the book passes or not—and certainly, if and when it does pass—the Free Churches of England will have more reason for their distinctive witness than they have had for generations; and they will have a new call and responsibility to stand for that evangelical reading of the Christian message, which is the New Testament reading of it and (as I tried lately to say to the other Council of Free Churchmen) the *great* reading of it, and which we shall never give up, for we have received it, not from our fathers only, but from Christ.

P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON.

II.

I HAVE been invited to write some comment upon the Opening Address of the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council.

It is not altogether an easy task, because the underlying questions involved in the whole matter are difficult in themselves, and could not be adequately discussed in the space at my disposal. But I accepted the invitation before I had seen the Address, knowing, from my personal intercourse with the Moderator, that though critical of the Church of England in many respects, he is always a reasonable and friendly critic. On reading the Address, I found that my anticipations were verified in a variety of points. I will mention one in particular in regard to which I think Dr. Carnegie Simpson has shown a more accurate perception than many who have spoken from his theological standpoint; he has seen that the provision for reservation, though he thoroughly disapproves it and distrusts its effects, “is not a denial of reformed doctrine.” (p. 595.) I thank him for this, and for many other things in the Address.

I wish to make two preliminary remarks. (1) It is right that I should say at once that I am not speaking in the name of the House

of Bishops, or, indeed, of anyone but myself. No one is committed by anything I may say. (2) It is customary to speak of the proposals for the revision of the Prayer-Book as emanating from the Bishops. This is, in a sense, true. According to the constitution of the Church Assembly, in matters of this sort, the point is considered by the Houses of Clergy and Laity sitting separately, and it is the business of the House of Bishops, when their proceedings are concluded, to consider their results in detail and determine the form in which the matter is to be brought before the Assembly. The three Houses had before them a document N.A. 84—the product of much labour in Convocation and the Assembly. The clergy proposed a very large number, and the laity a much smaller number of amendments in N.A. 84 and the Bishops, having all this material before them, have put the result of their deliberations before the Assembly. Critics sometimes speak as if the Bishops, out of their own minds, had thrown this document down before the Church. In fact, there are twenty years of labour behind it. The Measure and its Schedule came forward, after an immense period of reflection, in the most constitutional way. They have the support of the large majority of the House of Bishops, but the Bishops are not the sole originators of it.

I will now venture to offer one or two criticisms upon special points in the Address. I said at the outset that I expected to find Dr. Carnegie Simpson a reasonable and friendly critic. I do not think that he has disappointed me in any of the sections of his Address which are critical. What does strike me is the extraordinary difficulty of the most friendly critic in realising the situation of a body to which he does not belong—at any rate in realising the situation as it appears to those inside.

(1) He speaks of the Church as having made "a contract" with the State through the Enabling Act which it would be trying to "escape or evade" (p. 591) if it demurs to the exercise by Parliament of its undoubted power to throw out the Prayer-Book Measure. It is generally unsatisfactory to introduce the idea of contract into the relations of such bodies as the State and the Church: it savours of the letter rather than of the spirit, and makes no allowance for the permanence of such bodies as these and their need of such adaptation to the changes in outward conditions as all living things must make. But even if the Church had approached the State in a contract-making frame of mind—offering to provide, so to say, religious goods, and to be liable to pains and disabilities if the goods did not come up to sample—the Church might still expect intelligent and judicial interpretation of the terms. But I do not think this was the frame of mind in which we approached the State. I would refer to the speech of the Archbishop of Canterbury at the opening of the

first meeting of the Assembly, June 30, 1920. (Proceedings of National Assembly, 1921, p. 4.) Having read a gracious message from the King greeting the Assembly at its first meeting, and expressing the "earnest hope that it may be fruitful of good in the life of our Church and People," the Archbishop recalled to the Assembly the resolution of the old Representative Church Council which had led to the formation of the Assembly. This resolution ran as follows: "That there is in principle no inconsistency between a national recognition of religion and the spiritual independence of the Church, and this Council requests the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to consider the advisability of appointing a committee to inquire what changes are advisable in order to secure in the relations of Church and State a fuller expression of the spiritual independence of the Church as well as of the national recognition of religion." It was with these instructions that the committee suggested was formed, the Enabling Bill was drawn, and has been carried out since it passed Parliament. The whole of the Archbishop's speech is of the utmost value as indicating what the ruling ideas in the Church were. The conditions existing at the time practically deprived the Church of all power of adapting itself to the spiritual needs of a changing age, and it was this power which it hoped to secure by the Enabling Act.

(2) A second illustration of what seems to me a rather external view of the situation is found in Dr. Carnegie Simpson's remarks on the mutable character of the Bishops considered as an authority (p. 593). He quotes the case of the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, which, he says (p. 593) "the Anglican episcopate supported as a body." Some modification would, I think, seem desirable in this statement if the history of the time were more fully recalled. It is true that Archbishop Tait moved for a Bill, but the Bill that was carried varied very seriously from the Archbishop's original proposals. (See Davidson, *Life of Archbishop Tait*. vol. 2, pp. 190-191.) The comments made on it by some of his colleagues in the Government to Mr. Disraeli (Buckle, *Life of Disraeli*. Vol. v, pp. 315 ff), and the Reports of Convocation in the year 1874 show the Bill in its actual context at the time, the violent hostility it aroused, and the lack of enthusiasm for it which some of the Bishops displayed. Its knell was tolled by the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline 1906 (Report, par. 337). "It was passed through Parliament in the face of Convocation's criticism and in spite of vehement opposition on the part of High Churchmen in the country. . . . The transformation which the Bill underwent in committee on the motion of Lord Shaftesbury, with the support of Lord Cairns, then Lord Chancellor, but contrary to the wish of its original promoters, led to sharp recriminations in Parliament, to widespread disaffection

outside, and to a further consolidation of those who regarded the Bill as an engine of oppression of High Churchmanship. . . . In view of all the facts we think that the Act should be repealed." Even if the Bishops of 1874 had been more enthusiastic about the Act than they actually were, this verdict might fairly put their successors out of conceit with it.

I have mentioned these points because I think they show how hard it is for an onlooker, however friendly, to see the difficulties, which the present Measure is intended to meet, in the context to which they belong, as seen from the inside. Dr. Carnegie Simpson's comments upon the Enabling Act and the Public Worship Regulation Act are not surprising. Both are Acts of Parliament. They have been passed in the ordinary way, like Acts providing for taxation, perhaps more like Acts dealing with local and provincial interests. It is not unnatural, therefore, that he and others should ask: Can you guarantee that the proposals you now submit to Parliament will really be effective, and that discipline, which everyone admits to be seriously defective in the Church of England, will be completely restored or even improved if your proposals are accepted? This is sometimes treated as if it were a simple question to which a simple answer ought to be ready. This view is very far indeed from the truth. I think it is necessary to use some plainness of speech on this point.

(1) A Bishop is sometimes asked to condemn some doctrine or forbid some practice on the ground that it is Romanising or heretical. He may know for certain that it is neither, and that he would merely earn the contempt of all educated churchmen if he accepted such advice. However carefully and courteously he may explain this, he will be very lucky if he persuades his correspondent, and if his refusal to interfere is not set down to a weak-kneed tendency to encourage lawlessness. I have no doubt that if the new proposals come into operation, people will still make unreasonable demands upon the Bishops for interference. No legislation upon the Prayer-Book will ever stop this: the only way in which it can be brought to an end will be the more widespread extension of a reasoned knowledge of what Christianity is.

(2) It cannot be denied that in the last hundred years an immense amount of spiritual work of the very best kind has been done by High Churchmen, even by extreme High Churchmen. It is open to anyone to say that, however excellent they may be in their work, they ought to fulfil the letter of the law. This comment seems plausible. But the weakness of it is that in the conditions in which we have been living for the last hundred years, there was, in practice, no workable method of criticising and still less revising the letter of the law. It is probable that no society in the world, except

the Church, could have survived such conditions. A hundred years or so ago a trade union was an illegal association. The evils which the Factory Acts were aimed at preventing were in many, perhaps in all, cases unassailable under the letter of the law. What kind of prospect would the State have had if difficulties such as those which hindered church legislation till the foundation of the Church Assembly had prevailed in civil matters? Could we have escaped a violent revolution? We have escaped because we have found a more positive and rational conception of legislation—a method which increases freedom instead of stiffening prohibitions. The Public Worship Regulation Act, as it left Parliament, was the last instance, we may hope, of the old conception of legislation: it was consciously aimed at "putting down Ritualism." I do not deny that there have been perverse people and people with a real disloyalty to the Church of England among the ranks of the Ritualists, but I feel that our chance of dealing with them depends on our legislating in accordance with the requirement of this age and not trying to enforce the letter of the law two hundred and fifty years old.

In view of these and similar facts, I think the question raised by Dr. Carnegie Simpson is more difficult to answer than he has quite realised. And for the same reason I am hopeful of the effect on the order of the Church of the new proposals if they are brought into operation. There are various grounds of hope. They have approved themselves to very large majorities of all the bodies which have the right to speak in the name of the Church. It is said, of course, that the Church Assembly is not representative. But this is only partly true. It is representative of those Church-members who are sufficiently interested in the Church to record their names as electors and exercise their voting power. It is with the Church elections as with municipal elections, a large proportion of possible voters do not record votes. But this is not considered a reason for suspending or reversing decisions taken by bodies thus elected. Nor does a similar condition in the Church Assembly destroy the hope that the majorities obtained give promise of a large mitigation of the existing disorder. There are strong and vocal minorities who are not satisfied: but there is reason to hope that the proposals commend themselves to a great majority of Churchmen, and this is, in fact, the surest ground for order and discipline.

On the other hand, I am quite sure that the rejection of these proposals will produce a chaos greater than anything we have yet seen. Dr. Carnegie Simpson sees this, and realises the danger: but he bases on it a censure of the episcopate, on the ground that it should have prevented matters getting to this pass. It is a signal illustration of the point I noted above, that he looks at the situation from the outside rather than from within. Does Dr. Carnegie Simpson

realise the exact position of the Prayer-Book as it stands? The section in the prefatory matter "Concerning the service of the Church" definitely declares that the aim of the Book shall be that "from henceforth the whole Realm shall have but one use." Every minister at his ordination and on being licensed or admitted to a benefice promises "that he will use the form in the said Book prescribed and none other except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority." What of hymns? What of the services held in a parochial mission? What of harvest festival services? These are not in the said Book prescribed: what lawful authority is there to order them? This is not a fanciful question. The late Canon Body, who did so much to initiate and help the movement for parochial missions, told me that at the beginning of the effort he consulted the Bishop of the Diocese in which the first mission was to be held. The Bishop was interested and encouraging. But he said he could not authorise mission sermons of the type suggested, except in immediate connection with Morning and Evening Prayer. Canon Body said that this would be fatal to his plan, unless he might put the sermon first and the Morning and Evening Prayer afterwards. The people he wanted were just those who would not go to Morning or Evening Prayer. The Bishop did not press his point. Was he, or was he not "condoning lawlessness"? I doubt whether it is possible to answer this question. But I may point out that in the proposed revision hymns are definitely legalised for the first time, definite provision is made for thanksgiving for harvest, and power is given to a Bishop to sanction "upon any occasion approved by him, a special supplementary order or form of prayer" for use in public worship in his diocese. That is, certain things doubtfully lawful would be made definitely legal by these proposals: if they are thrown out may we not ask whether the doubt is not resolved in the other direction—so that all these things would then be definitely illegal? If there is doubt whether the proposals will restore discipline if carried, there is no doubt that the rejection of them will make discipline of any sort practically impossible.

(3) There is one other remark, of a general character, which I venture to make here. I have urged that the criticisms under consideration do not fully realise the actual condition of things in the Church. I suggest that the tests applied to the proposals are different from any that would be applied to any series of proposals for legislation in the secular sphere, and are such as no proposals for new legislation could ever satisfy. For instance, in 1926 there was a general strike. This year Mr. Baldwin's Government has passed a Bill the provisions of which aim at correcting certain defects in the law as it stood last year. If the Prime Minister is asked whether his Bill satisfies the extremer thinkers on his own side

or has obtained the consent of the extremer thinkers on the other, and whether he can guarantee that the scheme will prevent a general strike in the future, he must inevitably say, No. The success of such proposals must depend upon the country. He can say, I have gathered all the information I could, and given the best thought to it my colleagues and I can bestow: we have reason to think that the outcry raised in various quarters does not really represent the mind of the country: but neither we nor any other legislator can say more. In civil life this fact is recognised: it is true also of Church legislation. There is, however, this important difference in the two cases. The proposals now before Parliament have been submitted to all the bodies constitutionally qualified to speak in the name of the Church, and have been approved by overwhelming majorities. If then, we are asked, have you satisfied the extreme parties in your body by means of these proposals? we must say, No, and we have probably irritated a number of persons who object to all change and take no part in the more active life of the Church. If we are asked, can you guarantee that these proposals will restore order in the Church? we must answer, No, we cannot be fully certain of their effect till the proposals have been tried: we are exactly in the same position as any other legislator. We can say, that we have considered with the utmost care the points put before us in the Report of the Royal Commission and the Letters of Business: we have faced the questions where there is sharp controversy, as well as those where there is little or none: we have not satisfied ourselves with the futile plan of putting forward uncontroversial recommendations and leaving all the matters which foster indiscipline without suggestion of remedy. The scheme is not put forward lightly: it represents the work of twenty years. And we venture to claim that a scheme so vital to the well-being of the Church, on subjects so completely within its purview and competence, should not be rejected.

THOMAS OXON.

KING BORIS OF BULGARIA.

NINE years ago, on October 3rd, 1918, at the saddest and most critical hour of the history of Bulgaria, young Prince Boris was called upon to succeed his father on a throne imperilled by the results of a misguided policy. The war outside the frontiers had barely ended, civil strife reigned within; the country was on the road to ruin and anarchy. Few sovereigns have been faced on their accession with as many difficulties. King Boris set to work at once and proved equal to the tremendous task confronting him. Aged twenty-four only, he traced for himself a line of conduct which would do credit to the most experienced leader of men. Where others might have used the strength of their authority to impose their will, young King Boris resorted to kindness and gentleness alone. This policy of moderation, inspired by the most wonderful patience, did more to pacify the turbulent elements of the stricken kingdom than severity or force. King Boris placed his full confidence in the Bulgarian people and his struggling, hard-working and sorely-tried subjects have not failed him during the last years of suffering.

There was a time, not so very far back, when Bulgaria was universally admired and respected for the qualities of her race and the valour of her army. The admirable progress realised by this nation during the first thirty years of her existence as a free State had earned for her the esteem of Europe. After the brilliant victories of the Balkan Crusade against the Turks in 1912, Bulgaria was the recognised leader of the Balkan States. But the wheel of fortune turned; in 1915, the Bulgarian Government, with less luck in the dice game than their Balkan neighbours, backed the wrong horse and lost.

The trials of Bulgaria since the armistice are well known to all. Bulgaria remains threatened by the danger of Bolshevism, due to persistent Russian propaganda and the sad legacy of the war. One remembers only too well the Communist plots in Bulgaria in September, 1923, and April, 1924; the attempt upon the King's life and the bomb in the Cathedral. The other burdens of Bulgaria include: the loss of territories peopled by Bulgarians, the presence in Bulgaria of over 250,000 refugees, the reparations payments and numerous treaty obligations to fulfil, the deprivation of the promised outlet to the Ægean Sea, the lack of adequate means of defence, and the spirit of distrust which still obscures relations between the Balkan States. These are only a few of the problems with which, since 1918, the Bulgarian ruler and people have had to grapple. These years of difficulty and ceaseless work, of disillusion and sorrow, however, far from discouraging the valiant King

have only served to strengthen his personality and enhance his wonderful gifts. During eight years he never left the country, comforting and sustaining the people by his presence, advice and admirable devotion. In July, 1926, he crossed the frontiers of Bulgaria for the first time, hoping to do some climbing in Switzerland and enjoy a well-deserved rest. He was recalled to Sofia in August, by the untimely interference in the home affairs of Bulgaria by over-considerate neighbours.

This year, King Boris has been abroad since the end of July and returned to Bulgaria a few weeks ago. His eight years' seclusion in Bulgaria have resulted in the fact that the young sovereign is not yet as well-known outside the Balkan peninsula as he deserves to be. The eldest son of King Ferdinand (grandson of Louis-Philippe, King of France) and of the Princess Marie-Louise of Bourbon-Parma, King Boris III was born at Sofia on January 30th, 1894, receiving at birth the title of Prince of Tyrnovo. Born in the Roman Catholic Church, he was made to join the Orthodox religion for political reasons in 1896, the other three children of King Ferdinand, Prince Cyrille of Preslav and the Princesses Eudoxie and Nadejda (now Duchess Eugene of Wurtemberg), being brought up Roman Catholics.

The Royal children were devoted to each other, and spent an uneventful childhood in Bulgaria, the two Princes being educated at the Military Academy of Sofia. They had the misfortune, at a very early age, to be deprived of the affectionate care of their mother, who died after the birth of the Princess Nadejda in 1899. This first sorrow was deeply felt by Prince Boris, a prematurely intelligent and sensitive child, who seemed already conscious of the responsibilities of the future. During 1911 and part of 1912, the young Princes travelled extensively for educational purposes with their Swiss tutor and a Bulgarian professor in Asia Minor and along the Mediterranean Coast, visiting North Africa and the Canary Islands.

From early childhood, the future King showed great aptitude and liking for the most diverse subjects, including botany, natural history, mechanics. His father, who remains one of the greatest authorities on ornithology and botany alike, greatly encouraged these particular tastes of his eldest son. Meanwhile other branches of education were not neglected; young Prince Boris took all his degrees at the University of Sofia and studied languages so thoroughly that he speaks, with equal fluency, Bulgarian, French, Italian, German, and English. King Boris is also well acquainted with Albanian, Hungarian, and Turkish, three of the most difficult languages of Europe, his father ensuring this by giving his sons one Albanian and one Hungarian valet and a Turkish groom. The two Princes were never fond of riding, though they are better horse-

men than King Ferdinand was. From the earliest childhood they loved mechanics, and King Boris has since been called the "best Royal Chauffeur." He knows more about the complicated machinery of a Rolls-Royce than many a professional and is also a capable and experienced engine-driver. King Boris started shooting at fourteen, and it has become his favourite form of sport.

The official journeys of King Boris as Heir-Apparent included a visit to his Godfather, Czar Nicolas II, at St. Petersburg in 1897; visits to Brussels and Paris in 1910, which were both followed by extensive motoring and sight-seeing in Belgium and France, and the visit to London for the coronation of King George in 1911, when the Bulgarian Heir-Apparent, attended by Monsieur Dimitri Stancioff, then minister in Paris, set foot for the first time on British soil. The Prince, representing his father, attended all the ceremonies and festivities, which followed each other in a gorgeous succession from June 19th to the 28th. The strongest impression made upon the young Prince at the time was that of the Naval Review at Portsmouth, of which he still speaks with enthusiasm.

The coming of age of Prince Boris of Bulgaria, on January 20th, 1912, was celebrated with great solemnity at Sofia, in the presence of representatives of all the European States. The impressive ceremonies were carried out faultlessly, directed by King Ferdinand in person. The presence of all the Balkan Heirs-Apparent at Sofia in such a friendly atmosphere was more significant than it seemed at the time, as the Balkan Crusade against the Turks was to start but a few months later under Bulgaria's leadership. The Grand-Duke Andrew of Russia represented the Czar. The Balkan Envoys included the present King of Serbia, the late King Ferdinand of Roumania, the late King Constantine of Greece and Prince Danilo of Montenegro. When the youthful Prince Boris took the oath at the Military School of Sofia, and was given a high command in the infantry regiment of Tyrnovo, there followed an imposing review of troops and a salute; after which the enthusiasm of the usually impassive Bulgarian crowds testified to the popularity of Bulgaria's future King.

During the Balkan War of 1912 Prince Boris served as major under General Thodoroff, on the staff of the Seventh "Rilo" Division, the other officers including Prince Cyrille, General Ratch Petroff and M. Dimitri Stancioff, who, as Bulgarian Minister in Paris, had temporarily exchanged his post for active service in the army. Having left the headquarters (Stara-Zagora) on October 22nd, Prince Boris took part in the victory of Demir-Hissar, November 5th, against Ali Nadir Pasha's troops. The Bulgarians then drove the Turks from Enikoie, Negovan, Giouvezna, Arakli down to Salonica, then defended by Hassan Taksim Pasha.

Prince Boris, with the Seventh Division, took part in the victorious

march from Doiran, by Seres, Drama, Philippi to Cavalla. Later, passing through Veles, Uskub, Nisch, he joined the troops on the Adrianople front and inspected the Tchataldja lines. Prince Boris was one of the first Bulgarian officers to enter Adrianople after the Bulgarian victory. Treated as any other officer, Boris showed great fearlessness, endurance and competence; his kindness to the soldiers and his compassionate interest in the wounded ever increasing his popularity throughout the kingdom.

During the World War Prince Boris was attached to his father's staff under the strict control of King Ferdinand, who was well aware of his son's opposition to Bulgaria's co-operation with the Central Powers. King Ferdinand had no more tolerated the wise counsel of his son than the remonstrances of 75 per cent. of the Bulgarian nation. Fate chose that he should be helped at the time both by the clever tactics of the German and Austrian representatives at Sofia and the blunders of Allied diplomacy, misled by Russia. The results of this policy are but too well known. Following the abdication of King Ferdinand, Prince Boris was proclaimed King of Bulgaria by his people and has steered the nation through many a storm since. He has so closely identified himself with the Bulgarian nation since his accession that it is difficult to study his personality without alluding to Bulgaria's problems.

It has been said that the bachelor King—for, at thirty-three, he shares this privilege with the Prince of Wales—is a picturesque and rather sad figure. It is true that a halo of romance surrounds this modern ruler, related by hereditary ties to all the Courts of Europe, descendant in a direct line from St. Louis, King of France, and withal so essentially constitutional and democratic. His ancestors lie in the vaults of the Abbaye de St. Denis and the Royal Chapel of Dreux; yet he belongs closely to the Bulgarian people amidst whom he was born and bred. He finds time for everything and has so many aptitudes that his versatility seems almost incredible.

King Boris has a most engaging manner, which reflects his great interest in his fellow-beings; dark and slender, with long artistic hands, he has a narrow pale face, lit up by eager dark blue eyes that sometimes are very soulful, and by a wistful smile. He is unassuming, modest in bearing, high-minded, considerate and brave as a lion, as he has demonstrated on more than one occasion. On April 14th, 1925, a dastardly attempt was made upon his life when he was motoring back to Sofia from a shooting expedition. Concealed bandits ambushed the car. The chauffeur was hit, the car was damaged, the naturalist who was with the King was killed. After a stirring fight, the King ran to an approaching omnibus, seized the wheel, drove back full speed to a neighbouring town, collected a platoon of soldiers and returned to the scene of attack, still at the wheel.

Though King Boris lives practically alone, with his unmarried

sister, Princess Eudoxie, he is not lonely, as he mixes freely with his people in close comradeship. His popularity is enormous. His future marriage is naturally of considerable concern and importance to his country, as the Bulgarian Constitution does not allow anyone but the son of the reigning monarch to succeed. Though the matter has been as widely discussed, and names have been mentioned as indiscreetly as in the case of the Prince of Wales, King Boris is not contemplating matrimony for the time being.

The recent tour of King Boris, who left Bulgaria last August, has included, after some climbing expeditions in Switzerland, a stay in France, during which the King visited President Doumergue at Rambouillet and met M. Briand and M. Poincaré. Whilst sojourning in the British Isles, King Boris spent a few days with their Majesties the King and Queen at Balmoral. Passing through London, he laid a wreath of flowers on the tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey and was received by Lord Salisbury, in the absence of Mr. Baldwin and Sir Austen Chamberlain. King Boris met many prominent British statesmen in Scotland, and through the medium of grouse-driving political conversations took place of great interest to both sides. His interlocutors were all struck by his extensive knowledge, affable manner and clear judgment; one of them wrote as follows after meeting the King in Scotland:

"It was a great honour to meet King Boris and a great pleasure to be allowed to talk with him, intimately, about so many things, from wild flowers to constitutions, and from grouse to governments, as he so kindly permitted. His intelligence is far above the average and his courtesy and personal charm and approachability were of the finest kind. But what impressed me about him especially was a steady breadth of view and balance, the statesman's mental 'evenness of keel,' which is the real sign and seal of the governing mind. One can only rejoice in his future control of and effect on the destinies of Bulgaria. I thought his ideas on industrial development excellent. To convert the Balkans from a powder magazine into a power house is a great objective."

This is but one of the many tributes paid to King Boris during his visit to Britain. On his way home, he visited the King and Queen of Italy at San Rossore, was received by the Pope in audience and had two interviews with Signor Mussolini. After spending a week in Naples the King returned to Bulgaria, having acquired yet more experience and made yet more friends during his well employed holiday.

In Bulgaria, the young Monarch leads a simple and busy life, sharing in all the duties and responsibilities of administration with his ministers, whom he often visits at the government offices. The present Bulgarian Cabinet is under the able leadership of the capable, energetic and hard-working M. Liaptcheff, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party (Conservative), whose sole aim is to set Bulgaria on her feet.

The conversations between the Balkan Prime Ministers at Geneva during the last Assembly have dispelled some of the clouds obscuring the political horizon of the Peninsula.

The programme of King Boris and M. Liaptcheff is based on the wish to live on friendly terms with the neighbouring States, and the desire to be one of the factors of the Peace of Europe. King Boris, during the informal motoring trips throughout Bulgaria which he so much enjoys, is constantly impressing these ideas on the people. He often deserts the somewhat melancholy Palace at Sofia, for stays in his favourite summer residence at Euxinograde on the Black Sea, or for long rambles in the mountains. A great lover of nature in her wildest moods, King Boris is never happier than at the wheel of his car, dashing about the country with the Princess Eudoxie and one or two friends. Held in great esteem by the Diplomatic Corps at Sofia, he has made a special friend of the present British Minister. Bulgaria has to-day no more valuable asset than her King.

Since the armistice, Governments have succeeded one another in Sofia, have made mistakes, been denounced by their successors and have incurred hostility; but, as a British author wrote the other day, "no one has been able to accuse King Boris of a single false move in his country." This constitutes a splendid and unique record, which has earned for the young Bulgarian Sovereign the regard of Europe. It is to be hoped that this appreciation will soon materialise into more practical support. King Boris is a firm believer in the League of Nations and follows its work with constant interest.

Since the day of his accession, but few rewards have fallen to the chivalrous knight who presides over the destinies of the brave Bulgarian people, in a romantic land where the great Danube flows into the strange and wonderful Black Sea, where roses grow thickly in deep, mysterious valleys, where mountains combine the grace of Scotch hills with the impressive grandeur of Kashmir. Sad and beautiful Balkan Peninsula, where primitive instincts breed strife and possessions excite envy and distrust. However, the most indomitable Balkan race is fortunate in having King Boris as leader. If fate is kind, the capable young Sovereign, whose predecessor and namesake converted the Kingdom to Christianity in 865, may yet bring lasting happiness to his valiant nation through the forces of peace.

Boris III of Bulgaria, is, at thirty-three and after only nine years of reign, already a great King. His greatness has been achieved, not by dashing feats or dazzling exploits, but by his modesty, simplicity, high sense of duty and earnest devotion to the Bulgarian people. Endowed with these gifts, King Boris will always have the esteem and sympathy of Britain, where, as Lord Oxford once said: "Monarchy is held and can only be held by the highest form of public service."

MADARA.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SPIRIT IN PUBLIC LIFE.

THERE are few English institutions which have played a greater part in the national life than the Public Schools. The interest excited by them and the confidence reposed in them, not only within but beyond the British Isles, are alike remarkable. The Public Schools are not all similar in origin or history or in their social or educational character. Some, like Eton College and Winchester College, are strictly colleges, as having been parts of ecclesiastical collegiate foundations; others are Grammar Schools, such as the many schools which date backwards to the reigns of Edward the VIth and Elizabeth; others were created or remodelled in the nineteenth century; for it is a striking fact that no great Public School came into being between the reigns of Queen Elizabeth and Queen Victoria. Some of the Public Schools are wholly or mainly boarding schools; others are day schools. But, various as they are, they breathe a certain atmosphere, they exercise a special influence; and it would seem that they make an irresistible appeal to an ever widening circle of parents over all the British Empire.

The Public Schools have often been the objects of bitter attack. But it seemed to me, when I was a headmaster, that attacks, whether they were made upon the Public Schools generally or upon some particular school, did not perceptibly affect the number of boys whose names were entered for them. Since the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 the pressure upon the Public Schools has been heavier than it was before, partly perhaps because the wealth of the nation has been more widely diffused, and partly too because the service which the Public Schools rendered to the nation in its agony was itself felt to be an imperishable monument of noble patriotism. Even when I was a headmaster the possible influx of boys from all parts of the world, and from the Eastern as well as from the Western world, into the Public Schools had begun to create some anxiety. I remember that applications for the admission of boys to Harrow came to me from India, from Egypt, and from Siam, as well as from Africa and South America. A number of the leading Mohammedan princes in India made a proposal to support a boarding house and erect a mosque in connection with it for their sons at Harrow. I once said laughingly to that great friend of Harrow cricket, the Earl of Bessborough, that I thought he would live to see Harrow represented in the cricket match at Lord's against Eton by two coloured princes. It is probably the formation of character in the Public Schools which has most deeply impressed observers who cannot themselves look back upon the experience of Public School life. A good many years ago, when I was travelling in

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Japan, the Minister of Education kindly invited me to deliver a lecture before the University of Tokio upon the training of an English gentleman. When he spoke to me about the lecture, I told him that I thought the English Public Schools had been more successful in forming the character than in training the intellect of their pupils. A quiet smile played upon his face as he replied, "I think we can look after the intellect; will you be so kind as to speak about the character?"

A boy's entrance into his Public School is generally an epoch-making event in his life. He becomes for the first time, as it were, an enfranchised citizen of a society which far exceeds the scope and range of his own family. He is taken out of himself; he learns to think not of himself alone or of himself and those who are near to him alone, but of himself in relation to the general body of which he is a member; he learns even to forget himself in the interest of the whole body. The lesson so learnt is often, if not always, productive of high character. For one of the most inspiring and ennobling sentiments of life is the willing subordination of the individual to the State; and that subordination, when it is effectively realised, constitutes good citizenship.

But a Public School has a past as well as a present. To the boy who enters it, it appears as an institution of great historical dignity. He feels that he is the heir of lofty traditions. Dr. Arnold was wont to say at Rugby that such elevation of thought and life as would naturally be shown by the scions of ancient aristocratic families ought to be equally shown by the sons of famous Public Schools. A new boy soon becomes conscious of his scholastic ancestry. He thinks of the great men who have sat upon the benches, played in the fields and worshipped in the Chapel which now are his. He is daily reminded of them by their names inscribed upon the walls, by the prizes founded in their honour, or by the tablets which commemorate their lives and their deaths in the Chapel. In a true sense they are to him not dead but still living. If I may quote some lines of the late Edward Bowen, the poet of Harrow School, in reference to a distinguished member of the School who had been killed on active service:

He trod of old the hill we tread,
He played the games we play;
The part of him that is not dead
Belongs to us to-day.

So it becomes a boy's silent passionate desire that he may prove himself not unworthy of his school. That was the spirit of the young British officer who at the battle of Laing's Nek rode to his death with the words *Floreat Etona* on his lips.

A Public School boy, then, comes to appreciate the duty of

playing his part in the life of the School. He is willing to sacrifice himself for the public good; he cheerfully obeys the captain of his eleven, if he is told to take his place at the wicket when the light is bad just before stumps are drawn; it never occurs to him to resist or complain. Far better is it in his eyes that the School should win the match and that he himself should make a poor score, than that he should make runs at the cost of the School losing the match. Unconsciously, it may be irresistibly, the immemorial spirit created by so many generations of boys who have gone before stamps itself in indelible characters upon his mind and his soul.

Yet again a new boy in a Public School is taught to accept a certain definite code of morals. The code may not be, and in fact is not, altogether complete or correct. It deals too lightly with some offences and too severely with others; but, such as it is, it is the creation of the boys themselves for themselves, and it is silently but powerfully imposed upon every new boy. Perhaps the most conspicuous feature in this code of morals is a sense of honour. There are certain things which a boy, if he has once imbibed the Public School spirit, will not and cannot do; others may do them, and the supreme penalty of their doing them is that they are wholly unconscious of having done them, or of having done wrong in doing them; but the true Public School boy instinctively shrinks from them. He will not break his word, he will not show the white feather, he will not take unfair advantage of other boys; in a word, he will always and everywhere "play the game;" for it may well be that the spirit of honour is even more forcibly inculcated on the playing fields than in the class-rooms. A Public School boy learns that it is impossible to play any organised game, or to play it with any satisfaction, unless the players scrupulously observe not only the written laws but the unwritten conventions of the game. Whatever is mean then or tricky or underhand or disingenuous is repugnant to the true Public School boy. He is a sportsman; and sport, however gravely it may be debased by some of its votaries, when it becomes infected by the gambling spirit, is, or ought to be, a synonym of honourable conduct.

Public Schools may be said to be in a large measure self-governing republics. Their character is determined fully as much by the boys as by the masters. In fact, the rules which boys make for boys are generally stricter or more strictly enforced than the rules which masters make for boys. But boys in the Public Schools enjoy a great measure of liberty, and it is this liberty which fits them for the conduct of after life. They are not disciplined by the incessant vigilance of officials during many hours of every day; they are left to themselves in many ways to originate and administer the regular system of their own lives. It is possible that they are exposed in

their school life to certain dangers which they would or might escape if they regularly played their games or spent their leisure hours under the eyes of their schoolmasters. But if the liberty of a Public School entails a certain loss, yet it may be said that because of that liberty the great majority of boys leave their Public Schools with a self-restraint and a self-respect, with a power of initiative and with a capacity for co-operation in a degree which singularly qualifies them to fight the battle of life. Nowhere is a person so fully judged by his merits without reference to wealth or rank or social antecedents as a boy in a Public School. The liberty of Public Schools is qualified by leadership. Whether a system of monitorial or prefectorial authority exists in a school or not, certain boys, in virtue of their age or character or intellectual or athletic distinction, become its natural leaders. They set the tone of the place, they claim obedience, they excite imitation, they stand out as representatives of their Schools. It is under these influences and by these experiences that the character of a Public School is almost insensibly developed.

The Public Schools then have established a tradition of their own. They may have insisted upon uniformity at the cost of doing injustice to those exceptional boys who, while they have won little honour in their school lives, as they did not shine upon the commonplace lines of mental or physical prowess, yet in their after-lives have often become the most highly honoured members of their generation, if not of all generations, in the School. They may have issued therefrom in a certain stable mediocrity. But in spite of all their faults and failings they have in a large measure created and disciplined the character of gentlemen. It has been sometimes critically observed that the Labour Party lacks what I have ventured to call the Public School spirit. When the first Government of the Labour Party was formed, with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister, two great Public Schools, and only two, Harrow and Winchester, were represented in his Cabinet. For the first time during many years of English history there was no Etonian in the Cabinet. It happened when I referred in a speech to this exclusion of Eton from the Cabinet that a strong Etonian, who was also, I think, a strong Conservative, wrote to me saying this was one of the highest honours which had ever been paid to Eton. I could not pretend to agree with him, if only because I cherished the hope that the Cabinet Ministers who had been educated at Harrow and Winchester might not unnaturally breathe something of the Public School spirit into the Labour Party.

No student of British industrial history can indeed maintain that the Public School spirit has always characterised the political or industrial conduct of Public School men. In the history of the

coal mines, for example, who can doubt that the original responsibility for the unhappy disputes, which have during the last three-quarters of a century convulsed the mining industry, may be justly laid upon the shoulders not of the miners but of the mine-owners? Had the employers, and especially the mine-owners, in the early Victorian era, when profits were pouring in, been wise enough to give the workers an equitable share of the money which had in so large a degree been earned by the workers, instead of absorbing the profits or nearly all the profits themselves, it is possible, and indeed it is probable, that the long-standing acrimonious feud between Capital and Labour would have been avoided. The evidence published by the Royal Commission upon the Mines in 1842, before the legislation which is and will ever be associated with the honoured name of the great Earl of Shaftesbury, can only excite a feeling of indignation at the cruel and callous spirit which could suffer not the miners alone but their wives and their little children to be treated as brute beasts. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond in the seventh chapter of their *Life of Lord Shaftesbury* have well summarised the conclusions at which the Commissioners arrived. It will be enough to quote two or three passages of the Report. A Lancashire woman who worked in the mines gave the following testimony :

" I have a belt round my waist and a chain passing between my legs, and so I go on my hands and feet. The water comes up to my clog tops, and I have seen it over my thighs. I have drawn till I have the skin taken off me. The belt and chain are worse when we are in the family way."

Speaking of children working in the mines and of their working at the age of six or even five years, Lord Shaftesbury, who was then Lord Ashley, said in the House of Commons about the Yorkshire pits :

" A child has a girdle round the waist to which is attached the chain that passes under the legs and is attached to the cart. He or she is obliged to pass on all-fours, and the chain passes under what, in their position, might be called the hind legs, and thus they have to pass through avenues not so good as a common sewer."

He quoted the evidence of a witness who said :

" I went into the pit at seven years of age. When I drew by a girdle and chain, the skin was broken, and the blood ran down. If we said anything they would beat us. I have known many draw at six. They must draw or be beaten. They cannot straighten their backs during the day."

What wonder can it be that Lord Shaftesbury should, in speaking of that Report, have used the emphatic language :

" It is not possible for anyone, if he has a heart in his bosom, to

read the details of this awful document without a combined feeling of shame, horror, and indignation " ?

One striking fact may be added, if only as an answer to the complaint, which is sometimes recklessly uttered by agitators upon political platforms, that the clergy have done nothing for the benefit of the working class. Down to the year 1815 no inquest was ever held upon the victims of accidents in the mines of Northumberland and Durham. It was then that the Vicar of Jarrow, the Rev. J. Hodgson, in whose parish no fewer than ninety-two lives had been lost by an explosion in a coal mine, issued a protest which led to the establishment of a Society for the Prevention of Accidents ; it was that society which invoked the help of Sir Humphry Davy, and his help took the form of the invention of the safety-lamp.

Where was the Public School spirit in the minds and hearts of the men who could consent to accumulate wealth at such a price of suffering and misery? Where was the sense of human equality? Where was the generous view of society as a whole? Where was the honourable temper which would refuse to sacrifice the weak and the poor for the benefit of the powerful and the wealthy? It can be no pleasure to dwell on so conspicuous a failure of public duty and common humanity. But in the attitude of the mine-owners to the miners during all the early part of the last century lies the explanation of the profound dislike and distrust which so many of the miners entertain to-day toward the mine-owners. Therein lies too the explanation of the almost childlike confidence which they repose in Trade Unionism ; for they know only too well that such improvements as have occurred in their social and industrial circumstances have not generally been conceded by the mine-owners out of goodwill, but have been wrung from them by the force of that collective action which is popularly known as Trade Unionism. It is high time that the spirit of conciliation and co-operation should take the place of bitter antagonism in the relation of the employers to the employed all through the world of industry ; and that where conciliation and co-operation fail, the principle of arbitration, which the mine-owners and the miners alike regard as applicable to international affairs, should be at least equally applied to industrial affairs.

But if there is some reason for the belief that in the long series of lock-outs and strikes, which have gone far towards ruining the world of industry in Great Britain, the fault lay at first mainly with the employers, but has in recent years lain in equal, and perhaps in greater, measure with the employed, yet it would not be difficult to indicate certain points in which the spirit of Public School life has singularly failed to assert itself among men who have enjoyed more than members of the Labour Party the opportunity of

acquiring and displaying it. A Public School, as has been said, is a democracy. More than other societies it represents the democratic principle of equality. What would be said in the Public Schools of any such transaction as the sale of honours? It has more than once been my fortune as a headmaster to watch with admiring sympathy the purely equitable spirit in which a captain of the eleven has bestowed the highly valued honours which he commands upon the basis of merit alone, at the cost of excluding from the eleven boys who on every ground, except that of proficiency in the game, might have held themselves, and might have been held by their schoolfellows, to be entitled in a singular degree to represent their school as members of the cricket eleven. From pecuniary corruption the Labour Party has been specially free. Perhaps it has not yet been so grievously tempted as other parties to make money by the traffic in honours.

But there are lessons which the Labour Party still needs to learn, if it is to realise the Public School spirit. It must needs think of allegiance to the whole body of the State rather than to any one of its parts. The very name "Labour Party," as a French critic has suggested, is unfortunate, if only because it suggests that the Labour Party is one which adopts and pursues such a policy as tends to the good, and indeed to the material good, of the Labour Party alone. For if the Labour Party professes itself to be not a national but a sectional party, in other words, to serve not the State but Labour alone, it asserts a lower spirit of public service than other parties. The old political parties, whether Tories or Whigs, Conservatives or Liberals, aimed or professed to aim at the welfare of the whole community. The Labour Party alone to-day, like the Irish Party in the last generation, seems at times to forget or ignore all interests except its own. But whatever party in the State or in the Church aspires to achieve only a sectional, and not a patriotic or a catholic, end is in greater or less degree opposed to the national welfare. It is here that the Labour Party, whether it be in power or out of power, may fail in statesmanship. If it is to administer the affairs of the nation with any success, it needs to expand its political and social theories at least so far as to realise that the State is not the Labour Party alone; nor can the State as a whole prosper, unless all parties are equally protected and supported by its governors.

There has often been in British political history a strange tendency of certain Englishmen to pursue an anti-British policy. They scarcely affect to be patriots; they call themselves cosmopolitans. But cosmopolitanism is an honourable spirit, only if it is built upon patriotism, as is patriotism, only if it is built on the love of city or home. Apart from patriotism it is apt to be indistinguishable

from personal selfishness, as when a man seeks to escape the duty which he owes to his country by pleading the duty which he owes or thinks he owes to humanity. The Conscientious Objectors to military service during the war of 1914-1919 would have acted with sounder logic as cosmopolitans, if it had not been their policy to enjoy all the benefits which citizens derive from the ordered community known as the State, and then to refuse the corresponding service which all citizens may render to the State by defending it against its enemies. It is not a little difficult at the present time to understand the attitude of the Labour Party or of some among the leaders of the Labour Party towards Russia and China. They do not seem to be gravely moved by the fact that the Soviet Government has sunk in morality much below the level of the government of the Czar during the Crimean war, in so far as it has robbed English men and women of many millions of pounds which have been invested upon faith in the Government of Russia in Russian securities, or that the Chinese have threatened and, but for the fear of international consequences, would probably have destroyed, the lives of many thousands of Europeans who are living in the seaports and in some cities of the interior of China. Strangest of all perhaps is the plea advanced for military and naval inaction in China, if indeed it is seriously advanced, by more members of the Labour Party, that the English men and women living in Shanghai are not themselves members of the working-class. But would the British Government be justified in affording no security to English men unless they are manual labourers? Is it such a crime to be a civil servant or a merchant that no such person is entitled to the protection of British diplomacy?

More than once the question has been put to me by working men at a meeting: What is the good of the British Empire to us? and in listening to it I have thought that, if working men were to get into a difficulty in some remote part of the world, they would at once fly to the British Consul for the purpose of sheltering themselves under the ægis of the Union Jack. There is a danger in ignorance or prejudice as well as in the selfishness of class. Selfishness indeed, or shortsightedness as it perhaps ought rather to be called, is not a characteristic of one social class alone. It has been lamentably displayed by the plutocracy and the aristocracy in time past. But to-day the Labour Party seems to make a boast of it. Strikes, whether on the railways or in the mines, are apt to be examples of a selfish and cruel policy. For a cessation of industry brings untold suffering upon a vast number of wholly innocent people, and even of poor people. It cuts down their supplies, it sends up the cost of living, it leaves them to endure hunger and cold; it reduces to pauperism not only men but women who have saved just enough money after long

meritorious service to keep body and soul together in old age. Yet not a word of pity is spoken by the strikers for their unhappy fellow-countrymen. I do not plead for the inheritors of vast wealth; yet the representatives of Labour might perhaps feel generosity enough to show some sympathy with the descendants of ancient families who cannot without a feeling of bitter pain leave, and leave for ever, the homes which are consecrated to them by the traditional associations of many centuries. But at least the small tradesman and the daily worker whose living is brought to a standstill, the poor who are left helpless and homeless in old age, might appeal to the sympathy of the agitators who profess to speak for the railwaymen or the miners, and even of Mr. A. J. Cook.

Democracy, it is sometimes said, is inimical to moral courage. It invests the will of a majority with a sacrosanct force. *Vox populi vox Dei*. There is no temper perhaps more demoralising than that of subserviency to votes. He who sets great store by his moral independence may well be thankful if he does not need to seek or to gain anybody's vote. It would be wrong, however, to lay undue blame upon politicians; for they are bound to understand that nothing but a majority of votes will enable them to carry out a certain policy, or to attain such a position as will afford them any promise or hope of carrying out such a policy. All honour indeed is owing to those statesmen who do not shrink, even in a Democracy, from telling the people when and where they believe the popular judgment to be wrong. Yet for the most part the secret of success in a democracy is popularity, and popularity is often won by the sacrifice of principle. The lack of moral courage indeed is not peculiar to any political party or parties.

The Public School spirit has tended to cultivate the faculty of leadership. It has created the initiative which has so often asserted itself in many parts of the civilised and uncivilised world. It has encouraged men, and even young men, to accept responsibilities which they might not unjustly have felt to be too burdensome for their immature age. It may well be wished that all persons who take part in public life should learn the lesson of "playing the game." It is a lesson which has been regularly taught upon the playing-fields of the Public Schools. It springs out of the traditional British interest in athletic games. For sport is essentially a British institution. Many or most of the terms which describe the different aspects of sport in foreign languages are English in their origin. To say that an action is not sporting, or is not cricket, or that somebody does not play up, or does not play with a straight bat, or does not pull his weight, or that he hits below the belt, is an English method of indicating some defect of character. Perhaps one of the most difficult yet the most valuable habits which are

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formed as outcomes of the sporting spirit is the habit of obedience to the umpire; for it is a habit expressive of self-restraint, of respect for authority and of confidence in the honourable spirit of one whose decision, whether popular or unpopular, must be unhesitatingly accepted.

The true sportsman in a Public School or elsewhere will act with chivalrous honour. He will prefer honour to honours. He will sensitively avoid the suspicion or appearance of unfair play; he will always be ready to give the side which is opposed to his own the benefit of the doubt. It was so that, when an English batsman was run out in one of the test matches last year by the accident of collision with one of the fieldsmen, the captain of the Australian eleven courteously invited him to continue his innings. For the hatred of meanness, of self-seeking and of disingenuousness has stamped itself on the heart of the British people mainly, if not wholly, owing to the temper of true sport.

But the generosity of sport is not always displayed in public life. It may be admitted that the employers have been too eager at times to avail themselves of such means as were legally open to them for raising their profits at the expense of their workmen. But they have not, I think, committed actual breaches of good faith. They have upon the whole sustained the inviolability of contracts. But a lightning strike, as it is called, if it involves, as it does, the breach of plighted good faith, is a wholly immoral proceeding; it cannot be justified on the plea of necessity by men who resort to it. Yet lightning strikes have come to be far too common; they have almost been taken for granted as regular incidents in the industrial warfare, and the Labour Party has been apt to treat them as excusable, if not as actually commendable. The general strike itself was scarcely less immoral than the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. It is difficult to express the sense of pain which must arise in all patriotic minds at any such action as tends to destroy or impair the sanctity which has hitherto been regarded by the nations of mankind as attaching to an Englishman's word.

There is some reason also to fear that in industrial as in political controversy truth is held less sacred than it ought to be. It would be easy to quote instances of statements which have been refuted as soon as they were made, but have not been retracted. Yet to make a false statement and to leave it without apology, in the hope that it may blacken some one's character, is an anti-social offence. A recent trial in the Courts of Law has shown how unscrupulous may be the statements made by a man of good education not only against the living, but against the dead. It may well be hoped that a wider experience of public life will produce in all classes a more scrupulous reverence for the truth. It is impossible to overrate the

value of the implicit faith which has been everywhere reposed in the word of an Englishman. Scarcely less valuable has been the confidence so universally felt that it was possible to rely upon the honesty of Englishmen in the domain of commerce. British goods have been often preferred to the goods of other nations, they were not seldom preferred to German goods before the war, because it was possible to depend upon their quality. If then good faith is one of the lessons inculcated by Public School life, it has been an asset of the Empire all the world over. Nothing is more remarkable in modern history than the apparent incapacity of so many nations for constitutional government, and still more for constitutional monarchy. Bolshevism is as strongly opposed as is Militarism to constitutional action. The late Czar of Russia might have saved his throne if he could have reigned as a constitutional sovereign. But the choice seems often to lie between Absolutism and Communism. It is, I believe, the spirit of the Public Schools which has done much to inspire many generations of Englishmen with the moderate equitable temper which has facilitated the transference of power from the few to the many without revolution and which, if it remains the attribute of all classes in the nation and the Empire, will ensure stability as well as liberty in the progress of the British people through the coming days.

J. E. C. WELLDON.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND MONEY BILLS.

"WE shall, therefore, ask the House to reject the whole apparatus of the Joint Committee." Mr. Winston Churchill used these words in 1911. He was speaking on behalf of the Liberal Government, in the House of Commons, in the debate on the Lords' amendments to the Parliament Bill, providing for a Joint Committee as a substitute for the Speaker as the certifying authority in regard to Money Bills. I shall refer at a later stage to the reasons given by Mr. Churchill for the rejection of those amendments.

The present Government's proposals for the reform of the House of Lords and the amendment of the Parliament Act were announced by the Lord Chancellor, after "full reflection," in the House of Lords, on June 20th. They met with a storm of criticism both within and without the Conservative ranks—more particularly the proposals for the reform of the House of Lords. Notwithstanding this, Lord Salisbury, a month later, informed the House of Lords that they "remained the proposals of the Government." At Cardiff, on October 6th, the Conservative Conference passed with acclamation a resolution congratulating the Government "on its resolve to deal with the problem of the House of Lords during the life of the present Parliament." The Prime Minister, the same evening, said that the Government would announce their decision regarding the proposals before the end of this year. Whatever happens to the scheme as a whole there are substantial grounds for believing that at any rate one of the proposals, namely, the amendment of the Parliament Act in regard to Money Bills, will take legislative form during the lifetime of the present Parliament. The Government have been encouraged in this by the rather favourable reception given to the proposal in some quarters outside their own Party. They are under the impression that it can be carried with fairly general consent. It is necessary, therefore, for those who are opposed to it to make known their objections.

The Prime Minister has refused a request that the Government's proposals should be printed and circulated as a Parliamentary Paper for the information of the country. What the Government mean by their proposal in regard to Money Bills must, therefore, be gathered from the speech of the Lord Chancellor on June 20th and that of the Prime Minister on July 6th, and also from the Report of the Bryce Committee (Command Paper, 9038, 1918) whose recommendation in this particular the Government have adopted. From these sources we learn (1) that a Joint Standing Committee of an equal number of members of each House (the Bryce Committee recom-

mended seven of each House) should be substituted for the Speaker as the authority for determining whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, has stated (House of Commons, July 6th) that the Government would agree to the Speaker being added to the Committee as chairman, with a casting vote. (2) That the Committee should have regard not only to the form, but to the "substance and effect" of a Bill, or, in the words of the Prime Minister, to the "industrial, commercial, social, and political" effects of a Bill. (3) That the present definition of a Money Bill in Section 1 of the Parliament Act is to be repealed. This was not specifically mentioned by either the Prime Minister or the Lord Chancellor, but it is unquestionably implied in the proposal that the Committee should have regard to the "effects" of a Bill. Moreover, it is quite clearly indicated in the Bryce Report. (4) That Bills dealing with charges upon local rates should not be held to fall within the category of Money Bills, and that the House of Lords should have power to deal with matters affecting local rates. There was some mystery about this part of the proposal. Anyone reading the speeches of both the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor must see that it was part and parcel of the proposed amendment of the Parliament Act. But that Act already expressly exempts Bills affecting local rates from the category of Money Bills, and the Bryce Report merely preserved this exemption under the proposed new procedure. The Lord Chancellor has, however, since admitted (*Times*, July 26th) that this part of the proposal has nothing to do with the Parliament Act. But he stated at the same time that what the Government have particularly in mind is the limitation of the privileges of the House of Commons in regard to finance in so far as it relates to local rates.

The foregoing is, I think, a fair statement of what the Government's proposal involves. In this article I am not going to deal with the proposed limitation of the privileges of the House of Commons in regard to local rates, except to say that the House of Commons has always regarded its privileges in this respect with equal sensitiveness and jealousy as its privileges in regard to any other part of finance; that the proposal raises a serious constitutional issue; and that it is difficult to see what sort of legislation is contemplated to effect the change.

The proposed change in regard to Money Bills is not a new proposal. It was made, and debated at great length in both Houses, during the passage of the Parliament Bill in 1911. The arguments used in support of the present proposal, we are told, are the result of the experience obtained in the working of this part of the Parliament Act. But it is instructive to observe, by a reference to the debates of 1911, that the Conservatives put forward at that time

precisely the same arguments as they do to-day. It is an interesting coincidence, by the way, that Lord Cave, who announced the present proposal, also (as Mr. Cave) made the similar proposal in the House of Commons in 1911.

The objections to the Government's proposal may be stated as follows: (1) It would give the House of Lords for the first time an authoritative voice in finance. It is absurd to say, that if the House of Lords had a voice in deciding whether or not a Bill is a Money Bill, that it would not be interfering with finance. It would be an encroachment by the Lords on a part of the constitution which, hitherto, has been in the sole authority of the Commons. It would mean that the Lords would share with the Commons the right to determine the privileges of the Commons. Those privileges have always been jealously preserved intact by the Commons. Until the rejection of the Budget in 1909 the Lords never effectively challenged those privileges. That challenge resulted directly in the enactment of the Parliament Act of 1911, which, in Section 1, gave statutory form to the already existing rights of the Commons in regard to Money Bills, and enabled such Bills to become law without the formal consent of the House of Lords. The proposal to set up a Joint Committee on which the House of Lords is to be represented is much more than a proposal to amend the Parliament Act: intrinsically it is, as I have said, also an invasion of the privileges of the House of Commons, and it is doubtful whether the change could be effected by an amendment of the financial provisions of the Parliament Act, for the Act expressly provides in Section 6 that "nothing in this Act shall diminish or qualify the existing rights and privileges of the House of Commons." In support of the objection to this proposal on the ground that it would be an interference with the ancient and undoubted privileges of the House of Commons, a quotation may here be given from a speech by Mr. Winston Churchill, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, which he made in the House of Commons on August 8th, 1911, in the debate on the Lords' amendments to the Parliament Bill, to which I alluded at the beginning of this article.

"The House of Commons," said Mr. Churchill, "has always claimed to be the judge, through its Speaker, of what are its privileges, and there is no privilege which the House of Commons values more than the sole control of all matters relating to finance; and we are not likely at this time of day to abandon that most necessary and essential privilege or to add to the House of Lords at this present time powers which in all the centuries they have never successfully asserted. . . . We shall, therefore, ask the House to reject the whole apparatus of the Joint Committee, and to restore the Speaker of the House of Commons to his ancient and

natural place, not only in the Parliament Bill, but in the Constitutional practice of this country—his ancient and natural place not merely as the judge of the privileges of this House, but as their defender. . . . We cannot in any circumstances admit any member of the House of Lords to any share whatever in the decision as to the privileges of this House with regard to finance, nor could we in any way impair or divide the sole and plenary authority of the Speaker of this House to decide finally upon these matters." (*Hansard*, August 8th, 1911, Col. 994.)

(2) Those who support this proposal say that the task now imposed upon the Speaker is an invidious one and too onerous. Is there any substance in this argument? The decisions which the Speaker has to give in regard to Money Bills are judicial decisions, within the limits of a clear and precise statutory definition. It is no more invidious for him to give such decisions than it is for a judge to give a decision on a point of law. Moreover, in addition to having at his command the expert advice of the Clerk of the House of Commons, the Speaker has his official legal adviser. Furthermore, the Parliament Act itself directs that the Speaker "before giving his certificate shall consult, if practicable, two members to be appointed from the Chairman's Panel at the beginning of each Session by the Committee of Selection." When this argument about the task being invidious and onerous was put forward in 1911, the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) said: "Our plan does not cast upon the Speaker any invidious responsibilities or duties differing very much from those which he already discharges. . . . The questions the Speaker has got to determine are really much less difficult under this Bill than many of those he has to determine now from the chair." In the same debate Sir Rufus Isaacs (now Lord Reading) said: "I cannot understand why it is suggested that the responsibility is too great or that the Speaker would not be equal to it, or that it would detract from the position which he occupies. What we ask the Speaker to do now is really nothing more than what we have asked him to do before, except with this addition, that we are giving a definition of a Money Bill, whereas before he had not any definition of that character, and he has had to state what his own view is of the privileges of this House." (*Hansard*, April 11th, 1911.)

(3) Under the normal procedure of both Houses, the composition of the Joint Standing Committee would be such as to represent as nearly as may be the numerical strength of the parties in each House. Such a composition was proposed by the Conservatives in 1911, and it is implied in the recommendation of the Bryce Committee. Assuming that there would be seven members of each House on the Committee, the representatives of the House of Lords

would be five Conservatives, one Liberal, and one Labour. This, of course, would not matter when a Conservative Government is in office. But what would be the position when a Liberal or a Labour Government is in office? It might well happen that the representatives of the House of Commons would be, two Labour members, two Liberals, and three Conservatives. The House of Lords representatives would be the same as under a Conservative Government. Thus there would be a Conservative majority on the Joint Committee even when a Progressive Government is in office. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in such circumstances to progressive financial measures likely to have far-reaching social and political effects.

(4) Under the Government's proposal there would be no clear and precise statutory definition of a Money Bill; therefore, the decisions of the Joint Committee could not be judicial decisions. They could not possibly be judicial, when the Committee have to take into consideration the "industrial, commercial, social, and political" effects of a Bill—effects which would be highly controversial. With such a wide and undefined field within which the Committee are to wander it would be impossible to exclude party political bias from their decisions. The dividing line in the Committee would not be between the Commons and the Lords, but between the Conservative view of those "effects" and the Progressive view. As there would be practically always a Conservative majority on the Committee, the Speaker's casting vote could but rarely be exercised, and when it was exercised it could not be cast for the House of Commons as such, but only in favour of one or other mixed group of Peers and Commoners voting together for political reasons. When an amendment was moved to the Parliament Bill in the House of Lords in 1911, to provide that the Joint Committee should have regard to what was then called the "governing purpose" of a Bill, it is significant that one of the Peers who opposed it was no other than Lord St. Aldwyn (better known as Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), one of the greatest of Conservative Chancellors of the Exchequer. He pointed out many "very practical objections" to it, and concluded his speech by asking: "Why should they (the Lords) ask for a power they had never yet exercised?" When the Lords' amendments to the Parliament Bill were considered by the House of Commons, Mr. Winston Churchill, dealing with the point about the "governing purpose" of a Bill—which is only a variation of the "substance and effect" of a Bill—said: "In any case the matters on which they (the Committee) would decide are not those which are susceptible, in their very nature, of being the subject of judicial decision. Those are obviously matters of opinion and highly controversial opinion, and we regard

it as utterly impossible that such matters could ever be adjudicated upon by such a tribunal."

As regards the charges made by members of the Government, in the Lords' debate on June 20th, to the effect that the Speaker had given what Lord Birkenhead called "indisputably" wrong and inconsistent decisions, it is significant that they were unable to adduce any proof in support of their charges. The only case they cited (the two War Charges [Validity] Bills) was afterwards found to be without foundation, and the charge in this case was withdrawn by the Lord Chancellor, who expressed his regret to the Speaker. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked by Sir John Simon, in the House of Commons, to substantiate those charges, he gave no answer. A Parliamentary Paper, issued in July, gives a Return of Bills certified as Money Bills. This Return affords conclusive evidence of the circumspection and impartiality with which the Speaker has exercised his functions under the Parliament Act. The truth is, there is no solid case for the proposed change as put forward by the Government, quite apart from the infringement of the privileges of the House of Commons which it involves, and the conclusion to which one is driven is that the Conservative Party now, as in 1911, desire to get a controlling voice, through the House of Lords, in financial matters when the Conservative Party is out of office. We do not forget the words of Mr. Balfour (as he then was) at Nottingham, immediately after the Liberal victory of 1906, when he said that it was the bounden duty of each one whom he addressed to see "that the great Unionist Party should still control, whether in power or whether in opposition, the destinies of this great Empire."

D. ROWLAND EVANS.

THE PALESTINE VENTURE.

AMONG the convulsions brought about by the World War one of the most significant was the conquest of Palestine by Great Britain. This is obviously not due to the extent of the territory or to the political consequences, but, as is befitting the Holy Land *par excellence*, to the spiritual implications involved. The soil for which Christendom poured out its blood and treasure during the crusades has ever since been held by the power of Islam almost unchallenged by the rival Churches of Christ. But if Lord Allenby of Megiddo achieved a victory where Richard Cœur de Lion failed, the significance is not so much in the military as in the moral field. For the passing of Palestine from the rule of the Turk to the sway of England has brought about the cessation of the religious warfare which, quiescent or active, has been particularly associated with the country sacred to the great ethical-monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism. It is not as if sectarian rivalries have ceased, but we have at last an Imperial Power protecting the Holy Land and its hallowed sites and shrines, with a scrupulous regard for the interests and susceptibilities of all its inhabitants unexampled in its very long and chequered history. The change in the sovereignty over Palestine has thus not been a mere supersession of the Crescent by the Cross, but the assertion of a moral ideal of the reign of peace amongst men, which found in Palestine itself thousands of years ago its most illustrious prophets.

Indeed, the outstanding feature in the new polity that is being reared in Palestine is the exceptional place which has been accorded by Great Britain neither to the Christian conqueror nor to the Moslem majority, but to the Jew, "despised and rejected of men"—a position which has received the formal approval of the League of Nations. It was on November 2nd, 1917—we are just entering the tenth anniversary—that the British Government issued a statement, addressed by Lord (then Mr.) Balfour, as Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, whereby he declared that:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

This document, known as the Balfour Declaration, was hailed by the Jews in their world-wide Dispersion as an act of national-spiritual deliverance comparable to the edict of Cyrus, King of Persia, which led about 2,500 years ago to the re-establishment of the second Jewish commonwealth in Judæa. In its more realistic form, the

action of the British Government, supported by its principal Allies, was also justly interpreted as a recognition of the Jewish share in the struggle for the liberation of small nations as well as a contemplated measure in the post-war settlement to meet some of the clamant problems raised by the Jewish Question. The subsequent embodiment of the Balfour Declaration in the British Mandate for Palestine under the authority of the League of Nations, with the condition that "the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home," has thus given to the millennial aspirations of the Jews a solid foundation in international law and a national status in Palestine hitherto denied to them elsewhere.

The Balfour Declaration was issued when the hostile armies were still facing each other in their struggle for the mastery of the gates of Palestine, but we may regard November 2nd, 1917, as the turning point in the political fortunes of the Holy Land. In this decade of direct British interest in Palestine we have seen displayed within geographically narrow limits, but amidst a determined rivalry of racial and sectarian aspirations, the British genius for fairness and compromise as well as for a generous idealism no less than the *sacro egoismo* possessed by all imperial races.

The moral value of Palestine to the British Empire is one of those imponderabilia it is impossible to assess, but it requires no extraordinary imagination to realise the scope of the influence in Christendom and Islam as well as in world-wide Jewry exercised by Britain through its rule of the Holy Land. Quite tangible, however, is the power which has accrued to the British position in the Near and Middle East by the undisputed possession of at least one side of the Suez Canal. To the strategic importance of this artery of the Empire—which will be enhanced by the impending extension of the harbour at Haifa, with a possible railway line leading to Baghdad through British mandated territory—must now be added the interests of Imperial air communication. As a landing ground, Palestine is one of the air junctions in the grand route from England to India, and thus an Empire link of very real necessity and strength.

Although the scheme of a Middle Eastern Empire under British protection, of which the late Sir Mark Sykes was the most understanding protagonist, has not fully materialised, the idea has nevertheless found its embodiment in the present hold of Great Britain over the vast region stretching between Tripolitania and Persia, with the mandated area of Palestine and Transjordan as the centre. And even though the dream of a confederation of Arab principalities, with the ex-King Hussein of the Hejaz at the head, has been shattered by the Wahabi conqueror Ibn Saud, Great Britain has, for practical

purposes, retained the overlordship of Arab lands in a way that gives it an effective control of Near Eastern affairs at a cost that tends to become almost nominal as the price of Empire and with local responsibilities that are gradually being limited in their scope.

To the world generally, to whom the future of the Holy Land is a matter of intense interest, the governance of Palestine by Great Britain will, however, be judged entirely by the way in which it will carry out the terms of the League of Nations' Mandate, whereby it should, on the one hand, protect the civil and religious rights of the inhabitants in general and the economic development and national aspirations of the Jews in particular. In this there is, of course, no question whatsoever as to the infinite superiority of British over Turkish rule, for although there are still elements in Palestine which affect to look upon the old *régime* as preferable to the present one, this longing is due either to Moslem sentiment or to interests that have no regard for the common weal. The British have given to Palestine a clean and efficient administration hitherto unapproached in the East, and the systematic efforts for the improvement of the health and education of the increasing Arab population are providing them with opportunities for physical and mental progress quite beyond the range of an Oriental government. To be sure, the Palestinian Arabs have not been endowed with the self-governing powers which (thanks to British political goodwill and financial support) are enjoyed by their kinsmen in Iraq and Transjordan, but, apart from the specifically Jewish aspect, it is most unlikely that the exceedingly delicate responsibilities of an international character in the Holy Land could be entrusted to an Arab oligarchy which has neither the old-world prestige of the Grand Turk nor the unquestioned authority of a first-class European State. The heterogeneous native population in Palestine, to which the Arab language has given a semblance of unity, has, in any case, no truly national individuality or political traditions which could not be met by the institution of a repeatedly proposed Legislative Assembly concerned with matters of local government. The administration of the autonomous Arab Amirate of Transjordan, forming part of the Palestine Mandate, is certainly no indication to the contrary. Meanwhile, following the policy set by Sir Herbert Samuel, the Palestine Government considers it its primary duty to give to the backward Arab population the economic and cultural impetus for a higher standard of life. In addition to this, though in an unexpected and unavowed way, the Arabs in Palestine have been able to benefit substantially from the flow of Jewish money into the country and by the Jewish endeavours in almost every phase of national well-being. It is not generally recognised that a very considerable proportion of the large funds collected by Jews all over the world for the advance-

ment of their co-religionists in Palestine finds its way to the pockets of the Arabs. It has been estimated that in the year 1925 the amount which thus passed from Jews to Arabs for the purchase of land, house-rent, agricultural produce, labour, transport, etc., was about £2,000,000—a sum which almost equalled the whole of the annual state revenue. As it is, the enterprise and industry of the Jews are responsible for a disproportionately large part of the state revenue, which goes mainly to benefit the Arab population in so far as government schools, hospitals and various public amenities are carried on almost entirely for the advantage of Arabs, while the Jews are maintaining those communal services largely, in some instances completely, at their own expense. The present importance of the Jews as an economic factor in Palestine has indeed been manifested by the remarkable fact that the decline in Jewish immigration during the first seven months in 1926 was coincident with a reduction of 52 per cent. in the surplus of the Palestine Government revenue. The Jews have likewise introduced new and intensive methods of agriculture—the chief industry of the country—and have set an example of progressive development in so many other spheres of life that the Arabs could not but benefit materially from the growing association of the Jews with the land.

If the security and comparative prosperity enjoyed by the Arab inhabitants of Palestine are a tribute to the capacity of the British administration, the Jews have becomingly added a romantic aspect to the Palestine venture. For here we have returning to the land of their fathers a race of men whose roots, though spiritually embedded in Palestine, were physically torn out from the soil nearly two thousand years ago. They come from almost all parts of the world-wide Jewish Dispersion, each group with its own native language, with its peculiar mentality and difference of outlook. They all, however, are imbued with the feeling that, as the sons of one people, they are the common heirs of the Promised Land: the Hebrew language has become to them, as it was in the hoary past, the national medium of expression, and Palestine the national centre of the whole Jewish race. The revival of the classical Hebrew language as a modern vernacular is one of the most striking manifestations of the latter-day Jewish re-assertion of their individuality and unity*; the passionate attachment to the soil of Palestine finds its unmistakable proof in the pathetic devotion by which European men—and women—unaccustomed to manual labour toil in a sub-tropical climate in

* The educational standard of the Jewish working-class in Palestine is one of the extraordinary features in the new Jewish life in that country. In a census recently instituted there, it appears that of the average percentage of the workers 4.4 per cent. had received a University education; 40.4 per cent. a high school; 30 per cent., elementary school; 21.85 per cent., religious school; and 1.1 per cent. a technical school education. Only 2.25 per cent. were illiterate. It is significant that of the workers with a high school education, the women were 44.5 per cent. against 38.3 per cent. of the men.

tilling the fields, draining the marshes and paving the roads for a mere pittance.

To most of these Jews the return to Erez Israel (the Land of Israel)—as Palestine is termed by them—is the beginning of the Restoration foretold by the Hebrew prophets of old, and they themselves are in many cases the pioneers (Haluzim) of this new epoch in Jewish history. Once again we see these men and women—possibly the descendants of those who left the land before the Christian era—endeavouring to revive the land of their forefathers by the sweat of the brow, reckoning not the cost in life and treasure which this heroic effort will entail. True to the impulse and action of the idealism which has moved them to devote themselves to what they fondly believe will be the development of a regenerate state of Jewish society, these settlers present a unique combination of plain living and high thinking, and not only their idealism but their stern self-control and unmeasured self-sacrifice have won tributes from men so different in outlook and temperament as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Lord Plumer. Throughout they are stirred by a sense of a hitherto unknown, specifically Jewish, patriotism expressed with intense determination in the national endeavour to rebuild the waste places of the barren and forsaken land so that Israel may once again live freely on its own soil.

But the Jews who have taken up this cause look, in the establishment of the national home, to the goodwill and support of the Mandatory Power; and the extent to which England is contributing to turn this vision into reality is the test of the constructive statesmanship in which this historic task may be carried into effect. To be sure, the Jewish undertaking in Palestine has enjoyed the inestimable advantage afforded to it by the *Pax Britannica*. With the notable exception of the outbreak in 1921, peace has reigned in the land and the Jews have benefited by this as much as, if not more than, any other section of the population. But in their peaceful work of civilisation the Jews have been left almost entirely to their own resources. Even in spite of the expressly declared stipulation of the Mandate that State and waste lands shall be placed at the disposal of the Jews for colonisation purposes, the Jewish National Fund—the land fund of the Zionist Organisation—has had to buy in a competing market every inch of ground for public or private purposes, so that in this respect, too, the Jewish settlers have not enjoyed that active support by the grant of free land and other facilities which colonists are generally afforded in British Dominions.

As will have been observed from the proceedings of the Fifteenth Zionist Congress, just held in Basle, the Zionists have been particularly disappointed in their political anticipations. The hopes which were aroused among the Jews by the Balfour Declaration ten years

ago have almost entirely receded into the background. It is now customary to refer to Zionists who raise this issue as "extremists," but, unless we are to consider this as a relative term, it may be said that they entertain views once held by Lord Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and other British statesmen responsible for the Palestine Mandate. The appeal of "Judæa for the Jews" (to use a striking phrase employed in a public speech by Lord Robert Cecil on the issue of the Balfour Declaration) found a powerful response among the Jews because they believed then—as did at that time a remarkably large number of British politicians and other public men in this country—that a Jewish national polity was to be set up in Palestine, developing eventually either into a predominantly Jewish commonwealth or as a bi-national Arab-Jewish State on Swiss lines. Even among well-informed Zionists it was quite understood that the Jews in their National Home would be invested with political functions not enjoyed by Jewish communities in other parts of the world. Indeed, it was just this expectation of home-rule on their own territory which stirred the Jewish imagination and the rising hopes of a people proud of its illustrious past and yet, throughout the ages, repressed in the most elementary forms of self-determination. The Jewish national-political status in Palestine (with the Jewish Agency under Article 4 of the Mandate representing the Jewish people *vis-à-vis* the Mandatory Power) made it fundamentally different from the position of the Jews in other parts of the world, for personal freedom and communal autonomy in religious and educational affairs have been, and are being, enjoyed by Jews in the Dispersion generally. In Palestine, too, the Jews (no longer hyphenated Jews, *bien entendu*) will be fellow-citizens of men of other races and creeds—among whom the Moslem Arabs will obviously remain a numerically important element—but, through the Mandate, the Jews in Palestine are recognised as an ethnic group with specifically national needs and aspirations, so that any attempts to reduce the status of the potential Palestine Jewry—a nation in being—to that of a religious community (analogous to the Greek-Orthodox or other sects) is obviously contrary to the letter as well as the spirit of the Mandate. The last thing the Zionists expected was that Palestine would be turned for practical purposes into a British Crown Colony, where Jews—even English Jews—however gifted, would be treated on a level with "natives" and would hardly be considered fit to occupy any controlling office.

The appointment of a Jew in the person of Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner for Palestine was a significant indication how the Zionist conception was once shared even in the highest circles of the British Government, but this appointment was to have been the beginning, not the end, of a system whereby Jews

with the necessary qualifications would, in the service of the Mandatory Power, be placed in positions of recognised authority in the land of their ancestors. In these days it is possible for a Jew to be Viceroy of India, but only one English Jew is considered competent to be a senior official in Palestine.

It is necessary to understand this state of mind of many Zionists in order to realise that the exuberant enthusiasm of ten years ago no longer impels with the same force the Jewish world that is interested in Palestine both by its heavy financial contribution to the upbuilding of the country and by the moral considerations involved. It is, of course, not only the Jews who have suffered disappointment in the high hopes entertained for some time after the War, and Zionists, therefore, now also understand the hard realities of the situation. But Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organisation, and other leading men of the movement, on whom falls the burden of providing the expanding needs of the Jewish Resettlement in Palestine, are hard put to it to counsel patience to their followers and, at the same time, to arouse a not unsympathetic, but slow-going Administration to a realisation that the Jewish experiment in Palestine is not only demanded by the terms of the Mandate under which the country has been placed in the charge of Great Britain, but that it is an undertaking of historic import in which the credit of England no less than the destiny of the Jewish people is at stake.

In this respect, we have to bear in mind that the Resettlement of the Jews in Palestine "as of right and not on sufferance" (to quote Mr. Churchill's interpretation of British policy in Palestine in the White Paper issued in 1922) stands out unique and is as far-reaching as the Jewish Question. For not only is the Jewish people in Palestine, whether actuated by innate sympathies or by motives of mere self-preservation, closely bound to British interests in the Orient by ties on which the future of the Jewish National Home depends, but Great Britain has thereby on the one hand assumed a virtual protectorate over the Jewish race in Eastern Europe, and on the other hand evoked a sense of special attachment to the Mandatory Power of Palestine on the part of Jews generally. The most significant recognition of this tacit, but well-recognised, relationship between Israel and Britain—traditional since the days of Palmerston, particularly through the philanthropic missions of Sir Moses Montefiore in the middle of the nineteenth century—is the virulent persecution of Zionists in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the ruthless suppression of every philo-Palestinian tendency as a sure proof of British "Imperialist" sympathies. But not satisfied with the opposition to Zionism, the Bolshevik authorities have set up a positive counter-action to the British undertaking in Palestine by a

bold scheme of Jewish colonisation in the Crimea and other regions in the Ukraine and White Russia, where large tracts of land have been freely placed at the disposal of Jews for the purpose of agricultural settlement under the authority of specifically Jewish, Yiddish-speaking Soviets. Outside Russia, however, the ray of light which the Balfour Declaration brought ten years ago to the nationally and economically despairing Jews in Eastern Europe has saved them largely from the alluring will-o'-the-wisp of Bolshevism. Even though the hope aroused by the Judæo-British enterprise and community of interests in Palestine has since been dimmed by the course of events, it still remains for the Jewish people the most illuminating and inspiring epos of modern times.

For, with an endurance characteristic of the race, the work of Jewish colonisation in Palestine is proceeding apace in spite of the many difficulties in the way. Over 100,000 Jews have entered the country since the British occupation. In September, 1926, the Jews numbered about 158,000 (or 17.6 per cent.) out of a total population of 887,000—as compared with 83,794 (or 11.1 per cent.) in October, 1922. The total number of Jewish agricultural settlements is over 120, with a population of approximately 32,000. The development of urban colonisation is particularly manifested in the new and completely Jewish town of Tel Aviv (adjoining Jaffa) with its 40,000 inhabitants. The extensive growth of Jewish industrial enterprises—though checked by the economic crisis in 1926-7—is illustrated in the fortnightly *Palestine & Near East Economic Magazine*, published by Jews at Tel Aviv in English as well as in Hebrew, while labour conditions are maintained at a high level by the strict discipline fostered by the General Federation of Jewish Workers in Palestine and the enforcement by them of advanced labour regulations which, in the absence of State legislation, rest merely on moral authority. The well-known Rutenberg scheme in connection with the Jordan Hydro-Electric works, now incorporated in the Palestine Electric Corporation, Ltd. (which, with a paid-up capital of £950,000, has the Marquis of Reading as Chairman, as well as Sir Alfred Mond, Sir Hugo Hirst, Mr. Bernhard Baron, and Mr. James de Rothschild as Directors), promises to effect a beneficent revolution in the economic development of Palestine generally, as the prospective exploitation of the mineral resources of the Dead Sea will in the course of time also add substantially to the wealth of the country as a whole.

Special features of Jewish activities in Palestine are those of Health and Education, which incidentally relieve the Government of important public services at the expense of the Zionist funds. The number of pupils in the schools under the supervision of the Zionist Organisation is now almost as large as in all the Government schools

of the country, while the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the Jewish Technical Institute at Haifa are exceptional in their wide scope of higher education. In this direction the essays in new forms of education, of literature and art are interesting developments of a nascent Jewish civilisation, arising midway between East and West, as are the religious values fermenting—for the first time in a specifically Jewish atmosphere—under the impact of European rationalism and the traditional Talmudical Judaism of Palestine.

The Palestine venture cannot be measured by figures which, in the nature of the case, can, after all, only be of comparatively small account. But, in view of criticisms fostered by the popular Press, it should be recognised that, in spite of the grave unrest hitherto prevailing across the Syrian border and the inflammable material at its doors, the peace is now being kept in Palestine and Transjordan at no appreciable cost to the British tax-payer.* In fact, the Palestine Administration not only meets its financial requirements, but has been showing a substantial surplus for some years past. Constitutionally, too, the beginnings of local self-government have already been laid by the recent municipal elections, in which the possibilities of political co-operation between Jews and Arabs have been demonstrated in practice, and it is only a question of time—when, with the evident relaxation of their passive resistance, the Arab politicians will make up their minds to recognise the validity of the Mandate under which Great Britain governs the country—that a representative Legislative Assembly will be established. The British endeavour to do justice to the dual responsibilities inherent in the Palestine Mandate has, of course, raised certain thorny problems, and the necessity to adjust the legitimate claims of the native Arab population with the recognised needs of the Jewish National Home will consequently continue to call for the exercise of constructive statesmanship on the part of the Colonial Office and for the sympathetic co-operation of the responsible men on the spot.

PAUL GOODMAN.

* In an explanatory memorandum on Middle Eastern Estimates issued in July, it appears that the net British expenditure in Palestine and Transjordan for 1927-8 amounts to £376,000, denoting a saving of £166,600 as compared with the last financial year. Apart from a small contribution to the cost of the Transjordan Frontier Force (which has been reduced from one-half to one-sixth) and a subsidy to the Transjordan Administration (reduced from £92,000 to £62,000) the British expenditure is for the maintenance of the Imperial garrison, towards which the Palestine Government has, for the first time, contributed a sum of £31,000 for the current financial year. The change in the situation may be realised from the fact that in 1922-3 the British expenditure was as high as £2,124,000.

FOR THE CENTENARY OF FRENCH ROMANTICISM.

THE centenary of the publication of Victor Hugo's unproduced "Cromwell" in October, 1827, has been chosen by the French authorities, civil and literary, as the centenary of the Romantic movement. The choice was necessarily arbitrary: the rise of a movement is as imperceptible in its stages as the coming of daylight, the sky is already bright long before the appearance of the actual sun. In 1827 the pioneers of Romanticism had already passed. Madame de Staël was dead in 1817, Byron in 1824, *Sénancour* would write no more—his *Obermann* still awaited the recognition it would owe to Ste. Beuve and George Sand—Chateaubriand's magnificent prose was turned to the service of diplomacy, and his later works would mark little advance on the *Génie du Christianisme*, while Goethe had long returned to the cult of Greece and Rome. In the preface to "Cromwell" Victor Hugo comes forward as the leader of the main army, giving to Romantic ideals definite and combative expression—the final declaration of war after years of irregular hostilities, or, in a metaphor after his own heart, the trumpet blast before the walls of Jericho, though not till three years later, till the famous Battle of *Hernani*, would the city fall.

Critics differ on the essential marks of the Romantic movement. For M. Seillière, the imperialist philosopher, it means a triple mysticism, erotic, æsthetic, social—that is, in his terminology, passion, the inspiration of the poet, and democracy, raised to a supernatural plane by the will for power—and all three derived from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's disastrous fallacy of the natural goodness of natural man. Complementary to this appreciation, which may perhaps explain the perversions of Romanticism, is that of M. Brémont, who sees in it a great movement of spiritual renewal. It represented indeed, with the deepening of emotional life and the emancipation of the individual, such an expansion of consciousness as is wont to follow a period in which rationalism has unduly narrowed the horizons, in the same way as the dogmatism of positivist science seems to-day to be dissolving before an impulse of metaphysics and mysticism, "*Qui dit romantisme,*" said Victor Hugo, "*dit art moderne . . . profondeur, spiritualité, couleur, aspiration vers l'infini.*"

In the middle of the eighteenth century, the century of the Godless Reason, of Voltaire and the Encyclopædia, when d'Argenson wrote "*le cœur est une faculté dont nous nous dépouillons chaque jour, faute d'exercice, tandis que l'esprit s'aiguise et s'affine,*" and a barber would say proudly to his noble client, "Though I am only a poor man, milord, I also have no religion," in France as in Eng-

land there were signs of a new mental and moral orientation, showing itself in a restlessness, a desire for sensation, and that strange appetite for horrors that is best explained as a perverted religious sense. Spectres, corpses, winding-sheets, coffins, the terrors of the night, all the melodramatic imagery with which the great Romantics and Victor Hugo in particular were to produce such astounding effects, now laid hold on unaccustomed imaginations. English influences found ready response, for from across the Channel the stolid England of the Georges and Pudding Days appeared as a "land of passion and catastrophe," where sombre silent men suffered from the spleen and committed suicide in vast numbers. Young and Gray ("*c'est à Gray,*" declared Chateaubriand, "*que commence cette école des poètes mélancoliques qui s'est transformée de nos jours en l'école des poètes désespérés*"), Milton, who was admired for his "belle horreur," and Shakespeare for his ghosts and grave-diggers, found eager translators and enthusiastic readers. Richardson with "*Clarissa Harlowe*" reached deeper, stirring to the core a public which had known love only as gallantry and pleasure by intensity of passion and violence of realism. While Ossian illumined newly discovered nature with an unearthly light, revealing a new world of mist and wild mountain and vision, quickened by the sense of mystery and tragedy of the Gael.

It is strange to see the gradual growth of a sense of nature, a living growing thing amid the litter of absurdities that arouse the laughter of after years. It is present, barely perceptible, in the painters, Watteau, Lancret, Watelet, even in that Joseph Vernet who has left notes of orders for "two landscapes with cascades, rocks, tree-trunks, ruins . . . a truly horrid tempest . . . cascades on stormy waters, tree-trunks, and a wild and frightful country." It inspires the English gardens, in which twisting paths and rushing cascades replace geometrical pattern and tranquil lakes, and which a widening curiosity spatial and temporal has scattered with Egyptian tombs, Chinese pagodas, and Gothic ruins—especially ruins. Then step by step the countryside is revealed, as though sight were slowly returning to blind eyes. It is strange to realise that the Savoyard Alps were never anything but "frightful" till Rousseau unveiled their beauty, with the beauty of lake and woodland and cultivated field and smiling hill; that none felt the spell of the white solitudes of the High Alps before Ramon, that the sea stirred nothing but meditations on wrecks and orphans till Bernadin de St. Pierre.

The anti-Romantics, who rightly see in Jean-Jacques Rousseau the corner stone of Romanticism, have no difficulty in proving that he was a despicable character. Yet by this despicable character, a prey to ever deepening madness which in the end, it is believed, led him

to take his own life, the moral, religious, social and intellectual life of Europe were reborn. He was the first to find his way to the heart of nature, to mingle with nature, not only seeing but feeling, realising himself as living in a living world and attuned to its rhythm. He was the first of his time for whom the gates of horn were open, leading to reverie and dream. His was the fundamental heresy of Romanticism, the perfection of primitive man uncorrupted by civilisation, with its disastrous corollary that all natural impulses are good, and passion therefore of necessity virtue. Essentially individualist, despising society, subjective, translating his vision into states of mind, he was the originator of the cult of the *ego*—source of sublime lyricism and gigantic folly—seeking in his art self-expression and self-realisation. Therefore, since self-realisation is only rendered actual by emotion, he embraced melancholy, the melancholy glorified by Victor Hugo in the preface to "Cromwell" as one of the great gifts of Christianity, born of pity and the dualism between the finite and infinity, the chief heritage of all the Romantics. The *Nouvelle Héloïse* of 1761 opened the flood-gates of emotion, changing the whole direction of contemporary thought, and soon half Europe was murmuring with Rousseau "O sentiment, sentiment, douce vie de l'âme!" False sentiment, often enough, but revivifying nevertheless; giving new life to religion in the creed of the Vicaire Savoyard which shattered utterly the image of the methodical Deity in whom Voltaire never quite dared to disbelieve; revealing the poetry of earth, of the labours of the country (Lamartine owes everything to him), inaugurating a tradition that would change the face of literature—St. Preux is the begetter of Werther, of René, of Obermann, and his remoter descendants are as the sands of the sea.

The French Revolution and the Empire, bringing the Romans back to favour, was a return to classicism, so that Rousseau's direct heirs are to be sought in England and Germany and among the emigrant writers. While many Frenchmen, seeing in the tumultuous seekings of Romanticism a spirit alien to the measured clarity in virtue of which they claim descent from Greece and Rome, denounce it as a foreign importation, a newer and more attractive thesis explains it as a flowering of the old Celtic substratum of France. Ossian and Sir Walter Scott were high among its tutelary deities, Chateaubriand was a Breton, while it was the Breton Victor Hugo that recalled to life the fairies who for sixteenth-century writers still danced in moon-lit glades, the fairies of old Gaul. The Romantic melancholy resembles the melancholy of the Celt and Gael, the themes of the old bards are the favourite themes of the great Romantics—love, the sea, death, the wisdom of a fool, the high calling of the poet. Maybe the quest of a beauty beyond all beauties, of the supreme transfiguring passion of the myth of Tristan, lay at the

root of their turbulent loves. From the same well-spring comes their love of the supernatural, of magic, of symbol; a sense that the visible world is not the world of causation; a first tentative stretching out towards the unknown, leading them to choose for preference words of infinite range—the vocabulary of Victor Hugo is full of them—the beginnings of that "soif d'infini" that waited till the Symbolists, who were likewise of Celtic inspiration, for its definition. (It is interesting to compare Pascal's "Les silences éternels des espaces infinis m'effrayent" with Leopardi's "Il naufragar è dolce in questo mar," to see the distance between even a Romantic of the *Grand Siècle* and a late Classic of the nineteenth.)

The genius of Walter Scott brought forth a new aspect of Romanticism—the cult of the Middle Ages. It had had a beginning in the eighteenth century, Voltaire had made them the setting for some of his dramas, Bancelard d'Arnaud had written tales in archaic French, there had been reprints of Villon and Charles d'Orleans, and knights in armour had appeared on the stage. The deepening of national feeling after the Treaty of Versailles, a nostalgia for a golden age, an awakening to the beauties of the Cathedrals, an ever-widening curiosity extending even to pre-history, led to an enthusiasm for the past. In 1829 Balzac could write "Le drame et le roman historique sont l'expression de la France et de la littérature du XIX^{ème} siècle."

In this movement the influence of Scott was profound and universal for his power of evocation, of using imagination to quicken the dry bones of history. Lamartine apostrophised him as

"Un de ces hommes siècles, qui se nomment un âge.
Homère de l'histoire à l'immense odyssée,
Qui, répandant si loin la féconde pensée,
Soulève les vieux jours, leur rend l'âme et le corps,
Comme l'ombre d'un Dieu qui ranime les mors."

His imitators were to be found in every literature in Europe, and included Poushkin and Tolstoy, Mieczkiewicz and Manzoni, as well as the French Romantics, and especially De Vigny, Hugo, Dumas. Thierry and Michelet learned from him a new art of history, and in his inspiration lies the origin of the Romantic drama. "Qu'est-ce que les romans de Sir Walter Scott?" asks Stendhal, "De la tragédie romantique entremêlée de longues descriptions."

In 1827 Scott was at the zenith of his fame; it is not surprising that Victor Hugo, who vibrated like an immense lyre to every wind of collective thought, should have turned to historical drama, and sought in Scott the inspiration not only for certain of the scenes and characters of his "Cromwell" but for some of its essential elements as set forth in the preface. In the first place, the ideal, the evocation of a period seeking to reproduce "la réalité des faits, surtout celle

des mœurs et caractères," mingling tragedy and comedy, selecting not the beautiful but the characteristic, making local colour as essential as the "sap that rises from the roots to the furthestmost twig of the tree," aiming above all at nature and truth. (The theory is one of historic realism which the Romantics with their lyrical melodramas were utterly unable to achieve, Victor Hugo least of all!) From Scott, too, he learned the importance of the setting, its dramatic potentialities—a discovery which Balzac was to develop to its full extent, and which in his own hands was fertile in consequences.

"*Le lieu ou telle catastrophe s'est passée en devient un témoin terrible et inséparable et l'absence de cette sorte de personnage muet décompléterait dans le drame les plus grandes scènes de l'histoire*," he declares in his Preface, and from this vantage point opens his attack on the sacred principle of the unities which ordained that all the action of a play must take place within twenty-four hours and in a kind of anti-chamber where, as he complains, "the conspirators somehow come to declaim against the tyrant and the tyrant to declaim against the conspirators, turn and turn about." With the greatest of the classics this convention was tolerable; it led them to choose universal themes, pruned to a central knot, and in their reality transcendent of space and time—the secret of immortality. Yet there is justice in Victor Hugo's contention that by it their flight was restricted, for "the scissors of the unities clipped their wings." Corneille, so little a true classic as to attempt to stage a live Pegasus winging through the air on ropes, was plainly ill at ease in the narrow span of twenty-four hours, while in Racine, with his magnificent classicism of form, there is a lyricism, a strain of sensibility and passion at variance with the conventions of his time.

These conventions were largely due to the supremacy of the Salons, which had swept French society from a state of incredible barbarism to one of incredible refinement, relegating the lyrical poets to the taverns and demanding of literature only such sentiments as could be suitably displayed in a drawing-room of extreme gentility. To such a public *Polycucte* appeared irreverent, and the naked emotion of *Phèdre* almost indecent. The magic that is the soul of poetry was lost utterly; there is a line in one of the early seventeenth-century dramatists, "*Que tes pieds sont légers, prénant l'enchantement*," then the secret was lost for nearly two hundred years.

The most disastrous legacy of the Salons was the "style noble" which forbade the mention of any common object by name. Here indeed were scissors that not only clipped the wings of Racine, limiting him to a colourless and often exasperating vocabulary, but forced Bossuet to smoothe down his more vivid impressions and the editors

of Pascal's "*Pensées*" to shear away or excuse any too vigorous image. This tyranny was so firmly established that a translator in 1760 apologised for his blunt reference to jugs, cabbages, hay, peas, while the neo-classics of the nineteenth century gave it a recrudescence of life. In destroying it the Romantics renewed the language. Their preference was always for the concrete, the picturesque, replacing abstraction by image and symbol. At the same time, led by Victor Hugo and Ste. Beuve, they renewed the art of versification. For verse (and this also is in the preface to "*Cromwell*"), must be a form of bronze, framing the thought in its cadence "*sachant briser à propos et déplacer la césure pour déguiser la monotonie d'alexandrin; plus ami de l'enjambement qui l'allonge que de l'inversion qui l'embrouille, fidèle à la rime, cette esclave reine . . . pouvant aller de haut en bas, des idées les plus élevées aux plus vulgaires, des plus bouffonnes aux plus graves*."

The juxtaposition of tragedy and comedy, of the sublime and the grotesque, springs naturally from Hugo's antithetical genius, while following a Shakespearean precedent; it represents yet another blow at classical ruling, in the name of "the liberty of art from the despotism of systems, schools, and regulations." Three years later these, the fundamental principles of Romantic drama, had their public triumph in the stormy First Night of *Hernani*.

In 1843 the tide turned. For thirteen years Victor Hugo had dominated the theatre with the orchestral sweep of his verse, the floods of many-coloured rhyme which make the long tirades of a *Ruy Blas* endurable and carry off the most impossible situations. Now his "*Burgraves*" failed lamentably. The public was weary of harrowing scenes and gloomy castles and lepers and frenzied posturings. New tendencies were in the air; the religion of humanity had replaced the Catholic enthusiasms of the previous generation, a chill wind of rationalism was once more blowing, and Voltaire was returning to favour. By 1843 Alfred de Musset, Alfred de Vigny, Lamartine had their best work behind them and would add little to it, Théophile Gautier had forsworn Notre-Dame for the Parthenon, Ste. Beuve was even then prepared to burn what he had adored, while George Sand, under the influence of Saint-Simonism, and even Victor Hugo himself, had turned to sociological novels or *romans à thèse*. Romanticism had come in with the Revolution of 1830; with the Revolution of '48 it flared into political life, when Lamartine, filled with the Romantic idea of the Messianic mission of the poet, a Moses divinely called to be a leader of men, faced the Parisian mob with the flag of the Republic at the foot of the Hôtel de Ville.

The *coup d'état*, the bourgeois government of Napoleon III, when Lamartine sank to laborious oblivion and Victor Hugo was relegated

to grandiose exile, coincides with the beginning of a new era in literature, characterised by analytic objectivity, by the growing dominion of science, by an ever-increasing realism. Romanticism had spent itself, or rather, by a process comparable to the shrinking and cooling and differentiation of the flaming incandescence that was once the earth, had undergone a transformation. The realism of Stendhal and Flaubert, and later the naturalism of the Goncourts, Maupassant, Daudet, Zola, the impassive sculptural verse of Leconte de Lisle and Baudelaire, those two pillars of Parnassus, the positivism of Comte, the scientific application of Taine, the subtle scepticism of Renan, are at once a reaction against Romanticism and its natural outcome.

The history of nineteenth century literature is the history of successive strivings to attain reality, like the struggles of an inexperienced swimmer to touch the sea-floor. The naturalists, with their accumulation of facts and documents "from nature," succeeded little better than the Romantics with their imaginative reconstructions and mythisations. In the eighties the turn of the wheel, a fresh influx of English influence, and especially that of the Lake poets and the Pre-Raphaelites, a renewal of Celtic inspiration, produced a mystical reaction; something of the spirit of Romanticism in its flowering-time was reincarnate in the movement represented by Barbey d'Aurevilly, Villiers de l'Isle Adam and the Symbolists. Symbolism is at once a subdued echo of Romanticism and a refinement on it. Sensibility takes the place of passion, the earlier fierce melancholy has become plaintive, there are more crepuscular mists and weeping autumn rains than howling winds in stormy nights, while the assertion of the *ego* has become introspection, sounding even the depths of the sub-conscious. The will to express everything has produced the will to express even the inexpressible. The substratum of occultism and magic which underlay Romanticism is here declared, and the stream of mysticism which lost itself in the earlier movement has become a mighty sea.

Symbolism was only partially a reaction against Parnassus. Henceforth the threads of influence are inextricably interwoven, and one pattern merges into another, for Symbolism has led straight to a revival of classicism, a new classicism more exquisitely Greek yet enriched by all that had gone before, and so rallying to itself the greatest writers of modern France. In the words of Maurice Barrés they came willingly down from the barbarian forests to join the king's highway, but in submitting to the perfect discipline of the classics they demanded the honours of war, the right to bring with them "their rich stores and their banners not without glory"—their Romantic heritage.

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

RUSSIA AND THE WEST.

MR. RAKOVSKY lately assumed the rôle of stormy petrel in the West of Europe. It came as a surprise that so genial and harmless a diplomatist should assume that rôle. The events that followed gave us another illustration of the pointlessness of Russia's habit of provoking the West.

On August 9th it became known that Mr. Rakovsky had signed a declaration issued by the minority of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow. The manifesto contained the commonplace Moscow propaganda, and had nothing substantially new in it. It elaborated the familiar formulæ, which Moscow normally uses in inviting the world at large to confound itself after the Russian manner. In particular it contained this sentence: "Every honest proletarian in the Capitalists' countries must look actively for the defeat of his government, and all soldiers of foreign countries who do not desire to help their slave masters must desert to the Red Army." French opinion, which has a reputation for logic, interpreted that sentence as an attempt to seduce the soldiers of France from their allegiance. French opinion is not the only opinion in the West that has taken a heavy view of the propaganda that regularly drivels from the unbalanced people of Moscow. It is to be noticed that the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party made no pretence of pacifism as its motive. Its invitation was not that foreign soldiers should refuse to fight, but that they should all fight under the Red Flag. Could nonsense go further? What conceivable appeal could there be to the French poilu to bolt from the French army, migrate to Russia, and enlist in the Red Army? The thing was simply not true to life. Also, on the point of logic, assuming the Moscow invitation to have been accepted up to 100 per cent., there would be no army in the world except the Red Army, which would presumably spend its time marching up the hill and down again. To examine Moscow propaganda critically or logically is to become fatuous oneself. M. Poincaré examined it as earnestly as did Sir William on another occasion.

There was, perhaps, some interest in the personal position of Mr. Rakovsky. His years of service as Russian Ambassador in London and in Paris won for him the reputation of a certain simplicity and of a highly developed sense of fun. It is difficult to imagine that Mr. Rakovsky could take anything seriously enough to make him ill-disposed to anyone or to anything. Mr. Rakovsky as a world revolutionary is an almost comic improbability. In signing the manifesto of August 9th, he no doubt did so as a matter of Bolshevik routine.

He probably took so little interest in what he signed that it never occurred to him that there could be any difficulty or impropriety in his signing a document which, on the face of it, was seditiously directed against the country to which he was accredited as Ambassador. Yet, the combined duties of agitator and Ambassador hardly mix even when the rôle of agitator has degenerated into an almost meaningless habit. The storm duly broke in Paris. The French Press, with the obvious exceptions, immediately clamoured for Mr. Rakovsky's recall, although, as it was interesting to notice, the commentators were far too realistic to demand a rupture of Franco-Russian relations. French diplomatic thought is normally aware, well aware, of the interests of France. At the time, for instance, when Great Britain broke from Russia, French comment heartily approved of Great Britain's action, but equally heartily made it clear that France would never follow Great Britain's example. The eye for the main chance is a more potent thing in France than abstract indignation; which fact is, no doubt, a tribute to French common-sense.

So, in the present case, few voices were heard in France to support what was tentatively suggested as M. Poincaré's immediate personal impulse. It was suggested that M. Poincaré was tempted to break off diplomatic relations with Russia. Whether the suggestion was true or not cannot be determined. It was never tested. Perhaps M. Poincaré knew that he would never be allowed to play with fireworks, and therefore indulged an innocuous pretence of playing with fireworks. M. Briand promptly, and with a boldness we had not noticed in him for some time, opposed the issue which it was suggested had been raised by M. Poincaré. M. Briand had no difficulty in carrying off the honours, for his realism on that particular point was essentially French. There was nothing inconsistent, so at first it seemed, in the decision that was thereupon taken by the French Government. It was decided that M. Herbette, French Ambassador in Moscow, should make vigorous but verbal representations to the Government of the U.S.S.R. He was carefully instructed not to commit anything to paper. It was thereby hoped that French policy might succeed in running with the hare of M. Briand and hunting with the hounds of M. Poincaré.

The French hope might have had a better chance if the horizon had been any but the Russian horizon. There are domestic cross-currents in Moscow as well as in Paris, and there are more of them in Moscow. Moreover, the Government of the U.S.S.R., whose prestige abroad is of a somewhat brittle nature, is highly sensitive about that prestige. Mr. Chicherin jumped to the determination that a Russian diplomatic representative abroad must be respected. He publicly supported Mr. Rakovsky against the Paris outcry. In a

statement which he made to the representative of a Paris newspaper, he declared that the Government of the U.S.S.R. had not agreed to the verbal suggestion made by M. Herbette that Mr. Rakovsky should be replaced by someone else, and that his government had no intention of replacing him. He went on to say that, for his own part, he thoroughly approved and appreciated Mr. Rakovsky's conduct as Russian Ambassador in Paris. By a somewhat quibbling after-thought he added that the incident which had caused the excitement had been misrepresented in the French Press. It was, perhaps, not surprising that Mr. Chicherin issued that statement. It is the normal tendency of all governments, at any rate publicly, to support their Ambassadors abroad. Criticism of an Ambassador's action is, as a rule, made in strict privacy, and no inkling of it emerges into the light of day, except perhaps as a result of historical research at a later date. In the case of the Russian Government, unity of front in its dealings with other governments is clearly held to be more than normally expedient. Mr. Chicherin, moreover, was no doubt encouraged to identify himself publicly with Mr. Rakovsky's conduct because he quickly saw through the subtle diplomacy which had been used by the French Government in the form of protest adopted.

The result of Mr. Chicherin's pronouncement, however, was to play into the hands of M. Poincaré at a time when it would better have suited Mr. Chicherin's purpose to play into the hands of M. Briand. M. Poincaré, feeling that French prestige could not be allowed to suffer Mr. Chicherin's virtual defiance, regarded it as necessary that the French complaint against Mr. Rakovsky be formulated in writing. French opinion was momentarily inflamed, and M. Poincaré seized his tactical advantage. On October 6th, therefore, a French Note, formal and precise, was sent to M. Herbette, and was presented by him on the following day to Mr. Chicherin. The Note recalled what had happened on August 9th, and quoted the offending sentences that had appeared over Mr. Rakovsky's signature. The sting of the Note was something of an anti-climax. It submitted that Mr. Rakovsky could not be kept in Paris if it was desired to retain a congenial atmosphere for the debt negotiations. The French Government in short was trying to combine the tactics of administering a whacking with that of offering a sop, and got the worst of both tactics. The mere fact that a written representation was made constituted a diplomatic "situation." The attempt to explain it away as being due to French concern about the debt negotiations was clumsy, and made the whole Note appear perfunctory.

When the Ambassador of a country which has refused since 1917 to fund or to refund its foreign debts meets the Finance Minister of a country which since 1915 has adopted the like philosophy, the

spectacle is highly dramatic but not highly practical. At any rate, it would hardly seem worth while to sacrifice good feeling for no better reason than to preserve and to continue the farce whereby the one debtor aforesaid tries to induce the other debtor aforesaid to settle a debt between themselves. Unconvincing, however, as was the peroration of the French Note of October 7th, the fact that the Note was presented put a strain on Franco-Russian relations, and made it virtually impossible for Mr. Rakovsky to stay in Paris.

Mr. Chicherin meanwhile had produced as much embarrassment for himself as for M. Briand. It happened that Mr. Rakovsky had been a co-signatory with Mr. Trotsky and with Mr. Zinoviev of the Opposition Manifesto issued in Moscow in August. At home, therefore, Mr. Rakovsky would have to be considered by Mr. Chicherin as a political opponent. That would be embarrassing. The anniversary of the October Revolution was approaching. The ceremonies which take place on that anniversary are the summit of Moscow's annual glory. The Russian ideal on that occasion is to have the Revolution's window well-dressed, and to show the world what a united and happy family the Russian Revolutionaries are. For Mr. Rakovsky to return home in those circumstances would be inopportune. Having played the stormy petrel in Paris, he would now be forced to play the stormy petrel in Moscow. Mr. Chicherin personally would be placed in an equivocal position. He had blown hot on Mr. Rakovsky abroad; could he blow cold on Mr. Rakovsky at home, at a time when the world was being invited to admire the unity of Moscow? Mr. Chicherin, therefore, wrote a polemical letter to the French Government in which a long irrelevant part was devoted to accusations of leakage in the French Press about the debt negotiations, and in which the only four relevant sentences were these: "While the Union Government does not deny the French Government's right to demand the recall of a representative of a foreign State, it considers such a demand, especially when it refers to an Ambassador who for two years had successfully conducted in the interests of both States most important negotiations which have yielded very substantial results, should be really well founded. . . . The U.S.S.R. Government declines to assume responsibility in the smallest measure for M. Rakovsky's recall or the eventual consequences of this recall. The U.S.S.R. Government cannot do otherwise than take into account the fact of such a demand on the part of the French Government, in spite of the groundlessness of the reasons communicated to the Soviet Government. The U.S.S.R. Government therefore considers itself compelled to relieve M. Rakovsky of his duties as Ambassador to France and to appoint his successor, for whom it now asks the agreement of the French Government."

The successor designated by Mr. Chicherin was Mr. Dovgalevsky, who has played a prominent but a troubled part in the Russian Communist Party. In 1923, he was Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs in the Government, but was removed from his post because he was suspected of sympathising with the Opposition. To combine Ministerial responsibility with Opposition sympathy is an original but a difficult adventure. Mr. Dovgalevsky has been kept out of Russia ever since. He was first sent as Soviet representative to Stockholm, and later to Tokio. It looks as if Mr. Chicherin has his difficulties. He wanted to keep Mr. Rakovsky in Paris because Mr. Rakovsky clearly belongs to the Opposition. In the alternative, he wanted to send Mr. Dovgalevsky to Paris for a like reason. The ridiculous muddle produced by the Rakovsky incident merely epitomises the general muddle produced by Russia's attempt to combine disturbance abroad with harmony at home, to sow mischief yet to reap goodwill and loans.

The chronicle of Russia's muddles is a story without an end. The food-rationing, food-queues and food-hoarding that are the visible concomitants of the famine that is foretold by some people is only one element in a new danger that arises in Russia. Another of them is an indirect and unforeseen effect of the diplomatic break between Great Britain and Russia which is now causing concern to economists who take the large view of Europe. A combination of circumstances has produced the paradox that the Anglo-Russian rupture has helped the Government of the U.S.S.R. gradually and by subtle devices to reverse the principles of the New Economic Policy in Russia. The danger arises that the thin end of the wedge to private enterprise in Russia may be completely withdrawn. As a result of a new railway policy the farmers in Russia are finding it nearly impossible to transport their produce to any private trader. The trade in corn, which after the introduction of the N.E.P. fell almost wholly into private hands, is now reverting to the hands of the State. A definite retrograde development is discernible in Russian economics. The part played unexpectedly in that development by Anglo-Russian diplomacy is this. The private enterprises in Russia, especially those engaged in agriculture, had for some time hoped against hope that an Anglo-Russian political agreement would open an avenue to British credits for use in the replacement of worn-out and antiquated agricultural machinery and for other essential purposes. After the London avenue was closed others were explored. Germany has been unresponsive. Not only has last year's credit scheme for German-Russian trade been proved a failure, and the prospect of further German credits thereby curtailed, but the London banks since the break have refused to discount German bills in cases where the proceeds were wanted for Russian trade. France, who by

confirmed practice is a borrower, not a lender, in her turn held out little hope to Russia's new Capitalists even before Mr. Rakovsky complicated the prospect. Capitalist interests in Russia have, therefore, been placed at a disadvantage against the unregenerate "Bolshevist" economists of Moscow, who have eagerly taken their opportunity. The present cause for concern among British economists is due to the realisation that sooner or later an arrangement must be reached with Russia, that neither France nor Germany has any intention of following the diplomatic lead of Great Britain, and thereby forcing the diplomatic issue to a head, and that in the meantime the obstructive forces in Moscow are regaining lost ground.

THE FRENCH DEBT AND THE BRITISH BUDGET.

In the first week of October, M. Poincaré mysteriously announced that France was negotiating with Washington about the funding of the French Debt to the United States, but that so far as the debt to Great Britain was concerned "We are simply waiting. . . . The initiative of a compromise settlement must come from the British Government." Two years ago, in reference to the same debt, M. Briand said "we intend to be punctual." Between M. Briand's punctuality and M. Poincaré's patience there seems little to choose so far as the British taxpayer is affected; but M. Poincaré's remark reveals a landmark in French policy. The strange history of the French funding operations thus enters upon a new phase. That history has been so long drawn out, and the British people so stolidly refuse to take an interest in their own budget, that the elements of the matter are apt to be forgotten. At first sight, it might appear odd that M. Poincaré should expect any further proposal from London on this subject. In the summer of 1925, M. Caillaux drew up with Mr. Churchill a draft funding agreement which M. Caillaux undertook to submit to his colleagues in Paris. He was jointly responsible with Mr. Churchill for that draft agreement, and he was, at that time, the responsible Finance Minister of France. Yet that agreement, now more than two years old, has never even been submitted to the French Parliament. As if to show, however, that the French Government was becoming uneasy about its continued default, a provisional sum was paid to the British Treasury during the financial year 1926 to 1927. The amount paid was £4,000,000, the sum that would have been paid if the Caillaux-Churchill agreement had been ratified. Similarly, during the current financial year, France is paying £6,000,000, which again would be the sum due under the Caillaux agreement. This hand-to-mouth sort of procedure is something unique in international finance. From the British point of view, its drawbacks are obvious. There is, at

present, no undertaking on the part of the French Government to pay anything after the end of the current year.

In view of the fact that a definite funding agreement is already in existence and only needs to be ratified by the French Parliament, it is difficult for English opinion to understand why M. Poincaré should now expect a further "proposal" from Great Britain. It is all the more difficult because the Caillaux-Churchill terms were remarkably light for France. The British taxpayer lent a sum of about £600,000,000 to France, doggedly but not intelligently he has since paid 7d. in the pound in income-tax to provide himself with the interest on it. If the Caillaux-Churchill agreement were ratified, the result would be that the French taxpayer would undertake to pay 2d. in the pound towards the interest required for the service of the debt, while the British taxpayer would be left to pay the remaining 5d. in the pound for all time. In other words, Mr. Churchill proposed that France should repay only 2/7ths of the debt. The official figures published in Paris this summer, which show that French finances are in a flourishing condition, had led some innocent people in Great Britain to expect that the French Government would perhaps be disposed to pay more than was stipulated in the Caillaux agreement. When, however, M. Poincaré hints at a "compromise" proposal on the part of Mr. Churchill, he appears to have in mind a proposal in another sense. British opinion, which normally looks at world affairs with a certain amount of humour, could hardly be induced to take such a proposal seriously. There are those who suspect, and with some reason, that M. Poincaré is mainly thinking of his American tactics. Some Frenchmen indeed are frank enough to explain that if the French debt to Great Britain were funded, it would be impossible for France any longer to refuse to fund her debt to the United States. And in view of the tariff war and other complications, it is explained, France does not want to settle with the United States. In effect, therefore, Great Britain is asked to continue patiently to be victimised. It is fortunate, in these circumstances, that the British politicians have a sense of humour, and that the British taxpayer has no memory.

TANNENBERG, THE RHINELANDS, AND DISARMAMENT.

If the triangular relations between Germany, France and Great Britain could be described by a geometric freak as a circle, there would be no doubt that the epithet "vicious" would slip in before the noun. The long delay in the evacuation of the Rhineland has had an increasingly irritant effect on the Right wing of German opinion. The Locarno Treaties are now two years old, but neither the implications of those Treaties, that German territory would be

evacuated, nor the express promise made by the Ambassadors' Conference in its Note of November 14th, 1925, that the occupying troops would be appreciably reduced, have as yet been honoured. Few reasonable people defend the French refusal to carry out the promise, or the prolonged British acquiescence in the French refusal. Realistic people have for twelve months and more been afraid that somewhere or other at some time or another German extremist opinion would find an outlet. There were those who were not surprised when President von Hindenberg, in dedicating the Tannenberg Memorial on September 20th, took the occasion to express the extreme German thesis about war guilt. He was hitting at Monsieur Poincaré. President von Hindenberg is eighty, and it is the normal attribute of old age that it looks back instead of forward. Herr Stresemann was away in Geneva, and his President, therefore, could not benefit by the restraining influence that might otherwise have been brought to bear upon him. It may be inferred that the contrary influence took the occasion of Herr Stresemann's absence to play upon the Field-Marshal's weakness. It was all the more deplorable because President von Hindenberg had hitherto surprised his friends and confounded his critics by the moderation and far-sightedness of his statesmanship. At Tannenberg, however, he kicked over the traces in a dramatic and almost childish petulant manner. If the former contention, maintained immediately after the war by those who helped to impose on Germany the peace of Versailles, that the whole guilt of the war lay on the Kaiser's head, can hardly be recognised as true to life, the equally exaggerated thesis propounded by President von Hindenberg that Germany was alone guiltless is equally ridiculous. Herr Stresemann would never have perpetrated or approved such "gaffe."

The immediate reaction in Paris was a renewed determination not to reduce the occupying forces. It is true that a provisional agreement had been reached between the French and British Governments that the total forces be slightly reduced. A condition put forward by the French Government made it difficult, however, for the British Government to agree to a proposed French method of carrying that agreement into practice. A peculiar situation arose which made one wonder if, after all, the Tannenberg incident was the decisive factor in the hardened French attitude to the Rhinelands. A financial point of some importance was involved. Great Britain, as before and as always, was earmarked for the rôle of victim. The French Government claimed, and the British Government rejected the claim, that French troops be withdrawn proportionately with the British. According to the 1922 arrangement, the British quota of troops was fixed at 12 per cent. The present British quota is below that figure, and the French Government pro-

posed to reduce the total forces in such a way as to make the British quota still smaller in proportion. The financial point is this. The cost of the occupying troops is a prior charge against the Dawes payments. Owing to the present distribution of the troops, France receives about 70 per cent. of those charges, and would receive a higher percentage if her present scheme were accepted. If the French troops were withdrawn from the Rhine, they would have to be maintained in France at the expense of France. The financial element in the controversy, therefore, is that if the French proposals were adopted, French army expenses would be partially met out of Dawes payments to the detriment of Great Britain and other beneficiaries.

President Hindenburg's Tannenberg speech was unfortunately delivered a few days before his birthday. His eightieth birthday fell on October 9th. President Coolidge telegraphed his congratulations. The capitals of the Locarno Powers were silent. It is true that Sir Austen Chamberlain was cruising at the time in the Mediterranean, and it appears to be the case that the automatic machinery of State courtesies, at any rate in London, has not been brought up to date since Locarno. The King has never sent messages of greeting to Berlin since 1914, when the Kaiser's name, as it were, was struck off the visiting list. Now that attention has been drawn to the matter by the indignant comments of the German Press, we may hope that the German President will be added to the list, and that the apparent discourtesy will not happen next year. None the less, the suspicion that Buckingham Palace would have risen to the occasion, as did the White House, had the Tannenberg speech not been delivered, cannot wholly be dismissed.

Oddly enough, the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations, which had been mostly occupied by the practical and precise questions of the Geneva Protocol and of Arbitration, ended by raising a vague philosophical question, which, however, had some bearing on the vicious triangle. The question asked was whether it would be better to pursue the general purpose of the League by trying to arrange for disarmament before arranging for "security" or vice versa? Herr Stresemann raised the question by unequivocally declaring that German diplomacy regarded disarmament as the problem to be tackled first, whereupon French opinion reacted by claiming that security must precede any serious attempt at disarmament. It was always expected that Germany would take the earliest opportunity at Geneva to urge disarmament as the most pressing problem. That is easy to understand because Germany, relatively to the other Powers in Europe, is disarmed. It is true that opinions vary about the effective extent to which the German Government has carried out the disarmament obligation imposed by the Treaty of Ver-

sailles, but few people will maintain either that German armaments can compare with her pre-war armaments, or that Germany is relatively as well armed as, for instance, France. It is easy, therefore, to understand why German opinion attaches first importance to disarmament, and it is equally easy to understand why France attaches first importance to security. Sir Austen Chamberlain has always taken the attitude that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade peoples to disarm unless their fears of attacks were first allayed. To that extent, therefore, he has sympathised more with the French than with the German thesis. The main argument with which he supported the Locarno idea was that by eliminating one big danger zone the nations of Europe might feel more secure and that therefore the problem of disarmament on land might be the more easily tackled. It is easy to understand the argument that serious and lasting disarmament can only follow a general sense of security, for one of the lessons of the Great War was that armaments can be quickly improvised. On the other hand, official opinion in London takes a somewhat elastic view of the tactical issue raised by Herr Stresemann. There is a danger of attaching too much importance to the question of tactics. The general view of Whitehall is that it does not matter much whether you tackle disarmament first or security first so long as you do something convincing in either one or the other direction. During the Great War the streets of England displayed a recruiting poster which read, "Stand not upon the order of your going, but go." Those words of Lady Macbeth's epitomise the British attitude to the question of precedence raised by Herr Stresemann. Continental opinion is sometimes inclined to criticise British opinion on the ground that it is too vague and unpractical. The criticism may be just, but it certainly is the case that serious people in Great Britain are equally ready to admit that if the nations disarm, they are *ipso facto* secure, and that if they are secure, they will have no reason to maintain their armaments. It is largely a matter of commonsense. On the balance of the two arguments, British opinion inclines to the belief that the quickest way to effective disarmament is through an effective provision for security. That policy was exemplified in the Locarno Treaties.

THE POLISH LOAN.

Poland has been admitted to the list of countries who have afforded credit good enough for the raising of a loan in London and in New York. At the beginning of July a group of American bankers agreed, as a result of Polish representations, to grant a preliminary credit of \$15,000,000 and then to visit Warsaw to arrange for a substantive loan of some \$60,000,000 to be issued as

and when it might be practical. Discussions had been carried on in Warsaw, and more than once led to difficulties and to rumours of breakdown. The discussions were broken off at one point because the Polish Government refused to agree to the condition that the loan should be administered under foreign control and refused to accept the price of issue suggested by the Americans. It was to be a 7 per cent. loan, and the Americans suggested 89 as the price of issue. The Polish Government demanded at least 92. The negotiations were renewed at the beginning of October, and an agreement was reached whereby the issue price should be 92, but that the administration of the loan for the first three years should be subject to American control.

£2,000,000 of the loan were issued in London as sterling bonds, \$47,000,000 in New York and \$15,000,000 in Paris, Amsterdam, Warsaw, Bern and Stockholm. Poland is thus given the prestige of foreign confidence at a flat yield of £7 12s. per cent. As the present market price of Czechoslovak bonds gives a yield of about £7 6s. and the German bonds of 1924 a yield of about £6 10s. per cent., the Polish Government may be congratulated that its rate is comparatively not too high. The purpose of the loan is to stabilise the Polish currency. A plan of stabilisation has been drawn up which forbids any further issue of State notes, which stipulates that all future notes shall be issued by the State bank of Poland, and that the notes now circulating shall be converted. The Zloty is to be stabilised on a gold basis. A decree having the force of law dated October 13th, 1927, was promulgated to give to the Zloty a gold value equal to 21.43.48 to the pound sterling. That value roughly corresponds to the current paper value of the now to be discarded State note. The future issue of notes is to be strictly confined by conditions which will make the Polish gold reserve exceptionally big. As in addition the entire foreign exchange resulting from the present loan will be put at the disposal of the Bank of Poland, the gold reserve will amount approximately to 80 per cent. of the total liabilities. That is one of the highest ratios of any bank of issue in the world. Precautions therefore which appear to be adequate have been taken to safeguard Poland's financial health during the twenty years of the loan's currency.

For the service of the loan the entire Polish Customs are earmarked, and on their present level show a margin of four to one over what is needed. The loan forms part of a comprehensive scheme outlined in the plan of stabilisation for monetary, budgetary and administrative soundness, the plan having been drawn up with the help of international experts. State expenditure, for instance, is not to exceed budget estimates unless a corresponding increase in revenue is provided for, and the Government has had to renounce

the right to long term borrowings for budgetary purposes. The entire floating debt of the Treasury will be redeemed with a part of the proceeds of the loan. An American adviser will be elected a member of the Board of the Bank of Poland for a period of three years to assist and advise the Bank and the Government to carry out the plan of stabilisation. The adviser will present to the Bank a quarterly report, which the Bank is bound promptly to publish, showing the exact progress of the plan. The proceeds of the loan will be available exclusively for the purposes of the plan, and no payments whatever can be made without the counter-signature of the American adviser.

It is natural that the issuing of such a loan for the purposes of the Polish Government should have raised a certain amount of interest both among students of diplomacy and of finance. Polish politics are controversial. It may be that Marshal Pilsudski will be able to maintain his present virtual dictatorship in Poland. There are serious unbiassed observers who think that Marshal Pilsudski is sailing near the wind. His persistent refusal to convene a meeting of Parliament has led to unventilated discontent, which is always dangerous. At the beginning of June Marshal Pilsudski did consent to a summoning of Parliament, but the session was short and was again prorogued on July 14th. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the decisive cause which encouraged Marshal Pilsudski again to dispense with the services of Parliament was that in the meantime he had received the preliminary instalment of American credits aforesaid. At the end of August a manifesto was signed by certain deputies and senators demanding the reassembly of Parliament. It is significant that in Spain General Primo de Rivera and the King have had to admit the expediency of convening a National Assembly. It is true that the Spanish Assembly was nominated, not elected, and that the Socialist malcontents did not participate. None the less it represented a new tendency on the part of the Spanish Dictator to take a more constitutional view of the rights and prerogatives of the Spanish people. Governments must ultimately derive their power over the people from the people.

Even if the gloomy prophets who foretell grave industrial troubles in Poland this winter are proved to be wrong, there always remains the still gloomier fact that Poland's foreign relations continue to be delicate to the point of brittleness. No progress has been made towards restoring an atmosphere of complete confidence between Moscow and Warsaw, and the murder of the Soviet minister, Mr. Voikoff, on the Warsaw station is unfortunately the last important event that has been chronicled in the story of Russo-Polish relations. The chronic attempt that has been made to conclude a German-Polish commercial agreement has not yet succeeded,

although the prospect improved a little towards the middle of October. The Polish Government has threatened to double its duties against countries which have no commercial treaty with Poland and to bring the new tariffs into operation at the end of this year. As a lever against the German nationalists that threat appears not to have had much value, although the prospective holders of the new Polish bonds may derive some spurious satisfaction from the possibility that the Customs receipts may be increased. The difficulties are not entirely Polish, for the German nationalists who are included in the German Government are still averse from allowing Polish agricultural products to enter Germany free of duty. On the Polish side the main exports to Germany are agricultural,

The important diplomatic fact, however, is that Poland's relations with Russia on the one side and with Germany on the other are not of the best. Then there is the ever-present menace of Lithuania's increasing determination never to be reconciled with the loss of Vilna. So strong is the feeling in Lithuania on this subject that it is proposed by the Kovno Government to amend the Lithuanian constitution by the insertion of a clause dogmatically and roundly asserting that Vilna is the capital of Lithuania. Moreover, the present population of the Republic of Poland which is given by the Polish Minister of Finance as nearly thirty millions, is swollen by the inclusion of large numbers of alien minorities. It is hardly surprising that extreme precautions were taken to make the security of the loan as watertight as pure finance could make it. Pure finance, however, must be dependent in the long run and in some degree on the maintenance of diplomatic tranquillity. Poland in the past has cultivated the art of making enemies rather than of making friends. Now that she is quoted in the world's stock markets it is hoped by her sincerest wellwishers that she will reverse that order.

LAND REFORM IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

One of the questions that has been raised by the renewed agitation about the Treaty of Trianon is that of land reform, which has been attempted conspicuously by the Czechoslovak Government. The results of that attempt have led to controversy, because some of the pre-war landowners, Hungarian for example, have been transferred as a result of the war to a new State and have found it difficult to accept from the hands of what they regard as a strange government sacrifices which they might the more readily have understood had political continuity not been interrupted. The propaganda, however, which alleges that differential treatment has been meted out to various categories of subjects, is demonstrably untrue. The makers of the Czechoslovak republic were progressive in policy, and pro-

gress inevitably implies sacrifice on the part of those who hold antiquated and no longer justifiable privileges. Speaking in Prague a short time ago the new British Minister, Sir Ronald Macleay, said something which ought to carry weight with those who have swallowed uncritically some of the unscrupulous propaganda. "It is natural," he said, "that the men who shaped the new Republic and drew up its constitutional laws should belong to the advanced school of thought, which although progressive and liberal in the best sense of the word, realised the value of a wide conservatism in matters affecting private ownership and individual endeavour. It is an obvious principle of this school of political thought that the inhabitants of a State, which to a considerable extent is an agricultural one, must be given a full opportunity to possess and cultivate the soil and that the creation of a large and prosperous class of farmers forms the most efficacious antidote against the reckless and destructive ideals of law, commerce and economics which after the revolution in Russia passed from the theoretical to the practical stage there. This far-reaching reform must, however, be carried out, even though sometimes it involves sacrifices and inevitable hardships. But realising that the means applied are serving the welfare of the State and the great majority of its citizens, the Czechoslovak Government and nation can with confidence, as masters in their own house, continue to solve these internal problems in accordance with the directives which they have chosen, and they can afford to ignore the ignorant criticism which this policy may arouse."

At the last session of the League of Nations, Dr. Benesh read a memorandum on the post-War history of Land Reform in Central Europe which deserves the attention of those who are disposed to take an objective view of the matter. Dr. Benesh needs no apology. His reputation as a serious, well-informed and fair-minded statesman is well established, and the documentation of his facts is such as to admit of ready verification from the original sources. In passing it would interest Lord Rothermere to know that one result of the anti-Czechoslovak campaign was a meeting at Bratislava of the Hungarian section of the Czechoslovak Socialist Democratic Party, which passed a resolution affirming that "the Hungarian workers have more rights in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary." One need not attach too much importance to resolutions passed at public meetings, but one must attach importance to a memorandum by Dr. Benesh.

Dr. Benesh submitted that Central European land reform was a matter of vital necessity at a time when Bolshevism was a real danger, especially in Czechoslovakia, where the landed estates occupied so large a territory. The Czechoslovak reform was

quickly decided upon. It was codified in April, 1919, that is, before the Peace Treaties were drawn up. In some respects it seemed doubtful whether the provisions of the Land Reform Act would not conflict with those of the Treaties. In doubtful cases Dr. Benesh refrained from carrying out the Czechoslovak provisions. In another case, namely, paragraph 4 of Article 76 of the Peace Treaty, which provided that foreign subjects be given a free disposal over their immovable property in Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benesh at the Peace Conference suggested the addition of this clause: "On condition that such estates are subjected to the same treatment as the estates of Czechoslovak subjects." A commission entrusted with an inquiry into the point thus raised expressed the view in writing that the addition was unnecessary, because the clause of the Peace Treaty was to be definitely interpreted in a sense to fulfil Dr. Benesh's condition. The provisions of the Czechoslovak measure were therefore definitely regarded as harmonising with the Peace Treaty. At the Peace Conference the Magyar delegation expressed the spontaneous opinion that the Land Reform should be applied without distinction to Hungarian and to Czechoslovak subjects. Count Apponyi, the President of the Magyar delegation, wrote to the President of the Conference on February 19th, 1920, expressing the view that the Rumanian decree of September 10th, 1919, by which estates located on the annexed territories and belonging to foreign subjects residing outside Rumania, and paragraph 9 of the Czechoslovak land act of June 16th, 1919, by which the estates of subjects of enemy States were to be expropriated without compensation—(a paragraph which was never carried out in Czechoslovakia on account of the peace treaty)—were incompatible with Article 250 of the peace treaty, which exempted the estates of Magyar subjects from requisition and liquidation in the sense of section 4 of part 10 of the treaty. To remove that anomaly he demanded a declaration that no estate belonging to Magyar subjects and located upon the territory of the former monarchy should be sequestered, liquidated or expropriated, whether on the basis of a law or of special measures, except under the same conditions which might be put into operation towards the subjects of the State by which the respective law was passed or the respective measures carried out. The Magyar delegation did not ask for any exceptionally favourable treatment or for any capitulation to Hungarian subjects. It demanded only the application of land reform in the same manner for Hungarians as for Czechoslovaks.

Now if it were ruled (continued in effect Dr. Benesh's memorandum) that the mixed court were competent to declare directly or indirectly that the application of the Czechoslovak land laws was inapplicable to Hungarian subjects, it would imply privileged treat-

ment for the Magyars, for Czechoslovak subjects would not have the right to appeal to a similar court. In Czechoslovakia there are subjects of many European States who possessed landed property. The land reform act applies to all of them, French, English, Italian, Polish, Yugoslav, Rumanian, Swiss, Belgian, Spanish. None of them would be able to apply to such a tribunal. Nor would such privileged treatment for Magyars fulfil the spirit or the letter of the treaties, nor correspond to the expressed views of the Allied Powers, the Czechoslovak and Magyar Governments alike. The mixed arbitration court, according to the terms of the peace treaty, possesses competence merely to protect Magyar, German and Austrian subjects in certain clearly specified cases, where the liquidation or sequestration of the property of such subjects is at issue. The word "liquidation" is defined by the peace treaty as applying to measures adopted outside the scope of general legislation, or connected directly with the question of reparations.

"The Rumanian and Hungarian mixed court," ended Dr. Benesh, "by proclaiming itself competent, has exceeded its authority. I have always been of this opinion. But if in March there could have been any doubts in this matter, I conjecture that they can no longer exist to-day after the publication of the last report (No. 9) of the Permanent Court for International Justice. These are the reasons which settle the point of view of Czechoslovakia in the question of the Magyar complaint and in the question of the competence of mixed courts in this matter. At the same time these are the reasons by which the point of view of Czechoslovakia would be settled if in the future the Czechoslovak Government were confronted with such a question in the Council. In short, the Czechoslovak Government does not acknowledge the competence of the mixed arbitration courts in the matter of land reform."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 15th, 1927.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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KING EDWARD VII.*

This remarkable volume was in active preparation when the late Sir Sidney Lee, on January 1st, 1925, dated the preface to the first volume of his life of King Edward VII, and he hoped that it would be issued before the end of that year. He died, however, on March 13th, 1926, after a long illness, before his labours were completed. Much had been done. The very important chapters dealing with the Accession, with "the King and the Constitution," the conclusion of the South African War, the King and Foreign Affairs in the period 1901-1902, the subject of Army Reform, and not least the Epilogue, were virtually ready for the press, and Sir Sidney had made all necessary preparations for the reduction of his material and his memoranda and the incompleting chapters into final literary form. The whole work is therefore his, but it could not have been completed in the form that he had contemplated without the brilliant help of Mr. S. F. Markham, who was closely concerned with the first volume, of Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw, who revised the manuscript and proofs, and without the assistance of Dr. H. W. V. Temperley in the provision of valuable notes from the Foreign Office. The work in fact has appeared, there can be no doubt, in the form that that master of biography, Sir Sidney Lee, would have wholly approved. No one who has any experience of the difficulty of biographical work dealing with great affairs in contemporary times can have anything but praise for these unbiassed views of a great contemporary figure.

* *King Edward VII: A Biography.* By Sir Sidney Lee. Vol. II. The Reign, January 22nd, 1901 to May 6th, 1910. Macmillan. 31s. 6d. net.

The volume has three special aspects: the first is the continued revelation of the personality and character of King Edward VII; the second is a remarkable and judicious summary of what was practically world-history from the point of view of international relations during the decade in which King Edward was a leading figure; the third is the social and political history of England during ten years of outstanding constitutional and international importance. On the two latter themes the volume will prove a very useful guide in the period before definitive history, with the aid of documents that will not be available for many years, can be written. On the first theme it is difficult to suppose that Sir Sidney Lee's biography will ever be displaced.

From the first King Edward made clear that he did not intend to be "a *roi fainéant* under the control of a *Maire du Palais*," and he certainly never was this though he never stepped beyond the rôle of a purely constitutional monarch. Before his accession he had had great experience of international relations, and his knowledge of men and matters was of the first importance in the relations of Great Britain with her neighbours in a singularly difficult period. He was kept informed of everything, and upon everything he advised his advisers, leaving them to use their judgment as to the value of that advice. From the first he "came in far closer touch with current affairs than any previous monarch," and from the first plunged into work to him "all so interesting." Had the King died as Prince of Wales the intensity of his interest in public affairs would hardly have been realised. On his accession he declared that he would work for his country "as long as there is breath in my body," and his last words were "I shall work to the end." That his personality developed under the burden of Kingship is plain enough from this clear narrative. The sudden illness that delayed the Coronation brought out his essential character. He was much troubled by the losses that it entailed, and months afterwards "he keenly felt the disappointment he had caused, through his illness, to so many people on the eve of his coronation. The thought evidently much depressed him." Thoughtfulness for others was a keynote to his character. He was one of the few men who could have won the Irish, and his visit to Dublin in 1903 was an unqualified success.

But he had the personality that makes for friendship. He was very coldly received in Paris in May, 1903, but he dissipated with a smile the late May frost, and the sensitive Parisian public suddenly realised that "the King of England was determined to be the friend of France." Metternich found this visit of the King to Paris

"a most odd affair." In fact, it "was one of the greatest steps forward in the creation of the Anglo-French Entente." He won his way, with the most uncompromising material, by his essential common sense and sense of humour, kindness and bonhomie, coupled with a great sense of dignity and a total absence of fear. His thoughtfulness for others continually showed itself in little things. He was a great smoker though moderate to abstemious in drinking, but he strenuously objected to smoking in theatres and refused to allow it in London. He regarded it as an intolerable annoyance to the majority of an ordinary theatre audience and a danger to women's dresses. It is a small point, but one in full accordance with the principles that governed his public and private life as King.

His lifelong interest in all aspects of philanthropy and education grew with the increasing years, and he held strong views on all political questions that affected the internal unity of the nation. He quite frankly expressed his dislike of Mr. Birrell's Education Bill of 1906 because he thought that it would produce "a kind of political-religious warfare which is most undesirable, especially just now," he strove hard to make all parties work in "the spirit of concession," and he deeply and rightly regretted his failure to bring parties together. He had "firm faith in the value of conciliation," and "impatience with merely party considerations."

To those anxious to criticise some aspects of the earlier life of this remarkable man the penultimate paragraph of this book may be commended. "In spite of temptations that would have ruined a less virile man he acquired the full art of Kingship by his own tenacity of purpose." Sir Sidney Lee closes the book with a phrase that covers "the activities and interests of an intensely patriotic sovereign. He had the temperament of a king, and as a king he was eminently successful. *Son métier était Roi*." He loved the people of his Empire and to his last breath worked for them. The years that he did not see might have been more catastrophic had he not held the view that "Britain must live, that British interests must come first."

* * *

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.*

The volume of essays by the late Professor Bernard Bosanquet, published under the principal editorship of Professor J. H. Muirhead with the title *Science and Philosophy and Other Essays*,* presents a comprehensive view of the author's philosophy, which embraces logic and metaphysics, the ethical, social, and political sciences, and

* *Science and Philosophy and Other Essays*. By the late Bernard Bosanquet. George Allen & Unwin. 16s. net.

aesthetics. The essays were prepared at intervals throughout the long course of Professor Bosanquet's activity as a thinker, and most of them have previously appeared in the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, in *Mind*, or elsewhere. It is well that they should have been brought together, for they not only furnish a worthy memorial of a distinguished philosopher, but also enable those who have not studied his more elaborate works to gain a satisfactory view of the nature and compass of his thought. The book is, indeed, a monument of an intellectual achievement, which made Professor Bosanquet at once an outstanding figure among the metaphysicians of his time, and also enabled him to supply valuable illumination and guidance in all those spheres of practical concern where philosophical principles are most needed. For the purpose of gaining a view of the essential features of the author's philosophy perhaps the most important essays are those on "Science and Philosophy" (I), "The Philosophical Importance of a True Theory of Identity" (II), "On the Philosophical Distinction between 'Knowledge' and 'Opinion'" (III) and on "Contradiction and Reality" (V), in the first section of the volume, together with those on "Recent Criticism of Green's Ethics" (X), "On the True Conception of Another World" (XIX), and on "The Kingdom of God on Earth" (XX), which are to be found in the second section.

If the late Professor James Ward, whose *Philosophical Essays* we recently noticed, approached the central problems of Philosophy as a psychologist, drawing his inferences from the close scrutiny of his own inner experience and that of others, Professor Bosanquet elaborated his philosophy as a profound logician, understanding this to mean precise reasoning out and rigorous examination of the implications contained in thought, not merely as formal, but as man's only and sufficient guide to the Nature of Reality. For him philosophy was not "the theory of theories" but was the means of gaining direct access to the universe treated as a whole, by a process of admitting, criticising and eventually transcending the special contributions that are made by every part of this all-embracing whole. "Philosophy," as he said, "rests upon the whole spectacle of the ordered Universe, and on the judgments of value which are essentially and rationally implied in that vision." Hence Professor Bosanquet discovered and set forth a spiritual philosophy, an account of Reality as revealing itself within the limits of Humanity, conceived as a particular expression—the highest, the only and the sufficient expression within reach—of the Absolute Being, that is God. Thus, in presenting his account of the Christian Religion, Professor Bosanquet declared, "Divinity, the Christian religion said, was to be looked for in the spirit of man, implying, as we now see, that it need be looked for *nowhere else*" (p. 348). His

own italics are sufficient to show that, however the Absolute might and does transcend the particular content of man's thought, he repudiated any such transcendence as involves the "Otherness" of God. Or as he remarked more generally elsewhere, "The world, which is accessible through morality and science and art, is not dwarfed by anything else of a more real kind that remains beyond it and incapable of assimilation, although, of course, we cannot precisely say to what extent, within its continuous totality, the accessible world may be capable of modification. We can only say that we are not going to believe in the discontinuous or in the irrational." (p. 378). As to this, the only remark that is necessary is to say that the phrase "that remains beyond it and incapable of assimilation" is ambiguous. For the Absolute Philosophy of Professor Bosanquet it means one thing; for the Christian Theism, of which Professor James Ward may be considered an exponent, it means another. For the latter, God, in His perfection, is beyond the total content of human thought and experience, but not incapable of progressive, though ever incomplete, assimilation as creaturely capacity advances in the knowledge of Him.

With this important reservation, Professor Bosanquet's account of the characteristic scope and activity of Philosophy appears to us to be satisfactory. Philosophy is constrained to see and to construe the Universe as a whole, coming into immediate contact with it through thought, and, in order to this, receiving the contributions of all the special sciences and arts, yet so as to comprehend, and for this purpose to revise, them all for the purpose of unifying and interpreting the whole. The progress of knowledge, as contrasted with opinion, consists in the growing ability to organise the provinces of Reality, as presented to us, into living systems by means of principles which, while truly applicable to the matters in hand, are modifiable, from first to last, either by closer scrutiny of these principles themselves, or by comparison of these living systems with one another, and, finally, with the system of the whole that comprehends them all. Throughout this unending process it is the task of philosophy to seek the Meaning of the Whole as it reveals itself within the consciousness of a thinking subject, who is compelled to interpret and estimate it by means of forms of thought and feeling, of purposive desire and valuation, which have come into being and activity in, through, and for this all-embracing whole. As Professor Bosanquet says, "It is just this property of being a centre in which the Universal Spirit applies itself to the concrete situation, which gives the spiritual individual just that note of independence that is claimed for him" (p. 107).

So far every type of spiritual philosophy is in agreement. The point at which divergence from the philosophy of the Absolute

arises is as to what is involved in being such a centre. Certainly not "atomism" in the sense that Professor Bosanquet rightly rejects it. Yet, on the other hand, such substantiality, in the true sense of the term, such permanent being-for-self, is not to be resolved away in terms of, or destroyed by the life of, the Absolute, since the culminating purpose made manifest in Reality has been to set such centres up, to develop them, and to maintain them as ends in themselves. This issue, however, must be decided by considerations that strike deeper and rise higher than that of the consistency, coherence and completeness of Logic and Reasoning. The whole that is ultimately to be unified by Reason is, as yet, not completely revealed.

J.S.L.

THE COLONISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES *

Dr. Beard, whose work as an economic interpreter of American history and biography has long had many admirers in the United States, is to be congratulated on the successful completion, with the aid of his wife, of this gigantic work. I say gigantic because in the first place each of the two volumes runs to more than 800 pages, and in the second place our authors have tried to grapple with almost every phase of their subject, including literature, art, mechanics, business enterprise, parties and politics, warlike expansion, agricultural development, educational progress, etc.

On reading the first few pages of introduction about Anaximander, Hegel, Henry Adams, Oswald Spengler and Werner Sombart, the reader may be a little afraid that the book will be shipwrecked in the philosophy of the Absolute, or in some logic of the cosmos which would seek to rationalise and explain the freaks of history and the "manifest destinies" of the various white tribes who colonised in the course of two and a half centuries the territories that lie between Montreal and New Orleans and between New York and San Francisco. But Dr. Beard knows far too much, he has too many facts and figures at his command to undertake the Hegelian synthesis of essays, beginning with the colonisation of the continent by English, Dutch, French, Spaniards, Swedes, and afterwards by Germans, Irish, Italians, and all the other races who make up the present complex American nation. He does not forget the negroes and the negro question. He tells us something about Mexico and Mexicans; and although sometimes the average English reader will find himself bewildered by unfamiliar terms or allusions, yet on the whole

* *The Rise of American Civilization*. By Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. 2 vols. Jonathan Cape. 50s. net.

I venture to say that there is no existing book which will open up to an intelligent and receptive mind more comprehensive views of the great Republic of the West with its whirlpool of political, social, and economic problems soluble or insoluble.

The style of the book is excellent—vigorous and animated. Our authors have a copious vocabulary and an eye for the picturesque. The first three hundred pages, which take us down to the end of the War of Independence, make a fascinating record; for they are enlivened and illuminated by curious facts, amusing anecdotes, economic observations and philosophic reflections. The growth of the early colonies or plantations, started under English, Dutch, and Swedish auspices, are admirably described. Our authors have imagination, vision, and the art of presenting the salient features of history on a rich and varied background. They describe very cleverly the social and economic difficulties that beset those new societies in a new world.

A study of the life and culture of Provincial America brings us to an essay entitled "Clash of Metropolis and Colony." In the next hundred pages we have an ambitious revision of the Whig and Tory theories of the origins of the American Revolution and War of Independence. It is all very stimulating and suggestive. But when I read that, in the light of English and Provincial statutes and authentic records of earlier conflicts and controversies, "the concept of the American Revolution as a quarrel caused by a stubborn king and obsequious ministers shrinks into a trifling joke," I begin to wonder whether contemporary opinion and tradition can be overridden and reversed quite so easily. If minds so powerful, and so closely in touch with the facts, as Burke, Fox, Chatham, Franklin, Jefferson, and John Adams—to mention only a few—took this "trifling joke" view of the contest, and believed that the break need never have occurred, and would not have occurred, if King George III had not been passionately and stubbornly bent on asserting his right to tax and control the American colonies, then I can only say for myself that, with all respect to the infinitely greater erudition of our distinguished authors, I must register a humble dissent from their verdict. I would put it in this way. If the policy of George III and his Ministers and Governors towards the American colonies had been guided from the first by the advice of Burke, would the war have occurred? The answer I submit is certainly no. If the colonial policy of Burke or Adam Smith—afterwards developed by the Benthamites and Cobdenites towards other parts of the British Empire—had been applied to our Overseas Dominions from 1760 onwards instead of, say, from 1832 onwards, it seems to me possible and even probable that there would have been no separation, and certain that there would have been no

The scientific historian of Greece and Rome is rightly on his guard against ingenious modern interpretations or reconstructions which clash with primary authorities and contemporary historians like Herodotus, Thucydides, Cæsar, Tacitus, or the speeches of Cicero and Demosthenes. Similar considerations *ceteris paribus* apply to modern transactions. It is true that economic interpretations of history may throw a new light on old conflicts. But we should be slow to believe that really great thinkers and actors in the Revolutionary drama did not know what they were fighting about, and remained until death under an illusion so complete that their conception of the struggle can now be treated as a trifling joke. I would not argue that the New Englanders and Virginians, who were so ready to fight, were right in welcoming an appeal to force. By patient political resistance they could probably, in a few years, have got substantially what they wanted without the bloodshed and bankruptcy and miseries and hazards of war. Nor do I deny that a House of Commons elected on narrow franchise and a parliamentary majority corrupted by the King's influence, shared the responsibility with King George and his Ministers.

When war has once begun, conciliation is very difficult even between democracies with representative institutions. Probably Dr. Beard would say that the Parliament which endorsed the Boer War or the Congresses which endorsed some of the Imperialistic wars of the United States were not much wiser or more virtuous than English Parliaments of the eighteenth century.

Be that as it may, we need not quarrel with Dr. and Mrs. Beard because we do not always agree with them. Historical essays which excite no controversy are apt to be uninteresting. If this book had been a cold conventional assembly of facts and accepted opinions, it would not have arrested attention or stimulated reflection. As it is, our authors have combined research with instruction. They have opened out new views of the Civil War between North and South, and they have given fresh interpretations of the policies of the leading Republican and Democratic statesmen in our own time. The chapters on Jacksonian democracy and the Westward movement of business enterprise, on American Agriculture and Labour, on Imperialism and on the Machine Age, are original and suggestive, abounding in new ideas and apt illustrations of political and economic movements. Dr. Beard's treatment of President Wilson and his explanation, or attempted explanation, of his reasons for entering into the war will be keenly canvassed. He is a severe critic of Wilson, and it is pretty plain from his narrative that he disapproves of American intervention as it is of the Reign of Terror which followed. He says that the act of May, 1918, surpassed in violence the Sedition

It is certainly not easy to under-

stand why American public opinion was so much more intolerant towards critics of the war policy and towards advocates of a diplomatic peace than public opinion in England. Perhaps the explanation is that so large a section of the people is of German origin and that another large section (the Irish) was bitterly anti-English. The larger the minority in war time, the more tyrannical will be the temper and measures of the majority. Dr. Beard's analysis in chapter xxvi. of President Wilson's motives and failures strikes me incomplete and unsatisfactory. But it is nevertheless a serious contribution to an unsettled question.

F. W. HIRST.

* * *

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.*

Professor Clement Webb has done well to publish, under the title of *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*,* the substance of the course of lectures which he delivered in Oxford three years ago in commemoration of the bicentenary of Kant's birth. The volume is, as might be expected of its author, a careful and lucid exposition. It presents, in addition, an estimate of Kant's contribution to the Philosophy of Religion, which, while critical, is thoroughly appreciative of its value and importance.

Such an account and estimate is, for several reasons, timely. It was needed for the elucidation of a portion of Kant's philosophy to which, hitherto, justice has scarcely been done, at all events in this country. Still more, many of the considerations upon which Kant laid one-sided stress need to be emphasised at the present time for the sake of the soundness and progress of Religion itself. Yet, if the important elements of truth contained in them are to be influential, they require, so to speak, to be rescued from the difficulties with which Kant himself encumbered them and to be set in the larger whole which the advance of thought and the increase of knowledge, to say nothing of deeper insight into spiritual experience, have now made possible. In short, they need to be adjusted to the modern point of view. And this Professor Webb in large measure successfully accomplishes.

The fate which has from time to time set the seal of greatness upon systems of philosophy, namely, that they have given rise to interpretations of the Right and of the Left, has, above all, befallen Kant. And this, not so much because of his profundity and of the unification achieved by his system, as because of its lack of complete unification, and of the fact that this lack has been accentuated by the rigidity, and in some respects the artificiality, of the forms to which

* *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*. By Clement C. J. Webb. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. net.

he subjected his thought. Hence, for the most part, undue emphasis has been laid upon his First Critique, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, to the disparagement of the rest of his philosophy and therefore to its disintegration. Even in regard to the First Critique, the limits which Kant placed upon the scientific knowledge attainable by the Understanding have caused the vital importance of the Ideas of Reason to his system as a whole to be discredited. These Ideas—of God, the World, the Self—while only regulative assumptions for knowledge, carry with them irrefragable evidence of reality in the more important sphere—for Kant—of Morality, and, therefore, of Religion.

Nor does the difficulty end when the claims of the *Critique of the Practical Reason* to rank with the First Critique as an integral part of Kant's philosophy have been conceded. For then we have to bring both into relation with the *Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason*, to which Professor Webb rightly devotes most attention. In this work Kant maintained the position of the Critiques and used them for the differentiation and delimitation of Religion. For him Religion is exclusively, or almost exclusively, Morality treated as Divinely commanded. Hence it must be cleared alike of false claims to any speculative knowledge or mystic experience of God, of self-interest, of superstition, of fanatical emotionalism, and of the exaggerated institutionalism which elaborates mere means and perverts them into ends. Only thus can true Religion, conceived as the triumph of the Good Will, be rightly understood or truly advanced. With this end in view Kant restates the Christian Religion, giving abstract expression to what popular religion treats as concrete and as historic fact, and yet laying a truly Pauline stress upon the conflict of principles within human nature, and on the need of conversion, though this remains an explicable mystery. In all this, as Professor Webb admirably points out, not only Kant's rigid individualism and caution, but, in equal measure, the influence of the Pietism in which he was brought up and his subsequent reaction from it, played a part. Moreover, Kant's treatment of Religion, as of all else, was profoundly affected by his exaltation of mathematics and physics as the ideal of knowledge and by his disparagement of history, to say nothing of the paucity of historical material then available and of the lack of any adequate conception of evolution.

Three features in Professor Webb's treatment are of special value. First in order of importance is the attention he directs to what is now known as the *Opus Postumum*, the fragmentary work found among Kant's papers after his death, but of which an adequate account has only been made available in recent years. By this it is made evident that in his closing years Kant was inclined some-

what to modify the stark transcendentalism of his doctrine of God in the direction of immanentism, due to his recognition that the Moral Law is the law of our own nature although it is invested with an absolute and universal authority which is not determined by our own attitude towards it.

In the next place, Professor Webb calls attention to the fact that the material for a more adequate philosophy of Religion was within reach of Kant. According to his sublime declaration, "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing amazement and reverent awe, the oftener and the more steadily our thoughts occupy themselves with them; the starry Heaven above me, and the Moral Law within me." Seeing that this one emotion of "reverent awe" is called out towards these two objects, an account of Religion should have been given which would comprehend and unify both. Yet Kant's theory of knowledge incapacitated him from effecting this synthesis, and, therefore, his philosophy of Religion was almost exclusively based, to its detriment, on the Moral source of religious feeling.

Lastly, Professor Webb rescues the doctrine of God in His relation to Morality from the artificiality with which Kant presented it. According to his presentation belief in God is justified, if not necessitated, by the demand that eventually Morality and Happiness—severed in the existing order—should be brought together. In this light a merely external and hypothetical activity is assigned to God. Yet, as Professor Webb in effect points out, this is only an inadequate representation of the spiritual—and indeed the rational—demand that the order and issue of the Universe should not be indifferent to the Values which it has brought to birth, and also that some means should be found of harmonising the pursuit of Happiness as a spring of action with the Categorical Imperative of the Moral Law.

In a concluding chapter Professor Webb sums up the gains and drawbacks of Kant's treatment of Religion. The gains, which are held to be of special importance at the present time, consist in his insistence upon the implicit rationality of Religion, upon its implicitly ethical character, and upon the ethically rational character of the Christian Religion as its distinctive feature. On the other side of the account must be set Kant's unhistorical and individualistic treatment of Religion and also the weakening effect of "als ob"; that is, of the view that, while in discovering the structure of the world mind discovers its own structure, this discovery must never be treated as holding good of things as they are in themselves.

J. S. L.

JOHN FLAXMAN.*

Mr. W. G. Constable, of the British Museum, in the admirable volume on John Flaxman—an expansion of his centenary lecture at University College, London—deals mainly with Flaxman's work and his place to-day, an obscure one, in the history of English art. The volume is elaborately illustrated by plates that record the developments of his realistic tender line work. Flaxman was born on July 6th, 1755, and died on December 7th, 1826, with the reputation of being one of the greatest sculptors in the world. Germany and even France joined in the chorus of admiration for the great apostle of neo-classicism, or, as one is tempted to say, pseudo-classicism. That was the passion of an epoch of reaction and Flaxman, by his training, by his conscientious conservatism, and by his technical capacity, exactly met the demand. He was the son of a skilled maker of casts and models and while in his father's workshop, reading and drawing, he met incidentally artists and critics of great note and his informal education was in this way classical from the first. He quite early met Romney, who, in 1775, had returned to England from Italy "full of enthusiasm for classic art." But his taste was simple and he had "a puritanical standard of morals," and this reacted on his career.

That career was successful from the first. He won a medal from the Royal Society of Arts in 1767, and in the year of his admission to the Royal Academy Schools was awarded the silver medal for a wax model of Neptune. He had four portrait models in wax exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1771 and from the first he had something of the tenderness and charm of Luca della Robbia. Sir Joshua Reynolds and Flaxman did not appreciate each other, and the fact perhaps accounts for the young man's failure to win the gold medal of the Academy. The rebuff was a blessing in disguise as he thereupon accepted an offer of work in 1775 from Wedgwood and Bentley, the famous potters. Wedgwood was not enamoured of Flaxman personally. Indeed, he seems to have had the same kind of antipathy shown by Sir Joshua, but he realised that the young man, despite his egotism, would be a great artist, if properly trained, for pottery work. Wedgwood insisted on technical excellence and was a stern critic, with the best result since Flaxman yielded to the dominant potter's views. He worked, we are told, "for a definite end, in competition with others, under constant and enlightened supervision." Mr. Constable discusses and illustrates admirably the young artist's efforts and methods, the classical influence tending to submerge other elements. Meantime Flaxman continued to exhibit

* *John Flaxman, 1755-1826.* By W. G. Constable. University of London Press. 10s. 6d. net.

at the Royal Academy and his work of this kind reveals uncompromising realism.

In 1787, thanks largely to Romney and Wedgwood, Flaxman and his wife went to Italy to complete—the term is allowable—his education. He still kept touch with Wedgwood, but he remained in Italy seven years studying classical and mediæval art in a very thorough fashion. While in Italy he produced his important series of illustrations to Homer for Mrs. Hare Naylor. "Success was great and immediate." In 1804 a German edition appeared; in 1805 another English edition with additional plates, and publications in other languages, followed. This work was followed by illustrations for the tragedies of Æschylus and for an edition of Dante. "A group of preliminary sketches for the Homer and Æschylus illustrations in the British Museum, and elsewhere, show clearly how Flaxman worked." It was an elaborate process beginning with slight drawings in pencil. The success was undoubted, but it is clear that Flaxman never moved in the amazing atmosphere of the poets that he illustrated with such tenderness and care. Mr. Constable says, with brutal force, "Pope is said to have put Homer into a periwig; Flaxman put him into a muslin dress." Yet both Pope and Flaxman were men of genius. Mr. Constable explains the success by the alleged fact that "the enthusiasm for classical ambiguity which filled the air was not particularly robust." It was, however, particularly robust among certain schools of learning that greatly appreciated Flaxman. The art of Flaxman appealed to an age that was slowly turning in the direction of romanticism. There is a forecast of the romantic revival in all Flaxman's work, and if he cast it into the classical form he quite honestly met his own line of study and also met the new current of popular taste.

It is true he was not Blake, but he had the good fortune to know well that great imaginative and creative genius, and when Flaxman published his illustrations to Hesiod these had the extraordinary advantage of being engraved by Blake who "retained the sensitiveness of line in the drawings." Lawrence, after Flaxman's death, declared that, "though the master of the purest line he was still more the sculptor of sentiment than of form." He was not a sculptor of form. He was not really, though a sculptor, a worker in three dimensions. Mr. Constable makes that clear in his drastic criticism of many of Flaxman's memorial monuments, but that he was "the master of the purest line" is obvious, not only from his illustrations but from his tender work, sentimental sometimes to the pitch of annoyance, in marble. The line work in the Baring monument is almost Skopatian, while the pen and wash drawing *The Kiss* (at University College) is an exquisite example of the purest line. Mr. Constable declares that Flaxman suffered from imaginative poverty

and the lack of creative imagination. That seems to be not wholly true. He was not imaginative in the sense of the great poets; he was not imaginative enough to create great combinations in stone; but his imagination was sufficient to produce some exquisite works of art replete with the simplicity which, combined with his essential sense of reality, might in any other age have given him a place beside the Robbias if not beside Donatello. But, in fact he, unlike his friend Blake, yielded to the spirit of the age as the result of his susceptibility to environment and criticism. Hoppner said, "I can not draw; but I can draw better than Flaxman can, and his thoughts are all borrowed and purloined from a variety of things which he has seen. He has nothing original about him." But there was a native originality, and a sense of reality, an honesty of purpose that stands out in his best line work despite the accretions that a pseudo-classical cult had imposed upon his art. Had he been content to work as a pupil of Blake and limited his genius to the art of simple things he probably would have been one of the immortals. He was ambitious, and by that sin fell the angels. But he was not ambitious for money or even for fame. "Financial temptation and petty intrigue left him undisturbed" and that was not true of all his fellow Academicians. He had no jealousies and his art was all in all to him.

He appreciated, perhaps too fully as Hoppner alleged, most periods of art and may, from his appreciation of English Mediæval work, "justly be regarded as a herald of the Gothic Revival in England," but probably his most important work, work that has its *sequalæ* to-day, was the bringing of the artist and the manufacturer together. Mr. Constable writes:

In his work for a pioneer of large-scale productions, Flaxman's readiness to accept his employer's suggestions, and his skill in adapting his designs to the technical processes of the potter, are a lesson to artists; just as Wedgwood's high standards of taste and craftsmanship, and tireless search for new ideas, are a lesson to manufacturers.

All that is doubtless true, and should be kept in mind to-day when it is more necessary than ever for the manufacturer to be put into full touch with creative work. But probably Flaxman will live in the ultimate history of English art in his simple line work, in his *Kiss* and other exquisite tendernesses that are part of the spirit of romance and the new romanticism that Flaxman stimulated and lived to see in full flood.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

EARLY CAMBRIDGE STATUTES.*

This volume, with its echoes of pre-Reformation days, comes at a timely moment with the influx of new blood into Oxford and Cam-

* *Early Statutes of Christ's College, Cambridge, with the Statutes of the Prior Foundation of God's House.* Edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes by H. Rackham. Bowes & Bowes: Cambridge. 7s. 6d. net.

bridge at the opening of the University year. There never was a time when it was more necessary in the old Universities to strengthen the tradition of learning and scholarship and research that they carry. Each new generation must enter into that immemorial tradition, and to-day there is a special reason that this should be so, since the men who are now joining the various colleges in many cases represent that class of scholar which predominated in the great mediæval and Elizabethan days, scholars from the ancient and now resuscitated grammar schools throughout the country.

Christ's College, Cambridge, was founded at the very end of the Middle Ages, but it absorbed God's House, an earlier institution that was essentially mediæval, though its foundation showed that the Church was alive to the fact that the Renaissance was blowing clear trumpets from over sea. If the New Learning was to have any significance for the Church the Grammar Schools of England, over which a remarkable change had come by the introduction of English as the medium of instruction instead of the Anglo-Norman tongue (which only survived the Black Death as a legal language) a new school of grammarians must arise. In fact, very few of the old school of grammarians were at work in the century following the Black Death, and the Universities were feeling the pinch of empty grammar schools. We must believe that it was this emergency that sent a London Priest, William Bingham, to Cambridge in 1439 with the object of founding a House for the post-graduate work of training men to act as grammar school masters. Such an institution, moreover, had become necessary in view of new ranges of scholarship that had been revealed in Italy. It would be interesting if we could link Bingham with Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, and Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, in the beginnings of the New Learning in London. Dr. Venn makes Bingham rector of St. John Zachary in Cambridge, but he came from the church of St. John Zachary in the Aldersgate ward of the city of London, while one of the benefactors directed to be commemorated by the statutes of God's House was "John Brokley, formerly Alderman of London," who probably was the same person as John Brokle, a Draper, who was Sheriff of London in 1424 and Mayor in 1433.

However that may be, God's House was founded and was first situated on the spot where the west end of King's College Chapel now stands and (as Mr. Rackham in his interesting introduction tells us) placed under the supervision of Clare Hall, while so rapid was the progress made that in 1442 "licence was given to Bingham and to the Master and two Fellows of Clare to found God's House as a new college, incorporated and empowered to hold property." The College was moved to the present site of Christ's College by a royal licence of August 26th, 1446, which allowed instruction to be

given in any faculty. In the reign of Edward IV, after 1460, the Statutes were promulgated by Robert Scole and John Hurte, Doctors in Theology in the University, and sealed by the Vice-Chancellor and the Prior of Barnewell. The preamble to the Statute states that the House was founded "to restore the knowledge of grammar to a better condition and increase in this realm of England, it having in our days, as experience has taught us, in many parts of the said realm where grammar schools have customarily been, fallen into great defect and decay from the lack of competent teachers." To remedy this defect the founders looked to the University and especially to God's House, "lately founded by the Most Christian Prince Edward VI."

These Statutes, Mr. Rackham tells us, "have the bald precision of a legal document." They are in fact very lucid and the translation is excellent. They give a vivid picture of the life in college in the later fifteenth century, in a period when both Oxford and Cambridge are supposed to have fallen to a very low ebb of learning, so low that it has been said that the University of Paris for a time refused to recognise the University of Oxford. Certain terms used in the Statutes are unfamiliar, such as Masters in Grammar and Scholar-Artists. The Statutes give the idea of active scholarship. In fact, the form used dates back more than a century to the days of the founder, the Lady Clare, of Clare Hall, to the Statutes of 1359, and at first sight it might seem that the new Statutes are a mere formal copy. But, in fact, special paragraphs deal with the specialised study in grammar at God's House. It is interesting to compare in this way the Statutes of Peterhouse (1284) and the Statutes of Clare Hall (1359), the earliest phase of Christ's College, and the Statutes given to Christ's College by the Lady Margaret, mother of King Henry VII, in 1506. Here we get the full range of mediæval scholarship from the days of the successors of Walter Map to the days of the pupils of Erasmus.

Mr. Rackham tells us that "the Latinity of Lady Margaret's Statutes is more copious, graceful, and varied, showing in a marked degree the influence of the wider classical studies of the Renaissance." The Ciceronian age had evidently begun. It will interest some of the churchmen of to-day to think that thirty years before the Reformation the Fellows of Christ's were to be initiated and instructed "according to the custom of the University in Philosophy and the Liberal Arts, by which Theology is approached and without which it cannot be acquired" (*Quibus ad theologiam itur et sine quibus illa non comparatur*). Much current theology has no such sound basis. But there were relaxations. "At table every day at dinner they shall diligently and attentively hear the Bible or the writings of the Holy Fathers, until the Master or his Locum Tenens

shall order the Bibler (Bibliarium) to stop." The Fellows were to talk in Latin within the bounds of the college, except in their rooms, or on the occasion of a Feast or other lawful reason. But the forty-seven Pupil Scholars ('the seed from which new offspring may come forth and be born'—undergraduates should remember this phrase) are not forgotten. If any one of them is late at, or miss, the Reader's lectures, sophisms, problems, oppositions, or disputations in grammar, he is to be fined or (if sufficiently young) *virga correptur*. The rod has vanished from Cambridge among other wholesome and unwholesome things.

The Lady Margaret understood the ways of youth. She is insistent that the pupil-scholars shall have no free time for mischief. Chapter LXI begins: Nothing is more to be avoided by a young man than slothful idleness. And on this account we will and appoint that each Pupil shall always as far as possible be occupied either in the worship of God or in the study of the liberal arts or in learning virtuous manners." On Sundays and Feast days the Pupils are to attend the whole of each of the Divine services in the Chapel and duly attend mass before six o'clock. They are to attend all suitable lectures and other scholastic exercises in the College and the Public Schools, and so draw on to the goal of Bachelor in Arts and Master in Arts. But the original purpose is not forgotten. Six of the Pupils are to graduate in Grammar "in order that they may be able (if by chance they are ever called upon) to go forth competently to teach grammar in any part of England where an annual stipend of ten pounds is forthcoming." Ten of these pupils were to serve hall and chapel, seven serving tables, one reading the Bible and two preparing the Great Altar. At the end of a week the task fell to another ten. Sevenpence weekly was assigned for the commons of each pupil. All dined in Hall, and they had their private rooms two and two together. A laundress and a barber were provided for each at the charges of the College.

Mr. Rackham has gone to great pains to provide a perfect Latin text of the Statutes as they issued from the hands of the Lady Margaret. It has involved much textual criticism and collation, but the task was well worth performing, and throws light on the evolution of formal college life as the English world glided from the Middle Ages into the spacious days of Elizabeth. J.E.G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Dr. Norman Sykes is to be warmly congratulated on his biography of *Edmund Gibson*.* He has discovered a figure of first-rate importance who has been curiously neglected by modern scholarship, and has restored him to his rightful place among the great ecclesiastics of

* Oxford University Press. 21s.

the Anglican Church. The sub-title of the book is, *A Study in Politics and Religion in the Eighteenth Century*, and its pages throw a flood of light on the opening decades of Hanoverian rule. He made his way entirely by his own abilities. His learning and controversial skill rendered him useful as a young man to the highest dignitaries of the Church, and his famous *Codex Juris Ecclesiastici Anglicani*, published in 1713, secured him the respect of scholars of his own and succeeding generations. Gibson was forty-five years old when the accession of George I opened the path to power. He was appointed Bishop of Lincoln in 1715 and Bishop of London in 1723. For the next thirteen years he was the most important man in England after Walpole, with whom he cordially co-operated. He was, indeed, Archbishop in everything but name, for Wake outlived his faculties. Gibson's governing principle was to reconcile the Church with the Hanoverian dynasty—a difficult task, since it was still predominantly Tory. His attempt was unsuccessful, for though he worked with and for the Whigs, he differed from them on many of the most important problems of the time. They favoured Dissenters, a free Press, religious toleration, and Erastianism, while he was designed by Providence, as Dr. Sykes puts it, to be a High-Church Tory. Hence his intellectual isolation, his ultimate breach with Walpole, and the loss of his commanding position in Church and State. He was not a man to be loved; but he inspires respect by his high character, his loyalty to his principles, and his unceasing activity in his diocese and in the superintendence of the Church in the American Colonies. It would be difficult to exaggerate the many-sided interest of this learned, thoughtful, and well-written volume.

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This *Little Volume of Verse*,* by Miss Blanche Leppington, has been printed for presentation to her friends as a memorial. The verses are original and full of thought, setting forth the mind and attitude of the author to the deep things of life. She probes below the surface in search of an answer to queries that perplex the soul, and often finds it in nature and "Sweet Order."

"The Sacrament at the Front" is a tiny poem of three verses, but it is worthy of note, also "Cardinal Manning" 1892.

"Divided in the cause of Truth

The cause of Love yet made us one;
Starved toil, cursed childhood, outraged youth,
Found in each Faith its champion;
And where our suffering brothers stood,
We knew ourselves one brotherhood.

"United in the cause of Love,

Shall Truth indeed divide us yet?
Or that revealing Hour but prove
How near our groping touch had met,
While each with passionate fingers pressed
His own fold of the Seamless Vest."

Some of the lighter poems are charming, such as "The Castle Echo" Kenilworth 1901, also "At the Grave of a Little Dog," which all dog-lovers will revel in. The "Two Letters" which conclude this

* *Little Volume of Verse*. By Blanche Leppington. The Westminster Press, Harrow Road, London.

small collection of verses are almost too intimate for the light of common day, but for the friends for whom this memorial is printed, they will be highly valued. Miss Leppington was devoted to literature and wrote verses all through life. But social problems and human interest claimed her, and she gave without stint; not without sacrifice, for literature demands a wholehearted service.

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The Inaugural Lecture of Dr. F. W. S. Cumbrae-Stewart as Garrick Professor of Law in the University of Queensland, delivered in the spring of last year, is one of singular interest. The chair was founded by Miss Katie Cecie Garrick in memory of her father, Sir James Garrick, the eminent Australian lawyer, who died in England in 1908, after a career of profound imperial usefulness. Professor Cumbrae-Stewart chose a fitting theme in *The Law and the City*,* and one specially of interest in Australia, where the Common Law of England is in full growth and city life is being built up with a speed that calls for the exercise on every side of *pietas* and *urbanitas*. On those necessary elements in city life the Professor dwells. "Law and the City have grown up together in the evolution of human institutions. Positive law owes its being to the City." Certainly in the city customary law tended quite early to be modified by positive or enacted law though, strangely enough, customary law lingered in mighty London, in the matter of land succession, until January 1st, 1926, when gavelkind and borough-English were abolished. But if the City requires law it requires also *pietas*, faith and dutifulness, and *urbanitas*, which may be translated "sweetness and light," if great communities are to realise the great Roman ideal of *humanitas*. Professor Cumbrae-Stewart's admirable lecture will tend in this direction, and his juridical influence will help Brisbane to achieve its natural goal. "In a century a noble city has arisen much in the same way as Rome arose amid the fens and hills along the Tiber, but at a much quicker rate." She is nobly playing her part in building up a nation that is part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and it is a sign of her policy that she has chosen to found a chair of law, not merely of positive law but of law as the expression of human personality, of law as an educational force.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

No living scholar knows Goethe better than Professor J. G. Robertson, whose volume on the greatest of German writers is the latest addition to the excellent series of six shilling biographies published by Routledge under the title *Republic of Letters*.† In this little book of 260 pages we find a clear summary of "by far the most fully documented life in literary annals," and an authoritative appreciation of the writings and teaching of Goethe. It is a miracle of compression, which only a master-hand could have achieved; and yet the author finds room for all the touches which are needed to produce a living portrait. The book may be recommended to beginners as the best brief study of one of the world's great writers, and to advanced students for its challenging judgments on controversial points of biographical and literary interpretation. Greatly though he admires his

* A. J. Cumming, Government Printer, Brisbane.

† S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d. net.

subject, he is never for a single moment carried away by enthusiasm. Indeed, to some readers the colouring of the later chapters may seem a little sombre, the praise at times rather grudging. No other of the great minds of our race, he declares, has left behind him so many failures. The main lesson of Professor Robertson's book, on which he insists again and again, is that the stream of inspiration which ran strong and clear in the few glorious years of early manhood gradually dried up until, in middle life and old age, we find little more than a trickle. The supreme creative artist grew into the analyst and the symbolist, warm humanity was succeeded by shadows. It is in keeping with this attitude that we find in these pages a greater fervour towards *Werther* than is usual, and a chilly tribute to the *Wahlverwandschaften* and other writings of later years which have won warm admiration from many critics and biographers. "The light that shines on even so perfectly constructed a masterpiece as *Herman und Dorothea* is, alas! a light reflected through prisms." The drudgery and provincialism of Weimar, we are told, outweighed the advantages of the friendship of Karl August; the historic sojourn in Italy, the central episode of his life, witnessed the loss of his artist's soul; even the influence of Schiller was less favourable than is usually thought, for "It was a misfortune that he allowed himself to be drawn into Schiller's metaphysical and rhetorical orbit." The only compensation for the ebbing of the poetic tide was the growth in the wisdom of life. "He became the wisest of men"—the preacher of a "fatalistic optimism" in which his storm-tossed soul found harmony and peace, and which is enshrined forever in the *Conversations with Eckermann* and the *Second Part of Faust*.

* * *

Mr. Herbert S. Banner in his well illustrated book *Romantic Java As it Was and Is** gives a "description of the diversified peoples, the departed glories and strange customs of a little known island, remarkable both for its arts, decorative and dramatic, and for its natural beauty and the richness of its resources." The book is of interest to the anthropologist as well as to the student of history and geography and modern economic problems in Java. There is a useful description of the ancient temples and ruined shrines. There were not less than forty temples. The temples of Chanda Mendut and Borobudhur are in excellent preservation. It is only in comparatively recent times that the Hindu-Javanese temples have been brought to sight from centuries of deposits. To-day the vast grey pile of Borobudhur again dominates the landscape. To anthropologists the native superstitions about animals, such as the horrible were-tiger, crocodiles, otters, sacred carp, sacred monkeys, and crows, are of great value. "The world of the Javanese is filled with an innumerable company of ghosts. Among these, animal spirits have a definite place." Celebrations, ceremonies, spells and potions all have a place in the spiritual life of these people.

* Seeley Service. 21s. net.

CAPITAL AND SURTAX.

THERE are at least two quite distinct views as to taxation. One of these looks on the imposition of a tax as a distinct evil, only to be justified by clear demonstration that it carries with it advantages to the community at large which more than compensate for the harm done to the taxpayer. The other regards the taking of money from the individual and placing it at the disposal of the governing authority as in the interest of all concerned.

Those who hold the first opinion think that wealth on which taxes are to be levied will be used by the owner to much greater advantage to the community than by any organisation not actuated by the spur of personal benefit. They demur to the objection taken by certain schools of opinion against profits which go to the individual, believing that from this source must come, in ultimate recourse, the material progress of the world. Holding these opinions, they try to impress on the Government and the Legislature the essential need for economy. They contend that, after discharging the primary functions of maintaining order, of enforcing laws which shall interfere as little as possible with the freedom of the individual, and of providing for guarding the country from foreign foes, the functions of the State end. They view with suspicion any encroachment on provinces outside these limits. They require the most stringent proof of the need of such encroachments. The multiplication of officials to carry out laws, of which they question the advisability, is naturally condemned by them. All the more, because they doubt the capacity of such persons to control successfully operations not directly necessary to the well-being of the commonwealth. They seek to leave as much as possible to the individual, merely taking care that he shall not demean himself so as to injure the community.

They believe that the best results will flow from a system based on the principles which lie behind what has just been said. Such a policy makes, they say, for economy in the affairs of the State. It may be that parsimony rather than extravagance has to be guarded against. The day has gone when one important department of the Administration of this country was held to be subject to tendencies of this kind. The sage counsels of men like Welby and Farrer and other distinguished servants of the Treasury were always heard on the side of public thrift, and that branch of the Government acted as watchdog over the Spending Departments. In the opinion of those whose views in the matter are now being stated, the day when the Treasury abandoned its function as guardian of the public purse, and began to make heavy claims on the National

Exchequer, was a sad one for the future financial policy of Great Britain. Thrift is at best a mean and niggling sort of virtue. We are all in favour of it in the general. We, most of us, regard it in its application to ourselves as a disagreeable necessity to be avoided if possible.

The other view may almost be said to regard a tax as in itself a good thing. This view has become more marked since the State began more and more to concern itself with the private affairs of the inhabitants. Schemes of what is called "Social Reform" were pressed on the electorate, backed by promises of the wonderful improvement in the condition of the people at large which would follow their adoption. Already before the outbreak of war in 1914 great progress had been made with these. Various advantages were to be given "free" (as it is called) to the great mass of inhabitants. Not infrequently Parliament was induced to sanction such schemes on the assurance, either that the cost would be very moderate, or that advantages would accrue which would more than countervail the demand made on the taxpayer.

That these promises were not fulfilled did not deter politicians from making further bids for the suffrages of the ever enlarging electorate, with the result that the claims on the national purse grew to an inordinate and alarming extent. It was not only the taxes which were swelling. Parliament cast additional duties on local authorities. To discharge these the imposition of further rates was necessary. The pill was sometimes gilded by the promise of a contribution from the National Exchequer. A local authority, feeling that money was coming from London if it agreed to raise some itself, and, knowing that other like bodies would accept the offer whether it did or not, was the more ready to do its part to share in the plunder. Everybody seemed to forget that out of the same pocket that the taxes came, came also the rates.

To a world hurrying in the direction indicated came the war. This speedily broke down all the barriers against extravagance. It was found that credit could be created to an apparently unlimited extent. No sacrifice of life or treasure was too great to deal with the terrible situation in which the world found itself. Blood and treasure were poured out regardless of the ultimate result on the more remote welfare of those directly involved in the truly internecine conflict which raged for four years and more. The effect on the world at large was left entirely out of account. Even before the catastrophe, the growth of expenditure had made more and more difficult the raising of the necessary funds required for the policy on which the country had embarked. The Chancellor of the Exchequer dipped deeper and deeper into the pocket of the taxpayer. From being content to draw his supplies from income, he began to make claims directly on

capital. The relatively moderate duties on property passing, by the decease of the whilom owner, into other hands were increased by the death duties first imposed by Sir William Harcourt. This process, once begun, admits of apparently unlimited extension. It must be admitted that the hundred million Budget of 1895-6 gave pause to many. The weighty warnings of Mr. Leonard (afterwards Lord) Courtney, always a sound advocate of economy, passed unheeded. There is ground for believing that an even more distinguished person held views opposed to these duties. I have heard on good authority that Mr. Gladstone expressed a strongly adverse opinion on them. But the country was prosperous and seemed to experience no ill effects from the rapid rise of public expenditure. The danger foreseen by Lord Courtney has become more and more menacing. The tax falls on a relatively small number of people whose protests are of little avail against the claimants for State help. This minority is thought to be moved by purely selfish motives. Moreover, the effects of such impositions become apparent very gradually, which makes the voice of wisdom crying in the wilderness still less heeded.

The war found this attitude of mind existing in the community. In its earliest stages, little was done to bring the magnitude of the disaster which had befallen the world home to the inhabitants of this country. Credit was created without stint but the financial sense of our people speedily caused taxes to be imposed to meet, to some extent at all events, the horrible expenditure and to provide for the interest on, and repayment of, the loans we were raising. Further demands on income, still greater claims on property passing at death, were made to meet the inordinate but unavoidable growth of expenditure, till in many cases half a man's income was claimed by the State and more than a third was taken from the property passing at his death. Profits, which had come to be regarded by many as almost indefensible (perhaps it would not be too much to say, approaching close to being sinful), were seized by a State hard pressed to find the sinews of war.

The country has become inured to the great demands on its resources and receives with little anxiety proposals, which most of those who have given consideration to the subject think fatal to the growth of prosperity of the country. They would have been regarded as quite impracticable by all sound financiers even as recently as 1913. On what, let us ask, is that growth dependent? Is it not on the fact that out of the total produce of the country there remains a surplus which can be applied to maintaining and increasing its capital value? Buildings decay, machinery becomes obsolete, processes of manufacture alter: all these things must be made good out of a surplus beyond what is needed for the maintenance of the

people in such standard of comfort as circumstances will permit. If that standard is to be raised, it must be out of a surplus remaining when these absolute necessities have been met. Call it by what name we please, to diminish this surplus means to defeat that which we all desire to see accomplished: let it be added, which we have seen accomplished more or less steadily for many years past.

Attempts were made to induce the country to accept what is called a Capital Levy. It must be admitted that the possibility of this was asserted by some very capable persons, but no very precise scheme has been enunciated by those who favour the idea. Recently it appears to have been abandoned, and its place is taken by proposals for a special surtax of 2s. in the £ on all unearned incomes above £500 a year. Apart from the extreme difficulty of defining unearned income, let us consider what this means. All incomes derived from investments and exceeding £500 a year, besides bearing the present very heavy burdens necessary to meet the demands now made on the national purse, shall be further mulcted in a tax of 2s. in the £. The greater part of the money thus raised is to be applied to increasing the social services offered to the great mass of the population. But this must, by the assumption, be consumed without adequate return. The funds thus raised will therefore do nothing towards providing the surplus which is essential if the very object it is sought to attain is to be reached.

It is apparently assumed that every member of the community is by right entitled to some quite indefinite amount in order that he may attain something which is called a suitable "Standard of Life." Should the circumstances not enable him to reach it by his own endeavours, the community is to be held bound to supply the deficiency. As things are at present, it is largely left with the individual to settle what his demand shall be and how much, in excess of his income, is to come out of the public purse, whether central or local.

This demand takes many forms. A house quite out of proportion to the wage earning capacity of the occupier is one. A minimum wage established by Statute is another. No doubt there is such a thing as a "minimum wage," that is to say, a wage below which the individual receiving it will in due time cease to be a wage-earner at all. But to prescribe it by law and impose it on great sections to the wage-earning capacity of the occupier is one. A minimum Legislature. If the minimum wage be in excess of what that particular industry is able to pay, the recipient must either seek some better paid employment or be subsidised by the State. The former is the better alternative, but as the decision lies with him, there is always a probability that he will rather take the second and simpler

method. This means that some better situated branch of production is contributing to keep him in the less prosperous business on which he depends for his livelihood. It would be better for him and for the Community at large if he were constrained by force of circumstances to go where his earnings would suffice to meet his irreducible needs, even though the result would be that the industry he leaves should perish. But we must not lose sight of the possibility that conditions may arise in which the earning capacity of the Community may be so greatly reduced as to necessitate a general lowering of the spending power of the Community, and this would involve a reduction of the Standard of Life to which reference has been made. The great waste of wealth, which the war caused, makes many people seriously contemplate this as possible or even probable unless means are taken speedily to replace the wealth destroyed by the war.

Let us admit how little has been done in recent years to extinguish the intolerable burden of taxation imposed on us by the war. No "taking our bill and writing down four score" will relieve that burden. There is only one way in which to get quit of a debt and that is by paying it. A mere transfer of the obligation is of no effect. To annihilate a debt there must be a surplus out of which to pay it. This has a double advantage: First, the interest on the portion extinguished has no longer to be found, and second, the credit of the payer being thereby improved, he is able when a part of the debt falls due, if he cannot extinguish it, to re-borrow on better terms, thus further reducing the present burden. If, therefore, we are to add in any way to the present burden of taxation, it ought to be with a view to effecting these ends.

But before we decide on adopting this course, let us be sure that we can take anything more from the income of the Community. The urgent need of the moment is to increase that income. New capital is needed to set to work the army of unemployed who are now relying on the Community and making no return. Each man set to work adds to that income. He ceases to be a burden on the State and becomes a contributor to the common funds. He furthers the object we all have in view, namely, to raise the Standard of Life. He spends his earnings in giving employment to others instead of taking from them some pitiful allowance for which he makes no return. He brings us nearer to the day when returning prosperity has made large demands on the productive capacity of the country and the world, and so has absorbed all that mass of unemployed persons. Till that happy day dawns this mass is merely adding to the burdens which are weighing us down.

It is from this vicious circle we must seek to escape. This cannot be accomplished by adding in any way to these burdens. Now more

than ever before should we seek by rigid economy to reduce them. No encouragement should be given to people to look to the State for help. Salvation lies in our own strenuous endeavours to add to the capital of the country and so to recover the wealth destroyed by the war. To add yet further to the burden from which we suffer will make our condition still more deplorable, and postpone indefinitely that return of prosperity for which all true lovers of their country long.

HUGH BELL.

DISARMAMENT BY EXAMPLE.

THERE is some advantage in attempting to do something in the wrong way. It narrows down the choice of wrong roads and brings the selection of the right road a little nearer. The advantage is all the greater when several wrong attempts are made. Nevertheless this process of the gradual elimination of the wrong roads is likely to be protracted and so to produce impatience.

In varying degrees the statesmen of Europe may all be given the credit of not wanting a recurrence of war in the form they experienced it in 1914-18 or, as we know it will be, infinitely worse. They all want security for their countries but none of them believe that security can be obtained without armed force. The co-ordination of a warless world with national security is the problem they find impossible to solve. Their first attempt in 1919, hot from the conflict, was for the victors to disarm the vanquished. This was the first wrong road. Unilateral disarmament imposed by force neither makes for peace nor is it a first step towards general disarmament. The controversies between France and Germany in the years after the war were of the acutest possible character, and during nearly ten years the victors have never suggested carrying out the terms of the peace treaty by reducing their armaments to the standard imposed on Germany—a very simple proposition easy of execution and leading much further than any of the suggestions which have been discussed in the last seven or eight years.

In 1922 a scheme was brought forward for the reduction of armaments by each nation down to a fixed general standard. But without any specific guarantee of security this was considered impracticable. In 1923 the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was evolved which projected the conclusion of treaties of defence against aggression. No satisfactory definition of aggression was forthcoming, and although the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations supported this proposal it fell to the ground, being rejected by Great Britain.

In 1924 the Protocol was produced. In this the principle of arbitration was emphasised and proposals for disarmament were to be the preliminary to a general guarantee of security against aggression. Aggression was defined as resorting to war after a refusal to submit a dispute to the Council of the League. This was an advance. But while confining, it more precisely defined the obligations under the Covenant and still necessitated the retention of armaments for the possible eventuality of a breach of the peace by a recalcitrant nation. The British Conservative Government regarded the commitments as too extensive and the Protocol was turned down before the end of the year.

The Locarno Pact which followed two years later was a partial

and regional Treaty by which Great Britain guaranteed the Franco-German frontier against aggression from either side. Although a restricted, this was a very serious commitment on our part. The rather artificially engineered enthusiasm with which the conclusion of this Treaty was accompanied has since proved not to have been justified. There has been little or no improvement in the relations between heavily-armed France and disarmed Germany.

While the politicians were thus occupied a conference dominated by experts was charged with the task of formulating disarmament proposals. No more unsuitable body of men could have been chosen. No worse method of procedure could have been devised. Instead of providing them with principles within which to work, the very formulation of the principles was left to men who not only believe in force but whose business it is to see that the composition of that force is adequate and effective. The barren results of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament need not be recited here. In spite of the well-meaning resolution of the last Assembly urging the Commission to get on with their job, nothing can be expected from this method of approach.

In 1922 the Washington Conference succeeded in securing a certain measure of reduction in naval armaments, but the recent conference at Geneva, in which only three Powers participated, has shown by its failures not only that no further advance is likely to be attained in this direction, but that it is beyond the power of experts to discover binding principles of universal application for nations whose geographical position and general circumstances vary so widely.

Outside the official sphere the most significant movement towards the abolition of war has emanated from America. Proposals for the outlawry of war set out convincingly by Dr. C. C. Morrison, in a book recently published, are based on the simple proposition that the nations by common consent should place the waging of war outside international law. Considerable impetus to this movement has been given by a suggestion of M. Briand that war should be outlawed between France and the United States. Although sectional treaties for the outlawry of war would be a slower method of procedure and make a more precarious advance towards the ideal than a universally accepted resolution by a world conference, as is proposed, nevertheless outlawry has been brought into official prominence, and more is likely to be heard of it.

But so far as the League of Nations and the Governments are concerned the failure in the course of nine years not only to formulate any definite project for the abolition of war, but to give any hope that such a project is attainable, has been in the highest degree disappointing. The attempts made have many of them done more

harm than good. While the futile academic discussions have proceeded the governments have drifted back into the old diplomacy, defensive alliances have been formed, camps have been established and the old pernicious doctrine of the balance of power has been kept in being. The most significant demonstration of the hopelessness of any prospect of official advance towards disarmament has been afforded by the resignation of Lord Cecil, a devoted supporter of the League and untiring advocate of peace. Moreover while these various avenues have been explored with little or no success armaments continue to be manufactured in considerable quantities and at great cost, the traffic in arms continues in order that the less developed and, so called, more bellicose States may be fully equipped and then pointed to as potential enemies or breakers of the peace, and the ingenuity of science has been enlisted for the further development of more deadly engines of destruction.

The truth is that the inherent belief of the leading Governments in force as the ultimate sanction remains unaltered. So long as it remains armaments must continue to be prepared, and so long as armaments remain there must be competition, prospects of war and absence of security. Thus it is that the nations find themselves revolving in a vicious circle out of which there seems to be no escape.

It has been proposed that a nation, preferably ourselves, should come forward and make a bold and specific offer of a measure of disarmament, suggesting that if others will do likewise a general reduction can begin. But the fatal "if" stands in the way of such a proposal ever being regarded as a genuine offer. While the Governments are thus hesitant, the same cannot be said of the peoples. Disillusioned and far more determined than their governments that war is not only an inhuman but an utterly futile method of attempting to settle international disputes, they are becoming exasperated at the failure of their statesmen to find means of abolishing this barbarous institution. In several countries thousands have pledged themselves to refuse participation in another orgy of massacre. This may not stop war, but it will undoubtedly have the effect of preventing governments from using the threat of the war card in their diplomatic negotiations. No government would care to take the risk of going to war with any considerable section of their people determinedly opposed to rendering any help or support in such a contingency.

What then can governments, what can the Government of Great Britain, be urged to do to lead world opinion and to give practical expression to what, after all, is the dominant sentiment of the people of the world, although the majority of them may be largely inarticulate?

Before elaborating the proposal through which alone, one is compelled to believe, success may be achieved, it is necessary to clear the ground of certain myths and delusions which have grown up round the institution of war. The nature and origin of wars have changed as the centuries pass, and it is idle, therefore, to quote precedents from the past and to dwell on the glories of past military achievements, which are misleadingly represented to us in our history books. It suffices for us to take war as it is to-day and as it may arise to-morrow. In nearly all the discussion on the subject carried on by the Governments and the League of Nations the probable cause of war is misrepresented, and an elaborate mechanism is devised for an eventuality which will never take place. The existence of the League of Nations has made the statesmen believe that war will arise from an isolated and definable act of aggression. Wars in the past hundred years and more between European States have never arisen in this way. But the myth of the unprovoked aggressor has been kept alive by (a) the accusation of aggression which each nation has to bring against its enemy while war is being waged, and (b) the necessity of postulating an aggressor in peace time in order to make each nation prepare for the next war. Wars arise, and if the institution is maintained will arise in future, not from the breach of a Treaty, the isolated refusal of a nation to submit a dispute to arbitration, the crossing of a frontier, or the capture of territory, but from a complex network of tendencies producing estrangement between nations and finding expression in the formation of groups and alliances. When the tension reaches a certain pitch any act, however trivial, may become not the cause but the occasion of war. The whole concept of an aggressor, like the notion of "a criminal nation," must be dismissed if we are to clear the air of hampering misconceptions.

Another delusion is retained in the idea that you can abolish "private war" by organising in a restricted degree "public war" under the guise of a collective guarantee of security for all nations. In this rests the whole fallacy of sanctions. It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that the idea of stopping war by war is farcical in the extreme. So long as Governments agree that circumstances may arise in which the collective use of force is not only permissible, but essential, attention, and serious attention, must be given to the organisation of war, armaments must be retained, and not only public but private war will continue to exist. The obligatory provision in any conceivable circumstance of armed assistance queers the whole pitch. The organisation of war, in however restricted a sense it may be defined, must inevitably prevent the inauguration of Peace.

Lastly let us dispose of another specious fallacy which has arisen

out of all the discussions on disarmament. It is that war can only be abolished by stages and by degrees. No more fatally mistaken idea could have possessed men's minds. Every effort by standards, ratios, expenditure, or parity to reduce armaments, and every plan to restrict the occasions on which force may be used, only serves to give legal and authoritative sanction to the use of force and the institution of war. Such steps and stages are definitely inimical to the attainment of the abolition of war. The construction of an institution cannot be accomplished in one blow, the destruction of an institution can. The abolitionists of Slavery as an institution in British territory soon found that to proceed by steps and stages was fatal to the attainment of their object. When they determined to leave no loophole and allow no qualifications, they succeeded.

The abolitionist must be convinced, he must follow the course which reason and expediency, not to mention morality and civilisation, demand, he must not wait for or depend on the consent of others in order to take the step. Face-saving phrases inserted into declarations with a view to securing unanimity can be dropped. This means disarmament by example.

Let us see how this would work out and let us meet the objections brought against an idea which appears to some who do not look beneath the surface purely quixotic idealism. It is difficult to foresee the reactions in other nations because we are presupposing an outlook and steadfastness of purpose on the part of the initiator of which there is no faint reflection in the mood of any of the present Governments, and which by its implications will come as a call to the world of a very sensational character.

The Government which has the courage to announce its repudiation of war as a method of settling international disputes in any circumstances whatever will make its announcement before the League of Nations, and declare its intention to turn its back on war and cast aside for ever the war weapon. Those who oppose such a declaration being made base their opposition on the indispensable necessity of self-defence against an aggressor. As already shown, the aggressor is a war myth. But let us carry the matter a step further for the benefit of those who believe in him. No nation has ever admitted being an aggressor. No nation could get its people to support a war which was declared openly to be a war of aggression. An attack levelled against a nation which had repudiated the idea of ever resorting to force, and which, therefore, could not be suspected in the remotest degree of provocation, would *ipso facto* be a war of aggression and the nation who undertook it would be a self-confessed aggressor before the world. No nation, no government, no statesman would be a party to any such move. The fear, therefore, of a disarming or unarmed nation being attacked is chimerical and need not be taken into account.

The economic dislocation caused by the inauguration of complete disarmament (except for a police force) would be a matter which the Government in question would have to take into account, and for which careful provision would have to be made. So also the closing down of armament works and the prohibition of traffic in arms would have to come under Government control. Such plans of organisation and readjustment would be nothing like as difficult or as extensive as the colossal task of mobilising a whole nation for the waging of war. It would be a magnificent and inspiring effort for the real establishment of peace. To say that such an initiative taken by a Government would not be met by an immediate response from other nations is to underestimate the detestation of war that exists among the peoples and the eagerness of many governments to make a bolder and more sincere step towards the ideal than any which has yet been forthcoming.

Neither danger nor difficulties of practical execution are the real obstacle. The existence of the former can be disproved, the latter are matters of carefully thought-out organisation. But the dead-weight of the influence of the Services will be brought to bear against the inauguration of such a scheme and, indeed, against any advance which would be likely to relegate war to the category of an abandoned barbarity. The paramount influence of the members of the services both in the political and social sphere will operate, indeed does already operate, against the permanent establishment of Peace. Formidable as this obstacle is with its undefined and yet far-reaching ramifications, it can be fought by a democracy which is fully informed and adequately represented. Disarmament must be treated as the preliminary to, not the consequence of, security. The only way to overcome the obstacles which seem to lurk in any disarmament conferences where unanimity is sought is by a bold but reasoned initiative. Arbitration will become a reality and Court and Council can function without the fatal misgiving that their efforts may lead to an authorised exercise of force.

Great Britain desires no more territory, and even veiled aggression to secure a further extension of empire is not contemplated by any single person. Great Britain has learned that no desirable object is achieved by war, and the people of Great Britain decline to believe that by the diabolical barbarity of modern warfare their prestige can be enhanced or their beneficent intentions extended. They are jealous of no nation and they suspect no nation of evil intentions against them. They are a genuinely peace-loving people, and no people is more anxious to devote its energy, its enterprise and its wealth to mastering the crying social evils and economic injustices which at present hamper the development of its moral, cultural and spiritual capacities. The people of Great Britain are prepared to

give credit to other peoples for similar sentiments. They are exasperated at the interval of Peace being used, as it always has been, to sort out gradually a possible enemy and by pointing to the danger of conflict create it.

Disarmament by example has the same effect as the scheme for the Outlawry of War. The nation making the declaration thereby repudiates the legality of war. It does not contemplate any need for self-defence which implies belief in an aggressor. Moreover, it has the further advantage of being a practical step within the power of one government and easily understood, and not a scheme which has to await the consent of all the nations. It will force an amendment for the removal of sanctions from the Covenant or from the Protocol and it makes disarmament a reality and no longer a hopeless bone of contention for the experts.

Disarmament by example breaks the vicious circle, disposes of the fatal "ifs" and "whens" and implies a trust in other nations which will be justified because of the effect on the nations of the world which a government speaking with this voice is bound to have.

Disarmament by example cuts away at one stroke the steps and stages which are at present leading the nations into a blind alley.

Disarmament by example removes the dilemma with which a Government bent on the establishment of peace is confronted when by every other hitherto proposed scheme it is obliged to keep armaments in being, improve them so that they may not be out of date, and listen to experts as to their adequacy.

Credit must be given to the League of Nations for keeping to the front this vital question by continuous and repeated discussion of it. Nations are apt to be distracted by their own internal problems and to ignore this overmastering issue of peace and war, which governs not only international but national policy. Little, however, can be expected from the international debates on their present lines. When a government has the courage to proceed by way of example instead of precept the whole scene will change and the seemingly unattainable will come within the reach of man.

ARTHUR PONSONBY.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE.

IT is an obvious commonplace, and one that cannot be too closely borne in mind, that the Great War destroyed most of the political landmarks upon which the statesmen of pre-war Europe had relied, and replaced them by others which were quite unfamiliar and still require to be tested. It destroyed the two main political groupings, the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, and the alliance of victorious Powers which dictated the peace settlement was obviously not a permanent substitute. It proved fatal to the four Imperial Powers which pre-war Europe had known, ejecting their dynasties, robbing them of vast territories and in one case pushing the process to the length of dismemberment. It destroyed the old principle of the Balance of Power so effectively that in our own country, which had upheld it as a cardinal doctrine of political faith for some centuries, more than one statesman could express satisfaction at its disappearance without any fear of challenge. Against all this there is the decisive gain of the League of Nations as an international instrument; but behind it and even inside it the old forces are still at work, and politically Europe is still regarded by many as a moving bog which may yet overwhelm some of the new landmarks which have been erected. Even Locarno, which at first seemed to have definitely closed the transitional period following upon the Peace Treaties, is now seen to have been less definitive than had been hoped: while that very questionable survival of the Paris Conference, the Council of Ambassadors, cannot be regarded as more than a temporary makeshift, a compromise between those who desire to spare the League undue strain and those who would gladly demonstrate its impotence.

Europe then resembles a lantern screen upon which the outlines of the new slide—the League of Nations and a fixed international order—stand out confusedly against the background of another slide which has not yet been removed. Does Europe consist merely of disconnected units, seeing nothing but their own immediate advantage and living from hand to mouth in a state of economic anarchy, and are there no supra-national political forces at work, apart from the one great hope of Geneva? Clearly there are the twin dangers of Bolshevism in Russia and Fascism in Italy—two systems equally inimical to those ideas of political liberty which Western Europe had come to regard as its birthright. Apart from this there are three systems of political combination for concrete ends—the Locarno Pact which regularises the position of all the debateable land between France and Germany; the defensive alliance between Poland and Roumania for the protection of their eastern frontiers

and the series of agreements known as the Little Entente. It is with the latter that I am specially concerned, as a notable contribution to peace and stability in Europe. It is just because it represents one of the most solid facts in the still fluid situation of Central and South Eastern Europe, that it has been the object of so many recent misrepresentations, and it may therefore be useful to attempt a brief survey of its functions and principal aims.

The Little Entente is not a unitary alliance, but a triangular set of agreements between the three chief Succession States of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. First came the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Treaty of August 14th, 1920, then the Czechoslovak-Roumanian Treaty of April 23rd, 1921, and then the Yugoslav-Roumanian Treaty of June 8th, 1921: and these have been fortified, and in effect extended, by a whole series of further understandings between each of the three and other States. At the very outset it is worth emphasising that the Little Entente, though it may be a very loose organism, is the only real *political* substitute for what was till 1918 one of the six Great Powers of Europe and that the disappearance of that Power, Austria-Hungary, is the biggest *purely political* event in Europe since the fall of the Western Empire in the year 476. Other States have disappeared from time to time from the map (it is interesting to note in passing that they have generally been Slav States—Bulgaria, Serbia, Bohemia, Poland). But there is no other example in Europe of one of the Great Powers, apparently at the height of its dynastic prestige and military power, plunging into such sudden and complete ruin as the result of a war. Moreover, leaving the political side apart, we must also regard the disappearance of Austria-Hungary as one of the biggest *social* events in Europe since the French Revolution.

It is even now not sufficiently realised that in the Great War the Allies defeated, but did not break up, Austria-Hungary. Instead of saying that Austria-Hungary was broken up, it would be more correct to say that she broke down, falling by her own weight. In the month of October, 1918, she collapsed like a house of cards, the central authority was suddenly paralysed, a whole series of National Councils sprang into existence in the different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and rapidly crystallised into more or less national States—with the result that by November 3rd, when the Austrian armistice was signed, the chief difficulty for the Allies was to find any authority competent to place its signature beneath the formal document. The enlarged Italy, the German-Austrian Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the short-lived Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, Greater Roumania, Yugoslavia and that note of

interrogation called the Ukraine—all these took shape before the Conference of Paris could meet. They are not the creation of the Big Five: the Conference merely ratified accomplished facts, doing admirable and necessary work in modifying certain frontier details, in preventing open conflicts over such minor, though not unimportant, details as Teschen, the Banat, Klagenfurt, Silesia and so on, but in the main accepting what the peoples at that moment—or, some might say, what the most vocal and energetic of those who claimed to represent them at that moment—had already established by war and revolution. In a word, history proved stronger than geography and dominated the settlement—for a moment stronger even than economics; and so in certain directions facts were ignored which are to-day forcing themselves on the consideration of Europe as a whole, but which are not so easily remedied now that the situation is no longer fluid, but has so to speak hardened into fresh grooves.

The old Austria-Hungary was a State of 51,000,000 inhabitants: the Little Entente to-day represents a total of 42,000,000, and thus for defensive purposes, and in so far as it is inspired by a single purpose, it is a political force by no means to be despised.

After the first enthusiasm of victory there came a very natural rebound of disillusionment, and in certain circles it became the fashion to break the staff over the Succession States by speaking of the Balkanisation of Central Europe. This can only mean a protest against the substitution of a number of small or medium States for a large and powerful Empire. It suggests that the new organisms rest on a less healthy and natural basis than the heterogeneous slowgrowing organism which they have replaced. But before using the word Balkanisation, we should stop to consider what has made the Balkans a term of reproach.

Firstly, no doubt the foul tyranny to which they were so long subjected by the Turks and whose evil effects still remain in the victim's system; but secondly, and not less, the perpetual interference of the Great Powers, based as a rule upon motives of the European balance of power and upon a profound misreading of the local situation, and also only too often upon a cynical indifference to the fate of the countries and populations directly concerned. The new situation has at last made it more possible to apply the principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan Peoples," though recent events have shown that even to-day the Great Powers have not all renounced the hope of interference in the Peninsula: and if it is more difficult for them than in former days, this is not least of all due to the existence of the Little Entente. One of the many tasks of the League of Nations is, it seems to me, to strengthen this healthy tendency of "the Balkans

for the Balkan peoples," and to check the autocratic methods adopted by the Great Powers during and since the Peace Conference towards more than one small nation.

But to realise how superficial is this phrase of "Balkanisation," it is only necessary to consider what has happened in the huge triangular bit of country lying between Germany, Soviet Russia and the Mediterranean. In this area before the war there were three big political facts—in the North the hold of the Russian autocracy on the Poles and other border races; in the centre, the double hegemony of the Germans and Magyars—less crude, but quite as real—over the Czechs, Slovaks, Roumanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Italians of Austria-Hungary, and as a result, increasing complications in foreign policy and increasing dependence of Austria-Hungary upon Berlin: and then in the South, the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Russia for political hegemony in the Balkans, complicated by varying degrees of intervention on the part of the other Powers.

To-day all three facts have been wiped out. All the oppressed races whom I have named are free: and though the stress of war has left a highly unsatisfactory situation in almost every country, there is a slow but steady evolution back towards the normal. Above all, these countries are free agents in the direction of policy: and the Little Entente is the most signal example of this. The interference of the Great Powers is not ended, but at least very greatly reduced.

Moreover, one effect of the World War has been to destroy not merely the old Balance of Power in Europe, which so intimately concerned a country like Belgium, but also, even more drastically, the old Balance of Power in the Balkans. Before the Balkan wars the Christian States were all more or less on the same level—Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece (apart, of course, from the tiny Montenegro). One of the main motives which underlay King Milan's action against Bulgaria in the war of 1885, and again the formation of the Balkan League in 1912, and again the outbreak of the second Balkan War in 1913, was either to prevent one of these States from pushing ahead of the others without compensation, or to ensure parallel all-round aggrandisement. But to-day, for good or for evil, that ideal is gone. The two northern States utterly outweigh the three southern—on the one hand Yugoslavia with 12,000,000 and Roumania with nearly 17,000,000, on the other hand Bulgaria with 5,000,000, Greece with 6,000,000 and Albania with 1,000,000. Only a quarrel between Yugoslavia and Roumania, or their break-up—neither of them events which can be regarded as probable—could

restore anything like equilibrium, and indeed we may reasonably hope that the evolution of the near future will bring about a still greater concentration of forces by bringing Yugoslavia and Bulgaria closer together.

On the whole Turkey has become part of the Middle rather than the Near East, in spite of still possessing Adrianople and Thrace, while the Balkans have been brought nearer to the West by the double fact of the partition of Hungary and of the acquisition by the Yugoslavs of political control over their own coastline on the Eastern Adriatic. This is a situation which nothing short of a new general upheaval in Europe is likely to overthrow: and even the most resolute opponent of the new order in Central Europe will have to admit that this would be too high a price. Those who believe that on the whole, despite many obvious blemishes and shortcomings, this new order does stand for liberty and progress, will follow the activities of the Little Entente as, next to the League itself, one of the main stabilising forces in Europe during the tentative period of probation through which the League is at present passing.

They will also recognise a guarantee of stability in the fact that the great transformation of the year 1918 was not merely political and racial, but above all social. Draw a rough line on the map of Europe from Königsberg to Trieste, and in the territory east of it you will find that with certain notable exceptions there has everywhere been not merely a collapse of legitimist (and, indeed, for the most part, dynastic) principles, not only a downfall of the aristocracy as a privileged class, but also the advent of new classes to political power—of those whom the former Austrian Chancellor Dr. Renner used to call “the unhistoric nations”—the erection of new bureaucracies and of new educational systems for them, the revision of many fundamental civil and ecclesiastical institutions, and above all (and this is perhaps decisive) the transference of the land to the peasantry. It has become a commonplace that in Russia this transference of the land to the peasant is by an amazing paradox the real basis of a regime whose *raison d'être* is a denial of private property, and that it actually lacks the power to apply its principles against the peasant. It is this which gives Soviet Russia such stability as it possesses. In the same way the far-reaching agrarian reforms which have resulted from the war in most of the Succession States have, so to speak, acted as a sedative to the nerves of their sorely tried peoples. It is quite true that land reform has been applied in a revolutionary and often haphazard manner, that certain classes have suffered serious hardship and even injustice, and that so sudden an upheaval at first dislocated the economic system. The loudest

complaints came from the Magyar feudal nobility in Transylvania, who have undoubtedly been hit very hard and are in the same sort of position as another landed class which has lost its political power, namely the Irish gentry since the Sinn Fein Revolution. But it must be borne in mind that in Roumania, for instance, it is not merely the Magyar feudalists, but also the entire boyar class in the old kingdom who have lost their lands: and the best proof that the reforms were not an act of nationalistic reprisal, as is sometimes alleged, but part of a general State policy, is that many Roumanian cultural institutions, such as the Academy, the hospitals of Bucharest, and the Uniate episcopate, have suffered severely from the fact that a large part of their resources were in land and that no exception was made for them. It is not too much to maintain that the voluntary renunciation of their estates by the Roumanian landed aristocracy is one of the most memorable incidents of its kind in modern history. Let us admit that the law was voted at a moment of acute stress, and with the very definite desire to check the spread of Bolshevik propaganda: but let us also remember that land reform had long figured on the programme of the Liberal Party before the war, and that the first thing which Roumanian statesmen did on escaping from German occupation in 1918 was to redeem the pledges which had been made to the peasantry.

The details of land reform in all these countries are open to many obvious criticisms—criticisms which vary not merely as between the three Succession States, but also inside each of the three, according to the particular province or district. But if the change be considered from the old utilitarian standpoint of the “greatest good of the greatest number,” it is difficult to deny that it is already working out to the advantage of what are overwhelmingly peasant and farming communities. It is, indeed, probable that when the co-operative system which was already making such rapid progress in South Eastern Europe even before the war once more regains its old momentum, there will be a rapid increase of the general prosperity, increased exports and savings and so presumably political stability.

The recent attempt of Hungary to indict Roumania before the bar of Geneva, on the ground that the expropriation of certain Magyar landowners in Transylvania was a violation of the Peace Treaty, was ostensibly placed upon juridical grounds, but was none the less eminently political in character and motive. The fact that it would have given a very limited number of citizens of the new Roumania a privileged position over all the rest, that it would almost infallibly have provoked keen protest and disorder and rendered untenable the

position of any Roumanian Government which made such a concession, may be left aside as an opportunist argument. *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*, it may be said. But what gives the question its acerbity is the fact that one party to the dispute challenges the whole basis of the Treaty of Trianon and still entertains hopes of its revision. There is considerable irony in this appeal to the letter of a treaty by a country which ever since its signature has vigorously denounced it both in letter and spirit. It is also curious that Hungary should have concentrated its attack upon details relating to the land question, rather than upon many other points where it cannot be denied that the Minorities in Transylvania have real grievances. The explanation is that while the Succession States, like Russia and in a partial degree Poland, have undergone a complete transformation in the matter of land tenure, and have, despite many divergencies in social structure, become in their essence peasant democracies, Hungary on the other hand—as the solitary exception in the whole of Eastern Europe—is more than ever before controlled by the great Conservative landed families whose policy in pre-war days contributed so materially to the downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy, and has therefore evaded anything like drastic land reform in the territory still remaining to it.

The Bethlen-Horthy regime, thanks to the repressive measures originally adopted by the White Terror and subsequently developed into an all-pervading administrative system, and thanks also to the ineffectiveness of the Liberal Opposition, is for the present firmly entrenched in Hungary. But its chiefs are perfectly conscious of the antithesis between their own social and political system and that of Austria or the other Succession States. They are aware that Czechoslovakia is advancing by leaps and bounds in every sphere of democratic progress, and that Yugoslavia and even Roumania, though much more backward and hampered by a defective administration and a mentality that survives from Turkish days, have none the less adopted similar democratic institutions, and that it is only a matter of time for the new generations to make those institutions effective and efficient. And in particular they know that even the Magyar peasant, despite the obvious drawback of belonging to a Minority, finds the Succession States ready to satisfy this land hunger, while only a trifling number of his kinsmen in free Hungary have been able to obtain land. Anything which could discredit or arrest the land policy of her neighbours would therefore accrue to the advantage of the great landlords, lay and ecclesiastical, inside Hungary itself, who fear for their *latifundia* and the political influence which land still carries with it in that part of Europe.

Hungary's challenge at Geneva to Roumanian land reform is merely part of a general offensive against the Treaty of Trianon. The ill-considered campaign in favour of revision launched by Lord Rothermere in *The Daily Mail* has had very little effect in England: for those acquainted with the real facts are well aware of the many inaccuracies on which the campaign rests. But in Hungary itself it made an immense sensation and has rekindled hopes and illusions which were nearly extinguished. Lord Rothermere has been acclaimed as "the Saviour of Great Hungary" and it is seriously believed that the recovery of Transylvania, Slovakia, the Batchka and Banat, perhaps even of Croatia-Slovenia, is a serious possibility of the near future and may obtain official support in the West. The *Pesti Hirlap*, a very influential Budapest newspaper, has even argued that Hungary must demand not merely her own frontiers and an Adriatic port at Fiume, but also an outlet on the Black Sea. At the unveiling of a War Memorial at Miskolcz on October 10th the Archduke Joseph publicly declared that the time is not far distant when the Hungarian flag will again wave on the Carpathians and the victorious Hungarian army will return; and this meeting was followed by street demonstrations in favour of Lord Rothermere. Again, on November 6th, at the unveiling of the Kossuth Memorial outside the Budapest Parliament, Count Apponyi solemnly denounced the existing situation as a negation of independence and described the monument itself as a symbol of national strength and a pledge of resurrection, while Archduke Joseph spoke of Kossuth's dream of "a great and independent Hungary" as the goal of aspiration, and the Prime Minister himself expressed the hope that the hour of resurrection would strike.

Incidents such as these serve to explain the excitement which the campaign has aroused in the three countries of the Little Entente, where public opinion cannot be expected to estimate British "stunt" journalism at its true value or to appreciate Lord Rothermere's appeal to the City to destroy the financial credit of Czechoslovakia in the interests of Hungarian *revanche* policy. It is true that from the point of view of the Little Entente itself Lord Rothermere may in a sense be regarded as a public benefactor: for the exaggerated importance ascribed to his action has drawn the three countries still more closely together and stimulated co-operation between the three Foreign Ministers, while as regards Slovakia in particular it has done more than any incident of the last nine years to improve relations between Slovaks and Czechs. Monster meetings of protest against his interference have been held in every town and many villages of Slovakia, and every Slovak Party from Left to Right has

declared its solidarity with Prague in the question of revision. It is Hungary who is the chief sufferer by this "stunt," for she is now more isolated than she was before; the consolidation of her relations with her neighbours has been postponed; and so far from undermining the financial credit of the Little Entente, she has by the vehemence of her agitation against the peace settlement, caused an alarm in western financial circles which her Finance Minister, Dr. Bud, during his recent visit to Paris and London, found it necessary to allay by pledges of official moderation.

There has been much criticism of the new frontiers established in Paris, and in so far as this criticism aims at drawing attention to the plight of racial minorities and ensuring the remedy of their grievances, it is very much to be welcomed and can only do good. But the vague general lines which such criticism tends to follow—namely, that the frontiers should be purely ethnographical or that the old Hungary (or again, the old Austria-Hungary) was a natural economic unit which should not have been broken up—only lead to misconception and will not stand the test of detailed investigation. The fundamental fact in this whole question is that a "clean cut," or perfect racial frontiers, are absolutely unattainable, because in many places the races are intermingled village by village and even inside each village, and in some places, such for instance as the Banat, form a regular racial mosaic. Here and there geographical and economic reasons run directly counter to ethnical. Sometimes, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, the settlement rested in one place on the historical, in another on the ethnical argument, so that the Czechs may no doubt be said both to have had their cake and to have eaten it. There is no doubt that in certain points the new frontiers seriously disregard the ethnographical division: the most notable cases are the Brenner, the Schütt (the district north of the main Danube channel to the east of Bratislava), the Batchka (the rich arable land between the Danube and the Tisza) and the district between Satu Mare (Szatmár) and Oradea Mare (Nagyvárad), but certainly in the second and fourth cases and even to some extent in the third there are weighty reasons for upholding them, and no human effort could prevent the necessity for considerable Minorities remaining on the wrong side of every frontier. To take the worst instance of all, the largest and most compact mass of Magyars annexed to Roumania, the Székelys of south-east Transylvania (who in three counties and part of a fourth formed in 1910 between 83 and 95 per cent. of the total population, amounting in round figures to 450,000) form as nearly as possible the geographical centre of "Great Roumania." A very slight study of the map will

show that in order to reunite the Székelys with Hungary it would be necessary to hand back almost the whole of Transylvania, with the best part of 3,000,000 Roumanians. Even apart from the Székely territory, the remainder of the Magyars in Roumania are widely scattered among a predominantly Roumanian population, and those who live compactly along the frontier and could be detached without at the same time detaching Roumanians, certainly do not amount to a fifth of the total.

To take an example in the opposite direction, even the present "Rump Hungary," whose population at the last census was just under 8,000,000, still retained 550,000 Germans and 140,000 Slovaks according to Magyar official statistics (and still more according to Austrian and Slovak estimates). The whole question is one which can only be profitably discussed on the basis of large scale maps, detailed statistical tables (including those of Church adherence) and a knowledge of the economic grounds which influenced the experts of the Paris Conference. The result of such an inquiry would be to prove that apart from small adjustments affecting a few towns or villages (which, on the one hand, would not in any way appease the discontented ruling caste in Hungary, and on the other hand would revive a sense of insecurity and unrest among all the populations concerned, even if they could be effected without bloodshed) the only serious alternative to the existing frontiers of Hungary would be a restoration of the old frontiers of 1914. *Tertium non datur*. This was in effect the argument laid down before the American public some years ago by the veteran Hungarian Legitimist statesman, Count Apponyi, who represented his country in Geneva last September. It is a clear consciousness of this fact that underlies the present agitation in Hungary: the real aim is not the recovery of this or that town, but a reversion to the pre-war *status quo*. This could only be attained by a fresh racial war on a large scale and consequent chaos throughout the Danubian area: and most people even among the discontented Minorities recognise that this would be too high a price to pay.

The Little Entente on its side stands for the maintenance of the new *status quo* alike for reasons of internal and international policy. Internal, because any serious project of revision would be strongly opposed by every group or *nuance* of public opinion, both as undermining confidence in the State and as encouraging still further the illusions of Hungary. International, because it is quite inconceivable that revision of the four frontiers of Hungary could ever be officially discussed, still less carried into effect, without at once raising the question of revision between Germany and Poland, Austria and

Italy, Russia and her Western neighbours, to say nothing of the various Balkan and Turkish frontiers, or for that matter even the Rhine. It is high time for those who talk glibly of "revision" to realise that what they are asking for is really a re-making of the whole Peace Settlement of 1919-20. This is only attainable in one of three ways: (a) by a new war, which no one would dare to advocate openly; (b) by a new Peace Conference, which no responsible statesman would advocate to-day; or (c) through the medium of the League of Nations, which (I write as a confirmed believer in its principles and its ultimate triumph) obviously could not stand the test of such a strain under present circumstances.

The more closely the problem is studied in its various aspects, the more obvious it becomes that a policy of "revision" can only increase that very unrest and racial friction which it is the professed object of the campaign to allay. The only direction in which real progress can be attained is a frank acceptance of the existence of minorities as an inevitable factor of the European situation, and an attempt to mobilise enlightened and well-informed public opinion in favour of the alleviation of their grievances. The question of racial minorities is international, and no State, great or small, has any right to plead that the fate of its minorities is a purely private concern. On the contrary, it strikes at the root of public law and the international order. It is, however, obvious that the first postulate for generous treatment must be loyal acceptance of the new situation by the minority concerned, and that the constant encouragement of irredentist feeling reacts in two directions, by encouraging false hopes and even seditious action among the minority and by stiffening public opinion among the majority against further concessions, or in the most critical cases of all, even against the execution of rights already conceded on paper. It is quite true that the machinery of the League of Nations has not hitherto proved very effective for enforcing minority rights, partly, no doubt, because so many complaints addressed to it were of a frivolous and even mendacious character, with ill-concealed political motives in the background, but still more because of bureaucratic tendencies at Geneva and the entire lack of healthy publicity even in cases of acute and glaring injustice affecting important racial minorities. Many of those interested in these problems have already reached the conclusion that machinery should be erected at Geneva to deal with Minorities on exactly parallel lines to that which already deals with Mandates, and that subject to reasonable safeguards imposed by the Secretariat, it should be possible to raise minority questions in the open Assembly of the League. In any case, even if the jealousies of

the Powers should make it difficult to secure such an innovation, it is quite clear that the Minorities themselves have more to hope from an agitation in favour of the enforcement of rights secured to them by the various treaties than by an agitation in favour of the overthrow of those treaties.

Each of the three Succession States signed special minority treaties in pursuance of its obligations under the Peace Treaties, and these have since September 26th, 1920, formed part of the public law of Europe: while Czechoslovakia, by its Language Law of February 29th, 1920, voluntarily went some distance farther on the path of concession than its obligations demanded. It is in the perfecting and further extension of these rights that the best hope of the Minorities lies. In Czechoslovakia and Roumania, against whom the present campaign is mainly directed, the Magyar Minorities have far more schools and cultural institutions than either Slovaks or Roumanians ever possessed in pre-war Hungary; while on the other hand it may be pointed out that the Slovaks and Germans of present-day Hungary have no schools of their own. There are plenty of hardships which still require to be toned down before the ruling caste of former days can be reconciled to its position as a relatively unimportant Minority: and it may well be that the older generation is irreconcilable and too old to adapt itself. But it cannot be too often repeated that both official and public opinion in the Succession States will only be rendered less, not more, conciliatory towards their respective minorities by the kind of agitation which is at present being conducted from Budapest, with the encouragement of a few irresponsible persons in this country, and that a very cruel disservice is being done to the unfortunate minorities themselves by encouraging them to expect early "revision" or perhaps even a reversion to the old order of things.

The Little Entente, then, stands solidly against revision of the treaties, and it is not very clear how this attitude can be overcome save by actual force of arms. Another of its fundamental objects need only be very briefly alluded to here. It is definitely opposed to the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty, either in Hungary or elsewhere. It challenges the Legitimist contention that the Habsburg question is a purely internal affair of Hungary, and can point out that its international character was recognised not only in the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of December, 1923, but (what is much more important) by a specific declaration of the Conference of Ambassadors on February 2nd, 1920. It should be obvious that as the Habsburgs were sovereigns not only of Hungary, but of the whole Dual Monarchy, their return would have a direct and immediate

effect upon all their former subjects and would be a disturbing element in the general European situation. It is also to be remembered that the governing class of Hungary as a whole identifies Habsburg dynastic doctrine with the doctrine of territorial integrity. By his coronation oath the King of Hungary is pledged to uphold this integrity by every means, and not only not to alienate any possessions of Hungary, "under whatsoever right or title, but even to augment and extend them." Those interested in the problem may be recommended to study the curious mystical dogma of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen, with which all Hungarian constitutional theory is closely interwoven. Here lies the key which explains the attitude of the Succession States.

Moreover, it is quite a mistake to talk of Hungarian attachment to the Habsburgs, or even of Hungarian monarchical feeling, at least as anything like a tradition. For four centuries Hungary has been in conflict with the Habsburgs, and their deposition by the Károlyi Government in 1918 was the third such act in Hungarian history. Francis Rákóczy, who deposed them in 1707, and Louis Kossuth, who deposed them in 1849, are to this day the names to conjure with among the Hungarian masses, whose tradition is definitely anti-Habsburg and not untinged with republicanism. It is because Habsburg legitimacy and the agitation for the old frontiers are two sides of the same medal, that the ruling class of Hungary has recently shown such enthusiasm for the dynastic question.

It is hardly necessary to add that the objections of Prague, Belgrade and Bucarest, to say nothing of Vienna, to a return of the Habsburgs to Budapest are based not merely on the above considerations, but upon a broad survey of international policy. For it is hard to believe that the Habsburgs could return to their dominions without stimulating the movement for the return of the Hohenzollern and the Wittelsbach in Germany, and thereby creating very grave unrest throughout Central Europe. This is yet another illustration of the close interconnection of all the leading European problems under the very complex conditions of to-day.

There are other critics who reject a policy of "revision" because they realise that it can only lead to disorder or even war, but who find the chief weakness of the present situation in the new economic barriers which have been erected as a result of the war, and plead for a concentration upon economic, to the exclusion of political, problems. There can be no doubt that customs restrictions are a grave obstacle to consolidation throughout central and south-eastern Europe, and that their removal or diminution offers a fruitful field for reform. But these critics, though they strike at one of the main roots of the

evil, err in supposing that politics and economics can be placed in two water-tight compartments. In every case a definite economic policy has immediate political effects: to take only two concrete examples, Rašín's financial policy brought political as well as economic stability to Czechoslovakia, while the League Loan to Hungary saved the Horthy-Bethlen régime from ruin. In 1914 there were many who assumed that the pressure of economic factors would force the warring nations to make peace: yet the issue proved that political and national considerations were still more powerful and made men blind to mere material interests. And so to-day the new States regard political and national consolidation as paramount and as necessarily taking precedence of economic concessions to their neighbours. The revisionist campaign automatically retards the conclusion of proper commercial understandings.

This article is merely an attempt to summarise the main features of a very complicated situation. But enough has been said to show that the Little Entente—which, with its 43,000,000 inhabitants, virtually ranks as one of the Great Powers—is one of the most solid and stable facts in the Europe of to-day, and deserves the support and sympathy of all who have at heart the cause of peace and democratic progress.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

BALTIC POLITICS.

BEFORE the Great War only four sovereign States bordered upon the Baltic: the German Empire, Denmark, Sweden, and the Russian Empire. Owing to their weakness relatively to the two great Powers, and to their peaceful policy, neither Denmark nor Sweden could entertain plans of changing existing conditions in the Baltic; even the adjustment of the frontier in Slesvig, so ardently desired by Denmark, had to be postponed. Of the great Powers, Russia had no reason to wish for any alteration in the *status quo* except a repeal of the irksome prohibition to fortify the Åland Islands, imposed upon her by Great Britain and France after the Crimean War in 1856. Germany, on the other hand, with her "Drang nach Osten," regarded an alteration of the existing state of things around the Baltic, at the expense of Russia, as a natural development.

During the Great War it became possible for Russia to emancipate herself from the Åland prohibition. Germany also succeeded, towards the end of the war, owing to the military and internal collapse of Russia, in temporarily carrying out her scheme of expansion in the East. Had the conquest by Germany of the Baltic provinces been permanent, and had Finland remained dependent upon Germany, that country would have been the uncontested ruler of the Baltic.

It was, however, not to be. Russia, indeed, could not keep her position as Germany's rival on the south of the Baltic, any more than her absolute predominance in the Gulf of Finland, but Germany did not inherit. There arose, instead, several new sovereign States: Finland in the north, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in the south. The coasts of the Baltic were, before the war, owned by four States; now there are nine. Denmark's share has been slightly increased by the reunion of north Slesvig. Russia retains only the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland, and Germany has lost some 140 miles of the coast she possessed before the Great War. The war may thus be said to have caused something of a revolution in the political geography of the Baltic.

The losses have turned out very differently for those two empires that were forced to make room for others—even apart from the length of coast they have lost. Germany is now cut in half by the Polish corridor and the free city of Danzig, East Prussia, with Königsberg, the cradle of Prussia, being detached from West Prussia and the other German territories. Maimed as she is, the commerce and navigation of Germany have, however, not been fatally affected. It is true that Germany has lost the ports of Danzig and Memel, but she can well manage without them. The territorial losses of Russia,

on the other hand, although of no great extent in themselves, have almost destroyed her connection with the sea. The only port now reserved for Russia's trade upon or beyond the Baltic, which just before the war amounted to nearly half of her whole foreign trade (40 per cent. of the export and 40 per cent. of the import in 1913), is Petersburg, and even this port is, during one-third of the year, blocked by ice. Russia has lost Riga, the principal outlet for her exports before the war, as well as Reval, Pernau, Windau, and Libau—all of which are, as a rule, accessible the whole year through. This being so, it is obvious that the changes which have taken place around the Baltic do not imply any guarantee for their stability. It is, therefore, easy to understand the uneasiness as to the future that prevails in all the new States, and which with regard to Russia is only too well justified, considering that Russia has not entered the League of Nations, and that the ability of the League to interfere by force of arms in case of an attack from Russia is not to be relied upon.

Poland endeavoured to secure her present frontiers towards Germany by the Treaty of Locarno, concluded with France in October, 1925. But the dismemberment of Germany by the Polish corridor seems too unnatural to be regarded as definite and final, even if guaranteed by treaty. On the other hand, Poland's claim to a port for her Baltic trade cannot very well be rejected. As a Polish seaport Danzig has become the most important place of exportation on the Baltic, and its tonnage has rapidly increased by 75 per cent. as compared with the traffic immediately before the war. However the territorial conditions in this part of the Baltic coast may be regulated in the future, it seems reasonable that Poland should retain a zone in the port of Danzig, together with certain other liberties and privileges. This would only be what the Treaty of Versailles accords to Czecho-Slovakia in Hamburg and Stettin, and to Yugoslavia in Salonika.

The Baltic policy of Poland has nothing in common with the policy of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, for the former turns towards the west, the latter towards the east. The so-called Baltic policy, in which Poland has tried—and sometimes successfully—to make those States take an interest, has not been a Baltic policy but an East European policy, which interests Roumania, bordering on the Black Sea, as keenly as it does Poland. It may be pointed out, by the way, that this policy, had it been carried out, would have implied very great risks for Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, there being this difference between the Russian frontiers of these States and those of Poland and Roumania, that the latter are not based upon ethnographic considerations and are not recognised by the Soviet. For Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, the question of their own and Russia's position

on the Baltic is obviously the most important of all foreign questions, for to Estonia and Latvia the solution of this problem means their existence or non-existence as sovereign States. And even if the independence of Finland is not directly dependent upon it, the solution of this question will make it either easy or difficult for Finland also to defend her independence.

It may be remarked that this is not the only source of eventual controversy between Russia on one side and Finland, Estonia, and Latvia on the other. There is the great difference in the political system and the endeavour of the Soviet Government to propagate Bolshevism and the world-revolution, in which respect the fate of Georgia may be mentioned as relevant. Yet in this case the Russian conquest was influenced by the natural resources of Georgia and by the wish to command the railway connections between the Caspian and the Black Sea. Under any régime Russia will always aim at certain objectives, particularly of an economic character. So long as her present position on the Baltic is at variance with these permanent objects of Russian policy, the situation of the small States on her western frontier will be critical.

Finland as well as Estonia and Latvia have been anxious to remove everything that may increase the difficulties of Russia in her present position or rouse her dissatisfaction. The treaty of peace between Estonia and Russia (of February 2nd, 1920) accords to the latter a zone within the port of Reval, together with other privileges calculated to facilitate Russian trade. The treaty of peace which Latvia concluded with Russia (August 11th, 1920) contains no provisions of this kind, but there are later treaties by which Latvia has pledged herself to arrange these matters in the same way as Estonia. Finland, again, has, by virtue of the treaty with Russia (October 14th, 1920), demolished those fortifications on her coast which might threaten Petersburg and Kronstadt.

There has not, so far as is known, been any Russian discontent with the management of the Estonian and Latvian ports. It must be observed, however, that the economic condition of Russia is still at such a standstill that the trade of Petersburg, although this port is the only one Russia possesses on the Baltic, amounts but to one-fifth of what it was before the Great War. Conditions may change as soon as the economic life of Russia is stabilised, for then her national claims for ports of her own along the Baltic coast will probably assert themselves. Thus Estonia and Latvia cannot feel confident of the future. In Finland the demolition of the fortifications on the coast and the disarmament of the small islands has already taken place; but it is a curious fact that Finland has done nothing towards the neutralisation of Hogland, and that Russia, as far as is known, has never insisted upon such measures, although an

article concerning this question was included in the Treaty at the express desire of Russia.

Finland, Estonia, and Latvia have not followed any definite lines of direction while looking for guarantees for the maintenance of the *status quo* on the Baltic upon the basis of treaties now in force. Their policy has been a kind of groping after different means of attaining their purpose, all of which they have afterwards abandoned, either by force of circumstances or of their own accord.

After the Great War had ended in the defeat of Germany, the opinion prevailed in Finland that the neutralisation of the Baltic would offer the requisite guarantee. The advocates of this theory, for which the neutralisation of the Black Sea in 1856-1871 served as a model, proposed a prohibition against any State maintaining a navy in the Baltic or entering it with warships. In this way they hoped to remove the danger presented by the Russian navy to the neighbouring States, which were well-nigh defenceless at sea. In the treaty of peace between Finland and Russia there was, accordingly, inserted at the express desire of Finland a provision to the effect that both parties accepted, in principle, the neutralisation of the Baltic including the Gulf of Finland, and bound themselves to concur in the carrying out of the proposal. To this Russia assented, probably because she had already, in her treaty with Estonia, accepted a similar article concerning the neutralisation of the Gulf of Finland, besides which the Russians were well aware of the wholly platonic import of such a provision. That it really belonged to the world of theories is best seen from the fact that Finland has done nothing to make the neutralisation of the Baltic anything but an empty catchword, even although the Finnish Diet, in ratifying this treaty, pronounced the provision in question to be of great value for the defence of the country. In one instance only has the neutralisation been carried out, namely, in regard to the Åland Islands by means of the Convention of October 20th, 1921. Whether Finland has any reason for rejoicing at this measure is doubtful, especially as Russia is not among the signatories to this Convention and has never accepted it.

So the idea of the neutralisation of the Baltic in Finland was forgotten as quickly as it was taken up, mainly owing to the circumstance that those circles in which it had been particularly cherished thought they had found another guarantee against attacks from Russia: the entering into a defensive alliance with Poland and possibly also with Estonia and Latvia. It is not unlikely that such an alliance would have come into existence had not Poland wished, at the same time, to join these States together into a so-called Baltic alliance under Polish direction. The foreign ministers of these four States signed, for this purpose, an *accord politique* (with appurten-

ant protocols) at Warsaw on March 17th, 1922, which document the Finnish Diet, however, refused to discuss since Dr. Holsti, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been met with a vote of want of confidence in the matter and had been compelled to resign. The majority of the Diet thought that the risks of such an alliance considerably outweighed the guarantees, and preferred a neutral policy to an alliance directed against Russia and possibly also against Germany. The idea of an alliance of this sort was, however, not definitely abandoned. Conferences between the foreign ministers of Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, held at more or less regular intervals, have continued to keep it alive.

Towards the end of 1925 Dr. Erich, Professor of International Law at the University of Helsingfors, now Finnish Minister at Bern and Delegate to the League of Nations, suggested the conclusion of a Northern "Locarno" Treaty as a means of guaranteeing the independence of Finland, and ultimately of Estonia and Latvia, and the inviolability of their frontiers on the east. As Russia, however, was not to be among the guarantors, the treaty was interpreted as an agreement aimed at Russia, and the opposition which this suggestion met with in Sweden, whose traditional policy since 1809 tends to avoid every disturbance of her relations with Russia, was as decided as the indignation it roused in Russia herself. Later on, in the beginning of the present year, M. Cielens, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, spoke in favour of a treaty of guarantee including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, with Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain as guarantors. This suggestion, which excludes Poland from the treaty, is by her regarded as a blow at her position at the Baltic, nor does anyone in Poland believe that it could ever be accepted by Great Britain and France. Russia and Germany would then be the sole guarantors.

The idea of stabilising conditions on the Baltic by means of treaties with Russia herself, is the latest expression of the endeavour to secure the independence of the States concerned. Officially, at least, Russia has taken the first move (January, 1926) towards concluding non-aggression treaties—as Russian diplomacy prefers to call them—with these States. From this it may be inferred that the interests of Russia also require security against attacks from the small neighbouring States. Such attacks, however, are conceivable only in alliance with some third Power. Anticipating a conflict with Great Britain, Russia has desired in good time to secure her position by rendering her neighbours neutral—which really is the object of these treaties.

It cannot be denied that non-aggression treaties, in cases where they also involve arbitration for settling eventual differences, and contain nothing contrary to the obligations to the League of

Nations, would be likely to increase the security of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, especially if Russia would refrain from taking part in high politics. This, however, is hardly to be thought of; and as a war with a power like Great Britain is not out of the question, and would in all probability be carried on along the coasts of the Gulf of Finland, the import of such a treaty is considerably reduced. How could either of the belligerents abstain from occupying neutral, especially Finnish, territory?

Of the neighbouring States of Russia—Lithuania does not border upon Russia—only Latvia has shown herself perfectly willing to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Russia. And it is to be observed that in case of a war between Russia and Great Britain Latvia will not, like Finland and Estonia, be exposed to imminent danger. Nonetheless it is a remarkable fact that Latvia, after having entered into a political and military alliance with Estonia (treaty of December 1st, 1923), and after having, in principle, accepted a customs-union with her sister country, should follow her own course in a question of so great political importance. The attitude of Latvia and the success of Russian diplomacy in Riga can be explained by the economic difficulties of the country and her expectations of increased Russian trade, which expectations have been realised through the commercial treaty of June 2nd of the present year. It is, moreover, not impossible that Estonia will, for the same reasons, be compelled to follow the example of Latvia. Much depends upon what real advantages others can offer, as a counterpoise, to the little republic on the southern side of the Gulf of Finland, so important from the point of view of sea-strategy.

As for Finland, it appears clear that the best way for her to maintain her independence is to embrace the safe policy of the Scandinavian countries, which tends to peace and neutrality; to concentrate her energies upon productive economic activity; and so to secure her own position in the world. Nor can any economic conditions compel Finland to conclude a political treaty with Russia, which does not contain reciprocal advantages. The exports to Russia, which amounted, during the years preceding the Great War, to about 30 per cent. of the whole Finnish exportation, were in 1924 only 4.44 per cent., mounting up to 7.72 per cent. in 1925 and sinking again, in 1926, to 3.90 per cent. In return for the loss of the Russian market it has been easy for Finland to increase her exports to Great Britain (at present ca. 40 per cent. of the total), Holland, and Belgium, and to obtain a quite new market in the United States (cellulose, paper, and pulp). An increase of the exports to Russia and, above all, a steadier sale on the basis of a commercial treaty would, of course, be desirable, but is by no means indispensable.

Thus the position of Finland, from an economic point of view, con-

siderably differs from that of Estonia and Latvia and is, in other particulars too, by far the strongest. Finland can, therefore, adopt a policy different from that of Estonia and Latvia, while procuring guarantees for the maintenance of her independence. In no case, of course, will it be indifferent to Finland whether the southern side of the Gulf of Finland and the nearest part of the Baltic are occupied by Estonia and Latvia, or by Russia. And it ought not to be a matter of indifference to Western Europe either, that the *status quo* should be preserved in these parts of the Baltic rather than that Russia should regain the position to which Peter the Great succeeded in raising his half-Asiatic empire, and which it lost 200 years afterwards.

GEORG SCHAUMAN.

IN A YORKSHIRE TOWN.

THE destruction of provincialism by the wonderful development of the means of travel and communication during the nineteenth century is a commonplace of English history. The growth of railways, the penny post, the coming of telegraphy, are boasts of the Victorian age. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether the first quarter of the twentieth century has not done more to destroy seclusion and to substitute national for local standards of thought and conduct, of custom and activities, than the preceding hundred years. The motor and motor 'bus, the wireless and cinema, have destroyed the isolation of the countryside. Nor are they the only recent forces which tend to make provincialism archaic. The syndicated press has largely ousted the country paper which lived on local gossip and homely interests. League football is now a livelier topic in remote hamlets than their own games. The holiday-maker goes far further afield. Trade combinations have largely displaced the segregated industries which were so typical of both the practice and economic theory of the Victorian period. The experiences of the people in peace and in war, in sport and amusement, as well as in trade and politics, have operated as powerfully as has the actual mechanism of transport, to break down old barriers between north and south and between country and town.

This process of national assimilation has involved the loss of much that was distinctively English. Variety in tastes and customs, in dialect and character, is less likely to flourish when men and women from all parts of the country meet in a wider community. On the other hand, in an era when most European States are faced by the genuine menace of revolution, and when the very fabric of our civilisation is undermined by Socialist propaganda, the growth of national feeling at the expense of purely local sentiment makes probably for strength and stability. Looking back on life in a Yorkshire town in the last quarter of last century, the outstanding memory is of its parochialism. All the mechanical inventions of the age of invention still left it isolated in ideas and impervious to world influences. It is this century, not the last, which really broke down mental barriers between counties and trades and classes.

Clarendon described Leeds, Halifax, and Bradford as "three very populous and rich towns which depending wholly upon clothiers too much maligned the gentry." Their Puritanism never wavered through the centuries. In the Civil War they fought against Newcastle's royalist army and hung Bradford parish church with woolpacks to save it from gunshot. In the eighteenth century Wesley found a ready response to his appeal among the descendants of these champions of Parliamentary government. "At

Bradford there was so huge a multitude and the rain so damped my voice, that many in the skirts of the congregation could not hear distinctly " (July 27th, 1766). At Halifax " the work of God seems to increase in depth as well as extent " (April 15th, 1799). At Leeds " we were ten clergymen and seven or eight hundred communicants. . . . Such a congregation had been seldom seen there " (May 2nd, 1779). It was such a faith in God's providence as Wesley inspired that enabled the people of the West Riding to pass through the miseries of the industrial revolution : first, by instilling a wonderful patience among the poor ; secondly, by partially bridging with a strange fellow-feeling in religion the growing gap between employer and employee. Thus a local writer, James Hartley, describing in 1776 the recent creation of a Piece Hall at Bradford, says :

" 'Tis wonderful to behold to what perfection this useful branch of business is arrived at within the compass of a very few years. . . . How amazingly great is the goodness of God towards us Who from one period to another is raising up a set of men, endowing them with power and faculties suitable to the employment they are set apart for; stirring them ever up with emulation; blessing their endeavours not only with a sufficient competency, but many with great abundance to the mutual welfare and happiness of thousands of their fellow creatures who are constantly employed by them."

The first spinning jenny was set up at Bradford in 1790; the first factory was built in 1798. Thereafter no part of the North of England suffered more from the evils of the prevailing industrial system. Men and women endured little less than did their children. Nevertheless, the thought of rebellion was still stifled, and the sense of wrong was long deadened by the idea of fellowship in religion. Most of the mill magnates of the Victorian age shared the simple faith of their operatives. The dominating building in Sir Titus Salt's model village of Saltaire was its Independent chapel.

A boy who grew up among the stony hills of Bradford was no less conscious of the orthodoxy of local Liberalism than of the austerity of local piety. Indeed, in that era almost the whole West Riding " voted yellow." Christianity and Free Trade were deemed twin forces for good in a dark world. The only name comparable with Gladstone's was that of Peel in his last phase. Peel's fame has slowly withered, but among the names of the parks and among the smoke-stained statues of the North it still enjoys supremacy. Coming out of Huddersfield station a few months ago, I was asked by a companion, " Whose blackened statue stands there ? " Its back faces the station, but I answered with the assurance born of long experience of Lancashire and Yorkshire towns, " It can only be Peel's." It was.

Bradford of the nineteenth century was still a citadel of militant

Puritanism. A large proportion of the male population had Christian names gleaned from every chapter of the Bible. The less familiar the original bearer, the more desirable appeared the name. Many looked askance at theatres. Sunday games were taboo. The only picture in the free library of the period—there was then no art gallery—depicted the horrors of drunkenness. The town bristled with chapels. Its chief daily paper was the *Bradford Observer*. Its favourite holiday place was Morecambe. Like the Greek city state, it was its own cult. No place in the world was quite like Bradford ; no, not even Leeds.

There was, of course, something beyond crass parochialism to justify this civic pride. Goods manufactured in the mills which swarm in every valley around Bradford absorbed more wool than any other industrial centre. Three-quarters of the mohair grown in Asia Minor and South Africa were bought for consumption in this corner of the West Riding. Its worsted coatings and dress goods were sold in every market of the Continent until shut out by tariffs, and, in spite of increasingly heavy duties, were bought in vast quantities in America and British colonies. Then, as foreign markets contracted as the result of protection, Yorkshire manufacturers and foremen migrated to the United States or Russia or Poland to establish their industries beyond the tariff walls. In contrast to Lancashire, where cotton goods spun and woven and dyed in outlying towns were merchanted in Manchester, the shippers who found foreign customers for the worsted industry traded in the hilly streets of Bradford within a few hundred yards of mills and workshops. The nineteenth century was an age of hard work and long hours. Its commercial achievements were triumphs of men who never spared themselves, and if such men were materialist in their ideals and narrow in outlook, their enterprise and pertinacity were of lasting value to the race. That they inspired a vast local pride was most natural. What other cricket club could boast like Manningham that its ground commanded a view of 170 mill chimneys? *Sic itur ad astra*.

Looking back upon the simple and intensive life of this town community, absorbed in business and intellectually detached from the outer world, the contrast is striking between its pride in its trade and the poor and squalid background to its apparent prosperity. A few score of employers were rich ; one or two immensely rich. The great majority of the employing class, however, were never free from the anxieties of an industry which was largely dependent on the fluctuations of womens' fashions and on the fiscal tolerance of competing States. The demand for labour was consequently capricious while the supply rose steadily through the century. Eventually the industry was not great enough to support so large a

population. Hence wages remained relatively low, and *Bone Street*, the novel recently written by Mr. Mackinder, Socialist member for Shipley, draws a true picture of the mill operative's precarious economic status. Housing conditions improved very slowly. Long streets of mean cottages, blackened by smoke and peopled by the poorest of the poor, was the impression left on a stranger by a visit to Victorian Bradford. Its children no longer suffered from the horrors of the factory system which in 1820-40 practised its worst evils in this area; but to other eyes than those of local patriots, its workers long seemed ill-nourished and stunted. Nevertheless, a boy would grow up in the West Riding unconscious of the all-pervading hardship. The statue of Richard Oastler with a boy and girl by his side, unveiled by Lord Shaftesbury in 1869, stood in Rawson Square, but it seemed a mere relic of past history. Thousands passed it daily without realising that their own generation was confronted by graver, because less easily solvable, problems of poverty and penury.

In common with all the people of the industrial North, those who lived amid the clang of the Bradford looms found ways of escape from the monotony of labour. First, there was sport. The employers were not wholly Yorkshiremen by blood. Many of the merchant class were descended from Germans or German Jews who settled around Bradford after the Napoleonic Wars in order to buy woollens in the best market for consumption abroad; and many were Scotch. The mass of working people were, however, of the true Yorkshire type, and in the thrill of athletics they found what was then almost the only anodyne for trouble. The "eighties" and early "nineties" were the great days of Yorkshire and Bradford Rugby football. It was the main source of such enthusiasm as an unsentimental breed of men stooped to feel or show. Ministries might fall. Trade might languish. Strikes might again be threatened. Yet to the crowd at Park Avenue all such cares could be temporarily forgotten. What did anything really matter if only Bradford could beat Halifax?

Secondly, there was a general zest for music. However small the wage and however dark were prospects, here was a luxury which could only be given up if a home was on the rocks. Visitors from the South realised with surprise how rich was the capacity and sweet the singing among a people outwardly remote from everything æsthetic. In June, 1858, the Bradford Festival Choral Society sang by royal command before Queen Victoria at Buckingham Palace. "Each piece," writes Mr. Sewell, the historian of the Society, "was rewarded with the full amount of subdued applause usual in royal and aristocratic circles, the Prince Consort and the Duchess of Kent being especially demonstrative." This was the first of many

musical triumphs. Bradfordians who could not sing had always the brass band to fall back upon.

Thirdly, there was nature. No centre of industry even to-day enjoys easier access to glorious country. The great girdle of moors which mark the northern boundary of the industrial part of the West Riding is unchanged since the days of the Brontës. There was a ready refuge for the oppressed spirit. From the ugliness and blackness of the squalid, stony roads of Bradford, men and women could escape in half an hour to the great green hills of Airedale and Wharfedale—spacious, beautiful, remote.

Fourthly, there was education. Free schools and a frivolous press have rather damped the old fire with which north-country workers approached the pursuit of knowledge. Everywhere in Yorkshire, as in Lancashire, mechanics' institutes, Church institutes, technical colleges, philosophical societies, free libraries, symbolised in Queen Victoria's time a firm faith in the uses of learning. Books were believed in until they became cheap, and newspapers until they became popular. To a society which too often believed in men who "fair stink o' brass" and which accepted as a proper boast the expression, "I could buy him up," the call of things of the spirit came as a divine blessing. In W. E. Forster, Bradford had a member of Parliament who stressed the purest type of corrective to current ways of thinking. It lay in the school. There, too, started the one road out of the wool trade. In the Bradford Grammar School, the boys of Bradford possessed an ample and munificent avenue to a wider world of thought and activity, normally completely unfamiliar to a Bradford home. As such, it appealed to the imaginative. (It appealed also to the unimaginative because its fees ranged from £10 to £16 a year.)

Great changes have, no doubt, remoulded the common life of Bradford since the age with which this article deals. The last month which I ever spent there, July, 1895, itself witnessed Conservative victories in each division of the borough, and since then, as in other industrial centres, Conservatives and Socialists have mainly held the field, and preached causes which were little appreciated half a century ago. The traditional type of Liberalism has in later days seldom won the day. The old belief in the Yorkshire compound of Liberal principles, *laissez faire* economics and religious fervour has indeed faded at the coming of new national issues. The growth of "combines" and trade unions; the inflow of immense riches during the war; the introduction of new trades and industries, all belong to more modern times. Bradford has become a city, the seat of a bishopric, and a minor centre of association football. Moreover, as has been said above, the whole process of our age has tended throughout the country to destroy local self-sufficiency and mental isolation.

It may be the more interesting to recall here a transitional phase then probably common in the industrial north, but now fast passing from memory. Large as was the part already played by Bradford in the commercial activity of Victorian England, its inhabitants formed a self-contained community, professed an intensive political creed, and developed a distinctive character to-day almost impossible. It was a very narrow society in which to be born and brought up. Its mentality seems to me to have been more dour and less vivid than that of Lancashire with which in later years I became more familiar. But if its prejudices were deep, its patience and fortitude were equally inflexible, and no people ever worked harder.

GERALD B. HURST.

A NEW NATIVE AFFAIRS ACT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

"Mr. Amery, in replying, said that four years ago the Imperial Government had some doubts and misgivings in entrusting the white people of Southern Rhodesia with the responsibility, not alone of self-government, but of the welfare of the native population. Four years had shown that the action of the Imperial Government was justified. . . ."—*The Times*, August 19th, 1927.

HAS Southern Rhodesia done well or badly in regard to Native Affairs since Responsible Government was granted to her about four short years ago? The answer to that question is important in itself and moreover has a considerable bearing on the much-debated problem of whether Kenya ought or ought not to be governed by her own European settlers. Colonel Amery has answered that question: I also want to answer it.

There is a printed sermon of the Reverend Laurence Sterne in which the preacher, having taken a reflection from Ecclesiastes for text, begins quite bluntly,—“That I deny.” After prefixing a text from the British Colonial Secretary’s recent panegyric on the handling of her Native Affairs by Southern Rhodesia to this essay of mine, I shrink from being quite as blunt, irreverent and unequivocal as Sterne appears to have been in his discourse’s opening sentence. Nevertheless, I wish to advance certain considerations of my own and of others, here without delay—considerations which need to be taken into account, if the subject which Colonel Amery touched upon with such optimism is to be explored thoroughly—explored from our 900,000 Africans’ point of view as well as from that of our 40,000 European settlers.

A new Native Affairs Act passed its third reading in Southern Rhodesia on July 1st, 1927. Presumably encouraged by that approval (uneasy approval, unless I am mistaken), which our British Colonial Office had extended to its amazing Native Juvenile Apprenticeship Act, the Southern Rhodesian Government has drafted another measure “to make certain provisions for the control of natives and the conduct of native affairs.” “Not a few people,” writes the Reverend John White, a veteran Wesleyan Methodist Missionary in Mashonaland, “once they understand its far-reaching implications, will be astonished at the precipitancy with which the Native Affairs Act has been introduced and is being rushed through the Legislative Assembly. When important measures like native education and segregation were proposed we were apprised of this beforehand and ample time was given for their consideration, but the very existence of this, to my mind, revolutionary proposal is hardly known to the great majority of people. I doubt whether 50 natives of the 900,000

to whom it is to apply know even that it is being discussed." Well might this much-beloved and much-trusted Tribune of the Native Plebs in Mashonaland ask, "Why all this hurry"? His summary of its provisions is significant:

"Briefly it proposes to endow the Native Department with almost absolute authority (this is the keystone in the new edifice), it strikes at the root of the hereditary principle of chieftainship, it converts chiefs into constables, gives to them new and far-reaching power, and introduces corporeal punishment for youths almost at the discretion of the Native Commissioner." (See *The Rhodesian Herald* of July 8th, 1927.)

It can hardly be contended that the rights of our Southern Rhodesian Natives are likely to be safeguarded better under this new Act of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly than under the British South Africa Company enactment of 1910 (as amended by a Proclamation of 1916 and an Act of 1924), except by those who argue that a Repressionist Policy, the more thorough-going the better, works out best in our dealings with our African subjects. The marked change of tone which characterises the 1927 measure in contradistinction to 1910's proclamation may be likened to that which commended itself (after an interval for consideration) to the Israelitish King Rehoboam, against the advice of his more experienced counsellors. He, as may be remembered, declared his intention of ameliorating his father Solomon's regime by exchanging whips for scorpions, and by adding an extra burden to a yoke which had been admittedly heavy in the reign which had preceded his own.

I would draw particular attention to Clause 51 of this new legislation for conferring autocratic powers on our Southern Rhodesian Native Department officials, a clause so ingeniously devised and so comprehensive that it may prove enormously effective in securing convictions against, and providing occasions for imposing penalties upon those African subjects of whom His Excellency, Sir John Chancellor, our Governor, said on the 2nd of May in the present year, "Our native subjects have been loyal and law-abiding."

"In addition to carrying out the duties specifically prescribed by this Act, all natives shall promptly obey and comply with any lawful or reasonable order, request or direction of any headman, chief, Native Commissioner or other officer administering native affairs. In determining whether or not such order, request or direction is lawful or reasonable, regard shall be had as to whether or not it is in conformity with native law or custom, consistent with natural justice and morality, and calculated to promote good government among natives or their general advancement or welfare."

On this point Mr. White, who began his work in Mashonaland so long ago as 1894, and is now President of Southern Rhodesia's Inter-Denominational Missionary Conference, asks pertinently, "Who,

pray, is to decide these very moot points in questions on which there is such a variety of opinion? Alleged disobedience is not to be decided by some impartial tribunal; the Native Commissioner is to be both prosecutor and judge. I know that a court of appeal is to be set up but of what avail will this be in the thousand and one petty disputes that will occur under the new regime?" He goes on to deal with Clause 18: "An almost free hand is given to these Native Commissioners to use the cane on youths below sixteen. Last month the Juvenile Employment Bill with its generous provision for corporeal punishment was promulgated; now we are to have a further consignment of the same brute-force remedy. Truly, appetite grows by what it feeds upon."

It may be recalled here that under Clause 10 of the Apprenticeship Act referred to provision was made for the summary whipping of native male children who failed or refused to obey any order of a Native Commissioner given in pursuance of the provisions of this Act. In this new Measure we read under Clause 18:

"Should the person convicted appear to be under the age of sixteen years, he may in lieu of any other punishment be sentenced to receive a whipping privately not exceeding fifteen strokes with a rattan cane or rod in the presence of the Native Commissioner."

Fifteen! How faithfully this post-war, pseudo-British Measure for Southern Rhodesia awakens the old German East African echoes! I have it from no less an authority than the Secretary of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa—"The nickname by which the Germans were commonly known in their part of East Africa at the time of the War was 'Watu Wa Hamstashara'; that is, 'The People of the Fifteen,'—that is, lashes."

In dealing with the menace of trouble contained in the proposed new regulations as to the appointment and the status of Native Chiefs, Mr. White writes to this effect: "As is well known, this at present is a matter of succession. The office is confined to a few families. The age and ability of the heir are not factors that seriously affect the matter. It often happens that the occupant of the position is an old man and incapable of carrying much responsibility. Where the duties have to do mainly with domestic affairs and native custom, as at present, that does not much matter. But if you are going to invest him with these unaccustomed responsibilities, and ask him to administer in a community that contains a good sprinkling of educated and progressive natives, then the proposal is preposterous. The new Act anticipates such a contingency: 'The chief . . . shall hold office during the pleasure and contingent upon good behaviour and general fitness.' But this is not a very simple matter. These people are tenacious of the hereditary principle. The Government usurper would consider that he has the tribal

spirit to reckon with; he would also know that he has to govern without respect and loyalty of his people. The backing of the Government would not be a sufficient compensation for the loss of the others. Unless the new proposals are to be a fiasco, there will have to be a considerable number of chiefs and headmen deposed."

What is to be said for the new Act? A critic of Mr. White's pronouncement paints in *The Rhodesian Herald* (July 15th, 1927) a glittering picture of those benefits which may be expected to accrue from the replacement of the old regulations by the new experimental ones. "I would urge," writes he, "that we trust the experienced—I had almost said admirable—men who administer our native affairs; it was under their auspices the Act was drafted; and, left alone, not worried by official interposition or missionary importunity, they will do even better work than they have heretofore; the morals, industry and well-being of the natives will be at long last their sole and proper charge. The country as a whole must benefit, for beer-drinking to excess and laziness will hardly be tolerated. . . ." He hazards the opinion that those indulging in such weaknesses will be required to go forth and do an honest day's work. "Thank goodness," says he, "the men on the spot are being given a job under the Act." A Matabeleland friend of my own appears to hold a far less sanguine opinion as to those local autocracies which the Measure proposes to create, agreeing that it is a thoroughly bad one, especially in view of the fact that the Native Department will soon be in the hands of young Rhodesians who may be found lacking in sentiment or conscience where Africans are concerned. Moreover, the Executive of the Southern Rhodesian Inter-Denominational Missionary Conference has denounced this new adventure in African legislation as retrograde at a recent meeting in Salisbury, and its Resolution has probably reached the Dominions Office by now.

I pass on to deal briefly with that outstanding injustice which it is proposed to legalise by this Native Affairs Act. *Clause 17 grants a Native Commissioner authority to try a case in which he is virtually the prosecutor.* A Native Commissioner (a man evidently with real power of detachment) has been heard to deprecate the false position in which it is proposed to place him under the Act thus: "Really, I ought to be glad to have such absolute power put in my hands, but I do not feel good enough to give right decisions in such circumstances." Clause 17 is a flagrant departure from the law as it has stood since the old Chartered Company days. That law has declared that an alleged offence against a Native Commissioner must not be tried by himself, but by somebody else. In backveld Districts Native Commissioners may indeed occasionally have taken the law into their own hands. But, if they have done so, they have done so at their own peril. Is a really vital principle of British law (and British

fair-play) to be surrendered by the Colonial Office giving its consent to the placing of this measure on the statute-book of a British Colony?

It may be noted that when Clause 17 was discussed in Southern Rhodesia's Legislative Assembly a Member inquired if there ought not to be some definition inserted of what constitutes that crime of insolent or contemptuous behaviour on which a Native Commissioner is to be allowed to take action in the double capacity of prosecutor and judge. This Member mentioned that there used to be an army crime of silent contempt, or dumb insolence, which was abolished about the year 1900. "I remember," said he, "a man who was punished, who unfortunately had a twitching face, which annoyed the sergeant, and he was charged with dumb insolence. . . . Precisely what insolent and contemptuous behaviour is, it would be interesting to know." Nevertheless, in spite of this protest, Clause 17 was passed without any definition of "insolent or contemptuous behaviour" being inserted.

I would stress the point that the Attorney-General of Southern Rhodesia, the Bill's introducer, said "I do not wish to be understood to say that the natives are out of hand. . . ." He could scarcely have ventured to do so, could he, for this was on June 24th, and His Excellency our Governor had publicly stated on May 2nd that these same Natives had been loyal and law-abiding? The Attorney-General indicated as a sort of reason for the portent of this Measure's appearance that regulations as to Native Affairs "were being brought more in accordance with our conditions to-day." Does that explanation mean that the progressive evolution of loyal and law-abiding British African subjects is to be met by a retrogressive repressionism?

One remembers a passage from *Black And White In South-East Africa*, wherein Maurice Evans, who sat on the Commission that inquired into Natal's 1906 Rebellion, tells us Natal's tale of "Self-Government" and its bearing on Natal's Native Affairs: "Since Natal took over responsible government in 1893 no less than forty-eight new laws specially applicable to the native population were passed and many new regulations framed under these and previous laws. These laws and regulations pressed upon the daily life of the native on all sides. . . ."

Clause 57 states that responsibly-governed Southern Rhodesia's new Native Affairs Act will not come into operation until His Excellency our Governor has declared by proclamation in the *Gazette* that it is "His Majesty's pleasure not to disallow the same." Will not His Majesty be saving Southern Rhodesia (with her European population of about 40,000 Europeans all told) from herself, if he shall disallow an Act whose 17th Clause vitiates a sterling British principle of law and justice?

ARTHUR SHEARLY CRIPPS.

APPENDED NOTE ON "SELF-GOVERNMENT."

Evidence brought forward in this article may be found to support one important conclusion. It is that the action of the Imperial Government was *not* justified four years ago in granting Responsible Government to Southern Rhodesia under a Constitution which not only failed to insist that there should be a Second Chamber to revise hasty proposals, but also failed to provide for any direct representation of purely Native Interests in the One-Chamber Legislative Assembly it created, at a time when the number of qualified Native voters was, and was likely to remain for a long time, almost negligible. It is high time that this omission should be repaired in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution, and that the moral as to further extensions of "Self-government" in Central or Eastern Africa, should be taken to heart. Mr. Philip Kerr, the Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, has summarised the position in our part of Africa as follows:—"There is now a movement everywhere in Africa towards self-government for the white. It seems to me essential that when responsibility is transferred to a local legislature, that legislature should, from the start, represent all the races in the country. In no other way is it possible to avoid the creation of an oligarchy with a vested interest in the maintenance of its own exclusive political power—perhaps the most fruitful cause of injustice to the one race and of degeneration in the other. . . . In any case, for the present, the native in Central African legislatures would have to be represented by white men nominated by the Governor. But what is essential is that from the beginning the political structure of those new and rapidly growing communities should be such as to represent in some way all sections of the community, leaving its development to be moulded later by the light of experience."

A. S. C.

VENEZUELA TO-DAY.

WHILST there are many objections to the use of mere statistics for descriptive purposes, yet some idea of Venezuela must be given in actual figures at the beginning of an article which can only serve to emphasise the ignorance or indifference of the British public towards a country of such rapidly promising development.

The United States of Venezuela, then, comprise an area of 393,976 square miles, and the population, according to a census taken in February of last year, is about 3,000,000. To give a comparative idea of its size and population, Venezuela is nearly twice as big as France, a nation numbering 39,209,766 (in 1921), and is over three times the size of the United Kingdom and Ireland, with less than a fifteenth of our inhabitants. Its full name, Los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, is derived from the fact that it embodies twenty separate States. Each of these States is administered by its own Government and President; these in turn, as is the case also with the authorities of three "territories," being responsible to the President of the Republic and his ministers in Caracas, the capital.

Colombia is the Western neighbour of Venezuela, whilst Brazil supplies the southern boundary, which straggles along and is a very irregular frontier until, gradually acquiring a north-easterly direction, it leaves British Guiana to finish the dividing line to the coast. The Caribbean seaboard is, of course, the only really properly defined boundary Venezuela has, each of the other frontiers passing in a purely theoretical line through most difficult and but partially explored country. Wars and rumours of wars being so generally the rule in many parts of the world, with revolutions a particularly disastrous habit in next-door Brazil, it is decidedly refreshing to find, and in South America too, that nearly twenty years have passed since the last civil strife was encountered in Venezuela, nor have there been any conflicts with other nations. Much of the credit for this admirable stability of law and order is undoubtedly due to General Juan Vicente Gomez, who has so ably governed the Republic since 1909.

The chief reason for the slowness—until the last few years—with which the potential resources of the country have been tapped, is simply lack of transport facilities. There are many very mountainous districts, an eastern offshoot from the massive Andes range being the biggest obstacle as, in the Cordillera de Merida, there are peaks rising to a height of 15,500 feet. These topographical difficulties, together with the vast extent of swamps, for instance at the southern end of Lake Maracaibo—a shallow inlet nearly 200 miles long and varying from 14 to 40 in width—and

much virgin forest land, explain why there is no intricate railway system. In fact, there are less than 700 miles of railway lines in operation, thus covering lamentably little of the immense area of the country. One of these railroad systems connects La Guaira, on the Caribbean, with Caracas, and others penetrate as far as Tachira, Cucuta and Valencia. The majority of goods is water-borne, in *bon-goes* or *goletas*—small trading schooners. Speaking generally the roads, in the wet season, are deplorable. The best known is the splendid highway running from Caracas to La Guaira, along which, since there is a descent from an altitude of over 3,000 feet to sea level, it is delightful to travel, much beautiful scenery being revealed during the journey. There are a few others which, when not rendered impassable by the rains, compare favourably with an English country road, but these are seldom found.

The universal means of locomotion on shore is by donkey, even the beggar pursuing his pitiful craft so mounted. Mules are also used, but not nearly so extensively. In the towns the numbers of automobiles are growing rapidly. In the city of Maracaibo, for example, at the beginning of 1925, one could have counted not more than two hundred cars. Eighteen months later the number had risen to considerably over a thousand—without a known exception all of American make. This increase, stupendous though the rate may seem, gives some guide to the phenomenal expansion which has occurred during a very short period, to be entirely accounted for by the increase in oil production and producing territory—which aspect of Venezuela, however, is dealt with more fully later.

Courtesy dictates a slight reference to Caracas, the capital, and with reluctance Maracaibo and its pulsating oil-life must be left for a few moments. Situated some twenty-four miles by rail south of its seaport, the dirty smelly town of La Guaira (its sole virtue being the possession of a deep water harbour), Caracas is a capital to be admired. It enjoys by reason of its elevation a healthy climate—by no means an advantage to be generally found in Venezuela. The evenings are so cool that European clothes can be comfortably worn, in spite of the fact that it is only ten degrees north of the equator. Attractions of Caracas are its numerous parks and gardens, and an up-to-date and well-equipped casino, complete with cabaret show. The streets, built at right angles, are broad and well paved, worthy in every respect of a capital. There are many excellent buildings, the President's house being probably the most imposing. It is satisfactory to know that the British Legation is suitably housed, in a country where foreigners and their worth are usually judged wholly by appearances. The university includes schools of law and engineering, and a medical faculty so conscientious that before a European or other foreign doctor can practise in Venezuela he must

take a degree there, no matter how much experience or honour he may have in his profession elsewhere.

The chief city's history goes back through stirring times, having been seriously damaged in an earthquake so long ago as 1812. A year previous to this Venezuela had declared and begun her struggle for independence. Bolivar, the man who also freed the countries now known as Peru, Bolivia and Colombia from the yoke of Spain, was born here in 1783, and although he died elsewhere in 1830 his remains were brought with great pomp to Caracas and laid finally to rest there twelve years later. Francis Drake is reported to have captured and sacked the city during the course of one of his spectacular raids along this coast. At all events, the visitor is shown the old Spanish trail by which he found his way from the coast, somewhere near La Guaira, up to Caracas. Most good Venezuelans wish to go to Caracas before they die, and the leisured classes, who are generally those too of noble and ancient family, are present in fair numbers. There is a small English colony consisting of several railway officials and engineers, some oil companies' representatives, the Legation people, and occasional birds of passage in the persons of travelling salesmen. Caracas has no staple industry, only such trades as boot-making, the brewing of beer, and making of other necessities for local consumption, being undertaken. In spite of this, the population is now in the neighbourhood of 100,000.

Of the other towns in Venezuela, very few call for special mention. Puerto Cabello, from which port considerable quantities of coffee, sugar, and cacao are shipped, is also the headquarters of the navy. This, however, as an effective fleet, would scarcely cause alarm at a Washington Conference, albeit it is sufficient for its purpose. Valencia is an important town devoted to the collection of agricultural produce, and is connected by rail with Puerto Cabello. Tachira and Cucuta are out-of-the-way places not much bigger than the lesser known English market towns, yet of much greater corresponding value in Venezuela. Then, noted for sugar exporting also, is Bobures—from which little port on the Lake of Maracaibo a constant stream of the unrefined product is sent to the Dutch island of Curaçoa, for transshipment to other places abroad.

And now it is necessary to return to Maracaibo, mother-town of the oil country—a vast district surrounding the lake of Maracaibo—with a deserted outpost in one or two of the other States. The story of oil in Venezuela is romantic enough, but has yet to be written. Briefly, operations began two or three years before the war, but no startling results had been recorded by the end of 1914, and work was practically brought to a standstill until some time after the Armistice. Then wells were drilled in for small producers, much geological information was obtained, and gradually the grip of the

foreigner began. Still, the rate of progress was not to be remarked on until 1922, when, startling even those working in the vicinity and reverberating through every corner of the petroleum world, well No. 4 in the La Rosa field of the Venezuelan Oil Concessions at a depth of 1,509 feet, suddenly flowed "wild." This was the real "gusher" in the country; it gave 100,000 barrels a day for one week.

Twenty years ago a market town and port of some 10,000 inhabitants, exporting its quota of coffee, hides, sugar and other products, Maracaibo to-day is a city alive with energy, with gaiety and unhygienic houses, and seething with the contrasts of a boom only to be found in a "boom" (and incidentally in an Americanised) town. Even in 1923 the production of oil was 4,000,000 barrels. In 1924 this increased to very nearly 5,000,000. And the oil produced in January, 1927, is at the rate of 10 million barrels per annum. Altogether over five hundred wells have been drilled to depths varying from one to more than a thousand feet. These are only round figures, but will enable any interested observer to gauge to some extent the energy required to yield such rapid progress, and possibly to visualise vaguely the difference that such a sudden foreign influence must have made in a typically lethargic tropical town in an unhealthy and almost inaccessible part of South America.

The last point is made to illustrate the great drawback to even more intense speed-up in the rate of development, whether desirable or necessary. Prohibiting the entry of all vessels, those drawing not more than 11½ feet of water, are two sailing at the northern end of Lake Maracaibo. The location of the dangers to navigation is always changing, on account of the currents and tidal disturbances, and the limiting of the communication of Lake Maracaibo to such shallow-draught vessels is a serious problem with which the administration is at last making an effort to cope. For a considerable time every cargo ship arriving in Maracaibo has been loaded to capacity (so much so that occasionally part of the goods have to be lightered from a ship outside the fairway, to allow her to cross the bars with safety), but this capacity is small compared to the size of steamers which could easily be employed in such a trade, the carrying of machinery and stores for the petroleum undertakings, were unloading facilities better: a deep-water passage made possible. Similarly, the tankers which convey the oil from the specially constructed, flat-bottomed terminals of the oilfields are specially constructed, flat-bottomed vessels, not one of which can carry more than 16,000 barrels when fully loaded.

Maracaibo itself is not the loveliest of cities; the streets are again, all built at right angles to each other, but are mostly very

narrow thoroughfares, with the steep tropical pavement so essential during the heavy rains. At this time of the year the roads in the lower part of the town are always under water, causing a decidedly unpleasant odour, in which that section of the town's 60,000 inhabitants (1925) whose dwellings are clustered together in this neighbourhood have to live uncomplainingly. Refined pleasures are not easy of attainment in Maracaibo. There is a theatre, but very rarely does a visiting company, and then of doubtful repute and talent, discover the existence of this solitary playhouse. The films, of course, have a strong hold—original, if somewhat crude, methods of placarding and advertising often causing comment and demanding attention. Boxing matches are frequent affairs, "el Boxeo" stirring the blood of the young athlete there, quite as much as that of his English counterpart. There is also a regular bull-fighting season, in a properly designed arena.

A dozen churches open wide their doors day by day, the people being devoutly Roman Catholic. The Venezuelans are a new people in the process of formation. There are so many different types that the welding of them into a cohesive force as a nation is a super-human task. Most unapproachable are the numerous tribes of South American Indians, who keep to their settlements in the wildest parts of the country, and do not intermingle with the other peoples. A problem, perhaps, is the definite negro element, once-released slaves who have wandered to Venezuela. Then there are the descendants of the original Spanish settlers and adventurers, in whom is the blood of many nations. Poetical, proud and poor is a succinct enough character sketch of the people generally, and it needs little embellishment. In Maracaibo's own paper, *La Informacion*, the entire front page is often given up to verses of liberty and love, the main themes of the younger generation of Venezuelan poet. And on such a day, travelling say on a local tramcar, it is possible to note the fervid interest with which this portion of the newspaper is perused. Proud—the true native is not fond of work, and anything in the nature of an effort tends to provoke his rebellious spirit. He is poor: in that the disinclination towards labour makes him easily content, and, a diet of bananas and rice assured, he is in the main satisfied.

That the Government obtain most of their revenue from oil is an established fact (and quite as it should be), and two or three instances of the simple way in which this is done may be given, if only to the end that they will show how rich the country's exchequer must have grown recently. Practically the whole of Venezuela has now been sufficiently geologically combed for it to be roughly split up into concessions—for the granting of which the Government has received unknown remuneration. For every metric

ton (taken for approximate purposes as $6\frac{3}{4}$ barrels) of oil produced, a tax of two bolivars or the equivalent of 1s. 8d. is payable. Every tanker stopping at Maracaibo, compulsorily in all cases if only to obtain clearance papers, is charged a "Derechos de Boyas" tax at the rate of one bolivar or 10d. per ton, on the vessel's gross tonnage. On the other hand, it must be admitted that machinery and goods destined for oilfields are allowed to enter the country absolutely tax free.

It is possible to get an indication as to the trend of official feeling by studying the following extracts from an interview which the Editor of the *Tropical Sun*, Maracaibo's first paper in English and originally published only on June 5th, 1926, had with General Vincencio Perez Soto, the newly-appointed President of the oil-producing State of Zulia, of which Maracaibo is the capital and centre of administration.

"Without exaggeration or vain compliments," said the President, "I confess I am entirely in sympathy with the culture of the foreigner who has come to our country . . . my experience of the Government of other States has taught me that Americans and English are of great benefit to the upbuilding of the country, and that they are also respectful and obedient to the laws of the country in which they now reside.

"I request the foreigner to regard me frankly as an ally," (and here the poetical nature is evident), "only asking the respect that is fitting to the Government of my country—which is the child of the same God who created the most powerful of nations."

And yet there are reports which give rise to the suspicion that certain mediæval habits of thought and conduct still persist. An American salesman, travelling for a leading U.S. steel firm, whose veracity is of the highest order, repeated a story he had heard on good authority to the effect that torture was still resorted to in dealing with certain political prisoners. Besides old favourites such as the rack, the wheel and the thumbscrew, he declared that the most terrible of implements was a steel cap which, placed on the head of the unfortunate miscreant, was tightened each day by one seventy-second of an inch.

Perhaps a digression will be pardoned here, in order to describe a game which is indulged in by the less enlightened classes. The Caribbean Petroleum Company had to take a firm stand for the suppression of a sport which a crowd of persons wished to practise on the occasion of the celebration of Independence Day, which takes place on July 5th each year. A circle about twelve yards in diameter is marked out on any piece of flat ground. Then a number of holes are dug inside this ring, in each of which is placed a live chicken. The earth is filled in, leaving the head and about two inches of the unhappy bird's neck above ground. These operations

completed, with gathering excitement another circle outside the first and some four feet wider is drawn. Several small boys are then commandeered. Blindfolded and armed with a machete (a murderous looking axe-knife), they are placed at various points on the outer circle. The game is started, and each youth is turned completely round three times and given a push towards the centre of the inner ring, amongst the now squawking and terrified chickens. Gambling is freely embarked on, each boy having his followers. The winner is he who chops off the greatest number of chicken's heads. Nor is there any disqualification clause should one participant accidentally injure a fellow-competitor.

Overshadowed to some degree by the value and quantity of the oil produced in Venezuela, it must not be forgotten that gold is found and worked successfully in several parts of the country. The issue of the Venezuelan Goldfields Ltd. was too recently before the investing public to allow the existence of such an important industry to be overlooked, and it is worthy of notice that these properties are also located in the same vastly wealthy State of Zulia.

It may appear a very obvious thing to conclude an article of this nature with an Appeal to British Trade to assert itself in a country of whose being, after all, the average Englishman is scarcely aware, and the position and history of which he is totally ignorant—yet this must be done by the serious-minded observer. From September, 1925, until the same month in 1926, there came to Maracaibo to the best of the writer's knowledge only four English representatives. During that time, however, he was personally brought into contact with about fifty Americans, and can vouch for the appearance in that town of at least another fifty. It is granted as the chief explanation that New York is only ten days from Venezuela by direct boat, whereas the United Kingdom is separated by a three weeks' journey—and there is the additional handicap of transshipment generally from the big steamers at Curaçoa into the smaller vessels which are required to finish the voyage to Maracaibo. But obstacles more formidable than these have been encountered, and overcome, in the annals of British commerce.

Cotton and linen goods England can and does sell to Venezuela, but, to mention only a few of her products, America has the absolute monopoly in automobiles, machinery and supplies of nearly all kinds for the oilfields, imported boots and shoes, hats and many other articles in every-day and ever-increasing use. All honour to that country for seizing such a favourable opportunity, but the British resident longs for the chance to buy goods sent out from his own native land.

Venezuela is a great country, and in another two years will be greater still, for the boom has only just started. There is still time for England to get a better share of the business available and the money which, quickly earned, is not all sent home by those "in exile" there. But a state of hopeless apathy exists at present. Our Government has not statistics or a report on the trading conditions and oil production of Venezuela compiled for the year 1925 yet. With data at least two years old to work on, the enterprising merchant at home does not meet with much encouragement. And Venezuela is a country the rapidity of whose growth to importance during this last two-year period cannot be overstressed. What may and certainly should happen in the next two years is a matter for conjecture, and it would be difficult to make a prediction as to her future in the light of actual experience, which could be frankly stated as being duly optimistic, without verging on the fantastic.

More British capital could be invested with advantage. The British Controlled is true to its name financially, but the Venezuelan Oil Concessions though formally British is now controlled by Royal Dutch Shell shareholders. Purely British concerns are pitifully few. This is one direction in which undue conservatism may result in a loss and blindness to fortune which our trade cannot afford at the moment. Once again, there is still time to go with the crest of the wave, but a move must be made soon, and an intensive and well-backed campaign will have to be undertaken by those involved, with representatives who *must* speak Spanish—or so much effort put forth is wasted.

F. J. LEGGITT.

RENAN AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

THE present year marks the sixtieth anniversary since the publication of the thirteenth edition of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*. In a sense this edition may be called a definitive edition, for Renan himself tells us that, whereas the twelve editions which appeared during the years 1864-7 contained few alterations, the edition of 1867 was revised and corrected with the greatest care. Whatever opinions we may have about the merits or demerits of Renan's work, it would not be right to allow the anniversary to pass without comment, for this brilliant writer reached a public touched by very few historical critics of the life of Christ. The thirteenth edition is also important because it contained a very interesting and significant Excursus on "The Use which it is proper to make of the Fourth Gospel in writing a Life of Jesus." It can hardly be said that this Excursus received the attention it deserved. In it Renan proposed, putting the question of authorship aside, to follow the Gospel paragraph by paragraph as if it were a newly discovered manuscript. The discussion is fresh and interesting; it has indeed quite a piquant interest for any one who turns to the Excursus after reading the numerous works on the Fourth Gospel which continue to pour from the printing presses of the world. Needless to say, there are points, and some of them very important points, in which considerable advance has been made; but, for the most part, it is something of a revelation to note many significant opinions in which Renan has anticipated the findings of later exponents of the Ephesine Gospel.

Renan wrote his *Vie de Jésus* in the belief that the Fourth Gospel was the revised version of a work written by the Apostle John. In the thirteenth edition he registers a change of mind. He is still convinced that the Gospel has an actual connection with the Apostle, and that it was written at the end of the first century, but he no longer believes it to be the composition of St. John. On the contrary, the author is to be found in some of St. John's disciples, who wrote with the intention of passing off the work as that of the Apostle. The discourses are almost entirely fictitious; but the narrative parts contain valuable traditions which in a measure must be traced back to the reminiscences of the son of Zebedee. "I persist in believing," Renan writes, "that the Gospel possesses a fund of valuable information, equal to that of the synoptics and even sometimes superior."

In view of the sentence just cited, it might have been thought that conservative scholars would hail Renan as a useful ally, dissenting, of course, from his estimate of the discourse-matter. Such, however, has not been the case; and the explanation is probably that

given by Dr. W. B. Bacon, who mordantly remarks that Renan's stubborn clinging to the traditional authorship was not usually considered to atone for the violence done in its interest to both critical sense and religious feeling. Be this as it may, the silence of British scholarship regarding Renan's critical opinions is remarkable. One may read the works of such writers as Sanday, Moffatt, Stanton, Peake, Strachan, Charnwood, Streeter, and Nolloth, and find few, and in most cases no, references at all to Renan's critical judgments. The reasons for this silence will be considered below; for the moment it is enough to note that on many matters of critical importance Renan said sixty years ago exactly what many of these scholars have said. It is not too much to say that the modern orthodox view of the Fourth Gospel is Renan's doctrine divested of certain extravagances.

I.

It is not difficult to see why Renan has been neglected by British scholars generally. First and foremost, the effeminacy of his portraiture of Jesus revolted sturdy British sentiment. Renan's Jesus is a lovable character, but one lacking in moral strength. Half consciously a self-deceiver and a deceiver of the people, his figure, as Renan sees it, has only served to awaken revulsion. As an illustration of this, Dr. Fairbairn's reference to the *Vie de Jésus* in his *Christ in Modern Theology* may be cited. "Its faults," he writes, "were flagrant, as were all its qualities. . . . For the rest it was unctuous, without ethical sense or moral discernment, steeped in false sentiment, extravagant in its inverted pietism, offensive in its rapturous eulogies of One it could still represent as in the supreme moments of His life stooping to imposture" (p. 278). This is quite a characteristic British outburst and it explains a good deal. Renan has been buried beneath his rose leaves; the literary critic has been swamped by the author of "a French erotic romance." A second reason is Renan's sublime dogmatism. For all the felicity of his style, he can be very trenchant, and nowhere perhaps so much as when he speaks of miracles. "If miracle has any reality," he says, in the preface to the *Vie de Jésus*, "this book is but a tissue of errors." "Miracles," he writes, "are things which never happen; only credulous people believe they have seen them; you cannot cite a single one which has taken place in the presence of witnesses capable of testing it; no special intervention of the Divinity, whether in the composition of a book or in any event whatever, has been proved. . . . We reject the supernatural for the same reason that we reject the existence of centaurs and hippogriffs." The effect of such language can readily be imagined; it certainly did not predispose scholars to listen to Renan as a critic. The temper

is anything but that of the calm judicial mind beloved of British scholarship. Nature is looked upon as a closed system and testimony is dismissed in advance. If miracle is to be rejected it will be because of its historical inconsistency with all that Jesus was and stood for, and not on the ground of a rigid scientific impossibility for which the best scientists themselves no longer contend. We cannot, of course, blame Renan for his insensibility to later philosophical and scientific developments; nor need we make his rationale of miracle our present theme. All that I am contending here is that the pontifical note in his scepticism drowned his critical utterances; his denials outsang his affirmations in the ears of his generation. A third ground of offence lay in the essential scepticism of Renan's historical principles. He is a critic of the "either-or" order. For him alternatives are sharply cut; he pays little heed to the finer shadings of personality or to the insensible modifications which, with all the goodwill in the world, may affect the forms of early tradition. He can see no religious movements in which deceptions do not play a great part. "It has happened," he says, "that the wings of a bird, currents of air, or headaches, have determined the fate of the world." He roundly says that every tentative religion with which we are acquainted "exhibits unmistakably an enormous mixture of the sublime and the ridiculous." And for Renan this "mixture" is in the nature of things. "Humanity is so feeble of mind that the purest thing has need of the co-operation of some impure agent." It is a scepticism of this kind which lies behind the boldness which did not scruple to liken Jesus to a thaumaturgist who is eventually "cornered." "One begins by artlessness, credulity, absolute innocence; one ends in all sorts of embarrassments and, in order to sustain the divine power which is at fault, one gets out of these embarrassments through the most desperate expedients." The same cynicism appears in his account of the miraculous; a miracle, he holds, presupposes three conditions: "first, general credulity; second, a little complaisance on the part of some; third, tacit acquiescence in the principal author." Science alone, he declares, seeks after pure truth, and that is why until now she has had no influence on the people. He hopes that it may be better in the future, but meantime it would not be right to judge the great men of the past according to scientific principles: "Many great things have not been accomplished without lies and without violence."

These *obiter dicta*, of course, are historical reflections of a very dubious order, and ought not perhaps to affect our estimate of Renan as a literary critic. But current opinion even among scholars rarely makes distinctions of this kind; in listening to the critic, it cannot be deaf to the historian; it adapts in its own way the well-known saying, "What you are speaks so loudly that I

cannot hear what you say." Nothing, then, is more understandable than the reluctance of conservative scholarship to embrace Renan as an ally. He spoke in vain to a generation that did not trust him, with the result that his *Excursus* has passed into the limbo of half-forgotten things. How far this fate was deserved, and what significance it has in the light of subsequent inquiry, it may be of interest to consider.

II.

In studying the Gospel as if it were a newly-discovered manuscript, Renan was quite alive to the initial difficulties raised by the Prologue. The opening verses, he declared, raise within us the gravest suspicions and are a warning at the outset that the Gospel cannot be a simple history "transparent and impersonal like the narrative of Mark." None the less, he argued, it is a "premature conclusion" on this account to reject the Gospel in its entirety. His judgment in this matter was strikingly confirmed when many years later Harnack contended that the idea of the Logos is absent from the body of the Gospel. More recently, taking up Harnack's suggestion, the late Dr. Stanton boldly urged that the Johannine theology had already taken shape in the Evangelist's mind before he grasped the Logos-idea and applied it to the Person of Christ, and with this opinion the late Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter in his recent study of the Johannine Writings expresses much sympathy.

Renan was by no means disposed to exalt the historical value of the Fourth Gospel at all costs. He thought, for example, that the Evangelist had greatly exaggerated the theory that the Baptist proclaimed the divine mission of Jesus. His version, he said, "is less ingenuous, more advanced, more ripe" than that of the Synoptists. But the point which struck Renan's attention was the precision of the statement which says that John was baptising in Bethany beyond Jordan. He confesses that this single detail staggers him, and urges that "a theologian having nothing Jewish about him . . . would not have put in that detail." This is the first of a number of cases in which Renan shows how much he was impressed by the topographical details of the Fourth Gospel, its "pragmatism," as it has been well called. On this matter he uses language which recalls identical opinions expressed by Westcott, Lightfoot, Sanday, Drummond, Peake, Nolloth, and many others. Lightfoot spoke of "the familiarity with which the writer moves amid the ever-shifting scenes of his wonderful narrative." And Peake emphasises the difficulty of believing that a second-century writer "should have been so far in advance of his age in literary art as to trick out his narrative with details invented in order to make an impression of reality on his readers."

In discussing the stories of the Call of the Apostles Renan claims that they "resemble badly-edited recollections of one of the apostles." His comment on the story of Nathanael is particularly acute. "The allegorical exegete," he says, "does not speak in half sentences; he presents his argument and insists on it with complacency." Not even in the case of the Miracle of the Water turned into Wine was he willing to have recourse to the allegorical interpretation, roundly asserting that this imputes to the author a thought which he did not possess. Of course, with the views Renan held regarding the miraculous, it was not possible for him to accept the story as one of fact. Again, however, he points to the details of Jn. ii. 11f. "What importance," he asks, "would such topographical circumstances have to Hellenist Christians of the second century?"

The difference between the Fourth Gospel and the earlier three with reference to the date of the Cleansing of the Temple is well known. Stanton urged that inherent probability was on the side of the Fourth Gospel, and Sanday was of a similar opinion. Renan, however, is much more positive. "In the chronological arrangement," he says, "the advantage belongs entirely to our author"; the synoptic writers did not know where to place all the traditional material they had accumulated. On the wider question of the visits of Jesus to Jerusalem he justly claims that the synoptic representation of but one visit "admits of enormous difficulties." Side by side with this opinion, widely shared by modern scholars, the words of Dr. A. S. Peake may be quoted:

"It is intrinsically unlikely that Jesus, conscious of His Messianic vocation, should be content to work simply in the provinces and make no appeal to the religious capital of Judaism, and the centre of its constituted authority, till the last week of His life." (*Introduction to the NT.*, p. 214.)

Renan also notices that in the matter of interest in Jerusalem Luke seems to be in secret harmony with the Fourth Evangelist, or rather gravitates between the two opposing systems. This is very interesting because recent scholarship has emphasised the parallelism between the two Evangelists in quite a number of important details. Sixty years ago Renan observed the same fact. "This is very important," he writes, "for we shall reveal soon other circumstances where Luke sails along with the author of the Fourth Gospel and seems to have had a knowledge of the same traditions." Like many orthodox scholars, Renan extracts a sound argument from the very disparity between the Fourth Evangelist and his predecessors. An inventor *à priori* of a life of Jesus would either have nothing in common with the synoptists or would paraphrase them.

"There would not have been that sort of indifferent and disinterested circumstances which abound in our narrative. There is nothing which resembles the biography of an æon; it is not thus that the Hindoo writes his lives of Krishma, or recounts the incarnations of Vishnu."

In like manner Canon Streeter has recently noticed the "masterful way" in which the Fourth Evangelist deals with the narratives of his predecessors, and has argued that this feature, along with others,

"is much easier to explain on the hypothesis that he was a personage who possessed, and was recognised as possessing, a claim to write as an independent authority." (*The Four Gospels*, p. 426.)

Renan's comments on the stories of Nicodemus and the Woman of Samaria have much interest. He points out that Luke knew of the Samaritan Mission "which probably was real." Once more he notes the precise topography of Jn. iii, 22f and iv, 3-6, and says of the latter: "Only a Palestinian Jew who had often passed the entrance to the Valley of Sicheim could have written that." He explains iv, 2, "although Jesus Himself baptised not . . .," as a correction by the author or one of his disciples, and remarks that it is beyond his comprehension if it was written about the year 130 or 150 in the circle of Christianity the most removed from Judaism. For our present purpose, however, his reflections on the Sermon in the Synagogue at Capernaum are more significant still. He is emphatically of the opinion that the discourse is more important for the history of eucharistic ideas of the first century than for the sentiments of Jesus; nevertheless even here he sees "a gleam of light." At this point we may recall a suggestion of the late Dr. Sanday in what is perhaps the most moving essay on New Testament problems in modern times. It will be remembered that the discourse on the Bread of Life follows the story of the Feeding of the Five Thousand. Dr. Sanday described the latter as a consecrated meal, and suggested that such meals may have played a larger part in the life of Jesus than the Gospels would lead us to suppose. "I can well believe," he says, "that on one (or more) of these occasions the consecrated meal was accompanied by a discourse which supplied the foundation for that of which we have a record in St. John vi" (*Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, p. 25). Similarly, Dr. R. H. Strachan has recently said that it is not to be denied that "the sacramental and symbolic may have had a larger place in the ordinary teaching of Jesus than appears in the Synoptic narratives" (*The Fourth Evangelist* [1925], p. 207). In reading Renan's Excursus, we are at once reminded of these opinions, for this French critic holds that the Fourth Gospel is completely within the truth in disseminating eucharistic ideas in the course even of the life of Jesus. "It was not once," Renan writes, "but a hundred times, that Jesus had blessed

the bread, broken and distributed it, and also blessed the cup." The parallelism is striking; and this is also true of the question of the date of the Last Supper, in respect of which Renan supports the Fourth Gospel as against the Synoptics.

It is not necessary to follow the Excursus in detail farther; on perusal it will be found to speak for itself. My object is not to discuss Renan's views, or to assert that he is always right, but rather to show how frequently he independently anticipates modern scholarship. Equally striking parallels will be found in his views on Jn. vii, 1-10 (The Brethren of Jesus), which he calls "a small historical treasure"; his comments on the "realism" of the scene where Jesus indicates the traitor (xiii, 21-30); his reference to Annas (xviii, 13) where he says that the oft-repeated opinion that the Evangelist knew nothing of matters Jewish appears to him "utterly destitute of foundation." On almost every incident he has something arresting to say, and again and again something very much like the sentiments we find in later discussions which, for all that, owe little and in most cases nothing to him. It is true to say that at times he leaves upon the mind the impression of an advocate arguing to his brief. There is an amusing passage in the Preface in which he claims that the theologian can never be a historian; the orthodox theologian is like a caged bird and the liberal theologian a bird with some of its feathers clipped. Occasionally the opinions expressed in the Excursus provoke a like retort: can the historian be a literary critic? The instance in which Renan solemnly confesses to be "staggered" by the geographical detail of Jn. i, 28 is a case in point. The doubt will not always be exorcised that, like so many who have written Lives of Christ, Renan is not sometimes insensibly influenced by the diffuse character of the synoptic material and the need of appropriating as much as can be rescued of the material attached to the more firmly defined Johannine outline. This doubt, however, is checked by his more radical opinions. Thus, of the presence of the Mother of Jesus by the Cross Renan frankly says that it is "the greatest objection against the veracity of our author," and in this matter declares himself "wholly with the synoptics." Whether we accept his judgment on this particular incident is not the point at issue. The point is rather that in such cases Renan's scepticism stamps as an honest opinion his main contention that "the Johannine tradition was not an isolated accident in the primitive Church," and that "many traditions belonging to the school of John had become known or were common to other Christian Churches even before the compilation of the Fourth Gospel, or at least independently of it." When so many British scholars during the last six or seven years have argued this very proposition, it does not seem right that Renan's contribution should be left to lie beneath the dust of sixty years.

III.

It remains for us finally to consider Renan's treatment of the discourse-matter in the light of later discussion. Here, in order to find close parallels to his doctrine, we have to pass from most of the writers mentioned in the last section and turn to those scholars who find the Johannine sayings far more significant for the faith of the Christian Church than for the real teaching of Jesus.

Renan's views are sharply enunciated and expressed. For him the discourses are "almost entirely fictitious." The conversation with Nicodemus, for example, is for Renan a fragment of Apostolic theology: "I naturally sacrifice," he writes, "the whole of the conversation of Jesus with that Pharisee." Passages of this kind, he declares, teach us little or nothing regarding the doctrine of Jesus; they are imaginary, not traditional compositions, and can only be compared with "the harangues that the ancient historians make no scruple of imputing to their heroes." As we have seen, he looks upon the Sermon of Capernaum as more important for the history of eucharistic ideas of the first century than for the sentiments of Jesus. The theological disputes of Chapter vii. are "without any value in the life of Jesus"; they express ideas which the Evangelist attributed to Him. The discourses during the Supper possess "a certain beauty" but "contain nothing traditional." Pieces of theology and rhetoric, they have no analogy to the discourses of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, and have no more historical reality than the discourses which Plato puts into the mouth of his master, Socrates, at the moment of dying.

Opinions of this kind reflect a point of view which has been more common in Germany and France than in Great Britain. In this country it has had its representatives in Martineau, Percy Gardner, J. Estlin Carpenter, and others. But even in the case of these writers important differences appear when their position is compared with that of Renan; they give nothing like so casual an account of the origin of the discourses. Agreeing in denying the historical character of the Johannine sayings, they closely relate these sayings to the faith and experience of the Church. This is especially apparent in the case of Dr. Carpenter, the most recent British writer on the Johannine writings, who finds in the discourses the language of a religious fellowship. "A community, bound together by common trusts, sharing a common worship, practising a certain rule of mutual love, embodies its faith in these documents. So complete is the union of its members with their heavenly Lord that they can represent him as speaking by anticipation in their name" (*The Johannine Writings* [1927], p. 225). But with this important qualification, the agreement of these writers with the position which Renan himself owed to the Tübingen

school is striking; and the question arises whether sixty years ago Renan preached a critical doctrine which in the hands of Professor Bacon in America, and M. Loisy in France, is now firmly established. To this question no simple answer can be given. It is certainly no longer possible to quote the Johannine sayings as conveying the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, with the exception of certain passages, some of which (cf. Jn., iv, 35) were noticed by Renan himself.

To some the position just stated will appear like going over "bag and baggage" to the enemy, but this is very far indeed from being the case. The line as held by Bishop Westcott, and substantially by Dr. Nolloth still, is much too long and much too vulnerable. Nothing is so remarkable as the gradual shortening of this line, revealed in the discussions of Sanday, Jackson, Stanton, Strachan, culminating in the bold words of Streeter in *The Four Gospels* (pp. 369 ff.). It is a great gain to reach a view of the character of the Johannine sayings which enables us more hopefully to face the question of their origin, and which removes from the area of discussion a traditional standpoint which itself provoked extremer views. In support of this opinion all that can be attempted here is a brief summary of what is possible in the way of understanding the Johannine discourses in the light of their history and origin.

For some time now considerable attention has been given to the study of the intellectual environment in which the Fourth Gospel appeared, and to the influences exerted upon the Evangelist's mind by Stoicism, the Alexandrian philosophy, Gnosticism, the mystery-religions, and the like. The most recent phase of the inquiry is the investigation by Reitzenstein, Bultmann, and others of the reactions created by Mandæan Gnosticism. The influence of the Evangelist's environment is undoubted; but is this the principal key to the understanding of the Gospel? Is it correct, or even plausible, to suppose that the writer, or his circle, has created the Johannine sayings and discourses under the spell of these influences? Stated in its nakedness, this is the assumption that lies behind a good deal of contemporary criticism, and the parallel with the doctrine of Renan is obvious. The objection is that such a position does no sort of justice to the literary and historical probabilities of the case, and to the portraiture of Jesus which the Fourth Gospel yields. We give a much more credible account of the process as a whole if we presuppose a nucleus of historical tradition, consisting of sayings of Jesus about the Father, His communion with the Father, His own Sonship, and the purpose of His mission. The Evangelist does not give these sayings in the form in which he received them; his mind is too active for that, too sensitive to the complex influences of his time. His own experience, and that of

the community in which he lives, have insensibly moulded the form of the original sayings, and even extended them in ways beyond our tracing. But the process is organic; it is not a matter of superimposing alien strata, but of developing thoughts and sayings which have a historical basis. There is a consequent loss in this position: it is no longer possible, or but rarely possible, to say: "This is a transcript of what Jesus actually said." But there is also gain: I would even urge that the gain is greater; for we can say "This is the teaching of Jesus as worked out and interpreted by a singularly acute and virile Christian mind, sensitive to its environment and rich in spiritual experience." In other words, we have in the Fourth Gospel an interpretation, or as Canon Streeter would say, an "inspired interpretation" of the mind of Jesus. This is a mediating position; but it is not necessarily under a stigma because of that. For, written upon its face, Renan's doctrine bears all the marks of exaggeration and unreality, and is even farther removed from the truth than the older traditional view to which it is so radically opposed.

VINCENT TAYLOR.

OXFORD.

What is her secret, who can tell it?
Hers of the book, the triple crown.

NO one has ever told it, and although many books have been written about that city of grey buildings and green meadows, of learned age and radiant youth, the one characteristic common to them all is their inability to convey the delicate, indefinable, but strangely potent magic that is the secret of Oxford.

We left Oxford a few months before the outbreak of the war, and came back to it some seven years after the peace. At first it seemed a city of ghosts, outwardly the same, but utterly changed. It was Oxford still, a city unlike any other in the world, but a strangely different Oxford, part of a new and strange world. Gradually, as time passes, the ghosts fade, the faces of the living grow friendly and familiar. But the Oxford of to-day is a different Oxford from that in which we lived before the war. Probably the changes seem more marked to us who were away from Oxford during the war and the first years of peace than they do to those who lived in that extraordinary war-Oxford, full of hospitals, empty of undergraduates, and to whom modern Oxford must seem the real Oxford regained. Is it possible to set down these changes before the memories of then and the consciousness of now become inextricably blended?

To begin with, in the city itself, as is inevitable, some of the old buildings have vanished and new have arisen. Some are good, some very bad. Oxford itself has grown enormously. It stretches far out, east and west and north and south. There are growing colonies on all the neighbouring hills, poets and writers on one, Anglo-Indians on the next. There are houses everywhere, houses of all sorts and kinds, in straight streets and in curving roads, groups and scattered dwellings. Everywhere the tide of retired parsons, schoolmasters, generals, administrators—who are they all?—which was slowly creeping in before the war seems to have gathered force and to have swept over green fields and nursery gardens.

Oxford prides herself upon having been one of the first cities to adopt a town-planning scheme. But schemes take a very long while to get going, and the planning has come none too soon. Public-spirited citizens and lovers of the city are putting their heads together and trying to preserve her beauties, to save her from desecration. They have their work cut out for them, for Oxford is no longer, as once it was, only a University city, asleep for half the year. It is now a bustling centre of tourist traffic, and a thriving industrial town. In old days, once the summer term had come to its glorious end with the festivities of Commemoration, a deep peace settled over us all. Officially we were no longer in residence.

Garden-parties ceased, meetings were no more, and if we remained here, as many of us did, it was to work in undisturbed seclusion, to get done, or try to get done, some of the things for which there is no possible time amidst the bustle and activities of term.

All that has changed. The Long Vacation in Oxford is now the time of summer schools, which succeed one another with the most bewildering rapidity and bring distinguished persons of every sort and kind in their train. Distinguished persons must be housed and entertained, and our guest rooms and our dinner tables are as likely to be pleasantly occupied during the Long as at any other time. Nor is it only the frequenters of summer schools who fill our streets. Thousands of tourists come crowding in, from every part of Britain and from every part of the world. Every tongue is heard, though English of the Transatlantic variety prevails, and we are kept delightfully busy in entertaining and helping each other to entertain friends from every part of the globe.

If Long Vacation peace is a thing of the past, so is quiet at any time of the year. Our narrow streets echo to the sound of cars, great lorries wind their precarious way through the town, garages appear at every turn, motors for pleasure, for business and for trade throng every street and lane, rest in every possible and many very improbable corners, while aeroplanes drone overhead. We are anything but a haunt of ancient peace. Every method of movement in Oxford is full of excitement. There are still incredible numbers of bicycles, more than ever, although we have so many cars as well, and the bicycles are ridden with a gay abandon that brings terror to the heart of those who share the roads with them. School children, many apparently of the tenderest years, errand boys with large baskets insecurely attached, undergraduates of both sexes, workmen of all kinds, dash along three or four abreast, or in couples closely intertwined, carrying on animated conversation with their heads over their shoulders and their wheels swaying suddenly out into the crowded street. Pedestrians of every age and both sexes choose the road rather than the pavement for pleasant talk. There is a wonderful irresponsibility about it all. Miraculously we survive. But those of us who can, as most of us somehow do, drive, walk, or cycle with success in Oxford, can surely face traffic anywhere else with the lightest of hearts.

That Oxford should be almost impossibly full of cars is after all only appropriate, for is not Oxford the birthplace of one of the men who have done most to bring motoring within the reach of us all, and, as we are reminded when we arrive here by train or road, the home of the Morris Car? The ever-extending Morris works are scarcely three miles from Carfax, and it is their existence which has perhaps done most to change the life of the town. Those who knew

the working districts in old days, with their intermittent employment, their lack of any regular industry except for the comparatively few and infinitely superior employes of the Clarendon Press, can best realise what Morris means. There is little unemployment. There is a new look of prosperity in the working parts of Oxford, there are more shops, more trade, better-dressed people, fewer loafers. There is also, alas, much overcrowding and a terrible shortage of housing. Morris brings people in from all parts, and the problem of their housing affects not only the city but the surrounding villages. Morris employes are prosperous people who can afford to pay good rents, and the farmers round about complain not only that all the lads go to the Morris works, but also that their own men have nowhere to live. Nor is it only the farmer who complains. It is difficult to maintain the race of college servants. To get into college, once the ambition of every respectable lad, is an ambition that has now quite departed from the family horizon, blocked as it is by the Morris works. The old unfailing supply of boot-and-knife boys, who would ripen one day into scouts, is drying at the source, much to the perplexity of college bursars and the tribulation of troubled housekeepers. But when we think of the old Oxford, with one-half of its people out of work in term and another half in vacation, with its perpetual under-employment, its casual labour, the wives who eked out pawntickets with laundry work and scrubbing, and never got straight with the rent, it is difficult to repine over the new activities, disturbing as it undoubtedly is to the conservative mind to think of Oxford as an industrial centre.

Cars and aeroplanes, motor-buses and chars-à-banc, miles of new houses, hundreds of new inhabitants, thousands upon thousands of tourists and visitors, all these make up a very different Oxford from the Oxford of our youth. Social life has changed. Our maids cost more than double what they did twenty years ago, and rent and all housekeeping charges are greatly increased. The young couples take the new conditions for granted, but it is hard on the older people, who remember and regret the frequent little dinner-parties of six or eight, the pleasant easy social life of other days. We were mostly poor then, according to the standards of the world outside. But we managed to entertain and be entertained, to live comfortably enough and with but little domestic strain. If people entertain now they tend to do it in college common rooms, and the old friendly interchange of hospitality is a thing of the past.

What of the undergraduates who, after all, even more than the Morris works, are our main *raison d'être*? Have they changed too? Or is youth what it always was? The change is harder perhaps to define, but I am definitely conscious of it. There is the obvious change which results from the conferring of University membership

upon women. The girls fly about in cap and gown, it is proper to refer to them as undergraduates rather than as students, and the appearance both of the streets and of all University entertainments and ceremonies is altered by the presence of women in academic dress. The young people see more of each other, and are on easier terms than was customary in old days. But here again, remembering my own young days and the many other days and other generations of young people that I have known, I expect that Oxford girls and boys and their relationships are very like those of girls and boys outside Oxford. There is less chaperonage, much more dancing, less stiffness here than there was, but so there is everywhere. For my part I rejoice.

Undergraduate ways of life have changed to some extent. The cinema habit is completely established, and the cinemas are thronged every night with cheerful and vociferous youth. There is a new Playhouse, which provides an alternative to the Theatre, but unless Gilbert and Sullivan, or some equally powerful attraction, is in Oxford, the theatres hardly rival the films. The young people find it hard to imagine what their predecessors did with their evenings in pre-cinema days. Where did they see one another, and what on earth did they do when there was no "super" with its café? What did they? I cannot remember, but I am sure they were happily and gaily occupied, hard as the modern young find it to believe, even without cinemas and motor-cars. The other modern amusement, wireless, is in our homes but not in college, where its presence is, not inexplicably, forbidden. This restriction causes some regret. One young man complained that the exclusion of wireless from college rooms was a grave detriment to work. "If," said he, "I had wireless in my rooms I should have it on every evening, and then when it was dull, which it often is, I could get some work done. As it is I have to go to the cinema, and it isn't worth while trying to work when I get back."

Despite the presence of cinemas and the absence of wireless they get through a lot of work, and indeed the general impression seems to be that the standard of industry, sobriety and general behaviour is decidedly higher. Possibly we have fewer of the so-called idle rich nowadays. Certainly one has the impression that a larger proportion now come from the grammar schools and the county or municipal secondary schools than was the case in pre-war days, and that the public school element, though still predominant, is proportionately less marked. There were always many young men who managed to share fully in college life and yet kept their battels to a surprisingly low figure. Oxford has long had its share of poor students, although our Socialist critics do not believe it. Perhaps

in these days there are more of them, and they play a larger part. It is hard to tell.

The young men and maidens have changed, to my mind. They are easier to get on with, less shy of their elders, friendlier, more inclined to treat one as more or less their equal instead of regarding one as a totally different species of human being. Possibly they have lived more with grown-ups than did the children of other days. The segregated nursery and schoolroom life of pre-war days has given place, in these times of servant shortage and limited house room, to something more like the family life of the newer countries. But whatever the cause, the modern young are the kindest and most delightfully friendly creatures, and it is a joy to be among them.

Friendly as they are, there is between them and us an impassable gap. Between youth and age, between one generation and another, there must always be a gulf. But between this youth and its elders lies the deep and unbridgeable gap of the war. What to us is the most tremendous experience of our lives, the most indelible of memories, the vast barrier which separates the present from the past, is to them little more than a legend and a tale that is told. Never can there have been so great a division between the young and the middle-aged. And that is perhaps why Oxford, for all the glories of its youth, the loveliness of its river and its flowering meadows, the breathtaking beauty of its towers and spires, is to us who have returned to it after the war not only beloved, exquisite beyond compare, but poignantly and sometimes almost unbearably full of memories of the vanished past.

LETTICE FISHER.

TWO ANONYMOUS BOOKS BY LORD MORLEY.

LORD MORLEY'S early journalistic work deserves to be better known. On leaving Oxford in the early sixties he came up to London to seek his literary fortune and had a hard struggle. In one of the first articles he wrote, he refers to the man who "on leaving college is so unfortunate as to have a small competency of three or four hundred a year." Certainly he was not embarrassed in such a way. His father died early, and he had to fight for his own hand. In 1865, Morley collected some thirty of his *Saturday Review* articles and published them under the title "Modern Characteristics." A second edition was called for in 1867. In this year two more volumes from his pen saw the light. The one, published with the author's name, was a critical study of Burke, which good judges pronounce to be the best work on Burke yet written. The other volume has had a curious history. On page 55 of the *Spectator* for 1867 there is this advertisement in Messrs. Chapman and Hall's list: "'Studies in Conduct'—short essays from the *Saturday Review*. By the author of 'Modern Characteristics.' Post 8vo. In a few days." A further notice appears on page 371 of the same volume. From these announcements one might conclude that the book was on sale, but it seems to have been suppressed immediately after publication. The late Sir Wm. Robertson Nicol, with all his amazing knowledge of magazine literature, confessed he was unable to trace the book or to find any review of it anywhere. There is in fact a copy in the British Museum, but the veil of anonymity remains over it, and the catalogue makes no attribution of authorship. Mr. Hirst makes no mention of it in his recent "Early Life of Lord Morley." It is virtually a lost book.

Morley's early articles have a strong autobiographical flavour. In his later books, including "Recollections," he talks but little of the "*petites heures de la vie*." He eschews gossip, hardly mentions his own amusements or personal habits, and scarcely ever those of anybody else. Almost the only women who get more than a passing reference are George Eliot and George Sand. It is not too much to say that these early pieces, written when Morley was between twenty-four and twenty-eight, do more to reveal the man than his better known and more impersonal writings. It is extraordinary that they should not have been thought worthy of inclusion in the collected edition of his works.

Morley's critics have scolded him for not developing. He has been credited with a mind and temper of the rigid ecclesiastical type—his motto that of the Church, *semper eadem*. Certainly both the style and the matter of these anonymous books would betray their

author to anyone fairly familiar with his later work. A number of favourite words and turns of speech were characteristic of the man from first to last. More important still, there is visible here the vigour, the shrewdness, the raciness, the serenity and independence, the weighty gift of instruction, that marked the philosopher and statesman of after days. These essays reveal Morley as a sturdy, richly-gifted Lancastrian, feeling and fighting his way into the social and intellectual circles of the metropolis. The problems to be faced were urgent and practical, and not by any means matters for polite and detached reflection. After all, the late twenties are years when the pressure of life is felt in the most vivid way. Morley was no spectator in his tower; he was in the fray; and we are allowed to see the mind of the thinker at work and unable to rest until various considerations and points of view had ranged themselves under some principle of conduct. These books, properly understood, are the "Confessions" of John Morley. The following titles are typical: False Steps, The Uses of Dignity, Vague Aims, Thrift, Husbands, Clever Men's Wives, Small Hypocrisies, Cynical Fallacies, Crossing Rubicons, The Philosophy of Sour Grapes, Trimmers, Philosophers and Politicians, New Friends.

It is evident that from the first Morley was ambitious. There was nothing of the philosophical loafer about him. He saw that the most common secret of want of success in life was the tendency to let things drift. "The larger number fail for lack of a quality which is neither industry merely, nor acuteness, nor an eager desire to get on, but a kind of vigilant tenacity like that of the hunter after his prey." He was as far as possible from being one of the young men who start on their career with the idea firmly implanted in their minds that there is not much to be got out of life. The essay on "Sour Grapes," in particular, is informed with the strongest personal feeling. "Contempt for money is constantly found to be only a fine name for being too indolent to earn it or too extravagant to keep it." Again, "To pretend to think little of fame is to think little of a motive which has produced the greatest and most beneficent achievements that have made the globe as decently inhabitable as it is." He was not disheartened by his lack of funds—"When a man sees Mr. Disraeli leading one party and Mr. Gladstone the other, he cannot say that either ancient birth or unbounded wealth is absolutely essential to public success." He sums up—"Let a man be as lazy and as selfish as he pleases, but it is too intolerable to hear him impudently declaring that the objects which make other men refuse to be lazy and selfish are all hollow and insipid."

There was always something of the Frenchman about Morley. He had a lively appreciation of the uses of pleasure, and did not believe that the man who goes through the world with sober solemn jowl is

showing a deeper sense of the worth of life, and making more of his talents, than the elastic man. The legend of Morley's austerity is far from being wholly true. He had a keen relish for the amenities and good things of life, and was horrified at the blunderer who should like the flavour of Gladstone claret as well as that of Lafitte, or Cape as well as Port. Mrs. Asquith's verdict as to his sensitiveness and responsiveness is quite in accord with the man we discover in these forgotten pages. He betrays an extraordinary zest in living, and loves good food (he is very severe on bad dinners), good wine, good music, good talk, good company. The one thing missing is the taste for sport. As a young man Morley was already a lover of honour, decorum, and the ornaments of life. He insisted on shaving and clean linen when he did his writing. Campbell-Bannerman called him "Priscilla," and considered the name was chosen with insight. In a witty discourse on "the Uses of Dignity" he claims that dignity in non-essentials is a substantial and independent merit. No doubt, "the judge's knowledge of law would not be a whit diminished, nor his sagacity and penetration any less active if he sat in his shirt-sleeves in a rocking-chair," but Morley holds that every ornament and grace of conduct and manner, and even of material surrounding, is useful in the highest sense.

Whilst no worshipper of Mammon, he is well aware that there are some of the highest goods of life which can be secured by nothing but money. Morley knew his Lancashire too well, however, to suppose that to start life with an assured income was an unmixed blessing, and speaks feelingly of "that intractable emptiness of pocket which is the iron key to many a deed of ingenuous looking self-denial and Spartan virtue." Very characteristic, too, is his healthy sense of human possibilities and limitations. He appears as a deadly foe to cynicism and the spiteful valuation of the world. He thought human life by no means a poor thing to those who knew how to make the best of it. His loyalty to Mill made it essential that the reality of happiness should be both vindicated and attained, but he did not expect more from life than life is capable of bestowing. In these essays he claims the following to be the chief ingredients of happiness: a vigorous interest in the objects of mental culture; genuine private affections; and a sincere interest in the public good. This was his text in 1865, and he stuck to it all through his long life. He warns men against "commencing life with theories only fit for a world of angels and shadows." "One reason why even wise men are occasionally attacked by a fit of cynicism is that they have been infected by some sort of philosophy, or by some of the traditions of the race, which point to a golden age past or future when mortals on earth might enjoy the mysteriously blissful existence of the immortals on Olympus." *Les idées d'un autre monde font à celui-ci*

plus de tort, qu'on ne pense. Nevertheless, while scouting Transcendentalism, Morley believed with his masters Turgot, Condorcet and Mill that all the grand sources of human suffering are modifiable, and in great measure removable. Morley was no lover of provincial towns and, like Johnson and Lamb, had a very defective sympathy with rural delights. "Liveliness is a distinct breach of good manners in a country town. It is a wicked outrage put upon the great God of Dullness." Again, in "Social Troglodytes," "as might be expected, the Troglodyte is more frequently to be met with in the provinces than in the metropolis." "Everybody we suppose, whom it has pleased God to condemn to live in such places, looks upon his fate as more or less hard."

The essay on "The Pains of Association" supplies a clue to Morley's attitude to the town and traditions, the beliefs and friends he had left behind. Whilst not lacking in loyalty, he was no vehement sentimentalist who could not endure to think of cutting adrift anybody or anything to which time had attached him. "In a hundred ways," he says, "alike in thought and in conduct, the force of association restrains and paralyses. Courage to obey the dictates of truth and prudence, when the memory of former friends or beliefs or habits interposes, is one of the rarest virtues. If it is true that respect for some past is constantly found to be strong enough to keep people back from decline and retrogression, is it any less true that a mistaken tenderness for this same past as often keeps back even the better spirits from the vigorous advance which they might otherwise have made? . . . Nevertheless, a man does well to be very sure of himself before he takes any step which irretrievably cuts him off from his own past history. It would be very shallow to deny that all estrangements, all ruptures with a sweet and pleasant past, have a deeply pathetic side."

In 1897 Morley tells us he visited an Independent minister in Montrose, who regretted to be so far from the centre of intellectual or literary activity. "Nay," said I, "but the only centre of such activity is your own study, whether Montrose, Oxford or London." The good advice given to Dr. Garvie finds many echoes in "Studies in Conduct." "Here is another of the commonest delusions in the world. People hope that some change in outward circumstances will accomplish that change of character which in reality can only be effected by their own will. A man admits that he is indolent, but goes on hoping that when he gets into his new house, or has got his books into a quieter room, then his industry will forthwith know no bounds. . . . How many men have fancied that going into orders would extirpate all evil habits, and make the practice of virtue and highmindedness both easy and secure? Yet men do not hope to gather grapes off a bramble by moving it into a vineyard." One of the

most significant of these essays, that on "Philosophers and Politicians," gives us Morley's lifelong judgment upon those two quarrelsome yokefellows Letters and Statesmanship. Is not this a bit of self-revelation? "A man may form sound political judgments notwithstanding the more serious attention which he pays to non-political ideas and subjects. In fact, it is notorious that some of the most sagacious statesmen have also been profound abstract thinkers and inquirers in other departments." On the other hand, Morley saw no good reason why the hopes of a political should stand in the way of what might be an extremely useful literary career. "Some of the very best work in the sphere of ideas has been done by men habitually occupied in the sphere of affairs." He has no patience with fastidious despisers of political ambitions and activities. "Some men," he says, "would rather have been the author of *Hamlet* or the *Principia* than have held the highest authority in the State, but they are very often just the men of the smallest intellectual calibre, and least likely to erect one of these intellectual monuments more lasting than brass." In the full-length study of Morley which he contributed to the *Revue des deux Mondes*, M. Augustin Filon touches on a subject which no Frenchman could let alone.

" Ici se presente une question embarrassante. Il est indiscret de sonder l'existence intime d'un contemporain, et d'un autre part, il est malaisé de parler d'un homme tant qu'on ne sait point quelle place la femme a tenue dans sa vie."

There is certainly abundant evidence in these pages to show that Morley pondered deeply over this all-important subject. He refers to it, indeed, more frequently than to any other. Here are some of his dicta. "Probably about the most fatal blunder that anybody can perpetrate is a bad marriage, and moreover, of all blunders this is the commonest." "It certainly is rather sad and startling to think that you may possibly at the last croquet party have met a young lady who is destined to embitter the rest of your days, and bring your grey hairs in sorrow to the grave." With regard to the common opinion that women like men of the autocratic stamp, he says, "Women no doubt get more than their fair share of bullying and snubbing, but it is surely adding insult to injury to pretend that they like it." "A clever man, more than all others, requires a slightly acidulous element in his companion. At least no wife is perfect who cannot be a severe critic on occasion. To a very clever man it is the most considerable of her functions." "In all the nonsense that lovers talk there is nothing so common or so nonsensical as the resolution that when they are married they will live in some charming nest far remote from the busy haunts of men. On the whole, a wise man will not leave the city too far away!" Speak-

ing of friendship, Morley says—"Of all its forms, friendship between men and women is perhaps the most delightful. When the grace, the vivacity, the keen power of taking interest characteristic of all fine-natured women, are deepened by a culture which unfortunately only a few women give themselves, a character is formed in which every vigorous-minded person may find all that is most delicious and most valuable in friendship." Is this a reminiscence of his visits to George Eliot at the Priory?

The very interesting essay on "Sympathy with Nature" shows Morley well armed against the sinister aspects of popular Rousseauism and Darwinism. "This lustful hugging of nature is in truth the kindling and feeding of all those anarchic passions, the control and moderation of which has been the aim of all progress." He understood the import of the new doctrines of man's oneness with nature, and utters the warning that it is one of the most violently explosive social forces that have ever been discovered. "The creatures, albeit creatures of genius, who skip to and fro, raving about their sensibilities and basely indifferent to the feelings and interests of the rest of men, may have a wordy sympathy with nature, but it is worth not much to themselves and nothing at all to mankind. They contribute less to the existing stock of good things than if they had been virtuous tinkers." . . . "Suppose it were true, as fiery poets of despair are never weary of crying aloud to us, that Nature hates us and that the gods are never found by our prayers. Is not that all the more reason why we should be as gods to one another? Granting that we are left alone on the face of the earth, does it follow that the only thing for us to do is to borrow all our motives and mould all our passions from the example of tigers and tigresses?"

Instead of perverting man's kinship with nature into a plague-stricken charter of brutality and self-indulgence, Morley characteristically uses it as a text from which to preach upon his favourite virtue of Pity. Loathing of every sort of cruelty was at the core of the man. Sympathy with nature, truly understood, would mean "that every sentient creature ought to be treated with humanity, just as much as the members of our own species." This is the purport of a striking piece on "Imagination and Conduct." From first to last, Morley was an illustrious example of the divine saying that the number of things a man pities make the measure of his greatness of soul. We are reminded of the only answer he ever gave as a parliamentary candidate to a question as to his religious opinions. "Religion," he then said to the workers on the Tyne, "has many dialects, many diverse complexions, but it has one true voice, the voice of human pity, of mercy, of patient justice; and to that voice

your candidate, to the best of his knowledge and belief, has always done all he could to listen."

Finally, these two books help us to understand Morley's courtesy and toleration. There have been those who have practically charged him with thoughtlessness or inconsistency. How could he be a Radical, and yet delight in the refinement and decorum of great families? How could he admire, and to a certain extent follow, both Rousseau and Burke? Was this the famous "Compromise" in practice? In this earliest writing of his we are aware of a mind at work, striving to place in due relations the various and often conflicting truths which met him in his study and in the world. He had already imbibed from Mill and Comte a generous recognition of all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human improvement. He eschewed alike the mistiness and cowardice of compromise and the narrowness and rigidity of dogma. There was in him a certain catholicity of judgment and appreciation which strove to do justice to truths presented and services rendered in various schools, "with whom," as he said, "in important and even in vital respects, I could not in the least bring myself to agree."

Keeping one's own motives pure, striving faithfully to realise one's own ends whilst behaving with tolerance and generosity toward those who march to the goal along other paths; is not this susceptible of some more creditable explanation than that of "unconscious duplicity or dullness," with which Elmer More, the American critic, has charged him?

F. BROMPTON HARVEY.

LAUGHTER AND JOLLITY.

IT is rather a strange thing that the laughter philosophies of the past should have so largely omitted jolly laughter from their scheme of things laughterish. There is probably not the significance that one feels inclined to put into this; though I myself feel very doubtful about Hobbes, and Bacon, and Lord Chesterfield. It was left to Darwin to make out a clear case for the existence of merry laughter. Darwin in "The Expression of the Emotions" laid great stress on laughter as an expression of pleasure. Indeed, he confines his study almost wholly to merry laughter. He feels occasionally that there is probably more in it than this, and, with rather a perfunctory air, drags in the conventional theory of his time, descending incongruity. But he does not make a clear distinction between comic and merry laughter. He appears, indeed, to look upon comic laughter as being merely a variety of mirth. It is unfortunate that Darwin did not make this point plain. For, if he had done so, much unnecessary theorising might have been avoided. But he was not concerned with an explanation of laughter. What he aimed at was to show laughter as the expression of an emotion. Consequently, beyond emphasising the presence of merry laughter, he does little to further the explanation of laughter in general.

In spite of Darwin, jolly laughter is still not recognised as it ought to be, and in all its implications. Among recent writers, Mr. Max Eastman recognises it as "gay laughter" in a gay and happy book. But he mixes it up with his "play" theory, and eventually loses sight of it in the false simplicity of his "Humour Instinct," finally disposing of it by asserting that it has a common origin with comic laughter in the "gregarious instinct," and leaving it at that. The fact that jolly laughter is a simple and direct form of pleasure is entirely ignored. It has, for Mr. Eastman, to be linked up with the "driving instinct" theory; and as, unlike Mr. Macdougall, he sees the two laughs are in some way allied, he has to deal with it as his hypothesis demands, with unfortunate results for jollity. Bergson, of course, omits it altogether. Mr. Greig, in a more inclusive survey, also omits it—to his own cost. And Mr. Gregory deals with it shortly and very insufficiently in its relation to his very wobbly hypothesis of "relief."

And yet, I assert, jolly laughter is not only important. It is absolutely necessary to a theory of laughter; and to overlook it is to ignore entirely one of the main factors in laughter as a whole. It is just this neglect that accounts for the lamentable insufficiency of the great majority of laughter theories; though how it could be considered possible to write a book on laughter and ignore the element of the merry and jolly—of gleeful laughter—is beyond my compre-

hension. For, not only is it of great significance in itself. It is intimately associated with the main problem of laughter. Laughter is an amazingly complex thing. And it owes its complexity and its strangely paradoxical action to a principle that has never been recognised in laughter theory. Laughter has such extraordinary and opposing consequences simply because it is a combination of many different elements. It works both for and against sympathy; is both cruel and human; varies from man to man, simply because it involves several quite distinct factors. I do not wish to give a detailed list of its varieties. Many of them only enter rarely into laughter situations.

The laughs that are always necessary to laughter are two—comic laughter and jolly laughter. And this combination, whose action I call "the principle of double laughter," carries all through our laughter experience. Jolly laughter is the direct expression of jolly feeling, of pleasure. Pleasure is not the explanation of comic laughter; I shall show the exact relation later. There is, besides, the element of the comic. But jolly laughter is entirely pleasurable. It is a spontaneous expression of delight, a direct response to a pleasurable "feeling." It is a bubbling over of the spirit in the joy of life, or a sympathetic response to happiness in others: "laugh and the world laughs with you." It has no intellectual implications. What Lloyd Morgan would call "reference" in a specific sense is quite absent. Its only basis is the "interior feeling" of jollity, lightheartedness, and good cheer, which may result from a great variety of external causes—general causes that are only efficient in so far as they give the individual pleasure, as distinct from the one specific and never-failing cause of "the comic."

Jollity, as I use the word, covers all pleasure laughter. It is a better word than mirth, for it can never be confused, as mirth always is being confused, with the humorous. And it is better than gaiety, which need not imply laughter at all. I have, during the preparation and writing of this essay, kept a continual watch on laughter in man (this may appear an obvious thing to say; but, to judge from their books, it is not very thorough in most writers on the subject, who will omit whole chunks of laughter experience without a qualm), and I have found that jollity and the jolly laugh, and, more important still, the co-presence of jollity with comedy, are ever present in the laughter of men. I say men here, rather than man, because I mean men—people you meet in the 'bus, and in the street, and at home; not Man as an abstract conception. Jollity does not figure in my list of laughter-occasions simply because it occurs in situations that only the individual himself can know. If you try to record them in bald print, they either appear merely

silly; or the words that you do succeed in finding are absolutely useless to convey the complete situation that jollity implies.

Jolly laughter in itself is entirely distinct from comic laughter, "laughter-at," which is the laughter of nearly all theories. The more one studies these two varieties of laughter in their essence, the more fundamental their difference appears to be. Actually, however, the quintessence of these two laughs, of comic laughter at any rate, is rarely displayed. The situations in which they occur are not usually "pure." There is always some pleasure element in comic laughter; though the jolly laugh itself may often be free from any humorous quality. In spite of their being so different fundamentally from each other, these two kinds of laughter are nearly always present together in a specific situation: the situation is a double one. You do not laugh necessarily when you are pleased; but the fact of your being pleased or displeased has a great deal to do with your laughter. A pleasurable quality of mood will render you far more easily stirred to laughter than one of vague irritation or definite displeasure. That easy, comfortable, mildly happy state of mind, when you are feeling free from all cares, in good health, and with your self-confidence firmly established, is the mood for laughter. Laughter comes easily to a happy man; not only the laughter of jollity, but the richly qualified laughter of amusement.

Comic incidents which will ordinarily provoke laughter pass unnoticed in a duller mood—not necessarily an unpleasurable mood, but one in which no positive enjoyment is present. A boisterous or cheerful state of mind welcomes the slightest excuse to laugh, and will respond to the thinnest absurdities or the most obvious piece of humour. And melancholy or indigestion will blind one's eyes to all but the very richest of comicalities. But jollity is not only a rich soil for comic laughter, bringing it to fuller flower than the less fertile basis of indifference, or irritation. It is far more intimately associated than this.

A true explanation of the comic requires more than an impersonal analysis of that particular object, or relation "out there" in Nature, which, in conjunction with a human mind, results in amusement and laughter. The human mind is not a kind of animated machine, always reacting in a certain specific way to a certain specific stimulus. The perception of the comic exemplifies this very well. It is because of the desire for a simple and direct explanation of mind that the mechanistic conception of mind prevailed so widely during the last century. The action of a machine is particularly attractive to man, because man himself created the machine and hence can obtain a very clear idea of mechanical action. The

mechanical theories of life and mind are now a thing of the past. The mechanical theories of humour are still with us.

In a humorous situation, the mental state or mood of the laugher has all to do with his perception of the comic. Yet this fact has been persistently ignored by writers on laughter. I deal with this more fully elsewhere, but I will give it brief mention here in order to make clear the relation of jollity to the comic. The importance of the mental state, or emotional poise, that marks the threshold of laughter, and the necessary condition of its appearance, cannot be over emphasised. The particular state of the spectator's mind that must be present before amused laughter can appear is one of a mild and generalised pleasure, a feeling of normal content. One must be neither harrassed, nor actively interested; neither bound up in a specific mood or passion, nor engaged in any task; neither curious, nor irritable. The mind, in fact, must be as nearly *tabula rasa* of definite ideas or emotions as possible.

The new idea that appears on one's mental horizon must not break in rudely, nor challenge attention by any directly personal interest or influence. Self must not be actually involved in a laughter situation of this sort. As soon as you enter the picture, the comic atmosphere dissolves, only to return (if it can return) when your particular interest, pleasant or unpleasant, disappears and the serene impersonality comes back on the scene. The less one is disturbed, the greater is the possibility of amused laughter. For, once your mind starts to travel along a train of thought, the comic situation loses its grip; until, at last, your interests are so aroused that the comicality of the situation is entirely forgotten. Amusement finds its fullest moment in the leisured ease of a pleased comfort, and is at its best in a placid, undisturbed enjoyment of life in general. It is the comfort, and the indefinite quality of the mood, that give comic laughter its richest and most favourable foundation. Hence it is that jollity is the finest aid to the appearance of the laughter of amusement. For jollity, in its careless enjoyment and ripe pleasure; its vague but comfortable sense of well-being and love of living; and its merry freedom from "specificity" of thought, provides the essential elements of that mental condition necessary to full comic laughter.

I myself have found that a merry mood, a state of vaguely diffused pleasure, not only provides a firm basis for comic laughter, but it actually widens my comic horizon. Jollity seems to sharpen the comic appetite. Depression, besides sapping the foundations of the comic mood, blunts comic perception. A pleasant mood calls one's attention to things laughable. Humour begins to appear in a diversity of situations, and comicality creeps out of the most unexpected places. Jollity, therefore, may tend to increase one's perceptual

abilities, in addition to its being a very fertile emotional basis for comic laughter. Your pessimist is no laughing man. But, not only is he deficient in laughter of pure pleasure, he is rarely a man of humour. The more profound the pessimism (or even more effective, the rancour or ill-temper), the smaller is the sense of humour. It becomes increasingly difficult for jollity to arise; and only the strongest stimulus is able to wrench amusement from the unwilling mind. Why should this be? Obviously it is an affair of temperament.

The great laugher is always an optimist; which means to say that his "feeling level" is higher than in other men. His happiness index is higher. He lives on firmer ground than the melancholy man, for his pleasures are always many times fuller than the pleasures of others in the same circumstances. He possesses, by some natural alchemy, a faculty of "always seeing the bright side of things." In plain language, he has a bent towards pleasure, and sufficient natural will-power to keep him in that bent. The optimist is, therefore, usually a jolly man. Whether he is an insane optimist is here irrelevant. That depends on the intellectual factor and its relations with feeling, with which I am not concerned. What is of interest is his "pleasure level," which stands higher than it does in others. By the nature of my argument, given this richer, more intense quality of pleasurable feeling, there should be a larger proportion of men of humour among optimists and good-natured men.

This is so obviously a fact that it seems rather absurd to go to the trouble of saying it. Actually, however, it is not at all obvious in the usual explanation of comic laughter. Theories of the comic never seem to take into account that it is a man laughing, and not a human machine; a man with all the complexities of thought and feeling, pleasure and pain, that go to make him what he is. A man sees something that he finds funny, and his perception causes him to laugh. But who the man is that laughs, or what his nature and temperament are, does not seem to enter the minds of most writers on the subject. It is the comic that they are explaining, not the situation of a man laughing at something he finds comical. It is this omission that makes so many theories of laughter so laughably insufficient. It is impossible to separate the laughing man from the comic he is laughing at. The two are complementary, are parts of a situation, not entities on their own. Theories of the comic like Bergson's suffer from an initial blemish, in that they omit the feelings of a man completely. To base an explanation of human laughter on perception alone is absurdly insufficient. It is rather like "explaining" love by a detailed analysis of the actions and the external stimuli of a love situation without taking into account

the most important element of all—the fact that a lover loves, experiences delicious emotions and rich thrills of joy.

With this recognition of the necessary basis of comic laughter we return to jollity; and with jollity to the merry mind. It is clear that comic laughter itself, in its dependence on the merry mind, is largely a question of the nature of the individual. The laugh of amusement obviously involves other intellectual factors besides. But at the very root lies temperament, the cast of mind of the individual laugher. This personal stamp on comic laughter not only applies to feeling. It is cognitive as well. Both the emotional and perceptual elements of mind combine to make laughter an absolutely individual affair. Laughter at the comic is not a fixed and invariable fact. Its complexity is apparent at every turn. It varies—as all facts of human nature vary. But laughter's variability is particularly bewildering. A dozen things may spring up to prevent its appearance. Personal sympathy, or general sympathy; habit and long acquaintance; an intellectual grasp of the meaning of an object or event that might otherwise amuse; an uncomfortable or irritating sensation of some kind—these and many other factors may prevent laughter on a specific occasion, quite apart, of course, from a poor eye for the comic or a melancholy turn of mind. These two—a merry mind and a quick grasp of comedy—are the chief arbiters in making or breaking laughter.

Jolly laughter and comic laughter in themselves are very different. But the man who laughs in the one key usually laughs equally well in the other. A merry mind is not necessarily a mind that is in perfect tune with the comic in Nature. But it is a mind primed to respond; and the response is far easier when it does occur. It is obvious that the presence of a rich pleasure basis need not imply an acute perception. An intelligent element is clearly necessary in any subtle appreciation of the comic. But if jollity cannot get true comedy, it makes a comedy of its own. It laughs at beer, red flannel underwear, sausages, mothers-in-law, Mr. Baldwin's pipe, and the rest of the stale repertoire of the music-hall. None of these are comic in the true sense. They may have been comic in the far past; but use destroyed their lustre long ago. They are simply well-worn coins which are used for gaining laughter, but have no meaning in themselves.

A sense of humour depends essentially on the presence of certain intellectual factors, such as the power of perceiving shades of meaning, or differences between objects, that pass unnoticed by a clumsy mind. A really keen sense of humour is, indeed, one of the rarest things in the world. Only a wise man can be a man of deep humour. For only a wise man—a man of rare natural ability of intellect and a wide experience—has the capacity to see these so elusive rela-

tions and so delicate differences. A profound perception of the comic demands, *à priori*, a thorough acquaintance with the world of things and events. It demands, equally, an unusual and keen insight into the subtleties of life that is only granted to the few.

But, one asks, if those theories that describe the comic alone, without the man, are true, why is it that the wise men of the earth are not the greatest laughers? Why is it that all men of wisdom are not all men of inexhaustible humour, laughing without end at the ignorance, the mistakes, and the general fatheadedness that rolls on so merrily with the world? Why is Democritus the only laughing philosopher? The reason is partly because our men of wisdom are very often self-appointed—and the wiseacre can hardly be expected to laugh—and partly because the intellectual effort of hard thinking is not, in itself, an encouragement to laughter. But the real reason lies far deeper. It is of the very man himself. It is because the philosopher, or dramatist, or man of science, or novelist, is that kind of man, that he is, or is not, a great laugher.

The wise man, when he is a laugher, is a splendid one. I am not going to mention any names; for there is nothing more eagerly coveted than the reputation of possessing an acute sense of humour and an unlimited capacity for laughter; and nothing more resented than the imputation of their possible absence. It is sufficient to note that they do exist, and that we should be thankful for it.

It is, I repeat, the man himself, the individual temperament, that lies at the root of his laughter. It is when a wise man is also a merry man that the blessed mantle of humour falls on him. But jollity and the merry mind are not distributed reasonably among men. Nature scatters such rare gifts recklessly. Duke and drayman, baron and brewer, prince and philosopher, are merry or dismal simply because they happen to be made so. And nothing, not even a miraculous eugenics, will ever alter this, which is the nature of things. If, therefore, as is quite conceivable, you believe yourself to possess a rich sense of humour, take it as a blessing, not as a personal achievement. You may have strengthened it by intellectual effort; but without the temperament you were given in the beginning, it could never have been at all.

RICHMOND H. HELLYAR.

CHARLES, DUKE OF ORLEANS : PRISONER AND POET.

THE cult of Robert Louis Stevenson is so well established & one in the present day that it requires some courage to deny any of his statements or dispute any of his opinions. Yet it is impossible to read his Essay on Charles, Duke of Orleans, without feeling that in this one, at least, of his *Familiar Studies of Men and Books*, he has been guilty of injustice. From first to last he belittles both the man and his writings, and the whole Essay is couched in a sneering vein that seems strangely ungenerous when applied to one who was so long our prisoner of war.

That "his birth was above his merits," is Stevenson's first allegation: though both his father and his mother were highly cultivated people, "Charles cared for nothing but junketing and war." His view of "the whole duty of man is to us empty, vain and wearisome": when he made comparisons between the English and the French, "he did so on three points only—pleasure, valour and riches": "The futility of his public life was of a piece throughout": "Unintelligent in everything, but most unintelligent in his poetry": "His Ballades are thin and scanty of import": "No passion in his love": "An incapacity to see things with any greatness was fundamentally characteristic of the man": "I think it is scarcely cynical to suppose that religion as well as patriotism was principally cultivated as a means of filling up the days." Such are some of his accusations.

Since few people read Charles' poetry to-day, these charges might pass unchallenged, but he is not the only object of Stevenson's sneers. Henry V is so gallant a figure that it might seem impossible to slight him, but when describing his capture of Charles on the battlefield, he says: "Our Henry improved the occasion with something of a snuffle, assuring his prisoner that God had fought against the French on account of their manifold sins and transgressions." And later on, when commenting on the poems, he remarks that Charles "must have been under the influence of more than usually solemn considerations when he proceeded to turn Henry's puritanical homily into a Ballade, and reproach France, and himself by implication, with pride, gluttony, idleness, etc."

That his verdicts are too sweeping is proved by his contemptuous dismissal of the whole of early French poetry: "The Scotch saying on the sight of anything operose and finical—He must have little to do that made that—might be put as epigraph on all the song books of old France." And his scorn of Charles' "futility" and "inability" calls up an instant remembrance of that scene in *Henry V*, when after the *débâcle* of Agincourt Shakespeare depicts him as

making a vain effort to inspirit the despairing Dauphin and the Constable of France:

We are enow yet living in the field
To smother up the English in our throngs,
If any order might be thought upon.

A biased Essay, such as this, is in fact bound to send the reader back to Charles himself to discover what manner of man he was and of what quality are the poems that are so lightly waved aside.

The date of the Duke's birth is generally given as 1391. He was the grandson of Charles V, King of France, and the son of Louis, Duke of Orleans, and his wife, Valentine Visconti of Milan. Louis was murdered in the year 1407, by the orders of the Duke of Burgundy, and his widow, having appealed in vain for justice, died of grief in the following year. Charles, as a boy of fifteen, had been married before his father's death, to Isabel, widow of Richard II of England, a girl of seventeen. By her he had a daughter, Johanna, who afterwards married the duc d'Alençon. This early union came to an end with the death of Isabel in 1409, and a year or two later he married Bona, daughter of the Count of Armagnac. This union was as brief a one as the first, for Bona died in 1415 leaving no issue.

The condition of affairs in France was becoming steadily worse all this time, and with the defeat at Agincourt (1415) its subjugation by England seemed inevitable. That Charles took no part in its wonderful resurrection was no fault of his, for with other prisoners he was brought over to England, where he was to remain for a quarter of a century.

The fragment of a letter from Henry V touching the prisoners is preserved among the Cotton MSS. in the British Museum: "Furthermore I wold that ye commend (communed) with my brothre, with the Chancellor, with my cosin of Northumberland, and my cosin of Westmerlond, and that ye set a gode ordinance for my North Marches and specialy for the Duc of Orlians and for alle the remanant of my prisoners of France, and also for the King of Scotland: for as I am secrely enfourmed by a man of ryght notable estate in this lond that there hath been a man of the Ducs of Orliance in Scotland, and accorded with the Duc of Albany that this next somer he schal bryng in the mamnet (Mahomet) of Scotland to sturre what he may. And also that ther schold be founden weys to the havyng away specialy of the Duc of Orlians, and also of the King. As welle as of the remanant of my forsayed prysoners that God de defende. Werfore I wolle that the Duc of Orliance be kept stille withyn the Castil of Pontefret, with owte goying to Robertis place or to any othre disport, for it is bettr he lak his

disport then we wer disceyved. Of alle the remanant dothe as ye thenketh."

Henry at this time had two royal prisoners, both of whom passed many years in captivity and both of whom were poets. Robert, King of Scotland, after the death of his elder son, sent James, then a boy of eleven, to be educated at the French Court; but Henry caused the ship to be intercepted as it passed down the east coast of England, and for eighteen years James was kept in close, but not unkind, confinement. Sending word to the King that he could speak French as well as his cousin of France, Henry had the boy well educated, and he grew up a highly cultivated man. Stevenson has a gibe at "the mechanical verses with which he beguiled his captivity," but as a matter of fact the *King's Quhair* (Quire, or Book) is one of the most charming love poems in the language, and the description of Lady Joan Beaufort at Windsor as she crossed the "garden fair, close by the Towris wall," is as beautiful as it is touching. Her grace and loveliness so enchanted the Prince that it seemed to him that the sun set at her departing:

And when she walked had a little thraw
Under the swete grene boughis bent,
Her fair fresh face, as white as any snaw,
She turned has and furth hir wayis went;
And then began mine aches and tormente,
To see her part and follow I na might;
Methought the day was turned into night.

"To see her part and follow I na might!" The whole of a lover's longing is in those simple words. James' imprisonment lasted until the year 1424, but he was a faithful lover, and his first act on his release was to marry the Lady Joan and make her Queen of Scotland.

There is no such romantic story connected with the imprisonment of the other Royal Prince, but an examination of Charles' poems reveals a nature not less capable of sustained thought and sincere feeling. That he was subjected to no worse treatment than James is shown by various allusions to him in contemporary documents. He was allowed to keep a trusted servant with him, and this man was given passes from time to time that he might go over to France and bring clothing and other of his master's possessions, with supplies of money from his estates. Official language may be merely conventional, but in a note to the Treasurer dated from Westminster, May 28th, 1422, Henry gives orders that sufficient money is to be supplied for the "courtages et expences de nostre chier cousin le Duc d'Orleance." Joan of Arc seems to have taken deep interest in the prisoner, and since she predicted that he would be set free, a great effort was made by her friends on his behalf; but his release could not be procured, and as M. Chalvet points out in his introduc-

tion to the poems, Henry had good reason for retaining him. By his marriage to the daughter of Charles VI he had secured the right of succession to the throne of France, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Troyes, and therefore it was most necessary for him to keep the Duke out of the country, since he was a near relation of the Dauphin and one who was ready to uphold his right. As Henry himself wrote to the English Chancellor: "Si les prisonniers d'Agincourt and surtout Charles d'Orleans, s'échappaient, il ne me pouvait rien arriver de plus malheureux." Henry's object, therefore, was not the oppression of his captive, but the prevention of his harmful activities, and this view of the matter is borne out by the poems, for they are not the utterances of a sufferer driven desperate by cruel treatment, but rather the wistful and plaintive sighings of an exile.

An illumination in his book of Sonnets, preserved among the Royal MSS, in the British Museum (MS. Reg. F. 11) gives the earliest view known of the Tower and the City of London; there is nothing to show whether Charles himself executed it, but it represents him as seated in the White Tower surrounded by guards. Manuscript copies of his poems are to be found in the British Museum, the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and the Library at Grenoble. The first complete printed edition was produced in France by M. Chalvet in 1809 and in England by George Watson Taylor in 1827. The poems are chiefly in French, but some are in English, and it has been suggested that these are translations by some contemporary, though Charles' long residence in England would no doubt make it perfectly possible for him to write English poems. A few appear in both languages; as, for instance, the following address to his Lady:

Fraiche Beauté, très riche de jeunesse,
Riant regard très amoureusement,
Plaisant parler gouverné par sagesse,
Port féminin en corps bien fait et gent;
Haultain maintien demené doucement,
Accueil humble plein de manière lye,
Sans nul danger bonne chère faisant,
De ces grans biens est ma Dame garnie.
Tant bien lui sied, à ma noble Princesse,
Chanter, danser, et tout esbattement
Qu'on la nomme de se faire Maistresse.

Fresshe bewtie riche of yowthe and lustynes
The smylng lookis casten so louely,
The pleasaunt speche governyd by wittyness
Body wel shape, of port so womanly
The high estat demeyned so swetely,
The well ensewidnes of word and chere,
Without disdeyne shewyng to lowe and hye,
Alle thewis goode this hath my lady dere,
For whiche alle folk hir prayse and so do y.

So well becometh the nobill good princesse
To synge or daunce in all disport trewly
That of such thyng she may be called maystres.

The charge has been brought against Charles by several of his editors and critics that he was too much occupied with his own feelings and ideas, and that a true patriot would have spent his time in lamenting the distracted state of his unhappy country. Even Villemain, one of the most appreciative, reproaches him for not expressing his grief "sur les misères de la France, tant ravagée par les Anglais." But it should surely be remembered that Charles was a prisoner in the hands of these same English, and chivalrous a foe as Henry might be, it would have been most impolitic for a captive at his mercy to denounce his victories. His graceful fancies and his delicate sentiments probably saved him from despair during the twenty-five years of his imprisonment: as he himself says:

Il n'est nul si beau passe temps
Que de jouer à sa pensée.

His thoughts were his companions, they beguiled him in his hours of sadness and relieved the monotony of his existence. Nor did his fancies make him forgetful of the country whose wrongs he was powerless to avenge. France was ever in his mind, and though her shores were forbidden ground to him, his spirit dwelt among the well-loved scenes of his youth. It has been suggested that the richness of his images and the clear-cut precision of his phrases may have been influenced by the jewels, carvings, enamels, and other works of art that his parents loved and collected: "une idée nette dans une forme exquise," is the distinguishing mark of his poetry. But however this may be, the quality of his work is unmistakable, and as de Julleville points out, it is one of the reasons why it has not "dated": "Il est, parmi nos anciens, celui qui a le moins vieilli. Sa langue est si limpide qu'elle reste claire après cinq cent ans."

In one of the most charming of the Ballades he tells of his undying love for France:

En regardant vers le pais de France,
Ung jour m'avint a Dover sur la mer,
Qu'il me souvint de la douce plaisance
Que souloye oudit pais trouver.
Si commençay de cuer a souspirer,
Combien certes que grant bien me faisait
De veoir France, que mon cuer amer doit.
Je m'avisay que c'estoit sçavance
De tels souspirs dedens mon cuer garder,
Ven que je voy que la voye commence
De bonne paix, qui très bien peut donner.
Pour ce, tournay en confort mon penser,
Mais non pourtant mon cuer ne se lassoit,
De veoir France, que mon cuer amer doit.

Alors, chargeay en la nef d'Espérance
Tous mes souhaitz en les priant d'aler
Oultre la mer, sans faire demourance
Et à France de me recommander.
Or nous doint Dieu bonne paix sans tarder!
Adonc auray loisir, mais qu'ainsi soit
De veoir France, que mon cuer amer doit.
Paix est trésor qu'on ne peut trop louer
Je ne guerre, point ne la doy priser,
Destourbé m'a longtemps, soit tort ou droit,
De veoir France, que mon cuer amer doit.

It is of this Ballade of Dover Beach that Villemain says: "Ces vers ont la charme d'un demi-sourire au milieu des pleurs." But this wistful melancholy could at times gleam out into gaiety, and there is a touch of delightfully sly humour in the poem written on hearing that news of his death had been circulated in France:

Nouvelles ont couru en France
Par maints lieux que j'estoye mort;
Dont avoient peu de desplaisance
Aulcuns qui me hayent à tort:
Aultres en ont eu desconfort,
Qui m'ayment de loyal vouloir,
Comme mes bons et vrays amis.
Si fais à toutes gens sçavoir
Qu'encore est vive la souris.
Je n'ay eu ne mal, ne grevance,
Dieu mercy, mais suis sain et fort,
Et passe temps en espérance
Que paix, qui trop longuement dort
S'evellera, et par accort
A tous fera lyesse avoir.
Pour ce de Dieu soient maudis
Ceux qui sont dolents de veoir
Qu'encore est vive la souris.

In another poem in this lighter vein—*Les Fourriers*—he sings of the harbingers of Summer going before to prepare his lodging, hanging curtains of leaves and spreading carpets of flowers. Stevenson dismisses this as a trivial reminiscence of his childhood: "the couriers going before to adorn the lodging the royal travellers were to occupy are just what would strike a child's mind, impervious to real interest." But when we remember that this is the utterance of one who looked at trees and flowers through the bars of a prison, and who lived at a time when the beauties of Nature were little accounted of either in painting or in poetry, it is surely not too much to say that this fifteenth-century poet has so modern a touch about him that he stretches a hand across the ages to meet the hand of Wordsworth, who found in the dancing daffodils a solace for his sadness.

It is generally supposed that the long poem addressed to his

"Lady dere" was inspired by the memory of Bona d'Armagnac, whose grave had been but newly made when he was carried away from France. It has not the dewy freshness of the *King's Quhair*, but though some of its phrases are stilted and its sentiments conventional, it is a genuine outpouring of love and longing.

He describes his Lady's grace and wonder :

She is more lyk then womā a goddes,
I trowe that God hath sent hir almyghty
Into this world to shewe his gret larges,
What vertu he kan sett in oon body.
She is the sool fenix of Araby
Which may not be through praysid in a yere,
Hit to psume wer a gret foly.
For noon hath wett ther to suffisyngly,
Alle thewis goode this hath my lady dere.

To "biholde hir swete demene" is a remedy for "distres" : and one that makes "euery payne forgote." The "brennyng desir" to see his "fayre maystres" threatens to consume his "faynt hert which drepith in distres," and in his despair he calls upon Love to aid him :

Without thi grace O god of love y cry
Helpe now myn hert that many helpe hast sent,
Thus calle y for yowre socoure pitiously.

On this first fresh day of May, he says, Love is keeping his high feast; he decks the trees with green and covers the earth with flowers, all to cheer the hearts of sad lovers. But how shall his sad heart know cheer without her who is

My first in thought, and last, my lady dere !

There is something more than mere convention in the lament of the solitary prisoner :

Alas deth, who made thee so hard,
To take away the most nobill p'ncesse
Wich comfort was of my lyf and body,
Mi wele, mi ioy, mi plesere and richesse.
Alone am y and wille to be alone,
Alone withouten plesere or gladnes,
Alone in care to sighe and grone,
Alone to wayle the deth of mi maystres,
Alone which sorow wille me neuyr cesse,
Alone y curse the lyf y do endure,
Alone this fayntith me my gret distres,
Alone y lyue an ofcast creature,
Alone deth com take me here anoon,
Alone that dost me dure so moche distres,
Alone y lyue my friendis alle ar foon, (foes)
Alone to die thus in mi lustynes,
Alone most welcome deth to thi rudenes,
Alone that worst kan pete lo mesure,

Alone come on, y bide but thee dowlless,
Alone y lyue an ofcast creature.

The poem ends with a request to the God of Love to give him back his heart, for now that his Lady is dead he can no more be Love's servant. Love grants his request and tells him to put away grief, since the stroke of death cannot be undone, and to win some lady whose devotion shall cure his wound. To this advice he answers :

Allas sir, alas sir, pardon me,
Neuer more will I chese love or lady, (choose)
Plesaunce and y haue partid company.

Seeing that he cannot be moved, Love agrees to release him from his service :

Ye shall haue by my court of parlement
A quyttaunce geve by wich that alle may se
That y releasid haue thee.
The parlement seid ye. ye. ye.
We woll therto consent.

His heart is then given back to him and he slips it into his breast and departs with Comfort, who has been told to take him to the castle of No Care. From this castle he sends Love a letter to thank him for his kindness and for all the joy he had while in his service; the letter is "wrete"

As on the 13th day of Novembre,
Bi the trewe Charlis duk of Orleance,
That sumtyme was oon of yo pore servaunce.

But his "lady dere" still enthralls him and in another poem he describes in detail the dress in which she appears to him : her mantle is many-hued,

Nor blake nor grene
But most lyk to a raynbow hewe it was,
Forwhi the silkis wer so very straunge
That ay from blew to reed or grene thei chaunge,
Of wich the tissew ron in clowde werk
And as thei brak now here now ther
Some wt rayn and tempest lookid derk
And out of othir smote some bemys clere. (beams)
A bordir had this mantill eek theron
That praty was and riche in verry dede,
For made it was a brere of gold that ron (briar)
Now here and there wt rosis whit and reed,
Upon the wich and levis as thei sprede (leaves)
Some loose some fast thei sett were ful of ston,
And that of perlis passynge many oon.
The lynyng of hit was wt nedill wrought
So playn so thikke so smooth so prately
With litill litill flowris soft
The soven and the daisy,
But most of pancy myght y spy.

The lingering tenderness of this description is a convincing proof

that Charles is recalling some dainty robe in which the loved and lost Bona had delighted her bridegroom's eyes, with its shimmering lustre and its

litill litill flowris soft.

No wonder that as he saw it once more in his mind's eye there was among its embroideries "most of paney"—that is, heartsease!

It was not until long after the death of Henry V that Charles was allowed to return to France. The King had left a command in his will that he should not be released until his successor came of age, and M. Chalvet declares that the motive for detaining him was not wholly political: "Les revenus considerables qu'il retirait, les dépenses qu'il était obligé de faire pour représenter d'une manière convenable à son rang, pouvaient être en effet les motifs suffisants pour qu'ils ne fussent pas très empressés à le laisser partir." Henry's desire to smooth the path of his infant son seems motive enough, but in any case it was not until 1449, when Henry VI had reached the age of nineteen that the Duke of Burgundy was able to arrange the release on payment of a ransom of 300,000 crowns.

A great welcome awaited him in France, and one of his first acts was to ask and obtain the hand of the youthful Mary of Cleves. He was now a man of fifty and his bride was only fifteen, but the union seems to have been a happy one; Villemain says that in the youth of his bride he found a new Spring, that he was devoted to the children who were born to them, and that love and gaiety were the characteristics of their little Court at Blois until his death in 1463. Ballades and Rondeaux still flowed from his pen. This "captive and captivating prince," as Andrew Lang calls him, came back from his long exile with an unimpaired capacity for joy and love, and to accuse him of sentimentality because his swallow-flights of song dipped their wings in tears, is to ignore the inevitable effect upon a sensitive nature of such troubles as he endured.

It is, after all, in his own words that we find the truest description of his poems:

Dedans mon livre de pensée
J'ai trouvé écrivant mon cœur
La vraie histoire de donloir,
De larmes toute enluminée.

MARY BRADFORD WHITING.

PAUL BOURGET UP TO DATE.

AFTER more than half a century of literary activity, Paul Bourget is still faithful to his principle of finding his true recreation in his work. When, some three or more years ago, certain of his friends proposed celebrating his literary jubilee by a dinner and presentation, Bourget implored Bordeaux to forego any such idea, pointing out that to men of his, Bourget's, age every hour that remained to them in life was precious and that, as far as he was concerned, work was his real festival. And true to this theory, Bourget continues his output of books that count; of works that contain a series of adventures framed in social happenings, thus forming an exact chronicle of the evolution of thought and life in France, and showing with admirable precision what were the salient traits of the periods treated.

Bourget has shown in his novel *Cruelle Enigme* the influence of the Franco-German War upon the feelings and characters of his personages, and in his last novel, *Le Danseur Mondain*, the tragic war years of 1914-1918 are responsible for the changed behaviour of the hero. But this is the only point of resemblance between the two books, and the author once more proves his fidelity to his life-long aim—the search for Truth, and his successful clear-sightedness, in the wonderfully modern presentment of Nayrial, the *Danseur Mondain*. The subject of the novel may seem commonplace; but the way in which it is treated is original and in Bourget's best manner, pitilessly logical, ruthlessly true. His merciless analysis of modern society brings into high relief the discontent and restlessness of the after-war generation and its antipathy for the "middle-class" virtues and values of its predecessors.

In *Le Danseur Mondain*, Bourget touches upon the act of dishonesty committed by his hero, Pierre-Stéphane Beurтин, an act which is to colour the rest of his career. Demobilised, Beurтин is taken on as secretary by the famous lawyer, Jaffreux, an old friend of his mother's, who is dying of heart disease. In order to pay his gambling-debts, Beurтин steals some rare books in the lawyer's library and pawns them, hardly realising the meanness of his behaviour. Jaffreux discovers the theft and dismisses his secretary, opening the latter's eyes to the gravity of his conduct by some extremely straight plain-speaking, though refraining from prosecution for Madame Beurтин's sake. She, however, struck by her son's unhappy appearance, presses him to confide in her, and when the wretched lad blurts out the truth, the shock brings on a heart attack which proves fatal. Beurтин, full of remorse, and smarting still from the stinging remarks of his late employer, and loathing the restraints of a comfortable, everyday life, changes his name

to that of Nayrial, and offers himself as professional dancer in a Palace Hôtel on the Riviera.

Here he makes the acquaintance of a girl, who, guessing that his real position in society is not that of the dancing-master who gives her a daily lesson, falls in love with him. He is attracted to her in the first instance because her mother, Madame Favy, suffers from the same heart trouble as did his own. Later on, he makes friends with her brother, only to find that the latter, a gambler, is in straits for money. Still remembering his own past, Nayrial lends Favy money, but, this lost in its turn, the unhappy boy steals an opal brooch belonging to one of the guests in the hôtel. He confides in the "danseur mondain," who, in order to avoid a repetition of the scene that had cost his own mother her life, goes to give himself up to the police. Meantime Jaffreux has arrived in the hôtel, where he recognises Nayrial, and the Favy family, being friends of his, he denounces his former secretary, first to the daughter, then to the son, and then to the detective in charge of the lost brooch affair. But the latter, struck by Nayrial's manner when he declared himself the thief, has refused to believe his tale, and fails to be convinced by Jaffreux's suspicions. The brother and sister confide in the lawyer, and he, conscience-stricken by the chivalrous conduct of the man he had so unjustly judged, moves heaven and earth to hush the matter up, and then offers Nayrial a position which will enable him to marry Mademoiselle Favy, who is more than ever in love with him.

It is at this point that Bourget shows himself for what he is, one of the keenest observers of character, and of modern character into the bargain. Had he been writing in pre-war days, there is no doubt that his hero would have accepted the offer, married the charming little heroine, and done his best to go back to a normal existence among people of his own class. But Paul Bourget knows that the mentality of 1925 is leagues removed from that of 1914, and that the men and women of 1926 are incapable of actions that seemed perfectly natural to the personages in Bourget's earlier works. Therefore, when Jaffreux offers all these advantages to Nayrial, the latter first of all hesitates, and then refuses. Some of the finest and cleverest writing in the book is to be found in the letter written by the "danseur mondain" to his old employer, a letter revealing a mentality common to hundreds of younger men, who, having gone through the war or part of it, find themselves profoundly deceived by its results, by what they hoped would be peace, but which is only a period of unrest and uneasy seeking, an aftermath of collective powerlessness which prevents them either going back to the old easy life of the Past, or on to some nobler life in the Future. Bourget understands human nature and the strange mixture of feelings, good

and bad, that go to make up a man, and therefore Nayrial acts exactly as a thinking man of his time would act when he declines the lawyer's offers. Looking forward into the years to come, he considers what life would be, married to the girl whom he admits he admires and considers the most sympathetic in every way of all the women he has ever met. He looks at the matter from every point of view, then finally declares that marriage with Mademoiselle Favy would not be the "beautiful dream" described by Jaffreux, but that "it would be, in the most brutal sense of the word, an unbearable imprisonment." And there we have it, in Bourget's clean, clear-cut French—the modern hatred of any tie or situation that threatens to become irksome, the dread of a yoke that sooner or later may gall. With the "danseur mondain," hundreds of men and women are saying to-day, "I can no longer bear the dead-level of a commonplace life, I have drunk too deep of the cup of Risk." And so they, like he, are seeking restlessly some other form of living, and Bourget, bending over their disquiet souls, sees with his all-penetrating eye and understands with his all-comprehensive intellect their actions and reactions. A little sadly, too, he follows them, in the person of his hero, upon their questing way; summing up, in the latter's admirable diagnostic of himself, the result upon their personality:

"I have resembled those lovers who, betrayed by the mistress they adored, seek forgetfulness in the ignoble alibi of drink, so that what was noblest in them, their despair, drags them down to degradation of themselves."

Does not Bourget in these words, put into Nayrial's mouth, exactly describe the state of mind of hundreds of men and women to-day, and do we not see some trace of this same disappointment and unrest in the younger personages of Galsworthy's novels? Life has tricked them, somehow. They fail to find what they expected of it, and so despairing of satisfaction they stifle their nobler instincts and seek forgetfulness of their pain in pursuits unworthy of their better nature.

But Paul Bourget is too keen an observer of the drama of Life not to realise that such a frame of mind cannot be everlasting. The war broke up the old order of things, and the years since have been full of disorder and lacking in stability. Little wonder, then, that men's characters have become unbalanced. Every social evolution of any value takes time, and often generations pass before it reaches the final curve of its ascension. In his home at Costebello, the great French novelist has traced in so many of his works the varying stages on the upward road of poor humanity. He has not finished his self-imposed task of study and description, nor has he said his last word in *Le Danseur Mondain*. It is a well-known

fact in French literary circles that he is at work on another novel, to be called *Nos Actes Nous Suivent*.

This new work is going to emphasise one of Bourget's strongest beliefs, that a man's acts are the expression of his personality. He, and he alone, is the author of their being, he conceives and creates them. Far from shifting the blame or the responsibility on to other shoulders, he must face the truth that "his works follow him" as he himself has—consciously or unconsciously—ordained. And Bourget, it appears, in this new book will endeavour to show that a man owes it to himself, as well as to others, to rise superior to his feelings, his senses, and to his environment, in order that his works, that are destined to follow him, may be an uplift to those who come after him.

Tempora mutantur nos et mutamur in illis. Paul Bourget admits the self-evident truth, but while noting changes brought about by Time, and modifications in character due to Time's agency, he remarks that the basis of human nature and its essentials remain fundamentally the same. And he therefore concludes that in spite of a change in values, and in the face of present-day social upheavals, there is still hope for both the individual and the community.

E. EALES.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

LAKE TSANA AND THE NILE.

A SENSE of humour is an element in the Abyssinian character. It has lately been giving some innocent exercise to the diplomacy of the Great Powers. Last year elaborate arrangements were being made by Great Britain, France and Italy about their respective spheres of economic interest in Abyssinia, Great Britain specialising on Lake Tsana. The arrangement was made in an apparently satisfactory way. This month a curious and at first whiff exciting report came from America that the contract for building a dam at Lake Tsana had been granted to an American firm, whereupon the three Powers aforesaid, or one of them, appeared to have missed the fair altogether. It later transpired that the report was premature and even inaccurate, although it left behind something of a mystery.

The report alluded to was published on November 4th. It stated that the Abyssinian Government was on the point of granting to the American engineering firm of J. G. White a concession for the construction of a dam across the Blue Nile at the point where it emerges from Lake Tsana. The news was put out in so confident a spirit that an explanatory note was added to the effect that the American firm would "sell" the water thus collected to Egypt and the Sudan. If that report had been true, it would mean that the American firm would have control of a source of water supply which would be of immense importance to the cotton plantations in Egypt and in the Sudan. Now it happened that the British Government had by treaty obtained from the Abyssinian Government a promise that the concession in question would not be granted except with the consent of the British Government. The alleged news that a contract had been negotiated with an American firm came as a surprise to Whitehall, but Whitehall calmly maintained its confidence that the Abyssinian Government would live up to its promises. Further news therefore was waited calmly.

The waters of the Nile are a matter of life and death to Egypt and an essential factor in the prosperity of the Sudan. Great Britain has a preponderant interest in both these countries, and for many years therefore has taken careful precautions to safeguard those interests by concluding with various powers a series of agreements prescribing that those powers should not by any action of theirs diminish the volume of water in the Nile or in its tributaries. Italy, for instance, by a Protocol signed on April 15th, 1891 promised "not to construct on the Atbara in view of irrigation any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile." By a declaration dated March 21st, 1899 France bound herself not to acquire or

to seek either territorial or political influence inside the Nile Basin. By virtue of an agreement dated May 9th, 1906, the Independent State of the Congo withdrew from the Nile Basin except at one small point, and gave the further promise "not to construct any work on or near the Semliki or Isango River which would diminish the volume of water entering Lake Albert, except in agreement with the Sudanese Government." In 1902, moreover, the British Government obtained an important undertaking from the Emperor Menelik himself. The undertaking was embodied in an exchange of notes dated March 18th, 1902, in which the Emperor stated that in the event of the flow of the Nile's tributaries being interfered with by any project "preference will be given to the proposals of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan." He added that he had no intention of giving any concessions affecting the Blue Nile and Lake Tsana except to His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan or one of their subjects. A few months later, by the treaty of May 15th, 1902, the Emperor definitely promised "not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan."

The 1902 treaty obligation seemed to be watertight. The British Government, however, was not yet satisfied. In 1906 an elaborate arrangement was made whereby France, Italy and Great Britain agreed to protect the integrity of Ethiopia and to respect each others' economic interests. The Tripartite agreement was signed in London on December 13th. It was fully described in this section of *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* for August, 1926. The special interests of Great Britain and Egypt were defined in Article four, paragraph A, as centering "in the Nile Basin, more especially as regards the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries." Further conversations took place between Great Britain and Italy in 1919 and in 1925. In November, 1919, the Italian delegates made a proposal which was rejected by the British Government: "In view of the predominating interests of Great Britain in respect of the control of the waters of Lake Tsana, Italy offers Great Britain her support, in order that she may obtain from Ethiopia the concession to carry out works of barrage in the lake itself, within the Italian sphere of influence, pending the delimitation of the extent of the territorial zone to be recognised as pertaining to Great Britain in respect of the latter's predominant hydraulic interests, and pending a just consideration of the reservation on behalf of Italy by the Tripartite Agreement likewise in respect of her hydraulic interests. Italy further offers her support to Great Britain in order

that the latter may obtain from Ethiopia the right to construct and maintain a motor road between Lake Tsana and the Sudan.

"Italy requests the support of Great Britain in order that she may obtain from the Ethiopian Government the concession to construct and to run a railway from the frontier of Eritrea to the frontier of Italian Somaliland, which railway, according to the Tripartite Agreement, must pass to the west of Adis Abeba. It is understood that this railway, together with all the necessary works for its construction and for its running, must have an entirely free passage across the above-mentioned road.

"Italy requests from Great Britain, as she also reserves to herself, the right to request from France an exclusive economic influence in the west of Ethiopia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the above mentioned railway, and the promise to support with the Ethiopian Government all requests for economic concessions regarding the Italian zone." That offer was rejected by the British Government, which was unwilling to allow a foreign power to establish any sort of control over the headwaters of a river which is of vital consequence to Egypt and to the Sudan.

In 1925 Great Britain renewed her attempt to obtain from Italy a clearer recognition of the special nature of British interests at Lake Tsana. It was held to be all the more desirable that an undertaking be reached on that point because the Emperor of Abyssinia—"The Lion, conqueror of the tribe of Judah, Menelik II, elect of the Lord, King of Kings of Ethiopia" as he was officially described—had looked favourably upon, and even encouraged, Anglo-Italian difficulties. The more difficulties, the higher the price that could be asked for concessions; and the conqueror of the tribe of Judah was an Eastern potentate. An Anglo-Italian agreement was duly reached, in the form of letters exchanged in Rome on December 14th, 1925. Italy undertook to give "support and assistance at Adis Abeba with the Abyssinian Government in order to obtain from them a concession for His Majesty's Government to construct a barrage at Lake Tsana, together with the right to construct and maintain a motor road for the passage of stores, personnel, etc., from the frontier of the Sudan to the barrage." In return Great Britain undertook "to support the Italian Government in obtaining from the Abyssinian Government a concession to construct and run a railway from the frontier of Eritrea to the frontier of Italian Somaliland" and (in the event of the Tsana concession being granted to Great Britain) "to recognise an exclusive Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the above-mentioned railway." It was added as a condition that "such recognition and undertaking are subject to the proviso that the Italian Government on their side, recognising the

prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan, will engage not to construct on the headwaters of the Blue or White Nile or their tributaries or affluents any work which might sensibly modify their flow into the main river."

Thereupon His Majesty's Government began the enterprise of obtaining from the Abyssinian Government a concession for the construction of the dam. Two years passed. No answer had been received from Adis Abeba. Then suddenly an American firm claimed to have been given the contract. There seemed to be no doubt that Dr. W. C. Martin, who was on his way from the United States, had discussed the contract with the American firm. The report, premature and inaccurate as it was, certainly suggested that the best-laid schemes of twenty-five years' diplomacy might unexpectedly "gang agley." So easy in mind had been the Italian and British diplomatists about their schemes that after the 1925 agreement Signor Mussolini sent a magnanimous communication to the Regent of Abyssinia assuring him of Italy's determination strictly to respect Abyssinian independence. The Regent's answer was typical of his humour. He thanked Signor Mussolini for his assurance and remarked that the suspicion that Italy ever had other intentions had not crossed his mind.

The excitement produced by the firm of J. G. White was due to a general recognition of the importance of Lake Tsana. The mere safeguarding of the flow of the water in the upper reaches of the Nile is no longer regarded as enough to satisfy the growing needs both of the Sudan and of Egypt. In Egypt the population now works out at nearly three to every acre of cultivated land. An extension of the system of irrigation is therefore urgently desirable, but can be undertaken only when more water becomes available. In the Sudan also the welfare of large sections of the people has now become dependent on the development of irrigation schemes. The Sudan respects the riparian rights of Egypt lower down the Nile, and therefore cannot take the water out of the river except in the flood season. The particular need of the Sudan therefore is for further works for the conservation of flood water as a means of developing irrigation. The maximum development made possible by the present reservoir at Makwar on the Blue Nile will be reached within the next few years.

Hence the importance of Lake Tsana. Lying at the headwaters of the Blue Nile, it happens to be incomparably the best site for the building of a reservoir where the surplus water of the rainy season and of the floods may be collected in readiness for release when the flow of the river is low. At present Lake Tsana makes its greatest contribution to the Blue Nile when the Egyptian and Sudanese part of that river are amply replenished from other sources, and makes

its smallest contribution when the river is low. Some of the flood water is therefore discharged wastefully into the Mediterranean, neither Abyssinia nor the Sudan nor Egypt deriving any benefit from it. If by contrast the outflow from the Lake were controlled, the water could be kept back when the Nile is low, that is, when the water could be kept back when the Nile is low, that is, when the bigger supply released when the Nile is low, that is, when Egypt and the Sudan need Lake Tsana most. Abyssinian interests would not thereby be damaged, but served, because Abyssinia does not need the water for herself, and Great Britain, Egypt and the Sudan are prepared to pay for it. The building of a regulator would enable the Abyssinian Government to sell the water, and the regulator itself would constitute an integral part of the system of control works now being built in Egypt and in the Sudan.

The waters of Lake Tsana, now wasted, would, if organised, be of incalculable benefit to South Lancashire, for the raw material of the Lancashire cotton mills comes largely from the Egyptian and Sudanese plantations. It is estimated that a dam could be built without difficulty, without damage to Abyssinia's physical interests, and with benefit to her financial interests. It could be built to store an additional 3,000,000 cubic metres of water per annum—or a little more than the content of the Assouan dam—ready to serve the need of the plantations along the river when the need arises.

Hence it is that the British Government, relying on the promise of the 1902 treaty, has asked the Abyssinian Government for permission to build and to maintain a dam across the Blue Nile at the point where it leaves Lake Tsana, and to deepen the channel where necessary to ensure the fullest supply of water. It has been explained to Adis Abeba that the British Government would undertake as far as possible to use local labour, while claiming that the engineers and labourers from the Sudan, who would also be needed for building and maintaining the dam, should be ensured free access into the country. It is assumed that the Abyssinian Government would guarantee the safety of the workers and would help in the finding of local labour and materials.

It happens that they take a more philosophical view of the value of human life in Abyssinia than we do further west. Last June, for instance, eight British Somalis were killed and ten wounded by Abyssinian soldiers. A Court of Inquiry into the murders was held at Harrar, consisting of two Abyssinians and two British with the Belgian Minister as chairman. Ras Taffari paid an interim indemnity of £1000. The finding of the Court, as announced on October 25th, was that the total indemnity should be £2,500, and it recommended the "dismissal" of Gadla Giorgis, the chief of Jijiga, the district where the attack took place. That was all. It had been expected that Gadla Giorgis would be seriously punished, and that a

serious indemnity would be fixed. The "dismissal" of Gadla Giorgis will probably mean only his transference to another district. The interesting thing is that the efforts of the Belgian Minister to obtain redress on a scale more in keeping with the nature of the disturbance were apparently thwarted by the lighter view of the June affair which was taken in Abyssinia. For British official opinion to express its assumption that the Abyssinian Government would guarantee the safety of the workers at Lake Tsana would perhaps have seemed odd, apart from its context.

A promise was made by the British Government that once the dam was built the number of the permanent staff needed for its maintenance would be reduced to the minimum compatible with efficiency. The transport of material necessary for the building work would call for the making of a road from the Sudan frontier to Delgi on the lake. It is recognised that the people who live on either side of the Blue Nile are entitled to use the water of the river both for domestic purposes and for the cultivation of food crops. Such riparian rights would be scrupulously respected. An undertaking was offered as part of the contract that the dam would be built in such a way as to ensure that the water level of the lake would never rise higher than the highest level hitherto reached in the rainy season, so that the churches built on the islands in the lake or on the shore need not fear inundation. The sovereign rights of Abyssinia would no more be challenged by the building of the dam than is British sovereignty challenged by the building of Ford motor car works in Manchester. The British Government offered to pay a fair rent during the period of construction and an increased rent on completion, with the further promise that in proportion as Sudanese agriculture was benefited by the dam the rent would be further increased. If, for instance, experience showed that the resultant profits to the Sudan exceeded the original expectation, the British Government offered to revise the scale of rent agreed on. It was what business men call a business proposition. Moreover it is arguable that the inhabitants of the Tsana shores would benefit, because they would have a free safeguard against any flood level higher than any level known in the past; the new arrangements would help to drain the neighbouring malarial swamps to the improvement of health; the transforming the Gallabat to Delgi track into a good mountain road would give employment to local labour and improved means of local trade ever after; large sums of money would be spent in Abyssinia on raw materials and the work of building. The Tsana water is of no use for irrigation in Abyssinia. The bargain for Abyssinia would therefore appear to be complete.

East however is East. A bargain is never complete. Clearly there was something for Abyssinia to bargain with. France, Italy, and

Great Britain had the sense to eliminate the competition between themselves, whereat no doubt Ras Taffari was sorry. Across the Atlantic, however, is the United States, the home of the world's cash. When, on November 4th, the firm of J. G. White announced that an American contract was about to be signed, realistic people had to allow for possible developments. It was known that Dr. Martin was on his way back from the United States, whence it followed that he had been in the United States. He was there ostensibly and primarily on other business, but a big industrial firm, whether in the United States or elsewhere, does not announce to the press the completion of a draft agreement unless a draft agreement in fact exists.

While therefore the British Government stoutly sang the song of 1902, other less precise people became alarmed; for a job involving a capital of £4,000,000 belonging by treaty right to British engineers and to British labour, is of some consequence to Great Britain at a time when British industry is suffering from the attempted suicide of 1914-1918. The fact that America had more sense than to attempt suicide, except when it was certain that she couldn't, makes one take off one's hat to America; but Great Britain has been punished enough. When therefore Dr. Martin arrived at Liverpool on November 7th and announced that no contract had been signed, he relieved many minds, although it was remarked that he did not deny or refer to his relations with Messrs. J. G. White. On the following afternoon (November 8th) Sir Austen Chamberlain was asked in the House of Commons if he had seen the report that an American firm had been granted the future "control of the water supplies of Egypt and the Sudan." Sir Austen said, "Yes, Sir; but I have not as yet received any official information as to the reported negotiations, nor as to the attitude of the Abyssinian Government in the matter. If it had been the case that the Abyssinian Government contemplated the grant of such a concession without consulting us, this action would constitute a violation of the Treaty of 1902 between His Majesty's Government and the Emperor Menelik, whereby the Abyssinian Government undertook not to construct, or allow to be constructed, such a dam except by agreement with His Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan, but I am confident that the Abyssinian Government are not unmindful of this obligation, and this is confirmed by the interview with Dr. Martin which appears in this morning's papers. My meeting with the Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs gave me the opportunity to take counsel with him on this matter in which the Egyptian Government naturally takes a keen interest."

Dr. Martin went from Liverpool to London on November 11th and called at the Foreign Office, where he saw the head of the Egyptian

Department. The result was regarded as satisfactory in Whitehall, and as justifying the song above alluded to. Dr. Martin gave to the Foreign Office an assurance on two points which essentially embraced all the points at issue. He stated (1) that the Abyssinian Government had not granted any concession for the construction of the dam; (2) that the Abyssinian Government fully honoured and was acting in full accordance with the 1902 treaty. It followed logically that the Abyssinian Government would not grant this concession except with the consent of the British Government. The British view being that British engineers were good enough, and there being a definite British proposal in the field in that sense, it further followed—if black could be relied on to be black and white, white—that the concession would go to Great Britain. There the matter rested. At the moment of writing no word had been received from Adis Abeba in answer to the British tender.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

The Tsana Dam was not the only lever whereby British diplomatic interest in the Middle East was set in motion during October and November. King Feisal and his Prime Minister, Jafar Pasha, arrived in London at the beginning of the last week of October. On October 25th they went to the Dominions Office to start discussions about the Anglo-Iraq Treaty and the prospects of Iraq's joining the League of Nations. As the Anglo-Iraq Treaty limits the competence of Iraq in foreign policy the discussions were jealously claimed by the Dominions Office as belonging to their special province, although Sir Austen Chamberlain lay in wait in case any unforeseen point of foreign policy should arise. Mr. Amery being away on his Empire tour, the chief British spokesman was Mr. Ormsby Gore. We were assured that no controversial issue arose between Jafar Pasha and Mr. Ormsby Gore. The assurance was easy to accept because there is no controversy in British relations with Iraq. Exchanges are constantly taking place between Bagdad and London about the progress that is being made by Iraq towards that condition of solidity which will enable her to apply for membership of the League of Nations.

The British mandate over Iraq has been an expensive and an anxious burden. Great Britain is committed to give financial and military support to Iraq until such time as Iraq may be competent to assume full independence. By the terms of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, that British commitment is to come to an end either when Iraq joins the League of Nations, or twenty-five years after the Anglo-Iraq treaty was ratified, whichever period be the shorter. As the Anglo-Iraq treaty was ratified last year, the date beyond which the British mandate cannot be prolonged is 1951, but no one in Great

Britain or in Iraq contemplates the prolongation of the mandate for more than a few years. King Feisal, indeed, hinted in London this month that, in his opinion, Iraq will be ready to apply for membership of the League at the next Assembly. That was an interesting but not embarrassing subject for discussion.

It cannot be expected that any definite view will be formed on the British side during the discussions now proceeding. Exchanges of view on this subject have been passing through the diplomatic channel between Bagdad and London for many months, the main importance of the London discussions being to add the personal touch, which is always valuable in important diplomacy. On the British side, it is a cause for both gratification and congratulation that the young State of Iraq has progressed so quickly. The revenues of Iraq reveal a healthy financial condition. As a result, the cost of the British share in the Iraq administration has gone down from £4,000,000 to £3,000,000 in the last twelve months. That is an important matter at a time when Mr. Churchill has never succeeded in balancing a budget. It will be a still more important event when Iraq ceases altogether to be a British financial liability. The question, however, whether Iraq is yet in a position to take her full part in world affairs as an independent State is a matter primarily of commonsense. It is the nature of youth to force the pace. There is something to be said for those who argue that it would be better for Iraq to consolidate her prestige before applying to Geneva.

While the Iraq potentates were still in London Sarwat Pasha also arrived there. He crossed from Brussels to London on October 30th. In the case of Sarwat precautions were taken, a little exaggeratedly perhaps, by the spokesmen of both Cairo and London to discount any potential importance there might be in the visit. Their anxiety was no doubt due to the inflammable material of their domestic background. It was feared, for instance, that the Zaglulist element in Cairo, which is far from having been extinguished by the death of Zaglul Pasha himself in August, might find it incumbent on them to counter any suggestion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement by an outburst of Zaglulist protest, just as Sir Austen might find himself baited by the Die-hard fears about a British "scuttling." The tactical element in the atmosphere of Sarwat's meeting with Sir Austen did not, however, spoil the friendliness of it. It had for its object the resumption of the negotiations which took place in the summer between him and Sir Austen about the still-unsolved problem of regularising Anglo-Egyptian relations.

The points which were "reserved" when Great Britain in 1922 declared Egypt to be an independent Kingdom have not yet been settled. A public suggestion was made by Sarwat Pasha in the sum-

mer that an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance should be concluded with the dual object of satisfying the Egyptian claim for real independence and of satisfying the legitimate interests of Great Britain in Egypt. That suggestion has met with a measure of approval from British official opinion. There remains the practical problem of carrying it into practice. Since Sarwat Pasha was last in London, the death of Zaglul Pasha has in some ways simplified the problem. Zaglul never conceded the principle that Great Britain had any legitimate interests in Egypt whatever. Yet it is a firm principle of British diplomacy, and one which will be approved by reasonable people, that Great Britain must have security of communication with India and other parts of the British Empire through the Suez Canal; that the integrity of the Sudan shall be safeguarded; that adequate precautions be taken for the safety of foreign lives and of foreign property in Egypt; and that there shall be an undertaking on the part of Egypt never to allow any third party to obtain an influence in Egypt. The basis of the British argument is simple. It happens geographically that the Suez Canal is the jugular vein of the British Empire. Every point of British policy follows logically from that fact. The Suez Canal is a highway of international importance, and British policy will never agree to any arrangement which would enable any single power, whether Egypt or another, from closing that Canal and thus cutting the jugular vein. It ought to be an easy problem to arrange for such supervision of the Canal Zone as would satisfy the British postulate. The difficulty, so far, has been that an exaggerated Egyptian nationalism has prevented Egypt's diplomatic representatives from taking the large view of the Suez Canal. The prospect has improved, and it now becomes possible that the settlement of the four reserved points will be merged within the terms of a treaty of alliance.

MINORITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

The subject of minorities has come to be associated with propagandist grievances. The people who are interested in minorities are almost invariably those who are fired to indignation by the injustices inflicted on given minorities by their superior Government. The propagandist motive is generally sound. Unfortunately, as we have been lately reminded, the propagandists develop a habit which tends to defeat its object by being uncritical. In Central Europe for instance there are serious minority problems. It might be imagined that those who feel deeply the injustices suffered by the minorities whom they champion would be the first to recognise and to appreciate the alternative case where a minority is well treated and has no grievance.

To all serious students of Central Europe it is a matter of con-

gratulation that Czechoslovakia has won the confidence of her minorities. Some of the habitual propagandists none the less have indiscriminately included the Czechoslovak Government in the general objective of their castigation. As a specific example we have heard much about the alleged difficulties between Czechs and Slovaks. Although it is known by the informed people that such propaganda is beside the mark, the propaganda itself does harm. It happens that Dr. Hodza, the leader of the Slovaks, came to London for a few days this month. It was the first time since the war that a Slovak of the front rank has visited London. He came at a time when some of the habitual propagandists aforesaid had succeeded in raising as a matter of general interest the question of the 1919 peace treaties, their efficacy and durability. Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Cecil had lately been drawn into the controversy. Particular interest therefore was centred in Dr. Hodza's visit. The blindest crusader about Slovak grievances could hardly refuse to listen to the views of the Slovak leader on alleged Slovak grievances.

The fact that Dr. Hodza is himself Minister of Education in the Czechoslovak Government and leader of the Slovak wing of the Prime Minister's own party in itself has an obvious significance. I asked Dr. Hodza to give me a statement about the situation in Slovakia and about that of the minorities in Czechoslovakia. "Having fought," he said, "for the Slovak cause against Magyar oppressing for the last twenty years, I know the ground thoroughly. The establishment of an independent Czechoslovak Republic has been for us the fulfilment of a life-long aspiration. We Slovaks are now simply an integral part of the Czechoslovak nation. If there have been differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the past, they must be regarded as party politics only of the same kind as the differences in Great Britain between the Conservative Party on one side and Labour or the Liberals on the other. There have been Slovak ministers in every Czechoslovak Government since the establishment of the Republic, and in the present Government even the Slovak Catholic Party, which formed the Slovak opposition in the past, is represented by two ministers, there being three Slovaks in the Cabinet, including myself.

"The present Government in Czechoslovakia," he said, "the third Svehla government, includes two Germans who represent the two largest German political parties. There are no Magyars in the Government, but there are six Magyar deputies in parliament who sat on the Government benches until the recent London campaign began. There is now, in fact, a system of close co-operation between the Czechoslovak and their minorities. There will, no doubt, arise debatable questions between them, but only about the details of

internal policy. The loyalty of the German minority to the State is now beyond all dispute. By their active participation in the government they have definitely manifested their allegiance. This is an important fact, when one considers the former brittleness of that part of Europe where Slavs and Germans intermix."

Dr. Hodza being Minister of Education, I took the occasion to ask him how the educational needs of the minorities were now met. "The proportions," he answered, "of the German, Czechoslovak and Magyar population are about the same as the proportion of German, Czech, Slovak and Magyar schools. There is practically the same number of classes *per capita*, which is unusual in Central Europe; the minorities are, if anything, slightly better off than the Czechoslovaks themselves. In university education the minorities are equally well provided for. There are three Czechoslovak universities (Prague, Brno and Bratislava) in which Czech or Slovak is used. The Germans have their own university in Prague. A chair of Magyar literature is on the point of being founded in the Czechoslovak university of Prague."

I took the occasion further to ask Dr. Hodza's view of two matters of outstanding importance, that of the peace treaties, and that of land reform in Central Europe with particular reference to the treatment meted out to Hungarian and other expropriated landlords. On the first point he said: "First of all a word about the treaties in general. I am against any frontier changes. Such a change would mean conflict. The European body politic has not yet recovered from the surgical operation of 1919. Would you prescribe another without even the expectation of a better result? If you alter frontiers in Czechoslovakia you will have to alter them in Poland, on the Rhine, everywhere. This is not the time. What Europe needs is peace and confidence. In Central Europe there are two systems in being. One is the old reactionary system of what may be called 'class privileges.' That is a dangerous system. It produces economic and social distress, which in its turn produces Bolshevism. In Czechoslovakia we try to combine economic and social progress with constitutional conservatism. That is the other system, and it will prevail."

"Now something about land reform. After the war, we should have directly provoked the agricultural masses if we had not passed our laws on land reform. We gave the masses a direct and real interest in private ownership. The reform was no confiscation. In accordance with our laws the landed proprietors receive for their soil an equivalent in long-term State Bonds on the basis of the prices prevailing in 1913-1915, besides rebates for the capital levy and compensations for investments. That gives them, not 100 per cent., but 200 per cent. The objection has been raised that the current

prices ought to be paid. This suggestion involves considerable difficulties, and might have extremely unpleasant results for the landed proprietors. The current prices would have to be reckoned on the basis of the land tax, which is assessed according to the net yield recorded in the 'cadastre' (the land register from Austria-Hungary). It is no secret that the morality of taxation is not always what it should be, and the yield recorded in the cadastre was considerably lower than it actually amounted to. Consequently, the taxation was lower, and, therefore, the current prices would also be lower than we fixed them by law, according to the actual average between 1913-1915. There are, of course, bound to be cases of incidental injustice in the application of so large a reform. Such cases can be, and are, either adjusted privately, or submitted to our Supreme Court of Law. On the whole, the land reform, if it has meant hardship to some hundreds of landowners, has provided land for 450,000 people, and has fortified the present democracy, a pillar against Bolshevism, in Czechoslovakia and throughout Central Europe."

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE.

The Permanent Court of International Justice has held a series of thirteen public sittings in a preliminary examination of a question submitted to it by the Council of the League about the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube. The question has some bearing on the economic function of the Danube and its mouths. Although the Danube has never been as important economically as the Rhine, its lower reaches are important to Central Europe because they carry the products of the riparian States to the Black Sea as well as the Rumanian and Bulgarian imports from western Europe. The exports mainly consist of cereals and other agricultural products; the imports are mainly manufactured articles. There are no reliable statistics of the volume of trade involved, but it is estimated on the existing evidence that before the war the normal volume was 6,800,000 tons. During the war the figure was smaller, but it has risen in the last few years. In 1923 it was about 4,000,000, in 1924 about 3,750,000, but much greater in 1925 and in 1926. Sea-going vessels can penetrate the delta as far up as the Rumanian port of Braila, above Galatz. Transhipment to and from barges takes place in both those ports. Both ports possess important railway stations for the transfer of goods between trains and ships. There is also a certain amount of traffic from the upper Danube consisting of German, Austrian, and Czechoslovak manufactured articles. The mouth of the river, however, although it provides an excellent ingress from the sea to the interior of the country, is hampered by certain physical difficulties which necessitate con-

stant supervision. That is the reason why the European Commission of the Danube, in addition to its powers of jurisdiction, has always been responsible for certain technical functions such as dredging, the maintenance of buoys, and pilotage. Even before the war the currents of the river had presented serious difficulties which were accentuated during the war. By 1919 the main channel (the Soulina arm) by which the bulk of the sea-going traffic was carried had seriously decreased in depth. Since then, however, the European Commission has succeeded in restoring an adequate depth. It is clear, therefore, that the competence of the European Commission is a matter of some importance. Certain difficulties have arisen, on which are based the questions submitted by the Council of the League to the Permanent Court. The first was :

"(1) Under the law at present in force, has the European Commission of the Danube the same powers on the maritime sector of the Danube from Galatz to Braila as on the sector below Galatz? If so, what are these powers? How far upstream do they extend?"

That is the chief issue between the countries interested, Great Britain, France and Italy on the one side, Rumania on the other. What are the powers of the European Commission in the Galatz-Braila sector? Before the issue as submitted to the Permanent Court can be appreciated, the historical circumstances in which the Commission has worked have to be recalled. It was constituted immediately after the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris (1856) for the purpose of removing obstacles to navigation in the mouths of the Danube and of applying the principles established at the Congress of Vienna. The main principle was that no obstacle should be put in the way of free navigation, except in so far as might be involved by police and quarantine regulations. The task thus given to the Commission soon appeared to be so big that it became necessary to give to the Commission a permanent instead of a temporary competence. The new competence was given to it by the Public Act of 1865, which defined its rights and powers. By that instrument the exclusive authority of the Commission was confirmed over the mouths of the Danube from the Black Sea to a point above Isakcha, where navigation was to be controlled by regulations issued by the Commission. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877, which led among other things to the recognition of Rumanian independence, had a big effect on the Statute of the European Commission. That Statute was amended by the Treaty of Berlin (1878) which provided (1) for the admission of Rumania as a member of the Commission and (2) the extension of the powers of the Commission, so as to make it independent of the territorial authority up to Galatz. By the same instrument the powers of the Commission were prolonged up to 1883. During the Berlin negotiations the question of extending

the Commission's competence up to Braila was considered, but no agreement was reached. By Article 54 of the Treaty of Berlin however it was provided that one year before the Commission was to come to an end the Powers should consider both the prolongation of its existence and any modifications they might choose to introduce in its competence. In 1883, therefore, the Powers met in London and extended the powers of the Commission up to Braila. Rumania protested, and has never signed the London agreement. Between 1883 and 1914 the Commission did exercise certain *de facto* powers between Galatz and Braila, although those powers were never defined. In 1919 by Article 346 of the Treaty of Versailles it was decided that the Commission "resume the powers it possessed before the war," it being understood that a further conference would be called to define its Statute. The new Conference met in 1920 in Paris, and drew up a Statute which stipulated (Article 5) that the Commission should retain its pre-war powers and that no alteration should be made in the powers resulting from the various "Treaties, Conventions, International Acts and Agreements relative to the Danube and its mouths" and that (Article 6) those powers should extend from the mouths of the river to the point where the authority of the International Commission began. Certain differences of opinion were thereby produced among the Powers concerned. Those Powers were now Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania, the Treaty of Versailles having eliminated Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, who were members of the Commission before the war. On British initiative Great Britain, France and Italy in 1924 decided to bring the general question before the Technical and Advisory Committee for Communications and Transit of the League of Nations. In 1925 that Committee sent a Mission of Inquiry to Rumania. On its return the Mission formulated the opinion that the European Commission's competence extends from Galatz to above Braila under the same conditions as from the sea to Galatz. That opinion was adopted by the parent Committee. Rumania, however, refused to accept it, and the four Powers decided to request the Council of the League to ask the Court for an advisory opinion on the issue.

This is the problem on which the International Court is now engaged. The conflicting views submitted to the Court both orally and in writing may be summarised in this way. Great Britain, France and Italy claim that the Commission is competent in the Galatz-Braila sector in the same way as below Galatz. They base their case on Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Statute. It is the view of the three Powers that the essential questions are these : under what conditions did the European Commission exercise its authority in the past and at what point does the authority of the

International Commission begin? It is claimed that there can be no doubt about the answer. By Article 9 of the Statute the International Commission exercises authority from Ulm to Braila. The authority of the European Commission must therefore begin at Braila. As for the Commission's past competence, the three Powers maintain that the European Commission exercised complete jurisdiction from the sea to Braila under the Treaty of London of 1883, which is binding on Rumania under Article 54 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878; and that a consistent practice has been established which has been converted into law by the Danube Statute of 1921. It is true that Rumania refused to accept the Treaty of London, but it is argued by the three Powers that she tacitly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Commission as far as Braila from 1883 to 1914.

By contrast Rumania puts a different interpretation on Article 6 of the Danube Statute, and while conceding that the Commission does exercise certain powers from the sea to Braila maintains that in the past those powers differed in the area between the sea and Galatz and between Galatz and Braila. Whereas between the sea and Galatz the Commission had both jurisdictional and technical powers, it exercised only technical powers between Galatz and Braila. Rumania combats the claim that the Commission has any jurisdictional powers between Galatz and Braila. She argues that the Treaty of 1883 has never bound Rumania, and that between 1883 and 1914 there has never been any consistent practice to justify the statement that the Commission exercised jurisdictional powers between Galatz and Braila. If any such powers were exercised, the Rumanian Government never knew of it. Rumania finally argues that in extending the power of the Commission to Braila the Powers behaved improperly, because a State can never be bound by a treaty which it has never accepted.

As for the other two questions referred to the Court, the case of the three Powers is that in the ports the practical line of demarcation between the authority of the European Commission and that of the Rumanian Government must be decided by geography and not by territorial sovereignty. It is further held that if a distinction has to be drawn between the powers of the Commission in the sector below Galatz and in the sector between Galatz and Braila, the line must be drawn above Galatz. Rumania by contrast claims that the line should be fixed between the navigable channel of the river and the ports, and proposes a point below Galatz.

Having heard the evidence the Court is now considering its verdict.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 15th, 1927.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

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JAMES WILSON, AN ECONOMIST STATESMAN.*

Some twenty-five years ago a junior clerk, who had just entered the Treasury, was informed by a veteran of the Department that the best Financial Secretary the Treasury had ever had was James Wilson. From these most instructive and often lively memoirs of her remarkable father and of the interesting circles in which he and his daughters moved it is evident that Wilson's influence on public finance, not only as editor of the *Economist*, member of Parliament, and Secretary of the Treasury, but also as a person whose advice was held in high esteem by Cornwall Lewis and other Whig statesmen, was not over-estimated by his brilliant son-in-law, Walter Bagehot. Hitherto Bagehot's admirable but too brief Memoir (printed in the *Economist* after Wilson's death in 1860) is the authority to which a student would turn who wished to know something of the founder of the *Economist*. Mrs. Barrington, his youngest daughter, a versatile writer with charming memories of mid-Victorian society, has now published in these two handsome and well-illustrated volumes an account which enables us to fill in the details of Bagehot's sketch and to appraise the strong character and solid achievements of a great public servant.

* *The Servant of All*, by Emilie I. Barrington; *Pages from the Family, Social and Political Life of the Right Hon. James Wilson, M.P., During Twenty Years of the Mid-Victorian Era*. Longmans. 2 vols. 28s. net.

VOL. CXXXII.

James Wilson was born at Hawick in 1805 and was educated with his brothers and sisters in the strict discipline of the well-known Quaker school at Ackworth in Yorkshire. In 1831 he fell in love with Elizabeth Preston, a member of the Church of England, whom he married in the following year; and in consequence of this lapse he "left the Society of Friends" after being interviewed by two of their elders. Wilson set up in business in London, and began to take part with Radical reformers like Francis Place in the great movement for political and economic emancipation. But his most important friendship at this time was with Richard Cobden. His youngest brother, George Wilson, became Chairman of the London branch of the Anti-Corn Law League; and in 1839 James Wilson, whose home was then at Dulwich, wrote a pamphlet, *Influences of the Corn Laws*, which made a mark and was quoted in the House of Commons by Robert Peel. This brought him into touch with Charles Villiers, who used to consult Wilson before making his annual motion for the Repeal of the Corn Laws. With the encouragement of Cobden, Charles Villiers, Lord Radnor and others, James Wilson started the *Economist* newspaper in 1843. Its first number appeared on September 2nd of that year; and since then no week, as Mrs. Barrington observes, except one during the general strike of 1926, has elapsed without a number of the *Economist* appearing.

Wilson, like Cobden, was a friend of Chevalier, the French economist, and also of Achille Fould, Finance Minister to Napoleon the Third. With Fould he had long conversations in 1856 and 1857, and Mrs. Barrington claims that these conversations helped to pave the way for the Commercial Treaty which Cobden negotiated in 1860. In conversation, it seems, James Wilson was impressive and persuasive. As his daughter puts it in a letter: "the effectively convincing power my father possessed in conversation undoubtedly influenced Fould, who urged Louis Napoleon to adopt views which led to the Commercial Treaty of 1860." Walter Bagehot described his father-in-law as "a great belief producer."

Perhaps the most striking proof of his extraordinary energy, public spirit, and financial foresight is provided by the last chapter in Wilson's career. In the autumn of 1859, when the Government and finances of India were still disordered by the effects of the Indian Mutiny, he was appointed the first Finance Minister of India; and in spite of the opposition of a high permanent official (Sir Charles Trevelyan) he carried out before his death at Calcutta in August of the following year a wonderfully complete and successful reorganisation of the financial system of India. Finding himself confronted with a large deficiency and heavy additions to the Public Debt resulting from the Mutiny, he introduced the Income Tax and remodelled financial procedure by a plan of annual budgets and

estimates with a Pay department and an effective audit. At the same time he laid the foundations of a sound currency and of a good system of police, which would enable the Government, as he hoped, to reduce the native army by at least one-third. Finally he planned, or projected, productive expenditure on public works and roads, in order to encourage production of cotton and other raw materials and so enlarge the foreign trade and purchasing power of the people. Of this last phase and of her father's tragic death Mrs. Barrington gives a very full and touching account, illustrated by a number of interesting letters. Had space permitted, I should have quoted freely from the Diaries of James Wilson's daughters, illustrating their life in London and in their country home at Westbury in Wiltshire. But I must be content with one extract—from Julia and Elizabeth Wilson's record of their father's election campaign at Westbury in the spring and summer of 1853:

March 17—Papa held a public meeting at 8 in the British School Room.

March 18—Papa had gentlemen with him all the evening till 2 a.m.

March 19—Active canvass. Success sure. Public meetings. June 29—During the night the opposite party carried off Joseph Applegate and locked him up. Great commotion.

June 30—Papa and Mr. Moffatt had an interview with Mr. Lopes about the kidnapped man. Both parties met in the afternoon at Bratton. Ours carried off Joseph triumphantly.

July 2—We copied lists of the voters who are to have rosettes. Papa closeted with other parties at Daniells, out all evening.

July 7—Nomination Day. All the gentlemen and ladies assembled here. Some of the gentlemen took us down to our windows at the Crown, a gentleman between two ladies. . . . Show of hands in favour of Papa, 4 to 1. All the ladies and many of the gentlemen returned with us to luncheon. Mr. Harrop gave a dinner to the Marsh men and many of the voters at Bratton.

July 8—Day of the Poll. . . . Wilson 145, Lopes 138.

The two young ladies, Julia and Elizabeth, who wrote these amusing diaries, afterwards married two brilliant men—W. R. Greg and Walter Bagehot.

F. W. HIRST.

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.*

In this volume Dr. Scott Lidgett has brought together articles contributed to THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW and other periodicals. In spite of their scattered original appearance they form a connected whole and the claim made for the book by the publishers

* *God, Christ and the Church.* By J. Scott Lidgett, D.D. London, 1927. Hodder and Stoughton. 8s. 6d. net.

on the cover that it is an "exposition of the Christian Faith" is justified. The wide range of subjects dealt with might suggest that the treatment is superficial, and doubtless the author would be the first to confess that there are many places where further argument and illustration would be required in a full treatise. But though the professed student of dogmatic theology would often wish to cry, "Stay, while we consider this further," the general reader will be grateful for the swift and lucid survey of the whole contents of the Christian Religion as Dr. Scott Lidgett sees it. He will recognise also, with sympathy, that the book has really a practical aim and is written under a sense of the urgency of the present crisis in religion.

The author sees plainly the need for pressing forward with the ideal of Reunion and his message is a call to consider the danger of division and the opportunity of making a great step forward towards the Catholic Church of the future. In the true tradition of St. Paul Dr. Scott Lidgett bases his exhortation to confront a task of Christian duty on the first principles of the Christian creed.

The foundation of everything both theological and ethical, the author rightly asserts, is the Christian conception of God. Readers of his former works will not need to be told that he finds the leading thought here to be the conception of the Divine Fatherhood. We are indebted to him once more for an impressive and lucid account of the culmination of this thought of God in the New Testament and for a discriminating discussion of the meaning of Fatherhood which does justice to the element of sternness which is involved in Holy Love. The theological doctrine of the Divine attributes has frequently fallen short of the full New Testament conception and exalted the Divine Sovereignty in such a way as to obscure the Fatherhood. Dr. Lidgett would reject the Augustinian theology in so far as it had this effect. The sovereignty of God is a sovereignty of love. The author notes, in passing, the question whether his doctrines would require a limitation of God or, at least, a self-limitation, and suggests that "the conception that the indispensable conditions of any real spiritual and ethical process necessitate self-limitation on the part of God is due to our inveterate habit of conceiving the perfection of God in terms of power and not of love." It must be confessed that this is one of the places where a further development of the thought would have been welcome, and we doubt whether Dr. Lidgett could work out his view without being compelled to admit some kind of limitation of the Divine. The chapters on the idea of God are followed by a valuable discussion of progress in which Dr. Inge, the Christian, is effectively quoted against Dr. Inge, the master of startling epigram.

We are not able here to give any adequate account of the treatment of the doctrine of Christ which is, on the whole, both firmly

orthodox and in close touch with modern ways of thinking, and is moreover definitely related with the doctrine of God. There are two points where we have found cause not for criticism but for questioning. We think that Dr. Lidgett has hardly faced the problem which lies at the root of Christology. The Christian Faith affirms the specific Incarnation in an historical Person, whereas it might be argued that the doctrine of God and of His relation with the world might more reasonably lead to the idea of a progressive incarnation in Humanity. In other words, there is, perhaps, in this book no sufficient answer to the man who says, I can see that there may be truth in the conception of Incarnation, but why concentrate this conception on the person of Jesus? And this leads to the second point where further explanation seems needed. Dr. Lidgett says finely of Christ, "He stands out in His transcendence because He consummates the whole, revealing its meaning by fulfilling it, and fulfilling it because all the values which give it worth live for ever in the Divinely-human and humanly-Divine Personality that gives complete revelation of the Fatherhood of God in the sonship of man." The present writer has certainly no wish to quarrel with this statement, but it must be recognised that one of the difficulties which has been acutely felt in restating the doctrine of the Incarnation is the alleged absence in the historic Jesus of any adequate presentation of the values of Truth and Beauty. These remarks are not intended as criticisms of the argument of the book but as suggestions that it needs here and there additional support.

We must pass over the very sane and suggestive discussion of Anthropomorphism, which deserves careful study, and come to the concluding section of the work. In dealing with the theme of the future of the Church and its need for unity Dr. Lidgett has a touch of prophetic fire and eloquence. For him the Church is a supernatural society, more even than the instrument of the Kingdom of God, in some sense its vehicle and embodiment. He will not for one moment regard its external divisions with complacency. The unity of the Church visible is demanded by the faith in God and Christ on which it rests. He is prepared for adventure on behalf of the ideal of reunion and would go very far to meet the Lambeth Appeal. While justly claiming that no minister of a non-Episcopal Church should be expected to deny the validity of his ministry, he is willing to admit that the united Church of the future must be one which possesses an episcopal form of government and ordination and the Nicene Creed. We cannot help wishing that for a short time Dr. Scott Lidgett and the Bishop of Gloucester could become joint ecclesiastical dictators. They would find no difficulty in agreeing. In the meantime we hope that this work, truly evangelical and Catholic in spirit and outlook, may be widely read and pondered

in all sections of the Christian Church. It would "guide our steps into the way of peace." May it not have to be said, "When I speak unto them of peace they make them ready for battle."

W. R. MATTHEWS.

THE USES OF HISTORY.*

Professor G. M. Trevelyan's inaugural lecture as the Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge was a very thought-provoking affair, a literary address to those students, and not least the freshmen, who are making History the new vehicle of Humanism. He wisely insisted on this point, and the passage should go out to all the schools, elementary as well as secondary, of the country.

The balance between the Humanities and Physical Science now depends upon History. If it were not for the existence of the History School, the liberal education which letters give would be obtainable by youth only in the strictly linguistic Schools. And those Schools, important as they are, no longer suffice alone to maintain the cultural traditions of English civilisation in an age of rapidly-disappearing landmarks. . . . Though we still have the Classics and the Bible, they do not cover half the ground they used to do. What is the imaginative and intellectual life of England getting in their place?

An answer to this question lies in Professor Trevelyan's answer to the question, "What is the use of History?" He frankly holds that

"historical discoveries have scarcely any value except in so far as they educate the mind, stimulate thought, or intensify intellectual emotion. . . . In all ways it is necessary to make the young student feel that History is at once a stimulation and a satisfaction of intellectual curiosity; that it is a process of thought, not a mere learning by rote. Books have to be chosen and examinations set with that end in view. . . . History consists not only in collecting facts about the past, but in thinking about them."

That History has a larger though another value than the education of the mind, the stimulation of thought and the intensification of intellectual emotion is, however, not to be doubted. It is true that history does not repeat itself, but it is also true that, from the records of fact, the phenomena of human relations, there can be derived principles of universal application in the same way (though not in the same order of accuracy) as general principles or laws can be and have been derived from the manifestations of physical and organic

* *The Present Position of History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at Cambridge, October 26th, 1927.* By George Macaulay Trevelyan. Longmans. 2s. 6d.

phenomena. In the case of physical or organic phenomena history does not repeat itself: the cloudscape, the hedgerow, the litter of kittens of to-day have never occurred before and will never occur again, but we know that current phenomena are entirely subject to law, the law that has been derived from the observation of recorded phenomena. This is as true of human history as of all other history, and the greatest statesmen have been those who have derived from history empirical laws for their own use. An ever-increasing "use of History" is the effort to formulate laws relating to human organisation which will follow the highest process of science in a gradual approximation to generalised objective truth while performing that subjective function, the education of the mind, the stimulation of thought and the intensification of intellectual emotion, upon which Professor Trevelyan rightly lays such immeasurable stress.

Professor Trevelyan considers that Sir John Seeley, one of his eminent predecessors, was mistaken when he declared that History is "Past Politics." But is the statement not true, though perhaps in a wider and deeper sense than Seeley meant? Is not Politics the chief, indeed, the only distinction between a group of men and a group of apes? There are many other distinctions that differentiate a man from an ape, but the business of History is to deal with groups of men and of individual men as part of human society.

We see the beginning of politics in the organisation of the humblest little kinship group or tribe without chiefs or priests; politics is the soul of every community small or great, from the parish to the empire, and the politics of an empire represents the integration of innumerable political systems as small as a parish meeting and as great as a constitutional dominion. It is only in the acceptance of the view that History is past politics that we can hope to find laws that govern the processes of human organisation. Past politics in this sense is not a dreary limitation of the conception of History, since it must include the knowledge as functions of organised life of "past economics, past religion, past jurisprudence, past social life and custom." This view, if it is approximately right, does not in essence clash with Professor Trevelyan's view of history, and indeed illustrates his broad conclusion that "each generation of historians reacts against its predecessor in certain respects, but the thought and learning of the previous generation have always left some mark that cannot be obliterated in the palimpsest of History."

There are many striking passages in this instructive lecture, and not least the passage in which Professor Trevelyan argues that "Truth is perpetually being brought to light, not merely by writers of cool and detached temper, but also by the rival contributions of those who ardently espouse opposite sides in some historic cause. The past was full of passion, and passion is therefore

one element in historic truth." Another passage contains a metaphor that few will be likely to forget, the comparison of History to a great storm-tossed ship. "On the shore where Time casts up its stray wreckage, we gather corks and broken planks, whence much indeed may be argued and more guessed; but what the great ship was that has gone down into the deep, that we shall never see." But what if it happen that the ship has survived, after all, and glides, star-steered, into port in the twilight of our human dawn, storm-tossed out of the night?

Sun shall wax,
And star shall wane: what matter, so star tell
The drowsy world to start awake, rub eyes,
And stand all ready for morn's joy a-blush?

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

PROFESSOR WILDON CARR'S METAPHYSICS.*

In his recently-published book entitled *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics*, which he describes as a Metaphysical Meditation, Professor Wildon Carr seeks to present an idea of God which shall be in complete accordance both with Relativity and with Evolution. In his Introduction he states that "The problem of religion and ethics in modern thought is not, as I conceive it, to harmonise natural science with the old religious concepts, but to reform our concept of God in accordance with our progress in interpreting our knowledge of the physical world." With this object in view the author surveys, with his accustomed care and thoughtfulness, the entire field of science and philosophy, as well as of religion and ethics, in the light of the most recent conceptions and under the obvious influence of Bergson, though the only express reference to him is in respect of the prospect of personal survival after death.

From the standpoint which he adopts, Professor Wildon Carr finds himself compelled to abandon both the "Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob" and the "Dieu des philosophes et des savants" of Pascal's celebrated antithesis. The philosophers who have endeavoured either to interpret Mind by means of Matter or Matter by means of Mind have failed to reach a satisfactory synthesis. Materialism cannot furnish an explanation of Life and Mind, while Idealism cannot give any adequate account of the creative or constitutive relation of Mind to Matter. Thus both alternatives fail to unify the Universe for thought, and do so because

* *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics* By Herbert Wildon Carr. Macmillan and Co. 7s 6d. net.

both Mind and Matter are mutually exclusive abstractions from the indivisible unity actually presented in the fact of life. Hence the clue is to be found in Life; yet not in Life as manifest in organic structures, with their limitations, but in Life as revealing a vital urge, or rather an active energy, which is at once constant and universal in its creative impulse. This creative Urge cannot be construed either in terms of Mind or Reason, or by the imagination of Religion, whether terrifying or consolatory. For the universal activity in its work of Evolution lays its whole stress upon the process and treats its highest productions, as we are wont to consider them, not as ends in themselves, but simply as means for continuing this process which, at once, brings them into being, utilises and supersedes them when their function in carrying on the process has been exhausted. Hence, the true object of Religion and Ethics is to assist this process, without regard to the Why or Wherefore of it, though there are some grounds for supposing in the case of personalities, as Bergson has suggested, "that one end towards which the striving of life seems to be directed is to overcome the barrier or obstacle of death, and it may be that in the human mode it has succeeded or at least registered a great step forward to success." The task set before men, therefore, is to pursue the Ideal of Man, without committing the mistake of supposing that this Ideal corresponds either to the character or to the universal and ultimate purpose—if purpose be the right word—of God. Any such assumption would be out of keeping both with the spectacle of Evolution and with the limiting principle of Relativity. The Ideal of man must remain purely human, not only in its wonderful achievements, but also in its rigorous limitation. To sum up, the Idea of God presented by Professor Wildon Carr is that of Spinoza—to whom he once and again refers—with the substitution of Activity issuing in Life for Substance, of an energetic for a static system.

The simplicity of this explanation can, however, only be attained by emphasising the relativity of Reason, and by assigning to it, not only a narrow, but a strictly practical office. Hence, Professor Carr at once expounds and expatiates upon those activities and triumphs of human Reason, which distinguish human personalities and mankind in general from all other living and conscious beings within our experience, and at the same time denies to Reason any real value as an interpreter of the true meaning and value of the Universe. The highest outcome of Evolution—for the present at all events and so far as we are aware—is not permitted to throw light by its spiritual content, upon the nature of the spring out of which it arises, although this highest outcome appears both to appropriate and to transcend all that has gone before and that has, indeed, been instrumental to

its appearance. This conclusion must be tested by certain questions.

In the first place, can the general concept of Life, or of the active Urge that becomes manifest in Life, be treated as ultimate and self-explanatory, seeing that it emerges in Consciousness; that Consciousness distinguishes itself as Mind from Matter, and that Mind characteristically refuses to be reduced to terms either of Matter or of Life, claiming to subordinate both to standards of value which become ever more authoritative in proportion as they become loftier and more disinterested? Can an undifferentiated beginning which holds Mind and Matter within it, if it be really undifferentiated, be treated as more illuminating than its self-differentiating end? Is not the final antithesis jumped and not bridged? Furthermore, what is the significance of the fact that the highest spiritual Values, when apprehended and appropriated, reveal themselves as so absolute that they criticise mere Activity however universal, and subordinate Life even to the point of utter self-sacrifice? Why should the abstract principle of Life, Urge or Activity be treated as of more importance for philosophy, to say nothing of Religion and Ethics, than the Spiritual Content which gives worth to Life? It is a case, not only of enlargement of sphere, but of elevation of plane. And, why, above all, should man be so isolated in thought from the Universe of which, apparently, he is the culmination, that to affirm Values as human should involve the denial that they have either final or universal significance? These are only a few of the questions that arise. They suggest the conclusion that, despite many incidental merits of his discussion, Professor Wildon Carr has only simplified and solved his problem, to the disparagement of the God both of Reason and of Religion, by ignoring or passing over lightly, some of the most vital issues.

J.S.L.

GERTRUDE BELL.*

Not since the biography of Walter Page took England by storm has a collection of letters found such a warm and instantaneous welcome as those of Gertrude Bell. Page's reports to Washington owed as much to their high and tragic theme as to his incomparable art; but the magic of Miss Bell's legacy lies far less in her subject than in herself. A personality so quiveringly alive, so eager for experience, and so capable of intense enjoyment attracts readers who may never have seen her or read a line of her books. There is a good deal of superfluous detail and repetition in these handsome volumes; but Lady Bell has done her editorial work with loving

* *Letters of Gertrude Bell*. Two vols. 2 guineas. Ernest Benn.

care, and the figure of her step-daughter stands out as sharply as in the portrait by Sargent which looks us straight in the face.

The first volume takes us from the cultivated home of her distinguished father, Sir Hugh Bell, to Oxford in the eighties, where she won a brilliant First in History. Her hairbreadth escapes among almost inaccessible Alpine peaks revealed her adventurous spirit, which was stimulated by a voyage round the world at the age of thirty. Of greater importance for her later development was the visit to Jerusalem in 1899 and her first desert journeys. Taking the most difficult languages in her stride, she quickly mastered Arabic and submitted to the charm of the East which laid its mysterious spell on Palgrave, Burton and Doughty before her and on Lawrence a few years later. She was, however, a scholar as well as a traveller, and her work among the churches in Asia Minor won the admiration of her chief, Sir William Ramsay. The later chapters of the first volume record her journeys in the Syrian Desert in the last years of peace, and land her at Basrah in the spring of 1916, when the approaching conquest of Mesopotamia raised questions on which her sympathetic knowledge of the Arab world was judged likely to be of the highest political value.

The second volume, which forms a real contribution to the history of the war and the settlement, is devoted to Gertrude Bell's work at Bagdad from the moment that it fell into British hands to the day of her sudden death in the summer of 1926 at the age of fifty-eight. These years of effort and achievement amid the stifling heat of the Mesopotamian Plains were the crown of her life, and her name is indissolubly linked with the creation of the kingdom of Irak. The political drama in which she played her part is authoritatively described in two chapters contributed by her successive chiefs, Sir Percy Cox and Sir Henry Dobbs, who liked and admired her as heartily as she liked and admired them. Her pages are sprinkled with exclamations of rapture for her work and of affection for the people. The talk in certain political quarters at home of leaving Irak to stew in its own juice and saving the blood and money of British subjects moved her to indignant protest. "If Mesopotamia goes, Persia goes, and then India," King Feisul had trusted us, and we must not let him down. "My heart is in it. I live and die for it. Nothing else matters." She pours out her heart to the father whom she worshipped, and whose many-sided interest in life and knowledge resembled her own. Perhaps we come nearest to the heart of this remarkable woman in a letter to her father, dated February 16th, 1922:

"I want to tell you, just you, who know and understand everything, that I'm acutely conscious of how much life has given me. I've gone back now to the wild feeling of joy in existence—I'm

happy in feeling that I've got the love and confidence of a whole nation, a very wonderful and absorbing thing—almost too absorbing perhaps. You must forgive me if it seems to pre-occupy me too much—it doesn't really divide me from you, for one of the greatest pleasures is to tell you all about it, in the certainty that you will sympathise. I don't for a moment suppose that I can make much difference to our ultimate relations with the Arabs and with Asia, but for the time I'm one of the factors in the game. I can't think why all these people here turn to me for comfort and encouragement; if I weren't here they would find someone else, of course, but being accustomed to come to me, they come. And in their comfort I find my own. I remember your saying to me once that the older one grows the more one lives in other people's lives. Well, I've got plenty of lives to live in, haven't I? And perhaps after all, it has been best this way. At any rate, as it had to be this way, I don't now regret it."

G. P. G.

* * *

STANDARD ENGLISH.*

Mr. J. H. G. Grattan, an enthusiastic grammarian and a learned member of the University of London, in this paper (reprinted from the *Review of English Studies*) on the Anglo-American cultivation of standard English tells us that it "was written chiefly in the hope of provoking discussion of problems usually avoided in cultured English circles," and he invites reasoned opposition. With this he will readily meet, for anything more appalling than the idea of an English academy composed of American and British writers and scholars desirous of controlling the use of the English tongue can hardly be imagined. It is true that Mr. Grattan believes that it would be necessary actively to oppose the "International Council of English" inaugurated by the Royal Society of Literature last June if it adopts an *ex cathedra* attitude, and no doubt such a society, if it merely registers changes of speech and draws attention to the fact that there are substantial variants of standard English in the United States of America will be doing good work. But if this Council is regarded as a device for "counteracting mutual intolerance and misunderstandings in linguistic matters east and west of the Atlantic" the answer can only be to compare it to a broom sweeping back the tide.

At the present time there is happily a tendency in the schools to realise the humanistic value of local speech. For many years after

* On Anglo-American Cultivation of Standard English. By J. H. G. Grattan. Sedgwick and Jackson

1870 in England more or less ignorant school teachers were intent upon stamping out dialectic variations and imposing on the poor children something that they regarded as standard English. The foolishness of the effort and its dangerous effects on local character (which integrated forms national character) has at last been realised. But unhappily at the very moment of hope wireless telegraphy is making an unconscious effort to stamp upon the people of these isles and English-speaking peoples beyond the seas, another form of "standard English." This unexpected result of a useful scientific discovery is perhaps inevitable, but the people everywhere are at the mercy of speakers who, like the former teachers, may or may not speak the King's English. It may be doubted, however, if the wireless transmission of urban but not necessarily urbane speech will have any durable effect on those who are steeped in their own dialect. Moreover, local societies are busy counteracting in every possible way the evils of the general adoption of English standardised in this or that commercial undertaking.

But the Royal Society of Literature is not a commercial undertaking, and if it can influence for good in some measure the use of English for literary purposes among "the half-educated," so much the better. Mr. Grattan feels that "the continuity of our literary and linguistic heritage is unrealised by the wide-reaching influence of the half-educated." But this is no new thing. Let Mr. Grattan read the books and newspapers of a century ago. They are even worse than many books and newspapers of to-day, since they had an artificiality that the books and papers written to-day by the half-educated for the half-educated do not possess. If the new Council can do a good educational work without interfering with the growth of vocabulary, of linguistic forms, of dialectic variations, so much the better. Its first work is to educate the writers of scientific textbooks, many of whom still write in a pigeon-English only to be understood of the elect.

Mr. Grattan is very impressed by the fact that in the United States of America a good many writers of German origin are developing views in highly Germanic theses on the whole question of the English language in America. It is most desirable that German and Scandinavian methods of approaching this American linguistic problem should have full operation. The Germans know how to approach the subject scientifically, and it may be that they will avert, through the agency of the schools and colleges, the fate for American English that, let us say, Latin met with in the Western Hispanic region. But in England we must approach our problem in our own way. We have not to face the Babel that immigration has created in America. All that we need to avoid is the bastard standard English that urban newspapers, urban teachers and urban wireless tele-

graphy are unconsciously imposing in a slight degree on the countryside, the basic source of all true linguistic growth. The circulation of American books and newspapers is very small here, and there is no reason why remedies necessary in America should be applied in this country.

Mr. Grattan fancies that education as a popular thing has an older history in the United States of America than here. That is a misapprehension of which he should clear his mind. The early American schools, and especially the Latin schools, were merely echoes of the schools that had existed in England for centuries before America was heard of, and it is wrong to suggest, as Mr. Grattan does, in his discussion of grammar, that "as a deep-rooted ancient institution, the school exercises in the States a power over the masses such as is wielded by no popular institution in the Old Country." In order to be enthusiastic it is not necessary to be misinformed. By all means let us stimulate here the study of grammar and especially the invaluable grammar of dialects in daily use, as in Somerset or Yorkshire. That should be part of the work of every elementary school. But let us get away from the idea of standard English for the whole world. Let America develop her own tongue in her own way, as will be the case whatever we write or think. Let Australia be to England as Spain was to Rome. Let the tongues grow naturally, and let us in England fight sturdily the dangerous linguistic influence of wireless messages.

J.E.G. DE M.

THE D.N.B.*

The volume of the Dictionary of National Biography for the decade 1912-1921, admirably edited by Professor Davis and Mr. Weaver, is a continuation on "less ample lines" of the supplement issued in 1912 under the editorship of Sir Sidney Lee. The reason of restriction is obvious. Sir Sidney Lee's supplement for a period of eleven years added 1,660 biographies to the main work which, with the three supplementary volumes issued in 1901, only contains for the whole of British history rather more than 30,000 substantive articles. To continue on the scale adopted in 1912 would mean adding some 15,000 lives for the twentieth century. Apart altogether from cost, and the general public has to be considered, historical perspective, despite great increases of population and the consequent emergence of more men and women of note, would be lost. It is, of

* *The Dictionary of National Biography*. Founded in 1882 by George Smith. 1912-1921. Edited by H. W. C. Davis and J. R. H. Weaver, with an Index covering the years 1901-1921 in one alphabetical series. Oxford University Press. 21s. net.

course, very difficult to decide who deserves a place in this imperial record among the lesser personalities who played an active part in their time. Outstanding personalities are easy enough to select, though here again the task of bringing them into perspective is a very difficult and indeed an insoluble problem. Contemporaries cannot decide as to the personalities who will emerge as permanent lights in the night-sky of history, while the modern facilities for self-advertisement may easily make wrong estimates possible, or indeed probable.

Outstanding personalities in all the professions, in the civil services, in scholarship, science, art, literature, education, social service, journalism, sport and politics have the first claim in such a publication as this; but such headings by no means exhaust the range of choice, and perhaps the main difficulty of selection comes in the field where a man is not of great eminence in his formal sphere of life but has special claims to recognition in regions of work that are related to but almost alien from the daily round of life. Some obscure country clergyman may perhaps be the final authority on some textual matter of the first importance in biblical or classical scholarship, and therefore far more important in history than the Bishop who never recognised his merits. Many allied instances occur to the mind at home and abroad in almost every field. So far as it is possible the new volume takes these matters into account, but they cannot be fully estimated until time has placed the particular personality into his or her natural perspective.

The present volume lays perhaps more than adequate stress on the writers who died in the period. The outstanding literary figure of all, Mrs. Humphry Ward, who died in 1920, receives comparatively scant notice, a far briefer estimate than she would have received had she died twenty years earlier, though proper weight is given to her social labours. But the author of *Robert Elsmere* and *David Grieve* had a permanent literary and spiritual influence that are not at all measured by the two and a half columns allotted to her. On the other hand, a great deal too much space is given to Mr. Alfred Austin who, despite his not inconsiderable gifts, has ingloriously joined the very varying roll of our Poets Laureate. The only outstanding statesman who died in the decade under review, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, is the subject of an elaborate article which rightly concludes with Lord Balfour's estimate of him: "He was a great statesman, a great friend, a great orator, a great man."

A good instance of the careful balance and sense of perspective in this volume is to be found in the article on Sir Roger Casement. Those who knew him "knew him to be honourable and chivalrous as well as able far beyond the ordinary measure of men." His ex-

cution was one of the mistakes of the war. This mistake was not made at the time of the South African War, in a case at least as difficult. The article on Lord Moulton, which admirably sets forth his great gifts both as a scientist and a lawyer, does not refer to the extraordinary refusal of the Westminster Abbey authorities to commemorate on the walls of the Abbey a man who played a first-rank part in the winning of the war. That affair may, however, be set right when those authorities gain a fuller sense of proportion in matters of this type.

Perhaps the most notable list of losses in the decade was among the soldiers and the scientists. The editors had a very difficult task in respect of the vast losses in the field during the Great War, and their selections of names will probably satisfy the majority of critics. But apart altogether from war losses and the name of Lord Kitchener, we have the names of Roberts, Wolseley, Evelyn Wood, Charles Beresford and Fisher, and these recall memories of some of the most moving moments in English history. Among the scientists the losses of the period from the first rank were very heavy, as the names of Crookes, G. H. Darwin, William Ramsay, Rayleigh, A. R. Wallace, testify. Sir Sidney Lee died in 1926 and his biography will come in the next volume of the Dictionary, but it was obvious that a man who had played so great a part in the history of this national work—for the D.N.B. is not less than this—should have some adequate notice here, and Sir Charles Firth has contributed a welcome memoir of this generous and industrious scholar as a preface to the new volume.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The journal of Sir Francis Sacheverell Darwin now published under the title *Travels in Spain and the East 1808-1810*,* makes interesting reading. The text was compiled by Lady Darwin from her husband's diary, and this has been transcribed by one of her grandsons and edited by another, Mr. F. D. S. Darwin, who writes the memoir to this book. The author of the diary, born in 1786, was the sixth son of the scientist and poet, Erasmus Darwin. He came of a learned and distinguished family, and was himself remarkable, a hefty Englishman, six feet three inches in height, handsome and intellectual, with a wide and varied knowledge of men and matters. Classical literature especially appealed to him, while his knowledge of geology and his antiquarian researches greatly aided him in his travels and life of adventure. The danger of travel during the years of the Peninsular War was great and called for the indomitable pluck and courage which never failed him in difficult and dangerous circumstances. The travels recorded in this journal occupied two years, from 1808 to 1810. The concise and vivid narrative paints a convincing picture of scenes and

* Cambridge University Press. 1927. 6s. net.

adventures while laying little stress on the hardships and marvellous escapes through which he passed by sea or land. In its brevity, it reminds the reader of St. Paul, "In journeyings often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers." The banditti of a century ago were still a continuous source of danger. Dr. F. S. Darwin—as he then was—started, at the age of twenty-seven years, with his friend, Mr. Theodore Galton, and three other friends, from Falmouth, on November 20th, 1808, all desiring to see something of a nation struggling for its liberty, as Spain was at that period. War and preparation for war were proceeding on all sides, murder was rife, life was held cheap—few inquiries were made if a traveller disappeared. Of these five Dr. Darwin alone survived to return to England and tell the tale of the many lands visited, and the perils and losses of those two years. It is a wonderful story of difficulties overcome and knowledge gained and gives the student of history a vivid idea of Southern Europe and the Near East in the days when Napoleon was at his prime. The progress of the world in the course of a century can be measured by the record of these five dauntless young Englishmen set down by one of them. It all seems as far away as a story told by Marco Polo himself.

* * *

It is impossible to understand either the religious or the public life of the United States without knowledge of the part that has been played by the Methodist Revival, which made the Methodist Episcopal Church until quite recent times far the most numerous and, in some respects, the most influential denomination throughout the country. The extent and strength of its hold have been due to the pioneer work of the Methodist Evangelists, who, at a time when the Anglican Church held back, partly owing to the Civil War, and when the Calvinism of the non-Episcopalian Denominations restrained them from evangelistic efforts, pushed their way to the remotest settlements, not only of the Thirteen States, but beyond. Of this far-reaching and indomitable activity Francis Asbury* was the great pioneer. Sent out by John Wesley himself in 1771, he pursued a ceaseless campaign of Evangelism till his death in 1816, never once returning to his native land. For this reason his equestrian statue stands in Washington. At its unveiling President Coolidge said "He is worthy to rank as one of the builders of our Nation." The Rev. James Lewis has given us an admirable account of the life of this intrepid and apostolic missionary in the volume before us. We can strongly recommend it.

* * *

This volume† is a valuable contribution to the early history of Quakerism. At the same time the story it tells cannot be said to represent early Quakerism in an altogether attractive light, and shows the dangerous excesses to which the doctrine of the Inner Light was liable. The life of James Nayler is a tragic story of religious enthusiasm resulting in insanity in his case and in unbridled fanaticism on the part of his devoted adherents, mostly women. The lamentable impression created by the facts is only softened by the equally painful

* Francis Asbury, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. By James Lewis. Epworth Press, 7s. 6d. net.

† A Quaker from Cromwell's Army: James Nayler. By Mabel Richmond Brailsford. Swarthmore Press. 7s. 6d. net.

impression produced by the account of the barbarous treatment inflicted upon him by Parliament under the Protectorate, before which he was arraigned on a charge of blasphemy. Under the strain of this cruel treatment the victim's body was broken, but his spirit was restored to sanity and to the Christian Spirit of humility and love. Apparently this account is written in order to vindicate the memory of James Nayler by tracing his spiritual recovery. As a contribution to the History of Quakerism, and as throwing light equally upon its strength and upon its attendant weakness, the book is deserving of study.

Mr. L. B. Walton's *Perez Galdos and the Spanish Novel of the Nineteenth Century** is an excellent study of a writer too little known in England. An introductory chapter summarises the work of the leading Spanish novelists before the publication of *La Fontana De Oro* in 1870. The biographical chapter which follows sketches the busy life of a writer and a member of Parliament extending from 1843 to 1920, and portrays a modest and attractive personality. The larger part of the volume is devoted to an analysis of the enormous output of one of the most prolific writers of the nineteenth century. His masters were Balzac and Dickens, whom he resembles in his facility of composition and the breadth of his canvas. It is to be regretted that Mr. Walton has devoted so little space to the vast series of *Episodios Nacionales*. "They are hardly novels in the strict sense of the term, and their chief merit lies in the fact that they taught history to many Spaniards who previously knew none." Though they do not rank with the greater historical novels of European literature, this verdict seems evidently severe. The famous anti-clerical trilogy, *Dona Perfecta*, *Gloria*, and *La Familia de Leon Roch*, perhaps the best-known of the writings of Galdos, are well described. Lovers of Spanish literature will be grateful to the author for the précis of a long series of novels almost unknown outside Spain, dealing realistically with many types of town and country life. A concluding chapter estimates the place in literature of the creator of the modern Spanish novel, and discusses his influence on Pio Baroja and other writers of a younger generation.

Mr. F. Harrison, the Librarian of the Dean and Chapter Library, York, has secured the gratitude of many antiquarians as well as lovers of things of beauty by his volume entitled *The Painted Glass of York: an account of the Medieval Glass of the Minster and the Parish Churches*.† The Dean of Westminster, in his preface, declares that "there is no such storehouse of English medieval glass as York Minster and there are few people better equipped to write about it than Mr. Harrison." Mr. Harrison himself says: "Many cathedrals and large churches, prominent amongst them Wells Cathedral and Tewkesbury Abbey, possess much glass of this period [the decorated] and style. But York Minster, in this as in the early English and middle perpendicular styles is *facile princeps*. . . . For earlier glass he will go to Canterbury and will not forget Lincoln; for later glass he will turn his steps to Fairford and to King's College Chapel, Cambridge; for more

* Dent, 7s. 6d.
† S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d. net

perfect examples of the early perpendicular style he will find the antechapel of New College, Oxford, all that he can desire. But for the greatest and best preserved qualities of glass of three periods he will not need to go outside York Minster." This delightful book carries us through the Minster and the churches of the famous city.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Dr. Benjamin Rand, of the University of Harvard, has been usefully employed in editing "the correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke" between the years 1682 and 1704. Edward Clarke was a younger man than Locke, the famous pupil of Busby. Locke was born in 1637 and went to Westminster School in 1646 and to Christ Church, Oxford, in 1652. Clarke was born in 1651 and matriculated at Wadham College in 1667. Both were Somerset men and Clarke married Mary Jepp, Locke's cousin, and there was great intimacy between the philosopher and the barrister friend who was destined to become a well-known member of Parliament. Dr. Rand supplies a biographical narrative of an attractive kind and shows that this elaborate correspondence (from the Lovelace collection) throws light on the famous essays "Concerning Human Understanding" and "Some Thoughts Concerning Education." The book is worthy of close study.

The publication must be recorded of Mr. E. I. Watkin's translation of the third volume of Dr. Elie Halévy's well-known French work "A History of the English People, 1830-1841."† The present volume deals first with the Reform Bill of 1832 and the first Parliament after the passing of the Act, and secondly with "the years of Lord Melbourne (1835-1841)." English students of a crucial period of English history will benefit by the views of a foreign historian and critic. The reform of the land system, so far as legal procedure was concerned, was a matter of great importance in this period and foreran the reforms of 1926 and is noted here. The direct intervention of Queen Victoria in the question of National Education in 1830 should have been referred to. The account of the young Queen is spirited and fair and the reference to education would have emphasised this point of view.

Captain C. Wightwick Haywood, formerly District Commissioner in Kenya Colony and Political Officer in Jubaland, in his volume, "To the Mysterious Lorian Swamp," vividly describes "an adventurous and arduous journey of exploration through the vast, waterless tracts of unknown Jubaland." The journey was undertaken in 1912-13 when that province was still part of British East Africa. In 1926 it was ceded to Italy by Great Britain in recognition of her services in the Great War. It lies on the east coast of Africa between the Tana and the Juba rivers with a coastline of about 300 miles and an inland depth of 300 or more miles. The concession cuts off Abyssinia from the Indian Ocean. Italy now holds all the seaboard along the Red Sea except the strip of British Somaliland opposite to Aden. The whole

* Oxford University Press, 10s. net. † T. Fisher Unwin, 21s.
‡ Seeley Service, 12s. 6d. net

area of Jubaland is unexplored "largely waterless, covered for hundreds of square miles with almost impenetrable thorn bush, inhabited by nomadic tribes of warlike and murderous Somalis." These Arabs are said to have come from Arabia in the time of Mohammed and they soon dominated the peaceful Galla inhabitants. Native customs and superstitions are here adequately discussed. The description of the Kikuyu is especially valuable. The story of the "Woman Leopard" in the Goshu country is blood-curdling indeed. Captain Haywood has a pleasant easy prose style which emphasises, by its straightforward simplicity, the tale that he relates of arduous and wonderful travel.

Mr. Khub Dekhta Age, in his volume entitled "India To-morrow," writes in anticipation of the provision of Section 81a of the Government of India Act, 1919, that at the expiration of ten years from the passing of the Act a Commission should be appointed to inquire into the working of the system of Government and into the application of the principle of responsible government. He declares that "the suspicion that the British Parliament will prove reactionary is, at present, warping the minds of many in India. Britain has dared greatly in the past, as in Canada and South Africa. She will do so again, and it is just for that very reason that India must wake up to the gravity of the situation." Mr. Age declares that his "book is one-sided, as is every book written about India," but he feels that "the steel frame of the British Empire . . . a phrase that rankles in the mind of India . . . stands to-day between order and chaos in India." He wishes to clothe the steel frame: "the final structure is intended to blend all that is good in both East and West" to the greater good of India, the Empire and the world. The Statutory Commission makes this book timely.

Historical students will be grateful to Mr. Lowes Dickinson for a new edition of his scholarly and suggestive little work, "Revolution and Reaction in Modern France." Though published in 1892 and long out of print, the demand has continued, owing not only to the excellence of its workmanship but to the originality of its design. For it is not a history of latter-day France which is offered us, but a study of the development of parties and political thought from the Revolution to 1871. The new edition is practically unchanged, save for a few pages of reflections at the end on the Third Republic. By far the most valuable chapter in the book is that on the Paris Commune, which, curiously enough, has never been the subject of any really satisfactory work, but is clearly though briefly described in these thoughtful pages.

Mr. Wilfrane Hubbard in his volume of what may be called classical dialogues or novels, happily entitled "Tanagra Figures," recreates some features of Grecian life with an easy, learned, and skilled pen. There are eleven sketches in all including the Prologue "On Parnassus" which cleverly tells in allegory the origin of the stories, and the Epilogue "On Olympus" which certainly tempts the reader to go back and re-read the old stories and especially the one that depicts the last days of Alcibiades.

• Oxford University Press 7s 6d net + Allen & Unwin 7s 6d
• Macmillan 7s 6d net

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