

THE MADRAS



"They are slaves who dare not be
In the right with two or three."

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
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
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The Santals and their Relatives

Rev. G. Schanzlin, M.A., Methodist Mission, Bolpur.

Scattered over a territory that extends from Sahibganj on the great bend of the river Ganges down to the civil districts of Ganjam and Vizagapatam in Madras Presidency, a distance of over 500 miles, there are living today the remnants of the great Munda race, the Santals with the Mundas and other related tribes in the north, the Juangs in Orissa, the Gadabas and Savaras (see Miss Munro's article on the S'Oras, in the previous number of this Magazine) in the south, and far west, to the southwest of Narsingpur, the Kurkus. That these tribes are merely the remnants of what the race must have been in former ages is almost certain. Munda origin has recently been claimed for the *Bhils* in Central India, the *Cheros* in North India and other semi-aboriginal tribes as far west as Gujerat. As it is, the total number of actual Mundas, or Kolarians, as some writers still persist in calling them, that is people speaking a Munda speech, is about 3 millions, of which number more than half are Santals.

The present home of the majority of Santals is in the Santal Parganas, a tract of magnificent mountain ranges of about 5,000 square miles of which 1,356 square miles are included in the famous boundary line called the *Daman-i-Koh*, a Government reservation created especially for the protection of aboriginal tribes. Here Santali is the court language and *lingua franca*. The Santal Parganas are situated in the corner where the Ganges turns south at Raj Mahal in the present province of Behar. They are a non-regulation District; Santals form about 1/3 of the population.

The Santals share with all their other Munda, Kol, or Kolarian brethren the distinction of being a race quite separate from the surrounding Hindus and Mohammadans, wholly different in language, customs, religion and their whole

6828 outlook on life. Somehow, they have escaped the pressure of Hinduism which since the puranic revival some five or six centuries ago has reduced other aboriginal or semi-aboriginal races, like the Bagdis, the Haris, Doms and Bais to Bengali speaking low-caste Hindus or rather Hindu outcastes. It is interesting to realize that the Santals really have succeeded in saving their language, their tribal and domestic customs, their songs, traditions and beliefs, in the face of the mental, social and cultural superiority of the great historic races with whom they have been in contact all the centuries. (What is said of the Santals in this paper will as a rule also apply to all their Munda congeners unless stated otherwise.)

The Santals like all other aboriginal tribes everywhere, have received a good deal of attention, but it cannot be said that the work of investigation done on their behalf has always been systematical or successful. The time was when certain missionaries working among these tribes made strenuous attempts to connect the Kols, as they called the Mundas then, with the Cushites and Assyrians of Old Testament history, an attempt which could not possibly lead to tangible results.

Only recently, since a generation or two, have linguists been able to establish the relation that does exist, linguistically and perhaps also racially, between the Mundas in India, and the Mons in Pegu, the Khmers in Cambodia and other races and tribes of Indo China, way down into Malaysia and way out into the Indian Archipelago. Thus the Santals with all Mundas seem to belong to the Austric group of races, scattered over an enormous territory to the southeast of India, taking also in most of the races on the islands of the South Sea.

The name Santal has been derived from the word *Saontar* which finally goes back to the Sanskrit *Samanta pala*, borderer, or warden of the border. The Santals seem to have come to their present habitat in rather recent times, about 150 years ago, from the west, by way of Hazaribagh. In the "Asiatic Researches" of 1795 is found an article where the name Santal is first mentioned in British records. They are supposed to have then wandered in a north-easterly direction, drifting in the present Santal Parganas only from 1792 on. In the *Bangiya Sahitya Parishat Patrika*, the organ of the Bengali Literature Society of 1917, Bengal Era, in a Bengali poem quoted, "*Satali*" Hills are mentioned. The poet, Manik Datta, describes how at the behest of Durga, Hanuman, the monkey god, brings rocks from these hills for the building of an *Adya* temple in Kalinga. The author of the article, Mr. Hari Das Palit, then evidently too rashly assumes that the Rajmahal Hills, in the present Santal Parganas, are meant by this name. It is more likely however, that the poet referred to a mountain range nearer to Kalinga; a more southern range around Midnapur, or in Orissa, may have been known to the poet by the name of the Santali Hills. At any rate the passage shows that the Santals were well-known then to the Bengalis who already had given their name to a locality. This poem was written in 1774 A. D.

The Santa's are primitive in their mode of life and cultural achievements. They are almost without such arts and handicrafts as usually distinguish other

primitive races, simple blacksmith work, basket making, weaving and pottery work. We have to choose here between two explanations as regards that curious fact. It is a fair question whether the Santals never had any such arts, or whether they have lost them. The Rev. P. O. Boddington, an acknowledged authority on all matters relating to Santals, whom I especially consulted on this point, seems to think that the Santals have a certain contempt for bamboo work, which always has been relegated in this part of India to the out caste Doms. Similar prejudices existed among Hindus from earlier Buddhist times down to ours. Somehow, the bamboo workers together with other useful artisans, like blacksmiths, goldsmiths, potters, were always considered low castes. Mr. Boddington, who is a missionary of the Santal Mission of the Northern Churches, states, that the Santals make their own fiddles and flutes, also excellent bedsteads with woven or plaited tops, stools of the same kind, fish traps and many other articles for their homely and simple wants, also coarse cloth. But the making of all kind of baskets, fans and other articles for which bamboo is used, is left to the Doms and the Mahles, a tribe of half-Santals. In the excellent collection of Santal folklore, collected and published jointly by Mr. Boddington and Mr. Bompas, there does not seem to be a single case where Santals are described as anything but pure agriculturists, and occasional hunters, while all the blacksmiths and potters that figure in these tales, are non-Santal, i. e., low caste Hindu races. It is interesting to note that in the beautiful story of the Flute Girl, p. 388 of the above volume, the flute is made out of the "girl-bamboo" by a Dom, not by a Santal. Compare also the *Kolhan* story No. 15 in the Appendix of the same book.

If thus the handicrafts and arts of the present day Santals and other Mundas are of the simple and most primitive kind, or, are non-existent, a fact which is largely due to the Indian division of labor distributing professions and arts largely on racial and tribal lines—the time seem to have been when these tribes were more independent from this system than they are now, and it is believed that they originally worked in iron. The *Kolhas* or *Karmalis*, a subsect of the Santals, still smelt iron, and slag is found all over the old munda territory. Whether it will be possible to trace some of the ancient Munda arts, inherited probably by the large number of semi-aboriginal tribes of Bengal and Behar back to its original non-Aryan sources remains to be seen. There seem to be no cultural or other ties that connect the Mundas with their distant relatives across the Bay of Bengal, the Mons of Pegu, the Khmers and other races in Indo-China and in the Malay world.

The Santals have preserved certain oral traditions of their wanderings, but of a purely local and Indian character. This material, not uninteresting in itself, being the only remains and fragments of the history of a race, does not seem to be of great value in any attempt to unravel the mysteries which surround their past. Thus both their culture and their traditions leaving us practically helpless in this matter, there remains only that most wonderful of all antiquities, which, defaced and adulterated as it may be, still seems to bear the stamp of pre-Aryan India, their

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language. Sir G. A. Grierson in his work on the Munda Languages, Vol. IV, Linguistic Survey of India, sounds a note of warning when he says :

"The Mundas, the Mon-Khmers, the wild tribes of the Malay Peninsula, and the Nicobarese all use forms of speech which can be traced back to a common source, though they mutually differ widely from each other. Each of the tribes has had a development of its own, and each dialect has, in each case, struck out on independent lines."

The existence of a *radical* relationship of the languages of all this large group nations and races, admits of no doubt, but the specific degree of relationship in most of these cases is still to be worked out. Pater W. Schmidt, a German priest, has done nearly all the actual work that has so far been done in this connection.

Recent investigators seem agreed to admit that the Munda-Khasi-Mon-Khmer group of races as established satisfactorily from the standpoint of language, seems to imply an ancient *racial* substratum common to both, India and Further India, and forming the oldest layer of population on the Indian side. The question will at once arise : Where did this ancient population come from ?—And how did it happen that *geographically* the nearest racial relatives of the Mundas, the *Mons*, are living around Rangoon, separated from India by the Bay of Bengal ?

Was there a time when also the Indian branch of the old Austric race, the ancestors of the present Mundas, had reached the sea, as their descendants have not done in more recent times ? The Santals for instance, have no word for sea.—Were there ancient connections across the Bay of Bengal between the two branches of the one race ? It is generally admitted that the Burmese who in comparatively recent times have come down from the north, derived their civilization from the older civilization of the Mons of Pegu, when they conquered and overturned the ancient Mon kingdom. But while the *Mons* belong to the old Austric race, the Burmese themselves belong to a quite different group of races, the so called Tibeto—Burmans. Similarly the Siamese, or Tais belonging to a still another group of races, came down the Menam and Mekong valleys, destroying the ancient kingdom of *Cambodia*, also acquiring from the Khmers of Cambodia the beginnings of their own culture. Thus the curious fact remains that the old race to which the Mundas originally belong had branches which were capable of producing a high type of civilization like the two nations mentioned. The Javanese and Balinese civilizations come under the same head.

If the *Mons* were the only Indo-Chinese nation that belongs to the Austric group, one might be inclined to assume that they reached the Gulf of Martaban by sea, having come from India, down the Ganges, let us say, and separating early from the Indian Mundas. But there are not only the Khmers in ancient Cambodia on the lower Mekong, but as Schmidt has clearly shown, also the *Bahnars* and *Stiengs*, two very primitive races in present day French Annam, all branches of that same Austric group, who have preserved the ancient linguistic characteristics of the stock much better than their more cultured congeners of Cambodia and Pegu.

Thus we are almost forced to conclude that the original entry of the *Mons*, Khmers, *Stiengs*, *Bahnars* and the races to the south of them, into the peninsula, did not differ materially from that of the later arriving races, the modern Burmans and Siamese. In all these cases the route could have been only one, down the valleys of the great rivers of Indo-China, the Chindwin-Irravati, the Salwin and the Mekong. Starting from some common home the ancestors of the above four Austric races must successively have broken through the deep trench-like valleys of these great rivers, beginning their wandering in the great *hinterland* where Tibet and Upper Burma meet Western China, being driven by other hordes which were likely the ancestors of the present Burmese and Siamese, with the *Shans*, who are nothing but future Siamese in the making.

But if these races in Indo-China succeeded in reaching the fertile lower courses of the Irravadi, the Salwin and the Mekong, establishing splendid civilizations in the deltas of these great rivers, evidently the fate of the Mundas in India turned out quite different. It does not seem possible with the present amount of data at our disposal, to account satisfactorily for the presence of the Mundas in India. All the signs seem however to favour the theory that before their somewhat erratic and rather recent wanderings in Central India, there must have been a time when they were living around the middle course of the Ganges in the neighbourhood of Mirzapur and Benares. The hypothesis of Risley, that they came down from the Asiatic highlands by way of the Brahmaputra-valley, does not commend itself. From the neighborhood of Benares or Patna to their later habitat the next and nearest way would have been through the valley of the Sone. But why did they not follow the more natural course of the Ganges valley, arriving finally in Lower Bengal and building up a kingdom and civilization in the Ganges Delta, somewhat like their brethren of farther India had done in Pegu and Cambodia ? Could it be that other races stronger than themselves were ahead of them on the banks of the lower Ganges, just as the Aryans were back of them, driving them down the Ganges valley ? In that case, these ancestors of the present Mundas would have found themselves caught between two fires, and they would have been compelled to do, what they actually did do, namely deflect their course to their right, turning into the mountainlands of Central India and Chota Nagpur.

But who could these disturbing influences, which hindered their march down the lower Ganges, have been ? This is not safe to speculate on. When the Dravidian question will be opened up one day, it may not be impossible that also this question will find its answer and solution. It has long ago been recognised however that the ancient Tamralipti, the modern Tamluk, had curious Dravidian affinities. More than that it is perhaps not possible to say at the present time. Excavations of the old Tamralipta, as far as river and sea have spared it, might prove interesting though.

After this digression which seems to open large vistas for such a primitive race as the present day Mundas seem to the casual onlooker, something ought to

be said about their mental and religious life, their folklore and songs, their beliefs and superstitions. After large deductions have been made from the stock of Munda lore collected up to the present, after due elision of elements which are clearly spurious and borrowed from Hindu sources, there seems to remain a good portion of probably genuine Munda lore, that has however not been classified sufficiently so far. Differing again from the Mons and Khmers, which two nation possessed a considerable literature, the Mundas were still an unlettered race at the beginning, and up to the middle of the nineteenth Century, when missionaries first reduced their languages to writing.

The late L. O. Skrefsrud of the Scandinavian Missionary Society, in 1870—71 preserved many of the traditions, laws and saws of the Santals in a rather remarkable book, the *Hapramkoreak Katha* (Book of the Ancestors), which, written in Santali, has become, and has been adopted by the Santals as both, their national work of history and their code of laws. Mention has been made of the volume of folklore by Bompas and Bodding; the latter has recently completed another volume of folklore. In other parts of India where Mundas dwell, missionaries and others have made similar collections. Professor Sten Konow of Oslo, Norway, has studied the Santali language extensively.

It cannot be said that the religious traditions and beliefs of the Santals give a very clear and consistent view of their particular species of animistic belief. The three names *Thakur*, *Chando* and *Marang Buru* comprise nearly all there is of Santal theology. A thorough discussion of this subject could not be attempted here. It must suffice to say that a more thorough study of Santali speech and lore will probably have unexpected results throwing light on certain old beliefs and ideas which today seem to have completely disappeared among their faster-moving Bengali neighbours. (This is even true of the phonetics of older Bengali and Hindi. Unlettered Santals pronounce certain borrowed Hindi and Bengali words in the way in which it was pronounced at the time of the borrowing, while no living Hindu pronounces them thus.)

Thakur, almost certainly a figure borrowed from the Hindus, seems the most shadowy of the three gods. He is the creator of Santal mythology, and the confused creation story which is told of him reminds one suspiciously of that found in a semi-Buddhist work, called the *Sunya Purana*, which with the *Dharma Mangala* literature once constituted the religious literature of the more rustic portions of Western Bengal and the hill tracts of Orissa.

Chando, or *Sing Chando*, through really a *bonga*, is a sort of sun god, most likely purely Munda in origin, and his position in the pantheon is more clearly defined than that of *Thakur*. He is generally connected with the moral government of the world and human affairs in particular. Also here much remains to be done in clearing up matters, and the greatest need seems to be a *comparative mythology* of all the Austric group of races.

The third god, *Marang Burn*, (the great mountain), is the veritable personification of evil, the chief of the *bongas*, a god intensely feared and therefore—just as

intensely worshipped and appeased with sacrifices (there seems to be no worship without sacrifice among these tribes). He is the cynical tempter and seducer of the ancestral human pair from which the Santals claim to have sprung, the originator of witchcraft and the general source and originator of all evil.

But even this terrible god is sometimes confused with the two preceding ones, at any rate, the names of all three gods are interchangeable and used in the loose, vague fashion one would expect of a race that has no plastic arts to formally fix the types of its deities, giving them definite shape, outline and distinguishing attributes.

Another name of *Marang Buru*, perhaps his real original name, is *Lita*, a name which again curiously enough, figures in certain Santali folk stories, as the fixed type of a despised younger son who nevertheless always succeeds in his undertakings.

The *Bongas* are nature spirits greatly varying in their nature, and ranging from well defined tribal gods, living in *sal* forests and having great annual festivals of their own, down through household gods, private gods, gods of wells, lakes, tanks and trees down to the nameless and shapeless apparitions, terrors and fears of primitive minds. They are almost omnipresent in their variety and activity filling the dark realms of the Santal invisible world with their impish doings, flitting through and across the course of human life and action in many ways. In folklore they frequently form unions with human beings; some of the finest and touching stories deal with charming *bonga* girls who in the end always leave their sorrowing human husbands, going back to the world of *bongas*.

It seems likely that the *bongas* are connected with the *nats* of Burma and other countries of Farther India.

Thus the Santals are not at all poorly gifted. These people, childlike as the dwellers of the south sea islands, and yet steady, hard workers—when there are no festivals on—loving music, flowers, frolic and fun, great dancers like all primitive races, have considerable poetic feeling and gifts. They are an attractive race. One of the darkest chapters in their existence in their belief in, and the actual practice of witchcraft and their great tendency to drunkenness. The witches (*dain* from Hindi-Bengali *dakini*) are to the Santal mind a terrible reality; they eat the livers of human beings, and of course everybody who gets sick in a Santal village is bewitched. The witchfinder (*jan guru*) is, and always has been, a scoundrel and the source of endless trouble, woe, and cruelty. But this is a subject large enough to form the subject of another paper.

Here are a few Santal songs collected, translated and published by Mr. S. C. Majumdar in the *Visva Bharati* quarterly, the new *Santi Niketan Magazine*. They show the wonderfully poetic nature symbolism of the Santal.

"There is a voice and a smile in the *banam* (Santal fiddle), Muni,
There is a heart in the flute.
I am in your heart, Muni, and you are in mine.
On the webs floating in the sky, which binds everything together!"

* * * *

My mother is dead and so is my father,
 Who is there to call me :
 " Come and sit here, child " ?
 There's only the plantain tree in our courtyard.
 It is my father and my mother as well,—
 It calls me : " Child, come and sit with me."

* * * *

O mother, the drums, little and big sound in the village.
 As I listen and yearn, listen and yearn,
 My body rocks like a lotus leaf on the water.

* * * *

My parents are like the moon,
 My brother and sister are like the stars.
 I was born under the yellow *sirguja* blossoms,
 And my name is little Sunflower.

Herbert Spencer's Theory of Social Justice

(A Criticism)

By Eddy Asirvatham, Ph. D.

Spencer sums up his theory of social justice in the law of equal freedom, according to which "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man". (Data of Ethics, p. 46) It can be easily shown that this law of equal freedom is not the best means to maximum net freedom or to the fruits of freedom, and that indirectly it is not the best means to the maximum social justice that it is possible to attain. Leaving aside such a task for the present, we propose to try to see how far short of ideal justice the law of equal freedom falls, especially in its practical application to distributive justice, which is often considered to form a major part of social justice, if not to be identical with social justice itself. In undertaking this task, it is not our purpose to collect all the theories of justice which have been advocated by different schools of ethical and political thought and to compare and contrast them with Spencer's theory of justice. That would be beyond our power. We merely propose to select some of the outstanding theories of the day like the *laissez faire*, the utilitarian individualist, and the idealistic theories (the first two are probably not mutually exclusive), and to examine what light they can throw upon Spencer's theory. We omit the socialistic and communistic theories on the whole because of the wide divergence between them and Spencer's theory.

Confining our attention first to the problem of justice in the distribution of economic goods, which bulks large in the common notion of distributive justice, we find that Spencer's answer is for the most part in terms of the traditional *laissez faire* theory, though he builds it on a biological and utilitarian foundation. Thus he says that the chief law by which life has evolved in the case of human beings and which alone constitutes "pure justice" is "that each individual ought to receive the benefits (and the evils) of his own nature and consequent conduct." (Justice, p. 17) As to what exactly this primary law of life and happiness means in the field of economics, we have Spencer's own answer that "there must be adjustment of amounts to deserts." (Data, p. 222) But the question which offers us most perplexity is, how are we to determine what a person deserves? Are deserts to be in proportion to the moral effort a person puts forth or to his real needs or to the hardness and unpleasantness of the task? Spencer returns a negative to all

these alternatives. Deserts, he seems to say, consist of all that a person can earn in a society where the law of equal freedom prevails to the utmost, *i.e.*, in a society where there is no direct aggression on the person or property of any one and no indirect aggression especially in the form of breaches of contracts (cp. Data, p. 165), where, in other words, the power of the State is strictly limited to the fulfilling of its police function of protecting life, liberty, and property. To the self-evident truth that a loose expression like "indirect aggression" is capable of a very wide legitimate interpretation and to the fact that the law of equal freedom, in order to be practicable at all, would require an extreme form of State Socialism probably annulling the need for private property, we shall not direct much attention. Concerning ourselves only with the spirit in which Spencer would want us to understand the law of equal freedom—justification of a form of *laissez faire*—, we may ask ourselves whether a theory of least possible interference or "Specialised Administration" will be able to give us maximum possible justice.

The chief difficulty in applying the law of equal freedom to the distribution of economic goods is the familiar fact that the law of property in most modern states has evolved and reached a high degree of complexity without the aid of, and often in opposition to, the law of equal freedom, and therefore to apply this law to present-day conditions in discovering what a just reward should be, seems to be quite illogical. No conceivable theory of justice, for instance, can claim that all the present-day holdings in land were originally appropriated by people who left "enough and as good for others" (Locke) and if we thus find that the law of equal freedom breaks down at the very start, in its application to property in land, the primary commodity out of which all the other forms of wealth have been directly or indirectly derived, it seems fair to say that Spencer's formula can have a plausible application to-day only to a society which starts with no accumulated private capital in any shape or manner. If Spencer objects to this conclusion on account of the impracticability of starting society anew, in order that it may from the very beginning obey the law of equal freedom (if such obedience is possible at all), and says that we must put up with the unideal state of society in which we live, working persistently, however, through "empirical compromises" for a steadily increasing realisation of equal freedom, it seems right to argue that it is highly unjust to apply the law of equal freedom, in all its rigidity, to a society which up till now has been to a greater or less degree, founded upon unequal freedom. The philosophy of common sense demands that those who have profited by such unequal freedom should, to some extent at least, compensate those whose chances of survival and and prosperity have been considerably diminished on account of the small degree of freedom allowed to them or their ancestors in the past. Spencer himself, in his later treatment of land, seems to see the rightness of reparation for past injustice, when he claims that the money spent on the relief of the poor during the last three centuries is more than enough to compensate for whatever land may have been taken away from the poor of the past. But in thus virtually supporting private property in land, Spencer does not seem to see that his argument is a two-edged weapon which, while apparently supporting a limited ownership of land, may at the same

time be used to support such things as a graduated income tax and supertax in large estates and other fortunes that are not earned through personal effort; for very few people will agree that violation of the law of equal freedom in the past was confined merely to the appropriation of land and that, even in the matter of land, the poor-relief which has been spread over three centuries is a just compensation to the present landless, especially when we consider the enormous unearned increment of value, due to increase of population. In short, property in the past, it will be generally admitted, has not had too respectable an ancestry. A lover of state-interference, it seems to us, can easily prove, on Spencer's own premises, that free education, public libraries and public parks, state supervision of sanitation, and state-aided colonisation, to all of which Spencer is deadly opposed, are all compensations for past injustice, *i.e.*, for past violation of equal freedom, as well as for the institution of private property, which, as we have said before, is not a necessary corollary from the law of equal freedom.

It is evident that some such reasoning as regards reparation for past injustice underlies the writings of present-day *laissez faire* economists who endeavour to correct and limit the inherent shortcomings of their theory by the abstract principle of equality of opportunity. They realise that under modern conditions where there is a great deal of artificial inequality, largely due to the accident of birth or some such thing for which the individual himself is not responsible, and where the possession of capital does not necessarily mean the possession of qualities necessary for social welfare (or the lack of capital, the lack of such qualities), to let each individual take the natural consequences of his actions, as Spencer wants them to do (without a modification of the principle), would be unjust. Therefore, they propose to start individuals equally as far as possible and then leave them to make the most use of their opportunity. Some of the measures which they advocate in particular in bringing about this equality of opportunity, and for the realisation of which they do not hesitate to call for the aid of the State, are universal education, graduated inheritance tax, and minimum wage law. In all this, much of modern legislation seems to be on their side, because it is concerned with the removal of artificial differences and the equalising of opportunities, and, in so doing, with the providing of an open road to talent.

It cannot by any means be pretended that the idea of equal opportunity is the last word in social justice. It can be easily shown that a literal realisation of it is impracticable, and that, even where practicable, it would not always give us ideal justice. "To furnish equal opportunities," for instance, as Rashdall says, "to the dunce and the genius" would be "far removed from the ideal of just distribution." But the point to note is that a disproof of the principle of equality of opportunity, as a true canon of ideal justice, is not necessary for our purpose, because we are concerned merely with establishing its superiority to the law of equal freedom, and this, we believe we have succeeded in doing in what has been said so far. It will be generally conceded that the principle of equal opportunity as a negative principle, in spite of its limitations, is of great practical value in removing many artificial differences. There can be little doubt that, other things being equal, a much

greater measure of equality of opportunity than what we have to-day, is socially desirable, and that it will bring us nearer the goal of ideal justice than the mechanical and unpractical law of equal freedom.

Spencer's idea of justice, then, which, in spite of his protest, may be regarded as a species of the *laissez faire* type of theory, lets fall precisely those elements of that theory—reparation for past injustice and equality of opportunity—where it is relatively strong. It falls short of other theories too which, like itself, calculate just reward in terms of the economic productivity of individuals under conditions of ordinary competition. If justice demands that there should be a close correlation between work—mental or bodily—and material rewards, those who advocate such a theory of distribution are bound ruthlessly to criticise inherited wealth, unearned increment, holding of stocks, etc. But Spencer does not indulge in such criticism. To him, to interfere with a person's inheritance or unearned increment is to violate the law of equal freedom. Still another respect in which his theory of justice compares unfavourably with the theories of other utilitarian individualists is that even the most extreme of these individualists seems to realise that justice would be incomplete if it did not give some attention at least to the welfare of generations yet to be; and it is in the name of concern for future generations that they do not oppose the State undertaking such things as the preservation of forests, encouragement of scientific discoveries, etc. But Spencer is opposed to state-action in all these matters. One further matter where Spencer's theory is less just than the theory of enlightened individualists is that the law of equal freedom does not scruple "to let a man suffer for failures not due to wilful wrong-doing or neglect." (Sidgwick) Common sense demands that the cases of the sick, the disabled for life, and the unfortunate should be considered separately from those of able-bodied adults; and that, even among the able-bodied adults, the cases of those who are willing to work, but are unable to find work or are thrown out of work, owing to general social conditions over which they have no control, should receive a separate treatment from that of the persistently lazy and indolent. But Spencer groups all people together, irrespective of their special circumstances, and contents himself with the canon that there "must be an adjustment of amounts to deserts." In "Social Statics" he goes to the extent of saying that "inconvenience, suffering, and death are the penalties attached by nature to ignorance as well as to incompetence—are also the means of remedying them"; and the same idea receives its scientific formulation in the biological law of survival recorded in "Justice." It does not seem to have occurred to Spencer that, in order that his law of equal freedom, which aims at universal application, may have an intelligible meaning at all, it must be limited by a law which aims at treating persons in similar circumstances similarly. Spencer does not appear to see that to allot "special privileges and burdens to special classes of the community" (Sidgwick, *Methods* pp. 266-7), is not necessarily unjust.

We have so far seen that Spencer's theory of justice, in what it omits, fails to give us as much justice as theories to which it is most closely related—the *laissez faire* and utilitarian individualism. We shall now proceed to show that, even from

a positive point of view, it falls short of justice as enunciated by utilitarian individualists. Many of these theorists realise that economic value is essentially relative and not absolute and that, if competition be excluded, there is no way of fixing values or of comparing services (cp. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 244). They further realise that there are many kinds of valuable services for which there is no market value in our existing competitive society. They also grant the force of the truth that a person may be as industrious to-day as he was yesterday, and yet his wages may be less than half, simply because of an unforeseen decrease in the demand for his service (cp. Sidgwick, *Prin's of Political Economy*, p. 504). In the light of these facts, therefore, they hesitate to assume naively with Spencer that whatever a person is able to get in a free and open market is in accordance with the law of ideal justice. Nevertheless, they believe that, under our present conditions, it is right for a person to expect a reward in proportion to his economic productivity; but such belief is not in the name of ideal justice; it is in the name of economic welfare or social expediency. Such at least seems to be the point of view adopted by a writer like Dalton (author of "Inequality of Incomes") who, on the basis of Prof. Canan's distinction between considerations of *economy* and considerations of *equity*, concludes that justice is something that cannot be definitely ascertained and that, therefore, we must confine our attention merely to questions of economic welfare. Many persons will be inclined to agree with utilitarian individualists when they claim that there is no other practical way of rewarding a man than that of giving him his market price and that, under any other system of distribution, there would be "increased idleness, decreased saving, lessened efficiency of capital, pressure of population, checked growth of culture" (Sidgwick), etc. But the same persons will refuse to believe with Spencer that a mechanical proportioning of benefits to efforts (work), unrelieved by any qualifying condition, is the highest form of justice that we can have, either in the present state or in the ideal state of ideal men posited by him. Furthermore, if just reward, as Spencer imagines, can be accurately measured by a person's earning capacity, as that is determined by the law of demand and supply operating in individualistic societies to-day, his theory seems to reduce itself to the curious position that justice consists in the mere maintenance of the *status quo*—a position which even extreme individualists will find it difficult to accept without qualification. That this inference of ours is not unfair to Spencer can be shown from the fact that, in his evolutionary treatment of the laws of life and the conditions of existence, the presumption of his argument is in favour of existing moral rules which have managed to survive in the passive struggle for existence.

A second important point where Spencer's theory of a just reward, from the positive point of view, seems to be deficient, is in connection with the question of contract. Means who, like Spencer, appears to hold general happiness as end, contends that it "cannot be admitted that justice consists in the fulfillment of contracts." (Mind O. S. V, p. 397) For, as he says, "Very few persons in the lowest ranks of labour, perhaps, regard their wages as an equivalent for their pains. It is all they can get and they take it, but to say that justice is confined to giving them

it, is to say that existing social arrangements are perfectly just, which Mr. Spencer does not maintain. If he is talking of justice in the ideal state, he still has to suppose every person in making a contract to be able to decide what will be an equivalent for his sacrifice and to do this without comparison of pleasures." (Ibid.) Even if we grant to Spencer for the sake of argument that the fulfillment of contracts is the best means of every person getting what he ought to get, we are faced with a difficult question for which there is no answer from the side of the law of equal freedom. Are the contracting individuals to contract with one another in the capacity of separate individuals or as members of "coercive" groups? The reason for asking this question is that it is quite conceivable that a class of labourers will be able to sell their services at a much higher price as an aggregate than as individual labourers, and that, conversely, an employer acting in unison with other employers of the same kind will get cheaper labour than if he should act alone. In short it is clear that factors like monopoly and combination introduce into contract an element that is insoluble by the law of equal freedom. Any one of the four possible wages that a labourer may get according to the presence of one or more of the four conditions mentioned above, will be ideally just on the basis of the law of equal freedom, so long as there is no physical coercion or intimidation. If Spencer accepts this conclusion of ours, we seem justified in doubting, if not in denying, the exact or "scientific" nature of his absolute and universal formula of justice, which seems unable to provide us a precise canon of distribution, in the light of which our future action may be directed. Whatever a person can get through profiteering, artificial monopoly, obstruction, etc., within the law of equal freedom, turns out to be his just reward. But common sense certainly sets itself against "justice" of that kind. Even Spencer's own laws of life laid down in the early part of "Justice" do not support such justice. Adapting an argument used by Spencer in his chapter on Sub-Human Justice to the present context, we may say that the profiteer, the monopolist and the obstructionist so habitually break the relation between the conduct and normal consequence of their victims that in very few individuals are those relations long sustained. The sustentation of these enemies of society frequently means the destruction of "the best individuals as readily as the worst," so much so that human justice becomes "extremely imperfect alike in general and in detail." Therefore, we cannot dogmatically assert that those who go under in the economic struggle necessarily deserve to go under.

We have up till now concerned ourselves with a criticism of Spencer's theory of economic distribution from the point of view of theories closely akin to it—what we have called *laissez faire* and utilitarian individualist theories. We shall now approach the larger question of distributive justice, in particular, and of social justice, in general, from the standpoint of idealistic theories, *i.e.*, theories which never regard mere happiness as the supreme end of conduct. From the point of view of these theories Spencer's principle of distribution, resting as it does on the economic law of demand and supply, is open to the following defects: (a) that people do not always find the work for which they are best fitted; (b) that their demands are not always for things that they really need—sometimes they are even

for things that are positively hurtful; and (c) that sometimes things of the greatest value are very little in demand.¹ This criticism, we admit, will have little or no weight with Spencer, to whom justice consists in letting each individual sing or swim for himself. But if the conclusion reached by us elsewhere is valid,—that, even on Spencer's own biological and utilitarian premises, the organic view of society is the only true view, the above mentioned defects cannot be passed over lightly. On that view, justice would aim not at the mere apportioning of benefits to services, if such mechanical apportionment is possible at all, but at giving each individual a share in the common good of the community. While it may find it socially and economically expedient, under the complex conditions of modern life, to preserve our present economic system to a large degree (at least as far as the middle ranges of income are concerned), and regard poverty as punishment to some extent, it would at the same time correct and limit the inherent weakness of the economic system by paying due attention to differences of need on the one side and differences of capacity on the other. If a member of society is unable to earn for himself his minimum share of social good, it would endeavour to make it possible for him to earn it through such means as minimum wage laws, good methods of technical instruction, efficient labour exchanges, and state control of the supply of some of the more important needs.² It would treat each person as an end in himself and not as a mere means to an end. In other words, it would regard each person's good as of equal intrinsic value with the like good of everyone else and would consider superior capacity as constituting a claim to superior consideration³—though not always of a material character. Instead of trying to effect some kind of compromise between competing individuals, it would look upon these individuals as members of a common group, and endeavour to promote right relationships between them. It would elevate the question of distribution of external goods from the plane of economics to the plane of personality. It would secure to a considerable extent "that no unnecessary obstacles are placed in the way of each one discovering for himself what is the position for which he is best fitted, and eventually gaining that position." (Mackenzie) It would also do something at least to remove such extreme poverty as would prevent a person from securing the necessary materials and instruments for the proper discharge of his functions, and such extreme wealth as might tempt him to waste them.² Instead of mechanically ascertaining the just reward of each person by means of a universal and abstract formula of justice, it would aim at strengthening in the community as a whole, the disposition to ascertain and carry out what is just for each individual.³ In addition to emphasising justice in the realm of competitive goods, it would emphasise the cultivation of non-competitive goods like goods of the body (*e.g.*, physical health) and goods of the soul (*e.g.*, moral goodness, culture, knowledge, etc.). Instead of

¹ Compare J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, Ch. V.

² Compare Mackenzie's *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, Ch. V.

³ In the words of H. Rashdall, "An abstract 'distribution' cannot be a good, but a disposition and a will to distribute justly may be."

forcibly fitting itself into a preconceived notion as to the proper function of the State, it would regard the State as an instrument for the realisation of the good life of the community. Justice would become the master and the State its servant, and as servant, the State might be required to do much or do little, depending upon the intellectual and moral level reached by the community and the urgency or otherwise of the acts to be performed. Merely to call an act individualistic would not be to uphold it. Neither to call acts paternal or socialistic would be enough to condemn them. The good life of the community, which, to a large degree, is self-earned, would be the deciding factor, and the question regarding the limit of state-action would present itself as a matter of detail.

The superiority of the above view to Spencer's law of equal freedom is so obvious that we think it unnecessary to expatiate on it. We believe we have said enough to show that the law of equal freedom when and where practicable, falls short of the *laissez faire*, the utilitarian individualist, and the idealistic theories of social justice.

The Implications of History

By Ferrand E. Corley, M.A.

ANY one who runs over the histories published in the last half century or so can hardly fail to be struck by the preference for multiple authorship. No longer does a Gibbon, a Macaulay, a Mommsen, attempt singlehanded to cover the whole field. Not only are large histories like the Cambridge quartette* parcelled out among many authors; the History of England (as in the familiar editions by Longmans and by Methuen) must have half a dozen or a dozen to handle it, and even so modest a venture as Longmans' History of India cannot apparently be entrusted to a single pen but requires the labours of four authors to produce its three slim octavo volumes. The significance of this portent challenges consideration.

It is in part the result of specialisation. The mediaevalist will not touch the modern period: the historian of antiquity shrinks from writing of the Middle Ages. But that is not all: there has been a specialisation in topics no less than in periods, and the topics are many. We are often reminded that the old idea of history as merely a matter of wars and treaties, kings and their marriages and deaths, is out of fashion: and a cursory glance at some of the tables of contents confirms this. In addition to separate histories of religion, art, discovery and what not, there must be chapters devoted to such subjects in the general history or it will be considered incomplete. An estimate of the encyclopaedic learning required for the survey of such a field will at once explain why any history beyond the range of an elementary textbook must indent on the services of a great variety of scholars for completeness.

If it is not rash to try to put a big thing in a short and simple phrase, the central aim of history (as now viewed) may be expressed as not simply to record but to understand. We have here a conception of history which must not be overlooked. First formulated with any clearness by Thucydides† (deservedly recognised as the earliest master of historical writing) it has been developed with increasing purpose and completeness in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But the manifold advance of knowledge in every field, while offering the materials

* The Cambridge Modern History, The Cambridge Medieval History, The Cambridge History of India, The Cambridge Ancient History. The great *Histoire Générale* of Lavissee and Rambaud is another conspicuous example.

† The claim he puts forward for his own work—that it is something to keep always beside you, a thing for attentive study and not merely a means to beguile the tedium of a day—is hardly intelligible except on the faith that there are principles in human life and action, and that a new age may learn abiding lessons from the experience of the past.

for a fuller understanding, has at the same time the embarrassing effect of stiffening the demand: for the more we realise the complexity of the details thus displayed to us, the more passionate (but at the same time how much the more difficult) becomes the necessity to understand. The mass of facts at once enriches and impoverishes us, because we see that their mere record is no more than history's raw material. The historian of to-day cannot be content with a chronicle of fact, be it never so carefully verified: he must present his narrative as a reasonable account, justified by all we know of the way things happen, the way man behaves, or he leaves the understanding of his reader unsatisfied.

On a broad general view, then, we may say that the modern treatment of history entails two tasks both of which go beyond the mere chronicling of events. (a) The underlying causes as well as the obvious and apparent must receive justice. Recent changes in our own University illustrate the importance which is now attached to Geography. Amazing as it may seem, the teacher of history in this Presidency was for some time confronted with the disheartening task of trying to teach the subject to boys who knew no geography. Happily that nightmare is passing away. But why has geography been placed under the sheltering wing of the Board of Studies in History? Not arbitrarily, but because of the profound connection between them. Like many other ideas true in themselves the geographical element in history may be done to death, distorted by exaggeration. But until you have grasped something of the influence of permanent geographical facts like rivers and mountains, of climate (both directly, and indirectly through the natural products it favours or discourages, through the qualities it stimulates or inhibits) on the life of the communities dwelling among them, whole vistas of historical interpretation will be for you no more than the display of colour to a blind man. The history of India at large, of either North India or South India taken by itself; the history of France; the connection between Britain and India; the political evolution of Greece—how can we hope to *understand* any one of these if we give geography the go-by?

(b) History is first and last concerned with the actions of man, and of man in society. It is plainly waste of time to deal with those actions on the basis of understanding if you are ignorant of man himself. What he is—the significance of his aims, his qualities, of his "response to his environment"—must be the foundation of any true interpretation of his acts. It is difficult at this point to avoid a dangerous circle. We need to know what man is: but who shall tell us? History itself furnishes part of the evidence. An anatomist may conceivably satisfy himself that man is no more than a stomach with an exceptionally elaborate equipment for filling it: not so the historian. That is not a "reasonable account" for one who ponders all the records tell us—the growth of art and poetry, of religion and philosophy, of philanthropy, of scientific research. Such things are not to be explained on the basis of physical appetites. At every point—including such matters as geography, already touched on—while keenly alive to the forces which have helped to shape man, the historian must try to gauge also the power man has shown to shape them—unless he is to surrender to the idea that all is

(so to say) mechanical, and what we call History no more than a chapter or sub-division of physical science.

To make the matter clearer two or three examples may be a little more closely (though still briefly) examined. (1) The importance of geography has been emphasised and very summarily illustrated. No one can read modern history or study the signs of the times without an impression of the importance of "nationality." But as soon as you attempt to probe the difficult though fascinating problems of race and racial characters, or even limit your attention to the immediate formation of those groups whose mutual attraction and cohesion, on the basis of race, language, tradition, common experience and so forth, gives us our working definition of the terms we use, you can hardly miss the controlling influence of geography. Geography has helped to set the actual limits for those unities of social and commercial intercourse, of political order, of linguistic affiliation, which by their internal likeness and their difference from what is outside have gradually become the nations of to-day. Further, the historian can see that again and again the fate of kingdoms and empires has hinged on the geographical factor. Consider the effects (from this point of view) of the great plain of North India inside the encircling rampart of the Himalayas, or the decisive importance of the Pyrenees, successively exercised on the kingdom of the Visigoths, the Arab dominion, the empire of Charles the Great and the grandiose schemes of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Yet again, the perennial problem of Turkey can never be truly grasped by any one who fails to see the lesson of historical geography—that the narrow seas unite rather than divide the shores which a purely conventional usage has labeled as Europe and Asia. To take a still longer view, the geological history of the New World, and its consequent lack of the generous provision of quadrupeds suitable alike for pastoral husbandry and for draught or carriage with which the Old World was dowered, is in no small measure accountable for the backwardness of the indigenous civilisations at the time of the Discovery.

(2) Turn for a moment to Economics—which again is obviously linked on its own account with geography. How much of the history of kingdoms and empires, of the growth of the arts and sciences, of all that we call civilisation, can you hope to understand if you ignore the economic factors? We may deprecate, in common with other one-sided generalisations, the interpretation of history solely in terms of economics. No more in national life than in that of the individual is appetite the only clue to conduct—a point to remember later on. But the long struggle between Rome and Carthage, the passionate monotony of Cato's *Delenda est Karthago*, took on a new light, lost something of the character of mere record and came nearer to understanding, when we learnt to see the Roman as a merchant no less than a lawgiver, rightly detecting his bitterest foes in the Phoenician and the Etruscan, whose coalition had done so much to baulk the aims of his predecessor, the Greek.

(3) A third example may be found in *Race*. To any but the superficial the term at once presents a problem of which we can hardly expect to furnish a solution: but to ignore it is not merely a counsel of despair; it stultifies our whole

claim that we are out to understand. History may not yet be able to solve the problem herself; but she cannot allow others to propound a solution without the aid of her criticism. The long record of human action emphasises the effect of those strands of likeness and difference which terms like race commonly indicate. But when we sift all that the ethnologist, the philologist and (once more) the geographer have to tell us, when we have endeavoured to discover and to evaluate the facts of cultural contacts, the enigma is by no means resolved. The result of inquiry seems often not so much to answer questions as to multiply them. But in history, as in other things, a right view of the problem is a condition precedent to any hopeful attempt at its solution. Advance, far from bringing us to the goal, seems rather to open before us yet wider horizons for discovery. The riddle of race can never be fully resolved unless we face the whole complex and elusive problem of the relation between Heredity and Environment, which in turn is not merely a question for Physiology, but very decidedly one to which history must help to give the answer.

(4) A fourth instance, which must be the last, is to be found in two words, sadly hackneyed in our daily use, but fruitful in suggestion to all who really ponder their significance—Progress, Civilisation. Change—movement—is manifest: but how much of it is progress? Unless we can show that change is for the better, that movement is in the direction of a desirable and (in some sense) attainable goal, we have no right to speak of progress. From the cant expressions of the text-book it is but a step to the deep question of man's nature and destiny. Civilisation—a word hard to define—gives us another aspect of the same ultimate problems.* The many-sided product of the ages, it challenges us to explain its meaning and purpose: it challenges us (as always in historical inquiry) to scrutinise the origins. How—When—Where—above all, Why—did man take those first steps which led on insensibly to "the glory that was Greece, the grandeur that was Rome," to the speculations of a Sankaracharya or a Plato, to the theories of Newton and Einstein, the marvels of electricity, and the growing ideal of world-peace? At this point it is well to note the linking together of our examples among themselves: the story of civilisation confronts us afresh with those perplexing issues of geography, of race and language, of economics, already touched upon.

One of the catchwords of to-day is "Scientific History:" what does it mean? Any one who thinks that a dry-as-dust method—determined to "treat facts as facts" and never look below the surface—is scientific is to be pitied. History must be scientific, because (as the previous pages show, though the term is not used) it must be philosophic: it is in some ways unfortunate that our recent practice has allowed the terms philosophy and science to part company. A wholesome scepticism, refusing to accept either facts or theories without the appropriate evidence, is the necessary temper for historical inquiry—a determination to test not merely the

* Cf. the story of the Japanese diplomatist who complained that so long as Japan could only point to her art and literature Europe persisted in regarding her as barbarous: when she could display ironclads and factory-chimneys she was recognised as a civilised state. Even if exaggerated, there was point in the criticism.

theory put forward but the presuppositions on which it rests. Economic interpretations—glib phrases about evolution or survival—cannot satisfy us. We must probe deeper. What is man? What is the value—what is the validity—of that spiritual element which throughout his story seems to have played upon and complicated the material aspects of his being? Before you can fully answer these questions you must make your reckoning with Philosophy in the modern, technical sense, examining the foundations of science itself and the competence of man's powers to study his own nature and the universe of which he finds himself a part. Sooner or later, directly and indirectly, history compels attention to man as man, and to the deepest inquiries of his being: Whence came he? Whither is he bound? Why . . . ?

The agelong philosophy of India discredited the whole fabric of the visible world and man himself with his ceaseless activities as only apparent—the product of Maya, Illusion.† The paucity of Indian historical writings finds an explanation here. The literary output in other directions and the recognised acuteness of the Indian mind preclude the idea that the omission to write history was due to want of faculty. The alternative—want of interest—is the natural, we might say the inevitable, outcome of the penetrating and comprehensive denial of the reality of human affairs. Similarly, to accept any form of determinism (whether in the naked austerity which some affect or veiled in the trappings of "scientific history") will sooner or later have the effect of cutting the ground from under the historian's feet. If all is unreal, or if all is mechanically involved in the ultimate origin of things—if you cannot *learn*, and by learning adapt the phenomena of life to some standard, history loses all its meaning.

That eminent historian, Professor Bury, in the Introduction to his remarkable book on "The Idea of Progress," declares that the Progress of Humanity can neither be proved nor disproved: "Belief in it is an act of faith." He might have gone further: any real devotion to historical study is in the nature of an affirmation. Unless there is a goal worth striving for, a reasonable hope of traveling towards it, "All is vanity and vexation of spirit:" there is no reason why any one should be at the pains to record the futile movements of mankind, the fluttering of the moth about the candle that consumes it, the bustling of the squirrel in its cage. Or if, to amuse himself, he must record it, yet let him not suppose that any man will waste his time in reading the record. The conclusion is logical: but our hearts rebel against it. Our instinctive assertion of the worth of man gives value, gives interest,

* A suggestive illustration of the principles here advocated may be found in Prof. R.A.S. Macalister's brilliant little book, *A History of Civilisation in Palestine*, c. vii (Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature).

† The reader must not think I wish to slight Indian Philosophy. Though dissenting from its conclusions I regard it with profound respect: and it is (from my point of view) of real moment to the historian, as well as to the philosopher (in the stricter sense), that India has taken this position. Not merely the number of her population—philosophical truths cannot be determined by counting heads—but the importance of her contribution as a whole forbids a thoughtful inquirer lightly to set her views aside.

to his most trivial acts—how much more to his heroic achievements, his oft-times splendid failures, his indomitable power of endurance! And that instinctive reaction is the real answer to the depressing theory which evoked it. History is worth while—but the statement cannot be proved: "Belief in it is an act of faith."

Geography, economics, science in all its branches, philosophy, religion—it seems you must know something of everything to write history as we conceive it to-day. Small wonder that few will attempt to write singlehanded: a whole academy must be marshaled for the effort. And what of us, who study? To read with intelligence, with profit, must not we also know at least a little of everything? It looks as though we must. The students of history, still more those who are to be teachers of history, are to be commiserated: at the same time they are to be congratulated. They have a hard, an exacting, a never-ending task: that is the burden of it—but that is its delight, its abiding satisfaction. You may drink of this well without stint: no need to fear you will ever drink it dry.

Unemployment among the Educated Middle Class

By S. Subbarama Aiyar, M.A.

I

That there exists unemployment among the educated middle classes of every description, more especially among the literate section, in this Presidency, is beyond dispute. Since most of the products of our schools and colleges, technical and non-technical, seek employment in the *paid* services under the Government or private agencies, it is not difficult to get an idea of its extent by referring to the annual supply of qualified candidates from such institutions and the probable annual net demand under the Government and organised private bodies. We know that many a Madras educated youth seeks and some are actually able to find employment elsewhere as clerks, stenographers, etc. in some of the commercial cities of India and a few under the services of the Central Government. Though the numbers employed outside the Presidency may be large, and if more openings are available they may easily be more, there is no doubt that the majority of the products of our educational institutions seek employment in the Presidency itself.

That this problem is specially acute among the *middle* rather than the *richer* and the *poorer* classes is evident from the numbers of those who resort to the different stages of education, collegiate and secondary. Thus in 1924-25 the distribution of scholars according to wealth condition was as follows:—

Class of Institution.	Richer Class.	Middle Class.	Poor Class.
Arts Colleges	506	7,757	1,481
Professional Colleges	133	1,646	103
Secondary Schools	6,262	96,798	50,986
Training Schools for Masters	37	2,611	5,593
Others (industrial, etc.)	170	3,250	2,872

These scholars are drawn mostly from the landholding and official classes and traders, though this classification is by no means exclusive. The following are the figures according to the occupation of parents or guardians (1924-25) :—

Class of Institution.	Officials.	Petty officials.	Traders.	Land-holders.	Others.
Arts Colleges ...	3,248	1,124	1,021	3,902	449
Professional Colleges ...	762	40	127	808	145
Secondary Schools ...	29,623	24,464	26,485	54,452	19,022
Training Schools for Masters ...	534	1,789	394	4,377	1,147
Others (industrial, etc.) ...	1,256	797	740	1,303	2,490

Thus under all heads the landholders and officials are more numerous than the others. These landholders are by no means rich. Many of them are uneconomic holders and have even to borrow money to educate their sons so that these may follow some literate profession and supplement their earnings from land. In a caste-ridden country the official classes naturally desire to bring up their sons in their own profession, aiming, if possible, at a higher start for their sons than they themselves had.

From a communal point of view, the following figures show the relative strength of the different communities in our educational institutions (1924-25) :—

Class of Institution.	Brahmins.	Non-Brahmin Hindus.	Christians.	Muham-madans.	Others.
Arts Colleges ...	5,462	3,001	980	246	55
Professional Colleges ...	1,309	472	152	53	18
Secondary Schools ...	51,269	77,136	14,360	8,571	2,710
Training Schools for Masters ...	2,430	3,032	1,575	702	502
Others (industrial, etc.) ...	1,887	2,338	1,426	373	98

Taking the statistics of passes in the several examinations of the Madras University we note the following distribution of figures according to communities :—

Classes of Graduates.	Brahmins.	Hindus not Brahmins.	Indian Christians.	Muham-madans.
Bachelor of Arts ...	* 14,478	4,852	2,146	293
Master of Arts ...	669	122	85	8
Licentiates in Teaching ...	1,960	291	387	19
Bachelor of Laws ...	4,103	1,115	253	47
Medical ...	422	291	164	13
Engineering ...	216	32	29	1

* Number on the rolls up to 1925.

It is clear that the Brahmins, relatively to their strength, have taken to higher English education more than any other community. This is perhaps due partly to their tradition of intellectual work. But other communities are rightly taking an increasing interest in recent years in getting the benefit of modern education and we may therefore expect that the problem will be as keen among them as among the Brahmins.

The number of educational institutions, higher and secondary, and the students that resort to them show a tendency to increase :—

Class of Institution. *	1921.		1911.		1901.		1891.	
	Number.	Scholars.	Number.	Scholars.	Number.	Scholars.	Number.	Scholars.
Arts Colleges ...	50	7,840	31	3,741	41	3,279	35	3,205
Professional Colleges ...	9	1,784	5	890	6	636	5	518
Secondary Schools ...	585	169,634	446	105,945	732	100,126	815	70,515
Primary Schools ...	31,906	1,494,121	24,686	969,379	20,305	621,627	17,885	505,280
Training Schools ...	160	9,500	83	2,989	74	1,612	70	1,427
Other Special Schools ...	94	5,794	93	4,618	57	3,927	29	2,192

* Madras Census, 1921.

It is noticeable from the above figures that though there is a large increase in the numbers of those who resort to primary and secondary schools, the proportion of those who aspire to a University Degree to the pupils in the secondary and primary schools is greater in 1921 than in the previous decades. It is clear that the professional careers open to University graduates are becoming increasingly popular among the middle classes of all communities. The results of University examinations show a similar increase in the output of qualified men :—

Classes of Graduates.	1921.	1911.	1901.	1891.
Bachelor of Arts ...	* 1,202	642	342	206
Master of Arts ...	24	22	11	5
Licentiates in Teaching ...	150	† 98	48	3
Bachelor of Laws ...	385	† 128	142	32
Medicine ...	86	17	12	5
Engineering ...	29	7	2	1

* Actual numbers passed in these years.

† Average for 1911 and 1912.

Whatever may be the potential demand in such a vast country like India, the actual absorption of these men in the services which their organisers are able to provide has almost reached the point of satiety as evidenced by the large number of those who apply for such posts whenever advertised. The numbers of those

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who are supported by Public Administration, the Professions and the Liberal Arts tell a similar tale. Thus many of them support a less number in 1921 than in the previous decades :—

Occupation *	Population supported in			Percentage of variation	
	1921.	1911.	1901.	1921-11	1911-1901
Public Administration ...	322,237	353,164	396,610	— 8.8	— 11.0
Lawyers ...	22,350	20,723	20,569	+ 7.9	+ 0.7
Medical practice ...	72,164	75,205	68,571	— 4.2	+ 9.8
Instruction ...	129,285	146,746	123,745	— 11.9	+ 18.6
Letters, Arts and Sciences ...	130,124	139,193	128,898	— 6.5	+ 8.0

* Madras Census, 1921.

It will be noticed that except under Law the numbers of those supported by the Professions show a *minus* percentage of variation in the decade 1921-11. What with the multiplication of Universities and Colleges and the limited demand for their services, the problem of unemployment has reached a most acute stage among the University graduates. The strength of the Law College in Madras, which is increasing enormously in recent years, may be taken as an index of the acuteness of the problem of unemployment among the University Arts Graduates. Their prospects are not at all rosy after their course in law is over.

II

Let us now consider the relative importance of the several causes for this state of affairs. As our graduates and others are for the most part willing to take up any job for which their training has made them fit, however small the salary, on the principle that half a loaf is better than no bread and in the hope that something better may turn up in the future, smallness of remuneration cannot be regarded as an important cause of unemployment. Again, provided one is able to secure a living wage and prospects are sufficiently good, there is on the whole no disinclination on the part of our men to migrate to any part of the Presidency or to other Provinces and even to places outside India.

It must be admitted that apart from the vocational value of English education—which as we saw is getting less—it is often desired by the so-called lower castes of Hindus as a means of release from the age-long thralldom of caste prejudice. An educated man—especially if he occupies a decent post in Government service—is raised thereby in social estimation. Though the crushing poverty and the stolid indifference of the large mass of the lower castes of Hindus still stand in the way of their getting themselves educated in our English schools and colleges this social value cannot altogether be ignored in any discussion of the utility of this education or the supply of educated youths in South India.

Some have maintained that “academic distinctions—degrees and certificates—have acquired a definite social value, the man in possession of them being rated at a higher figure in the marriage market.” There are reasons to believe, however, that the dowry offered to the educated youth is not so much for the Degree but its market value, and with the fall in its market value the amount of dowry is also tending to fall. It should, however, be explained that the dowry system among the middle classes—though like every other institution it is often abused—has grown up out of a desire, nay of necessity, on the part of both the parents to pool their resources to set the couple on their feet on the threshold of life.

There is another social peculiarity about the supply of educated skill to which reference may be made. As far as ordinary occupations are concerned in which the traditions of the past are still strong they are not interchangeable, but in the organised industries and professions which are the results of modern economic changes in our midst young men of all castes do not scruple to rub shoulders with one another. It is true that a well to do parent tries at present to put his son in the ordinary University course or in some technical institution in which prospects of employment are certain and good, but with the pressure of unemployment on the increase in the ordinary occupations, we may expect that old habits will change and the wiser among them will exploit whatever source is available.

The cost of a purely literary education up to the B.A. standard is roughly Rs. 3,000 to 4,000, while the law course will cost Rs. 1,000 to 2,000 more. The cost of Medical and Engineering training may be put approximately at Rs. 3,000. Those who qualify themselves for careers in a commercial office or for agricultural and medical service are generally S.S.L.C's and Intermediates. Some are not able to bear the cost of the higher literary and professional education and hence go in for the lower commercial, agricultural or medical course. Others, having begun to realise that a purely literary education is not paying as a vocational training, deliberately choose the higher technical courses. Thus where a few years ago students had to be coaxed into the agricultural colleges by payment of stipends we had the spectacle this year of over 400 students applying for 40 seats in the college at Coimbatore. It is also a remarkable feature that in the Arts colleges of this Presidency the demand for a *science* course is great and increasing at the expense of purely *literary* and *arts* studies. These are perhaps indications that the parents and students alike feel the need for turning the corner.

III

Every student of the history of modern Indian education knows that it has taken a course of its own which even the authorities have been unable to control. Whatever may be said about the momentous decision of 1835—which ushered in English education into India—the famous Educational Despatch of 1854 urged “the establishment of provincial universities and the institution of vocational courses on a liberal scale which would teach the natives of India the marvellous results of the employment of labour and capital, rouse them to emulate us in the

development of the vast resources of their country, and gradually, but certainly, confer upon them all the advantages that accompany the healthy increase of wealth and commerce." The Education Commission of 1882 again laid stress on the need for "the creation of courses in the high schools intended to fit youths for commercial or non-literary pursuits." The unlucky Commission of 1902 sought to give a new turn to the educational course by diverting the growing stream of western educated youths from pursuing a purely literary course, but the political suspicions that were engendered made it impossible to give it a decent trial. The result is that we have a uniform type of University in India catering for the needs of thousands of students; while England, to quote the instance of an advanced country, has no less than 18 different types of universities. Now that there are reasons to believe that a purely literary education is felt to be insufficient by students and parents alike, it is perhaps time for the State to remodel the educational course.

It is perhaps necessary to emphasise at the outset that India needs to-day a cultural *as well as* vocational education and not one at the expense of the other. The aim should be so to combine vocational and cultural education that a youth when he arrives at the age of adolescence will not feel as helpless as he feels to-day when he has to wait for posts to be provided by others.

The primary stage of education which should be universal is intended to give to children the rudiments of the three R's and develop to some extent their powers of observation, memory and imagination. It is impossible in such a vast country as India to provide this essential service by the State alone except at a prohibitive cost. Private efforts of communities are indispensable. The possibilities of reviving the indigenous method should be fully explored.

Secondary education should aim at training the hand as well as the mind. The purely literary bias of the present curriculum should be given up. It is not necessary except in special cases to provide vocational training in special schools. Every school should have a pretty extensive cultivable land of its own where the teachers and the pupils might co-operate in cultivating the fields and engage themselves in such kinds of work as are required to make them a more or less self-sufficing colony. The present generation of students in our English schools and colleges has been brought up in the idea that manual work is not genteel and that to get one-self employed in the services, in those of the Government if possible, is to be preferred to working on one's own account. In the peculiar circumstances of India, even in the case of university education, boys should be taken through a course of practical training in agriculture and handicrafts along with their literary and intellectual education. Our boys will not be any the worse for it even from an intellectual point of view. It is time that we gave a decent trial to what Captain Petavel of the Calcutta University calls "an educational colony."

The present trouble is that the supply of educated youths has outrun the demand for their skill. One obvious remedy is to create more posts and open out greater chances in the professions. This is possible only when the producers of real

commodities succeed in earning enough to maintain their standard of life and secure a larger surplus to pay for the services of the professional classes. Indeed the improvement in the general prosperity of the country is in some measure a solution for the problem of unemployment among the educated classes.

If the State can do much, the people ought to be able to do more. The idea that the services of the State are superior to everything else must now be given up. Moreover, young men should try to develop a certain self-reliance, a capacity to fall back upon one's own resources rather than depend on an entrepreneur (whether it be the State or some other agency) to eke out one's livelihood.

Above all, the advice "Back to the Land" is a most wholesome one. Provided that in our hurry to impart the so-called *cultural* education, we do not neglect the agricultural surroundings, there is no great difficulty in changing the attitude of mind of our prospective students who hail mostly, as we saw, from the agricultural class of landholders.

The International Labour Organization and India.

By G. D. Watkins, B.Sc.

Misconceptions concerning the nature and the functions of the I. L. O. are not confined to India, or indeed even to those parts of the world we know as the Far East. Even in the very heart of the activities centring round this institution, we are told misunderstandings have been discovered, and Geneva still laughs over the story of one of its hotel-keepers who forbade his ballroom to the delegates of the International Labour Conference on the ground that he feared their hobnail boots would damage the floor. His surprise when he saw those delegates, tophatted, and in many cases graduates of the world's oldest Universities, is not recorded, but one can imagine it was none the less real. So perhaps the name of this wonderful partner of the League of Nations is not one of its strongest points, so much so that its friends have often wished it could have been renamed, with some cognomen less suggestive of Red Bolsheviks and unconstitutional behaviour.

However, the International Labour Organisation has come to stay, and in all probability its name will remain unaltered. Its work however grows apace, and it is a pity that so few people really know much about it. Critics are apt to give distorted views, and so the general public, taking its opinions from the columns of the news papers, in many cases sees only faults and overlooks the virtues in an institution like this. The need for a clear statement of the origin and work of the I. L. O. is therefore very real, and especially so in India, where even the leaders of political parties have been known to be inaccurate on the subject.

The need for the I. L. O. goes back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, and since England was the first country in Europe to experience this movement it may be best to trace its growth there. Other countries followed in much the same path as she had led, and today India is beginning to tread the initial steps of the same road. In 1700 England resembled in very many respects the position of the mofussil districts of India today. Arthur Young after his tour of agricultural England reported that in many cases agricultural implements were little changed from what they had been three hundred or four hundred years previously. Methods of agriculture were if anything more ancient, and it was due to his efforts and those of his friends, that what we know as the Agricultural Revolution became a fact. However in 1700 the people of England were mostly agricultural labourers, who, in their spare time, worked at home textile industries. The women spun and the men wove, and all this as a subsidiary occupation to agriculture. The

coming of machinery changed all that, and soon the new "factories" depleted the country-side of the labour necessary for agriculture, as round them the new "cities" began to grow. The comradeship of the master and man rapidly gave place to a social cleavage between the capitalist and worker, and soon one employer was the master of hundreds of workers, most of whom he hardly knew. The pity was that so many of these "captains of industry" cared little for the welfare of the employees, whose labour they hired, and slums grew as a necessary corollary of the "factory." Children were cheaper and in many ways better employees than their parents, and so before long the peculiar situation arose of unemployed parents living on the wages of their children, children of very tender years in many cases. Because of the prevailing economic doctrine of the time, best known as "laissez-faire" no governmental action was at first taken, and abuses of every kind sprang up in the new industries. Long hours, poor wages, child-labour, women's sweated labour, and dirty insanitary dwellings are a record that stains the history of the first days of the Industrial Revolution. Later on, under the leadership of men like Lord Shaftesbury, the Factory Acts were passed, and the era of reform dawned, an era which yet continues to grow to a more perfect day in the West.

It is these Factory Acts that gave to the workers of the West, what they prize very highly, their higher standard of living. Instead of typhoid and smallpox being prevalent in London as in the 17th century, when the death rate was 80 in every 1000, and more than half these children under five in the working quarters, these diseases are now practically unknown. Instead of children of three years and upwards working in the coal mines and factories of Great Britain, it was illegal to work any child at all below the age of 14, and national education was made compulsory for all up to this age. Workers now enjoy an eight hour day and many of the more progressive firms work even less hours than that. Wages are now the highest in Europe, and America has actually proved that high wages are more economical in the long run than low ones. Model garden cities are taking the place of slums, and in every way the life of the worker is happier than ever it has been. One can therefore understand that the workers of the West hold their present standard of living in great esteem and wish to do all in their power to retain it at its present level.

Having traced the fight for a better standard of living in the West, it is necessary here to digress a little and consider a certain line of thought which held sway here a few years ago and still to-day has many adherents. The line of thought is that of the opponents of machinery in this land, and the importance of their arguments is that if they be plausible, then the work of the I.L.O. is without purpose for India. When Gandhi returned from England in 1908 he was rash enough to say "I cannot recall a single good point in connection with machinery," and probably he was quite sincere in this. He had seen the horrors accompanying the stage at which the workers were beginning to climb out of the awful conditions brought on by the Industrial Revolution, and his mind, which is the mind of a religious leader and not that of an economist, naturally revolted. The horrors he

saw were as nothing compared with the horrors of the previous generation or two, and what Gandhi failed to see was that England had never considered the question of abolishing machinery, but rather was busy with the better way of improving conditions of labour and a better distribution of the wealth produced by modern industry. There is nothing evil in the use of machinery, which nowadays is essential for the creation of utilities for the large population of modern nations. England in 1810 would never have been able to support her population on mere agriculture, and her only means of livelihood was to continue as the workshop of the world. This she had become during the Napoleonic Wars, and by means of her manufactures had saved herself and also saved Europe from Napoleon. True it is that certain people then, as people do now in India, cried "Back to the land" and "Down with machinery," but their reasoning was soon proved to be fallacious. It is as well to remember that modern authorities are united in asserting that taken as a period the Revolution was not carried out anywhere at the expense of the working classes in the long run. Prof. Bowley shows that from 1810 to 1914 the real wages of the worker were rising all the time, for after all it is the poor who benefit most, when they increase the wages and they reduce the cost of production of articles previously considered luxuries, and make it possible for these luxuries to be everyday enjoyments of all. The rich can afford to pay any price, while the poor must rely upon mass production to cheapen the article desired. So whilst their wages were rising, the cost of articles, due to the use of machinery, was decreasing, and the standard of living of the workers accordingly rose. Real wages measured in this way were more than doubled in the half century previous to the war, education became free after 1891, food for the workers became more varied, and the development of opportunities for transport gave holidays and change of scene to many who previously could only dream of such things. This story of Great Britain is only one of many national stories of similar character, and America is now busy demonstrating to the world how machinery and high wages can give a standard of living to its workers far above the dreams of the rich of one hundred years ago. So machinery can be a great blessing when rightly used, and one who advises his countrymen to abolish it is doing his country a grave injustice in placing her outside these advantages.

India is overpopulated to-day in comparison with her food supply, and what she needs is an agricultural and industrial revolution comparable with that of England in the 18th Century. She cannot remain in the rearguard of civilization by going back to the "Charka" and the agricultural methods of her ancestral fathers, for food and livelihood must be found for her teeming millions, perhaps the poorest in the world just now. Any one therefore who endeavours to persuade India to go back to the "Charka" and primitive village life, is India's worst enemy in the long run. Dutt has shown in his works on the decline of Indian industries that it is necessary, to improve those industries along modern lines to meet the needs of the people of the country, and find employment for the rapidly growing population, so that competition is prevented with the cultivating classes. The spinning wheel is useful as a cottage industry just as in the West the cottages retain

similar industries to-day, but to imagine that it can ever prove a substitute for machinery is to live in the paradise of a fool. So India must take her place in the industrial family of the world, and produce for the world's markets in competition with all others, if her future is to be assured.

We said that the need for the I.L.O. originated in the later days of the Industrial Revolution and has steadily grown as the years have passed by. Today we are citizens of the world whether we like it or not, and a half-baked nationalism, though it may blind us to the fact for a time, cannot prevent us from sharing the privileges and the responsibilities of that citizenship. All the nations of the world to-day are economically interdependent and the suffering of one is the suffering of all. The free passage of raw materials and manufactured foods is a matter of great moment to all nations to-day, and any one who attempts to restrict that passage or prohibit it is a foe to his own people and the people of other lands. To use a homely illustration of this interdependence of nations, we might look at our own homes. Our cooking utensils being aluminium are from Germany or England, the pictures on the walls may be Japanese printed, the cloth we wear may be the product of Lancashire, and if we wear buttons they are probably from Czecho-Slovakia. The glass-ware we use was possibly made in Austria and the cars which fill our roads are American, as most certainly are the typewriters we use in our offices. We in our turn supply the world with tea, and with wheat from the "black-trap" soil of the Deccan, and so the whole world is bound up in a great network of giving and taking of the goods of life. One would have imagined that if the ladies of the western world bobbed their hair no harm could come thereby, but now we hear reports from a corner of China, that thousands of women who lived by making hairnets for ladies, coiffures are destitute for lack of employment. This is but one example of the unity of civilization.

That there exists unemployment among the educated middle classes of every description, more especially among the literate section, in this Presidency, is beyond dispute. Since most of the products of our schools and colleges, technical and non-technical, seek employment in the *paid* services under the Government or private agencies, it is not difficult to get an idea of its extent by referring to the annual supply of qualified candidates from such institutions and the probable annual net demand under the Government and organised private bodies. We know that many a Madras educated youth seeks and some are actually able to find employment elsewhere as clerks, stenographers, etc. in some of the commercial cities of India and a few under the services of the Central Government. Though the numbers employed outside the Presidency may be large, and if more openings are available they may easily be more, there is no doubt that the majority of the products of our educational institutions seek employment in the Presidency itself.

England and America, secured for themselves a certain standard of living, a certain type of dwelling to live in, a certain standard of clothing, food, leisure, and education for their children. So the whites fear that the people of the monsoon lands will rob them of the fruits of their victory by coming into their midst, and living under conditions unsuitable for workers in that country, and thus dragging down the wage-level to one below subsistence-level for the white. The most striking case of this invasion is that of Japan in America, and if it cannot be dealt with successfully it may even lead to war. It is so often forgotten nowadays that the root causes of war are economic.

Facing this problem therefore it can be seen that the remedy for it all is a *world-wide* endeavour to improve labour conditions, to raise the standard and thus remove impediments to social progress. This cannot be effected by isolated action; an international organization is required, associating not only governments but also employers and employed in the common endeavour. This necessity for international endeavour is most plainly seen in the case of industrial diseases, where national remedies will not suffice. Within recent years perhaps the case of white phosphorus is the most striking. This was used for making matches, and the workers absorbed the phosphorus under their nails and through the skin, and as a result a terrible disease known as "Phossy Jaw" claimed them as victims. Of course the obvious thing was to cease using white phosphorus and to use red phosphorous. But red phosphorous is dearer than the white variety, and for one country to adopt red instead of white phosphorus for its match manufactures would be to condemn its match makers to starvation, since the other countries would speedily under-sell the isolated reforming nation. So international action was needed to even up chances of competition for all, and now, thanks to the I. L. O., white phosphorous is past history. The same arguments could be used for almost every reform to be undertaken in industry today and no action other than an international one can be taken since the advanced country making improvements should have machinery available to secure an equivalent improvement elsewhere. This is the *raison d'être* of the International Labour Organization. The organization owes its birth to the same document as the League, namely the Treaty of Versailles 1919, in the preamble of which we find these words: "Whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical education.

"Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries,"

The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity, as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the following. Then follow the articles calling the International Labour Organisation into being, and known as Part XIII of the Treaty. It lays down nine guiding points for the organisation in its task of raising the conditions of labour all over the world. They form what is often known as the "Charter of Labour" and are built on the basic principle that "Labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce." These nine points make interesting reading. (1) The guiding principle above enumerated that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce. (2) The right of association for all lawful purposes by employed as well as employers. (3) The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country. (4) Adoption of an 8 hours day and a 48 hours week as the standard to be aimed at. (5) Adoption of a weekly rest of at least 24 hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable. (6) The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development. (7) The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. (8) Standards be set by law in each country with regard to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein. (9) Each state should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

The International Labour Organization then forms part of the institutions of the League of Nations, and membership of the League carries with it membership of that organisation. At first there were forty eight member states in this organisation, but now there are fifty seven such members, for the Conference of the Body may also elect states which are *not* members of the league. Germany was admitted in 1919. The expenses of the International Labour Organisation are provided from the general funds of the League and are controlled by the Assembly.

The machinery of the Organisation consists of:—

- (a) A General Conference composed of representatives of every Member State.
- (b) An International Labour Office, the permanent Secretariat of the Organisation, which is controlled by a Governing Body.

The General Conference is composed of four members from every State in the Organisation. This delegation is composite, with a right to four votes, and its composition is an interesting experiment. Of the four delegates from each member state, two represent the Government of the country, one the Employers, and one the Workers, the two latter being selected by the Government but only in agreement with the most representative organisation of their respective groups.

The part played by the technical advisers, two of whom may accompany each delegate for every item on the agenda, cannot be overestimated. It is especially

laid down that when questions affecting women are to be discussed one of the advisers should be a woman. The expenses of the advisers, and also of the delegates themselves, are borne by the Governments which send them.

The Conference must meet "at least once a year" at a place arranged for by the previous Conference, and thus continuity is maintained in the work of the Organisation. This is the keynote of success in the work, for by this rule it is made possible to bring together governments, employers, and workers' representatives from each member State into direct touch with each other every year and an international platform is thus furnished for the debate of world labour problems. The time of meeting is fixed by the Governing Body, and its duration depends on the Conference itself. The Agenda of each Conference is fixed by the Governing Body of the Office, Governments or representative organisations of Employers or workers having the right to offer suggestions. The Agenda is usually fixed well in advance of the opening of the conference, so that Members may be notified at least four months before that date and the necessary preparatory work carried out.

Proceedings at the Conference are conducted in English, French and German, and interpreters are employed for speakers who use other languages. The delegates are divided into a number of committees, and these draw up reports for the Conference to deal with. A two-thirds majority of the Conference is necessary for the final adoption of a Draft Convention or Recommendation.

Discussions of the Conference may be embodied in any of the following three forms:—(1) A Draft Convention, (2) A Recommendation and (3) A Resolution. The first two are of major importance. They are a vital part of the machinery of the Organisation, and the highest expression of the Conference's authority and competence. They are the sources of international labour legislation.

A Draft Convention is in the nature of a treaty between the members, which requires approval in the prescribed form to become binding on the Governments which approve it. It lays down definite regulations governing conditions of labour on the subject with which it deals. It is always and essentially an imperative document, in that its form is "each member shall" or "each member undertakes." It must be taken or left as it stands.

Two obligations are imposed on members in regard to a Draft Convention.

1. *Consideration*.—Each Government is bound to bring a Draft Convention before its parliament within one year from the closing of the Conference which adopted it. Governments may either reject or approve the Draft Convention and are not legally bound to support the attitude taken up by their delegates at the Conference. But once before Parliament, the Convention is really before the bar of public opinion, and the progress of international labour legislation is dependent upon the strength and enlightenment of public opinion in the different countries.

2. *Ratification*.—The next obligation is the registration of the ratification of the Convention with the Secretary-General of the League. This is a solemn international contract binding the Government to observe the provisions of the Convention for the period specified (usually ten years).

The Recommendation and the Resolution are two less important ways embodying the will of the Conference.

The Governing Body is the board of management of the Office and consists of twenty four persons, twelve representing Governments, six the employers, and six the workers.

The International Labour Office is the established seat of the League in Geneva, and is under the immediate management of a Director, who is responsible to the Governing Body. The office is the "Civil Service" as it were of the Organisation, and is recruited from persons of different nationalities, a certain proportion of them being women.

But, beautiful as all this seems to be, how can it affect India today? Has all this talk about the standard of living and improved conditions of labour any immediate connection with Indian industry, which is only just in its beginnings? Certainly it has a very important connection.

The condition in the factories of India only a few years ago were terrible, and the increase in the cost of living brought on by the war and other causes made the higher wages earned in these factories woefully inadequate. In many cases the rise in wages was only 50 per cent and less of the rise in the cost of living. The pre-war factory day was nominally twelve hours, but when we consider that children between nine and twelve years of age also worked this long day, we can see how long it really was. Then this working day, which might have been endured in a temperate climate, was not to be thought of when the work had to be done under a tropical sun beating down upon a roof of corrugated iron or glass, which greatly accentuated the heat. The only break on his long day was one of a few minutes in the middle of the day when a meagre "meal" was swallowed quickly.

The homes of the workers were extremely poor, with no window and no protection from rain. Even when, as in Bombay, the workers lived in tenements, one small room would have to accommodate half a dozen persons eating, sleeping and living there with no sanitation or ventilation. It is no wonder that often the children in the mill centres were rickety and consumptive.

That was the position before 1922, when the whole Factory Law was revised. A sixty hour week was introduced by legislation and the minimum age for workers was raised to twelve years. Complete prohibition of night work for women was also a pleasing feature of the legislation of this year, and ventilation, especially in ginning factories, began to receive the attention of the legislature. In 1924 the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed and it included practically all the employees in factories, mines and on railways, a total of about three million workers. In the same year N. M. Joshi brought forward his much needed Maternity Benefit

Bill to secure maternity benefits for female workers in factories, mines and estates. This is not yet law, but the force of public opinion in its favour prophesies its early inclusion in the Statute Book. The same might also be said for Chamanlal's Bill for the weekly payment of wages, which provides for the payment of wages weekly to workers instead of monthly, as at present.

Then in 1923 the Factories and Mines Act was passed, and this came into effect in July 1924, much of its form and substance being the result of the influence of the International Labour Organisation. By this Act, no person may be employed underground more than 54 hours weekly, and no child may be employed at all if it is less than thirteen years of age.

So India has achieved much, comparatively speaking, and it is not without good reason that she is included amongst the eight chief industrial states of the world. However like the other important industrial states she now has a heritage to safeguard and she must be on the lookout to prevent any other state from degrading her improved conditions in labour. Her chief fears in this respect will be from Japan, as there is little direct competition between Britain and India.

Britain has learnt now that the coarser materials she must leave to the Indian mills, and concentrate on the finer products that India is not yet in a position to produce economically. The rivalry of Japan is severe however, for here we have a nation producing the same fabrics as those of India, and doing it more cheaply. A few figures will demonstrate the extent of this peril. In 1923-24 India imported from Japan 123 million yards of piece goods, and this inspite of the handicap Japan suffered on account of the earthquake in Tokio. At the same time Japan captured a large amount of the trade of India in China in piece goods and for the first time in her industrial history, India found it impossible to compete against the cheaper Japanese yarns in the world's markets.

In the matter of imports from India to Japan it is interesting to note that 84% of the imports of Japan from India was raw cotton, an advance of 6% on the previous year. That is, Japan is buying Indian cotton and selling it back again manufactured into goods, which India wishes to make herself, and this because Japan can undersell Indian goods on the markets of the world.

Now why is this so? Simply because Japan as yet has no labour legislation worth speaking of, and sweated labour in Japan is being used to drag down Indian labour to a similar position. In brief, India has reached that stage in her industrial development when she needs to protect her workers so that their standard of living is not debased by the competition of other countries less civilized industrially. So India has three roads open to her to-day; she can go back to pure agriculture and the Charka again, but this would be national suicide now, on account of her teeming population and its need to be fed, a task that agricultural India could never fulfil adequately. Then on the other hand, she could sacrifice her workers and let them become as the slaves of industrial Japan, but this again

is impossible as now India is committed to reform, and her feet are well on the ladder of industrial progress, and the raising of the standard of living of her workers. So there remains but one road for her to walk, and that is the one of support for the International Labour Organization, and this road she is walking to-day.

To strengthen her hands in this good work, a strong public opinion is needed in the masses of the country, and the cultivation of this opinion is the work of all who love India. What India needs to-day is an army of enlightened men and women, who know the facts, and are not to be hoodwinked by economic fallacies, and who will not be satisfied until every thing possible has been done to make life worth living for the great millions of India's workers, their fellow men and women. And this army will be composed of those who have the ideals of the International Labour Organisation in their hearts.

The Indian Aryans and the Iranians

By T. Rajagopala Rao, B.A., L.T.

Perhaps at the glacial epoch or a little earlier, the Aryan race lived together speaking the same language and worshipping the same gods. According to Hindu evidences this early home of the Aryans is somewhere in *Ilāvṛta Varsha* in central Asia. *Ilāvṛta Varsha* is said to be round the *Mēru* mountain. This mountain is situated in the centre of the Earth. There are three varshas (countries) south of this *Ilāvṛta Varsha*, viz. the *Hari Varsha*, the *Kimpurusha Varsha*, and the southernmost *Bharata Varsha* (India). Hindu evidences are at one in this geographical account and state that man was first born in the *Ilāvṛta Varsha*, and that from there the sons of *Prish Krata* migrated to all parts of the world and to India. There are theories to-day that India, at least mythically, was the birthplace of man, but these theories do not give a proper explanation of the myth noted above which makes *Ilāvṛta* the birth place of man.

Evidence of language and religion leads to the belief that the Aryan races of Europe must have migrated earlier from their original home, whatever that may be, than the Iranians and the Indian Aryans. The present article tries to bring out some of the affinities of the two latter clans, viz., the Iranians and the Indian Aryans.

These ancient Aryan people counted their years by the winters and they were a pastoral tribe tending to their flocks. They had a complicated system of sacrifices. Agni, Varuna, Yama, Vayu, and Mithra were some of the gods that they worshipped. Some of them were *Asuras* and others were called the *Devas*, the *Yātus* and the *Pairekas*. They were on friendly relations with each other and kept the rituals and the sacrifices. Their numbers increased, and the Parsi sacred legends affirm that once every three hundred years they extended their conquests southward towards the sun (equator). As time went on the *Asuras* became more prosperous than the *Devas*; and for some unknown reason the two sections became deadly enemies to each other. The name *Asura* then became a byword of scorn to the sect representing the *Devas*, and the name of *Deva* became a word of abuse to the clan representing the *Asuras*. The word *Asura* thus became to the Hindu, a type of the grossest wickedness, cruelty and mischief as the word *Deva* was to the *Asuras*.

It is here that the history of the Zend Avesta and the later portions of the Rigveda begin. Let us follow the thread of similarities between the two religions and note the points necessary for historical purposes.