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LORD MORLEY.

THE death of Lord Morley removes one of the most distinguished and revered figures of our time. Since the death of Lord Bryce, Lord Balfour alone could match him in many-sided achievement. He belonged to the class of scholar-statesmen, rarely found outside our shores, who enrich public life by their opulent culture and who carry the bracing atmosphere of affairs into the tranquil fields of literature. Macaulay described Lord Chesterfield as a man of the world among men of letters and a man of letters among men of the world. Lord Morley's services to politics and letters were equally conspicuous, and in both spheres his influence has been profound. After the death of his friend Frederic Harrison he was the last of the great Victorians, and his passing severs a link with the almost legendary age of Palmerston, Cobden, and Mill.

When the outbreak of the world-war suddenly terminated his political career, Lord Morley sought distraction in writing his *Recollections*. In those delightful pages we may read of his Lancashire parentage, of his Oxford studies, and of his journalistic *début* in London. Though his academic career was undistinguished, he carried away from the University a working knowledge of the classics which remained one of the joys and consolations of his life. His main interest from the outset, however, was the world of thought and action. When he entered Lincoln College in 1856, at the age of eighteen, he found the influence of Mill supreme, and he enrolled himself among the most ardent of his disciples. The Oxford Movement was a memory, the Middle Ages seemed far away, and the task of the moment was to reform the University, to democratise British institutions, and to educate the electorate. Young men had to choose between Carlyle and Mill, between intuitionism and rationalism, and for John Morley the choice was not difficult. In Mill he found just what he wanted. The great teacher had freed himself from the shackles of a narrow Benthamism, and was writing the volumes on *Liberty*, the *Subjection of Women*, and *Representative Government* which supplied a working system of Liberal philosophy based on a reasoned optimism and inspired by a generous humanity. The young journalist took his place among the disciples with Cairnes, Fawcett, and Courtney; and when in 1865 he met the master himself his admiration for the teacher ripened into affectionate reverence for the man. Mill's portrait by Watts hung over the mantelpiece in the great library at Wimbledon, and half a century after his death he would still speak with gratitude of the deciding influence in his life.

The year 1867 registers the emergence of John Morley. He was already at home in the Republic of Letters, had made friends with Meredith and other young men of promise, and had published anonymously a volume of "middles" reprinted from the *Saturday Review*. But he was too much of a student to be content with journalism, and in 1867 he issued an analysis of Burke's political ideas which showed that he could think as well as he could write. Unfortunately, he allowed this admirable volume to remain out of print, and his subsequent monograph on Burke in his own series, the English Men of Letters, excellent though it is, did not fill the gap left by the virtual disappearance of its elder brother. It is satisfactory to know that the Political Study is at last likely to be reprinted, and that its resurrection was among the last of the topics which he discussed. Though there is much in Burke's later writings that he, like other Liberals, must almost angrily reject, he carried with him throughout life the notion of the organic nature of society and the continuity of development which the greatest of English political thinkers victoriously defended against the French *doctrinaires*.

The second event of the year 1867 was Morley's appointment to the editorial chair of the *Fortnightly Review*, which had been founded by Lewes as an organ of advanced ideas, and which its second editor, who guided its destinies for fifteen years, made the most influential of British periodicals. Its pages were enriched by contributions from Mill; but throughout the 'seventies no one contributed such a mass of material as the editor himself. For it was in the *Fortnightly* that the long series of studies of the French thinkers of the eighteenth century made its appearance. The familiar volumes on Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and the Encyclopædists, the delightful essays on Turgot, Condorcet, and Vauvenargues, though now half a century old, have never been superseded, and may still be read with profit and pleasure. The author's sympathies with the men who bravely combated despotism, social injustice, and religious intolerance, and proclaimed the rights of the common man, were plainly avowed; but the careful reader will note his emphatic rejection of Rousseau's unhistorical constructions and his consciousness of the dark spots in the dazzling orb of Voltaire. In a later essay, *On French Models*, he replied to Conservative critics who had not taken the trouble to read him, and who appeared to believe that, because he had written on certain French thinkers, he agreed with all their views. His hero was neither Voltaire nor Rousseau but Turgot, the austere scholar and thinker who gave of his best to the State, and might have saved his country from the horrors of revolution had he been allowed to remain in office. The project of writing

a history of the great cataclysm often flitted before his mind, and the long essay on Robespierre made some readers regret that it was never carried out. But the French Revolution is a jealous mistress, and he did well to avoid the dark forest in which the researches of Aulard and his school had hardly begun to clear the undergrowth.

The editor contributed political no less than literary criticism to the pages of the *Fortnightly*, and his interest in public affairs was as keen as his championship of certain philosophical ideas. The first important controversy in which he took a leading part was provoked by Forster's Education Bill of 1870. Like Chamberlain and other young Radicals he desired that the State should take no part in providing religious instruction, and he expressed his disapproval of the compromise in *The Struggle for National Education*. The volume was quickly out of print and was never republished. Its main biographical interest lies in the sharp attack not only on Forster but on Gladstone, who appears as the high priest of the theological obscurantism of which he was the sworn enemy. How deep was the gulf which sundered him from the Liberal leader was once more revealed in the volume *On Compromise*, in which he exhorted his countrymen to "use their minds without excessive awe of authority" and to proclaim their real opinions. There is a little too much mid-Victorian cocksureness in this once celebrated confession of faith; but it suggests the strength and the courage of its author, and helps to explain the commanding position which he had won among the oracles of radical youth.

The echoes of the education controversy died away, and in the later 'seventies the Imperialism of Disraeli rallied under Gladstone's banner all who detested the policy of adventure and aggression. Morley was a Cobdenite not only in his devotion to Free Trade and his cautious individualism, but in his ardent championship of peaceful co-operation between the nations. To read the articles and editorial notes in the *Fortnightly* during the last three years of Beaconsfield's dictatorship is to penetrate into the very citadel of his thought. The two master-keys of his life were the *Aufklärung* and the opposition to Imperialism, and he now definitely enlisted under the banner of Gladstone, whose acquaintance he made in 1877. It was a labour of love at this time to write the official life of Cobden. The biography, which appeared in 1881 and enjoyed immense and enduring success, was a declaration of Liberal principles no less than a record of one of the greatest of Liberal statesmen.

John Morley had stood for Parliament for his native city of Blackburn as early as 1869, and he stood again in 1880 for

Westminster. Though he was not elected, he took an active part in securing and in harvesting the victory. For the next three years he edited the *Pall Mall Gazette*, which proclaimed not only his own opinions but those of the Radical wing of the Cabinet. Morley and Chamberlain had met in 1873 and, despite their differences of temperament and training, had become fast friends. There are no more memorable pages in the "Recollections" than those in which the veteran statesman pays generous tribute to the Birmingham leader with whom he worked in happy comradeship. "For thirteen strenuous years we lived the life of brothers." No one outside the Cabinet had a larger share in the overthrow of the Chief Secretary Forster, whose régime of coercion was doomed to failure. The Irish question increasingly absorbed his attention, and when he at last entered Parliament in 1883, succeeding Ashton Dilke at Newcastle, he had already convinced himself that there was only one solution.

The election of 1885, which brought Home Rule into the foreground of British politics, made Morley for the first time a national figure; and his appointment to the post of Chief Secretary, with a seat in the Cabinet, was one of the easiest decisions which confronted Gladstone on his return to office in January, 1886. Morley and Chamberlain had come to the parting of the ways; but the personal tie was unbroken, and the new Minister deferred his acceptance till he had consulted his friend. During the stormy months that followed, the Prime Minister and his new colleague laid the foundations of that historic friendship which meant so much not only to themselves but to the world. For in that dark and difficult moment when the Whigs seized a welcome opportunity to leave the Liberal Party, and when Radicals like Chamberlain and Bright refused to follow their impetuous leader along untried paths, Morley's faith, courage and capacity were among the deciding factors which rallied the great majority of Liberals to the Home Rule cause. Lord Spencer's weighty support was an asset not to be despised, and Harcourt's reluctant assent strengthened the debating power of the Home Rulers; but no single man except the great leader himself played such a decisive part in the conversion of Liberal England to the gospel of self-government. That Ireland is to-day a Dominion, sitting with her elder sisters in the Assembly at Geneva and at the Imperial Conference, is due above all to Parnell, Gladstone and Morley. Now that the long story of embittered strife is at an end, the statesmanship of the pioneers shines out more brightly than ever. The critics who scorned the Chief Secretary as a "doctrinaire" have been confounded by events. Durham, Gladstone, Morley, Campbell-Bannerman,—these are the founders of the commonwealth of free and contented

communities who form the kernel and the strength of the British Empire. All the world now realises that the much-abused phrase "the union of hearts" was the key of the Irish problem. The contribution of the Unionists, who arrogantly claimed a monopoly of Imperial sentiment, was to delay the inevitable change till an exasperated people rendered the maintenance of the Union impossible.

During the decade which followed Gladstone's conversion Ireland was the main occupation of Morley's life. The Parnell scandal limited the Home Rule majority of 1892 to 40,—a figure which made the House of Lords the predominant Chamber and doomed the second Home Rule Bill in advance. The story of the endless debates of 1893, the brunt of which fell on the octogenarian Prime Minister and the Chief Secretary, has been told in the *Life of Gladstone*; and when the Bill was thrown out in the Upper House and Gladstone retired it seemed as if the efforts of the last seven years had been in vain. Certain of his colleagues, thinking more of the ballot-box than of the wishes of Ireland, would have gladly furled a banner riddled with shot and shell; but so long as Morley was in the counsels of the party, such a course was impossible. His fidelity to the principle of self-government was the more heroic since he was never temperamentally attracted to the Irish character. In his amusing *Reminiscences* Sir Henry Robinson passes in review the long procession of Chief Secretaries during the last forty years of the Union, and his chapters on Morley reveal a sensitive and austere figure in a state of perpetual irritation against the foibles of his temporary subjects. He never loved Ireland and Ireland never loved him. His course was dictated by reason, not by sentiment. Home Rule, he was convinced, was the only solution of the problem of Irish discontent. In later life, when devolution, or "Home Rule all round," was proposed as the remedy for an overworked Parliament, he would have nothing to do with it. Only overwhelming necessity, he believed, should diminish the effective authority of the Imperial Parliament.

On the resignation of Gladstone in the spring of 1894 Morley took a step which he was soon to regret, and which occasioned surprise at the time and ever after. The candidates for the succession were Harcourt and Rosebery, and it was mainly owing to his attitude that the Peer was chosen. Harcourt's temper, as everybody was aware, was bad and at times unbearable; but his services to the party were incomparably greater than those of his rival. Moreover his opinions both on home and foreign affairs were in close accord with those of the Chief Secretary, while Lord Rosebery was already known as the champion, if not indeed the founder, of Liberal Imperialism. The incident has been described at length in

Mr. Gardiner's monumental biography of Harcourt, and in later years Lord Morley frankly confessed to an error of judgment. But though he detested Lord Rosebery's conception of Empire, he was fully alive to the fascination of the man. Through all the changes and chances of later life their friendship was maintained, and their common love of books provided an inexhaustible theme for conversation and correspondence. Lord Morley used to inform visitors to Wimbledon that the comfortable arm-chair in which he sat at his fireside was the gift of his old political opponent.

Sir Algernon West's posthumous Diaries of the last Gladstone Parliament reveal a household divided against itself on political no less than on personal issues. Lord Rosebery bitterly complained that he possessed responsibility without power, and it was a relief to every Minister when a snap division on the supply of cordite released them from office in 1895. In the Liberal rout Morley was rejected at Newcastle and found refuge in Montrose Burghs, as Harcourt fled from Derby to South Wales. England, "the predominant partner," was Unionist. A strong Coalition Ministry took office and held the rudder for ten years. It was the era of Chamberlain and Kipling, of Rhodes and the Diamond Jubilee. Society knelt prostrate before the idol of Empire. Gladstonians or "Little Englanders" were dismissed as strange and discreditable survivals from a vanished age. The Home Rule spectre, it was believed by exultant Unionists, was banished for ever.

In such a world Morley could do little but bide his time. Not only was the Salisbury Government overwhelmingly strong, but the Liberal Opposition was rent by internal discord. Lord Rosebery laid down the leadership in 1896 on the ground that his authority was not sufficiently recognised, and Harcourt and Morley followed his example two years later. There was talk of intrigue and of rival ambitions; but the root of the trouble was a genuine difference of opinion between the school of Gladstone and the school of Rosebery, between "Little Englanders" and Imperialists. The advance to Dongola in 1896, which portended not only the reconquest of the Sudan but the permanent occupation of Egypt, revealed the gaping gulf. Like Campbell-Bannerman, Bryce, and others among his old colleagues, Morley opposed the advance; and when the operation was completed by the victory of Omdurman he resisted the proposal for a Parliamentary grant to Kitchener, on the ground that the General had violated the Mahdi's tomb.

Fortunately for themselves and the world, scholar-statesmen have two strings to their bow, and Morley spent his leisure during the decade of opposition in the peace of his library. In 1891 he had contributed a volume on Walpole to the admirable series of *Twelve*

English Statesmen of which he was the editor. The subject did not lend itself to Venetian colouring; but the study of our first Prime Minister was drawn by a master-hand, and the instructive chapter on the Cabinet was enriched by the assistance of Gladstone. After the *débâcle* of 1895 he turned his attention to Cromwell. In neither case was there any pretension to research, and the interest of the volumes lies in the author's reflections and judgments on familiar events. To the historian the study of Walpole is of higher value than that of Cromwell, but the volume on the Protector has naturally been more widely read. Of greater philosophical interest than either was his Romanes Lecture on Macchiavelli.

Far more important was the task which fell to him on the death of his leader in 1898. For four years he toiled in the archives of Hawarden, and in 1903 the three volumes of the *Life of Gladstone* appeared. The greatest of his works will be read so long as men care to know the story of their race and so long as Englishmen remain proud of the statesmen to whom they owe their liberties. The weakest side of the book is the treatment of foreign affairs; but as a record of sixty crowded years and as a revelation of personality it is beyond praise. In his closing years Lord Morley used to say that among the famous men he had known Gladstone stood out supreme. The third volume, which opens in 1880, is scarcely less an autobiography than a biography. Though they were sundered by a gulf in one of the deepest concerns of life, Gladstone referred to his colleague as "the chief stay I have," and Morley repaid his confidence by ever-deepening devotion. Though less scintillating than Winston Churchill's life of his father and less sensational than the final volumes of Mr. Buckle's *Disraeli*, the *Life of Gladstone* is a noble tribute to one of the greatest figures of the modern world. Morley's style, like his oratory, was at times a little *staccato*; but it was never undistinguished, and it often rose to passages of sober and stately eloquence.

The Boer War summoned the student back to the arena. Like Harcourt, Bryce, Campbell-Bannerman, Spencer, Ripon and the majority of the Liberal leaders, he regarded the struggle as the result of gross errors of policy from the Raid onwards; and these errors he attributed in the main to the overweening pride of empire which inspired Chamberlain, Milner and Rhodes to cut the South African knot instead of untying it. No one was more remote from the antediluvian Calvinism of Kruger and the Boers; but he had sufficient imagination to realise that such men must be led and not driven. Though he bitterly denounced "this insensate war," he never broke off relations with Chamberlain. One day his host at Highbury asked him: "At what point do you think we went wrong?" "At the Bloemfontein Conference," was the reply. He

explained that Milner, with his notorious lack of tact, was the last man to succeed in dispelling the suspicions of the old President, whose whole life had been spent in the jealous defence of Boer independence. During the years of conflict, despite weak health and absorption in the Gladstone papers, Morley occasionally emerged from his tent, and his denunciations of "uncompensated mischief and irreparable wrong" rang through the country. To the end of his life he spoke with satisfaction of his opposition to the Boer War, and he never fully conquered his distrust of Mr. Asquith, Mr. Haldane, and Sir Edward Grey for supporting the policy of Chamberlain and Milner.

The revival of Protection in 1903 disintegrated the Unionists and reunited the Liberals, and by 1905 the tidal wave of 1895 had at last spent its force. When Campbell-Bannerman sent him to the India Office Morley was close on sixty-seven. Like Gladstone, he had never given much attention to India, and his speech in the debate on the Address revealed how little he knew of the burning questions of the hour. But he learned quickly, and he was wise enough to accept counsel from Gokhale, noblest of Indian statesmen, who incarnated all that was best in the Congress movement. The story of his five memorable years at the India Office has been told once for all in the letters to Lord Minto which fill half of the second volume of his *Recollections*. What are called the Morley-Minto reforms were denounced by the Unionist leaders, who had learned nothing from the success of the Liberal policy in South Africa, which they had also violently opposed. Once more it was shown that the men who arrogated to themselves peculiar authority in all that concerned the Empire were equally lacking in courage and foresight, and once again it was left to a "Little Englander" to realise that an advance had become inevitable. Though the inspiration came from London, the reforms could never have been carried through without the support of the Conservative Viceroy, to whose open-mindedness and courage the Secretary of State never tired of paying public and private tributes.

Though the extension of the powers of the Councils was the main item in the reform scheme, its author attributed greater importance to his appointment of the first Indian to the Viceroy's Executive Council and of two Indians (a Hindu and a Mohammedan) to the Secretary of State's Council in London. There was opposition to be overcome within as well as without the Cabinet to this departure, and faint-hearted persons whispered that Indians could not be trusted to keep State secrets. Once again the bold course was the wise one. Mr. Sinha, a distinguished Calcutta lawyer, brought strength and experience to the Viceroy's

Council, and a few years later, with universal assent, received a peerage and the post of Under-Secretary of State. The presence of Indians on the Council in Whitehall has also become part of the established order. To-day our only wonder is that this "dangerous" step was not taken before.

Though the Secretary of State delighted his party by his reforms, he had to purchase support for them by allowing the Government of India a free hand in dealing with discontent and sedition, and he was persuaded to sanction the employment of a rusty old Regulation of 1818 allowing deportation without charge or trial. It was an obvious anomaly that the heir of Mill and Gladstone, the enemy of coercion in Ireland and South Africa, should allow *droit administratif* in India; and the inconsistency was hotly denounced by Sir Henry Cotton, Frederick Mackarness, and many other Liberal and Labour members. The opposition was all the keener since several of the deportees were well-known men of wide culture and high character. The "man on the spot" had to be supported, and the Secretary of State retaliated by warning "impatient idealists" not to weaken the arm of the Executive in difficult times. But he never liked playing the rôle of coercionist, and we subsequently learned from his letters to Lord Minto of his efforts to secure the liberation of the deportees and the abandonment of the indefensible practice of imprisonment without charge or trial. A little volume of *Indian Speeches*, published in 1909, preserves some of his more important utterances, and may still be read with interest by students both of Indian politics and of Liberal statesmanship. His experience in governing a vast dependency adds to the value of his little book, *Notes on Politics and History*, an expanded version of an address delivered in 1912 as Chancellor of the University of Manchester.

When Mr. Asquith succeeded Campbell-Bannerman in 1908 Morley, then in his seventieth year, took refuge from the labours of a constituency and the heckling of the House of Commons in the calmer atmosphere of the House of Lords. There was some speculation as to how the author of the famous phrase, "mend them or end them," would fare on exchanging the green benches for the red; but such doubts were quickly set at rest. The new Peer treated his hearers with studied respect, and he quickly became one of the most popular members of the Upper Chamber. In 1910, after five arduous years of office, he handed over India to Lord Crewe, and accepted the less strenuous post of President of the Council. After the resignation of Lord Ripon in 1908 he was the oldest and most experienced member of the Cabinet, and in the crisis of 1911 it fell to his lot to inform the members of the

Upper House that as many Peers as might be necessary to carry the Veto Bill would be created. With a brilliant picture of these historic debates his *Recollections* come to an end. He remained too much of an individualist to feel great enthusiasm for "social reform"; but he never attempted to slacken the pace or to discourage his younger colleagues.

The final period of Lord Morley's life was dominated by the war. He was not one of the Ministers consulted by Sir Edward Grey in January, 1906, at the inception of the conversations with France, and he privately protested when Mr. Lloyd George launched his high explosive at the Mansion House in 1911, with the approval of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, but without the knowledge of the Cabinet. Like Lord Loreburn, he came to feel that he had not been loyally treated by the men who shaped our foreign policy, and to the end of his life he declared that he hoped that none of them would ever again control the destinies of the country. He disliked our growing entanglement in the quarrels and ambitions of France and Russia, and when the storm broke in 1914 he led the opposition to intervention in a deeply divided Cabinet. When on August 2nd a promise to defend the coasts of France against attack was given, he resigned. Mr. Asquith begged him to "sleep on it," but on August 3rd he informed the Prime Minister that his decision was irrevocable. Mr. Burns had already gone. Two other Cabinet Ministers sent in their resignations, but were persuaded to withdraw them. Lord Morley was particularly surprised that Lord Harcourt, who had taken a very active line against intervention, neither resigned nor attempted to resign. To the end of his life he often talked of these hectic days, but he never regretted the decision which brought his tenure of office and his public career to a sudden close. Like Mr. Burns he never embarrassed his old friends and colleagues by public criticism of their policy.

Lord Morley was fond of relating how as a young man he was taken to task by Mark Pattison for speaking and writing of "progress." Both Gladstone and Mill took a hopeful view of human nature and human prospects, and their disciple shared their faith in the value of wisely-directed effort; but the savage passions of the world-war and the tragic folly of the settlement put a severe strain on his optimism. The lamentable results of the struggle confirmed his conviction that it ought to have been avoided by wiser statesmanship in the Chancelleries, not excluding Downing Street. When his younger friends urged him to acclaim the League of Nations he would reply that Wilson was a phrase-maker and that wars would be prevented, if prevented at all, not by paper constitutions but by Ministers who were bent on peace. The

horizon of post-war Europe was for a time still further darkened for him by the hideous struggle in Ireland; but he rejoiced when Mr. Lloyd George, to whose Government he gave a general support, at last confessed the error of his ways and allowed the Irish people to have what they wanted. It was a dramatic scene—preserved in Sir John Lavery's well-known picture—when the bent and almost inaudible octogenarian rose in the House of Lords, at the request of the Prime Minister, to move the Address to ratify the Treaty which transformed an exasperated vassal into a self-governing Dominion. It was his last public utterance, and no statesman could have wished for a more victorious *finale*.

For the last few years of his life Lord Morley lacked the physical energy to write books; but he retained his powers and his memory to the end. He continued to read omnivorously, and his friends will always picture him sitting at the fireside in his spacious library. Not less keen was his enjoyment, till within a day of his death, of the visits of his friends. It is difficult to describe the conversation of one whom Mrs. Asquith considers the best talker she ever knew. If it lacked the coruscations of Mr. Birrell, it possessed a subtle charm and stimulus of its own. He loved to propound large themes and to collect opinions on them—the decay of authority, the power of the Press, the meaning of liberty and Liberalism, the influence of ideas and ideals on events, political prophecy, lost opportunities, the achievement of Bismarck and Cavour, the future of the Labour Party. There was never the slightest attempt on the part of the host to monopolise the conversation, but he would promptly challenge an incautious statement and compel its author to defend or withdraw it. His reminiscences ranged over the celebrities of two complete generations. He used to say that if he could call back one and only one of the companions he had lost he would choose Lord Acton.

Those who had the privilege to belong to Lord Morley's intimate circle will carry with them throughout life the memory not only of the statesman and writer who played a high and worthy part on the world's stage, but of the beloved friend who through the long years shared with them the costly treasures of his mind and heart.

G. P. GOOCH.

THE RHINE-RUHR QUESTION AND BRITISH POLICY.

WHEN Mr. Baldwin and Herr Stresemann successively capitulated to M. Poincaré, and respectively called off independent action and passive resistance, the regret of the British and German publics was not unmixed with relief. It was regrettable, no doubt, that the Conservative party, that Prætorian Guard of British prestige, should have been reduced to the tactics of the "Valiant Duke of York"; and that the Great Coalition that was to get to grips with both M. Poincaré and the mark should not noticeably have affected the Sunday exercises of the one or the week-day lapses of the other. But that a new situation had been created was probable. That we and the Germans would now be on better terms with the French was possible. Optimists inferred that French military occupation would now become international on the Rhine and "invisible" in the Ruhr. Co-optimists of the Rothermere troupe told us their old story about bad Fritz and good France with renewed confidence.

But anyone who has spent the autumn in Germany has lost this happy disposition. Nor does anything that has happened since the double capitulation in any way justify optimism. It looks as though the surrender of the British Government has not restored its lost influence over Paris—as though the surrender of the German Government has not restored its lost power of negotiation there. It looks as though the French, by forcing the German leaders to call off an organised strike, have only brought on themselves a struggle with the workmen; and so have not ended the war but driven it from a passive to an active form. It looks, finally, as though the surrender of passive resistance was not the last action of the crusade by which our Carmelite Charlemagnes hope to convert the Saxons into pious and profitable subjects of the Franks, but rather the first action in a campaign by which the German races will a third time be resmelted in their own blood and iron until they are again terrible as an army with banners.

During the week before and the week after the calling off of passive resistance, everyone in Berlin, from the Brahmins of the Wilhelmstrasse to the Burghers of Wilmersdorf, was expecting insurrection. For the blow was, in one respect, harder and heavier than that of 1918. There had been in passive resistance originally a strong idealist and internationalist inspiration. Militarism and Imperialism were, for the first time in history, to be defeated by a strike. The costly and complicated mechanism of the Rhine-Ruhr industry, indispensable to the reconstruction of Europe in general and of France in particular, could only be worked by those

who had constructed it. The Germans would work it for French reconstruction and German reparations on fair terms. But if the principles of the armistice, and even the provisions of the Peace Treaty, were to be violated in their own favour by those who had imposed them on Germany by force of arms—then Germany would strike. The ruin that the French would bring on Germany would react so rapidly on Europe and on France that it would result in a real peace before Germany could be starved or strangled into submission. In two words, passive resistance originated largely in a pacifist resurgence. The end of passive resistance meant that someone, somewhere, sometime, would have again to fight. And there are as yet few in Germany who want to fight.

It was generally felt that passive resistance could have been carried on until something better could have been substituted if the "interests" would have accepted a financial and economic reconstruction. But the interests would sacrifice nothing, and forced the Government to finance it by an inflation that was profitable to them. As soon as it ceased to be so, orders were given to drop passive resistance, and politicians were found ready to execute them for reasons of party and personal rivalry. For example, the Socialists favoured surrender because they were fast losing power to the energetic Communists, who could better exploit the emergency.

That nothing happened on surrender was due, I think, less to the precautions of the Police State than to the caution of the rival *Putschists*. Both Conservative and Communist die-hards realised that whichever moved first would have to face a coalition of the other with the Police State. On the other hand, whichever moved second would bear the Government on its back through the crisis, and might hope to return from the ride with the legendary result. Another reason that kept Germany quiet was that the various lost causes and impossible ideals had not sufficiently sorted themselves out and lined themselves up. As in the early days of the revolution, when there was an excessive efflorescence of councils, so now there seems likely to be a plethora of dictators. If the future of Germany lay with a *fascist* movement centring in the middle class, there seems to be no reason why Germany should not become a *fascist* federation with dictators replacing the Presidents of the present constitution or the pre-war princes. But *fascism* in Germany will never be more than one of several factors.

Meantime, the Great Coalition, finding to its surprise that it is still in the limelight instead of on a lamp-post, has been busily trying to improve the shining hour by getting a dictatorship for itself. If it succeeds it will scarcely be on its merits. German Governments since the revolution, have not been worthy of the Constitution or

of the national emergency. In their point of view—peace at any price—and in their policy of procrastinations and palliatives, they represented nothing more than the helplessness and hopelessness of the average German to-day. But they rely for their power not on the political impulses of this apathetic amorphous mass but on the financiers who have secured control of the great productive and distributive organisms of the community. This is popularly expressed by the caricature that sees in Stresemann merely the political agent of Stinnes. And the caricature is true to this extent, that these financial interests can subordinate national policy to their main business of putting off the day when they will have to surrender their autocracy to, or at least share their authority with Socialism. They can even subordinate it to their daily bread-winning of putting off profitable deals with other interests. Among those who make and unmake Governments in Germany, the struggle between French and Germans on the Rhine—between reaction and revolution—between Reich and Lands, are not crises affecting the peace and happiness of Europe for centuries. They are matters that can be made profitable or otherwise. And the business of a German Government is to do nothing which may affect this process unfavourably. If it does something that gives trouble it must go. If it gives trouble by becoming unpopular through doing nothing, it can go too. There are plenty of place-hunters. That is why German Governments are so lamentably ineffective. Occasionally, however, politics arrive at such a pass that big business has to turn its best brains on to preventing an explosion. Such an occasion was the calling off of passive resistance. The solution found was the Great Coalition.

Such a Coalition in Government between nationalist liberals and right labour recommended itself to the leaders of those sections as an insurance against the excessively reported *rapprochement* between Conservatives and Communists. That the Coalition was really for the purpose of surrendering the cause of nationalism and socialism in the Ruhr could be camouflaged by phrases. That the Socialists were associated in this merely to divert the odium and onus of surrender from their opponents would be compensated by places.

The German labour party, like the British, has two branches, based respectively on economic and political organisations—on Trade Unionists and Independents. These two branches split long ago over the readiness of the trade unionist leaders, whose business in life was practical compromise, to let themselves be used as camouflage or catspaws in coalitions with wily opponents. The German labour party is now united again, and forms the largest solid parliamentary party. But, as a matter of fact, the Independents have

really disappeared as a power, their parliamentary function having passed to the Communists—and that of the Communists to extremist un-parliamentary factions of Communist-workers and Syndicalists. The strength of parties in the Reichstag no more corresponds to their strength in the country than the Reichstag expresses the real feeling of the country. Consequently, the Great Coalition of Stresemann with Hilferding, the leading Independent, which at first sight suggested a base widened from Winston Churchill to Philip Snowden, was really no broader or bolder than the Baldwin-McKenna combine. Dr. Hilferding did not come into the Coalition as the leading financier and economist of the intellectual branch of a united German Socialist party. He did not even come in as one of the leaders of the socialist section that has always stood for principle, as he would have a year ago. He came in as member of a group of leaders that had lost their command to the Communists through long halting between two opinions. His main value was that he was known to be a man of character and capacity of a group which had never yet been in a Coalition.

All went according to plan, until Stresemann realised that he was to have the odium of surrendering and was not to have the reward of a re-opening of negotiations with Paris which Stinnes* proposed to reserve for himself; also until Hilferding realised that he was to have the onus of a German bankruptcy without being allowed the radical reconstruction which Stinnes had no interest in, or intention of allowing. The Socialists then withdrew from the Coalition and Hilferding resigned. The Conservative *Volks-partei* also withdrew, but Stresemann, nothing daunted, went for a dictatorship. For a day he seemed likely to get it. But the Democrats then deserted him, taking with them the indispensable Gessler, the Minister of Police *en permanence*. Whereupon he agreed to seek unconstitutional powers constitutionally, and to reform the Great Coalition for this purpose. And to the surprise of all unfamiliar with Berlin politics, the Socialists who had been vowing they would ne'er again consent, consented. And if this isn't the last phase of parliamentary party Government in Berlin, it well deserves to be.

The solution of the German Socialist politicians for the political crisis seems as simple as the only solution they have so far found for the financial crisis—namely, to add cyphers to the left end of the Cabinet or currency-unit, and drop them off the right end. The solution of the German middle-class parties for the political crisis seems to be to sacrifice the one sound thing left—the Constitution—and of the economic crisis to let German big business save its own

* I use the word Stinnes as a convenient symbol for the "system," much as we use the name of a Prince or Premier.

pockets as far as possible by selling the German worker to the French.

The result of this bankruptcy of Berlin is, of course, that the Reichstag is at a discount in the country comparable to that of the Reichsmark—and that the supporters of the Liberal and Labour elements have streamed away to Conservatism and Communism. This does not mean, as it would have a few years ago, that German Socialism has become undemocratic and favours a dictatorship. The Communist party has become something very different from what it was at the Revolution, and from what it is still supposed to be by us. The French attempt to collect debts by armed invasion has had much the same effect on German Communism as it had on Russian. The German passive resistance in the Ruhr gave the German Communists the same opportunity of exhibiting their superior energy and enthusiasm, and of rallying into their own ranks the more active elements of Socialism. So far as the workmen were concerned, it was the Communists in the Ruhr who maintained passive resistance. The Trade Union elements who had favoured its adoption were, towards the end, all for its abandonment. The fact is now becoming clear that the abandonment of passive resistance by Berlin does not in itself mean a resumption of productivity in the Ruhr, and will give the Communists a further opportunity. The passive resistance of the Ruhr workmen was not merely boycott of the French, it was an active campaign against Capitalism for better conditions. The fact that Stinnes and the Ruhr industrialists are now again colloquing with the French for combination in mines and works and for co-operation in railways and other Government services, clears the real front. So long as German Capitalism was prepared to pay the worker an unemployed dole not to work for the French, he was ready to resist passively. But as soon as his two enemies come into alliance and begin to bully him with Moroccan troops and blackleg him with Polish labour, he will have both a Nationalist and a Socialist incentive to resist them actively. This is what I meant when I said earlier that the abandonment of passive resistance would convert a peaceable strike into a bloody struggle.

In this struggle the Communist party is now the natural political expression of German Socialism. The present Communist programme carries the prospects of the Socialists in each case only one step farther. But that one step is, as they have no difficulty in showing, just what makes the difference between nothing and something; and just what will, for that reason, be resisted to the uttermost by the powers that be. It is not too much to say in respect of the degree of their demands, that the German Communists are now reformist and not revolutionary. The same

conclusion is suggested by their general policy. The slogan of to-day is not the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," but "a Workers' and Peasants' Government." The inclusion of the peasants in their prospectus is very significant. It implies a recognition that the industrial worker of Germany, in spite of his numbers and organisations, cannot be the sole basis of a Socialist State. It involves the necessity of winning over the peasants from their traditional allegiance to the middle-class Catholic parties. This again results in a political attitude that is essentially democratic—that looks to governing through a majority and by compromise, not through a minority and by coercion. In Saxony and Thuringia, Communists are already governing constitutionally, in coalition with other Socialists. Thus, at a time when the middle-class parties are more and more turning to a dictatorship—that last refuge of political incapacity—German Communism is occupied with plans for making productive again the machinery of representative Government. Thus, as the Communists are brought nearer to power by the elimination of the unfit, they are themselves being made more fit for responsibility.

This new National-Communism of Germany maintains its association with Moscow; which stands to it in somewhat the same relation as does London to old Liberal parties which have hitherto been in power. Reports that Radek has been fomenting a Communistic *Putsch* are about as ridiculous as recent reports that Lord d'Abernon was at the back of passive resistance. Germans have had nothing in either case but good advice for which they are, let us hope, grateful. But, since the simultaneous capitulation of the Stresemann and Baldwin Governments to the French, many, even of the middle class, are now turning to the East, where they look for the National Resurrection.

The future political history of Germany will, in my opinion, be conditioned by the fact that the great industrial belt, from the Rhineland through Westphalia and Thuringia, Franconia to Saxony, interposes between the agrarian north and south. The future of Germany lies with the forces disengaged in this region and not in any co-operations at Munich between Prussian imperialist and Bavarian royalist factions—still less in further combinations of place-hunters and profiteers in Berlin. A report of the organisation of the national political life of the workers in this industrial belt now busily going forward, would require an article to itself; as would its connection with occasional outbreaks so remotely related geographically and politically as the recent strikes in Baden or the military mutiny at Kustrin.

Assuming, then, that the future of Germany lies with Socialism, and that the future of German Socialism lies with the Communist

party—the question arises, will that party follow in its development the lines it has been led into in the West by the French invasion of the Ruhr? Or will it follow the lead that has been given in the East by the Communist-Socialist Governments of Thuringia and Saxony?

In the Ruhr the national character of the struggle has, in my opinion, prepared Communism well for dealing with the broad issues of the national emergency; whereas the internal issues and domestic disputes through which Communism has won a controlling voice in the Saxon republics of the East have left it a somewhat crude composite of dogmatic principle and democratic procedure. It would therefore be a great misfortune for Germany if an unholy alliance of French imperialists and German industrialists were now to carry the Ruhr out of the Reich. For the first contribution of the Ruhr to German recovery may not be mere materials. It may well be such a moral welding of nationalism and socialism as will give Germany a bridge over the abyss.

The political future of Germany is in any case bound up in the fate of the Ruhr-Rhineland, and obviously the capitulation of the Great Coalition has advanced by a long stage the French policy of setting up there a separatist buffer state. The Rhineland Republic was, the Dariac report tells us, to be annexed to the French economic system. The Rhine-Ruhr Republic, as Dr. Dorten told me, is to contain as much territory again on the East Rhine bank—including the Ruhr, part of Hesse, Nassau, Frankfurt, and Darmstadt. And reorganisation of this principal productive region of Germany as a French economic dependency would be a large order. If the French contemplate this, they certainly cannot carry it out. But apparently their policy is merely a revival of the Napoleonic plan of German princes paying heavily for French protection—the German princes in this case being those great property owners who will comply and who will be rewarded accordingly at the expense of the recalcitrant.

In view of the negotiations now proceeding, it is an insult to our intelligence that M. Poincaré should continue to protest that the French are on the Rhine and in the Ruhr for the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles. The French proceedings during passive resistance, and still more since its abandonment, can only be understood—can only be excused—on the ground that they were preparing for autonomy. Read the daily reports and find any other explanation for what they record.

Europe and America will soon be faced with the *fait accompli* of a French proselytising protectorate on the Rhine in the historic home of German culture, and in the main hearth of German production. This dependency will be held by colonial—that is,

coloured—troops and exploited through various chartered companies and *régies*. And this authority of St. Cyr and Senegal will have to be asserted as against the two most explosive moral forces in modern politics—nationalism and socialism. Why, it is a conception that shocks, even in these days of shell-shock nightmares. The little Düsseldorf trouble of itself would suggest what a bloody mess there will be to clean up some day.

And what can we do? We have at least two points in our favour: in the first place that there is only one British opinion as to general policy. The Opposition may wish to go farther and faster than the Government; the Government than its supporters. A Diehard may accentuate the French interest—a Democrat the German. But we all equally want to keep the French from breaking up Germany and the Entente. Breaking up Germany means that it will have to reunite again by war. Breaking up the Entente means a return to the Balance of Power and a restoration of it by war. All will agree that peace depends on our retaining our association with France, and on our admitting Germany and Russia to it as soon as possible.

In the second place, we have only one leverage for restraining France and restoring Germany. It is not a dread of isolation. Why should France, with her present armaments and alliances fear the loss of our moral support? It is not demands for the French debt. Still less is it demonstrations in reinforcing or redistributing British armaments. It is, simply, that we are in Cologne, the capital of the proposed Ruhr-Rhine Republic; and that as long as we remain there further progress with the programme of converting the Allied occupation into a French annexation is altogether prevented. And the recent measures taken by the French in respect of our occupation are clearly with the object of getting us out. It is something that since attention was called to these intrigues Lord Curzon, in his speech to the Imperial Conference, has announced that we intend to maintain our position at Cologne.

But this is not by itself enough. When London last winter allowed the French, under cover of the Rhineland Commission, to control all communications and commerce on both sides of Cologne, it did not realise what a humiliating position this might entail for us. Our British administration of Cologne is both a menace to and at the mercy of foreign politicians pursuing a sinister scheme of which we disapprove. Cologne is cut off from its food supply which we disapprove. Cologne is cut off from its food supply districts, and though peaceful and prosperous at present, the French controls can, by another turn of the screw, reduce it to the condition of the large towns in the French occupied area. The result would then be that the food raids and famine riots already occurring just outside our area would spread to Cologne. And the consequence of

any serious collision between the British troops and the German population would be a public demand for the end of our occupation. The French would thus attain their object, and we should abandon the culture centre and industrial core of Germany to become a French protectorate administered by General Degoutte and Dr. Dorten and the Senegalese.

If, however, we are to stay—and stay we must—respect for England and our responsibility to Europe require that we should now make Cologne as free as Hamburg. Why should British traders have to get a licence from the French at Bad-Ems in order to trade between Great Britain and Germany through a town in British occupation? Why should the French impose conditions on traffic along the Rhine or over unoccupied German railways outside Cologne such as practically prevent trade? And this, moreover, in the name of "sanctions" which we have never recognised! British Chambers of Commerce have protested. The Swiss have protested. The Dutch have protested. We went to Cologne in the international interest as the last act in the overthrow of German Imperialism. We can make our stay there the first act in our opposition to a French Imperialism. Our occupation has changed its front in order to fulfil its international function. It is true that we unfortunately acquiesced in the first imposition of these sanctions last spring. But their recent rapid development has given us a ground for revising our attitude. For we can point out that the complete customs cordon that they have thrown round our occupied area now enables them to liberate from licences trade through that area without injury to their customs sanction. The abandonment of passive resistance has given suitable opportunity for revising the situation, and the consequent increase of trade already noticeable makes a removal of vexatious restrictions all the more important.

If we can in this way discharge the responsibility to international commerce and communications involved in our occupation of Cologne we shall have gone a long way to delivering Europe from the risk of a French-protected Rhine-Ruhr Republic. For with Cologne thus internationalised by us, and a free port, their whole mercantilist-imperialist scheme collapses. Nor would our least service be rendered to the French people themselves if by this or any other action—whether independent or concerted—we can restrain them from ruining Europe by their vain pursuit of a visionary *Rhein-gold*.

GEORGE YOUNG.

WILL THE GERMAN REPUBLIC SURVIVE? *

THE attention of the foreign traveller in Germany is arrested by one outstanding fact, namely, the absence of the outward symbols of a Republic and the abundant presence of the outward symbols of a monarchy. This is in part a purely superficial condition, the result of indifference or considerations of economy; but in many cases the monarchical symbol is the expression of conscious, deep-rooted monarchical feeling. Two years ago the Government of Hesse compelled the refractory Senate of the University of Giessen to remove from its great hall the portrait of the last Grand Duke, with the result that the body of students took an oath binding themselves not to use the hall for their gatherings until the picture was restored to its place; and since then they meet for ceremonial occasions in the gymnasium. Will the empty place on the wall be filled some day? Let history answer in the first instance. It teaches that, until November, 1918, the German people has never really made political history, which—apart from the convulsion of the year 1813—has been moulded either by its rulers and their confidential advisers, or by violence from outside Powers—often for the good of the country, often not; generally without its consent, frequently against its desire. The German people is, therefore, very little to blame for many things for which other nations hold it responsible.

Accordingly, it became an easy task for teachers of history, from the Universities down to the elementary schools, to picture the whole of German history as a record of rulers, to beautify or suppress its dark passages, to glorify unduly its brighter phases, and to throw ridicule on the Republican movement of 1848. They thus gave prominence to that servile deference and deliberate choice of impotent irresponsibility among the middle classes, which has been deplored by so many patriots of every party as the original sin of the Germans, and which contrasts so sharply, not only with the fearless independence of the German spirit in matters outside the range of politics, but with the dignified and self-respecting attitude towards their monarchical institutions that distinguishes other nations of wider political education.

It came, therefore, as an immense surprise for those who confounded servility with loyalty, indifference with contentment, and social use with political conviction, to find that in November, 1918, the twenty-two German reigning princes had deserted their posts in the face of a few mutinous sailors and hysterical quill-drivers without an attempt at resistance on the part of any one of them, and without the raising of a single hand in their defence. This

* This article was written before the termination of resistance in the Ruhr.—
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may be accounted for by the disillusionment of a nation, whom its sovereigns had buoyed up with promises of a certain and brilliant victory; the envy of the hungry masses in face of the luxury still prevailing at the various Courts and military headquarters (as exemplified also in the Russian revolution); the aversion to the officers' uniform (always worn by ruling princes even in times of peace), an aversion which, beginning in the army in 1916, grew in the course of time to quite fantastic proportions; the agitation fostered in the army and fleet since 1917 by the independent Socialists and Communists; the confident expectation (encouraged by Wilson in good faith, by Clemenceau with crafty motives) that a German Republic would obtain better peace terms than a German Imperial Government; and the very effective foreign propaganda, which made the Emperor and his entourage bear the greater part of the blame for the war and its prolongation, with the resulting conviction in the minds of the people that only by their removal could the longed-for peace be attained.

The number and variety of these reasons were only equalled by the number and variety of the solutions proposed. Was Germany to be one great homogeneous Republic, a Republican Confederation, a democratic Republic, or only a Parliamentary monarchy? The German people stumbled into its Republic just as it stumbled into its war. It desired and prepared the one as little as the other. And so the Republic hung on a thread. Had Wilhelm in the beginning of October, when an armistice was offered, resigned the throne in favour of his grandson, the revolution would not have broken out, Germany would have become a Parliamentary monarchy, would have experienced a more normal economic and political development, and, with the co-operation of her whole people, would have been much better able to weather the storms of the period in which the war ended. The abdication of the Emperor was not only expected by the enemy Powers, but would also have been in accordance with the most elementary sense of fitness; but Wilhelm's vanity and irresolution, no less than the cowardice of his sycophantic counsellors, delayed the decision until it was too late, until, in fact, Germany, this time again, came to grief through her rulers and their courtiers.

The German democratic Republic is not an organic entity, the creature of healthy political development. It harbours no proud memories of the heroic days of a Cromwell, a Washington, a Bonaparte, a Garibaldi; it is, in fact, the chance outcome of a military *émeute*, and represents a mere collapse. It started with a heavy handicap—the galling memory of its first official act, the compulsory confirmation of the capitulation of the imperial army. The Government cannot, therefore, claim to be anchored in the

mighty undercurrent of national pride. Legally, however, it is securely anchored in its various constitutions—the constitution of the Reich, and the constitutions of its component States, though these are liable to alteration (not, it may be added, easily accomplished) at the hands of the several Parliaments. Already the out-and-out Republicans in the Reichstag dispose of something less than half the votes, and it is quite conceivable that this figure may sink to less than one-third. In that case the monarchists might bring about a change in the constitution on strictly legal lines without an appeal to the people, of which the result would be doubtful. It seems more likely that the change may come about in one of the States, say, Bavaria; and this could not happen without hurt to the constitution of the Reich, which prescribes a form of Republican government for the several States.

Let us therefore glance at the state of public opinion. Dealing first with the parties in the Reich, we find that the Conservatives (at present known as the National Popular Party) are declared and convinced monarchists. Their most potent weapon is the “stab-in-the-back” theory—the assertion that the German army, unconquered and even within sight of certain victory, was stabbed in the back by the revolution, and that the Republic and its leaders (whom they allege to be of Jewish extraction) must be held responsible for all the ensuing evil. Strongly monarchical is also the other party of the Right, the National Liberals (now called the Popular Party), which, however, unlike the first, is not actively working for the overthrow of the Republic, but is simply awaiting developments. Many former adherents of this party belong at present to the Democratic Party, while retaining their allegiance to the monarchical ideal; but the Democratic Party as a whole defends the Republic, though, in the event of a revolution, it would take its stand on the “plane of circumstances.” The Bavarian wing of this party is avowedly monarchical. The Centre Party is divided. Its left wing, representing the Christian trades unions, is Republican, but places the solidarity of the party above every other consideration (though this does not, perhaps, apply to its leader, Wirth, and some of his henchmen), while its right, or agrarian wing, is at root monarchical. The Bavarian Centre is definitely active in the cause of the monarchy, and has therefore organised itself as a separate Bavarian Popular Party. The Socialists of all shades are, of course, Republican, and lay special stress on the fact.

This balance of parties, which in itself does not make for strength, develops day by day on lines progressively unfavourable to the maintenance of the Republic. Foreign nations know this, but are not sufficiently informed as to the causes of it. They are not aware, or have ceased to be aware, that for a short period

there was a Germany more republican, democratic, and pacifist than any other European country. In those days—between October, 1918, and the spring of 1919—the whole nation was thoroughly impressed with a sense of the large share that the German foreign policy had in the responsibility for the war. Even the Conservatives (who had by this time become the National Popular Party) demanded the “radical reform of the German foreign service,” and declared that the “German State has now obtained a form of Parliamentary Government, upheld by the trust of the majority of its citizens, and resting on equal suffrage.” The Centre demanded, among other things, “the unqualified recognition of the democratic, popular Government; the regularizing of the mutual relations of peoples and States on principles of eternal justice, not of physical force; the creation of a League of Nations; the introduction of courts of arbitration for all disputes; and reciprocal simultaneous disarmament on the largest possible scale.” Similarly the National Liberals (Popular Party): “We also welcome the idea of a League of Nations conditional on the full equality of all States. We adhere to an universal, democratic, equal, and secret electoral franchise. We desire a complete reorganisation of the Foreign Office.” The Democrats asserted that “our unfortunate external and internal policy has only left hunger and misery in its wake. The prevalence of the militaristic policy of brute force has led us into this war. Right must reign among the nations. We desire a foreign policy based on the principles of a lasting peace. We stand for a league of equal nations, for international courts of arbitration, and for proportional reduction of armaments.” From these utterances it can readily be conceived what the appeals of the Social Democrats were.

And the whole nation shared these views. At the elections of January 19th, 1919, the voting was as follows:—

Socialists	...	...	...	...	44 %
Centre	...	...	...	...	22 %
Democrats	...	...	...	...	18 %

giving a total of 84 per cent. of definitely Republican votes. But no later than at the elections of June 6th, 1920, these numbers had decreased to 42 per cent., 20 per cent., and 9.7 per cent., respectively, a total of 71.3 per cent., and these included a very great number of votes of secret and even open opponents of democracy and the Republic. To-day the movement towards the Right would be even more noticeable.

What had happened meantime? Just what had happened all over the world. A radical, Communist wing of Socialism had come into being, which would have nothing to do with democracy and

Parliaments, which in January, 1919, fomented a bloody uprising, and which inspired the great mass of the people with antipathy to the Labour class. But even more important were the effects of the Government's foreign policy, the discouraging experiences during the period of the armistice, the prolongation of the hunger blockade, the retention of the prisoners of war, the arbitrary peace treaty of Versailles, the refusal to admit Germany to the League of Nations. It was plain to everyone that those who had been liberal in promises of democratic institutions, justice and peace, had only given servitude, deception and militarism, though Germany had disarmed, and had become a Republic. It seemed evident that reactionary influences in the Entente were uppermost; and so the German people began to despair of anything in the nature of justice, liberty, or humanity, and turned to those who had consistently maintained that the whole business was an elaborate “swindle,” an opinion which now appeared to be justified by events. The one fact that clearly emerged was that the Republicans were blockheads and dupes. Is it to be wondered at that the idea of physical force, from within and without, appeared to offer the only means of salvation?

These tendencies are deliberately fostered by France with all the means at her disposal. Her crafty methods of tormenting the Rhinelanders (whom yet it is her purpose to win), the standing provocation of the presence on German soil of black troops which has so gravely damaged the position of France in America, can only be understood on the assumption that she desires a violent outbreak of *revanche* in order to vindicate her war-footing in the eyes of Europe and of her own people. Her game is threefold. On the Rhine she wants an autonomous clerical Republic, because she expects sympathy from it for Catholic France; in other parts of Germany, as, for instance, the Palatinate, she supports Communism as a potential agent of civil war; while in Bavaria she is in close touch with some monarchists who, though definitely Francophobe, are tempted by the bait of union with Austria in return for separation from the German system.

On the other hand, it is a matter of common knowledge that England and America would only consent to give financial credit and diplomatic support to a Republican and anti-militarist Germany; and this consideration has a constantly damping effect on the zeal of the German monarchists.

The chief source in Germany of monarchistic currents is to be found in Bavaria, more especially in the agricultural South with its capital, Munich. The predominating personage there is the former Crown Prince Rupprecht, a popular but somewhat doubtful figure, enjoying among the people, in society, and in Government

circles, something of the position of a king, a fact which became evident on the occasion of the funeral of his father. The industrial North, more particularly Nürnberg, is faithful to the Republic; but in this region also the inhabitants of the plains are not to be counted on. It has happened more than once that the monarchy was about to be proclaimed, but thoughtful leaders on each occasion managed to postpone this issue pending the time when Bavaria shall have become independent of the Prussian coal supply. This is expected to come about in 1925, when the gigantic project of the electrifying of the railways, at present proceeding, is likely to have reached fruition. It is quite possible, however, that, before that time, the National Socialists, organised on the model of the Fascisti, may have broken out. The cause of the critical position in Bavaria is to be found in the political backwardness of this State, by reason of which it lends itself readily to the disturbing efforts of outsiders, such as the Berlin Jew, Eisner, or the Austrian Jew-baiter, Hitler. Moreover, the people have not forgotten their unpleasant experience under the short-lived reign of the Communists. Other monarchical centres are East Prussia, separated from Prussia proper by the Polish corridor; Silesia, threatened by the Poles, and the province of Pomerania. Mid-Germany, on the other hand, is strongly Socialist and Republican, particularly Saxony and Thuringia.

Finally, what are the views of the people generally? The great estate owners, the nobility, the old military caste, and the semi-military secret organisations (whose slender equipment would suffice for a civil war) are pure monarchists. The big capitalists (with the exception of some Jews) subscribe to almost the whole creed of monarchy. This is also true of the Protestant clergy, the officials of University training (except those who obtained their appointments by party influence), the judiciary, the secondary teachers, and the Protestant peasantry, who mostly belong to an agricultural organisation run by the National Popular Party. Preponderatingly monarchistic are the learned professions, the University professors, the students (who would be the picked troops in an upheaval), the higher grades of the Catholic clergy, the Protestant elementary teachers of the North, and at least two-thirds of the Press. All these classes adhere to the "Stab-in-the-back" theory.

The only organised Republican opposition to this body of opinion would come from Labour, which is firmly determined to go to the length of manning the barricades on this question, and perhaps on this question only; and whose general strike on the occasion of the "Kapp-Putsch" proved such a formidable weapon. Some thoughtful members of the *bourgeoisie* would join them, but in Bavaria and Württemberg this class has been more or less affected

by National Socialism, and eight years of privation and agitation grammé. Most people call out for "a strong man"; but a nation reliable, though its commanders are not always trusted. The national militia (*Reichswehr*) is divided. The officers from top to bottom are solidly monarchical. They come from former volunteer corps and other more or less irregular bodies. A part of the rank and file would follow them, and so the *Reichswehr* could not be counted on as a solid asset for the Republic. Whether it could be used against the Republic is a matter as to which informed opinion differs, and which would largely depend on the conditions existing in the several States. The probability is that in the case of a *coup d'état* the *Reichswehr* would be neutralised by the police.

On a general view of these historical, legal, and political circumstances, and with a knowledge of how revolutions may be brought about by small minorities, one seems driven to the only possible conclusion, namely, that the Republic is lost. The same thing was said, and with even greater warrant, of the third French Republic in the days of MacMahon, and again in the days of Boulanger. And yet the Republic flourished ever more as time went on, the fact being that its theoretical loss was more than counterbalanced by the practical difficulties of a restoration often planned. The case of the German Republic is precisely similar.

In the first place, there is no Pretender. The flight of William II. (dubbed by the people "the Deserter") has cost him his prestige, except perhaps in strongly legitimist circles, though even in these his re-marriage so shortly after the death of the Empress, whom they honoured, has not been forgiven. For a little time the Crown Prince was a favourite, but no one dares to put him forward while the memory of the dissolute life that he is alleged to have led during the war is still fresh. The other adult scions of the house of Hohenzollern count for nothing, or for worse than nothing; and the eldest son of the Crown Prince, from whom much is expected, is still a child. Rupprecht of Bavaria is, as a Catholic, out of the question, for the North German monarchists are mainly Protestant. Furthermore, the restoration of numerous minor dynasties is impossible, either because the countries concerned (as in the case of Thuringia) have melted away, or because the Republic (as in Saxony) has taken a firm hold, or because the dynasties, which were liberally provided for, have lost the taste for governing. Then also it would be impossible to erect one undivided monarchy in Germany, for the most enthusiastic monarchists, the Bavarians, will not consent in any circumstances to renounce the House of Wittelsbach, while the Prussians are equally insistent on retaining the Hohenzollerns; and this brings us face to face with insurmountable constitutional difficulties.

In addition, there is a total lack of anything like a political programme. Most people call out for "a strong man," but a nation that has once travelled along the road of democracy is little likely to accept a dictator for any length of time, unless it be one who can achieve mighty victories, a state of things which present circumstances preclude. Moreover, the endless complications of existing conditions are completely inopportune for such undertakings. Finally, in accordance with the Austrian precedent, the neighbouring States might treat a restoration as a *casus belli*, and prevent it by main force. And at the present moment when the existence, not merely of the Republic, but of the Fatherland is in question, when the nation is defending itself with grim determination and as one man against a foreign enemy encamped on its soil, all internal broils are suspended.

To sum up. The German Republic will live. Nothing short of the extermination of Germany by France will kill it. Such an event would not be out of keeping with the political history of the German people which contrasts so crudely with her wonderful spiritual history, and with the great deeds of individual German statesmen who rose to power solely through the confidence placed in them by their sovereigns. And yet the Republic, and the Republic alone, will be able to supply the means of neutralising this contrast. To other peoples it is given to enjoy in peace their tried and trusted dynasties and monarchical institutions, but the German will have to learn in the hard school of a bitter experience to mould his own history worthily. He will only begin to value his freedom, and to understand freedom-loving nations, when he feels himself to be a responsible and self-respecting citizen, and not a subject seeking the protection of an irresponsible monarch. Therefore, and in spite of everything, all Germans gifted with patriotic insight look forward with enthusiasm to the future of the German democratic Republic. But whether this faith will become universal, or whether it will altogether die out, will depend in no small measure on how the nations of the world and their organisation, the League of Nations, are prepared to act by Germany on the basis of true democratic principles. And herein lies the responsibility of the world for the future of the Republic in Germany.

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THE PROBLEM OF INDIA'S ASPIRATIONS.

THE Indian problem to-day is so complex and intricate, that to those who do not care to look beneath the surface, and to those who confine their attention only to its outward manifestations, it seems to suggest the gloomiest forebodings. And yet, in my opinion, if the spiritual significance of the Indian problem is borne in mind its whole character becomes readily intelligible, being by no means different in essentials from the problems which are agitating the minds of many other countries at the present moment. The traditional European point of view about India, or for the matter of that about the whole of the East, has to be modified if we are to appreciate the true significance of our problem. It is no longer possible to describe the East as unchanging. India *has* changed, and *is* changing from day to day. What the results of this change may be no one can definitely foretell, but I think the fact of the change which has overtaken India must be recognised before any attempt can be made to understand her as she is to-day.

For more than half a century she has been spoon-fed by England. Internal security and peace have been assured by England, and, while the education of the masses has been neglected, an *intelligentsia* has come into existence, which has derived its inspiration from English history and politics. It has watchfully followed the trend of European movements. New ambitions and aspirations have been steadily growing in its bosom. Until a few years ago it carried on its own propaganda from its own platforms, or through its own Press. Its appeal to the masses was not direct, nor strong, nor intimate. Hence, until recently it was possible to ignore that *intelligentsia* as a microscopic minority, with no right to voice the feelings and sentiments of the larger India. People who went to India from England at a time when this *intelligentsia* could be thus truly described, and who became accustomed for long years to play the part of *paterfamilias* in their dealings with the masses, are still unwilling to recognise that the old order has changed. There never was much contact, friendly or otherwise, between Englishmen of this generation and the *intelligentsia*—and if anything there is less to-day. But the outstanding fact of the situation is that that *intelligentsia*—however small in size—has now got into direct and personal touch with the masses, and has acquired a decided ascendancy over their minds and their sentiments. It thinks for them, it preaches to them, and it inspires their higher activities. In one word, what was the nationalism of the few five years ago is, to the surprise of the uninitiated, rapidly becoming the creed of the many.

The fact is, India is to-day becoming intensely National in her outlook, and that Nationalism is spreading far and wide through her castes and creeds. The new consciousness which has sprung up there pervades not only the political life but the social and intellectual life also. Whether one likes it or not, the fact is that in social matters there is a reaction against Western influence, a distinct tendency towards re-Indianising our whole method of life, our domestic arrangements, and even our educational system. Orators who used to pride themselves a few years ago upon their command of the English language have now very little chance with their audiences unless they speak the language of the people. Young men and old men who received their education at Indian Universities, or who were at English Public Schools, the English Universities, or the Inns of Court, and who seemed to gather importance by affecting English dress or English ways of living, now take a greater pride in their own dress and their own ways of living, and this brings them into nearer touch with the people. I shall not refer to this aspect of the change at greater length. Our scholars who, a few decades ago, absolutely neglected their own history, and left it to Westerners to discover what was best in our past and to interpret it to us from their point of view in the languages of Europe, are beginning to build up a literature of their own covering all the branches of secular knowledge. Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose, Sir P. C. Ray, and Professor Raman are among our leaders in science. Rabindranath Tagore is the inspirer of the best that there is in our national literature. In the North Sir Muhammad Iqbal and Brij Narain Chakbast are feeding the spirit of Nationalism by their poetry. A new school of art under the leadership of Abanindranath Tagore is reviving our national art traditions. Jadunath Sarkar, to mention only one name, is re-writing our history for us, while in the field of economics an intensely national movement is developing under the guidance of several eminent professors and publicists. This is our position in intellectual life.

In politics, more than in any other sphere, passionately national appeals are made to the masses by leaders of all shades of thought, and no one has made a more rousing appeal to, or more entirely captured the imagination of, the people than Mr. Gandhi. Before his day there were great leaders whose contribution to the gradual building up of Indian Nationalism was neither small nor negligible. Talking in the phraseology of present-day party-politics, among the Moderates there were outstanding personalities, like Sir Phirozeshah Mehta and Mr. Gokhale, and among the extremists Mr. Tilak. There were differences among them as to methods of work; but I believe that the ideal which inspired them all was the

same. Their appeal was limited, in the main, to the *intelligentsia*, and their sphere of influence was also narrow. This was largely due to the fact that the Mahomedans as a body stood aloof from politics, and depended more upon the support and patronage of the British Government.

The position has been radically changed during the last five years. In 1917-18 India was in the throes of a great agitation on the question of self-government. Schemes of advance were discussed somewhat infructuously between Simla and Whitehall, until Mr. Montagu went out to India, saw politicians, sized up the situation, and tried in his own way to give effect to the famous announcement made on August 20th, 1917, in Parliament, that the goal of British rule in India was to establish gradually responsible self-government in the country. When practical steps were taken to give effect to that policy, and the Government of India Bill was passed, divisions arose in political India. One section of Indian politicians, namely the Moderates, or, as they are now called, the Liberals, decided to give their support to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The other section—the extremists—decided to have nothing to do with those Reforms, as, in their opinion, they did not come up to expectations, and transferred no real power into the hands of the people.

Up to this moment Mr. Gandhi was more or less in the background. Then came the trouble in the Punjab and the administration of Martial Law. India was thereby stirred to its depths, Mr. Gandhi found his opportunity and took up the cause of the nation's honour with his characteristic earnestness and zeal. His personal character, his spiritual fervour, and the simplicity of his life won for him power over the minds of the masses, which no politician before his day had enjoyed. The situation was further complicated by the Treaty of Sèvres, for Moslem India felt itself vitally interested in the future of Turkey. It separated itself from the Government, and openly challenged the good faith of Great Britain *vis-à-vis* Turkey. It joined hands with the Hindus, and for the time being Mr. Gandhi led the united forces of Hindus and Mahomedans. This might be said to be the beginning of the non-co-operation movement. By the middle of 1919 this movement began to take concrete shape. In 1920 the non-co-operators decided to boycott the Councils, the Schools, and the Courts of Law, and an open campaign of hostility to the British Government in India was started. Young and old non-co-operators alike went openly to the masses, in villages and in towns, and their inflammatory speeches and writings made the position of the Government of India extremely difficult and delicate. The culminating pitch of hostility was reached when the Prince of

Wales visited India, and the non-co-operators unwisely decided to boycott him. This naturally gave rise to angry feelings among many people both in India and in England, and I have no doubt whatever that this step on the part of the non-co-operators is to no small extent responsible for the set-back that the cause of Indian progress has received in this country.

Much as Mr. Gandhi himself desired to carry on his movement in a peaceful manner, the fact remains that his over-zealous and excited followers lost their heads, and the excitable masses were set aflame. Serious riots, resulting in grievous loss of life, took place in Bombay, Chauri-chaura, and elsewhere. Just before this time the Moplahs in Malabar had commenced an atrocious rising, which took the Government several months to put down. In these circumstances it was quite clear that no Government, either foreign or national, could sit quiet. It had to vindicate its authority, and to maintain law and order. A large number of men, including some of the most eminent non-co-operators, such as Mr. C. R. Das and Pundit Motilal Nehru, who in their profession in India occupied the same position as Sir John Simon does in England, were imprisoned. This further embittered the public mind.

Of one thing I can speak with confidence as a Member of the Viceroy's Cabinet at that time. I daily came into touch with Lord Reading. In my opinion, speaking with a full knowledge of the facts, he has received far less than his due from his critics. He has been blamed in England for weakness. But no man during those critical days had a clearer perception than he of the difficulties of the situation, and no Viceroy could have exercised a wiser, a more statesmanlike, a saner influence on the policy of Government. While on the one hand he was firmly determined to maintain law and order, on the other hand, he was keenly anxious to do everything that lay in his power to restore an atmosphere of peace and calm by satisfying the legitimate ambitions of Indians. I was closely associated with him in all the endeavours that were made to achieve this end. This chapter of Indian history has yet to be written authoritatively, and if I felt myself at liberty to disclose the true facts relating to the very earnest and general attempt that was made in December, 1921, to bring about a settlement, I have no doubt that I should be able to satisfy, at any rate, a considerable section of my countrymen that Lord Reading and his Government did all that they could to pour oil upon troubled waters. The attempt, however, failed, with the lamentable result that bitterness increased, and it has gone on increasing. Mr. Gandhi was put in gaol, and his disappearance from the political scene has undoubtedly led to the disorganisation and demoralisation of the movement of which he was the head. The

non-co-operators now speak not with a united, but with a divided, voice. A considerable section of them have recently decided to enter the Councils with the threat of destruction on their lips. Whether they will succeed in giving effect to this threat remains to be seen. My own belief is that they will not succeed, but one thing is clear to my mind, and that is that the new Assembly and Councils will be very different from their predecessors. They will be more critical, more vigorous, and more obstructive.

It is best to recognise the position of the Central Government in relation to the Assembly. Even the Assembly which has just expired, and of which I was an official member until January last, succeeded in acquiring considerable influence, although possessing far less power than a full-fledged Parliament. The task of the Government will be even more difficult in the future than it has been in the past. From a constitutional point of view the position is peculiar. There is an overwhelmingly large non-official majority in the Assembly; seven members of the Government, including the Commander-in-Chief and a few Secretaries, have got to face the Assembly from day to day, and to vindicate and justify their policy to that body. Hitherto the Government has more often than not succeeded in carrying the Assembly with it. I doubt very much whether it can count on such good fortune in the future. It must be distinctly recognised that the Government of India is not an independent Government, and, howsoever it may be denied, the fact remains that in all vital matters, and sometimes even in unimportant ones, the policy for India is formulated not at Delhi, nor at Simla, but in Whitehall.

Whitehall has its own traditions and its own outlook. The basis of its authority is the responsibility of Parliament for the good government of India. But how does Parliament discharge its responsibility? How many Members have any direct personal knowledge of India? There are, no doubt, a few retired Anglo-Indian officials in Parliament who went to India when the position of the country was quite different from what it is now. Some of these men, it is true, are valuable; but unfortunately there are not many Hope-Simpsons. Generally speaking, the attitude of the majority of the Anglo-Indians in the House is, from my point of view, reactionary. They pose as experts on Indian questions, and possibly they would have been very competent experts if India stood now where she did in their day. She has, however, changed, and is still changing, but they are immobile and hug their old-fashioned notions to their bosoms. I do not challenge their honesty of purpose, but I certainly maintain that they do infinitely more harm to India's relations with England than they realise. As to the rest of the Members of Parliament, their interests do not

lie in the direction of India. They are far too preoccupied with local interests, and they naturally prefer to leave India to be looked after by Whitehall.

There was a time in our politics when we looked up to Whitehall as against the Government of India. The position has radically changed now. We cannot always be sure of having a Montagu at the India Office, and we know that even a Montagu cannot have everything his own way. Mr. Montagu, I understand, is looked upon in certain quarters here as a wrecker of the Indian Empire. Our feelings towards him are wholly different, and if Englishmen could have the imagination to understand what a wonderful hold Mr. Montagu acquired and still possesses on the Indian mind, and what a valuable asset he is to the British Empire in India, they would realise that it is possible for an Englishman of the right kind to reconcile Indian patriotism with loyalty to the Commonwealth. Frankly speaking, I am one of those who feel that the position in India would be ever so much easier, even under the present constitution, if the Government of India could be left to deal with the local problems independently, and if the control of Whitehall over India could be substantially relaxed.

I will now turn for a moment from the Government of India. In the Provinces where there is partial responsibility, I believe that the Ministers have on the whole given a good account of themselves. But it must be recognised that their position is extremely difficult owing to the fact that the provincial finances have been at the lowest ebb. The "Nation-building" subjects, from the administration of which the Ministers might have derived strength and popularity, have been starved, with serious consequences to the general reputation of the Reforms. In certain Provinces Ministers have been treated by the Governors on a footing of equality with the Members of the Executive Council. By others, however, they have been kept at arm's length. They cannot command the finances which they would like to have for the development of the part of the administration under their control. The services, Imperial and Provincial, are practically independent of them, and I do not think that it is possible for them always to depend upon the support of parties in the Councils. For a true party system will never arise in India until there is a full responsible Government.

I will now briefly refer to certain subjects which excite the greatest possible interest at the present moment in the Central Legislature. First and foremost is the question of Defence, with which is closely associated the problem of the Indianisation of the Army. It is recognised that a really self-governing India should be in a position effectively to defend those land borders on the

North-West which have always in her history, going back to the time of Alexander the Great, provided an ingress to the foreigner. There never will be a time in the future, so far as one can foresee, when India can afford to weaken her position in that direction. The problem is further complicated by the possession of a large seaboard without a Navy of her own to protect it. Indian politicians are fully alive to the changes of the position, and it is precisely for this reason that they lay so much stress upon their military training and the organisation of a national Army and Navy. It is obvious that our ambitions in this direction cannot be realised at a stroke. Meanwhile, it is inevitable that the directing agency for our defence should in the circumstances existing be provided by England, and that the process of Indianising the Army and building up a Navy should be expedited. It seems to me that it is by no means inconsistent with our aspiration towards self-government to pay for and secure our national security from England. Several of the Dominions followed the same course at the initiation of self-government, and I see no reason why our inability to protect ourselves against the foreigner should be emphasised as an argument against internal autonomy.

Intimately connected with the general subject of Defence is that of the Indianisation of the Army. Eight regiments are to be Indianised within the next twenty-two years. This, let me say frankly, cannot be expected to satisfy the ambition of India. It is true that the scheme is an advance on the present position, but it is wholly disproportionate to the feeling that is entertained on the subject in India. We want to be admitted into every branch of the Army. We want to have every facility for training in military instruction, and if the Dehra Dun College has not evoked much interest or enthusiasm, it is, I believe, through the feeling that it is wholly inadequate to the needs of the situation. The policy adopted is one of extreme caution, and unless a larger and more courageous one is tried, I do not think there is much chance of enlisting Indian support.

Another question which is exercising the Indian mind, and which is likely to be in the forefront during the next few months, is that relating to the Imperial Services. A commission under the presidency of Lord Lee (of Fareham) is about to go to India to inquire as to the present condition of the Services and to frame a definite policy for the future. The subject is big enough for a separate article, and I only wish in the briefest possible manner to indicate the Indian point of view. The question of the Services and their functions in the machinery of India is intimately associated with the future of our constitution. Indians are distinctly of the opinion that the position of the Services should be approxi-

mated to that of the permanent Services in England. Hitherto, they have, so to speak, been the governing class in India. In future it is demanded that their functions should be to carry out the policy which is laid down by a responsible Government consisting of Ministers. So far as their financial grievances are concerned there is no objection to these being examined and relief being given to them consistently with the financial position of the country; but it must be borne in mind that the essential issue relates to the *venue* of recruitment, and it is felt that the time has come for it to be recognised that in the event of responsible Government being established in India, recruitment must normally take place in that country. I am fully aware of the objection raised in certain quarters to a rapid Indianisation of the Services. I know that it is held essential to keep the British element in the Services in order to maintain the standard of administration which has hitherto prevailed. It must, however, be remembered that even if recruitment were to be stopped in England to-day, the British officials who entered the Indian Services up to 1919, when the Reform Act was passed, can stay there for twenty-five years. I hold strongly that their presence in the ranks for so long a period should have a powerful leavening influence. Indeed it seems to me that for many a long day after the establishment of responsible Government there will be plenty of scope for the British expert in the various branches of our Services, and probably on better terms than those he enjoys at present.

Again, one of the most important questions confronting India is that of emigration and the position of Indians overseas. I do not wish to go into this question at length, because it is a subject for discussion at the Imperial Conference. The situation has been gravely complicated by the Kenya decisions, which have given rise to wide-spread dissatisfaction and resentment in India. I am told that the question is not so much racial in its character as economic. Making full allowance for all these arguments, Indians cannot forget that they are the "equal subjects" of His Majesty, and they refuse, and will continue to refuse, to occupy a position of inferiority in the Empire. Apart from force, to the use of which there are obvious limitations, the only bond which can unite India to the Empire is one of sentiment, and if that sentiment is to be disregarded or outraged, no present believer in the connection of India with England and the Empire can contemplate the future with equanimity.

Lastly, the one question which overshadows every other, is the question of constitutional advance. On this subject let me say frankly that there is no difference between the non-co-operators and the moderates. Their methods of work may be different.

The non-co-operators may indulge in threats of boycott and civil disobedience. The moderate may dissociate himself from such wild oratory; but, so far as the achievement of responsible Government is concerned, he is no whit less determined. He believes in constitutional methods and constitutional pressure exercised in and through the legislative bodies. Our opponents in this country fling at us our internal dissensions, the quarrels between the Hindus and the Mahomedans, and the position of what are known as the depressed classes. I recognise that every now and again differences between the Hindus and the Mahomedans come to the surface; but it must be very poor statesmanship which cannot find a permanent and abiding solution for them. The Mahomedan is as keenly political to-day as the Hindu. He is, however, anxious to protect his own rights and his own privileges. He wants adequate representation, both on Parliamentary bodies and on the Services. Both Hindus and Mahomedans are anxious that there should be no interference by the one with the other in the exercise of religious rights and ceremonies. The rougher elements of the two communities sometimes take the law into their own hands. But this disturbance of law and order is not a daily and universal occurrence, and we must be prepared for such occasional breaches in the future, whether the Government is foreign or national. In this respect, perhaps, the Indian States have better results to show than British India.

As regards the depressed classes, or the untouchables, the problem is not so large as it is represented to be. Madras is directly affected by it, and certain parts of Bombay too. It is practically unknown in Northern India. Speaking for myself, and for a very large number of the educated classes, our practical sympathies are wholly with the depressed classes, and, while I have no objection to this problem being mentioned in the Press as an argument against constitutional advance, I think it would be more consistent with fairness to acknowledge that serious attempts are being actually made by large bodies of Hindus to solve the problem, and do everything that lies in their power for the uplift of these classes. May I point out that only in August last, a big conference called the Hindu Mahasabha, was held in the Holy City of Benares, and even the most orthodox Brahmins and priests, who would, only a few years ago, have revolted against any suggestion of giving equality to these depressed classes, definitely resolved to recognise their social and religious position in the Hindu fold. It is significant that the leader of this movement should be one of the most orthodox Brahmins, namely, Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a political leader with a record of nearly forty years of work behind him.

PROTECTION AND THE WOOL TEXTILE INDUSTRY.

PROTECTIONISM has again raised its head and tears are being shed over the deplorable condition of several British industries. Few people, however, anticipated that the wool textile industry would capitulate to the spurious arguments of tariffism. But perhaps this is to libel a traditionally Free Trade industry. What has really happened is that a well-organised section of the wool textile industry has capitulated, for the employers in all branches of the trade are by no means united in the demand for an import duty, whilst the trade unions have condemned the policy out and out. The *Wool Record*, which speaks with authority, has raised the question as to whether it is worth while "to tinker with the fiscal policy of this country, especially in view of the fact that nothing can be done under the Safeguarding of Industries Act for several months." The article reaches the root of the problem when it expresses the view that "the remedy is to be found in a settlement of the existing problems between Germany and France, which would inevitably lead to the stabilisation of finance and the appreciation of the franc."

The desire of the wool textile protectionists is to invoke the Safeguarding of Industries Act, a measure which has been facetiously but accurately described as a Safeguarding of Interests Act. Part II. deals with the case of goods manufactured abroad sold in this country "at prices which, by reason of depreciation in the value in relation to sterling of the currency of the country in which the goods are manufactured, not being a country within His Majesty's Dominions, are below the prices at which similar goods can be profitably manufactured in the United Kingdom." The Act provides for inquiry and for the imposition of customs duties "equal to one-third of the value of the goods." The case of the tariffists is that, as a prominent leader of the movement expressed it, "with the utmost goodwill the merchants were unable to buy Bradford goods when they were offered a reasonable substitute from the Continent at 20 per cent. less than the home price." The remedy proposed for this situation is a 33½ per cent. duty, though it is admitted that the difference in price is due to more reasons than one. The factor, however, on which attention has been fastened, to the exclusion of all others, is that of the depreciated exchanges.

It may be observed, at the outset, that the French imports, which are the source of the trouble, are primarily dress goods, and particularly women's dress goods, of good quality. These French goods are put on the British market at prices with which

the manufacturers, or at least a section of the manufacturers, say they cannot compete, because the French manufacturer, owing to the exchange situation, produces at a lower cost than the British manufacturer. The complaint does not appear to be that there are difficulties in foreign markets arising from this source. The problem is the home market.

The effect of the depreciated French Exchange is, of course, undeniable. It has recently been stated that on a 40 lb. piece of good quality cloth, the costs of conversion (*i.e.* of raw wool into cloth) in France are 351.28 francs, and in the Bradford worsted area, £6 1s. With francs at, say, 80 to the pound, French costs at the factory only amount to about £4 4s. It is, moreover, argued that the Roubaix and Tourcoing employers bought large supplies of wool when the franc stood at 60 or 70, and are now disposing of their manufactures for sterling at the rate of nearly 80 francs to the pound without their costs of production having increased in proportion to the fall of the exchange. The fact is that the advantages which the French manufacturer is now enjoying in the British market are not due to the depreciation of the French exchange, but to the difference between the internal and external values of the franc. Whilst the external value of the franc (expressed, say, in terms of English money) has fallen, the value of the franc in France has not fallen correspondingly. That is to say, prices have not risen correspondingly. To say that prices have not risen is to say that the cost of producing French goods has not risen. Had prices increased in France *pari passu* with the depreciation of the French exchange, the French exporter would not have been in the fortunate position he now occupies. To the extent that French prices are readjusted to external prices, the situation regarding French competition will be eased. It is probable that some readjustment will take place, and every readjustment will diminish the gap between the prices of French products and British products. It is, however, doubtful whether there will be a close adjustment of the internal to the external value of the franc, and in so far as there is a disparity, the French producer has an advantage. But with every readjustment the case for protection obviously diminishes.

If, for the sake of argument, we admit that the French manufacturer will continue to place his British competitor at a disadvantage, the question is as to whether the clumsy machinery of the Safeguarding of Industries Act is the proper method of dealing with the difficulty. In the first place, it may be pointed out that unless the Government proposes to continue the provisions of the Act as regards collapsed exchanges beyond next August, the preliminary inquiries will hardly be completed before the legal

I admit that the ultimate justification for a democratic responsible Government must be found in the existence of an intelligent and capable electorate. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms have given us an electorate of some five millions; but this is like a drop in the ocean when we remember that India is a country of more than three hundred millions of people. In any scheme of constitutional progress, the very first thing to do will be to enlarge our electorates. The masses are illiterate, and they are not interested in questions of high policy. But we are told that we must needs wait for their education. If so, we must be prepared to wait for at least half a century. I maintain very strongly, however, that the mass of our people are naturally shrewd, and understand their local problems. They are far more orderly than people of their class in any other country. They are responsive to generous treatment and elevating influences. The consciousness of the possession of political power and the repeated exercise of it at elections should in itself be an education of incalculable value. In addition there is an obligation upon those who seek their suffrages to give them political education.

I have hitherto reviewed the position in India according to my light, and though I recognise that nothing is more dangerous in politics than to prophesy, yet I venture to predict that when the new Assembly and the new Councils come into existence in January next, the all-absorbing question in those bodies will be the demand for responsible Government, and, howsoever much moderates and non-co-operators may differ in other respects, they will stand firm in this demand. They will have at their back a considerable section of the population, and the Government of India will be face to face with a situation which will be far more formidable than at any time during the last three years. It is open to Parliament and to the Government here to take their stand upon the section of the Government of India Act, which says that on the expiry of ten years from the date of the passing of the present Act, Parliament must appoint a committee of inquiry; but that does not to any mind mean that if the situation demands it a committee cannot be appointed before the end of that period. Mrs. Besant, on the other hand, is trying to call a Convention of Indian legislators of all schools, with the object of formulating their demands, and suggesting the changes in the constitution which they desire. What success she will achieve I cannot say; but those who know her are well aware of her great organising capacity. It is for English statesmen to decide whether they will associate themselves with our movement. India, however, is clear and determined on her objective. No one realises more keenly than I the dangers of hasty legislation, or the perils

of ill-conceived constitutions. Our constitution in the future cannot be wholly logical, but England herself does not possess a logical constitution. I can foresee dangers in delay, not the least of which is the inoculation of the young and uneducated minds with ideas subversive of law and order and antagonism to England. "Too late" has often been written large on the policy of England towards India. Let that mistake not be repeated once too often.

I hope I have made it plain that I am writing as a firm believer in the connection between India and England. The saner section of my countrymen are fighting not to withdraw from the Empire, but to vindicate our right to a place of honour within its wide boundaries. We feel that your King George of England is our Emperor of India; like you, we are his subjects; like you we desire a place in his household. To Englishmen I would say: Think what India means to the Empire. She is your best customer. She is the keystone in the arch of your world-power. She is the bulwark of your sea-communications. She is the source of much of your prestige in the counsels of Europe. No European power save you can claim to speak for hundreds of millions of Asiatics, can claim to bridge as you do the rift between East and West. Will you not assign to India an honourable place in the Empire to which she contributes such glory, honour, and prestige? We do not ask impossibilities; only examine our claims for yourselves, and deal with them in the spirit of justice—in the spirit which marks your dealings with the other members of the Commonwealth. Do not fear for the safety of your sons or of your investments: India is not ungrateful. For the Englishman, whether state servant or business man, who comes to us prepared to work in accordance with the changed spirit of the times, we have nothing but welcome, coupled with opportunities such as few of his predecessors enjoyed.

I cannot conclude more fittingly than with a word to my own countrymen. There is much need of clear political thinking, for we have indulged too freely of late in wild talk, which leads nowhere. We must get together and speak with a united voice, which shall be sober, clear, and determined. There is an honourable place within the Commonwealth to be won for our country—a place which, when it is achieved, will enable us to rise to the full weight of our moral and political stature. Let us fight, and fight on, until we have won it, declining to dissipate our energies upon wild threats and empty boastings, but concentrating every power we possess upon the vindication of our right to self-government, and to a place as an equal member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

it is likely, therefore, to become a keener competitor in the market for wool textile goods. The chief centres of the French industry were concentrated in those areas which during the war were either actually occupied by the enemy or which, like Rheims, came within the range of enemy guns. In consequence, the industry was developed in other districts. Since the war the reconstruction of the damaged or destroyed textile factories in the north of France has been nearly completed, and the machinery destroyed or removed by the Germans replaced. Not only so, but additional combing and spinning mills have been erected. Over a great part of the French wool textile industry, old mills and machinery have been superseded by new and more efficient buildings and by new machinery. Moreover, "Alsace has brought a considerable accession of strength to the French wool industry, having over half a million spindles for combed wool and 10,000 looms."* We are told on excellent authority that "the French woollen industry . . . which suffered enormous damage during the war, appears destined to emerge, on its complete reconstruction, with equipment almost entirely renovated, and with a productive power considerably superior to that of 1914."†

But that is not all. Prior to the war the French dyestuffs industry was largely in the hands of Germans. To-day the industry is in French hands, two-thirds of the French output of dyestuffs being produced by a large French company which took over one of the German establishments. France has, in fact, taken over a well-equipped and technically efficient industry, and therefore possesses an advantage in this respect over Britain, which is endeavouring to establish an industry, and in so doing is penalising the dye-using industries. These new circumstances cannot be overlooked, and the adventitious aid of a temporary tariff will in no way destroy the improved efficiency of the French wool textile trade. Whereas exchange difficulties are likely to be more or less transient, a newly equipped and large wool textile industry and a well established and efficient dyestuffs industry present a permanent problem for the British wool textile trades.

A solution of the difficulties of the British wool textile industry is to be found in two directions. The first is admittedly complex and difficult; but it is fundamental. Bradford is suffering from the post-war condition of Europe, and a solution of the tangled problems of economic restoration is essential to the rehabilitation of normal trade. This point is too obvious to need emphasis. The wool textile industry could do much to bring the organised

pressure of one of our staple trades to bear upon the Government to pursue more active steps for the reconstruction of Europe. In the second place, the industry should be examined and overhauled. At a recent meeting of the National Association of Unions in the Textile Trade, which comprises thirty-six trade unions in the wool industry, a resolution was passed rejecting the policy of protection, but suggesting "an immediate inquiry by a Committee appointed by the Government, representing in equal numbers the employers' associations, the trade unions, and the consuming public, into the causes of the depression in the wool textile trade and the consequent unemployment," with the object of making recommendations to meet the situation. It is high time that the industry turned a searchlight upon itself and upon the problems with which it is confronted, with a view to contributing as far as possible to the solution of its own difficulties. These two lines of advance are the only really effective methods of dealing with the serious difficulties assailing the wool textile and other industries to-day.

The world of industry must compel attention to the external conditions which are choking trade, and each industry must endeavour to adapt itself to the new circumstances by improved organisation and efficiency. Tariff manipulation merely ignores the deeper issues, and attempts to secure a transient and unsubstantial prosperity by disregarding the causes of our present misfortunes.

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* *Report on the Economic Conditions in France.* (Department of Overseas Trade.) 1923. P. 53.

† *Ibid.*

authority to take protective action expires—a consideration which the Bradford producers appear to have ignored when they first put forward the proposal. If, however, a protective duty were imposed for a more or less lengthy period, it would and could do nothing to restore the French Exchange. Clearly, any method which merely seeks to counteract the effects of an evil without eliminating the evil itself is but a palliative. In these days when political events and abnormal economic conditions are reflecting themselves in extraordinary fluctuations in the Exchanges, no mere readjustment of trade balances by relatively small changes in the exports in one branch of a single industry can restore the exchanges to anything approaching parity. The truth is that the prospect of tariff jerry-mandering diverts attention from the root problem, and even if the hopes of the *Morning Post* were realised and protection were introduced, we should be no nearer solving the evil of collapsed exchanges.

The economic effects of the imposition of an import duty on French wool textile goods would be those which usually follow a protective tariff and are well enough known. It is, however, worth emphasising the stimulus it would give to demands from other industries for similar assistance. Already the country is on the slippery slope to protection. The silk and glove industries are now clamouring for help, and inspired newspaper paragraphs have appeared enlarging on the plight of other industries. In other words, there is a protectionist *putsch* at the present time, coinciding with the meetings of the Imperial Conference—a gathering which invariably leads to a public re-ventilation of the possibilities of Imperial preference. If protection were accorded to such an important staple industry as wool, the case of smaller and far less fortunate trades would be irresistible. Their inclusion within the orbit of protection would no doubt be challenged by the erstwhile free traders in the wool textile trades, for their admission would, in fact, rob the textile industry of the advantages of its own protection. But obviously the weaker industries would raise their voices in favour of tariffs and their claims could hardly be denied.

What the Bradford trade is suffering from to-day is the effects of the very policy of artificial protection it is seeking to secure. The policy of this country with regard to dyes, for example, is itself a handicap to British trade, and one of the reasons for the superior advantages of French wool textiles in the British market. Dyeing costs in this country are nearly 50 per cent. higher than in France, and they will not be reduced by placing an import duty on French dress goods. Moreover, the protectionism of the new States of Europe is a hindrance to the West Riding manufacturers, whilst American tariffs offer an almost insuperable barrier to the British

exporter. Mr. E. F. Hitchcock, in a letter to the *Times* recently, stated: "On a yard of English cloth shipped from Liverpool to New York I have seen the documents showing that 128 per cent. duty had to be paid before it was allowed to enter the United States—that is, the equivalent of 12s. 9d. duty on a yard of cloth costing here 10s." What is wanted, for the economic wellbeing of the British wool textile industry and the country as a whole, is less protection in the world rather than more.

But the proposal for an import duty on French manufactured goods is not the only item of the new Bradford policy. It is suggested that the Imperial Economic Conference should consider the advisability, where the Empire holds a monopoly, of placing an export tax on such raw products as are exported to countries outside the Empire. Translated into the Bradford vernacular, this is merely a request that Australia should impose a tax on its wool exports, other than those coming to this country. The proposal for an import duty on French goods is plausible, and to some extent comprehensible; the proposal for an Australian export tax is fantastic and incomprehensible. True, Bradford is but following in the wake of the Board of Trade Departmental Committee of 1916, which was set up to consider the position of the textile trades after the war, but that Committee, after all, was working in a war atmosphere and may perhaps be more easily forgiven. The Bradford demand is that a steam hammer should be used to crack a nut, for remember that the hullabaloo has arisen solely because of French competition in British markets. To cure this, it is suggested that Australia should impose an export tax on wool sent not only to France but to every other country outside the British Empire. Now in the matter of retaliation the United States, for example, has little to learn. It happens that the United States would be seriously affected by such a tax, and it would not be surprising if it retorted by still further raising the tariff wall against the West Riding manufacturers and perhaps even imposing an export duty on American cotton shipped to Britain, for America is requiring more and more of her own supplies of raw cotton for her own spindles. Even assuming that Australia and New Zealand were to agree to the proposal of an export tax on wool, an assumption which we are hardly entitled to make, the chief result would be to set certain countries by the ears, and it would end in calamity for British trade and disaster for the British wool textile industry itself.

The Bradford manufacturers have had little to say about the changes which have recently taken place in the French wool textile industry. But it is to be remembered that to-day the French industry is larger and better equipped than ever it has been, and

CROATIA AND GREAT SERBIA.

WHEN we went to war in 1914 we were repeatedly told that we were fighting to destroy militarism and to liberate oppressed peoples. We are said to have come out of the struggle as "victors," but it becomes daily clearer that we did not achieve either of these ends. The arrival of M. Raditch in London, burning with the grievances of Croatia and begging for justice, gives us a good opportunity for examining into war results in that part of the war's theatre in which the first scenes of the world's tragedy were played.

Among the masses of documents that have come to light on the causes of the war, very many deal with the mines of explosives which lay hidden all through Europe, but almost none have added to our knowledge of the deed that set them all ablaze—the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. By comparing the latest document on the subject of the murders with the statements of M. Raditch, we may arrive nearer to explaining the very unsatisfactory state of things in Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general. The war was actually precipitated by the failure of the Serbian Government to make any attempt to trace the crime and its refusal to permit Austrian officials to take part in any such search. Serbia did not take the opportunity of triumphantly proving her innocence to all the world. Those of us who were old Balkan hands asked ourselves anxiously what it was she dreaded would be discovered.

M. Stanoye Stanoyevitch, Professor of History at Belgrad, a man of some reputation as an authority on Serbian history, has just published what he asserts to be an exact account of the murder. His object, he says, is

"to present a few facts quite impartially and establish their historical truth and indeed the whole historic truth so far as is known to me. . . . The material upon which the part of the book which deals with the murder of Franz Ferdinand is based, is derived from the persons who took part in the events described. They are chiefly officers who shared in the conspiracy of 1903 against King Alexander, and who were afterwards either members or opponents of the secret revolutionary society 'Union or Death' (known as the 'Black Hand'). I obtained, as well, statements from persons to whom Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch of the Serbian General Staff, the organiser of the murder of the Archduke, told some details of his part in the affair. I have not accepted these statements without criticism, nor left them unconfirmed. Where I cannot confirm their truth I have stated my doubts and objections. I can say that this book is truthful in every word and can be verified."

M. Raditch states that the guilt of Colonel Dimitrievitch has long been well known in Croatia, and that, so far as it goes, Professor Stanoyevitch's account is entirely reliable. Briefly, it is as follows. He begins with an historical preface, intended to justify subsequent events, and starts, oddly enough, with the emigration of vast masses of Serbs, refugees flying from the Turks, into Austro-Hungarian territory in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That they were given land and protection and saved from annihilation he admits, but his opinion seems to be that, having been allowed to settle, they should also have been given complete national freedom, and that Austrian attempts to incorporate them in the Empire justify all subsequent action. We are reminded of the fable of the husbandman and the viper. If the Professor's contention be righteous, it is a warning to all nations not to shelter refugees. Naively he tells us that the Serbs fought on the side of Austria because without aid they could not hope to beat the Turks, but that their sympathies were with Russia, and they accepted Austrian help only so long as they needed it. After some very one-sided historical chapters he passes to his main theme—the Serajevo murders. Three groups, he says, were concerned in the crime: (1) the national party of the youth of Bosnia, (2) the group of Belgrad officers, (3) a group of Austro-Hungarian officials. Of the third group he can tell but little. Count Tisza is reported to have said of the crime: "It was the will of God and we must thank Him for all things." The part of the youth of Bosnia, he considers, is explained by his historical chapter. He does not mention the fact that their hatred was stimulated and intensely cultivated from Belgrad, as I saw for myself so long ago as 1906, when I wintered in Serajevo.

The Professor repeatedly refers to the Archduke as "our worst enemy," but gives no reason for so doing. The reason, in fact, was that Franz Ferdinand's publicly expressed policy was to make of the Dual Monarchy a Triple Monarchy by erecting a self-governing Slav State within the Empire and satisfying the aspirations of the Austrian Slavs. This the megalomaniac party in Serbia, which wished to reconstruct the mediæval empire of Tsar Dushan, dreaded of all things, and they did all in their power to make it impossible. The Professor tells in detail how in 1903 the conspiracy against the pro-Austrian Obrenovitches was planned and carried out by a group of eighty officers and some civilians, who murdered the King, Queen Draga, and her two brothers. He regards these murders as the starting point of Serbia's success. The murderers were "led to join the plot by honest patriotism," but he admits that "not all the conspirators had only idealistic aims," and tells how "having created the new régime they had to

protect it." Until England refused to resume diplomatic relations unless they were discharged from office, they had in fact ruled the "government" they had set up. Their "dismissal" to please England meant merely that they retired behind the scenes for a while, but the gang was not broken up and met occasionally. It reappeared in force when the Young Turk revolution in 1908 precipitated the annexation of Bosnia by Austria and the proclamation of Bulgaria's independence.

On the day following these events the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Milovanovitch, called a great meeting at Belgrad which resulted in the formation of the *Narodna Odbrana* (Society for National Defence). Stanoyevitch, an active member of this, declares its objects were "to collect material relative to the conditions in Austro-Hungary and to enlighten the Serbian population on the ideals, tasks, and duties of Serbia and the Serbian people." And, therefore, not revolutionary but entirely legitimate. This would, however, depend entirely upon the way in which "ideals and duties" were expounded to the "Serbian population," and here he does not enlighten us. By Serb refugee students in England I have been assured that one of the *Narodna Odbrana's* activities was paying for the education of Bosnian, Montenegrin, and other Slav students at Belgrad University; that these students met and had their meals at the inn of "The Green Garland," and were there often visited by officers and other patriots. Indirectly, therefore, the *Narodna Odbrana* may be more responsible for revolutionary methods than the Professor admits. He explains that the wilder spirits among the officers, particularly the old murder gang, were angry with the Government and the *Narodna Odbrana* for not taking more active steps, and in 1911 formed the secret revolutionary society *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* (Union or Death), popularly known as the "Black Hand." The head of it was Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch, one of the organisers of the murder of King Alexander, and it consisted of some 300 members, most of them officers. They organised and trained and led *komitadji* bands in Macedonia. The hideous cruelty of these bands can be best studied in the Carnegie Report of the Balkan wars. The Professor refers always to the "Black Hand" as "secret," but its existence was known both in Serbia and abroad.

The dynasty and Government having been put in power by this gang of officers was powerless to suppress them. The old story of the Prætorian Guards was in fact re-enacted. Moreover, as the Carnegie Report points out, "it was a distinct advantage to the regular Government to have under its hand an irresponsible power like this which could be repudiated if necessary."

Stanoyevitch describes Dimitrievitch as "gifted, well educated, honourable, an eloquent speaker, capable and industrious. He had immense influence on his *entourage*, was an admirable organiser . . . but also vain and affected. . . . He loved danger and secret meetings, and was so entirely convinced that he was right that he thought all who disagreed with him neither honourable nor patriotic. Restless and thirsting for adventure, he planned several murders. In 1911 he and Tankositch sent a man to Vienna to kill either the Emperor or the Archduke." This failed, and all trace of the agent was lost. In February, 1914, he planned with a revolutionary Bulgarian committee to assassinate Ferdinand of Bulgaria—a plan which was also abortive. The Professor describes Tankositch as weakly in appearance and dull witted, but very wild, raw, and undisciplined. He took an active part in the murder of the Obrenovitch and was a notorious *komitadji* leader in Macedonia.

The sweeping success of the first Balkan war so filled the officers with ambition and self-confidence, he tells us, that they were completely uncontrollable. The "Black Hand" at once came in conflict with the Government, which, to avoid war with Bulgaria, wished to come to terms over Macedonia. This the "Black Hand" would not hear of. In this I can corroborate the Professor. I was in Ochrida in 1913 a day or two before the second Balkan war broke out. The Serbian officers angrily and emphatically declared that they would not cede any of the land they occupied; that they would not accept arbitration; that they meant to fight Bulgaria, and were only waiting the signal to begin.

Having with the help of Greece and Bulgaria beaten their former allies and obtained the coveted territories by the Treaty of Bukarest, they became more uncontrollable than ever. They ruled the whole of the annexed lands with savage brutality and came into constant collision with the "Government," which wished to substitute civilian for military rule and promulgated an order to that effect. The officers broke into open revolt and there were fierce quarrels both at Uskub and Monastir. "The Russian Minister Hartwig appears to have been mixed up in the affair," states Stanoyevitch, "and the order was withdrawn." That Hartwig, reputed all-powerful in Belgrad, should have intervened on behalf of the "Black Hand" is significant. One of his predecessors had watched unmoved from the Legation windows the attack upon King Alexander's palace in 1903.

I can corroborate Stanoyevitch's account of the officers in Macedonia by a letter I received in February, 1914, from my former dragoman, who, shortly before, had rejoiced at the departure of the Turk. He now wrote:

"I write from Monastir, or, I should say, Bitoli, for there is no city of the name of Monastir in the vast Servian Empire whose Emperor Petar Karageorgevitch is wheting (*sic*) his sword sharp to deal a blow on the old Austrian Emperor. The conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the creation of a vast and powerful Servian Empire is occupying the minds of all army men. Taxes are tremendous; this city must pay 1,000,000 francs war-tax. This will go to the War Office, for in Servia the army has twofold duty, to fight and to rule. There is hardly a country where the military have concentrated so great power in their hands. The King, the civil authorities, must needs comply with the wishes of the officers. The Servian officer has no respect for anyone. . . . You cannot but pity us who are ruled by such men. . . . Corruption in all branches is the essence of Servian rule."

I never heard of him again. He doubtless fell a victim. It is clear he had heard plots against Austria discussed. I too heard similar talk at the dinner-table in the inn at Podgoritzza during the first Balkan war. All who stood in the path of Great Serbia were, as it was delicately put, "to be sent to visit the Obrenovitches." Ferdinand of Bulgaria was named as one of these though at the time Bulgaria and Serbia were still "Allies." All this seems to show that Stanoyevitch's tale is true.

About this time, King Petar retired in favour of the Regency of his son the Crown Prince Alexander. Whether this was brought about by the officer gang it would be of interest to know. They may have hoped for a forward policy from a younger man. The Regency at any rate must have been with their consent. We now approach the climax. While the "Black Hand" was in something like open revolt, its head, Dimitrievitch, was Head of the Intelligence Department of the Serbian General Staff, and thus received from the Russian General Staff the information that at their meeting at Konopischt the Kaiser Wilhelm and the Archduke had planned an attack upon Serbia. This determined Dimitrievitch to kill the Archduke, "our worst enemy," and thus, declares his apologist, save Serbia from war. We should like to know the terms of the telegram and of subsequent ones from Russia. The narrative is here compressed and much is obviously glossed over and omitted. Just as Dimitrievitch, we are told, had decided to keep peace in this singular manner, Tankositch informed him that two youths representing the youth of Bosnia had asked him to help them to carry out a plan to murder Franz Ferdinand. Dimitrievitch at once empowered him to arm, train and otherwise aid them. This was done, and they were smuggled into Bosnia. How, the Professor does not state. The Austrian Government severely blamed the Serbian frontier officials. They may be still living, and Stanoyevitch says nothing either of this or of the youths. By refugee Serb students I was told that they were students at

Belgrad and that Princip was selected because he was so tuberculous that he could not in any case live long. Having sent the wretched boys on their fatal errand, Dimitrievitch called a meeting of the executive of the "Black Hand" and revealed the plot. A hot discussion took place and the majority of the members opposed it. Dimitrievitch in the end promised to stop it and, says Stanoyevitch, "it is said he tried to do so." In any case he failed, and, with the help of Daniel Ilitch, a schoolmaster, the murders were committed. Ilitch was found guilty and hanged by the Austrian Government.

Stanoyevitch's tale, which, as we have seen, can on many points be corroborated, completely explains all that followed. The guilt of Dimitrievitch and Tankositch must have been known to many persons. The plot could easily have been traced. I could not when in Serbia go from one village to another or sketch a baker's shop without being pounced on by the police for my passport and reasons for my conduct. But in the case of the Archduke's murder no one was pounced on; no arrests were made. In reply to Austria's inquiry on June 30th as to what steps were being taken M. Gruitch gave the reply: "The police up till now have not occupied themselves with the affair." The Crown Prince, in one of his dispatches to Russia, says he would punish the criminals if he only knew who they were. But he mentions no attempt to find them. The "Black Hand" which had raised his dynasty to the throne could by the same means depose him. The Serbian Government dared not act. To expose to Europe that the crime had been planned by the Head of her Intelligence Department and that the land was ruled by an irresponsible secret society of officers would have ruined Serbia and stultified all her schemes for aggrandisement. What advice Hartwig gave on this occasion we do not know. That he again supported the officers is not improbable.

For a whole month Serbia did nothing towards assuaging Austria's wrath. No arrest was made till Austria insisted upon that of Tankositch. But when in the ultimatum she insisted also that Austrian officials should take part in tracking the crime in Serbia, the Government, only too well aware of the skeleton that must be found in the cupboard, preferred with Russian support to risk war. "And you must admit," said a patriotic young Serb to me, "that the plan has completely succeeded and Great Serbia is made." Many are in fact proud of it. A Serb boasted to Lady Boyle that he had helped teach the murderers to shoot, saying, "Did I not teach them well?" Space prevents giving other instances which corroborate Stanoyevitch. Dimitrievitch made yet more murder plans, he continues, and sent a man from Corfu in 1916 to kill King Constantine, but this failed. In 1917 he was

himself arrested with several others of the "Black Hand" on the charge of plotting to overthrow the Crown Prince Alexander and substitute a military government, condemned to death with five other officers at Salonika on June 11th and executed. Others of the arrested, notably the notorious regicide Damian Popovitch, the instigator of many atrocities, were condemned to long terms of imprisonment and very shortly afterwards released. Tankositch was killed early in the war.

When the war was over the object for which these men had plotted and murdered was obtained. The Powers gave all and even more than all the coveted lands to Serbia. And many members of the "Black Hand" survive to carry out their former policy. M. Raditch puts the matter briefly when he says: "Croatia has been plunged from the twentieth century and civilisation into the barbarism of the Middle Ages. A Western and civilised people has been put under an Eastern and barbarous one." All who were once subjects of Austria—Croats, Slovenes, Dalmatians, and the Catholics and Moslems of Bosnia and the Herzegovina—are now subject to just such a military tyranny as we have described.

The Croats, says Raditch, had a local Parliament (*Sabor*) which administered their internal affairs and they expected very shortly the establishment of Trialism within the Empire which would have given them all they wanted. For them the murder of the Archduke was the greatest catastrophe. Nevertheless they hoped and expected that when united with Serbia they would have at least the freedom they had enjoyed hitherto. They had a civilised code of law; courts in which justice could be obtained and a very flourishing University. Their Croatian officials are replaced by Serbs; their civilised code by one that inflicts brutal punishments abolished in Croatia a century ago. Flogging of the severest description is inflicted for even the smallest offences, mercilessly, and men have died under the lash. They are treated not as a "liberated" but as a conquered and annexed people. Justice is non-existent and blackmail frequent. The teaching of the Serbian dialect is enforced in the schools, despite the fact that Croatia, in literature, is far in advance of Serbia. Under Austria the Croats were recognised as a people (*narod*), so were the Slovenes, whose dialect is very different from that of Serbia. The Serbs do not permit the recognition of any such *narod*. "We are not Serbs," said Raditch, "our culture is Western. We are Catholics. The outlook of the Serb and his religion are Byzantine. The Serb tries to 'divide and rule.'"

The Croat is conscripted into the Serb army and taken from Croatia. He is bidden to hold down the Macedonians or the unfortunate Montenegrins and may be flogged to death if he disobeys.

Each of the annexed peoples is used to hold down the others. People are robbed of their lands and Serbs are settled upon them. Of the Karageorge dynasty M. Raditch spoke with the greatest bitterness. They were put on the throne by murder, he says, and by murder they hold it. Nothing has more horrified the Croatian peasant than being bidden to swear fealty to the present King Alexander Karageorgevitch who deposed his grandfather King Nikola of Montenegro, seized and sold his goods, even it is said the carpets of his palace, and usurped his throne. Among the peasants *Djed* (grandfather) is the great man of the family. He sits in the one comfortable chair and is respected and consulted. No peasant can have aught but contempt and horror for the King who has acted so impiously.

Not one Croat member will go to Belgrad to acknowledge the rule of such a man and sit in the Belgrad Parliament. To all the Serbian attempts at forcible Serbianising the Croat presents an unbroken front of passive resistance. "We will not copy the brutal methods of the Serbs. We are opposed to bloodshed and bloody revolution. We were a million times better off under Austria but we are ready to form one of a federated Slav State in which each *narod* has its rights. The Moslems of Bosnia are now throwing in their lot with the Catholic Croats and Dalmatians. Together we outnumber the Orthodox Serbs. The Serbs intended to put an end at once to the Moslem problem by extirpating the Moslems. These Moslems are not Turks. They are Croats whose ancestors became Moslem. They are some of the ancient inhabitants of the land. The Serbs began when they had 'liberated' Bosnia by burning seventy Moslem villages and slaughtering a number of people. It is certain that they mutilated 140 Moslem women. But they found the task of extirpation too great. If they are so much hated how did the Serbs obtain a majority for their Government in the last election? That is simple. They timed the election for the season when the corn supplies in the highlands were all exhausted and the new harvest was not yet due. Then they promised the starving people so much corn for so many votes. The Government waggons of *kukuruz* (maize) went only to the village that voted for the Government. No other corn could be obtained. The wretched people voted to save their lives. In Croatia we had corn enough and our peasants voted against the Government. Twenty thousand of our peasants have been imprisoned, often in heavy chains, and most of those imprisoned have been frightfully flogged. But they will not yield. We ask that violence shall give way to justice; that we may be treated as human beings and not as swine. We drew up a Protocol of our demands and Pashitch sent some Serb delegates to discuss them with us. We came at last to an agreement, and the

Serbs, and we too, signed the Protocol. We believed that the delegates had power to accept the terms. Three months passed and no amelioration took place. We asked Pashitch 'Where is our Protocol?' He replied, 'There is no Protocol.' He and his Government in truth fear the military and dare not go against them."

If Croatia suffers, the people in Macedonia and Montenegro suffer much more. The Montenegrins, who had been independent for years, and who are proud-spirited, resisted, and Montenegro has been devastated. Fifteen per cent. of all the houses of Montenegro have been burnt to the ground by order of the Serbian judges. About one-third of the population is in very bad prisons, and another third lives wild upon the mountains fighting and robbing the Serbs. Of the remaining third many are dead—others are young lads whom the Serbs are training. They appoint a lad of sixteen as governor of a district. The Serb army rules and declares that the local governors are all Montenegrin. The Serbs line the main road with troops whenever they bring a convoy of provisions or ammunition along it. The land which was peaceful and happy and safe for travellers a few years ago is now filled with misery. As for the Macedonians, none of them are Serbs. They are Bulgars and Wallachs and Albanians. "Under the Turk," the peasants say, "Macedonia was a cup of blood. Under the Serb it is an ocean of blood." Under the Turk the Bulgar had his own schools, and very fine ones; his own churches, priests, and Bishops. The schools are closed. The Serb language is enforced. The churches are closed, the priests and Bishops are dead or expelled. Even people's names are turned into Serbian. Death or flogging and prison punish all who resist.

According to figures provided by M. Raditch, out of a population of 11,992,912 in Yugoslavia only 5,554,245 are Orthodox Serbs. The others are Croats, Slovenes, Bulgars, Roumanians, and Albanians, with a few Turks, gypsies, and others. The attempt, therefore, to make a Great Serbia of it with a centralised Government at Belgrad is manifestly unjust. The war which was waged "to liberate small nations" has resulted only in transferring them to a worse *régime*. M. Raditch begs that the Powers who brought about this situation will intervene and make of Yugoslavia a true Yugoslavia, that is, a confederation of the South Slav peoples each working in its own way for the development of Slavdom, free from the grip of a military autocracy. The military power of Serbia has been greatly strengthened by the advent of a considerable part of Wrangel's Russian army, and Cossacks are said to have been playing a part similar to that

they played in the days of the Tsars. That Russians take part in military operations is proved by the fact that some were captured by the Albanians in one of the raids made by Serbs into North Albania—an invasion which brought about the intervention of the League of Nations. Though thwarted on that occasion, the ambitions of the Serb military are not diminished.

One of the most important steps taken by Albania towards gaining complete independence has been that of forming an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania. According to the rules of the Orthodox Church, a group of Orthodox Christians of sufficient size can become self-governing and has the right to conduct all religious services in its own tongue. The Serb, Roumanian, Bulgarian, and other national Churches are all thus autocephalous. The Serb Government has, however, refused to recognise the Albanian Church, and is insisting upon forcing a Serb Bishop into Scutari to protect the interests of the handful of Serb tradesmen in that town and the people of a small village hard by. These, curiously enough, descend for the most part, as they have often told me, from refugees who fled into Turkish territory in former days because "they owed blood," or more recently from persons who crossed the border to escape the Montenegrin police. They have always been permitted to have their own priest and a small Church and school sufficient for their needs. Nor has there been any question of curtailing these rights. As is well known to all students of the Balkans, the advance of a Bishop always means "check to your King"; it is a political step. The Bishop needs an establishment, then a bodyguard. Later he is "insulted," or has "rights," and a *casus belli* can at any time be brought about. The Albanians, protected by the League of Nations from a military advance on the part of Serbia, now see themselves confronted with an ecclesiastical advance which may have sinister consequences, and they refuse to recognise this Bishop.

The best possible solution of the difficulty would be to exchange the small Serb population for some of the many Albanians who are under Serb rule, and so get rid of what can only be "a thorn in the side" of both parties. If this could be effected by the League of Nations a real step towards peace would have been taken. Situated as she is between Greece and the Serbs, both of which wish for Albanian territory, Albania's lot is far from easy. Though there are many points of friction between Greece and Yugoslavia they would undoubtedly agree upon any policy which would facilitate the fulfilment of their respective aspirations in Albania. Thus the news of Albania which is telegraphed from Belgrad and Athens is always of a nature to prevent foreign

capitalists from investing money in Albania. Not long ago it described a great revolution which never took place at all. Serbia in old days suffered thus from the Press of Vienna. Recollections of this, however, have not roused a fellow-feeling and kindness. They have caused her only to adopt Viennese methods.

Reviewing the situation, we are forced to admit that our war "for the rights of small nations" has not been a success. We have created a Yugoslavia and a Greece much greater than either Serb or Greek could have made for himself unaided, and have thereby encouraged the megalomania from which both suffered. Moreover, from the Balkan point of view the success of the Serb is founded upon the success of the murder of the Archduke. It is a bad precedent. If one State can thus fulfil its national aspirations, why not another? Nor can any stability be expected until it is clearly laid down that each Government will be held responsible for the acts of the *komitadji* bands and revolutionary societies whose existence it tolerates and "can repudiate when necessary." The owner of a dangerous dog is responsible for the injury it inflicts. No allowance need in this case be made for the "first bite," for it was bitten long ago. Political murder must be recognised as a crime to be tried by an international Court. The injurer must not be permitted to be his own policeman.

We who remember in 1913 hearing Serb and Montenegrin boast: "If we do not get all we want we shall set all Europe on fire," realise even more strongly than others how unflinchingly the threat was carried out.

M. E. DURHAM.

RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY.

THERE are three ways of approaching and handling the problems concerning Religion and Theology,—the dogmatic, the speculative, and the psychological. The dogmatic method takes as its starting-point the acceptance of a real, or supposed, Revelation,—in the case of the Christian religion the contents of the Bible, with the addition, it may be, of the authoritative interpretations of the Church. This Revelation is treated as the *datum*, which contains and authenticates, either expressly or in principle, all that can be known both of God and of the universe as conditioned and controlled by God. The contents and implications of this Revelation are systematically drawn out, are differentiated from beliefs or opinions derived from other sources, and are supported by reasoning, which moves freely only within the limits fixed for it by authority and tradition. This method, inherited from Judaism, flourished under the Schoolmen, and still prevails in the great volume of Christian literature, both expository and evidential.

Side by side with the dogmatic is the speculative method, of which Greek philosophy in ancient, and the Systems of transcendental Idealism in modern times, have furnished the masterpieces. All these are attempts to reach a reasoned synthesis and interpretation of Reality through the development and combination of certain factors which have been selected by the thinker as determining the nature and meaning of the universe. These factors, however abstract they may appear, have been drawn from the common experience and the common sense of mankind, and have then been clarified by criticism for the purposes of philosophy.

There is, however, a third method, the Psychological, which, in recent times, has made rapid strides alike in acceptance, in resources, and in ambition. Discarding authority and endeavouring to keep clear of speculation, Psychology seeks to furnish a complete description of the characteristic contents of the mind, understanding by the mind both the entire experience of man,—intellectual, affective, and volitional,—and also its manifestations, not only in comparative maturity, but in animal, infantile, and primitive consciousness. The attempt is made not only to furnish a complete analysis of the contents of the mind, but to trace its growth from the humblest beginnings. The instruments of this research are introspection and accurate observation of the behaviour of others, as manifested both by individuals and in societies, not only at the present time, but throughout the past, as recorded in history and embodied in human institutions. Moreover, as Psychology has stooped, under the dominant conception of development, from the ordinary experience of adult minds at the

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present day to the faint dawn and earliest potentialities of mind, so it now essays to soar to the loftiest region. The ideal interests of mankind have come within its range, and especially both the nature and the explanation of Religion have attracted and claimed its attention. In many quarters the description of the characteristics and genesis of mental phenomena has been treated as being a sufficient, or at all events as the only available, explanation of them. Not seldom, also, the humble origin of many of our highest intuitions and aspirations has been used to discredit their value, whether for the enrichment of personal life or for trustworthy guidance as to the nature of the universe in which they have taken their rise. Such aberrations must not, however, be permitted to prejudice us against the importance and fruitfulness of psychological investigation when wisely pursued.

A comparison of the three methods which have been thus briefly described will make certain conclusions clear at the outset. To begin with, while Psychology is narrower in its range and more avowedly subjective than speculation, it may go deeper and may discern valuable material, which has hitherto been ignored but must in future be made use of by speculative thought. In truth, none of the three methods can be kept free from admixture with the others. Any instructed glance at the results of dogmatism and at its source in Revelation will suffice to show that both are permeated with influences that are essentially speculative and psychological, influences that can only be denied these adjectives on the ground that they are casually introduced and not methodically applied. Speculation, also, however abstract and venturesome, has never been clear either of traditional or of psychological elements. Indeed, those who have created speculative systems of thought have recognised, for the most part, that while criticising current beliefs, they were thereby seizing upon their underlying meaning for the purposes of philosophy, and that their chief means of world-explanation were furnished by the characteristic activities and experience of the mind itself. Especially has this been true of British philosophy, for which—as exemplified by Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Reid—the gateway to metaphysics was not primarily the problem of Reality, but that of the sources, material and nature of human knowledge. In the same way, the psychologist, however carefully he may seek to divest his mind of traditional and speculative presuppositions, cannot, in the nature of things, get sufficiently outside himself to be altogether successful in his endeavour. It is still more important to note that while speculation must of necessity lay the main stress upon the intellect,—its presuppositions, postulates and logical processes,—psychology directs its attention in the first instance, and for the most part mainly, upon

the affective side of human nature—its impulses, instincts, emotions and sentiments—as containing if not the secret, yet the spring of mental life. It seeks to ascertain the origin and growth of these affections, tracing them back to their animal beginnings and on to their spiritual fulfilment. It investigates their causes, conditions and demands. It watches the rise of intellect and volition out of the inchoate world of sensations, instincts and impulses. Only subsequently does it proceed to the structure and activity of the intellect and to the intellectual creations which are suggested, fostered, and to the end coloured by the affections and the purposive strivings they arouse.

When the problem of religion is approached from the side of the affections the same question arises as when the task of theoretic and particularly of theological world-explanation is undertaken by the intellect. In both cases the charge of relativity is brought against the competence of the mind to pass beyond the phenomenal order to find the explanation of its origin and nature. In the case of Theology, regarded as an intellectual construction, any attempt to treat human personality as furnishing an analogy for the interpretation of the universe is deemed to be an illegitimate attempt to make man the measure of all things. In the case of the religious sentiment a similar charge is brought that affections, which have a purely mundane explanation and function, have been exaggerated beyond their due measure and permitted to demand the creation of an imaginary object sufficiently high and great to satisfy their inordinate cravings. Within the strictly psychological sphere the question to be decided is whether those cravings are normal and healthy or whether they are excessive and morbid. If the latter view be taken, then the difficulty must be faced that such excessive cravings, if not in their intensest forms, at all events vaguely and spasmodically, have been and still are so general as to be almost universal.

When the frontiers of psychology have been passed the question is reached, How far is the religious sentiment, with all its accompanying affections, a trustworthy guide when it finds the clue to ultimate Reality in God? At the outset, the affections generally and the religious sentiment in particular have to encounter a strong antecedent suspicion. To begin with, they are *our own*, and to many it seems presumptuous to imagine that the subjective experience of man, even at its best, can reveal the nature of the universe of which he is so insignificant a part. Moreover, the higher affections generally and the religious sentiment especially are both variable as between different individuals and extremely fitful even in those cases where they are most markedly active and influential. It is clear also that from time to time they run to excess.

and that here and there they become obviously onesided and even mischievous. They are not infrequently capable of overmastering the intellect and overbalancing the deliberate exercise of the will. They are most dangerous not so much when they dethrone the intellect as when they excite the imagination. Above all, the religious sentiment appears to many to be capable of reduction either to a single element or to a complex of elements, more mundane and secular than itself. For some it arises out of the herd-instinct, with its need of a leader influential enough to control the life and social relations of the mass. For others it is an exaggeration and sublimation of the sex-instinct, demanding an object sufficiently infinite to satisfy the longings of an erotic spirituality. For a yet larger number, it is the composite result of these and of other instincts, including that of self-preservation, which seeks an effective insurance against the real or imaginary dangers that threaten man's mortal existence. Whether, then, the religious sentiment be reducible to a single mundane instinct, or whether it be the complex emotional result of many such instincts, it appears to be an exaggeration, by some deemed practically serviceable, by others pernicious. The Divine object it demands and presents for its satisfaction is considered to be merely the subjective creation of an imagination that is in servitude to the emotions.

Hence a simple alternative is presented to us. Do the affections commission and constrain the intellect, working through the imagination, to provide for them an adequate, yet illusory, object for their satisfaction? Or does a real and Divine object awaken and inspire the affections to demand a veracious and sufficient satisfaction, directing and guiding the intellect to supply it? In other words, does the Divine Reality, God, so constitute the spiritual nature of man, with its emotional, moral and intellectual activity, that his intuitions, growing eventually to reasoned ideas and concepts, are the effect and the trustworthy, though imperfect, reflection of the Reality to which they respond?

In attempting to justify the latter conclusion, it should be borne in mind at the outset that the human mind, working through imagination and reason, must needs be active, and not merely passive, in representing God to itself, however real He may be. And its activity must also, of necessity, be conditioned by its consciousness of personality, with all that developed personality includes. Both religious imagination and theological thought are of necessity anthropomorphic, for we cannot get outside ourselves, and our only means of world-explanation must be found within ourselves, growing in power and completeness as our personality is fashioned in and by means of the world to which we belong. This

limitation, if it be a limitation, is not imposed exclusively upon religion and theology, but is shared, in equal degree, by philosophy and science. However abstract the principles and methods adopted by these latter may be, and however narrowly reduced the scope of their endeavours, it remains true that whatever is accepted, whether as the ultimate, or even as a provisional explanation of the universe, or is adopted as the instrument by which such an explanation may be reached, is supplied by our own experience and abstracted from the complete content of our own personality. Whether the terms selected be substance and attributes, force and matter, energy and inertia, or any later refinements upon these, they are all demonstrably derived from our own subjective consciousness and then projected into the universe as the means by which we represent it to ourselves. All the conceptions by which we seek to interpret the universe, whether theological, metaphysical, or scientific, are equally anthropomorphic, and, therefore, all stand in need of searching criticism before their results should be accepted. The only question is whether the more complete and highly elaborated contents of conscious personality, in particular the values which it has eventually apprehended, are more or are less trustworthy as guides to the explanation of reality than the more rudimentary and, from the standpoint of personal worth, the lower elements of our conscious experience.

If these considerations be true of man's intellectual activity and its creations, they are equally applicable to his affections and their demands. These are no more to be discredited because they are our own than are the intellect and the concepts, whether higher or lower, that it selects for their theoretic purposes. Indeed, since these affections have been factors in the universal and normal development of mankind they may reasonably claim that the universe has supplied, awakened and moulded them, that they have had and still have a vital end to serve, and that therefore they are in correspondence with the nature of the universe out of which they spring. And this not least of all in the case of those highest affections by which the worth of man is estimated, and by the prevalence of which his progress can alone be achieved.

If this be conceded, we may come on to deal with the contention that because the religious sentiment does not exist as a separate faculty of the human mind, because it is either composite in its nature or the extension and sublimation of more mundane affections, it is therefore to be discounted, and the constructions it has either inspired or coloured are to be discredited as illusory.

In approaching this subject the following preliminary considerations should be borne in mind.

1. A complex object must needs evoke a complex affection.

2. Still more must this be so if this complex object has the function of organising and unifying other simpler and lower objects, with the affections they call out.

3. Since man, as both a living and also a spiritual being, can only be explained in terms of development, therefore the key to the meaning of his subjective life in its full range is to be sought above all in its maturity and not in its beginnings. His spiritual life reveals a hierarchy, of which each higher term is sovereign over what is beneath it, and exercises this sovereignty not by external control, but through the mutual immanence of all the terms.

4. Hence the higher consciousness of man must needs spring out of, appropriate and elevate for spiritual uses its more rudimentary stages and activities.

5. And, finally, however complex may be the mental affections and activities that respond to an object, and whatever may have been their genesis, they have a unity, as corresponding with their object, that defies all mechanical and chemical resolution.

If we reflect upon the awakening and growth of subjective life in the infant, it at once becomes apparent that its original world is its mother, with the confused background of stationary and moving objects that lies about her. The mother's presence or absence, her position and movements in the dim world that surrounds them is the first concern of the child. As the mother moves about the child gradually comes to distinguish her from its own body, from other people, whose appearance and behaviour are in many respects like her own, and from the impersonal world beyond. All this is inchoate and only gradually revealed to the consciousness of the child, assisted by its first sensations and spontaneous movements. It means, however, that slowly and imperfectly the child comes to distinguish between itself and its world, that its world to begin with consists chiefly of its mother, and that its experience is mainly determined by its mother's behaviour to it. In other words, the fact of personality is the first that dawns upon the child, the personality of its mother, and then the growing apprehension of the mother's personality leads the child to the gradual discovery of its own. The instincts of the child, however primitive, can only come into full play as they assist in and are directed by this growing apprehension of an objective, personal, and purposive world to which they are related and by which their needs may be met. This dawning consciousness, involving the gradual perception of identity and difference must take precedence, even at the instinctive and impulsive stage of life. The experience of personality is the earliest and the dominant factor in the child's discovery of the world. It establishes itself at the outset, as it will claim to be till

the end, as the highest and most important reality of which the mind can take account.

Side by side with the growth of apprehension the power to fix attention upon and to gain possession of objects that begin to seem desirable arises out of mere attraction and spontaneous movements, with their hits and misses. Then as this preliminary equipment becomes complete, the full activity of primitive instincts and impulses becomes possible within the framework of an objective world, however narrowly bounded, dimly discerned, and imperfectly commanded. All these instincts and impulses are in correspondence with reality in the sense that they minister to the primitive needs of the child or to the growing demands that mark and further its development. As these demands increase, their satisfaction depends upon the ever fuller activity of intellectual and conative powers, the presence of which, in rudimentary promise from the beginning, has been essential to the original discovery of the child's world. Henceforward, the growth of intellect, emotions, affections and will goes forward, not only enlarging and enriching the realm of consciousness, but also profoundly modifying the instinctive life that lies behind and beneath them. These higher and more mature activities are as truly in correspondence with reality as the lower and more primitive. Indeed, the fact that human life can only come to its mature development by means of their ascendancy goes to show that they get nearer to the heart of the universe than do any lower manifestations of conscious life.

The primitive instincts, however they may be enumerated, fall under one or other of two heads. Some are preservative of the individual; the rest satisfy the need of commerce with the external world of persons and things. Each class acts with and reacts upon the other. The preservative instincts, as they call out ever-increasing intellectual, emotional and volitional activity, go to build up the individuality of the adult. The other instincts,—including those of sex, and of the herd—when similarly calling the higher activities into play, develop the social side of personality. The former differentiate personal life from the outlying world of persons and things, reducing these latter to mere means of satisfying self-centred demands. The social instincts, on the contrary, tend to identify the individual with the world to which he belongs. In some cases the individual interests of life predominate; in others the social. In the former the social instincts are, in varying degrees, annexed and subordinated to the demands of self-preservation and self-aggrandisement. In the latter, the self-regarding instincts of life are subdued to the service of the social. When this happens, not only the demands of self-preservation, but the sense of individuality itself, may become almost submerged in the expan-

sive feeling of unity with mankind, or even with the universe. A due balance between the two is required, and is hard to find, still harder to maintain. And this because, according to religion, both of these tendencies, whether severally or together, are incomplete. As personality grows and as the values in which its highest life consists become apparent and influential, there comes, in varying degrees of clearness and intensity, the revelation of a Super-personality, in Whom the incomplete personality of finite individuals is seen to have its perfect Archetype and Source, and by Whose influence the individual and the social elements of life are unified on a higher level of human personality. This Super-personality, Who orders and sublimates that He may satisfy all human affections, is also the highest term by which the universe, with the spiritual values that become manifest in it, is explained. All lower principles of more partial explanation are true, yet inadequate, abstractions from this complete and all-embracing Reality. And this Super-personality is God.

Now let it be carefully observed that, on this showing, *the universe is within God's life*. He creates, or constitutes, and organises the entire system of human and extra-human relationships which make up the realm of human experience. And these relationships are not an external and rigid framework into which life is inserted and in which it is immured, but an environment with which we are organically united through the play of activities,—instinctive and deliberate, emotional and intellectual—which differentiate us within the universe, while they establish intercourse between us and it. If this be the relation of God to the universe and of the universe to man, then it becomes clear that the religious response to God, while it transcends all other affections, must needs include and utilise them all. The organ of God-consciousness and of response to Him can no more be isolated and self-enclosed than God is separated from and outside the universe, of which He is Source, Life and Law. Since He is not one object among many, but the spiritual and supreme Reality Who constitutes all objects, it follows that the religious response to Him will bring into its fullest expression vital contributions that are supplied by all the instincts and activities He has constituted, and that, by this response, all these will be sublimated by being raised to the highest use. Inevitably, therefore, the mind from time to time projects, either naïvely or with caution, images suggested by these instincts and affections as occasional and partial representations of a Divine relationship which may, in a sense, include, but certainly transcends and transforms them all. While it is absurd to explain religion by means of any, or all, the primitive instincts and affections of human nature, equally is it irrational and irreverent to deny to them their

part in that complete offering by which man, as finite spirit, acknowledges and returns to his Source.

St. Paul gives the key of Christian philosophy to the explanation of the religious sentiment and its relation to all other affections when he speaks of "The Father, after Whom every Fatherhood [literally, every family constituted by fatherhood] is named" (Ephesians iii. 14, 15). By this statement he means something vastly more important than the triviality that *Patria* (πατρίδα) is etymologically derived from *Pater* (πατήρ). In Jewish use the Name stands for the nature of the thing that is named. Hence St. Paul means that, in creating, the Divine Father goes out to constitute, in terms of His own life and love, the relationships by which human life is fashioned and maintained. This implies, not merely that the framework of human relations is patterned after the Divine Reality, but that the affections which create and fulfil these relations are, so to speak, the creative overflow of the Divine perfection. Furthermore, if with St. Paul we understand that the Fatherhood of God means that He goes forth, in self-giving, to constitute all things and all relationships in and through love, then two consequences must needs follow from this fact. Firstly, the religious response to God must take up into itself and sublimate all the varied enrichment that love has gained through the earthly relationships that have been thus constituted by God. And, secondly, in so doing religion will unify the whole experience of human relationships by assuming and consecrating to God all the affections that this experience has awakened and developed.

The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that a grave mistake is made when the religious sentiment is treated as the exaggerated and illusory extension either of any single mundane instinct or affection, or of any combination of these. Certain onesided and morbid expressions of religious sentiment have undoubtedly provided an excuse for such mistakes, but, in spite of such excuse, they are absurd. What we should rather say is that all these lower affections *as experienced* are partial manifestations of, and *as intellectually represented* are abstractions from, a spiritual potentiality which, though undeveloped at the outset, contains within itself the promise of the religious sentiment. When ultimately this sentiment has been developed it gains the power, not only of transcending the whole content of human affections from which it has become differentiated, but of returning to control and organise into a higher unity all the affective elements which for the ordinary purposes of human life have been drawn off from the central stream of spiritual life. The meaning of human life, therefore, is not to be found either in its confused and inchoate beginnings, or in any or all of the instincts and affections which are subsequently attracted by

particular objects and applied to the preservation, or enlargement, of mundane existence. It must be found, rather, in that which, emerging last, establishes a sovereignty over the whole, by reason of the values it reveals and of their influence in ordering and advancing human life as a whole. In other words, both human life and the universe must be interpreted in terms of the highest and not the lowest that is revealed in and to men. The highest in the universe—God—transcends, but is immanent in, all things. Religion responds to Him by finding fellowship with the highest values and taking all lower affections up into itself. Thereby it proclaims itself as the highest term in human development. Hence God, as the highest Reality, and religion, as the highest sentiment, authenticate one another, and are at one in the ordering and advancement of human life in all its interests and concerns.

In conclusion, man's progress has been achieved and his welfare depends upon the growing apprehension of the ideal values—Truth, Beauty, Goodness and Holiness. Wherever this growing apprehension exists these values take the entire realm of human nature,—its instincts and affections, its intellectual activities and its volitional strivings,—into their charge and transform them for service to the highest ends of life. Man does not create these values; he discovers them, or rather they are gradually disclosed to him. At present they are but dimly apprehended and their promise is inexhaustible. Yet they exist only as they are realised in personalities. What shall we conclude from the fact that they are thus *given* to us, that they claim authority and take command over us, that they unfold to us an infinite promise, and that they bring satisfaction to us by unifying and ordering all the strivings of our being? Surely that though they are so imperfectly apprehended by us they are realised in God, that they reveal to us, in growing fullness, His Divine perfection, and that His condescension in sharing them with us enables us to say with assurance that God is Love.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

SPAIN AND ITS PROBLEMS.

THAT the catastrophes which have overwhelmed so great a portion of Europe and of the whole world should have no considerable reverberation in Spain would in the nature of things be improbable. In his book on the origins of the war, Mr. Asquith recalls in how great a tension was the world up to August, 1914: the tension of those whom at any moment some dramatic event might cause to be plunged into the whirlpool. "Imus, imus, præcipites." The plunge into the floods came. The greater portion of the globe was affected directly, and *all* of it either directly or indirectly. Even after the formal conclusion of open warfare, the state of the world is such that one of our most famous public men may well ask, "Is it peace?" In such a series of calamities, it would indeed be strange if any part of Europe were to remain without some great change of circumstances.

Spain, it is true, is in several ways singularly placed as regards the rest of Europe. Geographically it has a large measure of isolation. Racially it has a marked degree of differentiation from the rest of the Continent. Its historical traditions tend to conservatism, favoured by a religious uniformity probably not to be found in any other part of Europe. The fact nevertheless remains that a series of events, affecting the whole world, could not logically leave unaffected even a country the most conservative in itself and which had preserved a strict neutrality in the time of the armed conflicts. It is very true—as Fernán de Rojas said in *La Celestina*:—"Vale más una migaja de pan con paz, que toda la casa llena de viandras con rencilla." Yet, if it so happens that, on all sides of the house in which one lives, the other houses are on fire, it will be strange if the interior of one's own house does not become heated! Moreover, one thing is perfectly clear in regard to Spain: for a considerable time it has had grave problems, crying for solution, which were bound soon to come to a crisis. Consider the dramatic events of a large part of the last hundred years in Spain since, or immediately leading up to, the Decree of October 9th, 1824, and Chaperon's "Commission of Madrid": the "serial revolution" following the iron hand of "Ferdinand the Desired"; the French invasion; the rise of Carlism; the turbulent period of the regency of Doña Cristina; the rebellion of 1868; the *régime* of General Prim ("the hero with too easy a conscience"); Amadeo's reign and the transient Republic; the dictatorship of Serrano; the election of Alfonso XII.; the regency of Maria Cristina; the American and Moorish wars. Even under the guidance of so able and popular a King as is Alfonso XIII.,

it was inevitable that, from so stormy a century, the present time would receive a heritage of grave social questions.

There is, of course, the ever-recurring problem of reconciling the unity of Spain, as a whole, with the marked diversity of some of its parts. The political ascendancy of Madrid can never obscure, in the eyes of the student, the pronounced distinctions between, for example, the Aragonese and the Castilians, the Andalusians, Valencians, and Murcians, and especially the Basque provinces and Catalonia. Let it be remembered always that Andalusia and Valencia were dominated by the overlords of Islam for five centuries, and that this resulted in a permanent modification of race; whereas nothing in any way comparable with that occurred in the North of the peninsula. As regards Catalonia the Moorish conquest in 712 was dispossessed in 788; but the history of the province has its own marked factors tending to differentiation from the rest of Spain. Ruled after the expulsion of the Moors by French counts, it later became annexed to Aragon by the marriage of Count Raymond Berenger IV. of Barcelona with Petronilla of Aragon. The annexation, however, was anything but secure. As late as 1640 Catalonia united with France under Louis XIII. Restored to Spain in 1659 it was, however, under French occupation again between 1694 and 1697. Again under the control of Madrid it was deprived of the "constitutional guarantees" in 1714; was held by the French from 1808 until 1813; was plunged into civil war in 1823; and is at all times what, up till 1921, we might aptly call the "Irish problem" of Spain. This also is the inevitable product of that which historically has gone before! It must be remembered also, of course, that, though Catalonia is much less fertile than Castile, yet it is superior to any other part of the peninsula in manufactures.

The dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which has now dominated the political situation in Spain, is confessedly aimed primarily at the defects arising from political corruption and the faulty working of the governmental machine in general. This, of course, is a matter which it is easy to misunderstand, and about which nothing is more easy than for foreign observers to assume an air of self-righteousness. Yet, after allowing liberally for the effects of "the limitations of the exterior view," the broad facts as to the corruption which prevailed in Spanish politics will hardly be denied: for example the system of the *rotativistas*. For a long series of years there was a tacit understanding by which the Liberal and Conservative parties shared the prizes of office alternately; so that Major Martin Hume was probably hardly exaggerating to any great degree when he said (in *Modern Spain*, p. 531), "Dishonest Governments are faced, in sham battles, by dishonest Oppositions,

and parliamentary institutions, instead of being a public check upon abuses, are simply a mask." The system of the franchise, nominally free and wide, was, in practice, largely nullified by the influence of the *caciques*. To quote Mr. Rafael Shaw (*Spain from Within*, p. 230), who expresses in vivid words a fact of the first importance which impressed all thoughtful observers: "In every small town or rural district there is a person known as the *cacique*, usually a large employer of labour or a moneylender, to whom most of the working population of the district look for employment, or in whose debt they are. . . . Thus the *cacique*, whether as employer or moneylender or both, has the majority of the constituency under his thumb. He receives his instructions from Madrid and issues his orders accordingly." Such a system, though of course by no means infallible in its results, had unfortunately reached a considerable degree of perfection in promoting the due working of that harmful "rotativist" system against which the de Rivera stroke is primarily directed. Its evil tendency was to produce a degree of corruption altogether opposed to the satisfactory solution of the grave difficulties facing Spain and affecting her social and political future.

Nevertheless, some efficient dealing with those difficulties has for years been increasingly urgent and, if there had not been a revolt from the Right, there would probably have been a revolt from the Left. There was, for instance, the Barcelona rising of July, 1909. The revolutionary mob, after assailing the churches, convents, and other buildings of the city, spread ferment throughout the whole province of Catalonia. Before its suppression was accomplished, there were three days' street-battles in Barcelona, martial law over all Spain, a military "white terror," and the shooting of Señor Francisco Ferrer. In 1910, again, was the quarrel of Canalejas with the Vatican on the subject of that Premier's "Law of the Padlock" (*Ley de Cadenas*) in regard to the monastic Orders. The repercussions of the Portuguese Revolution; the effects (great notwithstanding Spain's neutrality) of the European War; the results of the Morocco fiascos: all these also conspired to produce a position of affairs which might probably ere now have resulted in a "Left" revolution but for the stabilising effect of the popularity of the wearer of the Crown.

The above administrative problems of politics are much akin to the questions of Socialism and other forms of propaganda arising from the distribution of wealth. Spain is potentially very rich in iron, lead, copper, &c.; but not only are her resources backward in development, but much of that development is controlled by foreign capital and even by foreign officials. Nevertheless, the European War certainly stimulated Spanish manufactures very

largely; and (as is always the case when that takes place in any country) the popular realisation of the "unequal distribution of wealth" became more vivid. Moreover—even apart from such natural effects of world events—the financial and hence the general social state of Spain has still to recover completely from the effects of the Hispano-American War and the loss of the colonies. The bondholders, it is true, were made to suffer more than any other class of taxpayers in Villaverde's financial reorganisation; but the effects of national defeat in a war, loss of prestige and territory, and piling up of debt, are not easily or soon outlived, even when the war was on the scale of the pre-1914 era. Socialist agitation in Spain is, in the main, akin in causes and aims to that of other countries; but in Spain the "monastic orders" comprise a factor peculiar, in its economic and political bearing, to that country.

Problems connected with religion wear an aspect altogether different in the eyes of the Spaniards from that which they have in the perception of a Protestant people like this nation of the English. No Englishman will estimate such problems accurately, in their relation to the political affairs of Spain, save by seeing them through "Spanish eyes." Not, of course, that there is no universal principle of right or justice! Of course, there is! But particular factors have to be taken into account in estimating particular cases. The fundamental religious fact in Spain is that Christianity, of the Catholic type in its Latin development, is *national* in Spain—national, not in the sense of a numerical majority merely, but of being ingrown to the very fibre of the race. It is the only form of Christianity which has developed in Spain at all to any appreciable extent; it is associated with the centuries-long resistance to the Moors, and with the glories of Spanish chivalry; it was—to look at it on the darker side—driven even deeper into the national consciousness by the relentless eviction of all contrary elements at the time of the expulsion of the Jews and the Moriscos, and by the grim workings of the Spanish Inquisition. In dealing with Roman Catholicism in Spain, therefore, one has to realise from the very beginning that one is treating of a basic element of the national character. That the whole population, or even the immense majority of it, actually practises all the rules of the Roman Catholic religion would be a hard thing to say. Mr. Rafael Shaw wrote evidently with a strong bias against clericalism; and one must allow for that in quoting his estimate. Probably, however, there is a major portion of accurate observation in his remark (*Spain from Within*, p. 39) that "small though is the attendance of the working classes at Mass, and hostile though they are to the practice of confession, they are none the less deeply religious—firm believers in the efficacy of

prayer, and loyal to the fundamental tenets of their faith, such as dependence on the will of God, gratitude for small mercies vouchsafed by a good Providence, and devotion to the Virgin and the Saints." In short, Catholicism, in its Latin form, is a vital part of Spanish life; and, when we come to consider religious problems in their relation to practical politics, we must always view matters in the light of that governing fact.

There are, however, certainly some serious difficulties in regard to the actual working of the Spanish laws with regard to religion. Those laws depend not merely on the position of Roman Catholicism as the established religion of the State, but also on the existence of a definite *concordat* with the Vatican. Religious affairs are governed, even in details, by that *concordat*. As, however, the modification of a *concordat*—like the alteration of any other contract—presupposes the assent not of one party only, but of both parties who entered into that agreement, then it follows that no Spanish Government is able to change even the civil laws affecting religion except it has first obtained the consent of the Vatican, or else is prepared to face a bitter religious conflict. This all-important fact has been illustrated several times. The most recent instance took place in the summer of the present year. It resembles, however, a dispute of 1910 (the same time as the controversy over the "Padlock Law"). The eleventh article of the Spanish constitution guarantees the "free exercise" of all religions in Spain. It provides, however, that there may be allowed no "external signs or public manifestations of any religious confessions except that of the State": *i.e.*, Roman Catholicism. The result is that, though any person in Spain may, so far as legality goes, follow any religion which he chooses, yet he may practise it only in privacy. No dissident church buildings are allowable if they be such as may be recognised as of that nature from outside: not even a notice may be posted on a door to tell of services of a non-Catholic type being held; and, of course, public dissident preaching is illegal. The Speech from the Throne, June 16th, 1910, announced, however, an intention on the part of the Government under Señor Canalejas to "give the full sense of its text" to the eleventh article of the constitution: *i.e.*, to modify the restraint of dissident cults. A threat of severance of diplomatic relations by the Vatican, and a drastic campaign, antagonistic to the Canalejas proposals, on the part of the Spanish clergy, caused those proposals to be defeated. Just before the General Election of August, 1923, however, the question was revived. The Liberal Government announced an intention of dealing with this question of religious liberty in a way not dissimilar to that formerly proposed by Canalejas. A strong protest, however, came from the

bishops, who, indeed, suggested that were such an intention proceeded with it would be their duty to declare it sinful for any Catholic to vote for a candidate who supported it. Though, therefore, the Liberal Government was returned to power it first abandoned the obnoxious proposal.

Nevertheless, in view of general progress and developments in the world at large, it seems plain that the position is one pressing for a solution in conformity with that progress and development. It cannot be doubted, however, that the immediate cause of the present breakdown of things political in Spain, and of the setting up of a dictatorship, is to be found in the Riff calamities. Those disasters were "the last straw." Any military campaign in the Riff country would be a grave task! A rugged land; a torrid and exhausting climate; a pure Berber race, of fierce valour; it is not a light project, that of subduing the Riff territory! The problem of the Spanish war in Morocco, however, is one inextricably intertwined with that "secret diplomacy" of which so much is heard as connected with the events leading up to the present state of Europe in general.

Up to 1900, Spanish possessions on the Mediterranean coast of Africa consisted of Ceuta, Melilla, el Penon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas, and the Zaffarinas islands; while, on the Atlantic coast, she obtained from the Sultan of Morocco the settlement (a former Spanish possession) of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña. Between 1900 and 1903, however, were the Delcassé attempts to partition Morocco. To Spain was to be "partitioned" North Central Morocco (including Fez and Taza) and the North Atlantic littoral. In December, 1902, however, the Government under Señor Sagasta resigned, and that Premier's successor, Señor Silvela, declined to proceed with the project. There was, however, a Franco-Spanish Convention in the autumn of 1904 defining the limits, both as to place and time, of the signatory Governments' spheres of action in Morocco: such action of course including military operations. The whole history of the Moroccan *imbroglio* is a maze of largely vain arrangements between France, Spain, Germany, and England: at times, of arrangements of some of these unknown to the others. To Spain, however, the eventual result now is that she finds herself saddled with a very serious campaign against the Riffs. On July 24th, 1921, the Spanish troops sustained a disaster: killed, wounded, and missing amounting to thousands. The commander, General Silvestre, committed suicide. The troops fell back to Melilla. Although operations were resumed later, no appreciable progress was made; indeed, representatives of the Riffs now demand the formal recognition of

the Riff Republic. Such was the position of affairs when General Primo de Rivera established the Spanish dictatorship.

It has well been said that, if Spain persists in the policy of subduing the Riff country, "she has before her in Africa a task quite as formidable as that which faced Britain in the same continent twenty-four years ago." Although, however, the modern causes of the Spanish commitments in Morocco may be traced to diplomatic negotiations such as those referred to above, the problem in her case is affected by a factor absent in the cases of the other countries who were parties to such negotiations. That factor is the traditional association of the Moorish wars with the greatest events of Spanish history. For centuries the Moorish power dominated the very territory of Spain itself. That association calls up to the patriotic Spanish mind the chivalry of the Cid, the wars of the *soldados de la Cruz de Cristo*, when, in the words of the *Poem of the Cid*:—

"Los Moros llaman Mafomet,
Los Cristianos Sanct Yague."

Absolute abandonment of a war against a Moroccan adversary, therefore—and that abandonment after a humiliating defeat—would, in Spanish eyes, be possible only as a sheer necessity. Nevertheless, military glory or prestige is only one factor in the case; and the others may constitute the necessity referred to. A veil of censorship hides the present position of affairs. If General Primo de Rivera's *régime* seriously proceeds with the programme of the definite subjugation of the Riffs, the gravity and dubious prospects of such a task will need all the valour and determination of the Spanish character to consummate it. It may be, however, that, after certain military demonstrations, a compromise will be reached. The prospects are extremely obscure in any event.

How will the dictatorship of General de Rivera work out? It will be seen that its task is sufficiently difficult. The natural diversities of the country; the strong anti-Spanish movement in Catalonia; the evil legacy of political corruption; the social unrest inevitably increased during and after the European War; the difficulties in regard to religious liberty; the Moroccan problem with its terrible dilemma, as to which the choice is merely which horn is the worse: all these elements constitute a grave task indeed for any men to face! To our English eyes—merely those of lookers-on—the aspect which first strikes us in the de Rivera policy is its "repressive" acts: heavy control of the Press; restraint of criticism; repression of Catalonian propaganda. This wears the aspect of tyranny; but the very nature of a dictatorship is to be a tyranny. Its very nature also, however, is to be temporary. It

assumes control in times of national emergency; guides the nation until that emergency is passed; and the normal life of the country is resumed—perhaps in an invigorated form—thereafter. If this be, as, in fact, is declared, the course to be followed by the *régime* of the Marquis de Estella, then the policy will be judged and justified by its success. If, however (which cannot be supposed to be the case), it is a “white revolution” which has taken place, then—especially if it is committed to a Moroccan war—its failure would seem certain. Still, everything tends to indicate that it may be a cleaning of those Augean stables which most surely did need cleaning. If the corruption of the *rotativistas* be put an end to; if the Moroccan affair be adjusted; if some of the more glaring grievances of the working classes be remedied; then the de Rivera *régime*—provided it does not seek to make itself permanent after those tasks are done—will have deserved well of Spain. In relying largely on that admirable force, the Civil Guard, a method is adopted which, if force is indeed to rule, no one who knows Spain will say it is unwise. That body is officered with great care from the regular army; it is a kind of military police—not, however, engaging in ordinary police duties, but reserved for emergencies or special duties. They stamped out brigandage in the South of Spain, and they are incorruptible and efficient. If a *régime* of force is indeed necessary, the *Guardia Civil* is the best instrument upon which to rely. No lover of Spain, however, but will say it is a grievous pity a *régime* of mere force is needed at all; and the sooner that requirement passes the better.

Characteristic features of the Spanish character are its indomitability and its patience. It has never been subdued; yet it can bide its time. The latter of these characteristics, perhaps, has been cultivated—or has seemed to have been—to exaggeration of late years! A country so glorious and so hardy as is Spain, however, cannot but have a high destiny. If the defects of the political machine be remedied; if the unequal distribution of wealth be ameliorated; if religious liberty be increased, so that Article XI. seems less equivocal—then a mighty advance will have been made. In a land not so given over to the fever of the “factory system” as are some others, such an advance, indeed, might be made that Spain could be the happiest country in Europe. This, however, requires caution and yet idealism; progress and yet stability; liberality of mind and yet not rashness. Man is a fallible creature at his best! We can only look on at Spain with hope and sympathy; and, while remembering Scylla and Charybdis, yet remember also that Jason and his Argonauts managed so to steer and sail as to avoid them both!

J. W. POYNTER.

OLD AGE: REDEEMED AND UNREDEEMED

A FEW years ago many men felt aggrieved because opportunities for active service were denied to those over fifty-five years of age. But as the war proceeded most people had to admit that the line had been drawn correctly, and that more was lost than gained when zeal was allowed to compensate for excess of years. Yet it is obvious that important sections of the world's work are performed by men past active service. It is evident that age can contribute qualities of value to society which in certain circumstances are of more worth than at other times. And it is equally evident that these contributions can come from select and disciplined characters only. When age means nothing but the weakness which issues in irascibility, obstinacy, and tiresome blindness to the needs of the moment, there is nothing which age can helpfully tender to the common stock of ideas and emotions. But age may have a strength of its own just because weakness has subdued impulses and appetites, and experience has revealed the advantages which such weakness may bestow on the conduct of human affairs. Above all, age may cherish ideals purified from all that has proved disappointing in the aims of lusty life, ideals which are superior to the lures displayed by a great love, a great avarice, or a great fanaticism. It may make a speciality of that part of human existence which lies outside the struggle for life.

Our lot is cast in times when every circumstance conspires to help us to live up to and beyond the limit of three-score years and ten if we think it worth while to take the proper precautions. But no help has been given us to determine whether the enterprise is worth while. All that we can see for ourselves is that the world around us seems to have less use for the old than it ever had since the introduction of false teeth and spectacles. The inference is that old people are likely to be in the way of the two generations following them. And thus we arrive at a presumption that old age is not worth aiming at, and if chanced upon cannot be put to any desirable service. If this were all that could be said on the matter we should do well to use our false teeth for the purpose which a distinguished physician of an earlier generation characterised as “digging our graves” with them, and wallow in good living in self-defence. Yet it would be strange if this end of life were as simple as that, compared with the other end of life now studied and celebrated as being of incredible complexity. Some of the zeal being devoted to infancy and childhood might well be transferred to the years for which youth should have

made preparation. This is the more to be desired because everyone has been young once, though some have been younger than others, and the subject-matter is abundant, while hitherto only few have reached old age and provided us with manageable data.

Moreover it has to be admitted that, while youth looks more attractive the better we contemplate it and treat it, old age is in many ways repulsive and tiresome even to the old themselves. Vanity, a fine antiseptic quality through the greater part of life, is liable to develop into a devastating vice during the years when average individuals have no longer anything to be vain about. Probably vanity is the source of all the tiresome foibles of the old. This is well known to those scheming to influence the aged, but the peculiarity must be acknowledged and allowed for in any attempt to find a purpose and an ambition for declining years. And, indeed, we may be sure that our success will be small unless our efforts result in well-nigh cancelling out the vice in the course of building up the personality as the attributes of vigorous life weaken or fall away.

There are two ways of regarding every phase of human life. One is directed towards making the best of what exists, the way that tries to redeem it from all that would otherwise prove evil. The other is directed towards explicating what is involved in particular developments, tracing connection with what has gone before and must be accepted as inevitable. This way teaches us to treat with understanding, patience, and charity, peculiarities which otherwise would be deemed vexatious if not criminal. This is the way of the anthropological point of view. It is especially valuable in dealing with old age. As the vesture of recently-acquired virtues and pudencies falls away with the decay of life, the qualities rooted in the far past come more nakedly into operation, and remind us unpleasantly of the time when our ancestors could only survive and hand on to us the torch of life by dint of a strenuous, brutish selfishness which now masquerades under the guises of vindictiveness, jealousy, envy and avarice, most frequently sublimated in the passion of vanity. In many cases the connection with the far past is still more evident. We know that some of our ancestors must have spent a long period as troglodytes, and we see many of our aged folk instinctively reverting to that manner of life in their efforts at self-protection. On the other hand, we know that some tribes of our forefathers survived by wandering about the open steppes of the world, and thus we may occasionally meet the old keeping themselves alive by restlessly moving from one place to another, and patently gratified by a sense of exposure. This point of view must be recognised along with that concerned only with the way of

redemption, if misunderstanding of the subject-matter is to be avoided.

The nightmare haunting our newest age is the struggle for life which now appears cruel and ruthless to a degree undreamt of in the last century. For this struggle we would train our youth, because we fear that unless we do there will be no youth left to us. But so much the more keenly do we feel that our moral ideals should be lifted out of the zone dominated by the struggle for life. And thus we come to all those lamentations and despairs which cry for a change of heart. In short, we have to train our executive abilities on the principles of the struggle for life while we ardently desire to cultivate an ethos which should be superior to the ugly discipline and offer to men ideals mild, loving and beautiful, that never yet conquered a supply of food or established a state of freedom. Up to the present those ages of man necessarily occupied by the struggle for life have perforce rendered but poor contributions to the higher ideals. In a state of war there is little opportunity for pacifists. But the last age of man, also necessarily withdrawn from the struggle for life, should afford opportunity for cultivating that more beneficent ethos for which we are all longing. Those who have retired from the struggle should be admonished to forget the fighting rules that served them so well, and to cast about for an attitude towards life which may brighten with hope the strivings of those still deep in the conflict, and offer examples of serene and simple living that hitherto have attracted men only in their visions of heaven beyond the grave. This is no light task to charge on our declining years, for it demands a radical katharsis of character grown stiff and obstinate during a lifetime of conflict. And no one could hope to effect the change as long as the vanity of old age is allowed to endure.

But as soon as it becomes the fashion to subject the pretensions and vanity of old age to drastic criticism, and to point out, what is already implicit in the mind of the active world, that mere ageing in the old ruts and grooves is indefensible and inconsistent with public policy and personal respect—when the sixties are reached in an atmosphere of this kind, it is more than probable that the seniors of society will naturally accept the inspiring view that so far from losing grip on life they are about to enter on a new and stimulating stage of their intercourse with their fellow men and a blessed career for their own souls. In the ages of faith there seemed nothing odd for one distinguished by length of years to become deliberately as a little child and to retire from the rough experiences of secular life to contemplation of spiritual matters. In an age of knowledge our combative grand old men will seem to be monsters to be classed

with the great extinct saurians. Though monastic orders would fail to meet the requirements of our ancients when vows and discipline are alike unpalatable, modern conditions of intercourse make possible a community of sentiment and purpose among individuals scattered about the hearths of the country which should be better informed and more active for good than the most pious exercises and prayers in the cloister and the chapel. All that is necessary is discussion among those qualified by length of years to open up aims and methods that age can practise and youth can know, in far distant retirement from that demoralising region where men used to sigh: "Si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse pouvait!"

Men also used to think that, to exert influence, effort of will, struggle, and disputation, were needed, all of them unbecoming to the rank and quality of age. But lately there has been made explicit a truth, long hidden in the psychology of prayer and thanksgiving, which Coué, the prophet of the New Nancy School of Psycho-therapeutics, has expressed in the dictum, "in a conflict between the imagination and the will, the imagination always wins." Hence it is practicable for persons, grown incapable of strong will and effort, to exert great influence on their unconscious minds by suggestion working without effort. Hence a policy for the old to aim at can be formulated by the ordinary means of discussion; and when this has been decided upon it can be adopted into the life and mentality of the order of ancients by the methods of auto-suggestion, till society is permeated by a leaven of old persons determined to cherish a more mild and gracious attitude to the conditions of life than was ever possible to them when they had to deal with those conditions as protagonists of strife and competition.

This will be no easy achievement. The habits of a lifetime are not to be transformed without long and devoted contemplation of better possibilities. In only exceptional cases does harsh experience convince the mind that selfish striving defeats its own purpose. As a rule, habit blinds our perceptions, and will yield its position only to persistent attack by fresh and strong reinforcements. Such reconditioning of the self should be the aspiration of everyone advancing towards old age, and it will occupy all the powers peculiar to the old as long as life continues. We cannot hope to attain the rapid results which auto-suggestion is represented to produce in physiological therapeutics. No social amelioration could be so prompt. And the one example which we possess of an exceptional spirit suggesting to his self by repetition through twelve books of self-communings till, as old age was well-nigh attained, the highest point of human virtue was reached, this one example breaks off just as the life of soldier and imperator was

coming to an end and before the years when saint and sage should have had the throne of the world to themselves.

Much as we can learn from the anxious reflections of Marcus Aurelius, it is as nothing compared with what we should have learnt if that devout personality had been permitted to live into old age as the head of the civilised world and shown it how, after the Empire had been made safe from external attack, the principles of love and forgiveness could be applied to a world ready as never before to welcome a preacher and a saviour. But the saint died, and his pontificate only prepared the way for an authority based on intolerance and dogma.

Yet it is worth noting that Marcus, after he had turned fifty, did profess for a moment that he was an old man and pointed out how he should therefore demean himself. He said succinctly that now he must refuse to let the inner controlling self be the slave and plaything of selfish desires, and that he must not let it deplore the lot that falls to it in the present or fear what awaits it in the future. (II. 2.) This, he must have known, was a most difficult task to lay on old age, which naturally is prone to egotism, discontented with the new, apprehensive of the next to come. But it fits in harmoniously with his exhortation to live as on a mountain (*ἐν ὄρει*) wherever our lot may be laid. The precept, indeed, aims at the life of sainthood on the principle which was afterwards practised on the sands of the desert. And it must be admitted that the aloofness afforded by mountains or desert sands comes to many men, if they are willing, in the course of prolonged life on the crowded levels of productive industry. But to be willing is a condition which cannot be improvised in a moment. It can be attained only by devotion to the inevitable which is by no means common among men ready enough to provide against eventualities of life.

Thus we are witnessing much activity among those who would provide men with a policy for utilising the increased expectation of life. The policy which appears to be most popular aims at pretending that people are not old when they are. A certain respect is paid to the problem of blood pressure, but the rest of the policy ranges from smartening of costume and coiffure to a certain dapper use of simian glands and other curious ways of securing adventitious hormones. Whatever may be the physiological result of these artifices there can be no doubt that the moral effects can amount to nothing other than a more or less disastrous form of senile depravity. And this is a catastrophe which our doctors for old age must know to be neither imaginary nor even very remote if undisciplined characters are given powers of any kind, which overtax the moral sensibility slowly but surely

diminishing with the lapse of years. Senile depravity has been a favourite theme of the satirist but, mercifully, has not so far in nature been sufficiently common to provoke very earnest remonstrances from the moralist. If, however, senescence is to be brought under a new scheme of evasive treatments, moralists will have to prepare a code to meet fresh forms of infamy, or else the young and middle-aged will have observed the rules of their periods only to find the pitch of life badly queered by those who ought to have been its dignified guardians.

The ancients had more reason than we have to regard as most pitiable the state of the old who have no children. But among ourselves, even in communities where special care is given to the aged, easily named and easily recognised, the plight of the childless is pathetic and deserving of extenuating judgment. The terror of death is forestalled by the terror of old age when nature's kind methods of substitution and superannuation cease to operate, and the harsh onset of senescence cannot be mitigated by interest in the vigorous and by consideration from the young. Old age, unredeemed by human ties, is ugly and hateful to itself. Yet this horror tends to grow more frequent with the development of our civilisation. And thus life is beginning to be confronted by the problem of redeeming old age by taking thought, when nature has ceased to show anything but contempt for those cumbering the ground unsecured by any connection with the web of human existence.

By taking thought much may be done when the struggle for existence is no longer overwhelming. Probably no phase of senility is beyond redemption if our social ethos recognised its presence and conferred on it a mission adapted to its powers. As in all other phases of life, there will have to be leaders if any improvement is to be achieved. The men now jubilant in their ability to block the way before their juniors, must be persuaded to devote their powers to humanising the status of their contemporaries. For epitaphs let them seek to earn, not the fame of being an assertive animal to the last, but praise for continuing human to the end. At our present stage of thought it is probable that a general idea of the old man's rule cannot be extended beyond the effort to remain human to the end. For old women it is equally probable that such a rule is at present an unattainable ideal, but woman's personality is changing so rapidly that the impossibilities of one decade may become the rule of the next. So it would be a mistake to confuse our outlook by separating the potentialities of the sexes, though for the moment men and women may appear to belong to different orders of the Animal Kingdom between the ages of sixty and ninety. And when the

gravity of the task involved in redeeming old age is sufficiently realised, vanity, outlawed in its old activities, may find ample satisfaction in a new sort of propaganda.

So far the gist of our remarks is mainly negative. And, indeed, all human improvement is bound to start from renunciation of some sort. Then the gracious virtues spread and bloom in the gaps left by the extirpated weeds. Only experience can tell the farmer what fine grasses will attain strength after he has subdued the coarser growths. But it takes a lot of farming to effect the necessary discipline of the sward, and, perhaps, there is nothing to be gained at first by speculating too curiously as to the nature of the turf that will ultimately reward persistent culture. For the present it should be sufficient to recognise that current conceptions of what old age should do with itself are in no way adjusted to the modern prolongation of life. This monstrous disparity must be arrested. Till it is, the increased expectation of life threatens society like a plague. But man's best work is to turn curses into blessings. Old age, when redeemed, may yet become a boon both to itself and to the society it humanises.

ARCHIBALD WEIR.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLOUR.

SUBJECT to the laws of chemistry and physics, it is now pretty generally accepted that the form and colour of living things is brought about by natural selection. The more the subject is investigated, the more certain the proofs become, but there is one circumstance which continually tends to make the matter more complicated and oftentimes to puzzle the student by presenting him with what appear to be positive anachronisms. This circumstance is the fact that natural selection acts, as it were, from both ends. On the one hand, concealment by protective resemblance to surroundings enables the prey to escape from the preyer, and, conversely, assists the hunter to steal upon the victim. On the other hand, the perpetuation of the species is furthered by some attractiveness in the individual, enabling its kind to recognise it with the least possible delay and automatically to choose a partner fitted to sustain the best interests of the race. It is to these conflicting interests that the wonderful variety of form and colour which continually delights our eyes is due. If protective resemblance were the only factor in operation, the logical end would surely be absolute uniformity—a colourless, formless world of creatures.

Since Darwin gave the world his simple formula "the survival of the fittest," students in every department of biology have constantly had this in mind and have sought to convince the layman of its truth. Nevertheless, the layman often feels that the theory does not cover all contingencies. I think this is largely because the protective resemblance side has been made unduly prominent. It is, of course, the most fascinating aspect of the subject, particularly because it is sometimes manifest in a fashion positively dramatic; as in that remarkable case of the protected butterfly *Danaus Chrysippus* and its mimics, numbering no fewer than five other lepidopterous insects. The feature of this famous instance is that only the female of the mimicking insect assumes the protective form. In the case of the two butterflies, *Hypolimnas Missipus* and *Papilio Merope*, the male is without a shadow of likeness, either to his partner, or her model.

To these conflicting interests complications are undoubtedly due. The proof of this, it seems to me, is found in the comparative uniformity in shape and colour of the earlier stages of living things. The roots of plants, for instance, display little variety. They are very rarely coloured, and their form varies only slightly in two main directions. Either they penetrate straight into the soil to reach moisture at a depth, or they spread out infinitely near the surface, so that the utmost advantage may be taken of casual showers. On the other hand, when the plant reaches maturity, and perpetuation

of the species becomes of urgency, infinite variation is found to be achievable. It is the same in the insect world. When we consider how varied is the shape and colour of adult forms, we are impressed by the sameness among the *larvae* and *pupae*.

It is necessary, of course, to assume facts which we are not able to verify precisely, when we consider the effects produced by varied form and colour. We must take it for granted that the colours which please our eyes are pleasing to other animals. There are difficulties in the way here, of course, but, although the range of colour perception most certainly varies in different species and is, in fact, itself subject to the modifying influence of natural selection, it is safe to assume, failing evidence to the contrary, that the broad lines of attraction and repulsion are the same in all animal forms. Just as surely as a sharp blow on its body is resented by any animal, while gentle stroking is usually pleasing, so we may conclude that dull browns and greys are universally unattractive, while vivid reds and yellows are generally appealing.

The question of colour is most to the fore in flowers and lepidopterous insects. Neither can be considered entirely apart from the other, but while the varied colours of flowers are mainly for attraction, the hues of the butterfly are a compromise between the need for protection and the necessity for sexual attraction. With a few marked exceptions, butterflies depend entirely upon their colours for safety. They have no weapons of offence or defence, their senses appear to be, in the aggregate, not very highly developed, and the manner in which the colour is laid on their wings suggests, of itself, that it is a very plastic medium for working out elaborate modifications in their appearance. As every child who has handled a struggling butterfly knows, the colouring is very superficial. It is contained in minute scales laid in regular lines across the wings and is entirely independent of their structure. The fact that two species, scarcely distinguishable from each other in every detail of their anatomy, may have a totally different colour scheme, is all the evidence needed to show that these colour scales are capable of indefinite modification: they do, in fact, vary widely in the same species. The African *Papilio Merope*, already mentioned as a mimic of *Danaus Chrysippus*, is a most convincing example of this, for not only is the pattern and colour of the mimicking female quite unlike that of her spouse, but three totally different types of colouring are found in the females, each imitating a different species of protected butterfly.

The association between plants and lepidoptera is much closer than is commonly recognised, closer, indeed, than in the case of many insects, such as bees, which are noted for their remarkable adaptation to flowers by mutual structure. For, although bees live

entirely on the products of flowers, they do not make their homes in a floral environment, and their early stages are passed in a situation remote from the source of their nourishment. On the other hand, lepidopterous *larvae* rarely feed on any other substance than the living plant and although, in some cases, the caterpillar retires from the neighbourhood of its pabulum when it is satiated or desires to rest, most butterfly *larvae* remain on the foodplant from beginning to end of the preparatory stages. This is a fundamental fact which must be given its full value in considering the significance of colour, and it throws us back to the plant, which is undoubtedly prior in origin, for a base on which to build our theories. This base is not very far to seek. An essential element in the life of plants of all species is chlorophyll. Chlorophyll is still rather mysterious in its nature, but for the present purpose, we can accept the chemical fact that it is a green substance contained in certain protoplasmic corpuscles in the cells and that it is quite essential to the growth and health of the plant.

Here, then, we have a definite starting-point—the universal green colour of plants—and it is only in accord with what we should expect, that the basic colour of most lepidopterous *larvae* is green. Even if the great mass of species is considered, we find green the prevailing colour and exceptions rarely occur without some extraordinary modification of form, such as the presence of knobs and humps, or a covering of hair or spines. Without question, those species with green caterpillars are most abundant. The green caterpillars of the Winter Moth, for example, far outnumber any other species feeding upon British trees, in spite of the fact that they form the chief food of numerous birds.

If anything were wanting to link together the fates of these two outstanding examples of colour in nature, one could draw attention to the Cryptogamous plants—ferns, mosses, &c. Colour, other than green, is almost non-existent in this immense group, which is not associated with insect life to any extent, and there are only a few micro-lepidoptera belonging to very primary forms to be found feeding upon them. So far as is known, there is no interference by insects in their reproduction, therefore no inducement for attractive organs to be produced.

It is manifest that if a plant were entirely and always green, a perfect scheme of coloration in caterpillars living upon it would be a green of the same shade. This, however, is by no means the case. In very simple vegetable forms, consisting of nothing more than an aggregation of cells, the green is certainly very uniform, but progress is represented by the formation of structures containing little or no chlorophyll. The evolution of these structures is no doubt an effect of the consumption of the substance of the plant

by the animal. In primitive animal forms, the biting organs are incapable of dealing with matter of much hardness, so that any plants which produced in their substance more solid matter than the normal cellular protoplasm, would, to that extent, resist the attacks of the animal. In this may be seen the germ of leaf and stem structure, consisting of specially indurated portions, which, while unable to perform the digestive functions of normal cell matter, act as channels for the conveyance of excessive nutriment from one portion of the plant to another. These structures, seen in their primitive form as veins in a leaf and in their highest development as stems, trunks and branches, have a smaller proportion of chlorophyll in their composition, so that the colour is a lighter shade, or, when the chlorophyll is completely withdrawn, entirely yellow. It is manifest that if an animal, living upon a plant possessing these yellow veins, retained its uniform green colour, it would be quite conspicuous, and it is only what we should expect, that the majority of green caterpillars are marked with paler and generally yellow lines, sometimes in the form of longitudinal stripes, sometimes as transverse rings, and frequently both. Of this form of coloration, the Winter Moth caterpillar already alluded to is an excellent example.

It seems scarcely necessary to labour this point, and it is sufficient to indicate that with the gradual evolution of this indurated structure, other logical developments take place. The induration is, in fact, caused by the accumulation of mineral particles collected from the soil. Of these, silica and calcium are the most universal, but iron, phosphorus, chlorine, potassium and magnesium are almost always present. Each of these substances, when deposited in excess, must have some effect on the colour of the tissue. To the presence of these and the withdrawal of chlorophyll, as the epidermis hardens, is due the dark colour of the older stems of plants, culminating in the thick, brown, corky matter of bark. Here again is a physical foundation for a very common variation of colouring in lepidopterous caterpillars—various shades of brown—particularly noticeable in many moth *larvae*, which feed at night and rest motionless on the twigs or stems during the daytime. Some, as the Thorn moths, affix themselves by their anal feet and stretch stiffly out at an angle, the twiglike effect thus produced being heightened by the knobs, spines, and other excrescences on their bodies.

There is another change of colouring common to plants which has a most important bearing on the colours of lepidopterous insects. This is the fading of leaves which have attained maximum growth and ceased to function. In some cases such leaves drop off while still green, or shrivel and turn rapidly to a brown colour, but in most cases there is gradual fading to a yellow tint, the leaf remaining

attached to the plant for a considerable time. When we remember that this kind of thing is continually going on in a plant, leaves being in every stage from fully developed greenness to complete yellowness, we can appreciate the potency of its influence on leaf-feeding insects. Not only does it account for a considerable percentage of yellow and brown caterpillars, but it has also had a very powerful effect on many of the perfect forms. To my mind, it seems the basic cause of the prevalence of brilliant yellow among butterflies, particularly of species living in open and often desert country. It should be remembered that the stages of insect life follow closely that of the plant, and while the newly hatched caterpillars will be found on the bright green, springing foliage, by the time the perfect butterfly has left its chrysalis, the foliage will have become mature and there will be a large proportion of these yellow leaves. If we remember that the butterfly, coming out of its chrysalis (suspended from a stem or leaf) is incapable of flight and must remain hanging for several hours, we can realise that it is a time fraught with peril, the only hope of escape from which is invisibility. It seems plain that, under such conditions, bright yellow will give the most perfect resemblance. Even when these butterflies—*Pierineae*—are white or very pale yellow on the upper side, they have a very large proportion of yellow on the underside, particularly of the hindwings, which are always exposed when the insect is resting.

There are, however, other factors at work in this connection. One of these is the intensity of light in the open country favoured by these insects. In the deserts of Africa and Asia, such yellow butterflies are exceptionally abundant: they are recognised by entomologists as essentially dry country insects. Even in flight, pale coloured creatures are less noticeable in the desert than those of dark hue. The more intense the light, the less conspicuous a bright colour, and *vice versâ*. To realise the effect of this, one has only to compare the colours of nocturnal moths with those of diurnal butterflies, the former being almost invariably of dark brown shades or, when much colour is present, of deep red—which, in the absence of bright lighting, is virtually equivalent to black—while a very large proportion of the few paler nocturni are, significantly, of bright yellow colour. Probably the cream colour possessed by some of the most abundant *Pierineae* is even more effective in flight than yellow, but it can scarcely prove an adequate protection during the hours of darkness, when the insect is resting in some exposed situation in the desert. Under such conditions, a white object would almost certainly be secured by night-rambling creatures. Yellow, however, is a non-actinic colour and, while apparently equally bright and conspicuous by daylight, is

very much less so by night. This seems to me to account for the fact that so many of these white butterflies have extensive black and yellow markings on the under surface.

Probably both these causes, besides others, have combined to produce the same effect, but for the reason I have given, namely, the helplessness of the insect on emergence from its chrysalis, I think the former the most powerful factor, the effect of the other being an intensification of the former. The yellow butterfly escaping by its resemblance to the sere foliage, and afterwards failing on account of its conspicuousness in other situations, would be of little use. Since a butterfly closely associated with a particular plant is in many cases largely responsible for its due fertilisation, loss of the butterflies would react unfavourably on the plant.

To make this interaction quite clear, let us assume that a plant produces an equal proportion of red, yellow, and brown dead leaves. An equal proportion of red, yellow, and brown butterflies emerge from caterpillars reared on that plant and are able to take wing on account of their protective resemblance. The conditions of the neighbourhood, however, prove quite against the red and brown forms, all of which are wiped out by enemies, leaving only some of the yellow ones to return to the tree. Is it not apparent that a plant which produces the largest proportion of yellow leaves will receive the closest attention in the matter of fertilisation?

To consider all the intricate factors which affect this problem is a task of appalling magnitude, and intimate details, difficult at first sight to reconcile with the general theory, are continually cropping up. Before they are allowed to carry undue weight against the general trend of evidence, the incidence of other factors must be considered closely. That light colours are suitable to open country and dark ones to night or the shades of woods is unquestionable. The dark browns of the *Satyrids*, *Theclas* and *Euphraedas*, all characteristic forest butterflies, compared with the pale hues of the *Pierids*, are absolutely convincing.

Relatively, protective resemblance acts only feebly in connection with insects on the wing, for motion almost nullifies it. Not quite, however. Mr. Trimen, in *South African Butterflies*, mentions a butterfly, *Mylothris Trimenia*, a woodland species which, when on the wing, bears a striking resemblance to faded yellow leaves drifting before the breeze—a feature which carries the logical sequence of correlative development to a quite poetical climax. Beyond this, protection may be afforded by resemblance to an object, not merely useless to the hunter, but actually harmful, in which case the correlation between colour, form and habits is quite essential, though, at first sight, astounding. An excellent example is the Bee Hawk Moth, whose wings are semi-transparent and body

stout and hairy, like those of bumble bees. There are comparatively few birds which dare to attack such well-armed creatures as bees, and resemblance to them inevitably confers much immunity. Is it not apparent, however, that mere resemblance in form and colour would be of little use, if the ordinary moth and butterfly habits of flight were retained? There can be no other explanation of the swift business-like flight of the Bee Hawk Moths from flower to flower, for they have no need whatever to occupy themselves on what is, to the bumble bee, a necessity of existence for its family.

Still more striking is the wonderful accord between the protected butterflies of the *Danainae* and *Acraeinae* and their mimics. Both in the caterpillar and adult stages, these two groups of butterflies are ignored by birds, a yellowish fluid they secrete being distasteful, if not actually poisonous. *Acraeinae*, in particular, are in themselves striking evidence of the purport of colour scales on the butterfly, for, as they have no need to avoid recognition by enemies, the production of such colour becomes superfluous, and while all of them are thinly scaled, some have completely transparent wings. Their flight is indolent, close to the ground, and they are easily captured. Even their chrysalids are astonishingly conspicuous and hung in exposed places. Almost all the species of this group are mimicked with the greatest accuracy by non-protected butterflies, often of widely divergent families, the resemblance extending not only to outward appearance but to habits of movement. But for the fact that we can scarcely credit these creatures with any consciousness of their duplicity, we are tempted to wonder whether they ever feel uneasy lest their disguise should be penetrated.

While on the subject of colour protection in flight, a word may be said about a section of butterflies in which there is a striking departure from the tints which may be logically supposed to arise from close association with plants. These are the *Lycaenideae* or Blues. Relatively only a small proportion of the species of this family are blue, the name having been applied to the typical forms by British collectors. A blue butterfly on the wing, whether in sunlight or shadow, certainly appears distinctive enough, but bearing in mind that blue is the colour of the sky, it may be that these insects are not really more noticeable on the wing than those of any other colour. There are some rather strong facts opposed to this, however. Very few of these butterflies rise sufficiently high in the air to blend with the azure vault. On the contrary, they are small insects of lowly, if somewhat rapid flight. They do not, so far as my observation extends, show any partiality for blue flowers, where some confusion might be caused in the eye of the watchful bird. They are more generally associated with the white, red, or yellow flowers of clovers and their near allies. Another and

stronger objection is that it is often only the male which displays the brilliant blue colour, the females being generally dull, inconspicuous insects. It seems more reasonable to suppose that the bright colour of the males is a sex label, serving to indicate to the female the desirable partner. While this has a certain element of danger for the male, it is a fact that males are usually the more numerous and, as one union of the sexes is sufficient for the fertilisation of all the eggs, the danger is reduced to a minimum. If the sexes were both dully coloured, all would run equal risk before and during mating and the female would be obliged to expose herself more. The duration of the female for the purpose of depositing her eggs, often a tedious process, is necessarily much longer and her need for obscurity immeasurably greater. We need much more data on this subject, particularly as to whether the females seek out the males, but it is undeniable that in numerous individual cases the male is always more brilliant in appearance than the female. It is reasonably well settled that in the case of birds this attractiveness is sexual and there seems no ground for supposing it to be otherwise in the case of insects.

It scarcely needs much consideration to realise that protective coloration during flight is not needed nearly so much as protection at rest. Indeed, hardly anyone has paid much attention to the former aspect, though I have shown, I think, that it is decidedly operative, not only in a broad sense, by the development of light colours for daylight and open country, and dark ones for night and the depths of woods, but in particular species, such as those which mimic harmful creatures or drifting leaves. Protection at rest is not only more necessary, but is more obviously carried out. Singularly enough, the end is attained in precisely opposite ways by the butterflies and moths, but in both cases the general idea is to reduce the visible wing surface to half its normal area or less, and to colour such exposed surface in as protective a manner as possible. In the case of moths, which are nocturnal in the majority of instances, the hindwings are so constructed that they fold fan-wise, the forewings, which remain rigid, sliding back so that they cover the hindwings and the abdomen. Almost invariably, these forewings are dark coloured or of very neutral shades, moths with gaily coloured forewings being usually confined to certain diurnal groups. On the other hand, the hindwings are frequently light or brightly coloured, so that the appearance of a moth with closed wings is startlingly dissimilar to that of the same insect with wings expanded. Another curious fact which has an obvious bearing on the point is that the underside of moths, which is practically never visible, rarely presents any decided colouring. Indeed, one may read elaborate descriptions of a long series of moths and never find

the underside mentioned, so uniformly immaterial does this surface appear to be. On the first hint of daylight, or before, the moth goes to rest, settling itself flat against a tree trunk, a rock, or other solid object with which the colour of its forewings harmonises more or less effectively. In such cases as the *Geometers*, where the forewings do not slide back, there is always a close likeness between the upper and lower pairs.

Butterflies are almost invariably distinctively coloured on the underside of the wings, sometimes more brightly than above, but most frequently in duller shades. Whereas in moths of a group exhibiting wide dissimilarity between their upper surfaces, particularly of the lower wings, the undersides scarcely differ, numerous butterflies whose upper sides show great similarity are strikingly diverse on the under side. The very patent conclusion is that the under surface in this case is more subject to the modifying influence of surroundings.

The perfection of the arrangements which tend to blot out the resting butterfly from visibility is decidedly one of the most exquisite manifestations of natural selection. In the first place, the butterfly's wings are rigid and cannot be folded back like those of the moth. Obviously, if, when pursued by a bird, it settled down with its wings fully expanded, it would be simply inviting capture. Even when alighting temporarily, therefore, a butterfly generally lifts its wings vertically over its back. So closely are they appressed that, looked at from above, there is nothing but a thin, scarcely visible line. From either side, however, one half the full wing surface can be seen and this, in a large insect, is very considerable. It is notorious how completely butterflies disappear from the landscape when a cloud comes over the sun. However abundant they may be in a field, all but one or two of the boldest settle down and vanish. Into the complexity of devices which enter into this under-surface colouring, it is scarcely necessary to go at length. It should be noted, however, that it is the hindwing which is most protectively coloured on the under surface, for the more complete the repose of the insect, the more the forewings settle back between the hindwings, so that the gay colours often present, even on the underside of the forewings, are completely concealed. Of the utmost significance in this connection is the fact, which will be noted in nine butterflies out of ten, that however brightly coloured the main portion of the forewing, the extreme tip is always tinted in harmony with the hindwing. The forewings being considerably longer, this portion is bound to project however completely the insect endeavours to compact them.

Beautiful examples of this protective coloration may be found in every direction. Whatever the normal habit of the insect when at

rest, the colour of the underside of the hindwings will, in some way or other, tend to afford complete concealment. The example of the orange-tip butterfly, whose conspicuous, tessellated green and white markings harmonise perfectly with the umbels of beaked parsley: the dark brown under surface of the Peacock and Tortoiseshell butterflies commonly hibernating in dark crevices of tree trunks: the broken pattern of the Grayling, disappearing completely on a bare hillside, are such manifest examples that they shout protective resemblance at the most sceptical. Nothing is more striking, in this connection, than the under surface of the blue butterflies which I have already remarked as being conspicuous in flight. Invariably pale greys and browns, broken up by short black or white lines, dots or rings, cover the under surface and produce a pattern which, whatever the insect settles upon, seems to render it invisible.

Cases even more striking than these come to light from time to time. Mr. Trimen remarks on an African *Lycaenid* with pure white and apparently very conspicuous undersides which, however, prove perfectly protective because the insect is associated with a shrub whose leaves, reflecting the light in a peculiar manner, give the impression of irregular white patches. When settled on any part of the shrub, therefore, these insects are exceedingly difficult to identify. Another beautiful instance came under my own notice in the East of Europe. I was collecting in a deep ravine and encountered large numbers of a butterfly unfamiliar to me, the large Pandora Fritillary. It closely resembles the British Silver Washed Fritillary, but is rather larger and on the underside of the forewings there is a patch of rich rosy colour, exceedingly bright and noticeable. The insects were very numerous, but rather elusive and I should not have taken many specimens in good condition but for a fortunate circumstance. Above the ravine stood a tree of *Robinia pseudacacia*, which I passed under on my way and, examining the branches, as my custom is, I observed what looked like extra leaf lobes hanging downwards. On closer inspection I discovered Pandora butterflies at rest. The hindwings covered the rosy patch, leaving only a soft green, exactly matching the leaves, so that at a little distance it was impossible to distinguish the insects, even in the bright sunlight. I think it was Mr. Frohawk who told of a case of the very brightly coloured Brimstone butterfly discovered hibernating among ivy leaves on a wall. He was so struck with the perfection of the imitation of the yellowed ivy leaves by the angled wings, that, indicating its position within a few feet, he asked several people familiar with the butterfly to find it. Not one succeeded.

For the working out of details regarding the wide prevalence of

showy colours in flowers, sufficient data seem hardly to have been gathered, but there are certain things which, to my mind, indicate that the development of the attractive petals of flowers beyond what seems necessary is closely connected with butterfly habits. Undoubtedly, these insects, from their flower-haunting habits, have considerable value to the plants, many of which—the honeysuckle, for example—are obviously fitted by their structure only for fertilisation through the medium of long-tongued insects. It appears to me more than probable that the development of large showy petals is influenced very considerably by the fact that they harmonise with and tend to conceal the brilliant insects visiting them. The more protection they afford to the agents of their reproduction, the greater their chances of success. It seems likely that the evolution of this character is largely a thing of the past and we shall never be able to find sufficient examples in current action to prove the matter with anything like the precision commonly insisted on. Though the butterflies haunting them to-day may be very differently coloured, owing to the action of more powerful interests, it does not follow that the original agents for their fertilisation were not more nearly in harmony with them. Certainly the fine development of many yellow flowers is not without significance when we remember how numerous are certain species of yellow butterflies in the open plains on which they spread their glowing carpet of gold.

HERBERT MACE.

THE FIRST GREEK WRITER ON INDIA.

HOW many people have heard of Ktesias? Probably not one in a thousand. Yet both to English and to Indians he should have a particular interest as the writer of the first systematic account in which the wonders of India were conveyed to Europe.

Ktesias was a physician from one of the Greek islands, who was invited to the Persian Court in the spacious days of Xenophon and his Ten Thousand, successfully cured his Royal master of his wounds, and retired again into obscurity on the profits of his enterprise. Like other retired workers from Asia, he employed his leisure in composing works on the East, which have come down to us only in mutilated fragments. The passage of over two thousand years has rendered him a remote and indistinct figure: but as the precursor of the long line of authors of such works as *Leaves from an Eastern Notebook* and *Oriental Impressions*, he certainly deserves to be rescued from the wallet of oblivion.

To his own countrymen, Ktesias was Ktesias the Liar—though quite one of the best. "What Ktesias has said about the Elephant," remarks Aristotle, quite simply, "is false." The *savant* Gellius, finding a dog's eared copy of the *Indika* on the second-hand bookstalls, commented scathingly on the degenerate public taste for fiction. It seems a hard fate; but the pioneer recounter of foreign marvels must be prepared for as much. Possibly Ktesias did not always steel his heart against the traveller's temptation. He was bound to be disbelieved whatever he said, and he drew his bow longer than was strictly necessary.

It is true he never visited India. He thereby laboured under a disadvantage as compared with the gentlemen who consider one month in Bombay and Delhi to be the necessary training for an exhaustive work on the political, moral, and physical aspects of the country. He had consequently to rely for his information on the imaginative garrulity of the Persian bazaars. Considered in this light, it may be fairly doubted whether his account falls far short in point of accuracy of what would be compiled under the same conditions to-day. He repeats what he had heard, and one of the greatest charms of his narrative is the sudden recognition produced on one's self by some now well-known phenomenon at its first appearance. Had our friend been a modern painter, the critics would doubtless have informed us that "Mr. Ktesias aims at the vivid impression. This he succeeds in conveying by a few brilliant strokes of his brush, without a meticulous insistence on literal accuracy." But it so happens that he was not a modern painter. Scholars therefore dispute as to the modern equivalent of the Greek or Roman *stadium*, and the variations in the size of the

Indus: all because Ktesias wrote that the river was forty *stadia* across at its narrowest, and one hundred where widest. "A gross exaggeration," says his stern editor, after mature reflection, no doubt. What did that matter to Ktesias? He had never measured the river by tape or trigonometry. But he did succeed in bringing home to his readers that this stream was a far, far bigger thing than they in Europe with their boasted Danube had ever known. In the same way he shocked the sober geographers by stating that India was not smaller than the rest of Asia: but he first gave the public an idea of the vast extent of the many-peopled peninsula.

It is in his description of physical conditions that Ktesias is most vivid. Here we may, after the fashion of classical criticism, trace a distinct source of information, based on actual experience. We may give this source a personality and a title, dubbing it the Informant. The Informant had evidently visited the Punjab in the hot weather, that part lying nearest to Persia. The sun, says Ktesias, appears in India to be ten times larger than in other countries. "A palpable lie," said the sapient scientists. They had never spent July in the plains. "The heat," continues Ktesias, "is so intense that it suffocates many persons; there is no rain, but on the other hand there are violent hurricanes which carry away everything that stands in their course." Heat-stroke and sand-storms, the glaring sun and long-deferred rains—the Informant soon had enough of them, and fled, without waiting for the monsoon, doubting its very existence. Only in the hours about sunrise was relief for a moment vouchsafed, so that Ktesias writes: "the sun at his rising brings coolness, and during the rest of the day he causes vehement heat." The description is too vivid to be comfortable.

The most ordinary flora and fauna acquire an air of romance in Ktesias' book. By the banks of the Indus grows a great reed, the Indian reed. Let your European reeds droop their diminished heads. This reed is so thick that two men could hardly encompass its stem with their arms, and of a height to equal the mast of a merchant ship of the heaviest burden. It makes one feel quite proud of having seen a bamboo grove with one's own eyes, to know that it is such a distinguished plant. Then, so Ktesias tells us, there is in India a tree which actually grows wool, from which men can weave cloth, and of this cloth their garments are made. *There* is a miracle for you! Sir Walter Raleigh's tobacco cannot have been less of a marvel to the Elizabethans than this first account to the Greeks of cotton and its uses. Familiar as it is now, we can recapture something of the impression that must have been conveyed then, of an apparent reversal of the order of Nature. The cinnamon tree, and camphor with its penetrating odour, the

cochineal insect and its brilliant dye, oil of sesamum and oil of nuts, gums, spices, and fermented liquors, all provided Ktesias with excellent material to be "worked up," to surprise the credulous, and to make the learned sniff contemptuously.

The Man-Eater, or Martikhora (Persian, *mard-khor*), was a wondrous animal: a shaggy red beast, of the size of a lion, which alone among the beasts of the forest did not yield to its prowess. It had three rows of teeth, human blue eyes, and a voice like a trumpet. It ran with the nimbleness of a stag, and loved to gorge itself on human flesh. So far, so good. Ktesias had seen one of these beasts himself, which had been sent from India as a present to the Persian King. (This is a method he occasionally uses to cast an air of verisimilitude over an otherwise unconvincing, though far from bald, narrative.) But I am afraid he goes a little too far when he attributes to this already sufficiently decorative monster the possession of a long scorpion's tail, armed on the tip and both sides with stings which it shoots out like arrows at its pursuers. If anyone thinks that Ktesias is a competent writer on such subjects, says Aelian caustically, he must be content with the account which he has given of the Martikhora. But Pausanias more cautiously suggests that the Indians have accepted this account, "which is not true," through their excessive dread of the creature.

Ktesias is more convincing in his notice of the jackal, and once more we recognise the authentic voice of the Informant. Not only does he call it, as near as need be, by its Indian name as then current, but after speaking of its swiftness he adds that the animal imitates the human voice. Anyone who has been kept awake at night on his first arrival in the country, wondering whether the eerie cries in the dark issue from ghosts and devils, will appreciate this one of the many straws that broke the Informant's back. Ktesias has a congenial theme in the curious tails of the sheep and the monkeys, the many-coloured pheasants with gleaming blue-green and gold feathers, and the gigantic snakes; but he lapses into the realms of fiction with his griffins, four-footed birds, feathered in black and red and white and blue, who sit upon the mountains and preserve their gold (this last touch is alone sufficient to distinguish them from the griffin of our latter days). Elephants he had himself seen, tearing up trees by the root; and he relates how the King of the Indians, from among his ample allowance of a hundred thousand elephants of war, trained three thousand specially to demolish the walls of cities. An account is given of hawking (then the practice of the Thracians and the Germans), eagles being trained to pounce upon the fugitive hare. Psittacus, the parrot, is introduced to the Greeks: "it has a tongue and voice like the human, is of the size of a hawk, has a red bill, is adorned

with a black ruffle, and has a vermillion neck." While noting that this uncanny bird talks in the Indian language, Ktesias points out with quite delightful *naïveté* that "if taught Greek, it can talk in Greek too."

When he comes to treat of the peoples of India, the purely fabulous predominates: or one should rather say that time has sifted out the legendary, and allowed the heavier particles to sink. Here again, Ktesias was less misleading than misled. The Aryan invaders of Northern and Western India found themselves hemmed in by a sea of strange races, whose appearance seemed grotesque, and of whose manners they knew little, which little they misunderstood. From the fanciful legends then passing current in India, and still preserved for us in epic literature, Ktesias' account of the various tribes is largely derived: but he sets them forth as living people, with many touches of reality. Purely legendary is the fountain of Silas, in whose waters even the lightest substances sank to the bottom as soon as thrown in. This we know from the books of the Hindus to be the river of Sila, which guarded the approaches to the holy country of Uttara Kuru, where a happy people lived to the age of a thousand years—or even ten thousand. Here Ktesias hesitates, and when he comes to his tribe of Long-Lived Ones, he cuts down their age to a mere four hundred years, so as to be on the safe side.

Fable and verity are inextricably intertwined in the recital of the different tribes of hill-men, hunters, nomads, and so on. The hill-men have the heads of dogs; they do not use articulate speech, but bark like the animals whose heads they wear, and thus converse so as to be understood by each other. The Indians can understand what they say; but if they wish to reply, they have to bark back and gesticulate. As the dog-headed men did a considerable trade, this mode of conversation appears to have been fairly efficacious: the whole tale is not unlike the malicious misrepresentation of someone who was shirking the proficiency examination in Pushtu. Even English has been described by foreigners as canine barking when heard first. It is also of interest to learn that, as the tribes in question inhabited steep and pathless mountains, they could not possibly be conquered in war by the King of the Indians. Every five years the King used to send them presents. This indicates—if it were not already obvious—that the Frontier Question is of no recent growth. This may bring a fragment of relief to distressed heads in Simla.

There is another element of confusion. Homer sang of the Ethiopians, who are divided into two, and live at the world's end—one part of them towards the setting sun, and the other towards the rising. The Greeks often confused the two, and Ktesias frequently

calls the Indians Ethiopians. Remembering stories of the African race, he was liable to consider that similar legends in India must refer to the same people. On hearing of a population of small, dark men in the south of India, he naturally enough identified them with the Pygmies of Herodotus and other writers, and gave them the same name. They dwelt in the interior, were black and deformed, had snub noses, long hair and extraordinarily large beards. They were excellent archers, and the King had three thousand of them in his retinue. But there are certain things we must always find where there exists a race of Pygmies: and Ktesias is not behindhand in supplying them with sheep the size of lambs, asses smaller than, and horses and cattle the same size as rams—a pleasant diminutive Noah's Ark to match the size of the tiny Pygmies. In every country we have tales of dwarfs or giants, according as the last invading race was taller or shorter than the aborigines—in Ireland we even have both—so that this only means that the Aryans found a smaller race than themselves in the south.

But among these weird races of one-legged men, human beings with bushy tails, and people who reverse the ordinary course of life by being born with white hair which slowly turns black when old age approaches, we have a few meagre details of the real race among which the Informant lived. He had found them "just," devoted to their sovereign, and scornful of death. From his own observation, Ktesias notes that the dark colour of the Indians was derived from the sun, but implanted by Nature, for he had with his own eyes seen two women and five men of a fair complexion. As fair as his own Greeks, that is, and such as there are still to be found in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

In closing the abridgment of Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople, to whom we are indebted for the fullest account of Ktesias' work, we must feel grateful to the old physician from Knidos for his introduction to the Indian house of wonders, at a period still almost unknown. To the journalist there must be some slight feeling of envy at the unique opportunity provided to his predecessor—a virgin field of copy, a whole new country untouched by ink before, without let or hindrance, without danger of rebuke from the more accurate and less imaginative traveller. But let it be said that Ktesias made the most of his chance. The critics of style, who were not concerned with his matter, praised the ease, simplicity, and clearness of his elegant tales of wonder: he was a "sweet" writer, and they did not hesitate to speak of him as a poet, the very "demiurge of perspicuity." What greater tribute does he need? He passed the supreme test. He was read. And he would be read still, were his work still with us.

R. B. BECKETT.

THE ITALO - GREEK INCIDENT.

A REPLY TO DR. WILLIAM MILLER.*

A GREAT deal of nonsense has been published in the Press about the Italo-Greek conflict and its repercussions at Geneva, to which it is not worth while to reply, as the facts themselves provide a sufficient *démenti*. But certain remarks in the article published in THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW of October last by a writer usually so well-informed as Dr. William Miller cannot be allowed to pass without a reply.

Dr. Miller is an undoubted authority on Near Eastern history, but his statements about Italy and the Dodecanese are somewhat misleading. He suggests, although he does not say so explicitly, that Greece had a legal right to those islands; that is by no means the case. Italy seized them from Turkey during the Libyan war as a guarantee for the execution of the Lausanne Treaty (1912) by Turkey, but they had never belonged to Greece at all. If there was any Power to whom they should have been handed back it was Turkey, and not Greece. But in the meanwhile the world war broke out, which cancelled previous settlements, and changed many things. It is true that by the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement of 1919, Italy agreed to cede the islands to Greece with the exception of Rhodes, which would remain Italian for fifteen years and be given to Greece at the end of that period only if the population declared its wish to become Greek by a plebiscite, and if Britain by that time ceded Cyprus to Greece. But the carrying out of the agreement was conditional on certain action by Greece and on the coming into force of the peace treaty between Turkey and the Entente Powers. Peace with Turkey was concluded at Sèvres in 1920, but was never executed, while Greece proved unable to fulfil the terms of her agreement with Italy (one of which provided for the cession to Italy of certain territories in Asia Minor then held by Greece). Dr. Miller mentions the expulsion from the islands of certain Greek ecclesiastics; I do not know whether these expulsions are still maintained, but they were originally decided on in consequence of the anti-Italian political activities of the persons expelled. Dr. Miller knows his Near East too well not to realise that the activities of Orthodox ecclesiastics are mainly if not wholly political, and that to most of them (with honourable exceptions) conspiracy and political propaganda are the principal care and generally the best means for securing preferment.

With regard to Italian support of Albania's claims to what the Albanians call South Albania and the Greeks North Epirus, it

* In THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, October, 1923.

should be remembered that those claims were also supported by Britain and France, on the ground that the great majority of the population was Albanian, and also because the Albanian State must be made *viable* if it was to exist; the Commission appointed by the League of Nations to inquire into the conditions of Albania, composed of a Finn, a Luxemburger, and a Norwegian, with a Swiss secretary, came to the same conclusions. The Greeks themselves seem to have regarded the territory in question as inhabited mainly by enemies, to judge by the way in which they systematically devastated it in 1914. The present writer saw the results of their activities in the complete destruction of villages in the Liaskoviki area.

Dr. Miller quotes the present writer's statement, in his history of the Macedonian campaign, that Venizelos was not understood in Italy, and that he did render services to the Allies during the war. This is true, but the writer adds in that same volume that Venizelos was a much bigger man than the *milieu* in which he displayed his activities, and he also shows up the whole conduct of the Greeks throughout the campaign, and in particular recounts certain incidents of their behaviour towards the Italians which explain and justify Italy's mistrust of Greek methods, both political and military. It was, however, after the war that Venizelos became a danger to world peace, and proved his own country's worst enemy. His mad militarist policy in Asia Minor and his blind belief, which events have wholly belied, in Greece's capacity to rule a great colonial empire by force, encouraged by Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson, prolonged the state of war in the Near East for three years, and caused incalculable misery to Greece and to hundreds of thousands of innocent people, Greek, Armenian, and Turkish.

From the Italo-Greek relations Dr. Miller extends his inquiries to the Italian situation in general. Here, too, some of his statements cannot pass unchallenged. He asks himself whether we must judge Mussolini's real views and intentions by the articles he wrote in the *Popolo d'Italia* before coming into power, or by his diplomatic notes as Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Surely the facts speak for themselves, and the Premier's foreign policy is recognised by all observers, foreign as well as Italian, and grudgingly even by Dr. Miller himself, as wise and moderate. English readers will recollect the very considerable difference observed between Mr. Gladstone's remarks about Austria in the famous Midlothian campaign when not in office, and his attitude towards that Power after he had become Prime Minister.

Dr. Miller attributes certain aspects of *Fascista* policy to the fact that large numbers of *Fascisti* are too young to have been through

the war and realise its horrors; some of them certainly are very young, but the great majority have been through the war, and it is they and not the newest recruits who influence the action of the party and the Government. To state, as Dr. Miller does, that in Italy to-day the mass counts for nothing, is certainly misleading. Mussolini is supported by the immense majority of public opinion, even in circles that are not Fascist and that do not accept all aspects of Fascist policy. To talk about the Press being muzzled and to say that those who criticise Mussolini can only "do so behind closed doors and after a solemn vow of silence," is merely sensational; it seems to suggest that the author has recently had very little contact with Italians and does not read the Italian Press. Anyone who travels about Italy will find the majority of people he meets strongly in favour of Mussolini, but he will always find a minority who criticise at least some of his actions openly. Similarly with the Press: while most papers are Fascist or pro-Fascist, the *Mondo*, the *Stampa*, the *Avanti*, the *Giustizia*, and others, are definitely in opposition, while the *Corriere della Sera*, although it supports the Government's economic policy, is often sharply critical of other aspects of its activities. In the Italo-Greek incident, however, the whole nation was absolutely unanimous, because everyone felt that the national honour was at stake, and that in dealing with a Government that offered no guarantees of fulfilling its international obligations, swift and stern action was necessary. The behaviour of the Greek authorities in connection with the inquiries into the Janina murders is the best justification of this policy.

We cannot quite understand Dr. Miller's allusions to the possibility of war. He seems to fear that hostilities may break out at any moment between Italy on the one side, and (apparently) Greece, the Little Entente, and possibly France on the other, and quotes the opinion of an anonymous British General that the Jugoslavs were as good soldiers as the Australians. Now throughout the whole of the Italo-Greek episode there has never been the faintest likelihood of war between Italy and any other Power, although it must be admitted that certain zealots at Geneva did their best to promote ill-feeling, and would probably have been glad if they could have provoked a war. Fortunately their influence over world politics is not quite so great as their vanity led them to believe.

LUIGI VILLARI.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

BRITISH POLICY AND REPARATIONS.

THE lameness with which the Reparations policy of Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues slackened its pace in August and September and stopped dead in October took many people by surprise, the French most of all. Mr. Baldwin, as he frankly explained in one of his speeches on a non-political occasion, has had a short experience of office. Whether or not he was capable of statesmanship was unknown when he assumed the Prime Ministership. He was generally known to be sincere, and was thought by many to be simple. His career lay entirely before him, and so far as foreign policy was concerned he was given ungrudging and even confident support by a much wider body of opinion than that of his own party.

In his first fresh days as Prime Minister, he realised, what indeed was an obvious truth, that so long as French and British policy was at cross-purposes, and yet continued to be the theoretic basis of the European settlement, Europe was likely to slide quicker and quicker towards the abyss. He therefore advertised his opinion that Franco-British divergencies could be bridged, and emphasised his point to the French people by means of an interview which he gave to M. Philippe Millet of the *Petit Parisien*. The tactical position he thus took up was generally approved by British opinion, but it was recognised that the move could succeed only if the French Government could be coaxed back to a reasonable and possible policy. Mr. Baldwin devoted most of his time during the first few weeks of his office to a personal and exhaustive study of the French point of view, gathering representative opinions from all classes of French thought in the hope that he might allay the unreasoning fear which was responsible for French action, and to win French confidence. France was unresponsive, and Mr. Baldwin was quickly driven to the view, reached before him by Mr. Bonar Law, that agreement with France about Reparations and the whole cycle of economic problems connected therewith was not possible. Hence the White Paper of August 11th, the object and circumstances of which were recorded here in September (pp. 373-384).

Up to August 11th British Reparations policy since the Armistice had followed an intelligible line of evolution. Mr. Lloyd George had disagreed with M. Briand at every turn, but had refused to break with France on the ground that to do so would merely be to pass from the frying-pan into the fire. The keynote of Mr. Lloyd George was friendly squabbles running their course in conference, the friendliness in some cases being helped by the delightful setting of a Mediterranean coast. That policy failed. Mr. Bonar Law

took the further step of not only disagreeing with M. Poincaré but of driving the disagreement to its logical outcome in a business-like break-away. He did so, however, under the reserve of a benevolent neutrality towards the events in the Ruhr. Mr. Baldwin, by the White Paper of August 11th, after recapitulating the old and now chronic points of disagreement, took the still further step of hinting at the possibility of British separate action. Germany was by then on the point of collapse under the weight of General Degoutte's armies, and Mr. Baldwin carried his country with him in the thesis that prompt action was now called for.

It had so far been a consistent story. Three successive British Prime Ministers had tried and had failed to induce France to act the part of an ally towards Britain and the part of a pacific and reasonable Power towards Europe. The inevitable alternative policy was at last foreshadowed. At that supreme moment the British Government failed at the plunge. Mr. Baldwin went to Aix-les-Bains for a holiday and came back in a mood of anti-climax such as was only too faithfully interpreted by the German cartoonist, Herr Oskar Theuer, in the *Ulk* of Berlin. One of his cartoons portrayed a French hyena devouring the helpless body of Germany, with the British lion across the Channel lashing his tail and roaring, "In the name of humanity I enter a protest against this beastliness." A second cartoon showed the hyena undisturbedly pursuing its beastliness and the lion slinking away with his tail between his legs and observing, "There is nothing to be done." Whatever the explanation of this somewhat depressing anti-climax, there seems to be little doubt about the fact itself. Some day it will perhaps be known which of the whispered explanations were true; whether, for instance, it was true that the White Paper had been largely influenced by Lord D'Abernon's advice on the invincibility of German passive resistance; or whether M. Poincaré in his famous interview with Mr. Baldwin on September 19th dealt a sort of Carpentier knock-out to the White Paper. The facts, such as are known so far, point to a combination of both hypotheses, and to the second as by far the more important.

The facts are worth setting down in their order. The White Paper had been published on August 13th. Realising its damaging effect, M. Poincaré drew up an answer consisting of fifty pages of propaganda and explanation and published it on August 23rd. In it the French Government again joined issue with the British Government, but more heatedly even than before, abated not a centime of French claims, nor moved an inch from former intransigence. Strong pressure had been brought to bear on Brussels for the sending of a joint, or at any rate identical and simultaneous, Belgian and French answer to London. The pressure was

courageously resisted by MM. Theunis and Jaspar, and courage deserves its praise no matter how insignificant the result. Belgium delayed her answer for nearly a week, and it was published on August 29th. Moreover, the studied contrast between the two Notes was itself a remarkable act of courage on Belgium's part. While it substantially agreed with the French answer, as in the case of the former exchanges, its tone was so friendly that it amounted to a diplomatic departure. The Belgian Note chose the most off-hand passages of the French Note as the opportunity for its most striking expressions of sympathy with British feeling. It had been submitted to Paris before being delivered in London, but not a word had been altered. The stand made by the Belgian Government on this point, little as its effect was on big affairs, calls for all the more appreciation because the British Government had played into French hands on a similar occasion a short time before. On June 20th the British Government submitted to Paris and to Brussels the proposed draft of a joint Allied answer to the German Note of June 7th. M. Poincaré then also insisted on a joint Franco-Belgian rejection of that draft. Then also Belgium resisted the pressure, and a serious quarrel resulted between M. Poincaré and M. Theunis. If the British Government had been aware of that fact, it would presumably have avoided the tactlessness of lumping together the French and Belgian answers for a common rejoinder on August 11th. Thanks to the British Government M. Poincaré had the laugh over M. Theunis, but M. Theunis stuck to his guns, and in drawing up the separate Note of August 29th he not only defied M. Poincaré, but risked another clumsy snub from Lord Curzon.

MR. BALDWIN'S CHANGE OF FRONT.

On August 27th Mr. Baldwin left London for Aix-les-Bains. The French Note had been delivered in London five days before, the Belgian Note arrived two days after, his departure. He snatched a holiday during the first week of his stay at Aix, and then proceeded to an examination of the new French and Belgian statements. It was clear to the world that these statements had made precisely no difference to the Franco-British dispute about the Ruhr, and it was expected of Mr. Baldwin on his return that he would at once act on the White Paper, especially as the White Paper had insisted on the dangers of delay, which dangers were in fact materialising before our eyes. It is a quality traditionally attributed to British Governments that they mean what they say in State papers; but it is difficult to reconcile the White Paper with this tradition. On the argument of the White Paper itself the rapidity of events after the issue of the White Paper was a

reason, not for shelving, but for expediting, the policy which was outlined in it. While Mr. Baldwin was at Aix he was apparently much influenced by three things, namely: by the beginning of the German collapse, by the Italian occupation of Corfu, and by certain advances made by M. Poincaré.

Mr. Baldwin had never met M. Poincaré personally, and was as innocent as an unborn babe about the wiles of French diplomacy and the seductiveness of the political atmosphere of Paris. M. Poincaré had had one consistent object towards Mr. Baldwin ever since Mr. Baldwin took office, and that was to induce him to carry on Mr. Bonar Law's policy of benevolent inactivity while French designs were consummated. M. Poincaré had tried his best to prevent the publication of the White Paper and the resort to open diplomacy, advocating instead the method of secret and personal diplomacy between the heads of the two Governments. Having failed in his attempt to prevent the publication of the White Paper, he doggedly tried to undo the effect of publication by continuing to urge Mr. Baldwin to see him personally, thereby hoping, so it appeared, to draw the red herring of secret diplomacy across the path. Mr. Baldwin's purpose was firm enough up to the time when he left London for Aix on August 27th. At Aix a definite change took place in his outlook. He there found himself mid-way between Geneva and Paris during the Corfu crisis. On the all-important Sunday (September 2nd) when the Italian occupation of Corfu, carried out two days earlier, was rocking the foundations of the League of Nations, Mr. Baldwin was in constant communication with Lord Robert Cecil at Geneva and with Lord Curzon, who at the time was in Paris, and who in his turn was in constant touch with M. Poincaré.

Whatever may be said of French diplomacy on a long view, of its monumental inability to form or to sustain constructive ideals, there can be no questioning its lightning agility at close range, or the *flair* with which it can make the most of a sudden opportunity. On the Sunday in question, when the Corfu crisis illuminated the truth that the Treaty, the League, and the whole European settlement were endangered by the fact that in an emergency French and British influences neutralised each other, M. Poincaré saw and took his opportunity. On the attractive hypothesis that there could be no hope for Europe unless and until France and Britain decided to pull together, M. Poincaré began bombarding Mr. Baldwin with requests more insistent than ever for a personal meeting. Mr. Baldwin was urged to name the day on which he would pass through Paris on his way home from Aix so that M. Poincaré could arrange in advance not to have any conflicting engagements, or could even cancel existing engagements. The

argument would have been unanswerable if it had been accompanied by a change of heart in Paris.

Mr. Baldwin passed through Paris on September 19th, held his famous after-luncheon interview with M. Poincaré, and hot from the oven, as it were, an official *communiqué* was issued after the meeting which took London's breath away. The terms of the *communiqué* are well known. The important sentence in it asserted that "on no question is there any difference of purpose or divergence of principle which could impair the co-operation of the two countries." If Sir William Tyrrell had been in Paris on that occasion as a British dictator, one could have understood the *communiqué*, for Sir William has the merit of consistency. As, however, he was in Paris in his capacity of permanent official, it was on Mr. Baldwin that the limelight as well as the responsibility rightly fell. It was a Parisian limelight which revealed Mr. Baldwin, amid the lyrical chorus of the French Press, as a second Edward VII. The second Edward VII. duly returned to London and relapsed into a silence as sepulchral as the Entente Cordiale itself, while General Degoutte "mopped up" (to use an ugly, but fairly descriptive, military expression) the remnants of passive resistance. It would be untrue to imply that Mr. Baldwin had been taken in by a simple manœuvre. The subtlety of the manœuvre consisted in this, that Mr. Baldwin had been allowed to explain, and M. Poincaré had gladly accepted the explanation, that the British Government still stood by the White Paper of August 11th; and that on the other hand, when Mr. Baldwin asked M. Poincaré to state categorically that French diplomacy had no *arrière pensée* beyond "pure reparations," M. Poincaré had given the solemn undertaking. In those circumstances there obviously could be no "difference of purpose" or "divergence of principle."

The net effect therefore of the Poincaré-Baldwin encounter was as follows: M. Poincaré, by undertaking not to smash Germany (while in the very act of smashing her), obtained the re-establishment of the "psychological" Entente Cordiale, or in other words an assurance of British inactivity; Mr. Baldwin obtained M. Poincaré's respect for the White Paper by shelving it. France dropped the shadow and gained the substance; Britain dropped the substance and won the shadow. As might have been expected, French policy after the famous meeting ran on exactly the same lines as before, Britain stood politely aside and Germany crashed. Whether in diplomacy or in boxing our champions have apparently to learn how to deal with the lightning punch. In diplomacy Mr. Baldwin had an overwhelming advantage which he let slip at the very crisis when it was most needed. Our politicians will no

doubt make the usual British recovery, but valuable time will have been lost.

FRENCH FINANCE AND THE HOPE THAT FAILED.

The opportunity for making good what has been lost to the cause of European recovery will perhaps arise when the chaos of French finance reaches its climax. The French Government cannot afford what the occupation of the Ruhr has cost, and as a result of its own action cannot now hope for any immediate financial relief from German reparations. Therefore the French Government will want money. One of the most interesting discoveries made by Mr. Baldwin in his interview with M. Poincaré was that in one French quarter at least the British White Paper had had a profound effect. The last paragraph of the Memorandum on Inter-Allied debts had given rise in French financial circles to the fear that the British Government might refuse to renew the French Treasury bills, a contingency which would be certain to have a disastrous effect on the franc. The French Government had borrowed from the British Government by means of French Treasury bills. At the time of the borrowing the bills were made subject to renewal for a limited period only after the end of the war, with the clear intention that as soon as French credit was sufficiently re-established they should be redeemed out of French Government loans to be raised on the London market. There was no suggestion when the loans were made that the repayment should be dependent on recoveries from Germany. The last paragraph of the British Memorandum stated that:

"While his Majesty's Government have, by continuing to renew the bills beyond the period of the contract, tacitly recognised that the time has not yet arrived for giving effect to this intention, it must be clearly understood that in the absence of a new agreement the carrying out of it remains an obligation of the French Government which cannot honourably be repudiated, and that in the meantime the present practice of adding interest to capital cannot be indefinitely continued, and that a commencement of payment of, at any rate, a part of the interest should be made as soon as the sterling-franc exchange becomes reasonably stable."

One of the questions said to have been put to Mr. Baldwin by M. Poincaré on September 19th was whether the British Government really contemplated the discontinuance of its former practice of renewing the bills beyond the period of the contract. As the question had been raised in so practical a form by M. Poincaré, it is easy to believe that Mr. Baldwin, with his well-known financial ability, was able to explain, as one Prime Minister to another, the policy of the British Government on Inter-Allied debts. In effect

every British taxpayer is at the present moment paying about 6d. in the £ on account of the British loan to France. By not honouring her own Treasury bills and by refusing even to pay the interest on their extension, the French Government has obliged the British taxpayer to pay income tax which properly should fall on the French taxpayer. It is said that M. Poincaré at last saw this point, the surprising thing being that, as a Prime Minister, and therefore as one whose business it is to understand the feelings of electorates, he had not seen it before. If Mr. Baldwin plays his cards well, he ought still to regain the upper hand in the business of settling Europe. Within a week of his return to London from Paris he was given a further hint of the recognition that had already taken place in Paris of the fact that France is bound, sooner or later, and probably sooner, to become financially dependent on London.

What happened within that week was as follows. Now that passive resistance had ceased, M. Poincaré was in a position to sing *La Marseillaise* and to announce a victory of sorts to the French people; but by the same token, the moment he announced his victory, he would be under the obligation of presenting to the French peasant, who is a realist, the results of the victory in cash. That situation probably explains why M. Poincaré, when he had won his victory, and when passive resistance had ceased and ceased unconditionally, preferred not to accept his triumph, but instead to continue his Sunday speeches on the theme that the work was not yet done and that still more steadfastness of purpose was called for. None the less, with that diplomatic resource on which there has already been occasion to comment, M. Poincaré made a bold attempt to prepare the way for an announcement of victory which should be consistent with his own safety. Diplomatic staff work was at once set in motion in the Quai d'Orsay, and the rumour was sedulously spread in Paris that the British Government, in virtue of the humanitarian sentiments which always characterised it, had decided to save Germany from ruin by undertaking to back an immediate international loan for Germany. This report found its way into the British Press as an item of news, purporting to record an actual decision which had been taken by the British Government. There was no truth in it, and the kite flew back harmlessly to Paris. M. Poincaré thereupon dropped the idea and deferred his hope.

The idea itself had been cunning. France wanted money. She could not get it from Germany, because the attempt to create "the will to pay" in Germany had had the opposite effect of galvanising German determination not to pay, and at the same time of making it impossible for her to pay. She could not get it in France,

because the thrifty French peasant had been taught that as a result of the occupation of the Ruhr, German gold would pour into the French coffers, and the peasant would be confused if, instead of that, he was asked to subscribe to a loan to meet the losses of the occupation. She could not get it in the United States, because as far back as 1917 the United States had decided not to lend any more money to France except indirectly on a British endorsement of the resultant obligation. Subsequent events seem to have justified American business sense in this case.

The only market in the whole world which therefore could conceivably be applied to for a French loan was the London market. In view of the delicate situation resulting from the French repudiation of her existing debt to Britain, and from the public exposure made in the British White Paper, it was clearly out of the question for the French Government to ask directly for a further loan from London. If, however, on humanitarian grounds, the British Government could be induced to "back" (which in practice would mean to "contribute") a loan for Germany, the problem would be solved, because it has been common form, in all the proposed schemes for such a loan, that a percentage of the proceeds should be earmarked for an immediate discharge of Germany's reparations liability. Fifty-two per cent. of it therefore would go to Paris, by virtue of the Spa percentages—perhaps even more than 52 per cent., because at the same time the Quai d'Orsay was ventilating a claim for a revision of the Spa percentages in favour of France. London gold, so ran M. Poincaré's dream, would thus flow through Berlin to Paris.

On the other hand, there are eminent economists who still maintain that the international loan idea, if effected through the League of Nations, and if the loan be contributed internationally, would have much to recommend it. The main difference, in their view, between the British debt to the United States, which is being paid, and the German reparation debt to the Allies, which is not being paid, is that the British debt is the result of a loan which was directly asked for by the British Government, represents an obligation over the British signature, and is being paid therefore willingly as a matter of national honour. As the German Government, on the other hand, signed the Treaty of Versailles under protest and under a sense of injustice, the national feeling in Germany is engaged not in the payment but in the non-payment of the liability. If the reparations liability could be translated into a debt liability voluntarily incurred over the signature of the German Government, Germany, it is argued, would find as little difficulty in paying it as Britain finds in paying America.

The way to bring this about, according to the view which I

interpret, would be to place the whole matter of reparations into the hands of the League of Nations. The League would float an international loan for Germany, as it did for Austria, and the loan would be big enough to enable Germany at once to pay off her whole reparations liability under discount. She would then be left instead with an obligation towards her creditors which had been directly and voluntarily incurred. The psychological difference would, according to this argument, make all the difference in practice.

In passing it is perhaps worth recording two additions to the curiosities of M. Poincaré's career (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1923, pp. 241-2). Although M. Poincaré thinks of the Ruhr by day, dreams of it by night and speaks of it on Sundays, he has never been in the Ruhr since the occupation began. He has travelled several times to his native Bar-le-Duc, but has never found it in his heart to cross the frontier. The second curiosity is that he persists against all discouragement from Brussels in hitching Belgium to France in all his diplomatic dialèctics *vis-à-vis* Great Britain. At the beginning of the Ruhr occupation, he similarly exploited the suggestive association of ideas by always referring to the occupation as our "Allied" occupation. Since British policy forced him reluctantly to drop that epithet he has clung to "Franco-Belgian" as a substitute, not only to describe the occupation, but to describe French reparations policy and French feeling in general. It is of course a useful diplomatic device when it succeeds in establishing the association of ideas in people's minds; but M. Poincaré has had little luck.

THE GERMAN SURRENDER.

The catastrophic nature of the German collapse was illustrated by the way in which the mark broke loose from its bearings. On October 11th it fell to the value of 30,000,000,000 to the £ and proceeded at once, on the same day, to demonstrate its fantastic instability by recovering to the closing price of 15,000,000,000. During the following few days one could buy for £1 a quantity of marks which before the war would have been worth just over £1,000,000,000 sterling. The hawking bankers who sold marks at a million a penny in the Strand were engaged in gross profiteering. Hitherto the Russian rouble had been regarded as the classic expert in fluctuation; yet the rouble was outtroubled by the mark a hundred times over. When the rouble disappeared from the list of quoted securities at the end of 1922, it stood at 220,000,000 to the £.

It had been obvious since July that the German Government

was giving the mark its head, partly in despair, partly as a means of underselling foreign competitors and allowing tax evasion. The final descent to complete chaos was begun at the end of August when circulation was being increased by nearly 100 per cent. per week, and a new word, a "billiard," had to be coined to denote one thousand million millions (a milliard being the term for a thousand millions). Even before that time the extreme Nationalist elements in Germany had been raising their heads. In Bavaria Herr Hitler's "National Socialist Volunteers" were making demonstrations of an increasingly military character. "Fascist" movements were seen in other parts of Germany, notably in Württemberg, and the first hint of the seriousness of the Government's weakness was given on July 14th, when it became known that the notorious Captain Ehrhardt, the extreme nationalist and monarchist organiser, had been allowed to escape with impunity. Franco-Belgian policy played straight into the hands of the German extremists. Even the parties of the German Left which were opposed to sabotage in the Ruhr refused to countenance the complete cessation of passive resistance except on conditions which gave some security about future French policy. The Government of Herr Cuno therefore went as far as any section of German opinion in its desire to conciliate the French.

It is possible that the Cuno Government could have survived its nationalist opposition if it had not been that the internal finances were reduced to such a pass that the Government lost the support in internal policy of some sections of the Left which supported its foreign policy. A drastic scheme of new taxation presented on August 8th was made inevitable by the widening disproportion between revenue and expenditure, the ratio of which had dropped from 85 per cent. in May to less than 3 per cent. when the new scheme of taxation was drawn up; but it failed to arrest Socialist criticisms. On August 11th the Cuno Government resigned because the Social Democrats and the Centre party withdrew their support. Herr Stresemann, in forming the new Government on August 14th, decided on the experiment of a *grosse Koalition*, in which the Social Democrats were prominently represented by Herr Hilferding, as Minister of Finance. It was this Great Coalition that finally decided to put an end to the official subsidies for passive resistance in the Ruhr, and to attempt to placate the French Government by a declaration of Germany's willingness to pay accompanied by an offer of guarantees chargeable on German industry. The exchange of Notes between London and Paris had been followed by an exchange of public speeches between Berlin and Paris. M. Poincaré kept up so intransigent a tone in his Sunday speeches that the Stresemann Government in the end had

to surrender without receiving any compensating assurances whatever from Paris.

It was on September 25th, after eight and a-half months of hopeless struggle, that Herr Stresemann, after consulting the Federal Prime Ministers and the representatives of the Ruhr, decided to give up passive resistance. The surrender was announced in a Presidential Proclamation which tempered defeat with defiance. "German liberty will not be an object of negotiation or barter," it protested, and, although passive resistance in the Ruhr was at an end, it proceeded to declare that Germany would never surrender "the smallest piece of German soil."

During the following fortnight Germany underwent an agony of resentment which at every moment threatened to split both the Great Coalition and the whole machinery of government. A Bavarian dictator shot up in protest against surrender to France. No sooner had Dr. von Kahr assumed his dictatorial powers in Munich under the title of "General Commissioner of the State" than an answering dictatorship was set up in Berlin to combat the threatened disintegration. The whole Reich was then mapped out on a regional system of jurisdiction, the seven regions being placed under the orders of seven generals. While the fate of Herr Stresemann's Great Coalition was hanging in the balance and the whole future of Europe as well as of Germany was at stake, M. Poincaré, unbelievable as it appears, was indulging his congenial ecstasy of proclaiming that the French troops would stay in the Ruhr until Germany had paid her indemnity. The Paris Press was full of alarm and indignation at the prospect of reviving nationalism in Germany, and at the same time was backing up the French Government whose policy had been responsible for that phenomenon. It was entirely due to M. Poincaré that Herr von Kahr, the friend of Prince Rupprecht, had seized the helm in Bavaria.

While the trial of strength was contested between the All-Germany dictator, Dr. Gessler, and the Bavarian dictator, Dr. von Kahr, and while the mark was providing exercise in what a French writer called "astronomical figures," it would have been very much to the point if Mr. Baldwin had again raised the question which he put to M. Poincaré on September 19th: has France no *arrière pensée* beyond pure reparations? It is a fair parable to recall that on the very day, September 25th, when Herr Stresemann and his colleagues decided on surrender, Mr. Baldwin was addressing the students of Philip Stott College, near Northampton, on the value of a good education. It was an admirable address, and it was admirable that he should have given it; but it threw into relief the fact that on the subject of European affairs he

uttered not one word in public, and was known to be taking no steps in private. It was not a satisfactory explanation to be told that the Government was waiting to consult the Dominion Prime Ministers who met in London on October 1st. The White Paper had been issued without waiting for the Imperial Conference, and its whole point was to represent action as a matter of urgency.

It was Germany's innate sense of discipline combined with a pronounced and dogged instinct of self-preservation which was mainly responsible for saving her from disruption during that crisis. Herr von Kahr refrained from proclaiming the Monarchist restoration, but foreign observers construed as a disquieting symptom the difficulty with which a minor monarchist rising in East Prussia was suppressed. Socialist opposition, it is true, played its part in keeping Bavarian nationalism within bounds; and the neutralising effect of the conflict of authority between the Berlin and the Munich dictators enabled Herr Stresemann to keep his Great Coalition alive. Every hour of every day placed him in danger, yet he kept his head and had the common sense and the statesmanship to resist Herr Stinnes's ultimatum which demanded the abolition of the eight hours' day as a condition of industrial co-operation. At the time of writing Germany's fate was still undecided. Herr Stinnes at one point threw down the mask and defied Herr Stresemann, at another he negotiated with General Degoutte in the Ruhr.

CORFU.

The end of the Corfu episode was worse even than had been foreseen after the scheme of the Ambassadors' Conference had been drawn up on September 14th (see October CONTEMPORARY, pp. 513-522). The Commission of Inquiry set up by the Ambassadors duly started its work at Janina on September 17th, the British representative being Major R. E. Harence, of the Second Lancers, who at the time of his appointment was in Constantinople. The Commission had been given a time-limit of five days in which to draw up and telegraph its "first observations" to the Ambassadors' Conference. Within that time-limit the Greek Government was to satisfy Clause 5 of the Ambassadors' Note of September 8th, which read: "The Greek Government undertakes to ensure in all the desirable conditions of celerity the search for and the exemplary punishment of the culprits." If the murderers of the Italian mission had not been discovered by then, the Commission had to report on "the conditions under which the search for them had been carried out," and the Ambassadors' Conference, in accordance with its Note of September 14th, would then have to decide whether the Greek Government had done

everything that could be reasonably expected of it, or whether the Ambassadors should adopt "measures of another nature . . . by way of coercion or penalty." It had been hinted in the Ambassadors' Note that such measures might include the handing over to Italy of the 50,000,000 lire deposited by the Greek Government as the security for the payment of whatever indemnity might be demanded by the Permanent Court of International Justice. In the event of the latter penalty being decided on, Italy would not only receive the 50,000,000 lire, but might "apply individually to the Hague Court for her occupation costs."

During the five days of the Inquiry Commission's work it became known that the British, French, and Japanese representatives were satisfied that the Greek Government was doing all it could to facilitate the work. On the Wednesday morning of that week (September 19th) the ceremonial part of the Greek amends for the murders was carried out. The Greek fleet fired twenty-one salutes each to the Italian, British, and French fleets drawn up in Phaleron Bay, the salutes being returned shot for shot. The scene was in melancholy contrast to other historic scenes that have been enacted in that famous bay. Not a Greek was to be seen on the Phaleron front, and Athens, which had stayed at home, heard but did not see the distant ships. At the end of the week everyone expected that by the following Thursday (September 27th) the whole affair would be closed in accordance with the decisions already reached by the Ambassadors' Conference and now in the process of execution; that is to say, that on the presentation of the Inquiry Commission's report the question of damages would be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, in accordance with the Ambassadors' Note of September 8th; and that on September 27th the Italians would evacuate Corfu.

The report of the Inquiry Commission was duly presented on September 22nd, and the Ambassadors' Conference met in Paris on September 25th to consider it. The meeting was adjourned till the following day, in the evening of which the Ambassadors issued an official *communiqué* in the course of which it was declared that the Conference of Ambassadors:—

"Having, in conformity with paragraph 5 of its Note of the 13th, examined this report from the point of view of execution of paragraph 5 of the Note of September 8th; Consider that on the day of the said report the guilty persons had not been discovered; That on the other hand several charges of negligence had been raised against the Greek authorities in connection with the conduct of the inquiry; That in so far as concerns the search for the culprits several negligences have been noted: Judging that the fifth condi-

tion of the Note of September 8th cannot be in consequence considered as fulfilled; Decides that by way of penalty on this account the Hellenic Government shall pay to the Italian Government the sum of 50,000,000 Italian lire; the Conference and the Italian Government renouncing the appeal to the Hague Court of International Justice provided for in paragraph 7 of the Note of September 8th as well as any other penalty, and considering the question as settled on their part except for special recourse by Italy to the Court of International Justice on the question of the cost of the occupation; Decides that the payment of the sum of 50,000,000 lire above referred to shall be effected by the transfer to the Italian Government of the sum of 50,000,000 lire deposited on September 10th with the Swiss National Bank; And that in consequence the Court of Justice will be asked to order the transfer of this sum by the Swiss National Bank to the Bank of Italy at Rome to the account of the Italian Government. The Conference takes note in this connection that the Italian Government declares that it will carry out on September 27th the decision previously taken to evacuate Corfu on that date."

LORD CREWE AND THE FIFTY MILLION LIRE.

That document was signed by Lord Crewe, British Ambassador in Paris, on behalf of the British Government, which thereby was implicated in a gross act of quibbling injustice perpetrated by "Great" Powers on a small Power which had deposited the 50,000,000 lire in good faith. If there is any honesty left in British public life, Parliament when it reassembles will insist against all evasion on two things: (1) the publication of the text of the Inquiry Commission's report presented on September 22nd; (2) an explanation from the Government of what happened at the Ambassadors' meetings on September 25th and 26th and why Lord Crewe signed the decision. The Government is likely to be called sharply to account for the depths to which it has allowed British diplomacy to sink during its short term of office. For the Government to have been guilty within one month of feeble scuttling over the Ruhr and of something approaching dishonesty over Corfu is not an achievement of which British diplomacy can be proud. At the beginning of the Corfu episode Lord Robert Cecil's fine stand for honest dealing established British prestige as something which the small States throughout the world could depend on. Lord Crewe, on September 26th, with a stroke of his pen bade the small States go boil their heads. On September 2nd, at Geneva, British policy antagonised Italian feeling because it stood openly for justice against an act of Italian injustice. On September 26th British

policy in Paris antagonised the States which had applauded on the former occasion, by walking over to the enemy's camp. There was neither consistent realism nor consistent idealism in British policy, which as a result reaped the worst of both worlds.

What in fact happened on September 25th and 26th was that the French and British Ambassadors submitted to the dictatorship of the Italian Ambassador, whose chief, Signor Mussolini, had instructed him to carry off the 50,000,000 lire under the threat of a continuance of the Italian occupation of Corfu beyond September 27th. The Ambassadors on September 25th had before them the Inquiry Commission's report, which informed them that the British, French, and Japanese members of the Commission had come to the conclusion that the motive of the murder of General Tellini and his colleagues had been personal vengeance, which implied that the murderers were probably not Greeks at all, but Albanians, but that the Italian representative was of the minority opinion—if any Italian opinion on this point can have any value—that the murders were political in motive.

How then was Baron Avezana able to induce Lord Crewe and M. Jules Cambon to tear up the Commission's report and to become accomplices with the Italian Government in stealing the 50,000,000 lire which had been deposited by the Greek Government in good faith? On September 26th Baron Avezana triumphantly produced his trump card. He recalled that on September 13th he had agreed, not that Italy would evacuate Corfu by September 27th unless in the meantime the Greek Government had been proved guilty of negligence in the search for the murderers, but that Italy would not evacuate unless in the meantime Greece had been proved to be not guilty of negligence. If a boy at an English school had behaved as Baron Avezana behaved in Paris, he would have received at the hands of his fellows the thrashing of his life. The Ambassadors of Britain and France, by contrast, not only approved, but became parties to an act of unscrupulous trickery perpetrated on a small and impoverished State which was helpless in their power. Nothing is gained by following Baron Avezana on to his own dialectical ground, but perhaps one may recall that whether his statement to the Ambassadors on September 26th represented the facts or not, it was completely beside the point. Even if on September 13th he had made a declaration which contained the quibble which he later made use of, the fact remained that on September 14th a Note of the Ambassadors' Conference—bearing Baron Avezana's own *imprimatur*—put on record Italy's undertaking to evacuate Corfu by September 27th "in any circumstances." This statement was drawn up *after* Baron Avezana's individual declaration; and if

it failed to interpret correctly what he had said, why did he sign it or if he wanted to repudiate his signature, why did he not repudiate it publicly, at once, before the Inquiry Commission started its work?

LORD ROBERT CECIL AND CORFU.

As was natural, the League's record in the Corfu episode became the subject of keen controversy. Lord Robert Cecil wrote a letter to the *Times* of October 3rd explaining that, after the event, the Council of the League passed a resolution (September 28th) which declared that "the members of the Council agree that any dispute likely to lead to a rupture between members of the League is within the sphere of action of the League, and that if it is not settled by diplomacy, arbitration, or judicial settlement, it is the duty of the Council to deal with it in accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant." Lord Robert added: "The Italian delegation concurred in this declaration, which seems quite explicit as to the competence of the League. It should help to remove any impression which may have been created that Italy is not whole-hearted in her acceptance of her obligations under the Covenant." It is hard to criticise Lord Robert Cecil, the chief founder of the League, on any matter connected with the League. His past work for the League is something that one respects. Lord Robert, however, is also a member of His Majesty's Government, and when the Cabinet travelled from September 2nd to September 26th he went with it and shared the responsibility. To read the impassioned protests with which at Geneva he denounced the Italian delegate's defiance of the League, side by side with his subsequent statement, quoted above, about Italy's "whole-hearted, &c.," is a melancholy disappointment. It is difficult to see how whitewashing of that kind can do the League any good. Would it not be better to try and strengthen the League, and make it fit for its work by advocating its transformation into a true League of Nations, including Germany and Russia?

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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AN IMPERIAL SCHOOL OF LAW.

LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN* in 1900 advocated the creation of a school or centre in London where the Colonial laws could be taught and studied. That proposal met with no response, though it might have been anticipated that the Imperial Institute was a suitable centre for the teaching of laws that so vitally affect the economic unity of the Empire. Many things have happened since 1900, and to-day it is realised that the Empire is a unity and that such a unity is something more than a sentimental attachment from various quarters to the Mother Country and to an ancient dynasty. The Five Years' War has given a new significance to the Empire, and the world is seeing, and especially seeing in the Imperial Conference, that Lord Beaconsfield's belief in a future tendency to think in terms of the Empire rather than in terms of Europe was a sound belief. The Empire is a League of Nations, which controls a vast proportion of the habitable globe and of the inhabitants thereon. It is a League that possesses an actual, an internal and essential unity, not merely a unity imposed from without. It is a League that supports and forms a great part of the world League of Nations, but it is itself a League in a state of permanent stability, internally untroubled by the ambitions and the fears of many of the nations with which it co-operates in the World League. It is a League with a long history of growth behind it, it is a League with a common sovereign who inspires universal loyalty, it is a League with a nationality common to all

* In an address to law students at Nottingham. *Journal of Comparative Legislation*. Vol. 2. N.S. 1900. p. 180.

The foundation of such a School of Law and Library would form, I venture to think, the best Imperial Memorial of the men from all parts of the Empire who fell in the late war in the cause of Law and Righteousness. All Souls' College, Oxford, is a precedent for such a Memorial. That famous centre of legal thought was founded as a memorial of the men who fell in the long mediæval struggle with France. A new centre of Imperial legal thought might justly be founded as a memorial of the struggle which was fought in the profound belief of all classes of Britons that the issue was the issue of Right against Might, of Law as opposed to Force. Such a memorial would represent the spirit in which the Empire as a whole entered into the struggle, and would mark the determination of the Empire to make law and equitable dealing the spirit of Imperial growth.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

REVIEWS.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.*

The publication of the third and concluding volume of this monumental history of British foreign policy from the advent of Napoleon to the present day may be said to crown the vast labours of that very learned historian and scholar, Sir Adolphus Ward. He is the *doyen* of all modern historians, and the link between them and the great Continental and English historical writers of the past half century and more. The range of knowledge, whether he is dealing with men and manners or with high polity and humanism, is unequalled in our generation, and the fact is reflected not only in the lists of his publications, but in the judicious and judicial influence that he has exerted on the historical thinking of our day. To the volume before us he contributes no chapter, but his influence is visible on every page. No one knows the period from 1866 onwards better than the Master of Peterhouse, and his co-ordinating force is plainly at work throughout the book.

The present volume begins with an account of the policy of Great Britain in the period from 1861 to 1874, when the country remained neutral during the great American Civil War and the Franco-German War. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell deals with our neutrality in Continental affairs, while Professor de Montmorency

* *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1793-1919.* Edited by Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch. Volume III., 1866-1919. (Cambridge: at the University Press.) 3rs. 6d. net.

discusses the relations of Great Britain and America as revealed in problems of sea-policy and in the struggle over the Alabama claims. Mr. W. H. Dawson concludes Book IV. by a balanced statement of the "Forward Policy and Reaction" of British polity in the period from 1874 to 1885, when problems were ripening in Central Asia, in the Near East, and in North-East Africa. It is the period of the great Berlin Congress, but the brilliancy of its opening with the dominating figure of Disraeli in the foreground dies down into the dismal days of January, 1885, when Khartoum fell and Gordon died. The outstanding figures of the Congress were, of course, Beaconsfield, Gortchakoff, and Bismarck. Beaconsfield and Gortchakoff

"were rivals; but their rivalry was that of clever chess-players, sedate, polite, and good-humoured, each straining resolutely for his own hand, but always with perfect loyalty to the rules of the game. Beaconsfield was for a time something of an enigma to Bismarck, who, himself the author of so many *coups*, was always in fear that the inscrutable English statesman with the Oriental face and temperament would spring a dramatic surprise upon the Congress. He touched a weak point in British diplomacy when he discovered that Beaconsfield and his adjutant, Lord Salisbury, were not on all points agreed, the latter clearly not sharing the Prime Minister's extravagant Russophobia, and more disposed than his colleague to bring a European, international mind to the judgment of the problems in hand."

Mr. Dawson's estimate of the two English statesmen will not receive universal acceptance. There is to-day a considerable swing in opinion back to the view of the greatness of Disraeli as a European statesman, and a good deal of comment on Lord Salisbury's lack of foresight. Mr. Dawson, in his further chapter on "Imperial policy in the Old and the New World, 1885-1899," dwells again on the "international mind" of Lord Salisbury, and pays him the tribute that "the pre-eminence to which he attained came by none of the arts and wiles and shifts of the diplomatist, by no tricks of shallow skill, no resort to petty intrigue, no paltering with high principles or appeal to popularity, but was the tribute paid by international statecraft to a character in which strength and decision were conjoined with moderation, dignity, and lofty candour." No doubt this is all true, but if true it seems to put Lord Beaconsfield in an even more serene region, since Mr. Dawson tells us that Lord Beaconsfield's "overshadowing personality and dominating will seemed for a time to arrest his colleague's natural development." There had been a time when Lord Robert Cecil was by no means inclined to be ruled by Mr. Disraeli, and on the whole it is difficult to compare two statesmen who almost in succession, in different ways but with equal sense of utter loyalty to their country, secured what was practically

dominance in the politics of the world. Probably both Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury at times, and in a very serious measure, "backed wrong horses" (to use the latter's phrase), but historians to-day, as the events of half a century ago are falling into perspective, are beginning to realise anew the greatness of Disraeli. It was perhaps Disraeli who first realised, to quote Mr. Cruttwell, that "British foreign policy was growing to be imperial rather than European."

But the students of this careful and well-balanced volume will turn with eagerness from the far-off days of Beaconsfield, Gladstone, and Salisbury to almost current developments, though Sir Valentine Chirol's full account of the fateful period of the Boer War should detain them, and make them realise that a good many of our latest woes and triumphs turn on the events and the politics of twenty years ago. Yet probably Dr. G. P. Gooch's unimpassioned survey of the twelve years before the Five Years' War, and of the year that followed it, will attract most attention. The survey is, we need hardly say, entirely fair and judicial in tone, and it is incisive in presentation. Though the tenor of the whole volume is rather in the direction of condemning French ambitions in Europe, Africa, and Asia, Dr. Gooch lays no special stress on the fact. Indeed, the *Entente* of 1904 appeared to banish all the frowardness of our near neighbour, while there seemed to come up in Europe generally a sense of peace and goodwill. Indeed, Germany and England began to retake the ways of mutual friendliness. But in 1908 "the sky was quickly filled with driving clouds," and the growth of the German navy created great alarm and demanded careful policy. England did what she could. Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Churchill from 1908 to 1911 "led a crusade for social reform and a reduction of armaments," and every effort was made by King Edward VII. "to diminish the tension which was beginning to threaten peace." The Agadir crisis, and successive Balkan wars, led the nations, despite all efforts, down the slope to Armageddon, and at last the World War came in August, 1914. England entered it unwillingly in one sense, inevitably in another. It was, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George in 1918, "an obligation of honour." We were morally, though not legally, pledged to go to the assistance of France and Belgium in the circumstances that arose. Whether the situation could have been averted is another matter. Dr. Gooch writes, "On such conjectures it is not possible to express a final judgment." But certainly Sir Edward Grey, and indeed all English statesmen, strove to avert the terrible issue. In the result we plunged almost utterly unprepared into our greatest struggle for life, and "the greatest of this country's Wars has ended as the

greatest of her triumphs." To-day "the Balance of Power has ceased to exist; for the supremacy of France on land is as unchallengeable as British supremacy at sea." What of the future?—

"In a new world, where familiar landmarks have been swept away by the raging tempest, British statesmen have discovered that the highest interests and the abiding prosperity of their country are bound up with the vitality and authority of the one operative organisation for the preservation of peace—the League of Nations."

And that is no mean goal to have achieved, even after a century and a quarter of political and social unrest.

The first volume of the work surveyed the Napoleonic struggle, the second volume showed us the factor of industrial unrest and the uprising of democracy in national and international polity, the third volume describes the coming of the human Thunderstorm, and makes the mind think, when all is done, about British Foreign Policy in days not of war but of universal industrial competition. British Foreign Policy must become essentially Imperial, as Disraeli foresaw so long ago.

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BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS.*

Professor Tait has carried to a most effective conclusion the labours of the late Mr. Adolphus Ballard on the subject of British Borough Charters, a theme of extraordinary interest and historical importance which in the past attracted the labours of Professor Maitland and Miss Bateson. Mr. Ballard's book on the Charters issued between 1042 and 1216, a scientific work which received the widest recognition, gave promise of further labours in the same field. He had in fact before his death in 1915 projected a further volume dealing with the Charters issued between 1216 and the death of Edward I., and this volume had been carried a considerable way towards completion. Mr. F. W. Cuthbertson had helped in the work and carried it on at intervals during the war, but he was called abroad at the coming of peace and now Professor Tait has revised the whole material and substantially added to it. The present work is one of the highest value and will be indispensable to those who are engaged in research dealing with the origin of British cities and great (and small) towns. The method of classifying the clauses in the Charters adopted by Mr. Ballard is retained, and rightly retained. It has been criticised, but for purposes of research work

* *British Borough Charters, 1216-1307*. Edited by Adolphus Ballard and James Tait, Honorary Professor of History in the University of Manchester. Cambridge: at the University Press. 42s. net.

and comparative study it is the best possible plan, and it is one that makes it possible in a limited space to deal with a vast mass of material. For the purpose (since the sources are well supplied) it would be useless to reprint many identical clauses. Nine Charters that belong to the period of the first volume are given, namely, Glasgow (before 1211), Inverkeithing (1165-1214), Kelso (1165-1214), Launceston (1141-1167), "Radeclive" (1189), Rochester (1154-89), St. Andrews (1153-7), Thomastown (C. 1210?), Ulverston (c. 1200). The Rochester Charter is very brief: "I will also and command that the said monks (*ipsi monachi*) shall have the first purchase of merchandise after me and my ministers in purchasing their victuals in the City of Rochester." There are some few errors in the first volume that do not seem to have been corrected in this such as the statement that Greenwich had a Mint.

The volume opens with a valuable introduction describing the Borough Charters of the thirteenth century and defining, so far as it can be defined, a borough. Boroughs sprang from Royal or from seignorial grants by mesne lords and were, broadly speaking, vills "in which the tenements were held by burgage tenure." They represent economic or political efforts, and often both, to create or recognise centres of trade and industry. The process was hardened by the need to have centres from which representatives could be sent to Parliament, and this need resulted in the recognition of some towns which were not strictly boroughs and in the rejection of boroughs that were economically unfit to bear the burden of representation. A borough from 1252 had to have a Watch of twelve persons, and when the Sheriffs fixed on the boroughs that were to send members to Parliament it was almost necessary to fall back on this convenient rule. The borough was certainly a legal as well as an economic entity, and its Court conducted a good deal of local business in relation to the small civil causes, but the Court was largely dominated by the local lord if the borough was seignorial, and it was not until the town was granted at fee farm to the burgesses that the Court became really independent. The local Court rarely ousted the Royal jurisdiction, though sometimes the Justices in eyre held their Sessions in a borough which was not a Shire town.

The analysis of the Charters shows in detail this fascinating subject. First there is the group of provisions dealing with the formation of the borough. The next division contains the Charter provisions as to burgage tenure and the law of real property. The boroughs are taken in the order of date of creation. Thus the subject of grants of burgages begin with Abbots Bromley in 1222 and ends with Newcastle-on-Tyne in 1298. There is less material than might have been expected dealing with succession on intestacy,

but the famous change at Leicester from ultimogeniture (the so-called borough-English) to primogeniture in 1255-6 is fully set out. The provisions as to the right of will-making, a significant borough privilege, are full of interest. It is curious to note that the Chard Charter of 1271-2 forbids the leaving of property to Jews. This looks like an echo from a much earlier Charter. Another interesting point is the survival of the Celtic rights of kindred. These vestiges are of great historical importance.

But historical interest teems in every section. The clauses as to tenurial privileges, to burgess franchise, to jurisdictional privileges in the normal Courts and their procedure, and in ancient modes of trial (such as trial by battle), punishment and distress, to mercantile privileges and to borough finances, to borough officers and to public services all show that the history of social life and of economics owes much to the material gathered together in this laborious and monumental work.

* * *

THE BRITISH ASSOCIATION.*

The practice of publishing in a single volume the presidential address and other salient addresses delivered at the Annual Meeting of the British Association is an excellent one. Sir Ernest Rutherford's address (which took the form of a speech and a broadcast speech) will be welcomed in cold type. It is a document which demands very careful study and this is now possible. The mysteries that still exist in respect to the electrical structure of matter are brought out very clearly. There is as yet little if any information on the distribution of the protons and electrons in the atom, though there is some certainty as to the number of these ultimate units in the nucleus of all atoms. It seems clear, however, that while the law of the inverse square holds for the electrical forces some distance from the nucleus, "this law breaks down inside the nucleus . . . and it may be that new and unexpected forces may come into importance at the very small distances separating the protons and electrons in the nucleus." The complex nucleus of a heavy atom is "in a sense a world of its own, little, if at all, influenced by the ordinary physical and chemical agencies at our command." Does it in all cases represent a store of energy ready for release if we could only find the key, or is this true only "of atoms like the radioactive atoms which have not yet reached the final state for equilibrium"? If helium is forming in the interior

* *The Advancement of Science: 1923 Addresses delivered at the 91st Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Liverpool, September, 1923.* (John Murray.) 6s. net.

of hot stars, then the cooling of stars such as the sun is indefinitely postponed by the energy set free in the process of formation. We have not, however, and perhaps are unlikely to secure experimental evidence that helium can be formed from hydrogen, and our information on the subject of energy-changes in the formation or disintegration of atoms in general is as yet too uncertain and speculative to give a decided opinion on future possibilities in this direction. Sir Ernest Rutherford, speaking of the renaissance of physics, notes "the comparative simplicity of the ideas that have ultimately emerged. . . . No one could have anticipated that the general relation between the elements would prove to be of so simple a character as we now believe it to be. It is an illustration of the fact that Nature appears to work in a simple way, and that the more fundamental the problem, often simpler are the conceptions needed for its explanation." The conclusion is one of vast significance.

The addresses delivered by Dr. Vaughan Cornish and Sir W. H. Beveridge are of peculiar practical interest to the British people at the present time when there are all sorts of strange theories on foot as to the necessary restriction by artificial means of the population. The new Malthusianism received little mercy from Dr. Cornish when he dealt with the geographical position of the British Empire, or, indeed, from Sir William Beveridge in respect to the problem of population and unemployment: "increased birth-control . . . is irrelevant to our present troubles." Dr. Cornish, after surveying the British Empire, concludes that "the lands of the Empire are united by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and strategically separated by the North Pacific." The Empire has an "Intermediate Position among the commercial, national, religious and racial communities of the world such as is occupied by no other State." Australia is a vast land which has for the most part a climate "in which British children thrive and develop true to type." The Heart of Australia in the basin of the Murray River "is equal in size to France, Italy, and Germany combined, which have a population of more than one hundred and thirty million." The exclusion of coloured people from Australia makes it necessary for the white races to fill the fertile land. There is room for the coloured races in Asia, but the only moral ground for excluding them from Australia is that Great Britain should fill up the empty spaces. There is the same need on other grounds in Canada. Hence the alleged economic need for a reduced population in Great Britain is unsound. There is dire need that the British race should increase. Otherwise "we cannot ensure the internal peace and external security of the Empire, or the continuance of its beneficent work of enlarging commerce and restricting the range of war." Sir William Beveridge makes it clear that

the questions of unemployment and of population in these islands are distinct problems. Even excessive growth of population does not cause unemployment. Unemployment is dependent on, is a function of, industrial organisation and methods.

* * *

A WEST COUNTRY POET.*

We have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Ian Kelway strikes a new note in English poetry. His technique is excellent, his grasp of history is strong, and yet his realism is due to his full appreciation of the spirit of history, of the reality of tradition, of the eternal figures of comedy and tragedy, which change their cloaks but not their characteristics. Mr. Kelway's historical poems are alive because they draw out of the theme, be it an inn, a haunted mill, a castle, a cathedral, an ancient garden, the something which makes it of living interest to the present. Mr. Kelway's sense of the romantic is of this nature: romance means to him not merely the aroma of the past, not merely a reproduction in vital form of past and noble actions, but something which is eternal, clothe it how we will. He tells the dreadful, the revolting tragedy of Pibsbury Mill in such a fashion as to make clear enough that in any age if the moral sanction is relaxed men become worse than beasts, but that amid the intolerable gloom the Greek spirit of tragedy may rise to fearful heights and deeds in the simplest folk. No one can read this terrible poem without realising that Mr. Kelway is a poet who may have great achievements before him. The poem is not in the least like the work of Robert Browning, but Mr. Kelway has grasped in exactly the way that the great Victorian would have grasped the terribly tragic (in the strict Greek sense) possibilities of the theme of the village girl outraged by the drunken Roundhead troopers. To what extent the story is true we do not know. Cromwell is supposed to have kept his troops in hand; but that is hardly the point. The point is the girl's almost inconceivable revenge involving her own death.

Mr. Kelway's reflective and descriptive poems are more charming but not less suggestive of the historic and spiritual powers that haunt our ancient land. We see "the Twilight over Dartmoor," we see

"The glam'rous land, which haunts me, saps my will,
Powerless to combat, the weird, eerie past,
Which lives materialised on the wild moor."

* *Poet's Light*. By Ian Kellway. (London: The Folk Press, 16, Harper Street.) 3s. 6d. net.

The past has, in a sense, conquered the poet's will. He is enmeshed in it, and, perhaps, till he controls it and shows that it is part of an eternal growth he will not come fully into his own. But his power of singing will lead him out of the net. The song, "Our Wood," has a note of its own which gives much promise:—

"I know a wood in Devon
Which hides a teeny dell,
And all the fays of Devon
Have gathered here to dwell;
There's the Tree Fay, the Moss Fay,
The Stream Fay, too,
The Boulder, Fern, and Flower Fay,
And—well, just you."

The description when "Spring cheers the Vale" is full of charm:—

"As I came nigh to Ashton
The fields were all aglow
With daffodils a-nodding
To the gentle zephyrs' blow;
As I came nigh to Ashton
The gorse was all aglow.

As I came down to Chudleigh
The fields were gleaming white;
Each mead was quilted—snowy-decked—
With daisies thick bedight;
As I came down to Chudleigh
The fields were daisy-white."

Mr. Kelway's grave verse, such as his tribute to a Marlborough College prefect who fell in 1914, has a certain character and nobility of form and essence that is unmistakable. He gives us a poem entitled "Poet's Light," that light by which the poet reads the book of eternity,

"Uncertain, vague, and bordering on suspense,"

which is in a way the keynote to the book. Mr. Kelway is feeling his way towards a theory of poetry, as William Wordsworth felt his way, and he is feeling it in a mood of uncertainty and suspense. All poets must find their own path and pursue it without fear, often carving it out of what some may feel to be the dim inane. If a poet has the grasp of his tools, of his technique, the path may lead very high, to very noble world-inspiring things, and we hope this will be the case with Mr. Kelway.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE BRITISH RACE.*

The late Dr. Henry Bradley and Dr. Robert Bridges were some time since troubled for a solution of the problem in nomenclature relating to the persons who are of British nationality and owe allegiance to the British Crown. A correspondent from the Sudan inquired of Dr. Bradley: "Cannot a satisfactory *nomen unitatis* be found for *British*? I mean a word to express *one of the British*, as we use Frenchman to express *one of the French*. Otherwise we seem to be permanently saddled with *Britisher*, a word that one constantly hears abroad." Dr. Bradley rejected the term Briton used in *Rule Britannia* and in the *Death of Sir John Moore*. Dr. Bridges accepts the rejection, but says that "the term *British* does not suffer so badly from the disqualifying objection that Dr. Bradley urges against *Briton*," but add that persistence of the phrase, "I smell the blood of an *Englishman*," despite the correction to "British man" (made by Shakespeare or an Editor in the text of *King Lear*) "shows how unable the word *British* is to take the place of *English*." But is that so? It is true that the term *English* was, and is, used to denote the language which grew up from a Teutonic basis and absorbed British, Latin, and French elements. The Teutonic language conquered its rivals (though it lost itself in the process), but that is hardly true of the Teutonic race which brought the language. In a great measure the Teutons were absorbed by the Celtic or Brythonic basis of the island society, and though it was, and is, sound in some measure to maintain the name *English* for the language, despite the fact that the language is composite to a degree unknown perhaps elsewhere, yet it is not historically correct or true to say the same with respect to the race. The percentage of the original Teutonic blood in the British race is probably very small indeed. There is no evidence as to the numbers of the invading hosts of the fifth century, but there is a great deal of evidence that they did not displace the Brythonic inhabitants in any thorough fashion. Brythonic blood survived in all parts of the country, and it is not probable that the Teutonic invasion was more extensive than, or as extensive as, the later Danish invasions. Teutonic customs and agriculture, for instance, never secured a foothold in Kent. If, then, it is necessary, as a matter of tradition with a sound etymological basis, to retain the name *English* for the language, it does not follow that it would be equally strict to attempt to retain the name *English* for the people. For more than two centuries the name *Britain* for the whole island has secured an

* *Society for Pure English, Tract No. XIV., on the Terms Briton, British, Britisher.* By Henry Bradley and Robert Bridges. Preposition at end by H. W. Fowler. Correspondence, &c. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press.) 2s. 6d. net.

increasing vogue, while no one has ever suggested that the *British* Empire should be called the *English* Empire. It is true that the Americans, for some obscure reason, use the term *Anglo-Saxon* to cover the English-speaking race, but certainly Dr. Bridges is mistaken when he says that this absurd term is "generally used" for the whole English-speaking race. The Germans formerly liked to see it used, and on some occasions claimed cousinship or kinship with Great Britain and the United States. Kinship there certainly was and is, the kinship of being part of the same somewhat late waves of the Indo-European dispersion, but scientifically that kinship can hardly be related to the fact that a Teutonic tongue effected a footing in South Britain in the fifth century, and was sufficiently convenient to secure the name *England* for a part of the isle. In blood the Germans are much nearer to the French than to the English, and the fact perhaps accounts for the persistent unfriendliness of the two races. They know each other too well.

The terms *British* and *Britain* are deeply rooted not only in the language but in the hearts of the British people. The nationality of all subjects of the British Crown is *British*. That is a popular as well as a legal fact, and it is because of this fact that the Americans have invented the hideous term *Britisher*. There is no reason at all why we should not use, as our Celtic brethren in Brittany have always used, the word *Briton* to represent a person who is a member of the *British* race. It is a good word; it exactly defines the nationality of a subject of the British Crown; it is the name that naturally belongs to a subject of the British Empire. The word *English* is admittedly out of the question; *Britisher* is an affront to decency; and only *Briton* remains: an excellent name of fame.

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MR. CHURCHILL'S BOOK. *

We must record at once the publication of the second volume of Mr. Churchill's *Account*, as he calls it, of the World Crisis that will be represented in history as the Five Years' War. Criticism of the technical and political aspects of the book there will be, but for the moment it is necessary to draw attention to its scope and purpose. The first volume dealt with "the World Crisis, 1911-1914." The second volume deals with 1915, "with a year of ill-fortune to the cause of the Allies":—

"Brilliant opportunities presented themselves in vain; grave mistakes were made, and losses were incurred measureless in their

* *The World Crisis, 1915.* By the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty 1911 to 1915. (Thornton Butterworth.) 3os. net.

pain. The assignment and the division of the responsibility for these events is a task at once difficult and invidious. Moreover, I was for a time an actor exercising an influence or even an authority, sometimes decisive and often potent, upon the unfolding of the tragedy. I was brought by the convictions I held and the course I took into unyielding conflict with two of the most honoured and famous war-figures of our national life—Lord Fisher and Lord Kitchener. Both are now silent for ever. Yet my contention persists, nor could I without insincerity, without concealment, without a woeful surrender of the truth as I see it, fail to make that contention good."

The book is, then, confessedly a contentious book, and Mr. Churchill very properly disclaims the position of an historian. Yet all the same the volume is an historical document, since opinions play a great part in the structure of history. Mr. Churchill has a right to his opinions, strongly and pertinaciously held, and considering the position that he held as First Lord from 1911 to 1915, the recording of those opinions (the recording of the persistent opinion, for instance, in favour of the Dardanelles adventure in the teeth of Lord Fisher's repudiation of the adventure) is a necessary step. There is one difficulty that must be felt. Mr. Churchill publishes a number of official documents. No doubt these documents are necessary to the compilation of this record, but it is desirable that the publication should be justified. Many of these documents have been published officially. Ought any others to be included in a book like this until they have become public property? We do not desire especially to criticise Mr. Churchill's action. Many others of the actors in the administration of affairs during the Great War have done the same, have published documents to which they had only an official right of access. Certainly no permanent officials in the Admiralty or any other Government Department would be allowed to publish official documents without special official permission. It is desirable that the technical question should be settled. Mr. Churchill defends himself on the ground that other persons of importance have done the same, and that "it is absurd to argue that the facts should not be fully published, or that obligations of secrecy are violated by their disclosure in good faith." Certainly no one would attack Mr. Churchill's disclosures on the ground of lack of good faith. The one point is, had he, and others who have done the same, a technical right to use official documents for publication in a book which is certainly a private work, a book that is not official in any sense of the word? The question ought to be settled by Parliament at an early date.

That the work is very controversial goes without saying, since Mr. Churchill is conscious "of running counter to many established opinions, to the dominant military doctrines of those days, and

to some extent to the naval performance." He therefore submits "the convictions by which I was actuated" to the consideration of the public. The public will no doubt realise that the conflict is between a layman and the professional men of the two great Services. The amateur is often right when he opposes the professional, but after all Mr. Churchill, like most Cabinet Ministers, was an entire amateur in the work for which he was responsible. That is our British system, and there is something to be said for its extraordinary illogicality. The book opens with the deadlock in the West that existed at the end of 1914. The idea of the attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula was, however, already in the air. The creation of the Tanks is described, though in fact these wonderful weapons were not used until August, 1916. The action of the Dogger Bank took place on January 24th, 1915. Four days later the fatal decision as to the Dardanelles was taken, and even Lord Fisher, "the only rebel," came into the scheme. The idea of "fighting a way into the Marmora" was undertaken "because we were told that no military force was available, and in response to the appeals for help from Lord Kitchener and the Grand Duke." Mr. Churchill does not "regret the effort. It was good to go as far as we did. Not to persevere—that was the crime." This volume is really the story of the Dardanelles adventure, though of course there is much else, such as the account of the first defeat of the U-Boats which attempted as from February 18th, 1915, to blockade the British Isles. In three months the attack was foiled. Mr. Churchill writes of the whole Dardanelles enterprise as a series of tragedies, tragedies that the Fates allowed to happen because "it was not ordained that the world should escape easily from Armageddon, that victory should bring triumph and profit to any of the combatants, or that old systems should endure unchastened among men." No doubt everyone looks at the failure of great schemes in this way. There is a certain egoism in it, but after all the Plan of Things endures and may be consistent with Mr. Churchill's fatalistic suggestion that necessary supernatural forces fought against his plans.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Professor Pribram's "Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918" should be closely studied by all who desire to understand the causes and events of the world-war. The distinguished author of "The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary" was invited in 1922 to deliver lectures before the University of London on the recent diplomacy of his country, and this little volume is the result. In 120 luminous pages, in which there is not

* Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.

a superfluous word, he narrates and explains the course of Austrian policy from the Bosnian crisis to the *débâcle* of 1918, enriching his story with new material from the Vienna archives. The author speaks throughout in calm and level tones, and his impartiality is beyond praise. Among the most striking features of the book are the character-studies of the two last Hapsburg rulers, of the murdered Franz Ferdinand, and of their advisers, of whom Aehrenthal alone has any claim to greatness. He analyses without defending the conduct and motives of Berchtold in July, 1914, who staked the very existence of the empire on the improbable event of a successful struggle. "Austria, but for the war, might have existed as a Great Power for many years longer. The world-war was therefore the immediate occasion for the downfall of the old monarchy. But the deeper causes of its collapse lay in the irreconcilable antagonism of the different nationalities, which aimed at an independence incompatible with the idea of Imperial unity, and of the ascendancy which the Germans had enjoyed for hundreds of years." In other words, the realm of the Hapsburgs was mechanical, not organic. The Austrian problem, he adds, is by no means solved by the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy, and it remains one of the most difficult as well as one of the most important questions of European politics. The Danubian States need one another's resources, and a policy of high tariffs and exclusive nationalism is disastrous for them all and for the world. Neither Professor Pribram nor any other Austrian dreams of the political reunion of the Succession States; but some form of economic co-operation must be devised if the new order is to succeed. Meanwhile, the little Austrian Republic has been rescued from financial chaos by the League of Nations.

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Mr. E. A. Parry, one of the most eminent of County Court Judges, dedicates this book on "The Seven Lamps of Advocacy" to "The Northern Circuit where I learned these things." The lamps are the lamps of Honesty, Courage, Industry, Art, Eloquence, Judgment, and Fellowship. Certainly the plea for honesty is less necessary to-day than it has sometimes been. The great Cockburn declared that an advocate must uphold the interests of his client *per fas* and not *per nefas*, and Mr. Parry rightly says that "the best advocates of all generations have been devotees of honesty." Yet some great advocates have been dishonest, and that fact kept them out of the front rank. Judges soon get to know men in large practice who are not scrupulous, and such men will never attain the first rank. Courage is necessary as well as honesty; great courage, endless industry (intuition cannot take the place of work: to say it can is, as Lord Russell said, "all nonsense"), some wit or humour of a courteous type, eloquence (of the appropriate kind). The advocate needs, perhaps, next to honesty the power of judgment, of knowing the right line, the right argument, the strong points, and the virtues of silence, and the need to "watch the case." Last, but not least, there must be fellowship, for the law is a happy company, as Mr. Parry's many stories show.

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Mr. Frank H. Melland gives an account of the primitive Kaonde Tribe and their beliefs in his book entitled "In Witchbound Africa."† This account of the peoples of the Kasempa district of Northern Rhodesia is an ethnographical study in the light of comparative religion and social

* T. Fisher Unwin. 5s. net.
† Seeley, Service & Co. 21s. net.

science. Mr. Melland has worked for twenty-two years among Bantu people, eleven of these in the Kasempa area as a magistrate. The Kaonde tribe is almost certainly part of the Luba family, and took part in the great movement from the North-West that has gone on for perhaps five centuries. Succession among the Kaonde is matrilinear, but among the Lunda, the dominant race to which the Kaonde are subservient, the succession is in a transition stage between patriarchal (or filial, father to son) and matrilinear. This is a very important fact, and should be considered by all who are interested in comparative law. Religion is the life of the native, and there is the danger indicated by Mr. Melland that partial conversion to Christianity would, in fact, create heathens, natives who have lost their old and have not gained their new religion. It is necessary to study seriously the native faiths and the social fabric. This is an excellent book.

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We are grateful to Professor Leacock for the hours of merriment he has given us in this amusing book, "Over the Footlights and Other Fancies,"* by Stephen Leacock. It is full of wit and humour, mingled with a knowledge of human nature that one rarely meets with, and which delights us all. His comparison of the old melodrama, with its terror, agony, and murder, ending with the inevitable moral, to the cinematograph of to-day, which he describes as addling the human brain, is very witty, as is his criticism on the Greek drama. Professor Leacock, too, does not spare the great Napoleon, and his clever skit on the Emperor of the French, in *A Drama of the First Empire*, is delightful. The opening part of the play is intended to demonstrate the extraordinary fidelity towards the Emperor, on the part of the Marshals of France, whom he had created. The Professor goes on to show, in Scene II., how the great Napoleon used to dictate a letter, carry on a battle, and reveal business efficiency at its acme. All this he gives us with indescribable humour, holding our attention from first to last, for each fancy, as we are truly told, is an amusing farce, a gold mine for those who love fun and laughter. It is, indeed all through, a perfect antidote for depression, as with all its fun it carries with it an absorbing interest all its own.

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In "The New Constitution of India"† are reproduced three Rhodes lectures, delivered at University College, London, by that veteran jurist Sir Courtenay Ilbert, and three by Lord Meston. In the first lecture Sir Courtenay dealt with the factors which have brought about a change in the British policy of governing India, the change which has involved an increasing association of Indians in Indian public life. The lecturer made a point that there has been no real break of continuity in the policy of the India Office. The new Indian constitution is "eminently flexible," and Sir Courtenay considers that the new policy was good and wise as well as bold. In the subsequent lectures, he dealt with the Provincial Governments and the Central Government, while Lord Meston dealt with the genesis and principles of the new constitution, commended it, showed it at work, visualised the dangers that might have been involved in a failure to adopt a new policy, and expressed hope and confidence in the future.

* John Lane. 5s. net.

† University of London Press. 5s. net.

In "Early Rural Libraries: Their Policy and Organisation"* Mr. Robert D. Macleod, formerly Librarian to the Carnegie United Kingdom Trustees, sets forward a social educational policy in connection with libraries first adumbrated in the "Times" Educational Supplement. It is a policy of educational work in relation to adolescents and adults. It is necessary to connect opportunities for the widest reading with all continuation education, whether it be for adolescents or adults. The library and the librarian must carry on education beyond the organised stage. The library tradition is what we may call an "adult" tradition, and it can, and perhaps alone can, develop adult intellectual life. The scheme of social library work is to bring books into action, and the Rural Library movement is a link which will co-ordinate all other social educational movements. Professor W. G. S. Adams, in his "Foreword" to the book, points out that we are now seeing the birth of a rural community sense, and at the heart of it is the rural library. "It is the helpmate in all kinds of services. It has been proved to be a common ground on which different societies and parties can meet for a common service." The book shows how the library can be so used, and the technical side of the work in connection with rural voluntary associations, such as the Women's Institutes is fully explained. We trust that the book will be carefully read by all rural social workers.

* * *

"The Romance of Excavation: A Record of the Amazing Discoveries in Egypt, Assyria, Troy, Crete, &c.,"† by David Masters, is a book that will interest all those on whom the lure of discovery has taken hold, and comes at an opportune time, when, after years of patient work, the tomb of Tutankhamen has been unsanded, revealing treasures of untold value, and new discoveries are hoped for as the result of excavations in Rome now being undertaken. Doubtless more marvels in various parts of the world will come to light—for "if a task be dangerous known, the danger then is lure alone." It is always that which is beyond our reach which allures—whether it be to the heights above, or to the depths beneath, it matters not. The spirit of adventure is the making of a people, and the delving into the backward abyss of time has as great a fascination as the searching of the heavens for a new suspected star. The author of this book tells the story in a simple and popular manner that all who run may read. The wonderful discovery of the Rosetta Stone, now in the British Museum, and the story of the deciphering of it by Dr. T. Young, that gave the clue to the picture writing of the Egyptians, is told in a concise and rapid manner, and introduces the reader to the amazing discoveries that followed this find at the end of the eighteenth century, down to the work of Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Howard Carter. The story of excavation is, indeed, a romance, whether it be in Egypt, Babylon, Troy, or Crete, a search inexhaustible: the story of the unearthing of civilisations that have existed thousands of years ago, of arts that have been lost and found again, of the indomitable courage and perseverance of the brilliant men who, fired with the dauntless enthusiasm of discovery, have brought to light the evidence of forgotten or prehistoric ages. It is records such as these that encourage the student and lead him on to the path of research. There are many ways of digging, mental as well as physical, and still worlds to

* Grafton & Co., London. H. W. Wilson & Co., New York. 10s. 6d. net.

† John Lane. 6s. 6d. net.

conquer for the coming generations. The knowledge of the past should not only enrich the present, but teach the lesson of the causes of the rise, decline and fall of successive civilisations.

* * *

These two little booklets of verse, "Our Brave Boys" and "Various Verses,"* by W. B. L., show so much of the spirit of poetry, combined with a deep and simple faith in those days of war and loss when many of them were written, that they deserve attention. A few quotations chosen at random will suffice to show the quality of the verse and the conception which lies behind. Here is a good example entitled, "Thoughts of God":—

"How can the finite mind know God;
He who is infinite. Then how can man,
Earth's puny atom; whose life is but a span,
Of God's eternity, know God?"

For in the mystic deep of God,
A glow-worm's feeble light, on a dark night;
Or on the ocean's wave, a sailors' light,
Is as man's wisdom is to God.

And in the mysteries of God,
E'en as a curlew lightly skims the sea,
The wisest men but touch th' immensity
Of the infinity of God."

The poems are unequal in texture, and are worthy of more careful spinning. The author should guard against the temptation of length; the shortest poems are the best. The aphorisms in the smaller booklet are often to the point:—

"In love affairs 'tis best to go
With caution and 'adagio';
Else passion may but bring to thee
Discord instead of harmony."

"If thou hast borne a heavy cross,
It has not been in vain;
There is no gain without a loss,
No loss without a gain."

The philosophy of W. B. L. is of the right sort; it should help others, as it doubtless has helped the author.

* * *

In "A Modest Proposal to the Public of Eutopia"† an ingenious author, writing under the name "A. B. Rytoun," sets forth a plan of economic reform modelled on the language and style of Swift, and giving a vivid account of an island that had suffered a great calamity, had incurred a terrible national debt in attempting to cure the same, and had by "voluntary contributions" got rid of the debt and of all woe. The moral is obvious: the holders of War Stock should cancel their holdings and so help England to-day. But would it help? A man must invest his money somewhere; that is our present attitude. But, in any event, this amusing little book is "both a humble tribute to one of the Immortals and a tentative contribution towards a remedy for our present distresses," and is therefore welcome.

* Rush & Warwick, Leighton Buzzard.

† Blackheath Press, S.E.3. 6d.

PROTECTION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND TURMOIL.

FOR three years incalculable and uncertain elements in commerce, finance, and industry have turned even cautious enterprise into speculation. Hand-to-mouth transactions may have been safe but scarcely profitable, while long-term engagements and the holding and sale of large stocks have ended in loss after loss. Works are half closed because men of prudence would not run the risk of unforeseeable losses, which could only end in their closing down entirely. These heavy fluctuations in prices were due to political, social, and financial influences far more violent than anything we have known since the Napoleonic Wars, and these convulsions made contracts dangerous and work for the artisan spasmodic.

Mr. Bonar Law's business instinct told him that long contracts always spread work over long periods, and the long-term engagement could not be resumed until those responsible for the direction of industry were assured of a regained stability; that, as he put it, trade could be restored and steadied only by tranquillity. He secured support a year ago by an assurance given to British industry that the new Government would leave it alone to find its own equilibrium. That is what his fiscal pledge meant. And if Mr. Baldwin had adhered to his own first opinion he would have succeeded not only to the office but to the aim and object of his predecessor. By a couple of speeches he has shattered tranquillity, and, if his tariff masters have their way, there is to be an end of stability. Tariffs are as bad as the worst of all trade-disturbers—tariffs imposed and taken off as political parties sway into or out of power, tariffs for negotiation, tariffs to please influential trades or didactic busybodies. Until this new propaganda comes to an end, or until another premature General Election gives Free Traders or Protectionists a clear Parliamentary majority, very few managers of manufacturing industries will be able to estimate their costs of production in 1924, and no merchants will dare to commit themselves on a large scale to sales or purchases far ahead. It is amazing that any British Cabinet, knowing as they must have known how furious will be the struggle, should have so soon abandoned tranquillity as a trade policy and plunged us deeply into fiscal turmoil.

The spirit of Protection survives in some quarters from generation to generation. It is the same spirit that shook Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, ruffled the surface of industry in Farrar Eckroyd's time, and burst into heroic activity in the closing years of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain—the same spirit and the same phrases. Already we are to have, "Protect the home market,"

"Protection means work for all," "Make the foreigner pay," and so on from catchword to catchword, cliché to cliché, from simplicity to simplicity. The arguments of 1830 to 1840 and of 1890 and 1903 and 1923 are nearly all the same. Disraeli was mistaken when he said Protection was dead and damned. As long as there are manufacturers who think that by inducing Governments and Parliaments to prohibit imported goods or impose duties on the British purchasers of goods from foreign countries, they can squeeze up prices, so long will some manufacturers keep the idea of Protection alive. Damned it may be, but not dead.

The present opportunities for a protective policy seemed to the Tariff Reformers to be too good to be lost, and no more favourable conjunction could have come to the support of the Protectionists than those now exploited in their Press and on their platforms. First of all, the Dominion Prime Ministers were in London, and at least two of them asked more or less insistently for a preferential tariff to be imposed and extended here. Mr. Bruce wants us to do without American and Argentine grain and feed on the wheat of Australia. He can scarcely object to Canadian wheat or Indian, but he would seem to be inviting us to put a duty on all foreign wheat—to tax bread, in fact, in order to get out of the British consumer a higher price than the world's free price for wheat from Australia. Mr. Massey seems to want the British consumer to make a similar gift to the New Zealand meat companies and farmers. Mr. Mackenzie King is a little more shy in what he asks for Canada, although one of his official colleagues, Mr. Graham, has already annoyed the British agriculturists by making some impertinent and offensive demands at the Cattle Conference. These Dominion Prime Ministers are not consistent in their theories; for instance, at one moment they maintain that duties on wheat and meat with preference for the Colonies will not raise prices, and at another that in a free market the British and Dominion farmer "in many instances is unable to obtain prices that cover his costs," and the duties scheme is to cure all that.

It is, of course, true that in a market where the demand is constant and supplies are restricted, whether by Nature or by man, prices are not only bound to rise, but so far as Protection goes they are meant to rise. Mr. Massey brings his arguments up to date by the assertion that "every shilling spent with our people overseas will result in the provision of more employment for the working people of Britain." He appears to hold that when we buy from foreign countries it does not create trade and when we buy from a Dominion it does. The mixture of ideas enunciated at the Imperial Trade Conference by the wheat and meat taxers were pushed aside, however, by the representatives of the British Government as politely

as possible, for they dare not go to the country on the taxation of bread and meat. At Swansea Mr. Baldwin said he would not be a party to bread and meat taxes—so ends Mr. Bruce's and Mr. Massey's scheme. All that is left are the raw apples and honey, the dry and tinned fruits, and some manufactured articles, for which the Britisher is to pay more than the world's free price, in order to add to the income of a few packers and merchants and perhaps some growers and makers in the Dominions. The preference is not enough to satisfy Mr. Bruce's and Mr. Massey's and Mr. King's supporters. Yet even the presence of these very welcome and most genial guests of ours in London was made the occasion by our Tariff Reformers for a new Protectionist push.

The next fact exploited by and encouraging the Protectionists is the hard plight of arable farmers. They are having a hard time, especially hard by contrast with their prosperity during the war, but not so hard as the landowners. And to say that all farmers are losing money is an exaggeration. Undoubtedly some of them on heavy land who bought their own farms are hard put to it to pay interest to their bankers or mortgagees. The Government cannot invent means for helping these hapless farmers or the industry as a whole, for they dare not tax imported wheat, two-thirds of which comes from foreign countries, nor imported meat from the River Plate or the United States. They could not face the urban electorate with these taxes and survive. Some other means (not protective or fiscal) will have to be found whereby land may be kept under the plough and the rural population retained in the country districts. The means have not been found by the Cabinet, but the innate desire of many farmers of large or small degree for Protection is so strong that the Government is tempted to believe that county public opinion will support them now as never before on a vague hope of "Protection for the home market."

If time is given for full discussion, the farmers may learn that Protection of manufactured goods with grain, meat, and garden produce left out of the prospective tariff means that agriculture is to bear higher prices for its chemical manures, its ploughs, reapers, mowers, cultivators, rakes, tractors, and so on, but it is to get no help for what it breeds, fattens, or grows. Up to the present, that is the prospect outlined in the Prime Minister's speeches, and in those of Mr. Neville and Mr. Austen Chamberlain. The counties and the hardly tried farmers are to pay for the greater prosperity of Gainsborough, Grantham, and Lincoln. The import duties on, the protection to be given to, implements, chemicals, and other materials are to send up their prices—that is what the protection is for—which the farmers are to pay. No equivalent advantage is to be given under the new tariff to the farmers whose expenses are

thus swollen. It is no use their hoping for a Protective benefit some day; neither Mr. Baldwin's nor any other Government will ever have the temerity to put wheat or meat in the tariff.

The third powerful fact which the Protectionists have begun to exploit is unemployment. The very subject which a few months ago the Prime Minister said should never be used for political purposes is now taken by him as his main ground for his fresh political *démarche*. Unemployment now is to play the part assigned long ago to "two bad winters" by Mr. Bonar Law, when he told the country that two bad winters would make Tariff Reform popular. That is to help the push. Well, we shall see.

Finally, the Protectionists feel their opportunity good because the traditional and official guardians of Free Trade are weak; the Liberal Members of Parliament have only once been fewer than they are in the present Parliament. Now is the chance to register a vote in the country authorising a revolutionary fiscal change which the Liberals are not strong enough to resist. Let Mr. Baldwin and the Birmingham coterie beware, Liberals are neither as few nor as weak as they appeared to be in 1918 and 1922. There are, moreover, great bodies of non-political Free Traders who have to be reckoned with, namely, the miners, railwaymen, shipwrights, platers, cotton spinners and weavers, and masses of other Trade Unionists. Even if they could be stampeded there would remain the toughest of the commercial intelligentsia, the cotton mill owners and managers, the merchants who handle raw materials and the finished goods of the Lancashire towns—Free Traders to a man, because they have thrashed these questions out at conferences on 'Change and in offices, mills and eating-houses year after year. There are not many Liberals amongst the ship-owners, yet the Chamber of Shipping has recently drafted and issued a profound and unequivocal manifesto on the dangers of Protection in any form to our mercantile marine. And the bankers, who are judicious enough to abstain from party controversy, signed an almost unanimous statement on the vital necessity to this country, and particularly to the City of London (and all that it means) of the freest of free markets in Great Britain. The defenders of Free Trade are not so weak as the first rough estimate may have encouraged the Tariff Reformers to believe.

Why then did Mr. Baldwin take up Protection now, in spite of pledges and the earnest desire of business communities for stability? Was it the pressing needs of agriculture? No. Was it a mass of unanswerable argument at the Imperial Conference? No. Was it a desire to negotiate with tariff countries in Europe or America? Not as far as we know. Was it the fear of harm to

be done in England by heavy dumping of foreign goods forced from their ports of origin by collapsed exchanges? Perhaps that has weighed with him, although evidence of this dramatic dumping has not yet been produced, and the totals of imports of foreign goods which Englishmen have bought and brought into their own works and warehouses remain persistently at about the same percentage of all this country's imports as in recent years and in the years before the war. The sudden plunge cannot have been due to hypothetical dumping, and there has been no real dumping on a serious scale. Was Mr. Baldwin, who is a warm-hearted man as well as sincere and courageous, so deeply stirred by contemplation of a million and a half unemployed that he has flung prudence to the winds and declares that Protection is the only cure? Undoubtedly he was stirred, but why was he not more stirred a year ago when there were more unemployed, or six months ago before the winter was on us? Why should he remain unmoved until the threatening resolutions of the Plymouth Conservative meetings made a declaration of some kind on fiscal questions imperative? From all these speculations I can extract only one deduction, namely, that the Protectionists in his party think that such a conjunction of favourable circumstances has never come before, and their pressure on him rose to an irresistible pitch. But perhaps that was not all; his heart was really stirred, and as he has long believed in Tariff Reform meaning work for all, the natural man spoke as Lord Liverpool might have spoken a hundred years ago, partly to please his party and partly to please himself.

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Plain men are mystified by the variety of policies adumbrated by members of the Government in these months of October and November. In the early days of the Imperial Conference the President of the Board of Trade blessed the policy of Imperial preferential duties. He put gently on one side Mr. Bruce's food tax schemes and announced the policy of the home Government to be a further differentiation in existing import duties in favour of Dominion produce, *e.g.*, dried fruits and, for the first time, raw apples, preserved or tinned fruits and honey, with a further lowering of the duties at present in force for motor-cars, musical instruments, &c., from the Dominions. He showed no signs of plunging into more Protection; and this mild stuff was the Government policy—policy number one. The Prime Minister's Plymouth declaration on the cure of unemployment was the "Protection of the Home Market." That was policy number two. Then the pace quickened, and the Prime Minister explained at Swansea that the old Tariff Reform programme (which, by the

way, was riddled with shot in 1903 to 1906) was still in his mind, while Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking at Cardiff, Leeds, and Preston, with doubtless all the sense of responsibility appropriate to a Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose smallest sentence on new taxation sounds like thunder to a tax-paying public, declared for a general tariff on all manufactured goods. That was policy number three. The Prime Minister had at the end of October to visit Manchester, always an awkward centre for Tariff Reformers, and in his hearing and without contradiction or qualification Lord Derby, a prominent member of the Government, taking one step to the rear, said how glad he was that there was no intention of going outside of the pledge of Mr. Bonar Law to make no fundamental fiscal change. This was policy number four. The Chancellor of the Exchequer either overlooked this declaration or he flouted Lord Derby a few days later by repeating in a few snappy sentences at Leeds the old doctrine of retaliation or tariffs for negotiation. There we are left with the last of five various policies.

Merchants and manufacturers cannot do business safely while five different policies are held by the Board of Trade, the Exchequer (with its customs and excise departments), and presumably the whole Cabinet. Business men want to know at once if they are to provide for import duties when they work out their estimate of the future cost of their productions. A Chancellor of the Exchequer or a Prime Minister who plays with these questions without precision is a grave commercial danger. There is no room for levity in the selection of taxes. They are a serious matter for whole trades and the thousands or hundreds of thousands engaged in them. The country is entitled to definite information on a score of points of first-class importance without further delay. It is almost incredible that Ministers should leave in doubt the range and nature of their proposals. Already the demand for clearness comes from not only the controversialists but from plain practical men in every manufacturing town in Great Britain. They ask (i.) to whom they are to listen on these subjects, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Health, the Labour Minister, the Postmaster-General. If we are to listen to all, then why cannot they all agree on the same thing before they speak? (ii.) Is there to be a general tariff? (iii.) If so, is it to include or exclude raw materials? (iv.) What is the definition of a raw material on which the Exchequer is to act? Are steel, copper, lead, zinc, leather, paper, chemicals, to be treated as raw materials or manufactured articles? Are they to come in freely or are they to be subjects for taxation? Hundreds of industries want to know the settled official answer to that question. (v.) What is to be the fate of other important food-

stuffs, like butter, cheese, and eggs from abroad to the value of £64,000,000 a year; and raw fruit to the value of £28,000,000; to say nothing of margarine, edible oils, and fats? The President of the Board of Trade can mention £1,500,000 or £2,000,000 worth of motor-cars in support of his drastic views when he speaks at Coventry on Guy Fawkes Day, but neither he nor his colleagues say a word about scores of millions sterling in these essential foods. What a sense of proportion!

No doubt searching questioners will be told by the Government that the anxiety of England to know these things must await the reports of "expert and advisory Committees." Let us at least be told what is meant by an "expert and advisory Committee." Is it a committee of manufacturers and others who may very naturally each ask for Protection for whatever they have to sell? Twenty years ago one of England's great manufacturers used to declare honestly that if he could get Protection for his products and prevent any other trade from climbing into the tariff, his income would run up from thousands to millions. Nearly every shrewd fellow knows that fact to-day. Is it of honourable men who enjoy this piece of knowledge that the "expert Committee" is to be composed? And at last, when all is said by these experts, and their recommendations have been winnowed by the most upright members of the Cabinet, and the clearest thinkers in Downing Street have adjusted all the conflicting interests, there will remain one supreme question for final decision—the fate of the consumer.

A few days have passed since I wrote these pages, and we are back to the employment cry. Imports are blamed for the scarcity of work which has brought the British unemployed figures up to 1,069,106 men and 275,561 women. About half the women out of work are textile operatives. The other half were mainly in food, dress, tobacco, and laundry trades. But imports have nothing whatever to do with the slackness of their mills and works. They suffer from the weak demand in the export trade; customers abroad are unable to buy, for their resources are too low to cope with present prices. Prices are high because, amongst other things, raw cotton is terribly expensive, owing to a short crop. It is the bole weevil and the world's poverty that have driven the men and women of the cotton trade out of work. If imports were totally prohibited the cotton trade would not be a penny the richer; on the contrary, it would be poorer, for it is mainly an export trade, subject to the full blast of American and Asiatic competition, and if its goods are not as cheap and not better than those of its competitors it must lose its foreign customers. Import duties (or

prohibition of imports) by raising the price of everything the mill and the operative have to buy would add to the cost of living and of production. Protection has nothing to offer to the cotton unemployed except such additional expenses as would fall on all consumers, and, as Lancashire knows well, the certainty of injury to the export trade. To some Lancashire towns a Protective tariff means the extinction of their staple industry and all that depends upon it. To argue, as some quaint Protectionists have argued in speech and print recently (not for the first time), that import duties by stimulating the demand within these shores would tend to such internal activity as would lead to lower prices, is in fact to say to the protected trader, "We are reducing the competition against you, but your prices will, of course, remain as low as though the competition were hot." To such a statement the protected trader would naturally reply, "If that is really so, I have to thank you for nothing. I want higher prices." Every schoolboy ought to know that import duties raise prices and are meant by Protectionists to raise prices. Any other doctrine will fail to deceive the folk north of the Humber or the Mersey.

The other most depressed trades are shipping, shipbuilding and ship-repairing, engineering, and the iron trade in all its branches. Out of a total of a million and a quarter men on the unemployed lists masses of them were four years ago engaged in these trades. The Government's policy in any one of its four or five different forms would do nothing but injury to shipping, shipbuilding, and ship-repairing, to nearly every kind of engineering, and to all the trades dependent on iron as a raw material. As far as we can gather anything definite from the official confusion of tongues, we may anticipate an import duty on foreign steel. One of the minor Ministers stated categorically that Ruhr steel is to be totally prohibited. Soon no Englishman or Welshman may bring any of it into this country for use in his rolling mills, or shipyards, or ship-repairing dry docks, or to cheapen the cost of a building or a house, if this gentleman really speaks the mind of the Cabinet of which he is a member. And from the setting of his bold sentence he would appear to be proud of having thought of this heroic step towards securing work for the unemployed. With a little more thought he might have pondered on the cause of sorely diminished work in, for instance, our ship-repairing docks. The owners and managers of ships will not incur the heavy costs of repairs and re-conditioning in the United Kingdom at present, unless they cannot postpone the work or cannot find more economical contractors abroad. The boiler-makers' dispute paralyses many places, and when that dispute is solved the main obstacle to renewed activity will still be the high costs in these British establishments.

A little cheap steel would help to keep work here which now goes to Antwerp or Rotterdam or Copenhagen. The minor Minister and those who act with him would deprive this hungry industry of one stream, however trickling, of cheap raw material. By such means he does not help the iron workers, and he does injure the engineers, riveters, fitters, carpenters, &c., who might be employed on repairing ships.

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The facts are clear enough: we in Great Britain are suffering from trade depression because the world for the most part is poverty-stricken. America is rich; nearly all the rest of the East and West are poor; so exhausted by the War, if they were belligerents, that their activities are numbed and cannot be restored quickly; and if they were neutrals they have been surprised to find that even war profits can become a snare, and that every country with foreign trade is actually dependent on the prosperity of its neighbours for its own good trade.

The most remarkable evidence of the vitality of British trade and the strength and adaptability retained by it under our Free Trade system is in the increased share of the world's export trade held by us to-day in comparison with our share in 1903 and 1912. In 1903 the export trade of the world was valued at £2,110 millions, and the share of the United Kingdom was 13.8 per cent. In 1912 world exports had risen to £3,521 millions, and the share of the United Kingdom was still 13.8 per cent. As the prosperity of the world had grown in that period, our own prosperity grew. In 1922 we were doing 25 per cent. less export trade than in 1912; the volume of our trade declined as the volume of world trade declined. But, in spite of that fact, our share of the world's export trade in 1922 was 17.3 per cent.—a greater proportion of the whole than in 1912.

Here is a brief summary of facts and factors which the War has not changed and which still dominate our economic life:

(i) If Britain were self-supporting this country could hold a population of about 20,000,000 persons.

(ii) It is our foreign trade, the supplying of 17.3 per cent. of the world's foreign purchasers, which gives work to our industrial and shipping and commercial centres, so that we can support a population of 42,000,000.

(iii) We must have payment for the supplies sent abroad, and that can only come back to us in goods and services—by imports. Activity outwards means activity inwards.

(iv) Free buying enables us to procure food and materials from the places best fitted by nature for economical growth and pro-

duction. We get the benefit as buyers of the world's price without hindrance or the addition of import duties.

(v) Cheap production and being satisfied with narrow margins of profit enable us to beat our foreign competitors in neutral markets and even in many protected markets.

(vi) Whatever fiscal burden is added here to the cost of production puts our goods at a disadvantage with our customers abroad, and may crush trades like cotton, woollens, tin plates, and a thousand more. Without their export trade we would be a ruined people and could not support our 42,000,000.

(vii) Merchant shipping, our most representative and essential industry, is absolutely dependent on being able to buy for its use the cheapest supplies for both construction, repair, and operation.

(viii) It depends for its traffic on the maintenance of free markets here and on the maximum of activity inwards as well as outwards.

(ix) The export coal trade, which is as good as gold for the payment of the food for our teeming population and the raw material for our staple industries, depends on free imports as the basis for a demand abroad whence these imports come and on the double cargo voyage—the inward cargo as well as the outward—for keeping coal freights on a low level. If the vessels had to return in ballast, the outward freight would have to bear the whole cost of the voyage and would therefore have to be high. By low freights British and Welsh coal reaches customers abroad at prices which other coal fields cannot afford to accept, and thus the export coal trade and the many hundreds of thousands of miners employed in it are maintained. British coal export and British shipping beat the American exporters and shipowners because Britain is a Free Trade country and America Protectionist. If America went Free Trade and we went Protectionist we should have to put up the shutters and go out of foreign business. She would beat us decisively and finally.

(x) London, and not New York, is the finance centre of the world because we have free markets and free clearance and encourage the freest of free intercourse. The Chairman of every one of our big Banks, and practically every other banker in England, signed the famous Bankers' Manifesto for Free Trade after the War only some few months ago.

These are a few salient points. Facts and not shibboleths will decide this stupendous issue, and had the country been given time to examine the actual proposals, which are so confused and so assiduously beclouded, the verdict in 1923 would have been as decisive as in 1906.

WALTER RUNCIMAN.

November 15th.

THE TRAGEDY OF EUROPE.

FIVE years after the Armistice, war is still the dominant note in Europe, the condition of which is now rapidly becoming apparent to all. I have recently been all through Europe, and what struck me most was the extraordinary power of recovery visible everywhere, one may even say the relative ease with which Europe could have been salvaged and restored, and even now might be reconstituted and saved from general chaos and decline. The test of that statement lies in Austria. There, in perhaps the worst financial spot, in a country which is reduced to a city, and has lost all the props and pillars of its former greatness, health has been re-established; happiness has returned; actually a stable currency has been secured with a tendency to appreciate. And this financial equipoise was brought about quite simply, namely, with goodwill. The victors took pity on the poor Austrians. They allowed the healing mechanics of credit to operate. Austria is to-day the healthiest unit in the body politic of Europe.

Europe, of course, means the continent minus Russia, which is a continent in herself, and Britain, which is essentially a sea power; these two world powers constituting the Eastern and Western fringes or shutters of the old feudal disassociation of nations which represented what we term the "balance of power" of historical Europe. It is important to realise this geographical point, because it is in great part the reason of our lazy indifference towards the fate of Europe, and of the comparative indifference of Russia, however temporarily weakened, towards a continent which seems bent on self-destruction. For, militarily, both Britain and Russia are unaffected by Europe's plight. Hence the movement of both Russia and Britain to keep out of Europe, just as in Europe the movement is towards a flight from the respective currencies; and it is because of these dual negative or runaway tendencies that the one single policy produced in Europe has made good and to-day conditions the whole. This positive policy is, of course, that of France.

The attitude of France is logical and simple. First and foremost she aims at security. That was the Generals' policy at Versailles, though technically defeated at the time by President Wilson; and such was really the basis of the Secret Treaties which re-mapped Europe primarily and essentially to weaken permanently the Germanic power in Europe. The defeat in America of President Wilson gave France her opportunity, for just as the war was decided by American intervention, so too the peace might easily have been won by her. Yet a strange thing happened, which upset all calculations. The three controlling units shirked their

responsibilities. America sulked in her tents and withdrew. Russia, crippled with an economic theory which "missed" internally as an economic expedient and externally as a political crusade, lost all power of intervention and became herself a "world enemy." Britain, partly through economic miscomprehension, but chiefly on account of her democratic mechanism controlled by clamour and delusion, also withdrew into her shell, plunged into the vortex of an inflationist boom, thus leading to a catastrophic bathos of the three victorious forces. It knocked out all the leading figures of the war—President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau; leaving France in supreme command with Europe at her feet.

The world-war ended—locally, where it began. The vows and cries and protestations of the white world in arms etiolated into discord. The world left the battlefield for financial speculations. France found herself mistress of Europe's destiny, virtually free to carry out her design, already clearly indicated in her secret Treaties with Russia, to strangle and disintegrate the German Empire.

Originally, this aim was strictly military, and was propounded again and again by Marshal Foch at the Versailles Conference. The objective was the Rhine and the motive was "security." It is amusing to reflect that M. Clemenceau rejected it at the time. Then another strange thing happened, which at first perplexed the French. Britain, the home of political economy, the nursery of Banking, the great credit authority, went economically insane, and demanded an indemnity of £23,000,000,000 plus the head of the Kaiser on a charger. The French were puzzled over this sanguinary exhibition on the part of the cold, calculating English people, and did not see how to meet it until it dawned upon them that the exponents of this "new order" finance were not serious, and merely used the numerals of finance for home electioneering purposes, regarding it rather as a promissory note of hate values which could be scaled down at periodic round-table conferences according to the deflation in the hate sentiment. Hence the fall of M. Briand, who was almost trapped over a game of golf.

But French politicians do not play golf, and a stymie is the last thing they contemplate. Then another strange thing happened—the German flight from the mark.

Once more, things played unexpectedly into France's hands. Had Germany gone resolutely bankrupt, as theoretically she ought to have done according to the rules—they are not economic laws, of course—of Banking, France would have found herself in difficulties; but Germany, literally stupefied at Britain's ignorance or simulated ignorance of the credit mechanism and of transfer of

values, in turn sought evasion: (1) through her industrialists, who began to place their real money outside Germany; (2) then by necessity, when Reparation payments *de facto* began and the Government found itself compelled to print bad money wherewith to buy good money. Suddenly, the French began to understand. Germany was becoming a finance shell, with all her wealth going outside. She was carrying out a fictitious insolvency. Then the *Comité de Forges*, or great iron and steel Trust, saw their chance. This was the Ruhr, where Germany's coal, iron, and steel centre lay. One could seize that as pledge. One could play Germany's game with the bayonet. One could pose as bailiff or good creditor. One could force Germany into bankruptcy and incidentally force her component parts asunder. Would Britain object? No, Britain, like Byron's maiden, whispered she would ne'er consent and consented. The existing situation is the result.

The ideology behind this action is the conviction of the French that the Germans are a slave people who only react to force. They think that the whip can compel the miners to work and the big industrialists to surrender, and in the end the German people to split apart as was the case over a century ago under Napoleon, who in 1812 went to Moscow largely with the help of German soldiers. They reckon that Britain will leave Europe to her fate; that Russia is too weak to re-enter the lists; that America is not likely to return to Wilsonian idealism. They count on force, and as Europe is now remapped on a careful redistribution of military States dependent upon the patronage of France, the idea of hegemony has proved too fascinating for the militarists who to-day rule France, and so the Treaty of Versailles is already a scrap of paper, and an electioneering figure of reparations, instead of producing money, has restored France to the position she held under Louis XIV. and again under Napoleon, and Europe is once more drifting into a battlefield of small nations with only one hope of redress—war, in one shape or another.

By evading our responsibilities in the peace, we have done historically what Cromwell did over Spain, only that Cromwell destroyed a great sea rival, whereas so far we have only destroyed a great land market, the loss of which has placed us in a very unpleasant economic situation. So far as Reparations are concerned—they have almost ceased to be a concern. To France they were always purely a secondary interest. We, in Britain, now know that transfer of value is not so easy as a politician's peroration, and that money is no longer the problem, which to-day is the capitalist system now at stake, and the fear of the industrial output of Germany freed, on paper, of internal debt, whereas we are caught, on gold, with a deadweight debt of £7,000,000,000.

Reparations to-day have come to be policy; first, as against our Allies, who owe us indemnities; secondly, as against German future trade. It is a trade war pure and simple. We are handicapped on gold. Germany, relieved of reparations, would be able to swamp us. That is the position, due entirely to our blindness at Versailles and almost inconceivable political flabbiness ever since. To France, reparations present her with the Treaty right to go in and break up Germany.

What are the consequences in Europe? A glance at the exchanges will suffice. The money aspect of Europe is self-evident. Yet two odd facts emerge. One, the stability of the Austrian exchange; the other the stability of the new Russian exchange. In both cases there is an appreciation to register: in all other countries, depreciation.

This is the true answer to France's policy which has harmed both friend and foe. Take Poland. Poland is the pet foundling of France. It is a rich country with an exportable surplus, largely under-populated, economically a working unit. What do we find? Her finance has gone to perdition. Her strong pro-French, militarist Government has had to be reconstituted. Already in Poland disillusion reigns. On all sides one hears the cry: "Save us from our friends." Poles now realise that joyous militarism in shining armour is not a paying proposition, and that the silly policy of pin-pricks indulged in towards Germany, at the instigation of France, has landed them in a false position *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations and in an impossible position financially. The middle-classes have been ruined, precisely as in Austria and Germany. Confidence has vanished. Poland cannot buy. Lately an English warrior has gone out to give some sound banking advice. In a word, Poland has come to the end of her tether as the fighting satellite of France, and sooner or later will have to be "cashed out" *more* Austria and try a fresh orientation. Such is the effect of reparations upon the Eastern pivot of the French Grand Alliance, and the Poles are now ready, or almost ready, for a peaceful policy of trade and reconciliation, though perhaps this will not be wholly apparent until a strong new Government comes into power with a real determination to stop diplomatic adventures and wild-cat schemes of Prussianism.

Greater Roumania is another example. New Roumania is now the most corrupt country in Europe, politically. She is a composite people, ruling over powerful minorities whom she has treated shamefully. Transylvania is a byword for political persecution which will never be forgiven by the Hungarians there. Roumania is controlled by a gang of political exploiters, who have destroyed exports and credit and batten on an ignorant population

of illiterate peasants who are at the mercy of the political wire-pullers. The result is that she has not tilled the soil, and has no exportable wheat surplus. She is being bled white for the purpose of military display, and such is the unpopularity of the *régime* that when the King of Roumania visited Warsaw last summer soldiers were posted every twenty yards all down the line from the capital to the frontier as a precaution against assassination. Even the Tsar, when he visited Poland, never travelled in such cotton-wool. Practically, the standing army of Poland was engaged in lining the route, and soldiers examined us in the trains. That is typical of the two new States—Poland and Roumania now locked in military alliance, and they both self-contained agricultural countries which, but for the insensate militarism which has eaten up their revenues, might to-day be flourishing, solvent, and stable communities.

Czecho-Slovakia, thanks to the wisdom of her two leading statesmen, is in a more favourable condition financially. She has deflated, and politically displays genuine statesmanship. But her future is exceedingly problematic. She is even more composite than was Hapsburg Austria, and in her case the minorities form close compact segregations with the three millions of Germans strategically ensconced in the mountain gateway. Her difficulty is that of all European gold-credit nations—she cannot sell. And just as Switzerland has lost her watch trade, so the Czechs have lost the Pilsener beer trade and largely their glass trade, and they too are compelled for dear life to maintain a huge Army, if only as the symbol of authority in a unit which is an artificial compilation of conquered peoples so hostile and heterogeneous that under any system of political freedom the Czechs would actually not be able on a numerical vote to govern constitutionally.

Jugo-Slavdom is perhaps the least problematic of the Succession States, for here we are in the Balkans, and only surmise is justifiable in that part of Europe. If the Serbs could effect a reconciliation with the Bulgars, it is conceivable that a real Balkan federation might arise. The crux is no doubt Italy, who fears the Bulgars. As we saw only the other day, Jugo-Slavdom and Italy are restive neighbours. Anything may happen any day, and here again big armies are the inevitable consequence, and in fact the deliberate purpose, of the map.

Thus all the satellite or Succession States are, with the exception of the Czechs, semi-insolvent, and sinking on paper money and frenzied armaments, strategically unable to disarm, politically unable to pursue peace, economically unable to progress. They were created to fight for France as against Germany. They are obviously transitory phenomena, and not one of them conforms

even academically with the principles which motived their creation, or even with any principles calculated to promote peace. All are necessarily tyrant States. All are imitation Austrias carved out of the ruins of bigger and more highly civilised nations, and all have fierce compact minorities to combat or subjugate.

Poland is nationally the least offender, for about 67 per cent. of Poland are Poles. But the national side of these creations is by no means the most dangerous feature which lies in the wholesale economic transfers carried out purely for military reasons. The Dantzig corridor is really an offence to man. Similarly the transfer of Silesia against the wishes of the *plébiscite* to the Poles is an injustice which can lead but to one issue. The Roumanian annexation of Transylvania and Bessarabia are likewise force transfers which man will not submit to. As for the composition of Czecho-Slovakia it would not endure for a year in normal conditions, and can have no permanent foundations.

Thus we see all the Succession States are force creations whose only reason is force. It is idle to cry out against the Nationalist tendencies of these individualist groupings, for they are not national developments, or national assertions, or economic units; they were not invented to foster trade or civilisation or peace; they were called into being to serve as the Janissaries of France, and to represent so many bayonets as against the Germanic tribes of Europe. Owing to their heterogeneous compositions, they have to be fiercely Nationalist in order to hold down the minorities handed over to their tender mercies, like slaves in olden times, and unless they remain fiercely Nationalist, militarist, and aggressive, they are of no use to the Power that gave them their title.

That is the position in Europe to-day. All the neutrals are suffering economically from the effects of the broken exchanges. The distribution of trade has been upset by tariffs and customs obstructions. One quarter of Europe is armed to the teeth to hold down the remainder which is not allowed to maintain armies, and so month by month Europe declines, and the exchanges grow worse and the purchasing-power of the Continent diminishes, and the civilisation of Europe lapses into sickness. Right through Europe the middle-classes have been destroyed by paper money. Culture, science, learning, the arts—these rights of man are slowly being crushed out. People cannot buy books. Forty per cent. of the students in the German Universities are foreigners. No one cares. That is the terrible consequence of France's policy. Everybody in Europe is an exchange gambler. Morals are money values. Only money matters. There is no longer any balance of power or any power of redress left. Wherever I went I heard the

same refrain, whether in Poland, Hungary, Germany, Roumania, etc., "What is the good of trying? We are all betrayed. Europe will fight her way out somehow."

What about the future? Of one thing we can be certain and that is that if France is permitted to cut out the Ruhr, Germany will break up and Europe will become for many years an economic madhouse. The German position is simple. Germany is to-day a bankrupt State, defeated, broken, and rudderless. Her Socialists are impotent because their main function is to checkmate the growing communism. The Germans as a people are quite unsuited for democratic or mob politics, and they have no leaders and can have none as a defeated nation except through some organisation of force, such as Hitler in Bavaria, who is a kind of Mussolini without the fasces, or the shirt. If Germany had an army of 300,000 men the problem of reparations could be settled in twenty-four hours, and it is because Germany has no army that France can throttle her as she pleases and so long as she pleases, thereby holding up the recovery and sanitation of Europe.

The German danger will lie in Bavaria, which will inevitably secede as things grow worse, partly on account of bad money, partly out of love for the Monarchy, partly on account of the old German particularist tendencies, partly out of self-preservation. But secession would not imply national disunity. Quite the contrary. If Bavaria withdraws from the chaos of the *Reich*, it will be for ultimate purposes of reunion, and Germans will go back to the philosophy of blood and iron and await the coming of a new Stein and Bismarck. The break-up of Germany would of course put the lid on reparations, and that, too, is a powerful argument in Bavaria, which is the home of Royalist intrigue and anti-democratic policy. Those who contemplate this prospective German re-colonisation of Europe in acute conditions of Balkanisation, must, indeed, be queer democrats, for the end of that decomposition will be autocracy on the lines of Fascismo, and such is the clear trend of events at this juncture, in expectation of the crash.

The crash will come if Britain merely looks on and America refuses to intervene. Personally, I am still hopeful, because the economic consequences would be so serious to us that, unless we have really lost our genius, one cannot imagine any Government being quite so blind as to allow it; secondly, because civilisation cannot be entirely destitute of moral sense and courage, and will, I trust, even at the eleventh hour, cry halt to deliberate and wanton unreason. And Europe is ready for reason. The neutrals are only waiting for a big gesture on the part of England or America; to-day, even the Succession States would support any Government

which issued the brave summons—*assez*. Even France—the true, capable, infinitely lovable, France—would welcome a deflation in a situation which has run away with its instigators.

One can say this. If America declines to exert her matchless power of redress, she will forfeit the moral opinion of the world; and the same will apply to Britain. One word would suffice. I found all over Europe a general feeling that Germany was being unfairly and dishonourably treated. I found an ugly spirit rising up among neutrals against French methods of turning a world war to her own local and militarist advantage. I found everywhere expressed a hope that Britain would make the grand gesture in defence of civilisation, to which all Europe, as one man, would rally. There is no doubt of that. Italy is deeply conscious of the moral wrong done to a vanquished foe. For that really is the problem. The war was won by the world, in particular by the Anglo-Saxon world. That world can hardly look the other way while a great civilisation is broken up and driven back into the madness of war as its lawful right and destiny, which assuredly will be the outcome of the whole dreary business. The spectacle of M. Poincaré limiting the discussion on reparations to "present capacity" is only one more joke at the expense of Europe, and shows the inner meaning only too plainly. Reparations, in M. Poincaré's eyes, are to be an indefinite elastic claim upon Germany, variable in proportion with her prosperity. But this is war. It is intended to be, and that is, of course, the reason why France refuses to fix the amount pending the fulfilment of her aim which is the suffocation of her historical enemy.

Unless restrained, France will show no mercy. I met many Frenchmen in Europe and all discussed the matter with cheerful cynicism. Dantzig, they said, would be quite Polish in twenty years. The Germans would have to emigrate or die. In any case, German unity must be destroyed. Only one thing mattered—the security of France; and when I objected that perhaps the security of Europe was equally important, they replied with pained surprise that I must have been reading *ce coquin de* Maynard Keynes on the consequences.

What, in substance, is this French claim? It is that a small people, under forty millions, should dominate Europe by means of military alliances with a number of small States who must fight or succumb, and by virtue of imported conscript blacks. Unless white civilisation in the West is prepared to give up its ghost, such a preposterous disregard for the genius and spirit of man cannot succeed economically or militarily; it can only hope to endure even temporarily, provided the major part of civilisation goes to sleep or by reason of some strange aberration of perspective loses hold

of the realities of life, which assuredly do not lie in a Europe dragooned by African savages, to satisfy the morbid fear of France. That we may take to be crucial. As the French well say: "There is a justice."

Looking at Europe as a whole, we can descry only two possibilities. Either France will be stopped or she will wreck what remains of old Europe, bringing down friend and foe. The unknown quantity is Russia. Politically, Europe is only a *mirage* until Russia re-enters the arena, nor is it possible as yet to foresee the evolution of that mystic colossus. The immediate issue will depend upon the Anglo-Saxon world. We have looked on, very unlike a sporting victor, while France hired a gang of boys and desperadoes to set up a bogus Rhenish Republic, which is anything but Napoleonic in form or method. It is possible that we shall continue to look on while France completes her work. Germany cannot fight. She is at the mercy of her despoiler. No conferences will deflect France on the eve of an election from her mad career. Nothing but a swift, stern call to reason will stay her wrecking hand. Will it be forthcoming? If not, then the process of disintegration will continue, and our unemployed will enjoy another year, or perhaps decade, of doles and *dolce far niente*.

Then Europe will be reset for war, and war will be the justifiable remedy. Probably a stage of all-round, strong man governorship will succeed Germany's collapse, and Bavaria may be correctionally invaded. Or we may witness the setting-up of an "intelligent" Bolshevism which would ruin all the little States. On the whole, the chances are against France, because the spirit of Europe is moving against her, as we know is the case in Switzerland, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, even Poland. Chaos does not pay, that is the reason. Nor humanly can the map of revenge endure if only because it places weak and lesser civilisations over the greater. Under the Treaty of Versailles Europe has no chance, that is the tragic truth. The map is an attempt to defeat the laws of population, energy, and nature; it is a vain thing. To-day it is a wicked thing because it has made a travesty of the sacrifice and meaning of the Great War. Europe is asking for peace, and would welcome any remedial reconstruction, but the dislocations are so profound and the fire of nationalism burns so fiercely that few men living would profess confidence. The French-German conflict is a different matter. That is a local problem that could be settled with surprising ease if only we would tackle it. After all it was our war, and it is our peace.

As France refuses a proper conference, we should convene a world conference without her. Let the world settle reparations under the presidentship of America. Then let the world decide what it

ought to do to Germany and for Europe in the name of humanity and common sense. The procedure is credit to Poland, based on the security of a peace policy, thus freeing bankrupt Poland from the clutches of militarism. The moment that happened French hegemony would vanish. Disraeli would certainly have done this. Poland is asking for it. French policy would then be localised and within a short time France would be ready for the European outlook. All that Europe needs is a little imagination. The alternative is the restoration of the balance of power, which could be effected easily, *viâ* Poland, thus reconsolidating the East as against the West, and this clearly should be Britain's policy which, incidentally, would be good business. There is no reason why we should expect or wait for American intervention for the second time to win the war. The way out is easy. It is to prop up the East. It is to give Europe two minds again, as against the prevailing one mind, in true Napoleonic fashion, which is the only policy that France respects or understands.

AUSTIN HARRISON.

THE PRESS OCTOPUS.

THE "Fall" of 1923—to use the pretty American phrase—will ever be memorable for a great portent in the region of Fleet Street. It was the formation of a gigantic newspaper "Trust," the joint amalgam of two other newspaper "Trusts" which already cast a long shadow on that reach of the Thames. The shadow of the combined "Trust" is now a darkness that can be felt.

This Octopus—for it is nothing else—has many tentacles. It stretches afar. It invades our life both by day and by night. It comprises in its body seven great morning dailies and four great evening journals. It is a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night. Not content with that diurnal triumph, it pushes its long arms into our week-day meditations, and sends its electric thrills through our Sabbath peace. It includes seven weeklies and five Sunday newspapers. On no day or hour of the year can we escape from its far-reaching grasp.

This Octopus waxes exceeding rich. The Prospectus which has so unblushingly revealed to a disquieted world the intimate secrets of "Trust" journalism, claimed for the "Combine" a capital value of £14,600,000, and a present average yearly profit of over £1,000,000. But the Directors did not hesitate to forecast a future profit of £2,500,000, raised to that point by savings effected through co-operation in the supply of raw materials such as paper and machines—including the writing machines that used to be called journalists! The British public has accepted these sanguine forecasts. Conscious of their own powers of absorption, the investing public hastened to provide within a few hours the whole of the £8,000,000 asked for by the "Trust": and the enterprise is now fully launched on its career, fortified by the support and ownership of a million or so of the very public to whom it appeals.

This is an event of immense moment to our national life. For the combined newspaper-purchasing public affected by this "Combine" amounts to 13,250,000: in other words, if we accept the low average of two readers for each paper purchased, the change affects a reading public of 26,500,000: or nearly two-thirds of the population of Great Britain, which can now be estimated to amount almost precisely to 42,000,000.

Great Britain, since 1918, has been a real democracy, governed by the public opinion of a practically universal adult suffrage. This "Trust," therefore, spreading its influence from one centre over this great majority of the British people, bids fair, for good or for evil, to become the governing influence in this country, supreme over Parliaments, paralysing Ministries, appointing

Prime Ministers, and carrying its power from the furthest slum and smallest village of this great country right into the Chamber of the Cabinet. Such is the future frankly, and even proudly, avowed by the seven skilful and experienced moulders of opinion, three of them of one family, who appended their signatures to the Prospectus which had such an immense and immediate success.*

* * * * *

Mr. Kennedy Jones, one of the founders of the *Daily Mail*, told the following engaging story in that very self-revealing book, *Fleet Street and Downing Street*, which he published shortly before his death:—

“ I had luncheon one day at Sir William Maxwell's house with Viscount Morley of Blackburn. The conversation turned to journalism. ‘ In my day,’ said Lord Morley, formerly leader writer on the *Morning Star* and editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, ‘ there were none of these enormous circulations. A million readers were undreamt of.’ ‘ You must remember,’ I replied, ‘ that you left journalism a profession. We have made it a branch of commerce.’ ”

There you have it! The present “ Trust ” is simply the latest triumph of this policy of making journalism a “ branch of commerce,” so boldly avowed in the presence of the splendid veteran of the other faith. Lord Morley's comment remains unrecorded! He had himself, by the devotion of his brilliant literary talents to the daily work of journalism, carried the British Press to its highest point as a profession. But he left it for a higher sphere before the idea of converting it into a “ branch of commerce ” had invaded Fleet Street. The journalists of those days died poor. Like Lord Rosebery's Dukes, they were “ poor but honest.”

Mr. Kennedy Jones showed in his book that he had a very small opinion of these men. He himself died a millionaire. It was the reward of much wonderful energy and talent. Those men who converted journalism into a “ branch of commerce ” were masters of their craft. If the object of journalism be circulation, and again circulation, then they were kings of the machine. They woke up Fleet Street. They taught the old journalism many splendid lessons in the collection and display of news.

Lord Northcliffe was the “ electric eel ” of the British Press at the end of the nineteenth century. By his immense energy and initiative he roused it from its slumbers. He created a new and wider public. He immensely enlarged the province of the Fourth Estate.

* These Directors are Viscount Rothermere (Chairman), Sir Leicester Harmsworth, Sir Hardman Lever, Frederick A. Szarvasy, Esq., Sir Frederick Sykes, Sir Mayson Beeton, and the Hon. Esmond Harmsworth, M.P.

But in saving the body of the Press, he did grave harm to its soul. A fellow-editor of the old “ professional ” school went to visit Alfred Harmsworth—as he then was—in the early days of the *Daily Mail*, to expostulate against his flagrant encouragement of the South-African war-fever. Harmsworth touched the electric bell and a messenger came. “ Bring me the office ledger,” he said. The ledger was brought: and Harmsworth placed his finger on the column showing his rapidly increasing sales. “ That is my answer,” he said. Yes, that was his answer: and that is, in effect, the answer of the “ Trust ” Press to anyone who expostulates against their policy, whether in Europe or at home, to-day.

What are the fruits of such a policy? Mr. Arnold Bennett has shown us in his brilliant play, *What the Public Wants*. Great wealth, certainly. Lord Northcliffe started penniless, and died worth three millions. That is the great and intoxicating secret discovered by these enterprising men—that beneath the flagstones of Fleet Street there lies a gold mine. Ever since that discovery the rush to Fleet Street has been like the old rush to California in the 'fifties, and the banks of the Thames have been turned into a mining camp. Yes, gold. But what along with it? A Press devoted to “ stunts ” and “ thrills,” photographs and impressions, carrying the public along in one increasing whirl of sensation and excitement, wholly lacking in gravity or seriousness, playing to short views, indifferent to principle or even, in the long run, to true national interests. That is the price: and to-day we are beginning to pay it. America has been paying it for a long time: we are new to it, and have still to know fully what it means.

Contrast the other ideal. George Cadbury came deliberately from Birmingham to Fleet Street with the vow that he would devote any profits made from his newspapers to the housing of the people. He made no profits. He preferred the better course of supporting unpopular causes. In 1902 he told me, in some dismay—for he was a business man—that he had lost £10,000 that year owing to his attack on the Concentration Camps in South Africa. “ Ah! ” I said. “ But you have saved the lives of 10,000 women and children! ” “ You are right,” he said. “ The money has been well-spent! ”

That was the spirit of Fleet Street when journalism was still a “ profession ” and before it had become a “ branch of commerce.”

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For what is a profession? It is a vocation entered upon with a pledge of devotion to some object superior to gain. A profession, to be healthy and sound, ought to ensure a livelihood. But beyond that, it is the note of all high and honourable professions that they aim at a public, as distinct from a private, profit. That

is the common feature of all those callings now freely recognised as "professions"—the Church, the Law, Medicine, the Army and the Navy. Ruskin once shrewdly pointed out that the reason why a soldier was held in such high honour was that he, above all other professionals, received the smallest reward for the greatest risks. Just so with the high honour given during the last century to doctors, who will inevitably decline in public esteem if they should be suspected of working for wealth rather than healing. The poverty of the clergy is what saves them in the present crisis of religions, and the notorious earnings of a few picked barristers certainly does not add to the respect felt for the profession of the Law.

Take the doctors. Suppose that a small group of clever surgeons in Harley Street should combine to form a Surgical Trust. Fancy—if you can—that one of them, retiring with a profit of a million, should record that he observed to one of the old school of Harley Street: "You must remember that you left Medicine a profession. We have made it a branch of commerce." It needs little imagination to envisage the effect on the public mind. We should realise that the medical profession had sustained its Sedan. We should feel a certain shame before so vast a moral catastrophe.

It is such a catastrophe that has occurred to Journalism. It is such a shame that the older journalists feel in its presence.

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But long before such a calamity occurred to Harley Street, the State would be obliged to interfere. This is the age of Health: and the "Trust Press" itself would probably be the first to urge some drastic State action to prevent and forestall such a peril to our bodies. "A Death Compact" would be the mildest of the terms applied to such a combination of doctors: and Harley Street would, without doubt, soon figure in that Press, with its "heightened and telling way of putting things" as the "Street of Death."

And yet is the formation of a "Trust Press" really less serious to the nation than the formation of a "Surgical Trust"? The one would imperil our bodies. The other imperils our minds and opinions. But are our minds and opinions less important than our bodies? At a time when States are governed almost entirely by opinion, is it not very probable that an attempt to "make a corner" in opinion will, if successful, be far more calamitous in its effects than an attempt to "make a corner" in health?

Milton's splendid advocacy of the freedom of the Press sounded a note in English life which still vibrates. If we except English jurymen when they are deciding cases of libel, we may say that all Englishmen are very susceptible to the appeal for the liberty of

the Press. They regard it as one of their highest and most sacred rights.

But the liberty of the Press, in Milton's days, went along with the liberty of the writer. If the English people once become convinced that the writer is not a free man, but is writing to order: if they suspect that his pen is mercenary to an organisation behind: if they gain a glimpse of some vast central machinery which ends in orders given from a single telephone: then they may conclude that the "freedom of the Press" has already become an empty shadow. They may even argue that a Press so enslaved requires some new and decisive action on the part of Parliament or the public to free it from the thralldom into which it has fallen. For if the writer is to be enchained, then the Liberty of the Press is already gone. Slavery to Capital is, indeed, a worse slavery than slavery to the State. "Service" may be a fit name even for the State conscription of pens to public duty. But slavery to the private profit of others can bear no other name than—servitude.

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Russell Lowell, in a famous passage in the *Biglow Papers*, made the parson preach to the Editor of the *Jaalam Independent Blunderbuss* from the text, "Son of man, prophesy against the shepherds of Israel":—

"Methinks," said the parson, "the editor who should understand his calling, and be equal thereto, would truly deserve the title of shepherd of the people which Homer bestows upon princes."

From that time forward the Editor "unaccountably absented himself from our house of worship," and Biglow suggests that the real creed of that Editor ran thus:—

In short, I firmly du believe
In Humbug generally,
Fer it's a thing thet I perceive
To hev a solid vally;
This heth my faithful shepherd ben,
In pasturs sweet heth led me,
And this'll keep the people green
To feed ez they hev fed me.

That creed seems to have become popular again with certain editors. Do I say "editors"? But part of the trouble to-day is that the editors are gone. Fleet Street has been taken possession of by the Peers. The Barons have passed from Runnymede to Blackfriars. The First Estate has become the Fourth, and the Fourth Estate has become the First. What we have to deal with, in short, is not editors but aristocratic syndicates. Such powers in high places may not, indeed, always be content

is the common feature of all those callings now freely recognised as "professions"—the Church, the Law, Medicine, the Army and the Navy. Ruskin once shrewdly pointed out that the reason why a soldier was held in such high honour was that he, above all other professionals, received the smallest reward for the greatest risks. Just so with the high honour given during the last century to doctors, who will inevitably decline in public esteem if they should be suspected of working for wealth rather than healing. The poverty of the clergy is what saves them in the present crisis of religions, and the notorious earnings of a few picked barristers certainly does not add to the respect felt for the profession of the Law.

Take the doctors. Suppose that a small group of clever surgeons in Harley Street should combine to form a Surgical Trust. Fancy—if you can—that one of them, retiring with a profit of a million, should record that he observed to one of the old school of Harley Street: "You must remember that you left Medicine a profession. We have made it a branch of commerce." It needs little imagination to envisage the effect on the public mind. We should realise that the medical profession had sustained its Sedan. We should feel a certain shame before so vast a moral catastrophe.

It is such a catastrophe that has occurred to Journalism. It is such a shame that the older journalists feel in its presence.

But long before such a calamity occurred to Harley Street, the State would be obliged to interfere. This is the age of Health: and the "Trust Press" itself would probably be the first to urge some drastic State action to prevent and forestall such a peril to our bodies. "A Death Compact" would be the mildest of the terms applied to such a combination of doctors: and Harley Street would, without doubt, soon figure in that Press, with its "heightened and telling way of putting things" as the "Street of Death."

And yet is the formation of a "Trust Press" really less serious to the nation than the formation of a "Surgical Trust"? The one would imperil our bodies. The other imperils our minds and opinions. But are our minds and opinions less important than our bodies? At a time when States are governed almost entirely by opinion, is it not very probable that an attempt to "make a corner" in opinion will, if successful, be far more calamitous in its effects than an attempt to "make a corner" in health?

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with profit-making only. They may aim at something greater. They may attain to a position in which their control of the Press becomes practically unbroken. At the present moment we have still surviving among us some conspicuous examples of independent journalism. But in the face of this "Trust" the existence of these independent papers will become more and more difficult. It will not be easy for any of them, for instance, to command a supply of news such as will compete with the syndicated news service of this immense "Trust." Their control of raw materials and means of transport will place the "Trust" in the same position of power as Rockefeller attained before his final absorption of his other great rivals in the Standard Oil Trust. The end of it may be, one day, that the "Trust" will speak with one voice: and then that voice may appear to be the "voice of a god."

If we want to realise the seriousness of such a prospect, we must return again to the classic pages of Mr. Kennedy Jones's book. For, after all, the writer was one of the great pioneers of this new type of journalism, and was a close partner of Lord Northcliffe in the early days of the *Daily Mail*.

Mr. Kennedy Jones writes as follows in his notable book:—

"What sells a newspaper?" is a question often asked me. "The first answer is—WAR. War not only creates a supply of news, but a demand for it. So deep-rooted is the fascination in war and in all things appertaining to it that I am perfectly persuaded, despite the League of Nations, wars will not cease until human nature is radically changed. We shall have to turn into new channels men's innate love of adventure which finds expression in childhood in playing at soldiers, and in later life in reading about them. Only a drum has to beat or a trumpet to sound in the street to bring the people to their windows, and a paper has only to be able to put on its placard 'A Great Battle' for its sales to mount up."*

So spake Mr. Kennedy Jones—and, after all, he was one of the greatest authorities in the art of selling newspapers.

Let me give an instance of how this view may work. I remember being by chance in control of a great London paper, *The Daily News*, on the Sunday night in 1904 when the Russian Fleet, passing down the North Sea, accidentally fired on a fleet of British trawlers that was fishing on the Dogger Bank. When the news came into the office we immediately realised that we were faced with a great peril of war between England and Russia. We were also faced with a great temptation: because it was quite clear that if we encouraged the war spirit, we could immensely increase the circulation of our paper, and escape from the unpopularity which we had incurred by criticising the Government during the Boer

* Fleet Street and Downing Street. Page 108.

War. What we really did was to track down the Russian Ambassador, who was taking dinner in a house in Mount Street, and, dragging him reluctantly from his dinner-table, to obtain from him a statement that the act was unpremeditated and accidental. That statement subsequently helped towards the removal of the war danger and the reference of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal. It was an instance where a paper was divided between public policy and private profit. Following the ethics of old journalism, we tamely put aside the thought of profit and pursued the public interest. Will it surprise the prophets of "Trust" journalism that no other course ever occurred to us as possible?

But what should we have done if we had regarded journalism simply as a "branch of commerce"? That is the question. According to Mr. Kennedy Jones, we should have deliberately fomented war.

Happily, at the present moment the "Trust" Press is almost as united in favour of peace as it used to be in favour of war. But that may be only a passing phase. The motives which at present inspire the love of peace do not seem very different from the motives which, in the old days, inspired the love of war. The principle in both cases seems the same—"Give the public what they want." To-day they want peace. To-morrow they may again want war.

* * * * *

The greatest danger of the "Trust Press" is the monopoly of news. But here Science, which has given us the trouble, may give us the remedy. It is not entirely impossible that the wireless telephone may contain the germs of a new revolution which may take the whole of the printed Press on its flank, and may shake to its foundations the whole security of this new "Trust." At present the printed Press—by starving Marconi House of news—is putting up a strong and steady fight against the further triumph of this marvellous invention. But that fight cannot go on for ever, and the wireless telephone may yet break up the most powerful commercial resistance in the world. The broadcasting of some recent speeches—notably those of General Smuts and Lord Curzon—has already created a new popular demand: and it now seems quite within possibility that the "Wireless" may soon be broadcasting Parliament.

Even in that case we may simply pass from one "Trust" to another. The universal "broadcaster," by a careful selection of news, might effect a greater control over our thoughts and views

than the most powerful newspaper proprietor. It might prove a greater tyrant of the soul.

* * * * *

But putting aside that dream of the future, how are we to deal now and to-day with this growing "Trust" peril in the printed Press?

It would be useless for the State to organise a Press of its own: it is the one thing that no State can ever do. But control is a different matter: especially a control of finance. There the New World has given us a lead. For there would be no real encroachment on the freedom of the Press if we in Great Britain were to adopt in Press matters the main principle of the great American Roosevelt Anti-Trust Law—to place a limit on the number of enterprises controlled by one hand. "One man, one newspaper." How does that sound?

To enforce that principle would not be to imperil the liberty of the Press. On the contrary, it would be the first step to a new freedom, both for the newspaper and for the writer on it. Let us begin with that!

HAROLD SPENDER.

POLITICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTIES.

Il ne s'agit plus de rêver la meilleure forme de Gouvernement puisque toutes se valent, mais de faire prévaloir la science.
—(FLAUBERT TO GEORGE SAND. Corresp. cxxii.)

THESE are occasions in the passage of time—occasions which furnish the philosopher with new speculations and the historian with new periods—when the troubled stream of circumstance seems, at least in the retrospect, to have paused, as if caught in a weir, and then, renewing its strength, to have rushed forward with gathering momentum upon another level to a remoter goal. Such occasions might be found in the death of Cæsar, in the coronation of Charlemagne, in the challenge of Luther, in the latest Assembly of the States-General of France. Such another occasion, if appearances are not deceptive, is our own.

At times so pregnant the business of reviewing, adjusting, testing, and sifting political opinions becomes for serious citizens a duty of the highest order. The moral obligation of learning to live in the age in which we find ourselves is not exceeded even by the moral obligation of being true to ourselves; and neither can be fulfilled without effort, nor the two conjoined without difficulty. Heirs of the past, trustees of the future, we have as well to experience the pleasure, or, it may be, the pain of new ideas, as to recognise and reckon with the fundamental constancy of human nature amidst all the trappings and disguises of change. And just here—just in the discarding of what has worn away in our conditions and in the re-orientation of what is permanent in ourselves—lies the science that we seek and the proving of the statesman who is truly wise.

In order to reach the realities of politics it is necessary to be quit of the tyranny of names. Names pass away much less easily than party-cries and party-causes, just because they haunt our memories and colour our sentiments long after they have ceased to correspond with the facts of an evolving creative life. When Bryce put together his book on the American Commonwealth he noticed that the existing American political parties—the Republicans and the Democrats—had lost their vital differences, and that the age "called either for the evolution of new parties or for the transformation of the old ones by the adoption of tenets and the advocacy of views suited to the needs of the time."* "Neither party," as he said, "had any clean-cut principles, any distinct tenets."† And Ambassador Page confirms that judgment in his

* *American Commonwealth*, c. 53.

† *Ib.*, c. 54.

memorable Letters.—“ The old labels ‘ Democrat ’ and ‘ Republican ’ have ceased to have any meaning, not only in my mind and in yours, but, I think, in the minds of nearly all the people.”* Bryce was too good a publicist not to perceive the danger inherent in such a situation—the danger that party-conflict might degenerate from a struggle about principles to a struggle for place; and he was too well acquainted with the condition of British parties not to forebode some similar development at home. “ The Government of the country, with the honour, power, and emoluments attached to it, would,” he observed, “ still remain as a prize to be contended for ”; but “ loyalty to a leader whom it was sought to make prime minister would be a poor substitute for loyalty to a faith.”†

If we turn our eyes towards the actual state of the old English political parties it is obvious to many of us that we are now come to such a pass as Bryce foreshadowed. The Conservatives have as plainly lost their cardinal doctrines as the Tories did before them. The restriction of the suffrage, which was their aim throughout the middle of the nineteenth century, and the maintenance of the Union with Ireland which was their preoccupation at its close, have passed as really into the limbo of lost causes as the restoration of the Stuarts or the revival of the “ Patriot ” Monarchy of George III.; and, though the defence of the Church of England against disestablishment, or at least disendowment, and the preservation of the Peerage as an estate of the realm are still bonds of interior union amongst Conservatives, these principles have almost wholly lost their importance for want of any effective external opposition. Of the spluttering candle of tariff reform it is, perhaps, unnecessary to speak. Untaxed food-supplies are the inevitable, irresistible demand of a great urban population, insecure of employment and whose maintenance in any tolerable degree of well-being must be the immediate urgent preoccupation of every British Government; and to disregard that fact is hopeless. But its recognition is at once to bring down the Tariff Reform controversy from a question of high imperial economics to one of casual bargaining about nascent industries or “ dumped ” produce, such as a free-trader, free also of bigotry, should be willing to consider. In the case of the Conservatives, it is, then, reasonable enough to hold that the old party-name connotes almost nothing of the old, exclusive party-ideas.

How does it stand with the Liberals? Not very differently, though for a different reason! If the Conservatives have parted with their traditions by frequency of failure, the Liberals have lost

* Hendrick, *Life and Letters of W. H. Page*. Vol. I., p. 105.

† *American Commonwealth*, c. 54.

them by the very completeness of their success. They, or rather (and by this circumstance we may measure the extent of their victory) their quondam opponents, have carried the suffrage of men to a conclusion and made a fine beginning in regard to the suffrage of women; have established Nationality in Europe as a dogma, unchallenged in principle, if not in practice; and have given to Ireland the dubious blessings of Home Rule. Individualism, national and personal, has won all along the line. And if at the end the doctrine of *laissez-faire* seems to have made sport of its sponsors and the world to have become altogether a different kind of place from what Liberals anticipated that it would become under Liberal influences, we must also in justice remember that the times and seasons of political opportunity are transient, and that the surest conclusion of history is that changes are commonly made too late. The Liberal programme might conceivably have fared better if it had been realised sooner, and if a wider suffrage had earlier existed to modify industrial developments and foster international feeling. Conceivably, but not certainly! In any case it is clear enough now that Liberalism has shot its bolt. Its programme lies behind us on the field of history—just as really a position carried as that of the Conservatives is a position lost.

Meanwhile its philosophy is in decay. Bentham with his greatest happiness principle, and Mill with his Logic and his Liberty, are become only less historical curiosities than Hobbes with that gospel of force and fear which in an evil hour he bequeathed to the Conservatives. All the charm of novelty, besides, has faded from the Liberal creed and is passed into the power of the party which claims, as if it were a true peculiar, the title and dignity of Labour; and the most philosophic Liberal of the day,* doubtless still in the pursuit of the pathway to reality, has recognised the compulsion of circumstance and accepted the obligation of a new allegiance. So, also, one may suspect it will be henceforward with the rest of the pilgrims who, with too rash a confidence in the future as such, take in each generation “ the golden road to Samarkand.”

A critical examination of the circumstances and issues of the last General Election can only tend to enforce these conclusions. Distinctions of policy were, indeed, drawn by the official leaders of the two old parties; but it was impossible, unless with the aid of a microscope, to discover their differences. Mr. Bonar Law's programme was, in fact, so tentative and undefined that it might perfectly have been born of the counsels of that unlucky statesman who, in the only reckless hour of his life, emblazoned upon his banner the strange device of “ wait and see ”; whilst the

* Lord Haldane.

whole case of Mr. George and his followers rested upon the assumption that no real divisions existed any more between the great parties of the past. The election was, in fact, concerned with men and not with principles; and Lord Grey anticipated the judgment of the country when he welcomed the downfall of Mr. George as a national deliverance from something insalubrious.* The truth was that, so far as the adherents of the old parties were concerned, Lord Bryce's forebodings were come true, and the battle had been fought over a personality. Nothing seemed wanting to the complete demonstration of this fact. For the so-called Diehards themselves, in the very hour of victory, piloted into port the storm-tossed measure, whose passage they had intransigently opposed for close on forty years; and the flag of Home Rule, which had, all that while, been the foremost banner of the Liberal Party, thus became, at last, its shroud.

It will seem obvious to many at this point to remark that Conservatism and Liberalism represent in the last resort distinctions of temperament and not of conviction—that, whilst causes vary, dispositions remain. But it is more than doubtful whether this criticism has either historical validity or actual value. Legitimism versus the Sovereignty of Parliament; the Selection versus the Election of representatives of the nation; Home Rule as against the Union—these, at least, were no mere divergencies of sentiment and habit, but differences of argument and policy, sufficiently profound, if we probe their abysses, to reach principles worthy of contention. No such questions divide Liberal and Conservative to-day. And, if we quarrel gladly, we are surely not quite such *condottieri* in our thinking as to suppose it legitimate to quarrel altogether without cause. Temperament, if that is all that divides us, would be worth an effort to overcome in the interest of the State; for union, and not disunion, though we sometimes forget it, is the end towards which that institution is directed. But, in truth, the theory appears to be worsted by the facts. Gladstone—for we need to look no farther to prove the point—had we known him at the start of his career (and, indeed, still to the end, in the intimacy of private life) would have seemed to us to bear the stigmata of the temperamental Conservative, just as surely as Disraeli, if we had chanced to be present at Mrs. Austen's on that memorable evening when, in Byronic garb and shoes embellished with red rosettes, he declaimed his Revolutionary Epic, might have led us to put him down as a Liberal of the most subversive sect. Temperament, doubtless, plays a part in installing the various furniture of the mind, but

* Lord Grey at Bradford, Oct. 24th, 1922: " . . . I feel to-day a sense of relief that something that was not wholesome has gone out of the political atmosphere."

it is but a small part beside circumstance and teaching in youth, reflection and interest in adult life. And, besides, if it was ever true that "every little girl and boy that comes into this world alive is either a little Liberal or a little Conservative," it is evidently true no more, since a good proportion of small folk are born nowadays of the Labour that is married to Revolt or Revolution.

And there, perhaps, we touch the very heart of the matter. For the generation that is growing up old things have in a greater degree than is usual passed away. A desire of knowledge, for perhaps the first time in its existence, torments the country; and seekers after wisdom cannot be satisfied by a political education that has become plainly partial and incomplete. To profess oneself mere Liberal or Tory, in a world that has already sifted and absorbed the best values of both, must, at no great distance of time, be to court the character of Rip van Winkle. Both the domestic and international problems of our period lie outside the old classification of political thought. The former is economic in its nature, and all but religious in its pressure. We are busy no longer with votes and liberties, but about the division of the product of industry; and it may be something more than a coincidence that the canny Scot has just replaced the feckless Irishman as the stormy petrel of our Parliaments. Any way, there are many to warn us that we are finding a horizontal line of division instead of the old vertical one, and are exchanging an individual independence of opinion for a class consciousness. The "Haves" are, on this showing, to be ranged against the "Have-nots"; and in that case we may shrewdly suspect that, at the end of the struggle, Dame Justice, passing by, as in the fable, will find the equivalent of an oyster-shell to allot to each. Clever people in both camps countenance these kinds of suppositions. Lord Balfour and the group of alarmist politicians who surround Mr. George on the one hand, and Mr. and Mrs. Webb on the other, alike warn us that the economic issue is coming to a head, and deliver their contrary counsels of resistance and surrender. They may, of course, be right; but a new generation ought, at least, to enjoy the privilege of looking at its problem for itself, unencumbered by old animosities and inspired by a new enthusiasm for righteousness. Behind the desire to be quit of Mr. Lloyd George and all his works and ways, there was apparent at the late General Election a wish to put into power men who could be trusted to act with honour and think with discretion, until such time as the nation had been able to find light in obscurity. That obscurity had lately become very deep indeed.

A candid revelation of the thoughts of many hearts at the

present time might, indeed, probably show that socialistic criticism is felt to have made out a very fair destructive case against what is called capitalist civilisation and a very poor constructive case for itself. People are genuinely impressed with the contrasts of wealth and poverty; and the public conscience, which sleeps so soundly upon many a prickly pillow, is well awake to the duty of drawing out its soul to the hungry and satisfying the afflicted with bread. Pity is become the propriety of our time; relief, on a scale without precedent, streams from a depleted Treasury into the pockets of the workless; and men of substance, when their rates and benefactions have been added to their taxes and supertaxes, must be pretty nearly in a position to renew the boast of Zacchæus and claim that they have distributed the half of their goods to feed the poor. All this, however, does but little to placate the Webbs and the band of militant Sociologists who follow in their wake. They continue to describe our morals in terms that would not altogether have done shame to Juvenal, and to denounce our self-indulgence with a fire of reproach that might have been the envy of Salvian. A thousand individual nobilities leave them cold. Their quarrel is not with men, but with the very structure of society. As presented in the latest and most authoritative indictment* against the existing system, the counts are four. History, we are told, proves—but this is in truth a bold presumption—that, if the people are divorced from the ownership of the instruments of production, the most part of the nation lives in indigence and under the menace of starvation; that this indigence is emphasised and aggravated by the amenities enjoyed and idleness discovered by such as “live by owning”; that the subjection of one man to another who commands his access to the means of production and therefore his labour, constitutes a condition of things deserving of the name of “wage-slavery”; and, finally, that the organisation of industry on its present-day basis is both economically unsound and morally disastrous.

In an age when Christianity is apt to look like a social philosophy rather than a religious creed, such considerations are peculiarly calculated to trouble the conscience. The Bible in England is still the most potent of all political treatises; and Socialists are in a position to exploit the New Testament as successfully and as naturally as the Puritans once exploited the Old. Mr. Smillie's appeals to the Gospel during the sittings of the Coal Commission, if they lacked something in taste and subtlety, were yet profoundly characteristic of a nation that looks to the Scriptures as to a final court of justice; and we shall not get the measure of the power of Socialism until we have recognised the apparent correspondence of

* S. & B. Webb: *The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation*.

much of its teaching to that of the Evangel which came into the world with Christ. Here lie the central phenomena of our time. The poor desire to have the Gospel, not preached to them, but practised before them; and the rich have not the conviction altogether to embrace it, nor the audacity altogether to let it go. We can see, of course—those of us at least who take the trouble to read our Bibles critically—that the spirit of Christ was at a great remove from that of the school of judges and dividers to which Mr. and Mrs. Webb lend countenance. We know that Socialism, when, as in Russia, it gets the upper hand, or when, as in England, it sets out of Sunday afternoons to teach the young morality, betrays an ugly face. We are sensible that a political creed which, in its more reckless hours and by the mouths of its more fervent apostles, preaches the saving of Society by violent methods or predatory designs, has neither part nor lot in a faith that overcame the world by meek endurance and patient well-doing. And we are aware, too, that there is no great difficulty in playing Socrates to the Socialist Thrasymachus; that a thousand objections have riddled the target of Socialist theory, and some conspicuous failures the record of Socialist practice—William Lane's most favourably located New Australia experiment in Paraguay, for example, which came to “almighty smash” in the 'nineties of the last century, to say nothing of Lenin's less fortunately timed adventure now crumbling into decay before our eyes. We know all such men and the vanity of their communications.

Equality, ever since Rousseau gave it wings, has been a word to conjure with; and its magic has gone out into all lands. Yet nothing is more certain than that it cannot be harnessed with Liberty, which has (especially if we can conceive it, in the manner of Thomas Hill Green, as a choice of right *not* wrong, rather than just as a choice between the two) a longer record of beneficence and a truer relation to life. For a career open to talent presupposes the right of talent to rise to the top; and there is equality gone for ever. Equal laws do not, in fact, make for equal purses; and to bring incomes to a level would be to bring Nature as well as business to a standstill. All the world's a stage; the actors can look to play no equal parts and to secure no even profits; and it is a fool's philosophy that mistakes a pair of balances for the constellation of Justice. Yet still are we conscious how imperfectly for us the thought of individual liberty retains its savour, or the dogma of the old economy its promise of salvation. We are floating on as curious a current of disillusionment as the pages of history show—a current so powerful that it is sweeping us back behind the old party creeds to something deeper and wider, both at home and abroad, than they contain. Dimly, and in a sense dully, the Labour Party have discovered this fact; and it is all

the strength of their position. But they have not the historic sense, or the intellectual subtlety, or, if it comes to that, the intelligent support to disentangle their dreams from the unedifying conflict of the "Have-nots" against the "Haves," and to forge them into a considered philosophy invested with spiritual meaning and correlated with the thought of some far-off divine event upon which Creation, amidst much groaning and travailing, waits in hope. The outstanding movement of our time is just no better than a page of philanthropy; if it is to be of any real service to society it must be brought into relation with the larger science of religion.

In other words, it commonly escapes the twentieth-century Socialist, when he sets out to copy the political architecture of the Middle Age, that the fabric he admires was theocentric and not autocentric in its grouping. Yet that is a fact of quite outstanding consequence. It makes all the difference in the world whether the form and substance of social life are conceived as products of human organisation or as mysteries of divine appointment; whether we set ourselves to think out a society or to think ourselves into what we find; whether we believe that design obtains in the political as well as in the natural world, or merely that man is the architect of his own fortune: whether we try to play our part as subordinates or as principals in the drama of civic life. Political Mysticism—that sense of the unseen foundations of Society and of their gradually developing relation to a larger scheme of things than our minds can comprehend—comes to us with a great history, and carries with it the *imprimatur* of some of the finest and most representative British minds. Shakespeare, for instance, and Burke have, in their different ways, pressed upon us the claims of a divinity that shapes our ends, of an order we cannot fully fathom, of a destiny we cannot perfectly perceive; and the idea of keeping our politics in harmony with the soul of the Universe, or, if we like the phrase better, with the nature of things, formed, so long as Conservatism was a lucid faith, part, and perhaps the most vital part, of the Conservative tradition. But the Liberals lost it from lack of a definite theology, and the Socialists from being too great schoolmasters. One does not, however, study the Middle Ages for nothing; and students of politics will discover, with amusement it may be, yet without astonishment, an admission, in the pages of the leading Socialist periodical of our time, that the last attempt to order life upon a general theory was made by the Council of Trent, and a suggestion that the mainspring of our present discontents lies in the habitual, fragmentary treatment of human activities, and the failure to weld them into a harmonious whole.*

* *The New Statesman*, Sept. 20th, 1919

Political Mysticism is, in truth, that particular excellence of the mediæval world which our own generation is feeling after and not finding. Sometimes brutal, often turbulent, always incapable of bringing their fruit to perfection, the men of the Middle Age conceived the essentials of a true commonwealth with a science that has never been surpassed, and in so doing carried the world a stage further, so far as we can judge, upon its intended road. Seeing through a glass but darkly, they nevertheless disclose in the character of their institutions both the sense of partnership which ought to regulate the relation between man and man, and the sense of Christendom which is the true bond between nation and nation. Here lay an advance upon both the slave system and the imperialism of the Roman Empire which, in theory at least, covered all the distance between coercion and consent.

To what consummation a society, thus organised on a hierarchical and international basis in accordance with the theory of function and the conception of catholicity, might eventually have come is only now a matter of speculation. The Reformation, whatever its moral value, cut, as we can most of us see by this time, clean across the natural line of social development, and, in due course, made dominant the thoughts of the nation and the economic man. It was of a piece with, though not, perhaps, as a result of this, that Capital came to the fore, and that a conception of life, coloured by the Old Testament rather than the New and more Judaic than we commonly realise, took possession of many minds. For better or worse the broad movement of the world, politically speaking—and it is with the political and not the religious aspect of the matter that we are concerned here—was thenceforward from Catholicity to Nationality, and from Status to Contract.

We cannot undo the present by dreaming ourselves into the past. If we have made mistakes we must carry the burden of them with us, and not suppose that we can run our civilisation backwards like a motor-car that has made a mistake at a cross-ways. The Israelites who decided for a king had, perhaps, reason to regret the Judges: but kingship had become a consecrated institution before they discovered their error. It is on this account that Socialist politicians are so seldom recruited amongst citizens of real weight. Their politics are reactionary in the objectionable sense; they pursue the dead forms of the past and not the living spirit that made those forms organic; and, finally, they invite us to changes that must involve the fiercest of all forms of competition—a rivalry of economic ideas. But social convulsions have no manner of advantage for the generation that suffers them; and we who have already passed through a typhoon

can least afford the luxury of an earthquake. The virtue of the Middle Age may be studied in its effects, but must be copied in its causes. The economic institution of the guild, not less than the social conception of Status, towards which the critics of Contract cast despairing eyes, and the political sense of a Catholic civilisation, upon which are now founded the last hopes of a Europe distracted in all its members, rested upon no dubious faith in the automatic or artificial progress of the State—an institution mostly thought of in those days as something static—but upon sanctions intimately allied to a much more definite and scientific theology than now prevails. Thus the social teaching of the great prose-poets of the nineteenth century—of Carlyle and Ruskin and the rest—really resolves itself into little more than a plea for a supernatural foundation for the drama of human life.

But the Labour Party has little vision beyond phenomena, and is under an obvious incapacity for reaching first principles of any kind so long as its doctrine oscillates uneasily between the tenets of the Gospel and the theories of Marx. The older Parties have at least a common basis in the Bible, and to the age that is growing up represent rather complementary than competing ideas—ideas of faith and order, of hope and freedom. Now that the issues which made party-cries of these high civic virtues have passed away, now that time has worn our old causes and controversies into nothing, the virtues themselves have recovered their purity and are ripe for fusion in the light of a larger knowledge and a wider experience. From such a fusion a truer science of society than any we have known should some day be brought to birth; and it follows that to the older Parties has, in our time, been given the opportunity of its generation.

History, however, if we study it from a philosophic standpoint, is but a melancholy record of things not done in time—the likeness, we might say, of a Sibyl perpetually offering and withdrawing books—and the thought of a continuous, as opposed to a discontinuous evolution, has been foreign to the majority of politicians. Yet now that our intellectual baggage includes so large an admixture of scientific method, it seems improbable that this way of looking at things can satisfy the intelligence of the nation even so well as it did, or that we should be for ever content to allow one set of men to devote themselves largely to the undoing of the work of another. We can see without an effort what politics of this kind has made of Ireland; and, if we put our minds to work, we may come to require of our legislators that they should minister no more to our inherited partialities, but to our impartial judgment. Political issues, besides, have their root in advancing knowledge more often than our forefathers always understood. Democracy,

for instance, over which our parents fought so fiercely, has been well described as a form of civilisation rather than a form of government, and might have been discovered by a vision sufficiently acute, lurking behind the printing-press of Gutenberg and the steam-engine of Watt. Politics must keep pace with Physics; and natural science, with its vast possibilities both of good and evil, presses us continually by hopes and fears towards a greater benevolence. The industrial revolution of the Nineteenth Century required a new effort of disinterestedness, which was never made; and the wars of the Twentieth have discovered the claims of a catholic Christianity which is far from being realised. Whilst the Sociologist stands by and warns us with exasperating calm that “the future of international politics largely depends on the question whether we have a specific instinct of hatred for human beings of a different racial type from ourselves,”* the river of opportunity flows past and, from want of interest in the science of religion, we are like to be buried beneath the sciences of destruction and defence.

The world, meanwhile, has reached a condition when more than ever peace, not in word or in name, but in deed and in truth is the only worthy preoccupation of a serious politician. In such circumstances to perpetuate old, empty animosities is a political folly as well as a moral crime; to find the points of contact between the old Parties among the noblest of civic duties. Every calm observer can see that former things have passed away; that our old domestic controversies are dead; that we are entering upon another age; that we are ripe for a new orientation of thought. A little more courage in facing facts on the part of official Conservatism and official Liberalism; an honest admission, on the one hand, that the world must now rest, if it can hope to rest at all, upon the development of such Liberal ideas as democracy and nationality; an honest admission, on the other, that, in principle, its work is accomplished; an acceptance by both of the bridge that is offered them by the present predominance of foreign affairs which is a matter over which party politics have now for a long while had little hold—and there might then emerge a political philosophy more convincing than any that has gone before it and a generation of citizens more complete in education than any of its predecessors. For in an age of science, political philosophy dare aim at nothing partial. All catchwords of necessity do it wrong. It is no exclusive pursuit of power or wealth or happiness, nor of the amenities of life, nor yet of equality, nor even of liberty. Burke, who has been claimed both by Whig and Tory, but, in fact, belongs to neither, has alone said in familiar, imperishable words

* Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 10.

something wholly to the point; and in that something, everything seems to be contained. Society, as he saw it, was "a partnership in all science . . . in all art . . . in every virtue and in all perfection . . . a partnership . . . between those who are living, those who are dead, those who are to be born."*

We may say, if we like, that the thought is but a variation upon the old theme of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good; but it is at any rate a variation which both enriches and develops the idea. And any group of men to whom that idea is no form of words, but a strong persuasion, will, of necessity, be in a good position to read the signs of our times; to discern the path of wisdom and destiny; to temper the stern justice of what we know as Natural Law with the mild equities of the Christian Gospel; to eschew all differences with others that have not their root in the patient, unremitting struggle of right with wrong; to recognise the fact in which the Sociologist has found the saving hope of society, that "the Extreme as a personal ideal for those who are called by it is a necessary complement of the Mean in public policy; "† and thus, in a word, to acquire that enthusiasm of moderation which is not only wisdom but power to give it wings. To such as these any attempt either to degrade the State into the ally of the Capitalist or the Socialist, or to make patriotism the equivalent of a sacred egoism, must appear equally shameful. They cannot suppose Providence to be so partial, or Justice to be thus susceptible of private interpretation. Not so have they understood their partnership in all science, in all art, in every virtue and in all perfection; nor by any economic artifices do they hope to inaugurate the Kingdom of God. For they are aware that the foundations of Society lie beneath the surface of things, and that to a changed sense of values and some increased perception of the part that the Supernatural plays in the affairs of men we have to look for any hope the future may contain. Amid the rise and fall of kingdoms and the decay of once famous parties, amid narrowing creeds of nationality and doctrinaire systems of economics, the wise patriot may still detect a use for the Ten Commandments and the citizen of the world will still find subjects for meditation in the Sermon on the Mount. One might add that Shaftesbury's *Life*, lately rewritten from a purely civic standpoint, is an interesting reminder of how great things even a very limited personality can achieve in the political sphere, with such a code of law at its back and such a vision of judgment before its eyes.

ALGERNON CECIL.

* *Reflections on the Revolution in France.*
† Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 369.

THE DOWNFALL OF SOCIALISM IN ITALY.

THE purpose of this short article is to call attention to a phase of contemporary Italian history which seems to have generally escaped the notice of British writers on Italian affairs. In dealing with the national movement which is now dominant in Italy, few appear to have thought of studying the question of how it came to be that Socialism had so seriously lost its hold on the masses of the people at the time that Fascism began to gather strength as a political movement. Yet the fall of Socialism historically preceded the rise of Fascism. You cannot account for the rise of the latter until you have given reason for the downfall of the former. That downfall cannot be seriously attributed to an attack from outside; for no political organisation so widely and firmly established as Socialism was three years ago could have suddenly suffered such irreparable damage unless some process of internal decay had already undermined its foundations.

Consider for a moment the Socialist position in Italy before the Fascist campaign was launched. Its representation in Parliament steadily amounted to 30 per cent. of the whole House. It was by far the largest party numerically, having an average of about 150 members. Next in strength came the Popular Party, with one hundred members. These sat beside the Socialists on the Left. Other parties in the ultra-radical *bloc* numbered about sixty votes. Thus, with the hegemony of this whole group in its hands, the Italian Socialist Party was practically the ruler of the destinies of Italy. In the country its position was even stronger. Though in Parliament it had steadfastly refused to take office under a monarchical Government, but merely sat in the Chamber by way of protest, one remarkable part of its policy in the country was to secure as many of the municipal positions as possible for the party's nominees. This was certainly keen generalship and showed excellent results; for in Italy the national Parliament is not held in the same popular esteem as are the municipal administrations. Campanilism is still so powerful a force that the commune remains the pivot of the general political situation. The Socialist leaders seized on this fact of national psychology and made the utmost of it. They became the ruling power in almost every important commune throughout the central and northern districts, which are, of course, the political heart of the country. Moreover, they realised that in Italy the agrarian districts are by far the more important from the political point of view. Therefore they knew the value of going out into the country into the small communes and getting their followers into control there.

This explains the extraordinary position which they held

immediately after the war. It was quite a common thing to see the red flag floating from municipal buildings throughout Lombardy and Romagna and Emilia. Local labour was practically in the hands of the anti-Statal forces, and local co-operative societies, under Socialist patronage, played a large part in agrarian commerce and industry. It would take us outside the limits of this article to go into details; but in order that the British reader may have some notion of the intensive character of the Socialist organisation throughout the countryside, we may take one instance as typical. Ferrara is the nerve centre in the agrarian district of the Valley of the Po, which is the most important political region throughout all Italy. In the autumn of 1920 the Ferrara Labour Chamber had 100,000 members on its rolls, which exactly amounts to the whole able-bodied male population of the district. It was impossible for a farmer or labourer to live unless he had the Socialist *tessera* in his pocket and paid his yearly fees to the Labour Chamber. The City Hall was able to fly the red flag with impunity. Both God and the King were banished from the schools. That may be taken as a fairly typical instance of central and northern Italy, especially in the agricultural regions.

We come now to the immediate post-war crisis, which gave Italian Socialism its golden opportunity. To-day it is the custom with Italians to attribute their diplomatic defeat at Versailles to the bad faith of their Allies; but the historical truth, of which Italians themselves have always been fundamentally conscious, is that the defeat was due to the vacillating and half-hearted attitude of Italian statesmen during the war and to their utter incapacity to deal with the situation which had arisen at Versailles. This is said not principally of the men who represented the country at the Peace Conference, but rather of the public men at home. For the people as a whole the net result of the gigantic struggle was a tremendous disappointment. Italy had mortgaged three-fourths of her national wealth and had sacrificed over half-a-million lives. And yet her material recompense was only a slight rectification of colonial frontiers and the extension of her home frontier to the watershed of the Eastern Alps and a few strips of rocky shore on the Adriatic. Though she had conquered one of the richest nations, and the second greatest military power in Europe, her enemy's assets dissolved in a night, as it were, on the eve of the Armistice. Casting a glance northwards towards their "Latin Sister" across the Alps, one can imagine what the feelings of the Italians must have been. The general post-war disillusion and consequent depression was made worse by the everyday conduct of the Government. The interests of demobilised soldiers were simply flouted. Hordes of workers who had been employed in

war factories were suddenly dismissed. War profiteers, great and small, flaunted their wealth in the face of the enraged public. For those who had been neutral during the war the golden opportunity had arrived. Freed from the shackles of the censorship, the Socialist Party had once more regained its freedom of speech and action.

What use did it make of the opportunity? In the answer to that question will be found the real cause of the political *bouleversement* which took place in Italy last year. But before coming to the answer it will probably be necessary to point out to the British reader that in Italy the Socialist movement and the Socialist Party held much the same position towards the country in general as the Labour movement and Labour Party have held in Great Britain. It must not be considered *en bloc* as an anti-patriotic or subversive movement. It has exercised a function in the economic and social development of modern Italy which is probably of relatively greater importance than the Labour movement in Great Britain. Italian industrial life may be said to have a history of not more than forty years. During the early period of its development labour conditions still retained the feudal character of the Middle Ages. The worker was wholly at the mercy of an employer who had little sense of responsibility for the social well-being of the labouring masses. When one recalls the fact that the first serious legislation in favour of labour was not made until after the death of King Humbert, twenty-three years ago, and that it was not until then that a governmental Labour Department was called into being, one realises how slow the ruling classes in Italy have been to recognise the importance of Labour as a public element in national life.

In such circumstances it was that Italian Socialism became a factor in the political life of the country. Introduced from abroad, it was transplanted into a soil where no compact or definite idea of nationality had yet sprung up. The superficial political unification of Italy had only recently taken place; but there was as yet no sense of national solidarity among the people. Therefore in Italy Socialism retained its international character, not as in France and Germany, where it was necessarily forced into the currents of national life. Moreover, there was in Italy no capitalist class, properly speaking. The upper classes were identified with the bureaucracy on which the Government of the country rested. Through the necessities of the situation, therefore, Socialism found its direct target in the institutions of the State. Furthermore, the compromise with royalty, whereby the main opposing elements of the *Risorgimento* were finally brought together, left its residue of discontented and unconverted

republicans. All things considered, it is not to be wondered at that Italian Socialism was conceived and brought forth with a distinctly anti-Statal turn of character. This accident of birth has dogged its whole career. Though syndicalist and reformist elements have again and again essayed to force it within the orbit of the State, they have failed to overcome the counter influence of revolutionary Marxism. In the political, moral, and social *débâcle* that immediately followed the war, this original revolutionary trend became supreme. And it is this which really led to the downfall of Italian Socialism.

We now come to the practical account of that downfall. It will be found, I think, that in the main there are two leading features that have to be taken into account. First, there is the Socialist loss of control over Italian Labour and, second, there is the fool-hardy campaign of denigration against the war and those who fought in it. Let us take these considerations in the order in which they have been stated.

In accounting for the loss of control over Italian Labour, it must be remembered that, from the Socialist organiser's standpoint, there is a natural antithesis between the exigencies of industrial labour on the one hand and agrarian labour on the other. As a result of the war this antithesis became particularly accentuated in Italy, which is overwhelmingly a peasant country. Whereas in industrialism of the British type it may be and often is possible to raise the social status of the workman to as high a degree as he may wish without thereby transforming him into a capitalist, even on a small scale, the same thing is not possible among a peasantry. The peasant workman has a natural greed for the soil he tills. When he can purchase it in small lots and on easy terms no amount of preaching can prevent him from using his saved earnings in that direction. Now in Italy industrialism of the British type has only a scant importance, especially from the political and social point of view, as compared with agrarian labour. If therefore Socialism, by helping to raise the status of the rural labourer, thereby tended to transform him into a small proprietor, it obviously rendered him unfit material for its own revolutionary purposes. In doing so it clearly prepares the way for his exit from the Socialist ranks.

Now that is exactly what happened in Italy. The General Labour Confederation, of which the Socialists were the patrons, had a gross membership of nearly two millions. Of this the number of agricultural labourers amounted to 889,000 in 1920. Therefore the loss of the agricultural labourer practically rent the camp in twain. And that loss was due to the transformation of which I have spoken. One cannot go into details here; but a few

outstanding considerations may be mentioned. According to figures presented at a Congress held in Florence, where the "white" syndicates assembled in November, 1920, out of a total of 1,182,491 members enrolled, there were 1,016,812 agricultural labourers, distributed among the following categories:—

741,262 *Métayers* and small leaseholders.
180,589 Small proprietors.
94,961 Field labourers.

We have no corresponding figures for the Socialist or "red" syndicates; but we may take it for granted that the general complexion of their agricultural labour was the same. Now, these figures show what a large percentage of rural labourers had come to secure some sort of vested interest in the land they tilled.

The same thing has occurred in other countries; and it is due to the fact that during the war a high premium was placed on rural labour, whereas the cost of implements, stock, seeds, manures, &c., was exceedingly high and fell wholly on the shoulders of the landed proprietor. The *métayer*, who farms the land on a profit-sharing basis with the principal owner, was under no such expense, for the labour was supplied principally from his family. Therefore he had no heavy debit side to his account when the general proceeds were divided. Sooner or later he found himself in a position where he could purchase the soil outright. And he generally found the owner willing to sell; for the latter had suffered heavily under the importunities of the Socialist labour agitator. His outlook was not bright from any point of view, with war disasters and social upheavals on the horizon.

This transformation has taken place on a wholesale scale throughout the agricultural districts of central and northern Italy. By the end of 1920 the fraction of organised Labour that had not secured some sort of permanent interest in the soil was very small indeed. It was clear that Socialism had run its course in these districts. It had served the purpose for which the peasant had become enrolled in its ranks. It had, in fact, helped to create a new middle class which no longer needed the patronage of the agitator. Not only that, but against the communistic preachings of the agitator this class was ready to make common cause with the older bourgeoisie. All that was now needed was the tocsin of a new lead as the signal of a wholesale desertion from the ranks of the proletariat organisations.

As an index of this state of feeling we may return to the case of Ferrara, where, as I have said, the Socialists ruled supreme. In the elections of 1921 the Socialists registered only 17,000 votes as against 50,000 given for the national *bloc*. Moreover, in the same year the Labour element of that city formed a new organisation

which was destined to have enormous dimensions. It has to-day become the Fascist Labour organisation, has a national hegemony, and already counts two millions among its members. But the point here to remember is that it was originally founded in the Socialist citadel by those who had formerly belonged to the Socialist organisation. So heavily has it affected the whole Labour position in the country that the Socialist Confederation, which still retains its adherents in the industrial districts, decided last August to desert the party and all its theories of internationalism, &c.

So far we may to some extent consider the Socialist Party as the victim of circumstances over which it had no control; but when we come to the second principal feature which I have mentioned, the case is quite the reverse. In the moral *débâcle* of the post-war period the revolutionary section of the Socialists was given its opportunity, which it handled miserably. It was a time when general anarchy prevailed. There was disgruntlement and disillusion everywhere. Everybody felt the need of protesting against something or somebody. Throughout the whole of Italy the feeling was that the Italian cause had been betrayed; and there were even moments when patriotic men asked themselves whether it had not all been in vain and whether after all the non-interventionists were not right in 1915. Had Socialism at that time taken the cause of the returned soldier as its own, had it sympathised with the honestly disgruntled elements of the nation, had the Party taken up the cause of that seething mass of discontent and organised it in the interests of the people as a whole, even Mussolini might have been found among the leaders, and Socialism might have been borne into power on a tide of national enthusiasm, as Fascism was three years later.

But, instead of that, the Socialist leaders led a campaign against the soldier who had fought and suffered. They sneered at his sacrifices and spat on his medals. A time came when officers did not wear uniform in public, in order to avoid insult. It is hard to understand what process of cerebral decay had attacked the leaders of the strongest political party in Italy at that time. Where did they think the campaign would end? No nation will suffer vilification for a war in which it has spent its best blood; and the case of a lost war is often more important to the public conscience. It is a fundamental thing that touches the deepest traditions of the race; and even though a race may stand being flouted and vilified for the moment, the reaction is as certain as the operation of cause and effect. When it comes, it comes with the ineluctable urge of a force of nature.

Setting aside the constant annoyances caused by intermittent

strikes on the most trivial of pretences, such as the presence of a soldier or a policeman on the train; the constant dislocation of industrial and commercial life; the fatuous occupation of the factories in 1920—setting aside the irritating effect on the bulk of the people of this system of revolution by pinpricks, I think that the Socialist denigration of the war, together with the economic factors which I have mentioned, was the principal cause of the violence of the national reaction and the desertion of the Socialist adherents towards the national side. The Marxist leaders had shown commendable sagacity throughout the years in which they worked for the control of the communes as the basis of their political power; but they misjudged the psychology of the commune when they started the campaign of vilification against those who had fought in the war. The overwhelming bulk of the Italian army had been recruited from the country districts. Though the peasants were not originally in favour of intervention, and were never really enthusiastic for the war itself, they felt its human side far more keenly than did the cities or industrial centres, where exempted men were the rule rather than the exception. The simple familiar relations that exist between country folk conduced towards the formation of a group mind wherein the mourning of individual families for their war losses became a public grief. Anybody who had experience of Italy during the war cannot have failed to notice how the soldier returning on leave was fêted as a general hero. The loss of a son or father or brother at the front became the loss of the village. This was the sheer human side of the situation, apart entirely from the question as to whether the war was popular or not.

It must be remembered that it was from here that the *revanche* came. The first Fascists were simply returned soldiers who were out to avenge their comrades. From this it was that they gained their immense psychological ascendancy over the masses. And that psychological asset as an element in the Socialist defeat is clearer to-day than it was even at first. There seems to be a tragic fitness in the whole dramatic cycle, from the original Socialist campaign against intervention to the campaign of denigration which ended in the final catastrophe. The Italian peasants were against the war in 1915. It was only in the years that immediately followed the Peace of Versailles that they became interventionists, by a peculiar retroactive mental process which had been set in motion by the very men who had disowned the war. That reaction was the answer to the campaign of denigration, and Socialism became the victim of its own handiwork.

JAMES MURPHY.

SHAKESPEARE AS HISTORIAN.

I.

JOHN HEMINGE and Henry Condell, editors of that famous First Folio collection of the dramatic works of Shakespeare whose tercentenary is this year being celebrated, divided the plays which they presented to the public into the three groups, *viz.*, tragedies, comedies, and histories. The threefold division which they thus introduced has maintained itself down to the present day. Other classifications have, indeed, been suggested. One laborious American researcher, for example, has recently contended that a more scientific scheme would be to divide the dramas into two sections according as the ratio of stopt to unstopt lines exceeds or falls short of the ratio of 1 to 3.79451. The mathematical exactitude of this erudite proposal, however, has not as yet commended it to either scholars or publishers on this side of the Atlantic. They cling conservatively to the old trichotomy. Nevertheless, while doing so they admit that it is illogical. All the histories except *Henry V.* are, in point of fact, tragedies, and they might appropriately be grouped with *Hamlet* and *Othello*. The boundary line between the tragedies and the histories has, indeed, fluctuated considerably: in the First Folio the three Roman plays, now regarded as histories, were classified among the tragedies; in Macmillan's edition *Troilus and Cressida* and *Titus Andronicus*, usually included among the tragedies, are denominated histories. Perhaps, if the plays of Shakespeare have, in the interest of finite intelligences, to be analysed and docketed at all, the twofold division into (a) those based on history, and (b) those purely imaginary would serve as well as any. Not even this classification, however, would be easy of application. For there is a historic element in nearly all the imaginative tragedies, and even in some of the comedies, *e.g.*, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. "It was a peculiarity of Shakespeare's genius," says Mr. Churton Collins, "not so much to create as to realise." Shakespeare borrowed all his plots, with the possible exception of that of *Love's Labour's Lost*. No single important character in the whole range of his marvellous galaxy seems to have been purely his own invention, except Caliban in *The Tempest*. History appealed to him as an inexhaustible storehouse of accomplished dramas awaiting for their full interpretation his explicating mind.

II.

Students of Shakespeare as historian have to examine the dramas with a twofold purpose. First, they have to search the whole of them in order to discover, if possible, what revelations Shakespeare makes, whether deliberately or unconsciously, concerning his own

times. Secondly, they have to pore over the histories proper in order to find out how far he gives an authentic picture of the past.

The first of these two fascinating problems, *viz.*, Shakespeare's relation to his own times, must here be dismissed briefly. "If there is one thing more than another," says Mr. Aldis Wright, "which marks the contrast between Shakespeare and the writers of his time, it is his singular reticence with regard to contemporary events." And even the less reticent writers of the time, such as the Puritan pamphleteers, had to be careful what they penned, and still more careful what without licence they printed; because the Government was vigilant and suspicious, and its penalties were severe. The severity of the censorship was, indeed, such that playwrights who wished to dabble in politics usually resorted to two devices to avoid detection: first, they conveyed their political instructions to the actors by some means other than the printed copy; secondly, they wrapped up their political allusions so subtly in historical or legendary analogies that only the quick ear of an expectant audience could detect them. That the audience was expectant of political allusions is abundantly evident. Shakespeare himself did not escape the formidable suspicion of no less a person than Queen Elizabeth. "Know ye not that I am Richard II.?" she said to her courtiers on the occasion of the production of Shakespeare's play, and she was not alone in imagining that the whole drama was thinly veiled propaganda on behalf of the conspiracy of Essex.

Miss Lilian Winstanley has recently with infinite pains and ingenuity sought to prove that *Hamlet* is eloquent of the succession problem of 1603—that Denmark is Scotland, Elsinore Edinburgh, Hamlet's murdered father Darnley, his deluded mother Mary Queen of Scots, the wicked uncle Bothwell, Polonius Burleigh, and Hamlet none other than James I. himself. Similarly she has attempted to show that the real theme of *Macbeth* is the Gunpowder Plot; that the true tragedy of King Lear is the villainy perpetrated at Kirk o' the Field in 1567; and that the inner meaning of *The Tempest* relates to the assassination of Henry of Navarre. Even those who consider that Miss Winstanley has worked her seam too thin will probably agree that the robust common sense of Dr. Johnson was not deserting him when he said, "I am always inclined to believe that Shakespeare has more allusions to particular facts and persons than his readers commonly suppose."

Not that Shakespeare is entirely devoid of the most plain and open references to contemporary political events. Queen Elizabeth is the theme of half a dozen fulfilled prophecies, among which that in Cranmer's speech in *Henry VIII.* (sometimes attributed to

Fletcher) is the most notable; a precise allusion to the expedition of the Earl of Essex to Ireland in 1599 enables us to date the play of *Henry V.* to within a few weeks; the accession of James I. is alluded to in *Macbeth*; the union of the English and Scottish crowns is referred to in the same play and also in *King Lear* and *Henry VIII.*; the discovery of the Bermudas is mentioned in *The Tempest*. Pictures of the social life of the Elizabethan and Jacobean age are, of course, much more frequent and vivid than overt allusions to political occurrences. It is not, in fact, too much to say that Elizabethan and Jacobean England forms the background, however incongruous, to all Shakespeare's plays, irrespective of their theme. Shakespeare obviously knew little, and cared less, about the countless minutiae of dress, weapons, diet, manners, and morals which distinguish one civilisation from another. If anyone had told him, for instance (as doubtless Bacon and other of his learned contemporaries did tell him) that striking clocks had not been invented in Julius Cæsar's day, that rapiers were not used at Pharsalia, and that firearms—even if they were employed, as Milton suggests, by Michael and the Archangels in their primal battle with the fiends—were certainly unfamiliar to both Hamlet and Macbeth: if, I say, anyone had pointed out these things to him, he would doubtless have asked in amazement what on earth that mattered. He was not concerned with the trivialities of stage scenery; he was depicting the eternal verities of unchanging human nature. The Elizabethan background served him as well as any other, and was indeed the only one which he could employ without distracting the attention of his spectators from the things that really were of prime concern.

Shakespeare was, in truth, as Ben Jonson said, "the soul of his age" as well as "not of an age, but for all time." He was an Elizabethan to his very core. It is impossible to conceive him as living and writing either in the fifteenth century amid the distracting Wars of the Roses, or in the seventeenth century under the gloomy *régime* of the Saints. He was the child of the late English Renaissance, with its sense of freedom, its spaciousness, its love of adventure, its audacity of thought, its consciousness of commonwealth, its unity, its passionate patriotism. Every splendid line he wrote is a revelation not only of the everlasting immutabilities of the character of man, but also of their manifestation in the peculiar circumstances of his own brief and transitional generation.

III.

If, however, Shakespeare is a supreme revealer both of the unchanging nature of man and of the ephemeral features of his own transient day, is it possible that he can also be a faithful

delineator of the varied ages of the historic past with which he deals in his historic plays? If, for example, Brutus (the central figure of *Julius Cæsar*), clad in ruffs, doublet, knee-breeches, and silken hose, like any Elizabethan courtier—using, too, the language and expressing the ideas of the sixteenth century—represents to all futurity the universal characteristics of the unpractical ideologue in action, how is it conceivable that he should at the same time bear any resemblance to the Brutus of history? As a matter of fact he does not bear much resemblance to the Brutus of history, nor was Shakespeare greatly concerned that he should do so. Shakespeare in this and in all other cases took his sources as he found them. It was a matter of indifference to him whether they were authentic histories, or doubtful biographies, or admitted legends. He used them all with magisterial freedom to serve his dramatic ends. He recognised the fact that just as the imperfections of nature need to be redressed by the perfections of art, so do the delays, inconsistencies, incongruities, accidents, and immoralities of history need to be remedied by the skilled hand of the master-dramatist. He did not hesitate when necessary to "break this sorry scheme of things entire," and having done so, to "remould it nearer to the heart's desire."

Shakespeare's interest in history was primarily personal. What concerned him mainly was the development of typical human character in striking and critical circumstances. He selected kings and conquerors for his theme, not because he was a sycophant or a devotee of divine right, but because they were ordinary men placed by circumstances in exalted positions in which they were compelled, before the eyes of the world, to make decisions and embark on actions fateful for many peoples and distant posterities. In order to display this interaction between character and circumstance effectively, Shakespeare did not for an instant hesitate on the one hand to heighten or sharpen the traits of historic characters—*e.g.* to whiten Antony or blacken Richard III.; or, on the other hand, to modify circumstances so that they should reveal character in bolder relief. He often made events move more rapidly than they had done in actual fact, sometimes concentrating the incidents of several years into the span of a few days. He frequently synchronised and correlated incidents—*e.g.* the death of Joan of Arc and the marriage of Margaret of Anjou to Henry VI.—which were widely separated from one another in time, and but remotely connected in the actual chain of causation. He freely altered the ages of his *dramatis personæ* in order to make the words which their situations required accordant with their years: it would have been inappropriate to have Richard of Gloucester fighting at St. Albans at the age of three; or Isabella, widow of Richard II.,

pouring forth mature laments at eleven; or Antony and Cleopatra making passionate love to one another in the unromantic forties and fifties of their lives; or John of Gaunt uttering the ripe wisdom of old age when only fifty-nine. Again, he freely interpolated scenes or added episodes wherever they seemed necessary to secure the effect at which he aimed: perhaps the most remarkable instance of this is his wholly unwarranted ascription to the hand of Richard III. of the deaths of both King Henry VI. and the Duke of Clarence. Illustrations, however, of the extraordinary liberties which Shakespeare took with the intractable facts of history can best be given in the course of a rapid survey of the series of his historical dramas.

IV.

Shakespeare's three plays dealing with Roman History, viz. *Coriolanus*, *Julius Cæsar*, and *Antony and Cleopatra*, were all based on materials drawn from a single source. This source was North's English translation (published 1579) of Amyot's French translation (published 1559) of a previous Latin translation of Plutarch's *Lives*, originally written in Greek towards the close of the first century of the Christian era. For *Antony and Cleopatra* Plutarch was an almost contemporary authority: he actually tells a story which his own grandfather had from an eye-witness. For *Julius Cæsar* he was a fairly good authority, although he lived before the significance of Cæsar's work, or his outstanding magnitude, had been realised. For *Coriolanus* he had no value at all, and the researches of Niebuhr, Mommsen, Ihne, and Schwegler have shown that his narrative contains hardly a modicum of truth.

The *Coriolanus* of history was merely an undistinguished leader of a band of turbulent exiles about the year 443 B.C. (half a century later than the date required by Plutarch's story); he held up Rome from personal not political motives, and perished in deserved oblivion. Shakespeare, of course, could not be expected to be acquainted with the results of nineteenth-century German investigation; but we may safely say that if he had known of them he would have been unaffected by them. Plutarch's *Coriolanus* was, if not quite good enough for Shakespeare, at any rate quite certainly better than the *Coriolanus* of Niebuhr and his successors. It depicted a noble nature ruined by the fatal flaw of self-conceit, haughtiness, and pride. That was the idea which Shakespeare seized upon and developed with penetrating insight. In order to emphasise it he elevated the characters of *Coriolanus* himself, his mother, and his wife; he depressed the Roman plebs to a mere disorderly rabble; he concentrated the actions of three campaigns into one, and added numerous graphic details.

In following Plutarch's *Julius Cæsar* Shakespeare was not deviating widely from historic truth. He shows, however, even less appreciation of Cæsar's greatness than does Plutarch himself: he adds such defects as superstition, subjection to flattery, vacillation, and even a physical deafness of which Plutarch gives no hint. Brutus is the real hero of the play, and Shakespeare enhances his nobility by omitting the damaging Plutarchian data that before he married Portia (herself a widow) he had been through the divorce court, and that he had had a violent contest with Cassius for the office of Prætor Urbanus. Actions which in Plutarch extend over three years (45-42 B.C.) are compressed by Shakespeare into five focal days.

The theme of *Antony and Cleopatra* is a noble life blasted by self-indulgence. As to the external incidents of the tragedy, Shakespeare follows Plutarch very closely (hence the invertebrate structure of the play), while Plutarch is very near to historic truth, save that he shows no appreciation of the far-reaching political designs of the Roman statesman and the Egyptian Queen. The Antony of Plutarch and of history is by no means a noble character. Plutarch depicts him correctly as sunk in abnormal debauchery, as wantonly cruel, as guilty of robbery and corruption, as jealous of subordinates, and as a colossal failure in the field—the story of his disastrous Parthian campaign occupies no less than one-fifth of Plutarch's narrative. A person marked by such obnoxious traits was obviously incapable of becoming a hero of romance. Therefore Shakespeare omitted them all, together with the fact that he was fifty years of age, and makes him young, upright, tender, noble, brave, triumphant. Rarely has a character been so transfigured. The action of the drama has been condensed from twelve years (42-30 B.C.) to twelve days.

V.

The three legendary plays, viz. *Lear*, *Cymbeline*, and *Macbeth*, must not detain us long. The sources from which Shakespeare drew his materials are mainly Holinshed's *Chronicles*, supplemented by Spenser's *Faery Queen*, Sidney's *Arcadia*, and Boccaccio's *Decameron*. Although Shakespeare clearly regarded Holinshed as history, he recognised that in such records as those which he incorporated from Geoffrey of Monmouth, Hector Boece, and Fordun, there was a considerable element of fiction. He therefore permitted himself a much larger liberty in the construction of the plots than he did in the case of either the Roman or the English plays.

As to *King Lear*, although Geoffrey of Monmouth assigns to

the British monarch a date contemporary with that of Joas, King of Judah (*i.e.* about 900 B.C.), it is probable that the record of his reign has no foundation of fact whatsoever. The Lear legend of the old chroniclers is apparently the relic of a primitive Celtic nature-myth personifying the sea and the various winds. According to the original story the Zephyr (Cordelia) remained, when the Tempests (Goneril and Regan) had passed away, to soothe and pacify the troubled Ocean (Lear). This did not suit Shakespeare's book, so without compunction he changed the story into the drama as we know it, making it the supreme model of unmitigated tragedy. The underplot of Gloucester and his sons was added from Sidney's *Arcadia*.

For *Cymbeline* there is possibly a substratum of historic fact. The British hero is supposed to have been a contemporary of Julius Cæsar. So uncertain, however, is all our information about him that Shakespeare recognised him as largely legendary. He treated the materials provided by Holinshed with complete freedom, and added to them the story of Imogen from Boccaccio, as well as the ancient Teutonic fairy tale of "Little Snow-White."

Macbeth is in different case. Its central characters are historic figures who lived in the comparatively recent period of the eleventh century. Macbeth, Mormaer of Moray (not Thane of Glamis), was leader of an old Celtic party among the Scottish chiefs who resented the Anglicising policy of King Duncan (A.D. 1034-1040). He openly rebelled against Duncan, slew him in pitched battle in Elgin, and reigned in his stead for seventeen years (A.D. 1040-1057). Finally, in his turn he was overthrown and slain in battle near Aberdeen (not near Birnham or Dunsinane) by Duncan's son, Malcolm Canmore, brother-in-law of the English Edgar the Atheling. During the seventeen years of his reign, Macbeth ruled wisely and well. His wife, "Lady Macbeth," Gruoch by name, was famous for piety and good works: the magnitude of her largesses and the splendour of her religious endowments made her known as far as Rome itself. All this, the result of recent research, is, of course, very different from the story told by Holinshed on the basis of Boece and Fordun. Still more does it differ from Shakespeare's drama. For Shakespeare amalgamated the story of Macbeth's rebellion against Duncan with the story of Donwald's treacherous assassination of King Duff. He expanded the whole dæmonic character of Lady Macbeth from the single sentence: "But specially his wife lay sore upon him to attempt the thing, as she that was very ambitious, burning in unquenchable desire to bear the name of a queen." The walking of Lady Macbeth, the appearance of Banquo's ghost, and all the supernatural machinery, are Shakespearean inventions.

VI.

The English chronicle-plays are those which most clearly reveal the genius of Shakespeare as historian. They are, as is well known, ten in number. *King John* serves as prologue; *Henry VIII.* as epilogue. The remaining eight form a continuous series, precisely covering the Lancastrian and Yorkist period, 1397-1485, and giving full-length portraits of five of its kings. In these ten historical dramas, as in the tragedies and the comedies, the personal interest is dominant. The central theme of all of them is a subtle and elaborate study of ordinary human nature as it manifests itself upon the great stage of national politics, amid the exceptional temptations and unique opportunities provided by absolute kingship. The kings are all depicted as quite commonplace and normal men, exalted by high office, and burdened with heavy responsibilities. They are judged according as they perform or fail to perform their royal duties. Failure and not success is the rule. John failed because he used his lofty position merely to gratify his own base desires and murderous malignities; Richard II. failed because he resigned himself to debilitating self-indulgence and enervating sentimentalism; Henry IV. failed because he ambitiously usurped a place that was not his, and undertook tasks which were beyond his capacity to achieve; Henry VI. failed because his character—pious, sensitive, timid, vacillating, feeble, semi-imbecile—was totally unfitted to the part which he was called upon by destiny to act; Richard III. failed because to capacity of the highest order he added a villainy so black and so selfish that God and men combined to hurl him to perdition. Only Henry V. succeeded—for Shakespeare does not venture to indicate what he thought of Henry VIII.—and Henry V. is made to appear successful and morally estimable only by a free manipulation of history: his responsibility for the French war is shifted on to the bishops; his persecution of the Lollards is ignored; the blame for the massacre of the Agincourt prisoners is placed upon the French themselves.

But if the personal and human interest remains dominant in the chronicle-plays, another powerful interest becomes conspicuous. The kings are judged and placed according as they do their duty, or fail to do their duty, to England. In all the plays England is the heroine. It is evident that Shakespeare was consumed by a passionate love of his native land.

"This royal throne of kings, this sceptr'd isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war."

He shared to the full the zeal of the great Elizabethans for "the

commonweal of the realm of England." He was inspired by the lofty patriotism which made the age one of heroic sacrifice and adventure. He realised the horror of faction and civil war through which the country had passed during the fifteenth century. He glorified the Tudor dictatorship which had brought order and unity out of chaos and schism. He exalted government and authority, condemned disobedience and rebellion, rejoiced in strong rule, and showed a profound contempt for both populace and parliament. With unmistakable Protestant zeal, moreover, he displayed resentment at Papal interferences in English affairs; manifested an instinctive loathing for Cardinals (e.g. Pandulf, Beaufort, Wolsey), and evidently regarded as Henry VIII.'s chief title to fame the fact that he "broke the power of Rome." The principal impression that the chronicle-plays left upon the minds of the Elizabethan audiences must undoubtedly have been a passionate appeal for national independence, for social unity, for law, order, good government, peace, prosperity.

It is evident that, if these lessons were conveyed, Shakespeare was sublimely indifferent as to whether or not the details of his history were exact. It would be easy to compile a prodigious catalogue of errors such as it is the function and the joy of pedagogues to correct. In *King John*, for instance, apart from the ordinary heightenings of effect, the Duke of Austria is confused with the Count of Lymoges, Pandulf is made a Cardinal when he was not even a deacon; and Constance of Brittany is represented as a sorrowing widow, when she was really a virago who (having divorced her second husband) was married to a third. In *Richard II.* not only are the ages of some of the actors modified, as we have seen, to suit dramatic propriety, but the Duchess of Gloucester is made to die four years before her time, while, as compensation, Isabel of Castile, first wife of the Duke of York and mother of Aumerle, is brought upon the stage five years after she had made her final exit from life. For *Henry IV.* Holinshed provided the merest skeleton. In details, and especially in the development of character, Shakespeare allowed his imagination full play. The immortal Falstaff, in particular, bears so little resemblance to his prototype, Sir John Oldcastle, that he may be regarded as a new creation. Free, however, as Shakespeare was in *Henry IV.*, if he had been Bacon, he would not have uncritically followed Holinshed in confounding Sir Edmund Mortimer with his nephew, the Earl of March—a confusion which has the effect of making Lady Percy both sister and aunt of the same man. Still less would he have followed, not Holinshed but an uncorrected printer's error in Holinshed, as he does when he calls the Earl of Fife a son of Douglas.

SHAKESPEARE AS HISTORIAN.

Henry V. furnishes a wholly new and probably entirely fictitious interpretation of the King who is the eponymous hero of the play. The original chroniclers—Caxton, Fabyan, and the rest—all agree in describing Prince Hal as a reckless libertine suddenly transformed on his accession to the throne into a model monarch. Modern historians, such as Mr. J. H. Wylie, deny the libertinage altogether. Shakespeare takes the middle course: he admits the libertinage, but attributes it not to passion but to policy. Henry had never, he suggests, really belonged to the Falstaff crowd, and to abandon them involved no change of heart. Shakespeare intended to enhance the reputation of his hero: for once his psychology played him false. *Henry VI.*, on the other hand, probably presents a true and lively portrait of the weak and unhappy puppet whose disastrous reign it records. As a set off, however, against the penetrating study of a defective and abnormal character has to be placed the extraordinary confusion and falsification of the historical background of the play. It is quite beyond the possibility of rectification. The funeral of Henry V. in 1422 is interrupted by the news of the English defeat at Orleans in 1428; the death of Joan of Arc in 1430 is made to synchronise with the marriage of Henry and Margaret in 1445; the coronation of Henry in 1431 is placed as simultaneous with the final loss of Gascony in 1453. The characters of Beaufort and Gloucester are transposed. Queen Margaret is quite baselessly debited with an amour with the Duke of Suffolk; she is also represented as engaged in mortal feud with Eleanor Duchess of Gloucester, although that adventuress had ended her ambiguous career several years before Margaret's arrival in England. Richard Neville, the kingmaker, is confused with his brother-in-law, Richard Beauchamp. In short, any person who tried to learn the history of the period 1422-61 from the three parts of *Henry VI.* would only achieve a hopeless entanglement.

In *Richard III.*—a magnificent and moving tragedy of the Marlowesque type—we have, from the historical point of view, the defects of *Henry V.* combined with the defects of *Henry VI.* On the one hand, the character of the King is deeply blackened by the attribution of unauthenticated crimes, and by the denial of well-authenticated virtues, so that Richard is presented as a monster and not a man. It is not too much to say that the genuine Richard III. of history has been rendered almost irrecoverable by reason of the deep-seated prejudices implanted in the minds of successive generations by Shakespeare's travesty of him. On the other hand, the course of recorded history is deflected in the play beyond the possibility of restoration. Events spread over fourteen years (1471-1485) are crowded into a few weeks. The loathsome

Richard's wooing of Anne is invented and interpolated. Anjou, in the guise of an avenging fury, is made to be the Court of Edward IV. when she was really in the safe France, while three years after her death in 1482 she is present in active malignity at the court of Richard himself: Buckingham is made an accomplice, as he certainly was not, in the murder of the two princes. Richmond's two invasions, 1483 and 1485, are confounded into one single adventure. The slaying of Richard on Bosworth Field by the hand of Henry himself is a heightening of authentic history which can perhaps be justified on the ground of tragic propriety. Of *Henry VIII.* not much need be said. The great Tudor dictator was too nearly related to Elizabeth to leave it safe for Shakespeare to give rein to his imagination. Keeping close to his authorities he merely made him as dark as he dared. The pathos of the fate of Catherine of Aragon is accentuated by a judicious concealment of her intolerable dullness, her depressing plainness, her monotonous mournfulness, and her gloomy bigotry. As to Wolsey, it is enough to say that Shakespeare saw in him nothing but a Cardinal: it was left to Fletcher to grant him the redemption of his dying speech.

VII.

To sum up. As one closes the historical plays of Shakespeare, particularly the English series, and as one thinks of the numerous misinterpretations of character and the innumerable deviations from fact which have been noted, one is inclined to say with Courtenay, "The plays of Shakespeare are quite unsuitable as a medium of instruction to the English youth." If, indeed, scientific accuracy in detail were all that mattered in history, this verdict of Courtenay would hold good. But scientific accuracy in detail is, happily, not the only thing that matters. Much more important are the soul of man and the spirit of a great people. And Shakespeare is the supreme interpreter both of human nature and of national character. No one has revealed as he has the heights of mortal aspiration, or the depths of diabolical depravity; and no one has displayed as he has the white radiance of a transfiguring patriotism. Those who would know what an ennobling love of country is at its highest and best should read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest the three great speeches of Falconbridge in *King John*, the dying Gaunt in *Richard II.*, and the young King before Agincourt in *Henry V.* Those who do this and in doing it realise that the spirit is to the letter as the heavens are to the earth, will be disposed to agree, not with Courtenay, but with Froude when he says, "The most perfect history which exists is to be found, in my opinion, in the historical plays of Shakespeare."

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

EULENBURG AND WALDERSEE

IT is perfectly natural that a defeated nation should give vent to its feelings in apologies and memoirs. After Germany had defeated France in 1870-1, it was the French who talked, while the Germans remained silent. One need only recall the name of Emile Ollivier, whose Memoirs filled a bookshelf. And now it is Germany, defeated Germany, who talks incessantly. New, and sometimes monumental, contributions are constantly being added by her to the historical research of the future. Perhaps the reader remembers the six volumes of diplomatic documents which were the German Foreign Office's share towards contemporary history. Those interested in a *magnum mortalis aevi spatium* read them with avidity—like an enthralling novel. And nowadays we hear, not only the voices of the living—among them some principal actors, like Wilhelm II., Tirpitz, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff—but also the voices of the dead. The dead, too, owing to Germany's defeat, have been permitted to speak far sooner than would otherwise have been the case. The third volume of Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* would still be lying in the cellar, encased in coat of mail, had not the bankruptcy produced by William II., the bull in the European china shop, helped to unlock the lips of the great giant of the nineteenth century. His lifework had been destroyed, and thus it became a necessity for this giant to defend himself. On this ground his relatives hastened to break the seal of confession. The same reason explains the appearance of many other memoirs and records which, under other circumstances, would have remained at rest for many long years with other family treasures.

From the tomb now rise the voices of some of the principal actors—principal not necessarily owing to their genius, but because of the positions they occupied. Two such Memoirs are at hand, both of the greatest interest, *Die Erinnerungen des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld aus fünfzig Jahren*, and *Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee*, published at the instigation of his nephew. Intellectually, Eulenburg towers above Waldersee. This man, who had attained to the position of Ambassador at Vienna, would have been a personality even without an important position in the world. Every line written by him proclaims the man of intelligence. His book is full of the most arresting views and judgments. Waldersee was a much older and, on account of his rank, more important man. Both were in close touch with William II., and both books shed a bright light on the Kaiser's character and the events of his time. While Waldersee judges things from a more or less sanctimonious, Prussian-Conservative point of view, Eulenburg regards them in

a far broader and more enlightened fashion and, though rooted in Prussianism, leans to Western Europe, and is able to understand the English sympathies of Frederick and his wife. Eulenburg recognised at once that his premature death would have tragic consequences for Germany; for now "the rudder was guided by William II., moving restlessly from East to West and West to East." Very touching is his admission: "I knew that Kaiser Friedrich and his wife embodied a culture which would be buried in his grave. It was a culture which even penetrated into politics. I felt that this was the fulfilment of Germany's fate: concessions to the time were carried to the grave with Kaiser Friedrich." With regard to the tremendous antagonism which existed between Bismarck, Bismarck's son Herbert and Prince Wilhelm, the future Kaiser, on the one hand, and Kaiser Friedrich and his wife on the other, Eulenburg was more on the side of the Anglophil father and the daughter of the English Royal House. In this antagonism of William II. and his paladins Bülow, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Tirpitz, which spread to a conflict that was to drag Germany to destruction, Eulenburg was the ally of the wiser heads.

The perusal of these wonderful Memoirs has awakened in the present writer the desire to recall the picture of their author, with whom he came into occasional personal contact during the years of his Ambassadorship in Vienna. It was difficult to recognise in the dreamy features of this blond hero, in his rather fulsome manner, the skilled diplomat. However, weaving on the loom of time was not his only occupation. He liked to dream of the sagas of old, to write ingenious little fairy-plays. He composed and sang the *Rosenlieder*, and was not only the political confidant of his friend and master, William II., but a companion who shared the dreams of ancient days with the romantic ruler and composer of the *Lied von Aegir*. If he had to be judged only by what he says, one would be tempted to regard him rather as an enthusiastic admirer of his royal friend than a clear-sighted critic. In the clamour of Viennese society which, on account of the intimacy existing between the two Courts, put greater demands on the German Embassy than any other, the poetic and studious nature of this highly cultivated diplomat was unable to find much peace. But frequently he exchanged the capital on the Danube for his old inherited property Liebenberg in the Mark. It harboured many deep and silent joys for him which stilled his longings—great, green forests, dark, cool lakes breathing a poetry like that of Fontane and Willibald Alexis, those Prussian poets, who discovered the whispered secrets of their country as Scott discovered those of his. The spirit which glides through the snow-laden pine-trees at Christmas and dives into the depth of the lakes, Eulenburg

has tried to capture and weave, in a fashion all his own, into his songs and fairy-plays. On his solitary walks, when he had exchanged Eulenburg for his pseudonym "Friedrich Haesen," he encountered enchanted knights, fair ladies of the castle, shining fairies and touselled wolves. At times he would sing his Ballads and *Rosenlieder* charmingly to the Kaiser, thus earning for himself the title of Troubadour in the Berlin *Kladderadatsch*.

In his castle Liebenberg, where William II. and Prince Bülow frequently stayed, the peculiar Brandenburg character of the house was maintained. Amidst the busy social life pleasant old memories hovered. Patriarchal portraits told their story of one part of the family history. The picture of the founder of the house of Hertefeld, *Oberjägermeister* Jobst Gerhard, recalled days long gone by. And again, of all the splendour of that newly risen empire of William I. the frank, merry face of Count Fritz von Eulenburg could tell, Count Fritz, who went as Prussian Ambassador at the head of an expedition to East Asiatic shores to establish friendship, trade, and shipping agreements with Japan, China, and Siam. Thus it was the privilege of an Eulenburg to unfurl the Prussian flag on those far-off shores and to win prestige for the Prussian name. The little squadron, as yet, only carried Prussia's fame abroad, not Germany's. On his return home, after several years of absence in the Far East, Count Fritz von Eulenburg found Bismarck at the helm, and Bismarck took the man who had worked for Prussia's welfare on the other side of the ocean for his colleague.

Prince Philipp von Eulenburg was a young man at the time when his uncle administered Foreign Affairs under Bismarck, and was tremendously influenced by him, soon exchanging his uniform for a diplomat's coat. At the Court of the Prince Regent of Bavaria, he was introduced, for the first time, to the wider sphere of political duties. Later, when he was in constant contact with his sovereign, he was able to report to him on the proceedings of the Bavarian Court. In Munich he could see how lightly German unity, the establishment of which Ludwig II. had done so much to realise, was rooted in the hearts of the members of the Bavarian House. This point is of special interest at a moment when the gravest danger to the German Unity movement threatens to come from Munich, where the former Crown Prince Rupprecht is raising the banner of the Bavarian Kingdom within the German Republic, before the eyes of the all-too-patriotic Ludendorff. Young Eulenburg often met Crown Prince Frederick and the Crown Princess Victoria—daughter of the English Royal House—on their frequent visits to Munich. A year after the death of Ludwig II., the Crown Prince told the young diplomat that Prince

dragging, with it, the Empire to its doom like the Assyrian Empire with its tower."

William II., while still a Prince—the third generation, whose star was not to rise until the two older generations had passed away—had chosen him for his most intimate counsellor. But this does not prevent Eulenburg from sharply criticising the Kaiser at times—at least, in his Diaries—where he dissects his character without constraint, indeed, with scientific coldbloodedness. He contends that he inherited his domineering spirit from his mother, while his autocratic moods are traced back to Frederick William I. and Frederick the Great. Some of the Kaiser's moods breathed hostility to England, but Eulenburg interpreted them as reprisals for the enmity felt by the Hanoverian family for Prussia—an enmity which became very obvious when Bismarck broached his policy of Prussian expansion. The enmity felt for the Guelphs by the idolised mother, Victoria, was supposed to have been inherited by the daughter. The German Crown Princess was "divided by a gulf of alien views from the old Kaiser, the Chancellor, and all those Prussians who believed that the glory of their Fatherland would have to be fought for and won." As, however, German policy continued to lean to Russia, England's annoyance with Bismarck—who had, just at that time, inspired the almost boundless hatred of the old Queen and her daughter—also continued. "And he returned the hatred of these two ladies with an implacability they could not rival."

When a lesser man walks in a great man's footsteps and tries to imitate him, he is apt to exaggerate. Thus it was with Prince Bismarck and his son Herbert. The antipathy felt by Bismarck against the woman who was later to be the Empress Frederick, amounted to unquenchable hatred in Herbert, and he did not hesitate to incite Prince William himself against his mother. Eulenburg admits that he succeeded so completely that it was this very act which drew Prince William to Count Herbert. Eulenburg warned Count Herbert not to go too far, but he replied: "If ever the Crown Princess comes to the throne it is all up with Germany," or, "Prince William can never be sufficiently incited against England." How successfully the Bismarcks worked upon the Kaiser in this direction is proved by his agreement with Bismarck's statement: "God has not deserted Prussia, for the era of Frederick and his wife has been wiped off the slate." The Kaiser's impulsive nature alternated between antipathy towards England and anglomania, between hatred and the deepest respect for his British grandmother. Eulenburg writes: "It seemed strange to me to see my friend the Kaiser stand awkwardly and almost dumb in front of the little grandmother whom he hated at

one moment and passionately loved and worshipped the next. For only one or the other of these feelings could exist between these two. He was conscious of the uncomfortable sensation, when he was with her, that he was not her match. Indeed, he seemed afraid of her."

There are some rather serious indiscretions about the Prince of Wales—later King Edward. Once, when the Prince of Wales had the misfortune to be playing at a party where the stakes were very high and where one of his comrades in the Guards was discovered to be cheating, the Kaiser said: "It's really impossible to have anything to do with that fellow."

The three volumes of Waldersee's book, however, contain many more indiscretions. He has committed his most intimate conversations to paper, and though the publishers have omitted the worst and most dubious, enough remains. On January 2nd, 1889, Waldersee writes: "A snowstorm and thunderstorm has driven their Majesties into our house. The Kaiser feels the death of the Austrian Heir Apparent very deeply. He tells me that Prince Rudolf, through his association with the Prince of Wales, has latterly been leading a very dissolute life, and is drinking heavily." It seems that from his Chief of Staff, too, he had not many secrets. Of course, so long as the old Prince was watching over Germany's fortune there was no fear, for Bismarck knew, in spite of his Russian sympathies, how important it was to keep England in good humour. Indeed, a year previous to his father's dismissal, Count Herbert was sent to England in order to establish better relations with the Island Empire. Peace was to be concluded between the Kaiser and his grandmother and uncle—the Queen and the Prince of Wales. Waldersee wrote in his Diary: "Count Herbert is to foster our closer connections with the Island Kingdom against Russia." As Chief of the General Staff, Waldersee had always to bear in mind the possibility of war, and it was perfectly clear to Moltke's successor that Germany would be exposed to very grave dangers unless she could reckon on firm alliances. The Kaiser had said, however, on this point: "We must be prepared to fight the great fight alone if need be." Naturally, Waldersee thought that the greatest danger was from a war with France and Russia; but even a quarter of a century before the outbreak of the world-war, he feared Germany's complete isolation, an isolation which could only be prevented by seeking closer relations with Russia. When Crispi, who was well disposed towards Germany, was about to leave, Waldersee entered the following note in his Diary: "Crispi's position is seriously endangered, and with it our alliance. If this continues, that is, if we may lose our Italian ally, and Austria is weakened by Serbia's

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Ludwig of Bavaria (afterwards the last King), the son of the Prince Regent, had told the Duke of Connaught in London how deeply he hated Prussia. "This unhappy gossip," remarks Eulenburg, "was as fuel to the fire of the Crown Prince, who regarded the House of Wittelsbach as the arch-enemy of the Hohenzollern and who, in spite of all his liberal ideas, held to the autocratic belief that he, as Emperor, could suffer no kings beside himself." The Crown Prince and Bismarck differed on this point, for the latter, according to Eulenburg, held to monarchical Federalism, and his knowledge of the soul of the German people led him to say: "If they could afford it, every German would keep his own special king."

Eulenburg's and Waldersee's Memoirs both lead us into a world of intrigues, with just this difference: the former stands more or less above them, while the latter is involved in them himself. In consequence of his intellectual superiority, everybody desired to have Eulenburg as an ally in these intrigues at the Prussian Court, which may be compared to the former Court of the Tuileries, except that the webs spun round and about Napoleon III. and Eugénie were spun delicately and with grace, those at the Prussian Court with elephantine clumsiness. Bismarck himself, who scented plots wherever he went and who, moreover, believed the old Empress Augusta and the Crown Princess to be his enemies, was no stranger to intrigues. But by the time the era of William I. was making way for that of William II.—when he was getting old—he withdrew more and more to Friedrichsruh, leaving the rougher work in the hands of his son Herbert, whom he was determined to foist upon the young Emperor as his successor at all costs. *A propos* of these activities of the two Bismarcks, the Kaiser told Eulenburg that he could not rid himself of the impression that it was a new edition of the Merovingian Mayors of the Palace. The Kaiser said this *in camera*, but Theodor Mommsen had said it previously in public and had been indicted by Bismarck for libel. All Eulenburg's observations on Bismarck reveal a deep and reverent admiration for his genius but at the same time a recognition of the weaknesses, crudities and mortal, all too mortal, qualities of this hero. Some of the remarks about Bismarck might have been made by his valet but for the fact that Eulenburg knows how to clothe even ugly things in beautiful language.

Although he says that he does not wish to be regarded as either Germany's laureate or her Tacitus, it cannot be denied that Eulenburg's writings combine the qualities of the poet and historian. And yet one feels that, even in the soul of this distinguished man, was beginning the process of decomposition, which was to spread so far into the heart of Germany, bringing in

its train the war and her downfall. Who can enjoy books like Eulenburg's without a pang? Into the æsthetic pleasure creeps a feeling of spiritual bewilderment. There is no faith in anything or anybody. Bismarck, at one moment the almost godlike statesman, turns in the next into an envious mortal, drunk with power, full of hatred, crushing all who stand in his path. Eulenburg was an intimate friend in Bismarck's house, and there was a time when he felt it to be happiness to be allowed to pick up the crumbs from Homer's table at Friedrichsruh, Berlin, or Kissingen. Very beautifully he describes the man who gazed at him with his great eyes, "like a Böcklin sea monster." Once the young diplomat told the Prince, when he was staying with him at Kissingen, on Bavarian territory, about a little Bavarian princess who had died immediately after birth because she was born without a cranium. Bismarck replied, "A princess doesn't need a cranium." In describing Bismarck's struggle with the Empress Augusta Eulenburg writes: "Bismarck can only be really understood when one looks upon him as an infinitely delicately organised power-engine. That he is the best and most logical hater I have ever met I should call a subdivision of the Bismarck psychological organisation. The word 'forgive' has no meaning for him." Calm reflection had no part in Bismarck's character. "The seal he used was made of lava and intuition and generally left seared places."

This giant of the Saxon woods persecuted the Empress Augusta because she received Catholic Bishops at the Castle of Coblenz. The Kaiserin stood in his way in his struggle with Rome. "Would, I wonder," says Eulenburg, "this struggle with Rome ever have been undertaken if her flirtation with Catholicism had not been one of the many red rags which attracted the bull, Bismarck?" And yet Eulenburg recognised full well that Bismarck kept the Empire together, and that on his dismissal it would be exposed to many and grave dangers. Eulenburg, who was never a politician at heart, detested politics in his old age, regarding them as a "breeding-place for viper's eggs." The close confidant of the Kaiser, this Imperial Prophet of the Barracks, has many hard words for militarism. He speaks of the people in the Rhine Province and Baden as people "who have not imbibed their mother's milk on the parade ground at Potsdam." With regard to the hatred that the House of Bismarck felt for Frederick and his wife, he admits that the latter were, on the whole, far more germane to him than the militarism embodied in the Houses of Bismarck and William II. He found it difficult at times to feel at home "in the uniformed society of Berlin, which later, with its mighty war fleet, developed into a tower of Babel,

and Rumania's uncertain attitude and her own unhappy internal affairs, we shall have to consider whether it will not be advisable to sever the Austrian alliance entirely, and foster a *rapprochement* with Russia. Difficult as it would be for me to take such a step, I feel that here our own interests alone can decide. I only fear it is too late."

This was, without doubt, very sound thinking. When one reflects calmly to-day upon Germany's lost opportunities, one arrives at the following conclusions: Either Germany would have had to make an alliance with Great Britain, as Bismarck wished, which would have brought America's friendship with it, and remain in the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, or she must forsake Bismarck's paths, scrap her alliance with Austria-Hungary, and set out to destroy the Habsburg Monarchy. It would not have been difficult to contract an alliance with Russia, Italy, Rumania, and Serbia, whose aim would be the partitioning of Austria-Hungary. Such an alliance, whose object was to annex the German parts of Austria to Germany and the Italian parts to Italy, would have attracted rather than repelled the German subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy. Instead of this, Bismarck's successors stuck to his bequests, although one pillar of the edifice—Russia's friendship—had practically collapsed. The writer has a very vivid remembrance of a certain walk on the Semmering with Bülow, who was at that time Foreign Secretary, and later Chancellor, and who had already been in charge of foreign affairs under Prince Hohenlohe. Just before Germany had occupied Kiautschau, I permitted myself to say, half jestingly and yet in earnest, while indicating with my hand the valleys of Steiermark: "Excellency, this would be a more accessible coaling station for Germany." I wished to suggest that German policy should endeavour to obtain the German parts of Austria for herself, for only then would true German unity be attained. I was not surprised that Bülow remained silent. In spite of his independence, which made this brilliant man stand out from all his predecessors, with the exception of Bismarck, and from all his successors, he had the tendency to adhere to Bismarck's bequests in much the same manner in which theologians adhere to the Bible. Far from striking out fresh paths he clung to the old, even under altered conditions.

On one point, it must be admitted, he gave way to the wishes of his master more than Bismarck had done—to enlarge the Fleet and thereby to estrange England. Waldersee writes in a melancholy strain the following entry in his Diary in 1903: "Our relations with England and America seem to be getting steadily worse. Nobody trusts us, and as we cannot play the part of the strong

man who fears nobody alone, we must try, at all costs, to win the confidence of others." Later, in June, he writes again, this time inspired by two speeches of Chamberlain's, one in Birmingham and one in the House of Commons, and by another of Balfour's, also in the House of Commons: "I have no doubt whatever that England will soon appear in her true colours towards us. The question is a fight for existence. England wants to exterminate her most formidable rival in the world-market, and that, moreover, soon, perhaps not to-day or to-morrow, but certainly before the German Fleet is much stronger. Turning Germany into a purely industrial country will have its bitter consequences." Shortly after, in the autumn of 1903, he writes about the Kaiser-Manœuvres in which he took part as the Kaiser's guest: "Unfortunately these manœuvres, like those of previous years, have left a depressing impression on my mind. I have arrived at the stage where I consider a war, which I would for many reasons have welcomed for us, and only ten years ago would have entered upon with the fullest confidence, a very risky undertaking." In many pages of his Diary he expresses the indignation felt by the military that the Kaiser takes part in these manœuvres not as a judge but as a General who, in order to administer a bit of idle flattery, is always allowed to win. It is most interesting to note that a famous Englishman, at a time when the whole world still believed in Germany's military invincibility, questioned it. It was in 1891 that Waldersee wrote: "Sir Charles Dilke, who has been attending the French manœuvres, maintains that the progress made by the French is so enormous, that we can no longer claim to be the greatest military power." Waldersee had said to the Kaiser: "The war for which we are preparing will be the greatest ever undertaken and everything will be at stake." But the Kaiser, through his vanity, his egotism, and his unhappy choice of advisers did his best to hazard the future. One of the grimmest pages in his reign, and a sad chapter in Bülow's history, is the treatment of the Poles. Sometimes, indeed, better thoughts assailed William II., but they were mere bubbles of generosity, rising from his soul, only to disappear again quickly. During the last few years of Bismarck, whose treatment of the Poles was none too happy, Waldersee makes the following entry: "On our journey to Dessau the conversation turned to the Polish question. The Kaiser's suite prevented me from speaking freely, but I noted that he recognised that the reconstruction of Poland was a necessity."

Such lightning flashes from the notes of Waldersee and Eulenburg illuminate the stormy horizon of the present day. The dead are always more temperamental than the living, though this may seem a paradox. It was first brought home to us by

Bismarck's *Erinnerungen und Gedanken*, and now again by these two new publications. Written in the first warm impulse into their private diaries they come to us almost untouched. It is natural that writings such as these lack the reserve of books like Bethmann-Hollweg's, published during his lifetime, or Bülow's and the Kaiser's. Who can doubt that the latter's notes have been so repeatedly revised before they reached the public as to be almost non-committal? Infinitely more can be learnt by the student of history from snapshots like those of Waldersee and Eulenburg than from the posed and painted portrait of William II. It would be a pity if Holstein's notes, this psychopathic ghost of the Wilhelmstrasse, who sometimes flits mysteriously through the pages of Waldersee's Memoirs, were not to come to light. One characteristic is shared by all these German books. Moltke I., the conquering uncle of the vanquished Moltke II., appears in all of them as a great and commanding figure, above malicious criticism, suspicion, or even reproach. He who disarmed France has disarmed the most mocking and captious writers of Memoirs. This man, whose strategy as well as writings are classic, has not only, like his forefather Julius Cæsar, defeated the Gauls in the modern *Bellum Gallicum*, but also all kinds of Germanic writers who were not disinclined to wash dirty linen in public. Around this national hero, who was a happy combination of love of duty, foresight, coolheadedness, harmony, and modesty, no dirt or even dust seems to cling. Even the spiteful garrulity of one who was perhaps unworthy to succeed him—Waldersee—is silent. That Moltke had to be content with a successor like Waldersee, Bismarck with an academic nature like Bethmann-Hollweg, or a little bureaucrat and Christian Scientist like Michaelis, and William I. and Frederick with a son and grandson like William II. explains, in great part, Germany's downfall. We learn a lesson from these Memoirs: when the great moment came it found small men.

SIGMUND MÜNZ.

IRELAND OF THE PHŒNICIANS.

TWO questions, closely related to each other, are suggested by the recent explorations in Egypt, and notably by the discovery of the burial-chamber of Tutankhamen. First, whence came all the wealth in gold and precious stones possessed by these rulers of ancient Egypt and, secondly, why was so much gold, so to speak, wasted by being buried with them?

So far as gold itself is concerned the following facts, noted by the Austrian geologist, Suess, in his classical work on the subject, are worth bearing in mind. (1) Gold is the most widely distributed of all the metals. (2) As surface gold it is easily procurable. (3) The sources of it are speedily exhausted. (4) It is always found on the verge of civilisation. For those of us who hold that civilisation started at some particular point on the earth's surface, presumably in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean and probably in Egypt,* Suess's fourth condition possesses a special significance. For, civilisation being a plant of peculiar growth, drawing its alimentation from different sources, it becomes necessary, as these sources dry up in its immediate neighbourhood, to search for fresh supplies in more distant quarters. Hence its ever-widening circle.

Among the earliest products or resultants of civilisation is the desire to enjoy life and, if possible, to prolong the enjoyment of it indefinitely. It is to this desire, confined, of course, at first to those individuals who, owing to their rank or power, were in a position to enjoy life, that the idea of immortality owes its origin. Further, it has been fully established by Professor Elliot Smith† that among the elements supposed to confer immortality on the individual owning them are gold, pearls, precious stones, and certain shells. To this idea is due, as Mr. W. J. Perry has shown in an interesting article,‡ the legend of the Isles of the Blessed as places teeming with gold and precious stones, where if a man came he would never die but enjoy eternal life.§ One form of this legend, originating probably in Egypt, is, as Mr. Perry remarks, *The Voyage of Bran*, familiar to all students of Irish

* See particularly on this point a paper by T. Cherry on "The Discovery of Agriculture," read at the Australian Association for the Advancement of Science, Melbourne, January, 1921.

† See his Introduction to J. Wilfrid Jackson's *Shells as Evidence of the Migrations of Early Culture*, 1917.

‡ *Folklore*. XXXII. No. 3. 1921.

§ The idea survives in the crude conception of Heaven as a place where the streets are paved with gold and angels play on golden harps, &c. In Ireland the belief in an Island of the Blessed, or *Tír na nóg*, somewhere off the West Coast survived, under the name of Hy Brazil, well into the seventeenth century, as a curious application to Charles II. for a grant of it (preserved in the Irish State Papers) proves. I forget the precise terms of Charles's reply, but the gist of it was that the petitioner might have the island if he could find it.

literature. "But what," he adds, "was Ireland itself but a region that must in early times have been full of givers of life in the shape of gold, pearls, and other substances?" I will return to this point later on. At present my object is to show that in the notion that gold, pearls, precious stones, &c., were objects conducing to immortality a strong motive—stronger even than the thirst for wealth animating modern explorers—was given for the search after them. The subject is a large one, and thoroughly to discuss it would lead to an inquiry into the origin of ship-building and the progress of nautical enterprise in ancient times. Here I must confine myself to remarking that the chief searchers after these supposed life-giving commodities were the people known in history and legend as the Phœnicians.

But who were these Phœnicians? On this point we have recently received some valuable information which places the Phœnician problem in a new light since Movers and Rawlinson wrote their well-known books. This information we owe to M. C. Autran's *Phéniciens: Essai de Contribution à l'histoire antique de la Méditerranée* (Paris, 1920). Reading Curtius's well-known description of the Phœnicians in his *History of Greece*, M. Autran was led to ask himself how a people, presumably of Semitic origin, could have developed characteristics so at variance with those of their race. Starting with the curious fact, already remarked by Beloch,* that though, by their own admission, the Greeks acquired their knowledge of ships and navigation from the Phœnicians, not a single word in their nautical vocabulary is traceable to a Semitic origin, M. Autran has convincingly proved that numerous other loanwords in the Greek language—names of plants, animals, metals, perfumes, religious terms, and names of persons and divinities—can only be accounted for on the supposition that they are of Phœnician origin. The term is used as a generic title shared by a whole group of peoples or tribes—Carians, Lycians, Cilicians, Cretans, and others—who dominated the Ægean about 1500 B.C., and probably for a long time before. Phœnicia, or the land of the Phœnicians, was in the first instance only another name for Caria; but after the foundation by them of Tyre and Sidon the name was transferred and confined to a narrow strip of land along the coast of Syria.

Regarding the Phœnicians themselves, M. Autran has much interesting information to impart. Besides being enterprising traders and excellent sailors, profoundly versed in a knowledge of the stars, they were expert metallurgists, possessing an extensive knowledge of mechanics and the principles of architecture. Living

in small detached colonies, each under its own chieftain, but all more or less closely connected by ties of blood, religion, and language, it was their custom wherever they settled to build their habitations—half-citadel, half-emporium—as the eagle does its eyrie, on some almost inaccessible rock or spur of the coast. These buildings, guarded by walls of enormous thickness, composed of massive blocks of roughly hewn stone, they further strengthened by a complicated system of outworks and concealed entrances. Of such sort were Tyre and Sidon, Troy and Mycenæ, Gades and Carthage, and, as I hope to show, Dun Aengus in Ireland. The wealth accumulated by the Phœnicians as traders, manufacturers of purple and exploiters of the mineral resources of the known world, must have been enormous. But their prosperity rested on an unstable basis. Except for the little stretch of land in the immediate vicinity of their settlements, they were a people without a country they could call their own. Their domain was the sea. Elsewhere they were merely sojourners in foreign lands, exploiters of other peoples' labour, apostles of "pacific penetration." Herein, and in the emasculating effects of great wealth, M. Autran sees the cause of their downfall.

To a period of unparalleled prosperity succeeded about 1200 B.C. one of gradual decline. The proximate causes of this decline were (1) the destruction of Troy, and (2) a new Semitic invasion of Canaan under Joshua and the Judges. Of this invasion and its consequences M. Autran writes as follows:—

"Parcilles 'à des sauterelles,' les tribus bédouines s'infiltraient dans les vallées, razziant la campagne, prenant de force quelques villes fortes: Jéricha, Lakish, Gazer. Mais les premiers occupants demeuraient redoutables et, sur bien des points, les hordes israélites, assez molles dans leur effort militaire, ne purent parvenir à les extirper. Elles les laissèrent donc sans difficulté subsister au milieu d'elles, les assujettissant parfois, mais subissant bientôt, à leur tour, l'ascendant de cette civilisation supérieure qu'elles avaient contribué à détruire. Sur la côte en particulier où l'esprit commercial prévalait sur l'esprit militaire, l'élément sémitique fut plus complètement assimilé et partagea très vite la vie et les occupations de ses prédécesseurs cananéens. Il s'adonna donc, lui aussi, au négoce et peu à peu prit la suite de la vieille raison sociale phénicienne, sans jamais toutefois parvenir à porter aussi haut ni aussi loin son prestige. Il ne répara pas, ne renouvela point ce qui était bel et bien mourant. Il l'aida seulement à survivre quelques siècles de plus, mais ne put l'empêcher de succomber à la fin. Le rôle des grands Phéniciens de Syrie était terminé. D'autres Phéniciens, qui ne les valaient pas, avaient hérité de leur place. Puis 'les familles des Cananéens se dispersèrent' et portèrent ce qui subsistait de leur multiple génie sous des cieux plus favorables."

I make no excuse for quoting this passage in full, and in M. Autran's own language; for it enables us to see where historians

* *Die Phäniker am aegæischen Meer*, in *Rheinisches Museum*, xlix., 111-132. 1894.

have gone wrong in ascribing a civilisation entirely Ægean in its origin to a Semitic race. Of the value of M. Autran's discovery no scholar can have the slightest doubt, while every scholar will envy the scientific precision and singular modesty with which he unfolds his views.

But now, leaving M. Autran, we pass to the other end of the Mediterranean. Here, thanks to M. Louis Siret's *Questions de Chronologie et d'Ethnographie Ibériques* (Paris, 1913) we are in a position to follow the activities both as traders and miners of these early Ægean Phœnicians. Writing before M. Autran published his book, M. Siret naturally treats these Phœnicians as Semites, but it is worth noting that his inquiry leads him to the conclusion that there were two sets of Phœnicians, whom he distinguishes as pre-Gadarite and post-Gadarite, taking the foundation of Gadir or Gades to fall at some time between the twelfth and ninth century B.C. The collapse of the pre-Gadarite occupation of Spain, about 1200 B.C., he attributes to a Celtic invasion of the peninsula. His argument on this point is not convincing, and, like M. Autran, I am inclined to attribute the collapse to events happening in Syria itself. All the same, it is perfectly clear that something seriously interrupted Phœnician activity in Spain about this time, and it is quite possible, as M. Siret conjectures, that numerous Phœnician colonists emigrated to Denmark and Brittany. The matter is, however, one that does not directly concern us. My object at present is to emphasise the fact that M. Siret is a profound believer in the Phœnicians as the importers of a new and higher civilisation into Western Europe, and that, though he hesitates to subscribe directly to Nillson's views* of their activity in Scandinavia, he is firmly convinced of their influence and presence as far north as the Baltic.

But if in the Baltic why not in Ireland? Is it conceivable that these ancient mariners, scrutinising every country they visited for life-giving materials, should have failed to discover that, so far as gold, pearls, and purple-bearing shells were concerned, Ireland was, to employ a phrase sanctioned by Sir W. Boyd Dawkins and Sir Arthur Evans, a perfect El Dorado? It is difficult, now that the casket has been emptied of its contents, to convince the lay mind that Ireland was at one time one of the richest countries in Europe. The gold has gone—all except what is occasionally picked up still in the streams of County Wicklow—so, too, have the pearls and purple-bearing mollusc. But the National Museum, with its store of gold ornaments surpassing that of any other Museum in Europe, the geological structure of the island and the shell-heaps that line its Western coast, remain to

* *Die Ureinwohner des Scandinavischen Nordens*. 1866.

witness to the wealth it once contained. But other arguments are to hand to testify to the actual presence, over an extended period of time, of the Phœnicians in Ireland. Here I propose to deal with only one of these, *viz.*, Dun Aengus.

Dun Aengus on Aran Mor is one of the architectural show-objects of Ireland. Perched on the verge of a cliff 300 feet above the level of the sea, it resembles the keep of some gigantic castle, surrounded on the land side by three semi-circular or horse-shoe shaped walls of imposing dimensions. It has frequently been photographed and is the subject of various monographs, of which the most satisfactory is that by the late Mr. T. J. Westropp in the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* (vol. xxviii.). According to Mr. Westropp, the first writer to describe it was Roderic O'Flaherty about 1685. But beyond stating that it was a large mortarless stone structure—*ingens opus lapideum sine coemento*—his description possesses no archæological value. The next writer to describe it was Edward Ledwich about 1795. Ledwich accompanied his account with a view of the place, which is reproduced in Grose's *Antiquities of Ireland*. This view Mr. Westropp rightly condemns as an imaginary picture, adding that he (Ledwich) neither visited the place nor took any pains to get any accurate view or description of the ruin. Whether Mr. Westropp has any good reason for this latter statement I am not aware, but it is rather remarkable that such a minutely careful writer as he is should have failed to observe that the general view in Grose is accompanied by a descriptive plate. This gives (1) a plan of the central building,* from which we gather that it was of a roughly elliptical shape, the major axis running almost due north and south, with an entrance in the east wall; (2) a plan of what resembles an oblong stone cistern, apparently about 10 ft. long, 6 ft. wide, and 3 ft. high, running east and west, enclosing at its east end a large square block of stone surmounted by a conical stone pillar about 3 ft. high.

Whatever may be urged against the picture, the plan was certainly drawn on the spot. One feature not noted on the plan, but commented on by Mr. Westropp, is an oblong, artificially raised, stone platform, extending inwards from the present edge of the cliff, about 42 ft. long, 27 ft. wide, and 2 ft. high. There are other "forts" in Ireland closely resembling Dun Aengus in their construction, though in none of them do we find the three factors—raised platform, stone cistern, and conical pillar. But if the reader will consult Donaldson's *Architectura Numismatica*, Pl. 30, or Perrot & Chipiez's *Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, iii., p. 60,

* A large portion of this, together with the cliff on which it rested, has since fallen into the sea.

he will find, on the coin of Byblos there depicted, an exact reproduction of the plan in Grose (amplified by Mr. Westropp) with a representation of the building, probably of timber, that no doubt originally occupied the platform.

Having thus as far as possible reconstructed Dun Aengus, let us now turn to Mr. R. N. Hall's *Pre-Historic Rhodesia*. There the reader will find in the much discussed Temple of Zimbabwe an almost parallel example of Dun Aengus. From the plan accompanying the description of it we gather that the Temple of Zimbabwe is of a roughly elliptical shape with its main axis running N.W. and S.E. The Temple itself consists of a large open circular court to which an opening in the surrounding wall to the N.E. affords admission. A large stone platform occupies a considerable part of the court, and slightly to the east of it stand two conical towers—the one of enormous size, the other considerably smaller—to which a concealed passage to the east gives access. Commenting on the Temple, Mr. Hall remarks (p. 329) that the great conical tower is regarded by "scientists of the highest reputation" as evidence of the intrusion of Asiatic influence into South-East Africa in some remote prehistoric time, adding (p. 339) that "it is impossible to dissociate the tower and its allied phallic emblems from the oldest rock mines on this area, from which many millions of gold sterling have not only been extracted but exported to Asia" (? Egypt). In the course of his argument Mr. Hall compares the tower of Zimbabwe to the conical tower within an enclosure depicted on the coin of Byblos, to which I have already referred, insisting that, though in the case of Zimbabwe the enclosure is round while in that of Byblos it is square, the difference is immaterial—the round enclosure being due to Arabian influences, the square to Phœnician. But, and this is the gist of the whole discussion, in either case the cone within the enclosure is the sign and symbol of gold-mining operations.

I may leave the matter here with the remark that, in claiming Dun Aengus as a Phœnician settlement, built exactly on the lines described by M. Siret as peculiar to these ancient mariner-miners, I am not, as Professor MacNeill mistakenly conjectures,* indulging in "free speculation." It is a pity that for the scientific study of early Irish history the ghost of poor General Vallancey still bars the way. But, quite apart from Dun Aengus and other kindred "forts," there is ample evidence, both archaeological, social, and ethnographical, of the presence of the Phœnicians in Ireland.

ROBERT DUNLOP.

* *History*. January, 1923. P. 304.

THE DRAMA OF THE GERMAN REVOLUTION.

WHEN the complete and impartial history of Germany for the past eight or ten years comes to be written, in particular that part of it—perhaps the most difficult—which embraces the origin and course of the German Revolution, it is to be hoped that the historian will devote more attention than usual to the literary productions of the period. The novels of Defoe, of Disraeli, of a score of other writers, are a sufficient witness to the fact that there is often more of the vital stuff of history in a work of fiction than in several volumes of dull contemporary records. Even more emphatically is this the case when—as in Germany during the war and in the first stages of the November Revolution—free, unbiased expression of opinion, not to speak of untrammelled record of fact, was practically impossible of attainment. In order to recapture the Revolution atmosphere, pierce the Censor's veil and put physical facts into their right psychological perspective, the historian will unquestionably need to invoke the assistance of the chief imaginative writers of the time.

Germany is much less of a novel-reading and novel-writing country than Great Britain or France. The stage is her principal medium of imaginative self-expression, and the greater part of this article will therefore be devoted to a consideration of the most important stage-plays which throw light on the November Revolution and its sequel. For the sake of completeness, however, it may be worth while to mention at the outset one or two novels which give a picture of that war-time Germany that no amount of newspaper articles can completely reveal to us, a Germany which it is necessary to scan very closely if the beginnings of the Revolution are to be properly understood. Clara Viebig is fairly well known in this country as a vigorous historical novelist, devoting special attention to the modern history of her country, but refusing to place her pen—as certain of her fellow-writers did, both before and during the war—at the service of nationalist or party propaganda. This fact gives special importance to her two war-time novels—*Töchter der Hekuba*, translated into English two years ago under the title of *Daughters of Hecuba*, and *Das Rote Meer* (The Red Flood), a sequel which is equally deserving of an English version. Both deal in the main with German womanhood under the strain of the Great War. They show us, realistically and impartially, the German middle-class, suffering intense hardship, its youth experiencing the loosening of moral ties which all the belligerent nations knew in a greater or less degree, its quiet heroism, its despairing creed of "après nous, le déluge." And

the deluge came. *Das Rote Meer* ends just as the Revolution is breaking out. The defeat of Germany's armies and the defection of her allies was the last straw on the already overburdened shoulders of the people.

The outbreak of the Revolution in Berlin is also the point at which the popular novelist Bernhard Kellermann, in his *Der Neunte November* (The Ninth of November) concludes his narrative. His preceding pages had dealt with a rather different section of German society—the upper class, the military and higher official type—in a later and shorter period, namely, the last ten months of the war. The contrasts are heightened. Kellermann, like Clara Viebig, shows us Germany throwing off the moral restraints of peace-time, but it is a picture which, unlike hers, is unrelieved by any account of quiet suffering heroically borne. Rather can it be described as a gaudy background of vice, luxury, and defiant pleasure-seeking on the part of the fashionable world of Berlin, showing up, as it provoked, the terrible misery and revolutionary stirrings of the lower classes during 1918. Kellermann is a romantic writer, but his picture of Berlin dancing on the volcano has been given a certificate of general trustworthiness by impartial witnesses. In one respect it may seem to possess a propagandist motive—an attempted demonstration of the thesis that the internal condition of Germany was alone responsible for the Revolution, the breakdown of the German military machine having no influence—an all-important subject of controversy between Left and Right in the first months of the German Republic. But this fallacy can be corrected without difficulty from the recognised sources. *Der Neunte November* is a good type of the work of art which may be recommended to the historian for the historical atmosphere it provides. Without some such aid, relying on strictly documentary material alone, the historian of the future may find himself at a loss to account with psychological adequacy for the stupendous and spontaneous and swift movement which culminated in the flight of the Emperor, and the rapid transformation of all the German States into democratic Republics.

If prose-fiction is a fairly reliable guide in the present connection, the stage-play is even better, and for purely intrinsic reasons. A faulty delineation of society may pass unchallenged if presented in a novel; it is far less likely, if inaccurate, to be accepted when given on the public stage. When, therefore, to take an example which will occur at once to any student of German drama of the past few years—when we find the German profiteer or *Schieber*, in contradistinction to his counterpart on the English stage, shown in numerous German plays of the war and Revolution as a repulsive, sinister figure, unquestionably a villain

and by no means a comedy-character, it is fair to make the deduction, in the absence of protests against this characterisation, that war-profiteering was a much more evil phenomenon in Germany than with us, that it aroused much more bitterness and popular resentment, that it was, indeed, one of the factors in the origin of the Revolution and the Spartacist excesses which followed it.

This remark is capable of general application. The existence of plays of revolt long before the war provides useful evidence of a deep-seated political discontent. In this connection it is necessary to distinguish between the drama of social indignation and the drama of definite political purpose. The former was not peculiar to Germany; quite as serious protests against social evil were made in this country by Bernard Shaw and John Galsworthy as in Germany by Gerhart Hauptmann. But the second type of play, unknown here, was fairly common under the Hohenzollern régime, how common it has only since the Revolution been possible fully to realise, as several literary productions have been made public which before that date had to remain unknown or, in the case of plays, unproduced. Examples are the novel of Heinrich Mann, *Der Untertan* (The Subject), which, although written by July, 1914, could not see the light until 1919, as it was a definite satirical attack on the Kaiser and subservient *Kaisertreu* officials in various parts of the Empire. The play of Fritz von Unruh, the Uhlan officer who was destined to become one of the most important dramatists of Republican Germany, *Louis Ferdinand, Prinz von Preussen*, written in 1911, was permitted publication but not performance, the historical parallel between the King Friedrich Wilhelm III. and the Prince, on the one hand, and the Kaiser and his son, on the other, apparently being considered too close. The drama was, of course, released for performance after the Revolution, and had a remarkable success, not entirely due to the prohibition just mentioned, but in consequence of an unmistakable dramatic gift which later was to raise von Unruh to the position of one of the most important younger dramatists in post-Armistice Germany.

The last examples, among many, that we would mention of the political discontent before the war expressing itself in drama are Gerhart Hauptmann's *Festspiel*, and Frank Wedekind's so-called *Mysterium, Franziska*. The former was the contribution of Germany's greatest living dramatist to the celebration, in 1913, of the liberation of Germany, through the battle of Leipzig, from the domination of Napoleon. It met with severe criticism in all Nationalist circles, and was understood to have been severely disapproved of by the Prussian Court, in consequence of its entire

lack of the usual sentimentalising over the House of Hohenzollern and the exploits of the Prussian Army. The hints it gave, too, that liberty from French dominance was not the only form of liberty Germany desired, though set in a highly poetical framework, were unmistakable. The popularity into which Hauptmann came after the Revolution—he was, it will be remembered, even mentioned for the Presidency—and the official encouragement given to the celebrations of his jubilee in November, 1922, may be traced to this play much more than to his earlier dramas about social conditions. It would be easy to depreciate Wedekind's significance by suggesting that in any case he was a rebel against all the accepted canons of public morality, and that his plays for the most part deal with unsavoury subjects. But the odd thing about pre-war Germany was the way in which latitude was given to the morally questionable, but refused to even mild expressions of political protest on the public stage. *Franziska*, it is true, is mild in neither sense; it contains undisguised mockery of the ex-Crown Prince, which even Munich audiences laugh over to-day; but it is pretty clear, in view of the tolerance extended to certain other plays of Wedekind, that it was for political and not ethical reasons that its performance was forbidden before the proclamation of the German Republic.

Wedekind and Hauptmann are particularly good examples of the change which came over German drama and literature generally as soon as war was declared. All suggestion of political discontent was voluntarily suppressed; Hauptmann undertook the defence of Germany's cause with his pen; Wedekind, the defiant, wrote a number of historical sketches round the life of Bismarck. All criticism of the existing régime was stilled, as might have been anticipated. It was the actual experience of war which was to re-awaken the spirit of political discontent in German writers. Some of these had already made experiments in a revolutionary dramatic technique, the technique of Expressionism, with its calculated bizarre, startling effects, its jerky movements, its endeavour to portray types rather than imaginary individuals. But from a revolutionary technique several were to be led to revolutionary subjects by their share in the conflict. The most prominent revolutionary writers in Germany before the Revolution were Walter Hasenclever, Fritz von Unruh, and Ernst Toller. The first of these, who received part of his education at Oxford, had shown the spirit of revolt in a juvenile play entitled *Der Sohn* (The Son), a handling of the problem of relations between father and son which needs no further description here. The war and the political conditions in Germany which appeared to be responsible for it "got on his nerves," in an imaginative if not

in a pathological sense, and most of his subsequent work has borne distinct traces of lack of balance, an incoherence which may be ascribed to his experiences. His principal play published during the war was a new version of *Antigone*, based on Sophocles, but clearly adapted as a dramatic commentary on the political condition of Germany. Comparing the speeches of Creon, for example, with a number of typical utterances of the ex-Kaiser, the reader is struck by the apparent lack of perception on the Censor's part, that such an obvious parody of imperial eloquence could have been permitted publication. It may be that, at that date, 1917, the authorities felt sure enough of the general *morale* of the people to risk the effect of such works as this on popular opinion.

Another work towards which official tolerance was displayed, although there was no lack of newspaper protest against it—protest which has persisted to this day, resulting in the refusal of the Prussian Government last year to accord the Schiller prize to the play in question—was Fritz von Unruh's *Ein Geschlecht* (A Race). This passionate protest against war, spoken through a mother and a rebellious young soldier, was begun at the front in the summer of 1915, and finished in just over a year. It was performed at Frankfurt in 1917, and seems by all accounts to have been one of the most impressive productions in Germany during the war, as the same writer's volume *Opfergang* (The Way of Sacrifice) is to be reckoned one of the outstanding prose-volumes of German war-impressions. The fact that Fritz von Unruh did not follow up his pacifist writing with any sort of active political propaganda is probably the reason why he was left in comparative peace, developing his anti-war and anti-imperialist ideas in imaginative fashion. Apart from *Ein Geschlecht* his most important work of this character is the "dramatic poem in thirteen scenes" entitled *Vor der Entscheidung* (Before the Decision), which, against a background of the European War, introduces unnamed types of the great struggle, and confronts the spirit of Shakespeare with the spirit of Kleist. This work was completed in its original form towards the end of 1914, and is thus a remarkable witness to the early reaction of a young German intellectual against the war and its motives. It forms the first part of a trilogy, and the second part, entitled *Platz* (The Square), is partly staged in Germany during the war and partly in post-Armistice Germany; it is a rather confused but undeniably powerful and sincere representation of the Germany that Unruh imagined after the collapse of the imperialist régime. The fact that this was begun in 1917 is of some significance as showing how the mind of a typical young writer had advanced from negative pacifism to positive if not very practical or definite revolutionary

ideas. The third part of the trilogy has yet to appear, and for the moment, to judge from Fritz von Unruh's latest play, an imposing passion-drama entitled *Stürme* (Tempests), the dramatist is showing a welcome anxiety to escape from the trammels of war-time reactions. Even should he, however, attain that eminence in pure drama to which many critics hold he is destined, he will always, by virtue of the three dramas and the one prose-volume he devoted to the Great War, be an imaginative writer of exceptional interest for the historian. The hopes, fears, passions, and aspirations of that young Germany which went into the war to come out disillusioned but with new revolutionary ideals—these, in their turn to be, as many have held, thwarted—that young Germany finds its most perfect exponent in the Uhlan officer turned dramatist, Fritz von Unruh.

Ernst Toller is marked off from Fritz von Unruh by two characteristics. The war and Revolution took more complete possession of his mind and art; he also carried his propaganda into the sphere of everyday politics. When the war broke out this young man of twenty-one was on his way to France for purposes of study. He managed to get back to Germany and immediately volunteered for the front. His service in France made him a militant pacifist, and, on his release from the army on medical grounds, he began an active propaganda in conjunction with Kurt Eisner, who also, by the way, was the author of a revolutionary play entitled *Der Götterprüfung* (The Testing of the Gods). He took part in the strike of the Bavarian munition-workers in January, 1918, that first serious warning of the coming Revolution. He was imprisoned in consequence, and in the barracks in which he was detained he completed his drama *Die Wandlung* (The Transformation). This play in "six stations" begins with a gruesome introductory scene, representing risen corpses of the battlefield. Then follows a representation of the growth of the revolutionary movement, bewildering in its flashes of drama, the symbolist character of its personages. It is as revolutionary in its technique as in its subject, a typical production of expressionist drama. On the proclamation of the German Republic, Toller became prominent in the Soldiers' and Workers' Councils, which it was once thought would succeed in ruling Germany as the Workers' and Peasants' Soviets ruled Russia. But this hope of the extreme revolutionaries was dashed by the firm policy of the Central Government, and after the futile Bavarian Soviet revolt of May, 1919, Toller was again arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Thus it is that all his work has been written behind prison walls. His second play was entitled *Masse-Mensch* (Crowd-Man), an exposition, from the revolutionary point of view,

of the changing psychology of the crowd. Incidentally it reveals Toller at bottom as a Tolstoyan anarchist, conscientious objection to violence carried to its extreme.

Best known of all—outside Germany as well, since its translation into English and its production by the Incorporated Stage Society in London in May last—is Toller's *Maschinenstürmer* (The Machine-Wreckers). This drama of the Luddite rebellion at the beginning of the English Industrial Revolution is no doubt inspired by motives of Communist propaganda, but it is less open to objection than most other German revolutionary plays. There is less of the obsession most of them display, amounting in some cases almost to the pathological; in the place of hysterical argument undramatically advanced by personages of vague characterisation, we have a well-knit drama, to which a sense of tragic fate is given by its impressive representation of the hopeless struggle of the workers against the monster-like machine. In short, the *Machine-Wreckers* is less of a document for the historian than a piece of literature, standing out from the drama of social indignation of the early Hauptmann by a less crudely realistic technique, a better appreciation of deeper human feelings, a less materialistic outlook on life. There are few German revolutionary dramas of which the same can be said. Georg Kaiser's anti-capitalist play *Hölle, Weg, Erde* (Hell, Way, Earth), and Ludwig Rubiner's *Gewaltlosen* (The Powerless) should perhaps be named in passing, the latter because it again illustrates the ultra-Tolstoyan principles of some of the younger revolutionaries. Hasenclever's *Die Entscheidung* (The Decision) is also worth attention for its clearly first-hand impression of scenes of violence in Berlin, and its picture of the *Schieber* (Profiteer) is a good example of the suggestion advanced at the beginning of this essay. But none of these can be compared with Toller's historical drama.

Plays which show a reaction against the Revolution are not uncommon, and the best of them are a useful testimony to the weariness of violence which the Spartacist excesses induced in the German people as a whole. Richard Dehmel, Germany's most eminent poet at that date, who died in February, 1920, left as his principal posthumous work a play entitled *Die Götterfamilie* (The Family of the Gods), whose first act shows us heaven, with a number of allegorical personages, Courage, Hate, Cunning, Greed, Love, and the rest. The next scene takes us down to earth, and the same characters are shown in revolutionary Berlin, Love as a Red Cross nurse, Greed as a *Schieber*, and so forth. The reader is left in doubt as to Dehmel's opinion of the vanity of violent revolution. The same motive is handled rather differently by Rolf Lauckner, one of the most prolific of the younger

playwrights, in his *Wahnschaffe*. This is an interesting presentation of an idealist who gets carried by his ideals of social justice into the ranks of the extreme revolutionaries, only to find that there all the same meannesses, purposeless violence and hatreds hold sway as among the most detested of imperialists.

Apart from Dehmel's play just mentioned, which might perhaps be described as a fantastic satirical comedy, Germany seems to have produced only one real revolutionary comedy. This is Paul Schiemer's *Der Herr Minister*. The Government of Herr Ebert was clearly less sensitive to satire than the imperial régime it replaced, or it would never have allowed, at such a critical time in its fortunes as 1920, the production of this amusing skit on the inferior education of Germany's new rulers. It is significant that serious counter-Revolution on the stage seems since 1918 to have been absent, monarchist dramatic propaganda at a discount. The result of recent events has not been a revival of such nationalist dramas as those of Ernst von Wildenbruch, but a renewal of the popularity of Schiller, above all his *Wilhelm Tell*, which was prohibited in Essen during the French occupation. A whole chapter of German political psychology lies in this fact.

A. W. G. RANDALL.

SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN RUSSIA UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKS (1917-1922).*

THE first Commissar for Public Education, Lunacharsky, began his activities by issuing a manifesto to the school children, the burden of which was that the children were not to obey their parents and their teachers. The influence of the family was bad for the school and had to be counteracted, the children ought to be separated from their parents and from teachers incapable of assimilating new ideas.

The children, I remember, were at first very indignant about this manifesto; they ran from one school to another trying to get it publicly condemned by all the school children of the town, but this, of course, was useless. The manifesto was followed by reforms in the same spirit. Meetings of school children were organised, various Unions formed (*Osus*—the Union of Secondary Schools; *Kolduch*—the Pupils' Union); in each school meetings were held to elect representatives for these Unions. Everything was done to entice the children away from work, and in many instances this policy succeeded. Some of the more ambitious children enjoyed the sense of their own importance; others honestly thought that they were helping their schools; others, again, liked the excitement of it all; some went to the meetings simply from imitation, and those who disliked hard work found that this was the easiest way of avoiding it.

When strenuous efforts were being made to introduce Communism, these Unions became Communistic bodies, one in each school, affiliated to one Central Union. They enjoyed the special patronage of the Commissariat of Public Education, and every school was ordered to provide accommodation for storing Communistic literature and holding meetings at which Communism was to be preached and new members were recruited. Big meetings were also organised out of school hours for all the children of the upper forms. The audience generally went away from these meetings laughing, disappointed by the speakers specially sent out for propaganda purposes by the Central Union. The children soon grew tired of politics, Communistic literature remained unread, there was "nothing doing," the Communist rooms stood empty and were put to a more useful purpose.

All this would have been merely an amusing episode had not the Communist groups been given certain rights and entrusted with the supervision of the schools and the distribution of various things among them. Thus the children were charged with distributing tram tickets, among both their schoolfellows and the

* Translated from the Russian.

teachers, tickets for theatres (by that time some theatres were open to children twice a week), text-books, exercise books, sweets, extra rations on the occasion of Soviet holidays, &c. It is not hard to imagine the confusion that resulted from this practice, the abuses to which it gave rise, and the demoralising effect of it upon the children. In many schools discipline was completely destroyed; the poison of envy, suspicion, spying, had taken deep hold of the children's minds. Members of the Union assumed in their own school the rôle of supervisors of the store-rooms, the kitchen, the dining-rooms, bringing with them an atmosphere of malice and suspicion. The servants and those in charge of the stores were resentful and uneasy, the teachers suffered both from witnessing the moral deterioration of the children and from suspicions on their part: it would be said that one teacher had received a little more bread than the pupils, that another had had an extra plate of soup—while in truth all were equally badly fed. Soup made of herrings' heads or potato peelings, or, at best, boiled grain of doubtful quality, generally without a trace of oil or fat, was the usual school fare—and at home or in the public kitchens it was rather worse if anything. It was a terrible time. No one was able to buy food for himself, all had to be content with a beggarly pittance. It was particularly hard for the poor, starving teachers. In some schools they were accused of stealing bread and eatables and had to appear before a tribunal. In boarding schools the children spied upon the staff day and night. It is true there had been one case of a teacher stealing bread; but no one has counted how many teachers died of starvation. The bodies of those who lived by themselves were sometimes found only several days after their death. One woman teacher, unable to endure the hunger, killed herself and her child. Those who had families had to go through the agony of seeing their children dying of starvation. And the smug, well-fed and well-dressed Communists—members of the Pupils' Union—used to drive up to the school in cabs to investigate the misdeeds of the grasping teachers who tramped wearily to the schools in boots with holes in them, to sit, with their feet wet, for several hours in the cold rooms. Many of them died of pneumonia.

The activities of the Pupils' Union Central Committee ended badly: an enormous amount of money and stores intended for the schools was misappropriated, and there would have been a terrible scandal had not the Commissariat of Public Education made haste to hush up the affair and to take away from the children the right of distributing things to the schools.

To attract the children to the new régime and finally to estrange them from the school and the family, all sorts of amusements were

offered to them. Every theatre and cinema was open to them twice a week free of charge (fortunately, not all children took advantage of this); the Communist members of the Pupils' Union were invariably present. No one, however, had thought of making the repertoire suitable for the young, and the children had to sit through coarse farces and heartrending dramas of passion. True, it used to be announced beforehand whether the performance was intended for the younger or the older children, but this made no difference to the choice of the play. It is painful to think of the things the children saw in those years. The parents were for the most part powerless to stop them from going to the theatres once the tickets were in the children's hands. The teachers were at first not allowed to take any part in the distribution of the tickets or to look after the children in the theatres. The children themselves brought the tickets from the Union and distributed them to the higher and the lower forms, completely ignoring the staff.

The children suffered physically as well as morally from this constant theatre-going; ill-fed, badly shod, they sat up till late at night with their feet wet and had to walk home about one o'clock in the morning. But they enjoyed it. They felt more at ease in the theatre than at home: they laughed and shouted, made personal remarks, ran from place to place, the more enterprising ones climbed even on to the stage and were altogether unmanageable. The poor artistes suffered from such an audience and had difficulty in acting the play to the end; at last they begged to be delivered from the riotous youngsters. After that the Commissariat sent an order to the schools requiring the teachers to accompany the children to theatres and cinemas. Attempts were also made to make the repertoire suitable to the age of the audience. In the autumn of 1922 a special theatre for small children was opened (I believe on private initiative) where fitting and well-staged plays were produced—*The Blue Bird*, *The Magic Horse*, and others.

The Commissariat did not confine itself to amusements outside of the schools, but did its best to make theatrical performances a permanent feature of the school life; almost every school was to have plays, concerts, and literary evenings. There appeared a regular army of theatrical instructors, both men and women. All sorts of courses for the training of such instructors were opened; crowds of people rushed to the work with a zeal that made one believe it was the most important thing in life. One can only marvel at the mania for dramatic art which took hold even of serious-minded people. In almost every school a permanent stage was established, the children were to do the acting and the teachers to direct them. Few people realised how all this interfered with the normal school-life and work. The programmes of all the per-

performances were to be submitted to the Commissariat, and, for the sake of self-preservation, many schools produced revolutionary plays and had revolutionary poems recited in which the word "blood" was of frequent occurrence. The poor children learnt all these horrors like parrots. One of the instructors, a man of notoriously bad character, was installed in a boarding school for girls which was turned into a mixed school, and spent large sums of money (not out of his own pocket, of course) on producing ballets and pantomimes there.

One of the measures that did great harm was transferring pupils from one school to another; slum children were moved into schools for children of educated parents, boys were put into girls' schools; sometimes several forms from a bad school would be transferred to one of the best. All this was done quite thoughtlessly, in a purely mechanical way. "You are ruining the children," protested the teachers in one of the schools, "it's like transplanting a flower into frozen soil." "But it is unfair that in some schools everything should be good and in others bad," answered the Bolshevik official, "bad children must be put into good schools and nice children into bad ones." Fortunately, a few schools escaped this dangerous experiment.

When it became clear that the State was unable to support all the existing schools their number was curtailed, and this, too, was done in a thoroughly mechanical fashion: sometimes the best schools were closed while the bad ones were left open, and the pupils from the former were partly or wholly transferred to the latter. The teachers were treated with the same thoughtlessness. No consideration was given to the fact that each school had its own traditions, its own character, its own specially selected staff of teachers who formed a spiritually united Teachers' Council. The arbitrary transference of pupils and teachers from one school to another resulted in a hopeless confusion, and it was only at the cost of a desperate struggle that a few lucky schools succeeded in preserving their individuality.

To instil the proletarian spirit into the schools more thoroughly it was decreed that the people's representatives—chiefly workmen in factories—should take part in the sittings of the Teachers' Councils; special elections were held for the purpose. Representatives of children from the four upper forms were also to be present, while the parents were from the first forbidden to have any part in the school management. The Teachers' Councils were subjected to the jurisdiction of a Soviet consisting of twelve representatives of the working classes. Fortunately in most schools this reform failed to be carried out, and the Teachers' Councils continued as before. The failure was due to the fact that

the workmen did not care for the job to which they were not accustomed and which interfered with their regular work.

The exclusion of the parents from taking any part in the school management did not last long. Life itself showed that the school and the family could not be severed. At first the parents used to be invited by the teachers privately and at the risk of severe penalties, but when the schools became quite destitute, and, through lack of heating and repairs the buildings grew dilapidated, the parents were approached officially and allowed to hold general meetings and form committees for providing fuel and money for repairs. The Commissariat of Public Education, however, made a special proviso, the observation of which was strictly enforced, that the contributions made by the parents should on no account be used for helping the teachers, in spite of the fact that they were starving. The Commissariat was always several months in arrears with the payment of the teachers' salaries, and by the time they were paid they were not worth their nominal value, as the rouble was continually falling. The only thing that the teachers could do without any interference or restriction was to die of hunger. The schools which obediently carried out all the requests of the Commissariat gradually lost their teachers and closed down. The surviving teachers sought to earn their living in other ways; some became factory hands, others cab-drivers, &c.

The last important change was the reintroduction of school fees, which were made far higher than they had been in pre-Bolshevik days.

As a result of all these reforms, the number of Secondary Schools in Russia has decreased by 50 per cent. (according to data collected by N. Sorokin from official sources), and those that still remain lead a precarious existence; the children have lost the habit of working steadily and with concentration, and there has been a terrible waste of vital energy both on the part of the pupils and of the teachers. May the few schools that had the good fortune to be saved from the wreck act as leaven for the rebirth of popular education in Russia in the near future!

A FORMER HEAD-TEACHER.

THE FINANCING OF CHARITIES.

THE term "Charity" is vague, and the need for a more precise legal definition has been often urged. Omitting religious and temperance movements and also educational charities, the remainder of charitable effort may be grouped under five broad headings: (a) *Health*; (b) *Poverty*; (c) *Character*; (d) *Social Well-being*; (e) *Industrial Welfare*. Under *Health* are found the voluntary hospitals, district nursing, maternity and child welfare, and the care of the blind, the deaf and the dumb, and the mentally defective. Under *Poverty* are found pension funds, temporary relief societies, orphanages and children's homes, homes for the aged; also provident and thrift societies. Under *Character* come police court, probation, and prison work; also rescue work. Under *Social Well-being* come juvenile organisations, adult social welfare, settlements, and movements for general well-being. Under *Industrial Welfare* come apprenticeship schemes, emigration schemes, voluntary employment bureaux, societies for the improvement of industrial conditions.

The exact cost of the above voluntary services is unknown. From evidence which the writer has been able to secure from various sources, the following comparative statement, which errs if anything on the cautious side, may be made. The total annual income of charities in 1921 from voluntary sources was about £13,000,000, made up roughly as follows: subscriptions, donations, flag days, collections, sales of work, &c., £7,000,000; interest on investments, £3,000,000; legacies, £3,000,000. This annual income increases steadily. The increase for 1921 over 1920 with regard to regular annual subscriptions and donations has been estimated at £50,000, which was less than the 1920 increase over 1919. With regard to invested capital (apart from buildings, &c.), the amount has been estimated at from £75,000,000 to £100,000,000. This capital increases each year, and if the experience of a typical large town such as Liverpool is any guide as a basis of calculation, the annual increase of capital between 1910 and 1921 has been about £1,500,000.

These figures are large, and in the public interest it has long been realised that there should be some measure, not so much perhaps, of public control, as of public evidence of satisfactory and efficient management. The public also requires to be safeguarded against three possibilities: the continuance of a charity when its function is obsolete; the evaporation of surplus funds when a charity is wound up; the existence of fraudulent effort.

Certain steps have already been taken. The famous Report of Lord Brougham's Commission of 1817 brought to light the dis-

appearance of so many charities that in 1853 an Act was passed establishing the Charity Commission. The powers of these Commissioners are limited. They deal in the main with capital and not with income; and their powers are confined to charitable trusts; but probably not half the charities are charitable trusts. Within their limited powers, however, the Commissioners have rendered valuable service and safeguarded the perpetuity of much charitable money. By the valuable *cy pres* doctrine, when the function of a charity is obsolete, the Commissioners can vary the function to the nearest equivalent object; or pass on the funds to another society with such an object. In 1892 the Charities Enquiries Act was passed enabling the Charity Commission to make inquiries throughout the country as to the existence of local charitable Trusts. In 1916 two more important public safeguards were secured. Under the Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act, 1916, Police Authorities were given power to regulate street collections, and most Police Authorities have taken advantage of this valuable measure. Under the War Charities Act, 1916, there is a prohibition against raising money for war charities, unless these charities are registered. This Act is compulsory, and the new Registration Authorities set up throughout the country are the local County and Urban Authorities. This important condition of registration was carried a step further in 1920 under the Blind Persons Act, when the registration of all Blind Charities was made compulsory, the local Registration Authority being the same as those dealing with the war charities.

At the present time, with the numerous flag days, competition ballots, and popular forms of money-raising for charities, together with the rapid growth of new forms of charitable effort, the general question of public safeguards has come again to the front and calls somewhat loudly for attention. Certain needs also which were overlooked in the past require urgent attention under present circumstances.

Let us take first the question of registration. Its initiation and its extension to Blind Charities have been amply justified and have provoked no resentment from the charities themselves. On the contrary, the charities as a whole have welcomed registration. The conditions of registration are simple, being mainly the appointment of a responsible Executive Committee, the keeping of a proper minute book, the keeping of accounts, and the preparation of an annual audited statement which has to be filed each year with the local Registration Authority.

Four comments may here be made: *First*, the form in which accounts are kept varies, and the accounts are at times misleading. The conditions laid down by such responsible bodies as King

Edward's Hospital Fund for London and the Voluntary Hospitals Commission that accounts should be kept (a) on an Income and Expenditure basis, and (b) that in addition a Balance Sheet should also be published, should be extended to all charities as a condition of registration. *Second*, the accounts which have to be filed at the local Registration Authority are not open to public inspection, but only the names of the Committee and the title and address of the Charity, &c. It is probable that this omission to include the inspection of the accounts was inadvertent; but it would be highly desirable for the Charity Commissioners, who are the Central Authority with regard to the administration of Registration, to make this additional requirement essential when issuing their next set of instructions. *Third*, the local Registration Authority should publish an annual report as to its operations under this heading. *Fourth*, the regulation which enables a local authority to co-opt a representative of charities on to its Sub-Committee in charge of registration should be compulsory and not optional; and, further, such representative or representatives should be appointed by a body representative of local charities or at a meeting of representatives of charities.

The registration of charities would also secure one further important point, namely, that it would be possible to keep a record of charities. At present there is no such record except that in a few of the larger towns lists of charities have been compiled by Local Councils of Social Welfare or other voluntary agencies. One result of this omission of charities to be registered is that the Charity Commissioners are frequently unaware of the existence of charities with capital which should really be within their cognisance; with the consequence that even in the matter of control of capital the existing powers of the Charity Commissioners are utilised only to a limited extent.

This question of the safeguarding of capital requires further attention. It is a curious fact that there is no onus on the executors of any estate to report to any authority any charitable bequests contained in the wills they administer, nor indeed is there any check that the charitable bequests left in a will to be administered by the executors are executed. Fortunately, the standard of integrity among trustees as a body is exceptionally high; but a record of their transactions ought at any rate to be available in the public interest. In one town it has been the custom of the local Council of Social Service to arrange with the local Probate Register for the systematic transmission of details of all local charitable bequests. This practice is simple in operation, and has proved a great boon. The proposal for a systematic notification of all bequests is therefore perfectly feasible and also quite

inexpensive. The natural authority to be thus notified would be the local Registration Authority.

While thus safeguarding the birth of a charitable bequest, it is also interesting to note that there is at present no compulsion to place on public record the "decease" of any charity. It is quite true that the Charity Commissioners would like to be notified, and, if notified, could safeguard the appropriate distribution of any surplus capital; but there is no machinery of notification, and the Charity Commissioners comparatively rarely hear of the numerous windings up. The executive committees of charities usually exercise a wise discretion, but at times they are ignorant of their legal responsibilities, and at times also their action (to say the least) is not wise. How many people realise, for instance, that directly a charity invests money and asks one or two individuals to allow the investment to stand in their name, those individuals become trustees for seeing that that money is devoted to the use of that charity; and, further, that it is up to them to see, in case of the winding up, that the continued use of such capital for the purpose for which it was given is properly secured? It is therefore most important that the decisions with regard to the disposal of surplus funds in the winding up of any charity should be duly notified to some authority. For this purpose the appropriate authority would also naturally be the local Registration Authority.

We come now to the question of popular appeals. The 1916 Act giving the Police Authority power to control street collecting has been an enormous boon. There are, however, several points to note. *First*, the statutory power should be made compulsory and not optional; *second*, it is a question whether the local Police Authority is the proper local authority. There was no other Authority existing when the Act was passed, but now that there exist everywhere local Registration Authorities, it would probably be much better for this latter authority to deal with the matter of street collecting. On the Registration Management Committee of such authority, the local Police Authority should of course be represented; and the co-operation between the two be closely maintained. *Third*, the accounts which are required to be sent in to the Police Authority should also be open to public inspection at a small fee, if necessary. At present they are not so open, and permission to inspect the accounts has been refused to a donor. *Fourth*, the restriction of these regulations to street collections alone is too narrow. It ought to apply to door-to-door collections which are at the moment one of the most fertile sources of fraudulent collecting. The police have repeatedly expressed their regret at not being able to cope with this movement. It should be just as necessary to secure permission to collect from door to

door as it would be to make a street collection. It should also be necessary to secure permission in the case of competition ballots, whist drives, and similar competitions.

One final point remains. Should any limit be placed upon the administrative cost of collecting money for charities? Of recent years one has seen the rise of the professional collector, *i.e.*, a man who undertakes to raise money for charities on the basis of (a) an assured salary plus (b) a commission on the amount collected. It is notoriously difficult to get evidence as to the amount which such individuals secure, for no charity likes to make public the fact that it has paid many thousands of pounds in commission. The story I heard that of £150,000 raised in one instance £40,000 was handed to the charity, and £110,000 was retained by the organiser for remuneration and expenses is probably untrue; but a second story where a man raised £100,000 for charity and charged 15 per cent. commission is, I think, quite true. Another charity, in writing to me, said that their Committee thought it quite justifiable to spend 50 per cent. of the amount raised on the cost of the appeal, and as this particular charity raised for some years over £100,000 annually, the amount given by the public and yet not spent on the object of the charity was very considerable. I have before me the details of yet another charity which raised many thousands, the figures for which are even worse. He would be a bold man, I suppose, who would prosecute such a charity for misappropriation of charitable funds; yet the point certainly arises as to how far the public would subscribe to a charity if they knew that of the money they raised only half was used for the purpose for which it was given.

In considering this matter the effect upon the conscientious, needy charity which refrains from this expensive course must not be forgotten. In some cases, indeed, it is almost compelled to resort to equally expensive methods if it is to live side by side with its aggressive neighbour. The check to this extravagance in cost of appeal can probably only come from the public opinion vigorously expressed. What would be a fair rate of cost will vary in the minds of different people; but 20 per cent. in costs for appeals between £1,000 and £5,000; and 10 per cent. between £5,000 and £50,000, with a slightly lower rate for higher amounts, would probably be felt by many to be verging on the top limit. At any rate, the necessity for publishing in full the results of these appeals and the provision of facilities for the inspection of these returns by the public would have a very beneficial effect in checking this unsatisfactory tendency.

FREDERIC G. D'AETH.

A POPULAR WHIP.

WILLIE McARTHUR struck me as a most delightful personality. He wanted to be a sailor and when, fresh from school, he was given the choice of a University career or a trip round the world, he chose the latter, because it meant months at sea. So he remained entirely unconventional, bringing with him a sense of space and open country and rough and varied experience unlike our own. His enjoyment of life was contagious. Everyone liked him and he liked everyone. His whimsically belligerent attitude to revolutionaries, including suffragettes and anarchists and conscientious objectors, and anyone he looked on as "cranks," never affected his individual personal friendships. He seemed to have a natural affection for all seafaring men, and, apart from his vast acquaintance in the Navy, knew every man on the many P. & O. ships on which he journeyed, from captain to cabin-boy. He had as many friends among women as among men, being a very chivalrous person and of invariable courtesy, and these friends ranged over sea and land, Parliament, Clubland, the theatre, the world of music and of art. Owing perhaps to the Puritan strain in him it was Church music which especially delighted him. He loved "the pealing organ and the full-voiced quire—the service high and anthem clear," and often volunteered as organist.

But these interests were merely the relaxation of a man for whom the dominating call was that of political life. He was an excellent public speaker. He would confine himself to making one or two points and making them again and again, a method, to the success of which in catching the popular imagination as well as reinforcing the memory, Bible narrative and fairy tales alike testify. Then jests, stories, quotations filled in the framework, for he was widely read and a man of considerable literary taste and feeling. Able and genial, with an indomitable sense of humour which enabled him to wrest fun out of those things which, in other men, were sheer trials of temper, entirely unconventional and intensely loyal, an Englishman with the freedom of a Colonial, his adoption for a constituency was assured. He became Member for St. Austell in 1887 and remained there, adored by his constituents, who gave him complete independence in the House of Commons.

The House of Commons captivated him; how deeply it can do so is known only to the men who understand it. Its history, its usages and survivals become as dear as its daily life, and its mark is set on those who love and understand it. So much so that in the later years, when no longer a Member, McArthur would not enter its doors again. The Whips' Office soon claimed him, and Mr. H. J. Tennant, the ex-Secretary of State for Scotland, has told

Stratford-on-Avon and its Shakespeare Festivals and memories tempted him sometimes to leave London, otherwise his country visits were few. He revelled once more in his membership of the Westminster Glee Club. He began to re-form his large library, scattered when everything else went in 1908, but he rejected every suggestion of returning to political life. There is a note among his papers, written in 1917, stating his difficulties in giving positive pledges to an electorate:—

"For myself, I think the future course of this country and of the Empire and its Allies will depend entirely on the sort of peace which is eventually made, and whether or how or how far we have to safeguard ourselves against a repetition of the iniquity under which the world is now suffering. And I feel, too, that the old political parties have had their day and that our old party names have no clear meaning. We have got, first, to make our Empire safe—then to ensure, with the help of our Allies, the future peace of the world—and then to study and endeavour to meet the vast social problems which have risen on every hand, and to secure for our workers not only peace, but conditions of life which will give them a reasonable reward for their labour. Many problems will have to be faced in the new times. None of the old shibboleths appear to me to be of any use. We must all dig out our own way."

He went back to Australia in 1920 on business and again in 1923. His affairs were again prosperous, but with all his apparent gay *insouciance* the strain of the crash and of the years of the war had made their mark. He wrote that he was working hard, that "everyone was so kind, one can't be grateful enough," and told of the old boathouse where every Sunday he rested and "lay in the great verandah and heard the plash of the water under him and all the winds of heaven blew on him." Then he died suddenly early on June 7th, 1923, and it was on the great cliff of the South Head that they laid him, with the sea below and the winds above.

GERTRUDE M. TUCKWELL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

REPARATIONS: A LOST OPPORTUNITY.

THE Baldwin Administration which comes to an end on December 6th has left unsolved the main problems of foreign policy which it has had to deal with during its short career. So far as foreign policy is concerned Mr. Baldwin's record, granted even the appalling difficulties, is singularly empty of achievement. British diplomacy, which began the year with a business-like recognition of incompatibility of temper between Paris and London, but with a recognisable British policy, ends the year in a state of jagged indecision. Mr. Baldwin never recovered from his blunder of September 19th nor from the resultant anti-climax (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, November, pp. 645-650). Since that time he has pursued a policy of alternate opposition and acquiescence towards France, a policy which in this case, as often, reaped the worst of both worlds. In the early days of November he found himself in a tactical position comparable with that of Mr. Lloyd George at Genoa in 1922 and at the August, 1922, Conference in London, with the advantage intensified by the support of the United States. France was isolated. Both Belgium and Italy had declared themselves to be sympathetic to the proposal for an expert investigation into Germany's capacity to pay. The new world was at last returning to redress the balance of the old, or so it seemed. Mr. Baldwin was given an earlier opportunity than could have been expected of recovering from the position into which he placed himself on September 19th and of taking up again the threads of August 11th. Instead he decided to advise the King to dissolve Parliament and to invite the country to express its opinion on a mainly domestic issue.

Although it is likely that foreign policy will play little part in the election, the Protectionist issue arose directly from the existing conditions in Europe and their effect on British trade. One of the interesting topics discussed at the Imperial Conference was the possibility of mobilising the Empire's resources, at any rate to a sufficient extent to tide us over the next few critical years, while chaos lasted in Europe. The view was held with remarkable unanimity among the Empire representatives that there was no immediate hope in French policy, and that the disastrous effects already produced by French policy were bound to incapacitate the European market, so far as British trade was concerned, for three or four years ahead. In the interim period, while not excluding the European market as the ultimate basis of British trade, there was held to be no reason why the various parts of the Empire, all

us, in his charming *Times* tribute to his old friend, of the tireless energy and efficiency and popularity needed for that task, and that there was no more popular man in the House of Commons. "The great Nonconformist merchant community in England was never better represented in Parliament than by Willie McArthur," says Lord Novar, once a co-Whip.

He became Junior Lord of the Treasury from 1892-1895, but this was the only post he ever accepted—though during his political career he refused Office offered him, as later he refused offers of Colonial Governorship and a Peerage. As Whip he was first associated with Mr. T. E. Ellis and, when the latter died, again took the second place. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman wished to conjure with the great name of Gladstone in the make-up of the Whips' Office. The episode was characteristic of Willie McArthur's desire "to sweat for service not for meed," and Mr. Asquith recognised it in a letter bearing testimony to his disinterestedness, adding:—

"We all feel—and no one more strongly than I—the deep debt of obligation and gratitude under which the whole party lies to you for years of the most devoted and loyal service. The times have not been altogether propitious for any of us, but the courage and indomitable hopefulness which have never failed you have been a lesson and an example to us all. . . .

"And when the time comes—as it will—to gather in the harvest, there is no one in our party who will be better entitled than yourself to look back with satisfaction and pride upon the labours and efforts of the past."

Lord Gladstone tells thus of their days together:—

"Willie McArthur was my chief colleague in the Liberal Whips' Office from 1899 to 1906. . . . For this work his qualities were admirable. He had humour, patience, tact, and insight. He went straight to his point with a sunny freshness born of a natural honesty of mind and purpose. He possessed the absolute confidence of the Government Whips, even when party feeling was at its height, and this is a very high tribute to character.

"It was a time of great difficulty for Liberal Whips. In 1899 the party only mustered about 175. In the South African War Election of 1900 we just managed to hold our own. We were split into two sections, with separate organisations in the country. But the Whips' Office continued to serve both sections, and was the link which for some time prevented disruption. We kept up the party fight, but behind the scenes the preservation of unity was the more important and most anxious task for three or four critical years. The renowned individualities of Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Morley were in embarrassing detachment. Old friends—Sir E. Grey, Mr. Haldane, and Sir H. Fowler—looked away from Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman for leadership. Mr. Asquith followed his own mind, which sometimes perplexed us, but he never failed in giving us counsel when we asked for it. The task of marshalling forces, mitigating differences, and of adjusting the party

generally to its various official and unofficial leaders was frequently too much for us, but we stuck to it until lesser differences were merged in greater agreements and Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman returned to the House in 1906 in the company of 376 Liberals. Through all these trials and adversities McArthur and I were inseparably connected in a mass of unrecorded detail work. He never lost his temper, and often prevented me from losing mine. . . . Then, at the close, came the cruel stroke of fortune at the very climax of success. He remained true to himself, had no reproach for others, and accepted the end of his political life with a quiet dignity and courage which could not be excelled. He had a heart of gold, and those who knew him and worked with him will never forget him."

For to Willie McArthur when "life was pleasant" came in 1908 that adversity which tries the temper of man's nature. Faced with reverses he took the memorable advice of John Gabriel Borkman, picking himself up and going on as if nothing had happened, and so set himself in exile to the rebuilding of his fortunes. If, as Kipling says, *the man* is one who can lose and start again at his beginnings and never breathe a word about his loss, such was Willie McArthur.

When War came, as soon as he could leave his work in Sydney he was in England. His great ambition was to fight for the Empire, and there was no stair to Government Offices he did not climb to urge his wish. But this was for younger men. He found work at the War Trade Department, and Lord Emmott tells how he asked this volunteer to assume a general supervision of the section dealing with commodities in which the Board of Trade were specially interested:—

"He did the work so well that I never added anyone else. He occasionally came to see me on points of special difficulty, and I soon found he had got hold of the fundamentals and that I could trust his judgment. He was also one of those efficient workers who get through their work in the minimum of time and without fuss. . . .

"It needed careful management to avoid depleting home supplies, to steer clear of 'black list' traders indirectly as well as directly, and yet to keep the manufactures going which helped to provide the sinews of war. The fact that no complaints reached me is the measure of his success."

He kept on the work from 1916 to 1920, refusing then as previously an offered "Honour."

Returned, his old haunts claimed him, his clubs received him with open arms, and, when the strain of the war lightened, it was possible to renew acquaintance with Old London under the auspices of one who loved every stone of it, old or new, from the vestiges of the past remaining in the City to the glades in Kensington Gardens sacred to their presiding deity, Peter Pan.

of them suffering as they were from the same sort of trade depression, should not help each other out by some modified form of Protection which would not conflict with the Bonar Law pledge on fiscal policy. That pledge had been loyally renewed by Mr. Baldwin. At the Imperial Conference, however, the pledge was assailed from many sides, the prevailing unemployment affording ample scope for Protectionist manœuvre. During the past twelve months, for instance, some four thousand highly skilled mechanics have emigrated from Barrow to the United States. That and similar facts were quoted at the Conference to such effect that finally the Prime Minister decided to release himself from his fiscal pledge by an appeal to the country.

A CHANCE OF AMERICAN CO-OPERATION.

It was during the course of the Imperial Conference that on a British suggestion the United States Government again decided to take a part, if French obstruction could be overcome, in the European settlement. On October 12th Lord Curzon telegraphed to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, instructing him to inform the American Government of the keen desire felt in London for renewed American collaboration. On the day before the telegram was sent, President Coolidge was reported to have made a declaration that the American Government was still ready to act on the Hughes Declaration of December, 1922. That statement encouraged the British Government to send off at once the Note to America which was already under consideration. The important passages in it were as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government have during the past nine months made a series of proposals to their Allies for meeting these difficulties, none of which has been so fortunate as to meet with a measure of acceptance sufficient to bring about common action. And yet without such action, not merely Germany, but Europe appears to be drifting into economic disaster. In these circumstances his Majesty's Government have for long entertained the belief that the co-operation of the United States Government is an essential condition of any real advance towards settlement. America, by reason of her position and history, is more disinterested than any of the European Powers. At the same time she is directly and vitally concerned with the solution of the European problem, if for no other reason because in it is involved the question of the inter-Allied debt. . . .

"If his Majesty's Government have rightly interpreted the statement of the President, and if they may count upon an encouraging reception being given to such a proceeding, they will not hesitate to invite the immediate co-operation of their Allies in Europe in an

invitation to the United States Government to assist in the proposed inquiry, by deputing a delegate, whether official or unofficial, to take part in it. If, on the other hand, it were proposed to hold such an inquiry, although complete unanimity had not been forthcoming at this end, might his Majesty's Government and the majority of the Allies still hope for American co-operation? Alternatively, if it were proposed that such an inquiry should be entrusted to the Reparation Commission or to a body appointed by it, would America still be willing to participate? It is in the firm belief that the American Government have it in their power to render a great service to the security and peace of the world that his Majesty's Government, speaking in the name of the whole British Empire as represented in the Imperial Conference now assembled in London, desire to associate themselves with the renewed proposal of the President."

The American Government promptly (October 26th) answered through the British Chargé d'Affaires. "The Secretary of State," said the answer, "desires again to express the deep interest of the United States in the economic situation of Europe and its readiness to aid in any practical way to promote recuperation and the re-establishment of economic stability." The Note went on to express the belief that "present conditions make it imperative that a suitable financial plan should be evolved to prevent economic disaster in Europe, the consequences of which would be world-wide. It is to be hoped that the existing circumstances are propitious for the consideration of such a plan, inasmuch as abandonment of resistance on the part of the German Government will present a freer opportunity and an immediate necessity for the establishment of an economic programme." America expressed her willingness "to take part in an economic conference in which all the European Allies chiefly concerned in German Reparations participate, for the purpose of considering questions of the capacity of Germany to make Reparations, and an appropriate financial plan for securing such payments," but took the occasion to make her attitude clear on three important points which may be thus summarised:

(1) America had no desire to see Germany relieved of her "just obligations."

(2) The proposed conference "should be advisory; not for the purpose of binding Governments who would naturally be unwilling to pledge their acceptance in advance, but to assure appropriate recommendations by a thoroughly informed and impartial body intent upon solving difficult pending problems upon their merits."

(3) The American Government "has consistently maintained the essential difference between questions of Germany's capacity to pay, and of the practicability of methods to secure Reparation

payments from Germany, and payment by the Allies of their debts to the United States, which constitute distinct obligations."

FRENCH ISOLATION AND M. POINCARÉ'S INCONSISTENCIES.

There resulted from this document a highly interesting situation. It looked as if the British Government had seriously reverted to the programme laid down in its Note of July 20th to France and Belgium (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, September, pp. 377-8). Among the proposals made in that Note was that "A body of impartial experts should be set up, charged with the duty of advising the Allied Governments and the Reparation Commission respectively as to Germany's capacity to pay, and as to the mode of payment to be prescribed. The co-operation of an American expert to be sought, and arrangements to be made for German experts to be consulted and heard." It further appeared that the Government, having failed to induce French acceptance of this proposal, had, by its Note to America, evolved an ingenious means of carrying out the threat of "separate action" contained in the Note to France of August 11th.

Just as, however, the promise of the August White Paper had been belied by supine acquiescence in French intransigence, so the promise of Anglo-American initiative was belied by renewed acquiescence; and that in spite of the fact that the British Government, whether cleverly or by accident, had manoeuvred itself into a position of tactical advantage over Paris. Both Belgium and Italy promptly accepted the second alternative of the British proposal of October 12th, namely, that the proposed inquiry should be entrusted to the Reparation Commission or to a body appointed by it. The Belgian Government suggested certain minor emendations in the scheme, which the British Government found not only consistent with the object of the scheme, but calculated the better to achieve it. The main emendation was that, in the proposed committee's terms of reference, the phrase "capacity to pay" should be altered to "capacity to make reparation." The emendation had the effect of widening the scope of the inquiry so as to allow of a full report on Germany's capacity both in cash and in kind, and further of leaving open the question whether the "reparation" referred to was that of the May, 1921, schedule, or some more practical total. With the emendation incorporated the British Government was able to ask the French Government to accept, not merely an Anglo-American, but an Anglo-American-Belgian proposal. As it became rapidly obvious that the French Government had no intention of accepting anything of the kind, a piquant situation resulted between Paris and Brussels, which perhaps restored to British diplomacy some of the prestige lost by

its unfortunate misreading of Belgian policy on an earlier occasion (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, November, pp. 646-7). There followed a short exchange of view between London and Paris, the point of which was that London wanted to invest the proposed committee with powers as wide as possible, while Paris wanted to restrict its powers into impotence.

M. Poincaré's diplomacy at this point excelled even its former record for muddle and self-contradiction. During the last few months some of the more striking vagaries of M. Poincaré's supposedly rigid mind have been chronicled in these pages (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, August, pp. 241-2, November, p. 653). By his official communication of October 29th, M. Poincaré insisted on an expert investigation of nothing beyond "Germany's present capacity to pay." In his Note to the British Government of August 20th he declared: "Germany's present capacity to pay corresponds to zero, as a result of the Reich's own will. All expert inquiry would be useless."

Even more remarkable perhaps was the discrepancy between M. Poincaré's official communication of October 28th and other official communications made by him up to July 30th. On October 28th he declared that "France will never agree to discuss again the total of the debt as it was fixed on May 5th, 1921, and she will not give her consent to any reduction of the total obligations of Germany as it was fixed by the Reparation Commission on May 5th, 1921." Up to July 30th he had demanded as France's share of Reparations a net amount of 26 milliard gold marks (£1,300 millions), that is to say, as was at the time explained, that France consented to such a reduction of her 52 per cent. of the May, 1921, total on condition that her debts to Great Britain and to the United States were cancelled. As the French debt to Britain is the equivalent of 12 milliard gold marks (£600 millions), and her debt to America 15 milliard gold marks (£750 millions), France in July in effect claimed 26 plus 12 plus 15, or 53 milliard gold marks (£2,650 millions). As the White Paper of August 11th pointed out, that sum would be "three or four times larger than would on balance fall to her share under the existing agreements." By contrast, if the French communication of October 29th be taken literally, the French share of Reparations would work out as follows. Under the Spa Agreement, France would receive 52 per cent. of the May, 1921, total, which would come to 34 milliard gold marks (£1,700 millions). Out of this she would have to pay Great Britain 12 milliards (£600 millions) and America 15 milliards (£750 millions), and would thus be left with a balance of 7 milliards (£350 millions). In arriving at the estimate of 34 milliards as the French share of the May, 1921, schedule, one takes the estimate of

M. Bokanowski, the Reporter of the French Budget, which on a 5 per cent. basis puts the present value of the May, 1921, annuities at 65 milliard gold marks (£3,250 millions), the nominal capital sum being 132 milliards (£6,600 millions). If, therefore, the French communication of October 29th be taken literally, it would logically and arithmetically imply a reduction of the preposterous French claim of 53 milliard gold marks (£2,650 millions) to one of 7 milliards (£350 millions). One can only conclude that it is to be taken neither literally, nor logically, nor arithmetically. Can it be that M. Poincaré's memory never goes back further than a fortnight, and that his imagination never reaches more than a fortnight ahead?

There was a still further lapse of memory on M. Poincaré's part, although in this case it was a matter of years, not of weeks, in the interval, and as such perhaps less disturbing. M. Poincaré has often claimed to take his stand by the Treaty of Versailles (1919). By insisting on restricting the committee's terms of reference, he showed that he had forgotten some of the important stipulations of the Treaty. His restrictions would have had the effect of nullifying that part of the Treaty (Part VIII., Annex 2, particularly clauses 9, 11, 12, and 12b) which gave the Reparation Commission the fullest latitude to appoint such a committee with the widest reference.

ALTERNATIVES FOR BRITAIN.

With stolid imperturbability, however, Lord Curzon tried to penetrate the mist of M. Poincaré's mentality and to induce him to agree to some form of invitation to the United States. The negotiations became protracted. The French Press showed that the Quai d'Orsay derived some confidence from that phrase of the American Note of October 16th by which America undertook to accept only a "unanimous" invitation from the European Allies to take part in the proposed inquiry; but it equally showed that French opinion had failed to read the American Note, even on this point, with care. The relevant passage of the Note read thus: "In view of existing exigencies it is hoped that the project of such an inquiry as is contemplated of an advisory nature might commend itself to all these Powers, and that the question suggested [*i.e.*, whether America would co-operate with the 'majority' of the Allies in case unanimity were not realised] will not arise. But if it should arise from lack of unanimity on the part of the European Powers, the United States Government must reserve its decision as to its course of action." The reservation was tactfully kept out of the picture in the British representations to France.

While the Franco-British exchanges were taking place, the

American Government lost patience and directly asked the French Government to explain what exactly it was driving at. Conversations took place in Washington between Mr. Hughes and M. Jusserand, the French Ambassador, and meanwhile the British Government again marked time. The upshot, as one might have expected, was that the American Government was driven to the conclusion that the French conditions were calculated to reduce the proposed investigation to a farce, and the conversations were abruptly broken off. The British Government then found itself faced with the following two alternatives in policy:—

- (1) To inform Washington, Brussels, and Rome that it was prepared and even anxious to hold the expert inquiry, and that if such an inquiry could not be arranged with French concurrence, then it could and should be arranged without French concurrence. (The American reservation could be argued to invite such a suggestion.)
- (2) To urge the three Governments to hold the inquiry on the French conditions.

The choice had not been decided when Mr. Baldwin plunged for a general election. There was, however, ground for knowing that the Cabinet was sharply divided on the point. On one side it was argued that the adoption of the first alternative would involve the instant and formal rupture with France, which had for so long been on the horizon. The argument against the course, as used by what may be called for short the "Tyrrellite" section of the Cabinet, was that to break with France would affect not only Western Europe, but Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and the Near East generally. The sort of pre-war and pre-Entente relationship such as was illustrated by the Fashoda incident might conceivably, it was argued, be as disturbing an obstruction to the restoration of peace and business as the existing relationship. It was pointed out that the Tangier Conference was at the moment sitting in Paris, having been at last convened after prolonged and hitherto unsuccessful attempts to convene it, and that it was highly desirable not to jeopardise its belated work. On the other side it was argued that French obstinacy and unreason were at the moment jeopardising the new resolve on the part of America to help in a European settlement, and Anglo-American co-operation was an event which weighed more heavily in the balance than any other single factor in world-politics to-day. It was a critical choice that the Government was called on to make, and delay might cause irreparable damage; but the Government scuttled into an election. On the eve of leaving London for South Africa, General Smuts issued a strong and statesmanlike appeal that this important matter should not be

allowed to slide (*Times*, November 15th). At the time of writing it remained to be seen whether the Government would be influenced by that appeal, although there seemed little enough hope.

PHILIPPE MILLET.

On October 23rd Philippe Millet died, and Europe lost one of the few forces which were working effectively for peace and reconciliation. His loss will be felt in London as much as in Paris, in some ways more than in Paris. No Frenchman understands England and English ideas as did Millet, and no Frenchman has his will or his power to influence French feeling in the way he influenced it. One had learnt to respect the sincerity of his search after the truth, the courage with which he criticised the more emotionally Nationalist tendencies of his countrymen, and the conspicuous honesty with which he subordinated a perfect patriotism to the bigger idea of European peace. His opinion counted in the Quai d'Orsay. At more than one acute crisis between France and Britain I have known Millet's influence to count on both sides.

Himself the son of a distinguished French diplomatist, he started his journalistic career with inside connections which have been made closer by the intrinsic quality of his political work. His short but brilliant career has been dominated by the belief that for France and Britain to replace their war-comradeship by mutual recrimination in victory is not only a vulgar, but a stupid spectacle. Only Millet could have written in France the articles which he wrote in the *Petit Parisien*, or *L'Europe Nouvelle*, appealing for reflection on the part of the French Government. His faith in the Franco-British Entente was helped in its growth, first, by his war experiences, and after by a unique experience of English life. A French master at Harrow, a correspondent of the *Temps* in London, a liaison officer between the French and British forces, a cousin of Mr. Hilaire Belloc, a personal friend of many English people, he came to know and to sympathise with English ideas and English people. He spoke and wrote perfect English, and was a witty critic of English idiosyncrasies.

In my experience of him I knew of only one exception to his understanding of Anglo-Saxon ideas, namely, British finance. No Frenchman understands money. The nearest Millet got to it was when a few months ago he wrote an article in the *Petit Parisien* urging the French Government to pay its debt to Britain, not only as a matter of national dignity, but of business. He never reverted to the subject, perhaps because he realised that English views about debts were too specialised for French understanding. Millet himself believed in December, 1922, that France could simply march into the Ruhr and seize wealth.

A fortnight before his death he visited Berlin. On his return he wrote an article, published in *L'Europe Nouvelle* of October 20th, making a powerful appeal to M. Poincaré to restart negotiations with Germany, and warning him that if France failed now to take a reasonable line, the critics who imputed other motives than that of Reparations to French policy would be justified. That Millet's work should have been cut short is a serious thing for Europe.

THE FANTASTIC CARNIVAL.

While the negotiations were in progress for an expert international investigation into Germany's resources, the climax of French policy was reached in the tragic farce of a Rhineland Republic, "the fantastic carnival of the Separatists," as Dr. Stresemann called it. In the last week of October French bayonets at last succeeded in prodding the spurious champions of separatism into action; but, as might have been expected, it was not an easy thing to set up this Rhineland Republic; nor had the Quai d'Orsay calculated what results such a Republic, if set up, would produce. On Sunday morning, October 21st, the public buildings of Aix-la-Chapelle, which is in the Belgian zone, were seized by the pseudo-Separatists; whereupon Paris and even Brussels affected to open their eyes in wonder. When on the following day Mainz, Crefeld, Coblenz, and some nine other towns were similarly seized, Paris shrugged her shoulders and declared that what must be, must be. Twenty-four hours later the mask was torn off. Not only did it become known that the Belgian troops had been carefully kept in barracks at the crucial moment of the "coup," and all steps had been taken to ensure a walk-over for the "Separatists," but the starved and oppressed population mustered strength to give the lie to this dishonest attempt to proclaim independence in their name. The "Separatists" were roughly handled. The Belgian authorities thereupon called up reinforcements to impose peace, but they tried to round up, not the "Separatist" disturbers of the peace, but the forces of law and order. The chief of the German police was arrested. It was not surprising that within a few days that topsy-turvy proceeding had to be reversed and before order could be restored the native police had to be given their sway.

When one recalled the consistent propaganda which had been conducted in the French Press for many months in favour of a "liberated" Rhineland, it was hard to take seriously the affectation of disinterested surprise which greeted the ultimate performance. It was harder to understand the complete lack of appreciation shown, both in the Quai d'Orsay's policy and in the French Press comment, of the connection between the Rhineland Republic and the Treaty of Versailles. The *Temps*, for instance, asked why

Great Britain objected to the formation of a separate State in the Rhinelands, and yet had never shown any opposition to Bavarian separatism? To all but French minds the question answered itself. In Bavaria there had never been any question of setting up an independent State, but only of Bavaria's assuming the lead in the Reich. There has never been any suggestion that Bavaria would secede from the Reich or cease to honour Germany's obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. By contrast the separate Rhineland Republic would not be a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, and French unofficial instrumentality in bringing it into being would merely have the effect of releasing an important section of the German people from their Treaty obligations.

Another point which apparently escaped the Quai d'Orsay was that under the Treaty (Article 428) it is provided that "as a guarantee of the execution of the present Treaty by Germany the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty." If the Rhineland were separated from the Reich, what authority would the Allies have for continuing the occupation?

So far as Reparations were concerned a separate Rhineland Republic threatened endless difficulties—which again were lost on the Quai d'Orsay. In the case of the territories detached from Turkey the succession States had a proportion of Turkey's liability allotted to them by treaty. In the case of the Rhinelands their detachment from Germany would necessarily be unaccompanied by any compensating Reparations liability. The British Government made it known that it would have objected, on the grounds indicated, to the establishment of a separate Rhineland Republic, even if it resulted from the wish of the population concerned—which was manifestly not the case. Lord Crewe made representations in this sense to M. Poincaré on November 14th. From the French point of view, and on the assumption that France wants reparations, the attempt to detach the Rhinelands from Germany was an amazing piece of folly.

At the moment when the election preparations began and thereby put British diplomacy out of action, a new crisis threatened between Germany and France owing to certain reactionary developments in Germany and a correspondingly increased appetite for sanctions in France. One danger was that in case of disturbances the French were already hinting that they would want to pour troops through Cologne. That would present a delicate problem to the British Government. It had been raised in a somewhat analogous form in the early days of the French occupation of the Ruhr, when a compromise was reached between

the French demand for the use of the Cologne railways and the British insistence on neutrality. The compromise was that the French authorities were given a rationed use of the train services through Cologne.

No sooner had electioneering started in Great Britain than French diplomacy began to force the pace. Several meetings of the Ambassadors' Conference were held in Paris to consider (1) Germany's attitude towards an Allied request for the resumption of Allied military control, (2) the escape of the ex-Crown Prince from Holland and other Monarchist tendencies in Germany. The main object of the British Ambassador was to gain time, prevent any precipitate action by France, and thus to leave it for the new Government in London to take whatever decision might be called for. The Dutch Government undertook no responsibility towards the Allies when the ex-Crown Prince took refuge in Holland five years ago, his case being different from that of the ex-Kaiser. Article 227 of the treaty declares that "the Allied and associated Powers publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." By virtue of this article the Allies, on January 16th, 1920, sent a Note, signed by M. Clemenceau, to the Dutch Government, demanding the surrender of the ex-Kaiser for trial. The Dutch Government refused on the ground that the ex-Kaiser was a political fugitive, and as such entitled to asylum, but in answer to insistent Allied demands it did give some vague assurance of Dutch responsibility for the ex-Kaiser's safe-keeping. A further Note from the Allies, signed this time by Mr. Lloyd George, recorded the fact that the Dutch Government had undertaken such responsibility, and in November, 1920, Mr. Bonar Law, in the House of Commons, stated that "the undertakings given by the Dutch Government would preclude their allowing the ex-Emperor to leave Holland." Those undertakings did not apply to the ex-Crown Prince.

It was a more difficult thing for Lord Crewe to gain time in the matter of Allied military control in Germany. The French were openly demanding more sanctions, and were stiffening in the Ruhr. In his Sunday speech of November 18th, M. Poincaré declared that "we are resolved not to evacuate the territories occupied in virtue of the treaty before all the clauses signed at Versailles are completely executed and until we are solidly assured against new possibilities of aggression." It is true that a semi-official statement was issued that same evening in Paris explaining that M. Poincaré's phrase did not lay down, as would appear at first sight, any new condition on the part of the French Government; that in other words M. Poincaré did not refer to the Ruhr, but to the territories

occupied "in virtue of the treaty." If French logic could be taken seriously, that semi-official explanation might be construed as implying that the occupation of the Ruhr was not "in virtue of the treaty," and that much of the former propaganda emanating from Paris on this subject thereby fell to the ground. One need not, however, examine these latter-day evolutions of the Quai d'Orsay too closely. On the question of military control in Germany British policy was to oppose the application of any new penalty on Germany for the non-fulfilment of demands which Germany could not reasonably be expected to fulfil. An indication of the seriousness of affairs in Germany at this stage was given by the advice of the British Embassy in Berlin to British women workers in the official service to prepare to return home as a precautionary measure in the likely case of serious rioting.

PRESIDENT MASARYK'S VISIT.

President Masaryk paid state visits to Paris and to London in the second and third weeks in October, which had a wholly salutary effect on Europe as a whole and which are worth examining in some detail. A certain interest attached in the first place to the way in which the visits were arranged. When Marshal Foch visited Prague some months ago it was suggested to President Masaryk that he should pay a state visit to Paris at an early date in the interests of Franco-Czechoslovak friendship. A delay took place in making the arrangements for the visit because President Masaryk wanted to take the occasion also to visit London. He regarded this point as so important that the French arrangements had to be postponed until the English arrangements could be made at the same time. It was made clear in Czechoslovak quarters that while Czechoslovak policy aimed at a continued understanding with France, it equally aimed at a complete understanding with Britain. The most lavish preparations were made throughout France for an impressive welcome to President Masaryk, the Minister of Education having arranged that on his arrival the work of every school throughout France should be suspended and the pupils should stand and sing the Czechoslovak National Anthem. The glowing reports of the French Press were cabled to Prague, where they were duly reproduced.

In spite of this stage management an important difference between the Paris and London visits was made clear to Czechoslovak opinion and caused the liveliest satisfaction both to the British Government and to British opinion. Just before President Masaryk crossed to England, the English Press had published reports emanating from their Paris correspondents, to the effect that when they were in Paris President Masaryk and Dr. Benesh

had concluded with the French Government a new military alliance. Those of us who had been in close touch with French policy and feelings knew that such an alliance was urgently wanted by the Quai d'Orsay. It came as a relief, but not as a surprise, in London to find out that there was no foundation for the statements which had been published in the French Press and reproduced in the English Press. By contrast the British Government had only one request to make to the distinguished Czechoslovak statesmen, namely, that Czechoslovakia should persist in the pacific and progressive policy which we have all learnt to associate with Prague, and which has already proved to have been of inestimable value in Central Europe. All that Great Britain asks is that Czechoslovakian influence shall continue to consolidate peace and economic recovery in Central Europe, which is all the more necessary because of the increasing disintegration in the West of Europe.

PRESIDENT MASARYK'S CAREER.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk is one of the most remarkable personalities of our time. Born on March 7th, 1850, the son of a coachman who made him a locksmith's apprentice, he has lived to achieve distinction as a university professor, a political and moral philosopher, a Member of Parliament, a party leader, a revolutionary leader, the creator of a new State and its first President.

He is acknowledged by students of Russian affairs to be one of the classic authorities on Russia. His two-volumed *The Spirit of Russia*, published first in Germany and translated into English at the end of the war, provides almost inexhaustible material for students. The chief characteristic of Masaryk's thought is its compression and intensity, which make severe demands upon the reader, but abundantly repay them. To understand the moral force which always underlies President Masaryk's political work one has to remember the national background in which he was born and trained. The political awakening of the Czech people dates from the French Revolution of 1848. President Masaryk has lived long enough to remember the failure of the movement started by the historian Palacky in the middle of last century which aimed at the reform of Austria into a federation of equal nations, one of which would be Czech. Palacky himself had to confess that Austria was incapable of such an evolution, and he reverted in his later years to an advocacy of complete separation. President Masaryk is the man who now at last has carried this object through.

When the Germans defeated the French in 1871 the Nationalist

movement among the Czechs was put back, as it has proved, for half a century, and in the meantime the Czech leaders, including Dr. Masaryk, have had to work under a constitution which they repudiated and under an alien and oppressive governing clique. Both Palacky and Masaryk had learnt by their experience that Czech progress and Czech victories had been achieved by moral factors; hence Dr. Masaryk's famous ideal for the Czech nation—"What is needed is an inner renovation without which there is no meaning in political liberty. What is needed is an active love for one's neighbour, without which there is no true patriotism. What is needed is to love, to seek and to defend the truth. What is needed is to establish public life upon the basis of morality and truth." Similarly, when he was in London in the latter half of the Great War, Dr. Masaryk, as he himself explained, acted on the principle that "justice is not only noble but also prudent and expedient." The principles on which the Habsburg Monarchy was based were the negation of the principles expressed by Dr. Masaryk. During the war, therefore, he spent his energies in exposing that degenerate dynasty, its senseless imperialism, and its crude militarism. He summed up this crusade in his propagandist masterpiece, *The New Europe*, a book which he wrote as he travelled round the world during the war, and which was published in London. The Czechoslovak National Council had to work entirely abroad during the war, for the censorship imposed upon the Czechs by the Austrian military authorities amounted to persecution. Not only were the newspapers gagged or suspended so far as they showed Radical tendencies, but only Austrian official news ever saw the light in the Czech Press. Even scientific and literary works were censored and mutilated. One example will show the meticulous care with which the censorship was carried out. In a memoir of an Anglophil Czech there appeared the sentence: "He strove to emancipate Czech literature from German and French influence." The words "German and" were struck out before publication.

President Masaryk and Dr. Benesh did most of their war-work in England, Switzerland, and America. It is an example of Czech thoroughness that President Masaryk travelled completely round the world, made special visits to Holland, Germany, Austria, and Italy, as well as the countries already mentioned. In 1915 he founded two newspapers, *La Nation Tchèque* (Paris), and the *Ceskoslovenska Samostatnost*, the latter being a Czech paper for Czechs abroad. He also helped to found *The New Europe*, the well-known English review of foreign affairs, edited by Dr. Seton-Watson; and became a lecturer under Dr. Ronald Burrows, at King's College, London.

The Czechoslovak Republic was founded on October 28th, 1918. It has established itself as the solidest political factor in Central Europe, has kept its exchange steady, and its Budget balanced during the five critical years that have since passed, surrounded as it has been on all sides by unrest and even chaos. Such a record is the best tribute to the statesmanship of President Masaryk and his colleagues.

AMERICA AND THE THREE-MILE LIMIT.

At the end of the Imperial Conference a solution was in sight of the difficulties which had arisen between the American and British Governments as a result of the conflict of the Volstead Prohibition Act with the principle of the three-mile limit. The full details of the controversy were published here in the August number (pp. 242-251). The Imperial Conference appointed a Commission which was presided over by Lord Curzon and participated in by all the heads of the Dominion delegations. They drew up a recommendation which followed the lines of the recommendations of the Government Commission which had been sitting since the summer. Briefly, the suggestion is that the three-mile limit should be extended, perhaps to a twelve-mile limit, perhaps to some smaller limit, so far as American territorial waters are concerned and for the special purpose of allowing the American Customs' officials to search or seize vessels suspected of attempting to smuggle liquor into the United States. In return, America, under this compromise, would allow incoming vessels to enter and leave American ports with sealed liquor for the return journey. It would be understood that the principle of the three-mile limit, to which the British Government attaches great importance, would in no way be compromised, the contemplated modification of it being a strictly *ad hoc* measure. At the moment of writing a treaty was being drawn up on the above lines, special care being taken to draft it so as to obviate any constitutional obstacle in the United States—a wise precaution in view of the unfortunate experience of the 1919 treaties.

The precaution was further suggested by certain latter-day propaganda on the part of the extreme Prohibitionists in the United States who had used the "Heads I win, tails you lose" argument that the suggested compromise might be accepted, but that the American Supreme Court should make it impossible for America to carry out her part of the bargain. What the Prohibitionists relied on was the ruling of the Supreme Court, given on April 30th with one dissident, interpreting the Volstead Prohibition Act as forbidding the carriage of liquor, either foreign or domestic, within the territorial waters of the United States. Effect had been given at once to that ruling by a series of regulations. At the time of

writing, it was hoped on the part of both the American and the British Governments, that the draft treaty could be so worded as to obviate any constitutional difficulty in the United States.

THE JANINA REPORT.

It is not surprising that the report of the Janina Commission on the murders of August 27th has been suppressed by the Ambassadors' Conference (*see* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, November, pp. 656-660), nor that the Greek Government has been refused a copy. The deadened moral sense produced by the diplomatic atrocities of our time, coupled with the diversion of a general election, may enable Mr. Baldwin's Government to escape the obligation of explaining the part it played in so dishonourable an episode. No honest public man in London will, however, rest content until Mr. Baldwin or his successor has published the Janina report. This hole-and-corner business is thoroughly un-English.

The late House of Commons contained too few members with enough keenness or courage or interest in affairs to cause the Government any qualms about a matter of this kind. On November 15th, the day before the prorogation, two or three members put questions to the Prime Minister in the sense indicated here last month. It was then suggested that Parliament should demand the publication of the Janina Report and the explanation of Lord Crewe's action of September 26th. In answer to the first demand, the Prime Minister had the assurance to say: "It is not considered in the public interest to publish the report, and His Majesty's Government could not in any case do so without the consent of the other Governments concerned." When he was further asked if the finding of the Ambassadors' Conference had the approval of the British Government, Mr. Baldwin made the almost frivolous answer, "I think it had, but I should like notice of that." There is something deplorable in a Prime Minister who thus advertises his indifference to a matter of national honour, and in a House of Commons which meekly acquiesces in his evasions. It is hard to believe either that the honour of British diplomacy, or the delegated responsibility of the British people, will allow themselves to accept the stigma which at present attaches to them as a result of the Janina-Corfu incident, without some attempt to mitigate it by at any rate insisting that the official facts be published.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.*

IT is not easy in a brief notice to suggest the scope, and it is impossible to criticise in any real sense Dr. Rice Holmes's monumental work on the late Roman Republic. The backs of the volumes suggest that Dr. Holmes had performed in literary fashion what all historians had hoped that Dr. E. C. Clark would have lived to write in his unique manner—a history of the Roman Republic down to the date when, according to Mommsen, the primitive regal office was re-established in the new office of Imperator. But in fact Dr. Holmes has not attempted to reconstruct, in the light of the discoveries of over sixty years, the story of early republican Rome that Dr. Mommsen issued in 1861. That task remains to be performed by some one who can edit and enlarge Dr. Clark's collection of material. Dr. Holmes's task, laborious enough, was to complete, as every poet or maker should, his trilogy. Caius Cæsar is his hero. In order to exhibit that great man in Gaul, Dr. Holmes has given the world a volume on the conquest of Gaul that is a classic. In order to show the Cæsar who came, saw, and agilely retired from Britain, he has given the world a volume on Ancient Britain that reveals our pre-history, the prolegomenon of our island story, in a fashion that shows what offspring the marriage of minute learning and polished prose can produce. But, after all, Gaul and Britain are but manifestations of Cæsar's genius. To picture him clearing the foundations of an

* *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire.* By T. Rice Holmes. Three volumes. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.) 63s. net.

ancient State and laying the basis of an immortal Empire is the task of tasks, and to this work all Dr. Holmes's former labours were preparatory. Yet it is a disappointment not to have had the earlier history of Rome from his pen; not to have that acute analysis of legendary, customary, epigraphic, and literary material which is still incomplete, and is likely still to seek in masses of monographs and in the revolting details of petty and endless controversy.

We have an introductory chapter which flashes a light over the dim origins of the regal and early republican periods, and shows us something of those disputable times. Dr. Holmes derives, without hesitation, the Etruscans from the East, adopting the fancies of Bachofen and the possibly sounder methods of modern archæology. Yet the conclusion is by no means certain, and the matrilinear tendencies of that remarkable race, so Aryan in its characteristics, are no more evidence of a Semitic origin than the matrilinear habits of good Scottish Celts. But these early days are not Dr. Holmes's goal, and he even declines to discuss the origin of the plebeians, though he indicates Professor Eric's suggestion that they were a neolithic residue. That the plebeians were of as early as or of an earlier date than the patricians all agree, and Dr. Clark's suggestion that they were one of the first immigrant tribes of a slightly inferior ethnic character seems confirmed by the parallel case of the Goidelic and Brythonic waves in Wales. The fact is not unimportant in view of the part played by the plebeians in securing a Republican constitution.

Dr. Holmes's constructive method is well known. Though his text is plentifully illustrated by footnote authorities, he adopts the further and admirable precaution of discussing in monographs, forming a second part of each volume, the outstanding problems that have aroused the ardour and often the human passions of British and Continental specialists. Those who recall the first two parts of the trilogy completed by these volumes will remember those elaborate surveys of vexed questions, the judicial balancing of evidence, the slaying of those who pursue attractive will-o'-the-wisps of scholarship. Dr. Holmes's survey of the ethnology of Ancient Britain is definitive, and the only wonder is that the author has so long survived its publication, since many social anthropologists are men of blood.

In these volumes Dr. Holmes has pursued the same bold course. He records with something approaching a smile the German treatment of the sources on which our authorities for this period drew. He approaches with immense thoroughness the public laws of Rome during the half century preceding the law regulating elections in 81 B.C., which limited the legislative power of the tribunes. He

discusses with force the *Lex Thoria*, which raises the vexed question of the meaning of the words *Spurius Thorius agrum publicum vitiosa et inutili lege vectigali levavit*. The extraordinary difference of opinion as to the meaning of these words is an instance of the difficulty of writing a history of Roman public law. Dr. Holmes, Mommsen, and Dr. Hardy assume that the word *vectigal* means *rent*; Strachan Davidson thinks that it means *rent-charge*. But Dr. Holmes suggests that the sentence means "relieved the public land from rent by an invalid and useless law," and Strachan Davidson largely holds this view, while Mommsen and Dr. Hardy think that it means "By imposing a rent relieved the public land of an invalid and useless law." The point is important in the vexed history of the vital agrarian laws, and affects the chronological order of those laws. A simple-minded Roman lawyer might find himself in acute disagreement with all these learned authorities on the ground that *vectigal* never has the meaning of *rent* in public law, but is a tax, and that, therefore, the sentence simply means that *Spurius Thorius*, by the imposition of a tax changed the tenure of the public lands and so rendered obsolete an invalid and useless law under which the State was the nominal landlord. The third agrarian law [? 111 B.C.] thus becomes understandable, for it abolished the tax imposed by *Spurius Thorius*, and so completely freed the land.

The subject of the number of the population at Rome in the last century before our era is another indeterminate problem. The attempt to calculate the numbers from the *modii* of corn imported from Egypt is ingenious, but as indeterminate as if we attempted to calculate the population of London from similar data. Modern statistical methods are more valuable if we assume Mommsen's statement that there were at least 320,000 adult males in Rome in the time of Augustus. Our census authorities would work out the problem in a moment. There are probably at any moment in modern society a population of four times the adult males, and in a society such as Rome, where every adult male was in some form of matrimonial union at an early age, the average family probably exceeded two adults and three children, and this would give a population of men women and children of about a million and a half. It is impossible to accept Beloch's figures as to the proportion of women to men. In a warlike population the number of women always exceeds the number of men. The average birth-rate of the two sexes is, on the whole, everywhere equal, but male babies are harder to rear than female, and the drain of war falls exclusively on the males. So there is a good deal to be said for the proposition that the population of Rome at the end of the Republic considerably exceeded a million and may have been a

million and a half. It is not possible here to pursue the numerous monographs on vexed questions that adorn this work, but it is, for the present purpose, enough to say that they are always models of judicial and acute marshalling and balancing of evidence. The text itself, based on the judgments set out at length in the many excursions to which we have referred, is as delightful to read as perhaps history can be made. Most readers will turn at once to the tragic ending, to the murder of Cæsar, the emergence of Antony, and the efforts of that narrow-minded politician Cicero to resuscitate the dead and corrupt body of the Republic. Cæsar and the Republic died together and the work of each was carried on, after a world-shaking interlude, by a man even greater than Cæsar, and by an Empire that never wholly forgot that it was a Republic. Yet it was Caius Cæsar who made it all possible, who saved not only Rome, but civilisation. Had there been no Cæsar there would have been no Western civilisation.

It is true that great men foreran him. Sulla was almost as great as Cæsar. It was he who destroyed a republic ripe for destruction, and created in its place a tyrannic State based upon the principles of law and order. His was a dominant mind, and he, even better than Cæsar, knew how to make men love him: "No friend has ever served, no enemy has ever wronged me whom I have not repaid in full." The enemies of Rome called forth for Rome great men: Hannibal annealed the Roman State; Mithradates, the indomitable, found in Pompey one who made Rome the European bulwark for centuries against the Asian hordes and Oriental instability. Sulla, Pompey, Cæsar: these three; but the greatest of these is Cæsar. The lesser men fall out of fame before his very presence. His campaigns in Europe stood out against the amazing failure of Crassus in Asia. A superb leader of men, he was not less superb as a conqueror. The great Asian conquerors have always waded through slaughter to an unstable pre-eminence. Some of them were perhaps as great commanders as Cæsar, but victory only begins when the defeated lay down their arms. Cæsar knew that "conquest can never be complete until coercion has been followed by conciliation." That was Cæsar's great discovery. Napoleon knew of it and strove to apply it. Our age knows it, but does not seek to use it. Cæsar—and that republican history which in its greater traditional elements was concentrated in his person—perhaps stands out at his greatest in the days that follow his death. He was dead, and the poverty of the world becomes immediately apparent. His murderers, the *illuminati*, the intellectuals, of Rome, suddenly become little helpless men, mere tribal creatures of the baser sort with their artificial humanism, their painted loin-cloths, stripped off them. Cicero, the humanist, the

"mirror of his age," becomes a baffled criminal, a tribal blood-feud man; Brutus a medicine-man tricked out with false heroics; Cassius a servile traitor, as he always was at heart. The littleness of them all is what amazes the mind. Antony swept them away with a twist of his wrist, and Antony himself was not great in the Cæsarian sense. But Cæsar had provided against all emergencies when he adopted Octavius. The scene of world-wide disorder, painted with such amazing truth in *Antony and Cleopatra* by Shakespeare, did not quench the spirit or the work of Cæsar, and at last there arose from the waves of the troubled human sea a form like unto the Virgilian Neptune, and the work of the Founder of the Roman Empire and the refounder of the Roman Republic achieved its purpose in the spacious quietude of the Augustan Dawn.

J. E. G. DE M.

REVIEWS.

MR. ASQUITH ON THE GREAT WAR.*

Mr. Asquith is the fourth member of the Liberal Cabinets of 1906 and 1908 to take the world into his confidence and to make his contribution to the tangled story of the origins of the Great War. Lord Loreburn's book is critical, not autobiographical. Lord Haldane has described his work for the sorely needed reorganisation of the army. Mr. Churchill, in the opening chapters of his first volume, has narrated his labours at the Admiralty during the last three years of peace. And now we have the testimony of their common chief. As might have been expected, he writes with his habitual dignity and self-control, and without the slightest desire to magnify either his personality or his achievement. Mrs. Asquith has spoken of the "incurable modesty" of her husband; and, indeed, nobody who played a leading part in the colossal drama is less tempted to pose and posture before posterity or to strut about the stage on stilts. He tells a plain story in a businesslike way, without rhetoric, invective, or purple patches.

Mr. Asquith and his colleagues have been the target of criticism from various quarters, as is inevitable in the case of men who held power for so many years, and at a time of crowding and tragic events. The silly legend that Liberal Ministers could not be safely entrusted with National Defence had never any foundation, and the careful narrative presented in these pages should convince

* *The Genesis of the War.* By the Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith, M.P. (Cassell & Co., 1923.) 25s.

every reader that the change of Government in 1905 made no difference in the watchful care for the safety of the Empire. The Committee of Imperial Defence, which Mr. Balfour had founded, was retained and developed. The Expeditionary Force was equipped for any task which might be suddenly entrusted to it, the Volunteer movement was widened into Territorials, and a General Staff was created. After Campbell-Bannerman and his successor had repeatedly though vainly invited Germany, by deed no less than word, to abate the ruinous competition in capital ships, an ample margin of superiority was maintained. The most valuable part of the volume is that which describes, with the aid of new material, the manifold preparations for a danger which was never left out of account. Compulsory service might have been introduced by an omnipotent autocrat; but it was politically impossible, and it would have thrown the military machinery into confusion during an anxious period when instant readiness for war was essential. The Colonial Premiers were, for the first time, initiated into the *arcana imperii*, military, naval, and diplomatic, and a War-book, containing instructions for the different departments of State, was compiled and kept continuously up to date.

If Mr. Asquith has no difficulty in rebutting the charge brought by some of his political opponents of neglecting the national defences, he is equally successful in repelling the accusation of some of our enemies that he and his colleagues aimed at the encirclement and hemming in of Germany, and that they planned an attack at some future date on a commercial competitor. We have learned from Hammann and Eckardstein that during the Boer War Great Britain offered Germany an alliance, and Chamberlain bluntly added that, if Berlin declined our outstretched hand, we should make up our quarrels with France and Russia. The offer was declined and the forecast was fulfilled. The authors of the isolation of Germany were not King Edward and Sir Edward Grey, but the Kaiser and Bülow, Holstein and Tirpitz, who antagonised Russia and Great Britain simultaneously, and paved the way for the Triple Entente. But though no one who has studied our policy since the Boer War, or who has personal knowledge of the statesmen who directed its course, can discover the slightest desire for war with Germany or anybody else, there is no such unanimity as to certain decisions taken by our rulers in working it out. Mr. Asquith, like the authors of every apologia which issues from the Press, finds nothing to regret in the diplomacy of his Government. He even defends the Mansion House speech of 1911, and explains that there was nothing provocative about the words of Mr. Lloyd George. However innocent their intention, they proved just as provocative to Germans as the

Kaiser's Tangier declaration of 1905 proved to ourselves. On both occasions a Great Power in shrill tones cried out that it must not be treated as of no account, and on both occasions a serious error in judgment was committed.

When Mr. Asquith passes from his narrative of the steps taken by himself and his colleagues and embarks on the open sea of Continental diplomacy, he sometimes gets out of his depth. The exacting duties of public life have left him no time to familiarise himself with the mass of important material published in different parts of Europe in recent years, without a knowledge of which it is impossible to understand the whole complex of events and policies, ambitions and intrigues, which led Europe to its doom. The treatment of the Morocco question, for instance, shows him to be unaware of the reasons for Germany's protests against French policy. Nor does he realise the decisive part played in the causation of the war by Serbia's determination to imitate Piedmont, and by Russia's encouragement to find her "promised land" in the southern provinces of the Hapsburg Empire. Again, in the discussion of the Bosnian crisis, all his wrath is concentrated on Aehrenthal, and the reader is only informed in a footnote of Izvolsky's complicity. As a matter of fact, the Russian Minister not only approved the annexation in advance, but carried on negotiations for months behind the back of France and Great Britain. Any sketch of the Bosnian crisis written without reference to the facts and documents revealed in the second volume of Friedjung's *Zeitalter des Imperialismus* is incomplete and misleading. In like manner, the discussion of the outbreak of war in 1914 is vitiated by the failure to master the new material. Yet it is proverbially difficult for a prominent actor in a great crisis to be wholly fair to his opponents and reasonably critical of his friends; and future historians will long continue to study and to value works written in good faith and with inside knowledge by such able and high-minded statesmen as Mr. Asquith and Bethmann-Hollweg.

G. P. G.

* * *

THE PAGEANT OF GREECE. *

Mr. Livingstone has rendered real service to the cause of education by the publication of this book, *The Pageant of Greece*. The author unrolls before his readers specimens in translation of perhaps the noblest literature that the world has known, from the

* *The Pageant of Greece*. Edited by R. W. Livingstone. (Oxford: Clarendon Press.) 6s. 6d. net.

ninth century B.C. to the sixth century A.D. This period includes the greatest Greek writers from Homer to the Epigrammatists: that wonderful procession of genius from which has sprung the civilisation that encompasses us. Mr. Livingstone realises how essential it is that every educated person should acquire some knowledge of the debt that is owed to the ancient Greeks and be able to form some idea of what they achieved, of the legacy that they left to succeeding generations. It is only by knowledge of the legacy and assimilation of its wealth that we can become worthy successors of that superb civilisation. For many of us this inherited wealth is wrapped in the napkin of ignorance, producing no interest. It is this that has induced Mr. Livingstone to bring out his book, which shows that even in translation, and divorced from the beauty of the original language, Greek literature may provoke a thirst that can only be slaked by wider study.

This grand procession of literary genius which the author marshals before us is a living people, not the dry bones of a past civilisation rehabilitated, but clad *cap-à-pie* in their habit as they lived, fighting their battles and their passions as men should fight. It is a goodly pageant, heralded by the great Homer, of whom Milton writes: "Homer, whose poem Phœbus challenged for his own." Then follow the masters of lyric poetry, with whom Sappho takes her place. Her symbolism is Eastern—Tagore must feel akin with her. The following translation in prose gives some idea of her imagery. She is writing of a friend who has left Mitylene for Sardis:—

"Now she shines among the women of Lydia, as the rosy-fingered moon, when the sun sets, shines brighter than all the stars. The light falls on the salt sea and on the fields deep in flowers. The dew descends in beauty, and the roses are in bloom and the clover and flowering grasses. Arignota wanders up and down and thinks of gentle Atthis, and her thoughts are heavy with longing, and her heart with distress. She calls aloud for us to come to her, but night with the thousand eyes does not carry the words across the sea, and we cannot hear."

Tragedy, Comedy, History, Philosophy, Oratory, and Science are all represented, and as the student who has little Latin and less Greek reads these translations which Mr. Livingstone has so well chosen and edited, he must be struck with the modernness of it, much of which might have been written to-day when the nations are reaping the aftermath of a great war. This does not apply to one theme only; all share this quality. Even Thucydides' views on democracy still perhaps hold their own. "I have remarked again and again that democracy cannot manage an empire." The democracy of Greece was a handful of middle-class freemen. That of to-day is vast in numbers and should be one day better educated,

since education is perhaps the chief care of empire. Is an empire a colossus that can only be directed and controlled by supermen, and can democracy breed such men?

It is difficult to lay aside this fascinating book. As the author passes in review each representative of the Greek genius, the student sees and becomes aware of the influence that they exert, and will continue to exert, on all modes of thought, whether in literature, science or art. It is like a pebble cast into the pond of Time. Ever-widening circles are reaching out to all nations, and doubtless to civilisations yet to come. Time cannot change nor "custom stale its infinite variety." The Greeks were ever seeking after truth. The form of the Grecian Urn declares:—

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

S. DE M.

* * *

FATHER BERNARD VAUGHAN.*

It would be difficult to find a more admirable biography than that of Father Bernard Vaughan by Father Martindale. It is short, it has not a word too much or too little, it is not clogged with tiresome letters, it is absolutely judicial and just, and the biographer, with extreme ingenuity, by becoming the devil's advocate against the subject of the memoir, clears him from the onus of abuse that he invited, and yet, in the highest court of morals, did not deserve. Father Martindale realised from personal knowledge, from current social history, and from the appalling mass of sermon notes and other material which he had to deal with, that he had a difficult theme. The best of a difficult theme is that it gives opportunities for victory over the material and for the presentation of a living portrait. Now Father Bernard Vaughan was, on the one hand, the *enfant terrible* of the Order of Jesus, and, indeed, of the Roman Catholics in England. On the other hand, he possessed not only a sensitive and essentially good, "immensely" good, personality (as Father Martindale would say), but great capacity for self-expression. A noble figure of a man, he had the capacity for winning both souls and audiences. He attracted the goats as well as the sheep with his wild and passionate utterances, his biting epigrams, his delightful humour and repartee, his robust Christianity, his charming manners, his hard head, and his soft heart. He did not mind what he said or where he said it, but he did it all in the grand manner, whether he was attacking an Anglican Bishop or a Protestant *grande dame*,

* *Bernard Vaughan, S.J.* By C. C. Martindale, S.J. With Illustrations. (Longmans.) 7s. 6d. net.

or a butterfly of society or a Nonconformist minister or the German members of the Order of Jesus or a British *queue* of workers blocking wounded soldiers out of an omnibus. His sermons did not appeal to the learned clergy of the Church of Rome. The attractive and spacious manner tended to become standardised, and one priest called it "the usual stuff." His manner was rather like that of David the painter. He laid the colours on with a ruthless hand, and his canvases would have adorned Piccadilly Circus.

Yet behind all this apparent recklessness of talk and behaviour was a hard mind that had definitely chosen a method of policy for the salvation of society, and incidentally for the "reconversion" of England to its long-lost Roman allegiance. People, and not only Roman Catholics, were inclined to cry "Charlatan" and worse things, but this amazing figure of a man had clearly no personal axe to grind, no ambitions to serve, not even the ambition to be regarded as the Savonarola *de nos jours*. He was a comet that came into our British ken, a comet that made naughty and half-naughty people and myriads of poor sad people see how much nobler and happier light is than darkness, a comet that then slid away into the realms of light. He was as much beloved of those whom he obstinately regarded as heretics as by the faithful of his own Communion, and perhaps most beloved because he had the courage and defects of his qualities. The hard North of England loved him, the poor, whom he personally served, adored him, and he probably, in his outrageous but deliberate way, did more for the revival of Roman Catholicism in England than Wiseman, Newman, and Manning rolled into one.

Father Bernard Vaughan was what English people like. If he was outrageous, he was sincere with all the sincerity of a boy. He was an aristocrat and a member of one of the ancient families that maintain the continuity of the Roman allegiance, and his passion for "reconverting" England was both traditional and personal. He believed that England was not Anglican at all: it had lost or was fast losing all Christian faith despite the desperate efforts of the Protestant bodies. He looked at the problem of the Christianisation of England from a point of view not very different from that of General Booth, but he claimed to have something better to offer: the tradition of a divinely appointed Church. In one sense he applied to this conversion of a people whom he believed had forgotten God the methods of evangelisation that were used in his Church before and after the days of the Reformation, and by Protestant reformers from Wiclif to General Booth. Born on September 20th, 1847, almost in the year of

Revolutions, he made up his mind very young to become a priest, and this book records a life that from beginning to end was burning with faith to the very last day, the vigil of All Saints' Day, 1922. He was at the Cape a few months before his death, and the *Cape Argus* draws a wonderful picture of the old man as he stood on a public platform. The writer detected "tremendous rigidity of purpose" in the face. It was that purpose which really dominated a life that had in it no fear, much love, and endless internal spiritual struggles. His was a notable figure, and notably has his biographer revealed it.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE CITY CHURCHES.*

This publication, compiled and issued by the London Society, is a most useful handbook, and gives at a glance the salient points in history, architecture, or both, of each edifice, compiled in alphabetical order. Dr. Philip Norman in an introductory note, brief, but full of information, gives the number of parish churches in 1516, "according to Fabyan, as 113. In the Great Fire 86 were destroyed or badly injured, 51 were rebuilt, 33 were made to serve two parishes, while St. Mary-le-Bow did duty for three. Of the churches that escaped the Great Fire, 21 in number, 8 still remain."

The Tabular List of the surviving City churches begins with All Hallows, Barking, and ends with St. Vedast, Foster Lane, E.C. They are forty-five in number. The list gives services that are held in each church, both for Sundays and week-days, the hours when open for prayer, and for such other purposes as the church is used for, and states if the churchyard is open to the public, and whether the church in question is associated with any City Company or Civic Organisation, and General Remarks as to date, architecture, &c. St. Bartholomew-the-Great, West Smithfield, E.C., is described as follows: "The finest and oldest church in London, England, &c. Norman period of architecture. 800th anniversary kept this year, 1123-1923." In other churches notable baptisms and burials are recorded, as well as anything of interest connected with the church.

The Rector of St. Dunstan's-in-the-East in the concluding pages of this book, endeavours to do away with the misconception regarding the "scandal" of the City Churches. He shows that the average income of the City clergy (including four Suffragan

* *The City Churches, Their Use, Their Preservation, and Their Extended Use.* Containing historical notes by Dr. Philip Norman, F.S.A., a tabular list of the Churches (compiled by the City Rectors), suggestions for their extended use. By the Rev. Arthur G. B. West, Rector of St. Dunstan's in the East. (Fisher Unwin.) 1s.

Bishops) does not exceed £750 per annum, without a house. Most of the Rectory houses having been taken away without the consent of the present clergy, "who must even live where they can," over £100,000 every year passes from the endowments of the City to Church work outside its walls, and huge sums are paid away from Parochial Funds to Education and Philanthropic Institutions. Yet the men who pay this money have no voice in its control, and their interest in the use of City Church Funds is naturally lessened.

Mr. West advocates many practical uses to which City Churches might be put to save them from abolition. Sunday services are not the main feature. The week-day services are well attended by the day workers. He suggests that all but a dozen or fifteen might be closed down on Sunday, thus releasing at least thirty clergy for other work in suburb or slum. The Bishop of London approves of this policy, and it could be extended if found to answer. The Rev. R. J. Campbell, in a letter to the *Times* of November 13th, thinks differently, and says that there is no real problem of the City Churches. If men with the true preaching gift are put into them, the difficulty vanishes, as at St. Edmund's, Lombard Street, or St. Ethelburga's, Bishopsgate, or the City Temple. "Let there be a drastic revision of endowments"—which will release funds for other purposes—"throw upon every preacher's congregation the duty of providing his stipend, and we should not hear much more of the problem of City Churches."

There are, of course, many difficulties to be surmounted in dealing with these Endowment Funds, and in allocating them to other than their original purposes. In suburban districts the closing of a church or diverting its use to other activities is fraught with obstruction on every side. Where there are crypts and family graves, and the right of burial still persists, it is hardly seemly to use the churches for parish halls and entertainments. It is only by thought and discussion that a better and fuller use can be made of these sacred edifices, and thus save them from demolition. There is little doubt but that much can be done to meet the changed condition of to-day, and this pamphlet will help towards that end.

There is a very strong feeling among all interested in the essential dignity of the most famous City of the modern world, a city of spires and steeples, that the superb work of Sir Christopher Wren should not be sacrificed because of the site value of the various churches. The destruction of these sacred and beautiful buildings, which belong to the whole nation, to supply funds for a church that is very rich and ought to endow its clergy properly, has aroused the most bitter comment. The discussion at the recent Church Assembly leaves the future open. A Committee has been appointed to discuss the whole question of the Churches with the

critics, who include the Lord Mayor and the Corporation of the City of London. The proper policy is to refuse consent to the destruction of a single Church. The iconoclasts are narrow-minded, and there is a great duty to posterity. The matter is a national one and not merely sectarian.

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THE BAKITARA*

These two well-produced volumes are part of the material that has become available as to what we may call native Africa since the War. Africa, and especially Central Africa, has still many ethnological secrets to yield, and till these secrets are yielded, the task of the comparative anthropologist can make inadequate progress. In Central Africa, South Eastern Asia, and Southern India, lie the keys to an accurate theory of human evolution. Here is recorded a piece of work that throws much light into dark places, the report of the Mackie Ethnological Expedition. This expedition was undertaken without any European companion during the war by Canon Roscoe. It owed its inception to Sir James Frazer, who had for years been anxious to have certain Central African tribes more carefully investigated. Canon Roscoe, in the first volume, deals fully with the Bakitara tribe, a highly organised pastoral, and to a large extent a nomadic people, who once possessed the country of Kitara, or Banyoro, "the largest and most powerful of all the autocratic kingdoms in the lake region of Central Africa." About a hundred years ago, the land was invaded by an agricultural and progressive race, the Bagonda, and largely occupied. In 1890 the country was reduced and became subject to Great Britain. In the old days the kings of Kitara ruled some two millions of people, but war and migration have vastly reduced the population and the enormous herds formerly possessed by the Bakitara.

This very full investigation into the life and manners of a feudalised pastoral people in the early savage stage is of peculiar importance, as the material may throw a good deal of light on the parallel conditions in Central Europe just after or before the great Aryan dispersal. The facts collected have been secured in most cases first-hand: "the investigation was carried out without the use of an English interpreter, though at times it was necessary to appeal to some native who knew a language common to myself and the person under examination." Many of the customs

* *The Bakitara or Banyoro: the first part of the Report of the Mackie Ethnological Expedition to Central Africa.* By John Roscoe. (Cambridge: at the University Press.) 25s. net; the second part 15s. net.

described survive in use. A great deal of the material as to the elaborate descriptions of Court life, a most amazing life, were supplied by the King of Banyoro himself, who "spent hours of his time in recounting what he remembered of the Court as it was in his father's time." He procured the evidence of men who had the most intimate knowledge of the customs of the country, and arranged a week's pageant of ancient ceremonies which Canon Roscoe photographed. In a word, no more favourable example of detailed research exists, and we are fortunate in having secured a complete account of the daily life of a highly organised pastoral and almost monotheistic people. The details as to religious belief are very valuable.

The information is of peculiar interest since here we see a pastoral totemic people dominating a servile totemic agricultural people. The totemic system defines consanguinity in connection with marriage but also serves many social purposes. There are three groups of totems belonging respectively to the pastoral conquerors, to the agricultural serfs, and to the mixed races. The system of taboos is interesting. The world-wide fear of women is noticeable. If a man sets out to work and meets a woman before a man he has to return home for that day. It is an evil omen. Some of the customs, especially with respect to marriage, are so astounding and unparalleled that from time to time the fear arises that these negroes, who have an acute sense of humour, were playing with the credulity of Canon Roscoe. Such a thing, with the most careful investigator, is possible, and that is the reason why investigators should work in pairs and so check mischievous impostures. The administration of justice centres in the King, who acts personally, but the district chiefs have judicial powers from which, however, everyone has a right of direct appeal to the King. The account of the Court life and the milk-drinking ceremonies is, as we have said, amazing. The official Queen must be a half-sister of the King, a practice that may and perhaps must have come from Egypt. The account of the industries, and especially of the iron-working, is very important for comparative purposes. Not less important is the social life of the people, the complexity of which shows many sources. The clan system will be compared with the Australian and the American material. Altogether the book is one that every student of anthropology will study with absorbed interest.

The second volume deals with the small district and people of Ankole, in the Uganda Protectorate. They are of the same stock as the Bakitara, but are far earlier settlers, and it is important to compare successive waves of the same tribal movement. The investigation was carried out in the same thorough fashion as in the

case of the Bakitara, and Canon Roscoe is to be congratulated on a valuable piece of detailed research work. Other volumes on other tribes are to follow, and students of these volumes will await them with eagerness.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Dr. Corti's "*Leopold I. of Belgium*,"* translated by Mr. Joseph McCabe, is a real contribution to history. It is curious that a man who played so many parts during half a century should have waited so long for a competent biographer. The official life cannot be attempted till the King's own papers are available; but Dr. Corti has had access to a quantity of new material, including 136 letters to the rulers and ministers of the Habsburg Empire, above all to the Archduke John, a younger brother of the Emperor Francis. The book is not only a record of the first King of Belgium, but a study of the extension of the influence of the House of Coburg throughout Europe. Leopold's place in English history, dating from his marriage to Princess Charlotte, was revealed by the publication of Queen Victoria's correspondence; but many readers will learn with surprise from Dr. Corti's pages how unswervingly he sought to increase his own power and that of his family. Though he made an efficient and conscientious ruler of the country which called him to its throne, he, like his son, found the little kingdom too small to satisfy his ambitions and absorb his energies. "Not with weapons in his hand, but by sheer reliance on his personal influence and ability, this Prince of a small German House won prominence for the name of Coburg. Attained without bloodshed, his success has few parallels in history." His life, however, was not free from disappointments, for the overthrow of his father-in-law, Louis Philippe, and the rise of Louis Napoleon was a bitter pill. Nor was he altogether satisfied with the amount of influence which his niece, affectionate and grateful as she was, allowed him to exert on British politics after her accession to the throne, and particularly during the later years of his long career. The impression which this book conveys is that of an able and liberal, but not particularly attractive, personality; a great schemer rather than a great statesman, an enlightened egotist rather than a servant of humanity. The volume would be of still greater value and interest if his services to Belgium were set forth in as great detail as his excursions into the troublous realm of international politics.

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Sir James Rennell Rodd, in "*Social and Diplomatic Memories* (Second Series), 1894-1901: Egypt and Abyssinia,"† provides an account of his life in Egypt during the last decade of the nineteenth and the first year of the present century. It includes a useful record of a mission to Abyssinia in days when that mysterious country was little known. Sir Rennell Rodd, as second in command to Lord Cromer from 1894 onwards, saw a great deal of Lord Kitchener, with whom he was in constant official association for eight years, and, of course, was even more closely in touch with Lord Cromer. In 1919, after eighteen years' absence,

* Fisher Unwin. 21s.

† Edward Arnold. 21s. net.

Sir Rennell Rodd was recalled to Cairo to join Lord Milner's Special Mission. Perhaps one day he will compare the Egypt of Lord Cromer and the Egypt of Lord Milner. It is refreshing to record that in this useful footnote to history the author does not use official documents of a private character: "I have never in my diaries made notes from official documents which have come under my cognisance. . . . Official expressions of opinion have been recorded in official communications, which will no doubt be accessible when the proper time comes. My aim has rather been to reproduce the atmosphere in which certain interesting situations developed, and to do justice to the character of some of the principal actors as I saw them behind the scenes. If memoirs succeed in conveying such an atmosphere, they may assist our appreciation of history." This seems the right attitude of an official in the diplomatic service. It is in vivid contrast to the use of official documents made by leading English statesmen. It is interesting to note that Lord Cromer, however great the pressure of work might be, "always found some time in the day, whether early or late in the evening, for reading. History and the great Greek and Latin authors were his constant resource." Lord Kitchener, with his intense reserve and his unsuspected way of approach to a conclusion was "officially something of a problem." His mind seemed to work on Oriental lines, but he had vision. "He seldom bestowed praise, or even approval. And yet men worked for him as for no other. . . . Many admired him. Very few really liked him. He walked by himself." He had vision and was an idealist. Perhaps it may be added to Sir Rennell Rodd's account that he, like Gordon, was also a mystic.

* * *

Monsieur O. P. Guilbert in "The Prince de Ligne: A Gay Marshal of the Old Regime" * (translated from the French by Joseph McCabe) has allowed the Prince de Ligne, though in a condensed form, to tell his own story, which has added greatly to the interest of the book. It was at Brussels, on May 23rd, 1735, that the Princesse de Ligne gave birth to Prince Charles Joseph de Ligne, "with all the solemnity desirable in the case of so great a person." Descendant of a race in which bravery was hereditary, Ligne, we are told, though scarcely ten years old, eagerly followed the battle of Fontenoy, May 11th, 1745, which took place twelve miles from his home, Belœil. This with subsequent successes of the French troops developed his passion for war, encouraged by the military fervour of his uncle Prince Henry Ernest. As a boy his education was variegated and lively, divided as it was between an austere father and a succession of professors whom we learn succeeded each other with the rapidity of a cinema. In his sixteenth year he was made Chamberlain to the Emperor of Austria, Francis I., and not long afterwards married Françoise Marie Xavière, Princess of Lichtenstein, who proved herself to be a good mother and a good housekeeper. His life is varied and full of interest; he knew Catherine II. of Russia, Marie Antoinette, Rousseau, Voltaire, and many others; of Marie Antoinette he speaks in moving terms; indeed, with exquisite and respectful tenderness of that unfortunate Queen. To a brilliant and creative imagination, with some self-esteem, the Prince de Ligne joined an acute understanding, that was most prompt in seizing any new idea the moment it presented itself to him; all of which, no doubt, coupled with his high rank, made him a central figure in both the literary and historical worlds of the day.

* T. Fisher Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

Prince William of Sweden, in his book entitled "Among Pygmies and Gnomes, with the Swedish Zoological Expedition to Central Africa, 1921," * gives an account of an expedition planned before the war. It is of special interest as there are few original works in Swedish dealing with Africa and its tribal problems. The expedition has enriched the National Museum of Sweden with specimens to the extent of 1,000 mammals, 1,700 birds, and 10,000 insects, and has enriched human knowledge with much new ethnographic information. The expedition started from Nairobi and passed through Uganda to the heart of Africa, where the Prince met, above the Bufumbera Plain, his first pygmies, a race of which many records exist in early history. The ones met are not really very small. "The average height would be about 4 feet 8 inches. The colour of the skin is very dark, the heads are round, the noses flat. The body in general is harmoniously developed, the shoulders are broad and the chests full. Round the loins they wrap a skin, but otherwise are naked. Their worldly goods they carry in a small bag on their backs, in which the 'fire sticks' are also stuck." They light fires with these sticks by friction with great ease. They make simple and beautiful vessels of clay, but this is their only handicraft. "They lead a nomadic life in the forests, and settle where it suits them for the moment. Their huts are also of the simplest construction. Their arms consist of short spears, besides bows and arrows." They are probably descended from some pure-blooded pygmy tribe, but there is also some foreign element. They believe that they come from far away in the south. The book is full of excitements. There is a wonderful lion hunt. "I have looked into many lions' eyes at night, but I have never seen them luminous, as so many hunters assert." This is strange, since the domestic cat's eyes are certainly luminous at night. Wonderful photographs add to the charm of a really remarkable and well-written book of adventurous travel.

* * *

Professor Gilbert Murray contributes an introduction to this collection of essays and papers on international organisation and the control of nations by Mr. F. N. Kean, entitled "Towards International Justice." † Mr. Kean was an active member of a group which throughout the war strove to organise the conditions of permanent peace, an International Council, an International Court, an International Law, an International Navy—in other words, an International State. So we can now read essays on "The World in Alliance" (February, 1915), "The working out of Details" (December, 1917), "A League of Nations with Large Powers" (December, 1918), a League able to control national armaments and States not members of the League, and "such Powers as shall aim definitely and directly at the entire abolition of aggressive war between civilised people." Other post-war papers follow advocating the extension of the League. Professor Murray regards it as "among the few pieces of good luck that the League has enjoyed that there has so far been no international force. . . . Until the League has earned public confidence by its justice it would be madness for it to try to impose its will by military force." What has been done up to the present shows that it is "very far removed from a super-State . . . the whole strength of the League lies in the machinery for constant conference and discussion." Professor Murray discusses the broad view that the authority of the League rests on publicity.

* Gyldendal, 11, Hanover Square, W. 25s. net.
† George Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. R. L. Hobson, the Keeper of the Department of Ceramics and Ethnography at the British Museum, the learned author of many works on Oriental and English porcelain and pottery, has now produced his noble treatise on "The Wares of the Ming Dynasty,"* with 120 illustrations, of which eleven are in colour. This is the first monograph on Ming wares, belonging to the late but magnificent period of ceramic art that arose after the major arts of poetry and painting had long passed their prime. The potters of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 220) had laid a great foundation, on which the T'ang period (A.D. 618-906) artists had built a noble structure. The work of the Sung period paid great attention to high-fired glazes, but we get the use of enamel colours at the opening of the thirteenth century, and blue and white work was not unknown when the Ming period, about 1350 or a little later, brought in coloured and blue-painted porcelains. The porcelain of Ching-tê-Chên, an ancient home of pottery work, is especially associated with ceramic art at its best in the Ming period. The book deals with very many varieties of Ming porcelain. "The text is based primarily on information obtained from Chinese sources and the occasional notes made by Europeans who visited China in the Ming period. To this must be added the deductions which can be made from the study of well-authenticated specimens, and, of course, the valuable work enshrined in the books which are mentioned in the bibliography." Ching-tê-Chên porcelain occupies the greater part of this superb work. The story begins with the accession of the Emperor Hung Wu in 1368, and ends in 1619 with the death of the Emperor Wan Li, one of the last of the Ming Emperors, who were succeeded by the Manchu dynasty in 1644. This last period is marked by an effort to improve taste and to restrict the potters to blue and white work. The glaze of this late period is often impure, but most of the work is of singular and attractive beauty, and the "mixed colour" types are not the least beautiful.

* * *

In "Shakespeare's Fellows: Being a Brief Chronicle of the Elizabethan Age,"† Mr. G. B. Harrison introduces the reader to the study of the personal side of the Elizabethan drama. Its purpose is "to provide a background for the study of the early dramatists; to give a few pictures of Shakespeare's professional friends and rivals; to show some of their difficulties and adventures; and to portray in outline the world in which Elizabethan Drama was brought to light." So we see the contemporary stage and universities, and meet Robert Greene, Thomas Kyd, and Christopher Marlowe. Mr. Harrison accepts Francis Mere's account of Marlowe's death, despite the fact that it is in direct contradiction of the statement in the list of burials at St. Nicholas Church, Deptford, "Christopher Marlowe, slain by Francis Archer." The mystery of his death, it may be hoped, will be cleared up one day. This was in 1593, and Shakespeare is emerging at last. So we are taken to the records of the great acting companies: Lord Strange's company, the Lord Chamberlain's company, and Lord Nottingham's (or the Admiral's) company. Then we pass to the days and friends of Ben Jonson, and to the great creative period of Shakespeare and his fellows. It is a well-balanced, useful book.

* Benn Brothers, 8, Bouverie Street, E.C.4. £4 4s.
† John Lane. 6s. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

In "The Action of Alcohol on Man,"* by Ernest H. Starling—with essays on (1) Alcohol as a Medicine, by Robert Hutchinson; (2) Alcohol and its Relations to Problems in Mental Disorders; (3) Alcohol and Mortality (with illustrations)—certain conclusions of importance are reached. Professor Starling records his conviction that "in a civilized society such as ours the abolition of all alcoholic beverages from among our midst, even if carried out by universal consent, would be a mistake and contrary to the permanent interest of the race. If it were enforced by legislation against the wishes and convictions of a large proportion of the members of the community, I believe that it would be little short of a calamity. While it would not result, in the long run, in the improvement of national health and efficiency, it would diminish that respect for the Law and that identification of self with the Law which are essential for the stability and welfare of a democracy." Professor Starling pleads for a study of the evidence as a whole.

* * *

Here is an excellent book with an unattractive title—"Man: What? Whence? Whither?"† by Captain R. C. T. Evans. Captain Evans is a medical man, who combines with a liberal general education a wide war experience of men of many varieties of type and of all ranks. The book really represents the effort to reconcile religion, science, and philosophy for those who cannot accept the conventional or usual exposition of the Bible. The book is an earnest effort to restore faith, to show the essential reasonableness of faith in God as a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Who never makes a mistake, Who is always working out a great purpose, Who loves everyone. "I believe that not one life has, in God's great providence, been wasted, as regards His and the man's own point of view. God is looking after the real welfare of each one that has been killed, that has died, or that has been maimed in this war." The book should specially be read by those who have serious doubts, and we heartily commend it.

* * *

In "Religion Since the Reformation"‡ Dr. Leighton Pullan prints eight lectures preached before the University of Oxford on the Bampton Foundation in 1922. The lectures consist of "a few studies and sketches" which the lecturer hoped "might be useful in present circumstances to members of the University." The term Modern Protestantism is used in this book in the technical sense employed in Germany and Holland, signifying a form of Theism, while Modernism is used in the current sense. The lectures successively deal with the Counter-Reformation and the Decline of Grace; Religion in Great Britain from 1550 to 1689; Continental Protestantism from 1520 to 1700; the Roman Catholic Church from 1700 to 1854; Religion in Great Britain and America from 1689 to 1815; Aspects of Lutheranism and Calvinism since 1700; the Eastern Orthodox Church; Aspects of Christian Thought since 1815. This book should be useful to students who desire a bird's-eye view of theological movements in the past three and a half centuries.

* * *

In a strangely named book, "Ungodly Jingles,"§ Mr. Sholto O. G. Douglas sets forth in brave Swinburnian verse a defiance of the problems that are set by the mysteries of things to mortal man. The poet's

* Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

† Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 2s.

‡ Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. net.

§ Elkin Matthews. 6s. net.

tion of the Note of September 8th cannot be in consequence considered as fulfilled; Decides that by way of penalty on this account the Hellenic Government shall pay to the Italian Government the sum of 50,000,000 Italian lire; the Conference and the Italian Government renouncing the appeal to the Hague Court of International Justice provided for in paragraph 7 of the Note of September 8th as well as any other penalty, and considering the question as settled on their part except for special recourse by Italy to the Court of International Justice on the question of the cost of the occupation; Decides that the payment of the sum of 50,000,000 lire above referred to shall be effected by the transfer to the Italian Government of the sum of 50,000,000 lire deposited on September 10th with the Swiss National Bank; And that in consequence the Court of Justice will be asked to order the transfer of this sum by the Swiss National Bank to the Bank of Italy at Rome to the account of the Italian Government. The Conference takes note in this connection that the Italian Government declares that it will carry out on September 27th the decision previously taken to evacuate Corfu on that date."

LORD CREWE AND THE FIFTY MILLION LIRE.

That document was signed by Lord Crewe, British Ambassador in Paris, on behalf of the British Government, which thereby was implicated in a gross act of quibbling injustice perpetrated by "Great" Powers on a small Power which had deposited the 50,000,000 lire in good faith. If there is any honesty left in British public life, Parliament when it reassembles will insist against all evasion on two things: (1) the publication of the text of the Inquiry Commission's report presented on September 22nd; (2) an explanation from the Government of what happened at the Ambassadors' meetings on September 25th and 26th and why Lord Crewe signed the decision. The Government is likely to be called sharply to account for the depths to which it has allowed British diplomacy to sink during its short term of office. For the Government to have been guilty within one month of feeble scuttling over the Ruhr and of something approaching dishonesty over Corfu is not an achievement of which British diplomacy can be proud. At the beginning of the Corfu episode Lord Robert Cecil's fine stand for honest dealing established British prestige as something which the small States throughout the world could depend on. Lord Crewe, on September 26th, with a stroke of his pen bade the small States go boil their heads. On September 2nd, at Geneva, British policy antagonised Italian feeling because it stood openly for justice against an act of Italian injustice. On September 26th British

policy in Paris antagonised the States which had applauded on the former occasion, by walking over to the enemy's camp. There was neither consistent realism nor consistent idealism in British policy, which as a result reaped the worst of both worlds.

What in fact happened on September 25th and 26th was that the French and British Ambassadors submitted to the dictatorship of the Italian Ambassador, whose chief, Signor Mussolini, had instructed him to carry off the 50,000,000 lire under the threat of a continuance of the Italian occupation of Corfu beyond September 27th. The Ambassadors on September 25th had before them the Inquiry Commission's report, which informed them that the British, French, and Japanese members of the Commission had come to the conclusion that the motive of the murder of General Tellini and his colleagues had been personal vengeance, which implied that the murderers were probably not Greeks at all, but Albanians, but that the Italian representative was of the minority opinion—if any Italian opinion on this point can have any value—that the murders were political in motive.

How then was Baron Avezana able to induce Lord Crewe and M. Jules Cambon to tear up the Commission's report and to become accomplices with the Italian Government in stealing the 50,000,000 lire which had been deposited by the Greek Government in good faith? On September 26th Baron Avezana triumphantly produced his trump card. He recalled that on September 13th he had agreed, not that Italy would evacuate Corfu by September 27th unless in the meantime the Greek Government had been proved guilty of negligence in the search for the murderers, but that Italy would not evacuate unless in the meantime Greece had been proved to be not guilty of negligence. If a boy at an English school had behaved as Baron Avezana behaved in Paris, he would have received at the hands of his fellows the thrashing of his life. The Ambassadors of Britain and France, by contrast, not only approved, but became parties to an act of unscrupulous trickery perpetrated on a small and impoverished State which was helpless in their power. Nothing is gained by following Baron Avezana on to his own dialectical ground, but perhaps one may recall that whether his statement to the Ambassadors on September 26th represented the facts or not, it was completely beside the point. Even if on September 13th he had made a declaration which contained the quibble which he later made use of, the fact remained that on September 14th a Note of the Ambassadors' Conference—bearing Baron Avezana's own *imprimatur*—put on record Italy's undertaking to evacuate Corfu by September 27th "in any circumstances." This statement was drawn up *after* Baron Avezana's individual declaration; and if

creed, like Swinburne's creed, is a sad, indeed an impossible one, the creed that a man can walk without regret through the dimness and the darkness of life.

"Unswerving I march to the end,
Unconquered I rest in the grave,
Though I have not your God as my friend
Yet I am not his slave.
For I fear no impossible hell,
Nor the worm with incredible sting;
If a slave I am free to rebel;
Free to die if a king."

The book shows nature religion of a sort, and one that pre-supposes the vague faith of a doubtful doubter. Even Swinburne became more of a believer as he realised the largeness of things. There is no reason why this poet should not turn to a fuller outlook. To do so would be to follow great philosophers, and it is certain that the values of human life are inseparable from firm faith in God and immortality.

The Bishop of Worcester has returned to his mediæval studies, so fruitful when he was at Westminster, and has produced an account of a famous predecessor, "Thomas de Cobham, Bishop of Worcester, 1317-1327,"* in the form of "Some Studies drawn from his Register, with an account of his life." Dr. R. L. Poole has dealt in the "Dictionary of National Biography" with the public life of this very famous man of Kent, but his episcopal labours were not considered in that biography. This book represents the joint labours of Dr. Pearce and Dr. Poole at Cobham's Register, and reveals him as "The Good Clerk" in the two senses of the word: he was an honest official to the king, and was a good bishop if a somewhat doubtful politician. This book reveals the inner episcopal work of one who was a great figure in the great days—for they were great days—of the early fourteenth century. Dr. Pearce's knowledge of the ecclesiastical life of the period is very thorough, knowledge acquired by patient spadework in manuscripts, and the book is, therefore, a substantial addition to our information of the early days of the England of the fourteenth century.

In "The Fifth Army in March, 1918,"† by Mr. W. Shaw Sparrow, with an Introduction by General Sir Hubert Gough, and twenty-one maps by the author, is issued a third edition of the work originally published in January, 1921. The preface to this edition is a lengthy document which concludes with the statement that "Thanks to our Fifth Army, the curtain was rung down upon the first act of a new tragedy, destined to pass rapidly through German victories into Germany's capitulation, and on to the Versailles Treaty and its menacing consequences." General Sir Hubert Gough, in his Introduction, declares that the work "is a serious and valuable contribution to history." It is certainly a valuable record.

In the "Sayings of Queen Elizabeth"‡ Mr. Frederick Chamberlin has compiled a volume that brings together the writings, speeches, and sayings on many subjects of the greatest of the English queens. It will prove a useful book to use side by side with histories of various aspects of the Elizabethan age. The wisdom of Queen Elizabeth was worth collecting in one handy volume.

† John Lane. 7s. 6d. net.

* S.P.C.K. 15s. net.

‡ John Lane. 16s. net.

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