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CONTENTS.

AUTHOR	TITLE	PAGE
ADAM, KENNETH	Holland Takes the Offensive	404
ANDREWS, W. L.	Cramping the Press	391
ARMITAGE, John	The Age of Imperialism	69
	The Age of Responsibility	187
ATKINSON, William C.	Bogotá, 1948	377
BAERLEIN, Henry	Denmark To-day	13
BELOFF, Max	Russia's International Position	133
BENN, Robin	The Schoolroom has no Clock—A Poem	353
BENSUSAN, S. L.	Of a Garden	136
BERLIN CORRESPONDENT, A	The Russian Zone of Germany	19
BOND, Freda C.	The Judas Tree—A Poem	28
BUTLER, Sir Harold	The Voice of Europe	369
BUTLER, R. A., M.P.	Government and Industry	81
BUXTON, John	Eliot Howard	206
CHEN, Jack	Britain and American Policy in China	89
COLE, G. D. H.	Living Together in Europe	102
COLYER, Douglas	Britain's Place in Civil Aviation	29
COOMBS, B. L.	One Year of Nationalization	46
CRAIG, Harry	The Fall of Mr. De Valera	261
CROFT-COOKE, Rupert	Gypsy Origins	270
DACIE, Anne	Trieste as an International Centre	322
DAVIS, Melton S.	French Labour	315
FRIEDMANN, W.	Australian Prospects and Problems	253
GIBBERD, Kathleen	The Groundnuts Scheme	411
GRAVES, Robert	What is Asphodel?	214
GREEN, O. M.	Reconstruction in Japan	385
GREGORY, Joshua C.	Telepathy, Radiation and the Unconscious	121
HEYMAN, Hans	American Aid to the Middle East	96
HINKSON, Pamela	The Women of Germany	176
JAMES, Walter	Co-Ownership in Industry	247
JOHNSON, Geoffrey	Three Women—A Poem	204
KENDON, Frank	Albert Schweitzer	59
	The Touch of Time—A Poem	416
LANGDON-DAVIES, John	Radioactivity	239
LETTS, Winifred	The Fays at the Abbey Theatre	420
LEVY, Hermann	The Pitfalls of Planning	333
MANNHEIM, Hermann	The Criminal Justice Bill	39
MORRIS, John	Across America	128
MOSS, John	Children Bill	190
MURPHY, J. T.	Are the Workers Ready to Control Industry?	341
MURRY, J. Middleton	The Only Way to Peace	24
NEILL, Bishop Stephen	The Churches and the Iron Curtain	232
NICHOLAS, H. G.	The Making of America	424
NORMAN, Sylvia	A Word on Katherine Mansfield	278
PATMORE, Derek	Coventry Patmore and Robert Bridges	196
PENDLE, George	Unification of the Balkans	164
PERRY, Lord	Can Britain Recover?	1
REDAL, William	Western Lights	301
SCHWARZ, R. P.	The Meaning of the Marshall Plan	225
SINCLAIR-THOMSON, Peter	Haganah	266
TOMALIN, Ruth	Feste—A Poem	135
TOMKINS, The Rev. Oliver	Society and Moral Will	355
EVES, G. E.	Italy's New Constitution	169
RIEDEL, L. A.	Georges Duhamel	142
WEEDY, Owen	Partition in Palestine	12
	Anglo-Egyptian Relations	308
BLAKER-SMITH, Derek, M.P.	The Two Camps: Contemporary Socialism	116
LLS, W. T., M.P.	The Two Camps: Contemporary Conservatism	112

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THE FORTNIGHTLY

JANUARY, 1948

CAN BRITAIN RECOVER ?

BY LORD PERRY

AUTHOR	TITLE	PAGE
WENTWORTH-SHEILDS, F. W.	Art from India and Pakistan	61
WHALE, J. S.	Why Drag Religion into Education ?	182
WILLIAMSON, The Rev. Hugh		
ROSS	The Pilgrim's Progress Reconsidered	347
WOLFENDEN, J. F.	Conflicts in Education	327
WOODHEAD, E. W.	The Juvenile Employment Service	398
Correspondence :		
O. M. GREEN and JACK CHEN	Britain and American Policy in China	284
The Rev. B. C. PLOWRIGHT	Sir Henry Slesser and The First Europe	286
The Rt. Hon. Sir Henry SLESSER	A Question of Syntax	314

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TOO few people realize that Britain's financial plight is not wholly the result of the 1939-1945 war. Long before Hitler disrupted world economy by striking at Poland, there were many signs that Great Britain had entered a phase in her commercial history far less satisfactory than that of the prosperous late Victorian and Edwardian years. There was a steady decline in her command of both the visible and invisible export markets. New and formidable rivals were making great headway in Britain's most cherished and characteristic industries. Japan and Italy had emerged as rivals in ship building. The cotton trade was no longer a Lancashire monopoly. Increased transport facilities and new forms of power had changed the old topographical advantages once possessed by the British Isles. The rapid rise of German and American industrial output in the first thirty years of this century, the disturbance caused to the old flow of trade by Russia's changed status amongst the nations and the steady imitative progress of Japan were all factors causing concern to anyone observing the comparative trends of international trade. Even the seizure and exploitation by the new Russian Government of oil and gold deposits was beginning to have a palpable effect before the late war was launched.

The general pre-war picture was of a Britain whose trading advantages were visibly diminishing, whilst competitors were creating and enjoying counter advantages of their own. It was in such a developing situation that certain palliatives were applied. Free imports were abandoned ; looms and shipyards were ' scrapped '.

Such was the extraordinary reserve of strength in the nation that, even after the sacrifices of the 1914-1918 war, the loss of young manpower and the neglect of peacetime industrial modernization and re-equipment, Britain emerged from the world crisis of 1929-1934 far less apparently shaken than any other nation. Bad as were the opening years of the 1930's in these islands, we saw nothing comparable to the utter breakdown of the banking and fiscal system which confronted Franklin Roosevelt on the very morning of his first inauguration. Resistance to that world economic blizzard was such that the British Empire and Dominions were able to meet the first devastating blasts of the 1939-1945 war and to stand alone in a war shattered world, and to emerge again victorious.

These events are the commonplaces of memory and history, but they must be kept vividly in mind when an attempt is made to assess Britain's

chances and means of recovery from the *débâcle* which politicians have christened "the present crisis".

An outstanding sign of Britain's changed status in the world is the familiar one that we have ceased to be a great creditor nation and have become a great debtor nation. Changes in currency values make any comparison of figures misleading. It must be noted, however, that on day to-day presentation of Britain's trading position she has been for long years a trading debtor, in the sense that her intake of necessary goods from abroad, including the vital necessity of raw materials and food, far exceeds countervailing exports of goods, but the excess debts were paid by such invisibles as dividend and interest on foreign investments and fees for services, marine insurance and the like.

Even in the 1930's it was obvious that a continuous decline or a sudden interruption of such "invisibles" would present Britain with a tragic problem. Her awkwardly positioned industrial populations, which the islands themselves could not support, might starve. A failure in the fiscal system might make her impotent to resist foreign aggression.

As we know, the sudden interruption came in September 1939, and was the worst possible kind of interruption, for it was a war in which we were the first and chief belligerent. To sustain that war Britain had perforce to sell or pawn overseas investments. Shipping, banking and assurance services were no longer earners of foreign exchange. What was equally bad, overseas markets had to be allowed to drift into the hands of foreign trading competitors. During the progress of the war our industrial plants and processes were transferred from their true vocations: what modernization was possible was applied to war uses. In many industries there was a seven year lack of new entrants. The older skilled generations of operatives were growing towards the time of retirement: the generations which would normally have replaced them were in the fighting forces or diverted to other industries.

Such was the dramatic interruption to the flow of Britain's visible and invisible trade which occurred in 1939, and which augmented, but did not provide an adequate solution.

It has also to be remembered, though it is now very often overlooked, that even before hostilities began, the totalitarian States had affected world trading technique to Great Britain's detriment, by their attempts to reach autarchy and their re-introduction of primitive barter into modern commercial economy. Germany had also as strongly affected world trade by restless pursuit and successful exploitation of *ersatz* substitutes, which were a necessary part of the search for autarchy.

Pari passu with this process of change in both the methods and materials of world trade went the decline in what one may call Britain's comparative energy. It was possible for a commentator in 1938 to write:

The future of the world demand for coal is hotly debated between economists and

industrialists. Whatever the future of world coal demand, the demand for British coal is precarious. . . . There is no comfort in the suggestion that German coal exports make headway because German coal is helped by a bounty, which cannot go on for ever. The real bounty to German coal exports is that German miners turn out forty per cent. more coal per man at twenty-five per cent. less cost than the British miner.

It was also possible in 1937 for the Joint Committee of Cotton Trade Organizations to declare: "Lancashire cannot afford to export at a loss indefinitely." This brief reminder of Britain's immediate pre-war position is necessary because the problem before us is not, as some politicians have said, that of getting back to 1938 standards. If by some politico-economic miracle a return to the 1938 position were achieved, we should still be facing the same grim question—can Britain recover?

In preparing to assess Britain's hopes of recovery, and to discuss the means towards it, we are faced with a grim, stark situation, known only too well to many of us. Our country is internationally bankrupt, carrying a heavy debt in the shape of sterling liabilities held against us and dollar indebtedness which cannot be paid in money. If these debts were forgiven, or drastically scaled down, we must still face the fact that our necessary purchases from overseas—requirements necessary to bare survival for most of our population—amount to more per diem than our saleable exportable goods can pay for. In addition to this, many of those necessary purchases have to come from particular countries, the 'hard currency' countries in which British exportable goods are unsaleable. To cover our daily bill for food and raw materials, by which alone we can exist, it is not sufficient to achieve the production of an increased volume of goods for sale abroad; it is necessary that we should be able to sell to a select group of overseas customers in the dollar area. To this end, Great Britain has to contrive to maintain an interim inflow of food and raw materials while she organizes her industry in such a way that it can lower its costs, meet possible markets in design and quality, re-train her skilled labour force in both old and new products, and, by her diplomacy, help to nurse back to economic health those components of the trading world which have either been shattered by actual war—as Germany—or have been crippled in their trading activities by power politics or the rise of disruptive internal sectionalism, as with the 'client' states of Russia.

It may be said immediately that Britain's basic asset for this struggle is unimpaired. That basic asset is the skill, ingenuity and tenacity of our people. Given the will to work—that is, given a removal of those false doctrines and artificial and restrictive practices which diminish the workers' energy, both physically and psychologically—the British worker of every grade, from the operative to the management, is able to bear comparison with any worker in the world. In the faculty of inventiveness and in aptitude for salesmanship, there is no reason to suppose that the British have lost any of their old quality. If they are not displaying it, the reason is not biological degeneration, but it may well be political frustration.

It should be realized, however, that even if all frustrations were removed, and the political factor instead of being a hindrance were transformed to help, the immediate, the interim problem is no nearer to solution. That immediate problem is how to keep going until long term factors are enabled to operate successfully and efficiently. If complete national autarchy were possible, which it is not in these islands, or if Imperial self-sufficiency were possible, as it well may be, such a re-organization would take time, and "time is of the essence". As His Majesty's Ministers have recently freely confessed, their immediate preoccupation is buying time. The short truth is that, whether we like it or not, some new form of dollar aid is essential. Fortunately, it is as essential to the United States as it is to us that Great Britain shall survive as a fundamental part of world economy. The granting of dollar aid, whether under a Marshall Plan or some other, will not be the exercise merely of philanthropy, but of self-preservation. In a normal pre-war year Britain took within the neighbourhood of £120,000,000 of merchandise (at old values) from the United States. Her general value to the American economy is thus immense. Her special value to certain states, the tobacco and cotton states in particular, transcends that of any other customer.

It is argued that Britain's best plan at such a time would be to face any rigours and endurances rather than to take a further loan. Sentimentally there is everything to be said for this Spartan course. Practically, however, it would teem with danger. The further dislocation of our industry, an increased diminution of food rations for a population already debilitated, the resentment at further deprivations by masses of men and women unable even yet to grasp the root necessity for their suffering, might lead to a progressive weakening of the national power to recover, and might even lead to social disruption.

The diplomatic necessity, if and when further dollar aid is available, as an interim salvation, will be to ensure that no new loan shall impose conditions similar to those attached to the loan now exhausted. There should be no further recourse to dollars whose purchasing power can fall or be driven down so swiftly that a moiety of the purchasing power is lost before the loan is fully applied. There should be no further consent to a relinquishment of sovereignty over our trade relations within the British Commonwealth or over our own currency. Beggars, it may be said, cannot be choosers, but, under the duress of circumstances, a further dollar loan will, of necessity, be from a lender as desirous to lend as the recipient is willing to borrow.

It is also argued that such further aid will only be a staving off of the evil day. Admittedly, it will be a staving off: that is the only purpose of the loan. But it should be a staving off until the day when Britain will, under proper and experienced leadership, earn her own living. To-day she cannot, but at a day not too far removed she may hope to do so.

The mistakes made about the original loan are not encouraging. It

was hastily negotiated. It was made in dollars whose purchasing power was not protected. It was applied to purchases which could have been better selected. It tied Britain to certain international agreements which hampered her capacity to put her own Imperial house in order. The effects of the non-convertibility clause were woefully misconstrued by those who should have known better. The breathing space which it gave was grossly misused. These are errors, however, from which we should have learnt wisdom to avoid in future.

The first alternatives, then, are these: either there is new aid, and it is used to give time for re-organization and recovery of lost export markets; or there is no aid, and the Government will have to apply all the tyrannical powers it has taken to drag the nation into acquiescence with extreme deprivation, perhaps even starvation for parts of the population, and the nation itself will have to 'muddle through' the struggle back to prosperity, physically debilitated and psychologically depressed. Of these alternatives, the first, unpleasant as it may be, seems to be the better.

It being assumed that time has thus been purchased, can Britain, and at what cost, recover? To that question a dogmatic answer can be given. She *can* recover, but only by the hardest and most sustained of efforts; she can only recover if the most drastic changes are made in her political, economic and fiscal systems. At the best, the struggle will be desperate, and will demand full national unity and unremitting toil and sacrifice from all classes of the community.

The clue to recovery is in the word cost. It is a potent word, whose implications are rarely fully realized. Costs are not governed only by the more obvious factors; they are affected by things other than a skilful and economic purchase of materials, an economic hiring of labour, a skilful and economic management and the achievement of a large turn-over. All these are vital to low costs, but there are other factors, including, first and foremost, the burden placed on production and distribution by taxation and the other demands of the State, particularly the expense entailed by meeting or disputing or legally evading whatever delays, interruptions or distractions are imposed either by government itself or by organized bodies seeking to interfere with industry. To guard against misrepresentation, let it be said at once that the conscience of humanity has agreed that certain impositions shall be placed upon industry, both by the State and organized bodies enjoying legal sanction, for the protection of humanity against social injustices. The great slur on the early nineteenth century was that it achieved sectional prosperity, and the entry into world markets, by the virtual torture of women and children and a gross cruelty to other sections of the community. It was content, also, to wax rich by such activities as the opium traffic. To prevent such practices and outrages, certain restrictive fiats must be obeyed, whatever their effect upon the interior economy of industry. None of us would have it differently. It is agreed by all that even if slave States of a lower standard of morality compete with us to our hurt, we shall not degrade

humanity to their level. It is arrant nonsense, therefore, to infer that, when removal of restraints, restrictions and hindrances are suggested, any return to the old brutal and thoughtless days of the Industrial Revolution is intended.

There is an old adage which declares that one should never swap horses when crossing a stream. In granting previous loans America—both the United States and Canada—furnished us with assistance which could have been used to cross the distressing stream of waste and dislocation which had flooded Britain. Instead of using this horse in the manner for which it had been trained, we have been foolish enough to attempt to re-harness it, to replace its accoutrements and substitute a technique of which we have no adequate experience or knowledge.

Surely the nation's present extremity is not an opportune time for making experiments, but rather for a proper use of past experience.

Anything which adds to costs hampers the expansion of exports. Anything which impairs industrial efficiency adds to costs. The expansion of exports and foreign investments is the key to recovery. Set out as a trio of axioms, those three indisputables furnish the first broad answer to our problem. The burden of an inflated bureaucracy and an outmoded system of taxation is an unnecessary, cumbersome, irritating and unremunerative addition to cost.

The imposition upon the British people of a bureaucratic system, in place of the age-old system of private enterprise which made the country great, was largely made possible by the hypnotic effect upon untutored minds of the phrase 'a planned society'. Those who advocated a change of system were cunning enough to imply by that phrase that in the past our society had been unplanned. The truth was, and is, that society has always been planned. Had it not been planned, it would not have been a society, but a mere barbaric rabble. The modern phrase 'a planned society' means to-day that social and industrial effort shall be controlled and planned from the centre, planned by a mythical entity called the State and actually controlled by a junta of politicians and bureaucrats. The phrase 'private enterprise' really meant a society wherein each activity was planned by these actually conducting it—fuel planned by men engaged in the production and distribution of fuel, transport planned by men conducting transport, clothing planned by clothiers and housing by builders. In a word, bureaucracy is centralization, free enterprise is decentralization, not by locality but by function.

Extreme centralization is cumbersome, costly and inefficient; it involves loss of time, tardiness in decision; it means decisions taken on transmitted instead of personal knowledge. It also means the addition to the processes of industry of numbers of non-production functionaries, whose job it is to see not that industry works properly, but that a particular system is worked properly—a very different thing. Without any guarantee that the centralized system is any better, in any way, than the system it has

replaced, industry is immediately saddled with the costs in time and money of these extra 'passengers' whose only possible contribution to the joint effort is delay!

In industry and the conduct of export trade one of the first essentials to success is to be a little ahead of the competitive rival in both purchase and sale. In competition for stocks of raw material, to buy quickly is as important as to buy cheaply. Almost as important is the capacity without delay to replace a missed market by some other. At the selling end it is as important to be able to offer and deliver quickly as to sell at standards of quality and price which suit the buyer. Under a system of free enterprise this is possible: under collectivism it is impossible. Buyers and sellers cannot operate quickly and economically if they are hampered by the need to wait for the decisions of politicians and their advisers, transmitted in the form of complicated orders and directions drafted by persons untrained in the industrial and commercial processes into which they have trespassed.

Bulk purchase of raw materials, with centralized allocation, must of its nature be slower and dearer than purchase by skilled and mobile buyers acting directly for the purchaser-user. Paradoxically, it must be more uncertain. The entry into a world market of a governmental bulk-purchaser is the signal for a concerted rigging of the market against him. He must buy, whereas the individual vendors need not sell to him. They can form a ring against him, they can sell to another buyer and hope to benefit in some way from the second price thus obtained, they can, in common market parlance, do what they like with him. His purchase, once made at a forced and false price, has then to be allocated at the will or whim of a State Department. It will be so allocated not by the needs of the enterprises waiting for the material, but by either the dictates of some paper 'plan' or the tactical requirements of some politico-economic policy. In any event, its delivery will be delayed, and time lost to the British user will be utilized by competitors.

Amongst the extra costs imposed by a bureaucracy in its rigid control of the materials for industry are those arising from staff charges to provide the personnel to cope with the bureaucrats' lust for statistical and other information. Just as on behalf of the Chancellor of the Exchequer all big enterprises have to support a small staff to perform the duties of honorary tax gatherers for Inland Revenue in the collection of income tax under P.A.Y.E., so they have to maintain clerical staff to cope with the innumerable and often changing forms without the filling and rendering of which they are not permitted to produce at all. Trivial as each of these unnecessarily extended transactions may seem, in their totality they represent a costly delay in our industrial processes which helps to thwart the successful re-entry into, and retention of, competitive export markets.

Flexibility and fluidity in the purchase and conversion of raw material and in the sale of the subsequent product had its counterpart in the engagement of labour until trade-unions resorted to what are admitted, on

all hands, to be 'restrictive practices'. For those restrictive practices in the beginning there was a necessity and justification, but they are developed recently to an extent where the original purpose and justification are forgotten or ignored. Practices adopted to prevent the conscienceless exploitation of unprotected pockets of 'labour' are now a closed shop for sectional vested interests. The Labour politician was accustomed to maintain that the sincerest wish of the employers' hearts was to keep a pool of perpetually unemployed workers, which would ensure the taking of work at cut and sweated rates. Whether that was ever so may be argued, but it is certain that in the twentieth century what the average employer wants is not cheap or sweated labour, but competent workers to whom he is glad to give as much as they might care to earn. What is equally certain now is that if Britain is to recover she will be in such need of workers that they will for a long time enjoy, so to speak, a sellers' market. Prosperity in the process of its recovery will imply a shortage, not a surplus, of labour, both skilled and unskilled. The restrictive practices of the unions have begun to operate now against the interests of the trade unionists who still apply them. 'Ca'canny', which may or may not have been an assurance that what work there was would be shared, is now only a means of keeping all workers out of an otherwise attainable increase in the standard of living.

One of the most curious examples of a changed effect of a trade union practice is to be found in the payment of overtime. When the practice of paying overtime was introduced the reason for it was clear. It was to prevent an employer from working his labour force too long while other workers needed employment. To discourage him from so doing the unions said in effect: 'If you must work your staff longer hours than those agreed as fair and just, then you shall pay more for the fatigued labour than you pay for the fresh and vigorous labour of the normal working day. This may, at least, persuade you instead to bring in other and unfatigued workers.' What has since happened, with the hearty connivance of the unions themselves, is that overtime is regarded as a kind of legitimate perquisite of the worker. So abused has it become that examples have been frequent of men absenting themselves on a week day, but working on Sundays or other days when, by agreement, overtime rates are paid. To put it at its simplest, and ignoring any abuse of the system, it may be said that overtime, which was instituted as a deterrent to long hours, has changed into a demand by the worker to work long hours. If Britain is to recover it is surely necessary that all similar practices should be reviewed and overhauled in the light of labour's actual working circumstances to-day: all restrictions which owed their origin to conditions which have long disappeared should be ruthlessly rescinded.

If it is admittedly desirable to reconsider and rescind certain trade union practices it becomes abundantly necessary to examine governmental restrictive practices, whether recent and by 'orders and regulations' or old

and by Statute. Trade unions, let it not be forgotten, are an integral part of a free enterprise system. They have no legitimate place in a collectivist State. Socialism is the political antithesis of trade unionism. Employers and trade unionists together would have no difficulty in reaching an amicable agreement as to what restrictive practices, whether of the State or of the unions, are still the necessary protection of the worker, and what are now but outmoded hindrances to industrial vigour and general restoration. Most certainly, at a time when labour shortage is such that men and women have to be State directed, restrictions devised in fear of dilution of labour are palpably unjustified, and, if not abolished, should be suspended.

If a *sine qua non* of Britain's recovery is a reversal or suspension of the process of nationalization and collectivism and all other forms of centralization, equally necessary is a drastic reform of the system and technique of taxation. If Sir Stafford Cripps desires to detect barriers in the way of export expansion, he need look no further than the Treasury. A faulty system of taxation is extremely harmful to industry: it raises costs by collecting revenue by uneconomical methods.

Our existing method of assessing and extracting tax is not a system at all. It is a veritable patch-work quilt of accumulated expedients. The kinds of imposts levied, and the varied and conflicting means of levying them, have never been reviewed from the point of view that all taxation ultimately falls upon industry. Since the days of the younger Pitt, the fabric of taxation, in both its assessment and collection aspects, has been added to by Chancellors caught by unexpected expenditure demands. The Budget was once a means whereby the Commons supplied, after careful scrutiny, the monetary needs of the Crown. It is now used as a means to extract from the people whatever the State, led by an inexperienced doctrinaire Cabinet, supported by a subsidized Commons, may think necessary to obscure financial ineptitude or institute Utopian ideologies. No sooner had Mr. Gladstone finished using the Budget as a means to implement the free imports policy of Peel, than his successors in Whitehall continued its use as a means of changing social relations and redistributing the national wealth. These usages, as affected by the chronic interruptions of war costs or unforeseen economic crises, have resulted in a hotch-potch of imposts, some collected in one way, some in another, some assessed this way and others assessed that way, but none devised or reformed to comply with the historic tests of sound taxation. Those rules, as Adam Smith gave them, are familiar. Subjects of the State ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly as possible according to their means. Taxation should be levied at the time and in the way most likely to be convenient to the taxpayer. Every tax ought to be so contrived that it takes from the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the Treasury. Under our present hotch-potch all these rules are flouted in one way or another.

The first obligation of the State, as of the community, is to ensure that

industry is given every possible help, positive and negative, to recover its old vigour and to compete in world markets with competitors now enjoying the advantages which we have lost. That being so, in framing taxation our first care must be not to levy any impost—if it can possibly be avoided—which may harass or hamper that recovery. Equally important, we should ensure that any impost levied is simple in its conception, in its method of assessment, and in its methods of collection. As the vital aim is to bring industry, which must eventually pay all taxes, back to a full capacity, we should, if only for a time, ignore any use of taxation as a means of redressing social inequalities or pleasing excited voters at the polls. The sole aim must be to devise a simple means of extracting from the populace an economically collected contribution towards the unavoidable expenditures of the State. Instead of this approach, we tolerate, to our grave injury, the persistence in taxes originally levied from all manner of expedient motives. There is, as all men of business will confirm, no enterprise which has not to spend its time and money in careful calculations, scrutinies and confirmation of what does and what does not 'rank for tax', and in arguments with tax-paid officials on the result. There is no enterprise which has not to employ experts and assistants to help the professional tax collectors to assess the workers and then to collect and transmit their taxes. There is no enterprise which can even hazard a guess as to what tax liability will be—what will be challenged and what not—from period to period.

The present method of collecting purchase tax, excise duties and customs levies increases the cost of living by many millions of pounds sterling per annum. Anticipated revenue in the Budget for the current year is £1,316,790,000, all of which is collected from the taxpayer by attaching the levy to the wholesale price of the commodity involved. The price to the consumer is thereby increased by the sum of the distributor's profit on the tax. If it be assumed that a tradesman is content with ten per cent. gross profit on turnover (and it is only the big multiple shops in urban districts who can survive on so narrow a margin), it is immediately obvious that the sum of taxes paid by the consumer of £1,316,790,000 more than is received by the Exchequer. An annual wastage equivalent to £4 7s. od. per head of a working population of 30,000,000.

We seem, indeed, to have developed a genius for devising and levying new taxes in the most expensive and uncertain ways. If it be granted that some system of pay-as-you-earn was necessary, as the Treasury could not cope with defaulters under any other system once the tax net swept in masses of weekly wage drawers, can it be maintained that the system adopted was not the worst imaginable? It duplicated the functionaries at the Treasury with opposite numbers in the pay offices of businesses; it involved all manner of unnecessary calculations as to what any one tax-payer's code number must be, and how and when it was to be altered; and it caused a complete change of attitude towards wages and salaries

in every worker, thereby producing industrial restlessness and law-breaking. Similarly, when a purchase tax was decided upon, instead of adopting the simple method already tried and tested in other countries, where the tax is levied over the counter at the level of the ultimate purchaser, we devised a tortuous scheme whereby the tax was applied to the wholesale level, which not only necessitated the creation of a horde of mythical 'wholesalers' who do not exist, but which made any adjustment of that tax so fraught with complexities and injustices as to become a fiscal nightmare and a social danger. Incidentally, the tax was so framed and applied that it remains a deterrent to industry. Buyers very naturally now postpone purchases of heavily taxed goods in the hope—probably groundless—that sooner rather than later the tax will be modified or removed. While new production is thus retarded, the second-hand market and the black market flourish. But, in the meantime, the manufacturer is deterred from experimenting with new models and new processes, and is forced back into a state of uncertainty and anxiety. Unless, and until, the whole process of assessing and levying taxation is reformed, British industry will continue heavily handicapped, and the hope of eventually securing sufficient overseas trade to pay for our necessary imports will be thwarted.

From even so superficial and sketchy a survey as is possible in an article of this nature will be seen that my personal answer to the question "Can Britain Recover?" is that Britain, by an enormous and protracted effort, can recover, but that she will not recover unless there are lifted from British industry those burdens which now make such an effort physically and psychologically impossible. Unless the present administration, or its successor, examines scrupulously every existing regulation and order and revenue impost, and removes or changes all those whose effect is to retard industrial progress or diminish industrial *morale*, whether in the workers or management, Britain cannot hope to regain an entry into lost markets or to extend her command of those where she has preserved or already found a footing. Unless the attempt to increase the general productivity of these islands, both in agriculture and manufacture, and to weld the Imperial connection into a closer economic unity, is successful, and unless we can bring the whole of our people to a common realization that squabbles on political dogmas or ideological differences are suicidal distractions, there can be no recovery. There can only be an accelerated decline into that complete insolvency which will be the economic prelude to a political helotry.

PARTITION IN PALESTINE

BY OWEN TWEEDY

PALESTINE remains in the news, as she has been off and on since the days of Sennacherib the Assyrian, not only as the distraught home of the three great monotheistic religions of the world; but also unhappily as the age-long cockpit of the Middle East. In one particular respect this persistent publicity has produced a distorted impression in the public mind. Everyone's Bible and atlas have a map of Palestine in them and it is thus one of the best known maps in the world. But in the atlases Palestine is almost always given a full page—just as the great powers each have a page of their own. Again, one of the best known clichés about Palestine's size is the phrase "from Dan even unto Beersheba", which custom links with other similar phrases such as "China to Peru" and "Land's End to John o' Groats".

Of course, though everyone knows that Palestine is smaller than her atlas neighbours—France, Italy, Russia, the United States—how many realize how much smaller? How many visualize that Palestine is only the same size as Wales, or as the State of Vermont which is one of the smallest of the forty-nine United States of America? And how many appreciate, too, that "from Dan even unto Beersheba" is a matter of only one hundred and fifty miles—or about the same distance as from London to Shrewsbury or Doncaster—and that the maximum width of Palestine, as from London to Margate, is nowhere more than seventy miles.

The partition of this Lilliputian country has now been approved by the United Nations. It is to be divided into no less than six isolated segments, three of which will constitute an Independent Jewish Sovereign State, the remaining three a similar Arab State. In addition there will be two special enclaves. The Jerusalem enclave will be smaller than the county of Rutland and will be administered and controlled by an International Commission, and the Jaffa enclave in the central Jewish zone with an area of about the size of Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens will constitute a dependency of the Arab Sovereign State.

The three Jewish zones can be conveniently though ominously described in quasi-military terms. The central zone is a beach-head along the Mediterranean with a depth inland averaging about fifteen miles and a coastal length of about a hundred miles including Haifa and Tel Aviv. The northern zone is an outpost centred round Tiberias, with frontiers abutting on two of the Arab Palestinian zones and, to the north and east,

on Syria and Transjordan. The southern zone is another outpost and includes most of the Negev Desert south of Beersheba town. It abuts on Transjordan and Egypt.

The three Arab zones fill in the rest of the patchwork. The northern area around Acre abuts on the Lebanon; the central, which includes Nablus and Hebron, has a common frontier with Transjordan; the southern, along the Mediterranean around Gaza, meets Egypt along her Sinai boundary.

The enforcement and organization of this intricate plan has been entrusted to a special Palestine Commission responsible to the Security Council of the United Nations Assembly. It is to take over from the British Mandatory and later to hand its interim responsibilities to the respective Jewish and Arab States when they come into existence. The British evacuation of the country is to be completed by August 1, 1948, and until then British Forces will continue to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order throughout the country.

This segmentation of this minute country is due to politics; and the unhappy need for the uneasy segregation of the two communities will provide the United Nations and its new Commission with two particular problems which will severely tax their energy, wisdom and patience.

The first problem concerns frontiers and their control. The three zones of each State meet only corner-wise like the diagonal squares on a chessboard. As a result each zone—Arab and Jewish—has four frontiers. This, in terms of defence and control, means that not only have both States a total length of frontier to protect two-thirds as long as if they were compact contiguous territories, but also that there are only cross-road communications between one Jewish zone and another and between one Arab zone and another. The three zones of the Arab State have common friendly frontiers with the Lebanon, Transjordan and Egypt. But they have no territorial access to a proper port. For Acre and Gaza are only sheltered roadsteads and Jaffa is buried in the Jewish coastal zone. The Jewish lay-out is even more awkward. The shallow beach-head on the Mediterranean has three Palestine Arab frontiers to watch, and the two outposts will have additional Arab neighbours in Syria, Transjordan and Egypt, all of whom are openly hostile to the creation of the Jewish State. And for the long-suffering travelling public of neither Arab nor Jewish nationality, after Partition no less than four separate permits or visas will be required—for instance—for the simple journey from Cairo to Jerusalem either by road or rail.

The second problem concerns the minorities in the two States. The cardinal facts of their dilemma can be stated bluntly. Moslem Law will be enforced in the Arab State; in the Jewish State it will be a blend of Talmudic and Socialist law. And each State will have a constitution of its own. Again, the minorities in both States—but more particularly the much larger Arab minority in the Jewish State—are mainly vested land-

proprietors : villagers and settlement dwellers. Both are individualistic by nature. Both have deep ties in the land they own. Both will be fearful of the new order of things. And both correspond in a sense with that category of irredentist populations which, throughout history down to the days of the Sudeten Germans, have been sources of friction.

The leaders of the Jewish Agency have declared their preparedness to set up the new Jewish State, and no one need doubt that this is so. But their enthusiasm and their capacity for organization are going to be additionally tested to the full by their own domestic Jewish community problems. Their main preoccupation will be financial. The original ideal of Zionism was the "close settlement of Jewish immigrants on the land." Vast financial support for this settlement policy came from charitable Jewish donations mainly subscribed in South Africa and America. But latterly—and particularly during the last twelve years—there has been a swing from the original ideals of the movement ; and since the great influx of immigrants from Germany between 1933 and 1936, great Jewish industrial developments have been set afoot with the implied policy that Jewry in Palestine was aiming at becoming the industrial emporium of the Middle East. The result has been a great population drift to the towns. During the war these new Palestine industries worked for the Allies and prospered ; but since 1945 this war market has ended and in addition the boycott of Zionist goods by the Arab Middle East has not been ineffective. The outcome has been a slump and unemployment in the towns, the dangers of which are financial collapse and a serious lowering of Jewish standards of living. Funds still arrive generously from abroad and financial support for the new Jewish State in its teething days will certainly continue to be lavish from America and South Africa in particular. But the industrial prosperity of the country depends on the supply of raw materials, of which Palestine and certainly Jewish Palestine is painfully short. Into the bargain, even given raw materials, Jewish industry in Palestine, if it is to survive, needs the Arab market in the Middle East where alone it has a chance of competing successfully with imported goods from Europe, America and the East. That Arab market will be denied until friendly relations are established with the Arab League.

Next, there is the immigration problem of the new Jewish State. Obviously the gates of Palestine will have to be opened ; for sentimentally there can be no longer any restrictions on the lines of "absorptive capacity". Again, with an eye to political bargaining in the future, Jewish immigration will certainly be encouraged in such numbers as will bring the Jewish population in size up to or above that of the Arab population in the new Arab State. But how can these new immigrants be supported ? Where will the work for them be found ? Where, other than from charity, will the funds come from to maintain those who fail to find employment ? In fact, will this new immigrant influx increase unemployment and thus imperil the present high standards of Jewish

living in Palestine ?

One other disturbing fact must also be mentioned in this connection. It concerns the Jewish orange industry. It has recently been officially announced that the sweet water supplies in the coastal plain have shown sporadic signs of exhaustion from over-exploitation for the irrigation of the groves. This is a fact of nature which, like unemployment and the maintenance of Jewish standards of living, will be the responsibility of the new Jewish Government to tackle.

Finally there is the high problem of the possible reaction of the existing local Jewish population in Palestine to the present and future conditions of economic depression and violence and the consequent lowering of the standards of living and security. Similar economic conditions in 1927 resulted in Jewish emigration from Palestine exceeding the immigration figure by over 2,000 persons. This isolated incident of the past should not be given exaggerated importance. Nevertheless, for the last year or more there has been talk—to some extent substantiated by fact—of a considerable increase in the demand for visas to America and this country by well-to-do Jews who now wish to leave Palestine for good. What their numbers are, no one knows. But it is known that in view of the bargaining asset of the maintenance of the Jewish population in Palestine, the authorities which control the Jewish community—and their control is drastic—place every objection in the way of those who now wish to seek a new life outside Palestine.

The policy of the Arabs, in all the stages leading up to the General Assembly's final vote, had been negative until they produced their eleventh-hour offer to accept a federalized government for Palestine. With its rejection by the American and Russian delegates and the subsequent adoption of Partition, they withdrew into blank opposition. Thus the United Nations Commission cannot expect any constructive Arab co-operation over the next six months, which we must regretfully anticipate will be marred by Arab-Jewish violence and bloodshed.

In this test of strength the Jews are relying on the superior organization of their resistance and their main agent will be the redoubtable and well-disciplined Hagana, which will now become the Jewish defence force. But its responsibilities are wide and the protection of the scattered and often isolated Jewish colonies as well as the maintenance of communications through a difficult and hostile countryside, will severely dissipate its available manpower. Behind the physical military force of the Hagana, there are two psychological factors on which Jewish hopes of success are inevitably relying.

The first is bribery. I will quote from a recent conversation with a distinguished Jewish friend of long experience in the Middle East. "The Jew," he said, "knows that every Arab has his price ; and," he added to prove his point, "I'm told that already there are Jewish arms dumps in the Lebanon, Sinai and Transjordan which are actually looked after by

Arab Sheikhs in Jewish pay. They were put there to escape the British Army's searches in Palestine." What truth there is in such assertions is open to doubt. But the story runs the rounds and creates psychological distrust between Arab and Arab as to their national integrity and devotion to the cause.

The second factor is more direct. The Jews will be fighting for the existence of the new Jewish State and in this "life and death struggle" as it is naturally represented in Jewish publicity, half measures will go nowhere. Already Arab villages have been surprised by unconcealed visits from Hagana units threatening them with the most violent reprisals if there are anti-Jewish incidents in their vicinity. The list of successful Jewish reprisals against the British over the last two years of Jewish terrorism has bred the belief among Arabs that such Jewish threats are not empty threats; and the psychological effect of this organized inculcation of fear—which is horribly reminiscent of other times of very recent memory in Europe—is a real Jewish weapon in these desperate days.

Finally, from a purely military standpoint the Jews have two advantages—a single command and interior lines of communication.

The problem of concerted Arab action has always been jeopardized by family, dynastic and national rivalries and jealousies. These have to some extent been neutralized by the Arab League which, as a machine, has co-ordinating potentialities—particularly in the direction of recruiting manpower and finance to assist the Arab resistance in Palestine. But the personal direction of what must sadly be called "military operations" is as complicated and delicate as was our own Allied Command during the late war. For there will certainly be rival Arab claimants for supreme control.

The Arabs in Palestine have, however, one asset of value. Potential reinforcements, arms and money can be infiltrated into Palestine without let or hindrance across the open frontiers which it shares with the Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Transjordan; and such declarations as have been made in Palestine itself and in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman and Cairo indicate that the opposition to Partition will concentrate on guerrilla tactics to which, as the British forces in Palestine well know, the terrain lends itself easily. The forces which will undertake this programme are not precisely disclosed, nor is it possible to hazard the rôle which may be played by the Transjordan Arab Legion, the best armed and disciplined Arab force on the Palestine frontiers. The Legion is under the supreme command of King Abdulla who, apart from his personal ambitions in the direction of kingship over a Greater Syria, may be feeling very sore with the Russians who have not only sponsored Partition but have also vetoed Transjordan's admission to membership of the United Nations.

As far as is known, there are as yet no Arab plans for the administrative organization of the three Palestine zones allocated to the Arab State under the Partition plan. But a possibility is the formation of an emergency

Arab Government for all Palestine, to take over the organization of the Palestine Resistance Movement. In it the rôle of Haj Amin el Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, will be vital. He has a position and a reputation; but he is an individualist and has yet to prove his ability to overcome his personal feuds and jealousies and to weld Arab opinion of all shades in Palestine and beyond its borders into an effective, disciplined and loyal whole.

This very gloomy appreciation of the possibilities which the United Nations Interim Commission has to face may of course prove to be exaggerated. But animosities are so highly concentrated and the local atmosphere of Palestine and the Middle East is so inflammable that any wishful attempt to minimize these possibilities would be dishonest.

The acceptance of the Partition scheme will go down in history as primarily the work of two nations—America and Russia. And already Moslem opinion everywhere and a large section of non-Moslem opinion at large has, on its own, found a popular and not at all flattering explanation of this unexpected alliance in unanimity over what is, of course, a purely political decision. It is that the American Government hopes to gain the support of the Jewish vote in the Presidential Elections of November 1948, while the Russians are backing the Jews as potential Communist missionaries in the Near and Middle East which the Soviets, with eyes on Haifa harbour, are hoping to penetrate. This blunt statement may be grossly unfair. But it would be insincere to deny that this widespread explanation of the American and Russian votes is very generally accepted.

Shortly after the Partition decision was taken, I met a hard-boiled American who belonged to the Republican party and lived in and on American politics. We discussed the vote at Lake Success and, after much frank talk which was mainly centred on past British incompetence in Palestine, he summed up his views. "You've heard of Nebuchadnezzar," he said, "and you've heard of Harry Truman. Well, listen now; and when you're listening, remember that Nebuchadnezzar and Harry are the same person in this doggerel." And this is what he recited:

Nebuchadnezzar the King of the Jews
Sold his wife for a pair of shoes.
When the shoes began to wear,
Nebuchadnezzar began to swear.
As the shoes got worse and worse,
Nebuchadnezzar began to curse.
When the shoes were bust to the wide,
Nebuchadnezzar lay down and died.

"And", laughed my friend, "in a year all the Jews in New York will be voting against Harry; while his "wife"—the Wall Street oil interests in the Arab Middle East—will be after him like a pack of wolves."

One more story. Who, to-day, remembers that the powder which kindled the Crimean War, was touched off by a spark lit in—of all places—

the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem? The story was told to me in the grotto of the Birth itself by a Christian Arab whose family had for generations been official guides in the Church. The Latin and the Greek priesthood, he said, had come to blows over their sectional rights in the Grotto of the Birth, and Christendom rang with protests and counter-protests while Napoleon III took up the Latin cause and the Czar Nicholas I that of the Greek Church. In an eleventh-hour effort to patch up a solution, the Turkish Vali, as representative of the power responsible for peace and order in the Church, invited the French and Russian Consul Generals to state their cases on the spot. They came. Neither would budge an inch; arguments led to high words; and eventually the Russian stumped off up one stairway to the Greek Convent and the Frenchman up the other to the Latin Church. That was the spark, and it was lit where the Christian message was first heard: "On earth peace, goodwill toward men." My friend shrugged his shoulders. "What did Napoleon and Nicholas care? They were playing power politics."

It is poignantly sad that our much-loved, tiny and holy Palestine cannot—at any rate yet—be a single Palestinian State. Were it not for the violence of Arab-Jewish antipathies and for their fomentation from outside Palestine, such a State would be the normal solution. It would eliminate the horrible intricacies of the proposed inter-State frontiers; it would centralize policy, finance and the utility services; each community could have reassuring powers of local government; and it would be far cheaper and—in the end—much less dangerous. These reflections imply—on my part—no bias, either pro-Arab or pro-Jewish. To me they are common sense. The Arabs proposed such a programme at Lake Success and tens of thousands of non-political Jews would accept it—even to-day. But Palestine in 1947, as it was in 1853, is the toy of power politics and that is that. Still, common sense always wins in the long run.

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THE RUSSIAN ZONE OF GERMANY

BY A BERLIN CORRESPONDENT

THE problem of the "iron curtain" over a part of Europe is too often discussed by British writers from the point of view of their political outlook. To newspaper correspondents who live in Berlin, however, it is not a matter of opinion but of fact. This "curtain" stretches along the Western frontier of the Russian Zone of Germany; and, in such a way, that with the exception of Berlin, which is a fifth zone under Quadripartite control, the country to the east of that curtain is closed to all free inquiry. No correspondent can work there as he does in any western democracy. In fact, he is not allowed into that zone except on periodical, carefully-controlled tours.

From the time he leaves Berlin until the time he returns, the correspondent has to travel as a member of a group, which is accompanied by a member of the Russian Secret Service (N.K.V.D.). This guide is generally a person who knows very little German, and who remains in the background once he has handed you over to the local section of the Press Department of the Soviet Military Government in a particular area. There is no question of a correspondent roving round and getting information for himself. If he should leave the group for a moment to talk to a German, or tarry too long with a German official in a bureau or a factory, there is always a Russian at hand listening to the conversation and ready to make some lame excuse about pressure of time. To get permission to go over any place like a concentration camp or a uranium mine is impossible.

In consequence, it may be correctly stated that it is as difficult to be rightly informed of what is happening in the Russian Zone as in certain countries of central and south-east Europe. So much is kept secret regarding political and economic developments, or is misrepresented, that an overall picture is a matter of much sifting of information from many sources. Fortunately, however, Berlin is not completely controlled by the Russians, so that a great deal of information does seep through.

The Russian Zone covers most of Germany east of the River Elbe (except Berlin), and includes the *Laender* of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. It joins on to the British and American zones, in the North and West, and to Czechoslovakia and Poland, in the South and East. The *Autobahn* and the railway, from Helmstedt to Berlin, and the air route are the only international connections inside the Russian Zone.

This eastern zone is mainly agricultural. Poland has taken the Silesian

coalfield. During their two-and-a-half years of occupation the Russians have done everything possible to integrate this territory into the political and economic system of eastern Europe. This policy has been accompanied by the taking of as much in reparations, both in the form of capital equipment and of current production, as possible. The story of the dismantlings is now a matter of history. All outstanding industrial plants have been stripped of everything that could be transported eastwards. This action has, however, been carried out in so careless and unscientific a manner, that much of this equipment has either become rusty and unusable *en route* or is still held up at Brest-Litovsk, the most important railway station where the Russian wide-gauge lines begin. The Russians also early realized that they required not only the plant, but also the skilled workmen to re-assemble and work it. As a result, hundreds of "spezi"—as the Russians call the experts—have been "voluntarily" sent eastward for such tasks. A classic example of the method followed was that employed in the case of the famous Zeiss Works, Jena. More than 200 of its best workers were rounded up in the early hours of the morning at the point of a Russian bayonet, at their homes, and ordered to leave immediately.

The re-organization of agriculture was one of the early tasks carried out by the Germans, under Russian direction. A sweeping land reform, without any compensation to former owners, was introduced as one of the first measures throughout the zone. That some drastic change from the former system of land ownership was essential is obvious. It was even urgent in view of the millions of German refugees arriving from territory which is now Polish, and from Czechoslovakia. At the same time, not only from the point of view of justice but also of economic results, the manner in which it was carried out leaves much to be desired.

This land reform measure has been boosted in the Russian-sponsored German press as the greatest of post-war achievements in this country. It extended to thirty per cent. of all workable agricultural land in the east zone, and applied to 3,000,000 hectares. Of these, 2,000,000 were parcelled out to some 500,000 refugee families, and the rest continue to be worked by public corporations, which therefore are now the largest landowners in the area. Results up to now show that the new settlers have not contributed to agricultural production what was expected of them. This is not surprising in view of the following facts. Between all of them, only 220,000 animals—cattle, sheep and goats—were distributed. This did not amount to one animal per family. Many of them have neither a cow nor a pig, while the average number of chickens to a farmyard is four. Some 60,000 houses and 70,000 cattle sheds and barns have also to be built before these new farmers are properly settled in. Drought, the lack of fertilizers and of draught animals are responsible for a great deal of the failure hitherto. But even when full allowance has been made for conditions over which neither the Russians nor the

farmers had control, the fact still remains that in view of the poor quality of the soil in many areas, the size of the average farm—five to ten hectares—is too small to make it self-supporting, even in normal years.

In industry, production is now about forty per cent. of that of 1946, which is good compared with that of the western zones, especially in view of the dismantlings. Production has however been falling during the present year, especially in the coal mines. During 1946 the output reached 9,600,000 tons a month of brown coal—there is little other coal in the zone—or sixty per cent. of the 1943 figure. The highest output for 1947 has been 8,200,000 tons, and there seems little chance of its being increased. The reasons for the falling off are many; but chief among them are poor food and lack of clothing and adequate fuel for the miners, and their growing conviction that there is little point in working hard merely to see the coal being used for reparations. Further dismantlings (despite the Russians' earlier statement that these had ended months ago) also add to the indifference of the miners. Recent dismantlings have seriously affected the transport situation. In many parts of the zone to-day there are only single-track railway lines where there were double-tracks at the end of the war. In Mecklenburg, for example, the position to-day is said to be what it was in 1914.

Reparations are taken by the Russians in the form of both capital equipment and in contributions from current production. This latter method is made all the easier by the fact that Russian syndicates now own or control most of the industry in the zone. Reliable estimates show that sixty per cent. of the total industrial capacity is Russian-owned; and that of the remainder, sixty per cent. of the textile production, ninety per cent. of metal goods, eighty-five per cent. of leather goods and 100 per cent. of glass and porcelain are in Russian hands. The famous Meissen porcelain factory is reported to have been "bought" for RM 1,500,000, and the trade mark of the crossed swords has been replaced by the hammer-and-sickle.

The political and cultural activities of the Russian Zone naturally received special attention from the occupying authorities and the German communists associated with them, from the beginning. As in all countries where they have had to deal with the division of the workers into communists and socialists, the Russians came forward with the slogan: "Unity of the Workers against capitalism, reaction and fascism." In practice this resulted here as elsewhere in a "co-ordinating" (*Gleichschaltung*) of the political parties in a single party, controlled by the communists. Here, it appeared under the name of the Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.), and led by men like Wilhelm Pieck and Walther Ulbricht, who had spent years between the two wars not in concentration camps, but in Soviet Russia. Some former Social Democrats joined the S.E.D., but the majority of the prominent ones who refused either left the eastern zone, or have been arrested and are now in prisons or concentration camps,

or have been sent eastwards. It was not surprising under the conditions then operating that the S.E.D. should have emerged as the leading party in the zone. What was surprising, and gratifying, was that so many Germans had the courage to vote freely. The result was far stronger support of the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democrats than was to be expected (the Social Democrats were prevented from participating in the election). Had the elections been conducted under the same conditions as in Berlin on October 20, 1946, the S.E.D. would have received about thirty per cent. of the votes actually cast for them!

Political business in the various diets or state parliaments is carried on under a system which is superficially democratic, but which actually ensures that the S.E.D. gets its own way in all essential matters. This system is the so-called "bloc system" whereby the agenda of the diet is settled beforehand by negotiations between the political parties, and free discussion in the diet is a farce. Even so, the S.E.D. has failed on a number of occasions to put through some of its more blatant proposals, as for example, when in Saxony-Anhalt, the diet refused to agree to the censorship of the postal service "in order to check black market activities."

Despite the strong direct and indirect pressure brought to bear on political life by the Russian Military Government in the interests of the S.E.D., that party is far from popular among the Germans who see in it a mere tool of the U.S.S.R. The Russians would like to find some other means of winning over the population to their side, but since they gave their support so undividedly to the S.E.D. from the first moment, this embarrassing connection cannot so easily be discarded.

The Russians have been active and alert in their propaganda especially through the press and numerous publications. They never seem to lack newsprint, as do the military governments of the other zones, and can turn out newspapers, magazines and books in unlimited quantities. The Leipzig printing presses are working overtime trying to fulfil the propaganda demands of the eastern zone and eastern Europe. In a bookshop in one large city some months ago an exhibition of literature was held. The main window was full of communist publications all for sale; in a side window were some old editions of Dickens, Scott, Wilde and Shaw, but each of them carried the sign "not for sale". And it was not that they had any antiquarian value!

There is an agreement between the four occupying powers whereby there shall be a free circulation of newspaper and literature throughout all Germany. This was agreed at the Moscow Conference but hitherto very few publications from the western zones have found their way to Germans in the Russian Zone. In the past, anybody there found reading the *Neue Zeitung* or *Der Tagesspiegel* (American licensed papers) or the publications of the Social-Democrats has been branded as a "fascist" or "anti-democrat".

Talking to Germans from the Russian Zone, one finds that their chief

complaint against the Russian occupation is not concerned with lack of food or of work, but the fear for their personal safety and liberty. Not only is there no freedom of the press or of public opinion as understood in the western democracies, but there is also the constant fear of arrest and deportation on flimsy charges—or no charges whatever. Habeas corpus is unknown in the Russian Zone. The number of people, including women and children, who have been suddenly rounded up and sent to unknown destinations, without any word being given to their relatives or being received from them for months after, must run into thousands. (This, of course, does not include the hundreds of thousands of German prisoners-of-war, about whom little is definitely known to their relatives.)

Much propaganda is made in the Russian-sponsored German press about the cruelties of the Nazi concentration camps; but nothing is said about conditions in many of these same camps to-day. They have long been used for similar purposes. The only difference appears to be that the present inmates are Social Democrats, "recalcitrant" landowners and other Germans who have incurred Russian displeasure. (Some of those people who talk so glibly about freedom of movement in the Russian Zone, might try to get right inside Buchenwald Concentration Camp, and report what they see and who they meet there!)

Education has been given special attention. School guidance books for teachers, which are now being published, show that history is treated completely from the communist point of view, with the materialist conception of history as the central dogma. Religion is officially stated to be the private concern of the individual, and the religious instruction of the child is no longer a concern of the school, but of the parent. There is no open oppression, but a great deal of "spying" on congregations goes on; in a number of cases it is known that pastors report periodically to the local Russian authorities about the activities of their members.

Though the Russian sector of Berlin is officially not a part of the Russian Zone, there is no doubt but that the Soviet authorities would like to make it such. The zone is actually directed from the headquarters of the Russian Military Government, in Berlin-Karlshorst. But as long as the American, British and French governments are represented in this fifth zone, such a co-ordination is impossible. If it should ever happen, then the Russian control east of the Elbe River will be complete.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that though the Russians rule their zone more strictly than do the other occupying powers, the Germans have not been won over to Russian ideas. These same Germans are looking westward, to Washington and London, not to Moscow for future help. This is not simply because they have lost so much territory to the Poles through Soviet support, but because they feel more strongly than ever before that they belong to the West and not to the East.

THE ONLY WAY TO PEACE

BY J. MIDDLETON MURRY

IT is a rare and satisfying experience to read a book on the world-situation to-day which sees both the wood and the trees, which combines dispassionate objectivity in rendering the details of the complex tangle, with an impassioned emphasis on the significance of the spiritual pattern into which the tangle, seen by the eye of imagination, resolves. Sir Harold Butler's *Peace or Power* is such a book.* The contrast implied in our description between the dispassionate and the impassioned is superficial, and cannot be sustained. There is a passion for truth, and a passion for righteousness: and the one cannot live without the other. They are a single passion. It is this twofold passion which is the spiritual dynamic of Western civilization, in so far as it retains vitality. Sir Harold's book has it. It derives from the finer spirit of that civilization, and appeals to it. It is at once comprehensive and clear, charitable and uncompromising.

The author's technical qualifications for making a survey and a synthesis of this order are probably unique. Between the wars he was the head of the International Labour Office, the organization created by the League of Nations which, by reason of the excellence of its information and its palpable disinterestedness, came to command more general respect than any other of its organs. He thus acquired an unrivalled knowledge of the actual situation in the European countries. During the war he served as Minister of Information at the British Embassy in Washington, and thus acquired a sympathetic understanding of the motives and policy of U.S.A., the difficulties and desires of that great democracy in its massive adjustment to the unfamiliar responsibilities of leadership. Sir Harold's position has been on the margin of official authority. He has had the opportunities of the exalted view, and the opportunity of detachment; and he has profited by both.

This unusual knowledge leads to certain unusual emphases which give a powerful originality to the author's view. For instance, though we are all familiar, in the abstract, with the material devastation of Europe wrought by two world wars, it does not make a deep impact upon our consciousness. But one feels, in the case of Sir Harold, that it has become the permanent background of his thinking. The awareness is not intermittent; it is there all the time. One might say that he perceives and

* *Peace or Power*. By Harold Butler. Faber & Faber. 15s.

ponders as a good European, but the familiar phrase has to carry a new nuance of meaning. The kind of good European that Sir Harold is is acutely aware that the European idea is not localized in Europe. It has spread, in its most universal and viable form, and mainly by the agency of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, to the United States and the British Commonwealth. It is a political and moral idea.

Most of the political apparatus with which the West has equipped itself from Magna Charta onwards has been designed to curb the arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of power. That after all is the first condition of liberty, whether of men or of nations. At the cost of long struggle and sacrifice it has been established as a sacred principle in all democratic communities. It cannot be established in the society of nations at a lesser price.

But this idea has never taken real root in the East, to which, by reason of its non-participation in the great formative experiences and institutions of the West, Russia essentially belongs. The concept of one world, in which the nations live in harmony because of their adherence to the common principle that justice must be achieved and can only be achieved by the restraint of arbitrary power, is alien to Russia. Her tradition ignores such a principle; and the Communist creed which she has imposed upon herself by oriental methods categorically denies its validity. Hence the whole effort of Russian propaganda and Russian diplomacy, since the war, has been "to suggest that the world is divided into two incompatible types of society." They thwarted at every turn the deep desire of the United States to make the United Nations a reality. Inevitably the United States has reacted. If it "has felt compelled to apply the weight of its power to keep the world in balance, it is only because the Soviet had declined to join in a common enterprise for peace."

On this fundamental issue Sir Harold is completely uncompromising; and that is an enormous relief after the moral woolliness with which so many of those who seek peace between Russia and the West are afflicted to-day. How frequent, and how nauseating, is the assumption that, simply because the antagonism between Russia and the West does threaten the peace of the world, or rather threatens to prevent the world from finding its arduous way back to peace, *therefore* it is six of one and a half-dozen of the other; that the attitude of the peace-seeker must necessarily be one which sees equal right, and equal wrong on both sides. This feeble and immoral conception of impartiality is itself a sign of degeneracy. It betokens an intellectual and moral paralysis.

The utmost objectivity in considering the facts; the utmost trenchancy in passing judgment on them when they have been objectively considered—that is what is demanded of the Westerner by all that is noblest in his tradition. Sir Harold fulfils the demand, to my sense, completely. His exposition of the facts is scrupulously fair. For example, he shows how the "democratic" governments instituted in Eastern Europe after the German defeat in 1918 were largely fictitious, because of the poverty and illiteracy of the peasants who were always the majority, and often the

overwhelming majority, of the population. Honest democracy was therefore out of the question, when the elections were rigged and the nominal voters terrorized. Except in Czechoslovakia, the democratic governments of Eastern Europe were corrupt, incapable and humbug. The necessary prerequisite of genuine democracy was therefore agrarian revolution—the expropriation of the great feudal land-owners and the distribution of their lands. This necessary revolution was feared and suppressed. Those who advocated it were denounced as Communists, whether they were in fact Communists or not, and liquidated with extreme brutality. The inevitable consequence was that for the peasants, completely ignorant of Marxist theory, Communist was the generic name of their only friends. The Communists would give them the land.

And the Communists have given them the land, which both the illusory parliamentary régimes favoured by the Western powers and the authoritarian régimes which succeeded them were determined not to do. It is obvious that against such a background of experience, the Soviet claim to be the defenders of true democracy, both against the sham democracy favoured by the West, and the Fascism which superseded it, has a force that most Westerners are loth to admit. It is one of Sir Harold's most valuable achievements in this book that he makes this so clear that the unbiassed reader is compelled to the conclusion that in the main, in this particular sphere of Eastern Europe, the Soviet claim is justified. There is, of course, a glaring exception to this generalization. The eclipse of the genuine peasant democracies which had been established in the Baltic States has been a terrible price to pay for the emancipation of the peasantry in the Balkans, in Hungary and Poland. Moreover, under the corrupt parliamentary régimes there was a degree of personal freedom, which has been extinguished by the secret police common to both Fascism and Communism. But, even when we have given full weight to the dark side of the agrarian revolution which the Russian power has fostered, we cannot in honesty refuse to admit that, so far as Eastern Europe is concerned, the Russian power has been on the whole beneficent, and that the Russian claim that Communism has sponsored "true democracy" as opposed to the false democracy sponsored by the West is more true than false. When the claim is made to the peasants who have been emancipated—and it is to them that it is chiefly made—the claim is practically irrefutable. It corresponds to their experience; it speaks to their condition.

It is imperative that the defenders of the West should make this acknowledgment, and realize that parliamentary democracy is fatally compromised in the greater part of Eastern Europe; not merely by the cruel experience which the peasants have had of an evil caricature of parliamentary government in their own countries, but by the open support which the parliamentary governments of the West, partly through unpardonable ignorance, partly through a craven fear of Communism, and partly through their own subservience to commercial and financial interests, gave to those corrupt

parliamentary régimes, and to the pinchbeck dictators who succeeded them. The bitter experience of the Director of the I.L.O. speaks in Sir Harold's verdict.

Because so many of the political bosses, like Dollfuss, Beck, Tzvetkovich and Tartaescu, were courted and fêted by Western statesmen and diplomats, the ideas which were preached in London, Paris and Geneva became fly-blown and suspect in the eyes of the Eastern proletariat.

The West has lost Eastern Europe, because it deserved to lose it. Whether Russia can keep it is another matter. There are weak spots in the new united front. There is Czechoslovakia, which though basely betrayed by the democracies of the West, has the fundamental principles of democracy deeply rooted in her tradition from the days of Huss. There is the more equivocal Poland whose link with the West is rather through Roman Catholicism than any political and moral affinity. And, behind these, is the fundamental problem of supplying the economic needs of Eastern Europe, which will not be easily solved by Soviet Russia.

The West may yet have an enormous power of attraction for these still debatable lands. But the condition of its possessing such a power is a radical change in the West. It must become conscious of what it stands for. The negativity of democracy must change to positivity. In other words, democracy must will its own continued existence. The great difficulty which it has in so doing is manifest in the parlous situation of the key-democracy of France, where the atomism and individualism engendered by negative democracy appear to have largely destroyed the moral cohesion necessary to the existence of a national society. There the peasants and the *bourgeoisie*, emancipated by the French Revolution, by clinging to their own selfish interests, have virtually conspired to prevent social justice being done to the industrial worker, whose just discontents are now being exploited by the Communists precisely in order to prevent a renaissance of democracy in Western Europe. Here, as ever, Sir Harold, though his book was written some months before the present crisis in France, is a safe and illuminating guide. His pages on the political and social condition of France are masterly.

But behind the various vicissitudes, and the greater or less degree of jeopardy, of particular democracies to-day, is the fundamental question posed in the title of Sir Harold's book. The question is: shall it be Peace or Power? And, in the last resort, it must be affirmed categorically that the only way to peace is the way of Western democracy. For, whatever be its historical shortcomings, the fact is that only the methods of authentic political democracy—the willing submission of the minority to the majority in the confidence that its submission will not be abused—can secure the peace of the world. Without that, nothing is left but the pitting of power against power. Just as in the national democracies themselves the survival depends upon a new conception of the positive duties of the democratic citizen, so in the world-society the survival depends upon an equally new and corollary conception of the positive duties of one nation

to another, in the economic sphere and in the maintenance of the world's peace.

These new conceptions of positive democracy, domestic and international, are taking shape. The great U.S.A. has been the pioneer in positive international democracy; and Congress is now in travail of that new birth. Britain, incapable for the moment of action on this grand scale, may fairly claim to be the pioneer of positive domestic democracy. For an exhausted nation to have plunged, however blindly, into her present effort at social regeneration is something of which we may be proud. Both these efforts at further incarnation of the Kingdom of God have all "the scandal of particularity" of which modern theology speaks, reminiscently; but it is a pity that the religious are not more aware of new incarnations when they are actually happening. The more so because these efforts have need of every atom of spiritual energy on which they can call. Sir Harold's book is a summons to that dedication "to a new morality and a new faith" to which every thinking man will respond.

THE JUDAS TREE

BY FRED A. C. BOND

After the bombers had passed, that April morning,
I saw the ruined street and the Judas tree;
Its crimson, sinister blossoms spattered the pavement,
Its limbs were blasted: the symbol of treachery
Trailed in the dust, struck down
When the wind from the jaws of midnight swept the town.

Who would have prophesied the second flowering?
While still the fallen masonry strewn the path
The shattered branches broke into crimson blossom,
A beautiful, malignant aftermath.
The Judas tree lives on
Although the postern where it bloomed is gone.

The cycle of years revolves, and out of the ruins
Of lands and peoples a new growth burgeons now.
Are the leaves of the tree for the healing of the nations?
Will the fruit of Paradise redden upon the bough?
Or will it be
But a second flowering of the Judas tree?

BRITAIN'S PLACE IN CIVIL AVIATION

BY DOUGLAS COLYER

THE structure of civil aviation as it exists in this country rests upon the authority of three Acts of Parliament, the first two of which, the Ministry of Civil Aviation Act and the Civil Aviation Act, regulate its domestic organization, and the third, the Air Navigation Act 1947, governs its international relationships.

Governmental control of civil aviation in the United Kingdom dates from the period immediately following the 1914-1918 war, when a Civil Aviation Department was set up in the Air Ministry charged with the responsibility for administering civil air legislation. Through the years between the wars, the responsibility of this Department, controlled by a Director General directly under the authority of the Secretary of State for Air, grew in scope and complexity. Whereas it had first seemed desirable to leave British air transport to support itself, it was soon obvious that it could not compete on these terms with the air services of foreign countries which were receiving substantial subsidies from their Governments. A policy of subsidization was therefore adopted and civil air transport continued to run as a co-operative effort between State and private enterprise until 1939, when the outbreak of war put an end to its normal activities, though it continued to function unbrokenly, under State control, throughout the period of hostilities.

As the war drew towards its conclusion, it became clear that drastic action would be necessary if this country were to be prepared to take the place in post-war civil aviation to which its position as a world power and its responsibilities entitled it. The War Cabinet therefore set up a committee to study the question in October 1943, and its recommendations were incorporated in the Ministry of Civil Aviation Act of 1945 and the Civil Aviation Act of 1946.

The first of these Acts provides for the appointment of a Minister of Civil Aviation (though Lord Swinton had in fact been appointed the first Minister in October 1944), and lays down his functions. He "shall be charged with the general duty of organizing, carrying out and encouraging measures for the development of civil aviation, for the designing, development and production of civil aircraft, for the promotion of safety and efficiency in the use thereof, and for research into questions relating to air navigation."

The Civil Aviation Act of 1946 defined the scope of the Minister's responsibilities, made him responsible for the acquisition of land and the

administration of the aerodromes required for air transport services, and created corporations to operate air transport services under State control. As a result, the Ministry of Civil Aviation assumed the status of a first class Department of State, administered by a Permanent Secretary, and was greatly expanded to deal with its additional functions. By May 1947, the headquarters staff of the Ministry numbered 1,450, another 3,500 being employed at outstations; a total of 4,950, as compared with the 273 persons who formed the staff of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation in the Air Ministry at the outbreak of the late war. It is anticipated that when the Ministry's programme of public aerodromes has been completed the total number employed directly by the Ministry will be about 11,000.

Since the direct control by the Ministry itself of the various aerodromes and their complex organizations throughout the United Kingdom would present serious difficulties, it was decided to decentralize this control into four divisions, with headquarters in London, Prestwick, Bristol and Manchester or Liverpool respectively. The controllers of these four divisions will be responsible for the normal administration of the airfields within their divisions, the heads of the specialized services located on the airfields having, however, direct access to their departmental chiefs at the Ministry in London. Under the divisional controllers, each airfield has its own aerodrome commandant.

The corporations created by the Act are three in number, and possess a monopoly of scheduled air services. British Overseas Airways Corporation operates services across the North Atlantic and throughout the Empire and the Far East; British European Airways Corporation is responsible for internal and European routes; British South American Airways Corporation serves South America and the Caribbean. The members of the Boards of these corporations are appointed by and are responsible to the Minister of Civil Aviation. They are bound to carry out the directions issued to them by the Minister, who has however stated that it is his conception "that Government policy requires the freest exercise of day to day management by the Corporations direct." It is to be noted that their function is the operation of air services and not the provision of aircraft and they are forbidden to undertake the manufacture of aircraft or their accessories.

By the terms of the Act, the corporations conduct their business on the lines of a normal commercial company, so far as that is possible, their accounts being laid before Parliament annually. It was foreseen however that during a period of ten years, they would probably be operating at a loss, and up till April 1, 1956, therefore, grants may be made from the Exchequer to cover operating losses. These grants must not exceed £10,000,000 in the present year and £8,000,000 for each of the subsequent eight years.

In order that the corporations shall be in a position to plan their services for a given year, it is clear that they must have the blessing of the Ministry

for any estimated deficiency in revenue on the year's running. For this reason, they are directed to submit programmes of proposed services, and the Ministry and the Treasury then decide whether or not a grant shall be made to them for that particular year. The Ministry have stated that "it is hoped to provide an incentive to economical operation by fixing the grants (or the basis thereof) before or early in the year to which they relate." Nevertheless, for the current year, there was a serious lag in the approval of programmes submitted by the corporations, due to a variety of reasons connected with the purchase of suitable types of aircraft and the availability of airfields. In fairness to the corporations, such time lags must clearly be reduced to a minimum in the future. The estimates for the year ending March 31, 1948, provide for grants of £5 million to B.O.A.C., £2½ million to B.E.A.C. and £¼ million to B.S.A.A.C., but these are made up partly of balances due for 1946-1947 and partly of advances on account of grants for 1947-1948. It is expected that these latter grants will finally amount to £7½ million, £2 million and £¼ million for B.O.A.C., B.E.A.C. and B.S.A.A.C. respectively.*

In the planning of programmes, the provision of suitable aircraft to operate the services proposed is of the first importance, and it is here that the need for clear understanding between the corporations and Government departments is most apparent. The present arrangements involve quadrilateral negotiations between the constructors, the operating companies and the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Supply. The reasons for this are of course mainly financial. The cost of developing a new aircraft, especially if new techniques are involved, is beyond the means of the constructor or the operating company alone. It is only the Government which can provide the necessary funds.†

For such a system to work satisfactorily, there must be the closest co-operation and a genuine measure of give and take. Though it is apparent from evidence given before the Select Committee that the corporations and the constructors would like to have greater autonomy than they have at present in the choice of types and the placing of orders for aircraft, the system appears to have worked fairly satisfactorily.‡ The Government decision to concentrate on British-built aircraft, even at the expense of some temporary acceptance of less suitable types for interim operation, has been loyally accepted by the corporations.

The complete concentration of the British aircraft industry on military aircraft during the war has placed our constructors temporarily at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Americans, but it is reasonable to believe that the lag will be made up and, in the meantime, British constructors have been able to profit by the experience gained in their wartime efforts, to produce interim types deriving directly from combat aircraft, and to

* Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates Session 1946-47, pp. vii and viii.

† See *The Economist*, October 18, 1947.

‡ Sixth Report of Select Committee on Estimates 1946-47, pp. 165-174.

apply the lessons learned in war to the design of real civil aircraft to follow them. There are already on the stocks a number of civil aircraft which are in no way inferior, and indeed almost certainly superior, to the American aircraft which will be coming into service at the same time. The need for a programme of the aircraft types which would be required after the war was early foreseen and the Brabazon Committee Reports, from February 1943 onwards, laid down specifications for each main category of civil transport aircraft, including helicopters, ranging from the light feeder line 5/6 seater to the Brabazon I, an aircraft of 140 tons of which two prototypes have been ordered from the Bristol Aeroplane Company. The first of these prototypes should be ready to fly by mid-1948 and, if successful, will initiate a new era in the operation of air services, with a normal cruising height of 35,000 feet, carrying 100 passengers in a pressurized hull at 350 miles per hour. Such an undertaking as this, involving the expenditure of several million pounds would obviously be beyond the resources of any commercial company, and the system by which the Ministry of Supply shoulders the burden of the cost of development and the price of a limited number of prototypes appears to be the only method of making progress in such a field, notwithstanding the natural dislike on the part of operator and constructor of too close governmental control.

Though the Civil Aviation Act restricts the operation of scheduled services to the government-controlled corporations, it leaves the field open to private enterprise for the provision of 'charter' services, although it does not prevent the corporations from competing in this field also if they wish. The definition of a 'scheduled' service is not easy and different countries have interpreted it variously. The 'scheduled' journey, as defined in the Civil Aviation Act of 1946, is "one of a series of journeys which are undertaken between the same two places and which together amount to a systematic service operated in such a manner that the benefits thereof are available to members of the public from time to time seeking to take advantage of it." In this somewhat cautious phrase the key words are "systematic service" and "available to members of the public". Such services are the prerogative of the corporations, but any services operated in response to specific requirements from private individuals or organizations for their own purposes are legitimate charter operations. Equally, the carriage of freight, even on a regular service is outside the restrictions imposed by the Act. In practice, the charter operators have had little difficulty in keeping within the rules and obtaining business sufficient to keep their aircraft earning reasonable dividends. It is moreover to be noted that the Civil Aviation Act applies only to the United Kingdom and a number of British charter companies have been able to do a lucrative business from bases established outside the British Isles.

In present conditions, there exists another opening for business for the charter companies. The corporations have the right, and, indeed, the

duty to provide services where there exists a public demand. Shortage of aircraft at present makes it impossible for them to respond to all these demands from their own resources. They are, therefore, empowered to hire the aircraft of private companies to act as their agents in supplying these services—and the charter companies are in some cases running scheduled services for a longer or shorter period in the employ of one or other corporation. A recent example of this occurred during the French railway strike in June 1947, when aircraft of private companies were chartered to run a special auxiliary service to carry stranded British tourists from Paris to London.

The need for sub-contracting of this kind by the corporations on passenger routes is, however, likely to be only a temporary phase. With the production of suitable types and the development of commercial aviation to a point at which the corporations will attain financial solvency, it is probable that they will themselves be capable of catering for the needs of most of the passenger traffic upon, or deriving from, their routes overseas, in those cases where the feeder routes are not served by local companies. In these circumstances, the charter companies will probably find their most lucrative field in the carriage of freight, especially of perishable goods, where speed justifies the additional expense of air transport. The production by several British constructors of types of aircraft especially designed for freight carrying is a sign of the appreciation of this trend.

In this connection it is of interest to note that the Civil Aviation Act provides for the setting up of an Air Transport Advisory Council to consider any representations made with respect to the facilities provided by any of the three corporations and any questions relating to facilities for air transport. The Council is not concerned with any matter which is regulated by international agreement to which the British Government is a party.

This leads us to the consideration of the international aspect of civil aviation. It is perhaps in its ability to overpass geographical and national frontiers that aviation, in its commercial aspect, has its most important contribution to make to international relationships, and it is against this background that our national organization should be viewed. "The aeroplane ignores frontiers and there can be no doubt that the right organization for air services is a world air authority to own and operate such services. . . . We must be large minded in civil aviation and cast away the impediments of petty nationalism."

It was in this spirit that the International Commission for Air Navigation (I.C.A.N.), the Comité International Technique d'Experts Juridiques (CITEJA), the International Aeronautical Federation (IAF) and a number of other international bodies came into being during the years

* Mr. Ivor Thomas, Parliamentary Secretary, M.C.A., House of Commons, January 24, 1946.

between the wars. All these bodies made valuable contributions to the cause of civil aviation and, in addition, the various commonwealth conferences, by fostering air transport agreements within the Commonwealth, paved the way for wider international agreement.

The 1939-1945 war, with the great increases in range and size of aircraft and the vast expansion of transport operations which it entailed, brought the need for a real world authority to regulate civil air operations into urgent prominence. A number of exploratory talks were held between interested Allied governments and ideas began to crystallize. It became clear that there was a measure of agreement among the nations, especially as to the need for a world-wide convention to lay down rules for the orderly development of international air transport and to eliminate uneconomical competition.

A British Government White Paper was published in 1944, setting forth certain privileges which it was proposed should be reciprocally granted between the nations. These privileges have come to be known as the "Five Freedoms". They are as follows:

- (i) Freedom to fly across a country's territory without landing.
- (ii) Freedom to land for non-commercial traffic purposes (that is, for refuelling, maintenance, etc.)
- (iii) Freedom to disembark passengers, mails and freight embarked in the aircraft's country of origin.
- (iv) Freedom to embark passengers, mail and freight for carriage to the aircraft's country of origin.
- (v) Freedom to carry traffic between two foreign countries.

The White Paper proposed that the first four freedoms should be universally granted, the fifth being reserved for negotiation between individual countries.

At about the same time, the United States of America issued invitations for a conference on the subject. Representatives of fifty-four nations met in Chicago in November 1944. In the course of protracted discussions, a wide difference of view between the United Kingdom and the United States on the question of the fifth freedom became apparent and the difference proved irreconcilable.

Nevertheless, the conference was far from abortive. There emerged from it a new convention on international civil aviation embodying, to quote the preamble, "certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically." The new convention included the setting up of an International Civil Aviation Organization, whose main aims were to

- (i) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world.
- (ii) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected

and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international air lines.

(iii) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation.*

Pending the ratification of the convention by the requisite number of nations, a Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization was brought into being at Chicago to ensure co-ordination and collaboration in the international field. With its seat at Montreal, an Assembly meeting from time to time, an elected Council in permanent session and an international secretariat, P.I.C.A.O. did much valuable work on the widest range of subjects, until its metamorphosis into I.C.A.O. early in 1947. The Air Navigation Act, which received the Royal Assent on March 27, 1947, makes effective in the United Kingdom the so-called Chicago Convention and provides for the costs involved in membership of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Parallel with the convention, the conference produced an International Air Services Transit Agreement, tabled by the United States Delegation, providing for the reciprocal grant of the first two freedoms. The agreement was signed by a large number of countries, including all the member countries of the British Commonwealth, who had not felt able to subscribe to an alternative draft agreement which the United States delegation had tabled and which proposed the grant of all five freedoms between the signatories, a removal of all barriers to open competition which was quite contrary to the pattern of orderly development of air transport which, in the British view, was the correct solution of the problem.†

There remained the need for nations wishing to operate mutual commercial air services to conclude bilateral agreements. The divergent views of the United Kingdom and the United States on the pattern of future civil aviation development were at the root of the problem of organizing a workable system. Their ability or inability to make a satisfactory agreement was, therefore, of particular importance in determining the future relations of nations in this important matter. Good will on both sides was not lacking and an agreement was reached at a conference in Bermuda in 1946 which is therefore of particular interest, and has provided the pattern for a number of other bilateral agreements between the nations.

To quote the words of Sir Henry Self, who was the head of the British Delegation: "The Conference tackled the controversial issue of fifth freedom traffic. The agreement acknowledged the right to carry this class of traffic, but provides that capacity offered should be related to the traffic demand between termini and en route, after taking account of local and regional services."‡ Within these limits, the two countries

* International Civil Aviation Conference. Command 6614. H.M. Stationery Office, Appendix II.

† The Status of Civil Aviation in 1946. Second British Commonwealth and Empire lecture by Sir Henry Self. Aeronautical Reprints No. 105, Royal Aeronautical Society 1946.

‡ Op. cit.

granted to the designated air carriers of each other the right to operate commercial services enjoying all "five freedoms" through each other's territory on routes agreed between them, and agreed upon the rates to be charged for passage or freight carried on these routes.

In case of disagreement, should the two national authorities be unable to arrive at a solution, provision was made to refer the dispute to I.C.A.O. for an advisory report, which should make final agreement a reasonably simple matter.

The conclusion of the "Bermuda" agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States was an important step on the way towards making possible a multilateral agreement embodying those principles to which all members of I.C.A.O. may be able to subscribe, leaving to bilateral agreements such matters as the choice of routes to be operated and other questions of special interest to individual pairs of States. The subject was discussed at length at the First Assembly of I.C.A.O. at Montreal in May 1947 and at a Conference in Geneva in November, which unfortunately was unable to reach agreement.

In international civil aviation, the question of rate fixing is obviously of primary importance. In the United Kingdom, as in most other countries, it is recognized that the operators are as yet unable to provide services at a price attractive to the traveller and at the same time adequate to cover the cost of operating the service. While subsidies are, therefore, necessary at the moment, the health of the industry must depend on its ability to stand on its own feet as soon as may be by providing services at a price sufficiently low to create an increased demand, but which, in time, will cover the costs of efficient operation plus a reasonable profit. It is perhaps worth noting that, whereas the United States air lines are ostensibly operating without state assistance, the contracts which they receive from their Government for the carriage of mail, are, in fact, so attractive as to amount to a virtual subsidy.

The machinery for fixing rates for the services operated by the Governments signing bilateral agreements is that provided by the Regional Traffic Conferences of the International Air Transport Association, an association of air line operators formed in 1945 to which the majority of international companies belong. This association, generally known as I.A.T.A., has its headquarters in Montreal, by the side of I.C.A.O. and is the international organ for the regulation of relationships between the operators, just as I.C.A.O. is the organ regulating governmental relationships.

Such, in brief outline, is the pattern of civil aviation as it affects this country in the year 1948. Little more than two years after the end of the war, it is inevitable that there should be many gaps still to be filled and that much remains to be done before it can be certain that the organization—Ministry, corporations, aerodromes, services of all kinds—has been planned and is developing on the right lines. Much still depends on a

system of trial and error and decisions taken are frequently the object of criticism, both ill- and well-informed. The wisdom of accepting a position of temporary inferiority in aircraft in order to save dollars and encourage the British aircraft industry has been energetically debated; the degree of control exercised by ministries in the production and supply of aircraft to the corporations remains a fruitful subject of controversy. On the operational side, there are complaints of the level of landing fees at aerodromes in this country, which is much higher than is usual on the Continent, and, coupled with the high cost of petrol, on which full duty is charged when it is used in aircraft on internal services, cannot fail to have a cramping effect on the development of flying services within the British Isles.

Such problems are inherent in the period through which we are passing. Modifications will have to be made as experience is gained. The development of a truly national aviation, commensurate in strength and efficiency of operation with the world position of this country is not the task of a day or a year. The determining factor in the successful operation of air services is the quality of the service given and this is dependent upon experience, a high standard in material and personnel and the financial ability to provide the expensive installations which are essential for comfort, speed, safety and regularity. In our present situation, it is possible to provide the first two in reasonable measure. The standards of safety and regularity, especially the latter, are still not what they should be. There is, unfortunately, even now, a good deal of truth in the catchphrase: "If you've time to spare, travel by air." Fog, headwinds, shortage of aircraft are all factors which interfere with the regularity and add to the risk of flying. Navigational aids, reserve power and range in aircraft, larger fleets, are essential to the elimination of risk and delay, but time and money are needed to provide them. Right decisions on the many and intricate problems involved call for the closest and most ungrudging co-operation between Ministry and airline operators.

But however wise our decisions may be on the national plane, developments in other countries are of only slightly less importance to us in the planning of our air network. As the framers of the Chicago Convention recognized, aviation makes countries inter-dependent for its operation to an extent which was not true of the older methods. While the size and nature of its civil air fleet are matters for each country to decide for itself in the light of the position which it wishes to occupy in the carrying trade of the world, the building and equipment of its airports up to modern standards is a matter of concern to all the countries operating international air routes through it. Unfortunately, the building of a modern airport, equipped with all the latest navigational aids, involves an expenditure quite beyond the means of some of the countries whose territories occupy key positions on the main air lanes. International operation is dependent upon the provision of facilities where they are needed and the intervention

of the international civil aviation authority to advance the necessary funds is therefore essential in order to avoid delay in the development of world-wide facilities. This is one of the most urgent problems facing I.C.A.O., if "the orderly growth" of commercial aviation is not to suffer a serious setback. Only when fully-equipped airports are available, spaced at reasonable intervals along the air routes of the world, will civil aviation be able to make its proper contribution to the provision of communications between the nations. So long as the design of aircraft is conditioned by the availability of suitable aerodromes on which the aircraft can land, air transport can only be an affair of makeshifts.

Moreover, until all countries are willing to come into a universal fellowship of nations offering reasonable facilities for the operation of commercial aircraft of no matter what country, into and through their territory, the potentialities of civil aviation as a contribution to international understanding will be wasted. The signing of a number of bilateral conventions for mutual co-operation in this field is an encouraging sign; the fact that more than a score of nations are ready to discuss a multilateral agreement is a step on the way; but the road is long and there remain some formidable obstacles still to be overcome before the goal is reached. To assist in clearing them is not the least important of the functions of our own national authorities.

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THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL

BY HERMANN MANNHEIM

THE Bill, which has recently reached the Committee stage, has been, rightly and almost without any dissenting voice, acclaimed as an excellent and enlightened piece of work.* Of an equally high standard was the debate in the House of Commons on November 27 and 28, 1947, where the criticisms voiced by members of all parties referred to questions of technical detail rather than of principle. In the course of the debate it was stressed by several members and also explicitly admitted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Home Office, that many important sections of the criminal law in this country are in need of consolidation and reform. Reference was made to questions involving general principles, such as the age of criminal responsibility, as well as to specific crimes such as homosexual activities and murder. The MacNaughten Rules and the law of abortion might be added to this list. However, urgent as some of these reforms may well seem, it is obvious that each of them would require too much preparatory work and introduce too many controversial issues to justify a demand for their incorporation in the present Bill. How difficult any kind of piecemeal reform must inevitably be in the field of criminal justice will become evident to every reader of the Bill, especially where it deals with points of procedure. All the amendments of the law of criminal procedure proposed in the Bill are desirable in themselves, but there are other points which are equally in need of reform such as, for example, the distinction between felony and misdemeanour, or the powers of the Court of Criminal Appeal.

The main contents of the Bill may be divided into provisions of a destructive and prohibitive character, on the one hand, and of a constructive and permissive nature, on the other. Regarding the first category, one of the most important tasks of this Bill is the abolition of out-of-date and merely degrading methods of punishment or of empty legal conceptions which have lost any meaning or outlived their usefulness: corporal punishment, penal servitude, "hard labour" and the obsolete "division" system in prison; the terms "Criminal Lunatic

* My previous article "A New Criminal Justice Bill?" was published in the August 1946 issue of THE FOURMAGNET. For several of the criticisms and recommendations made in the present article I am greatly indebted to my colleagues on the Executive Committee of the Howard League for Penal Reform and on the Council of the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency. I should like to make it clear, however, that neither the League nor the Institute are in any way responsible for the views expressed in this article.

Asylum" and "criminal lunatic", which are to be replaced by the terms "Broadmoor Institution" and "Broadmoor patient". No opposition has so far arisen to any of these changes with the exception of the abolition of flogging, but even here, to judge from the debate in the House of Commons, it seems that the educational spadework done in the ten years since the publication of the admirable Report of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment (1938) has had its effect.

One of the most important of these prohibitive provisions is Clause 16 which forbids the imprisonment by Courts of Summary Jurisdiction of persons under seventeen and by Courts of Assize or Quarter Sessions up to the age of fifteen, and requires any Court considering the imprisonment of a person under twenty-one to obtain "information about the circumstances, including the character" of the offender. Under this clause, a prison sentence can be imposed on a person under twenty-one only if the Court is of opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate, the reasons for which opinion have to be stated in the warrant of commitment. Moreover, as soon as the Secretary of State is satisfied that other methods than imprisonment are available, His Majesty may by Order in Council prohibit Courts of Summary Jurisdiction altogether from imprisoning persons under twenty-one. This otherwise admirable provision means in one direction a retrograde step as compared with the pre-war Bill which proposed to prohibit imprisonment of persons under sixteen by any Court.

In view of the considerable numbers of persons between sixteen and twenty-one sentenced to imprisonment (in 1944: 3,021 youths and 904 girls), the Home Secretary's task of finding adequate alternatives will not be an easy one. One of the alternatives already proposed in the Bill will be the Detention Centre (Clause 17) where young people between fourteen and twenty-one may be detained for three or six months provided the Court considers no other method of dealing with them (except imprisonment) appropriate. The value of these Centres, which are intended as substitutes for the Howard Houses of the pre-war Bill, is difficult to assess because, here as in the case of the other new institutions envisaged, the Bill contains only the framework, leaving it to the Home Secretary's Rules and Regulations to fill in the details. The idea behind these detention centres is obviously to provide the "short, sharp lesson" which is regarded as necessary in the case of young offenders for whom probation would be too soft and long-term detention unnecessary. At present, the danger cannot be entirely ruled out that these centres may be established in wings of prisons and therefore hardly superior to the existing "Young Prisoners' Centres". There seems to be no reason why, at least as far as juveniles under seventeen are concerned, the same object could not be achieved by short-term Approved Schools, of which a few are already available. In any case, children of school age should not be eligible for commitment to detention centres and the use of prison

wings as centres should be forbidden.

Before leaving the prohibitive Clauses of the Bill, one should perhaps point out that no attempt has been made to get rid of those very short prison sentences which are universally condemned as wasteful and destructive. Under the Bill, the minimum term of imprisonment legally permissible is still five days. There has no doubt been a great improvement in this respect in recent years as Courts have become conscious of the evil effects of such sentences. According to the Report of the Prison Commission for 1945, prison sentences not exceeding one month have gone down from 13,865 (or fifty-one per cent. of total receptions) for men in 1938 to 6,579 (or 28.2 per cent. of total receptions) in 1944, but even this figure seems still too high, and the proportion of sentences between one month and three months has even somewhat increased during the same period. Bearing in mind the cautious statement made in the Report that "for those serving very short sentences the most that can be done is to try to create conditions which will do the prisoners no harm, physical or mental, in the hope that the deterrent features inherent in the fact of imprisonment will have some effect on their future conduct," surely what is needed is, if not a complete prohibition of very short prison sentences, at least a provision on the lines, referred to above, for young persons under twenty-one to make Courts still more reluctant to impose such sentences on offenders of any age. In many cases, probation would no doubt be a perfectly adequate substitute. It may be noted in this connection that in the recently published *Criminal Statistics* for 1939-1945 a regrettable decline is shown in the use of probation from fifteen per cent. of the total in 1938 to six per cent. in 1945 in the case of offenders aged twenty-one and over dealt with for indictable offences in Magistrates Courts and from thirteen to eight per cent. in Courts of Assize and Quarter Sessions. If Courts, before passing a prison sentence on an adult, had to make thorough preliminary inquiries of the kind they will have to make under the Bill for persons under twenty-one, this downward trend would probably be reversed.

Among the predominantly constructive clauses of the Bill, none should be given a more careful second reading than those dealing with persistent offenders. True as it undoubtedly is that the young delinquent must hold the centre of attention in any modern programme of penal reform, the failures, called recidivists, of our preventive efforts, should not be ignored. Of approximately 25,000 male convicted prisoners received in prison in 1944, only 8,801 were not known to have any previous proved offences, and of the recidivists 7,507 had five or more such offences and 3,547 had been in prison at least five times, 527 even more than twenty times (imprisonment for non-payment of fines excluded). Preventive Detention, established under the Prevention of Crime Act 1908, to deal with the habitual criminal, has conspicuously failed, mainly because it has not been used by the Courts. The number of prisoners serving such sentences had

dwindled down to thirty-eight in 1944, whereas the Prison Commissioners, in the remarkable document (reproduced in their Report for 1945) which presents their far-sighted programme for the post-war years, estimate the number of prisoners who would have qualified for preventive detention under the Bill of 1938 at over 2,000.

The reasons why Courts have been so reluctant to pass sentences of this kind are obvious: outstanding among them is, in the first place, the dislike rightly felt by judges of the present "double-track" system which means that preventive detention can be used only in addition to a sentence of penal servitude; secondly, their inclination to take into account the offence of which the prisoner is convicted rather than his whole personality; thirdly, a point too often ignored, the inadequacy of the information available on that personality, and finally, the unconstructive and un-reformative character of the methods of treatment employed which—largely in consequence of the small number of prisoners at present serving sentences of this kind—are not sufficiently adapted to the needs of the different types of offenders. In conformity with its predecessor, the present Bill proposes to replace the double-track by a single-track system and to make preventive detention more elastic by providing two possibilities instead of the one at present available; corrective training for persons aged twenty-one years and over with at least two previous convictions of a fairly serious character, and preventive detention for persons of thirty years and over with at least three such previous convictions who have already served at least two terms of Borstal training, imprisonment or corrective training. Whereas a person of the first category may be sentenced to corrective training of not less than two nor more than four years if the Court finds it expedient with a view to his reformation and the prevention of crime, a person who comes under the second category may receive a term of preventive detention of between four and fourteen years "for the protection of the public" (Clause 19). In matters of detail this Clause is an improvement on the pre-war Bill: corrective training is no longer excluded for persons over thirty; the use of preventive detention is less rigidly restricted according to the type of offence committed; and above all, before a sentence of this kind is passed, the Court is to give the Prison Commissioners an opportunity of making their views known as to the offender's physical and mental condition and his suitability for such a sentence.

It is to be hoped that this provision will enable the Commissioners to develop for recidivists something on the lines of the machinery so successfully built up for boys likely to be committed to Borstal at Wormwood Scrubs and more recently at Latchmere House where social workers under the guidance of psychiatric and psychological experts collect detailed case histories for the use of the Courts and, if a sentence of Borstal detention is passed, of the Prison Commissioners.

Naturally, the compilation of good case histories is much more difficult

for men in their thirties or forties than for adolescents; it can be done, however, by a well-trained and adequately equipped staff. The information thus collected will in time form the basis for research into the causes of recidivism—research which is overdue and indispensable for a revaluation of the success of different methods of treatment. Whereas some statistical material is at present available to show the rate of recidivism among ex-Borstal inmates and ex-prisoners—and even this is not detailed enough for scientific purposes—the study of the causes of recidivism has so far been almost completely neglected. In the debate in the House of Commons on November 28, 1947, Major Vernon rightly expressed his surprise that the Bill, in contrast with the National Health Bill and the Education Act, has failed to make any provision for expenditure on research into the causes of crime.* The causes of recidivism are no doubt among the most urgent topics for research, and the expenditure which it would involve would be very small compared with the improvements in the administration of criminal justice which it might bring about. The success of corrective training and preventive detention will depend not only on the methods of treatment applied in prison but just as much on the methods of selection used by the Courts. If, in the words of the Prison Commissioners, "the main problem concerns the Courts, and how they may be induced to use such statutory powers as may be available to them," surely, the provision of full and reliable information on individual offenders will do more than anything else to solve this problem.

With regard to the objects to be achieved by preventive detention, the present formula which mentions "the protection of the public" as the only aim seems to be too narrow. Reformation, explicitly referred to as one of the objects of corrective training, should not be omitted. Bearing in mind that preventive detention can be used for persons not older than thirty who, even if they should be detained for the maximum term of fourteen years, would still be in the mid-forties on discharge, the need for reformatory efforts is almost as strong here as in the case of those who, because they may be younger and not yet so far advanced in their criminal career, are sentenced to corrective training. It may also be suggested that the recommendation of the Report on Persistent Offenders, that an offender who becomes eligible for a sentence of preventive detention should receive a warning from the judge and a written reminder on discharge from prison, should be incorporated in the Bill. Finally, it seems only fair that previous convictions which an offender has received before the age of seventeen—for juveniles the use of the term "conviction" is prohibited only if they appear before Juvenile Courts and not in cases dealt with by Assizes or Quarter Sessions—should be disregarded in Clause 19.

Already in my previous article in *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, special attention was drawn to the need for a reconsideration of certain aspects of After-

* *Flansard*, cols. 2346-47.

Care. If the Bill should become law, the present system of discharge on licence (the old "ticket-of-leave" system) will disappear together with penal servitude, and the former ex-convict who will now be an ordinary ex-prisoner, will as a rule, be discharged not on licence but unconditionally. This means that it will be left to his discretion whether and how far he will wish to place himself under the supervision of an After-Care Society and to avail himself of its services. There are only two exceptions to this rule: Under Clause 20, certain categories of recidivists shall, on receiving a sentence of at least twelve months, be ordered to keep an After-Care Society regularly informed of their whereabouts for one year after discharge. Moreover, under Clause 46 the Prison Commissioners may discharge on licence and place under the supervision of an After-Care Society a prisoner aged under twenty-one on reception and serving a sentence of not less than twelve months. This latter provision, it is submitted, does not go far enough and should at least be extended to prisoners up to the age of twenty-five, many of whom are no less than adolescents in need of guidance immediately after discharge.

The changes proposed in the Borstal system are partly on the lines of the pre-war Bill. Whereas at present under the Prevention of Crime Act 1908, an offender can be sentenced to a term of Borstal detention only if this is regarded as expedient "by reason of his criminal habits or tendencies, or association with persons of bad character," the Bill refers only to the offender's "character and previous conduct and to the circumstances of the offence" (Clause 18). The intention is to make a Borstal sentence less stigmatizing and to enable the Courts to use it for adolescents who have not yet developed criminal tendencies but may do so very soon unless firmly dealt with. It might be objected that for such beginners Borstal may mean the danger of contamination. However, in view of the very considerable expansion which the Borstal system has undergone in recent years—the number of institutions is almost twice that of pre-war times—and of the consequent improvement in classification, that danger is now considerably less. Another proposal, which was not embodied in the 1938 Bill, to reduce the maximum age for a committal to Borstal from twenty-three to the original limit of twenty-one, has found universal approval. On the other hand, the extension of the length of Borstal detention for absconders from Approved Schools to a maximum of three, instead of two, years is bound to arouse mixed feelings, particularly with regard to adolescents committed to an Approved School not as delinquents but as being in need of care and protection or beyond parental control. For this category, the use of Borstal as a penalty for absconding should be altogether abolished and replaced by improved facilities for classification and psychological treatment in Approved Schools.

With regard to Probation its clear and distinct separation from its much less desirable bed-fellows, "binding over" and simple dismissals, is most welcome (Clauses 4 and 7). The disappearance of the cumbersome

machinery of "recognizances" whose meaning is hardly intelligible to the average layman, will cause no regret, with the possible proviso that powers might be given to the Court, on simpler lines, to impress upon neglectful parents their share of responsibility for the misconduct of their offspring. The proposed setting up of special Case-Committees in addition to already existing Probation Committees is in conformity with the pre-war Bill. The strengthening of the female section of the Probation Service, the expansion of the training scheme for Probation Officers, and the special attention given in the Bill to the much needed further development of Probation homes and hostels—all this is certain to be warmly applauded. On the other hand opposition will be strong against the abolition of the present system of making Probation orders in Magistrates Courts without a formal "conviction". As has been suggested by the present writer already with regard to the corresponding proposal in the pre-war Bill,* such a change is not necessary even from the point of view of juridical logic, as a distinction may well be made by the law between a mere "finding of guilt" and a solemn "conviction". In view of the undesirable stigma and the legal disqualifications connected with a conviction—consequences which cannot be altogether prevented by Clause 11—the present position might better remain unchanged.

The desire for improved facilities for mental examination and treatment of lawbreakers hangs closely together with the growth of Probation. Although the Bill contains some important improvements in this field unconnected with Probation (for example, Clause 24 which enables Magistrates to remand an offender on bail, instead of to prison, for medical examination), the principal provision of this kind is Clause 4 relating to Probation orders requiring the probationer to submit to treatment for his mental condition. Of the many questions of detail which are likely to arise under this heading only one may be mentioned: the Bill, in contrast to its predecessor, makes no provision for the payment of expenses for medical examination and treatment, probably because it is assumed that under the National Health Service there will be no need for such provisions. Is it safe, however, to assume that the very specialized requirements of delinquents will be adequately cared for under the vast machinery of the new Health Service?

It is gratifying to find that adequate provision has been made for the establishment of Remand Centres for cases too difficult to be dealt with in ordinary Remand Homes, although for the latter, too, some improvements are envisaged (Clauses 24, 25, 38, 39). If only it could be made clear in the Bill that such centres shall never be set up in prison wings!

* *The Dilemma of Penal Reform* (1939).

ONE YEAR OF NATIONALIZATION

By B. L. COOMBES

A year has passed since we stood under the flood lights outside our pit head baths and watched the blue and white emblem of the National Coal Board flutter wildly as the wind of that January morning discovered it. More than a thousand white faces looked upwards as our manager and the Lodge Secretary each made a very short speech asking for co-operation now that we were working for the nation. We cheered three times, then the first grey dawn of 1947 crept past the mountain crests and we clattered pit-wards for our first shift under nationalization. That was one year ago. How do we feel about the happenings of the year and the prospects for the future?

It is beyond argument that we have gained many points during that period. We have now the security of full work and the certainty of a full week's wage—unless it can be proved that work was lost for some reason outside the Coal Board's control. To those of us who remembered the years of irregular working and the continual returns from the colliery with no hope of payment this security means a very great advance. Our paid holidays have been extended from the one week; now the Bank Holidays are included. The Coal Board now maintains the pithead baths and we are tenpence weekly better off. It is possible to argue that other professions and industries had all these advantages years ago. We did not, anyway, so they are certainly a great gain.

Then again, the five-day week has been granted and operated. During this last splendid summer this shorter week made a big difference to life amongst our mining valleys and to the health of the miners. Every Saturday was gala day and our folk found ways of enjoying themselves. The sports section was busy in the Welfare Parks, the dramatic and operatic societies caught up a new energy, the cycling clubs pedalled away happily and the allotments were more prosperous. When the emergency made it imperative that some Saturdays should be worked again the miners conceded it knowing the shorter week had been established and that the time will come when it can be enjoyed again. It should be remembered that all miners did not benefit by the five day week. Afternoon and night shift workers throughout South Wales did not gain one hour or one penny in pay as they had been granted the bonus shift (because of the inconvenience of the shift they worked) in the early years of this century. Nor is this bonus shift system so very popular, chiefly because it is operated drastically. Illness, no matter how severe is not accepted as an excuse;

or again, a day shift worker who has a long way to travel may have to get from bed at about four o'clock in the morning. Should he sleep late once he has no hope of getting more than four days' pay. With double-summer time it meant that he had to get up by two o'clock normal time.

Another gain is the recent wage increase, and it has been given without the use or threat of strike action. Our last wage agreement was four years old and a new one was due but it came smoothly this time. Of course, we expected a larger increase but most men seem ready to accept the compromise. In this matter the complaints heard are against our leaders, for they have repeatedly emphasized that the next agreement would be framed to level up the unfair gaps between the high wages of a section of the colliers and the low wages of the day wage and maintenance workers. This has been the cause of continual and bitter controversy. It seems that the wide gap is still to be allowed and I expect complications to follow. Already it is difficult to get skilled men for the most essential jobs of repairing and with this new all round advance the repairers and timbermen and other workers at maintenance jobs will continue to agitate that they be given a chance to do the better paid, and often less dangerous and skilful, job of coal getting.

Totalling our gains we must agree that the Coal Board has tried to be a good employer. One year is not long enough to undo the mismanagement and neglect of a quarter of a century. Nor is it long enough to dispel the hatred and distrust that neglect has left in miners' minds. I will not agree that hatred is too strong a word. In these valleys where everyone lives on or by coal the old control was hated as much as a conquered country would hate the invaders. The miners, the miners' wives, and their grown children joined in this bitterness because of what it had done to their homes and their loved ones. Everyone who took an official post was condemned and this acted unfairly because there were decent men on the managerial side and they had to work to limits. There were also sections of the employers who worked and hoped for a better feeling. I found this better type of employer and feeling in the smaller companies and in the areas where there were other industries and all life was not dominated by coal. In Leicestershire I found conditions so good that my mates in South Wales would not believe my account of them nor could the Leicestershire miners understand the way we felt towards our South Wales employers. Had the large mining areas the friendly memories of managerial control which exist in Leicestershire and the smaller producing areas the human problem of the mines to-day would not exist.

I think the Coal Board will in time reorganize the industry and set it on an efficient footing. They will provide mechanization and facilities for a sufficient output . . . if they can conquer that past which is in the minds of the men. It is all very easy to suggest that the old wrongs must be forgotten and a fresh start made but the miners are interpreting this as a very convenient doctrine for those who were on the other side during the

old control. They think that far too many of the men who served the old employers well have been given as good, and often better, positions under the Coal Board. They ask how can such men who prospered and were given authority under private ownership believe in nationalization of the mines? They and their kind opposed it almost to the end, so the miners feel that these officials would not worry much if nationalization failed; good positions would be waiting for them in any case. I attend committee and mass meetings and meet the workers at many collieries. Their complaints are very similar. You may explain that this is but a transitional period and that there will be changes again; also that skilled administrators were scarce in the mining industry therefore the Coal Board had to appoint those who already had experience. The reply will surely be that it was understood the old control was wasteful and inefficient both from the industrial and the humanitarian point of view so, if that was true, why should its chosen disciples be allowed to act in this new method? In addition, during this last year there has been a great finding of new positions and some extraordinary appointments. I am in close contact with a colliery in which one overman managed his shift and controlled the firemen and the workmen under him well. Things went along happily but in the last two months that part of the colliery has had two extra overmen appointed. One had not been under ground during the last ten years. Even if there was need for his appointment what modern mining experience has he?

For a training face in another part where the young trainees were to learn their craft of mining and conveyor work it was found that two of the six men nominated as training officers had very little mining experience and neither had been underground during the last eight years. The workmen's committee intervened here. They also interfered when the manager appointed his own choice as Safety Officer, and brought a young man of twenty-six out from the mine to an outside job of clerking. The argument was upheld that this young man must return to a coal producing job and, in the Safety Officer's case, the miners argued that no man picked by the management was likely to be critical over the conditions in the colliery. That appointment was changed but the man got another official position at the same colliery. At the meetings to discuss working again on the Saturdays there was long and bitter controversy. Not concerning the temporary suspension of the five-day week but because of the feelings about the new appointments of Coal Board officials. At one the resolution was passed that: "Those new spivs that are walking about our collieries should be made to produce coal as well as us."

A fine car travels along the street of a mining village: "Hallo", come the comments, "some of them Coal Board guys. Sure to be." The picture of a great house is in the papers: "Another little home for the Coal Board, I suppose," is the verdict even before the picture has been properly seen. The old stalwarts, the men who worked, dreamed and

starved with the hope of nationalization ever before them, are subdued and disheartened. "Catch me ever voting for the Labour Party after this," is their method of explaining what they feel. "It's become a racket—jobs for the boys." It does seem to us that those who fattened on the private enterprise in coal mining have also done very well under this new State control. The miner, except for the benefits stated earlier, remains still the bottom dog of his industry to be nagged and threatened when the output is low and to hear others given credit for their organization when the coal starts to come out faster. On the other hand, this condemnation of Coal Board officials must have its unfair effect for I know there are some who are sincere and eager to bring a fresh atmosphere to our industry.

Still, the old game persists as in the past, in payment of work done. In no respect have the methods become any more straightforward. A man or a group of men is asked to work late to complete some job that will make it possible for the next shift to start coal filling. They work on half a shift each and tell the official about it, just to be sure, at the end of the week. He assures them it is all right. As a week's work is always kept in hand it is the following pay day when that half shift should be paid but it frequently is not paid. The man goes to his official who shows him that it is marked as worked on his time book. They then go to the timekeeper who insists that he has booked it in. Then the miner takes it to his Union Secretary and, finally, when a deputation has gone to see the manager it is reported that some auditor or other has been in the colliery office and has crossed out various payments as not being authorized. The feeling of the miners can easily be imagined especially if they remember what we are being repeatedly told—that those same auditors get more for one day's work each than we get for a week. Probably the miner gets his half shift about a month later but he remembers all this trouble when he is again asked to work on.

Apart from all other considerations these weekly upsets and interferences prevent all hope of much better feeling and, of course, there are men who argue that it is a deliberate policy of indirect sabotage.

There may be a hundred similar cases to Tom Richards during this year in the British coalfields. I expect there will be, but because Tom lived within sight of the house where I am writing, I am giving him as an instance. Ten years ago his colliery manager gave a special and written testimonial to Tom's skill as a miner, his trustworthiness, and his mining experience. Last May, still working in the same colliery, Tom was killed. He was the last of five stalwart brothers, all of whom had either been killed or disabled in the mine before they were fifty years of age. At the time of his death Tom had no one dependent on him but his surviving brother, a partly disabled miner, who saw to the funeral and had Tom taken to the churchyard where he was buried alongside his relatives. Because of travelling it cost about forty pounds altogether. When the insurance company were approached they refused to pay any more than

fifteen pounds "to cover medical expenses and burial costs." As I can prove, every effort was made to get more help for the disabled brother but fifteen pounds was the maximum.

Had this tragedy happened a couple of years earlier Tom's burial expenses would have been paid in full. He worked for an independent colliery company then, and they realized that the insurance payment was inadequate and so found ways of supplementing it. Of course they might not get more than one such case every year. It is easy to understand the attitude of the Coal Board for they must be prepared for many such cases and cannot do in one area what they are not prepared to do for all. The miners have another viewpoint. Tom was a good man who paid with his life for his devotion to his job. Yet fifteen pounds was his value at a time when more than that amount weekly is being paid to men who have received the bottom grade of positions under the Coal Board.

So the miners' union and the local leaders still have their full share of problems, amplified by the feeling that the central control of the Mine-workers' Union has taken it out of touch with the intimate problems of its members and that it is getting much too fond of sending directives to its members instead of allowing each Lodge to discuss and vote on any new development before it is accepted. Most miners realize that the leaders are in a difficult position for any definite action against the Coal Board is interpreted as being against the country and the people.

We have had the new scheme for settling disputes explained to us. So far we can find nothing new in it except that fresh names are used for the various lanes our disputes must wander along until they become lost. It seems the old formula of next week, next month, sometime—or never—will again be used for dispute settling and that must have its certain result in frustration and more strikes.

The Coal Board has increased the welfare levy and the whole system of Welfare seems progressive and energetic. National conditions prevent much new building but the miners' libraries are being filled with modern books, their halls are busy with discussion groups and their amateur societies have been enlivened by the visits of professional musicians and dramatic groups. The pit canteens are slowly getting into action in overcoming the initial handicaps and mistakes. Now we are quite as well catered for as are the local factories.

Consultative committees have been elected to replace the Pit Production Committees but few miners appear to consider this an improvement. At the start The Consultative Committee Ballots were not well explained or advertised so that the men did not understand how they would function. Voting and nomination were indifferent and those who were elected now complain that they have no real power and that the management side has the over-ruling vote.

Our output for this first year has been higher than many experts thought possible and surely much greater than seemed likely at any time during

the spring and summer. Recruiting, despite expensive and often silly propaganda, has not mounted. We have just managed to cover our wastage figures, with a little over. To the statistician this may seem quite satisfactory but not to the practical miner. Every man who goes out from our industry after twenty or thirty years of mining takes all that skill and experience with him. The one who comes in his place has to be taught, guided and watched for a long time. He will be a liability and his training will prevent an experienced mate giving all his time to production. I feel every effort should be made to keep the older miners at work for a year or so longer, even if they had to lose some time now and again and if their output were not so high as in their young days. I knew one English colliery where the amount of coal required was lowered as a man's age increased but his wage remained the same. No worker in that colliery was on piece work yet they had one of the highest and most regular outputs in the whole country.

Various journalists have felt it worth their time during this year to visit the mining areas for a swift and usually superficial survey. Some have stated their surprise at finding miners living as human beings and being students of economics and world affairs. They would have been wise also to have realized that miners have facilities for reading and remembering, for some of the extraordinary reports will condemn the writers in future wherever industrial workers confer.

This part of the country was very interested in the case of the com-missionaire from the "Miner Comes to Town" Exhibition who was so convinced by what he saw, heard, and read inside the exhibition that he volunteered for mining work and travelled to Mountain Ash. There he found the true facts of the industry and, rather than work for three pounds a week less than he had at the exhibition, he returned to London. His photograph and an interview were well publicized in our local papers.

The men who wanted nationalization of the mines are not nearly satisfied with what they have got. They say that the miner is surely the man who knows most about coal and its getting—even mining engineers must work underground for some years before they can qualify. The miners felt that the whole problem of coal production would have been solved by making the managements and the men jointly responsible for working the pits and getting the coal into the trucks. After that, they felt it was the job of some other department. The miners had their Lodge Committees and their Production Committees all ready; the managements had their equivalent bodies acting and between them they could have dealt with each pit in the best way that their years of experience warranted. I think the knowledge of being responsible would have encouraged co-operation; there was a deal of happier and more friendly relationship at the beginning of nationalization.

I feel that instead of a wage increase there should have been a bonus on results for each colliery with each man being paid the rate his grade of

work requires and the bonus being shared between all. They would all watch production then and would try to see that the pit and material were put to the best use. Their committees should be able to check any new appointments and have a say in whether they were justified or not.

We have rescue squads always waiting at stations in case of explosions. They can be at the required spot in a couple of hours. In like manner I would have a skilled arbitrator from the men's side, another from the managements, and an independent chairman waiting in each mining area. Wherever a dispute threatens, these men should be rushed there with full power to settle. If some action or cause brings the miners to an indignation meeting after or before any shift the leaders ought to be able to assure the men: "The disputes experts will be here before a couple of hours are past and they will decide." I think that assurance would check very many spontaneous strikes. As it is, the weeks and months pass in argument and evasion. The men stop work in disgust; then they are told they must resume work before negotiations take place. If they will go back the dispute will be considered at once. Why should this old method of delay and annoyance be still allowed? Coal is too valuable for such dilatory methods. The quicker a dispute is handled the better.

Coal is the corner pillar of our national life. We must have it if we are to survive as an important nation. It will only be produced by strong and skilled men working under unnatural conditions and in continual danger. Nothing will alter these facts. More machinery will help but that will never be a complete solution because many of our seams are not suitable and in some instances experienced men have produced more from hand cut faces than from machine faces in the same districts. In any case you will always have need of the miner. He will produce the coal because it is his job but he wants to be recognized as a co-operator in that production. He knows he is necessary, that the managements are necessary and that a controlling body like the Coal Board is necessary—but between the men at the pits and the Coal Board it seems to him that a new 'snooper' class has jumped into authority, and flaunting that new power and authority more arrogantly than ever before in his experience. He will not work patiently under such happenings. He thinks the British public should insist that a re-assessment should be made of all those appointments. I know our union has a mass of protests in its offices about this and if public opinion does not stir the miner will once again feel it is time he showed his feelings, and that may mean a break in the flow of coal.

DENMARK TO-DAY

BY HENRY BAERLEIN

In the little town of Brande in the West of Jutland there is a simple memorial, an inscribed rock with a small garden round it, to one whom it describes as 'The king of the heather, our true friend', and the inscription goes on to relate that Enrico Mylius Dalgas exhorted his countrymen, seeing that they had a diminished fatherland after the disastrous war of 1864, to make the best of what they had. This part of Jutland is one of the least fertile regions of Denmark. Heather and rocks used to hold the country in an iron grip, while the sand, swept in from the dunes by the prevailing west wind, did nothing to improve matters. Inspired by Dalgas and with infinite labour and patience great areas of heather have been cleared, trees have been planted to arrest the wind and now some 2,000 square miles have been brought under cultivation, the work being subsidized by the State.

What has been done by this resolute people in Jutland is typical of what the whole country has accomplished since the war. The Germans plundered it to an amount of some ten milliard kroner (about £500,000,000) partly by demanding exports without themselves providing equivalent imports—in other words a system of public and private looting—and partly by demanding that the country should finance the German army of occupation and its various measures, such as transport, fortification works, the purchase of various goods, such as huts, and the rent of hotels and other buildings. (How delighted were the Danes when the buildings at Aarhus and elsewhere which were in the hands of the Gestapo were skilfully destroyed by the R.A.F. while adjacent houses were uninjured!)

Of the important European countries only Great Britain is more dependent upon overseas trade than Denmark. The steady rise in the Danish standard of living over the hundred years before the outbreak of the 1939-45 war was rendered possible only by the increasing import of raw materials, with a parallel increase in the exports of agricultural and manufactured goods. Now of the 558 ships (1,100,000 gross registered tons) which constituted the Danish merchant fleet at the outbreak of war twenty-nine were lost before the occupation of Denmark in April 1940, while up to the end of 1945 264 ships (660,000 registered tons) were lost. If Danish shipping is again to earn such large sums in foreign exchange and provide so much employment—before the war 40,000 to 50,000 Danes were engaged, directly or indirectly, in shipping and the annual net contribution of the industry to Danish economy was

150-160 million kroner—it is essential that the merchant tonnage should be brought up to pre-war figures as rapidly as circumstances permit. What are the possibilities? Raw materials are short, there is great pressure on the shipyards for repairs and there has been a very heavy rise in building costs. On the other hand it is satisfactory to know that Britain and the United States have now paid considerable, if not entirely adequate, sums as reparation for the losses incurred by the Danes when the vast majority of their merchant navy ignored Hitler's instructions and placed itself unreservedly at our disposal throughout the remainder of the war. It is satisfactory to hear, on the authority of Mr. Christian Harhoff, chairman of the Danish Steamship Owners Association, that Danish shipping is ready, through quality and efficiency, to maintain its competitive position. Nearly all those excellent passenger steamers which used to ply between Harwich and Esbjerg were lost in the course of the war, but one that exceeds them all in size, speed and luxury—the *Kronprins Frederik*—has been built and is proving most popular. At the same time the Danes on their inland waters have now no lack of excellent steamers and ferries. Some of them take whole trains, such as the huge ferries which cross the Great Belt—an hour's journey—and are perhaps the most luxurious in the world.

Even in smaller ferries between Denmark's many islands lorries and motor-cars are accommodated, while the passengers stroll about and partake of the Danish food, concerning which one is in danger of becoming lyrical. Of course the famous *smørrebord* is not what it was before the war and at Davidsen's in Copenhagen it may happen that during some hours a few of the 194 varieties are temporarily "off". At Davidsen's, by the way, no less than twenty-five women are occupied throughout the day in removing the shells from shrimps, for a *smørrebrød* consisting of rows of shrimps ready to be eaten is very popular. These women become so expert that I am told they can all deal with four lb. of shrimps in an hour, which, considering the weight of a shrimp, is some feat. There are to-day shortages in the Danish kitchen—chocolate is very scarce, as are some other imported articles; on the other hand butter is plentiful and eggs can be had in any number. For instance, in Faaborg harbour I came across an ex-German yacht, now flying the Red Ensign. Her owners were two British officers and their wives who had bought the boat at Kiel before coming for a week's leave into Danish waters. When they returned to the British zone of Germany they had with them I forget how many dozen eggs and they could have had more if they had asked for them. Such things are so well organized in Denmark that not merely the farm from which the egg hails is known but the identity of the hen which laid it.

We were talking of the vessels on Denmark's inland waters. From towns such as Aalborg or Aarhus fine, large boats sail every night to Copenhagen and the same applies from and to the fascinating island of

Bornholm in the Baltic. With hundreds of cabins at one's disposal this is a pleasant mode of travelling. And on the inland waters where voyages are shorter the boats are always adequate. There is still plying to-day in the lovely Silkeborg district of wooded rivers and lakes a steamer which is ninety years of age and which remembers proudly that it used to convey the jovial King Frederick VII with his two friends, Hans Andersen—who thought for a long time that his fairy tales were rather trifling affairs—and Michael Drewsen, an enterprising person who established a paper factory at Silkeborg (it prints Denmark's bank-notes to-day) and thus is the founder of the town. On the roof of one of the local schools a stork used to dwell, returning every year. When the Germans came to the town this stork disappeared, when they had to go the stork came back. But the prosaic explanation is not that the bird was imbued with patriotic Danish sentiments, it simply could not endure the noise made by the Germans.

Talking of schools, it is impossible to withhold admiration from the system under which scholarships are awarded at Copenhagen University. Practically without exception they are awarded for merit plus want and practically never for merit alone. Competitive examinations for scholarships are unknown. The most important group of scholarships is the so-called *Kommunitet*, which was established by Frederick II in 1569. It has a capital of about eleven million kroner and most of the interest accrues, in various forms, to poor students, the greater part in the form of 200 scholarships of 900 kroner (nearly £50) each annually. This may seem an exiguous amount, but 103 of them are coupled with the right to free residence in a hostel belonging to the *Kommunitet*. There is a Students' Loan Fund which lends money to students of the leading institutes of higher education, chiefly to enable them to complete studies already begun some years beforehand. The interest is three per cent. which is only about half the usual loan rate in Denmark. The absence of fees and the low cost of living for students in Copenhagen make it possible for parents of modest means to give their children a university education. It often happens that students whose parents do not live in Copenhagen or that neighbourhood club together and take a large flat and keep house.

At an earlier stage in their careers the young Danes are likewise catered for in a manner I have not found elsewhere and the Children's Library at Aalborg is, no doubt, an example of what exists in other Danish towns. It is externally the most attractive, since it is situated in the former post office, a picturesque red and black half-timbered house. Having been removed from its original site it has been joined to the Public Library and is available, without any fee, for citizens between the ages of ten and sixteen. They can either read the books—fiction and non-fiction, and hundreds of each category—on the premises or take a book home with them. But if they keep it for more than a fortnight they have to pay for every additional eight days the sum of one penny. The charming woman

who presides over this institution told me that in the long winter evenings the place is so well patronized that although there are only seats for twenty-nine readers more than seventy are often there, the others being quite content to sit on the floor or on the pipes of the central heating which encircle the main room.

But, you may ask, is there then nothing rotten in the state of Denmark? Great and successful efforts are being made to eliminate any flaw. Take, for instance, the scheme inaugurated this year by the Danish Tourist Association, whereby the hotel which caters for foreigners enjoys a corresponding advantage in the matter of rations. Thus if a hotel containing 100 beds has had fifty per cent. of them—that is to say 1,500 bed-nights in a month—it will receive for every foreign bed-night 400 grammes of meat, 100 of sugar, 100 of butter and fifty of coffee. If the percentage is between twenty and thirty of foreigners the hotel will receive seventy-five per cent. of the above rates, if it is between ten and twenty it will receive fifty per cent. and if it is less than ten it will receive no special terms. A hotel in a favoured position can run its kitchen better, which is also to the advantage of the Danes who stay there.

We in Britain are naturally much interested in the condition of Danish agriculture. The occupation had serious effects on the supply of fertilisers, the importation of phosphates being almost entirely suspended. Live-stock conditions were very difficult, a shortage of protein supplies specially affecting dairy cattle. Despite all efforts the output of butter has not yet reached the figure of 1939, though as a means of relieving the shortage of proteins during the winter there has been carried out to a much increasing extent the ensilaging of turnip tops. But the output of butter, bacon and eggs has not yet been restored to the pre-war level. However Danish farmers have been anxious to contribute their share to the solution of the international food problem. Plans were made for the relief of Norway before the occupation had ended and all was ready when liberation came, the supplies then shipped to the sister-nation being of the value of about £5,000,000. Assistance to the Netherlands amounted to £800,000, some thousands of Dutch children and hundreds of adults have been (and are in many cases still) spending several months in Denmark to recuperate after their period of starvation. The same, of course, applies to the Norwegians. The value of food parcels to the Netherlands is about £500,000, making Danish relief to that country second only to that of the United States. France, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and Hungary have been similarly assisted, while 100,000 food parcels have been despatched to British soldier homes. They resulted in a stream of letters very flattering for Danish bacon and butter. "Danish butter is, I think the best in the world," wrote Lord Montgomery's mother. No British personage, save perhaps Mr. Churchill, is more generally popular in Denmark than Lord Montgomery; the achievements of Britain, especially during the period when alone she withstood the grave menace to civilization, are

gratefully recognized, but it is only natural that a Danish farmer, who sells to us for four shillings what has cost him five and has the other shilling from his own Government in the form of a subsidy, is not sure that this can be continued indefinitely. He cannot help regretting that we cannot pay him a bigger price for his products; he points out that if he buys from Britain a tractor he is told that the cost of it to the maker is a certain amount and that a reasonable sum must be added to enable the maker to live.

How are the people living and under what flag are they to live in South Slesvig? Owing to the influx of German refugees from East Prussia the mixed population of this province has, if these Germans be taken into account, a definitely German majority. Until the future of these refugees has been settled—how many of them are going to remain permanently and how many are merely transient dwellers in the province—one would have thought that they should certainly not be given a vote and even more certainly that they should not receive appointments as officials. Yet both such measures have come to pass. But this has not necessarily caused them to vote in favour of leaving the province in Germany. Those who wish it to be allotted to Denmark do so from various motives: some of the pre-war population remember that in other days, the local Dukes being antagonistic to the Danish King, their suzerain, the German language was forced upon the people, who were influenced in such a manner as to make them feel more at home with German than with Danish culture, although the latter was that of their own ancestors. The shape of their houses, of their implements, of their shoes and so on remained Danish, and now, so it is being said, they have come to see that Denmark is their real home. The desire of others to have a Danish flag flying over them is due to the material benefit of adhering rather to a victorious than to a beaten country and has caused their critics to label them 'Bacon Danes'. These critics have small belief in the sincerity of such people, clamouring to-day for Danish schools for their children; who knows, say the critics, whether in twenty or twenty-five years they will not be demanding that German shall be the language of instruction? Let us wash our hands of this province, say those who follow Mr. Christmas Möller, the former Foreign Minister who managed to escape to Britain during the war—his resignation from the post of Minister of Commerce had been demanded by the Germans. Mr. Möller has now resigned from his position of leader of the Conservative Party in Denmark, because the majority of that Party does not agree with his very prudent views on the Slesvig question. He sees no reason why there should be any alteration from the frontier allotted to his country after the 1914-1918 war when North Slesvig came back to Denmark, after a plebiscite thus undoing the theft committed by the Prussians after their attack of 1864. Apart from the presence of the 'Bacon Danes', Mr. Möller does not wish a perpetual grievance to be felt by a neighbour who will some day be

restored to the comity of nations and with a far larger population than Denmark's.

On the whole it would seem advisable to postpone, say for twenty or twenty-five years, the ultimate fate of South Slesvig, asking the people then to state their desires. But during the intervening period it would be no easy matter to administer the province. Its present administration does not seem to redound to the perfect credit of the British overlords, for it is surely unfortunate that Germans from East Prussia, not only because they may be transient dwellers there but also because East Prussia was not exactly a nursery of liberal ideas, should be appointed as officials. And to claim that the Danes in South Slesvig are a minority owing to the arrival of all those refugees does not seem particularly intelligent.

Over and over again in Denmark I have been astonished to observe the dissimilarity between Danes and Germans, although they share a common land frontier, and the likeness of the Danes to ourselves, in spite of the North Sea by which we are separated from each other. When the Germans during the occupation resolved once and for all to crush the spirit of the Danes they massed a great number of tanks in the main square of Copenhagen. The small boys would approach a stern warrior sitting at the wheel to ask how much a ticket for the show would cost. One evening Mr. Kai Friis-Müller, the well-known writer who has also translated many English poems into Danish, was discoursing on that subject over the wireless. He gave Kipling's words "Come you back, you British soldier" in the original and did not add the next words "Come you back to Mandalay". All Denmark chuckled with enjoyment and on the following day a German officer arrived in a state of wrath at the broadcasting house. Were those actual words, he inquired, in the original and the full stop. Well no, he was told that the full stop was Mr. Friis-Müller's own idea. "Then we prohibit him from ever speaking again over the air," said the German. The Danes have a sense of the ridiculous which rings a bell with us, for even as the Scots are reputed to manufacture the stories in Aberdeen which libel themselves, so is it with the inhabitants of the peninsula of Mol, in the east of Jutland, a region that until recent years was rather remote. And so their backwardness was said to be their chief characteristic. When one of them complained that a stork was getting into his wheat-field and consuming the wheat he was advised to send in a man to drive the stork away, and when he objected that this man would trample on the wheat they recommended that he should get four men to carry the stork scarer. Then there is the tale of the men from Mol who wanted to drown an eel, which they took out to sea in a rowing-boat and, to mark the spot at which the deed had been accomplished, they made a notch in the side of the boat.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER

By FRANK KENDON

HOLLY hedges grow thick and close knit, tough, spiny, and painful. They can be five feet through and ten feet tall. Such a hedge immures you on all sides; naked and knifeless and out of call, what are you going to do?

Fear, cruelty, political theory, secret science, greed, suspicion, hate, seem now to wall in every serious thinking person. If we do not get out we shall die, figuratively, then actually. "All men are mortal" is true, with a subtle and tainted attraction. Imagination, seeing no way, cynically justifies inertia and so consolidates it, and nothing is done. In your holly prison it may well seem ridiculous to express the obvious: if there were no barrier, I could walk out. So, in this other prison: if men revered the life of all men there would be no war ahead, no threat to civil existence. That is obvious; and your neighbours on both sides will laugh at you, not unkindly, for wording a truth so impractical. Then, having laughed, they will turn away sorrowful, to do nothing, because nothing can be done. Still, if there *were* no holly barrier, you *could* walk out; and if all men's hearts could indeed be the centre and mainspring of their hourly doings there *would* be no imprisoning fear of the future, no cruelty for a cause, no antagonism. That a truth is obvious does not make it unimportant. In holly prison your desperate situation would soon set your instincts to work. You would, if you were collected, break a twig of breakable size, break its neighbours, and those that these neighbours had knit with, and thus, twig by twig disarming the hedge, you would be outside, though not at once. In fact, as patient and humble action demonstrates, there was no barrier, except to speedy freedom.

Are you a sportsman? When you go out with the gun and, as the result of a fine long shot, in some elation find that you have bowled over a running rabbit—I ask the most habituated shot, in all seriousness—when you go to collect this individual creature's carcass, doesn't a swift the warm fur, or you notice the transparency of its ears, doesn't a swift regret for the vermin always, after all these years, have its part in your mood of justified pride in your own skill? Sometimes as you gather up your creature you feel called upon to say to your companion: "Pretty things, aren't they?" or some such throwing-off phrase. Cautious about giving way to tender feelings, we are not ashamed of them to ourselves, as we should be ashamed of greed or stupidity; for we well know that all men—it is in their nature—share them in some degree.

This not unnatural and not shameable kindness of the sportsman's individual heart—does this, perhaps, contain a clue? Shall we at length start at the bottom of the right ladder? The counsel of perfection—loving God with heart, soul, and strength, and one's neighbour as oneself—cannot be put into action in any other way. No State can do this. Only heart can do this, and heart is individual.

Albert Schweitzer, septuagenarian, native of Alsace, a medical missionary at present doctoring negroes in tropical Africa, discovered for himself, as he thought, certain truths about civilization, about ethics, a great many years ago, when he had already shown himself on the way to a career of renown in theology, philosophy, and music. He has since written down his cogitations at some length, he has argued them searchingly, he has lectured about them. In all this he has followed the procedure of other hard thinkers, and no doubt he has made his converts. But Dr. Schweitzer's originality is, that he has, in a second chapter of life, himself deliberately embodied and acted upon his cogitated principles; having generalized his philosophy to the utmost of his truth, he has thereupon, and for thirty-four years, individualized it and put it to the only available test. Having shown in his thought and books (what is now clear enough without either) how European civilization was on a dark, wrong road, he thought to wager in his own daily doings that there was still light and what might possibly be a right road. With his own fingers (he commanded no others) he began to break down our imprisoning hedge, twig to nearest twig. It seemed essential that someone should begin, however small, however real that beginning. If he had found a truth, who but he should act upon it? It seemed to him the rational way. It seems so to me.

By what we deduce from his books—his gentle temperament—Albert Schweitzer seems to have been born a natural disciple of Christ; but, equally fundamentally, he was born the questioner, the searcher who venerated finally only demonstrable truth. Even his religion (above all, his religion) he could not take from the professionals. His book, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, is the record of his unfolding (from the documents) of a kind of Christianity which seemed to him to be rational too. Being found, it then had to be written, offered for criticism. But until thought issues, somewhere, in action, it remains unreal. Generally the teacher labours in teaching, and the thing taught comes to action through his hearers. Dr. Schweitzer felt that he had to be his own practitioner.

When he is described as the founder of his hospital at Lambarene, it is therefore not surprising to see a photograph (there is one in Mr. Seaver's book* about him) of the doctor himself in act of planting the hewn timber piles of an extension of the building. "If you want a thing done, do it yourself" is a proverb often quoted with a shrug of misanthropy. It might well be a favourite saying with Albert Schweitzer, but without

* *Albert Schweitzer: The Man and his Mind*, by George Seaver. Adam & Charles Black. 18s.

misanthropy. He wants civilization saved. He modestly but assuredly begins by saving it in himself. That is to be absurdly fundamental. But fundamentals make for soundness.

He wants Bach understood. He plays Bach's music himself, thinks into it, writes about it, gives public recitals of it. He has a conviction about organs, how they should sound, how they should be built. He therefore intervenes to save old organs, or to restore them on lines that he thinks to be the right lines. More ridiculously still, he traces, as he believes, the root of all ethics: man's inborn reverence—do what we will—for the principle of life; and being as literal as the lovable Dr. Doolittle, before he drops the weighty wooden pile into the prepared hole, he is down on his hands and knees first, to extricate any unimportant toad which may have taken up its home there. (Seaver, p. 289).

Proud Naamans, the political theorists, have of their own the Abana of Communism, the Pharphar of World Government. Who is this simpleton who offers them the Jordan of a change of heart? It has to be admitted that there are no signs of this little river overflowing its banks. Yet the problem of saving civilization by timetable looks to be too complex and too rash. World Government as the materialists see it can only save its own version of civilization by ruthless one-party methods, and what that means has been plainly shown in recent history. Dr. Schweitzer diagnosed a leprosy in western civilization long before it became a newspaper topic. But, born with an inveterate gentle heart, he could not consent to the temptation of fatalism. He first sought for causes, because a knowledge of causes must at least precede any rational cure. He found a steady modern degeneration in conduct of national affairs, which were less and less regulated by what had always been respected as an axiom of conduct by individuals generally—paramount respect for personality and for rights of the individual. He found a decline from reason. State action could be ruthless now because the normal human ethic did not apply. He knew, nevertheless, that man, by personal nature, was a rational and ethical being, to whose soul's health toleration and reasonableness were as necessary as food. The increasing fierceness of politics was robbing individual man of the power to be decent, and hence of his very appetite for kind and reasonable action. For material advantage, or the urge for it, we were selfishly piling up debts, denying for our own gain our natural duty to others; exploiting life; and the bankruptcy of civilization was following as it was sure to follow from this. Powerful and elaborate civilization, built upon suffering and injustice to less powerful classes and races, is dangerous, unstable, degenerate.

Led on to find by question, if he could, the origin and arising of ethics, he saw that man could not have deduced it from the universe, where good and evil seem to have no meaning; he saw, too, that the goodness of God was not thus to be demonstrated, or that, if it were, then the cruelty of God was equally demonstrable. He was driven to conclude that our notion of

good came from the root, common to all, of a natural sympathy—the thinking life's natural sense of kinship with other life. "God is love," had, indeed, put it succinctly centuries earlier, and Dr. Schweitzer's 'reverence for life' only extends the regions for the practice of the Golden Rule.

Looking not only into his own heart (but looking there without shame, nevertheless) he found that it was characteristic of all conscious human nature—even of the most hardened in some degree—to regard the possession of life, the capacity for suffering, as a fair claim upon consecration and sympathy. That this is true seems to me to be made evident in all kinds of unexpected ways, actions, and reluctances; from the spectacular, when a party of men with ropes will rescue a dog or a kitten from cliff or quarry (always 'news,' as the journalist knows) to the minute but positive action when any casual passer will instinctively deflect his foot to avoid stepping upon a single new-fallen flower on the path. Much more, of course, when someone in difficulties is seen to be in need of immediate help, great or little. We say, 'it is only natural to help'; we recognize it as the mark of our nature. In this Albert Schweitzer would greet the root of our mysterious notion of goodness. In the benumbing of this or in the studied disregard of this on the excuse of some political advantage, he finds a prime cause of the degeneration of civilization. And therefore, to combat the growing disregard of it he would have men as individuals constantly and by practice re-assert the principle and strengthen it.

In small occasions frequently, as well as in rare and great, this individual instinct towards civilized conduct—a reverence for other life, altruism—can be continuously exercised—in forbearance, as well as in charity—until we never cause suffering unnecessarily.

Necessarily in the course of our lives, heaven knows, we must be the cause of much, because life lives by an enforced borrowing from lives. How solve this, this problem of necessitated suffering? We can neither solve it nor reason it away; it is foreign to our notion of the good; we can only recognize its existence and in whatever small occasions are in our control, lessen it. Bringing the fact home to himself, Dr. Schweitzer, happy in his youth, in his upbringing and in his gifts of mind, owed all that, he said, to other less fortunate lives quite unknown to him. All the individual debts could never be discovered; but since all life is to our deeper nature felt as a fraternity, the debt of one conscious life to all life was valid, and human honour bound him, he thought, to make what repayment lay in *his* power. To his fellows he issued no list of duties, but, recognizing his own, thereupon dedicated his life after the age of thirty years to the personal practice, on man's behalf as well as his own, of the doctrine of repayment. Music, friends, scope, social life, abilities—he enjoyed till he was a little more than thirty, and left them when he went out to build his hospital in a swamp in tropical Africa; paying back, as

he conceived it, a small but positive portion for redemption of the honour of civilization so far—a debt which unrecognized is, he believes, dragging us down.

There is no organization behind him. His work has been supported by a few small groups in many western countries; or when funds have languished Dr. Schweitzer has returned at long intervals to lecture and play the organ, to remind those who chose to be reminded of the needs of the work he now has most at heart. Mr. George Seaver's recent book is the most comprehensive account yet given. It presents Albert Schweitzer by first-hand acquaintance, by summaries of his own accounts of himself and his hospital, and it presents his track of thought by synopsis and quotation. It gives a number of personal impressions; and is itself evidence of a deep devotion to his subject in the author.

Dr. Schweitzer may be looked at as a thinker and as a saint. Thought is controversial by definition. Some professional thinkers will pass by his thought with a smile of toleration, as though he were an admirable fellow, honestly trying not to argue in a circle. There is still not enough of the cold interplanetary air of detachment; his desires are too active; he may believe himself to be ready for *any* eventual truth, but he tends towards his favoured answer. "Those who restrain desire," says William Blake, "do so because theirs is weak enough to be restrained." Certainly Dr. Schweitzer had always been by nature passionately kind, serious and simple, and in this ruthless political climate, and in this ruthless world of nature, where the fittest not only survive but destroy the less fit (a model for twentieth century 'statesmen'), troubled with questions, he (a model for twentieth century 'statesmen'), troubled with questions, he longed and looked for a kind and gentle answer. "You can never *know*," seem to say our new-age philosophers, "you may only observe and report and co-ordinate." And Dr. Schweitzer, too, was philosopher and report and co-ordinate. They had their theories, and enough to know that we can never know. They had their theories, and folded their hands in dispassionate observation. He formed his theories, too; and unfolded his hands.

Can a sense of debt and of love to repay that debt, can gentleness as a conscious principle of life, ever hope to get humankind out of this prison of shouting and grabbing and cruelty in which we now find ourselves? So simple a remedy? It seems impossible; we are tempted to answer with a 'no', though a 'no' is no more justifiable than a 'yes'. There appears to be no magic to intervene for us, nor no political formula that will set us free tomorrow or the day after. Plans that handle men in the mass handle injustice, and seem to be not a right remedy. To forbear to cause suffering, to be fair dealers to all men, these things, easy to name and as obviously effective to the purpose as any other ideal, cannot become universal practice by any compulsion nor according to any plan. Doubt may say they are no remedy because they cannot be largely applied and immediately applied. But what can, immediately? They can be applied only in freedom, and only by units. Suffering certainly lies ahead,

an incalculable sum. It is in persons' power, by small degrees, by little and sure, to reduce that sum—though never to zero. Whether we argue or not, says Albert Schweitzer's life, let us at least *do*.

The principle of altruism is there in the human pattern. In it, distinctively human as it is, is the seed of the future for humanity; our hope is waking there. With simple reason Dr. Schweitzer says, practice will strengthen it, practice however small or however great. Advocacy alone will not, but practice will. No sane man can see suffering and remain unmoved. Life suffers; life is a fellowship. Not to harm, not to lend oneself to destruction, not to destroy where we have a choice (and we nearly always do have a choice); to help a life to live itself; to pay back a grain of joy; to spare and thus to bless—and to have a reason for all this—Albert Schweitzer only restates the Golden Rule, but multiplies the occasions and joins it to a great purpose. Not all men can relieve suffering in the African swamp; but it is not to be despised now (as the heart knows) to spare the smallest fellow creature an instant of suffering, if that is possible; until the mind which admits the tendency acquires the character.

For any reader who desires to know more about Albert Schweitzer and his thought and practice, besides Mr. Seaver's *Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind* I would recommend *The Path to Reconstruction* by Mrs. C. E. B. Russell, and Dr. Schweitzer's autobiographical sketches, *Memoirs of Childhood and Youth* and *My Life and Thought*. Whoever encounters it there will find, I believe, a strange quality about the golden-rule-like 'reverence for life': that it is a private turning-point. It cannot but be acted upon; it applies with equal significance to small actions and great, and makes with our own magnanimity (which we would not wish to deny) a chord, as in music, at once.

Yet simplicity of this heroic order leaves us smiling and a little baffled. (Why?) Can it matter, one toad the more, or the less? Measurably, no; a dead toad does not matter. A dead man, then? Again the answer—logic demands it—is the same. What is dead does not suffer, does not matter. But what remains alive—the conscious one who was thoughtless or ruthless, and became so, or became more so, in the act of the omission of it—*he* matters; for the trend of humanity is in him, alive. So acts, whatever their outcome, are important. There is a cumulative force; mind adds to mind; the least neglect condones the little wrong; the little wrong defends the greater; mind turns to not minding; so much ill exists which is clearly beyond our power instantly to stop, that we begin to excuse our absent altruism. But to care about the death or the pain or the deprivation of the least is the beginning of kindness—the beginning of the end of the reign of unkindness. Who am I that I dare to withhold my gift?

ART FROM INDIA AND PAKISTAN

BY F. W. WENTWORTH-SHEILDS

IT is inconceivable that any western observer could visit the exhibition of Art from India and Pakistan without finding much to admire and enjoy. All true works of art have an aesthetic appeal which is distinct or faint according to the sensibility and artistic experience of the beholder. To western eyes, a great deal of Indian art is immediately satisfying, but satisfaction is tempered with an uneasy sense that to admire in a purely visual way is to fall far short of proper appreciation and understanding. Closer study reveals more and more clearly that the aesthetic criteria of the west have a limited application to essentially oriental concepts. It is idle, therefore, to lie back among cushiony generalizations about art being a universal language, and art knowing no frontiers, and the like. Sooner or later, the edge of a sharp difference makes itself apparent and obliges a change of attitude.

In his brilliant introduction to *A History of Europe*, H. A. L. Fisher writes: "Scholars may explain to us . . . that the west has borrowed from the east, and the east from the west, and that the interpenetration of east and west has been so complex, subtle and continuous that any attempt to disentangle the European elements in our civilization from those which are foreign and adventitious, must be a forlorn enterprise. Nevertheless, the broad fact remains. There is an European civilization. . . . A civilization which reposes on an inheritance of thought, achievement and religious aspirations . . . A civilization to be distinguished from that of the Semites, the Hindus or Chinese." When the western observer admits that he is part of a civilization distinct from that of the Hindu, he realizes at once that his western mind, shaped by a Hellenic cast of thought can do no more than touch the fringes of a culture which developed apart and remained aloof from the influences of his own. Furthermore, the Indian background is so vast in its dimensions of time and space, so bewildering in its sequence of events involving so many millions of people that the Royal Academy's exhibition in London can afford him no more than the briefest glance at the tremendous scene.

The exhibition is laid out in such a way, however, as to invite the western observer to enjoy with his eyes even though his comprehension be limited. The objects are well and thoughtfully displayed, and often beautifully illuminated with skilfully placed spotlights. The catalogue is so explicit as to merit the title of guide. There is, then, every encouragement to look and every assistance to a better understanding.

The curtain-raiser to the show is a collection of pre-historic antiquities excavated in Rajputana and the Punjab, in the valley of the River Indus. They consist of statuettes, ornaments and seals, of extraordinary interest and beautiful craftsmanship. They are attributed to a remote civilization which flourished in the third millennium B.C., but their connection with the main body of Indian art is, up to the present, a matter of argument and conjecture.

The exhibition really opens with examples of Buddhist carvings in red sandstone. They are the first indications of the great Indian tradition of sculpture. Most of these exhibits are decorative adjuncts to the simple architectural form of Buddhist stupas. Stupas, originally, were primitive burial mounds, but in the second and first centuries B.C., they became depositories to enshrine the relics of Buddha. They were circular mounds with a flattened top, and this hemispherical shape was adopted as a symbol of the Buddha's death and final arrival at a state of beatitude, or Nirvana. The mound was encircled by a railing punctuated by richly ornamental gateways. The carved details shown are from the railings and railing pillars. They are representations of minor deities, spirits of fertility, episodes from the life of Buddha and aspects of a simple, pastoral existence. All are instinct with an enthusiastic pleasure in humanity, animals, trees and flowers as delightful elements in a world of contentment and abundance. They are a free and decorative expression, uncomplicated by any distinction between earthly and spiritual values, of the Buddha's teaching that all men are equal and closely identified with nature in a universal scheme of things. In the middle of the third century B.C., Buddhism had been proclaimed the official faith of a great empire, and these carvings are, in fact, a version of Buddhism modified to incorporate traditional and popular cults and myths.

Following a campaign of widespread conquest, which brought the greater half of India under his sway, the Emperor Asoka was seized with remorse at the death and distress that his victories had caused. He repudiated all forms of war and violence and adopted Buddhism as the religion of his kingdom. To signalize his conversion and to promulgate his edicts, he caused numerous monuments to be built. Their construction is an important landmark in building because timber, which hitherto had been the material for architecture and sculpture, was replaced by stone. It is said that he was responsible for the erection of eighty thousand stupas. Few of them have survived. But the fragments shown in the exhibition are a fascinating indication of their form and style. To the same period belong other monuments known as Asokan columns. The mighty capital of one of these columns is shown in the central hall at Burlington House. It is in the form of a hump-backed bull, carved in sandstone and highly polished. Asokan columns were averagely forty feet in height, and their purpose was to carry inscriptions of the Buddhist-Imperial law. This exhibit has an apt dignity of design for such a purpose, both in its

scale and impressive sculptural qualities.

Examples of the culmination of stupa art can be seen in the limestone low-reliefs from the Amaravarti stupa. Attributed to the first and second centuries A.D., they display a virtuosity of carving which, perhaps, was never excelled. The intricacy of these many figured compositions, and the control of each design in all its complexities of pattern and rhythm is astonishing. But in spite of their superb handling, the simplicity of the earlier sandstone work is more attractive than the restless, teeming surfaces of these panels.

The period from the third to the sixth century A.D. saw the decline of Buddhism, or rather, its absorption into Hinduism. Evidence of this process of assimilation is found in the appearance of Buddha among the Hindu pantheon as an incarnation of the god Vishnu, and in the adoption of Buddhist legends as illustrations of Hindu principles. A superb example of this period is the massive, bronze Buddha from Sultanganj, in Bihar. The figure is impressive in size, in its still, aloof character and in the great, curving sheath-like form of the drapery that covers the slender, formalized body. The face, with full mouth, short upper lip and large half-closed eyes is strange and unearthly. The whole dark silhouette against the light stone-coloured walls compels attention with a kind of dramatic insistence. Weighing nearly a ton, it is a notable and interesting example of metal casting. But the three finest bronzes are the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth century South Indian representations of the Hindu god, Siva, as Lord of the Dance. Slight and supple, these four-armed figures are beautifully poised in a flickering, circular setting. They are unique as portrayals of movement in sculpture. Their bodies are alive with a strong rhythm which, because it is controlled and contained within the design is neither restless nor disturbing. Comparison of the three figures reveals a very close adherence to an idiomatic formula, but slight differences in modelling suggest that each sculptor had a small margin of licence in his method of treatment.

Confronted with these and many of the other single figure images in the exhibition, either anthropomorphic or theriomorphic, each one conforming to a rigid symbolism which gives every attitude, gesture, garment, fold or accessory a particular significance, the western observer is aware that the sole purpose of these sculptures is their employment as objects of devotion. It is almost incidental that they are works of art, for they were certainly not created with that intention.

Sculpture is the predominantly important section of the exhibition because it represents the essentially Indian art. Sculpture and architecture, almost merged into one, are characteristic elements of the Indian scene. Painting, on the other hand, was never so closely woven into Indian life as to become a widespread means of expression. Save for the magnificent Buddhist frescoes at Ajanta, there is little evidence to show that it was used extensively as a decorative adjunct to building. At the Royal Academy

there are four galleries filled with paintings. They are representative of the Mughal and Rajput schools. The former originated with the Mohammedan invasions of Northern India in the thirteenth century. Originally derived from Persian painting, it was a dynastic art developed and encouraged by the Mughal emperors. In style, it is a combination of extravagant decoration and drawing of the utmost precision. In subject, it is devoted to scenes of court life, portraits, remarkable for their delicate and explicit definition, and drawings of animals and birds, recorded with sensitive observation. Rajput painting, far more varied in treatment, subject and style, is much nearer to a folk art. Many of the themes are drawn from popular legend and traditional stories. These pictures have an engaging and entertaining quality, a charming conventionality and most agreeable colour values.

The exhibition is rounded off with a diversified display of minor arts, carpets, textiles, glass, jewellery, jades and tiles, examples of the rich inventiveness of eastern design and of the quality of its exquisite craftsmanship.

When the western observer begins to assess the scope and diversity of the eastern man's artistic achievement, it seems to matter very little whether he can understand the full implications of what he sees, or not. At a time when his own inventiveness is numbed by a jaded, post-war inertia, a kind of listless resignation to the grey limitations of austerity, this display of teeming creativeness is stimulating and refreshing.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

THE tragic failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers is a reminder, amidst present forebodings, of the grim legacy which Britain and all Europe inherits from the nineteenth and early twentieth century conception of power politics. The insulting accusations daily hurled at us by Russia, and the charge that Britain and America are inspired solely by imperialistic motives, strike us to-day, knowing as we believe their falsehood, as unjust and malicious even when we endeavour to look at Europe and the world through the eyes of a deeply suspicious power. Not all the suspicions of Russia can be accounted for by the attitude of Britain and others to the revolution and the U.S.S.R. in the years between the wars. Russia looks far ahead and far back. She is a nation to whom Mr. Bevin's once-expressed wish for cards on the table, face upwards, does not appeal, especially as she probably feels that she now has better cards to play.

But that there was a time when the charge of imperialism could have been laid at Britain's door and by Britons proudly justified is not contested; it is now illuminated by the remarkable third volume of the history of *The Times**. This volume covers the years 1884 to 1912: it will be followed in due course by a fourth taking the story to 1935. The book, in spite of its great size, will be a disappointment to those whose chief interest is in home affairs. There is nothing here about internal politics and the rise of the Labour Party, nothing about the beginnings of the modern structure of local government, nothing about trade unionism or the advance of elementary education, nothing, in fact, about the great seething of social ideas which has transformed social life in Britain; nothing even about the reform of the House of Lords. These are omissions and great ones from the story of a newspaper and they have the odd effect of making the editor, G. E. Buckle, a shadowy figure dominated at all times by the personality of C. F. Moberly Bell, the manager, and to a lesser extent by the heads of the foreign department. But the reason for the omissions is clear. One story had to be told, the progress of *The Times* throughout the period; another, the part played by the staff of *The Times* in foreign relations was too important to be curtailed. Obviously it was foreseen that if *The Times* had a contribution to make to history it was in the detailed disclosure of its foreign correspondents' messages to that paper and the instructions and advice they received. That this has been done with punctilious honesty and with no attempt to justify the actions of individuals deserves the highest praise.

The highlights of this volume are the chapters on General Gordon, Parnell and the Pigott forgeries, the Jameson Raid and the inquiry that followed, and the sale of *The Times* to Northcliffe. Those pages are full of story-book personalities, Gordon, Frank Le Poer Power—*The Times* correspondent in Khartoum, Houston who produced the

* *The Twentieth Century Test. 1884-1912. The Times Publishing Co. 21s.*

forged letters, Cecil Rhodes, Flora Shaw—so intimately concerned with the events leading to the Jameson Raid, Alfred Harmsworth and C. Arthur Pearson. These men and women spring to life, thanks to a narrative that portrays them not as actors on a stage but as human beings whose frailties, abilities and beliefs shaped events, the ends of which could not be foreseen. In Flora Shaw a correspondent who was unafraid of the responsibilities of opinion, and in Moberly Bell her confidant at *The Times*, faith in Britain's imperial mission was most clearly shown. They schemed for Britain in a manner outrageous to modern minds but to them justified and honourable; nor did they fear war.

The outstanding contribution of the book, however, is the insight it gives into Britain's relationship with Germany and the growth of antagonism between the two countries. Politically in Britain the rise of Germany to the position of a leading continental country was first and foremost a matter of upsetting the balance of power; in *The Times* office she was more often looked upon as a rival, whose intentions once clear were unequivocally opposed even if attempts were made from time to time to bring the two countries closer together. Valentine Chirol, correspondent in Berlin from 1892 to 1896 and later head of the Foreign Department, was at first partial to Germany but George Saunders, his successor in Berlin, was implacably opposed to Germany's naval expansion and his messages earned him increasing hostility from the Wilhelmstrasse. That these messages played a big part in forming British opinion and in foiling the Kaiser's ambitious plans is not to be doubted*. Events, however, hung in the balance until the defeat of Russia by Japan made an accord with that country easier for Britain and *The Times*. From that date Chirol's policy towards Russia underwent a marked change, and it was Germany that was isolated.

How Moberly Bell managed to devote so much of his great energy to the imperial fortunes of Britain throughout this period is something of a mystery for he had other and more personally pressing problems with which to deal. Financially *The Times* was in a bad way. It was crippled in 1887 by the Parnell commission, a suit which cost the paper over £200,000, and from that time it faced years of declining sales. Moberly Bell, with the encouragement of two American publishers, was quick to see the value of subsidiary enterprises which would bolster up the profits of *The Times*. An *Atlas* was produced, the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was reprinted and sold on "easy" terms and finally, after other ventures, "The Times Book Club" was formed. But profitable though these efforts were, some proprietors were far from satisfied that they were in keeping with the dignity of the paper. In the end Bell was nearly beaten but he displayed great energy when *The Times* had to be sold in baulking Pearson and helping Northcliffe, under the pseudonym of X, to be the purchaser. For Bell it proved an unhappy action. Northcliffe, as was soon proved, was incapable of giving *The Times* the independent editorial policy he had promised. He brought pressure to bear on the question of the ratification of the Declaration of London and for the "old gang" it was the end. Bell died of heart failure in the office in which he had sat during twenty-one years. A man of many parts he was to *The Times* the "colleague whom we all loved."

* On June 13, 1902 Bell wrote to Saunders after dining with Alfred Rothschild asking for a statement of his views, and informing him that the King had had a conversation with Count Metternich who had complained about the attitude of *The Times* and Saunders to Germany. In a long and reasoned reply, Saunders asked: "Are we to ignore the whole tendency of German policy during the present reign, are we to pass a sponge over every indication of German plans and ambitions and to range ourselves definitely on the German side . . . ?" And he concluded: "So far as Germany is concerned, we hold the keys to the Atlantic Ocean and indeed of all the Seven Seas. Let us keep them! Germany is a parochial Power and, if we are firm and not foolish, it will remain so."

THE AFTERMATH OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, by H. G. Schenk. Kegan Paul. 16s.

The state of Europe after the Napoleonic wars bears so many resemblances to its present predicament, though it was not then as materially devastated, and the attempt to erect a common government for the continent is so much in line with some current aspirations, that almost any book on the period 1815-1825 has fascination. Mr. Schenk's work does not lack it, even for the ordinary reader, but as a piece of general history it is disappointing. It is essential in sound historical writing for all the facts presented to bear close relation to a central theme. The trouble with many of Mr. Schenk's facts is that they are not so related. Further, although one can be said to exist, it is extremely difficult to discover the connecting thread of argument from chapter to chapter, and to this extent the book may be held deficient. He tends to lose himself in the minutiae of particular histories—the independence of Greece, the rise of the South American republics, revolution in Spain—and the effects of these events on the relations of the Powers and the Alliance idea are never sufficiently brought home.

In spite of this, anyone with a taste for history and an interest in contemporary European movements will be constantly struck by the appositeness of many quotations, which, indeed, are the book's strength. One valuable piece of material, offered for the first time to the general English reader, is the Czar's original draft for the Holy Alliance, before Metternich had made his amendments. The Alliance was an affair of monarchs and statesmen, and lacked the popular support and interest which the League of Nations attracted. But the Czar's conception of "three princes ruling over three provinces of a united Christian nation"—Russia, Austria, Prussia—is a classical expression of idealistic internationalism, as the many comments quoted upon it from Talleyrand's "ludicrous contract",

represent the response of "realism".

The book's most satisfying endeavour is its discussion of the religious background. The future of Christianity, its importance in the individual life, as well as for the health of States and societies, were being debated by a number of notable men. The author's researches here supply most striking parallels for the opinions of those to-day who link the spiritual and intellectual disintegration of Europe with its loss of Christian faith. From men like Burke and de Maistre who eloquently defended religion as a mainstay of the State, to others like Jean Paul who indignantly refused to have the "sanctuary transformed into the State's cookshop"—we have their counterparts alive to-day. John Stuart Mill's description of "this age, in which real belief in any religious doctrine is feeble and precarious, but the opinion of its necessity for moral and social purposes almost universal" still has point.

The years after 1815 were a time, not of democracy, but of restored and nearly absolute monarchs. One remark of Francis I, Metternich's Emperor, to Austrian teachers has a cautionary ring. "I want not scholars" he told them, "but good citizens." Are not some of our educationists in danger of saying almost the same? It might be worth their notice that the Emperor continued his remarks on this occasion by declaring: "Whoever serves me must teach according to my orders." It is for backwaters like this, rather than for its main stream of narrative, that this book will be found rewarding to the ordinary reader.

WALTER JAMES.

NELSON, by Carola Oman. Hodder & Stoughton. 42s.

To assemble in a single volume—even in one that exceeds seven hundred pages—all that is known about Lord Nelson's life is a formidable task. It is difficult, therefore, to praise highly enough the hard work, scholarship and enthusiasm which Miss Carola Oman has brought to

this, the latest and best biography that the Admiral's memory has inspired. In her chief object as a biographer she is, beyond question, successful. Here is the life of Nelson, thoroughly investigated and ably described. And no other work of comparable importance has appeared since 1846.

Considered as naval history, this work adds little, perhaps, to what was already known or believed. Diffident of her technical knowledge, which must nevertheless be considerable, Miss Oman has not sought to improve upon received doctrine. For the campaigns and battles she has been content to follow Mahan, Corbett and Callender. But on Nelson's private life her research has been original and her judgment exceptionally sound. Excellent is her analysis of the family background and of the Lady Hamilton affair. Best of all, though, is the chapter dealing with the 'Twenty-five Days', the period Lord Nelson spent at Merton before that last voyage began from which he never even expected to return. In her chapter on Trafalgar, the book's inevitable climax, Miss Oman does justice to a great theme and ends fittingly with the lines:

.....Dr. Scott was able to approach his first letter since the action. It was with a trembling pen that he addressed his sheet "Mrs. Cadogan, Merton Place, Surrey", and began to trace the words: "Hasten the very moment you receive this, to dear Lady Hamilton, and prepare her for the greatest of misfortunes."

Going beyond 1805 in a final chapter, Miss Oman shows, interestingly, that Horatia, or Mrs. Ward as she became, lived to eighty-one and yet died still uncertain of her parentage; which was not finally proved until 1893. Long before that, however, the pensions tardily awarded to her children in 1854 were the proof that the facts were, in government circles, common knowledge.

Where so much has been done so well it may seem invidious to complain of small omissions and errors. But in what must be a standard work, of which the first edition is already presumably sold, the opportunity may arise for amendment. When it does, a recourse to the Captain's

Logs of the *Hinchinbroke*, *Albemarle* and *Boreas* would add a little to what is known of Nelson in his early years. They show, for example, his strictness in command—he punished his carpenter once with eleven lashes and a quartermaster with twenty-three. Neglect of duty, mutinous language and disrespect to an officer he dealt with most severely.

The *Albemarle's* Log (1781-1783) contains, incidentally, an episode which biographers have so far agreed to ignore but which illustrates, nevertheless, his readiness to assume responsibility. The scene is at the Nore and the date, October 29, 1781.

At 11 got within hail of the *Haswell* and Ordered her to come to an anchor but she having all her men on board would neither admit the Boats to board her or bring too untill we compelled her by firing 26 Nine-pounders and one 18-pounder shot at her. We likewise brot to three others and anchored alongside the Headmost in 5 fathom Water. At 5 A.M. Weighed and Run alongside the *Haswell* the people having refused to be Imprest and threatened resistance but finding the *Albemarle* yard arm with them, they submitted. . . .

The firing of two broadsides into an East Indiaman off Sheerness was drastic treatment even for those days.

Of actual errors in this book, there are few indeed. But it might some day be thought proper to modify the statement on page 169, that "smoke from the gunfire had now produced a perfect calm."

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

MYSTICISM IN RELIGION, by the Very Reverend W. R. Inge. *Hutchinsons' University Library*. 12s. 6d.

"It may be doubted whether a very old man ought to write a book, even if he is asked to do so. I cannot expect that the critics will be very kind to this my latest piece of authorship. 'He has said all this before, and said it better. He has no sympathy with the hopes and aspirations of the young. When he looks towards the future he sees only the approach of another Dark Age.'". Thus Dr. Inge writes as the first words of his new book and I quote them not as

an example of the humility of a great scholar—though they are that—but in order that at least one critic may give them a decided negative. This is a very important book indeed and that it may drive the younger generation of readers back to the author's earlier works, especially *Christian Mysticism* and *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, is of secondary importance only. It demands to be read in its own right, partly because of what is new in it—Dr. Inge's examination of the Orthodox mysticism of Berdyaeff and Frank—, partly, precisely because it is the work of "a very old man", with its mellowed wisdom and balanced judgment, and partly because of its Christian optimism.

After being known for at least a generation as 'the gloomy Dean', and criticized on that account, Dr. Inge has survived into a new generation which reserves its amused contempt not for him but for his critics. It is they, not he, who have been proved wrong and all his scorn for the philosophy of 'escape by futurism', the liberal utopias of secularized optimism, is shared by the young who assume the imminence of an epoch considerably darker than the Dark Ages. Because even in the hey-day of the gospel of materialist progress, he insisted that its conventional values and assumptions were false when judged either by theology or by history, by Christian revelation or by the observed effects of the time-process, he has now come into his own; and because then, as now, he held fast to the basic Christian philosophy that "here we have no continuing city" and that the clue to Nature lies in super-nature, he has a word of hope in the surrounding despair.

It is to his treatment of the Orthodox mystics of to-day that those familiar with his earlier work will naturally turn. Unsurprisingly, he hails Frank's *God with Us* as "a gem of the purest water", while at the same time calling attention to the central weakness of Frank's approach. He doubts "whether Frank quite realizes that the certainty which he enjoys is not given us to start with, and is not given to all good people" and he

insists, quite rightly, that "the mystical sense is no criterion of our acceptance with God." As for Berdyaeff, he quotes, with substantial approval, his analysis of the difference between Orthodox and Catholic mysticism—that the former tends to emphasize the Holy Spirit where the latter is more Christocentric—but fails, perhaps, to give full weight to the implications of the Western approach.

Dr. Inge sees, indeed, what Berdyaeff explicitly warns, that the Orthodox approach may, without a firm theological basis, shade off into "an impersonal and undifferentiated love" which is really Hinduism. It is, in fact, exactly that danger which besets the popular mysticism of the Hollywood school of Huxley and Heard at this moment. Many of us, rightly or wrongly, are convinced that it is only the Christocentric emphasis of the West which will guard contemporary mysticism for Christianity; and are thus prepared to accept what may sometimes seem an indefensibly rigid conception of the nature of the Church as the Mystical Body and of the unique relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Visible Church. As a Christian nurtured in the Western tradition, Dr. Inge would undoubtedly agree with the end; but it is the last paradox of his position that he is still critical of the mightiest of the means. For his one blind spot—if one may say it kindly and with no controversial intent—is still the Roman Catholic Church.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON.

WORDS IN ACTION, by Sir Philip Hartog. *University of London Press*. 8s. 6d.

All who knew the late Sir Philip Hartog will recall how deeply he realized the importance of the English language. His experience in India, and his interest in Palestine had taught him the vital rôle of English as an international medium. His vast knowledge of the educational problem in Great Britain at all stages had convinced him

that the English people treat their language scurvily and that adequate teaching of the mother tongue is the most essential basic training for citizens in a democracy. "With words we govern men," wrote Disraeli, and that phrase is the motto of this volume into which Sir Philip had crowded the fruits of his life-long investigations. As one turns these pages one can see again, that small, untiring figure, relentless in the pursuit of an argument, courteous, but insistent that cant should be eliminated, rhetoric kept disciplined, and reason given an opportunity to be heard.

Sir Philip Hartog produces formidable evidence to show how inadequate is the control of English among many school children, and how dangerously near a number of them are to illiteracy. Fortunately he was not prepared to leave the matter with mere denunciation of the present situation. For half-a-century he had been constructing a system through which English could be taught. He had always violently opposed the schoolboy "essay" as an exercise. "In my view", he wrote, "the very form and ease of the essay by a Steele or a Johnson, a Hazlitt, or a Lamb, imply a knowledge of life and an authority to which the school-boy cannot pretend."

In place of the mechanical imposition of the essay Sir Philip Hartog devised a series of exercises, imaginative in conception, and Socratic in principle. With the courage and practical vision which always emanated from him he carried these into the class-room and tested them by the only experience that counts. He taught boys and girls to increase their vocabulary because they needed more words for the purposes they had to express, and further he trained them in self-criticism, so that they could examine what they had written or what they discovered on the printed page.

Before Sir Philip's conclusion he returns to his attack on the public examination systems. He reminds us of how his experiments showed that the same examiners would after an interval of five months give entirely different

marks to the same scripts. "My Committee", he adds, "came to the conclusion, on the basis of the evidence, that the term 'literacy' as applied to work of this kind has no meaning sufficiently well recognized to be effectively used in judging the scripts of candidates."

The English language is our greatest national possession, as it is indeed our greatest "invisible" export. It would be a tribute to Sir Philip's memory and also serve a most practical purpose if some Society could be formed to carry on the work which he so forcefully initiated.

B. IFOR EVANS.

PORTRAIT OF EDITH WHARTON, by Percy Lubbock. *Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.*

There are only a few books published in any one year whose opening paragraphs inspire the reader with instant confidence that the author has chosen the right subject for himself and has unhesitatingly found the right manner for the subject; that he is distilling out of a matured plenty instead of putting together material hastily scraped up for an *ad hoc* purpose; that, in fact, he has produced a vintage book.

Mr. Percy Lubbock knew Edith Wharton, and her friends. He had been a spectator at more than one of those brilliant "first nights" when she "flashed upon England", and sitting between Henry James and Howard Sturgis "all alive, easy, and active in repose", she listened and talked, and "seemed to bring a great deal with her, and to occupy space about her as one well used to space." What she brought was the world, and "the old everyday life seemed to vanish as she took possession."

She had not very much to say to Mr. Lubbock, the young man "believed literary in his aspirations" who watched her from the background. He was shy and she did not know what to do with shy people. She lived on the crest, she was offered so much of the choicest and took it so easily as a queen taking her

due, that she had no time to look for anything which grew under the leaves. He did not help her to find him. He felt the approach to her too public, and did not want to "go faltering up the red carpet" but he watched her with an eye admiring, enchanted but not dazzled. There is a touch of irony in his homage. Perhaps all the more because he was not drawn right into the circle he is able to recreate for us not only Edith Wharton as a figure, even in private life a figure, but her world, the distinguished world of the aristocracy of taste and letters in which she moved with the grace and confidence born of her vitality and of her tradition. She seemed to have it every way this lucky woman, a writer whose writing never worried her and was always kept in the background, and yet went so well. Mr. Lubbock does not reveal her private heart; it was not often shown. She too, surprisingly, was shy, and except for that almost irrelevant novelist's gift lived mostly in the external world.

Mr. Lubbock does not only hold up his own mirror to her; he catches her reflection in the eyes of her own countrymen; of England and France and Italy. He shows her as the chatelaine in the American country house whose beauty and smooth running was another of the works of her creative energy, and he shows her as a travelling companion devouring every new sight and sound. Music itself did not interest her till late in life when she discovered it in a way which must have been maddening to any musician in her company. She appears sometimes a little heartless, but this is the only glimpse of her as 'phoney'.

It was like her quick moving nature that at the outbreak of the 1914 war she should turn at once to vigorous service; perhaps like her too that with all her acute sympathies and ardent wish to help she should have produced an impression of never quite grasping what war really meant. It was very like her to be one of the first to pull herself out of the war mood, to start writing again while others were drawing breath, and to rebuild a civilized peacetime life in the Pavillon Colombe. There, an old lady, still

gracious and graceful, still holding court, still talking, she died and, with a friend's brief glimpse of her a few days before her death, Mr. Lubbock closes a book rare in its accomplishment and in its power to perform exactly what it sets out to do: to paint a vivid picture not only of a remarkable woman but of a vanishing world.

LETTICE COOPER.

THESE FROM GOD'S OWN COUNTY, by S. L. Bensusan. *Routledge. 15s.*

Here is another large collection of short stories by Mr. Bensusan, whose articles on country matters will be known to readers of THE FORTNIGHTLY. Mr. Bensusan's territory is the Essex marshlands, and to his varied studies of the field-workers in this part of England he brings a lifetime of loyalty to the district of his predilection, and a detailed knowledge of the regional dialect.

In a short introduction to this book

ALL THE CONFERENCES ARE FAILURES. THIS IS INEVITABLE FOR HOLY SCRIPTURE DECLARES THEIR FUTILITY IN THESE WORDS:—

"Associate yourselves, O ye people and ye shall be broken in pieces."

"Take counsel together, and it shall come to nought; speak the word, and it shall not stand."

"LET GOD BE YOUR FEAR, AND LET GOD BE YOUR DREAD." (Isaiah viii.)

"And it shall come to pass, that WHOSOEVER shall CALL on the name of the LORD shall be delivered." (Joel ii. 32)

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Mr. H. de Vere Stacpoole writes: "I keep Bensusan on my bookshelf beside Hardy." It seems to me that the comparison here is quite spurious, can only alienate the reader and perhaps blind him to Mr. Bensusan's more modest merits. It would be a matter for wonder and praise indeed if Mr. Bensusan had anythink like the poet's (and greatest countryman of his time) creative vigour, to say nothing of lyrical impulse. To the reader who may not have heard them broadcast, many passages in these stories are written in a style that is too unselective, with rather heavy irony and laboured reference, as for example this from "Mrs. Springbone and the Bullfinch":

Mr. Mace expressed the view that since it suited Jessie and suited him, it was the only possible one. Perhaps he did not put his case tactfully; he is a common man enough with crude ideas about individual rights that are probably quite unsound. It is true but irrelevant to the issue that when the idea was first mooted, Jessie had implored him not to let her go away, adding, "I'd leifer you threw me down th' owd well, Dad." Then he had assured her that she should never be taken from him, "nit f'r Mrs. Springbone ne yet f'r a dozen sech" though it is only fair to point out that Providence in its kindness has not even duplicated the lady in the Marshland area; mercifully she is unique.

And later on in the same story:

After a brief spell of striving and unrest the bird reconciled himself to captivity and even allowed Jessie to feed him. He would pipe as loudly as though in some earlier incarnation he had learned what Theocritus has written about soothing sorrow with song.

But many of the stories are entertaining, true to life even if they lack creative warmth, and carefully constructed. They are both grave and gay, and treat of a great variety of subject from the duplicity and cunning of poachers and keepers to the love of woodland trees, the killing of vermin, the drunkenness of a frightened carpenter and the disappointed wiles of a young lady. Of the tragic stories I liked particularly "Woodland Calling" and "The Beaver" which stay in the mind. But while reading other stories such as "Young Love" and "Mr. Cant's Adventure", good though they are, I was unable to forget the far

greater dramatic punch and lyrical passion of Mr. H. E. Bates's country tales. All the same Mr. Bensusan's work gains in value when we reflect that he writes of ways that are quickly disappearing before the hand of progress. This book is pleasantly illustrated.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

MUSIC FOR THE MULTITUDE, by Sidney Harrison. *Michael Joseph.* 10s. 6d.

Yet another book on musical appreciation! Why has it been produced and how does it differ from other books which attempt to explain music to the ordinary listener? The answers to both these questions lie in the fact that most other books on appreciation confine themselves to the period from Bach to Brahms, or the slightly more extended period from the Elizabethans to Elgar, relying very largely for their interest on biographies of the great composers. The present volume, however, starts with the music of the ancient Greeks—what little we know about it—and takes the development of the art through the middle ages to the present day in relation to the social history of the times. We see the medieval conflict between music and the Church; opera as the child of the Renaissance; Bach composing in the atmosphere of the Lutheran Church; while Handel settled in London and enjoyed the advantages of a growing Calvinistic industrialism ("Calvinism evolved from a religion of militant Puritanism into one that encouraged the gaining of wealth, provided that it arose from the exercise of such Christian virtues as thrift, sobriety and industriousness"): Haydn and Mozart serving the princelings of a dying aristocracy; Beethoven's sympathies with the French Revolution, and so on, right up to a short Epilogue on music during the war under CEMA and ENSA.

The teaching of this book is not only of history but of the bones and sinews of music itself, with illuminating chapters on Scales and Modes, Notations, Counterpoint, Rhythm, Harmony, Fugue, Form

and Orchestration—illuminating because at every turn the author has the happy knack of explaining the musical idea in simple language illustrated by some simile from everyday life.

To cram a thousand years of music into some three hundred pages implies a certain amount of condensation and the author sometimes makes a sweeping statement where a point is open to debate. For instance, he says: "Few people can muster any interest in obsolete instruments. A superseded type of instrument is not like an old piece of furniture—it is not an admired antique that can still be usefully employed, nor does it give ideas to the craftsmen of to-day... Only a few enthusiasts gather to hear performances on a consort of viols or on recorders and clavichords." How then does he account for the keen competition whenever genuine old instruments appear in the sale room, the enthusiasm whenever they are played, not merely before audiences of "enthusiasts" but to school children and at ordinary concert-giving clubs, and does he realize that at least four makers of these instruments have as many orders as they can handle?

However, this is a book "for the multitude" and it goes far beyond the realms of Tchaikowsky, the *Unfinished*, "No. 5" and Rachmaninov—the multitude's reputed horizon.

EDGAR HUNT.

FROM TYRONE TO THE TEST, by James Dickie. *Seeley Service.* 15s.

The title of this book suggests one of those rare but delightful collections of angling reminiscences but, although there are good stories with a hint of both Tyrone and Test embedded in them, it must inevitably disappoint if approached for the virtues its title would appear to hold. In reality it is a book of instruction, and the author's own intention may perhaps give some glimpse of what he has aimed at: "In this book I am trying, first of all, to give the reader a general picture showing how a trout behaves and why, then to tell him of the pitfalls into which I myself walked."

There is no doubt that the author has carried out this intention to a degree, but in plain truth the result suffers the almost inevitable fate of articles written for the press when collected together—it fails to make a real book. A feature prevalent here that seems to owe its derivation from this sort of source is the faintly irritating preponderance of paragraphs that are just too short in some of the chapters. In a newspaper an article, which at first sight an editor might feel could not appear as written, can be made more palatable by splitting up paragraphs to form shorter ones. But this device is rarely attractive in a book, where a perhaps more serious study on the reader's part can be expected. In addition there is always a difficulty in creating a continuous thread throughout such a volume and here the author seems to have failed to overcome it.

In spite therefore of the object and scope of the book as it stands the outcome for the reader may well be that of the author's own quoted experience: "When I was young, I read all the books on fishing which I could lay my hands on, and the more I read the more confused I got."

But all this, which on reflection seems ungenerous enough, is not to say that there are not excellent and highly interesting things to be found in this book. For one thing the author's knowledge of flies is vast, and both in his treatment of tying and choosing the fly there is much that is original and stimulating. In particular too there is a quite fascinating chapter designed to throw light on the optical delusions—what fish see—which form a fundamental factor in the problems of fly-fishing. And the illustrations are numerous and excellent.

J. F. BURNET.

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BOOKS ON THE TABLE

In a sad and beautiful book (published in 1943 and so soon forgotten) André Maurois writes of "the most infallible taste" of André Gide who, in 1922, at the Abbey of Pontigny and elsewhere, gave words of wisdom to the young writer. How wide has been the influence of this man on French thought and literature, and indeed on world letters, may be judged in part by *THE JOURNALS OF ANDRÉ GIDE*: Vol. 1, 1889-1913, translated from the French with an Introduction and Notes by Justin O'Brien (*Secker & Warburg*, 25s.). The period covers only the years of his life from the age of nineteen, yet his quality as scholar, artist, critic and individualist is already established here.

The Introduction of the Professor of Contemporary French Literature at Columbia University is naturally more than a biographical study. He weighs his subject's merit as a stylist, revealing something of the huge effort of pruning and polish; he goes to the heart of the intention in all André Gide's work—the devotion to truth, the problem of "being free"—and corrects the superficial impressions of those who have not heeded the caution that "under the obvious poison I took care to hide the antidote." No praise is too high for the easy translation and careful research—the thirty pages of the Glossary of Persons contain the relevant facts about some 400 of the philosophers, artists and statesmen alluded to in the journals, the works of André Gide are exactly classified, the index should satisfy the most diligent inquirer—and this first volume makes the reader wish time away until the second and the last are published. Obviously Justin O'Brien loves the man, with the "samurai's face" of M. Maurois' perfect description, as he loves the labour.

"Glad did I live and gladly die"

Another who obviously loves her subject is Lettice Cooper, who in *ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON* (*Home & Van Tasselt*, 6s.) has revived that always entrancing story. One of the most

potent attractions of this book is the simplicity, the straightforwardness of the portrayal. Miss Cooper has none of the impertinence, nor the rashness, of modern biographers who, by giving imaginary expression to the great man's thoughts, instead of ennobling so often belittle. Least of all does R.L.S. need refurbishing, and anyone coming freshly to him through her study must surely make the same delighted discovery as Henry James: "Character, character is what he has!" Those who greet Stevenson's books as old friends, who never cease to reverence his passion for craftsmanship in writing, and who still cannot contemplate his life without emotion, will be grateful for this new biography, for the trouble Lettice Cooper has taken in devoting some of her chapters to the telling of his tales, and for her care in assessing their place in his literary development.

Lebensraum

Flora Shaw and Sidney Colvin were two who felt apprehensive about the effect on R.L.S.'s literary work of his obsession for Samoan affairs. W. K. Hancock has not thought the happenings of an even more remote island too "exasperatingly petty and obscure" to serve as a parable for these times. *POLITICS IN PITCAIRN* (*Macmillan*, 10s. 6d.) gives its title to the first essay in this collection and recounts the history of the peopling of the island by the *Bounty* mutineers. Through savage totalitarianism they imposed the rule of law and became eventually a most pious and self-sufficient community. But with the coming of a few ships the longing for wider horizons invaded the breasts of the Pitcairners, increasing population made them covet more elbow room and, as Professor Hancock says: "Utopias will not always bear transplanting". It is not surprising that the next piece is called "Machiavelli in Modern Dress." The implications of this book, which work their way through "Maps for Politicians", "England and Australia",

"Italian Métayage", "Economic History at Oxford" to "A Note on Mary Kingsley", provide so many stimulants to thought that it is hard to put it down before the last words have been read:

She desired to conserve what was sound in native custom so that it might... achieve... a new and stronger life, different from the past but continuous with the past.

Fiction, tall and short

Which brings us to another parable, this time in the form of a novel, so serious in purpose and so wittily written that it is recommended as much for these reasons as for the success it achieves purely as a good story. *THE PREVALENCE OF WITCHES*, by Aubrey Menen (*Chatto & Windus*, 9s. 6d.) is concerned with the backwardness of a part of India, evidently well known to the author, where "Catallus"—as clear cut as the bust of his Roman namesake—and the newly-appointed education officer discover that their western idea of morality is an incongruity. The title conveys precisely what the book is about and to reveal further the fantastic, yet quite credibly related result of their conclusions (or conversion) would be unfair to a writer whose first novel this reader sincerely regards as one of the signs that the art of fiction is still capable of emerging from wartime stagnation.—The short story continued to hold its own unabashed and nowhere more so than in France. *FRENCH STORIES FROM NEW WRITING*, selected and edited by John Lehmann (*John Lehmann*, 8s. 6d.) is a representative group which might well be used to illustrate the influence of André Gide on such men as Jean Giono and Antoine de St. Exupéry. Unhappily the development of Paul Nizan and Louis Clamorgan, also dead in battle, can only be speculated upon. Jean-Paul Sartre was of course comparatively unknown when his two short stories here were originally published. For the rest, there are André Gide himself, Jean Cassou, André Chamson, Louis Guilloux and Noël Devaulez, and one and all have been fortunate in their translators.

A lazy man's thoughts

Joseph Joubert has been fortunate in his interpreter, Joan Evans, who in *THE UNSELFISH EGOIST* (*Longmans Green*, 10s. 6d.) has now assembled the mass of papers left by him, with the help of André Beaunier's compilation of the notebooks and a list of publications which make an impressive bibliography, into a delightful 'life'. The book will spread the wider fame that Joubert's originality of thought and unconventional judgments deserved. In Miss Evans' own words:

When Joubert died in 1824 he was known to a small literary circle in Paris as a critic of the most delicate sensibility, who published nothing; to a wider academic world, as the most disinterested of school inspectors; and to his neighbours at Villeneuve as the kindest of friends.

In her hands he comes to life in all three spheres, a man who lived quietly through the French Revolution and the years of upheaval that immediately followed, and one who counted Chateaubriand, Diderot and Fontanes among his friends.

London pride

One of Fontanes' letters to Joubert, written in 1785, gives a vivid picture of London which he says is "full of thieves", apparently on hearsay. Sixty-six years later Henry Mayhew's *London Labour and the London Poor* was published and Stanley Rubinstein has now collected from it the material for *THE STREET TRADER'S LOT: LONDON 1851* (*Sylvan Press*, 12s. 6d.). Some of its titles recall the fairy tales that harrowed our childhood: "The Lucifer Match Girl", "The Crippled Street Bird-Seller", "The Wallflower Girl" and "The Blind Boot-lace Seller"; others strike a merrier note: "The Grease-Removing Composition Sellers", "The Baked Potato Man" and "Doctor Bokanky, the Street Herbalist", with "The Book Auctioneer" and his treasures as this reader's first favourite—Mayhew recorded that "1,375,920 volumes were sold annually at an average price of 9d." Statistics of profit and loss, of wealth and dire poverty are set out in astonishing, because unexpected, detail. The illustrations are all contemporary prints and

add to the fascination that all such books hold for the Cockney who, sniffing the air of dirty old London streets, finds it fragrant.—And to a fellow-Paddingtonian Sir Harold Bellman's *CORNISH COCKNEY* (*Hutchinson*, 15s.) is not only the autobiography of the "local boy who made good" but the continuation of this awareness of London life.

Harold Bellman as the bright young man of "Fernhead Road Wesleyan" rather overshadowed the childhood of this reader; what he said in Sunday School or at "Pleasant Sunday Afternoons" was quoted by school friends on Monday, and when his name became associated with the higher circles of the Abbey Road Building Society his example was held up for the edification of careless adolescence. To read his own version of this tale of success after years of second-hand reports is a curious experience. Most important, it kills the ancient suspicion that he was or is a prig; he is now seen plainly as an authority on housing and economic problems and as a traveller with an informed and critical mind, not unaware of his achievement in social and business eminence but with a sense of fun unimpaired and mind and spirit still informed by an essentially "humble and contrite heart" as part of a happy life.

A father to his son

Another happy man, secure in the complete confidence of wife and children, and appointed abroad, wrote *LETTERS FROM A CIVIL SERVANT TO HIS SON* (*Frederick Muller*, 8s. 6d.). These were found among the boy's papers after his death in action and are now published with the anonymity of the writer preserved. They cover poetry, books, music, criticism, religion, sex, politics, careers and wars with a frankness that must still be rare in the relationships of fathers and sons. So close is the companionship that the reader often feels an intruder, though at times there is a sense of kinship, as for instance when the boy's mother dies and the heartache is shared

so intensely that the book has to be put away for a space. With such a father as shines from these pages it is safe to say that the son's brief life must have been poised, serene and amply blessed.

Highways and byways

Bad management has left too little space for the excellences of *THE ENGLISHMAN'S HOLIDAY* by J. A. R. Pimlott (*Faber & Faber*, 16s.) and Joseph Braddock's *KENT-SUSSEX BORDER FOOTPATHS* (*Chaterson*, 8s. 6d.). The one is a history of holidays: Elizabethan days in Bath, the Grand Tour, new watering-places made accessible by the railways, some playgrounds of Europe, the pre-war cruise and the latter-day holiday camp. The illustrations are profuse, full of enlightenment and good humour, and the appendices and index packed with information that every holiday-maker would like to know. While conceding that one's own meat may well be another's poison, the organized holiday provided by Mr. Butlin still seems to be altogether too depressing a sign of this generation's inability to amuse itself.

"Far from the madding crowd", depicted with the caption: "Start of an organized hike, led by a Red Coat", we may flee to Mr. Braddock's footpaths. Here on the borders of Sussex and Kent, as J. H. B. Peel says in an editorial foreword, "is the sort of landscape that we mean when we use the word *pastoral*"; nothing in fact like Filey Camp. There is Ashdown Forest, there are the oast houses around Goudhurst, there is Withyham, Penshurst, Appledore, Wadhurst (where the author lives), Burwash and Tenterden and there are boats on the Rother and a lighthouse at Dungeness. The many photographs convey that cherished atmosphere of being alone which has nothing to do with loneliness. Though practical data is included this is no ordinary guide book. And why? It is written by a poet.

GRACE BANYARD.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

APRIL, 1948

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THE MEANING OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

By R. P. SCHWARZ

IN their public utterances, obsequious eulogists and spiteful detractors of the Marshall plan both show the same absence of critical judgment. On any unsentimental view, the motives of the European Recovery Programme are neither so completely disinterested and humanitarian as one side would have it; nor so viciously imperialistic and machiavellian as the other side proclaims. The eulogists under-estimate the strength of the impersonal forces at work in a society of which the main motive power remains the pursuit of private profit. These forces are quite powerful enough to vitiate the best intentions. The detractors have been taught to ignore the individual. For them, only the "system" counts and that, being capitalist, is wicked. But there is nothing either wholly wicked or wholly pure in this world and the Marshall plan is no exception to this rule.

(I)

In its *subjective* aspect, the Marshall plan displays some features of astonishing generosity. There is only one example of a country whose citizens have granted international relief and financial assistance on a scale proportionately as large as or even larger than that now contemplated by the United States. That country is Switzerland. Within the three years since the end of the war, it has, with exemplary modesty and a refreshing lack of fuss, made gifts and granted credits amounting in all to 2,400 million Swiss francs (nearly 600 million dollars). On a per head basis, the equivalent amount for the United States works out at 18,000 million dollars—which happens to be roughly the estimated cost of the Marshall plan for a period of four years.*

But from the psychological angle, Swiss help has been easier to achieve; Switzerland has upheld her neutrality in two world wars, but for obvious reasons, she has never known isolationism. Her moral and physical closeness to the rest of Europe, apart from a long-standing humanitarian tradition, accounts for much of her action.

The United States, like Switzerland, can pride itself on its humanitarian tradition. But for the rest, a moral hiatus, more important even than geographical distance, separates it from Europe. Not many Americans are likely to admit even now, that their entry into the 1939-1945 war follow-

* See the presidential address by Dr. R. Speich, of the Swiss Bank Corporation, Basle, at the latest annual meeting of shareholders, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of February 29, 1948.

ed largely from their own obstinate attachment to an outdated doctrine of foreign policy. For them, in their great majority, Europe remains the scapegoat. On such a view, the urge to help her cannot be very great. It would be more logical to expect that Americans, after their experience of Europe's quarrels during the last thirty years, would wish to sink that troublesome continent at the bottom of the ocean, for good and all. Nor is it likely that the mass of the American people realize even now the full extent of the changes that have occurred in their country's position. Intellectuals and internationally-minded businessmen may grasp the significance of Willkie's "one world" formula and accept its implications. But what percentage do they represent in a total population of over 140 million? And to what extent has a knowledge of world problems been able to spread among a nation which, for close on 150 years, has prided itself on having no foreign policy and has entered world politics barely five years ago?

Thus, the American citizen, faced with the Marshall plan, must first of all overcome psychological resistances with which the Swiss case provides no parallel. Though his endorsement of the plan is unlikely to involve him in actual privations, it will compel him to accept unpleasant sacrifices such as restrictions on the free consumption of goods and the maintenance of high taxation. Nor is limitation of profits quite to be excluded. For the individual, these will be concrete acts of self-denial. Their effect will be felt by the American housewife, the American wage-earner, the American businessman. In their various capacities, these people will hardly be impressed by the abstract argument that relates commitments under the plan to gross national income and goes on to show that, on a *per annum* basis, their cost will be less than three per cent. of that income at its current rate. What interests them are the repercussions on personal, not on national, income.

In these conditions, can humanitarian or even economic motives suffice to explain the acceptance of the Marshall plan by the American citizen? Generosity must not be confused with altruism. The answer is, therefore, that sums of this magnitude would not be granted either as charity or as conscience money—"for having suffered less"—or even as a large-scale contribution to unemployment insurance. Only the search for comprehensive life insurance provides a sufficiently potent motive.

(II)

According to M. Zhdanov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the Marshall plan is "the American plan for the subjugation of Europe" and its aim is "the building up of imperialism and the preparation of the new imperialist war—struggle against socialism and democracy and the support of reactionary and anti-democratic, pro-Fascist, régimes everywhere."*

* M. Zhdanov's speech at Warsaw, at the end of September, 1947, to the representatives of the Communist parties of nine countries of Eastern Europe. See *The Times*, October 23, 1947.

These accusations are obviously half-truths. Undoubtedly imperialist forces are at work in the United States, as elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the Marshall plan might, in certain conditions, lead to the subjugation of Europe. But little though one may love American capitalism and its imperialist manifestations, power politics do not differ in essence, whether pursued by the east or by the west. The difference lies in tactics, in methods. And Russian methods have been outstandingly successful in decimating within less than three years, the ranks of those who, for good reasons, had endeavoured to keep equally apart from anti-Communism and Communism. Russian tactics, even more than Russian strategy, have compelled them to choose *la sauce à laquelle ils veulent être mangés*—and they have chosen the more nourishing one. From the Communist point of view, it may be regrettable that the governing classes in western Europe should have been successful, on the whole, in "buying off" the proletariat by the material blandishments of a higher standard of living. But without Russia's active help they could never have succeeded to anywhere near the same degree. If the unification of western Europe were to come about under the Marshall plan, Molotov even more than Marshall would deserve a monument in every capital of the sixteen "participating countries".

It is evident by now that Russia's strategy of denial is associated with tactics which, from the stage of unfriendly abstention, have already passed to that of active non-belligerency. The slogan will be "every kind of sabotage short of war." Yet, despite recent events in Czechoslovakia a real trial of strength further west—even if it were to give Russia a temporary success—is even now likely to produce as victor not a new *Commune*, but a new Thiers. In such a case, a period of revolutionary strife would be an unfortunate likelihood. Yet, after the lesson of Czechoslovakia, a revolutionary victory would pre-suppose a degree of stupidity on the part of the defenders that one would hesitate to debit against them despite their disastrous performance in inter-war years.

The Sixteen have it in their own hands to disprove M. Zhdanov's second accusation and to avoid "subjugation" even if they cannot escape a temporary loss of independence. The latter, in any case, is a fact. It will remain the more limited in degree and in time, the more the Sixteen are led to act in unison, to co-ordinate their reconstruction plans, their economies and hence ultimately their political policies. But it will of course be untrue to claim that independence will be preserved merely because the treaties to be concluded under the Marshall plan may eschew political clauses. There is no need for the United States to spell out clauses of this kind. The treaty parchments, held against the light of sober reason, will show them as their watermark. For he who pays the piper calls the tune. The knowledge that vital outside assistance may be cut off at any moment if its beneficiary balks at toeing the line is a deterrent

far more effective than the most restrictive political clause that could possibly be conceived.

(III)

For the United States as such, as distinct from its ordinary citizen, the Marshall plan is, politically, life insurance and economically, unemployment insurance. Whatever may have been the intention of the State Department, the economic purposes of the Marshall plan have by now quite evidently become subordinate to its political aims. All false pretences have been abandoned in this field. It is no longer disguised in any way that the plan is designed to ensure to the United States those allies which it will need in the event of armed conflict with the Soviet Union and to see to it that they will be *bündnisfähig*. It is for that reason that Congress is likely to accept a policy which, ten years ago, when it would have been far cheaper to follow a similar policy against Hitler it would not even have considered.

But for America, the Marshall plan has more than a political value contingent upon war with Russia. It has a very real economic value, independent of the political evolution, though the fact may be overshadowed by the political aspect. In the first place, the plan provides a means of balancing, temporarily at least, the United States' international accounts. The surplus in the United States balance of payments, constant since 1919, with the exception of the lend-lease years 1942-1944, may be an *embarras de richesses*. But the embarrassment is becoming unbearable. The extent of the surplus has been greatly increased by the world's exceptional post-war requirements. Although there is at least one British economist who claims that the world dollar shortage is "one of the most brazen pieces of collective effrontery," this solipsist impression is not shared by the numerous countries who cannot raise dollars for their most essential imports. In fact, failing dollar gifts or credits, the United States will find exceedingly few solvent buyers for its exports after mid-1948.

Even American senators are beginning to learn the facts of life. Senator Millikan, chairman of the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, thus defined the consequences that follow from the constant surplus in his country's balance of payments :

"We have to increase our imports, even though from a selective standpoint, we may not want to import. We may not need them. Or we have to lend, or we have to give them (the debtors) our surpluses"

Would that the distinguished Senator or his predecessors had discovered these self-evident truths a few years earlier—before the Tariff Act of 1930 for instance. It is largely because the United States would not increase its imports during the inter-war period that it must to-day lend or give its surplus. Right now, the other possibilities mentioned by the Senator do

* Hearing before the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate on Trade Agreement System and Proposed International Trade Organization Charter, March 20 to April 3, 1947, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1947, page 106.

not exist. If the United States decided overnight to cancel its whole tariff, its debtors could still not, in present conditions, produce sufficient exports to pay for their imports. Payment by imports is the long-term solution. On short-term, the only way out is gifts and credits.

It must, however, be realized that such a policy is merely an expedient designed to gain time. As such, it would have to be adopted on economic grounds alone—quite apart from compelling political reasons. For, in some manner, equilibrium must be restored in the United States balance of payments. As long as this cannot be achieved by merchandise imports, only gifts, credits and, in a small measure, invisible imports (American tourist expenditure abroad and payment for services rendered by foreigners) can be used for that purpose. Besides, this expedient is useful in another way. Given the present structure of United States economy, there is a direct connection between the maintenance of exports and the volume of employment. Maintenance of the former is likely to be helpful in stabilizing the latter. Provided the United States does not, in a future depression, abruptly discontinue foreign lending, as it did in 1930, "Marshall exports" may indeed assume the functions of a vast system of unemployment insurance. Thus, as a provisional solution, the policy is valuable. But it is unlikely to provide a permanent solution of the balance of payments problem. For it is highly improbable that the United States will want to continue acting as the world's largest pension fund. Objections are bound to arise for political reasons. But politics apart, the United States cannot fail to discover in time that instead of giving away its surpluses, it can, thanks to a different distribution of national income, absorb a much larger share of the national product than heretofore.

It is only incidental, among the economic aspects of the Marshall plan that it provides, in addition, a useful corrective to the mistakes and insufficiencies, by now quite patent, of the economic policy associated with Bretton Woods and the unco-ordinated series of reconstruction loans to various European countries. Normally, the plumbers would not have turned up quite so quickly to repair the burst pipes. But then, their own workshop was in danger too.

(IV)

One would like to know how many Americans realize the fact that in its economic aspects, the Marshall plan constitutes at best a provisional solution. Yet, unless that fact is understood, the time to be gained in this manner will be frittered away. Confusion of the provisional with the definitive is bound to lead to a rude awakening later on. On this point, one can hardly be optimistic when one observes that, until now, the plan has been "sold" to the Americans—much like the loan to Britain before—under all sorts of false pretences: the pretence that it will not cause a rise in American prices—when at the very least, it will put the brakes on any reduction; that it will not cause shortages in the American markets—that, in a large measure, will depend on how exports are organized; that

it will increase the chances of free multilateral trade and thereby act as a stimulant to "free enterprise" all over the world—as though that did not mainly depend on the American attitude to imports after the completion of the Marshall plan. For the time being, in any case, the United States, regardless of its doctrinal position, is being compelled, by overwhelming force of circumstances, to engage in the greatest experiment of economic planning ever attempted. It is an aggravating circumstance that it must carry out this experiment in the field of international economic relations, the one field from which even intrepid planners have shrunk so far on account of the particular difficulties involved. Supreme irony—the planning of exports, necessary under the Marshall plan, must inescapably lead to a considerable degree of planning of production and distribution, that is, of domestic economy as a whole.

(V)

What the Marshall plan means, respectively, to each side, does not seem to be any clearer to Europeans than it is to Americans. There are, of course, those who are satisfied with its immediate advantages. Mostly they are also those who seem to have reconciled themselves to the permanent supersession of Europe by the younger and more vigorous power of the United States. Having resigned themselves to this situation, all they want is a reasonably liberal life annuity from the American pension fund. Now, it may well be that Europe will prove unable to recover her former rôle in the world and that the lead has definitely passed to the other side of the Atlantic. But all that Europe can expect to get is a terminable annuity—and terminable at short notice.

Thus, in her case, time is even more precious. Europe, in the short space of four years, has to rebuild the main structure of her economy and to adapt it to utterly changed circumstances. Like the United States, although for different reasons, she has failed to achieve this adaptation during the inter-war period—necessary though it was even then. For the Sixteen the chief value of the Marshall plan derives from the possibility it offers of achieving economic, as well as moral, recovery in conditions of relative political freedom. If that were not the deeper meaning of the plan, there would be no reason to decline the Soviet recipe for Europe. As Monsieur Bertrand de Jouvenel pointed out recently*, it would be far more logical, for economic reasons, to integrate industrialized western Europe with the agricultural east rather than with the even more industrialized United States. It would also be easier to accomplish. The question is only at what level and cost a new equilibrium could be attained. It is evident that the eastern solution would mean a drop in the standard of living to a level considerably lower than anything western Europe has been accustomed to for a long time. It would not therefore be accepted by common consent; it could only be enforced after the disappearance of

* See his editorial in *Economie contemporaine*, Paris, July-September, 1947, published by Centre de recherches et de documentation économiques.

democratic institutions. Now, western Europe may have become sceptical of the performance of these institutions. She may even at times doubt the positive value of democracy. But she is still unlikely to adopt a régime under which even symphonies must follow "the path of Socialist realism."*

Thus, to take it at its lowest value the Marshall plan is for western Europe the lesser of two evils. It may involve a temporary loss of independence. But that is merely acknowledging a fact. The plan, if it is consciously used for this purpose, offers at least a chance of recovering independence. That would be true had it even been deliberately designed for imperialistic ends. For, if it is successful, Europe will recover her solvency. But economic solvency and political independence are largely conterminous. A solvent Europe can recover much, if not all, of her former economic and political importance. It is a power factor not to be despised by either side—and that remains true even if its political frontier runs along the Elbe. Before the war, the sixteen Marshall countries had a population of 206 millions (of 245 if Western Germany is included); their imports (without Western Europe) represented 40.8 per cent., their exports 30.4 per cent. of total world trade and they owned 58.6 per cent. of the world's shipping.

If the "participating countries" recover their former economic strength, clearly, their rôle in world economy would again be considerable. Is it not for this reason that the United States is seeking their alliance, that Soviet Russia is trying to prevent that alliance? Weak allies have never been welcome. Western Europe, economically co-ordinated, hence politically far more unified than she has ever been before, would constitute that third force that seems indispensable to achieve something like economic and political equilibrium in the world. If peace is maintained for the next five years and the stage of recovery can thus be reached, such a third force may even be a decisive factor in preventing east and west from settling their disputes by arms. Even some outside pressure, some compulsion towards unity, some loss of independence, do not seem too high a price to pay for that result.

(VI)

Implicit in this conception of the Marshall plan is the assumption that western Europe still possesses a spirit of her own, the belief also that, for different reasons and with greater or lesser vigour, she rejects both the Russian and the American way of life. This assumption may prove over-optimistic. Her spirit may be too broken, her organism too weak, after two world wars in short succession, for such an assertion of independence. The decline of liberal tradition in western Europe is, from that angle, a bad symptom. Time only can test our real condition.

* Having been criticized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the "formalistic and anti-popular tendencies" of his music, the Soviet composer Khachaturian said that criticism would help him "to adopt the path of Socialist realism in musical art." *The Times*. February 17, 1948.

THE CHURCHES AND THE IRON CURTAIN

BY STEPHEN NEILL

IN August of this year, the World Council of Churches will hold its first Assembly at Amsterdam; it will then emerge out of the condition of "in process of formation" in which, through the exigencies of the war, it has continued for nearly ten years, and will become a regularly constituted body.

It must be obvious that the grandiose title reflects an aspiration rather than a present reality. The Roman Catholic Church, claiming itself to be *the Church* and to have within itself the fullness of truth and of authority, cannot have any official relationship with a body which recognizes the existence of *Churches*. It may, and does, take a friendly interest in the movement towards closer fellowship between great bodies of separated Christians; it cannot go further than personal contacts between individuals without official sanction or support. This must be taken to be a closed question. There is another question which is open, and is of singular import for the future of the world-movement of the Christian Churches. Will the Church of Russia be among the hundred and fifty Churches represented at Amsterdam, or will it be conspicuous by its absence?

The iron curtain is the ever present reality by which all contemporary statesmanship is conditioned. The Churches are not free from the same conditioning influence. But their experience is rather different from that of States, since the Church itself exists on both sides of the iron curtain, and, in spite of all that tends towards separation, is still conscious of its underlying unity as the body of Christ on earth. Can this unity be more than a vague inherited tradition, a gossamer ideal for an undetermined future? Or can it be a factor in contemporary situations?

Evidence about the Church in Russia is now becoming available in considerable quantities. But it is difficult to interpret, and especially difficult for a western observer to be sure that he is not distorting the picture by the injection of western pre-suppositions irrelevant to the life of an eastern Church. It is certain that the Russian Church has survived the days of conflict with the State, weakened but not destroyed. It is certain that, through its ardent co-operation in the war of liberation, it has won for itself a position of toleration such as would have seemed quite unattainable in a not very distant past. Apparently bishops have been provided for vacant sees, and the work of theological training seriously taken in hand. Of the numbers of the faithful, and of the age-groups to which they belong, most conflicting reports are received, all the discrepant statements being put forth with the utmost confidence.

What is, however, more important than almost anything else, is that the

Moscow patriarchate of the present day seems to regard itself as in all respects the heir of the Russian Church of earlier days. It has never been easy for dwellers in western Europe to feel at home with the mystical, almost messianic, belief of Russians in their country as the holy land, from which one day salvation is to come to all the earth. It is perhaps even harder for western Christians to take as seriously as Russian Christians do the idea of the Russian as the one true Church, as that alone in which Christianity is fully expressed, and the head of which is naturally and inevitably the head of all Christians throughout the world. We are much more familiar with the similar claims of the Bishop of Rome. It is not easy to understand how we can be regarded as sheep who have somehow strayed from the Orthodox fold, and who, in our separation, can hope only to receive, and that as it were by divine oversight, some crumbs that fall from the table of grace spread in its plenitude. Yet that is exactly the way in which the Orthodox regard members of all western Churches; the west has lost the true light; the time must come when the light of the Gospel will go forth from Russia over the whole of the unfaithful world, and over all the degenerate Churches. The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome has survived all the vicissitudes of the Revolution. As early as the end of the fifteenth century, the doctrine was set forth by the Abbot Philotheos: "The Church of ancient Rome fell because of Apollinarian heresy. As to the second Rome—the Church of Constantinople—it has been hewn by the axes of Ishmaelites, but this third new Rome—the Holy Apostolic Church, under thy mighty rule, shines throughout the entire world more brightly than the sun. All the orthodox Christian realms have converged in thine own. Thou art the sole Autocrat of the universe, the only Czar of the Christians. . . . Observe and hearken, O pious Czar, two Romes have fallen, but the third stands, and no fourth can ever be. Thy Christian Empire shall fall to no one's lot." Ideas are effective in proportion not to the strength of their foundation in objective fact, but to the tenacity with which they are held. It can hardly be doubted that Russian ecclesiastics of the post-revolutionary era regard themselves as inheritors of the glories and the tasks of the third and last Rome.

The disappearance of the Christian prince from the Orthodox world has, indeed, brought about a certain crisis in Orthodox thought. The God-defended Emperor played a larger part in the life of the eastern Church than even Charlemagne or Henry Tudor in the politics of the Churches in the west. Now, for the first time since Constantine there is no Christian Emperor. (It is unlikely that the one Orthodox prince left, the king of Greece, would put in a claim to be the successor of the Emperor of Byzantium.) But the disappearance of the prince only lends a greater glory to the patriarchal throne of Moscow, and to the prelate who has been seated on it.

There is good reason to think that the actions and policies of the Moscow

patriarchate are determined by this conception of the office of the Patriarch of Moscow, and of his position in the Christian world. What strikes a western observer as expansionism, only too nearly parallel to the expansionism of the Russian State, is to the Russian churchman no more than the assertion of a divine authority inherent in the patriarchal office. We may consider one or two examples of this expansionist tendency.

The oldest of the Uniat Churches of the Roman obedience, that of Ruthenia, has been re-incorporated in the Russian Church, from which it had been separated since 1596. Of the methods by which this result was achieved different observers have written in different terms. There are those who think that they resembled rather too closely those by which the separation was brought about three hundred and fifty years ago.

Negotiations have been going on for a long time, with a view to the restoration of the Russian Orthodox bishoprics in America to the patriarchal fellowship. These have so far proved abortive, since the American bishops are not willing to accept the measure of control regarded as necessary by Moscow, and the Patriarch is unwilling to submit to limitation of his patriarchal powers.

The Patriarch of Moscow had invited the heads of many eastern Churches to a great Orthodox conference to be held in Moscow in October 1947. The issuing of the invitation led to correspondence between the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarch of Moscow, in which the customary rhetoric of eastern Church correspondence scarcely concealed deep-rooted opposition. Constantinople claims that the summoning of synods is a prerogative of its Patriarch alone. Moscow repudiates any intention of departing in any way from the ancient Orthodox canons, yet makes it clear that it cannot regard the position of the patriarchates in the present day as having been settled unchangeably by what were never more than conventions, and those belonging to a day in which Byzantium was the imperial city. Most of the Church leaders of the Greek-speaking Orthodox Churches declined the invitation to Moscow. It has now been announced that the conference has been postponed. It seems that this check has been a disappointment to Russian churchmen. It cannot but be a disappointment to others, as it seems probable that among the subjects discussed, if the conference had been held, would have been the orthodox judgment on Anglican orders, and the Orthodox attitude to the world-movement of the Christian Churches, especially as manifested in the World Council of Churches. But it is not likely that Moscow will accept this as a final rebuff; the attempt to gather the Orthodox Churches round the throne of its Patriarch is likely to be repeated before long.

The attitude of western Churches to this Russian revival tends to be ambiguous. There are those who accept at its face value all the most favourable evidence that comes from Russia, and hail with delight what they regard as one of the greatest renewals of all Christian history. Others

are so disturbed by what they regard as the subservience of the Russian Church to the State that they are profoundly sceptical of there being any religious significance at all in what is taking place. The *tertium quid* stands back from both positions, welcoming every evidence of greater freedom for the practice of religion in Russia, yet at the same time watching with anxiety the success of the Church in apparently reconciling the irreconcilable.

The Russian Church seems to view all western Churches with considerable suspicion. The plain anti-communist declarations of the present Pope damn the Roman Church in Russian eyes as one of the strongest allies of recrudescing fascism. The Anglican Church is allied to a capitalist State, and therefore has no spiritual freedom. The American Churches, which are the strongest supporters of the World Council movement and in the main finance it, are the handmaids of American big business, by which their policies are determined. When the Patriarch of Moscow stated that he had called the pan-Orthodox conference to meet in Moscow, because that was the only Orthodox capital in the world in which the Church was free from political interference, the claim may leave western readers gasping; but there is no reason to suppose that the Patriarch made the claim for any other reason than that he took it for granted that it was true.

Ideally Churches, even those which have a measure of connection with the State, retain their spiritual independence and can frame their policies without regard to political considerations. But it has never been possible to make so neat a division between what is due to Caesar and what is due to God. Those who are concerned with ecclesiastical relationships become aware at every turn that it is impossible to deal with Churches as wholly autonomous entities, without consideration for the political situations in which they find themselves and for the relations with States by which their policies are affected. For good or ill, Russia has become the touchstone for the world. The Russian Church cannot be spoken of abstractly, as though the Russian State had never existed.

Two attitudes towards Russia are so crystal clear as to require no exposition. There are those who accept Russian messianism, and see in it the one hope of the world. There are Christians also who take this view, though perhaps they are not very many. On the other side, there are those who concur with the judgment of the Vatican, regard communism as the source of every evil, and consider Russia to be so inextricably involved in the Marxist system that opposition to everything Russian becomes almost a Christian duty. In this camp are found a great many Christians, not only Roman Catholics, in almost every part of the world.

But enthusiastic acceptance and radical condemnation do not exhaust the possible attitudes. We find some who, while rejecting the Marxist

philosophy, are willing to recognize in communism a force which in many ways has worked and is working for the good of men. There are others who, while remaining faithful to orthodox Christianity, and perhaps still belonging to parties of the right, passionately condemn the traditional attitudes of the Churches in social and political affairs. While the former group would look towards Russia with the hope that experience might prune away excess and enucleate the good from its embarrassing accompaniments, the latter would be disposed rather to regard communism as a judgment let loose by God upon an unfaithful world and an apathetic Church.

In all the problems of relationship between east and west, ecclesiastical and political, a part of great significance has to be played by the countries and Churches of central Europe, and especially by that of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs themselves are very well aware of their own position. Their cultural affinities are mainly with the west, and to these they hold with intense determination. But they are conscious that race and language alike give them access to the Slavonic world such as is denied to the peoples further west. They desire to maintain close relations with all their western friends.

Until a month ago Czech Church life reflected something of the feeling for political independence. The majority of Christians are Roman Catholics. Of the Protestants, many are Lutherans or Reformed. Those Churches, however, which take their origin from their own national reformation in the days of John Huss, and not from the confusions of the sixteenth century, claim to be, more than others, the true interpreters of the national tradition and the inheritors of that stubborn Bohemian nationalism, which made the Bohemians so formidable an element in the medieval world, and kept the Czechs together recognizably as a nation through centuries of political submergence. The leaders of these Churches took a position of independence, which is not to be confused with timid compromise. They are oecumenical in their outlook, and shared intimately in the development of the movement leading up to the Assembly at Amsterdam this year. It is too early to interpret the consequences of the new political alignment of Czechoslovakia for the life of its Churches. The Roman Church has claimed to "stand above politics", which may be interpreted as a claim that to be a good Catholic does not imply being a bad Czech. Some Christian leaders, with strong western sympathies, may well have lost their jobs in the purges. But we should be rash to assume that the new régime will not find supporters and apologists among Christian leaders.

But neither Czechoslovakia, nor the German Churches, divided in two as they are by the lines of zonal division, nor the supporters of the Moscow patriarchate in the Russian *diaspora* in France, can answer the question whether the Russian Church will be represented this year at Amsterdam or not. As matters are moving at the present time, it seems likely that

there will be no official representation, but that Russia may be present in the person of observers. Those attending the Assembly in this capacity will not have the right to speak unless specially called upon to do so; on the other hand they will be free from any share or responsibility for decisions and pronouncements of the Assembly.

And what, if anything, is this great Assembly of the Churches to say on the most burning issue in the world to-day? Many people feel that they know the answer to that question. There are those who would like a plain declaration of the evils of communism and of its radically anti-Christian character. This might be so expressed as not to be directed against any one country. It might be formulated as a judgment on philosophical ideas, and not on any existing political system. But any such statement, however safeguarded, would at once be taken as a declaration of hostility to Russia and to all that it stands for in the political world. The World Council of Churches would be stamped as being the organ only of those Churches which stand on this side of the iron curtain, and would be regarded as aligned on the anti-communist front with all those political and religious bodies which have felt it right to adopt a clear attitude of hostility to the communist experiment. The World Council would then lose, for a period to be measured rather in decades than in years, all hope of co-operation with the Churches under Russian influence. Some would be ready at once to discount this loss. Others would feel that the loss would be severely felt on both sides. The Churches beyond the iron curtain need all the help that can be given by more fortunate Churches, as they take up the immense task of repairing the ravages of thirty years. The Orthodox Churches have a wealth of liturgical experience and of devotion, without sharing in which no movement can call itself genuinely oecumenical. The present composition of the World Council is far too western; this preponderance of the west needs urgently to be balanced by the riches of the eastern traditions.

Another group would like to see the Assembly put forth a declaration in an almost exactly contradictory sense. For this group, capitalism is the hydra-headed monster which is laying waste the life of men. Its supporters are not for the most part communists. They would not ask for any unconditional commendation of the communist system or of the Russian régime. They would be quite willing to recognize the incompatibility of rigid Marxist orthodoxy with Christian faith. Yet they would maintain that the Russian experiment has brought new hope and life to the peoples of the world. Some of the delegates from Asia are likely to say, if it comes to a choice between the imperialism of the so-called Christian nations, or closer association with Russia, that their peoples, including the Christians, may well choose the communist alternative, and that it is unrealistic not to recognize and to record this fact. Others, less politically fixed, may consider that for the Church to adopt a merely negative attitude to Russia is to abandon its prophetic office, and that it must exercise a

task of discriminating judgment.

But, however it is phrased, any statement on the situation which falls short of outright condemnation of communism and all its works is likely to arouse bitter opposition in certain quarters. There are Christian groups in England and America the attitude of which towards communism is that of a holy war, and which regard any sort of compromise as treachery. If the World Council makes any statement which can be construed as giving any sort of countenance to communism and Russian policy, it runs the risk of alienating some of those Churches which from the start have been most deeply engaged in the oecumenical movement, and which have done most to foster it by their gifts.

There remains the possibility of silence. But is this a possibility that can be taken seriously? In a year of crisis, the Churches of the world meet to talk about high themes. Will they declare that on the most living issue in the world to-day, and an issue which cannot be dismissed as merely political and therefore irrelevant to the spiritual task of the Church, they have nothing at all to say? If they do so, they will have done much to justify the onlooker in his judgment that the Churches may have been useful in past times, when men still believed in invisible worlds, but that they are outworn survivals in a day when we have at last learnt to confine our attention to the things that we can see and touch. The greatest Church of all has already declared its mind with no uncertain voice. That which is, at least potentially, the second largest, has taken its stand on the opposite side. Will those other Churches, numbering perhaps two hundred million adherents, which are attached to the World Council find anything to say that the world will find worthy of its attention?

The answer is by no means obvious. The Churches in many countries are expecting a great deal from the Assembly. It is not surprising that those responsible for the preparations for it, look forward with intense interest, not unalloyed by apprehension, to August 22, 1948.

(The author is Assistant Bishop to the Archbishop of Canterbury and is one of the Secretaries of the World Council of Churches.)

RADIOACTIVITY

By JOHN LANGDON-DAVIES

THE discovery of radium put into the hands of medicine a powerful new tool, for it was soon discovered that cells in living tissue could be altered or destroyed by the fast moving particles shot out of the radium nucleus. But, as a tool, radium proved to be two-edged. Brought into contact with the normal human body, it produced "burns" which ulcerated and frequently became malignant. Aimed at malignant tissue whenever this could be bombarded without endangering the healthy tissue in which the malignancy was embedded, curative effects were possible. Radium soon became the method of choice for combating many forms of cancer. Its chief shortcoming was its scarcity. The world began to see the depressing sight of cancer victims queueing up for the one treatment which gave them hope, a hope which rapidly faded in the face of delay, since malignant disease waits for no man.

In the 'thirties, there came new hope, for it was discovered that by means of certain powerful and costly apparatus, of which the cyclotron is the best known, man could produce artificial radioactive elements. These consisted of atoms with precisely the same chemical nature as those of ordinary elements but in an unstable state of balance. In a given time such atoms recover their balance by shooting out a particle from their nuclei just as natural radium and other radioactive elements do. Thus radiosodium is ordinary sodium except that there is a particle too much in its nucleus. By ridding itself of the extra particle the atom becomes stable once more.

The world supply of radium, probably not more than thirty pounds weight in all, began to be supplemented by these new artifacts. The cyclotron was able to produce many new types of radioactive elements such as radiophosphorus, radiosulphur, and radiocarbon, which not only supplemented radium but suggested altogether new uses.

Radioactivity was no longer regarded merely as a bombarding force to be used for the destruction of cancer and other diseased cells, for scientists very soon saw that it could be used for exploration into the hidden processes going on within the living body. The usefulness of radioactivity for this purpose is great because it can be easily detected and measured with immense accuracy.

By the use of the Geiger counter a single atom disintegrating within the living body can be detected. Explosions are heard as a click or auto-

matically counted by the apparatus placed near the suspected source of radioactivity. By mixing minute quantities of an artificial radioactive element with normal atoms of the same element, it thus became possible to find out where any substance entering the living body went, what the body did with it, and what chemical changes took place in the course of its physiological history.

Thus, if a quantity of ordinary iodine is "tagged" with a few atoms of artificially produced radioactive iodine, the progress of the iodine as a whole through the body could be followed by the clicks set up in a Geiger counter. However, the amount of artificial radioactive atoms which a cyclotron can produce is very limited, and their manufacture very expensive. Nor can many kinds of radioactive elements be made. So, although the new tool was fully appreciated by scientists, it could not go into every-day use. But to-day the atomic pile, perfected in a hurry to create the most destructive of man's inventions—the atomic bomb—has completely altered the situation.

As a by-product of its more disreputable activities, the atomic pile produces virtually unlimited quantities of radioactive isotopes, as they are called, of at least sixty different elements. In many cases, more than one kind of radioisotope can be made for each ordinary kind of atom. These radioisotopes have precisely the same chemical qualities as an ordinary atom of the same element and, as well, the quality of emitting radioactivity. The body is unable to distinguish them from normal atoms so that they go through the same changes as any other like substance entering a living body.

One of the most valuable radioisotopes is carbon¹⁴ and the effect of the coming of the atomic pile can be seen by comparing the costs of producing this valuable substance now and a few years ago. A minute quantity of carbon¹⁴ which, made by the cyclotron would cost a million dollars, costs at the moment fifty dollars when the atomic pile is used for its manufacture.

Now it is not at all certain even in the event of a third world war that atomic bombs will be used. There is a growing school of strategic thought which believes that strategic bombing with ordinary bombs was a mistake and that strategic bombing with atomic bombs would be such an egregious mistake that nobody would dream of making it. On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that the use of radioisotopes will completely revolutionize the biological sciences within ten years. It is more than possible that the experiments already in progress with radioisotopes will affect humanity far more profoundly than any bomb.

It is important to emphasize that their first value is for the increase of fundamental knowledge about the processes of life and not directly as a medical tool. Certainly the immediate value of radioisotopes for curative purposes can be exaggerated, but with that warning three examples of their

use in medicine may be given.

When iodine is introduced into a human body, either in the course of normal feeding or for experimental purposes, the thyroid gland takes selective action and within a short time a large percentage of the iodine is concentrated in the gland. One form of thyroid disease can be helped by taking advantage of this fact. Radioactive iodine in quantities which would be dangerous if it were to remain distributed all over the body, can be introduced into the patient with the firm knowledge that it will be accumulated in the gland. Here it will act on the cells causing the disease, and by destroying them, return the gland more or less to its normal functioning. In this case, valuable results can be obtained, thanks to a physiological property of the body, namely, its power to concentrate iodine in one particular organ.

There is one property of any radioactive atom which adds greatly to the practical value of the new tool: of any number of such atoms half will have "decayed", that is, given off their radioactivity and become stable, at the end of a fixed and invariable interval. You cannot tell when any given atom will explode but you can be certain that of X atoms of radioactive iodine¹³¹, $\frac{1}{2}X$ will have exploded in thirteen days, another $\frac{1}{4}X$ in thirteen more days, and so on. Of X atoms of radioactive carbon¹⁴, $\frac{1}{2}X$ will have exploded in ten thousand years, another $\frac{1}{4}X$ in another ten thousand years, and so on. Of X atoms of sodium²⁴, $\frac{1}{2}X$ will have exploded in 87.1 days.

Every radioactive element has a different "half-life" varying from fractions of a second to millions of years and this "half-life" never alters. This means that you know how long it will take for a dose of any given element to become exhausted and by choosing an element with the right length of half-life you can limit the amount and therefore the dangers of radioactivity introduced into a living body. In the example just given, you can introduce radioactive iodine knowing that after a definite interval, the activity will have become negligible. Were this not so it would never be safe to use such a deadly material at all.

A second example shows how radioactive iodine can be used as an indicator rather than as a cure. It is the nature of a cancer, when it has reached a certain stage of development, to send through the lymphatic system or through other channels of the body, colonies of malignant cells which settle down in remote parts of the body, there to start secondary cancers. Radioactive iodine is introduced into the patient and allowed by natural processes to accumulate in the cancerous thyroid gland. When this cancer sends out its colonies of daughter cells, they will take with them radioactive atoms; and then, if the colonies settle down in remote parts of the body, there to grow into secondary tumours, their presence can be detected by a Geiger counter, or by photographic means, and they can, in fortunate instances, be given surgical attention before it is too late.

The third example concerns the use of the radioisotope of sodium. In

certain diseases of the heart, the patient's tissues become water-logged and the patient dies of a sort of internal drowning. Hitherto, efforts to combat this have taken the form of giving drugs which increase the excretion of water from the body. Now, in the normal course of life, water is passing from the blood stream into the tissues and back again unceasingly and in large quantities—twenty barrels a day being a fairly accurate estimate. This passage of water to and fro through the walls of the blood vessels, is controlled in part by the sodium salts suspended in the body fluids. It has been estimated that fifty pounds of sodium chloride pass in and out of the blood vessels every twenty-four hours.

It was resolved to discover the whereabouts of the sodium chloride by tagging the sodium with a radioisotope. By counting the radioactivity in the tissues of healthy people and oedematous (that is "water-logged") people, it was shown that thirteen per cent. of the sodium returned from the tissues into the blood every minute in normal people, and only seven per cent. in diseased people. Thus a far larger proportion of sodium chloride was remaining in their tissues, and the water followed the sodium chloride. However much water was persuaded to leave the body by diuretic drugs more would enter the tissues so long as excess sodium chloride remained in them. This meant that a rational way of combating the disease must include the means not merely of eliminating the water from the tissues but the sodium salts also. In short, by finding out what happened to a chemical within the body, a means of securing healthy physiological action which otherwise could not have been devised becomes possible.

This last is an example of the kind of research which will occupy scientists for some years to come. There is no process in physiology which cannot now be studied more effectively, thanks to radioisotopes. The body has become transparent, and every chemical element, every organic compound, every nutritional substance, can be seen going about its business, thanks to the signals they can all be made to emit. Thus, red blood corpuscles have been tagged with radiophosphorus, and followed in their course throughout the circulatory system. This has already thrown light on the type of heart disease in which the heart muscle itself becomes starved of blood through the damming up of the vessel supplying it with blood. It was known that in such conditions, the heart could bring into use alternative channels for blood supply, but the actual process was a mystery. The tagged red corpuscles have now been followed in their course through this emergency system and the whole problem elucidated.

Again, in order to be able to cure anaemia it is first necessary to understand what governs the rate of manufacture of blood cells in the bone marrow. By introducing the radioisotope of iron into the body and later examining the blood corpuscles, their date of birth from the parent bone marrow can be estimated. A smear of blood can be placed on a slide, a

photographic plate put in contact with it and on developing the plate the amount of radioactivity can be seen and an estimate can easily be made of the proportion of the cells which have come into existence since the radioactive iron entered the body.

Hitherto, most of the problems of "intermediate metabolism" have been insoluble mysteries. Human life consists of chemical changes. Chemical elements enter the body and are built up into compounds; or compounds are broken down into simpler substances. These are finally either built into the body tissues or excreted as waste. But the process is by no means simple. The body cannot always change its food into what it wants in one single step. The raw material is made into some new compound which in turn is changed into a third substance which the body can use. Often there are many such steps before the body can use what it assimilates in the form of food from the outside world.

The understanding of health and disease depends very largely upon knowing how these intermediate steps take place. It is possible to isolate and study the intermediate products of metabolism but hitherto usually only by methods which involve the death of the animal and therefore interference with the normal chemical processes.

By introducing tagged elements into various compounds we can follow the way in which the body breaks these compounds down and turns them into other compounds which it can use for building up its tissues. Or we can use tagged elements to find out from what source the body draws its supply for building up the compounds it requires. We are in a position to elucidate complicated processes which until now have had to be taken on trust and therefore we are the more likely to be able to find remedies when these processes go wrong.

A simple example can be taken from research into plant behaviour. The plant physiologist can tell us how the plant is able to use the sun's energy for building up carbon and oxygen and hydrogen into sugar, starch and other carbo-hydrates. He has been able to make various more or less accurate guesses as to the course taken by the plant foods through the tissues of the plant, but now he can go many steps further. He can make carbon dioxide with a certain amount of radioactive carbon included in the molecule. If he then feeds this to a plant growing in full sunlight for, let us say, an hour, and allows the plant to grow for a few days more, he can now tell precisely what the plant has been able to do in the course of those days with the meal of carbon dioxide absorbed in that hour. If for example the plant is a sugar cane, he can find out in precisely what parts of the plant any sugar manufactured by it out of carbon dioxide during that hour has been deposited, for the molecules of sugar will contain a proportion of radiocarbon whose presence will be revealed either photographically or by a Geiger counter. In an experiment in Honolulu, where tagged carbon dioxide was given to the leaf of a large

cane plant for an hour, the radiosugar was found three days afterwards chiefly in the growing tip, the roots and the youngest leaf of the plant. But even the oldest shoots were slightly radioactive.

In the same way, by using radioiron the cause of the commercially important disease of plant chlorosis has been elucidated. Soil conditions lead to the accumulation of phosphorus on the surface of the roots; this acts as a barrier to the iron in the soil. Insufficient iron reaches the leaves so that chlorophyll cannot be synthesized and the plant cannot properly use the sun's energy. Thus, innumerable mysteries surrounding the way in which animal and plant life use their food for the building up of their tissues and for the carrying on of their life processes, can one by one be made visible to human sense.

The best text-books of physiology abound in such phrases as "so-and-so thought to be", "it is believed that", "what happens to so-and-so within the body is unknown." To-day all over the world physiologists working with small packets of radioisotopes shipped from American piles and from the British pile at Harwell are attacking these patches of ignorance.

In one place, agriculturists are tagging fertilizers and watching with Geiger counters their passage through plants. Minute quantities of minerals known to be required to keep plants in health are fed in radioactive form and when, later, the fruit is sliced and laid against a photographic plate, the infinitesimal quantities are found to have ended up in the seed or the skin or in some other special organ, as the case may be.

Hitherto, we have only known that in the right cases it is a good thing to inject penicillin into the ailing human body. Crystalline penicillin can now be tagged with radiosulphur and its progress traced through the body. We can see if it combines with other substances and if so, how.

Even more remarkable is that bacteria can be induced to feed on radio-phosphorus and to become self-signallers of their own presence. We know that many healing drugs act by competing with bacteria for chemicals essential for the bacteria's food. By tagging suspected chemicals we can find out what the bacteria eat for they too will become radioactive if they consume any of our tagged material. Tuberculosis is one of the important diseases being studied in this way.

Sex hormones and others are also being tagged and it is hard to over-estimate the importance of the possible results of these experiments, since it is generally agreed that the health and right organization of the living body depends on the balanced working of the endocrine glands which produce hormones often in minute quantities. By tagging the products of these glands in turn it will be possible to watch the part played by the pituitary, the adrenals, the gonads and the rest.

The extraordinary accuracy of the new tool may be illustrated by the experiments which are being carried out concerning the part played by manganese in the living body. It has long been known that a minute

trace of manganese is necessary for healthy life, but why, or where the manganese goes in a living body, seemed altogether beyond human ingenuity to discover. By tagging it with radioactive atoms it is possible to find what is done by a rat with a dose of one thousandth part of a milligram of manganese. Three days after this speck has been eaten by the rat, most of it turns up in the liver. If, however, it is injected into the rat with a hypodermic needle, the chief concentration is found in the skin and bone. Why this should be is a matter for further research, and it does not concern us here, but the example will serve to show the extreme accuracy with which the new tool can be used.

Another example of this astonishing accuracy comes from quite a different branch of science. Engineers are vitally concerned with problems of friction. Wherever there are moving parts, there is bound to be wear and tear, and this must be reduced as far as possible. Hitherto nobody has known much about what happens to the minute pieces of metal detached from the machine parts as a result of friction. It is now possible to irradiate a piece of steel in an atomic pile so that some of its surface molecules will be radioactive. These can be used for friction experiments in which some of the molecules will be rubbed off. Their new whereabouts can then be traced with a Geiger counter or a photographic plate, and it is found that a certain amount of metal is transferred to the other surface which has been rubbing against the radioactive steel. So accurate is this method that it is possible to detect as little as one ten-thousand-millionth of an ounce of metal.

Various applications of radioisotopes in oil boring are also reported from America. For example, in a very deep oil boring, water bearing strata may be encountered and in order to continue the operation satisfactorily these have to be sealed off by squeezing in cement. By incorporating radioisotopes into the cement, the position of these leaky strata can at any later time be verified simply by lowering an instrument which will detect radioactivity. In this way a complete vertical map of the strata can be obtained. Furthermore, various geological formations absorb the radioisotopes with different intensities. It becomes possible therefore to find out what strata are lying hundreds of feet under the ground simply by using radioactive tracer material. Thus, the tool which makes the human body transparent also enables the oil engineer to see the structure of the earth hundreds of feet down an experimental bore hole.

It is not much more than a year since parcels of radioisotopes began to be distributed from the Clinton laboratories and in that time nearly two hundred separate groups of research workers have received about one hundred varieties of man-made radioactive atoms. Every one of these parcels is being used to solve the enigmas of science; not only is a tool of the utmost importance thus being distributed but, unfortunately, a source of very grave danger also. Every radioactive parcel, however

small, can destroy its user unless the proper controls are observed. Everybody handling the material, either at the laboratories from which it is distributed or in the course of research, has to wear a badge containing suitable photographic film, and this film has to be developed at regular intervals. On the film will be found an accurate measurement of the amount of radiation which has escaped into the scientist's own body and if danger level has been reached immediate remedial action must be taken.

The importance of devising an adequate technique of protection before radioactivity comes into still greater use will be realized directly the significance of one effect of radioactivity is fully appreciated. It could become a danger not merely to the people who use it but to the human race as a whole. Not only can it set up incurable diseases in the body which comes into contact with it, but it can produce mutations in the ova or spermatozoa carried by that body.

The bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed many thousands by radiosickness but they had hidden effects also which may become apparent in the Japanese population hundreds of years hence. A single exploding radioactive atom may alter a gene in a human chromosome thereby altering some human characteristic in an unborn child which will inherit that altered chromosome. Such mutations are almost always deleterious. A mutation affecting intellectual qualities is almost certain to produce idiocy rather than genius. The effect of these mutations does not become immediately apparent because they are almost always recessive in character, that is to say, that to make their effect apparent in a child, the child has to inherit the same defective gene from both of its parents.

If these facts are considered, two consequences vital to the human race can be seen. First, there is no such thing as a dose or quantity of radioactivity which can be regarded as harmless. We cannot say that so long as the amount absorbed by people is kept below a certain quantity there is no danger to the race, although there is a maximum which can be regarded as harmless to the actual individual concerned. Secondly, it is a matter of statistical calculation to determine the likelihood of a man and woman having the same lethal gene mating and producing a defective child. The larger the proportion of a given inter-marrying population to be subjected to radioactivity the sooner will this occur. It can be shown that if a certain proportion run the risk, then defective offspring may be expected in a given population after ten, twenty or thirty generations. It may not seem very important that in four or five hundred years sub-human Japanese will begin to be born as a result of Hiroshima, but if we are about to enter an epoch of universal application of radioactivity, the problem becomes one of life or death for the human race as a whole.

It seems as if once more humanity can only eat of the tree of knowledge at its own peril. Good and evil are combined in all its fruit.

CO-OWNERSHIP IN INDUSTRY*

BY WALTER JAMES

BEFORE the factory system, in a great part of England, the worker stood on his own feet as a master manufacturer; after it, he found himself a hired hand in somebody else's mill. That is the fact of chief significance about the Industrial Revolution. For instance, in 1806:

In the domestic system, which is that of Yorkshire, the manufacture is conducted by a multitude of master manufacturers, generally possessing a very small and scarcely any amount of capital. They buy the wool of the dealer and, in their own houses, assisted by their wives and children, and from two or three to six or seven journeymen, they dye it, when dyeing is necessary, and through all the different stages work it up into undressed cloth. ("Report from the Select Committee on Woollen Manufacture". P. 1.)

As Professor Paul Mantoux has pointed out, the journeymen served only as a reserve from which the class of small manufacturers was recruited. These small owners were yeomen of industry. They worked as operatives work to-day, but were independent, responsible and proud.

It is not necessary here to describe how economic forces changed these many masters, not without bitter protest, into the hands of a few great employers. But Mr. J. A. Waites, of Manchester University, in his paper on "The Attitude of Adults towards Property in a Lancashire Urban Area" (*British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXXVI), has given in his account of the village of Stubbins a history which symbolizes the whole disastrous division of industry into two camps—owners with their managers, and workers. When the mills first went up in Stubbins they were small, and masters and men worked in them side by side. The spirit of domestic manufacture remained a little while; the workers still spoke of the mill as "ours", not "his". As time went on the masters became richer; they no longer worked beside their men; they began to live in finer style. It was becoming harder for the worker to think of the mill as "ours", when, one day in 1842, the workers of Stubbins struck for better conditions and the masters called in the dragoons to send them back to the looms. That action killed the workers' use of the happy pronoun of possession. As Mr. Waites points out, their industrial experience changed their morality. Stealing something from the mill caused them little conflict of conscience. The mill had become something in which they had no stake or care, something in alien hands. The history of Stubbins is the history of industrial England. It is a history of how ownership in the sphere of work, through a change in economic organization, passed from the many to the few.

That this deprivation should be seen first and foremost as an affront

to human dignity, only tolerable when man's true nature had been forgotten, is the standpoint of a policy resolution which will be laid before the Liberal Party Assembly at Blackpool this month. It is based on the belief that, while man has a need of ownership in many things, he has a natural right to ownership in the product of his mind and hands, in the tools he uses, and in his place of work. The implication of this declaration of "natural right" is important. It implies the acceptance of a particular philosophy of man, which maintains that ownership is natural to him, that is, he cannot live his full life without it. This is the philosophy of Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke. Man works on material and on this material (which he "hath mixed his labour with," as Locke put it) leaves the mark of his own personality, something of himself, something that is characteristically "his". Master of himself, man is also master of what he has made. Further, tools are the agents between the maker and the thing made. If the worker lacks some degree of property in the tools he uses he cannot be said to possess independence. His power to use his skill is at the mercy of some other, who possesses the only means by which the workers' skill may be translated into action.

Now ownership, according to this position, is not something desirable, but necessary. Without it, a man's will to freedom and responsibility is seriously reduced.

Any system that subjects man to permanent loss, by denying the needs of his nature, must of necessity be filled with discord. The industrial system is no exception. Man did not lightly surrender the dignity with which he was endowed, of which his right to ownership was part, and the workers' struggle against the dehumanizing trends of economic organization led to the formation and hardening of the "two nations". The ill feeling between employers and men which marked the nineteenth century has no parallel in history until one goes back to the fall of Rome, and finds the slaves deserting their humane and civilized masters for the barbarians.

Underlying the profound resentment of men against their masters which grew up in the last century was their deprivation of all share of ownership in industry. It may be objected that the workers did not quote Aristotle and Locke or appeal to any doctrine of natural rights. Through their dream of liberation there stalked nevertheless the phantom of ownership. It is a remarkable fact that immediately the working classes organized themselves politically and became articulate their first demand, which has been continued until this day, was for the industrial ownership that had been snatched away from them. How else may the doctrine of Socialism be taken? From its beginning it has been tied up with a theory of ownership. That the ownership offered by the Socialists was indeed a phantom, a rhetorician's fancy, without solid advantage of any sort, is now in process of being discovered. Socialism has failed because public ownership in industry in no way changes the status of the worker. Further, ownership through the State is impersonal; it is a

legal and constitutional abstraction which the ordinary man's mind can neither understand nor enjoy.

Thus the restoration of ownership in industry to the worker still remains to be accomplished. In their attempt to devise a policy that may succeed, a group of Liberals under the chairmanship of Mr. Elliott Dodds, the party's president-elect, drew up the Blackpool resolution. There is in it no looking back, even of the robust Chestertonian sort, and no hankering after the years before the factory economy. There is no wish to write down the triumphs of the industrial system and fly away to some dream world where reigns the quietude of the domestic manufacture. All these things are impossible, and the restoration of ownership does not demand the impossible. A principle must be maintained, but its application will vary from age to age. Ownership in his work was realized by the worker of the eighteenth century, and not by the worker of to-day, but this does not mean that we must return to the forms of ownership current in the eighteenth century. The principle of ownership must be restored—for those who take a certain view of man this is more a duty than a political policy—but the mode in which this principle is practically expressed must be suited to industry as it now is.

Personal or family ownership as a generalized solution throughout industry is plainly out of the question. In a concern employing a thousand or more men and women ownership must be on an associational basis, and, in place of the capital investors who now monopolize ownership, it is necessary to establish a new owning group made up of three sections—labour, management and capital investors. The proposals to this end are as follows:

A Liberal Government will accordingly introduce legislation requiring every industrial concern with a capital of not less than £50,000 and/or not less than fifty employees to submit, within a stipulated period, for approval by a specially constituted Commission, a scheme embodying certain fundamental principles. In the event, however, of a concern being able to prove, to the satisfaction of the Commission, that it is impracticable to establish such a scheme, then it will receive a certificate of exemption.

These principles are:—

1. Employees to be paid at least the Trade Union or Trade Board wages applicable to the particular trade, including any negotiated bonuses or additions.
2. After due provision has been made for reserves and other proper purposes, including the payment of preference share dividends and a non-cumulative return at the gilt-edged rate on ordinary share capital, the surplus profits to be apportioned between those actively engaged in the concern (according to their earnings and length of service) and the ordinary share-holders.
3. Opportunity to be given, where desired by the employees, for employee share-holding.
4. All persons actively engaged in the business to be entitled to elected representation on the Board of Directors, where such exists, and consultative machinery to be operative at all levels.

In the case of nationally-owned industries or services a Liberal Government will, wherever feasible, adopt a policy of decentralization, beginning with the coal-mining industry, where remoteness of control has already been the cause of unnecessary

friction and ill-feeling. Legislation will be introduced to enable groups of mines to be managed with the largest possible degree of local autonomy, on a basis which provides for the sharing of "efficiency-profit" among the employees and representation on the boards of management.

Summed up, it is a policy for compulsory profit-sharing, with workers' representation on all boards. Thus it satisfies two essential requirements of real ownership; it allows the worker to get something out of what he owns and have some say in its control. Shared profits, shared control is the nearest we can get to this in industry.

It is necessary to emphasize again the reason why this policy is being put forward. It is not chiefly to catch votes, though Liberals hope that votes will be caught. It is not chiefly as an industrial incentive, though it is expected to serve as one. The demand for the right to ownership (and the share in control it gives is far more important than the share in profits) is put forward on the same sort of grounds as the right to vote in earlier days. The idea of man's natural right to ownership, and to democratic government, spring from the same tree. Democracy accords man a say in whatever concerns himself, even indirectly. It is surely absurd to grant him this right in national affairs, where its misuse can give rise to extreme danger, and not in factory affairs, where at the worst its misuse can do no more than drive one concern out of business. All the arguments against the workers sharing control in industry are arguments against universal suffrage. A worker does know something at least about his factory, while about foreign affairs, as the cynic suggests, he often knows nothing at all.

This being said, it may at once be granted that a share in control of a factory sets its work-people no more in complete command than the right to vote allows an electorate to behave as a government. It is true that the people are politically sovereign, but it is also true that the people are willing to let themselves be governed by a small specialist body, who are skilled not only in the high knowledge of government but also in handling the people, their masters. The Government and Parliament generally (here is the virtue of representation rather than delegation) have not to bother about every changing current of public feeling and excitement. They can hold a settled course and wait until reason prevails. This satisfactory result is attained by the admirable complexities of our Constitution which, as the creation of a long line of men who believed in original sin, hedges every right with safeguards, usually of a delaying character, against its misuse. Thus to suppose, as some will certainly do, that workers' directors will lead to workers' control in industry, with the chaotic consequences that attended such experiments in the early days of the Russian Revolution, is as unfounded as Shaftesbury's nineteenth century delusion that democracy must inevitably mean mob rule.

It is a right, then, that this policy seeks to restore. It is a policy of moral purpose first and foremost. Yet there are strong secondary arguments in its favour that, through its restoration of a natural right and

its overthrow of the inhuman and artificial industrial relations which are the legacy of the early 1800's, there will be created an altogether better atmosphere inside the nation's mills and factories. Profit-sharing by itself is not a particularly good incentive to increased production, but, when it is used to express the whole idea of ownership and is wedded to a share in control, it stands for a change in the character of industrial relations which is bound to have an excellent influence over production. By far the greatest slackener of production is bad human relations, or, to use Disraeli's phrase again, the continued rule of the "two nations". Treat management, workers and capital as equal in dignity and rights and the first step has been taken to their showing the united efforts of a team out to win.

There is, of course, a sufferer by this new arrangement—the passive investor of capital. The position and rewards of managers and operatives, and indeed of owner-managers—all people actively engaged in the concern—are usually improved, and never reduced, under the scheme. The manager and owner-manager will receive much the same as before. They will have, however, certain new problems in the sphere of personal relations. It will no longer be enough for them to know how to organize production; they will be required to lead men. The history of the wartime joint production committees proved one thing—that this sort of consultation succeeds only where managers are up to their job. No aspect of management is more important than that of knowing how to handle men, and the co-ownership scheme only makes it more important still.

It will not surely be taken amiss, after these general remarks, for a Liberal to suggest why he thinks this policy will be of advantage to his party. For a long time Liberals have had no distinctive policy of their own, and their sensible and moderate researches have been regularly used by the two larger parties. Liberals are used to arguing among themselves, the one saying: "We have no policy" and the other replying: "We have too much policy." Both are right. Liberals have plenty of sensible suggestions to make in every field, but no distinctive policy with which their party is identified in the public mind. Such a policy is their only sure means of reviving themselves; they will get nowhere by manoeuvring, or talking at large about freedom and responsibility. Co-ownership is a distinctive, practical policy, and it flows from a traditional philosophy of man to which most Liberals subscribe. It is a moral policy with an "ought" about it. At the same time it is not a policy that other parties are likely to borrow. There was no copyright in the Beveridge policies for Social Security and Full Employment on which the Liberals fought the 1945 election. They were statements of the most enlightened thinking in their respective fields, and the enlightened in all parties could support them. Everything in Labour party history, however, makes it unlikely that its members would even wish to borrow Liberal ideas of co-ownership. Earlier in the century there would have been much in it to

attract the syndicalists ; nowadays the Labour party is committed to State socialism and sweeps away the famous co-partnerships of the gas industry in its nationalization bill.

Although Conservatives have talked much about profit-sharing and co-partnership, they are not competitors. In fact, the Liberal policy will steal all the thunder from the *Industrial Charter*. It is, of course, almost impossible for a party whose core of strength is the great employers to have a bold co-ownership policy. It is rare indeed for any class of men to espouse a policy which goes even to a small extent against their interests. Here lies the reason for the vagueness of the Conservatives' *Industrial Charter*, which is going to render it worthless as ammunition in the next general election. The Liberals will have a scheme for co-ownership throughout industry which will be enforced under law. The Tories, held back by the great employers, have no more than a scheme for propaganda on behalf of co-ownership. It was put as clearly as could be wanted in Mr. R. A. Butler's article in the February 1948 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* : " Our proposal is that the Government should lay down a code of good practice in these matters. We should seek the approval of Parliament for this code and endeavour to mobilize in its favour the powerful pressure of public opinion."

The inability of either the Conservative or the Labour party to settle the divisions of industry is caused by their fatal commitments to the two sides. The Conservative party cannot have a national policy for industry, in spite of the good will of some of its members, because the main strength of the party springs from one section of the nation, the great employers. The Labour party in its turn is ham-strung by the T.U.C. connection. Liberals are fortunately free of commitments to interests ; they are honest brokers if any are to be found. If they have the courage to accept at their next Assembly a policy which, though radical, has evolved from *Britain's Industrial Future*, they will cause considerable embarrassment to their two main opponents and greatly advantage themselves. Co-ownership is a policy which, put out the right way, could win back the working man's vote. Obviously the Conservatives think so, but they themselves can offer words only, not action. Labour, on the other hand, will be left defending the blessings of public ownership—an ever more hopeless task once Labour voters gain experience of working in public concerns and of seeing their unions tie up with the new boss.

AUSTRALIAN PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

By W. FRIEDMANN

AT present hundreds of thousands of British and other Europeans, obsessed by the fear that hangs over Europe and the deep economic crisis which shakes Britain, look to Australia as a land of hope and prospects. At the same time, politicians and strategists think of Australia as a secondary centre of Empire, as a country destined by its relatively secure situation and its potentialities for development to assume a far greater share in imperial and international responsibilities. In such circumstances it is only too easy to substitute vague hopes and aspirations for sober thinking. It is therefore particularly welcome that some recent books illuminate some salient aspects of Australia's life, development, resources and problems.* By a happy coincidence the three books under review deal with the three major problems of Australia's future : her economic resources and potentialities, her constitutional and governmental problems conditioned by her federal structure, and her international position, particularly in relation to the United States on the one side and Great Britain on the other.

The collection of essays on the resources and development of Australia, edited by the Professor of Commerce in the University of Melbourne, gives a sober scientific and well-documented appraisal of the economic potentialities of Australia by leading practical and theoretical experts. The greatest merit of the book is that it serves to correct vague talking about the vast empty spaces of Australia. There is a widespread impression among Europeans that here is a continent which only waits for energy, enterprise and the removal of restrictions to enable the development of vast spaces hitherto neglected and uncultivated.

In his introduction, Professor Wood points out the magnitude of the Australian achievement in little more than a century :

In many ways Australia is the Cinderella of the continents—the youngest in point of European contact and settlement, the most isolated by geography, the most refractory in natural resources, the least attractive judged by resemblance to many countries of Europe or North America. The conditions of early settlement were no such as to endear the new homeland to immigrants, or to provide the human basi-

* *Australia : Its Resources and Development*. Edited by G. L. Wood, Professor of Commerce in the University of Melbourne. Macmillan. 20s.
The Future of Australian Federalism. By Gordon Greenwood, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Sydney. Oxford University Press. 17s. 6d.
American-Australian Relations. By Werner Levi, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. Oxford University Press. 16s.

upon which a promising extension of European civilization might be built. It would, indeed, in 1800 A.D. have been hard to imagine a less congenial nursery, or a less suitable field for the transplanting of English life and ideas.

The first great phase of Australian development was made possible by two great experiments. The introduction of the merino sheep by MacArthur made Australia the world's greatest wool producer, and wool is still to a large and probably dangerous extent the basis of her prosperity. Farrer's experiments in wheat breeding, coupled with the introduction of fertilizers and later of large-scale mechanized farming, made possible the development of vast grain-growing areas whose productivity is to-day a matter of life and death for Britain. But as the distinguished scientific and agricultural experts, who in the same book discuss the soils of Australia, her pasture and fodder resources, her vast agricultural and forest industries and the economics of farming, point out, the limit of Australia's agricultural development was on the whole reached at the end of the last century, and in some ways pushed beyond the limits of reason and efficiency. Australia's agricultural possibilities are above all limited by the distribution of rain-fall. Heavy rain-fall lowers the reserves of plant nutrients in the soil: on the other hand, an almost complete absence of rain in nearly three-quarters of the continent, makes agriculture impossible. The agriculturally productive belt of Australia is situated in an area between the arid central desert and the coast, which has the heaviest rain-fall. Much has been done to improve natural fertility, in particular by the addition of super-phosphates and the sowing of subterranean clover. But no country is so exposed to the alternatives of abundance and disaster dependent on rain-fall as Australia, and in order to find compensation for poor yields large-scale farmers have sometimes gone into areas which it is utterly uneconomical to cultivate. It appears that only in a few fields, such as the cattle industry, a substantial quantitative increase is still possible, and this is above all dependent on international market conditions.

It may well be that Britain's dollar shortage will compel her to abandon the high-class Argentine beef and to content herself with the less high grade Australian cattle. This is one of the many aspects of the economic-political reorientation caused by Europe's, and in particular Britain's, economic crisis. This might lead to a further development of certain parts of Australia's agricultural economy. But Australia's demands for additional agricultural man-power will in any case be small. The nature of the country demands not small scale mixed farming, but mechanized farming over vast areas or the managing of vast herds of sheep and cattle by a few men helped by mechanized farm equipment. This explains the smallness of Australia's agricultural population in relation to her city population (two fifths of her people live in the three biggest towns), and also explains the present encouragement of the immigration of tradesmen, engineers, builders, scientists, rather than farmers or agricultural labourers.

Australia is in fact still in the middle of the second great phase of her development, dominated by the growth of industry. The progress already made is astounding. It was stimulated first by the discovery of vast mineral resources, and secondly by the incidence of two major wars which forced Australia to rely on her own manufacturing skill rather than on imports. Australia is rich in some of the essential industrial raw materials. In 1929 the probable black coal resources of Australia were estimated at over ten milliard tons, the brown coal resources at nearly four times that quantity. On the other hand no substantial oil deposits have been discovered despite assiduous research, and the hydro-electric sources of power are relatively insignificant except in Tasmania. Australia is the world's fifth producer of gold, but economically more important from the long-term point of view is probably her production of lead and zinc (roughly one-seventh of world production) and of iron ore, the production of which amounted to 2,570,000 tons in 1939 but could be substantially expanded. It is against the background of these *natural* resources that Australia's secondary industries have made astounding progress, especially during the two world wars. The number of employees in factories between 1938 and February 1944 increased from 565,000 to 737,000. How much further this development will go will largely depend on the development of the international economic and political situation. While the leading industrial producers of the world, such as the United States, Great Britain and, before the war, Germany, still possess superiority of industrial experience and craftsmanship, the gap is rapidly diminishing. The last war has been a great challenge to Australian ingenuity and resourcefulness. In the course of it thousands of new engineers, scientists and tradesmen have been trained. The trend towards greater industrial self-sufficiency will undoubtedly continue. At present it is stimulated by the desperate world shortage of manufactured goods. Moreover Australia has for many years pursued a tariff policy designed to shelter her growing secondary industries, but Great Britain is still Australia's greatest purchaser of agricultural produce, and other countries, such as the United States, are very substantial, though erratic, purchasers of Australian wool. Quite apart from her continued dependence on many industrial products, especially in the heavy industries, Australia cannot therefore neglect the two-way trade with some of the leading industrial countries of the world. This may be reinforced by political and strategic considerations which may make Australia an important partner in an Empire economy.

Australia's industrial development is marked by one factor which creates perhaps her biggest political and psychological problem. Almost the entire incidence of industrial raw materials and of industrial development is concentrated in two of the six Australian states. New South Wales and Victoria between them in 1942 were responsible for nearly

eighty per cent. of the value of Australia's production. As these two states also have, in Sydney and Melbourne, the two major cities containing over one-third of the total population of Australia, and also her two major harbours, they have for many years—with Queensland as a rich agriculture producer as a minor associate—been the "have" states of the Australian federation confronted by the three "have nots", South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.*

This leads to the second great Australian problem, which is illuminated by Mr. Greenwood's interesting and suggestive study: the future of Australian federalism. The association of six states with a combined population of no more than 7½ million, in a federal system which causes the most complex problems of political economic and social government, dominates Australian life to an extent which people living in a unitary State like Great Britain can hardly appreciate. Australia achieved federation in 1900. Contrary to the usual pattern it was not defensive but economic considerations which supplied the main stimulus. But they were not urgent enough to overcome to more than a limited extent the particularism and the divergencies between six states which had grown up separately and under different conditions and whose centres were separated from each other by many hundreds or even thousands of miles.

The United States Constitution supplied the model for Australia's federal constitution. It was natural that Australia should look to the United States for precedent, as the most recent example of federation achieved by a former British colony. Moreover, American-Australian relations, whilst sporadic, have been persistently friendly. But it was unfortunate that a constitution framed more than a century earlier supplied the model at a time when the problems of industry, communications, as well as strategy, had changed beyond recognition. The Australian Constitution follows the American pattern of specifically enumerated powers for the federation with reserve powers left to the states, while in a number of subject matters there is concurrent legislative power—that is to say, the states remain competent to deal with them until the federation decides to take charge. Exclusive federal competence is confined to defence, external affairs, taxation and customs. The undoubted extension of Commonwealth functions which has taken place under the pressure of wartime conditions is due to the existence of these powers and an interpretation probably not foreseen by the founders of the Constitution. Until the last war the Commonwealth had hesitated to exercise its responsibility in the field of income tax. It had been content with the revenue from customs, although in 1927 a vital advance towards Commonwealth supremacy was made by an amendment of the Constitution which sanctioned the taking over by the Commonwealth of the public debts of the states and the establishment of an Australian Loan Council responsible for

* Of these South Australia may be on the way towards becoming a "have" state owing in particular to her iron ore deposits.

future loans to the states by the Commonwealth. A more decisive advance came when, in 1942, the High Court declared constitutional a wartime Act by which the Commonwealth assumed complete priority in the whole field of income tax, thus leaving a purely theoretical residue to the states. The assumption of this power was legally justified by the competence of the Commonwealth in matters of taxation.

Other important controls which still prevail, such as a comprehensive and effective price control and rationing system, are based on the Commonwealth's defence power. In the latter field, however, a temporary promulgation of the Commonwealth's defence powers will soon expire and a referendum on the maintenance of price control powers in the hands of the Commonwealth will decide whether what started as a war emergency will, as in so many other countries, become a main permanent pillar of a controlled economy.

In most other fields the distribution of competences as between the Commonwealth and the states has been the source of endless conflicts, uncertainties and ambiguities. Outstanding in importance have been s.51(i) by which the Commonwealth Parliament was empowered to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to trade and commerce with other countries and among the states, and s.51(xxxv) by which it acquired competence for "conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state." Both clauses are unfortunate because modern commerce as well as modern industrial relations do not correspond to the boundaries of states established under very different conditions. Countless decisions have attempted to fix the borderline between trade laws or industrial disputes affecting only one state and those extending beyond the borders. How futile the distinction is is shown by the existence of federal trade unions. In order to make the matter one of Commonwealth concern industrial disputes originating in one state have often been deliberately extended to other states.

Another ambiguity arises from the provision in s.92 of the Constitution that "trade commerce and intercourse among the states . . . shall be absolutely free." Does this mean freedom from all regulation, such as licensing and marketing provisions, or does it merely mean the abolition of economic frontiers between the states but without prejudice to such general regulations as changing economic and social conditions make necessary? These apparently technical formulas cover deep political and social issues between planning and *laissez-faire*, individualism and collectivism, local and national loyalties.

In Australia as in the United States the highest law court of the country is the ultimate arbiter. It has faced the same dilemma, how to preserve judicial impartiality and unpolitical prejudice in the interpretation of a fundamentally political document. The problem is probably insoluble. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the High Court of

Australia has solved it despite the eminence of their members and the quality of their judgments. They have vacillated between conservative and progressive interpretations, between the logical and a sociological approach. Coupled with the changing composition of the courts, the result has been confusion and, in the case of the High Court of Australia an increasing exposure to political attacks. At the time of writing, the most important political issue in Australia is the introduction of a Bill for the nationalization of banking by the Commonwealth Labour Government, after an Act giving limited powers to the Commonwealth over the conduct of banking by the states which had been declared unconstitutional by the High Court. The debate was marked by strong attacks on the High Court as an instrument of political reaction, and equally heated counter-attacks. These and many other problems, such as the fantastic diversity of railway gauges which are the preserve of the states, lead Mr. Greenwood to the conclusion that federalism as an institution of government is out of date and for the sake of the further progress of Australia must be replaced by a unitary system in which an increasingly artificial division of competence between a sovereign centre and equally sovereign member states is replaced by far reaching administrative devolution from the centre to the individual units. In his contribution to *Australia: Its Resources and Development* Sir Robert Garran, former Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, comes to similar conclusions.

It is, in fact, an inescapable consequence of political and social development that no modern State, whether conservative, liberal or socialistic in philosophy, can do without a large degree of economic and social control. Federal states, by their very rigidity—amendments to the Australian Constitution require not only an absolute majority in both Houses of the Federal Parliament but an approval, through referendum, by a majority of electors and by separate majorities in the majorities of the states—and by the obsolescence of the principles embodied in most of the existing federal constitutions are incapable of securing the necessary minimum controls. It is only in a system where the strong and ruthless control, by one party compels a member state to fall into line, as in Soviet Russia, that effective planning is compatible with a federal structure. It may well be that the importance of federalism in our generation lies in its suitability for international associations and states, but that it has outlived its usefulness inside the existing states.

The third outstanding feature in Australia's position, which is illustrated by Mr. Levi's study on the history of *American-Australian Relations*, is her geographical and mental isolation from the storm centres of international affairs. Twice within a generation Australia has taken an active and heroic part in international struggles. In both world wars Australia's contribution, in fighting forces, financial burdens, industrial effort, has been extraordinary in proportion to her population and resources. The last war has also brought considerable numbers of young Australian

serving overseas in direct contact with other countries' peoples and problems. Yet it is no more than a handful of Australians who take an active interest in international affairs. There is a growing awareness of the long-term threat to Australia from the pressure of the immense increasing Asiatic masses in proportion to her own thin and scattered population. For a brief moment, in 1942, the threat of Japanese invasion, averted at the very last moment, showed to everyone the inevitable implication of Australia in international developments. The threat passed as by a miracle, and at the moment the internal weaknesses of China, Japan and India make the problem less immediately acute. The threat was too sudden and the danger has passed too easily to produce as yet a fundamental change and attitude.

The overwhelming pre-occupation of Australians is with their own affairs. Australian developments have been decisively influenced by two world wars and by Australia's participation in them, but they have not affected the main rhythm of life. Yet it is obvious that in the coming years Australia cannot escape the need for a fundamental re-orientation. There is first the need to assume some of the burdens of Empire hitherto borne by Britain, in terms of defence, foreign affairs, scientific research, industrial development. Australia faces, secondly, the growing interest and pressure of the United States in the Pacific. Thirdly, the Asiatic problem looms in the background.

Australia has taken an increasingly active part in the affairs of the United Nations, but this has largely been the work of a handful of people led by Australia's active Foreign Minister, Dr. Evatt. Foreign policy must in the long run not only be adjusted to economic and military resources, but it must be supported by the people in order to be sustained and effective. As Australia's industrial and military influence and commitments grow, she will inevitably become more active in international affairs. But she will face the need for a deeper and more challenging re-orientation. So far Australia has consistently maintained her White Immigration Policy which, at the cost of numbers and diversity, has preserved an Australian population descended almost entirely from British stock. To-day the Australian Government actively fosters large-scale immigration from Britain and selective immigration from other European, preferable Nordic, countries. Even on the most optimistic estimate these sources will not be sufficient. Many people are aware of the need for broader measures, though few advocate unrestricted immigration. But a quota system, comparable with that of the United States, might give a stimulus such as a mixture of races, traditions and talents has undoubtedly produced in the United States.

It is perhaps this one-track development of Australia which accounts for the most remarkable and problematic feature of her national life: Australia has achieved a social and political stability and tranquillity of a type which other countries usually achieve at the end of centuries of

dynamic and restless development. Her political and cultural ideas are almost entirely those of Great Britain, usually with a time lag and without the stimulus of challenge and danger which makes modern Britain such a lively place in all her stress and embarrassments. Collective bargaining, social security, fairly high standards of wages, industrial arbitration and conciliation, have been developed in Australia at a relatively early stage of her development. The latest development is the universal introduction of the forty-hour week. The carefully regulated limitation of production, the leisurely pace of individual and social life, the mental isolation from the stream of world events: all these will be threatened as Australia enters the next phase of her development as an industrial and military power of growing importance. Whether it will mean greater happiness is certainly doubtful. The position of a major power usually implies imperialism, pre-occupation with war, and the threat to the stability and happiness of life. But it is impossible to have it both ways. If Australia becomes, as she shows every sign of being, the most important State in the South Western Pacific, she will have to undergo the mental revolution which follows from active participation in world affairs. In her development up to date Australia has combined the development of a liberal democracy on the western pattern with a remarkable degree of social progressiveness and an absence of imperialistic ambitions.* There is at least a hope that these Australian traditions may have a beneficial influence in international councils.

Dr. Friedmann was appointed last year to the Chair of Public Law at the University of Melbourne.)

* The claim to the control of certain Pacific islands, such as New Guinea, is essentially protective.

THE FALL OF MR. DE VALERA

By HARRY CRAIG

FOR the first time in her troubled history Ireland has achieved a major political change without at least some show of violence, without the breaking of a single human bone. Yet such achievement, which inevitably to the English mind is progress, may to the Irish be lethargy. Indeed some political commentators, familiar only with the Handy Andy aspect of Irish politics, and impressed by the lack of traditional thump in the exchanges have concluded that the Irish have gone cold on their elections. But this was not quite the truth. The coldness, the tiredness, the state of the low tension of the electorate did not indicate disinterest or, as the commentators said, a dumb resignation to Mr. De Valera's rule. It was not so simple. Ireland voted this time, like Napoleon's army marched, on its stomach; politics suddenly ceased to be a poetical exercise, and the far cry of the romantic was lost in the harsher discussion of household economics.

This election, then, was decided in the kitchen and not, as Mr. De Valera would have had it, in the stars. Yet all the usual properties were there—the flags, the bands, bonfires, party leaders walking to platforms under torchlight, the horseman-escorts for Mr. De Valera or Mr. MacBride, the terrible presence of the republican Dead—everything as before. But they did not convince nor inspire nor delude as before; the old amalgam of hates and loves—the Adam's rib of Irish republicanism—did not prick the heart as before. Formerly, one could sum up Irish politics as a hatred or a liking for England, and cover most of it. But not now. The Irish, always moved to softness by the adversity of others, at present, surprise even themselves by the generosity of their sympathy for their old enemy, England, now that she too is in "the troubles". So, this time, the electorate thought less about their running fight with England, less about the price of the Republic and more about the price of food.

Apart from this change of attitude to Britain, this revolution in thought, there were two other major causes for Mr. De Valera's downfall. First, economic grievance, the dissatisfaction of life on low wages, quite out of proportion with continually rising prices. Since 1940, the cost of living has gone up eighty-six per cent., while wages, which were pegged, only by thirteen to twenty per cent. The wage pegs came off a year ago but the disparity with prices still persists, in spite of urgent trade union negotiation and many hard fought strikes. Moreover formal rationing is at a minimum

giving way to rationing by price. During the elections, eggs sold in Dublin at 5s. or 4s. 6d. a dozen and meat, whatever weight of it the visitor may enjoy, is beyond the reach of a large proportion of the working class. Opulence swells beside poverty; large luxuriant hotels, expensive dwelling houses, cinemas, are built at the expense of hospitals and the clearance of unworthy slums. In a country where the old age pension still stood at the 1914 level of ten shillings, the purchase of costly aeroplanes and equipment, the building of large aerodromes could be described only as vanity.

The remaining factor contributing to Mr. De Valera's defeat, though it is a corollary of the factor of economic grievance, is less easily traced or defined. It arises out of the great power of example, the infection of ideas. The Irish are wanderers, they tend toward emigration. Sometimes, in search of the adventure of a new place, they go voluntarily; more often their going is the fleeing of a persecuted people, for the majority it is escape from the economic drudgery of overcrowding on small profitless farms; for others, escape from unemployment or low wages. But, it is a national characteristic that all want to come again to Irish ground—if only, as Liam O'Flaherty has said, to go on their knees and smell it. And they have brought back to their small farms, or their isolated country towns, news of a new spirit of government, social government, to people who although unable in any detail to readjust it to Irish circumstances, yet comprehend and desire it, quite naturally, for themselves.

The appearance of this third element, "a bread and butter vote", into Irish politics, which reacted so decisively on Mr. De Valera's fortunes, does not mean, however, that the left wing politics of economists have at last arrived in Ireland. As yet it is seen but darkly, unrooted in a political philosophy and unambitious beyond the satisfaction of immediate demands; it is an urge which may be variously directed and absorbed into one or other of the major capitalist parties, before, as one might expect, Labour can trap it. For Labour in Ireland up to the present has trapped little; it is a party weakened by internal dissension, lacking in imagination and over-given to equivocation. It has made the mistake of believing that sanity can only come to Irish politics when abstract, mystical politics have been, like the devils, exorcized.

Though down, Mr. De Valera is not, by any rule, out. Even without office he is still the strongest political force in the country; no fewer than forty-two per cent. of the last electorate voted for a continuation of his government; he controls the largest party in Dail Eireann. He can count sixty-seven individual heads yet the whole moves to his signals like one obedient dog. Only the closest combination of the five opposition parties, a compromising of divergent policies, and some back-ground bargaining levered Mr. De Valera out of office. No one can tell, certainly

not Mr. Costello, the new Taoiseach, at what moment Mr. De Valera will act, when, for some apparently unimportant division, he will whistle in the dog. For the gaunt, ecclesiastical-looking leader of the opposition is not only the leader of the largest party, he is also the most ruthless, the cleverest of political manoeuvrists. He it was who said that by looking into his own heart he could read the wishes of his countrymen. Obviously it is an arrogance not to be provoked needlessly, certainly not to be trifled with. The mythology surrounding Mr. De Valera will die hard, if it dies at all, for its qualities are indeed the qualities of the immortal.

It disarms criticism, absolves blame, recognizes no fault; when something goes wrong—"It is the people with Mr. De Valera who are to blame not Mr. De Valera himself"—the myth cannot be fallible. "Dev" appears not as a man but a shape, a figment of the imagination, to be judged inhumanly. The repository of the republican tradition, in "Dev" is reincarnated—all the ghosts of the patriotic sacrifices, "the dead generations" as Padraic Pearse called them.

Probably no other country has a sense of the dead as Ireland has; the past is in the present and the future; they are the household gods and almost every cottage hangs some martyr's picture on its walls. All political platforms evoke the dead, each political party has its front-bench of dead—Labour has Larkin and Connolly; Fine Gael—Griffiths and Michael Collins; Fianna Fail—the men of 1916 and the men of 1922; behind them, summoned without party discrimination, are the dead of all generations, back even into the twilight of medieval Ireland.

That, too, is the tradition of Mr. De Valera. He should have been dead at least twice; only a last-hour, unsolicited reprieve saved him in 1916, and when he came out of prison in 1917, it was as the only surviving leader of the Rising, and from that day he began to enjoy those honours reserved only for the dead. Such was the source of the mystique; the bottle out of which the "Dev" myth first began to smoke.

So unique has been the influence of Mr. De Valera on the affairs of his country, so vivid and dominating his personality, that we judge the movement of Irish politics by their flow towards or away from him. In 1932, after defeat in a civil war ten years earlier, he regained power on a New Deal policy. Politically, he was to regain the Northern Counties and establish the Republic; economically to develop industry, to break economically the English connection by making the Island self-sufficient; Sinn Fein, "Ourselves Alone" as Arthur Griffiths formulated it. But Mr. De Valera solved no major problem. In fact, on the question of partition, he managed only further complication. Much of the industry which he established so studiously behind tariff walls had to be protected from Belfast and Birmingham alike. The industrial North of Ireland depends on free trade with the commonwealth, the industry of the twenty-six counties upon protection. Compromise between two such

disparate economic systems, where political division already exists, is indeed difficult to conceive.

Coalition or "mixum gatherum" as Mr. De Valera contemptuously calls it, was not seriously entertained as a possibility before the result of the election was made known. Mr. MacBride's party with its youthful ambitions of forty seats—it got ten—and Labour did meet to explore the advantages of a left wing election pact; Labour opinion was, however, divided on the unsettled appearance of Mr. MacBride's party,—why some men of known conservative attachment and interest propagated Mr. MacBride's uncertain brand of radicalism—and the idea of a pact was, thereby, abandoned. The two parties did however observe an unofficial truce.

On the other hand, the old Conservative party Fine Gael (presently the largest group in the Dail Eireann after De Valera's) made, vague, unrequited suggestions of coalition, pointing out, very reasonably, that inter-party government is the logical conclusion of proportional representation and not to accept it is to argue against mathematical fact. Mr. De Valera, himself a mathematician of some repute, did not miss this point and was exhaustive in his attacks upon P.R.—the electoral system "enshrined" by his own hand in the Constitution of 1937. Indeed Mr. De Valera will gain some sympathy for what must seem to him now to have been youthful indiscretion. But for P.R.—which manufactures minorities at the cost of the major parties—he would be still securely in office. The effects of P.R. may perhaps be understood more easily by comparison with English electoral statistics: in 1945, by the simple majority system, the British Labour Party obtained sixty-one per cent. of the parliamentary seats on forty-eight per cent. of the votes cast; in February 1948, by P.R., Mr. De Valera with forty-two per cent. of the votes cast gained only forty-six per cent. of the contested seats.

The new government, comprising parties of previously hostile interests, with its carefully farmed portfolios, its precise beating, came then, as a surprise to those for whom, previously, the politics of compromise had been anathema, a betrayal of principle. Only the *idea* of coalition was there, remotely, unapplied to Irish circumstances. Mr. Costello's coalition is popular; the spontaneity of its formation, the good temper and the tolerance it implies have had a profound effect. Indeed so far as political altruism goes the coalition lacks nothing; yet considered as a fundamental purpose, the exclusion of the "strong government" of Mr. De Valera, is a negative one. The contentious aspects of party policy are placed in abeyance, and government is to be by the reduction of policy to its lowest common denominator. Thus, the emphasis of government is on the modification, the reformation of existing legislation rather than on the initiation of new. In fact, the one political cliché noticeably absent is that Mr. Costello's Government is not "boldly marching" anywhere.

The programme of coalition, a plan of ten points drafted by Labour, is as directed against immediate grievances and, although not all of it will be interpreted as Labour sees it, it is a radical programme and acceptance is drawn Fine Gael towards the left. Fine Gael, originating in Cumman nGael, which under Mr. W. T. Cosgrave held office before Mr. De Valera, has been in turn an associate of General O'Duffy's fascist blue-shirt movement and, during the war, the defender of civil and parliamentary liberties against Mr. De Valera's Government by Decree. To-day, as the focus of whatever organized public opinion there is in the country, it is the only example of a Liberal party—in the British sense of the word—in Ireland.

Mr. Costello's ministers, though tentative before an opposition with more knowledge of departmental files than they can as yet command, have, nevertheless, shown a considerable confidence in the announcement of new policy. The most important change is in the policy for agriculture. Agricultural production is again to be aimed at the British market; Britain demands cattle, so tillage, the main plank of Mr. De Valera's self-sufficiency platform, will be replaced by grazing. The proposed inauguration of a transatlantic air-service has been indefinitely postponed, while hospitals and T.B. sanatoria are to be extended; the new health minister is a young doctor who was promoted to Cabinet rank on the day when he first entered the Dail.

But it is yet too early to have more than a scrappy knowledge of the possible effects of the new Government. Mr. De Valera held office for sixteen years and, so far as parliamentary inquiry would allow, governed in silence, keeping secret as much of the workings of his department as he decently could. Thus, the changeover is made more difficult. Yet whatever the demerits of coalition, whatever the insecurity of the present government with its bare majority of seven deputies, it has already restored to the public a new faith in politics—a faith which had been undoubtedly disturbed by the "mild dictatorship" of Mr. De Valera. For in so far as he ignored the opinion and demands of the opposition, Mr. De Valera was a dictator.

HAGANAH

BY PETER SINCLAIR-THOMSON

'HAGANAH' is a Hebrew word meaning simply 'defence'. It had its origin in the defence groups which safeguarded Jewish life and property in Palestine in the late 1870's, later formed into the Organization of Jewish Watchmen, (Hashomer) in 1907. This defence arose directly as a result of the massacre of the Jews of Safad in 1823 and of the repercussions in Palestine of the Damascus Blood Libel in 1840. Throughout the Turkish régime in Palestine, there was little or no public security provided by the Government. In those days, defence was a matter of the fist and the cudgel rather than of firearms, but it instilled the rudiments of military training and personal bravery in inexperienced settlers. During the 1914-1918 war the Shomrim, members of Hashomer, formed the basis of the Jewish Legion that served with the British forces. After the publication of the Balfour Declaration, it was feared, with the large entry of immigrants to the country, that the Shomrim would tend to become a dominating group, able by force of arms to impose its will on the community. It was therefore decided to create, in its stead, a defence body in which all able-bodied Jews should serve. This body was to be known as Haganah and was to constitute the Territorial Army of Palestinian Jewry. During the disturbances of 1920 and 1921 there was considerable loss of Jewish life and therefore secret preparation for the development of Haganah began. Considerable protection was thus afforded the Jewish population by the "illegal" Haganah in the 1929 disturbances, although 150 Jews were killed in the towns and much Jewish property was destroyed.

The real value of Haganah was shown in the disturbances that broke out in 1936, on a far greater scale than any previously carried out by the Arabs alone. It was found quite impossible to get troops to outlying Jewish settlements in time to save life and property. The Haganah not only filled the breach completely, but also demonstrated that it was a defence organization and not a private army of aggression. Winning the admiration of the military commanders, these succeeded in persuading the Administration to permit Haganah to hold a legal quota of arms for self-defence, thus leaving the British troops free to carry out offensive operations. At the same time a number of the Haganah in each settlement were enrolled as supernumerary police.

The first unofficial co-operation of Haganah with the Administration,

and the first use of it in an offensive capacity, occurred in 1938 when the late General (then Captain) Wingate conceived the idea of fighting the Arabs by using their own tactics. For this he required loyal men with an intimate knowledge of the terrain and formed, with the whole-hearted support of Field Marshal (then General) Wavell, small "commando" groups of Haganah, under British Officers and N.C.O.s, trained by himself on the identical lines which he afterwards adopted for his Chindits. There is no doubt that these small groups did more to put an end to the disturbances than any other military operations, and Haganah received the highest praise, both from General Wavell and from Wingate.

This entry into the offensive field of military training did not alter Haganah's character as a defence force. The report of the Royal Commission noted this in particular and stated (page 121):

It is true of course that in times of disturbance the Jews, as compared with the Arabs, are the law abiding section of the population; and, indeed, throughout the whole series of outbreaks, and under very great provocation, they have shown a notable capacity for discipline and self-restraint.

In the 1939-1945 war Haganah again formed the backbone of Jewish military effort. Not only did it provide, with the permission of the Administration, the bulk of Palestine's Home Guard, but also encouraged the enlistment of 35,000 men and women into the British forces. These Palestinian Jews served in every branch of the three services and their contribution to the various intelligence departments and to resistance movements in occupied territory was considerable. Many young Jews and Jewesses lost their lives after being dropped as agents in enemy territory or in organizing Jewish and other resistance movements, including the Warsaw rising, in all European countries. Finally, and most important, Haganah offered six major services under a "post occupational" scheme arranged for the possible occupation of Palestine by the Germans. These covered:

- (i) Provision of a guerrilla force.
- (ii) Provision of a special task force to cut communications after the British evacuation.
- (iii) Provision of a technical unit to establish an underground radio network.
- (iv) Provision of intelligence agents.
- (v) Creation of a task force to cut off a German retreat in a British counter-offensive.

There is clearly a great deal of difference between a disciplined organization such as this and the terrorist groups who have carried out the dastardly acts of murder, not only against Britons and Arabs, but against their own kith and kin. The Irgun and Stern groups are both extremists politically and rebels against all forms of discipline, national, political or military. Many of them are ex-members of the Maquis and other former under-

ground groups of the European war. Others are coarsened by years of incarceration in the death camps. Thus, to them terror and murder are things of small consideration and, from their experience, the only means of obtaining the freedom they have fought for elsewhere for so long.

Two points emerge from the character of Haganah. The first is that by its very nature it is a non-political body since it includes all shades of political opinion, as does any other army, and secondly, that it is its own master. It is not, as is often thought, under the direct control of the Jewish Agency. In accordance with the terms of the Mandate the Jewish Agency is:

... a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may effect the interests of the Jewish population of Palestine and subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. (Article 4).

The Jewish Agency, therefore, is in no sense a governing body and has no power, nor means of enforcing power, upon any part of the Jewish population of Palestine except by means of appeals to the public, which means have constantly been adopted. (This explains the reason why the Agency has been unable to deal with the terrorists.) There does exist, as is well known, a Haganah liaison officer within the Agency. His function, however, is purely that implied in his title and there is no compulsion upon Haganah to carry out Agency policy. This point has, in fact, given rise in the past to disagreement over the subject of immigration.

Haganah, since the beginning of the Mufti's attacks on Jews and Arabs in opposition to the UNO decision, has endeavoured to protect Jewish and Arab life and property. (This has been necessitated by the policy of neutrality adopted by His Majesty's Government in their effort to refrain from taking sides with either the defender or the aggressor against the UNO decision in which they had no part.) In recent weeks, this protection of life and property has developed into offensive action. Many people—including Jews within Palestine and without—both in the Jewish Agency and in the Zionist Organization, deplore such a policy on the part of Haganah and claim that it has sunk to the level of the terrorists in adopting the tactics of senseless reprisals. This is an instance of false judgment of events alone. It has long been established as an essential strategic principle that attack is the best means of defence and anyone who has had experience of Arab guerrilla warfare cannot but agree that passive resistance to their attacks results only in a speedy increase in their size and number. The only possible means of defence against these attacks is to strike at their heart, at their headquarters or at their centres of recruitment. In this way only can such guerrilla warfare be brought to an end and so halt the steeply rising rate of Jewish and Arab casualties and damage to property.

The terrorist groups, who blur the true picture of Haganah by their

wanton acts, are cutting across the policy of Haganah and acting as fifth columnists against Haganah efforts. Under the present "neutral" policy of the Palestine Government, whereby, as has been said, action is taken against defender and aggressor alike, it is impossible for Haganah to prevent terrorist activity. It is only with the establishment of the Jewish State, and the formation of a Jewish militia from the ranks of Haganah under the jurisdiction of the Jewish Government, that the terrorists will be stopped.

It should not be forgotten how only seven months ago Haganah men were giving their lives in an effort to put down the terrorists. A leading article in the *Daily Express* of June 20, 1947, relating how a member of Haganah gave his life to prevent the blowing up of a British Army headquarters by terrorists, said: "He did not die for Britain. He died for the principle of the rule of law, and for the authority of the United Nations in whose hands the future of Palestine lies. The help of Haganah in preserving peace should be given full recognition. It is a fine, courageous answer to the propagandists who pretend that the thugs are supported by all Jewry." There seems no reason, when the facts are known, why men of this calibre should be accused of motive totally repugnant to them and totally at discord with the fine record of Haganah.

(Captain Sinclair-Thomson served before and during the 1939-1945 war as a Special Service Intelligence Officer.)

GYPSY ORIGINS

BY RUPERT CROFT-COOKER

THE history of the gypsies is still a speculative and controversial one. Much of the fantasy and mystery which covered it has been stripped away and a few essentials have been established beyond doubt. But the tendency of scholars, Borrow among them, to stress the occult in gypsy character and legend has not made for elucidation.

It is the philologists who speak with most authority. A study of all that remains in England of the Romani tongue and on the Continent of its variously corrupted forms, has established one positive fact—that this language owes its origin to India. Naturally enough there have been attempts to be more specific, to discover from what Indian people or caste the race emerged. There are a score of theories, and as many conjectures about the date at which they left the east, the route by which they came westward, their purpose in travelling from Hindustan, and so on. But there is not, and there is not likely to be, any certainty in the matter—which seems to excite the scholars to more ingenious postulations. They hold varying opinions on the basic question as to whether the gypsies are akin to some of the nomadic tent-dwellers of modern India, or whether they are identifiable with the ten thousand Indian musicians who, according to Firdusi, were imported into Persia in the fifth century. Nor has that earlier and persuasive theory of Grellmann's that they were low-caste Hindus fleeing from Tamburlaine, ever been finally disposed of, however it may be out of favour with modern gypsiologists on the grounds that there were gypsies in Europe before Tamburlaine's time. And even when it is admitted, as it must be, that Romanes is a language of Sanskrit origin (it is in fact an Indian language with a still evident likeness to Hindustani), it is not known whether the gypsies can definitely be called an Indian people, either Aryan or Dravidian, or whether their history pre-dates even the Aryan invasion of India and goes back to some dim civilization from which they had escaped in still earlier times to make their way across the Indus; whether in fact they might not be Egyptians after all who, migratory as now, had wandered eastwards one, two, three thousand years before Christ and had remained in India since then so that they had absorbed their Sanskrit tongue. Nothing, indeed, absolutely nothing is known categorically of their racial origins.

If only they had preserved some remnants of religion, these might provide a clue. But as Richard Jefferies said: "The Negroes have their

fetich, every nation its idols; the gypsy alone has none—not even a superstitious observance. It is very strange that it should be so at this the height of our civilization, and you might go many thousand miles and search from Africa to Australia before you would find another people without a Deity." Jefferies exaggerates when he says that not even a superstitious observance is left, for there are such matters as the burning of a dead man's possessions which may well be of Hindu origin. But there is nothing which might not have been a usage, half religious, half hygienic, picked up by any nomadic people for its own preservation. There is nothing which stamps the gypsy as having certainly belonged to a Hindu caste, or even as having been a Hindu outcaste. If he was once the former, one would have thought that there would be vestiges of Hindu observance left in his daily life after he had migrated westward, but most arguments in favour of this are specious.

To avoid all more or less fanciful theorizing we must be content to see in the gypsies a race of people which, both migratory and nomadic by habit, left India and wandered westward. But how long, for how many decades or even centuries they may have tarried on the way, in the Balkans for instance, is again unknown. They seem to have reached western Europe at some time about, or just before, the beginning of the fifteenth century—that being the period of the earliest references to them in Continental chronicles. From then onwards the story grows more clearly defined. There are early woodcuts which show the women clothed in something suspiciously like the sari, that most beautiful garment which has been the feminine fashion in India for two thousand years. And there are descriptions of those "masterful beggars" which—though they vary according to the fancy and imagination of the fifteenth century journalist who wrote them—do allow us to form some mental picture of the turbulent multitudes who infested Europe at that time, moving great distances as stealthily as deer, appearing suddenly at the gates of cities and demanding alms from the inhabitants on the grounds that they were pilgrims or penitents who carried letters patent from the Pope.

The men were horse-dealers, a trade which seems almost invariable among nomadic peoples, and remains the staple business of the gypsy to this day. They were also wood-workers, metal-workers, mummers, singers and dancers—occupations all which are wholly consistent with the life of a wandering tribe from the East, and which, in some degenerate form, remain as the pursuits of our modern *didakais*. A gypsy squatting by an English wood cutting clothes-pegs with swift deft strokes of his knife, or ornamenting his waggon with curious carved designs, may have come a long way from the Indian wood-carver, but his pre-occupation with the wood and the tool have not changed. The gypsy tinsmith or knife-grinder with his barrow, who can make a miniature kettle from a

penny piece, is perhaps less far removed from the metal-workers whose belts and harness gleamed with silver five centuries ago. The men who never remain long in an inn at night without encouraging one of their number to sing in ringing tones some sentimental English song of the last century, or the gypsy circle which will form round any youth who will perform the astonishing tap-dances which his people love, may be poor reminders of those who performed at Holyrood House in 1530, but it is hard to find even a half-caste gypsy to-day for whom singing and dancing are not an integral part of the happy life.

At Bologna in 1422, the women were described as being able to foretell a man's future truly, though few who consulted them returned without a lost purse. The women of the band wandered in groups and entered the houses of the inhabitants where, while some told idle tales others laid hold of what was in their reach. Of a visit to Paris, five years later, we are told that there were witches in their company who looked into people's hands and told what would happen to them. In the English Act of 1530 "they by Palmestre could tell Menne and Womens Fortunes." And so on. Scarcely an early reference to gypsies but mentions the powers of divination claimed by the women, till "cross the gypsy's palm with silver" has become a by-word.

To me history is a visual thing, and I find the picture of these migrants moving across medieval Europe a vivid and attractive one. What the contemporary descriptions lack in information of value to the historian, such as details of numbers, place of origin, language and religious usage, they make up for by their sometimes racy portraiture, their graphic snapshots of a people who they seem to have viewed with wonder and even jealousy. Groome's Introduction to his *Gypsy Folk Tales* most succinctly quotes these descriptions, and the picture remains of great companies of swarthy man and women, their leaders well mounted and lavishly dressed and ornamented with silver, followed by their game dogs. The following multitude was poorer in dress and ornament, the men "very black" the women with their "faces covered with wounds, hair as black as a horse's tail" while nearly all "had both ears pierced and in each ear a silver ring." The date of these descriptions seems remote in Europe but in India it is yesterday. Whether or not the nomads had but recently come from beyond the Indus they are recognizable enough to anyone who knows India, and the flabbergasted awe of the dwellers in the comparatively tidy little communities of fifteenth century Europe may well be understood.

Then some of the gypsies—not even a conjecture at their numbers can be made—crossed the Channel to the British Isles. It is fascinating to consider how they made this move. What ship's captain for what fee brought these black foreigners across the water? So far as we know it was their first sea journey. Did they embark with their horses and game

dogs, go swiftly ashore at their English or Scottish port, and disappear into the landscape? Was their arrival watched by the scared subjects of Henry VII or Henry VIII who dwelt in the fishing port which the French or Dutch ship had chosen? Did they send scouts across first who returned to say that Britain was a land of promise where the fruits and livestock were plentiful enough to support a few hundred picturesque satellites and that the palms of the country-women itched to be read?

I think that they had already learnt the value of their own savage and unfamiliar mien. For what would the inhabitants of any lonely Tudor village have done when a wild and devilish-looking band of black men and women were camped close by, but count their sheep and drive in their cattle and lock their doors till this visitation from another world had passed? And soon began the long and painful struggle between nomad and householder, between gypsy and *gorgio*, which has continued to this day. The gypsies knew how to intimidate by numbers and by the strangeness of their barbarian appearance, or by playing on the superstitious fears of the rustics, so that the "gypsy's curse" is still a threat in rural England. They knew, too, how to enchant and entertain their hosts and could so captivate a Scottish monarch that he gave them monstrous privileges. Outcasts for the whole of their racial memory, they defended themselves, and fed themselves, and entertained themselves at the expense of the peaceful population, and if they did not also enrich themselves it was because they were, as they are to-day, inveterate spendthrifts without a suggestion of cupidity or usuriousness in their character.

"The first undoubted record referring to Gypsies in Great Britain is:—'1505, April 22. Item to the Egyptians be the king's command vij lib.' " This statement was first made by H. T. Crofton in the Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, was quoted with acknowledgments by David MacRitchie in his *Scottish Gypsies under the Stewarts*, from this with acknowledgments by Groome five years later, and since then, without the grace of any recognition, by various journalists whose research has taken them to the three historians, but not to their sources. The statement has not yet been contradicted. No specific mention has been made of Egyptians before that date though as the three scholars once again point out (each bowing to his predecessor) there was an Act passed in Scotland in 1449 concerning certain "masterful beggars" going about the country with "horses, hunds and other goods" which may well have been directed against gypsies. It is safe I think to assume (though not without readiness to be contradicted by any evidence which may yet be brought to light) that the gypsies landed on our shores at some time in the fifteenth century, as they spread over Europe in the fourteenth. My own reason for accepting these suppositions is a literary one which I cannot advance against the fruits of research—it is that the tone of all these early references implies the writers' surprise and wonder on first beholding gypsies. If

indeed they had been at large in the Continent before about thirteen hundred or in Britain before fourteen hundred, surely their observers would have spoken of them in more commonplace terms as an increasingly familiar phenomenon? Yet all the chronicles dwell on the bizarre, the unexpected and the novel in their appearance.

For three hundred years, until the interest of the nineteenth century was aroused, gypsy history in England remains obscure, and such references as there are to 'Egyptians' are mostly records of prosecutions and persecutions of the dark people by a citizenry often outraged by their wayward life. During that time they must have increased vastly in numbers, but they kept their racial integrity as no alien race, not even the Jewish, better succeeded in doing. Until a century ago they remained essentially foreigners speaking their own language, marrying within their own tribes, following their own leaders and regarding the *gorgios* as enemies whom they must fear and as dupes from whom they might profit.

It is this long period of growth in isolation which interests me most, for I find it wonderful that the hunted gypsies should have survived at all, still more so that they flourished and increased, as they must have done. There was, for instance, an Act in the twenty-seventh year of Henry VIII's reign from which Hoyland quotes: "Whereas certain outlandish people, who do not profess any crafts or trade whereby to maintain themselves, but go about in great numbers from place to place, using insidious, underhand means to impose on his Majesty's subjects, making them believe that they understand the art of foretelling to men and women their good and evil fortune, by looking in their hands, whereby they frequently defraud people of their money; likewise are guilty of thefts and highway robberies; it is hereby ordered that the said vagrants, commonly called Egyptians, in case they remain one month in the kingdom, shall be proceeded against as thieves and rascals; and on the importation of any such Egyptian, he (the importer) shall forfeit £40 for every trespass."

Hoyland further reprints records to show that cargoes of them were re-shipped to the Continent in the same reign, and passing to Elizabeth's time recalls an Act under which it was "felony without benefit of clergy" to remain with gypsies for a month or more. And so on for a couple of centuries. It was a crime to be one of the outlandish people calling themselves Egyptians and not infrequently a crime punishable, on some pretext, by death. It is a long and tragic record of hangings, imprisonment for long periods on trivial charges supported by the flimsiest evidence and in later years of transportation for life, the "hulks". George Hall, writing in 1909, said that he had never yet known an elderly gypsy whose memory lacked a store of what may be called transportation tales, and even a modern gypsy informant of mine spoke of the transportation of an ancestor.

There is little doubt that between the *gorgios* and the gypsies during these centuries were both fear and hatred. The Romanies had no love for the "happy folk in housen" who would arrest loiterers from the tribes and imprison stray gypsies as vagabonds. The house-dwellers, on the other hand, could scarcely be expected to welcome a string of satellites who would fill their wives' heads with the nonsense of fortune-telling and live off their land without recognition of such a sound principle as that of ownership. Moreover there must have been, I feel, an element of jealousy in the *gorgio* disapproval of the vagrant brotherhood, the envy of the well-fed domesticated animal for his wild fellow, the envy which a man tied to his profitable labours will feel for the shiftless but free. It was the fact that the gypsies lived none too badly and without routine which must have infuriated the honest labourer, and his envy and anger, though there is less cause for them, persist to this day.

But in the nineteenth century when first Hoyland and Crabb and then Borrow and the other students began to take an interest in the Romanies, they had changed vastly from the cut-throat gangs of oriental horsemen who had intimidated house-dwellers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in the eighteenth had become persecuted vagrants who made incursions into criminal life. Slowly the dark easterners whose forbears had chosen the chilly island of Britain as their travelling ground were making attempts to accommodate themselves to our life. Their language as a pure and separate tongue, was already dying and their speech even among themselves had grown thick with English words. They had assumed English names, or perhaps had had English names thrust on them. They had married into the families of house-dwellers. They had even begun to work in a spasmodic, or at least in a seasonal way, taking their natural swiftness of movement into account at fruit and hop picking, and turning to profit the crafts—basket making, wood carving, wood-cutting, tinkering and horse-doctoring—which they had once used only for the maintenance of their own communal and individual life. The men had grown accustomed to dealing in horseflesh with *gorgio* farmers and coopers, the women had begun a more orderly kind of calling, with baskets over their arms, ready enough to tell fortunes but selling their wares too, in a more business-like fashion. And although they were still, as Borrow took care to show, a secret people, capable of travelling forty miles in a night, gliding out of Norfolk and reappearing under another name in Essex, though they still for the most part married and died without the conscious assistance or even the knowledge of house-dwellers, though they still sickened if they were kept between walls, they were certainly domesticated compared with the long-haired tribesmen of Tudor times.

It does not seem that a more articulate knowledge of their own past would have aided the gypsies greatly in their wanderings. They were frequently called in one country by the name of the people of another which

they had recently left, or with which they were associated. They seem to have made no objection to those misnomers, if they were aware of them, and as "Saracens", "Egyptians", "Bohemians" were content to travel. It may be presumed that they were illiterate even in India, for scholars among them would surely have aroused interest at the time when the race was a novelty in Europe. But they were natural story-tellers and as Groome has shown, their folklore like their language owes much to the east. How long, I wonder, did it take for their racial memory to lose all recollection of India? And could a gypsy in Europe in the fifteenth century have told a questioner, if he would, from what country his ancestors came?

The name "Egyptians" may have been given to them in Britain for no other reason than that they were dark. In the days of blonde Queen Bess, when brunettes were out of fashion, Shakespeare summarized a lover's delusions by making him see "Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt." The line has been quoted to indicate that Shakespeare was aware of the dark foreigners who had come to England and been given the name of Egyptians. But may not the reverse be true? If "Egyptian" was a synonym for "blackamoor", a term used for anyone swarthy, as well it may have been, its application to the Romanies is understandable. And they were scarcely likely to object when one of their number was given the title "Lord of Little Egypt."

It was their ignorance of their own past which made them seem "mysterious" to students. A Jew was a Jew with his history and religion forever at his finger-tips, but who were these strangers who knew nothing of their ancestors? Borrow suggested that they kept such knowledge to themselves, but that was only a part of the mystification in which he delighted. They did not, they do not know more about themselves than that they are gypsies, born in a tent or waggon. The mystery was an outward not an inward thing—a visual mystery of queer, dark, strangely clad people passing across the land at dusk in silent fraternities, pitching their tents on a lonely heath, talking a strange language among themselves, carousing there for a night or two perhaps and in the white mist of one morning disappearing without a trace. How could the farmer—or even the lord of the manor, for that matter, be other than mystified?

It is to India that one must go to have the last sentimental traces of that mystification removed. For India has changed so little from the land which the gypsies left a mere five centuries or thousand years ago, that one can see them as they were before they set out on their westward journey. One can see their encampments outside many villages, one can watch the women with their tattoo marks ("faces covered with wounds") and black hank of hair ("hair black as a horse's tail") and their little tents constructed exactly as are those on Epsom Downs to-day. These

people are outcaste nomads who have roamed India from time immemorial, and the Indian scene would be unfamiliar without them. But take them as they are with their great silver ear-rings and anklets, their dirty but vividly coloured clothes, their jibbering and laughter, their caution never to approach within reach of a stranger, like half-tamed sparrows, their packs of scurvy dogs, their innumerable bright-eyed, beautiful but lousy children, and imagine them arriving on the outskirts of an English village in Tudor times, and you will see how the word "mysterious" has clung to them.

Besides, so accustomed is the tired world to the migrations that follow warfare that it is puzzled by one that was apparently one of peace. Small wonder that Grellmann supposed the gypsies to have come west to escape enforced Mohammedanism imposed by Tamburlaine, since in the Christian era such racial movements seem only to have come from war or religion. The Parsis moving south east to Gujerat to practise their Zoroastrianism undisturbed, the Puritans sailing for Virginia, these are understandable. So are the great movements that follow the conquests of the Moors, the Mongols, the Turks. But here was an exodus and an invasion that seemed spontaneous, a race on the move for the pleasure of travel, even crossing the sea to find its way about a remote island.

So we must read this or that argument about the gypsies, note with genuine delight each scholar's discovery throwing light on one of the vague chapters of their past, but we cannot hope for more. There are a few potential sources of information still untapped; this point may be clarified or that philological problem solved, but the story of the gypsies may never be wholly known.

A WORD ON KATHERINE MANSFIELD

BY SYLVA NORMAN

PERHAPS a quarter-century is a shorter age than we were led to believe in our schooldays. Three months then seemed a dismal tunnel, and a decade was something astronomical, unexplored; as it were, a light-year. Time shrinks, and across the wrinkles of its unquiet surface we can almost touch the days when Katherine Mansfield was writing her last stories, unwilling to believe that she died twenty-five years ago. But since twenty-five years are there, between her and our present selves, we can use their evidence that she will not die now. The danger is past. The gigantic second storm that might have wiped her out in its idiot fury has spent its force without displacing her, so that after the bombing and confusion peering eyes may gaze and voices outside the illuminated circle whisper with our Else the washerwoman's child, "I seen the little lamp". She lives, if not boisterously, in her own works and through her progeny, since the short story in this country changed in character and conception when her writings became known. Tchekov, to be sure, comes into the matter. That influence, or more accurately affinity, is undeniable; but it is less than just to look on Katherine Mansfield as a sort of pipe-line bringing Russian oil for Britain to burn at midnight. Something of the sort has been suggested and this too she will survive.

Amongst other available fallacies, the Mood of her Moment might be emphasized. No doubt each period has its special drama that affects its writers, and if Coleridge and Wordsworth could be directly kindled by the French Revolution we had, in this interim war, besides Rupert Brooke the "swimmer into cleanness leaping", a heroic tale of C. E. Montague the Mancunian dyeing his grey hair brown in order to squeeze into the cattle-trucks bound for wars in France. But Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen and others were there to invert the glamour, and its sequel was a sapless age wherein those who had not been through the horror croaked its disillusionment, dragged every brief ideal *à la lanterne*, and turned gold, when they could find it, into lead. Even if not "cynical" (a word that worked overtime for many years) they were unhappy, unhearty, generally distrustful of any but the gloomiest signs. To say that Katherine Mansfield was independent of all this would be neither true nor flattering; no writer who counts is utterly detached. She was impatient herself when, as a reviewer, she handled mediocre novels written to a formula that has, so far as artistic truth went, been knocked

crooked by the four gaunt years. A "change of heart" was needed. "I can't imagine," she wrote to her husband, "how after the war these men can pick up the old threads as though it had never been."

Old threads though, speaking in quite other fashion, she *did* pick up, precisely because it had been, or was being, and she had found, in common with so many after a later war than hers, that flatness and despair are not fruitful subjects for a fiction writer. Satire and cerebration in the manner of the earlier Aldous Huxley could be cut to sparkle, giving the venomous toad its precious jewel; or one could experiment dizzily with technical factors, and foster a literary cubism with a weather-eye on the abstruse antics of James Joyce. In this fog a study of both Stein and Einstein might yield spurious bearings to pilot a writer into some publicity. But the little corpses sunk beneath the wave may be left in decent privacy. Katherine Mansfield turned to her own memories. Memories of a New Zealand childhood were the base of those inter-related stories "Prelude" (with its first draft "The Aloe"), "At the Bay", "The Doll's House", which she had thought of weaving into some kind of a novel. Her sources then were simple and objective. The finished product too looked simple and objective, but the two were linked or separated by a painful underground progress of assimilation, condensation, transmutation, till they emerged as her intimate personal property, obeying the sage's philosophical dictum: "Look in your heart, and write". Much that formerly stuffed out even the short story was simply not there. The resultant clarity of primary colours, like impressionist painting, confronted you the more clearly and insistently. By a further paradox, it was even like those free, spontaneous pictures children have been encouraged to paint—this work that, as we know from the Journal, cost her so much effort and heart-searching. Marie Laurencin has felt and conveyed this childlike quality in her illustrations to a selection from the stories printed in a limited luxury Quarto in Italy just before the war.* But Marie Laurencin shows only the children, not what the children see with their large eyes so near the ground and nature so much magnified. Katherine Mansfield's vision easily took this angle. She was at home there, more than in the adult world, and her children live because she lives in them. "A mosquito and a wasp came to the edge of the honey dish to drink. The mosquito was a lovely little high stepping gazelle, but the wasp was a fierce roaring tiger." And as they saw, so could they hear:

For these little voices: the bee, the fly
The leaf that taps, the pod that breaks,
The breeze on the grass-tops bending by,
The shrill quick sound that the insect makes.

Those lines are written in her own character; and after all no child

**The Garden Party and Other Stories*. With coloured lithographs by Marie Laurencin. Officina Bodini, Verona, 1939. London: Collins. 42s.

has quite such a progressed articulate perception. So we begin to see that middle process between the first encounter and the final showing. There is no need to guess at what her *Journal* gives so amply. The process—just before the ultimate freedom—was nearly always an unhappy one, a fight against frustration or untrustworthy facility, a painful reaching out as though to grow some organ that did not normally exist. At first she felt the maddening inability to snare the ideas she glimpsed, and get them down in a way that satisfied. Hundreds of blue birds, and not one to keep its colour! "I am all right—sky high. And even in my brain, in my head, I can think and act and write wonders—wonders; but the moment I really try to put them down I fail miserably." (*Journal*, December 8, 1916). And when she has put them down they seem to her like false starts, none of them "in the middle of the note." Right back in her New Zealand days, in 1906, ease and spontaneity eluded her, when she had "many ideas but no grip of any subject." And in time she came sternly to repudiate easy writing with a deep spiritual distrust. It may seem that she deliberately tortured herself in the exhausting determination to bore down to truth, rejecting more and more of what would have been perfectly acceptable in a fiction writer. (Take those unfinished stories with two or three alternative beginnings; can we honestly judge, without trying to follow her own mazy twists of feeling, which one is best?) During her last years literary life was all one passionate, painful search for essence, for an inner radiance, for the kernel in the heart of the transfigured fruit. She was writing with her life blood. The reader may well ask: why all this torture, all this aspiration and rejection? Is this in fact the way a genius works? Did Shakespeare, Stendhal, Fielding, go through these contortions in order to produce such robust matter in such quantities?

The question is perhaps unfair; there may be some inverse ratio between scope and striving—the greater the output the less, not relatively but absolutely, the strain. But we must face it that Katherine Mansfield, for all her exquisite productions, is not of the stuff that makes great writers. And this is not only because her scope is limited; for indeed the dilemma of Ma Parker leads by its single thread to a note as universal as any based on the suffering of thousands. There are too many negatives though. Within her mind one pictures a 'No Trespassers' board at the entrance of a score of avenues she might have strayed in; and the one she chose was never the broad-walk. In a certain twisting of her pathway she is not unique. Virginia Woolf, for instance, was for the most part a natural poet who wrote in prose. But Katherine Mansfield would not allow herself even the easeful singing of the lyric bard, except when "off duty" she permitted an escape in actual verse melodious with notes parallel to her contemporaries De la Mare, Yeats and Rupert Brooke. Above all, she would not let herself be just a teller of tales. If a story had not, for her, a deep intrinsic meaning, a root in the profundity of life, it was not worth

putting on paper. She had begun to apply this means test even to reviews. It had become a habit—if we dare apply the word in speaking of a mind so honest—to scrutinize and re-ponder everything, prepared in innumerable cases to reject. The reason may, I think, be traced right back to the beginning when, like so many with artistic yearnings, she could not break through into creation. There she would sit—like Joseph Conrad on his thwarted days when he had three sentences to show, *crossed out*, for eight hours' work—with her faculties tingling, ready for the theme that did not come. Though she conquered this inhibition which might have prevented her once for all from being a writer, she retained her tactics, straining her ears for all the questioning voices, and mistakenly, one feels, withholding her confidence. For when the felicitous note does come it brings perfection with it, even speed. It can, but for a few verbal alterations, be trusted, and left to dance away with the theme alone. Spread out the product for analysis, scrutinize it in sections, and numbers of faults may seem to show. It may even be improved considerably, when not rejected; but to work this way is not congenial to creation, and brings the process back full circle to the first point of striving negativity. The torture then must necessarily be great.

I am far from suggesting that so fine a portrayer of humanity lived in a perpetual state of frustration, only that a barrier of her own making held her back. Without her over-rigid discipline so much that is hinted at in her writing might have broken joyfully in, tearing down the trespasser boards and expanding the whole outlook and comprehensiveness. But she did not want it. Expansion to her would mean a useless spilling out over the surface at the expense of the delving she required. Up to a point she is right that to gain in breadth is to lose intensity. The question is: how far is it desirable in a fiction writer to pursue intensity and abandon breadth? Intensity, for instance, usually cuts out humour. She had plenty; but that too was kept sternly disciplined and could flow out with more freedom in her *Journal*. She was, on her own confession, one of those solitary walkers who enjoy jokes by themselves that would go stony with a statelier companion. She looks at Lloyd George's latest and most eloquent metaphor in the paper wrapping her rhubarb and invents his memorial tablet: *In the hour of England's most imminent peril he grasped his Niblick and struck out for the open course*; but what *espèce de Niblickisme* will the French make of it? she asks. Or there is wit that can triumph through illness:

Almighty Father of All and Most Celestial Giver
Who has granted to us thy children a heart and lungs and a liver;
If upon me should descend thy beautiful gift of tongues
Incline not thine Omnipotent ear to my remarks on lungs.

Humour may enter the most passionate story as a satire on the modern bloods, as it does in *Bliss* where Bilks's new poem has the "incredibly beautiful" opening line: "Why must it always be Tomato Soup?" "It's so deeply true, don't you feel? Tomato soup is so dreadfully

eternal." This is a too slick gibe at intellectualism ; but she would have smiled appreciatively to know she had become, in 1936 and 1937 a thesis subject for two German university students, examining her philosophy and her style. She is all alive to the comic factor in solemnity (Charles : Pray dear papa, what is the Solar System ? Papa : Wipe your nose, Charles, and I will tell you.). In the stories humour is incidental, delicate and subordinate. We should rejoice to see it for once picking up the whole Burnell family at the seaside and racing with them away across the fore-shore, coupled up soundly, as it were, not dancing a *pas seul* like a wandering Puck.

This matter of intensity versus breadth leads straight to the query whether the progressed short story, freed as it is from so much of the machinery of fiction, is to be considered as nearer to the novel or to the lyric—or even the devotional—poem. Through its movement, characterization, grouping and development it approaches the novel ; it leans towards poetry in its concentration on a single universalized aspect, whether expressed by the Grecian urn as "Beauty is truth, truth beauty", or by our Else the washerwoman's daughter as "I seen the little lamp". Katherine Mansfield strove in her later work for the poetic analogy while her solidly realized characters pulled the other way. This in itself would be a drag on free creation. We have to remember too, though it may seem irrelevant, that all the self-scourging and urgent stretching-out for life and love are products of acute, deep-seated physical illness. Towards the end her personal writings, no less than Keats's letters to Fanny Brawne, are evidence of what amounts to a pathological condition. The body really dictated what the spirit felt and what the mind expressed. She was luckier than Keats who wasted his passion on a commonplace girl, in escaping to a mystical vision. But just as Keats could utter his central and unaberrant truth: "Bright Star, would I were steadfast as thou art," so she, during the last few months of life, wrote this evidence of her faith and striving: "But warm, eager, living life—to be rooted in life—to learn, to desire to know—to feel, to think, to act. That is what I want. And nothing less." To write this from the keenness of her suffering is a gesture comparable to Emily Brontë's deathless iteration: "No coward soul is mine."

She did, let us say, choose poetic lyricism and then let the novel in. It is a difficult compromise to be always pressing, not a quart into a pint pot, but a gallon into a gill. More life—but bottled. But *why*—why bottle it ? the exuberant, ample writer would complain. Doesn't the whole wonder of the thing consist in budding, extending, leaping suddenly on to strange territory you had never clapped eyes on but which you know (having approached it by your secret tunnels) to be your own ? Even if piracy and trespassing come into it, what matter ? What matter indeed ? Only that if you are *all* the time listening for the faint gnat voices you cannot have this galloping about. "Listen," she could whisper to us,

even in 1911 before the threat of wars, "to what I hear" :

Through the sad dark the slowly ebbing tide
Breaks on a barren shore, unsatisfied
A strange wind flows, . . . then silence. I am fain
To turn to Loneliness, to take her hand,
Cling to her, waiting, till the barren land
Fills with the dreadful monotone of rain.

Such verses, although part of a formal sonnet, can be taken as her private utterance. (In that year she published *In a German Pension*, her earliest and gayest set of tales). The beauty of the stories is their objectivity. They belong, not to a mind performing solo aeronautics, but to the children, the women, sometimes the men who are in them. These move like living beings ; but behind them, behind even their most personal secrets, something they do not know about is going on. This is where, in the triumphant stories, the gallons do go into the gill of cream. Consider those Daughters of the Late Colonel, timid, cowed, afraid even to insult the tyrannical corpse by stowing it in a coffin. They are unaware, as *we* are made aware, that they stand for a whole system of "Colonial" domination and the rigidly negative training of young women to be cyphers and and servitors. Freedom comes too late. They want—they know not what. There are clues in the image of Buddha, in the sparrows whose cries, "so weak and forlorn", are *inside* Josephine. There is in Constantia a child's romantic dream of sea and storm and moonlight like a Claude Lorrain, never destroyed by wisdom and maturity. Something is frightfully important, but in the end both sisters have forgotten what they were trying to articulate, or, after all those tethered years, they are too shy to say it.

Two briefer stories hold these overtones conspicuously. "The Fly" appears to start with the ironic debunking that delighted Shaw and became in the A. D. Huxley of the 'twenties a form of analytic torture. The boss, whose son was killed six years ago, "wanted, he intended, he had arranged to weep"—and couldn't. He sees himself looking round and about the pinpoint of his mourning with a sort of midday disillusionment. Then comes the fly, like some selected Job amongst lepidoptera, fighting the onslaughts of an inky fate. The suffering boss, turned God of persecutions, admires the little fellow's pluck, gives it one test too many with his ink-blob, and the creature dies. The reverberations of this tale are almost endless, and though the boss is blind to them he too is an object of sympathy and not contempt. "Honeymoon" is simpler: Fanny, so ecstatically happy on the French Riviera with her wooden but awfully decent George, is deeply worried by the quavering old man who sings for his meagre living at the café. What Fanny sees is the cruelty of life that to her was only pleasure. What the reader sees, through their respective attitudes to the singer, is that George and Fanny are poles apart, and the suffering that to Fanny is a cool acquaintance will be intimately hers one day. Here is the perfection of Katherine Mansfield's method—

the whole course of a marriage contained in a single hour.

It is part of her unavoidable artistic burden that truth must always be sheathed in suffering. She accepted that with courage and went to meet it—like Fanny, doubting her right, now, to be so happy on that gorgeous coast. So Bertha, in *Bliss*, is astonished that the pear tree was still flowering when she knew her husband loved Miss Fulton. And so Laura, contrasting the pleasures of her garden party with the back-street accident of a labourer's death, could find him "wonderful—beautiful. While they were laughing and while the band was playing, this marvel had come to the lane." Her characters find, in the discovery of earth's misery, something approaching the sublime. Here is her justification and—when the miracle works—her triumph. Other writers, other orderings. But for Katherine Mansfield, to spread out, if her potential stretch could allow of it, and gather in hunks of miscellaneous activity, would be too much like gaining the entire world except its soul. She could revolt for a while, writing in a letter ten days before her death: "I want to be much more material, I am tired of my little stories like birds bred in cages." It was a whim; the birds were there unfledged, but singing inside her with the sparrows of Josephine. Some fifteen of her undeveloped beginnings were published in 1923. They are not of necessity lost masterpieces, but their ghostly outlines seem to hover in an aura round her clear achievement, adding their assurance that *this*—take it or leave it—was the Mansfield way. The quarter-century has gone by, and Europe has taken it.

CORRESPONDENCE

"BRITAIN AND AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA"

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

Mr. Jack Chen's political sympathies are so evident that no reader can have been unable to allow for them in estimating the weight of his article in the February number of THE FORTNIGHTLY. But the article contains important mis-statements and omissions which should be pointed out to those not closely acquainted with Far Eastern affairs.

Regarding Russia's persistent refusal to allow Chinese troops to be stationed in Port Arthur and Dairen, Mr. Chen says:

... the Soviet authorities have stood pat on their treaty rights which entrust the defence of Port Arthur to them and also of Dairen during the term of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and while a state of war exists with Japan—that is, until a peace treaty with Japan is signed.

It is surely rather childish to talk of "defending" Port Arthur and Dairen more than two years after Japan's defeat. But in any case there is nothing in the treaty which gives Russia the exclusive defence of these ports, nothing which forbids Chinese troops to be stationed in them. Dairen is declared to be a free port under Chinese administration, Port Arthur to be a naval base for the "joint use" of both countries. Russia's violation of the treaty in both these respects has been continually protested against by the Chinese Government, but without effect.

"No difficulties," says Mr. Chen, "have been put in the way of establishment of

civilian Chinese administration at these places." This is simply not true. In May, or June, last year, after prolonged representations to Moscow, the Soviet Government gave permission for a Chinese Mission to be sent to Dairen to prepare for the restoration there of Chinese administration. But on its arrival the local Russian Command put so much obstruction in the way of the Mission that it was obliged to leave with nothing accomplished. This position is still unaltered.

Incidentally, in December 1946 three American business men in an American ship were refused entry into Dairen by the Russians and the ship was told to leave the port. No other foreign merchants, I believe, have since tried to enter Dairen.

On p. 90 (THE FORTNIGHTLY: February) Mr. Chen refers to the "settlement . . . reached at the All-Party Political Consultative Conference of January 1946," but carefully omits details. At the P.C.C. General Chiang Kai-shek conceded practically every demand made by the communists; and at a meeting of the Kuomintang Congress a few days later he obtained the endorsement of these concessions by an overwhelming majority. In the forming of the Coalition Government last April eleven places were left open for the communists and Democratic League which, if accepted, would have put the Kuomintang members in a minority; and throughout 1946 and the first half of 1947 General Chiang in many public addresses begged the communists to stand by the P.C.C. settlement (which they had nominally accepted), enter the Government and co-operate with others for the good of China. Whatever else General Chiang may be (and those who know him personally are disgusted by the communists' vile abuse of him) he is no hypocrite. It was not until he realized (as General Marshall stressed in his farewell report) that the communists did not want peace, that he started military operations against them on a considerable scale.

Mr. Chen lays stress on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in 1946. He omits to mention (a) that by then Russia had stripped Manchuria of £181,000,000 worth of Japanese machinery; (b) that in withdrawing from each town the Russians waited four or five days before notifying the Chinese Government Commanders, thus enabling the communists to get in first. What other help Russia has or has not given the communists is only known to them. But it is certainly not straining probabilities to suggest that one reason for Russia's exclusive grip on Dairen is the presence in the neighbourhood of Chinese communist troops which are passed through the port to fight in Shantung.

Yours faithfully,

O. M. GREEN.

Virginia Water.

Mr. Jack Chen replies:

If my recent article did not make evident my political sympathy for democracy, then indeed it would have failed of its purpose. As regards its weight, I note that Mr. Green makes no criticism of its main thesis—which, on the basis of the facts, is unanswerable—namely, that large scale American intervention has been going on in China, that there is a danger that it may be intensified and that Britain may be embroiled in it to her own disadvantage and that of democracy.

Perhaps it is characteristic of the times that in failing to challenge this thesis, Mr. Green endeavours to shift the discussion to—Soviet Russia. I was dealing mainly with American policy otherwise I might have dealt at length with the question of Dairen or perhaps raised the question of Hong Kong and the use of this port to supply General Chiang's armies, or the training in the British Fleet of Kuomintang naval personnel who are being used in the civil war against the Chinese democrats. I might have mentioned the 160,000,000 dollars of arms and supplies being sent to General Chiang from Canada, and much else. However, in view of the primary significance of American intervention, these are subsidiary issues. But then I might have mentioned also the protection afforded by Hong Kong to the democratic leaders who have had to flee from General

Chiang Kai-shek or the efficient Chinese civilian administration of Dairen headed by a non-communist, Mr. Chih Tso-hsiang. It is common knowledge that the Chiang mission wanted to bring its troops into Dairen to turn it into a base of operations against the liberated areas (not to mention the Russians) and for other purposes only too clearly known from the twenty years of experience of Kuomintang misrule. Quite apart from this, the Russians are well within the rights granted to them in the Treaty signed by the Kuomintang government.

The American businessmen mentioned were one Standard Oil man and two press correspondents, all without proper landing papers, who arrived in a U.S. naval vessel. This "incident" was staged for provocative purposes as every newspaperman in Shanghai knew at the time.

If I had gone into details of the P.C.C. Settlement it would have provided stronger evidence of General Chiang Kai-shek's hypocrisy. It was not a communist but an American professor, Mr. Nathaniel Pfeffer, who said: "The present government of China is the worst Chinese government in modern times, one of the worst in the world to-day—worse in point of incompetence, corruption, spoliation, quasi-fascist repression and lack of decency of purpose." Mr. Harold Ickes described him "as ruthless, cruel and treacherous a dictator as ever wielded despotic power." Mr. Henry L. Stimson characterized him as an "ignorant, suspicious, feudal autocrat." Mr. Marshall in fact criticized "the dominant group of reactionaries in the Kuomintang" (and General Chiang leads these reactionaries), who "were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue" while they "have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their action." General Chiang Kai-shek indeed rushed into a civil war he thought he could win, and captured 141 towns before the tide was turned.

It is true, I did not mention that the Russians took Japanese machinery from Manchuria. This fact is generally known and admitted, though Mr. Green's figure is purely hypothetical, but I also "omitted" mention of the vast destruction to China resulting from American intervention. In Harbin the Kuomintang established an administration with troops while the Russians were still in occupation, also in Changchun and other centres. If the Manchurian Resistance forces entered other places before the Kuomintang as the Russians left that was surely no fault of the Russians. The Kuomintang troops were too far away. Surely Mr. Green did not expect the Russians to hold these places until the Kuomintang troops fought their way in? At that rate they would still be in occupation of Harbin and Tsitsihar and most other Northern towns.

No evidence of course has ever been advanced to support rumours of Russian aid to Chinese communists in Dairen or elsewhere. The only party that has received Soviet aid is none other than General Chiang Kai-shek when he led the Kuomintang armies against the "legitimate" Peiping government in 1926 and again when he received some 300 million dollars of Moscow gold to stiffen his resolution against the Japanese invaders in the late war.

SIR HENRY SLESSER and *The First Europe*.
The Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,
There is a sentence in Sir Henry Slessor's review of Dr. Burns's volume *The First Europe*, in the March number of THE FORTNIGHTLY, which may easily cause misunderstanding. Sir Henry writes: "Christopher Dawson alone sees in this period the foundation of . . . medieval Catholic Christianity." Surely the purpose of Dr. Burns, explicitly avowed in the Introduction, was to emphasize that very fact, and to insist that during the period (400-800 A.D.) that society was being shaped in which, to quote Dr. Burns's own words, "everyone was assumed to be Christian and Catholic."

Yours faithfully,
B. C. FLOWRIGHT.

Beckenham.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY

By JOHN ARMITAGE

ONE of the advantages we may hope to gain from the five-Power union in the west—once we have accepted as temporarily inevitable the tragic disadvantage of a divided Europe—is the much closer co-operation between men and women in the five countries who are working on similar sociological problems. Article II of the Five-Power Treaty gives promise of this by saying that the High Contracting Parties will "develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries." Article III supports this promise with its declaration that every effort will be made to lead the peoples "towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges."

With these Articles of the Five-Power Treaty in mind it is encouraging to note an example of what could be done given in a recent book.* *Lawless Youth* outlines a policy for the juvenile courts and was prepared by the International Committee of the Howard League for Penal Reform. As Miss Margery Fry tells us in the opening chapter the publication was "the outcome of a series of meetings of a Committee of men and women of thirteen nationalities brought together in London by the fortunes—or misfortunes—of war." Perhaps the members of that committee, though well versed in the legal systems of their countries, were not all specialists on juvenile delinquency and on other children in need of care; nevertheless an excellent job of work was done, a most interesting book produced and, most important of all, a clear indication given of how much swifter progress might be if we would only study and profit by the experiments, successes and mistakes of others.

In the five western European countries of the union—with others, we hope, later to be added—consultation and collaboration should now be practicable. All five have a big problem of juvenile delinquency and the care of children, orphaned or neglected, largely as the result of war. Although the national traditions of approach and methods of treatment differ in detail, none is sacrosanct. (Except, of course, our dual system of State and voluntary Homes and our unpaid lay magistrates, whose existence shocks, according to *Lawless Youth*, legally minded people from other lands.) What is plain, from the wealth of intelligence in this book, is that there is a broad sympathy of aim, which may be summed up in M. Grünhut's words, "to present the prevention of juvenile delinquency as a social and educational concern, and to substitute for retribution and punishment the offender's corrective training and rehabilitation." With this as the object it should not be impossible for the five nations to advance in step, although we know that the most useful prevention would be the restoration of the stability of the home from which the child came, if this were possible.

Two plans are needed, one to meet the present situation, which as the result of war is worse on the Continent of Europe than it is at home and the other, long-term. With part of the present problem, the Lord Mayor of London's United Nations Appeal for Children will be able to help by providing food, medical supplies, clothing and educational equipment but with the other part, the actual homelessness and delinquency, and

* *Lawless Youth, A Challenge to the New Europe*, by Margery Fry, M. Grünhut, Hermann Mannheim Wanda Grabinska and C. D. Rackham. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

the long-term plan there is need for expert collaboration.

One point which seems ripe for decision is the establishment of an age of responsibility. In M. Grünhut's article in *Lawless Youth* it is stated that "as far as juvenile offenders in the legal sense are concerned, the lower age-limit varies from 8 in England to 15 in Denmark and Sweden, the higher age-limit from 16 in England to 18 in certain Continental countries." The discrepancy is not, perhaps, as great as it appears for what is really at stake is whether there should be, in addition to a court, a quite separate tribunal for those children who are not presumed to have reached the age of criminal responsibility and at what age the jurisdiction of such a tribunal should stop. As it is, in this country a child under fourteen, though appearing before a juvenile court is presumed *doli incapax*, unless he is proved otherwise, and children who have not committed an offence but are in need of protection also appear on occasions in the juvenile court.

The movement now is towards considering all children under a certain age as in need of care and protection and not as criminals, since it has long been accepted that children who reach the court as in need of care are often more disturbed and difficult than those who have committed an offence. We recognize this by committing some children in need of care to the same approved schools as those attended by delinquents.

So the questions are: at what age should a child be expected to accept criminal responsibility for his actions and should children under that age be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts? Answers vary but at least there is to-day sound evidence for suggesting sixteen—the eventual compulsory school age provided for in the Education Act 1944—as the age-limit for treating children as in need of care rather than as delinquents, though the further idea of providing for them a special welfare tribunal may not appeal. On the whole our juvenile courts have developed well with the right amount of severity tempered by the understanding demanded by the age of the child. Because a child were not regarded as criminally responsible up to sixteen would not argue that he should look upon himself as someone who was in no way responsible for his actions. Moreover, now that the Children's Branch of the Home Office is rightly regarded as the custodian of homeless children as well as delinquents, it is proper that we should continue to enhance the prestige of the courts by developing the positive as against the punitive side of their work.

DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE, 1938-9, by Professor L. B. Namier. Macmillan. 18s.

"The issue of a crisis," writes Professor Namier, "depends not so much on its magnitude as on the courage and resolution with which it is met." Intended as a statement of the lessons to be learnt from Munich, these words may also be read as an expression of the spirit in which Professor Namier has compiled this masterly account of the diplomatic negotiations between the European Powers from September 29, 1938, to September 3, 1939. His knowledge of the national and political backgrounds of the countries with which he is concerned, his friendship with many of the leading statesmen of whom he writes, his style

which combines the lucidity of Thucydides with the sparkle of Macaulay—these are, indeed, invaluable assets. But it may well be doubted whether he would have completed the task to which he set himself in 1940, had he lacked the courage and resolution to re-write and re-shape in 1945 and 1946 much of the material which he had already published in a series of articles in the *Political Quarterly*.

To the material with which he was originally concerned, there were added at a later date the documents offered in evidence at the Nuremberg Trial, the reports of press correspondents, statements in Parliament, and the information garnered in conversation with exiled statesmen. New wine had, as he says, "to be carefully infused into old bottles"

but these bottles would not hold it all. The result is the addition of a section entitled "Episodes and Men", the purpose of which is "to provide packing space for matter complementary to this book, but which could not be incorporated in it."

It is, of course, unfortunate—although in present circumstances, inevitable—that two years should have elapsed between the completion and the publication of this study. In the interval much new evidence has become available, some of it useful in supplementing the earlier collections of official documents on which Professor Namier commenced work. The British Blue Book is almost wholly concerned with the last ten days before the declaration of war. The French Yellow Book was "severely cut and pruned before publication". Both the German and Polish White Books were intended to be propagandist. It is Professor Namier's success in correlating these incomplete records with the official and unofficial evidence which became available both before and after the Nuremberg Trial which gives to his study a unity which it might otherwise have easily lacked.

Nevertheless, it is not always possible, on the evidence submitted, to accept Professor Namier's judgments and opinions. The failure of pre-war diplomacy was, in his view, the failure of Neville Chamberlain and his colleagues to achieve an alliance with Soviet Russia. It may be, as he suggests, that the tragic inevitability of the months he surveys could have been avoided by the overthrow in the 'thirties of the Versailles agreement which only made possible the continued existence of Poland on the basis of German-Russian tension; but his unconcealed contempt for the policy pursued by British and French statesmen in the period between the wars hardly lends conviction to his argument.

JOHN MACKAY-MURE.

AUSTRIAN REQUIEM, by Kurt von Schuschnigg. Gollancz. 7s. 6d. Pre-war Austria was the fore-ordained

victim of that graceless period of "appeasement" which led up to the ordeal by battle of the great powers. To-day, with the war of documents now being waged about responsibilities for that grisly culmination, it is useful to have an opportunity of re-focussing our vision of the prelude. Dr. Schuschnigg's evocation of his unhappy summons to Berchtesgaden and the aftermath (which he recounts in detail) is illuminating, and the story is a moving one. This slice of history in Book I, and the accompanying sketch of Austria's foreign relations during the preceding period, constitutes the political substance of Dr. Schuschnigg's apologia.

Because Austria was to all intents and purposes a ward in chancery of the European Great Powers, her fate was sealed when in 1936 the international power-balance shifted. The Berlin-Rome Axis was Dr. Schuschnigg's political death-warrant—and he knew it. Pressure at home, however, in any case compelled him to contrive a public agreement with Germany—namely the *modus vivendi* of July 11, 1936: pressure not so much from the actual National-Socialist Party in Austria (which was never really important) but from the large number of Austrians who, because they felt themselves to be, after all, Germans by history and tradition, hankered still after some sort of *Anschluss*.

The rest of the book is a very human document in diary form describing the author's seven years of confinement, for three years alone, thereafter in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen and other prison camps, waiting for a trial by People's Court which never came off. In the last two months of the war he found himself with M. and Mme. Blum, Dr. Schacht and various German generals in disgrace who displayed a "bottomless hatred and contempt for the strategy and the methods of the Führer's headquarters." Finally there is a juicy appendix of the actual transcripts of telephone conversations between Berlin and other capitals at the time of the occupation of Austria.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

THE AWAKENING OF MODERN EGYPT, by M. Rifaat bey. *Longmans.* 15s.**SYRIAN PAGEANT**, by Wilfrid T. F. Castle. *Hutchinson.* 21s.

It is a refreshing and enlightening experience to read *The Awakening of Modern Egypt*. Egyptian history has hitherto been almost exclusively written by non-Egyptians. Now for the first time we can follow the story of modern Egypt through Rifaat bey's virile, scholarly and accurate Egyptian eyes.

Its high interest lies in the personalities of Mohamed Aly "the Great" and his grandson, Ismail Pasha "the Magnificent." Both in their different ways did much which ultimately if not immediately was to contribute towards the moulding of Modern Egypt. Both were international as well as Egyptian figures. Both had highly sympathetic sides to their characters. But Rifaat bey has not been blind to their complementary failings. His account of the almost pathetic stagnation of Mohamed Aly's expansionist and domestic policies after 1940 is told with courage and discrimination. Equally downright is the description of the dilemma into which Ismail Pasha fell because he had no idea of cutting his cloth to suit his measure.

One chapter, "The Leap into the Dark Continent", is of special interest to-day. Ismail Pasha, like Mohamed Aly, had expansionist ambitions; but profiting from his grandfather's experiences, he eschewed the Levant and Europe and turned his eyes southwards into Africa. In 1868 a chance conversation with King Edward VII—then Prince of Wales—gave him the meritorious idea of Sir Samuel Baker's Mission to civilize primitive Africa and to stamp out slavery; but he linked this idea with his own less meritorious instincts which were essentially aggressive and imperialist. The result was a huge, flimsy, ephemeral Egyptian Empire, the terrific cost of which contributed fatally to Ismail's downfall.

In his concluding chapters Rifaat bey

deals with Orati Pasha's rebellion and the Cromerian régime from a strictly Egyptian standpoint. His story is revealing. He does not mince his words in his criticism of Orabi and he is generous in his appreciation of Lord Cromer's achievement for Egypt.

It is good to know that we may look forward to the second volume which Rifaat bey is preparing to cover the reigns of King Fuad and King Farouk and the making of Independent Egypt.

Syrian Pageant is an equally well-timed book. It covers no less than three thousand kaleidoscopic years of normally bewildering history; but in tracing the rise and fall in Syria of Empire after Empire down to the present day, there is a chronological coherence or thoroughness throughout which is easy and exciting to follow; and Mr. Castle's scholarly and intriguing narrative never descends to the unhappy level of "potted history" or to the sterility of a handbook.

The accounts of successive Jewish régimes in Jerusalem have particular topical interest at the present time especially the rarely told history of the Maccabean interlude (B.C. 166 to B.C. 63) with its heroic beginnings and sad and sordid end.

Mr. Castle has achieved for Syrian history what Mr. Seton Lloyd has done for Iraq in his *Twin Rivers*. That is real praise and Mr. Castle deserves it.

OWEN TWEEDY.

FRANCE: a short history, by Albert Guérard. *Allen and Unwin.* 8s. 6d.

Professor Guérard holds the chair of literature at Stanford University. He has spent forty years in American Universities, teaching the history of France. His convictions are summed up in this book, which he calls his testament.

It is therefore primarily an expression of his faith in his country, and of his belief that reverses lead it to further endeavour and greater attainment. On occasion, his enthusiasm produces an idealized or over-simplified picture.

The first thirty pages of his book are

full of illuminating comments on the character of the French nation, and its contribution to the European inheritance. It is only when France has sought refuge in isolation, or "sacred egoism", that her sense of mission has been obscured, to her own detriment and the world's loss.

After describing the geographical conditions of France, Professor Guérard gives an interesting account of the structure of society in medieval times. He shows the two exaggerated conceptions of the Middle Ages, the one representing it as a period of Gothic darkness, the other as a vanished Utopia. He makes it evident that the feudal "system" was far more incoherent than the word itself suggests.

The chapters on the consolidation of France under Henri IV, Richelieu and Louis XIV are among his most vivid and picturesque pages, with lively character sketches of the leading personalities. Professor Guérard makes some interesting comparisons between the opportunities for advancement which talented men of the *bourgeois* class enjoyed under Louis XIV, with the obstacles and frustrations that they encountered in the two subsequent reigns.

In other respects, however, these chapters are inadequate: they do not give a sufficient account of the social conditions of the mass of the population or of the general economic state of the nation. The influence of the salons, either in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, is only mentioned in a cursory way. There are, unfortunately, too many occasions when more information or explanation is required to make the narrative complete. Professor Guérard describes some of the features of the intellectual background of the eighteenth century, but he omits others of equal importance. He has little to say about the penetration of foreign thought into France; he provides singularly little close analysis of the social and political discords of the last 150 years.

His treatment of famous men is often

perfunctory; Turenne, Turgot, Danton, Talleyrand and Pasteur are scarcely more than names. Even Napoleon remains a shadowy figure and there is practically nothing to explain why he won a battle or inspired a nation. On the other hand, Napoleon III is discussed at some length, and treated with considerable indulgence.

Professor Guérard's account of modern times is sometimes open to the same criticisms. He gives an interesting description of France's internal recovery after the first world war, but he somewhat obscures the issue by representing her foreign policy as completely subservient to that of England, during the years of the dictators. His picture of the unity of France after the Liberation is again one that needs to be given more light and shade. His final chapter—perhaps one of his best—is concerned with the development of the French Empire, and various forms of colonization from the days of the Normans onwards.

CHARLES GOULD.

THE ATLANTIC ISLANDS: The Faeroe Life and Scene, by Kenneth Williamson. *Collins.* 16s.

So many excellent books with a leaning towards topography and natural history have been produced in recent years, that it is particularly welcome to find one dealing with a part of the world which has so far been cavalierly treated, at any rate in the English language. As Mr. Linklater suggests in his foreword, Mr. Kenneth Williamson has supplied a want which has waited for fulfilment.

The Atlantic Islands seems a rather too general title for a book which deals with only one group of the isles in that ocean; especially as Mr. Williamson's book can quite frankly be described as one of the most satisfying volumes of its kind that has appeared for some time past. It is satisfying both as a portrayal of its subject and as a corrective to the *accidie* which is outstanding among the failings of the present-day Englishman.

Reports from troops stationed in the

Faeroes during the late war indicated that there was a continual complaint of "having nothing to do". Mr. Williamson proves how unwarranted this was, and in the course of his four years of military service he managed to find out most of the many things that can be done in the Faeroes. He has described them in a way which is fascinating to the general reader and tantalizing to the ornithologist and the ethnologist, both of whom will feel sure that the author has a great deal more to say on the ways of birds and men than he has included in the present book.

Unlike many writers with a scientific outlook, Mr. Williamson never forgets to be human; his Faeroe men and women are not mere units, they are real individuals (and a very charming collection, too). Their history is heroic: apart altogether from the hazards of fishing and fowling, the men risked their lives to bring fish to Britain during the war; no Briton can read without a thrill of gratitude that the Faeroemen were responsible for seventy-five per cent. of the fish that reached our shores in the dread spring of 1941, or that the Faeroes sacrificed more men in proportion to their population than any of the fighting powers. It is some satisfaction to know that it was on the suggestion of the Royal Navy that Faeroe ships first flew the island flag—a privilege never permitted by Denmark.

The description of the *grindadráp*, the mass slaughter of caving-whales in the Faeroe bays, is bound to be the most notorious chapter of the book; but it is indeed "a sordid and sanguinary job of work," and Mr. Williamson is right in insisting that, with all due allowance for the excitement of the hunt, the main objective is the provision of food in a land unblest with the customary bounty of nature. Bird-fowling, too, carried out with great skill and no little risk, is quite distinctly a matter of hunting for the pot. But farming is the main occupation of the Faeroe people. Although volcanic geography and a highly oceanic climate allow only a few

acres of soil to be worked, the energy and ingenuity which the Faeroese put into their farming and stockbreeding are an example to some of our own remoter islanders, who make great complaint under much less unfavourable conditions.

Should the reader wish to know about the system of land-tenure, the presence or absence of bees, the local method of constructing a water-mill, or whether there is an opening for an enterprising wheelwright in the Faeroes, his curiosity will be satisfied. This is a rare and refreshing account of a highly-civilized community still sufficiently remote from the main streams to have retained its individuality intact.

The "trimmings"—indexes, appendices, glossary, and even chapter-headings—are arranged in the most convenient way possible.

L. RUSSELL MUIRHEAD.

INSIDE U.S.A., by John Gunther.
Hamish Hamilton. 21s.

The American elections of 1948 will, from the average Englishman's point of view, be the worst reported elections of modern times. The four-page newspaper, struggling to enfold in its skimpy embraces the manifold complexities of the contemporary world, cannot hope to do more than give the barest outlines of a contest whose duration and convolutions, even in more spacious days, taxed the skill of correspondents and sub-editors to the utmost. Even the lordlier organs of the twopenny and threepenny press will have to simplify, select and compress to a degree which will leave their readers only half aware of the diverse issues and intricate manoeuvres that lie behind the deceptive simplicities of nominations and elections.

But fortunately, like an American food parcel arriving to supplement the week's bare rations, Mr. Gunther's *Inside U.S.A.* is available (or was—you'd better hurry) with just the kind of up-to-date, detailed and intelligible information on candidates and issues which will make the bare bones of newspaper despatches

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John O'London's Weekly 9/6

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come alive. Politics bring their surprises to everyone, even Mr. Gunther, but 1948 will be indeed a "year of revolutions" if it brings men or movements into the election campaign which have escaped the haul of his wide net.

It is not, however, in this obvious and narrow sense alone that Mr. Gunther's pages constitute the ideal companion to the elections. The campaign will be fought against the background of the astonishing diversity of the United States. In a sense American elections are always re-affirmations of unity in difference, the contest for the presidency in particular a kind of political polyphony which culminates in a great C Major chord of national self-determination. To a comprehension of this process an appreciation of the diversities is no less necessary than a realization of the unities—and the former, from a distance of 3,000 miles is very much harder to obtain. Distance lends a deceptive enchantment to the American view. The great merit of Mr. Gunther's book, over-riding all its other virtues (and they are very many) is its faithfulness to what he calls the "mixedupness" of the United States. It is this "mixedupness" which baffles and frustrates so many would-be chroniclers, leading them to search desperately for ever wilder categories of interpretation, devising increasingly brutal strait-jackets of abstraction to contain a vitality which they have mistaken for abnormality.

Mr. Gunther, of course, has some questions which he would like answered, but they are practical questions, like "Who runs Kansas?" or "Who bosses Boss Crump?"; the cosmic overtones are noted down if they become clamorous but they are never allowed to get in the way of a straight record of things seen, heard or experienced. *Inside U.S.A.* is keen, lively, intelligent, honest reporting. If you want to know what the U.S.A. is like, it is like this—as large, as varied, as vital, as amusing. I do not know where else you could begin to get a comparably accurate portrayal.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

LATER VICTORIAN CAMBRIDGE, by D. A. Winstanley. *Cambridge University Press.* 25s.

It is unlikely that D. A. Winstanley's reputation as the historian of certain aspects of Cambridge will be surpassed. Winstanley combined the mind of a scholar with the experience of a man of affairs, and a quiet wit pervades his writing. His first works dealt with the political history of the eighteenth century, and were distinguished for accuracy of scholarship and originality of research. Largely concerned with the Duke of Newcastle, who was at the time Chancellor of the University, his mid-eighteenth century studies were the starting point for his work as a University historian.

The present book, published posthumously, completed the task the author had set himself, to record the history of the University from the eighteenth century down to the statutes of 1882. Few who are not already familiar with his story will realize the Vice-Chancellor's power over persons who were not members of the University, even to the extent of committing to the "Spinning House" a young woman charged with "walking with a member of the University in a public street in the Town of Cambridge." The whole story of Daisy Hopkins, the "venomous and bitter" feeling of the town, even the anonymous postcard to the Vice-Chancellor, signed "Tit-for-Tat", are admirable material for Winstanley and show him at his best.

Quite apart from this anyone who might think the history of a University to be appropriate only to the pen of a Dr. Dryasdust, need only read the opening chapter on "Robinson's Vote." This tells of the election of C. K. Robinson to the Mastership of St. Catharine's and of the rumours that he had obtained the office improperly—in fact by voting for himself when he had promised to vote for his rival. Such a slender plot may not suggest a very interesting story, but the research imposed by the difficulties of conflicting

evidence has rewarded the author with an insight into the characters of the principal actors.

There is nothing dull in the book, and the chapters on the effects of the religious Tests and the movement to bring about their abolition, and on the rights and wrongs of the reception of the Judges at Trinity College are rewarding.

Of greatest interest perhaps is the chapter on educational reform between 1860 and 1880. Here the death of ancient prejudices was a lingering one, and it was not without a struggle that "the long-cherished superstition that mathematics and classics alone gave a liberal education gradually receded into the background and studies, hitherto unrecognized or despised, obtained an honoured place."

The book is a worthy successor of its predecessors—*Unreformed Cambridge* and *Early Victorian Cambridge*, and with them forms a single work.

J. F. BURNET.

THE LAW OF THE PRESS, by Thomas Dawson. *Staples Press.* 20s.

This book deserves a hearty welcome from those who are occupied in any work or transaction connected with the press and who wish for advice on the rights and duties conferred or imposed upon them by the law. As the learned author says, it is intended primarily for writers, publishers, printers and others concerned in the production and dissemination of printed matter; but he hopes that it may also be of some use to members of the legal profession as a digest of the law of the press, and his hope is fulfilled.

All the legal problems that may confront the press are considered—the law of libel, of copyright, of contracts for printing and publishing, of advertisements, of elections, of imprints, of newspaper regulations and posting regulations. These topics are preceded by an attractive introductory chapter on the history of the law relating to the press.

I venture to make a few suggestions on the law of libel for the next edition.

On page 40, in the paragraph numbered 2, it is stated that the "report (of a public meeting) must be of public concern or published for the public benefit." My impression of the law is that "and" should be substituted for "or". In explaining fair comment, the author cites a *dictum* of Lord Esher in *Merivale v. Carson*: "The question which the jury must consider is this: Would any fair man, however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism has said?" Elsewhere, I have criticized this odd description of "fairness". In the account of law relating to libel on a class of people, it might be worth while to cite the latest authority, the decision of the House of Lords in *Knappferr v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd.* (1944) A.C. 116. In the law on "Indemnities to printers" it should be noted that the plaintiffs in *W. H. Smith & Son v. Clinton & Harris*, knew that the matter they printed was libellous, and it may be inferred that that was why they could not enforce a contract of indemnity against the proprietor of the paper. Further, I see nothing in the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1934, which was passed subsequently to the decision, that would prevent recovery on such a contract by printers who neither knew, nor could reasonably have been expected to know, that the matter was libellous.

These suggestions in no way diminish my high opinion of the book and the belief that it deserves, and will have, a very wide circulation.

P. H. WINFIELD.

FRIENDS AMBULANCE UNIT, by A. Tegla Davies. *Allen and Unwin.* 15s.

The young men and women members of the Friends Ambulance Unit who saw service between 1939 and 1946 in twenty-five countries were all Quakers or "those who share Quaker views on peace and war." In all they numbered 1,300, or two per cent. of the conscientious objectors of the war, so that the size of the teams in any theatre of operations was necessarily very small.

Realizing this, the reader is all the more likely to be astonished at the extent of the activities of the Unit and the variety of the tasks it undertook. Accounts of work in the battle areas cover Finland and Norway, Egypt, Greece, the North African Campaign with the British Army and the Hadfield Spears Hospital Unit; from Alamein to Germany (this time with the British and the Fighting French), Burma, London and other home cities in the blitz; and they range from casualty clearance in the front line to the organization of medical stores at base. Other chapters tell of the Unit in Syria and Ethiopia, with the International Red Cross in China, and in India.

While hospitals, clinics, education and relief were occupying the Unit in three continents, members at home were working and training in over eighty hospitals, doing relief and social work, and serving as assistants and voluntary "guinea-pigs" for valuable and unpleasant medical research experiments. From September 1943 until the end of the war, civilian relief took the Unit's teams to Sicily and Italy, the Balkans, the Dodecanese, and Yugoslavia, and finally to North-Western Europe and Austria.

Mr. Davis states that his purpose is not to argue a religious or philosophic case, but to give an account of pacifism in action. His account, however, illuminates several of the problems which confront the pacifist serving with an army in the field or the unpaid worker to whose professional colleague the posts of responsibility for which they compete imply primarily more pay. Moreover, it provides testimony from both sides to a "commendable tolerance".

In nearly 500 pages Mr. Davies has not succeeded in overcoming all the difficulties which he admits faced him. Though apparently "requested as an 'official history'", the work will find its best audience in the members of the Unit. To the general reader there is a lack of cohesion in the arrangement, and an insistence on trivial and seemingly irrelevant details, which bewilder and often irritate. Some self-consciousness

is to be expected (though self-consciousness spoils a few of the otherwise excellent illustrations); but in seeking to be objective, Mr. Davies relies too much on passives and impersonals and abstractions which nearly stifle the occasional living phrase. It is a deadening artifice which mars a work in which there is much of lasting interest.

ROBIN BENN.

INDIAN SUMMER, by John Arlott. Longmans, Green. 7s. 6d.

INTRODUCING SQUASH, by D. G. Butcher. Faber and Faber. 10s. 6d.

John Arlott, whose poems and reviews appear from time to time in the pages of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, brings, in *Indian Summer*, his descriptive talents to bear on cricket. Well known as a broadcaster on the game, Mr. Arlott watched most of the matches played by the Indian cricket team in 1946. A book about men as well as matches played, it will delight all followers of the game.

Another *FORTNIGHTLY* reviewer, Mr. J. F. Burnet, contributes a chapter on the well known Jesters Club, which he founded, to Mr. D. G. Butcher's book *Introducing Squash*. Mr. Butcher, who was for some years professional champion of this now deservedly popular game, has long enjoyed an enviable reputation as a coach. His book, therefore, will be widely welcomed. As a player he was famed for the artistry of his stroke play; as an instructor in his book the clarity of the text is well supported by many helpful diagrams.

J.A.

THE PROMETHEUS BOUND OF AESCHYLUS: A Translation by Rex Warner. The Bodley Head. 6s.

FROST AT MIDNIGHT: Poems by J. H. B. Peel. Venturebooks Ltd. 7s. 6d.

CHILDREN OF THE CENTURY: Ballads and Poems, by Alan Moray Williams alias "Robert the Rhymer". Frederick Muller. 6s.

In these days of almost universal "small Latin, and less Greek", hard

days moreover of moral doubt and bitter disorder, any new translation of the classics by an author of good standing is to be welcomed; especially is this so when the classic is the *Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus which, as Mr. Warner himself tells us, is more than the story of Shelley's perfect hero, the romantic over-glorification of the rebel, but in the hands of this great dramatist is a "partial investigation into the problem of the injustice of life." And then on the purely technical side, as Mr. Cecil Day Lewis has stated it in a Foreword to his own translation of *The Georgics of Vergil*: "I believe that every classical poem worth translating should be translated afresh every fifty years. The contemporary poetic idiom, whether it be derived chiefly from common speech or a literary tradition, will have changed sufficiently within that period to demand a new interpretation." That is true, and Mr. Warner's version of *Prometheus Bound* appears in modern dress, clear, easy to read aloud, and as simple as the allegorical and prophetic quality in Aeschylus makes possible. For those who cannot read the original, it is in the quality of such works that some antidote to our present spiritual discontents might be found.

Mr. Peel and Mr. Williams both give the impression of being profoundly troubled men. In his new book of poems, *Frost at Midnight*, Mr. Peel, whose lyric gift at its best is as fresh as spring-water, holds to his heart his love of nature, withdrawn into his own privacy from what he detests in modern life, humble in his joys, aloof, often sad, sometimes defiant and proud. He is at his best perhaps in such lyrics as "Tomorrow":

They cut the hay tonight,
and in the waning light
it waits devoid of scent,
irrevocably rent;

but when I wake again
and wander in the lane
its fragrance will be born.
O hasten, lovely dawn.

I liked the poems "Written On Reading The Paston Letters", "Love's Bite", "Neighbours", "His Mirror", "The Great Divide" and "October Fields" with its slight echo of Tennyson:

With vigour now
the autumn plough
divides the harvest stubble
and leaves a sheen
where share has been
among the matted rubble.

Where Mr. Peel sings quietly of what he loves, Mr. Williams in *Children of the Century* would seem in many poems out to flay us with his message about what he hates. Well, he has written broadsheets under the pseudonym of "Robert the Rhymer", and his book is dedicated to the memory of Rudyard Kipling, though of course he has neither Kipling's tone, mastery, nor punch. But he jumps right into the middle of the fray of modern life, and he is sincere. It may be said that Mr. Williams is clearly an idealist who glorifies the rebel:

But the rebel, the pebble
That's new to the beach,
The one who's "so serious";
The one you can't reach—
You'll abhor him, ignore him
And do nothing for him,
The saucy young upstart
Too knowing to teach!

One is left convinced that Mr. Williams wants a better world, but he is guilty in certain poems—"The X.Y.Z. Hotel" and "The Luckless Genteel"—of the inverted snobbery of the extreme left-winger. Yet he tries to be fair:

It's true the British poorer-paid
Have claims that long for justice cried—
Yet what fair-minded judge could say
All faults were on the Rich Man's side?

His social idealism finds expression in "Communal Restaurant":

Symbol of happier days to come,
A blueprint of a better world.

A part of the book contains eighteen interesting translations from the Russian.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Plainly LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY by M. M. Lewis (*Nelson*, 12s. 6d.) is an important book. In a world which needs as never before a common speech and where the revival of nationalism induces the countries to cling to their own; where international communications have never been so complete and where the nations are further away than ever from understanding each other; where the language of diplomacy is synonymous with hypocrisy, and where speech is debased to a propaganda tool, such an analysis of what the author calls the "linguistic revolution" related to thought and action in and between societies is to be welcomed. Plainly, too, such a theme is fascinating—and Mr. Lewis handicaps himself by almost persuading the reader that it is dull. As a specialist naturally tends to use the terms of his speciality, allowances for this are duly made, but the ponderosities of style are surely uncalled for and, allied to this of all subjects, are a powerful deterrent. Nevertheless, in spite of pronouncements couched as follows:

In a word, what has been neglected is what we may call the social manipulative and declarative functions of the mother tongue: English as a means of promoting the more complex technical activities of the individual in a society, and of the integrative activities of the society itself—English as a means of social integration,

the reader should press on for the rewards which are hidden in the chapters on language in industry, warfare and politics, and on language and social integration and social conflict.

India speaks

Another medium through which understanding of world problems may be sought, is the "Teach Yourself History Library" (*English Universities Press*, 5s. each volume). The latest in the series is WARREN HASTINGS AND BRITISH INDIA by Penderel Moon. The career of an English "trading adventurer" who became the first Governor-General of India finds its parallel with that chapter in the history

of British dominion just closed. The author makes the affairs of the East India Company and the impeachment of Warren Hastings intensely interesting—which, for a pupil who could not be prodded into any genuine enthusiasm for empire, is more than history classes at school were able to do.—Pride in his heritage glows throughout Mohammad Yunus' *FRONTIER SPEAKS* (*Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay*, Rs. 4-8). This is the story of the North-West Frontier Province of India from 3000—2000 B.C. to the General Elections of January 1946. This book too is largely the history of the struggle of a region as exemplified in the biography of one man, the "Frontier Gandhi", Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, whose Preface states that the Province is so situated that it "will begin to play an important rôle not only in free India, but in free Asia." Pandit Nehru, in a balanced Foreword pays tribute to this borderland of India and to its war-like people who are becoming increasingly converted to the doctrine of non-violence. And both men, though not always in complete agreement with his views, commend the book and its author to readers, the British among whom will be disarmed by his apology: "Young that I am, I have not been able to curb the crudities of an emotional and youthful style."

Where people are content

Youthful too is the style of *ESKIMO DOCTOR* by Aage Gilberg (*Allen & Unwin*, 15s.) though a third of this might be because of Karin Elliott's translation. The other part is certainly due to the unquenchable fervour the Danish author has for North-Eastern Greenland where he went in 1938 to work among the Esquimaos as their doctor and friend. With his gift for compromise—witness old Moses who would puff his pipe in the ward and whose bed was moved to the corridor where he could smoke in peace, or the patient who was allowed to live in her tent outside the hospital—it is safe to

say that he was loved in return. He has much besides sickness and health to tell about; of seal and walrus hunting, of dog-sleigh tours over the glaciers and longer journeys across the ice to the far-northern settlements; and the illustrations testify to his skill with a camera. On their return to Copenhagen he and his wife were struck by the "unwillingness of people to help each other unless they received money, praise or glory for it," the claiming of more from the community than is contributed to it—characteristics they had forgotten while with the Polar Esquimaos who "live as their good consciences tell them."

The golden mean

These mentors guided for the most part the owners of the portraits in *A NORFOLK GALLERY*, by R. W. Ketton-Cremer (*Faber & Faber*, 21s.). Many of them lived during the Civil War, when 'lower case' liberals were caught and crushed between King and Parliament. Such a one was Bishop Hall, who gained his appointment to Norwich because of his tolerance towards Puritanism, and found it strongly entrenched in his new diocese. But he was not allowed to enjoy the fruits of popularity for long, and some of the indignities and deprivations he suffered smell like present-day witch huntings. On the other hand, the chapter entitled "The County Election of 1806" should impel both 'lower' and 'upper case' liberals to reflect thankfully that with the secret vote, the spread of the franchise, the ending of abuse and coercion at the poll, English democracy in one of its facets at least has proved to be the better part. Other portraits in this pleasing exhibition are of Sir Hamon L'Estrange and his sons, Robert Marsham, Humphry Repton and the Earl of Orford.—To counter the excesses of Puritanism, a quotation from Coventry Patmore's letters to Robert Bridges, published in the March number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, may be cited:

Gerard Hopkins was the only... saintly man in whose religion had absolutely no narrow-

ing effect upon his general opinions and sympathies.

This verdict is now endorsed and amplified by Eleanor Ruggles in *GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS* (*John Lane The Bodley Head*, 10s. 6d.), an impressive piece of work. Hopkins' circle of admirers is still restricted and his life comparatively unknown and the search (hinted at by the eight pages of bibliography), nearly sixty years after his death, for the biographical material of this Jesuit priest and poet with an obsession for privacy must have been exhausting. In recounting the extraordinary refusals of Hopkins to publish his work and his committal of the bulk of it to Robert Bridges, who edited and released it in 1918, the author pays graceful tribute: "Bridges was to fulfil his trust with a felicity and a success that Hopkins in his lifetime could never have commanded."

Oh to be in England—then

When Hopkins died Ford Madox Hueffer, the subject of *THE LAST PRERAPHAELITE*, by Douglas Goldring (*Macdonald*, 15s.) was sixteen years old, and just about to enter the 'nineties. He emerged apparently uninfluenced by any of the literary manifestations of the period. Yet, as the first editor of the *English Review*, he was able to show a list of contributors for the opening number in 1908 which quite properly awed the young sub-editor, who says "the thrill is still easily recalled", and who now writes Hueffer's biography. Among them were Hardy, Henry James, Conrad, Galsworthy, W. H. Hudson, Wells, W. H. Davies and Henry Nevinson. Mr. Goldring presents his old chief's complex personality affectionately but always objectively and gives only enough of his matrimonial and financial troubles to fill in the background. It is inevitable that such friends as Conrad and Wells and such relations as W. M. Rossetti and Ford Madox Brown should loom large in the picture, and the whole makes a "life" which surely is one of the very best recently published.—Back to the 'nineties with *FIN DE SIECLE*, edited

by Neville Wallis (*Allan Wingate*, 10s. 6d.). In order of preference the illustrations seem to take first place. All are worthy examples of the artists' work and the William Rothenstein portrait drawings and the caricatures (equally portraits) of Max Beerbohm set a standard reached by the others. Next, Holbrook Jackson's "A Note on the Period" is, as would be expected from him, as fair an assessment as could be wished. Then comes Mr. Wallis's Introduction in which commendably he displays that undiminished enthusiasm for *fin de siècle* shared by so many who were born too late. Last of all are the literary selections; not only are there not enough of these but most of them are snippets. The exceptions (excluding Kenneth Grahame's "The Roman Road") were written either before 1890 or "after the turn of the century." Some of the authors, and notably Wilde, are not represented by their better work, due perhaps to copy-right difficulties. In short, one who has long called herself a "ninetyite", greedy for a feast, found crumbs.

Taming wild beasts

Nobody need go hungry to bed with a copy of *ORPHEUS*, a symposium of the arts, edited by John Lehmann (*John Lehmann*, 12s. 6d.). Any of its contributors who are conscious of their high calling in poetry, prose or paint need feel no apprehension nor affront at this identification with a bedside book. The pre-slumber state demands pieces sufficiently long so that the mind suffers no jerks, sufficiently specialist to avoid the lullaby category by holding the attention, and sufficiently near to one's particular interests. For example: Edith Sitwell's "Some Notes on the Making of a Poem", Norman Marshall's "A Producer in Search of a Play", Norman Nicholson's "The Poet needs an Audience", Bernard Denvir's "Modern French Tapestries", John Lehmann's own delightful "The Man Who Learned to Walk Naked", an appreciation of Yeats, and Osbert Sitwell's "A Short Character of Arnold Bennett", which makes one sorry afresh that *Left Hand*,

Right Hand must some day have an end. In his Foreword John Lehmann says firmly that "the word of the poet is the mainspring of history", and if the theme of poetry is preponderant in these titles, this is not because other subjects are not treated equally carefully by their exponents, nor remain unread.

Artists all

Lavish too is the production of *THE GROWTH OF TWELVE MASTERPIECES* by Charles Johnson (*Phoenix House*, 25s.) with its sixty-one illustrations in colour and monochrome. Such volumes are satisfying simply to handle, and this one has no skin deep beauty. As befits an official lecturer at the National Gallery the author treats his pictures intimately and his readers with consideration. His painters are Ugolino da Siena, Bellini, Antonello da Messina, da Vinci, Titian, el Greco, Rubens, Nicolas Poussin, Watteau, Constable, Ingres and Cézanne. The reading and study awake resolves to visit the London Galleries (too often taken for granted with so many temporary exhibitions to attend) much more frequently, a consequence presumably not displeasing to the author.

—And, without ulterior motive, one would like to visit Reginald Turner's widespread gallery too, though a few of the hotels he mentions are already familiar as bygone holiday hosts. His *THE SPOTTED DOG* (*Sylvan Press*, 12s. 6d.) is a book of English inn signs and the wood engravings of these by John Farleigh add much to the character of the book. It has been compiled out of a great deal of erudition and in the pattern are traced religion, heraldry, animal and fish life and agriculture, with the corruptions and oddities that have grown through the centuries. The observant author has some comments about the sort of signs he finds aesthetically satisfying, and their suitable settings. And his reader is often roused to startled agreement, as when he says: "I wish that sign painting had come the way of Rex Whistler."

GRACE BANTARD. *

THE FORTNIGHTLY

MAY, 1948

WESTERN LIGHTS

BY WILLIAM RYDAL

WRITING in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* in January 1947* I sought to dispel the One World illusion to which progressive societies and persons the world over have so long been addicted and to commend in its place the goal of European unity. I argued that the primary mission of our time, as well as the only sure way of successfully meeting the Russian challenge, was to establish, through a nucleus of European Union, a rallying-point for all who prize the values of Western civilization, the democratic way of life as we understand it in the west. Central to my argument was the need for distinguishing carefully between elaborate Meccano thought-structures and the indispensable minimum of political construction which is actually practicable. To-day, sixteen months later, the initial step has been taken. Western union exists in embryonic form, the air is thick with official and unofficial plans for the organization and reconstruction of Europe—and, needless to say, the federalists are in full cry. Does the present action of the Governments, however, measure up to the vital needs of the age? Can a hard core of European substance be created and preserved, at the same time as the ballast of the perfectionists is jettisoned? These would seem to be the questions that must be asked in any review of the swift progress of events since Mr. Bevin's catalytic speech in the House of Commons on January 22. The chief agencies of the transformation since January 1947, it must be admitted, have been extra-European: on the one hand the Jekyll-and-Hyde phenomenon of Russian intransigence and Communist mischief, and, on the other, American crusading zeal, which bids fair to convert the original salvage operation of the Marshall Plan into an anti-Communist jihad. Now, the dangers of any European integration effected by these two external influences are patent. A 'western bloc', conceived simply as a concentration of power directed against the U.S.S.R., is not at all the same thing as a union of free nations which should be the embodiment of all that is best in European civilization. The erection of a dam against Russian power, the adoption of measures of decontamination in the presence of the Communist plague—all this sort of thing, indeed, may be urgently necessary, and the Truman doctrine of aid to the threatened nations perfectly intelligible; but any such negative and defensive

* "World Mirage."

expedients need to be sharply distinguished in our minds from the positive task of building up a western European polity: the inclusion of a near-Fascist element like Franco Spain, for example, could only be a fatal political liability to the kind of union which is premised, and neither Greece nor Turkey qualifies as a western nation. The European recovery scheme fostered by Mr. Marshall, which seeks the maximum of economic expansion, must, of course, spread its net wide, and cannot be entirely divorced from political considerations. But it is essentially a plan of economic rehabilitation, and it is an egregious fallacy to suppose that political unity will automatically grow out of common economic interests. This mistaken view is obstinately held by far too many Englishmen in high places. Let it be clearly understood, moreover, that what the British Government is faced with to-day is no passing emergency to be met by a temporary association with the other war-stricken—or war-threatened—nations of Europe but the supreme test, first posed by M. Briand in 1929-30 (and in which then we failed) of this country's ability to "speak European".

Mr. Bevin's outline of policy on January 22 was cautious enough in all conscience: so nebulous and imprecise, indeed, were his references to the new departure made necessary by the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers that one could be pardoned for thinking that his utterance was nothing more than a politician's lip-service to "western union" which concealed a basically isolationist attitude. The perfunctory suggestion to the Benelux countries that they should make haste to concert treaties with the United Kingdom on the pattern of the Treaty of Dunkirk only went to confirm that impression. Meanwhile, however, M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, with characteristic aplomb and vigour, assumed the leadership which London was handling so gingerly. The shock of the storming of the democratic defences of Czechoslovakia, too, had manifestly a salutary effect in clearing away some of the cobwebs. The result was the Brussels Five-Power Treaty, hailed by Mr. Bevin as the "hard core" round which western union can be built.

That Treaty, signed on March 17, undoubtedly represents a landmark in the history of our times. It runs for fifty years. It postulates maximum co-ordination in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Article 4, based on the collective self-defence clause of the United Nations Charter (Article 51), provides guarantees of automatic assistance in Europe to any one of the associating States. By stipulating that it should be open to other States to accede, subject to certain conditions, the authors of the Treaty clearly marked it off from such "regional arrangements" as the Rio de Janeiro Treaty (covered by Article 52 of the Charter), mindful of the fact that regional groups so characterized may act only *after* the Security Council has given authorization. And, although there is nothing in the Treaty about any joint plan of action or the creation of a joint military staff, this clause was duly amplified in the Five Power announce-

ment on April 17. Article 7 provides a pledge to create a consultative council "which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously" and which is required to meet *immediately*, should any situation arise which may constitute a threat to peace, "in whatever area this threat should arise"—implying a wider range, that is to say, than the mutual assistance pledge of Article 4. All this amounts to an assertion of common interest in every field of policy. And in the Preamble, which is perhaps the most significant part of the text, the contracting parties—France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg and Great Britain—solemnly pledge themselves anew to cherish and preserve the fundamental human rights, to maintain civil liberties, to uphold the rule of law and so on, a welcome re-affirmation of all that constitutes the ethos and common patrimony of the free nations.

Measured simply in terms of defence, it is true, the contribution of this country goes no further than what has traditionally been accepted as a British vital interest: any threat to the Channel Ports was ever a threat to our own shores. The novelty is in the formal acceptance of commitments, an abandonment of the empirical approach which indeed merits the chorus of satisfaction that has gone up from our Continental neighbours. On paper, then, "Britain becomes what she never has been in modern times: an integral part of Europe, a land with a continental frontier."* This is one noteworthy advance marked by the Brussels Treaty: the other, of course, is the abandonment by the Low Countries of their traditional neutrality policy.

What must be said, however, and deplored, is that this Treaty—like the parallel economic organization of the Paris Conference—does not purport to create a European (or, let us say, western European) authority. As the leader-writer in *The Observer* of March 14, writing on the eve of the signature of the Treaty, pertinently comments:

Liaison by agencies of less than Governmental status leaves each separate national Government still in the position of the highest authority and the final arbiter; national sovereignty remains untouched.

And he goes on:

A possible criticism of the Treaty is that it prescribes too weak an institutional framework for the forces which it tends to unite; that it sets up aims which can be achieved only by real Union without providing a real Union. Before long we may well find that in order to make the Treaty work we must go the whole hog and pool our sovereignties. The deepest historical significance of the Treaty may one day be seen in the fact that, although it shied away from Union, it left us no choice but Union or failure."

That is a fair criticism. The Brussels Treaty, like any other pact concluded by the professional attorneys of the respective States, is designed to operate wholly within the context of national sovereignty. It prescribes, in fact, just such consultation among the interested parties as would in any case take place through the ordinary processes of diplomacy; and the agencies to be set up are duly subordinate to their national Governments. This is

* *The Observer*, March 14, 1948

not western union, for which the hungry sheep look up, it is not integration: there is here no abatement of national sovereignty such as Mr. Eden pleaded for, and Mr. Bevin himself foretold in his famous House of Commons speech in November 1945, with its vision of a world assembly composed of delegates directly elected by the peoples. And, with regard to economic matters, specifically, Mr. Bevin in his speech to the Committee of European Economic Co-operation on March 15, dotted the i's and crossed the t's. He recognized the need for setting up "the right kind of organization with the right kind of objective"—and then restricted his appeal to one for team-work and the team-spirit (in the best public school tradition!), saying: "I do not want to bring in any abstract discussion on sovereignty. It does not arise..." Yet is it not an open secret that the U.K. delegation fought very hard to resist the French efforts to establish something in the way of an international executive authority for the administration of the European Recovery Programme and to ensure that power in the Continuing Organization is vested in the national delegations? Whenever an Englishman starts inveighing against the abstract, you may be sure he is intent on evasive action!

As Foreign Secretary, it may be said, Mr. Bevin can do no other. His expert advisers, trained to think exclusively in terms of H.M.G. and—the Rest, are unable to conceive of a wider authority of which Britain is only a part. Fortunately back-bench Members of Parliament are not necessarily thus inhibited. Hence the importance of the all-party motion, launched on the eve of Mr. Bevin's journey to Paris and Brussels, which looks forward to a real fusion of the units of Western Europe, which calls for the creation of "a political union strong enough to save European democracy and the values of Western civilization." The 170-odd signatories of this programme are no starry-eyed utopians.* They distinguish between the necessary *emergency policy* "designed to secure immediate and effective co-operation between the countries of Western Europe" and a long-term policy "designed to bring into being a Federation of Europe." What the British Government (with the other signatories of the Brussels Treaty) is doing answers well enough to the description of the former: Mr. Bevin has expressly, and emphatically, dissociated the Government from seeking to compass the latter. Yet everything hinges on this country being brought to face up to the revolutionary change implied in a real union and, ultimately, a design for Europe as a whole.

The terminology employed in the M.P.s' declaration (which has its counterpart, apparently, in similar motions calling for a European Constituent Assembly tabled in the Parliaments of other Western European States) is not altogether happy. For a first requirement of the emergency policy, we are told, is the establishment of a Council of Western Europe "consisting of representatives of the Governments of the

* This use of the term "utopian" as opposed to "realist" is borrowed from Professor E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.

sixteen participating countries in the European Recovery Plan and Western Germany . . ." There is a confusion here between the arrangements for American-aided economic stabilization and development of Europe as a whole and the immediate task of "consolidation of western Europe" in Mr. Bevin's phrase. Point 4, setting forth the long-term policy, contains a similar loose identification of Europe and western Europe. And the choice of the term 'federation', as it happens, at once bedevils the issue. For federation, in any proper sense of the term, is such a long way off that the mere mention of it stirs up in the bosom of the 'realist' all the instincts of rebellion, and there is a distinct danger that the necessary process of integration of western Europe which can and must be here and now, may get lost in the mists of 'federal union'.

One immediate consequence of the M.P.'s Declaration (apart from its making nonsense of the Labour Party's sectarian attitude to the forthcoming "United States of Europe" conference at the Hague, with which I am not concerned here) was a most illuminating correspondence in *The Times*. I cannot better conclude this article than by making a brief analysis of this exchange of views. Mr. Wilson Harris, the editor of *The Spectator*, set the ball rolling* with an explanation of the reason why he was not prepared to sign a cheque for federation. While entirely in agreement with the short-term policy, he said, the long-term programme envisaged meant

commitment here and now to the principle of a European super-government, to which our own country, in spite of its intimate association with the Dominions, would be subject in regard to defence (which involves finance), external affairs and other vital matters . . .

He was answered by one of the signatories, Mr. John Martin, who pointed out that consultation with the other members of the Commonwealth was indeed necessary as a preliminary to further action by Britain—and was specifically postulated in the motion. But in any case the *caveat* formulated by Mr. Wilson Harris applied just as much to the short-term as to the long-term proposals. Definite material support of some kind, not only from the Dominions but also from the United States, was a condition precedent of "western union", but why assume that such backing was going to be withheld? (President Truman's endorsement—in carefully-chosen words—of the Brussels Pact on the following day aptly underscored Mr. Martin's premiss). Another correspondent on the same day made the debating point that the only "subjects" of a federal government are the individual citizens. Which impelled Mr. Wilson Harris in a second letter to re-state with greater precision the arguments against the federal nexus and to echo the familiar warning against 'trying to run before you can walk.' He secured his place on the side of the angels, however, by agreeing that "the closer confederation, a union between

* *The Times*, March 15.

Governments, can be made, the better." On the same day appeared a communication from the Chairman of the Council (and members of the Executive Committee) of Federal Union opining that a Council of Western Europe in the sense of a league of European Governments could not be anything but a first and very temporary step, that any such assemblage of sovereign States must inevitably suffer from the same crucial defect as the League of Nations, lack of executive power. Then Mr. Emery Reves, author of *The Anatomy of Peace*, weighed in, and with supporting letters from Lionel Curtis, high priest in this country of the federal idea, and his opposite number in the Labour Party, Mr. R. W. G. Mackay, we had the pure milk of the gospel of federal union. Mr. Mackay, it may be noted, however—wiser than the authors of the parliamentary motion—confined his case for federation, as distinct from confederation, to western Europe. These apostles of federation were effectively answered by Professor Mitrany who pointed to the tremendous difference between the device of federation—that is union for certain common purposes—in the eighteenth or even nineteenth century and the burdens which would be imposed on a similar authority in the international field to-day: in the present era of economic and social planning, he contended, the federal instrument would be inappropriate, and a new international authority would have to be hardly less than a full-fledged international government. That is certainly not in sight to-day. And Lord Merthyr attacked on the flank with a lucid reiteration of the two-point nostrum associated with the late Lord Davies and the *New Commonwealth Society* (still alive and kicking)—not federation, but a central authority equipped with an international police force and an equity tribunal.

In the realm of logic, indeed, this thesis is unanswerable. The trouble is that life is not a thing of logic. It is perfectly true that the root of all our troubles is the modern fetish of national sovereignty. But the hooks to bind Leviathan which we must contrive will be more subtle than any mere projections of the human brain, they may well be almost invisible and they will certainly be mainly functional. When that has been said, however, let it be recognized that diplomacy by conference, which is still apparently the British Government's conception of international action, is not enough, that there is need—and also the possibility—here and now of some permanent form of organic union, beginning with western Europe. As Mr. Robert Boothby (to whom credit for the M.P.'s motion on the Conservative side is largely due) observed in his contribution to *The Times* correspondence:

There is no necessity for private persons to discuss, at this juncture, details which can only be settled by the Governments concerned. Our business is to proclaim and to advocate the broad conception in general terms . . . what ultimately emerges must clearly be something less than a single sovereign State, something very much more than a league of independent sovereign States, and based upon an enforceable charter of human rights.

Mr. Bevin is entitled to the practical man's distrust of neat-looking

paper plans* and to plead that any programme taking into account "the realities which face us" will have to be taken a step at a time. Those not burdened by office, however, are no less entitled to harry and press for the creation in western Europe of "a real new European Power, able to apply the resources of all its constituent States to their joint recovery and security." The masterly article† by A Student of Europe in *The Observer* of March 7 set out clearly what is involved. We must set our sights for a European Economic Cabinet, that is, pending the crossing of the Rubicon of national sovereignty, at the least a permanent council of economic Ministers of the countries concerned, and, in view of the Communist conspiracy, we must not flinch from accepting the need for common European organs of public order. Nothing less will do. When the house is burning—ordinary caution has to go by the board. Europe's house is burning—and it is not enough to send for the fire brigade. "The situation of western Europe is one where caution is death and the only salvation audacity."

* Speech of January 22.

† "The Burning House."

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

BY OWEN TWEEDY

TO-DAY Anglo-Egyptian negotiations after a spell of hopeful activity in Egypt and in this country in 1946, to be followed by a spasm of bitter publicity at Lake Success in 1947, are again in the doldrums. Their object is the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936; and the hitherto abortive attempts to find agreement have shown that the stumbling blocks are, baldly stated, first the defence of communications through the Suez Canal and secondly the future of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the Sudan.

In the 1936 Treaty the reference to the Suez Canal occurs in connection with the Egyptian sanction for the retention up to 1956 of a small British Force in a special zone on the Canal after the general British evacuation of Egypt proper. The Canal is described as "an integral part of Egypt" and "a universal means of communication and also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire"; and "until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of Navigation of the Canal," its defence is to be undertaken in co-operation with the Egyptian forces by British forces stationed in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal.

The incentive towards this striking demonstration of Anglo-Egyptian partnership was the rapidly developing threat of the Italian encirclement of Egypt. But by 1945 Mussolini was as dead as Queen Anne and political Egyptians began to revert to instinct about the Canal. To them it has always seemed to breed nothing but the threat of foreign interference and to be in fact only a physical embarrassment to Egyptian political influence without those compensating financial advantages which would offset the disadvantage that the Canal Company by its concession is—as it were—an international *imperium* within the Egyptian *imperio*.

The history of the concession explains this Egyptian outlook. The construction of the Canal was opposed both by Mohamed Aly and his two immediate successors who, in co-operation with the East India Company, had brought the Egyptian overland express transit services between Suez and Alexandria to a high and lucrative pitch of efficiency. The overland route was completely ruined by the Canal. And not only that: by the terms of the Francophile Said Pasha's concession to the Company, Egypt was almost scandalously despoiled. "Never has there been a

concession" wrote the British historian, Edward Dicey, "so profitable to the grantee and so costly to the grantor as that given by the Viceroy Said to the Suez Canal Company." The facts speak for themselves. Egypt paid some nine millions towards the cost of construction which amounted in all to about eighteen millions. In addition a further eight millions of Egyptian money went towards incidental expenses and the purchasing of the Egyptian quota of shares and the paying to the Company of indemnities of one kind and another. Finally in 1875 Ismail sold this same Egyptian quota to the British in an eleventh hour attempt to preserve the solvency of his foreign loans; while in 1879 the Egyptian share—fifteen per cent.—of the profits of the Company had to be surrendered to meet the country's stringent financial needs. And three years later by selecting the Canal as his line of advance, Lord Wolsey bluffed Arabi Pasha and turned his flank at Tel El Kebir which led to the British military occupation of Egypt.

Indeed up to the end of the last century the Canal had been anything but a boon and a blessing to Egypt. But early in this century, as the ideas of Egyptian nationalism began to revive, Egypt herself awoke to these hard facts about the Canal; and by 1913 Lord Kitchener's new Egyptian Legislative Assembly felt itself strong enough to reject on national grounds an international application that the Canal concession should be extended for a further forty years after 1968 when the original concession is due to expire. That thirty-five-year-old gesture of independence is now celebrated by Egyptians as a great milestone in their political and physical emancipation. And by it Egypt will become sovereign mistress of the Canal and its property in twenty years time.

But there remains the Treaty obligation of 1936 by which British troops can continue to be stationed in the Canal zone until 1956. This Egyptian sanction was—as I have said—a striking demonstration of Anglo-Egyptian partnership in 1936 in face of the Fascist menace. The question to-day is whether the elimination of this Fascist threat which was achieved largely by British force of arms, has also eliminated consideration as a long-term policy of the mutual advantages of Anglo-Egyptian defence partnership in our world of 1948.

What is the Egyptian point of view? In the first place, the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil is represented in political circles as an offence to Egyptian sovereignty. Secondly, Egyptians are fully aware of loose talk on the lines that if need be a British army on the Canal could be back in the occupation of Cairo within eight hours and of Alexandria within less than a day; and this loose talk which has been as general in London as in Cairo has bred a load of mistrust that the British withdrawal from the Delta is only a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. Then to heighten this mistrust came the British argument that even with the best will in the world it would take at least two years of British effort to remove their war and other stores. The Egyptian reaction was a curt reference to

other British evacuations—India, Pakistan, Burma and Palestine—where similar removals were achieved in a matter of months. And finally there is the Egyptian strategic argument that anyhow the defence of the Canal under modern conditions of warfare—atomic bombs and the like—is no longer a question of any garrison on the Canal other than for local security purposes; and for such needs the Egyptian Army alone is quite adequate.

The British point of view is extremely simple. There is no wish to infringe Egyptian sovereignty. There is no intention to re-occupy the Nile Delta or its towns. But what would happen, to quote from the 1936 Treaty, to "the essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire" if war from whatever quarter should engulf the Middle East, and if Egypt should disappear helplessly, behind for instance, an iron curtain? And is the present state of the world such as to warrant Egypt jettisoning at this very moment the precautions against ideological interference from outside which were so perfectly effective in Egyptian as well as British interests against the Fascist threat of 1936? And evidence is not lacking of the infiltration of these ideologies already. I quote from a letter which I have just received from an Egyptian in Cairo:

Communism in Cairo is finding lots of sustainers and hard believers, especially the students of both Universities. Slogans of 'No Islam after to-day' were heard all the time during the last strikes. They are all for it and they don't care what happens to them as long as they believe everyone is to become owner of the land he plants and have free treatment and education and work. No one knows what Russian life is exactly like but they all say that it is better than nothing. Everything is just like a Russian salad. We hope for the best and may Allah have mercy on the human beings he created!

The second problem to be solved by Anglo-Egyptian negotiation is the future of the Anglo-Egyptian *condominium* in the Sudan. The Sudan is a curiously unreal cartographical and ethnical phenomenon. The name in Arabic means the "black country" or "the country of the blacks" and the Sudanese until the middle of the last century were in the mind and language of the Egyptians merely "blacks" just as the Romans talked of the "barbarians" and we British on our exploration journeys of "aborigines". Indeed in the original Turkish firman of 1841 from which the rulers of Egypt derive their legal claim to the Sudan; Mohamed Ali is described as "Governor of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan and Sennar" and the word Sudan does not occur. To-day the conception of the Sudan and the Sudanese is very slowly taking shape and the policy of 'Sudanization' is a growing reality. Nevertheless the population lack homogeneity, and society is still organized on fundamentally tribal rather than national lines. In the north Arabic is the lingua franca and Islam the general religion. But two hundred miles south of Khartoum, put Africa begins—pagan, nilotic-negroid with a medley of different language and dialects. Such is the Sudan "Macedoine"; and it is the common welfare of these wildly, and widely different Sudanese elements that the

condominium has to cherish.

The 1936 Treaty had confirmed the terms of the original *condominium* convention of 1899 with the addition to the preamble of the pregnant words that the primary aim of both the *co-dominii* "must be the welfare of the Sudanese". But the 1946 negotiations went further and an even more ample draft formula was initialled by which the primary aim of both the *co-dominii* would be

Within the framework of the Unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt, to assure the well-being of the Sudanese; the development of their interests; and their active preparation for self-government and consequently for the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan.

The subsequent breakdown occurred mainly over a difference of opinion as to the scope of the right of the Sudanese to choose the future status of their country. The Egyptian interpretation maintained that recognition of unity under the common crown of Egypt was implicit whether the Sudanese opted for union or some other less close form of association. The British contention was that the wording of the draft formula did not rule out the opportunity for the Sudanese to secede from the Egyptian crown.

But apart from the secession issue, there is the major political and administrative question of the machinery of the *condominium* itself. As a régime it is an extraordinary device with only one parallel in the world—the New Hebrides in the Pacific where the British and the French have contrived a joint administration on a more or less fifty-fifty basis. In the Sudan, however, there has so far been a very senior partner—Britain—and a very junior, almost sleeping partner, Egypt. Jointly they appoint a Governor General who has always been British though his actual letter of appointment is signed by the King of Egypt and he rules the Sudan with the assistance of a council composed of the most senior members of his British administrative and political staff. The early years of the *condominium* were devoted to an administrative recovery programme after the thirteen years of Mahdist misrule during which the population had dwindled from some eight million souls to two and a half million.

It was uphill pioneer work and it was brilliantly undertaken by a devoted band of single-minded British officials under the inspiring leadership of Sir Reginald Wingate; and by 1912, fourteen years after the final Mahdist defeat in 1898, the country which had hitherto balanced its accounts with Egyptian financial aid had become not only law-abiding but also self-supporting. Up to then and indeed up to 1922, the Sudan had had no articulate political problem of its own. But slowly Egyptian politics were seeping up the Nile and in 1924 the first signs of political unrest appeared in Khartoum and politics are now an important part of the life of the towns throughout northern Sudan with political leaders, a political press and political slogans. Indeed, to-day, the responsibilities of the Governor General are quite as much political as administrative. The execution of a

dual loyalty is difficult anywhere : but it can scarcely ever in history have been more difficult than for a Governor General who represents two independent nations jointly associated in the government of the Sudan "for the well-being of the Sudanese" but publicly differing most acrimoniously as to how the country should be governed. In the event, in the more pungent political issues the Governor General has taken his orders from the British Foreign Office without reference to the Egyptian Government. This is as deeply resented in Egypt as is the British contention giving the Sudanese the right to secede.

But the *condominium*, however one-sidedly it has been administered, has been of great service to Egypt. In the first place, it has secured the southern frontier of Egypt proper. And in this connection it must not be forgotten that only sixty years ago Egypt was invaded from the south by a Mahdist army and that only eight years ago the tiny Sudan Defence Force with a stiffening of British troops held off 180,000 Italians from Abyssinia who had boasted that they would be in Khartoum and on the Nile in eight weeks. But the greatest service which Britain as co-partner in the Sudan has rendered to Egypt, has been in connection with the security of the waters of the Nile flowing down to Egypt.

The story starts in October 1898 with an event in the Sudan which was of even greater importance to Egypt than the final overthrow of Mahdist power. I refer to the now almost-forgotten Fashoda incident. Two months before the battle of Omdurman in September 1898 a French expedition under Colonel Marchand had hoisted the tricolor at Fashoda on the Nile some four hundred miles south of Khartoum. In two years it had made a historic trek from French Equatorial Africa and the French intentions were to establish a new French colony athwart the White Nile and further eastwards as far as the Abyssinian frontier. Lord Kitchener at once hurried south from his victory at Omdurman to expel the newcomers and, hoisting the Egyptian flag within sight of the French camp, invited Colonel Marchand to withdraw. The Fashoda crisis lasted for two months and nearly led to war between Britain and France. But at the eleventh hour the French gave way and left the Egyptian flag flying unchallenged. But the crisis demonstrated to the world in general and to Egypt in particular that the British Government was prepared even to go to war rather than admit any foreign power to any control of the waters of the Sudanese Nile which might jeopardize the very existence of Egypt.

This political principle was officially endorsed some ten years later by Lord Milner. He wrote :

It is an uncomfortable thought that the regular supply of water by the Nile which is to Egypt not a question of convenience and prosperity but actually of life, must always be exposed to some risk as long as the upper reaches of the great river are not under Egyptian control.

And thus we come back to secession. Just a year ago I was discussing with an Egyptian politician who was also an up-to-date and benevolent

farmer on the most modern lines. "Twice during the last thirty years," he said, "you British were almost starved out when German U-Boats got temporary control of your sea routes. You know what you felt then. Well, Egypt is like Britain and what the Atlantic is to you, the Nile is to us ; and into the bargain, its waters are now so delicately harnessed as to make the river almost an artificial waterway with a control so terribly brittle that only experts can operate it. Under the *condominium*—whatever its faults from other points of view—we in Egypt have never had any qualms on the score of Nile water or possible interference. For the *condominium* has loyally preserved security and our Egyptian engineers have run their own irrigation offices in the Sudan. But supposing the Sudanese opted for secession and complete independence ? Please don't think," he went on, "that we in Egypt are less keen on the welfare of the Sudanese than you are ; but when it comes to the intricacies of Nile control the Sudanese on their own could never master them—or at any rate not for years and years. At best they would bungle it by inefficiency. At worst they might monkey it about to bring pressure—political pressure—on us in Egypt. And let me tell you this, if there was any hanky-panky—even for a week—with the Nile water from the south, Egyptian life and agriculture would cease to exist as dramatically as if we had been atom-bombed. We wish the Sudanese well but that is no reason why we should give them a stranglehold on our very existence. And we have not forgotten that the worst misrule in the Sudan was not under the Egyptians but under the Sudanese themselves during the Mahdist revolt. And don't you forget either that in Egypt all roads lead to the Nile and all life comes from the Nile."

I have tried to analyse the essentials of this protracted Anglo-Egyptian controversy—first the defence of the Suez Canal and secondly the Nile and its control. And to me they seem to be the real and only issues at stake for discussion between Anglo-Egyptian negotiators. How then can the vital interests of our two countries be secured ? I have spoken of an iron curtain. It is in the interest of Egypt and of the Sudan no less than of our commonwealth communications that never should the two countries of the Nile and the Canal disappear helplessly behind it. Indeed the issue seems to me to be the same sort of problem for the Middle East generally as the collaboration and security problem, which is now being tackled by the Brussels Treaty, is for a Western Europe ; and as such would it not be appropriate that the Canal defence issue be included in the larger territorial problem of the defence of the Middle East generally, which is a matter in which all members of the Arab League must be vitally interested ? And no one would have more chance of bringing all these interested governments together and of seeing such a programme launched than Mr. Ernest Bevin who has been so successful in sponsoring the Benelux plan.

The Sudan on the other hand is a domestic problem and its solution lies

in domestic negotiation. The desiderata would appear to be first: that the control of the Nile within the Sudan should be vested *in perpetuo* in the Egyptian Government with the proviso—which already exists—that the requirements of present and future Sudanese irrigation should be fully met so long as they do not prejudice the prior rights of Egyptian agriculture and life north of Wadi Halfa. Secondly, that in pursuance of the establishment of Sudanese local self-government the Sudanization of the northern zones of the country should continue to be energetically fostered under the trusteeship of the *condominium* administration which should be re-gearred on a more equal scale of partnership as between the two *co-dominii*. Thirdly, that the evolution of the pagan south should continue to be conducted at a tempo and on lines suitable to the less advanced social conditions which exist there. Lastly, that all political—as distinct from administrative—Sudanese questions should be handled in agreement between London and Cairo on a basis of parity. Here as in the wider defence problem, success can only be achieved by goodwill, by understanding, and above all by a determination to look ahead rather than rake up the unhappiness of past history.

Some fifteen years ago I lunched with a much harassed Treasury official. He had been “sitting in on” a meeting with the Irish Government over the settlement of outstanding troubles and when he joined me he was absolutely worn out. “Dev,” he said, “started at 1.30 a.m. and hasn’t stopped since. When we rose for lunch, he had just finished with Cromwell and the Drogheda massacres and he proposes to continue this afternoon from the Battle of the Boyne.”

That was the sort of mood that dominated Anglo-Irish relations for years and years—a monotonous harking back to the grievances of other days. And outside the conference, in the clubs, in the offices and, most of all, in official files Irish salt would be eternally rubbed into British sores and the process would be reciprocated with interest from the British side. It all led nowhere; and unhappily, in connection with Anglo-Egyptian relations, an analogous state of things is to-day very general both in London and in Cairo. London says “ungrateful Egypt” and justifies the adjective by illustration from ten, twenty, thirty and even forty years ago. Egypt retorts with that wretched perennial—“*Perfidie Albion*”, and dates it back to what Gladstone said—was it in 1884? The problem is to stop it all and to make a fresh start. For unless this is done, there is no immediate hope of getting the Anglo-Egyptian problem out of the doldrums of suspicion, mistrust and recrimination where it has already been drifting for far too long.

FRENCH LABOUR

By MELTON S. DAVIS

IN the midst of the riots last Autumn, a wise old French trade-unionist refused to get excited: “Everything in France has happened before,” he said cynically, “and very likely will happen again.”

Since then events have tended to prove him right. The average French workman is once again putting out eighty per cent. of his budget for food. He went months without meat only eventually to find it in the market at exorbitant prices. Now it is butter; when he can find it, a kilo at the black market rate costs him three days’ wages. Coal is up twenty times on pre-war prices. The general cost of living index is fifteen times that of pre-war, while salaries are up only ten times. The worker has other reasons for nostalgia. In the ‘thirties he worked one and a half hours for a leg of lamb, now it is one and a half days. Last year food prices went up sixty-four per cent. A French deputy said recently: “Liberty belongs to human beings before it belongs to meat prices.” But his was a voice in the wilderness.

The spiral continues its upward climb. Since the Liberation rents have increased over seventy per cent. and landlords are asking for further boosts. Cabinets have taken drastic steps which, as usual, have turned out to be ineffectual. Cuts in government expenditures are promised, but bureaucracy grows apace. Each new Premier, like his predecessor, attacks the high cost of living with violent speeches—his next official act being to sanction price increases. “This,” he says, “will bring prices down.” So France moved from a “controlled economy” (which was in reality, a semi-free market) to a so-called “free economy” (with almost no controls). This step served to add over twenty per cent. to workers’ living costs in the space of a few months.

Sacrifices still are continually called for but these manage to fall mainly upon the working man. Outrageous financial scandals are punished with light sentences and extra-legal methods comprise the French way of life for large parts of the middle-classes. Farmers continue to hoard gold and needed foodstuffs, doctors strike against income tax laws. Shopkeepers, restaurateurs, wholesalers, middlemen merely raise prices. But the *lampiste*, the French workman, finds his real income getting smaller and smaller. It is little wonder that he disparages every new government, distrusts each old politician. His leaders, from the Left and Right, have betrayed him time after time. To whom can he turn now? One metal worker faced with new higher commodity costs immediately after the

fiasco of the 5,000 francs note turn-in shrugged: "*Voilà, maintenant il faut que les gras récupèrent leurs pertes.*" ("Now the big ones must recoup their losses.")

What had the CGT (*Confédération Générale du Travail*), under Communist domination, done for its 6,000,000 members since the Liberation? Well, on the surface most of their strikes had been successful. They were getting rises regularly; laws ameliorating working conditions were passed, more frequently under Communist auspices than through the initiative of any other party. Nationalization which workers believed held out some hope for a more secure future, began to take place in basic industries, mines, electricity, gas, banks, insurance companies. Social security and maternity allowances were introduced. Shop stewards were finally given payment for overtime. A five per cent. wages tax insured worker training, badly needed in industrially backward France. Older workers were helped by reduction of taxes, free clothing, lunches, medical care and lighter utility bills. Each firm of over fifty workers had to establish a *Comité d'Entreprise*. These were to look after social welfare in the factories, to be kept well informed on profits and to be consulted on direction of production and distribution.

The French worker for the first time was being made to feel part of the economy. As a result of this he was willing to accept the principle of the forty-eight-hour week. The average working week had been forty-five as against a pre-war thirty-nine; it would have been even higher if necessary materials were available. Production rose past 1938 levels and started to approach those of 1939.

There were a few attempts to slow down the gains achieved. The CGT and the other large labour organization, the CFTC (*Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*) demanded a return to collective contracts. The employers' organization, CNPF (*Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français*) wanted retention of the Vichy rule whereby the Ministry of Labour set national wage scales. A typically Gallic combat but had to be approved by the Ministry of Labour. This managed to satisfy no one and antagonize everyone. Seemingly though, the Communist leadership had won the individualistic French worker to a group attitude on production, wages and general policy. Moreover, this policy coincided with that of much of the rest of the country.

The Communists were still in the Government—and still unchallenged in their CGT leadership—when the PTT Union (Postal and Telephone workers) struck on July 30 1946. The well-organized strike for higher wages took place against union officials' orders. The rank and file thought their salaries had not kept pace with prices. CGT pressure forced a back-to-work movement but several thousand workers two months later, under André Morguès, broke away and formed an autonomous union. That was really the first rift in the cosy picture painted by Communist

trade union leaders. In February 1947, the traditionally rumbustious newspaper printers' union hit the cobblestones. For years it has been composed mainly of anarcho-syndicalists and Trotskyites with no love for Communists. Also in the picket line was the Union of Public Employees, strongly Socialist. But the followers of the Lenin—Stalin—Thorez line at the time were still desperately striving for respectability. Communists went so far as to try to break the strike.

Communist Party heads were doing their best to keep the slogan of "Production, more production" in front of the recalcitrants. But other attacks were shaping up on the flanks. Led by the PTT autonomists, a Trade Union Study Circle was formed outside the CGT composed of over 10,000 anti-Communists. The CNT (*Confédération Nationale du Travail*) consisting of anarchists and Trotskyites began pushing their membership toward the 100,000 mark. Then came the Renault strike in April 1947. Purely wildcat in origin, it exposed the C.P.'s straddling strategy. Either they were a working class party plumping for revolution or they were a *bourgeois* group of opportunists thumping for production and class collaboration. They were hoist with their own petard. Meanwhile the Renault movement spread. The CNT, by its own claims, launched an attack from the Left in the nationalized railroad industry. The popularity of this C.P.-disapproved step forced the party to take a stand. Manoeuvred out of the Government they hurried after the strikers excitedly yelling: "Wait for your leaders, wait for your leaders."

Until these latter two strikes only 267 man-days had been lost in 1947 by work stoppages. But the events of May and June brought the figure up to the amazing total of 7,000,000. From this point C.P. leadership floundered. Once out of the Government they could not decide on strategy. They relied on short range plans and long range hopes. They started making more mistakes than any party with its pretensions (France's largest at the time) had a right to make. They issued contradictory statements, called upon Lenin to witness their return to traditional tactics, then later reversing their policy and making a bid for middle-class support. (Eight months earlier the *Politburo* had said prices could be lowered and wages raised mainly by squeezing the middleman.) The CGT went so far as to confer with the CNPF (France's F.B.I.) and completing an agreement with the employers which had as its obvious end the raising of prices and the bilking of the consumer.

Meanwhile, the public was beginning to get tired of strikes. So were many of the workers. Again it was an autonomous union that forced the Communists' hand. Métro motormen walked out of their jobs on October 11, 1947. The Communists attempted to outflank them and issued a call for solidarity, bringing out all Paris transport workers. The motormen strongly influenced by *Travail et Liberté*, a group of purged leaders, issued a statement calling the CGT chiefs "enemies of the working class." The public, for the most part workers kept from getting to their jobs, cursed

the inept leadership and waited apathetically for developments. The Government gave the CGT everything they asked for and issued a face-saving statement denying they had capitulated.

It was plain from the November 12 riots at Marseilles, that strikes had become a political weapon. The French word for strike—*grève*—had lost its industrial significance. About this time, the fallacy of striking for “more” and then seeing prices rise even higher came to be considered by a thoughtful few in trade union ranks. The French worker began to realize he was on a vicious merry-go-round. In December he tried to get off.

Many workers failed to follow CGT orders because, when they were ready for revolution, Communist leaders of the unions had counselled patience—and production. Now that they were too tired to revolt they were called upon to shake off their chains—many of them forged by C.P. mistakes. It also became clear that the Communists had relied on the CGT, not the other way around. In November, Maurice Thorez tried to attribute his party's setbacks to American “intervention”. His only concession to *mea culpa* was that this had not been seen and understood quickly enough. The growing rank and file support for the Marshall Plan further loosened C.P. reins on French labour. Added to this was the tactical mistake of not knowing when to negotiate the end of a strike.

Force Ouvrière, a group whose leadership was composed mainly of Socialists, decided to break away from the CGT. Granted that many French workers, maybe even a majority of those in organized labour are disgusted with Communist Party leadership, can they turn for help to one of the other political parties? The Socialists were against the November strikes. They were also against the earlier summer strikes. Yet they had stood still for the elimination of bread and coal subsidies thus increasing rail fares, telephone, gas and electricity rates. This, supposedly, was to balance the Government budget, on paper anyway. But it unbalanced the family budgets of many thousands of low-paid workers. New wage demands were the order of the day. *Force Ouvrière* was also against the November strike. But it had not been very critical of a Government which, including the Socialists, seemed to be aiding higher prices, albeit unwillingly. This was why the anarchists refused to co-operate with *Force Ouvrière's* December split claiming that the leadership had merely shifted from one political party to another.

Socialists received three-elevenths of the votes cast in the last CGT elections. *Force Ouvrière* officials will be pleased if they can get the amount of members this represents, about one and three-quarter millions. But already there are hints that FO will not provide dynamic enough leadership. One observer wondered when they would “go in for militant syndicalism” and stop following “*socialisme à l'eau de rose*.” In fact, on the part of the Socialist party, the far-Left *Bataille Socialiste*, has walked out of the fold. They claimed that FO did not appeal to the revolutionary

spirit of French workers. “After all,” said one of these rebels, “France was more concerned over the Sacco-Vanzetti case than the United States ever was.” On the other hand, some middle-of-the-road Socialists viewed the split as an admission of their own tactical defeat. Although the CGT had had a non-Communist majority they had not been able to make their weight felt.

The Government has done what it could for the new labour organization. FO leaders met with officials on an equal standing with other labour groups. What is more, they were given forty million francs left over from the Vichy labour organization. CGT had only received two million with another two offered and refused.

After the first burst of enthusiasm, FO membership drives have understandably slowed down. In their present condition, it is doubtful if in a crisis they can muster anywhere near the same kind of discipline the Communists were able to do.

Several factors have contributed to the dark future now faced by FO. One of the organization's chiefs, M. Bouzanquet, signed a manifesto issued by *La Troisième Force*. This tied his organization up with a political grouping that is losing favour day by day. The idea that a party or coalition of parties should be supported in power merely because it is not at either extreme is losing ground. The concept of the middle way has deteriorated due to costly, ineffectual manoeuvres by its present interpreters. Another point: anti-American propaganda is beginning to take hold. Americans here have found that individual Frenchmen distrust donors of gifts. Therefore when Communists charge that America is sending food and merchandise with an ulterior motive the implication is right down the thought-alley of the Frenchman. It is only a short hop to linking FO, the United States and the *Troisième Force*.

Too many of the country's leaders are living in the past, applying variations of time-worn measures. This is as true of trade unionism as it is of other segments of the French economy. M. le Bourre, in his thirties, is one of the few younger trade union leaders. He helped swing his own union, *Fédération du Spectacle*, and others in the autonomous Study Circle into FO. M. le Bourre, an ex-Communist, insisted from the start that FO would have to use dynamic propaganda methods. He suggested taking a few leaves from the tactics book of the Communist Party.

What are the differences other than political between CGT and FO? Strangely enough CGT wants local Federations to make the rules, claiming the national executive body is too far away from reality. FO, also strangely, says that it is easier to adjust salaries on a national basis and claims that regional conventions only multiply the occasions for discussions and provide spring boards for new agitation. CGT will no doubt continue to carry members who have not paid their dues but FO cannot afford to. FO wants to abolish block voting and establish the secret

ballot. CGT says the secret ballot encourages *lâcheté* (fear of militancy). The CGT for the first time campaigned for price reduction rather than salary increases. But then it hurriedly went back to traditional tactics. After all, the party line must maintain that price increases are inherent in the quasi-capitalistic system that exists in France to-day.

Anarchists are still at work with their Committees of Struggle, crying: "Long live the general strike." Not yet quite decided is the CFTC (Catholic trade unions) which goes now with CGT and then with FO. Being an extremely intelligent, liberal organization, they are hoping their membership figures will benefit from the split. Still on their own is the CGC (Foremen's union). Former Socialist leaders of the CGT used to fulminate against them; to-day's attitude is silence. Meanwhile the dread of "*chômage*" mounts as unemployment hits various industries. Aero-plane production, films, dressmaking, hotels, restaurants, radio and electrical trades have all been affected.

Can the worker hope for anything better from his elected representatives? Well, he still has not reconciled himself with the Government. "*They* do this, *they* do that . . ." He has little faith in his institutions, all of which have failed him, one after the other. First the Church, then the monarchy, then the *bourgeoisie*, and lastly the "party of the working class", the Communists. He no longer has the fine glow of the Resistance to urge him on. The MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*) has moved too far Right to satisfy any continental labour organization, even including fellow Catholics of the CFTC.

It is a sign of the poverty of other political leadership that the Communists despite their mistakes continue to control as many votes as they do. It would be unwise to under-rate their political strength or their trade union leadership. As far as the de Gaullists are concerned, it is more than even money that the General, given the chance, will dissolve the CGT and back FO despite de Gaullist worker groups. This "kiss of death" could very well turn out to be the end of free organized labour in France.

This shows up two flaws in French labour strategy. One is the lack of a trade union base for the political non-Communist Left. The Socialists, more concerned with sitting in the Government than seeing party doctrines adopted, have failed to mobilize workers. If FO really remains aloof from politics there can be no labour party as an outlet. The second flaw is the lack of liaison between labour and intelligentsia. In England, this liaison was brought about by the co-operation of the Fabian Society and the Trades Union Congress. No such possibility exists in France. Politically the intelligentsia have brought forth no new ideas. As one admitted: "We adhere to many parties and contribute to none. We only add an ideological gloss to cover the void that exists beneath."

White collared workers predominated at FO's first congress of April 12-14: clerks, *fonctionnaires*, employees of service industries, all fairly

well-dressed, fairly well-fed. One observer noted, "as many automobiles outside as one would see at a CNPF (employers' organization) meeting." Speeches flowed all over the delegates. But M. le Bourre pointed out: "We need muscles in our arms, not in our mouths." Leon Jouhaux warned them: "This scission is due also to the excessive passivity of the non-Communists who, fearing responsibility, allowed the Communists to surpass them in energy and take away official positions." Communists had ignored the *Comités d'Entreprise*, but then the Socialists had never done much about them. Now the Communists have decided to use them *à la Prague*. Strategic strength still rests with the Communists, controlling such unions as the dockers and the coal miners.

Infected with the same *malaise* as the rest of the country *Force Ouvrière* has made only half-hearted attempts to help itself. As a result February elections showed the *Fédération du Livre* (pressmen), transitionally a non-Communist union, voting to stay in the CGT. Moreover, miners' voting went eighty per cent. against leaving. The teachers' union, less than ten per cent. Communist, while leaving the CGT, voted against joining FO. The CGT is still the most potent union confederation in the land.

What has not yet become obvious is that economically France and the rest of Europe must eventually approximate American standards in wages and prices. A French worker's average weekly wages are around 4,000 francs (\$13) whereas prices are close to those of the U.S. where workers get three to four times as much. It is beginning to appear impossible to go back. For better or worse European economy at present is tied to that of the United States. American prices determine to a large extent European prices. The era of low living costs in France is finished. The day of low wages for Europeans is over.

Before these things get themselves straightened out, turmoil and violence lie ahead. But in this coming struggle for readjustment, French labour is handicapped by division. It is undergoing a process which it has suffered before; recrimination, division, weakness, peril. *Le lampiste* does not know where to turn. His head is full of ideologies, panaceas and doctrines. Will they help him to eat, to clothe his children, to live a normal, full life without fear of war, poverty or oppression? To-day, as the conservative *Le Monde* points out, again the French worker's *cri de misère* echoes through the land. Who will answer him, who *can* answer him?

(The author is an American journalist who has recently returned to France after a period in his own country.)

TRIESTE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CENTRE

BY ANNE DACIE

THE aim of UNESCO, as stated in its own charter, is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science, and culture. It claims to have made "an exhaustive inquiry into the tensions affecting international understanding with the help of experts in social research and social engineers everywhere as a step towards developing practical means for effectively reducing tensions which make for war."

By November 19, 1946—the date of the First General Conference of UNESCO convened in Paris—the four big powers, on behalf of the United Nations, had already decided that the burning problem of what was ethnic and economic justice on the inflammable frontiers of Italy and Yugoslavia could best be solved by the establishment of a small free buffer-State on those very frontiers, built round a port which in its geography belongs essentially to Austria. Note that the frontiers were known to be inflammable. Then ask why the educational, scientific, and cultural organization of the United Nations in its "exhaustive inquiry into tensions" sent a small group of experts to the vast and little-known forest regions in the equatorial heart of South America—to establish there a scientific institute for the promotion of world advance in international education and understanding. They were sent at a time of unprecedented tension in the stormy heart of Europe, arising from the convalescence of the ills engendered by conflict, and as a first essential project. But can a sudden swift remembrance of poor illiterate primitives living for centuries without progress or enlightenment in the "dark areas" of the world lead to stability in those civilized regions of the world where, if despair is to be lifted from the hot-bed of emotions now dividing west and east, there is most urgent need for positive co-operation. That despair was already grounded in November 1946, but so far there has been no suggestion that UNESCO should make a similar concrete attempt—except through the circulation of fair-worded literature—to safeguard the education of humanity in Europe through scientific assistance and practical concern.

What better site for some big bulldozing project of social engineering to build a structure for peace than on that small area of land already mapped by UNO as Trieste Free Territory? This short stretch of coastland lies at the northern end of the Adriatic Sea, its 321 square

miles on the threshold of frontiers east and west. Linked to Italy on land by a narrow and vulnerable strategic coast road, Free Territory is shaped like a balloon beside a mountainous hinterland which since the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty (September 15, 1947) has belonged to Yugoslavia. Neither the Italians in the towns nor the Slovenes and Croats in the villages of Free Territory claim ancestry as remote as that of the scattered natives who inhabit the two-thousand-mile insect-infested reaches of the Hylean river Amazon in a stone-age society. They live on a frontier with every opportunity for immediate inquiry into the tensions making for war, and every need for action to plant a world flag for peace. What more timely place than Trieste for a suitable establishment of a scientific institute "for the encouragement of fellowship and other personnel exchanges across national frontiers to improve understanding among people"? I quote UNESCO'S own words.

But what has UNESCO done? In the immediate neighbourhood of Trieste there are 348,000 citizens known to have ration books, and there are 40,000 unemployed. Numerous persons have entered Free Territory as refugees or political and illicit traders who have no ration books, adding to an acute and swollen housing shortage already enlarged by five thousand British and five thousand American troops, all needing buildings for welfare and amusement in addition to routine work and accommodation. On the east side of Free Territory five thousand Yugoslav troops "safeguard" the only agricultural land of Free Territory with tommy-guns and tension. In this area it is impossible to ascertain statistics of the population with ration books or who are unemployed. The only co-operation yet discovered between the two distinct zones dividing Free Territory—contrary to UNO intentions—lies within the fields of medicine, enterprise and culture. But at no time has a UNESCO expert or social engineer visited Free Territory to survey such an obvious site for an international educational institute. The building is already there—a large modern white erection put up by the Fascists for a technical university, with the interior completed later by Allied Military Government. It stands out prominently on the hill as you drive into Trieste from the heights of Opicina overlooking one of the most panoramic views in Europe.

The view is guarded by a lighthouse standing conspicuously over the Bay to flash signals across the blue estranging waters of the Adriatic Sea. For visitors the lighthouse looks like the statue of Liberty built in keeping with the castle named after San Giusto. Every citizen knows that the patron saint of Trieste represented Justice. Everyone can see that the outline of the coast towards the east resembles an avaricious alligator. But must we believe even so that the decision to form Free Territory was taken by all four of the big powers to relieve UNO from responsibility? Examine the situation in Trieste. There are shipyards there capable of constructing 35,000-40,000 ton ships and some of the finest warehousing

facilities in the world; but except for naval ships and those bringing military supplies the port has been little used since May 1945. Of UNRRA supplies passing through the port from 1945-1947, 1,038,400 tons were destined for Yugoslavia.

Tuberculosis figures in Yugoslavia have constantly risen since the thirty-seven per cent. increase stated in 1945, with eighteen per cent. of the population in Slovenia and fifteen per cent. in Dalmatia contracting this disease where it was hitherto unknown. So great is the fear of tuberculosis in Yugoslavia—before the war there were 124 trained specialists, after the war 61—that throughout Istria and the Yugoslav-controlled land adjoining Trieste local authorities have planned to build health stations and anti-tubercular dispensaries as first priorities in an area of completely war-shattered towns and villages which are still untouched shambles. In these clinics the only aid for the majority of the population comes from unqualified and unskilled students. (Excluding Fiume, there were only thirty-four doctors working in the whole of Istria in 1946, numbers since decreasing as political pressure increases.) In consequence half of the TB out-patients in Trieste are those arriving from Yugoslavia in urgent need of help. Large numbers of those contracting tuberculosis are children.

North of Trieste on the Italo-Austrian and Italo-Yugoslav borders there is an annual outbreak of infantile paralysis; and, directly caused by war, thousands of the people of Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia need plastic surgery to eradicate disfigurement and to bring strength back to muscles.

A large number of doctors of various nationalities have come to Trieste, some as refugees, and all glad to offer help where it may be given without political danger to themselves. Professor la Penna, director of the big central hospital, ardently supports all opportunities for medical research that can be undertaken by the medical faculty in Trieste. He is advocating that research in plastic surgery, infantile paralysis, and tuberculosis should be firmly established as a necessary part of local students' training in the medical laboratories attached to the Ospidali Uniti. In charge of Public Health, British Lt.-Colonel E. G. Dalziel, M.C., of Allied Military Government, has imported considerable quantities of streptomycin, insulin, and penicillin, largely through American generosity. The British Council have sent medical text-books and dictionaries to stock the university libraries; and the local faculty sponsored the first conference of gynaecologists to be held in Trieste last autumn with doctors coming from all over Italy. In February 1948 the faculty invited specialists in child diseases from all over Europe (including Austria and Hungary) for its second conference. Permits to visit Free Territory are not easily obtained, but difficulties have been waived for doctors with the help of A.M.G. The medical faculty feels that it cannot wait for UNESCO.

Foot and mouth disease, hog cholera, undulant fever, rabies and swine

erysipelas have long been endemic in the hinterland of Trieste. In 1946-1947 despairing Istrian farmers were driving the UNRRA animals, given them from Croatia, across the Morgan Line for Allied treatment. Lester Weil, a Florida farmer in charge of the Agricultural Department of A.M.G., had had the forethought to import a large number of animal vaccines as well as new seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, such as DDT, for the tent caterpillar ravaging forest trees. An agricultural research laboratory has already been established, but land development should not depend on the resourcefulness of one American farmer. Trieste needs a central bureau with regular agricultural radio broadcasts, farming bulletins, and informative leaflets distributed each side of Free Territory in Italian, German, Slovene and Croat.

Future timber supplies depend on wise afforestation planning now. Much valuable forest land in Slovenia and the northern area of the late Venezia Giulia has short-sightedly been cut down for a quick realization of currency—to gain Italian lire for the expansion of Yugoslav propaganda, but fatal for the future needs of Italy and Trieste Free Territory. On the outskirts of Trieste a large modern tree plantation is now being developed complete with water-tanks, sprinkler systems, and rows of rich earth terraces. A high wind blows over the stony uplands of Istria and through the draughty squares of Trieste in late winter and early spring; but the successful cultivation of the gardens of Miramare Castle—built as a residence for the unhappy Habsburg Duke Maximilian in 1855—prove that on a bare rocky promontory protection from the *bora* can be found through specially nurtured trees and shrubs. Lester Weil plans to introduce the kudzu plant which has climbed so miraculously over arid stony farms, preventing soil erosion in sterile parts of the southern states of America and bringing fertility to poverty-stricken land which is now rich in fodder and hay. Kudzu may be the key to prosperity for many poor Istrian farmers who have not yet heard of UNESCO.

Centrally situated within easy distance from Vienna, Trieste was second in musical importance only to the capital. The Triestini are among the most musically appreciative audiences in the world. Trieste Free Territory could become a second Salzburg. Major the Hon. Hamish St. Clair-Erskine, M.C., is much loved in Trieste for his work in the last two years to bring back the city's music. At the height of the riots and strikes that paralysed Trieste in the summer of 1946 old San Giusto Castle conveniently disclosed a rebuilt open-air theatre with opera stars billed from Italy. During the few weeks' season the city remained undisturbed by bombs. Slovenes and Italians flocked up the hill to the "court of militia" where, under the stars and with the Slovene hills lit up with flares for Marshal Tito in contrast to the quiet lights of a cruiser in the harbour, ten thousand people at a time could listen enraptured to Giuseppe Verdi's *Forces of Destiny* for which the ancient warlike walls were the natural setting. Many international artistes of repute have visited Trieste

in the last two years. Igor Markovich, Zecchi, Honegger, Benjamin Britten are very well-known names. The Arts Theatre Council sent Fay Compton, Alec Clunes and Jack Hawtrey to give a short season of British plays at a critical time in January 1947 when the whole city was tense with rumours of new peace terms. This example of British enterprise met with no adverse criticism. It was loudly acclaimed by the otherwise violent anti-British Communist press; and every house was packed for *Hamlet*, *Othello* and *Candida*.

Art exhibitions, poetry readings, national songs and dances—all depend on local initiative. Last October an industrial fair achieved considerable success from the benefits of exchange across linguistic and national frontiers. The Allied reading room and well-stocked library of American books are most popular. Local university professors dream of an international university including faculties for international law, marine engineering, and modern languages. Football, bicycle races, swimming and yachting alone cannot develop character. Sanity in the young depends on health and opportunity, and a proper-balanced outlook on prospects for livelihood and adult education. Or what is left but *boule royale* or roulette? There is plenty of room in Free Territory for lively business men, if given UNO encouragement. Should it be left to the British officer commanding Allied troops, Major-General Airey, to present a report to the Security Council of UNO stressing the dangers if Free Territory is left spiritually and physically entirely dependent on imports?

UNESCO claims to cost its member States six million dollars a year, the price of one light cruiser or ten bombers. Until the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty the expense of Anglo-American administration in Trieste was borne by Italy; now the major part of expenditure (cut down to the minimum) is still the burden of Italy, the country which has lost Trieste. There is no other procedure under which Free Territory can live. But the price of failure is despair and misery stalking borders built for a third world war.

"Here is a programme for common action to construct in the minds of men such defences of the peace as the minds of men can maintain." Can you blame a ragged Yugoslav soldier or a young embittered Italian for thinking these are idle words? They were expressly used in the report of the programme commission at the first general conference of UNESCO in 1946.

CONFLICTS IN EDUCATION

By J. F. WOLFENDEN

ENGLISH education is getting out of hand. There is so much more of it than there has ever been before that the sheer quantity seems to be overpowering us. By comparison with the position at the beginning of this century, the total number of hours spent each week by Britons of all ages in educational activity is immeasurably increased. The increase has been, so to speak, three-dimensional; in the length of the individual's official education, in the width of range of the activities now recognized as educational, and in the depth of the proportion of the population covered by them.

One serious consequence of this admirable extension of the educational field is only just now coming to light. It is that everybody connected with education is so desperately busy doing the present and immediate job that nobody has any time to sit back and think. The Ministry is working at rush-hour pressure the whole time; the officers of the local education authorities are overwhelmed by the administrative consequences of the 1944 Act; the teachers in the front line, from the primary school to the university, wearied as they are by the perils of war and the burdens of peace, are harassed by greater numbers of pupils than ever before with daily more varied and more strident demands. Now, if ever, do we need the synoptic view and the freshness of outlook which positively welcomes new problems as exhilarating. Instead, we are in danger of fighting, with unreflecting enthusiasm but with no strategic plan, a disjointed jumble of individual small-scale engagements on a multitude of different and disconnected fronts.

Because everybody is cumbered with so much serving nobody has time to examine the antinomies which are gradually making themselves apparent. By an antinomy I mean a pair of propositions, views or aims, each of which seems to be tenable, laudable and even desirable, but which taken together seem to be in mutual antagonism. It may be of some small help towards a constructive synthesis if some of these antinomies can be at least recognized and laid bare.

The first arises directly from the quantitative increase in the amount of education. On the one hand it is argued that this increase must in itself be a good thing. England has had universal compulsory education of any kind for less than eighty years. Before that only a tiny fraction of the population had anything like a serious or extended education: the

vast majority had none at all. Now for the first time all young people remain in full-time education up to the age of fifteen, the 1944 Act provides for compulsory part-time education up to eighteen, the Forces have weekly periods of education in "the King's time"; and there are countless varieties of informal education available in youth clubs, community centres and all the voluntary societies concerned with what used to be called "Adult Education". More and more it is recognized that if we want a civilized, intelligent, self-reliant democracy the only way to get it is by more and more education. The longer each child's school-life, the bigger the number of State scholarships to the universities, the wider the range of educational influences, the better our chance of achieving what no country in the world has yet produced, an intelligent and sensitive adult population. In the political and economic complexities of modern international society, there is no hope for a nation unless its ordinary average voter can understand what is at stake, unless, that is, there is open to everybody the kind of knowledge and experience which in former centuries was reserved for the few.

Nor is it only from the point of view of the nation as a whole that this is desirable. Each individual member of the community has potentialities which it is society's duty to develop. In days gone by a great part of these individual potentialities has gone to waste. There must have been hundreds of Miltons mute and inglorious simply because they never acquired the ability to express themselves, they never trod the fields John Milton knew. Now, although we have not yet perfected the machinery, there is far more chance for the individual of developing all his innate powers, because at each stage in his mental growth the opportunities are there, if he will take them. And these opportunities are not narrowly scholastic. Physically, aesthetically and spiritually, as well as mentally, the field of choice is so wide that every single taste or talent can find its proper outlet and development. On these fuller and richer individual lives the happy community is built; and the foundation-stone of the whole structure is education. Only by raising the level of education of each individual person can we retrieve the disastrous waste of past ages, and make the most of our endowment, personal and national.

But is it all quite as easy as that? To some ears the other side of the argument will sound more convincing, though less plausible. Granted that what we need is an educated adult population, is the way to produce it to extend by one year, or even two, the compulsory full-time school-life of everybody? On the evidence of the present day it is hard to believe that the millions of money spent on universal education since 1870 have returned any appreciable dividend. The standard of taste reflected in the popular press, the cinema and commercial amusements could hardly be lower. The mere fact of being able to read, quite exceptional two hundred years ago but almost universal to-day, has done little more than open up to our adult population the football pools and the near-pornography of the

bookstalls. Neither as individuals nor as a nation have we any grounds for supposing ourselves either happier or more intelligent than our great-grandfathers.

The concentration on the quantitative is fundamentally mistaken. By lengthening the school-life of every single boy and girl we are wasting money, materials, teachers' time, which could more usefully go to doing something worth doing with those who would really benefit from it. To increase the number of scholarships is in real life to do no more than to lower the standard of the winners of them. Moreover, every teacher knows that scores of boys and girls of fourteen are ready to leave school; they will in fact learn more from the practical life of the farm or the factory than they could possibly learn inside a school building; they will be healthier, happier and more efficient. To keep them at school for another year is well-intentioned stupidity; they neither want it nor enjoy it nor benefit from it; on the contrary, they become discontented, frustrated, rebellious and determined never to have anything more to do with books or music for as long as they shall live. Why not let them go, to a properly controlled industrial system where they will, in their own way, learn far more than we pay millions of pounds and wear out hundreds of teachers to teach them?

The root fallacy is the exaltation of quantity at the expense of quality. We are so obsessed with notions of equality and uniformity that we finish up by imposing on unwilling thousands something they neither want nor deserve, while we leave ourselves neither time nor money for those who really are worth both. Of course it was wrong that in the past the benefits of education were confined to so few. But to-day we are making the opposite (and much more costly) mistake. Human beings are not born equal, in educability any more than in physical beauty or personal charm, and it is doctrinaire nonsense to treat them as if they were. By all means give to those who merit them all the opportunities there are; so shall we establish ourselves as a nation, and so shall we make the most fruitful use of our limited man-power. If we water down the quality of what we provide we shall produce nothing but a nation of dreary half-educated nonentities. Make quality the touch-stone; extend the quantity as far as ever it can be extended without debasing the quality. But stop there, for to go further is to do a dis-service to the nation and to the individual.

There is the first antinomy. Which half is right? Which ought to be our national policy, quantity or quality?

The second antinomy arises from the first. What sort of education ought we to provide for our young people? In the welter of administrative detail we have submerged the problem which to the practising teacher is the fundamental one. Never mind, he says, about regulations and memoranda and statistics; all these can be dealt with by somebody else; my job is in the front line; I have the Toms and Bills and Joans and

Helens in front of me in a class-room ; what exactly am I going to teach them ? In botherments about machinery we have forgotten that for the sake of which all the machinery exists. It is the content of education that matters, what is actually taught in an actual class-room. What ought that content to be ?

On the one hand it is argued that this is the age of specialization, and that if we are to hold our own in world-markets there is no time to waste on anything but making each Tom and each Joan the most efficient possible producer. Most obviously and most heatedly this is argued at the university level. We need twice as many technologists as we have ever had before. We need doctors, lawyers, parsons, teachers, research chemists, engineers ; we have a comparatively small population, and we simply cannot afford anything but the most rigorous economy in its time or the most intensive cultivation of its capabilities. Let us not make the mistake of supposing that specialization is confined to scientific studies : the lawyer is as much a specialist as the physicist. And let us not be afraid of open and avowed specialization. It is not un-educational to learn " more and more about less and less " ; in fact, it is both desirable and necessary, desirable because academic abilities are most fully developed by steady application to a particular and limited field of inquiry, necessary because life is too short for anything else.

Nor is it only at the university level that this principle holds good. If a boy is going to be a good gardener, or a girl an efficient worker in a plastics factory, he must be taught to be a gardener and she to be a plasticienne. Why not face facts ? If the object and goal of a particular boy's education is known, it is just silly not to bring him up with that end in view. We now have all kinds of techniques for deciding what the careers of boys and girls should be ; it is obvious and logical that when these are decided the education which follows should be deliberately designed to foster and fulfil the individual's capacities and potentialities. Those things are the things they ought to be taught.

But, again, is it quite as easy as that ? If the " specialists " have their way, what will be the result ? Already we see, at the university level, the consequences of their doctrine. Not only is it already the case that no two professors in different faculties can hold rational conversation with each other ; worse, in many faculties the sub-divisions of one ' subject ' have reached such a degree of detail that no common ground remains. And this is reflected down into the schools. It is all very well to applaud concentration on a particular field of inquiry. But in real life the demands made, for instance, on the intending medical student are by now so extensive and so detailed that he has no time for anything but physics, chemistry and biology from the age of sixteen onwards, unless a " reactionary " headmaster insists on some other studies to keep the unfortunate boy sane. If this is true of the comparatively able boy in the grammar school, who might be expected to have other and non-

specialist interests, what must be the effect of specialization on the academically less gifted ?

The fact is that we have abandoned the ideal of the " educated man ". Overwhelmed by the recognition that nobody nowadays can hope to be a polymath, we have thrown our hand in and no longer expect a man to know anything outside his one chosen line. In former days a man was educated first and then learnt to be a doctor afterwards. Then the educational psychologists decided that the general training of the mind, with subsequent transfer to some specialized field, was a myth. So the educational system was planned (if that be the right word) accordingly. More lately the psychologists have spoken with a less dogmatic voice, having, perhaps, learnt a little more in the meantime. But the damage has been done, and it will take a long time to climb wearily back to former sanity. Meanwhile, we are producing thousands of competent laboratory assistants but precious few educated scientists.

Let it be granted straight away that we need highly trained technologists and doctors and engineers. But is not the really first-class man among them one who has some sort of sympathy, sensibility, insight, which his purely technical studies cannot give him ? To produce thousands of highly competent technicians will not solve our economic or professional problems. Width as well as depth is necessary ; and that can only come from a sympathetic regard for studies beyond his specialism.

Again, which half is right ? Can the antinomy between " the educated man " and " the specialist " be resolved ?

The third antinomy is the most fundamental of all, but so deep and far-reaching that we instinctively try to pretend that it does not exist. In its simplest form it is : should our national system of education be religious or secular ?

The secularist would argue that religion is really no concern of the school's. A child goes to school to be taught things practical and useful. Religion is a matter for the child's parents. If they choose to bring him up in a religious atmosphere, that is their affair ; if they do not so choose, that is still their affair. In neither case is it the school's business to interfere. There are still traces, in the appointment of teachers, of an outmoded state of society ; and there are lingering relics of a nineteenth century (or even a feudal) obscurantism. But official religious teaching is an impertinence on the part of the school, apart altogether from the dangers of personal persecution and individual proselytism. Leave all that to the parents or to the parsons ; at all costs keep religion out of the schools, unless you want friction, unhappiness and intellectual dishonesty.

Contrariwise, it is argued that without religion education is without heart or soul. The issue is not merely the formal or official teaching of scripture or doctrine. It goes far deeper than that. Either a religious atmosphere is breathed throughout the whole school or it is not ; if it is not, a few scripture lessons a week are neither here nor there. Nobody

supposes that there is a distinctively religious kind of arithmetic or French grammar, as distinct from a non-religious ; but everybody who works in a school knows that there is a difference between a religious and a secular attitude towards the whole of a school's life and activity.

No doubt the antinomy is a reflection of the indecision of the British people at the present time. We are reluctant to come out with a downright affirmation of religious faith, lest we should commit the frightful crime of seeming old-fashioned : but we should, perhaps irrationally, be a shade uneasy if religious observance disappeared altogether either from the national life or from our national education.

Indeed, all these three antinomies derive from unresolved disjunctions in the life and thought of the nation as a whole. Do we want quantity or quality ? Do we want bigger and better specialists, even at the cost of wider general sympathy and interest ? Do we want a religious basis to our lives or not ? A country's educational system reflects that country's ideals. For as long as these questions remain unanswered our own national system of education will drift without course, rudder or compass, and everybody who works in it will be desperately busy getting nowhere.

(The author, who is Headmaster of Shrewsbury School, is Chairman of the Headmasters' Conference and a Member of the English Central Advisory Council for Education.)

THE PITFALLS OF PLANNING

By HERMANN LEVY

I.

THE popular argument of planners is that they wish to replace disorder by order, and those who advocate planning as a new economic system allege that in former days there was economic chaos, bad organization, over-lapping and waste of effort as a result of unrestricted competition and *laissez-faire*. The argument is not limited to those who plan without any personal or financial interest. It is also used by representatives of trades who are anxious to create a non-competitive organization of their businesses through monopolist combination. They wish to replace 'cut throat competition' by 'orderly trading' and give no consideration to the possibilities lying between the extremes of such competition and a planned economy.

The only fair appraisal which can be made of a period of (more or less) free competition must be related both to the commercial and social epoch before the 1914-1918 war. Previously, indeed, the idea of a planned economy, though visualized in some socialist writings, for instance August Bebel's *The State of the Future*, was unknown to the world at large. With wheat at 7s. per cwt., an annual percentage of unemployed of just over two per cent., a most favourable balance of payments and an undisputed rise in the purchasing power of wages maintained for many decades, this period should be remembered with envy far more than with criticism of its "imperfect" organization. When planners of all kinds warn us of the dangers of reverting to the chaotic conditions before the 1939-1945 war they should bear in mind that the epoch 1914-1939 saw the destruction of many conditions on which pre-1914 prosperity had rested : a physical destruction of many countries ; the disintegration of world economy by mounting tariff barriers and the nationalist policy of newly created States ; the impediments of free immigration to the U.S.A. and other overseas countries ; the inconsiderate concentration of gold in the hands of the U.S.A., the development through this of credit inflation in America and the breakdown of an artificial boom after 1929 involving in its train all exporting nations, and the development of inflation in Germany as the result of an uneconomic peace treaty. All these circumstances ran counter to the fundamental principles of world economy on which pre-1914 prosperity had been established, and if they all led to "chaos" and "disorganization" this only proved the case for a free competitive

world as it mainly was before 1914. It is ridiculous to blame a "system" when its foundations have been removed and its decisive functions paralysed. Yet, even under such conditions of a partially disabled system of unplanned economy the social results were not unsatisfactory: the overall picture in the employed worker's standard of living in 1938 when compared with 1914* shows that he worked seven to eight hours less each week; that family "real" income was up by thirty-seven per cent.; and the number of people to be kept was down by twenty per cent.; that "real" consumption of food per head was up by thirty-five per cent. and "real" consumption of clothing per head was up forty-five per cent. Not a bad show for an "un-planned" "chaotic" economy greatly hampered by conditions which lay quite outside its spheres of influence.

II.

The drive for planning before and after the 1939-1945 war is due, if we ignore the purely socialistic impulses and ideologies, to a very plain reason. Its aim at first was to remedy the critical conditions followed by the international depression of the early 'thirties and is now to redress the unavoidable impact of war and post-war economic calamity. The avowed aim was not to restore the pre-1914 structure which planners look upon with distrust. Ruined buildings not less than the disorganized state of every field of economic activity give rise to a feeling that something entirely new should be set up; not just a patching-up of remaining possibilities with a view to regaining by and by the old standards, but an entirely novel structure to remedy the real or fancied deficiencies of economist tradition. The idea of planning fits into this attitude for it promises to replace an individualistic, competitive, decentralized type of economy by a centralized, mostly non-competitive but pre-formulated policy by—a "plan." It aims at replacing the mechanism of competition and evolutionary development by a rigidly pre-conceived and systematically elaborated system. It attacks the old method for having been no "order" at all; and indeed, viewed from the angle of the planner, it never was an order. It was a system seeking an equilibrium by the hidden hand of uncontrolled economic forces.

But is this not "order"? It was, after all, the system on which the progress of wealth and civilization was built ever since, in the eighteenth century, the old "order" of mercantilism, the guilds and town corporations, was discarded. One could just as well pretend that a free lance writer was no writer at all. It is true that this order originated as a principle from the somewhat unreal conception of competitive struggles which through some mysterious, probably holy, law would in the long run be to the benefit of mankind. This was the interpretation of individualism by the representatives of moral philosophy of whom Adam Smith was one. In his view it was not necessary for a man to make

*See Mark Abrams: *The Condition of the British People, 1911-1945*, page 86.

well-being or happiness his object; if he only followed his instinct, so far as law and morality would allow, experience would show that both his own advantage and the well-being of society followed in the natural course of events. This was certainly the reverse of planning. But "instinct" as the beneficial economic motor in our scientific epoch should not be considered as an unassessable, obscure factor in economic life.* It has come to be recognized in modern economics and business life as a very real and explicable factor of the economic mechanism. The "hidden hand" is no longer shrouded in mystery. The trade in futures, for instance, is nothing less than the practical application of instincts to the attainment of the fairest possible price level. It stands, of course, in sharp contrast to the aim of determining by cost calculations what the "right" price should be—an aim of which the hopelessness was recently confirmed by the official statement that "there has not yet been evolved a technique which solves satisfactorily the essential problem of how, in the absence of free competition, to settle the "right price" to be paid for a particular article.† But the price mechanism as we know it on free markets, and futures trading in particular, settled the problem. The "bears" and the "bulls" with their pessimistic and optimistic vision, their individual "feeling" for the things to come, this individual flair called "hunches" in the buying of textiles, provide the means of arriving at average price levels which come as near as possible to a correct equilibrium of supply and demand.

It was the distortion of world trade, the exchange restrictions limiting the effectiveness of arbitration, the conditions of general economic instability, of over-production and under-consumption which during the inter-war years paralysed the adjusting functions of futures trading and brought about the restriction and buffer pool schemes and other proposals to replace free trade by planned economy.‡ But this does not disprove the usefulness of "bears" and "bulls" in normal times nor the system of price determination by competition. Some fifty years ago German agrarians succeeded in abolishing the trade in grain futures by which, as they contended, corn traders were depressing the producers' prices. It was not very long before such dealings were re-established as their prohibition had obviously resulted in heavy fluctuations of the seasonal prices for agricultural products, the safety valve of speculation having been removed. The "hidden hand" which provides an equilibrium by assessing as correctly as possible the hopeful prospects as well as the risk of developments is the plain result of commercial psychology.

In the sphere of manufacture and retail distribution the system of unplanned competition is accused of resulting in wasteful over-production.

*For a recent interesting review of the ethical and philosophical side of economic liberalism see Margaret Macpherson, *The Philosophical Foundations of Free Trade*. The Free Trade Union. 1947.

†See Fourteenth Report of the Select Committee of National Expenditure, 1943, page 15.

‡See for interesting details Gerda Blau, "Wool in the World Economy," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*. 1946.

Planners claim that their systems of rationalization and concentration will exclude such developments. But, as a matter of fact, concentration of units had been progressing—for good or evil, for it may lead to monopolist organization—through action by manufacturers themselves long before we heard about planning. In the period when the much accused system of un-planned economy was at its height the number of blast furnaces was reduced from 629 in 1865 to 338 in 1913 while the production of pig iron simultaneously increased from 6.3 million to 10.2 million tons. This was not achieved by planning committees but by the common sense of private industrialists. But when in the 'twenties some sort of "rationalization fever" broke out, fostered by planners of all kinds, the effect became detrimental enough to make Professor D. H. Macgregor exclaim that "they rode the horse of rationalization harder than the pace of industry could keep up with it." England was lucky that in its conception of "rationalization" it had not gone as far as the United States and Germany and, therefore, felt the setback less severely than both these countries.

But, after all, the original impetus for larger industrial units, amalgamations, concentration of efficiency and vertical combination came from industrialists and not from official or un-official planners. That it was less in the British coal industry than should be logically expected was mainly due to the fact that the structure of British coal production is characterized by a great diversity of coal as well as of coal mines; smaller mines, as any mining engineer will be able to confirm, are sometimes those where both conditions of labour and efficiency are unsurpassed while the larger ones may sometimes fall considerably below the best standard in both respects.* Even Political and Economic Planning (PEP) cannot avoid striking a cautious note on the social effects of re-grouping of production units.† As to retail distribution there may be an overflow of outlets. But consumers have not suffered by it. As long as retail trade associations are endeavouring to regulate prices and margins it is doubtful whether a "planned" reduction of shops would lead to the desirable result of reduced prices.

On the other hand such modern types of retail units as the department store with its carefully "planned" lay-out, the multiple chains, the fixed-price stores and the cheap bazaars are all innovations introduced by businessmen themselves, unaided by planners of any kind. If the latter through various organizations now try to canalize the modern development of stores into a general pattern by advocating a rigid division of shopping centres, concentrating the main activities in the centre of the town or suburb and leaving only the shops serving the daily requirements of customers in the side streets and subsidiary shopping places, they will once

*See *Coal* by a Colliery Manager, 1945, page 45; also Mr. R. A. S. Redmayne's interesting letter in *The Times* of March 27, 1947; also Trevor Evans in the *Daily Express* of June 11, 1945: "Men of the little pits get the big output".
†See PEP Broadsheet of October 24, 1947, page 122.

more exhibit their complete disregard of the commercial conditions of retail distribution as they have developed to the satisfaction of shops and shoppers. Will, for instance, the pharmacist in a subsidiary centre no longer be permitted to sell cameras because they may be bought in the central shopping district? Will the small baker or grocer be prohibited from selling sweets because planners think it sufficient if a side street is already served by one single trade sweet shop? Have they assessed the time lost by the housewife when she is obliged to buy in the centre what before she could buy next door? And what if the few single trade traders in a subsidiary centre left over by the process of "planned" reduction of shops use their fortified and less competitive position to exploit the consumer? All such considerations have no place in plans which consider their expediency in purely economic arithmetic.

III.

The characteristic feature of the "non-planned" economy is the belief that the common economic interest would best be served if all persons connected with economic life were allowed to use their individual gifts and their differing abilities as freely and fully as possible. The same principle applied to countries leads to the free trade concept. But from this idea of individualism also springs another principle: that responsibility and decision should be placed as near as possible to action. It is only through this nearness to action that the individual is enabled to use his special faculties and to realize his specific aims. This means differentiation; indeed, such differentiation is aimed at by economic liberalism as the great purpose of higher civilization. Planning proceeds in the opposite direction. Considering differentiation as chaos, multiplication of effort with its necessary corollary of failure of the less efficient as waste, planners advocate a unification and standardization of production and distribution methods. It is clear that such unification and standardization would immediately dispense with the services of individuals who follow their own instincts and vision. From such planning centralization of administration follows logically. Indeed, standardization is the pre-condition of centralization. One may agree that where through a natural process standardization of production, distribution or services has developed, centralization and possibly even nationalization may not be objected to. This may apply to railways, for instance, or to the milk round or to burial services*. But the position is very different where, through differentiation of wants, differentiation of production units and of the administrative machinery is still required. In such cases any attempt at planning can only be achieved at the expense of variety and flexibility of production and service. Standardization of production in the United States was only achieved at the expense of the consumer's choice; by

*See Sir Arnold Wilson and Professor Hermann Levy, *Burial Costs and Funeral Reform*, 1938, where communal burial is advocated.

erecting high tariff walls consumers were forced to accept American uniformity; the "success of mass production", as Lewis C. Ord emphasized in his book *Secrets of Industry* (1944, page 90), was coupled with "lack of variety."

The danger of such standardization will easily be realized in Britain where so much depends on exports to a great variety of countries with a great variety of tastes which cannot be bullied into acceptance of a few standardized styles achieved by bulk production. It is for that reason that the plea for planning has been perfunctory perhaps in British textile industries. The pitfalls here would be too obvious.

Planning, by placing administration as far away as possible from action—for this is the result of centralization—must forego taking into due consideration the regional, local or any other differences which may influence the economic structure. These, indeed, must be replaced by uniformity, however artificial. A good example of this are the Milk Marketing Acts. While milk is a more or less uniform product, which, as I suggested before, may be distributed in retail, as it has been, by a uniform and single milk-round, the production of milk shows a most disintegrated structure related to farmers of many kinds, near and far away from consuming centres, dependent on the changing commercial chances of the sale of fresh milk or its manufacture into milk products. The Milk Marketing schemes have tried to create for all this more or less uniform conditions, to iron out geographical differences, to reduce seasonal discrepancies and stabilize prices. The result has been the creation of so-called "artificial proximity values" and a host of complicated regulations such as the bonus for level deliveries, complicated pooling arrangements, a network of specific charges and rebates related to transport, depots, etc. But the most deplorable result has been, as the late Sir Daniel Hall pointed out in his book *Reconstruction and the Land* (1941, page 235), that the "Marketing Boards concerned with milk have adopted methods which do not tend to give the public more and cheaper milk." Though devised and "planned" to simplify and rationalize milk production and milk wholesale distribution they were immediately confronted by the diversification in the traditional structure of production, the pressing of which into their iron-clad pattern became the object of their multifarious and complex regulations.

The experience of other marketing boards has not been dissimilar. The latest Report on Marketing Boards, recently published, does not provide a more satisfactory picture. The result after an experience of twenty years is, as *The Economist* put it in its issue of November 22, 1947, that "the producer-controlled Marketing Boards did very little (considering their powers) to rationalize distributive channels—a fact which hardly helps their claim to do the job now."

It is the great defect of any centralization that it tends to flatten out any structural differences and thus deprives the individual producer, or the

local or regional administrators of the possibilities of meeting specialized requirements.* A student of incentives, Mr. R. P. Lynton, suggested that had the central authorities decided to use the procedure of local negotiation to the settling of increased working hours in coal mines much wasteful delay could have been avoided.† Such statements should be as little ignored as that of M. P. Fogarty who writes in his brilliant book on local and regional development organizations, *Plan Your Own Industries* (1947, page 289): "At a time when, by common consent, the weakening of local autonomy has already gone dangerously far . . . the Board of Trade has actually taken over from the local and regional development councils functions which these bodies were performing efficiently before the war." He suggests that this a matter of "administrative convenience". But as a matter of fact the desire to assume the exclusive right of administrative functions is everywhere one of the characteristics of centralized planning.

IV.

Planners ridicule the system of the free play of forces and accuse it of chaotic results. But their own schemes are by no means infallible to achieve the desired ends. On the contrary many planning schemes are based upon "assumptions" which may just as well be realized as not. The "Plan for Plymouth," for instance, devises in detail a grandiose planning scheme for shopping centres, but it is explained that the plan can only be put into practice if the passenger transport system is improved by new peripheral roads and enlarged traffic facilities to make the journey easy and pleasant to the distant housewives. Where the finance for this revolutionary improvement is to come from and when it will come is an issue wisely avoided. In the same way the Beveridge plan and the successive social insurance schemes are based on the "assumption" that a comprehensive health service will be created. But two months before the inception of the social insurance scheme it is tragically obvious that the shortage of hospital accommodation, of nurses, of doctors, specialists, surgeons, dentists, of rehabilitation centres and even of medical appliances is such as to delay the realization for many years of an assumption so easily made. Assumptive economics are, indeed, one of the most dangerous make-shift aids of planners. In other countries social insurance schemes have successfully developed their system of medical benefits by the decentralized machinery of local sickness funds, works funds, professional indemnity associations and contracting-out schemes in gradual compliance with the specialized requirements.

Planners are well aware that they have no means of assessing future trends of markets. You can, if you wish, "plan" production by legislation

*See an interesting Letter by an industrialist Major E. Beddington Behrens, in *The Times* of October 6, 1947.

†See *The Times*, October 17, 1947.

and administration, but you cannot enforce the sale of the so produced commodities. Fifteen years ago Russia failed to clear stocks which had been made for export and stored "according to plans made in respect of every country"* simply because the world market conditions had changed; this is a representative illustration. The plan had been based upon failing assumptions. The Report on the Agricultural Marketing Acts says very properly—and probably this wisdom is due to the disappointment with marketing boards—: "Enterprise and initiative entail willingness to risk mistakes. Civil Servants cannot afford to take these risks." But, as a matter of fact, planning when based on "assumptions" is taking a still greater and probably more dangerous risk to the nation. Least of all can export markets be planned, because they are subject to the ever changing whims of millions of distant consumers and to their varying tastes and requirements. It is for that reason that textile exporters in this country oppose the suggestions made by theorists to standardize textiles with a view to reducing cost through bulk production. It may mean that the goods so produced will lack markets while the home market—unlike that in the U.S.A.—is too small to compensate for a reduced world trade. If planners believe that they may simply devise the technical means of mass production while leaving the sale of the goods to free enterprise they are grossly mistaken. It is the market which determines production and not production the market and this will be so in particular when the post-war period of sellers' markets is over. This may also become the thorn in the flesh of export targets. What at any moment the markets are and what their future development may have in store is, as far as humanly possible, best assessed and foreshadowed by traders themselves on a short-term basis; only when spontaneous developments promise some consolidation and continuance should industry devise its long-term technical programmes.

The situation in the steel industry is a significant example; the programme now in hand was conceived at a time when the acuteness of immediate economic difficulties was not foreseen. A diversion of effort for a time to short-term needs is urgently required. But too many bodies—the Government's central planning board, the steel section of the Ministry of Supply, the Iron and Steel Control Board and the Steel Federation—are concerned in making decisions which thereby are necessarily made very slowly. Short-term adaptation, the essence of the businessman's success, does not fit into "planning".

In its inherent unsuitability to provide the necessary links between supply and demand, production and markets, industrial technique and a flexible commercial disposal of the goods, lies perhaps the greatest pitfall of the system which "planners" are advocating.

ARE THE WORKERS READY TO CONTROL INDUSTRY?

By J. T. MURPHY

THE question has a long history. Had it been asked of James Morrison who first put forward a plan for "a parliament of trades" as the alternative to the parliamentary system of the 'thirties of the last century, he would have answered most emphatically that "the workers were the only people who mattered and fit to run the affairs of the country." And he meant by the term "workers" the manual workers, the men of no property who toiled with their hands. This proletarian and manual content of the term "workers" was generally accepted. "Workers of the world unite" meant the same as "proletarians of the world unite."

When the syndicalists of the latter half of the nineteenth century used the expression "Workers' control of industry" the industrial manual workers were meant and it was envisaged that one day these would be so completely organized into industrial unions that they would be able to sack the employers and themselves own and run the industries with their unions.

This connotation of the term "workers" still lingers in current usage although it is no longer generally accepted. The democratizing process of two world wars has given the word a new and wider application. Managers, technicians, and clerical staffs, who at one time could not bear to think of themselves as "workers" now hasten to affirm that they also deserve this designation and no one denies it. Those who advocate "workers' control of industry" to-day do not think of a parliament of industry as an alternative to the parliamentary system based on citizenship but as a functional institution responsible for the running of industry owned by the community as a whole. They mean that each industry should be controlled by all engaged in it whatever their capacity, managerial professional, clerical or manual, and that the self-governing industries should co-operate together by means of a parliament of industry.

Nevertheless the old primitive syndicalist ideas and definitions persist in the minds of men although the conditions which gave rise to them do not characterize the situation of to-day. Then there were no nationalized industries; to-day there are several and political power is in the hands of a Government and Parliament committed to extend the principle to other industries. The Government is also compelled by the circumstances of our time to exercise an over-riding political control over the whole economic and industrial life of the country. The private profit motive which dominated the economic and industrial life of the nineteenth

*See Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, 1946, page 266.

century has been eliminated from the nationalized industries which are subordinated to the political control of the State in the interests of the community as a whole. It is not too much to say that we are in a period of rapid transition from the private ownership and control to the social ownership and control of the means of production. But it is clear, I think, that the Labour movement which inaugurated the great change was not itself ready for and did not see clearly all the implications of the changes for which it would be responsible. On no issue is this more in evidence than on the one concerning the control of industry.

The Labour Government has nationalized the coal mines, the gas and electricity industries, the railways and road transport. The most striking thing about these developments is, that whatever the intentions of the Government, neither the people, nor the miners for example, are conscious of having become owners of a great industry. On the contrary it appears to them and to many others that instead of us all having become equal partners in ownership, the miners have exchanged their old bosses for new ones, more remote and more powerful and that they have become the employees of a new, over-riding, bureaucratic corporation backed by the State. It seems a better employer in some respects, having granted, under the pressure of an urgent need for coal, higher wages and other social amenities which the miners have long demanded. The article by the miner B. L. Coombes in the January issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* brilliantly illustrates the changes that have taken place in the first year of the new régime in the mines.

It may be asserted that there has been complete co-operation between the Mine Workers' Union and the National Coal Board. That the Executive of the Union has opposed strikes, emphasized the importance of production, indeed campaigned for it and succeeded in persuading the men to work overtime, and conducted its old function of pressing the wage claims and so on of the miners ably and well, no one can deny. But there is little evidence of the adaptation of the union structure to the new functions which should naturally accompany the great change in ownership.

I am sure there is not a trades union leader in the country who does not realize that once the industry in which he functions has become the property of the nation, he and his members are inhibited against strikes. Everyone is quite sure that the unions can, in the new circumstances, secure remedies for their grievances and regulate the conditions of their employment in negotiation with the new authority without strikes. Indeed from the moment they are definitely conscious of the change of ownership they become really more interested in production than in retarding production or stopping it. And why not? Surely if the mines have become the property of the nation and the miners have become equal partners in ownership with the rest of us, it should follow that the old antagonistic relationship, in which it was the function of the union to fight the employers, would be swept away, and the social basis be laid for

a new functional relationship of all, from the manager down to the gate boy, in co-operation for the production of coal! That neither the Government, nor the Coal Board, nor the leaders of the Mine Workers' Union have prepared the workers, managers and inspectors in the mines for *this* transformation seems self-evident.

What appears to have been happening during the last twelve months is something entirely different. The National Coal Board as a great corporation seems to have usurped the powers hitherto invested in the private owners and stands in exactly the same relationship to the miners as the mine-owners did before them. Witnesses are numerous. The Grime-thorpe strike extending far into the Yorkshire coalfield and depriving the people of hundreds of thousands of tons of coal, proclaimed to the world that a new power had arisen *over* the workers in the mines. Never was there a more lively example of the stupidity of bureaucratic authority than in this exhibition of the Board upholding its "dignity and authority". Never did so many leading bureaucrats, high up officials of unions and the Government make such a contemptible exhibition at one and the same time. What a caterwauling, threatening, bawling in the highways! And why? Because a body of miners stubbornly refused to operate a decision about which they had not been consulted in the making. And this was the year of democracy 1947!

The N.C.B. was defeated in that struggle but the full significance of the battle has not yet been thoroughly appreciated and understood. From many coalfields protests against the "New Power" have been growing. What is wrong is simply that the bureaucracy of the Coal Board does not think of itself as part-owner with the rest of us, but as having stepped into the shoes of the coal-owners to exercise their old powers and functions in the old way of "class paternalism", as Carlyle called it. A similar carry over actuates the leaders of the Mineworkers' Union and other unions too. The Mineworkers' Union has certainly got in front of the others in becoming an industrial union. But its leaders have not anticipated and prepared for the new responsibilities of their victory, by organizing their members in the mines to pass from conflict to co-operation even though the pit committees of miners were there to hand ready for co-operation.

That there must be a National Coal Board no one would deny. That it must have some authority is equally incontestable. But it should be a *functional authority* derived from all engaged in the working of the mines, who, collectively, are held responsible by the nation as a whole for production in the mining industry. The captain of a football team derives his authority to direct the team from the willing co-operation of all the team, and not from any extraneous power over the players. That is what I mean by functional authority. Hitherto the functional authority within industry has been vested in the property relations and these have been based on one form or another of private property. Now the mine

workers are ostensibly common owners, with us, of the mining industry. If such is really the case then the relationship of the N.C.B. to all engaged in coal production should be similar in kind to that of the relationship of the captain of the football team to the rest of the players, and its authority should be derived from the "team" acting in co-operation.

To suggest for a single moment that the workers in industry have become so mechanized, stupid and dumb that they are incapable of doing in co-operation, as free men and as equal partners with the rest of us in national ownership, what they have been doing under the pressure of circumstance and the discipline imposed by economic and political enemies, is to flout all experience. The Government should beware lest the people become convinced that what they appear to be doing under the banner of "National Ownership" is a huge swindle, and discover that, instead of the people owning the mines, the railways and other concerns, the real owners and controllers of industry turn out to be the corporations of bureaucrats, including all the old personnel of managerial authority, which ruled the workers previously, now backed by the power of the State. As yet we are in the early stages of the change-over from private ownership to national or social ownership and there is time for the Government and the Boards to prove otherwise. The check lies not in the House of Commons and Mr. Morrison rightly refused to allow the National Boards to be subject to a fiat of criticism from the House of Commons. Nor is it in whether there are enough ready-made managers in the bureaucracy of the trade unions waiting to be selected to a new bureaucratic oligarchy. The real test lies in the extent to which the nationalized industries begin to function as organizations of free partners in ownership, pooling and organizing their skill and common wisdom, as self-governing industries, in the most efficient and fruitful organization of the productive process.

The forms of this new mode of common participation in responsibility for production have already been shown to us in the widespread development of "joint production committees of workers and management"—in the mines the "pit committees". It is significant that these organizations in the first place were not formed on the initiative of the Government or even the trades union executives. They were formed on the initiative of the workers in the factories, mills and mines, in response to the fight for life against the external enemy. They were certainly welcomed by the trades union leaders and the Government of the day because of this common purpose. At first they met with the resistance of many employers and those who did accept, more frequently than not, accepted them reluctantly.

I well remember a young works manager, politically a Tory, telling a committee of shop stewards of which I was chairman at the time: "Were it not for the war, I would not touch the proposition with a barge pole." But the war being on and the common struggle for existence having to over-ride the claims of private profit and property, he agreed. A "production committee" composed of equal numbers of the management

representatives and the workers on the floor of the factory met regularly and pooled their experience, to eliminate bottle-necks, accelerate the flow of production, bring forward new inventions, new gadgets, jigs and improved methods of work. It is true that at first both sides were suspicious of each other and the trades union shop stewards began to operate as if they were on another committee whereby to squeeze concessions from the management. It would have been easy to say at this point: "The workers are not ready to control industry." But it would not have been true, as the experience of these production committees has amply demonstrated. Once the workers and the management had been drawn into common action by means of the common interest and purpose, the life, activity and productivity of the factories completely changed.

It is worth while here to observe how these committees were formed. They were elected by "the workers on the job", and as the new principle of accelerating production superseded the principle of retarding production, the choice of men and women to serve on these committees changed. After the first initial experience in which old habits decided the choice from those who had played a prominent part in organizing them to secure collective bargains, they began to elect people because of their knowledge and skill in production.

Two things were impressed upon me by this wartime experience of co-operation between management and workers. Once the common purpose of the production activity had entered fully into the consciousness of managers and workers through organized consultation, one with the other in the factory, and everybody was taken into the fullest confidence concerning the work to be done, production improved in quantity and quality. The second point is this—the deadening, levelling effect of mass production and machine production which social critics and craftsmen have denounced as soul destroying for the individual, found its answer in the transformation of the mechanically levelling process into a conscious co-operative team activity of the group, in which every unit of the group was inspired with its purpose and everyone's part in attaining it. Power relations had given place to co-operative functional relations even within enterprises where the profit motive remained. But it was subordinate to the larger purpose.

The first year of nationalization of the coal mines has not yet established that kind of co-operation but only the co-operation of the central bureaucracies of the National Coal Board and the Mineworkers' Union. This brought us strikes and threats of strikes that were wholly unnecessary. The unity has to be shifted into the mines and into all places of production. In this sense, the workers are ready to control industry. For this demand has no longer the meaning it had when first the syndicalists put it forward. Then it meant that the working class should sack the capitalist class and themselves run the industries. Now it means and cannot mean anything else but the organized co-operation of *all* engaged in a socialized industry

346 ARE THE WORKERS READY TO CONTROL INDUSTRY ?

as free and equal partners in common ownership.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, addressing a labour conference a year ago, said we were moving towards "the administration of things" as distinct from the government of men. He was right. But the way towards that will be very stormy and costly if the leaders of Labour work on the assumption that the workers in industry are not ready and willing to participate in the "administration of things". The workers are rather tired of being bossed by "Boards", preached at by politicians and patronized with "class paternalism" from any quarter.

(A former shop steward in more than one firm the author, who has written a number of books, has served on joint production committees.)

THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS RE-CONSIDERED

By HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

(1)

THE classics of childhood can seldom be approached with an open mind and one is filled with something like envy for the lady who, seeing a book called *The Pilgrim's Progress* on sale in one of our great book-shops at Christmas, asked the manager: "Has it been well reviewed?" (This is a true, not an apocryphal, story.) If she ever managed to read it, she would, one feels, be the best kind of critic to make an assessment of Bunyan in our times. For how can those of us for whom Giant Despair was some kind of relative to Polyphemus and the ogre who said 'Fe-fi-fo-fum'; who half-expected to find Apollyon among "the wicked shadows that go tramp, tramp, tramp" in the gloom round the candle-lit banisters of Robert Louis Stevenson's child going up to bed; who recognized Vanity Fair immediately when the travelling showmen came in summer to a little country town; who, from an old Victorian steel-engraving knew, as a panorama, the way to the Celestial City better than any secular geography—how can such a one ever detach himself sufficiently from the magic of childhood to see *The Pilgrim's Progress* as just an ordinary book?

And that is not the only obstacle. There is not only the childish surrender; there is the adolescent revolt—revolt, that is to say, not against Bunyan but against Shakespeare. With what secret revolutionary delight one welcomed George Bernard Shaw's great essay, come upon by accident in school-days and quoted to oneself:

All that you miss in Shakespear you find in Bunyan, to whom the true heroic came quite obviously and naturally. The world to him was a more terrible place than it was to Shakespear; but he saw through it a path at the end of which a man might look not only forward to the Celestial City but back on his life and say: Tho' with great difficulty I am got hither, yet now I do not repent me of all the trouble I have been at to arrive where I am. My sword I give to him that shall succeed me in my pilgrimage, and my courage and skill to him that can get them.

The heart vibrates like a bell to such an utterance as this: to turn from it to "Out, out, brief candle" and "The rest is silence", and "We are such stuff as dreams are made of; and our little life is rounded by a sleep" is to turn from life, strength, resolution, morning air and eternal youth, to the terrors of a drunken nightmare. Let us descend now to the lower ground where Shakespear is not disabled by his inferiority in energy and elevation of spirit. Take one of his big fighting scenes and compare its blank verse, in point of mere rhetorical strenuousness, with Bunyan's prose. Macbeth's famous cue for the fight with Macduff runs thus:

Yet I will try the last: before my body
I throw my warlike shield. Lay on, Macduff

And damned be he that first cries Hold, enough;
Turn from this jingle, dramatically right in feeling but silly and resourceless in
thought and expression, to Apollyon's cue for the fight in the Valley of Humilia-
tion:

I am void of fear in this matter. Prepare thyself to die; for I swear by my infernal dea
that thou shalt go no farther: here will I spill thy soul."
This is the same thing done masterly Shakespeare fond as he is of describing
fights has hardly ever sufficient energy or reality of imagination to finish without
betraying the paper origin of his fancies by dragging in something classical in the
style of the Cyclops' hammer falling "on Mars's armor forged for proof eterne".
Hear how Bunyan does it:

I fought till my sword did cleave to my hand; and when they were joined together as if the
sword grew out of my arm; and when the blood ran thorow my fingers, then fought I
with most courage.

Nowhere in all Shakespeare is there a touch like that of the blood running down
through the man's fingers, and his courage rising to passion at it.

I have quoted this passage at length partly because it is still not
sufficiently known, partly because, thirty years after I first read it, I still
think that the criticism is, within its limits, valid; partly because—a
point to which I shall return later—it is relevant to a reassessment of
Bunyan in this 'century of wars'.

The revolt against Bunyan (for it was bound to come) was an adult
one. It was precipitated by a repudiation of his theological beliefs,
strengthened, on the secular side, by what may be epitomized as a
sensitvity to and-this-side-idolatry worship of Shakespeare and all
that that implies, and, on the religious, by an acquaintance with some of
the great mystical literature in which the soul's pilgrimage is described in
other terms and at a profounder level. By this comparison, *The Pilgrim's
Progress* appeared suddenly superficial, thin, clumsy, tedious and tasteless.
Even where the prose was majestic, it was because it was either the
Authorized Version of the Bible or a tolerable imitation of its rhythms
and cadences.

Even in the extreme of recoil, however, one did not go as far as Mr.
Alfred Noyes's bitter and partisan attack (which, indeed, had the effect of
convincing me that Bunyan must be a great deal better than I now supposed)
and one was still able to enjoy Macaulay's pillorying of the Anglo-Catholic
divine who tried to transform it into a Tractarian book, made the Wicket
Gate a type of Baptism and the House Beautiful of the Eucharist, so that
"as not a single pilgrim passes through the Wicket Gate in infancy, and as
Faithful hurries past the House Beautiful without stopping, the lesson
which the fable in its altered shape teaches is that none but adults ought
to be baptized and that the Eucharist may safely be neglected."

And now, having passed through these stages of a mental pilgrimage
about Bunyan's Pilgrim, one is confronted with two reissues* of the
book, each in its different way equal to any edition which has gone before,
each, by its choice of artist, format, type, directed at different audiences,
and one is half-compelled, half-cajoled to read it once more and to try to see

**The Pilgrim's Progress*, by John Bunyan, with illustrations by Edward Ardizzone. Faber. 12s. 6d.
The Pilgrim's Progress, by John Bunyan, illustrated by Clarke Hutton. S.C.M. Press. 12s. 6d.

it with the virgin eyes of the lady who asked: "Has it been
well reviewed?"

(II)

On the whole, of course, it has not. It remains "perhaps the only
book about which, after the lapse of a hundred years, the educated
minority has come over to the opinion of the common people." For a
century, if it was mentioned at all by the critics, it was mentioned only to
be damned. Cowper, who, greatly daring, praised it had not the additional
daring required to mention it by name. If, in the end, the critics came to
the conclusion that the book which stood third in its influence on their
countrymen (the Bible being the first, in fact; and Shakespeare, by a
courteous fiction, the second) was presumably a classic, their belated
laudations might be suspected of owing something to this circumstance.
The eulogy was less spontaneous and enthusiastic than the neglect.

This phenomenon—the *literati's* neglect and dislike of a book which
has gone for centuries into edition after edition, which has been adapted
in countless forms and translated into most languages (the critic should
look at the columns in the British Museum library catalogue)—is of some
relevance to any approach.

In judging a classic, we are warned, we are judging ourselves. This
is true provided we go one step further and ask: judging ourselves *by*
what? And the answer to this is usually 'by the somewhat eclectic
tastes of a group of critics who first pronounced the work 'a classic'.'
This explains why most 'classics' turn out to be, on acquaintance, dull
and unreadable—or, at best, containing a thimbleful of gold to a mountain
of slag. The most badly needed critic of any generation—and he seldom
appears—is one who should look at the 'classics' with the clear honesty
of the child who announced that the Emperor had no clothes. (It was
honesty, rather than arrogance, in Walter Pater which made him refuse
the conventional abasement before Shakespeare on the grounds that
Shakespeare had written perhaps ten pages of perfect poetry whereas he
himself had written one page of perfect prose.) Thus to judge a classic
unfavourably is not usually to sit pigmy-wise in absurd and self-accusing
judgment on the giant author, but merely to dispute the taste and creden-
tials of the author's contemporary critics and question the validity of the
parrot-endorsement of their views through the centuries.

But with *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and perhaps with *The Pilgrim's Progress*
alone, this is not the case. Here one is in the presence of a masterpiece
which generation after generation of ordinary men and women have taken
to their hearts in spite of the critics, and what is at stake in one's own
verdict is something very different from agreement or disagreement with
literary fashions or academic lucubrations. So one's approach becomes
not challenging but humble.

And in this humility I think one finds the key. One approaches as a
C1

child again and finds—this is the miracle of re-reading—all the magic that was there in childhood. Bunyan's very defects, in a literary sense, become virtues. I had expected to find long careful descriptions of the places that are so vivid—of the Slough, the Interpreter's House, Doubting Castle, the Valley of Humiliation; of the Delectable Mountains and By-Path Meadow and Vanity Fair and the Celestial City. But there are none. For him, as we now know, they were all real places in Bedfordshire; he knew them too well to need to describe them and by this very restraint communicated them perfectly to me, who knew them quite well in Hampshire, or to you, who may know them in Cumberland or Cornwall.

As with the places, so with the people. To dismiss the giving of such names as Worldly-Wiseman, Faithful, Lord Hate-Good, Mr. Live-Loose, Giant Despair and the rest as the mere following of the fashion of Jacobean and Restoration drama and to say that Ben Jonson on the one hand and the Carolines on the other did it with more subtlety and wit is surely to betray even a mere literary insensitivity. Who except scholars of the period or visitors to the performance of a revival can remember off-hand the names of half-a-dozen such characters in the entire Jonson and Restoration canon? And who cannot recall a dozen of Bunyan's? Again his very simplicity has given them the enduring quality of great art whereas the others have sunk into the oblivion which awaits the academic jest and the fashionable entertainment. If the characters have as little description allotted to them as the places through which they move it is because they do not need it. Bunyan knew them. So do we. Everything is in a name.

This economy of style, which is the mark of all great writing (*The Odyssey* is a supreme work of art; anybody, given sufficient patience, could write a *Ulysses*) retains its effect even in descriptive scenes. I remembered, from childhood, the horror of Faithful's end. Having, in the interval supped full of horrors from Edgar Allen Poe onwards and seen every literary ingenuity employed to produce the effect of it, I wondered whether Bunyan's simplicity would fail. But—to me, at least—it does not, because it releases, instead of circumscribing, the imagination:

they scourged him, then they buffeted him; then they lanced his flesh with knives; after that they stoned him with stones, then pricked him with their swords; and last of all they burned him to ashes at the stake. Thus came Faithful to his end.

The third point where the spell of youth still holds is in the story itself. First, last and all the time, *The Pilgrim's Progress* is a tale of adventure and fighting written by a man who had adventured and fought.

It has the authenticity of an autobiography, whether its adventures are spiritual or physical. If in the one we may also recognize ourselves, in the other we recognize one who knows what pain and fighting and peril are in actual war and is not merely a playwright providing patter for a fencing-match to tickle the groundlings. As for the story, it reveals Bunyan's mastery of the first task of the artist—the apparently simple yet infinitely

difficult variation on the theme: this happens therefore that happens therefore the other happens—which explains why there is *something* in all works of genius which appeals directly to children. Whether this quality in Bunyan will appeal generally to an age which applauds purposeless and patternless psychological meanderings as masterpieces of fiction, I do not know. I can only admit that I found it exhilarating.

(III)

There are three other aspects of the book, as it appears in 1948, which must be touched on briefly.

The first is that it is more comprehensible to the twentieth century than it was to the polite rationality of the eighteenth or the vulgar "progressive" optimism of the nineteenth. It was written in one age of crisis—the seventeenth—and it can speak directly to another, our own. The desperate attempt of an individual to escape from a city doomed to destruction has assumed more than an individual significance. In the personal sense, the apocalyptic atmosphere is always and everywhere true—as Claude Houghton has epitomised it: "The last sunset that a man sees is the death of the sun for him"—but now a universal feeling of doom enforces the personal apprehension. We are more *conscious* of our imprisonment in the City of Destruction and with that consciousness, Bunyan's allegory takes on something of the meaning which he himself gave to it. There is no Utopia for us to escape to. There is only the Celestial City on the other side of the River of Death.

"Something of the meaning" only. For there is still the question—and this is the second point—of the Calvinism which formed Bunyan's own theological outlook. Everybody outside his own sect is damned. There is no escaping this (which, as I have said, once led me to think badly of *The Pilgrim's Progress*). Nor can one take refuge in the reflection that it does not matter. It certainly mattered to Bunyan and it was, as certainly, a factor in the book's original popularity. But to deal with it adequately would need a lengthy discussion of—as, for example, T. S. Eliot and Wyndham Lewis have discussed—the connection between the beliefs of the artist and the appreciation of his work of art. Here it is perhaps sufficient to say that the assertion that no Catholic can appreciate *The Pilgrim's Progress* is an over-simplification as true and as false as that no Protestant can appreciate *The Divine Comedy*. The solution of the problem lies in a recognition of the actual historical context. Once that is faced, the theological particularity is less of an obstacle to the non-Calvinist reader than might be supposed. The main drawback of the obstructing theology is its dullness. But beneath it there is a stratum which can be accepted by all Christians, in some sense, and deeper still a spiritual validity which can be recognized even by those readers who reject the Christian way of salvation.

The third, and last, point arises out of this. How far, on re-reading,

does *The Pilgrim's Progress* survive a comparison with other classics of the mystical life? Here, again, I was surprised at its quality. To treat this matter adequately would need another essay, but the two points I should like to make, without discussion, are, first, that it has a curious and satisfying quality of Englishness.

Mystical experience, quite obviously, transcends national boundaries. But it is equally true that the expression of mystics is conditioned by their national temperaments and that, for example, the present fashion of the great Spanish mystics has not always the effect intended on those to whom they are recommended for reading. (I am not, of course, speaking of those who are far advanced on the mystical way.) But Bunyan's account of his soul's experience of salvation is written in an idiom and with a restraint that makes it intelligible to his fellow-countrymen. They can, as they read, separate the essence from the accidents—a process, in this particular kind of reading, of literally vital importance and one which the ordinary religious Englishman finds it extremely difficult to do with, for example, St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross and practically impossible with, for instance, Angela of Foligno.

Secondly, the fact that Calvinism itself was a reaction against a corrupt popular conception of Catholicism—a re-assertion of the transcendent majesty of God in an age which had misconstrued the meaning of the ministrations of men—gives Bunyan's book a special place even among the English mystics. It cannot compare of course with the great Benedictine clarity and charity of Father Baker (which is, roughly, contemporary); but to read it after some of the English medieval mystics is to realize both its affinity and its uniqueness. And, if it lacks something they have, it has also restored something they lack. In particular, it is a corrective (however it oversteps the bounds in another direction) to the stifling Neo-Platonism of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, which, though written in Christian terminology and much recommended at times to Christian readers, is certainly not a Christian book.

These considerations are not meant to suggest that *The Pilgrim's Progress* is a great mystical work; but only to explain why I found my one-time revulsion to it on theological grounds mitigated on a new approach and to suggest that it might be the same for other readers who do not share Bunyan's creed. For those who do, there is, obviously, no problem; and for those who have no creed at all there are worse Christian apologists—though they may seem more orthodox—than Bunyan's "Christian".

Yet this will never be the primary appeal of the book. And in the end its secret defies analysis. It stands a much-loved work of undefinable genius and ingenuous simplicity to be accepted or rejected. Myself I find that I still accept it.

THE SCHOOLROOM HAS NO CLOCK . . .

By ROBIN BENN

The schoolroom has no clock save twenty faces
each with its chiming jaws
and the fidgeting tick which frets thin time away.
All senses sway as the nimble brain retraces
tightropes from effect to cause,
balances by natural laws
one more unwieldy fact on the pile for to-day.

Each new conception spawns another query,
utters the squalling 'why?'
to befuddle the brain and suffocate elation.
No savour lasts; and the palate soon is weary—
sips the cups and puts them by,
votes them uniformly dry,
in mere indifference rejects discrimination.

* * * * *

In the greasy sink of the afternoon
five drops of sound clang down, so slow
that half the mind can measure them and go
before to the haven promised in their tune;
and the body too, though it stays for the lazy word
twitching its postures to the showman's strings
and echoing whispered promptings from the wings,
leans outward to the hope the mind has heard.

* * * * *

Resort to mere mechanics of existence
(here is the key to the personal time-machine)
tomorrow is dimmed to comfortable distance,
conscience quelled by passive non-resistance,
and self escapes on the arm of secure routine.

The jostling shoulder bruises no reaction,
the face encountered conjures up no name,
no outrage now provokes the swift correction—

all purposes submit to that attraction
which homeward draws the body's empty frame.

* * * * *

The bathroom's veil of folding steam subdues
the strong insistence of immediate things,
water to flesh and flesh to water clings,
and here sensation claims belated dues.
In this still temple all their stories tell—
glad trinity of Spirit, Body, Brain—
and each is pleased; while there, in soft refrain,
the water drips an echo to the bell.

CORRESPONDENCE

A QUESTION OF SYNTAX.

The Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

The difference between the reviewer of *The First Europe* and the Rev. B. C. Plowright whose letter appeared in the April 1948 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, is really on syntax; whether the words "sees in medieval Christianity the norm of culture of the Christian north" extends to the latter part of the phrase. Certainly Dr. Burns wrote that medieval society grew out of the period he describes, but in his last chapter he does not hesitate to point out its limitations, whereas Christa Dawson, and, more particularly, Hilaire Belloc, give to the age of Catholic Europe a unique, hypostatic value, as being an attempt to incarnate the Kingdom of God on earth on the principles of St. Augustine. It is not for me to say which view is better but certainly the appraisements of the Dark Ages by C. Delisle Burns and Christa Dawson differ very greatly. The one sets forth the Catholic view, the other the Protestant or agnostical.

Yours faithfully,

HENRY SLESS

Postbridge,
Devon.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

SOCIETY AND MORAL WILL

By OLIVER TOMKINS

WHEN Mr. Middleton Murry travels, he travels fast and arrives with a bump—followed by a long explanation of how he got there. This time* the journey is from pacifism to the advocacy of threatening Russia with atomic war in order to end war and the explanation is long and full. It is impossible to summarize the argument, for the book is not so much an argument as variations on a theme, the theme that conscience is the heart of the free society and that Communism murders conscience. If the free society is to live, this intolerable threat to it must be removed. So long as men live under that threat, all creativity, all values are stifled. If Russia is frankly faced with the ultimatum of the democracies that they will declare war, whilst they still have atomic advantage, unless Russia freely agrees to join an international atomic development and control system, then the odds are that the 'war to end war' may need to go no further than a threat. However, the odds are perilous, because the Russian rulers realize that to open their frontiers is to destroy the supremacy of their tyranny. Even so—the condition of the survival of the free society is the destruction of Communism, whether it is destroyed by the Russian people co-operating with the democracies against their tyrants or by the democracies destroying the Russian tyrants and their helpless people with them. At all costs and one way or the other the free society must be preserved, because it is the Kingdom of God on earth (p. 127). Any other way lie only darkness and destruction of the spirit.

But such a crude summary of the theme does not do sufficient justice to the richness and profundity of the variations. For this is an immensely rich and rewarding book. It has always been the characteristic of Mr. Middleton Murry's writing that he cries out from the deep places of the spirit, destroying our complacency, importuning our company through Inferno and Purgatory, in the search for Paradise. This is a deeply contemporary book, a vivid demonstration of the costly engagement which the spiritual mind of our time must undertake if it will live. As a piece of political theory, it grapples courageously with the central problem of all politics worthy of the name, the relating of society to the moral will.

For these reasons it is not an easy book. It is too aware of the dissolution of old landmarks, too concerned with the need for radical re-statement, to be read without a good deal of sustained attention and a readiness both to grapple with close logic and to seek patiently the meaning of familiar words in unfamiliar settings. In this latter, Mr. Murry often makes things unnecessarily difficult for some of his readers. Concerned as he is with the ultimate problems of God and man, Mr. Murry is talking theology. But the technically trained theologian is constantly baffled by finding the recognized terms of his trade being used in purely arbitrary and individual ways. For example, the phrase "the free society depends upon God and God depends upon the free society" is meaningless in its latter half if the word "God" carries the unconditioned meaning which theology gives it. If it has any meaning, it must be that the free society depends upon man's knowledge of God and that man's knowledge of God depends upon the existence of the free society—a contention which is powerfully and salutarily elaborated (p. 226 ff.) in a passage denouncing the thesis that, in the monolithic totalitarian State,

**The Free Society*, by John Middleton Murry. Dakers, 12s. 6d.

Christianity can endure "in the catacombs", and in the frightening, and frightened, chapter "Is Conscience Annihilable?" But many readers will feel that they would like to know a good deal more about the quality of the Christian Church, which had already survived a generation of persecution in the U.S.S.R. before it was "restored" in 1942, before they accept Mr. Murry's answer to this question.

But it is not the author's handling of Christian words which arouses deepest misgiving. It is the suspicion that he has not grasped their content. There is a dimension missing from Mr. Murry's thought, what the Gospel calls *skandalon*, that hard particularity which is nowhere clearer than in the most "spiritual Gospel", the Fourth. Or, to put it another way, Christianity is concerned with the fact that the Word became flesh; Mr. Murry is concerned with ideas. Christianity is forever wrestling with the eternal redeeming the finite and limited. Mr. Murry is forever slipping off into the infinite and ultimate. Take his attitude to this possible 'war to end war'. He writes of it with exaltation; it will be wholly different from all other wars. He bestows upon it a justification qualitatively different from those "just wars" in which the Christian man believes, with a heavy heart and a reluctant hand, that it is lawful for him to bear arms. War is *always* sordid, bestial, a fruit of sin, even this "last war" of them all.

So with the free society itself. We cannot be too grateful to Mr. Murry for opening our eyes to the dimensions of the moral effort—no, deeper, the revolution of human culture—which are required if mankind is to survive in the new chapter of its history. But to talk of the free society as the Kingdom of God is to lose the tension of finite and infinite, of sin and redemption, in which Christianity moves. Reinhold Niebuhr's *Children of Light and Children of Darkness* contains a more effective, because more sober and restrained, defence of democracy than Mr. Murry's political apocalypses.

Paradoxically, we must reject Mr. Murry's conception of the free society for the same reason as we must reject its great enemy, Communism, because both have made into an absolute, claiming the unconditioned obedience of men, the ambiguous, relative achievements of man in history. This is not, for one moment, to say that the choice between them is not a matter of life and death—even in certain circumstances, a matter of damnation and salvation. But the salvation lies not in the choice but in the choosing. Grant that Mr. Murry has justified his claim (and it is a claim to be most carefully weighed) that "the free society is nothing else than the vehicle of conscience. Take conscience away from the free society; it dies instantly. Add conscience to the Communist society; it will kill it instantly." Grant even that, and the free society will still remain a finite and partial achievement, in which conscience has still to bow before a still transcendent God. Perhaps this is what he means when he says that the free society is the most crucial "experiment" man has ever made (p. 190), but it is not clear that it is his meaning.

Mr. Murry has some trenchant, and deserved, observations on the political irrelevance of pacifism. But pacifists are at least a reminder of the limitation of the moral claims of politics. Possibly Middleton Murry the pacifist was more politically relevant than the Murry who has abandoned pacifism for politics.

A CASE HISTORY OF JAPAN, by Francis J. Horner. Sheed and Ward. 10s. 6d.

In the past ten years at least ten times as many books have been published repeating in various keys the story of Japan's rise and fall. The peculiar merit of Mr. Horner's profoundly interesting book is that he shows us

how these things happened and how the Japanese have become what they are. Mr. Horner's fourteen years of teaching in a Japanese university were the pleasantest in his life. No people, he says, are more courteous, kind and generous than the Japanese; yet none can, on occasion, be "so exasperating, offensive, unreliable and generally im-

possible." Both statements are perfectly true.

Much is due to the former Japanese boast that they had never been invaded, a source of strength in promoting unity in war, but of weakness in that they have never known the infusion of new blood which propagates "new thoughts and ideologies from within the people themselves." For 250 years the Tokugawa Shoguns cut Japan off from contact with the momentous world changes then occurring; and for hundreds of years Shinto and ancestor worship "have treated the people precisely as though they were in the nursery" riveting upon them a "herd instinct", terror of asserting individuality, and a submissiveness to external authority which made them as clay in the hands of military oligarchs.

In such training, combined with the mystic belief in *Yamato damashii*, a peculiar spiritual essence inherent in every Japanese, the position of the Emperor as head of the whole Japanese family (and also its high priest) developed naturally. That Hirohito has in nowise lost caste with his people by repudiating his divinity is evident; and it is interesting to note, in recent weeks, the marked revival of Shinto ceremonial, no doubt in revolt against American-taught democracy, which the Japanese simply cannot (and one may venture to add) will never understand.

Buddhism is chiefly conspicuous by the richness it has imparted to art and literature, while Zen Buddhism specially appealed to soldiers by its elaboration of the self-discipline which is ground into every Japanese from childhood. Yet, as in China, Buddhism provides a means of spiritual consolation of which every visitor to the temples of Nara and Kyoto can see that the Japanese make daily use. It is to the undoubtedly deep religious strain in the Japanese nature that Mr. Horner looks (as General MacArthur does) for Japan's ultimate redemption through Christianity from her present lost, bewildered

frame of mind. How this can be achieved, on the basis of the best principles in Japanese life, is sketched out in the closing pages of an altogether exceptional book.

O. M. GREEN.

BALTIC ECLIPSE, by Ants Oras. Gollancz. 15s. HARPER OF HEAVEN, by Robert Service. Benn. 15s.

If only the three Baltic States had been situated elsewhere they would certainly have enjoyed a far more happy existence, but with Russia and Germany as neighbours their lot has been unenviable. Mr. Oras, who was persecuted by those powers as an Anglophil, is now fortunately on the staff of the Bodleian and it may be doubted whether among those millions of books there is one more tragic than his wherein the story of his people is very clearly and interestingly depicted.

When the three States entered upon a pact of mutual assistance, fully approved of by the Kremlin, it was suddenly found by that mysterious authority that the pact constituted a serious menace to the safety of the U.S.S.R., a menace which could only be met by complete military occupation. There would indeed have been a menace if freedom of action prevailed in Russia, for the prosperity of, for instance, Estonia compared strikingly with the ragged, down-at-heel appearance of Russian towns. However the political commissars explained that Estonia had been subsidized by the entire capitalist world as a showpiece so as to be used to undermine the morale of Soviet citizens. Presumably this undermining had been continued in the educational sphere, for when the Russians set up schools for illiterate Estonians no pupils could be found for them. The Russians themselves, that is to say the authorities, looked down upon the sort of lectures which Estonians had listened to in the days of their separation from the wisdom of Russia when, for example, they were unaware that *Antony and Cleopatra* is in

with a description of the victory of the organized State over individualist anarchy and that Goethe in the second part of *Faust* is the champion of technical progress. Alas, there seems little hope with the world as it is, for these three admirable States to regain the liberty which they enjoyed between the two wars.

The Russian scene is also painted for us in a very detailed manner by Mr. Robert Service, the Canadian poet, who in this book tells of his wanderings through many countries. He has a most remarkable memory or else he has always kept a very full diary, for we learn not merely the conversations in which he took part many years ago, but what he had to eat night after night. However caviare, roast chicken and ice cream did not serve to blind him to what is sordid in the Russian way of life. But his acquaintance with that country does not go far back; it is all very well to proclaim that for men and women to bathe at seaside resorts with no clothing whatever is a Soviet triumph over the old-fashioned conventions of capitalism. If Mr. Service had bathed, as I did, at Odessa before the fall of the Czarist régime he would have witnessed much the same spectacle as that of to-day. In the next edition of this book, by the way, let me suggest that the famous church outside the Kremlin has nothing to do with anyone called Isaac the Terrible, for it was Ivan of that ilk who put out the eyes of the architect when he acknowledged that he was capable of building one even finer.

There are not many inaccuracies in this long and fascinating book. Mr. Service is by origin a Scot and even a Scot, he says, would revolt at finding that he was living far below his means. So he bought his wife a bicycle and off they went on a tour of Touraine. His French wife had been won in a highly original fashion; she and the family, to whom our author is devoted, do not appear to resent his long and frequent absences, for it has been his custom to rush, alone, from one end of Europe to

another. The country he loves the best is obviously France; there, long ago, he met Edmund Gosse, who ignored him, and James Stephens whom, like all worthy people, he loved. Stephens would sing rather than recite his latest poem written on the back of an old envelope, chanting the lovely words with a thick brogue. "There are only two great living authors," he would say, "and the other is myself." He would not say who the first was. Hugh Walpole, then a young student at Tours, was too respectable for our friend who is quite ready to laugh at himself as he reacts in this way or that to every kind of encounter.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS, by Hugh Shearman. *Faber & Faber.* 16s.

Ireland, to her sorrow, has always been able to arouse enthusiasm for her cause of the moment on the other side of the Atlantic or across the Irish sea. To her sorrow because time and again she has found that her champions have not taken the trouble to inform themselves and fade away when they find they are being taken seriously. It is not easy to get to the root of any Irish political problem. It invariably proves to be a complex tangled affair, striking deep into history, religion and the emotions. But those who would befriend the country should be at some pains to understand the issues before they delude the susceptible Gael into a belief that the world is on his side at long last.

The current delusion concerns the problem of partition. Incredibly, sympathy for reactionary Eire in her de-truncation is being lavished by British socialists. To the Irishman it appears as though a large and influential section of the British Government party is brimful of facile notions for doing away with the border. It is greatly to be hoped that this manifestation will not be taken too seriously. Obviously, few of these fervent anti-partitionists have

studied the implications.

For students of this and other Irish questions Dr. Shearman's book should become a standard work. Especially so on partition, since it does what has not been done before in presenting a reasonable and historically-inspired case from the Northern Ireland point of view. So far, all the argument seems to have come from the South, the anti-partitionist side of the border. It is quite time that the partitionist Northerner realized that if he has a case he must put it and the putting of it must be of a more reasoned nature than is customary in Orange orations on the Twelfth of July. His Southern fellow-countrymen are an importunate lot and have a habit of getting their own way. They certainly will not see the day lost for the want of argument.

Thus Dr. Shearman's advocacy is timely. His book is essentially partitionist in theme, for he sees the border not as a necessary compromise but as

the natural and inevitable result of the geographical, historical and social background. Within the limits of a comparatively short work he depicts accurately the story of Irish affairs up to the present day—that is, his facts are historically accurate, and it is only with his handling of them, the gloss, the suppression, the judicious emphasis, that one might quarrel.

There are one or two factors to which the author does not appear to have given the attention they warrant and which should be taken into account by any serious student. Probably from his desire to make clear-cut the Protestant-Unionist, Roman Catholic-Nationalist distinction, Dr. Shearman underrates the importance of the part played by Protestants in the Nationalist movement. For example, he would have us assume that the United Irishmen and the '98 rebellion were almost exclusively Roman Catholic affairs. In fact, Irish Nationalism has more often than not

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GEORGE CATLIN, Ph.D.

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been officered by Protestants. It may be that the Protestant-Nationalist element which undoubtedly exists both in North and South will eventually provide a basis for reunion. Again, the author writes of Northern Ireland as though it were inhabited entirely by die-hard, loyal royal Orangemen. In fact, the Roman Catholics are the largest religious denomination, slightly more than one-third of the population. And the fact that they are on the increase and the Protestants on the decrease may be time's solution of the partition problem.

Anglo-Irish Relations is not an impartial account; it is advocacy and right good advocacy. The reader will realize that there is a case for the partition of Ireland and that the problem is not one that is going to be solved by good intentions alone. Feelings are still too bitter in Ireland—they are being kept bitter by politicians on both sides of the border—to allow of a satisfactory and permanent settlement. Ireland's would-be friends will best show their good will by leaving comparatively well alone.

F. A. G. WILLIS.

ARE THESE HARDSHIPS NECESSARY?, by Roy Harrod.

Rupert Hart-Davis. 5s.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN PEACE AND WAR, by Lionel Robbins. Macmillan. 3s. 6d.

There was little to sustain Mr. Harrod's earlier defence of American economic policy, but something can be said in favour of his present thesis, which purports to show that Britain must cut her capital expenditure. Indeed, if Britain's acute economic problems were not to such a large extent governed by external (*versus* internal) factors, such a cut could at least make a subsidiary contribution towards reducing "inflationary pressure", particularly in association with other anti-inflationary measures such as the achievement of a large budget surplus, etc. But to argue thus, adequately and fairly, two things are required: a proper perspective of Britain's economic problems seen against

their international background; a balanced *exposé*, which must deal not only with the short-term advantages, but also with the long-term disadvantages, of reduced capital expenditure.

Considered in isolation, the present condition of Britain's productive equipment commands an exceptionally high rate of capital investment. That it may not be possible to achieve it at present, is a serious misfortune. But it is hardly the way to arrive at a sound economic policy to make virtue out of bitter necessity—with barely a word said about the consequences for the future. To reduce the technical backwardness and to increase the productivity of certain British industries, a good deal of privation and even a limited degree of inflation could be justified. Yet, Mr. Harrod holds that capital investment should be cut by about 500 million £ of which 350 million £ would represent productive investment, the balance a cut in budget expenditure. What such a cut would mean becomes clear from Command Paper 7268 ("Capital investment in 1948") which, it should be pointed out, was published after Mr. Harrod's book. Originally, the forecast for gross investment in 1948 was 1,600 million £. That figure is now to be reduced, so as to correspond, by the end of the year, to an annual expenditure of 1,320 million £ of which repairs and maintenance represent about half. The rest, that is 660 million £, corresponds to about 300 million £ of 1938 value. That was roughly the estimated value of new investment in 1938. The rate of new investment was insufficient even then. How much more so after six years of war.

Mr. Harrod argues that in view of the limited resources in materials, equipment and labour, the cut he proposes is necessary. That, in reality, depends on whether we want to spread restrictions in private consumption over a longer or a shorter period. One must grant the author that in a free society and after a prolonged period of reduced consumption, there is a limit to what traffic will

bear. Had Mr. Harrod confined himself to this argument, agreement would be possible. But he seems to believe that reduced capital investment would more or less automatically and within a relatively short time remove the present difficulties of the balance of payments situation. He writes:

This allegation of a "world dollar shortage" is surely one of the most brazen pieces of collective effrontery that has ever been uttered. (p. 43).

Yet, the reviewer will continue to believe, with brazen effrontery, that the constant excess in the U.S. balance of payments must have a counterpart in the deficits of other countries. Short of a constantly growing flow of lending by the United States, they must lead to a dollar shortage. Britain's deficit, in particular, is largely unavoidable—for, to the extent of forty-five per cent. of their total value, her imports, in 1947, consisted of food, drink and tobacco. And, finally, we shall all have to face the fact, patent by now, that neither retrenchment nor export drive, nor both combined, can proceed sufficiently far to close the gap sufficiently fast. A cut in capital investment will not reduce it appreciably while aggravating the long-term prospects of British economy. Meanwhile, it would seem more important to stop the present flight of capital of which the Balance of Payments White Paper (Cmd. 7324) bears unmistakable evidence.

In *The Economic Problem in Peace and War*, Professor Robbins examines various aspects of the mechanism of distribution, discusses the objectives of production and analyses the premisses which underlie the wartime economic system. He concludes by surveying the control of production in peacetime. Not unexpectedly, the author confesses that he is still inclined to hold that the goal of progress lies in a direction different from over-all collectivism.

These three Marshall Foundation lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1947 are not without interest as a sober and careful restatement of the conceptions of a free-enterprise economist. Professor

Robbins has resigned himself to some cautious qualifications of his basic tenets while maintaining them in their essentials. He shares with Mr. Harrod certain ideas about the advantages of the price mechanism and also about the necessity of reducing capital investment, but he is far more guarded in his judgment. He treads angelically where Mr. Harrod rushes in.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

ORDEAL BY PLANNING, by John Jewkes. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

All through war and post-war controls Manchester has maintained her traditional spirit of economic individualism, and the author of this book who is now Stanley Jevons Professor at Manchester University, is one of its most ardent supporters. His elaborate note to the Working Party on Cotton was an excellent example of this spirit and attracted much attention inside and outside trade circles.

In his new book Professor Jewkes tries to expose in detail many of the fallacies of planning. Beginning with a short analysis of the "spread of the fashion" he raises the question as to whether "the business man has become obsolete" and then deals with all the various arguments put forward against a free economy. In an arresting chapter on national planning and world economy he analyses the causes of the disappointment which so far has followed the much hailed system of planning.

In our present position there are a good many reasons which appear to be more or less accidental and which, therefore, may be quoted by planners as not proving anything against a planned economy in principle. There is the British balance of payments crisis in August 1947 with the running out of the American Loan more quickly than was anticipated. But, as Professor Jewkes rightly emphasizes, "there was something more fundamentally wrong." The collapse was inevitable because of a

series of grave errors in British planning strategy. The first of these lay in the fixing of the export targets and in pursuing policies based upon the assumption that the targets would be reached. The second planning error was the setting of too high a domestic investment programme. The third error was probably the maintenance of an inappropriate rate of exchange.

Professor Jewkes argues that things might have been different if the State had confined itself to its legitimate rôle of restricting the volume of money sufficient to prevent domestic inflation. He seeks to prove this contention among others by dealing in detail with the defects of bulk purchases by the State and he contends that such purchase destroys the futures market, one of the most highly specialized weapons in a free world economy. But will not a free economy still strengthen the power, already formidable, of private monopolies and combination? Professor Jewkes tries to meet this argument in a chapter devoted exclusively to the question: "Must monopoly destroy free economy?", and his observations will attract particular interest now, as the time for monopoly legislation in Britain approaches.

Here it seems that sometimes Professor Jewkes is led astray by his desire to prove his case of economic freedom at all costs. He contends that nowadays the "laboratory" and the ever increasing number of new inventions is fighting against the monopolist. He seems to ignore all that has been said of late about the cartelization of patents and international cartel agreements, dividing fields of research and exploitation of commercial territories. He believes in the possibility of controlling abuses of private monopoly, but he avoids a more detailed discussion of what exactly legislation should do. An analysis of the factual position of monopolies in Britain, in particular as they concern the loopholing of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade by recent court

decisions, would have been an advantage. But Professor Jewkes quite naturally is less concerned with a discussion of the mechanism and the possible deficiencies of unrestricted freedom than with that of the failure of planning. And on this score he may be congratulated for providing an extremely valuable and suggestive piece of work.

HERMANN LEVY.

DECADENCE, by C. E. M. Joad.
Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Joad opens his inquiry into decadence with an estimate of the philosopher's function in the contemporary world. He deprecates the idea that philosophical knowledge should be held back from the many, or its meaning obscured under a deliberately forbidding cloak of recondite phraseology. Those philosophers who withdraw themselves and their knowledge from the world not only isolate themselves from the world's influence but cease to influence the world's affairs. He pleads a strong case for the *vulgarisateur* and instances the beams of enlightenment which emanated from Erasmus in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

In formulating his own comprehensive definition of decadence, Dr. Joad refers to the familiar passage from the Epilogue to Walter Pater's book *The Renaissance* in which reality is fined down to "a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may be even more truly said that it has ceased to be than it is." Experience, "not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end." This view which by implication, denies absolute standards of morality, truth and beauty—for if everything is transitory how can anything be eternal?—Dr. Joad identifies with decadence. Scepticism, hedonism and subjectivism tend to be associated with this view in so far as they depreciate the significance of objective judgments. This pre-occupation with subjective values: "This leaving out of 'the object' is an essential part of my definition of

decadence; it is also a pervasive characteristic of the intellectual climate of our time."

Perfection does not exist potentially in human beings. If perfection is apprehensible at all, it is not by the medium of the senses, but it manifests itself through the mind and spirit in such values as truth, beauty and goodness, which are an expression of the perfect element in the non-material world. Only by awareness of and reaching out for these values can the human being advance towards perfection. To discard or disavow them is to deny the existence of standards and ideals. It is to restrict human potentialities to human limits. It is to "drop the object".

Dr. Joad makes a wide survey of the attitude of mind that is implied by the phrase. He criticizes its defects, traces its consequences and devotes the second half of the book to examples drawn from the creative, intellectual and political activities and beliefs of the contemporary world. He determines the malaise by the symptoms he has defined. If his diagnosis is depressing his remedies are constructive, his analysis vivid in its clarity and sparkling in manner. Dr. Joad's systematic location of the objects dropped by a "spiritually rootless and intellectually guideless" generation is admirably consistent with his conception of a philosopher's function.

F. W. WENTWORTH-SHEILDS.

THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS, by John Newsom. *Faber. 8s. 6d.*
TO BE A TEACHER, by H. C. Dent. *University of London Press. 4s. 6d.*
PARTNERSHIP IN EDUCATION, by various authors. *Jarrolld (Norwich). 7s.*

As Mr. Newsom's *jeu d'esprit* is on an educational aspect of the eternal war between the sexes it should not lack readers and may for some months to come supply conversational gambits for the austere dinner parties of the middle class. "With notable exceptions," runs his argument, "it is true to say that the

education of girls has been modelled on that of their brothers without any reference to their different functions in society."

A growing number, of course, fit themselves to pursue the same functions through a professional training that takes them to the universities. But Mr. Newsom's interest is in the vast mass who have no higher aim than being mistress, companion or nurse to some man. Now to catch a chemist there is no need for a woman to study chemistry, and so we are led to a wholesale revision of the curriculum. In future the ordinary girl who is not going to be a professional woman needs to study no more than English, physical education, the structure of modern society, and some kind of handicraft. This sounds a magnificent pruning, until one discovers that in physical education, for example, our author includes human biology, social studies and "the effect of the Christian tradition on the contemporary life."

Even Mr. Newsom strays at times into the prevalent anti-intellectualism. "To produce," he writes, "an *Homard à l'Américaine* to perfection needs as much wit as to construe one of the more obscure passages of *Berenice*." Loud cheers from all the men. But obviously he means a different sort of wit, and, if he is honest, a lower sort. Otherwise Mr. Newsom might be expected to choose his friends from among eminent chefs. As he is education officer for Hertfordshire this seems unlikely.

There is a trace of the same misunderstanding in the latest book by Mr. H. C. Dent, who might be called the Rupert of educational reform and certainly did more than most men to create the atmosphere in which the 1944 Act became possible. "Every teacher" he says, "should be a scholar." Now this is like saying that every man should be a saint and equally gratifying to our egalitarian ears, for it implies that every man can be. In fact, far from every teacher being a scholar, very few first-

class honours men are scholars or wish to be. A scholar is a precious rarity, a defender of inherited truths and a discoverer of new, a widener of the bounds of knowledge.

It is perhaps unfair to fall at so much length upon what is only a small point in a sincere and stimulating review of the teacher's training and life's work. This is just the sort of guide that young men or women trying to decide whether or not to become a teacher should have put in their hands. Like the young, it has gusto. At the same time, there are some interesting arguments for older heads, among them a bold plan for rationalizing the teacher's salary. Mr. Dent rightly maintains that the profession must offer solid rewards to others than head masters if it is to attract good recruits. He sees also that the higher salary must go to merit—not to good degrees, for they may be gained by bad teachers, or to seniority which is gained by every fool in time. He proposes "promotion tests" in which teachers will be required to show themselves possessed of leadership and administrative ability, as well as powers of teaching, before further advancement.

The third book is a series of essays, by excellently chosen authorities, on the effects of the new Act upon the various sides of the educational system—the administrative units, the teaching profession, and the people as a whole. Its theme is the necessity of eager co-operation between all parties, from the Ministry down to parents and employers. Some of the essays are mainly expository, as that on the School Health Service by W. A. Bullough, school medical officer for Essex. Others, like the plea by Mr. I. J. Pitman, M.P., that vocational training can be sound education, are admirably provocative. Two outstanding contributions in this vein are the frank discussion of the problems of county administration under the Act by Mr. A. B. Clegg, chief education officer in the West Riding, and the masterly criticism by the Editor of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, Mr. John Armitage, of

the new system of divisional executives.
WALTER JAMES.

EL ALAMEIN TO THE RIVER SANGRO, by Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. *Hutchinson*. 25s.

THE GOOD SOLDIER, by Field-Marshal Earl Wavell. *Macmillan*. 8s. 6d.

When you study military history don't read outlines on strategy or the principles of war. Read biographies, memoirs, historical novels. . . . Get at the flesh and blood of it, not the skeleton. To learn that Napoleon won the campaign of 1796 by manoeuvre on interior lines or some such phrase is of little value. If you can discover how a young unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight, how he gave it the energy and momentum to march and fight as it did, how he dominated and controlled generals older and more experienced than himself, then you will have learnt something.

This quotation, taken out of one of the two books lying in front of me, is a remarkable commentary on the other. It is part of a lecture delivered by Lord Wavell at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1939 and now bound up, together with other material, in a little volume full of shrewdness and wisdom. One might reasonably suppose that Field-Marshal Montgomery's personal record of the 8th Army's campaigns would provide the student of war with precisely the sort of material that Lord Wavell recommends. The odd thing is that it does nothing of the kind. No-one will question, I think, that Field-Marshal Montgomery held that magic power over his troops which distinguishes the great commander from the clever strategist. No-one will doubt for a moment his recognition of the vital part played in war by the impact of the general's personality on the minds of his men. Yet here in his own pages are revealed all the factors that win battles except that one secret. Here are the determination, the judgment, the timing, the capacity for detail and the clarity of mind, set out plainly for all to read. Only the magic of the man escapes. To say so is in no way to detract from the

value of the book. It establishes, however, one thing. Earl Wavell is a fine writer as well as a great general. Viscount Montgomery is a great general.

All those who served in the 8th Army will remember the certainty of victory which came with Field-Marshal Montgomery's command. It is of particular interest to learn from this record how often that certainty was felt by the Commander himself, and at what moments his own conviction wavered—when, in other words, he knew he was taking risks. One such occasion was during the approach to the Mareth Line. Because of a considerable enemy success against American forces, the position on the 1st Army front had at that time become grave. Field-Marshal Montgomery, approaching from the east, was asked to do what he could to relieve the pressure.

But I would not be ready until 4 March, and during the period 28 February-3 March the 8th Army was unbalanced. In driving on to assist the West Tunisian front I had taken serious risks. Rommel had been forced to pull out and was now concentrating against me. The first days of March were an anxious period, during which all the signs of the impending enemy attack were apparent and it remained to be seen whether the enemy could strike before our arrangements to receive him were completed.

In the event Rommel missed his opportunity. His opponent was ready by the evening of March 4. It was not until March 6 that Rommel attacked, after telling his troops that if they did not take Medenine, and force the 8th Army to withdraw, the days of the Axis forces in North Africa were numbered. Bizerta and Tunis fell on May 7.

In *The Good Soldier*, Lord Wavell combines a number of essays and papers over a range of subjects from military genius to tactical exercises. In a comparative study of T. E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate he writes: "Both had high-powered minds which seemed when working—and they almost always were—unable to run in any but top gear, however rough the going; so that they impelled the chassis of their bodies at the expense of rest and comfort and with

tear and wear beyond the ordinary." Particularly vivid is the sentence from one of Wingate's own orders. "Finally, knowing the vanity of man's effort and the confusion of his purpose, let us pray that God may accept our services and direct our endeavours, so that when we shall have done all we shall see the fruits of our labour, and be satisfied." That is not a quotation from Cromwell. It is from an order issued on the crossing of the Chindwin in 1943.

GORDON WINTER.

THE SCENTED ISLE, by Joseph Chiari. *William Macellan*. 7s. 6d.

When Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote in June 1794 to his wife from Corsica he said that it was like Scotland with a fine climate. And the author of this book, a Corsican who has for some years lived in Scotland, draws various parallels between the two. There are also points in which they differ, for the aforesaid Sir Gilbert wrote that if he were to think of building a summer palace of jasper and porphyry he might be thought extravagant by Scots unacquainted with the Corsican quarries. When the Genoese held the island they did not make themselves beloved and we are told of a lady of our day who, after a quarrel with her maid, asked for forgiveness since her outburst of temper was due to her wretched Genoese blood. Of course we all know of Boswell and his enthusiasm for the Corsican patriot Paoli; there was likewise a Corsican Wallace, Sampeiro Corso; both patriots, in order to carry on, had to flee in disguise. But Sampeiro strangled his wife, after a touching scene in 1563 and it is difficult to think that the shock and horror of this affair did not come to Shakespeare's ears.

Mr. Chiari is an admirable guide and the beautiful illustrations in his book will persuade many Scots and others to long for a holiday in Napoleon's island.

H.B.

construction, treatment, adaptation, dialogue and marketing, their advice appears to be infallible. With such an excellent guide there is no excuse left for the fools who rush in.

Travellers

After 350 years the only novel of the author is republished by John Lehmann (1955). It is *THE UNFORTUNATE TRAVELLER* by Thomas Nashe, illustrated with an Introduction by Michael Ayrton, who avers that "I am unable to assess its value as literature, nor can I judge its particular effect upon subsequent prose fiction." Nevertheless, he proceeds to impart biographical details, to sketch Nashe's intellectual and scholastic background, with appraisements of his pamphlets, verse, play collaborations, qualities and excesses of character, which are indispensable to the newcomer to Nashe's work. In short, Mr. Ayrton, who says he cannot write "a literary introduction" has done it to perfection. And his illustrations explain and complement the script which, in its archaic spelling and style is at first daunting, with his usual brilliance and competency. The book is a mixture of "lyrical beauty interspersed with episodes of violent savagery"—just when one had hoped the post-war fashion in violence had abated.—Elsbeth Huxley's novel *THE WALLED CITY* (Chatto & Windus. 10s. 6d.) is an exercise on colonial administration in an Arabian community set in the desert under an African sun which, in spite of the somewhat stilted dialogue and situations, indicating surely the urging of a cause rather than the telling of a tale, held the interest to the last word. Freddy, the natural bureaucrat, Robert, the visionary who sees human beings in all his contacts, the wives Amorel and Priscilla, are tangled in private and public responsibilities. It is not unnatural that Mrs. Huxley's wide knowledge of her subject should tempt her to write a 'documentary' and nobody who reads the open acknowledgment of this fact

on the book's jacket should be deterred from embarking on the adventure provides.

Shivers

SOMETHING TERRIBLE, SOMETHING LOVELY is a collection of short stories by William Sansom (Hogarth Press. 8s. 6d. where, again, the terror looms large in nightmare encounters. Any straining after effect has been pruned with a sharp knife or, better, smoothed into the texture until it is indistinguishable, so that the desired atmosphere has all the appearance of having been created with ease. There is always the doubt of course that the preference for writing of horror is a sterile one, in that the story is remembered only as a bad dream is remembered.—Which brings us straight to *GREAT TALES OF TERROR AND THE SUPERNATURAL*, edited by Herbert A. Wise and Phyllis Fraser (Hammond, Hammond. 18s.). Here are 832 pages, of the reading of which the editors wisely suggest that "too generous a ration of horror may defeat its intended purpose, and succeed only in creating a surfeit." They discuss the fascination that such tales hold, the question of ghosts, credibility and the place of modern terror stories. Read them in bed and the maximum of contrast is obtained by the doings on the printed page and the comfort and security of the blankets, under which if the worst happens, the head may be popped. Downstairs, ash falls from the fire, curtains rustle and, in a bomb damaged house at least, door handles gently but suggestively quiver. The only valid deterrent to reading this collection—which includes examples from such masters as Poe, Hawthorne, de Maupassant, Sheridan Le Fanu, with that of others whose names are associated with more orthodox branches of literature, like Walter de la Mare, E. M. Forster, Edith Wharton and Robert Hichens—horizontally is the weight of the book.

GRACE BANYARD.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JUNE, 1948

THE VOICE OF EUROPE

BY SIR HAROLD BUTLER

FOR the first time since the middle ages Europe has begun to find its voice. The Congress, which met at the Hague in a charming setting of homeliness and hospitality such as only the Dutch can provide, was a unique gathering. There were men and women from every country of the continent on either side of the iron curtain, of all shades of political opinion short of Communism, of all branches of the Christian church. But they did not meet each other as politicians and economists, trade-unionists and capitalists, Catholics and Protestants, poets, professors and philosophers. They met as Europeans to discover whether there was a European faith transcending all the differences of nationality, language, creed, party and material interest, which divided them. Because they came not as representatives but as private citizens, they constituted a more truly representative assembly than could have been convened on any narrower or more closely defined franchise. They spoke with a freedom which no mandated delegate can command. They presented a broader cross-section of European life than could have been reflected in any more organized and disciplined conclave.

It has been my lot to attend innumerable international conferences of all kinds. I never saw a conference quite so distinctive as this. At first it seemed that such a heterogeneous assembly must be so anarchical as to be incapable of reaching any positive result. Its procedure was regulated by no detailed code of standing orders. Anyone could speak on any subject under discussion. There was an endless flow of speeches, translations and amendments, but every speaker, however prolix or obscure, was always listened to with courtesy and frequently with attention. In spite of the keenness, which kept committees going with a full house into the small hours of the morning, the clashes of opinion never exceeded manageable parliamentary bounds. The debates were in themselves an impressive demonstration of the free play of democracy, which all the delegates instinctively shared, a concrete illustration of the political tradition which is common to all true Europeans. As it turned out, it furnished striking confirmation of the practical utility of the democratic method. For out of all the differences and diversities, which lend so much life and colour to any typically European gathering, coherent and clear-cut decisions gradually emerged from all the welter of words and motions. An overriding sense of common purpose smoothed out the

CLXIII

antagonisms, and in the end brought the Congress to a degree of unanimity which in retrospect seemed hardly credible. Built up in four days under tremendous pressure, the final resolutions were not always models of parliamentary draftsmanship, but what mattered was not so much the word as the spirit. Whatever their technical defects, there could be no doubt of their purport. They denoted a solid faith in the future of Europe and a clear perception of the means to ensure it. To my mind their importance lies, not so much in the specific proposals which they contain, as in the evidence which they afford of the rebirth of the European spirit.

The programme of the Congress was set forth by Mr. Churchill in one of his greatest and most statesmanlike speeches. It immediately lifted the delegates up to a high plane of endeavour, sweeping away the hatreds of the past, rising above the quarrels of parties, calling imperatively for unity as the only salvation of Europe. Mr. Leslie Hale found the right word for it, "magnanimous", the utterance of a man of broad vision and deep human understanding. Without any allusion to them, that speech brushed aside the squabbles and suspicions which had preceded the Congress as unworthy of its notice at a moment when Europe was summoned to the supreme task of reviving "its genius and its honour, which by our quarrels, our follies, by our fearful wars and the cruel and awful deeds that spring from war and tyrants we have almost cast away." For this nothing less than the unity of all Europe would suffice, not a western bloc marshalled in opposition to the east, but a European union standing as one of the regional pillars of the United Nations alongside the Soviet Union and the western hemisphere. The European community would by its very nature include any country "where the people own the government and not the government the people," where the charter of human rights is honestly respected. But there could be no European community which was politically unorganized, no economic integration or common system of defence, which was not "accompanied step by step by a parallel policy of closer political unity." All the nations of Europe must sacrifice some part of their individualism in order to assume "that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions, all of which under totalitarian systems, whether Nazi, Fascist or Communist, would inevitably be blotted out."

That was the lofty aim which Mr. Churchill set before the Congress at the outset, the vision of a new Europe no longer at war within itself, no longer dominated by fear, but capable of securing peace and prosperity to all its peoples, once more taking a leading place in expanding the knowledge and increasing the moral stature of mankind. In a time of disillusion and moral disarray it is good that such things should be said with all the force and eloquence which Mr. Churchill can command. He spoke not in his secondary rôle of party leader, but as one of the few great

men of our age. Without his inspiration the Congress could not have struck the higher path. He alone perhaps can guide the European movement among the inevitable pitfalls that will beset its early endeavours. If only he were free to do that to the exclusion of all other preoccupations!

What then can the Congress be said to have accomplished in the direction of European unity? Did it in fact make any positive progress towards that difficult goal? As I see it, it has two definite achievements to its credit, whose importance is very great. Exactly three years after the last shot was fired, it marked the end of the war, the beginning of reconciliation in Europe. There can be no European peace until Germany becomes a member of European society, nor any European recovery until German productivity is restored. Those are facts from which there is no escape, but which most Europeans with the horrors of war and occupation fresh in the minds found it hard to face. Mr. Churchill's gesture in welcoming the German delegation made a profound impression alike upon the Germans themselves and upon the many others present who had suffered cruelly at German hands. No one else could have done it with the same effect. His words drew spontaneous applause and left the Germans gasping. A new spirit was generated. One heard a German delegate declare that no country had more need of the European spirit than Germany which had learnt the value of freedom by bitter experience during "its aberration into totalitarianism and dictatorship." On their side, the former enemies of Germany forebore to propound an immediate answer to the riddle of the Ruhr, while the Congress declared that the only solution of the political and economic problems of Germany was its integration in a European union. To one who had witnessed the long drawn out struggle between the Allies and Germany after the first war, this was indeed a new approach. In those days there was no gesture which might have given strength and hope to the hesitant forces of German democracy, no offer of an alternative road to the recovery of Germany's self-respect which might divert German thought away from aggressive nationalism, no trace of German condemnation of the evils wrought by its leaders. It would of course be foolish to suppose that the solution of the German problem is in sight, or that Europe can or will dispense with the precautions necessary to prevent any resurgence of German military power. But a first step has been taken to create the atmosphere, in which a real peace in Europe might be nurtured. Peace is much more a matter of psychology than of treaties. That is why the attitude of the Congress of Europe to Germany may prove to be a turning point.

The second achievement of the Congress was the reaffirmation of the faith, upon which European civilization has been built. It was not just an abstract declaration in favour of the rights of man, but a passionate assertion that without liberty of thought and speech, without free assembly and the right of political opposition, life in Europe would not be worth living. On that issue there was no shadow of dispute. Everyone realized

that the foundation of European unity was not material but spiritual, a common sense of ultimate values transcending all national, ideological and religious differences. No doubt that is the inner conviction which the vast majority of Europeans have always held, but it had never been explicitly stated as a collective creed. There had never been a collective answer to the communist propaganda such as the Congress of Europe has now given. Whether the proposed cultural centre will materialize and whether it will become an effective expression of the European ideal, remains to be seen. In any event this resounding declaration of common faith, to be embodied in a European Charter of Human Rights, will have far-reaching effects. It will not only strengthen the ties which are drawing western Europe together but, as a Polish delegate said, its echoes will revive the courage of those who are waiting and hoping behind the iron curtain. The heated denunciation of the Congress by the Moscow radio is the best testimony to its success. From a half-hearted, bewildered defence the spiritual forces, which radiating from Europe have carried the standard of liberal ideas and Christian ethics throughout the world, have once more passed over to the offensive.

Those then were the two capital achievements of the conference—the beginning of European reconciliation and the assertion of a common European faith. In comparison its discussion of the means towards political and economic unity was secondary, because no unity can be evolved until there is a general will to peace and an underlying consciousness of common purpose. Naturally enough there were sharp differences of opinion both in the political and economic fields, which might easily have split the Congress. Had it not been held together by an overwhelming sense of agreement as to ends, it might have been fatally divided as to means. Unused to the vehemence of expression in which the Latin temperament indulges, some of the journalists revelled in a pessimism which the real situation hardly warranted. On the political side the federalists constitute a ginger group ardently advocating the immediate federation of Europe as the only cure for its ills, regardless of the great mass of opinion, which does not share their view and is not likely to share it without a long process of education. Though they acted as a useful goad, their vocal activity over-represented the real strength of the forces behind them. Nevertheless it was recognized that political and economic action in order to integrate and develop the common resources of Europe could not succeed without some merging of sovereignty. In one sense this is a platitude. Every treaty connotes some limitation of the rights of nations to do as they like, some diminution of “national sovereignty”. The question is how fast and how far the nations of Europe are prepared to limit their liberty of action in order to reap the advantages of a united front. The Marshall countries and the Brussels countries are already advancing along that path, but to force the pace might easily ruin the whole enterprise. The federalists are apt to portray sovereignty as a great

bogey, one and indivisible, which must be laid before any progress towards unity is possible. In point of fact it is not an absolute but a relative, something which can be shed piecemeal and by degrees. If it is so treated on practical political lines, it becomes a manageable problem. If it is treated on metaphysical lines, it will prove insoluble. As a test of the extent to which the peoples of Europe are ready to go at this moment, a European assembly chosen by their national Parliaments was proposed. It would have no legislative powers, but would be called upon “to stimulate and give expression to European public opinion” and to consider “practical measures designed progressively to bring about the necessary economic and political union of Europe.” As the next step forward that is a practicable proposal. The united parliamentary voice of Europe would have immense power in the world quite apart from any projects for the future which it might devise. It might not succeed in framing any comprehensive plan, but it would have great educational value both as to the need and the difficulty of European union. It is an experiment to be tried.

On the economic side the conviction that “Europe must unite if it is to regain its former prosperity and to reassert its economic independence” was universal. Running through the debate was an acute awareness of what Europe had already lost before the last war in economic strength and social advancement as compared with the United States. Now with the disastrous impoverishment produced by that war added to the weakness arising from the “compartmentation” of European economy, there was clearly no way of restoring and improving its standard of living or of enabling Europe to stand on its own economic feet except by developing its industrial and natural resources on continental lines. This may be a hard saying, but none of the many economists, business-men or trade-union leaders, who took part in the discussion, contested it for a moment. They were entirely agreed upon ends, nor did they differ as to the means which ought to be immediately adopted as a first instalment. None of their proposals as to trade, currency, production or labour is either unnecessary or impracticable. The only serious difference arose on the social side, where the socialists successfully pressed for the association of labour with the agencies entrusted with the development of the new European economy. But in any case the general sense of the Congress was clearly progressive. Though as Mr. Bob Edwards and others recognized, the new Europe would not and could not be an exclusively socialist Europe, it was only possible on the basis of progressively establishing “a democratic social system,” aiming at full employment, economic security and independence for the individual and a better life for the whole European community. There was perhaps more unreserved agreement on the economic and social than on the political resolutions, and again some of the press-reports gave a false perspective of the debates by stressing the small area of initial discord rather than the large area of

complete agreement. When one thinks of the violence of domestic controversies on economic affairs here and in France and in Italy, it is not a little surprising that such far-reaching unanimity should have been possible both as to ends and means. Perhaps this implies that we are on the way to evolving a pattern of social democracy distinct both from the American and the Russian systems. Perhaps it implies that the solution of these family quarrels can only be found in the larger framework of a European economy.

No one denies that there are great obstacles to be surmounted before any sort of economic union can be achieved—not least among them the political obstacles—but can anyone really maintain that the prestige, prosperity and security of Europe can be re-established by any other method? If there is such a method, it should be proclaimed from every housetop, but at present opposition to European unity takes the form of a blank negative, an apathetic acceptance of inevitable doom. That spirit of fatalism began creeping across the continent after the first war. It became an obsession after the second. It prepared itself for a capitulation to Communism, just as the citizens of Rome in its decadence resigned themselves to helpless submission to their barbarian conquerors. Whatever its shortcomings, the Congress of Europe marks a sturdy reaction against that spineless attitude. It has shown the way to purge the continent of its interminable feuds and civil wars, to restore its economic independence and to attain its social aspirations, to breathe fresh life into its ideals and so to recover its self-respect and renown in the world.

BOGOTA, 1948

By WILLIAM C. ATKINSON

IT was in Colombia, of whose territory Panama then formed a part, that the first conference of New World States was convened by Bolívar in 1826, and the tendency was natural, at the Ninth Pan-American Conference held in Bogotá in April 1948, to cast a backward look and take stock of the ground covered in the intervening century and a quarter. For the first half of that period the ideal was not Pan-Americanism, nor even Latin-Americanism (Brazil, till 1889 a monarchy with an economy based on slave-labour, was one apart from the family of new Spanish-speaking Republics), but Spanish-Americanism, with one over-riding objective, solidarity against the United States.

The first stirrings of Pan-Americanism derived in fact from the inability of the Spanish-American States to live at peace one with another; and the initiative came precisely from the United States which in 1881, shocked by the "War of the Pacific", convened a conference in Washington "to seek a way of permanently averting the horrors of cruel and bloody combat between countries oftenmost of one blood and speech, or the even worse calamity of civil strife." That conference never took place. The horrors of bloody combat were to be familiar to Latin America for another sixty years, while the "worse calamity" is not yet exorcised.

The Pan-American idea had none the less been born, and a decade later, in 1889-1890, the First Conference did meet, in Washington, attended by eighteen nations, with trade questions, including a proposal for a customs union, overshadowing now on the agenda paper such political topics as arbitration and international law. The 1890's had seen a vital change in the interpretation of Monroe. United States' territorial expansion was complete. Her present needs were first, military security consonant with her prestige as a great power, and secondly, foreign markets for her rapidly expanding industry. The former was to lead to the building of the Panama Canal (with the detaching of Panama from Colombia), to the virtual reduction of the Central-American Republics to colonial status, and to the conversion of the Caribbean into a United States' lake. The latter launched the new "dollar diplomacy", its tentacles reaching everywhere through Latin America. "United States' diplomacy," President Taft was to admit later, "might well include active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists the opportunity for profitable investment." And trade required stable conditions. Hence the famous

"Roosevelt Corollary" (1904) to Monroe: "Chronic disorder anywhere calls for the intervention of civilized States; in the West the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, to the exercise of an international police power." The most positive result of that notable first meeting was the creation at Washington of what was known from 1910 as the Pan-American Union.

There followed three more general conferences before the 1914-1918 war: Mexico (1901-1902), Rio (1906), Buenos Aires (1910). The last-named, passing in review the action taken by individual States to implement earlier agreements and recommendations, found the result so negative that many were inclined to pronounce Pan-Americanism a failure. Brazil, raising the desirability of a general underwriting of Monroe by all member-States, revealed another besetting weakness of the nascent system: the violent susceptibilities aroused by any suggestion, however oblique, of the infringement of national sovereignty. Much water was to flow under the bridges before the Fifth Conference met at Santiago in 1923. The war over, the United States, having insisted on writing Monroe into the League Covenant, then refused to join the League, and Latin America became genuinely alarmed. It looked now to the League as a counterpoise to the United States, and came to Santiago with all its old suspicions intact. The Sixth Conference (Havana, 1928) threatened for a moment the final collapse of Pan-Americanism.

The year 1928 marked in fact the end of a period. The United States had seen the red light. The Roosevelt Corollary she now specifically repudiated, and Monroe reverted to its original function of a bulwark of the United States against Europe, not against Latin America. It remained for Franklin Roosevelt at the Seventh Conference, held at Montevideo in 1933, to turn this negative withdrawal from an interventionist policy into a positive concern for friendship and co-operation. The "good neighbour" policy was born, to fructify at the Eighth Conference (Lima, 1938) in specific pledges of joint action in the face of any threat, from within or without, to the peace of the hemisphere. Monroe had at last been given a basis of all-American support, and the failure of the League of Nations and the storm-clouds gathering over Europe combined to breathe new life into the Pan-American ideal. The solidarity had come just in time. It was still a very relative solidarity. The acid test continued to be, not the nature of the conventions concluded at successive congresses, but the number of these subsequently ratified by individual Governments; and Argentina, for example, as late as 1943 had only ratified six out of ninety agreements concluded since 1890. The real achievement lay rather in the gradual creation of a climate of opinion in favour of the pooling of problems, in the deepening of the sense of common interests and eventually of common responsibilities. And alongside these eight general conferences more than two hundred congresses had been held on specific, generally technical, questions: commerce,

communications, hygiene, education and many more.

The 1939-1945 war, if it again interrupted the normal sequence of general conferences, brought into play instead the emergency consultative machinery devised at Lima, in the series of meetings of Foreign Ministers that followed on the heels of every major development in the conflict. The first met at Panama in September 1939, after the outbreak of hostilities; the second at Havana in July 1940, after the fall of France; the third at Rio in January 1942, after Pearl Harbour. The fourth, held at Mexico in January 1945, on "Problems of War and Peace", looked beyond the war to the establishment of a new and permanent common front against aggression, the specific commitments involved being the theme of the fifth, that met in Rio in August 1947, on "Hemisphere Defence". The Rio meeting, coming two years after the end of the war, showed many of the Latin-American States impatient to get down to the problems of peace. The threat to political security had vanished, for the time being; their economic security, ill-adapted to the strains as to the aftermath of world war, was now the nightmare. The United States was firm, however, in keeping the Foreign Ministers to their agenda, and President Truman perhaps a trifle unkind in replying to the query whether Washington had no Marshall Plan for Latin America with the remark that just such a plan had been in existence for over a hundred years, its name Monroe.

The theme uppermost in Latin-American minds was thus not dollar diplomacy, but dollar-starvation, when the twenty-one nations at last re-assembled, in the Ninth of the regular series of Pan-American Conferences, at Bogotá in April 1948, with anxieties rendered more acute by the vast financial commitments just undertaken by the United States for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. United States' resources were presumably not bottomless. Here would be found the touchstone of United States' professions in the matter of hemisphere solidarity. It is a fatality of the Pan-American cause that there should still be no escaping this pitting of the twenty against the one. In time of war the one leans heavily on the twenty; in time of peace the twenty lean no less heavily upon the one. Only large-scale industrialization throughout Latin America can change that dependence; and only large-scale United States' help can effect that industrialization. One only among the twenty Latin States at Bogotá wanted nothing, in only one economic garden, it seemed, was everything lovely; and Santo Domingo, unfortunately, important as she is, scarcely weighs enough to change the general picture.

This was not, needless to say, the only or even the first item down for discussion. The full agenda had been planned to occupy six weeks, and the Secretary of State announced his intention of seeing it through. Some delegations complained that there was matter in it for three months. In the result the time-table went awry. Revolution, it has been said, is the occupational disease of Pan-American conferences, but never before had the explosion gone off, as it were, under the very seats of the delegates.

Four days were lost after the outbreak of April 9 before the Conference could resume, after great difficulties, whence it was able to move back to the Capitol ten days later. By then, much of the agenda had been written off to a later occasion, especially—to the chagrin of the Latin-Americans—all major economic questions; within a week the Secretary of State had left for Washington and the Conference began to pack up. Its effective life had been reduced, by coincidence or design, to little over three weeks. In achievement, therefore, it may be accounted much less fruitful than the occasion called for. But much of importance took place none the less, and a clear picture emerged of present problems and tensions, of certain trends of development of high significance, and once more of the difficulties inherent in the attempt to mobilize for common purposes the good will, energy and resources not merely of a continent but of a hemisphere. One detail may suffice to correct the tendency in Europe to over-simplify those problems: the official languages of the Conference were four; Spanish, English, Portuguese and French (Haiti).

The chief political item on the agenda went straight to one root of past weakness, the very loose nature of the system itself as such. The term Pan-American Union has always suggested more than was warranted. In fact this has merely been the permanent secretariat in Washington of an entirely voluntary association of nations that had no written constitution and few of whose organs rested on formal convention. It has undertaken the preliminary spadework for conferences, prepared the agenda, served thereafter as a depository for archives and instruments of ratification and set in motion the machinery for giving effect to decisions taken. This apart, it is an active research and information centre on all matters affecting inter-American relations. But it has no real powers. Only when a Pan-American Conference was in session could the nations of the Americas be said to be acting as a union, and—paradoxically but inevitably—such conferences have tended to serve even more as platforms for the airing of grievances and the voicing of disunion. At Mexico in 1945 the Foreign Ministers took stock of the situation, and after their resolution on mutual assistance and hemisphere solidarity they put next in importance a resolution concerning “the reorganization, consolidation and strengthening of the inter-American system” as their contribution to the chief problem of peace.

The implementing of this resolution was remitted to Bogotá, and here the Conference did achieve its objective with the institution of a formal “Organization of American States”—for reasons already mentioned it could not, unfortunately, be styled “Organization of the United States of America”—with a Charter enshrining the juridical principles on which it is based, its nature and ends (peaceful solution of problems, collective security), the rights and responsibilities of member-States, and the constitutional bases of the organs through which it will work. The measure of initiative and political power that it was proposed should be vested in the

Governing Council was considerably shorn in debate, leaving the quinquennial Pan-American Conferences as the legislative organ of the new system, and the *ad hoc* meetings of Foreign Ministers as the executive. The first Secretary-General of OAS is to be D. Alberto Lleras Camargo, ex-President of Colombia and since 1946 Director-General of the Pan-American Union, with Mr. William Manger of the United States, his Deputy-Director in the Union, as Assistant Secretary-General. Much of the debate on the Charter hinged once more on questions of sovereignty. Limitations of national sovereignty, as Ecuador pointed out, generally work out to the detriment of small nations, leaving the larger unscathed: hence a solicitude that procedure under the Charter should not impair in any way the provisions of her own Constitution for the independent invocation, at need, of the help of other Spanish-American countries.

Another and weightier solicitude concerned the relations of the Organization with the United Nations. Here everything had changed since 1918. Not merely was the United States in the United Nations: the United Nations was permanently established on United States' soil. And while Monroe did not figure in the Charter of UN, this did respect “regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace.” Herein lay the hope, in Chile's words, of “excluding the possibility that American affairs might fall within the orbit of action of extra-continental organisms based on juridical norms alien to those of our system.” The Act of Chapultepec, signed just before the elaboration at San Francisco of the UN Charter, had definitely envisaged sanctions for the keeping of peace in the Americas, and the Rio Treaty on Hemisphere Defence made the relevant obligations explicit. Rio, however, also incorporated into its text adherence to the UN Charter and the acceptance by member-States of the commitments involved, while laying it down that parties to any inter-American dispute would seek a settlement through their regional organization before referring it to UN.

The necessary co-ordination in the new OAS Charter of commitments undertaken at Mexico, San Francisco and Rio brought to light one anomaly. The UN Charter lays it down that the invocation of “regional arrangements for enforcement action” must first be authorized by the Security Council. Should OAS propose therefore to apply sanctions against one of its number in enforced settlement of a dispute, any permanent member of the Security Council (for example, Russia) could veto such action. Should the Security Council, left with the responsibility, when itself propose enforcement action, any one of its permanent members (for example, the United States) could again impose its veto. The resolving of that dilemma is, however, for UN, not for OAS, whose complete liberty of action is nowhere else infringed. Bogotá was anxious further that the economic, social, juridical and cultural activities of the specialized agencies of OAS should work in closest harmony with similar organs of UN, though never to the point of sinking their Pan-American

identity and autonomy to the status merely of regional instruments of the world body. The desire to be not only good Americans but good world-citizens had already been shown in the invitation to Mr. Trigve Lie, which he was unfortunately unable to accept, to attend the Conference, as he had already attended that at Rio in 1947. The Rio Treaty, it was recalled, was the first regional pact for the maintenance of peace to be concluded within the framework of the San Francisco Charter.

The efficacy of the new Organization and its Charter has yet to be tested, but if the obligations now undertaken are faithfully carried out the day of territorial change by violence in Latin America would appear to be over. That is not to say that present frontiers rank henceforth with the laws of Medes and Persians. Colombia, host to the Conference, in her backward-glancing speech of welcome dwelt meaningfully on Bolívar's project, more modest than his dream of a Spanish-American Union, of the union of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador in a single State, Great Colombia, corresponding to the colonial Viceroyalty of New Granada. That project, realized for a moment, straightway crumbled; whence a large part of the disillusion that caused him to refer bitterly on his death-bed to having "ploughed the sea". But the ideal never wholly perished. The Great-Colombian Merchant Fleet launched by the three Governments in 1946 was a modern echo, and nowhere in the proceedings at Bogotá was Bolívar's presence more in evidence than here. The motion in the name of El Salvador, warmly seconded by Guatemala and Ecuador, that membership of OAS, as it was open to every American nation, should equally be open to any new State resulting from the union of two or more existing member-States, was carried unanimously; and there are signs that, were such a Great Colombia to be reconstituted, Panama would enter too, so returning to the allegiance from which she was wrenched in 1903. A conference of these four powers was convened in Quito for May 1948 to discuss the formation of an economic block and customs union; the participation of Panama in the joint merchant fleet aforementioned would follow. A similar possibility present in many minds concerns the five Central-American States which, sprung from the disintegration of the United Provinces of Central America (1823-1838), formerly the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, have been seeking a basis for federation now for close on thirty years. Brazil, whose divergent political history on emancipation from Portugal averted the disintegration into the seventeen independent nations that, on the Spanish-American model, might well have resulted from her colonial Captaincies, is a standing reminder of the strength that is unity.

What OAS cannot yet cope with is the "worse calamity", civil strife. Within the past two years there have been revolutions in Bolivia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Colombia, an average of one every three months. The phenomenon is disturbing alike to economic development, to professions of "democracy", to inter-

American relations and to the prestige of OAS. Intervention, however disguised, would infer such a blow to the principle of respect for national sovereignty, still the tenderest nerve in the body politic throughout all Latin America, as to threaten once again the whole edifice of Pan-Americanism. Yet non-intervention, as President Truman said in Mexico in March 1947, cannot be indifference: "The lawlessness of one may threaten the very existence of the law on which all depend"; and he appealed for respect for democracy within each individual State. The good neighbour policy had left the United States only the political sanction of refusing to recognize régimes implanted by force, a rough-and-ready policy of the inadequacies of which the recent disturbances in Costa Rica were eloquent testimony. The question of the recognition of *de facto* governments was therefore also on the Bogotá agenda, again as a remit from Mexico and Rio. At Bogotá it was once more remitted, this time to a juridical committee charged to report to the next Pan-American Conference, to be held in Caracas in 1953, leaving as only immediate achievement the formal re-affirmation of the two existing principles that recognition may not be used as a means of extorting unjust advantages and that the maintenance of diplomatic relations implies no judgment on the internal affairs of the régime in question, with the platitude that continuity of diplomatic relations between American States is to be desired.

The problem is unquestionably one of the thorniest, if only because in Latin America a *de facto* régime may not only claim, as dictatorships invariably do, to represent the will of the people, but may in fact represent it. And between peoples so closely related the border-line dividing the internal from the external is often tenuous. Commenting on the proposal, in a draft "American Declaration of Individual Rights and Duties" (not to be included, it was decided, in the Charter nor to be the subject of a special treaty, and so merely pious in intention), that no foreigner should intervene in internal political affairs, Uruguay pointed out that the observation of such a precept a century and a quarter ago would have precluded like Bolívar, San Martín and Garibaldi from playing their part in the emancipation of the continent. And non-recognition may easily prove more inconvenient than effective. Thus the United States, which has not recognized the present régime in Nicaragua, could only protest unofficially to the latter against the alleged presence, while the Conference was actually meeting, of Nicaraguan forces on Costa Rican territory. The incident was well ventilated at Bogotá, and before a committee of enquiry was finally appointed there emerged such differences of view concerning procedure and competence, in a matter apparently so straightforward, as to suggest that the drafting experts and the jurists have still much to do before the new Charter may be said to be water-tight. Typical of drafting difficulties was a twenty-five minute debate over whether, in the declaration "The American States condemn all wars of aggression: victory confers no rights," the colon should not be a full stop. To

Colombia the colon opened the door to "dangerous interpretations" to the United States its retention was vital. The full stop finally won the day, after Argentina had voted diplomatically in favour of both.

The debate on *de facto* régimes did at least provide an opening for discussion of the dangers of foreign subversive activity, on which several members, notably the United States, felt strongly even before the Bogotá uprising; and a vigorous anti-Communist declaration was duly drafted and signed, recognizing that "the world situation demands urgent measures to ensure that agents in the service of international Communism or of any other form of totalitarianism shall not stultify the genuine will of the peoples of the Western hemisphere." There was no need to mention Russia by name. Another and more subtle form of subversion was the economic. "Cuba fears economic aggression more than armed attack," said the Cuban delegation, which had already raised the issue at Rio; and a motion was approved to the effect that: "No State shall apply or encourage coercive measures of an economic or political nature to the end of exercising compulsion on the sovereign will of another State and of obtaining therefrom advantages of any kind." Argentina, while supporting the resolution, hinted at the difficulties of interpretation that are bound to arise here too by expressing the hope that States would not go tobogganing down the slope of economic susceptibility, qualifying as coercive measures taken in legitimate defence of a nation's economy. Cuba exulted none the less at seeing now closed "the only breach in the juridical curtain of non-intervention in the Americas."

The desire to round off another cycle in the American story lay behind the discussion on colonies. The precedents in the matter, insofar as it is one of continental concern, are few and simple. The Monroe Declaration undertook not to interfere with existing European colonies (although this did not suffice to confirm Spain in the possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico after the events of 1898). "No American territory," said President Grant in 1870, at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, "shall pass from one European power to another." The contingency then envisaged did not in fact arise until the fall of France in 1940, whereupon the Havana Conference of Foreign Ministers added the logical corollary by approving plans for collective trusteeship for any colonies so orphaned. That Conference also, however, asserted—or re-asserted—"the right of all American territories to self-determination," and the collective concern of the twenty-one nations at Bogotá was to find a way of translating that "right" into reality. In the absence of the other interested parties—the powers at present responsible for such colonies and the inhabitants of the colonies themselves—what might have been an interesting legal discussion of the nature of the "right" became a matter rather of rhetorical assertion. "Every country in the New World is morally bound to fight for the ending of the colonial cycle in America, both as an ideological duty and as a measure of defence against extra-continental imperialisms."

Nor did it appear that the States most immediately interested were fully alive to the discrepancy between their demands and the fulfilment of the said right. For it is apparent that the colonial populations in question, in the exercise of self-determination, might well opt for a continuance of the *status quo*. Even if they opted, in the sense tacitly assumed at Bogotá, for the liquidation of the colonial system, it is conceivable that they might still prefer independence to absorption into the nearest State, and it is not inconceivable that the machinery of OAS might eventually be called into play to protect them against the machinations of the very States that insisted on putting this question on the agenda. Argentina sought indeed to safeguard her position by claiming that the Falkland Islands question was one not of colonies but of unlawful occupation. The United States properly demurred against any suggestion of unilateral action, and, after Colombia had drawn attention to the charge laid on colonial powers by the UN Charter to help colonial peoples forward on the road to self-government, this matter too was passed to a sub-committee, styled "American Commission for Dependent Territories," for further study and report. The resolution meanwhile adopted, declaring opposition in principle to the retention of European colonies in the Americas, in effect disallowed the jurisdiction of the Conference in the matter and carried an implicit recommendation to the States concerned to engage in direct negotiation with the European power or powers affected. And that went for the Antarctic too.

But the burning question at Bogotá was not the OAS Charter, nor *de facto* régimes, nor colonies: it was quite simply economic aid. And never was it less possible to isolate the economic from the political. Rio had already laid it down that: "Economic security will always be the surest guarantee of the political security of the American peoples," and it was made abundantly clear now that it was idle to denounce Communism so long as social conditions provided an ideal breeding-ground for the virus. The United States had come to Bogotá with the understanding that economic questions would only be dealt with in general terms—as, for example, in the drafting, duly achieved, of a "Pact of Economic Assistance." After the interruption and subsequent abbreviation of the Conference this became inevitable, and the solution of specific problems, among them the demand, led by Argentina, Colombia and Peru, for the creation of an Inter-American Bank, was formally relegated to a special Economic Conference to be held in Buenos Aires in September 1948. There an inventory will be drawn up, on the one hand, of Latin-American needs in terms of agricultural and industrial machinery, manufactured goods and raw materials for processing and, on the other, of exportable surpluses available in furtherance of the Marshall Plan for Europe.

But the United States was left in no doubt meantime that economic problems were becoming, to the Latin-American States, the touchstone of the whole Pan-American system. Mexico, in what was perhaps the most

moving utterance made at the Conference, spoke frankly of present doubts and difficulties, the method of confronting which would either strengthen their high principles or pronounce them unfitted, as nations, to uphold them. Pan-Americanism in the past had been subject to strange fluctuations waxing strong when the world was torn by war and waning with the return of peace and optimism. The principle of equality between States was undermined in practice by the inequality of their resources, and the abyss which separated some American States from others in this respect seemed to deepen every day. The poorer countries did not want help only *in extremis*, when the enemy was at the gate: they wanted help to live. If Pan-Americanism was to be a reality, every American nation must accept as its duty the rendering to others of all possible help in matters of economic and technical assistance, monetary stability and long-term credit. Latin America was not lacking in sympathy with nations that had suffered the martyrdom of war; it wished to see set alongside such the sufferings of peoples that for decades had been the martyrs of peace. Inanition and destitution in the ravaged countries of Europe were strictly comparable with the plight of many of their own Indian populations. The present economic disarticulation of the interests of nations always so ready to sing aloud their unity amounted in effect to a constant unheeding aggression against the weaker. The Latin-American countries, as Colombia phrased it, have now exhausted the first stage of their economic existence, as scrapers of the soil and producers of raw materials for export; but they must have help before they can enter upon the second.

Against this, the explanation by the United States of the European Recovery Plan, as having first claim on United States' resources and as ultimately beneficial to Latin America too, and the exposition of the part Latin America was expected to play in it, were received without enthusiasm; and even the announcement that a further \$500m. had been placed at the disposal of the Export-Import Bank for loans to Latin America evoked never a cheer. The Washington view is that large-scale development, as in tin, oil and rubber, is a field rather for commercial investment. Such investors will demand ample security against risks and contingencies of which the Bogotá revolt was itself a vivid reminder; and one important clause in the final agreement on inter-American economic co-operation did establish guarantees of adequate compensation in the event of expropriation. Whether that will be sufficient in itself to re-start the flow of private capital from the United States remains to be seen. If it is not, and if Washington does not prove more forthcoming on the official level at Buenos Aires in September 1948, Mr. Sumner Welles' gloomy prognostication that: "The inter-American system is in real danger of collapse, not from Communist intrigue but chiefly from recent United States' policy," may not be far off the mark.

RECONSTRUCTION IN JAPAN

By O. M. GREEN

RECONSTRUCTION in Japan necessarily involves two questions, what the Japanese are doing for themselves and what the Allies will ultimately do for them; it must regretfully be said that the present complete uncertainty on the second point is telling injuriously on the first.

In many respects Japan has made a better recovery than other vanquished nations. The mental paralysis caused by defeat has long worn off. Rebuilding of ruined cities is being pushed on; Hiroshima, in particular, appears to have surmounted the wreckage of the atomic bomb with extraordinary vitality. Though the centre of the great manufacturing cities Osaka and Nagoya was blotted out, many mills and factories in the suburbs were undamaged. Rice production this year is expected to reach the full 4,583,000 tons fixed by General MacArthur, thus ensuring a regular daily ration of $\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. of rice (in Singapore it is hardly half that). It was a great advantage that the Government administration remained intact, thus giving General MacArthur the necessary machinery to work through, as also that there was only one power, America, to give orders. In General MacArthur himself, Japan has found a fairy godmother: if his eagerness to remould Japanese life on the pattern of American democracy is open to criticism on grounds of sheer practicability, there can be nothing but admiration for his devotion in labouring to restore Japan's self-confidence and self-sufficiency, while American generosity is still pouring out hundreds of millions of dollars in Japan.

Yet, for all this, the Japanese are restless and unhappy. Industrially the sudden spurt in exports, of which such surprising reports were heard towards the end of 1946, was evidently due to the accumulated stocks of raw materials still in existence in Japan. The pace has not been maintained and the stark fact of the Japanese manufacturer's dependence on materials brought from abroad presents itself with unpleasant force. Coal production, which was pushed up in the war to 57,000,000 tons a year, has dropped to about 28,000,000; mining machinery and the general state of the mines are both reported in poor condition. This no doubt can be repaired, but there remains the perennial problem of where Japan is to obtain coking coal. Native iron-ore resources have been estimated as sufficient only for two years' normal consumption. According to a

recent report Japan has 174,000 tons of scrap from the breaking up of her navy and there are still 50,000 tons' weight of destroyers to be scrapped. Meanwhile steel is urgently needed for house-building, gas and water works, railways, maintenance and reconstruction of manufacturing machinery, ships and shipyards and articles for export.

The problem of Japan's irrepressible population becomes the more formidable now that there is no apparent outlet in her vanished overseas possessions. Since 1935 the population, swelled by the numbers of Japanese repatriated from abroad, has risen from sixty-nine to seventy-eight millions. By 1952 it is expected to reach over eighty-two millions. The Government has a five-years' plan to increase exports by that date to the value of U.S. \$1,000 millions; at present Japan's industrial production is only twenty-two per cent. of the average in 1940. But since Japan has lost her former invisible exports in shipping and foreign investments, she will still be faced with a heavy adverse balance of trade. According to some calculations her foreign debt by 1952 for food and raw materials will be not less than U.S. \$1,460 millions. One serious loss not generally realized is that of the right to fish in Russian waters, which not only cuts down a staple food supply but also Japan's former valuable export of tinned marine produce. Meanwhile inflation and rising prices tell heavily on the multitude. Officially the Yen, once worth \$2, is rated at sixty to the American dollar, but actually it stands at 300-400. Profiteering and the black market flourish scandalously.

Such are the main features of the economic position which aggravates and is aggravated by the political and social unrest. It is noticeable that while the destruction of the military machine, accomplished within four months of General MacArthur's landing in Japan, excited no popular reaction, social changes are strenuously resisted. More than a year ago General MacArthur was taking action to dissolve the *Zaibatsu* (the great family syndicates which controlled nearly three-quarters of Japanese industry, commerce and finance) which had supplied the militarists with the sinews of war. Last December the Katayama Government passed the Economic Decentralization Law, also aimed at the *Zaibatsu*. Yet it is still by no means clear that their power, though exercised behind the scenes, is really destroyed. While, on the one hand, they represent the accepted Japanese method of business (Mitsui, the most famous, is said to date from the sixteenth century), on the other, the lack of a Japanese middle class makes it difficult to see who will take over their multifarious affairs.

Again, for the benefit of the peasants, who number fifty-three per cent. of the population and notoriously its most heavily burdened, most neglected class, the big landed estates were to be broken up and the tenants to be assisted in buying them. In 1947 3,500,000 acres thus changed hands. But since the beginning of this year the landlords have contrived means of getting round the law and sales have slowed down.

These are illustrations of the struggle between old and new Japan which was so conspicuous in the downfall of the Katayama Government in February. Mr. Tetsu Katayama, who took office last May, was conspicuous as the first Christian Premier of Japan and the first to be elected by the Diet instead of being appointed by the Emperor. As his own party, the Social Democrats, numbered only 143 in the House of Representatives and the Opposition 135 (nominally Liberals but actually Conservatives) he had to form a Coalition Cabinet with the Democrats and in the main to pursue a policy of compromise which pleased nobody. He tried to enforce controls on food, finance, prices and wages, only to find his supporters falling away, some because he went too far, others because he did not go far enough. On February 11 he resigned office to Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, Foreign Minister in his Cabinet and President of the Democrats.

The fact that Mr. Katayama had not called upon Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, former Ambassador to Great Britain and leader of the Liberal Opposition, caused a prodigious uproar in the Japanese press which denounced "Ashida's political black marketing" and clamoured for a general election. So violent were the protests that General MacArthur was obliged to deliver a sharp lecture to the press, the burden of which was that Mr. Katayama's action had been perfectly constitutional and democratic; that the attempt by certain groups to force a particular candidate on the Diet was unpatriotic and un-Japanese; and that frequent elections were "one of the greatest plagues of parliamentary government." "When father says turn we all turn." The clamour died down. But the general instability of Japanese politics had been vividly illustrated. The apathy of the man in the street towards the Diet is reflected in the general comment on the Ashida Cabinet that it will be just the same thing as usual." For any release from the cost and inconveniences of life the public hope for little from above.

In marked contrast are the activities of the new trade unions. Frowned on by police and soldiers alike trade unionism was stunted and anaemic before the war. General MacArthur has deliberately encouraged it, however, in order to familiarize the Japanese with democratic practice. There are now between 2,000 and 3,000 trade unions, divided broadly into two groups, the Japanese Federation of Labour, and the National Congress of Industrial Organizations. The former is anti-Communist, the latter pro-Communist. It is naturally this group which attracts most attention and excites most uncertainty for the future.

Although the Japanese Communists claim only 16,500 members (this may be an under-statement) their influence is out of proportion to their numbers. Their representation in the Diet is still tiny, only four in each of the two Houses. But their organization and tireless activity are the same as exhibited by Communism in all countries. They have no specific head, direction proceeding from a committee, but the driving spirit is

still the same fiery Tokuda, through whom the movement was started in Japan early in the 1920's, about the same time, curiously enough, as the Communist Party was born in China.

At one time the Japanese Communists were the only party who stood for the abolition of the Emperor, but they are reported to have dropped this demand owing to its general unpopularity. They are now particularly devoting themselves to the peasants, the most conservative class in Japan. "Do not buy land from the landlords or sell your rice to the Government," they preach. "The landlords will only take the land again, and the Government will swindle you." At the sixth national Communist Congress in December, plans were laid for a fresh campaign of attack on the social order. Regional strikes, one following quickly after another, have been launched in order to get round General MacArthur's prohibition against a general strike. Whether the Communists have any direct connection with Russia is not known. But Communist papers printed in Saghalien in Japanese flow into Japan and the Russian Mission Headquarters in Tokyo keep a well-stocked library of Communist literature easily accessible. The danger that Japan might ultimately take a violent turn either to the right or to the left, if post-war conditions became intolerable, has long been foreseen by those who know Japan best. In a nation so imbued with devotion to the Throne as the Japanese, a Communist State seems impossible. But it cannot be forgotten that totalitarian Government in Japan has been the rule rather than the exception; that the Emperor has habitually been the puppet of the actual rulers; and that there appears no inherent reason why a Communist junta might not use the Emperor as the Fujiwaras, the Tokugawas and the militarists of modern times have used him. This is not to suggest that such a paradox of government is within even measurable distance, certainly not while the Americans remain in control. But the energy of the Communists in stirring up trouble, while the peace treaty hangs fire and the Japanese chafe more and more under foreign control, is not to be ignored.

Only eight months ago it was confidently expected that peace would be signed this summer. The Canberra Conference had revealed a workable identity of aims between the Commonwealth powers and America. Russia's demand that the treaty should be drafted by the Big Four, thus enabling her to use her veto, instead of by the twelve combatants represented in the Far Eastern Commission at Washington, could and not impossibly would have been ignored: Russia was only in the war six days and has paid herself handsomely for marching her troops into Manchuria by plundering that country of £181,000,000 worth of machinery and seizing Southern Saghalien, the Kuriles, Dairen and Port Arthur. But China, fearful of Russia and apprehensive of American lenience towards Japan, has also plumped for the Big Four and the veto; and to draft terms for Japan without China is hardly thinkable.

Not only is nothing whatever being done to hasten the conclusion of

peace, but insidious differences begin to appear between the Allies as to the degree of freedom to export that should be granted to Japan. There is obviously only one answer to the fundamental issue—that the most virile, enterprising people in Asia forced back into the relatively narrow compass of the Japanese islands must be enabled to support themselves or become the pensioners of others. But American manufacturers have not the same acute recollection of the competition of Japanese cheap labour and mass production that British and other manufacturers have; and the recent arrival in Japan of Mr. William Draper, U.S. Under-Secretary for the Army, with a party of experts to study how "to make Japan the workshop of the Far East," has awakened anxious thoughts in Lancashire, Australia and New Zealand. These misgivings are not lessened by America's ardent desire to build up Japan as a barrier against Russian Communism and it appears fairly clear that she will take her own line in doing so. Meanwhile the hopes founded on the opening of Japan to foreign merchants have not been released. Apart from the fact that dealings in the principal staples are still on a Government-to-Government basis all transactions are in effect under the control of SCAP. There is no foreign exchange rate, all business is done through U.S. dollars and the American authorities frequently quote rates that are wildly at variance with world prices. Other genuine grievances could be mentioned: for instance, the continued occupation by the U.S. Army of British-owned offices and godowns. The complaint is not that General MacArthur discriminates against foreign merchants but that he does not understand how much the freeing of trade could do to improve Japanese morale and allay discontent.

There remains the question: Are the Japanese ready for a peace treaty? The answer is surely that they are over-ready. The Allies cannot play Providence for Japan indefinitely; only she can work out her own salvation; and it cannot be doubted that her present unrest is mainly due to her anxiety to take affairs into her own hands and to uncertainty as to when and how she will be allowed to do so. Her military strength and colonial empire have been so utterly smashed that fear of her starting out again on the rampage within any measurable length of time is fantastic; and it ought not to be impossible to fix a scale of exports sufficient for her support without unfair competition with others.

Nobody, probably outside America, shares General MacArthur's belief in the "spiritual revolution" of the Japanese. The conversion to American democratic practice in a couple of years of a people steeped for centuries in feudalism and submission to clan and family is too much to ask. Recently, too, one may see an unconscious revolt against the American teaching in a marked revival of Shintoism. Another symptom of the clinging to old institutions was the hundreds of thousands who flocked to the Emperor's palace when a part of it was opened to the public last New Year's day. All who could wore tail-coats; deep bows

were made towards the Emperor's residence ; and the crowds who could not get in took off hats and coats and abased themselves before the gates. In proportion as Hirohito has shed his divinity and emphasized his humanity by many visits to bombed and distressed areas he has come closer to his people's hearts ; he may well prove the strongest influence in leading them in new ways. His New Year's poem addressed to the nation

Learn from the ever-green pine tree in a lonely garden in winter decay that does not change its colour,

struck a chord to which all will respond.

If, when left to themselves, the Japanese swing back to the institutions in which they feel most at home, it need not be feared that they will prove offensive to others. It may sound merely sentimental to dwell on the many elements of good in their complex nature : hitherto Japan and the West have largely shown each other their worst sides. But the Japanese faculty for summarily discarding one course of action which has failed for something different and for learning from others is a commonplace ; and while they themselves may not become democratic, they realize that the democratic peoples' friendship is worth having. A peaceful self-reliant Japan would provide an element of stability in the Far East that is sorely needed.

CRAMPING THE PRESS

BY W. L. ANDREWS

IF you force on newspapers a drastic reduction of their sizes you are bound to deprive readers of something vital to their understanding of public affairs. That has happened in Britain. To-day much that ought to enlighten the country goes unreported and undiscussed. Many people begin to know less, and care less, about such important subjects of community life as their local government. All this, in a hazy way, is common knowledge. We have grown used to it. The Government stonewall any request for more paper. They repeat that we cannot afford it. Readers hardly deplore any longer (unless their own speeches are woundingly ignored or savagely cut) that our newspapers, by order of the Government, have sacrificed two-thirds and in some instances four-fifths of their space.

What is that something vital taken from readers by the restrictions on newsprint ? It is the abundance of information that a citizen needs to get an adequate understanding of all but the most dramatic crises in national and local government. Debates, whether in Parliament or in local councils, have the life and the competition of argument crushed out of them by the sub-editor. Men with agile minds and authoritative knowledge may explain, cut, thrust and clash for the better part of a day, and a newspaper be compelled to get the whole thing down to a quarter of a column. This means picking out the bare result and a few points by the main speakers. The substance has to be thrown aside.

A leader writer may want to comment on the debate and be limited to 300 words. What can he attempt in the way of exposition ? How can he pierce indifference, sting the conscience, get minds marching into action ? He cannot take his argument from one logical stage to another ; he is bound to assert his conclusions with tub-thumping abruptness. That may comfort readers of his own way of thinking and annoy his opponents, but is unlikely to convert anyone. The paper fails on a perhaps important issue in two ways ; it does not answer that greatest question of all for a politically mature people : " What are the facts ? " nor does it get far with that invaluable process before decisive action, a process that ought to be the pride of thoughtful journalism, that of persuasion.

This complaint will strike some readers as excessive. They will say that we get on fairly well in spite of such small newspapers. True, the reader may not miss what he never sees ; but the omissions from the press

weaken and mislead his judgment just the same. The worst effects have been concealed. A newspaper, though in some respects a public concern, is also a commercial enterprise, and does not want to advertise its shortcomings, even though free from blame; it would rather have readers think it is valiantly mastering all difficulties. The passage of time has dulled our memories of the full information we used to get from our favourite columns. Many people now grown to manhood and womanhood have never known what ample and adequate journalism is. Their knowledge of public issues in their own town or district is poorer than that of their predecessors for generations. Some young couples, unable to get the local paper because of the stop put on more sales, remain cut off from most of their neighbourhood activities. They do not know who the local mayor or council chairman is. They do not know who their public representatives are. Public spirit cannot thrive in this mental isolation.

Another reason for lack of a sharp awareness of what we are missing in the press is that the most influential readers, those who in London or in their local circles give a lead to opinion, come off best for newspapers. They subscribe to the larger and dearer dailies, and these, though they had to cut down substantially, are not cramped as sorely as the penny ones. Our quality papers above a penny provide, not unfortunately the bountiful old array of news, pictures and comment, one of the wonders of the world, but something not hopelessly short of the generous measure the penny press once provided. Circulations of the larger as of all papers are severely limited. A minority of important readers, but only a minority, whose numbers are kept down by regulations to economize paper, can be fairly well informed about certain topics; but that is no remedy for the general shortage of some kinds of news and no inducement to the general and local information of millions of people.

The gradualness of newspaper size reductions has blurred for me the astonishing contrast between the pre-war press and to-day's. I have had to refer several times to my collection of souvenir newspapers, now returned from cellar to attic with the journalist's usual trunk load of manuscripts of books he could never get published. It is no less startling to see how ample and handsome our newspapers were. Here is *The Times* for September 9, 1938, with twenty-four pages, essentially the "Thunderer" we know to-day but with more of everything, printed more readably with plenty of large type and plenty of spacing. The cricket reports are in type as large as the leaders to-day. How is it that one thought of *The Times* as always sedate and even ponderous? There is a sunny and serenely aristocratic look about this old copy. "Thunderer" does not seem the right name at all for this companion with the pleasant, courteous voice.

I pick up a *Yorkshire Post* for Saturday, July 15, 1938. What elbow-room there is for good writing in its twenty-two pages, and how much to surprise the reader to-day!—for instance, a column of small type on

the state of the rivers, an angling magazine page and a magnificent half-page air picture of Old Whitby looking from its abbey-crowned cliffs on a festal, diamond-flashing sea.

Old copies of the *Sunday Times* and *Observer* strike one to-day as truly magnificent. A forty-page issue was taken in their stride. Here is an old *Observer* with St. John Ervine's column about the theatre, a feature of light comment by *Observer*, a Paris causerie by Philip Carr, a week-end page with motoring and gardening articles and a weekly competition. J. L. Garvin's main article spread itself elegantly over most of the leader page. Book reviews ran to six or even eight times what they are to-day. Sport had four times its present space.

A Falstaffian *Daily Telegraph* catches the eye. It ran to thirty-two pages, with rather more than half of it devoted to news. Such lavishness allowed a daily woman's page. Book reviews were three times their present space. One comes upon (it seems incredible) a whole page for music. There is a full picture page, and I remember there were sometimes two. How did we read these giant issues and the great special numbers here stored away? One looked at the pictures in the Coronation, Royal Wedding and Royal Funeral numbers, perhaps read a little of the orotund and majestic letterpress and then put such souvenirs away for the spare hour that never came.

Trained in the habits of such opulent and spacious journalism, what was an editor to do under the restrictions of the paper famine that grew as the war went on? The main remedies were omission, compression and "editionizing". The word "editionizing" seems to have gained a secure footing in journalistic technicalities but I prefer the old word "editioning", though to be sure it was used to mean editing and not the process meant here, the putting of different news in different editions. Compression took two forms. Not only were articles and news stories severely cut but type sizes were also reduced. White space was more sparingly used, margins were whittled down, and there were fewer and smaller headings. Sub-editing became much tighter; that is, sentences were squeezed of their verbiage, needless if ornamental phrases were blue-pencilled. The concluding sentence of a paragraph was often remodelled to save spending a line on perhaps a single word. But the readiest and favourite remedy of all for our dwindling space was editioning. This developed on a new scale. It became the habit of many provincial dailies to print several local editions, perhaps five or six, each going to a separate town and district and containing the news of that town and district but omitting the news of neighbouring districts, and even of the head-office town, unless such news was of striking importance. This system was adopted not only by provincial daily papers but also by many provincial weeklies. Under it the reader suffered in two ways from the cramping of news. Information from his own local authorities shrank by a half or even two-thirds, and he was deprived of reading the news of

neighbouring local authorities and of forming those comparisons which are part of the lifeblood of judgment. The news conspectus of a region often became the ragged patchwork of a district.

Some details will make clearer what has happened. Though all newspapers have suffered, they have not all suffered alike. First we have the morning papers sold at 1½d., 2d. or 3d., and Sunday papers sold at 2d. and 3d. This group includes most but not all of the quality papers, with several Sunday papers of a highly popular, million-circulating type. All have had to discard many new attractive features and reduce others, but are still able to give a respectable variety of news. Sales of the quality papers have risen considerably. There are numbers of readers who are willing to sit down to study a trusted paper for half-an-hour or so. They were probably wearied by the twenty-page pre-war papers and were content with the pre-war penny papers that gave about sixteen pages, but they do not get enough information from the present four-page sheets.

While the twopenny papers have been thus comparatively fortunate they have lost not merely elegancies and pastime features but also much that was of public value. *The Times* has had, generally speaking, to cut its seven to twelve columns of Parliament to three to five columns, to cut financial and commercial news from forty-eight columns to twelve, to drop the weather map, daily law notices, and the military and naval gazette, and to reduce almost all features. *The Manchester Guardian* in its devotion to great international issues can give little local news to-day. Its space for book reviews has been cut by four-fifths. Commercial news is down from sometimes five pages to a maximum of four columns. Pictures, once a full page with three or four photographs elsewhere, are limited to one and a half or one and three-quarter columns. In the *Glasgow Herald*, district news has suffered most. Glasgow Corporation is reported at a fair length, but other local authorities get short shrift. Parliament used to get a page. Only on important occasions nowadays can the paper give more than two columns to the parliamentary report. *The Scotsman* has had to condense in much the same way. Its news of finance and commerce, always a proud feature, has been cut to a quarter. The paper sometimes confines its stock exchange quotations to closing prices. The parliamentary sketch and daily picture page have gone.

The Western Morning News, being 1½d., has the advantage of several six-page issues in a week. When the Boundary Commission's report came out in April it was of close interest to all areas because of its extensive ramifications to counties, county boroughs and country districts. Before the war it would have been given a solid page. Coming on a four-page night it had to be compressed into a column and a half.

The London penny morning papers are so familiar to readers that little need be said of their difficulties. These indeed, are somewhat less irksome (though Fleet Street editors might not agree with this) than those of the provincial penny papers. The London penny mornings before the war

averaged twenty pages. They are now down to four. The area of reading matter is between a quarter and one-fifth of what it used to be. Use of smaller type in the headings and text has helped to get in more news. Women's pages have virtually disappeared. Theatres, books, radio and films have suffered. There is less room for comment and background material. Lord Layton, of the *News Chronicle*, has made extensive research into the use of reduced space and has published a valuable pamphlet entitled "Newsprint: A Problem for Democracy." His well-marshalled facts make it clear that in the reduction to four pages Parliament and foreign news—that is, serious news—suffered most. Many foreign countries go almost unreported. Who knows what is happening to-day in that land of immense significance to us—Japan?

The peculiar difficulty of the provincial morning paper of four pages for a penny is that while giving the national and international news it must also cram in local news and a liberal amount of advertising. London papers circulating in millions charge heavily for advertising, but a provincial paper with a necessarily much smaller sale cannot charge nearly so much; to get an adequate revenue from advertisers it is bound to give them more space than its rivals in Fleet Street would. How to do justice to local news and local political and cultural activities has been for years a harassing problem for the morning papers in the provinces. Disappointed readers still believe when their letters are omitted or some amateur dramatic performance gets no notice (even though a reporter was present) that the editor has exercised a malignant prejudice against them. Omission of news creates more than indifference. Wild rumours rush in to fill a news vacuum. Famished minds are not the most judicious.

Evening papers, even where they sell at 1½d., have been burdened with the same problems as their penny morning companions. Papers which printed eight to twelve pages, being now down to four, have cut out or reduced almost all regular features. Many provincial evening papers have dropped nearly all special articles. One of them imposes a 350-word limit on letters to the editor and has cut reports of town council and other local meetings by about half. Most evening papers run district editions and slip pages (special local pages) to an extent formerly unknown. Some of them have reduced leaders to a mere note or couple of notes. Others, such as the *Yorkshire Evening Post*, the *Manchester Evening News*, the *Bolton Evening News* and the *West Lancashire Evening Gazette* (Blackpool) have remained generous with editorial comment: they find that leaders written with pungency and personality have often a strong influence in controversy, local and national, but especially local. But on the whole, evening papers have become far more bitty than they would like to be.

The provincial weekly papers lament size reductions bitterly. These papers have as their chief object, as they have always had, the printing of local news in a straightforward, factual way. They are an indispensable

source of information for the ratepayer about local government. Every weekly paper editor tells the same melancholy tale of important news and important features being forced right out of the paper. One country weekly that used to print fourteen to sixteen pages and sometimes twenty pages finds itself compelled in the eight-page paper of to-day to skeletonize local meetings: the result is that each party accuses the editor of bias against it. Another editor says he reports all council decisions of consequence, but heated exchanges are rarely mentioned. Reports have to be incomplete and solidly factual. The reader misses the stormy scenes and takes less interest in his council.

One weekly paper tries to eke out its space by printing reports of local, urban and rural district councils piecemeal. A report of a meeting will be given in one issue and extracts from the committee minutes in the next. One weekly paper of six pages, in order to get in the local news for different editions, has to make up twenty-one different pages. Many reports, like the county council's, which affect the whole county and in the old days were given three and four columns, have now to be severely editioned, so that a district has to be content with references to its own business at the county council's and gains no impression of the meeting as a whole. Another weekly, much given to editioning in a built-up region, has people on one side of a road wanting one edition and people on the other side wanting another edition. It must be a complicating nuisance for the newsagent. In one town the town council complained so much of inadequate reporting that an arrangement was made with the town clerk to dictate every week news of interest from the committee minutes so as to give as much information as possible by spreading it over several weeks.

A troublesome effect of newsprint restriction is too little space for public notices, smalls and other types of personal advertising which are part of the vital substance of our provincial newspapers. This has a bad effect on any kind of public and social life that is dependent on the local paper for necessary announcements. A delay of six weeks before some kinds of accepted advertisements can be printed is not unknown. The training of young journalists has been made far more difficult by shortage of space. Indeed, almost all journalists are disheartened by the uselessness of so much that they write.

Some public men have used censorious words about the way the press uses its limited space. These criticisms are usually based on the doctrine that anything light in the paper should be thrown out to make room for serious political news. Undoubtedly the popular newspapers choose to print lively reading rather than important political speeches. But they do as a rule offer their millions of readers a good deal of serious news and a good many first-rate feature articles explaining world problems. If they were given more newsprint and if an intensely exciting murder trial began at the same time, no one need doubt which kind of subject would benefit

by conspicuously larger spaces. But exciting murder cases are not heard every day, and a larger allocation of paper would mean an increase of serious information for readers. One occasionally hears slighting references to country weeklies because some of their news items are trivial except to those concerned. They may be trivial, but so is much in *Hansard*. The country weekly, like *Hansard*, is an invaluable record. A favourite criticism by the man who does not care for sport is that newspapers use too much of their scanty space for racing, cricket and football. Sport, even in small type, is extortionate for space because racing programmes, football fixtures and cricket details are irreducible. If newspapers had more paper most of them would wish to print more sport commentaries, but it need not be feared that the increased space given to these would swamp what matters most.

After careful inquiry, with the help of many editors in London and the provinces, I am confident that more paper would give us fuller reporting of serious affairs, such as Parliament and international questions, and, especially in the provinces, local government and cultural movements. We are accustomed to look to the press for public enlightenment and public spirit. Those needs are bound to suffer under the limitations that editors have felt so sorely for years. Junius uttered a noble sentiment when he wrote: "Let it be impressed upon your minds, let it be instilled into your children, that the liberty of the press is the palladium of all the civil, political and religious rights." How can this palladium guard the people with sacred power when full presentment and discussion of civil, political and religious questions are so often made impossible? Denial of adequate paper is the crudest editing there is.

(The author is the Editor of The Yorkshire Post and Chairman of the Joint Editorial Committee of the Newspaper Society and the Guild of British Newspaper Editors.)

THE JUVENILE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

BY E. W. WOODHEAD

IT is a commonplace that the work of the schools cannot be effective unless proper arrangements are made for providing young people and parents with full information about the careers and occupations which may be open to school leavers and advice which will help them to make a wise choice. Nothing is more frustrating for boys and girls, who have been helped in school to develop all their capabilities to the greatest possible extent, than to find themselves in unsuitable employment which offers no possible outlet for the very abilities which the school has been at pains to develop. Moreover, it is in the interests of the community as a whole that young people should have the opportunity of obtaining the kind of employment or training for which they are best fitted, as they will then be most likely to make the best possible contribution to the national well being.

The Juvenile Employment Service has had a chequered history. The Labour Exchanges Act of 1909 provided for the setting up, under the Board of Trade, of labour exchanges, later transferred to the Ministry of Labour. These exchanges were primarily for registering applicants for work and were not designed specifically to meet the needs of young people leaving school, although in some exchanges special juvenile departments were set up. At the same time many education authorities were realizing that their responsibility to boys and girls did not end when the young people went out of their schools, and, even before 1909, some education authorities had made arrangements for helping boys and girls to choose suitable work. The Education (Choice of Employment) Act of 1910 formally empowered local education authorities in England to give this service to young people under the age of seventeen, later raised to eighteen. The supervision of the work of education authorities in this connection was the responsibility of the Board of Education.

Not all education authorities recognized this responsibility and during the whole history of the growth of the service there have been two systems in operation, the education authority bearing the main responsibility for the service in some areas and the Ministry of Labour in others. The Juvenile Employment Service has, in fact, been a no man's land between the Ministry of Labour and the education authorities. Zealous bands of crusaders from both sides have set out into this no man's land to establish strong points from which the other side has not been able to dislodge

them. A number of Government inquiries into the situation were made from time to time and various alterations in the administrative machinery were agreed, one of the most important being the transfer from the Board of Education to the Ministry of Labour of central responsibility for the administration of the service in the areas where local education authorities exercise their powers to provide a service.

At the outbreak of war in 1939 the Ministry of Labour, having many new onerous duties, found it difficult to maintain a full Juvenile Employment Service and in the areas where they were directly responsible for the service they gave instructions (which were later much modified) that the work was to be curtailed. They also suggested similar curtailments in the areas of local education authorities and, though many of the education authorities providing the service did not wish to limit their work, it was not possible for them to develop the service in wartime and some curtailment of work was necessary in certain areas owing to shortage of staff.

In 1944 good work was being done in some areas, both under education authorities and under the Ministry of Labour, but there was no doubt that in many places an adequate service was not being provided. At the beginning of 1945, therefore, a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Sir Godfrey Ince, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, to consider how a comprehensive Juvenile Employment Service for the whole country could best be obtained. This committee, popularly known as the Ince Committee, issued its report at the end of 1945. It had been hoped that the committee would resolve the long conflict between the education authorities and the Ministry of Labour as the local agencies for organizing the service and would be able to suggest a uniform method of operation for the whole country. This, however, did not come about, as there was a division of opinion among members of the committee. The statesmanship of Sir Godfrey Ince, however, finally induced the warring parties to agree to disagree and the report recommends that those local education authorities who wish to do so should continue to have the right to provide a service, but that those who do not exercise their option to do so within a limited period should not be able to take up powers at a later date. This recommendation, though it was received with some regret by the protagonists of education authorities, is a reasonable one, for the Ministry of Labour cannot be expected to do their utmost to provide a good service in the areas for which they are responsible if they know that at any moment an education authority may decide to take up its powers and reorganize the whole scheme. It is also reasonable that where an education authority decides to exercise powers the authority should provide a service for the whole of its area. It has been possible in the past for an authority to establish a scheme covering one part of its area, leaving another part to the Ministry of Labour. The remainder left to the Ministry may be an area in which

it is, in any case, difficult to provide an adequate service, and even more difficult when the service has to be provided, for example, in a rural area which has been administratively divorced from the town which is its natural centre. It is also an anomaly of the present situation that, whereas education authorities in England and Wales have power to provide a Juvenile Employment Service, Scottish education authorities have not. The Ince Committee therefore recommended that the powers at present enjoyed by education authorities in England and Wales should be extended to those in Scotland.

The alterations in the powers of education authorities recommended by the Ince Committee cannot be brought about except by legislation. Provision for the necessary legislation is made in the Employment and Training Bill. When the Bill is passed, all education authorities in England, Wales and Scotland will have the duty of deciding whether or not they wish to provide a Juvenile Employment Service. If they decide to do so, they must submit a scheme for the exercise of their powers to the Ministry of Labour within six months of the date when the Act receives the Royal assent. Each authority submitting a scheme will be required to take effective steps for putting it into operation within six months from the date on which the scheme was approved by the Minister, though some extension of this period may be allowed if the Minister so decides. It seems therefore, that a stable situation throughout the country will be achieved within a measurable time after the passing of the Act. The work will still be performed locally either by the education authority or by the Ministry of Labour, but it will be known definitely in which areas the two types of administration will operate and every effort will be made on both sides to ensure that common minimum standards are reached and that the best possible service is provided for the boys and girls, to meet whose needs is the primary object of the service. It is generally agreed that the service is nowhere perfect and indeed is not as good as it could be even under present circumstances, with both types of administration, in some areas.

Local education authorities who do not already provide a service will, in reaching a decision on the matter, no doubt have as their first consideration which system of administration will best serve the needs of the boys and girls in their respective areas and will best enable the work of the Juvenile Employment Service to be integrated with that of their schools. They will have in mind that juvenile employment officers whom they themselves select to operate the service may be more easily accepted as colleagues in the education service by the teachers than would be the officers of an outside body, for without the co-operation of the teachers the service cannot be effective. Moreover, the complexities of the educational system, which present no difficulties to people working within that system, are often very bewildering to officers whose training and experience have been in other fields. They will realize the importance of

linking the Juvenile Employment Service as closely as possible with the provision for Further Education, especially part-time education for young workers, which will become even more important when the provision of county colleges makes it possible for all young people to continue their education after they have taken up employment. But perhaps the most important factor which education authorities will take into account will be that educational and vocational guidance are parts of a continuous process and that the advice on training for careers which is provided through the Juvenile Employment Service must be linked as closely as possible with that on suitable courses of education provided within the school. Indeed, it is not possible to separate completely the functions of teachers and juvenile employment officers in educational and vocational guidance. There are occasions when the advice given by teachers must have a direct bearing on vocational guidance and when the advice given by juvenile employment officers must have a direct bearing on future courses of education. Improved methods of selection of pupils for different forms of education, a matter very close to the heart of all education authorities, must take into account the effect which this selection will have on the vocational guidance to be given later.

It is now generally agreed that one of the principal functions of the Juvenile Employment Service is to give advice and information which will help young people, under the guidance of their parents to choose their future wisely. It has hitherto been one of the weaknesses of the service that information concerning the qualities shown by boys and girls in their school careers was supplied to the service only where those responsible for the management of a school decided to supply it. Without a school report, even the most experienced juvenile employment officer may be misled about the abilities and attainments of a boy or girl, and the Ince Committee therefore recommended that the proprietors of schools of all kinds, including private schools, should be required to supply to the Juvenile Employment Service certain information about all young people leaving the schools. This recommendation has been accepted by the Government and is embodied in the Bill.

The Ince Committee also felt that it was unfortunate that many young people did not receive the advice they needed through failure to make contact with the Juvenile Employment Service, and they therefore recommended that the Minister should have power to compel boys and girls, whose particulars were registered with the service by schools, to attend for interview within a prescribed period of the date of leaving school. This is the only recommendation of the committee which the Government have not accepted. Although in making the recommendation the Ince Committee had in mind only that young people should receive advice and not that they should be compelled to take it, public opinion will, in general, support the decision of the Government not to embody this recommendation in the Bill. Even a suggestion of com-

pulsion is, at present, most unwelcome, and it is better that the improved Juvenile Employment Service which is to be provided should not be open to any suspicion that young people are being regimented to meet the needs of industry.

The Bill also gives legislative sanction to the establishment of the National Juvenile Employment Council and the Central Juvenile Employment Executive, which were recommended by the Ince Committee and have already been set up. The association of officers of the education departments and of the Ministry of Labour on the Central Juvenile Employment Executive has already proved its value.

The provisions of the Employment and Training Bill and the general interest which is being taken at the present time in the work of the Juvenile Employment Service will encourage all who are connected with it to do their utmost to make it really effective. The whole conception of the service has changed since the early days when the Ministry of Labour was mainly concerned with filling vacancies and the education authorities were mainly concerned with helping children to avoid "blind alley employment". Any form of advisory work connected with a career or with training for a career is now looked upon as a normal function of the Juvenile Employment Service. The work which juvenile employment officers are already doing in some areas and will do to an increasing extent in helping heads of schools to advise seventeen- or eighteen-year-old school leavers in the choice of suitable university courses may, at first sight, seem far removed from that of helping the boy or girl of rather low mentality to find a suitable niche doing routine assembly work in a factory. Both, however, are similar in that their intention is to help young people, however widely their levels of ability may differ, to find the career or occupation which suits them best, and the advisory work which is being developed for older pupils who have continued their education beyond the statutory leaving age is a natural development in the growth of the service.

The improvement which is now taking place in the methods of presenting information to young people about the opportunities which may be open to them is another development which is inevitable and right. In many areas consideration is being given to the best form of education to be provided for boys and girls in modern schools during their final year, and interesting experiments are taking place in many schools. The opportunity is being used, as part of the normal school curriculum, to increase young people's knowledge of the country they live in and to widen their conception of their responsibilities as citizens. The work, which is being done in collaboration by teachers and juvenile employment officers, in arranging for parties of pupils to undertake industrial visits and in providing for talks and discussions in school on opportunities of employment, can be fitted naturally into the school curriculum. A visit by boys and girls to a factory is likely not only to help them to understand

the organization of industry or to gain a deeper knowledge of a particular process of which they may have heard, for example, in a chemistry lesson, but also to give them some knowledge of the opportunities of employment to be found in that particular factory; whether the visit was arranged primarily by the school to illustrate some phase of school work or by the juvenile employment officer to give information about possible future occupation.

When the administrative framework of the service has been settled, it will be necessary to breathe life into these bare bones. This can only be done by the appointment of suitable staff to carry out the functions of the service. If the service is to develop, or even to maintain the level of efficiency which it has already achieved in some areas, it is essential that an increasing number of good candidates should become juvenile employment officers and that adequate arrangements should be made for training them in their complex duties. A juvenile employment officer must be a person of wide general education, deep human sympathy and with a well balanced personality. He or she must command the respect and confidence of heads and staffs of schools, young people and parents, employers and members of local committees, since the service is to be used voluntarily, and people will not use it unless it offers something they feel is worth having.

(The author is the County Education Officer of Kent and was a member of the Ince Committee.)

HOLLAND TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

BY KENNETH ADAM

HER Majesty's Commissioner for Zeeland offered me a cigarette from a black and battered tin. Since it was given to him by a marine in a green beret a few hours after the first landing on Walcheren, this tin, of unrecognizable origin, has been everywhere with him. Mr. Cassembroot says he would not change it for a gold case. To him it is a symbol of liberation. The high-spirited Mr. Cassembroot is by way of being that himself. He is in his early forties, a swarthy, stocky man, one of the leaders of resistance in South Holland. He talks of November 1944 as "the best days of my life", knows the name of every unit which took part in the landings, and this summer is going to Scotland to renew his friendship with the King's Own Scottish Borderers. From being Burgomaster of Westkapelle, he has recently been elevated to the post of chief executive of the province of Zeeland; the eleven Provincial Commissioners are among the most important men in Holland and since the war Queen Wilhelmina has appointed young men, with fresh ideas, abundant energy and irreproachable wartime records. Mr. Cassembroot does not take kindly to the trappings of his new office. He apologized for taking me round the island in a luxurious car of American make: "I prefer my jeep; it does not shut out the wind."

It is not easy to shut out the wind anywhere on Walcheren. When we stood, our tour almost completed, on the platform of the lighthouse behind Westkapelle from which the Germans directed operations against the Commandos, it tore at our clothes, whipped away our cigarettes, and sent us staggering against the rail, a wild, frolic wind, but though it stirred the North Sea in front of us into a cauldron the waves flung themselves impotently enough against the sturdy new dyke which closes the breach between the dunes made by the R.A.F. Mulberry Harbour parts have been incorporated with traditional Dutch materials in the Sea Bulwark of Westkapelle, which is always under guard against the age-old invader. Mr. Cassembroot told me how the Germans called upon the population to construct emergency dykes after the bombing, but the Dutch were stricken with mysterious illnesses, or hid, or sabotaged the frantic attempts to stem the waters. It was necessary that the island should be sacrificed in order that the Allies might use Antwerp; very well then, homes, crops, all that the people had went under. But so did the German defences.

From the lighthouse, 175 steps up, and the highest point on Walcheren,

the island lay stretched like a smooth green cloth. The fruit and hawthorn trees which before the war would have been breaking into blossom, were dead, salt-soaked stumps. But new trees are being planted. The windbreak patterns were visible in stripling rows, and the dunes will soon have a collar of trees to prevent erosion. Few animals were to be seen, except a few of the Dutch draught horses, massive and heavily muscled, pulling carts which even from that height seemed disproportionately small. Pasture is not so easy to restore as arable, however much gypsum is spread. When the farmers recovered their tools, they found them coated with mussel shells. But the soil in the early evening sunshine had the colour of fertility, and the corn crops looked full of promise. A 100 per cent. pre-war yield is looked for this year on the island that might have been erased from the map of Europe.

Immediately below, the village of Westkapelle, four-fifths of which was destroyed by water or in battle, was astir. Dutch rooftiles shone redly on new houses each side of the main road. In the island as a whole 11,000 seriously damaged houses have already been repaired. That evening the building gangs, who camp on the spot, were to have a concert from visiting artists, and the villagers were to join them in their canteen. Reconstruction is not complete. Many of the Nissen huts left by the British sappers who helped to restore the dyke, are still occupied. So even are the elaborate bunkers dug into the dunes for Nazi protection. A flag fluttering at the cavellike entrance denotes a family within. But they will all be properly housed before the summer is out.

To the south sprawled Flushing, whose sea-front, where the Germans had fortified it, is still scarred from the pounding of Allied guns on the other side of the Scheldt. Here and there the hotels are being bravely patched and painted. Traffic is creeping back into the harbour. At the back of the town an emergency estate has been built in the past eighteen months for 13,000 people, street after street of one-storied houses in brick, with their own shops and schools. Asked if they were temporary dwellings, my escort shrugged his shoulders. One has seen that shrug in England. But the Dutch housewives are making an uncomplaining best of their "new town". The doorknobs gleam and the doorsteps shine as brightly as those on the tall and gracious eighteenth century houses of the Heerengracht in Amsterdam.

Of the closing of the Nollledijk, near Flushing, which was the biggest breach the bombers made, where 3,000 Dutchmen fought a four-month battle with the elements, up to their thighs in water and mud, I was told his story: an old ship was used to help fill the gap; that night the chief engineer's report read: "Dyke closed, only leaking through portholes." The Dutch have a sense of humour.

North-east of the lighthouse I could descry the little fishing town of Veere on its mound, where the smacks with their threadbare, redbrown sails come right up to the door of the Town Hall to-day exactly as they did in the seventeenth century print which hangs on the wall of Mr.

Cassembroot's office in Middelburg. Near the town I had been shown earlier the third of the gaps, a kilometre long. There the new dyke, which in its final stage had to be closed in the quarter-hour of lowest tide, had been built slightly inside the old line. "We lost land there," I was told. It is not much, but the Dutch do not like to lose even a minor engagement.

Climbing down from our gusty eminence we drove to Domburg for supper, past the barbed wire of a collaborationists' prison camp. Gaudy Belgian coaches filled with tourists swept by us. Holland is cheap for Belgians, but the francs they bring are welcome. Under a shield carrying the lion of Zeeland emerging from the sea, and the proud motto of the Province: *Luctor et emergo*, we ate and talked of the future of the island. Mr. Cassembroot reminded me of the narrow strips into which the land had been divided and on which we had looked down. "Those 'slagen' are our biggest agricultural problem," he said, "not only in Walcheren, not only in Zeeland, but throughout the Netherlands. Some of them are only a few yards wide. But they are often a mile long, in places even as much as eight miles long. They are the result of the Dutch principle of sharing an inheritance equally between the heirs, and of the attempt to see that each heir received his proportion of good, average and bad soil. In these days when we must have maximum yields, such divisions are absurd. With eighty-seven per cent. of Dutch farms smaller than fifty acres, there is a great deal of wasteful working. So we have embarked on a policy of re-allotment. It is not popular. But it has to be done." I asked what happened to the dispossessed, and to the heirs from now on. "They go to the Wieringermeerpolder, and to the North-East Polder. In years to come, they will go to the polders which are still to be claimed from the Zuyder Zee."

It was to the Zuyder Zee, or the IJssel Lake, as it has been called since the twenty-one-mile dyke, which is one of the wonders of the world, was built from North Holland to Friesland, that my next journey was made. Sixteen years ago, I saw the first harvest being gathered on the Wieringermeer, which is roughly the size of Leicestershire and Rutland together. That was only two years after it had been a seabed. By the outbreak of war, it was the most advanced agricultural district in the country. It had 25,000 miles of ditches, fifty-nine bridges, 150 miles of roadway, 400 flourishing farms, and three villages, with their churches and schools. During the war it became a German granary. Seventeen days before the capitulation in 1945, the Nazis blew the dyke in two places, a wanton piece of destruction. Fifteen years' work was drowned in two days. Houses, barns, stables disappeared beneath the swell. The Wieringermeer became a land of floating roofs. The scour of the water pouring at high velocity into the polder, at this point, twelve feet below the IJssel Lake, enlarged the gaps to 200 and 130 yards. Craters 100 feet deep were excavated just inside them. The sand from the dyke was spread over an area of one and a half square miles.

The highest priority was given to the remaking of the dyke and the reclaiming of the polder. Three months after VE Day, the gaps were closed. To avoid losing time by filling the craters, the dyke was bent round them on the other side. In 1930 the drying out of the polder had taken seven months. This time it had to be done more quickly in order that the swell, as the water became shallower, should not destroy the roads, ditches and canals, which were the very bones of the body of the polder. The two great pumping stations, "Lely" and "Leemans", had been left unharmed. Auxiliary pumps speeded from America were mounted as well. Inside four months, the Wieringermeer was dry land for the second time.

In the spring of 1948 it is hard to imagine, as one drives over admirable roads, through mile after mile of healthy green crops, past spick-and-span farms, over white concrete bridges and by clear canals, the endless grey wastes that confronted the farmers two years ago when the engineers had finished their part of the restorative task. Fortunately, of course, the flood-water was not salt, as on Walcheren, because it came from the IJssel Lake; but the successful replanting of these 50,000 acres, when labour and implements and materials were all scarce, was, and is, an astonishing effort, explicable only in terms of that intense loyalty which the Dutch conceive for their polders.

Cultivation in the first year of reclamation was carried on despite a complete absence of habitable dwellings. It is in the three villages of the polder that the visitor realizes how recent the emergency was. On the Town Hall of Wieringerwerf, the head village, a dark stain seventeen feet up the wall, shows the high-water mark of the inundation. A stone column outside, bearing the words: "Here a future was born; carry on" carries the mark of the waters. In the rows of cottages where the labourers live, who bicycle every day to their farms, there are gaps; families are sharing; but by the harvest more than two-thirds of the pre-war population should have been rehoused in the polder. My companion scowled when he saw that men were busy on the three large churches which minister to the souls of the thousand inhabitants, while work on the schools appeared to have stopped. "Half-empty churches; overcrowded schools; typically Dutch," was his laconic comment. We went on to see the new dam, an imposing structure with a crest of brick athwart the stone pitching, shaped like a right-hand bracket which has been gummed on to the straight line of the original dyke. It is, I hope, more typically Dutch that a decision has just been taken not to attempt to drain the deep craters between the arms of the bracket, or to clear the sand which was washed over the land beyond, but to transform one into a pleasure lake and the other into woodland walks, so that the monument to an infamous deed will be a thing of beauty in the land.

Large as the Wieringermeer is, it will be very much the smallest of the reclaimed areas of the Zuyder Zee when the project is completed. The

North-East Polder, sometimes, but unofficially, called Urkerland, from the island at its south-west corner which has been enclosed, is the second of the four polders to have been brought into existence. It covers an area of 186 square miles, more than twice that of the Wieringermeer.

The dyking and draining of this polder began in 1936 after certain hesitations in the Stages-General, the expenses of the big dykes and of the Wieringermeer having been greater than anticipated (though only £30 million in all). This was hardly surprising. Hydraulic works of this magnitude had never been attempted in any part of the world. Accurate estimates of cost were too much even for the cautious engineers in the Delft laboratories. Nobody knew, for instance, how a vast body of water affected by the tides would behave when cut off from the ocean.

In other words, when would the tides subside and how? In the result, the calculations of the great physicist, Lorentz, based on experiments in the laboratory, proved remarkably accurate. The Government decided that work should proceed after receiving assurances that the future reclamations would in fact be on a less expensive scale than in Wieringermeer. Experience there had shown, for example, that the system of navigable waterways which had been planned, was unnecessarily extensive. In the North-East Polder, there would be fewer canals, and as the holdings were to be bigger, fewer farms in proportion, too.

Four years went by before the last gap in the dam was closed. By then, the Germans were in occupation. Once the new land had been pumped dry, the Dutch began a deliberate delaying policy. Some thousands of young men called upon to work in the Reich took refuge in the polder. It was immense, and bleak, and the reeds grew eight or ten feet high. While those reeds remained, there was comparative safety in their midst. Food was smuggled out to the refugees by the workmen. They built shelters out of the reeds where the growth was densest, even wove themselves primitive coverings. After a time, some sought slightly better conditions by asking the Dutch authorities to take them on as labourers. Few of them were fit for this kind of work, but all of them were given an ostensible job, and were represented to the Germans as capable employees. The clearing of the polder proceeded at a snail's pace.

Among those in hiding were many university men, and an astonishing archaeological research was carried on by scientists who had a price upon their head. Rumour had long credited this part of the Zuyder Zee with having been inhabited in the early Middle Ages. A few traces of human habitation were found but it was satisfactorily established, during this unique 'extra-mural' course, that no towns or settlements of any size had existed there. A number of wrecks was discovered, however, with interesting relics in them, and these have been collected in a museum which is housed in the old church of the onetime island of Schokland, now a part of the polder. In the late summer of 1944, the Nazis at last carried out a thorough raid. They trampled down or attempted to cut the reeds

alight but the refugees, like rabbits in a cornfield under the reaper, retreated to the centre. The reeds would not burn; the area was too vast. Only a very few men fell into the enemy's hands.

However, the fear was abroad that the Nazis would return, and more effectively. The exodus from the polder was general. Even the pseudo-employees of the reclamation authority thought the time had come to move on. When the war ended, the North-East Polder was largely a wilderness still, its farmhouses half-built in clearings, its roads, such as they were, made of rubble, its bridges crazy wooden affairs which could be, because they were meant to be, easily destroyed at a moment's notice. Even so, it was marked down by the Germans for inundation; only sabotage by a group of Poles saved it from the fate of Wieringermeer. Little or nothing of this strange wartime story of the North-East Polder has yet been told, even in Holland. It is an episode which deserves its historian.

A great deal of ground has gone under the plough since the end of the war, and Urkerland as I saw it at the end of April is a fertile champaign. Along the roads leading to Emmeloord, the central settlement, lorries rumble for all the world as if they were on Watling Street or the Great North Road. At Emmeloord, too, the three main canals meet, and the barges that ride on them are loaded high with bundles of reeds which will be made into mats for Dutch housewives who are short of carpets. The atmosphere, however, is remarkably like that of the prairie provinces of the United States, raw and roomy. It is a strange feeling to have, this recency, in such an anciently settled continent as Europe. Beyond Emmeloord, with its post office, its doctor, its vet., its tradesmen and functionaries, where, incidentally, we found the local government office deserted, with money and coupons and all the paraphernalia of a country in austerity lying unguarded on desks and counters, beyond Emmeloord, the polder becomes less civilized. The bridges are temporary, the road is rutted, the reeds on either side are scarcely under control, and we come to a notice which says flatly: "The motor road to Urk is not open." My companion chooses to ignore this; he tells me that the people of Urk are still fanatically opposed to losing their island status. Finally we are halted by stakes in the road, and a fiercer notice which warns that we cannot proceed further except on foot. Urk is scattered up and down a hill, like Winchelsea or Rye, but its inhabitants in their handsome traditional dress, greet us with scowls. The marks of inbreeding are only too plain in the children who shy away from us. This is the only place I have seen in Holland which is dirty, ill-kempt and noisome. At the inn we are told they cannot give us food, but after a time the host thaws, produces fried eggs, and even tries out his English. His, it seems, is one of eight Catholic families in a population of 5,000 strict Calvinists. His trade is largely a backdoor one. The fishermen drink gin only aboard their boats, which lie idle outside his windows. He explains their grievances.

With the closing of the Zuyder Zee they have been compelled to switch over to fresh-water fishing. The herring has died out; so have the shrimps. The flounder has been more biddable, and appears to tolerate fresh water. The innkeeper admits there have been gains, too. The IJssel Lake has become an excellent breeding place for eel, which, smoked, is a great Dutch delicacy. But the root grievance is that Urk is no longer an island, and the Calvinists will quote you a number of texts to prove that tampering with nature never did anybody any good in the long run.

Whether the good people of Urk like it or not, their lords and masters are committed to much more tampering with nature in the years to come. The decision has now been definitely taken to proceed with the rest of the Zuyder Zee scheme. This involves two more polders, the South-Western, which will embrace 220 square miles, including the island of Marken, whose tourist-spoiled inhabitants are not likely to be less vocal in their objections than those of Urk, and, finally, the largest of all, the South-Eastern, which will be 500 square miles in extent. In the laboratory at Delft, where all the problems posed by these ambitious projects are met in miniature, Dr. Thyse, its head, is even now testing, in a 170 foot flume, or water tunnel, the effect of wave motion on levees and breakwaters which will ring the new polders. It is one only of projects from countries all over the world which are brought to the laboratory to be tried out on models. "We play havoc with geography here," he says with a smile. On the wall of his office hangs a great map of Holland, as it is, and as it will be. The day before I met him a date had been fixed for the final completion of the Zuyder Zee scheme, which will enlarge habitable Holland by half a million acres, and its cultivable land by ten per cent. It is 1976. Dr. Thyse will not see the plan come to full fruition. He is already past middle age. But he and his friends are not content with what they have to do. Already they are visualizing a continuous coastline, running from the Belgian border to the German frontier, enclosing all the islands in Zeeland and South Holland as well as the northern islands which run like vertebrae almost to the Danish coast. Behind this coast, whose only gaps would be locks in the waterways giving access to the ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp, all waterways not needed for drainage, and the Wadden Sea as well, would be reclaimed. This stupendous undertaking would enrich the country with almost a million acres of agricultural soil. Technically, it is already almost possible, and certainly will be so in a year or two. Financially, it should not prove prohibitive. When Sir John Boyd Orr says that the world is rumbling to destruction because it will not heed the desperate urgency of its primary problem, and grow more food, and when American experts tell us that every year soil erosion reduces the land under cultivation by an area the size of Yorkshire, what the Dutch call their 'new imperialism' begins to look like an enlightened common sense.

THE GROUNDNUTS SCHEME

By KATHLEEN GIBBERD

THE present world shortage of oils and fats is a grave one not only because it is formidable in size but because it has an unpleasant aspect of permanence. It has been estimated at about 400 million tons per annum of which the British deficit is roughly $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons. Towards this deficit the Groundnuts Scheme as planned at present could make a contribution of 250,000 tons of oil a year.

The shortage is due to several causes: a decline in the production of oils and fats in western Europe, the increased consumption of milk in some countries—especially in the U.S.A. and Britain—with a consequent decline in butter production, the restrictions imposed by a recent agreement on whaling, and the much greater internal consumption of oils and fats by some of the chief producer countries. It is this last factor which makes the shortage appear permanent. India is a case in point, for Southern India used to be the most important source of the world's supply of groundnuts. Now, for various reasons, including the higher standard of living enjoyed by some sections of the Indian people, most of this supply is required by the Indians themselves. If this improved standard of living is maintained and rises, as is to be hoped, and if, as is also to be expected and hoped, there will be a rising standard of living among all peoples who have hitherto lived near the subsistence level, the likelihood is that the oils and fats shortage will get worse unless new measures are taken towards remedying it.

Among the various sources of vegetable oil, groundnuts, more commonly known as peanuts or monkey nuts, have always been important because of their very high yield of oil. The plant grows readily in tropical and semi-tropical climates and is one of the main products of West Africa, especially Nigeria, where it is cultivated by peasant farmers. Long before the oils and fats shortage reached its present critical stage the possibility of increasing the supply of this fruit in African dependencies was under consideration.

No real impact on the present critical situation, however, could be made by an extension of the African's customary method of cultivation, in which the only implement used is the hand hoe. The proposition which Mr. Frank Samuel, Managing Director of the United African Company presented to the Minister of Food and the Colonial Secretary exactly two years ago represented a jump from the most primitive to the most modern,

agricultural methods. The outlines of the Scheme are now familiar. A number of selected sites in East Africa, totalling (in the final version of the plan) about 5,000 square miles were to be cleared of impenetrable bush inhabited only by wild life and notably by the tsetse fly. Groundnuts, grass and ancillary crops were to be planted in the cleared spaces. Fertilisers were to be applied, roads, railways and port installations built. The total capital outlay, apart from the cost of communications, was reckoned at £24 million spread over six years. The estimated saving in the cost of groundnuts by mass produced methods was about £17 per ton—or on the assumption that the whole output would be bought up by the British Government, £10 million a year on our food bill.

Modern equipment was to be used throughout; bulldozers and treedozers for clearing the bush, agricultural machinery for planting and harvesting the groundnuts. The African labour force, relatively small in view of the mechanical methods to be applied would be recruited locally, and settled in new modern villages with every amenity.

It is noteworthy that in accepting the plan as a practicable proposition the Government regarded it very much as a military operation and that those who sponsored it in Parliament used military terms and analogies. As in a military undertaking there were risks involved—in particular, financial risks—and it was freely admitted that there were bound to be unforeseen difficulties. Some freedom and flexibility had to be allowed to those who directed the operation. In point of fact, Government action, usually so slow to proceed from paper plan to concrete achievement, moved with a speed that even in wartime might have been considered remarkable, and the United African Company, acting for the time being as the Government's managing agents, rounded up the requisite equipment no less remarkably from all quarters of the globe.

Three months after the plan was put to the Ministers concerned a small government mission flew to East Africa to examine the practicability of the project on the spot. In another three months they had returned and presented their report. That was in September 1946. The decision to act was taken immediately and four months later, in January 1947, the vanguard of the groundnuts pioneers pitched their tents in the Kongwa region of Tanganyika, within sight of the enemy—the vast miles of bush-land. But this enemy had to be defeated without the priorities for equipment which the leaders of an army have a right to expect. Britain manufacturing for export had little to spare. Nor could new material be bought elsewhere. Resort had to be made to surplus military stocks, machines abandoned on the beaches of the Philippines or lying idle in the Middle East or Ceylon.

The orders from British firms were delayed by the fuel crisis of last winter; other consignments were held up at sea by storm and fog. At the port of Dar-es-Salaam, where vessels have to anchor out at sea and await unloading by lighters, there was congestion almost amounting to

confusion. A new port at Mikindani, with deep water berths was part of the plan but that will not begin to be ready for another eighteen months at least. There was also congestion in the overburdened Central Railway line of Tanganyika, and the collapse of a railway embankment due to floods caused further delay.

At last, some four months behind schedule, the first attack was launched on the bush. Areas of dense thicket fell before bulldozers and treedozers. The debris was burnt and wind-rowed but the roots remained. They proved more intractable than had been expected. Experiments had to be tried, mechanical adaptations contrived and the whole operation was complicated by the shortage of spare parts.

Only 7,500 acres were planted at the end of 1947 and the whole crop from these acres will be used for replanting next season. The first worthwhile commercial yield will be in the spring of 1950. This delay has aroused some criticism and those who originally felt that the forecasts of early results were too optimistic and that initial difficulties had not been sufficiently explored before the programme of operations was drawn up, have not hesitated to point out that events have confirmed their warnings. But civil no less than military campaigns often take longer than had been hoped and, as happened in Burma, operations in an unfamiliar terrain are often complicated by unforeseen problems. Mistakes in timing, important though they are, do not matter so much as the essential soundness in strategy. Nor are unexpected increases in the cost of equipment necessarily serious. In the case of this project, it looks as if the increased costs to which public attention has been drawn are going to be more than cancelled out by the considerable increase in price which groundnuts now fetch in world markets.

Despite the criticisms, the new conception which the Groundnut Scheme embodies, the conception of a public corporation engaged in large scale economic development, has not been seriously called in question; certainly not in Parliament, where Mr. Oliver Stanley, Conservative and former Secretary of State for the Colonies, declared private enterprise in undeveloped territories to have had its day, and where all shades of opinion have not only supported this first experiment in East Africa but accepted without division or serious challenge the Overseas Resources Development Bill. The Act establishes, first, the Overseas Food Corporation, which took over the Groundnuts Scheme from March 1, 1948, and can expend £50 million on this and new food development schemes anywhere in the world, with the concurrence of the government concerned; and secondly, the Colonial Development Corporation which with £100 million at its disposal is empowered to start new schemes for the development of any kind of colonial resources.

The reason why the Groundnuts Scheme is taken over by the first and not the second of these two corporations need not be considered here. It was a matter of convenience rather than logic. What is important for

our purpose is that the Act combines two separate objectives, food shortage and colonial development, the same two objectives which are the basis of the Groundnuts scheme.

Here we part company with the military analogy. Military campaigns are single minded, one-pointed. The Groundnuts Scheme was, from the start, planned for a dual purpose. The acute urgency of the food shortage was responsible for its timing, for that problem could not wait, but economic development of colonial resources by mechanical methods was by no means a new idea fortunately discovered at an opportune moment. The problem was already being partially tackled in a number of small scale enterprises under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945. The oil and fat shortage provided the first opportunity for something bigger.

It may well happen that the world's lack of so many foods and raw materials will in the end prove the colonies' great advantage, for it is only by the expenditure of capital far beyond their own resources that the fundamental poverty of the colonies and the resultant lack of social services can be remedied. And, however desirable it may be that our own and other nations' colonies should be opened up by public money, it is improbable that this would have been contemplated on a vast scale from disinterested motives alone. All the same, it must be admitted that in any such enterprise as the Groundnuts Scheme the human risks for the native population may be at least commensurate with the financial risks to the British taxpayer. Indeed, they are almost certainly greater because they are outside the bounds of arithmetical calculation. But as an acute and alarming shortage is the justification for taking on one kind of risk, so a problem of acute poverty and threatening famine justifies taking on the other kind.

A great many of the tribesmen of Tanganyika live an unenviable existence despite the lackadaisical ease and cheerfulness which might impress the casual visitor. Tilling the land with a hand hoe they produce enough food for subsistence but not enough for healthy living. They are under-nourished and prone to disease and since they are either ignorant of, or unconvinced by elementary health precautions, they continually fall prey to infections, both those which are peculiar to a tropical climate as well as others which are common to most parts of the world. Worm infections and skin diseases are common, outbreaks of typhoid and small-pox frequent occurrences, and in some areas the proportion suffering from venereal disease is extremely high. Such a state of things demands social and educational services beyond the capacity of the Territory to pay for them; the revenue of so poor a country, where sisal plantations and partially exploited mineral resources are almost the only source of taxable wealth, is extremely limited.

Even with the allocation of £5½ million from the recently constituted

Colonial Development and Welfare Fund it is not possible to do much more than apply palliatives, for the most serious factor in the whole picture is the gradual loss of soil fertility. Soil erosion has already occurred on a large scale and the campaign against it takes first place in the Ten Year Plan of the Tanganyika Government. There is in fact here, as in many other parts of Africa, an excessive pressure on the land by primitive people living at a subsistence level which shows every sign of deteriorating.

This major problem would be incapable of solution within the boundaries of Tanganyika itself if there was no spare land. In point of fact most of the Territory consists of spare land, uninhabited except by wild animals, but at present it is covered with dense bush. To open this up, prepare the land for cultivation, introduce modern farming methods and establish settlements of African farmers there, with adequate health and education arrangements—this has been a theoretical solution for some time.

The Groundnuts Scheme begins to make it a practical one. But as has already been said, the process involves a great human risk. It means first bringing in as a labour force, for bush clearance purposes and afterwards for farming operations, a considerable number of Africans from other parts of the Territory, or from elsewhere in Africa. This cannot be done without interference with those deep tribal bonds on which the morale of the African depends. It is a revolution which depends for its success on the same imagination, resourcefulness and flexibility and the same application of new techniques as the project requires in its other aspects for its economic victory.

The plan of operations pays every bit as much attention to the ultimate prospects for the African as for the supply of groundnuts. It envisages him as the ultimate owner of the whole project for it is proposed that after the Scheme has become a going concern it shall pass into the hands of the Colonial governments concerned and thence into the co-operative ownership of the farmers who grow the groundnuts. But by that time groundnuts will not be the only crop grown, for ancillary farming operations will be developed, including the raising of livestock. Before this final transfer can take place it will be necessary to ensure that the Africans concerned have adapted themselves to mechanical agriculture and are aware of the importance of preventing soil erosion in the new lands.

But this is looking far ahead. Even the first farm settlements are of the future. At present the Africans are mostly engaged in bush clearing and initial agricultural operations or in work as clerks and orderlies in the messing tents and in the hospital. A fair proportion of them have to learn to drive and to service tractors and other machinery. Their first requirements are better health and education. The first is provided by abundance of good food—including two cooked meals at work as well as food to take home at night—and by the sanitary and hospital arrangements. But even health measures do not go far without some education and the first thing here is to find a medium in which to teach. It is a sign of the

spirit of enterprise which informs the whole project that Mr. Adolph Myers, whose success with the Indian Army will be recalled, has been appointed Education Development Officer. He has already begun to work out a form of basic English which will be the medium of education first for adults, and eventually for children also. His purpose is to work out a method of teaching the language with a content related to the actual needs of the Africans, both in the technical work which they will have to do, and in the life which they and other families will live. Every kind of visual and other aid that serves this purpose will be used.

This educational experiment is only one of many new techniques which will be tried out as the Groundnuts Scheme progresses. Ultimately the Scheme can only be judged by its success or failure in relation to its two objectives—a substantial contribution to the world's supply of vegetable oil and to the economic rehabilitation of the people of East Africa. But, as has been shown, the significance of the Scheme lies in the mobilization against peacetime problems of certain energies which have hitherto been associated with war. And as the exigencies of war have always produced new inventions and new ideas which have often been found to have a usefulness far beyond their original purpose, we may reasonably expect from the Groundnuts Scheme quite a number of unforeseen adventitious benefits.

THE TOUCH OF TIME

BY FRANK KENDON

WE turned aside, expecting ruin,
Where stone grew living and sublime,
No touch of grief, no irony,
Broken, but blest—transformed—by Time. . . .
O traveller Mind, draw near this token,
Of sainthood's hope the sole survival;
Visit and venerate a Skull.
What bitten stone can this outrival?

These window-eyes to delight a place
Hollowed for song, for prayer, for thought:
Here passion slumbered, something mastered,
And harvest lay here, labour-bought.

THE TOUCH OF TIME

Behind these bonds the novice grew;
Habit became his friend; his fear
Rose in the dark, grudging the rising,
But rose and sang, conquering here.

Within the valley of a world
Green to the rim, and wildly watered,
With trees for company, and long pastures
Sweet to the ewe-lamb shorn unslaughtered,
Patience at wondering guess laid down
By rule and square, in stone, his plan:
Cloister and cell, vault and chapel—
Wilful obedience, God in man—

Giving stone wings of faith to fly
In the air, teaching the truth to fall
In many hued wedge on placid pavement.

The bell rang. Kind was the call,
Kind that call to accepted penance,
And short but lief the desired sleep;
Order forbidding the leer of chaos,
Lighting a candle of soul-to-keep.

Weathered builders, your hands are bones.
Assured, you watched the suns of years
Ripening your creed, your carven leaves,
Your mason work, your clustering piers;
And if from moorland a mist rode in,
Or showers fell, or swiftfoot rain,
To christen your quarried masterpiece—
"Time confirms us", you said, profane.

For that same harmless, warming sun,
Through age on age has bitten deep;
Toothless winds deface the stonework,
Into whose crannies mosses creep;
Fingers of frost loosen the tracery;
At every dewfall stirs one grain;
Threads of silk devour the timbers;
The foundered bell blooms green with rain.

So Age decays the varietal jewel.
Dawn, and day's monotonies—

Questions—fernseed—find some lodgement ;
 Faith rises from weary knees.
 Few, and poor, and weak, you grapple ;
 The yards mire, the barns lean ;
 Three toil at the grave of one ;
 Silence enters, briers between. . . .

Till travellers, hearing tell of this,
 Would turn aside, stand together,
 Stare at the ivy, scare the jackdaws,
 Shelter from the brazen weather,
 Whilst longing fingers out of the past
 Touch at their nerves, touch unguessed :
 " We (who yielded to certainty) "
 Signifying—" in ruins rest. . . .

Oh, gaze reverently ! This skull
 Has housed a hope of life ;
 Pleasure little, and pain enough ;
 Branded love, and simple guile.
 These hollow arches above the eyes
 Are yet endowed with singular beauty ;
 Sense sweet in guarded use
 Honoured on earth our dark Almighty. . . ."

Yes. Through holes a slanted sun
 Enters deep, a denizen ;
 Birds nest in crowns of angels ;
 Ferns spring from the feet of saints ;
 On chancel step the tear-drop rain
 Sometimes lays its circles down ;
 In cavities at the altar side
 The faithful winds intone.

Stone—or human history—
 Purpose weathers down to this :
 Soft sunlit afternoons,
 Leaves' shadows, leaves' hiss,
 Ants' endless generations
 Hither and thither scurrying past,
 Tombs cut with eternal chisels
 Bluntly unreadable at last.

Let the briers ramp and fruit ;
 Let wandering newcomers gaze ;

Let veneration weed the cornice,
 Guess, envy, measure, praise ;
 A young hand on the warm step,
 A mouth stained with blackberries,
 Such, for God's sake, to man's loss,
 They had not, all their days.

Oh, harsh denial and strange fear—
 Were it not sin to breathe as breed ?—
 Loving at beauty to leave no offspring,
 None to succeed.
 Though these sit now on heaven's benches,
 By old, strict disobedience
 All is empty, all is lost—
 Though lovely—beyond recompense.

(More sceptical palaces rise in Time,
 Whose facings strip, whose girders rust
 And leave corroded shard for others,
 And salt, infertile dust.
 And of *our* sons, which, from highroad turning
 To light on riddled acres,
 Will find Man's peace in rubble and clinker,
 Or Time's, or his surpassing Maker's ?)

Childed, this warm September time
 We dreamed ; and in their precincts haunted,
 Suffered the peace of a place they thought
 To make more durable, saint-enchanted ;
 Their crucifixes crumbled down,
 Their slow antiphonies' echoes fled,
 Their barren lives, their burning zeal—
 As we say hurriedly—Dead !

THE FAYS AT THE ABBEY THEATRE

By WINIFRED LETTS

I went to the Abbey Theatre in Dublin one Saturday afternoon. It is very long ago, and it was at a time of youth when the difference between sixpence and a shilling is worth considering. I forget not just why I decided to go on that afternoon, coming to Dublin on the train from Blackrock. It was rather a daring move, for the Abbey was regarded suspiciously at that time by my own Unionist, Protestant circle. My mother, who had no prejudices of that sort, would have thought that only Shakespeare deserved the journey into Dublin. Uncles and aunts, if they approved the theatre at all, considered a nice English play at the Gaiety the only just cause for spending money on a theatre.

Only sixpence to pay at the door! That was a pleasant surprise. I stumbled into the pit. There seemed to be very few people there. In the stalls I saw the majestic head of W. B. Yeats, and the elderly lady with a black mantilla-thing on her head; I guessed that she must be Lady Gregory. A small orchestra played good music. Then the curtain rose.

Now and then a play is such an experience that it stands out as an adventure in life, poignant, never-to-be-forgotten. There are so few of them; this was one. It was *Riders to the Sea*, by J. M. Synge. The tragedy was searing, the foreseen disaster so cruel that on the curtain's fall there was a hush. Applause for the agony of life is unthinkable. Here the agony was real, a part of Ireland's life. What did I know of the sea in quiet Blackrock? A rough day meant some breakers on the rocks, but the sea was no ruthless fate as it was here. The women had spoken quietly, they had accepted as inevitable the death of the young, low-voiced man, who came in for the horse's halter so that he might ride to the sea. Dazed, I sat there in the interval, and wondered who these people might be, if they ever really returned with cheerful faces to the Dublin world. The young man was played by William G. Fay, the mother was Sara Allgood, her daughters were Maire O'Neill and Brigid (who was Mrs. Fay). I forget what followed on the programme. It may have been Lady Gregory's *Rising of the Moon*, where William Fay was the escaping rebel, an enchanting person who sat back to back on the sea wall with the sergeant who had been sent to capture him, an unsuspecting big 'gom' of a man, played by Sinclair.

I went back to suburban life in a sort of dream. Synge's plays had that effect on their audience. One's thoughts took on those lovely turns of phrase he had heard in Wicklow or in Kerry. The unemphatic speech

of his tragedies, their poetry, their idiom haunted young minds. I began to think out a little one-act tragedy that was, of course, as a frank reviewer defined it, "Synge and water". There was a murder on the bog, just the curlew-haunted bog of the *Shadow of the Glen*. My murderous hero (to be Willie Fay of course) had killed his man after much provocation and had then sought his love in her lonely cottage. The next visitor was a blind man (played by Frank Fay) who had the awkward gift of seeing ghosts. He saw quite plainly the ghost of the murdered man behind the murderer's chair. After that a confession followed and the curtain fell on tragedy.

To my great surprise the play was accepted and I was bidden to come to the Abbey Theatre and discuss it. Being young and quite inexperienced in theatrical life I was both shy and exalted as I sat in the dark theatre at my first rehearsal. I could not have dreamed of correcting or suggesting. It was wonderful to me to meet these people on the stage and in the green room. Their charm was that they spoke off the stage just as they did on it. Frank was more precise, an orator and elocutionist at heart; Willie was full of theories about production but it was his genius not his theory that made him a perfect Playboy of the Western World, and such a poetical Fool in the *Hourglass* and *Baile Strand*, two Yeats plays.

The Eyes of the Blind died a quiet death after its week's performance. I had lost nothing and had won friendship with the two men who had laid the fame of the Abbey Theatre. I had also heard a frank opinion in the pit where I went for the Saturday matinée. An old lady with bugles in her bonnet turned to her companion and said as the curtain fell: "I don't think much of that." I feel sure her criticism was sound.

W. B. Yeats drifted in and out of the theatre while I was there and he was very kind, for I had two letters of advice from him. I have pasted them into my copy of *The Celtic Twilight*. I see he says:

If you would found your work as much as possible on real life you would find it at once easier to write and more powerful in structure. I mean if you would take the class of people you know most of and invent stories not to amuse or startle but to express the truths of their life. Probably you allow yourself to read anything but on the surface. If one writes one can hardly ever afford to read anything but old and simple books, or if modern books only the greatest. I am myself going to school to Balzac and have in the last few months read some thirty of his forty volumes. There are things in him, in his description of provincial life, which are or were true of Ireland. We want an equal reality. Those fantastic plots, a product of the contemporary stage, make sincerity almost impossible. A good play must have truth of atmosphere as in poetic writing—or truth of fact or truth of idea (as with Shaw who overflows with theoretical energy) and truth of fact is generally the best to aim for at the start with most writers for the stage.

Perhaps I did wrong in suggesting to you as I think I did not to take peasant life as we had so much of it. Take any life you know and express its reality as your own eyes have seen that reality. To know what one has seen is the greater part of the labour of literature.

Re-reading this letter I feel that the writer was kind to spend time on a

young woman's efforts. There was another letter about a one-act play which was performed after the Fays had left the Abbey. Yeats and Lady Gregory had approved the idea of it—the two old men who fight a duel in an old Dublin house over a wrong that one of them has entirely forgotten. It was intended for a tragedy but the audience decided at once that Arthur Sinclair, Fred O'Donovan and Kerrigan must be engaged in comedy, whatever they might say. As each appeared there were shrieks of laughter and the laughter barely ceased as one old man fell dead from over-excitement when the clock signalled them to shoot. As the author I could have prayed for the boards to rise up and cover me. Not even the sympathy of Yeats and Lady Gregory could salve the hurt of that absurd but miserable moment. "You know Mr. Yeats has had a serious play laughed at," said Lady Gregory. She felt that this must surely comfort me. Indeed in her kindness she asked me to come to her hotel in Nassau Street and go over the play. But I saw no hope for it except as a farce—which the audience had proclaimed it.

At the end of another letter from W. B. Yeats I find this delightful passage: "The lake near Dromahair is wonderfully beautiful. I once walked round Lough Gill, starting at nightfall, trying to sleep in a wood and getting back to Sligo, half dead from lack of sleep and fatigue at noon the next day. I remember the rabbits at sundown and a little after sunrise."

After the Fays had left the Abbey theatre I was still in touch with them. I remember how Willie was thrilled by the air of New York. "In Ireland I feel the world on my back. In New York I can pick it up and carry it." Frank and his brave little wife were living in Dublin with their two children. Life was hard for them for Frank was an artist and easily hurt. His passionate theories about production and stagecraft made him fall out with those who did not share them. I had introduced the two Fay families to my quite untheatrical home. My mother, who liked people for themselves alone, regardless of their fame, took an immediate fancy to the brothers. Willie in looks and speech enchanted her. Frank became her reader-in-chief. On the days when he came to visit us she laid out the books that he was to select for his readings. On one occasion she chose the Book of Isaiah. Frank was charmed and read on and on while supper awaited us in the dining room. It was like the classic story of Carlyle's prolonged reading of the Book of Job at family prayers.

Shakespeare—the right method of speaking his lines—had become almost a phobia with Frank. *Hamlet* was always his chosen example. The subject so agitated and annoyed him that we all determined to keep him off it as long as possible during supper. It became a family game to see how often we could toss the conversational ball to and fro and prevent his getting hold of it to rush it to the Shakespearean goal. Dear Frank! I have never forgotten him as the old man, outside the lighted window in Maeterlinck's *Interior*. His own life had much of tragedy in it.

Willie's, which ended not long ago at a reasonable old age, was a far

happier one. An understanding and intensely vital companion was his wife. In every straitened time she was beside him as working partner and cheerful friend. In 1915 I met him in Manchester. I was a V.A.D. at a base hospital and he was playing in *A little bit of fluff*. It seemed an affront to his peculiarly Irish genius. The last time I saw him was in M. Farrell's comedy *Spring Meeting* in which his delightful face appeared at a window where he was the gardener, busy over some job. The weather was freezing in London but his wife was driving him to the theatre from Highgate every night. Yes, his life was a happy one, for he was full of interests and ideas. I remember a drive with him to the Scalp, that Pass between Dublin and Wicklow counties. We sat on one side of an outside car and he expounded to me the secrets of this world and the next. I suppose it was theosophy but I always felt that a faery world would have been homely to him. I remember him best as he is in the portrait by John Butler Yeats in Charlemont House. Just so he looked, full of life, of ideas, of a sound common-sense which he added to a genius that I think he never recognized in himself. He and Frank have left the Abbey theatre a tradition that can never be forgotten. Willie's screen personality now survives him in that fine film *Odd Man Out*.

Wonderful actors like F. McCormick passed their life in the service of the Abbey. Mr. Dolan is still there, I believe, the ideal Irish priest or schoolmaster. For me he marks another unforgettable stage adventure, the presentation of *Noah*. I had known from babyhood all about Noah, a little wooden man in a round hat, who captained an ark full of wooden animals whose paint one must not suck. But this Noah, that Mr. Dolan showed us, was one of the heroic figures of history, the man who stood at the turn of the ways. From Ararat the roads divided; his three sons went in different directions to generate warring races. And now the beasts were no longer the friends of man. Suspicion and hatred sent Noah's friendly beasts away to their jungles. Alone and tragic I see Noah standing there. And even the incomparable Maureen Daly, but of course she was Mrs. Noah, had left him spiritually unfriended.

It may be the influence of the old morgue that became a playhouse, but at no other theatre is there such a volcanic muttering. Fierce criticism sweeps its stage and a battle may break out, like that at the "Playboy". How Willie Fay enjoyed that fight! He described it with exquisite zest. Or some young poet may rise and denounce the management and bid his followers to leave the theatre. I remember in old days a pungent criticism of one of the directors made by a girl in the company. "I tell you what he's like," she said. "If he was sitting on one side of God Almighty, and he saw a plum he wanted the other side he'd stretch across and take it and never ask God's pardon."

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE MAKING OF AMERICA

By H. G. NICHOLAS

THIS massive pair of volumes* constitutes a formidable specimen of that unexciting literary genre, the anthology of historical source material. Designed presumably for American college students, it consists, in equal parts, of extracts from literature or documents and of brief commentaries and connecting narratives. It spans American history from Queen Elizabeth to Wendell Willkie and it ranges over constitutional, economic, social, political and foreign fields.

The book, the authors write, "has grown out of the requirements of the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia College." But despite its fullness and length, what strikes one most is its inadequacy as an introduction to contemporary civilization. What has it to offer on the problem of culture in a machine-ridden society? A few paragraphs from Tocqueville and André Siegfried. Or on the paradox of American strength and American psychological insecurity? Nothing much more relevant than Emerson on *Nature* or Whitman's *Democratic Vistas*. Or on the enigma of a pacifically minded people involved in two world wars within one generation? Only the stock quotations from Wilson, Roosevelt and Charles Beard (as unregenerate isolationist), plus echoes of the old myth that the superior efficiency of British propaganda did its bit as well. Professor Hacker quotes and endorses the deep-seated American conviction of their own uniqueness, that affirmation which paradoxically receives its most characteristic expression in the negative epithet 'un-American'. But he does not ask the question which naturally stems from this phenomenon—what is it that makes Americans so self-conscious of this uniqueness, what inspires them at once with the conviction that they are and with the determination that they ought to be "the last, best hope of earth"? Above all what inspires this most idealistic of peoples with the restlessness that strikes all foreign observers and the diffidence that is borne in upon themselves?

These questions are the very warp and woof of American history. If he had included amongst his documents Lincoln's Second Inaugural he would have found there an almost perfect expression of an American's awareness of the tragic paradox lying at the heart of the long four years of civil war and suffering.

Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with or even before the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other. . . . The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered fully.

(Not the least inexplicable feature of Professor Hacker's selection, incidentally, is his restriction of Lincoln items to the famous reply to Greeley and the Emancipation Proclamation.) His view of the American story sees it as a success story—a continent conquered, a democracy established, poverty progressively eliminated, opportunity opened to all, two world wars fought and won. Correspondingly, it is in the same terms that he interprets the American uniqueness which he acclaims—by contrast with other continents still imperfectly moulded to their inhabitants' uses, with other democracies still encrusted with privilege or shackled with abuses, with poverty-stricken multitudes dependent upon America for their very means of subsistence, with

police States where opportunity is a reward for party services, with all those regions of the world still torn by war or the aftermath of war. Such a picture is an impressive one, but it is not the whole American story. It puts into strange perspective, for example, that great catastrophe which Professor Hacker denominates the Second American Revolution, more often known as the American Civil War. As exhibited in these pages it becomes a matter of party platforms, Negro emancipation, Homestead Acts and the Tariff. The war itself, the four-year spilling of brothers' blood, the fighting whose memory haunted Mr. Justice Holmes from the moment of the wound at Ball's Bluff to his deathbed seventy years later—these realities are curiously absent from his pages, although their mark is still visible beneath the surface of American life.

Possibly the reason for Professor Hacker's reluctance to do justice to these irrational, wasteful, negative realities in American history is that he is himself a true child of the eighteenth century America of the enlightenment, a kind of Benjamin Franklin anchored in a firm belief in economic man, not of course as a sordid money-grubber, but as a human being whose material development and cultural progress will go hand in hand, must indeed so proceed, if they are to advance at all. Success has not gone sour in his mouth. He can accept the Andrew Carnegie who preaches the doctrine of wealth as service without feeling impelled to ask what became of that earlier Carnegie, who was going to retire at thirty-five, "settle in Oxford and get a thorough education, making the acquaintance of literary men." He is not even too worried by the philistinism of the 1920's—deplorable of course, but a mere interlude before the energizing drafts of the New Deal.

It is not surprising, consequently, that this collection has most of interest and freshness to offer in its economic sections. These are very full and contain not merely much raw material for the study of economic development—for example, the 1851 prospectuses of the Illinois Central Railroad—but also a most interesting and representative set of samples of American economic theory as it developed from mercantilism down to the New Deal. It is probably not fanciful to detect some indebtedness here to the work of another Columbia historian, Professor Dorfman, whose monumental *Economic Mind in American Civilization* recently laid bare every detail about pre-Civil War American economic thought. Nor does Professor Hacker stop with native economists. Not the least interesting items in his gallery are the extracts from Cairnes's *Principles of Political Economy*, warning the U.S.A. in 1874 of the dire consequences of a protective tariff, and Sir George Paish's attempt in 1910 to instruct Congress in the fundamentals of the American balance of trade. And it is from the unbiased Mr. Colin Clark's *Conditions of Economic Progress* that he draws the most convincing testimony to the remarkable superiority of American productivity.

There is one factor in American development, both economic and social, which one would have expected, on Professor Hacker's own historical valuation, to find treated at greater length. That is immigration. The second volume does indeed present a fascinating reprint from a pamphlet called *Minnesota, the Empire State of the New Northwest*, which is a striking sample of the promotional literature that the Western states distributed in the overcrowded cities and villages of central Europe after the Civil War. It also quotes from a typical speech by Henry Cabot Lodge advocating congressional restrictions on 'the new immigration' before the old American stock is submerged beneath the 'non-Teutonic' elements of Latin and Slav Europe. But considering the rôle that immigration has played in American development, that the whole history of the country is, viewed in one aspect, a history of continuous immigration, this is hardly enough. The processes of translation and adjustment from Old World to New have been described in a rich and vivid literature, that ranges from John Smith's *Virginia* to Louis Adamic's *Return of the Native*. A judicious selection from them would have helped considerably to make comprehensible that phenomenon of Europe-in-America (sometimes even of Israel-in-Babylon) which accounts for so much

*The Shaping of The American Tradition, by Louis M. Hacker and Helene S. Zahler. Columbia University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 2 vols. 42s.

United States history and policy.

But to supply all these desiderata, Professor Hacker would have to have added another volume to his existing two. Surely, he might retort, there is richness enough here for the average student? And indeed there is. Perhaps, when all criticism has been made, one should end on a note of thankfulness for the variety these volumes contain. Roebuck's audience with Napoleon III, Lilienthal's concept of T.V.A., Commodore Perry's opening up of Japan, Roger Williams's *Bloudy Tenent of Persecution*, Pecora's *Wall Street under Oath*—these and much more may not be the whole of American history, but they are a pretty rich *smorgasbord* to the full meal.

SOCIALISM OF THE WEST, by Leo Moulin. *Gollancz*. 7s. 6d.

OPERATION MOSCOW, by Christopher Norborg. *Latimer House*. 15s.

GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE, by J. E. Tyler. *Stevens*. 8s.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1947. *Stevens*. 20s.

In these days of paper shortage and long delays in publication there is a strong case, one would think, for publishers in concert imposing a taboo on wordy analyses and interpretations of world events. Time marches on with giant strides, and the intelligent perception of one year or month becomes the commonplace of the morrow. But publishers are fallible mortals and peculiarly refractory to united action. Mr. Gollancz is still a chief offender. I find it difficult to believe that the publication to-day of such a book as *Socialism of the West* can be justified: it is the author's own abridgment of a work published in Belgium, adequately translated by Alfred Heron.

That there is a great gulf between democracy and Socialism in the Continental acceptance of the terms and our own social democracy is a well known fact, which few Englishmen concerned with these matters can fail to appreciate. And the antithesis between the "communal" régime and the totalitarian scarcely needs underlining. M. Moulin runs the whole gamut of abstractions and -isms in order to state his case for what he calls a new social humanism or personalism. First he traces the birth and destiny of "individualism" originating in the Renais-

sance and translated by Rousseau into a principle of inordinacy (*démésure*) which the Romantics and the rationalists in their different ways upheld; then he depicts the anarchy of the twentieth century to which all this led, in the economic, political, social, international and spiritual spheres; and finally proceeds to define his conception of man as a Person on which can be built the kind of Socialism which answers to the living traditions of the west and the present needs of Europe. What he has to say is sound and sensible enough beneath the cloak of verbiage, and on Continental socialists it may exercise a salutary influence.

Operation Moscow, an American contribution, suffers not so much from verbiage and abstraction as from the time-lag. Although dated 1947 the pattern of development which the author discerns has been largely overtaken by events: we are all conscious to-day, his own fellow-countrymen not least, of the need for a positive answer by all the peoples of the west in a united effort to the challenge from the U.S.S.R. Mr. Norborg, accepting the fact that action through the United Nations is estopped by the veto, calls for "a frank, firm and manly policy" grounded in Article 51, the collective self-defence article, of the Charter. He visualizes the operation of power in the world—that power which is the basis of all peace, *pace* the pacifists—through four regional police authorities; the American Regional Authority, the Soviet Regional Authority, the Atlantic Regional Authority and the Pacific Regional Authority. To-day the necessary "firm union of the United

States and Western Europe in a single Atlantic Regional Authority" is on the way to accomplishment; in the hard school of experience we are learning "the technique of world peace enforcement."

Mr. Tyler's little book, which makes no pretensions to being apocalyptic, also reads strangely in the light of the prodigious advance in American awareness since it was written (in 1946). Originally planned as a study of Anglo-American relations it became inevitably in the writing a matter of measuring U.S. and Russian power. The world-problem to-day, as he says, replacing that of Germany is "that of Russia's forceful re-entry from the wings on to the centre of the stage." It means that the U.S. must assume heavy responsibilities for which she is ill-prepared. When Mr. Tyler wrote, the required policy could well enough be described in terms of hemispheric defence *plus*—security preoccupations in the Arctic and a readiness "to pay the constant price of Admiralty." Actually America has a far more difficult row to hoe, she has to face the fact that she has a large stake, too, in Europe, while the west as a whole cannot afford to overlook the "huge political vacuum" in east and south-east Asia. Mr. Tyler is an unexciting writer, but he makes his points clear. He is Senior Lecturer in Modern History in the University of Sheffield. The book is published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, now established by its parents, Professor Keeton and Dr. Schwarzenberger, as a worthy successor to the original New Commonwealth Institute.

This Institute publishes a quarterly periodical which contains articles by recognized authorities, with a greater parade of scholarship than, for example, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). It has now also initiated a series of Year Books, of which the one under notice is the first. Two meaty contributions on the Soviet Union head the list of articles, one on

"Permanent Features of Russian Foreign Policy" by Dr. W. Gurian of Notre Dame University, Indiana, the other, on western and Soviet democracy, by Dr. R. Schlesinger, the author of "Soviet Legal Theory." They are followed by a somewhat slighter piece on Czechoslovakia by A. G. Bettany, Reuter's correspondent in Prague. Other subjects covered are "The Communal Problem in India" by the India Secretary of the Church Missionary Society; "Nationalism in Eastern Asia" by Professor G. W. Keeton himself; "The Problem of Tangier" by a Californian Professor of Political Science; "The International Red Cross" by Dr. L. Ledermann, its Director of Information and a Lecturer in the University of Geneva, and "The Future of International Economic Institutions" by Professor A. G. B. Fisher, formerly of Chatham House. A number of Reports on World Affairs—extensive book reviews—complete a notable volume.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

MODERN TRENDS IN ISLAM, by H. A. R. Gibb. *The University of Chicago Press: Cambridge University Press*. 14s.

This scholarly book comprises the series of Haskell Lectures in Comparative Religion given by Professor Gibb at the University of Chicago in 1945. It sets out in six chapters the present diversity of Muslim thought about the interpretation of the teachings of Mohammed in the Koran. There is no diversity as to the inspiration of these teachings. "By all Muslims of Mohammed's own time and of later ages, they were taken to be the direct word of God dictated to him through the Angel Gabriel." Thus neither the voice of God nor the voice of the Prophet are challenged. But diversity of thought does arise on a third count—the principle of IJMA, the "consensus of the community"; that is the application to the religious and social life of every Muslim of the tenets of the Koran. It is over their interpretation that the conservative and moderniz-

ing wings in Islam have been at growing variance especially since the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Professor Gibb traces the controversy from the reformist puritanical movement of Mohammed Ibn Abd al Wahhab in 1750 which was crushed because "its violently hostile attitude towards the other orthodox schools crossed, in fact if not in theory, the line separating orthodoxy from heresy." The powerful revival of the Wahhabi movement under King Abd el Aziz Ibn Saud, however, "showed in practice a greater tolerance." Outstanding between these two Middle East Wahhabi movements towards puritanism came the mission of the great Egyptian Sheikh, Mohammed Abdu of Al Azhar University in Cairo. His programme included not only the purification of Islam from corrupting influences and practices and the defence of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks, but also—on modernizing lines—the re-formulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought and the reformation of Muslim higher education.

Al Azhar is the greatest Muslim university in the world; but to-day in Cairo and Alexandria there are two rival secular foundations with modern and westernized curricula—the universities of King Fuad and King Farouk. Al Azhar had been deeply affected by Sheikh Mohammed Abdu's programme and is moving slowly and perhaps reluctantly towards modernization of method and in 1936 revised its programme of studies into three faculties—Islamic law, religious sciences, and Arabic language. Even more striking evidence of this trend towards modernism lies in the foundation of such secular bodies as the Muslim Association of Modern Youth which has branches in Syria and Iraq as well as in Egypt.

Professor Gibb deals fully with all such outward signs of change both in the Middle East and in India and in his four concluding chapters discusses their implications for Islam from a religious, legal and social aspect. His book is a

timely publication; for in the two years since he lectured in Chicago much water has flowed under the bridges of the Nile and the Indus. Modern ideologies are to-day having a sharp impact on Islam and it is only a few months ago that Egyptian demonstrators, led by students, were including in their street slogans the ominous cry: "No Islam after to-day." Modern trends in Islam are indeed even more modern to-day than they were in 1945.

OWEN TWEED

THE BACKGROUND OF EASTERN POWER, by F. B. Eldridge. *Phoenix House*. 18s.

It is claimed for the author of this book, an Instructor in History at the Royal Australian Naval College, that he "has studied a mass of material hitherto only available in a vast number of scattered, and often expensive and inaccessible publications." This is evidently true. It is admitted by Mr. Eldridge himself, on the other hand, that the book contains nothing new or original; and this also is true.

The specialist, therefore, in oriental or maritime history will find little in the volume to interest him. The general reader, however, should find the book both instructive and entertaining, even if the scope of the story—which ranges from Arabia to Panama and from prehistoric Polynesia to the year 1763—produces symptoms of overcrowding towards the end. Much space is rightly given to the conflicts of the Ancient East, including those in progress when the Portuguese arrived. It was the Koreans who defeated Hideyoshi's fleet in 1592, teaching the Japanese a lesson which the Spaniards had learnt, at as heavy a cost, in 1588. But, more modern than the Elizabethans, the Korean Admiral employed an ironclad, impervious to missiles, which rammed her opponents one by one. As fascinating again is the story of the Portuguese seamen with

"the pumps in their hands and the Virgin Mary in their mouths" who conquered and lost their Empire with almost equal speed.

Perhaps the author is at his best in describing the early rivalry of Dutch and English. He quotes the first English Ambassador to the Mogul as concluding: "Let this be received as a rule that if you will profit, seek it at sea, and in quiet trade; for without controversies it is an error to affect garrisons and land wars in India." It may be that events have proved him right. By contrast with a readable text, the bibliography of this book is useless and the illustrations mostly unhelpful. Readers would do well, moreover, to retain the dust-cover, for the cloth-binding is hideous.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

GOD WAS IN CHRIST, by D. M. Baillie. *Faber & Faber*. 16s.

In what sense is Christianity a historical religion? Does it stand or fall with the actual occurrence of certain events in Palestine at the beginning of our era?

The Greeks thought that the cosmos pulsates slowly back and forth in never ending recurrence. The Jews, and traditional Christianity, that God governs by occasional *coups d'état*. The last century believed—Catholics call it the last western heresy—that the universe is automatically evolving in a desirable direction, and that God, the soul of the world, is evolving with it, doomed presumably to share its fate, if the law of entropy is true.

Is the Jesus of history the same as the object of Christian worship? The attempt to recover, by criticisms of the records, an authentic portrait of "the Prophet of Nazareth in Galilee" is a modern quest. Lives of Jesus have poured from the press, most of them with an ominous likeness to the ideal hero as conceived by the authors, English, French, German or American. The records were rationalized; the picture which emerged was of a supreme moral teacher and example for the

modern man. This Liberal Protestantism, of which Harnack was the most famous exponent, was attacked by Loisy as unhistorical. We must acknowledge, he said, "*comme deux Christs*" a Galilean peasant of limited intelligence and the Christ of Catholic Christianity. The institutional Church thus took the place of the incarnation; Loisy hoped that he had put Canute's chair safe above high-water mark. The Church indignantly rejected this strange champion, who moved further and further to the left. But destructive criticism of the Gospels was carried on by some scholars who claimed to be Christians. We need not consider the absurd theory that Jesus never existed at all. There was certainly a wandering prophet who was executed as a political agitator. But if He was such a one as Loisy supposed; if He went about predicting an apocalyptic end of the age; if He hoped to make a revolution at Jerusalem with the help of a few unarmed peasants and women, it really does not matter to us whether He existed or not. In that case Jesus, as the founder of a religion, belongs not to the class of Buddha and Mohammed, but to that of Mithra and Osiris. The suggestion is that in the apostolic age the Church made Him (as Samuel Butler hints) a peg on which to hang their own best thoughts, and that the synoptic Gospels represent not history but homiletics and apologetics. This is the conclusion of the German form-critics.

It is difficult to reconcile this theory with the undoubted fact that almost immediately after His ignominious death His disciples were worshipping Him with the highest honours they could think of, the Jewish Christians as the Messiah, a claim which in my opinion He never made for Himself, the Gentiles as the Lord, the Saviour-God of their mysteries. This is surely unaccountable unless He had made an overwhelming impression upon those who had known Him. Equally striking is the fact that St. Paul, a religious genius of the first rank, never hesitated in identifying the Holy Spirit

who dwelt within him with the Spirit of the glorified Christ.

Professor Baillie agrees, on the whole. But instead of following the *philosophia perennis*, which by recognizing the affinity of the Pauline *pneuma* with the *Nous* of the Greeks and the Infinite Self, the *otman*, of the Indians, is bringing together Catholics and Protestants, Christians and Buddhists, he has steeped himself in Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, Tillich and Hoskyns. Those who prefer another approach to the great mysteries will nevertheless value this careful and discriminating discussion of a school of thought which at least on the Continent is receiving much attention. The text "God was in Christ," is acceptable to all.

W. R. INGE.

THEOLOGY AND THE ATOMIC AGE, by D. R. Davies. *Latimer House*. 5s.

THE SIZE OF LIFE, by J. P. Murphy. *Longmans, Green*. 7s. 6d.

DOCTOR JOHNSON'S PRAYERS, *S.C.M. Press*. 6s.

Both Mr. D. R. Davies and Dr. J. P. Murphy are concerned with the same familiar theme: the crisis in scientific humanism. Ever since the Renaissance man has sought to create his own material Utopia in this world, confident that the nearer he could get to this the more all else would be added unto him. In actual fact, the nearer he has by his harnessing of natural forces got to the material ideal of security and plenty the more have grown his actual distresses and insecurity until to-day the release of atomic energy, potentially his supreme triumph, threatens him with literal extinction. He has tried, and signally failed, to live by bread alone: only a return to the Word of God can save him.

But their treatment of this theme varies profoundly. Mr. Davies's, as ever, is broad, easily flowing and social; his conclusion is that this atomic era is quite literally Apocalyptic, in which the too long neglected warnings of the con-

summation of the age in fire and destruction may come true at any moment, and that the Christian Church must return to the tense, 'on its toes' frame of mind of its earliest days. This alone may by the grace of God enable man to stave off the final cataclysm or, if it does occur (which he himself believes to be the lesser probability) can give him the right mind in which to meet it.

Dr. Murphy's approach is more individual. In his first three chapters he proceeds to the "size"-ing up of worldly appearances by the spiritual realities which underlie them. Material things are really quite secondary, for their very existence is derived from that of God; art is, in the last resort, an expression of man's God-given conscience; and as to science, the most real one is theology for it deals with the only, because revealed, certainty which is God, whereas physics, chemistry, etc., are necessarily but man's tentative gropings in the world around him. In his fourth chapter, which is half the length and of the same title as the book, he proceeds to vindicate this spiritual "size"-ing of all things by a close-knit and vigorous exposition of now almost old-fashioned apologetics and to demonstrate to his own complete scientific satisfaction that the Church of Rome can alone "size" life for all men and that of all spurious substitutes (though he does not specifically mention either) the Anglican Church is the most deplorable. This is the real point of the whole book, which ends with a hope, no more, "the travail of the times may be but transient" and the consoling thought that "atomic bursts, gigantic though they be, still take the form of a giant mushroom."

The chief merit of both books will lie in the thinking they are likely to produce in the reader rather than in their own intrinsic argument. Mr. Davies's general survey of the situation, and in particular his chapter on the cult of power, is excellent; Dr. Murphy's earlier chapters, although at times rather awkward in verbiage, are provocative in rather an amusing way. Most people

seek to avoid any kind of thought on a dread issue before which they feel helpless; it will be all to the good if these books help them to cast away that fear.

Dr. Johnson's *Prayers* form an admirable collection. They are personal in the best sense, covering not only his difficulties and temptations but also his health, his birthdays and other special occasions, his friends (by name) and including much of thanksgiving; they are the prayers of a great man walking humbly before God and, apart from their own interest and worth, may suggest a like pattern for the reader's own prayers.

JOHN HALET.

THE CHARACTER OF ENGLAND, edited by Ernest Barker. *Oxford University Press*. 30s.

Sir Ernest Barker has gathered together a distinguished collection of authors to describe the character of England; the resulting volume—beautifully illustrated throughout—takes its place with the well-known Oxford University Press volumes on *Shakespeare's England*, *Johnson's England*, and *Early Victorian England*. But its scope is wider than these in that, although the book is designed as a monument to the England of to-day, the portrait is of England without reference to any specific point of time.

Those who do not like *symposia* (and they are many) may not be disarmed by the Editor's Aristotelian quotation in the introduction: "Feasts to which many contribute may excel those provided at one man's expense"; but they will be generous enough to recognize the quality of the contributors who, if not always those one would have chosen (Bernard Darwin is surely much missed in a volume like this), are without exception distinguished authorities on the twenty-six aspects they severally present.

It is not surprising that such a book, representing so many individual points of view, is unequal; nor that it startles

from time to time by the dogmatic expression of thoughts that scarcely command universal or even fellow-contributors' assent. Such expressions, however, are stimulating in themselves, the most striking perhaps being Mr. I. J. Pitman's assertion that: "To this day not only every boy, but every parent and friend, would prefer—and fortunately evidence shows that the two need not be exclusive—a school career to end as Captain of Games than as Captain of the School." Many will no doubt prefer the authority of Captain C. B. Fry (perhaps the greatest example of the truth of Mr. Pitman's parenthesis) when he says in his delightful autobiography *Life Worth Living*: "One of the points that strikes me most in looking back on the six years I spent at this very English Public School, which for the last eighty years at least has been one of the most successful not only in scholastic achievement but also in games and athletics, is that the popular notion of a Public School as mainly a home of hero-worship in the latter department is a fiction . . . there is no doubt at all that the eminent lights of the Upper Sixth and the winners of the School prizes figured on the whole as more important persons in public estimation than the successful gamblers."

As for the other contributions one must single out for special attention a chapter of greater interest to the ordinary Englishman to-day than it would be at any other time—Mr. Richard Law's brilliant contribution on "The Individual and the Community." But in a final summing up Sir Ernest confesses to a shiver of doubt as to what the immediate future will bring. Is his portrait one of England as she is to-day (or even as she was yesterday), and may it not be falsified to-morrow? Will the permanent elements amid change persist in the England of the future? These constants Sir Ernest lists as social homogeneity, the vogue of the amateur, the idea of the gentleman, the voluntary habit, eccentricity, and youthfulness with its companion love of nonsense.

Changes have been great, and the pace of them almost faster than one can follow, yet the great qualities that have gone to make up the character of England will not surely vanish. One may conclude in the hope, and even in the belief, that the Editor is right in his final judgment: "Nor are the habits of a nation and its silent sense of its own way of life, so easily sloughed, even at the call of pure reason . . . this long slow movement of the character of England—has it not something enduring?"

J. F. BURNET

AFTER BATTLE, by James Monahan.

Macmillan. 5s.

CAGE & WING, by Frank Kendon.

Cambridge University Press. 2s.

Mr. Monahan's second book of poems allows, even encourages, a further and deeper examination of his work than his first volume, *Far from the Land*, which was written more closely to the war. *After Battle* is also affected by war, for the poetic digestion chews a slow cud, but in a number of these poems he is writing in, and out of, the peaceful atmosphere of a home which is the sweeter by contrast with the hardships of war.

Technically he maintains his former excellence: rhyme is an unobtrusive tool of his craft and his metres while careful, follow the stresses of speech and sense so that his communications flow easily into the mind of the reader. His ideas are rich and his images strictly his own. Deeper than the level of his mechanics there is apparent a sense of pattern which may yet prove the strongest of his poetic characteristics. Just as a good landscape painter paints his scene with a consciousness of a basic pattern, almost as if land were flesh moulded about the bones of a formative body, so there is pattern in each poem. The imagery, as well as the subject matter, moves in symmetric lines, and with considerable visual quality. His horse in "The Running of the Black Horse" strikes attitudes as it rears or runs and the arch of neck,

lift of leg, the whole line of the moving horse, are conveyed in a series of mind-pictures. Side by side with the run of the horse, running with it in close harness indeed, is his romance which, in its turn, is outspanned by allegory.

Every true poet has a deeper, a basic pattern, sometimes stated openly, more often implicit in almost all his poems, however varied his immediate subject-matter. In Mr. Monahan's work this larger, underall poetic trend—so fundamental as to suggest the basic concept of the poet himself, is one of ultimate peace. Again and again through this book a single image, even a single word, opens up the view beyond the immediate province of the poem to peace in the end. There is an almost sensuous association of words when he speaks of rest—a compensating starkness when he deals with violence.

Attacking war as an evil yet, perforce, accepting it as a fact—as indeed every man in it had to accept it or deny his daily life—he sees it from differing angles. Violent death he shows in its horror, peace won at grisly cost. Of the F.F.I. of the Marne, however, in "Resistance", he writes with warm sympathy. He has a feeling for France, a feeling which, in a poet, is bound ultimately to be a feeling for her people. His French resistance troops reflect much of the poet's own Englishness—but they reflect it through a French glass. Between the true French resistance forces and the Englishmen who were with them in the time of their effort and their greatness, there was a bond which no press-fostered differences disturbed. After their years of secret resistance they came proudly in the uniform of mere armlets and they are caught in the poem

to rule fat acres,
or openly or secretly, that fed us
although we neither reaped nor drove a plough
to live like this—why was it not to be
a little bit like ragged emperors?
and then, and here is the language of
men who understand one another and
talk together with the unsaid pressing
through the surface of the said:

Let them remember
our arms not blindly biddable, our legions

like briars spread through Europe's undergrowth . . .
Can we, I wonder, ever live with laws?

In "Perambulator", through eyes extra perceptive for having seen that which denied the home and its rights, the poet is warm yet dignified, romantic yet never unreasonable.

Mr. Kendon works with more maturity of outlook. In *Cage and Wing*, we recognize his familiar dignity of technique, his humility and his belief in ultimate salvation. In this short sequence he is perhaps at his best when he catches the quality of both his poetry and his mind with:

Sloping sunbeams fall to sleep across
The tombs of centuries.
A bell in the stone tree-tops hides its hour
away.
Out of the stealth of solemn thought within
A smouldering organ-wisdom rises.

In the setting of quietness and peace Mr. Kendon moves quietly and with the complete assurance of one who knows that he belongs there.

JOHN ARLOTT.

COME TO THE OPERA!, by Stephen Williams. Hutchinson. 12s. 6d.
MESSIAH, by Julian Herbage, and
THE GOLDEN AGE OF VIENNA, by Hans Gal. Max Parrish. 6s. each.

Mr. Stephens Williams was perhaps wise in choosing only the more well-known operas for inclusion in his *Come to the Opera!* His experience of the subject and of its associated arts is known to be wide, and so to have limited his scope to fifty-seven operas implies no more than lack of space. Those desirous of quickly gaining information and "background" before going to the opera are almost certain to find it here. That is the strictly utilitarian purpose which the author had in mind, as he explains in his Prologue, amusingly rough unaccountably couched in jiggerel verse. It is, in fact, a guide book.

Mr. Williams's method is to summarize the story of each opera in a style that is free from fussiness. At all times the musical connections are kept before the

reader—unlike the common book of plots—and music-type illustrations draw attention to the highlights of the score.

Wagner gets most space and about this it is unreasonable to grumble. In Mr. Williams's view the incipient Wagnerite should not at first bother overmuch about the *leitmotifs*, and thus they have little mention in his book. Leaving technique to the specialist guide, he remarks, "Wagner was full of theories. He was also full of music"—pertinent observation, typical of his approach throughout the book, and expressed clearly in the appreciation of each work. Here his infectious ardour, while not blind to operatic absurdities, leads us straight to the heart of that queer mixture which is opera.

Sir Thomas Beecham has written the Foreword in familiar vein, and appears to welcome with relish another opportunity to become vocal on the subject of British musical life. He says: "We have touched rock bottom, and if we are to have opera again of any consequence we shall have to rebuild from a crude beginning." No doubt our standards have fallen, but the current revival, on an unprecedented scale, of interest in all kinds of music may provide excellent material on which to build a more secure foundation. There is the right stuff in this book to appeal to this new public, and to encourage its interest along sound lines.

The emphasis is on beautiful book production in *Messiah* and *The Golden Age of Vienna*, which are the first two titles in "The World of Music". This series promises well if sustained at the initial level. Both authors are well-known authorities; Mr. Herbage prepared an edition of the *Messiah* for the B.B.C., and Mr. Gal is a distinguished Austrian musician now lecturer at Edinburgh University. The latter's book is of exceptional fascination, covering a period of intense and varied artistic activity. The colour illustrations to both volumes are superb.

PHILIP H. MORRIS.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Memory is busy with the Irene Hentschel production of *Candida* in 1937 where Marchbanks, reminded by Candida that when she is seventy-five he will be sixty, flung out his hands and said: "In a hundred years, we shall be the same age." Stephen Haggard's dart and swoop kind of acting fitted the "excessive nervous force" of the Shaw character because he was a dart and swoop kind of person. This boy and his restless prancings—jerky, awkward, yet light as summer air and as free from loutishness—shows clear in Christopher Hassall's *THE TIMELESS QUEST* (Arthur Barker, 15s.). Unblurred by the pity of early death, this 'life' by a discerning friend is a true memorial of the actor, teacher, novelist, poet, dramatist and soldier whose powers were as elusive as his personality and as hard to assess; in his activities, as the author says, "time brought him assurance but not wider scope." The last words he wrote were in his poem "Lotus" published in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* in 1943, and Christopher Hassall, by allowing sufficient time to lapse, has made his own and the judgments of the many other discriminating people who discuss Haggard here, all the more valuable. Perhaps Mr. Shaw's description of Marchbanks, rather than the Carlyle quotation, might have graced the introductory page:

He is so uncommon as to be almost unearthly; and to prosaic people there is something noxious in this unearthliness, just as to poetic people there is something angelic in it.

Going places

An actor-writer who happily has lived long enough to fulfil all early promise is Russell Thorndike. It was to be expected that *IN THE STEPS OF SHAKESPEARE* (Rich & Cowan, 12s. 6d.) traced by such an eminent Shakespearean player (though it is important to remember his scope: was he not the first Peer Gynt, and one of the most distinguished, in this country?) would be rewarding, but how good a commen-

tary it is must not be missed by anyone who might be 'put off' by the honest simplicity of the title. The style, too, has the same characteristic, and should not blind any reader to the erudition of the author's research. Such a guide book, with twenty-four photographs of places as well, is a remarkable by-product of one who might have been well content to remain the interpreter of the mind of Shakespeare and eschew his topography. It should occupy a niche very near the plays on the bookshelf and be well thumbed before they are seen in the flesh.

Painter and planner

And one of the many reproductions in *JOHN MARTIN 1789-1854: His Life and Works*, by Thomas Balston (Gerald Duckworth, 25s.), is of Macbeth and Banquo, two small figures with the soldiers following on a lower road standing against a background of mountains and stormy sky, which the artist with justification called one of his most successful landscapes. This biography puts the neglected Martin back among the Lawrences, Constables, Turners and Wilkies of his day. He excelled in the range that crowded the canvases like "Joshua commanding the sun to stand still", "The fall of Babylon" and "The Deluge" allowed him and it is not surprising that "Belshazzar's Feast" was "the most famous picture of his age"; the illustration indicates the miracle of detail this was. He seems to have been equally at home with *Paradise Lost* and Queen Victoria's coronation ceremony and, as an early town planner, knew all about pure water supply and sewage disposal. Mr. Balston has documented his work exhaustively with lists of paintings, engravings and pamphlets and has made of the whole an important addition to the study course of those who would learn more of the history of English art.

Adam and others

And for those who never tire of the history of English architecture *Batsford*

adds two more to its long list of books on the subject: *THE AGE OF ADAM* by James Lees-Milne (21s.) and *STUART AND GEORGIAN CHURCHES: Outside London 1603 to 1837*, by Marcus Whiffen (18s.). They make a pleasant proximity of interiors and exteriors and, if not complementary, they stimulate speculation in each other's respective fields as, for instance, the suggestion that Robert Adam might have excelled at church design had more opportunities come his way. Mr. Whiffen's avowed purpose is to show something of the quality of the often despised churches outside London, and he says, "the tradition of ecclesiastical building from Elizabeth to Victoria can be studied in its full continuity and variety only in the provinces." The other book is a looking backward; "upon delicious tides of retrogression, away from the present quagmire of existence" groans Mr. Lees-Milne, and he certainly succeeds in rescuing eighteenth century 'elegance' and 'tone' from fashionable sneers. Both volumes are in the *Batsford* succession of good and comprehensive 'picture-books'.

The countryman

Nature's architecture in the woods calls forth some of the most acute observation of Richard Jefferies in *CHRONICLES OF THE HEDGES*, edited with an Introduction and Notes by Samuel J. Looker (Phoenix House, 12s. 6d.). The book, illustrated by the delicate pencil drawings of the author and his uncle John Luckett Jefferies, is made up of essays and notebook jottings, hitherto published only in periodicals which range from *The Times* to the *Live Stock Journal*, and is obviously the pride and joy of its editor who, being an authority on the naturalist, now gives this new collection to the world. Maybe it is churlish to wonder if the great man is best served by admirers who revere every crumb because it falls from his table. Some of the pieces here on country life in sight, sound and feeling are admirable. Others are not; the long essay called "A Defence of Sport",

for example, is ingenious but unconvincing. The notes on London too are trite in thought and expression. However, there is much to commend in this book and a few drops of faint praise cannot damp the ardour of Jefferies addicts like Mr. Looker.

Essays in the urbane

Those towering sycamores and chestnut trees That in our garden up at Hampstead grew
* May once have been a part
Of some fine eighteenth-century avenue,
And still my mind's eye sees
Their majesty of branches, felled so long ago

sighs Clifford Bax in *ROSEMARY FOR REMEMBRANCE* (Frederick Muller, 12s. 6d.), a book to put figuratively and actually alongside *Evenings in Albany*, a favourite of 1942. Now the author continues from the same address his reminiscences and criticism of life and ideas. His stories, especially of the autobiographical kind, that is told at first hand, are full of the same good-humoured malice; he can laugh without stinging—in fact, if he will forgive the pun, he is *The rose without a thorn*. And his 'thumbnail' sketches are portraits not caricatures: anyone who knows that "poet-detective" cum B.B.C. cricket commentator will smile affectionately at "John Arlott, mournful and infuriated" but "not wholly quenched, with burning eyes pelting to the House of Commons..." Mr. Bax unconsciously invites his readers to share his fun, his enthusiasms—and his scholarship—and this is one of the secrets of his charm as a writer.

The cult of Lawrence

How long ago it seems since we struggled to find the secret of the works of D. H. Lawrence! As long ago indeed as when Mr. Aldous Huxley's mission was to tell a tale of people he detested and before Mr. Middleton Murry forsook first rate criticism for windmill political theory. Heigho! They and Dorothy Brett, the Brewsters, Catherine Carswell, Edward Garnett, 'Kot', Katherine Mansfield and Mabel Dodge Sterne were some of those who helped us make up our minds on Lawrence's work and relationships. Now *The Frieda*

Lawrence Collection of D. H. LAWRENCE MANUSCRIPTS comes from America edited by E. W. Tedlock, Jr. (*University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque*. \$3.50) and with a grateful Foreword from his wife. She says: "I have been waiting for Lawrence to come into his own in America. Not only for a handful of the supercultured to admire his brilliant writing, but for the love and truth (O abused unhappy words) in him to rouse the love and truth in many others, and now I see a beginning." It is fair to say that in England even the "supercultured" no longer feel unanimous about the brilliance of his writing but that most ordinary people interested in style would unhesitatingly acclaim his share in the evolution of the short story form, and that one at least still reads his 'travel' books, such as *Mornings in Mexico*, with undiminished pleasure. This is not to detract from the completeness of this massive bibliography arranged under the headings of novels, novelettes and short stories, poems, plays, essays on education, democracy, religion, literature and art, travel and descriptive sketches and so on. Its comprehensiveness asks that it should be published in England where it might at least be on the shelves of all reference libraries for the instruction of a new generation and to fortify the memories of those who were young, impressionable and awed when Lawrence died.

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From a street in Cumberland

It would be unfair not to pay tribute to Lawrence as a nature poet (his disciples often forget this) one of the truest among his contemporaries because more than most he had the naturalist's eye. Which brings us to the contemplation of *Rock Face*, Norman Nicholson's new book of poems (*Faber & Faber*. 7s. 6d.). His images of Cumberland hills and dales are so increasingly impressing themselves on his readers' senses that his "dark brogs of broom", his hydrangeas blowing "their blue-white bubbles", his

"lilac cloud-wrack of an arctic spring", his cormorants curling "black question-marks above the threshold of the sea", are beginning to be seen in a recognizable landscape. Furthermore, he is developing a gift for hewing portraits, in "Cowper" for instance or in "For Emily Brontë", which comes near to the medallion-cast or rock carving poetry that Sidney Keyes used so wonderfully in his sonnet on Wordsworth. And time is Mr. Nicholson's ally.

Vox populi

Shelley's essay "A Defence of Poetry" and his "Letter to Lord Ellenborough" denouncing the sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment and an hour in the pillory, passed on Daniel Eaton in 1812 for publishing Part III of Paine's *Age of Reason*, are reprinted in pamphlet form by *The Porcupine Press* (2s. 6d.). Much of what Shelley said on the mind of poets and the making of poetry is still good debating material. He made large claims outside the immediate practice of the art—that poets "are the institutors of laws and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, the teachers. . ."; in short, that they are men apart, benevolent but despots. In his Introduction to *THE GREENWOOD ANTHOLOGY* compiled by him (*Frederick Muller*. 7s. 6d.) Herbert Palmer goes the democratic way, urging that his collection might be regarded "as an anthology of the People, the Voice of the People" and thinks he has discovered "poetry which is living speech." As the judge of the Greenwood Poetry Prize competition organized by the Poetry Society, Mr. Palmer sifted from the 1,000-odd entries some seventy which have gone to the making of this book. Many of their authors are or were in the Forces and with names as yet unknown; a few, like the two Gibsons, Wilfrid and Douglas, have had time or are about to establish themselves. "Something, emotional, musical, and lyrical", as Mr. Palmer says, is in these pages.

GRACE BANTARD.

[Mr. H. S. Town]

[1st June 1946]

yarn as a result of the introduction of the Utility Cloth Scheme, which has had the effect of reducing the quantity of yarn available for handlooms in India by about 10,000 bales per mensem. Sir, it is very difficult for me to question an official statement. But that part of the scheme of utility cloth production which caused yarn to be consumed at such a terrible rate was given up in January 1946. I do not think it has any effect on the present position.

"I want to go back now to sub-paragraph (3), for very little is said in this report about exports of cloth from this Presidency. The export of cloth is very necessary. It has an important place in the economy of this province and this is not always understood. It is all too easy for a person in need of cloth to be annoyed when he hears that cloth has gone out of the Presidency. But there are vital reasons why we in Madras must not neglect the export trade of cloth. So long as the Government of India, on grounds of general policy, permit exports of cloth from India, then this province will lose nothing by doing everything possible to regain its old export markets, both internal and external, and to create new ones. In saying this, I am ignoring the temporary suspension of overseas exports. As I have said, a certain amount of cloth is going to be exported anyway, and if it does not go from Madras, it will go from some other province. Any province which sends out cloth in place of Madras will have less cloth available to send to Madras; so we shall gain no more cloth, but we will have lost a valuable future trade, much of it in handloom cloth.

"In conclusion, Sir, I feel safe in saying that despite criticism, the general position in Madras, viewed against the all-India background, is not unsatisfactory. Cloth dealers, and to a lesser extent yarn dealers, on the whole have behaved well and have realized that they have too much at stake to flout the control orders. There certainly have been some black sheep but the regulations are fairly well observed and what mill-made cloth there is, is sold for the most part at controlled prices. The complaints of high prices for handloom cloth are genuine and well-founded. If the Government of Madras can devise ways and means of ensuring handloom cloth reaching the consumer at reasonable prices, the most serious complaint of all will be removed.

"I do not believe that rationing will be successful. I am against any attempt to encourage purchase of cloth in small quantities throughout the year. I believe that the proposals made will cause a great deal of work and will in the end attain very little improvement in the position. The imminent introduction of the 48-hour week is a very serious matter; for, apart from creating an additional shortage in mill cloth, it will throw thousands of handloom weavers out of work. I think that this side of the question should receive the immediate and serious consideration of the ministers concerned.