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
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THE FORTNIGHTLY

JANUARY, 1943

WAR CRIMINALS

BY VISCOUNT SANKEY

THE problem of war criminals falls under three heads—

- (1) Whether they should be tried at all.
- (2) The experience of the last war.
- (3) If they are tried, what are the chief difficulties and what principles and procedure should be adopted to counteract them?

(1) *Whether they should be tried at all.* This question can be answered shortly, although there has been some difference of opinion with regard to it. There are people who would not take any steps with regard to war crimes. They say that when the war is over a series of war crime trials prolongs bad feeling and delays the resumption of friendly intercourse between former enemies. Bygones are bygones all the world over, they urge. Besides, many of the chief criminals will have escaped to neutral countries and difficulties may arise if their extradition is claimed, especially if it can be shown that the neutral country concerned contends that the offence charged is a political one in respect of which they have been accustomed to grant a right of asylum. They point out that the agitation at the end of the last war to hang the Kaiser ended in nothing. Wilhelm II on November 10, 1918, sought refuge in Holland. A special clause (227) in the Treaty of Versailles provided that the Allied and associated Powers would address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor, in order that he might be put on trial. The Netherlands refused and the ex-Emperor was never tried. He lived for many years at Doorn and died on June 4, 1941, without having earned a martyr's crown.

This attitude is warmly applauded by the criminals themselves and is not likely to put them in any fear or restraint for the rest of the present war.

There are several answers to the contention, though it must be admitted there should be no delay in bringing the criminals to trial. But the rule of law must be established if the world is to enjoy peace. International law is law in the making, and no effort should be spared to compel its observance.

It will be a misfortune for the future if the victorious Allies failed to exact a penalty for the proved violation by Germany of the laws and customs of war. To the cynic who protests that there is no such thing as international law, the reply may be made that Germany has committed acts of cruelty and inhumanity contrary to the provisions in Convention after Convention to which she has put her signature.

Again, there is a general feeling which cannot be disregarded that retribution should be exacted from the Nazis for war crimes, a feeling held not only in Great Britain but among the Allied Nations. Are those responsible for massacres like Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade and Lidice to escape because of the difficulties in bringing them to justice? It may be doubtful whether it will be easy for them to find an asylum elsewhere. But Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the Allied Nations are pledged to the principle of retribution of war crimes. On October 25, 1941, the Prime Minister issued a declaration from Downing Street which, after referring to the horrors and butcheries committed by the Germans in France, Yugoslavia, Norway, Holland and Belgium, stated that retribution for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major purposes of the war. On January 13, 1942, at a Conference in London Mr. Eden made a similar declaration. Finally, the Lord Chancellor announced in the House of Lords on October 9 last—

- (1) That the proposal was to set up with the least possible delay a United Nations Commission for the investigation of War Crimes, and
- (2) That named criminals wanted for war crimes should be caught and handed over at the time of and as the condition of the armistice, with the right to require delivery of others as soon as the supplementary investigations are complete. (Hansard. October 7).

(2) *The experience of the last war.* After the armistice on November 11, 1918, the agitation to punish war criminals became violent and insistent. Subsequently, at the Peace Conference, a Commission was set up to enquire and report upon such matters. As a result, three articles were inserted in the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed on June 28, 1919. Article 228 provided:

The German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and associated Powers to bring before Military Tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law.

Article 229 provided that "persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and associated Powers shall be brought before the Military Tribunals of that Power." And by Article 230 the German Government undertook to furnish all documents and information of every kind . . .

As between Great Britain and Germany the Treaty did not come into force until January 10, 1920, and thus there was some delay in the trials. The lists were prepared by the Allies containing 896 names, many of them national heroes in Germany. It would have been impossible for the German Government to comply with the demand. Difficulties emerged as to procedure, and at length the Allies accepted an offer by Germany to try a certain number of cases before the Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of Justice of Germany at Leipzig. The trials took place in May, June and July, 1921. Great Britain prosecuted six persons, five of whom were convicted; France five, one was convicted; the single Belgian case ended in an acquittal. The trials are admirably described in a book by Mr. Claud Mullins: *The Leipzig Trials*, published by H. F. & G. Witherby, 1921.

Of the British cases, three were against men who had sunk hospital ships, three against men for cruelty in prisoners' camps. The first was against the Commander of a submarine for having torpedoed and sunk without warning the hospital ship *Dover Castle* off the North Coast of Africa on May 26, 1917, causing the death of six of the crew. The 841 souls on board were rescued. The accused satisfied the Court that he acted in obedience to a service order of his highest superiors, which he considered to be binding, and was acquitted.

The next two accused were prosecuted in respect of torpedoing and sinking the hospital ship *Llandoverly Castle* on June 27, 1918, about 116 miles South-West of Fastnet (Ireland). This was contrary to the orders of the German Government, which had forbidden the sinking of hospital ships in that area. A number of those on board took to the lifeboats; while there they were shelled by the submarine, no doubt with the object of destroying evidence of the submarine captain's breach of orders. Pirates of old used to say "The dumb fishes will tell no tales." The Commander of the submarine was on the British list of criminals, but he escaped and the two accused, his junior officers, were put on their trial on the initiative of the German Government. The chronicles of crime afford no worse case, and the details fill us with amazement and horror—234 people lost their lives. The Court found that "by sinking the lifeboats the Commander purposely killed the people who were in them . . . It threw a dark shadow on the German fleet." They regarded the two junior officers as accessories. "They should have refused to obey," but as the principal guilt was with the Commander there were mitigating circumstances, and a sentence of 4 years' imprisonment was imposed. It has been stated that after the two prisoners had served a few months of their

sentence they escaped from prison. It is not surprising that at the Washington Conference of 1921 and 1922 an effort was made to make illegal submarine warfare piracy.

The Prison Camp cases were in respect of—

- (1) Many acts of cruelty in October and November, 1915, at Herne in Westphalia, where a sentence of 10 months was imposed, but the period of detention during trial was to be counted as part of it.
- (2) Many acts of cruelty in April, 1918, at Flavy-le-Martel. This was a terrible case. The cruelty resulted in a heavy death roll. The Court said the conduct of the Commandant "has sometimes been unworthy of a human being." A sentence of 6 months' imprisonment was passed, the period of waiting for the trial to be counted as part of it.
- (3) Many acts of cruelty in December, 1917, at Pommerensdorf. A sentence of 6 months' imprisonment was passed, the period of waiting for trial to be counted as part of it.

In all these cases unprecedented brutality was proved. It is impossible to imagine such details. Those who now read them must agree that the sentences in all the cases were entirely inadequate.

It is not necessary to be a Judge to appreciate the difficult task of the German Judges. The day after the trial of the *Llandovery Castle* cases the German Press came out with "Four Years' Imprisonment for U Boat Heroes." Still, it must be said that a trial of German war criminals in this war by German Judges is not a course which a responsible statesman would advise.

As to (3) *If they are tried, what are the chief difficulties and what principles and procedure should be adopted to counteract them?*, several questions arise:

- (a) What shall be the Courts?
- (b) What are the war crimes?
- (c) Who are to be tried?
- (d) What law shall be applied?
- (e) What punishments should be awarded?

These questions were the subject of discussion by the Commission set up at the Peace Conference in 1919, at the Washington Conference in 1921 and 1922, and have been canvassed in numerous learned books and articles, the most recent of which is a well documented article by Mr. Schwarzenberger in the *Czechoslovak Year Book of International Law*, 1942. They have led to great difference of opinion. Nothing, however, will ever be attempted if all objections must be first overcome.

Many of the difficulties will be minimized if it is remembered that Great Britain is not the only country at war with Germany, nor the only country whose nationals have been killed and tortured by Nazi

war criminals. We must not arrogate to ourselves that we are the only nation who can try war criminals justly, decorously and expeditiously. While it may be desirable to agree as far as possible with our Allies on certain general principles, the working out of these principles had better be left to the individual nation.

It is, therefore, of primary importance that a Commission should be set up in each country to consider these problems and to prepare for the use of the victorious Allies a list of the war criminals who are to be handed over, while exacting from the Nazis the necessary information to support the charge and facilitate the hearings.

(a) *As to the Courts:* For reasons already given a Court of German Judges is not desirable. Normally those accused of crimes against the nationals of any country should be tried by a Court of that country. There is no sufficient reason why British Courts should not try cases of crimes against British nationals, Russian Courts crimes against Russian nationals, Polish Courts crimes against Poles, and so on. The total number of cases would be more expeditiously disposed of. But in addition to these National Courts there would need to be a Special Court. There may be cases where the victim of the crime may belong to no State, as for example a Stateless Jew, or where the accused is charged with a crime against two people who belong to different nationalities, or where in a particular case a trial is better held by a Special Court. Although the Judges in a National Court would be appointed by the State in question, the Judges of the Special Court would best be drawn from an international panel, and the place of trial be decided at the armistice.

It would be for the victorious Allies to appoint a Commission to assign the various cases to the various Courts. We should leave it to each country to choose its own type of Court, whether military or civil, and details as to time and place of trial. As far as Great Britain is concerned, anyone who has been a Judge may be pardoned for preferring trial by a Civil Court. The reproach of the law's delays cannot be laid at the door of our Criminal Courts, and the machinery for the purpose is in being and well understood.

Whichever Court is decided on, it will be necessary to have a short Act of Parliament to clothe it with authority to try crimes committed out of the jurisdiction. The Judges of the Court would work out the rules for procedure. No appeal should be allowed.

(b) *What are the war crimes?* It is not necessary to enter into an elaborate examination of what are war crimes. Their punishment is dealt with in Articles 441-451 in the *Laws and Usages of War on Land*, in the British Official Manual of Military Law (Edition 1929, at pages 340 seq.). A general definition is: "The

term war crime is the technical expression for such an act of enemy soldiers and enemy civilians as may be visited by punishment or capture of the offenders." Many specific examples are given, but there are some which present no difficulty. For example murder, torture, shooting of hostages, bombardment of hospital and hospital ships, robbery with violence, assaults on women, acts of violence to and torture of prisoners and others under charge or control of the enemy, acts of piracy at sea.

(c) *Who are to be tried?* First it must be remembered that it will not be just or indeed possible to try the whole German nation, or even the whole Nazi party—the number of trials will have to be limited. The real difficulty will be not whom to put on the list but whom to leave out. The experience of the last war must be avoided. Then the big men escaped and only a few insignificant ones were tried. The task of selecting those who have to be tried should fall upon the Commission already referred to. But some general principles may be discussed.

Take extreme cases. The simplest one of soldiers who have been members of a firing squad detailed to shoot hostages or other victims of Nazi oppression. You could hardly put all of them on trial. Then the other extreme case. Are you to put on trial the head of a State and those whom you think are responsible as the authors of the war? This subject will be referred to under the heading of "punishments." To some extent in making the list the Commission would consider possible defences. The most important question is, who is responsible for giving the order which led to the crime charged. The easiest case would be where such person has acted in breach of the German Government's own orders, as in the *Llandovery Castle*. Then a case where a person in authority has given the order to secure his own ends. A third case, where a person under orders has been accessory to the crime; yet another where the crime does not arise out of the war but rather during its course, as for example where the crime is due to the personal lust, greed or wickedness of the accused or his sadistic desires. In many cases the contest would be not whether the accused has done the acts complained of but whether he had an excuse for doing so.

(d) *What law should be applied?* It is said as to war crimes that different countries have different codes, and what is a crime in one country may not be a crime in another; rather it would be more correct to say that the results of a trial may be different because some countries lay more stress on certain matters which may be raised by the accused in his defence. No doubt there are cases near the border line where national laws may differ and controversial questions arise, but it would be wise for the Commission of selecti-

to avoid such cases. There will be plenty about which there is no doubt. The British law on the subject is contained in Article 443 of the Laws and Usages above mentioned which provides: "It is important to note that members of the armed forces who commit such violations of the recognized rules of warfare as are ordered by their Government or by their Commander are not war criminals and cannot therefore be punished by the enemy." The code gives the following example in section 11 of Chapter 3 on Offences and Punishments, at p. 18. "If the command were obviously illegal the inferior would be justified in questioning it, or even in refusing to execute it, as for instance if he were ordered to fire on a peaceable and unoffending bystander."

The German Code lays more stress upon the defence of acting under orders. It goes as far as saying that an inferior acting under order is responsible only if he knew that the order involved the infringement of civil or military law. This distinction appears in the judgment in the *Llandovery Castle* case, where the inferior officers were held guilty as accessories.

It is not possible to lay down exact rules. You cannot foresee the facts of every case, but the difficulty of applying the law to the facts is not so great as some people seem to think. The supreme test is that the case must be brought home to the accused, and every opportunity must be given him to defend himself. As to procedure, that varies in different countries. Although the French Criminal Procedure differs greatly from our own, one would hesitate to say that justice is not done in French criminal trials. Each national court for the trial of war crimes should be entitled to adopt its own procedure. The procedure of the Special Court should be left to the Judges of that Court.

(e) *What punishments should be awarded?*

Three are suggested—

- (1) The Death Penalty
- (2) Imprisonment
- (3) Preventive Detention

As to the death penalty, there is much to be said for limiting its enforcement. In extreme cases like the massacres at Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade and Lidice, and piracy at sea, it is difficult to see why the capital punishment should not be inflicted. There again, however, it should be left to the National Courts or the Special Court to decide.

As to imprisonment, that obviously should be left to the discretion of the Courts, but with regard to preventive detention, different considerations arise. Preventive detention has two

objects: to some extent it is a punishment, to another extent it is imposed for public safety. The fate of Napoleon is an example. The late Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, in his volume on Napoleon, Cambridge Modern History, Volume 9, page 756, says, referring to him:

But the man whose ambition had wrought such disasters could not expect to be treated with leniency and the British Government determined that Napoleon was no guest but a prisoner of war. It was a case of policy not of precedents, and even if Lord Liverpool's Cabinet had been accessible to quixotic impulses, it would have been their plain duty to suppress them in the interests of European peace.

History repeats itself, and it may well be the best plan to inflict a sentence of preventive detention upon the Nazi leaders, imposed by the victorious Allies at the Peace Conference. That there is no precedent for their punishments is not an argument for contending that unprecedented war crimes should go unpunished. Over and above that the safety of the world demands that they should not be given another opportunity of disturbing the peace. It is not so much a question of precedent as of policy, but to-day we have a precedent for such a policy. Kept in detention in some remote spot they would not again be able to threaten the peace of Europe, and in addition not be able to live in luxury on their illgotten fortunes.

Justice must be done; not only for the purpose of preventing such crimes in future, but for retribution on those who have committed them. If they are proved guilty, they should not escape the consequences.

EXEUNT THE UNEQUAL TREATIES

BY O. M. GREEN

THE Anglo-American declaration on October 10 last of their surrender of extraterritorial rights in China neatly rounds off the century from the legal recognition of these rights in connection with the Treaty of Nanking, signed between Great Britain and China on August 29, 1842: from which such multifarious fruits have since grown, never even dimly imagined at the time.

Extraterritoriality is not actually mentioned in the Treaty: it was provided for, in rather loose terms, in the General Resolutions attached by agreement between Sir Henry Pottinger and the Chinese Commissioner Kiyung, and was not explicitly defined until the Chinese-American Treaty of Whampoa in 1844. But the British had always stood firmly on the principle that their nationals must not be tried in Chinese courts. And as the British took the lead in introducing extraterritoriality, so they have led in its abolition. Just sixteen years ago this month Sir Austen Chamberlain addressed a note to the Chinese authorities setting out in detail Great Britain's readiness to surrender her special rights in China; and four years later an agreement for the abolition of British extraterritoriality had been initialled by Sir Miles Lampson and the Foreign Minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria put an end to the negotiations.

Since the Anglo-American declaration Norway and Brazil have adhered to it. As far back as in 1930 Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Spain and Portugal, when renewing their trade agreements with China, consented to give up their extraterritorial rights when the Great Powers did the like. German, Austrian and Russian rights disappeared in the last war. So at last are annulled "the unequal treaties" under which Young China has so long chafed. It was, of course, a foregone conclusion that they would go automatically after the war, in which China could justly claim (as she often but vainly did) that she had been fighting the cause of her Allies for over four years before they were directly involved in the Far Eastern battlefields. The point need not be stressed that it was far better in every way that the surrender of extraterritoriality and all the rights and privileges connected with it should be gracefully and spontaneously announced as it now has been.

No one who has not been to China can visualize the enormous fabric of foreign independence that has grown from extraterritoriality, the great wealthy cities it has built, the *imperium in imperio* which it created. Funda-

mentally the meaning of this formidable-looking word* is simple enough, namely, that a foreigner possessing it is tried in his own courts and by his own laws. The extensions to which it has given rise in China are not necessarily inherent in it, as witness the examples of Turkey and Egypt where extraterritoriality was enjoyed without giving birth to a Shanghai, a Tientsin or Hankow. It has often been remarked that if one of the great Emperors of the early Manchu dynasty, K'ang Hsi or Ch'ien Lung, had been on the throne in the 19th century, foreigners would never have acquired the ascendancy that they did. But the dynasty was rapidly going down hill; the T'ai-pin Rebellion which rent China for fourteen years and killed off twenty million of her people was but the climax of the agitation of a dozen secret societies born of the weakness and corruption of government; and the barriers within which the foreigner surrounded himself were at least as much a matter of necessary self-defence as of deliberate encroachment.

Unwittingly, too, the mandarins themselves gave the first impetus to the later developments of extraterritoriality. Shanghai was opened to trade by the Treaty of Nanking and the first British merchants who went there lived in the Chinese City. They did not like it—Fortune, the botanist, has left a description of how the rain and snow blew into their loosely built Chinese houses—nor did the local Chinese officials; and the latter made no difficulty in granting to Captain Balfour, the first British Consul, a tract of land beside the river in which the foreigners might own land† and manage their own affairs in their own way. There is very little doubt that the Chinese official hoped to shut up the foreigners as they had been shut in the Canton factories to which they were most strictly confined except for excursions under escort on certain days in the month to the tea gardens across the river. But there was that germ of self-government in Shanghai which had not existed in Canton, and which was to lead to a state of things very different from the old factory régime.

One point must be emphasized, namely, that the mandarins saw not the slightest objection in 1842 to granting foreign extraterritoriality, rather the reverse. The same principle had long been applied among various alien tribes in China and was naturally extended to white men as a mark of their inferiority. The mandarins did not consider the foreigners worthy to be judged (as one of them wrote) by "the great maxims of reason" applicable to Chinese.

And that, of course, was the root of all the troubles which ultimately flared

* In latter years a habit has grown up of shortening it to "extrality," which is certainly easier to pronounce, though perhaps not wholly approved by those who, with practice, had mastered the original in all its rotundity.

† Or rather hold it on perpetual leasehold, since it was against the law to sell land to foreigners, paying a small annual tax to the Chinese Government. This is the system on which all land is held in Shanghai, although of course it is trafficked in without difficulty. In the Concessions at Tientsin, Hankow, etc., the land is granted by China to the different foreign Powers, which lease it to their nationals.

up in the war of 1840-42 (and very largely in those of 1856 and 1860). Opium was certainly a complicating factor in the first war; it had nothing to do with the later ones. But it is entirely untrue to say that Great Britain went to war to force opium upon China.* The grand issue was that the British demanded recognition of the equality of their status with Chinese and the mandarins would not hear of it.

There is much to be said for the mandarins. They had never yet encountered any people whose civilization could at all compare with China's; the earliest Portuguese and Spanish traders were rough, violent men, little better than pirates; and even at the beginning of the 19th century Jack ashore, after weeks, even months, of being cooped up in a windjammer, was prone to be riotous. No wonder the suave and glossy Chinese looked upon the white men as barbarians rigidly to be kept down. On the other hand the men who had conquered Napoleon and the hordes of India were little likely to admit their inferiority to any race, and they had unquestionable grievances in respect of trade. Morse, the great American historian of China's relations with foreign Powers, makes a strong point that the British were never a menace to China's sovereignty as Russia once was and Japan. All they wanted was fair trade; and the terms required of China in the various Anglo-Chinese treaties were chiefly designed to promote it. Looking back, both sides may admit intolerance, and in the end the mandarins pushed their intolerance too hard, with disastrous consequences for themselves.

Of the many fruits of extraterritoriality Shanghai was the most luxuriant and peculiar not only because it became by far the largest and wealthiest centre of foreign trade, but because of its unique constitution. Hongkong grew from the barren malarial rock that it was when ceded to Great Britain in 1842 to be one of the loveliest, most prosperous of all our colonies. But it was a colony; for which primarily the Home Government was always responsible. In our Concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, much as they owed to the enterprise and initiative of British merchants, the predominant authority was the Consul-General. But Shanghai ruled itself through a Council elected by the merchants who had made the place. These men were responsible only to their electors, to whom they annually gave account of their stewardship. The Treaty Powers protected Shanghai but had no right to give orders to the Council. And the Councillors, be it remembered, had no training in the arts of government. They were business men who gave their time ungrudgingly in what, as Shanghai grew, became a very heavy public service. Yet the bitterest critics of the British merchant in China admitted

* The British were not the first nor at any time the only people to bring opium to China. Portuguese, Dutch and Americans brought plenty. The East India Company never carried an ounce after the Emperor Ch'ia Ching's edict forbidding it in 1800 and the Chinese knew this and never opened the Company's packing-cases. Opium is nowhere mentioned in or in connection with the Treaty of Nanking. And after the Treaty had been signed, the British Government warned the merchants that it would give them no protection if they were caught smuggling opium.

that they did their work well and held the balance fairly between the many nationalities and enormous interests in their charge. Best of all was the fact that there was never the slightest taint of graft. No one could ever say that a municipal councillor, in any of the great Treaty ports, had used his position to put a single cent in his pocket.

Shanghai originally consisted of three areas, French to the south, British in the centre, American to the north-east, and was administered by the three Consuls concerned. But by 1854 the task had become too big for them, and the administration was handed to a Municipal Council annually elected by the foreign ratepayers, empowered to govern by a charter to which the Chinese agreed, called the Land Regulations, and to levy taxes and maintain a police force—the two standard marks of an independent State. Nine years later the French decided to cut adrift and to run their part of Shanghai as a separate Concession; and the British and Americans amalgamated their parts into the famous International Settlement.

The year 1854 is doubly memorable as that in which the merchants first took up arms in their own defence, and which brought the Chinese into the Settlement. An offshoot of the T'ai-ping Rebellion had seized the Chinese city of Shanghai and the Imperialist troops sent to evict them proved a far greater nuisance to the foreigners than the rebels did. An ultimatum was issued to the Imperialists to withdraw, and when no answer was forthcoming a tiny force of British and American volunteers with a few men-of-war's men—under 500 against a camp of 20,000 Imperialists—boldly marched out to the attack. There was a lot of banging, very little bloodshed, the rebels joined in, the Imperialists fled: the Battle of Muddy Flats as it became known in history ended in complete victory for the foreigners.

That, incidentally, was the beginning of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, which ultimately became an exceedingly well trained, well equipped force of some 2,000 men. Just seventy years after the Battle of Muddy Flats when during the Tuchun wars of the 1920's a Chinese army of some 10,000 men was left stranded by their leader's flight in a dangerous position on the western border of the Settlement, the S.V.C. marched out, disarmed the Chinese troops and marched them back into the Settlement where they were kept in empty godowns till they could be shipped away to the North where they belonged.

It may be added that the Council had already arrested a fugitive Chinese general, a notorious man known as Little Hsu, who was sheltering in the Settlement and designed to attach the leaderless troops to himself—which would really have been too bad for everybody. But the audacity of the Council's action through the whole episode was astounding. Its complete success was its justification and one cannot recall that anyone complained—except Little Hsu. He eventually took a trip to Europe for his health, as defeated Tuchuns commonly did in those days.

The influx of Chinese due to the T'ai-ping Rebellion was the ultimate cause of most of Shanghai's troubles. Of course they added greatly to the wealth

of the town: landowners made fortunes by letting houses to them. But the eventual result was actually to withdraw from China's jurisdiction something like a million Chinese and put them under foreign rule. In 1864 a Mixed Court was established under Chinese magistrates and foreign assessors sitting together for all cases in which Chinese were concerned. After the establishment of the Nanking Government in 1927 the assessors disappeared and Chinese judges sat alone, but the Council still retained control of the police who executed the Court's warrants.

The 1920's were turbulent times, when innumerable Chinese factions were seeking to pay off scores on each other; and the Council enforced the practice that no Chinese resident in Shanghai should be surrendered to officials outside until a satisfactory charge against him had been established in open Court. In like manner the Council forbade the posting in Shanghai of any Chinese official proclamations. Considering the heavy responsibility which the Council bore for the peace and welfare of the Chinese population, it is difficult to see how it could have done otherwise. But it is easily understood how bitterly the Nationalists resented the existence of this uncontrollable foreign State within their borders. Matters were made worse by the practice of one or two of the smaller Powers (or rather their officials in China) of selling patents of nationality to Chinese who could pay the price.

Pictures of the Shanghai Bund with its magnificent buildings, swarming traffic and the river in front alive with shipping of all the world have become familiar enough in recent years to dwellers at home. The little muddy *enclave* of 1843 had grown to be the sixth port in the world, with lovely parks, fine hospitals, a public health service unsurpassed in the world, schools, playing fields, a police force of 5,000 men, a municipal administration which justly earned for Shanghai the title of "the Model Settlement." It was alike the financial, industrial and commercial hub of China and the stronghold in bad times of incalculable wealth, Chinese even more than foreign. Like every other foreign centre in China, Tientsin, Hankow, and the Treaty ports where foreigners gathered though without owning Concessions, it radiated prosperity over a wide circle. And most important of all, it was, as the Concessions and Hongkong were, a standing example of the fruits of the rule of law and honest administration. In latter years before the Japanese invasion, Shanghai had become so internationalized that its original character was greatly lost. But as it was opened by the British so it was entirely dominated and its institutions formed by them during the 19th century and with all its faults it stands as an amazing monument of British enterprise and initiative.

Foreigners certainly lived a very pleasant easy life in China, cushioned by the deft ministrations of the incomparable Chinese boy. Yet if they took, they may fairly claim to have given. Apart from the prosperity and employment that radiated from them, there are the great services of the Customs and Salt Gabelle, created by the late Sir Robert Hart and Sir Richard Dane, which are China's greatest financial assets. Nor must one forget the splendid

work of De Rijke, the Dutch engineer, whose genius dredged the shallow Whangpoo on which Shanghai stands, set the tides to work in keeping it open, and enabled 30ft. ships to come up the river alongside Shanghai's wharves.

But it had long been obvious before the war that the new China would not endure the independence and ascendancy which foreigners had acquired, while foreign shipping carried the cream of her trade on coasts and rivers, her finance was largely controlled by foreign banks, and the best factories were in foreign hands. The question which exercised all minds was how the transition of authority was to be effected, which was obviously certain sooner or later to take place.

From this point of view the war is indirectly a blessing. It has awakened the Chinese people, steeled them and made them one as nothing in China's history has ever done before, and it has taught the world to look on China with new eyes. Even before the Japanese invasion in 1937, during the short space since the rape of Manchuria, the actual reform and renaissance achieved by the Chinese Government had dissolved many old prejudices and replaced them by admiration. British and Chinese, even in Shanghai, were drawing more closely together in sport and society as much as in business.

And this new mutual understanding, intensified twenty times by the war, is the best promise possible of future relationships. When Sir Rutherford Alcock, our Minister in Peking from 1865 to 1871 was leaving China, a mandarin said to him "Take away your extraterritoriality and you may go where you please; keep it, and we must do all we can to restrict you." So I think it will be to-day. It is not so much the presence of the foreigner or the pleasures and prosperity he enjoys that the Chinese resent as that these things appear to be the result of compulsion, not of good-will. Now that the stigma of extraterritoriality, long recognized as a slur not upon the foreigner but upon China, has gone, one may be pretty sure that life for the foreigner will go on as smoothly, indeed more so, as it has ever done.

In the disposition that will have to be made for the future of British property in China, probably more than £200,000,000 in value, Great Britain is on the strong ground of being able to claim reciprocity, since any Chinese may come here and buy land, open a bank or factory and run his ships between our ports. But the best foundation for the future is the similarity of the British and Chinese character, their love of compromise, of laughter, their sense of justice, their genius for improvising. Dr. Lin Yu-tang has said that the greatest tribute that can be paid to the English is that all compradores and business men, who know them best, agree in liking them. It is impossible for Britons and Chinese to know each other without a steady growth of mutual regard. And the Anglo-American declaration has opened the door to a much wider exercise of this appreciation than is to be found only in business.

BALKAN REALITIES

BY CECIL F. MELVILLE

THE countries of the Danubian and Balkan regions have felt the impact of Nazi imperialism more violently than has been the case with the countries of Western Europe. In the horrors which have been visited upon them by Hitler may be seen at once the unbridled ferocity of Jaziism and the culmination of the centuries old attempt of Teuton to exterminate Slav. At the same time, it is in these regions that Hitler has found most of his allies, or rather satellites, and these puppets have not lagged behind their German mentors and masters in cruelty and ruthlessness. Hitler has been able to make use of them for his own purposes because he found ready to hand old local rivalries and hatreds which could be exploited in Germany's interests, according to the time honoured principle of *divide et impera*.

But if the Balkans have suffered most, they have also put up the stoutest resistance. It is in the Balkans, moreover, that the repercussions of the general military situation are felt the most strongly. Thus the German failure at Stalingrad, and the Allied progress in North Africa have between them resulted in increased resistance in South Eastern Europe, and, at the same time, in a corresponding effort on the part of the Axis and its satellites to consolidate their positions in the face of this increased resistance.

The situation is made very complicated because of the way in which the national and the ideological are in many cases bound up one with the other. This sometimes leads to the struggle in the Balkans assuming a triangular form—with the Democratic-Bourgeois elements and the Communists both fighting the Nazi-Fascists, but also fighting each other. In a sense, therefore, the main elements of the general European drama are present, in concentrated and intensified form, in the local drama which is being played out in the Balkans.

I propose firstly to take the case of Yugoslavia, for it is in that country that the various factors mentioned above are most clearly in evidence. In Yugoslavia the fight against the Axis Powers and their satellites is at once the fiercest, the most widely spread and the best organized. In Serbia, for instance, there is the epic fight of General Draga Mihailovitch and his "Chetniks" (guerrillas) against the occupying Powers and against the two "Quisling" régimes (that is, the Pavelitch government in Zagreb and the Neditch Government in Belgrade). General Mihailovitch is at the same time the leader of the organized military resistance in Serbia, and the representa-

tive, as War Minister, of the Yugoslav Government in London. He is the symbol of the national, *bourgeois* and peasant Serbian elements who, almost to a man, rose in revolt on the historic March 27, 1941, against the Svetkovitch-Marcovitch-Matchek government and the policy of accommodation with the Axis which that government, under the inspiration of Prince Paul, wish to pursue. His fight is the continuation of the March *coup d'état* and the war between Yugoslavia and the Axis which followed. Mihailovitch's fight is Yugoslav in principle, but mainly Serbian in physical fact. The "Chetnik" movement is the main body of resistance in Serbia. It extends also to Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and sometimes makes inroads into Croatia. But in these provinces, as also in Slovenia, there is, in addition, the resistance of the communist "Partisans." In Serbia proper, the "Partisans" have recently become weakened, and the situation there is mainly in the hands of the "Chetniks." But the "Partisan" movement is making itself felt in the other provinces in question, and more especially in Croatia.

During the early months of this year there were difficulties in Serbia between the "Chetniks" and the "Partisans." In some cases the latter set up local village Soviets, which caused clashes between them and the local peasants and also brought them into collision with the "Chetniks." General Mihailovitch's attempts to secure some form of co-operation between the two guerrilla forces did not succeed. The "Partisans" preferred to carry on their struggle against the Axis on their own account. The situation became further complicated by the fact that Moscow, asked to help in bringing about a *modus vivendi*, did not reciprocate, ostensibly on the grounds that it had no control over communists in other countries. At the same time Moscow indulged in propaganda hostile to Mihailovitch.

One can only assume that the Soviets had been misinformed as to the extent of the "Partisan" movement in Serbia. But recently there have been improvements in the situation, inasmuch as the anti-Mihailovitch propaganda has become much less. It may perhaps be presumed that the Soviets, with their strong and understandable desire for a Second Front, will be no less alive than any other quarter to the benefits of united action against the common foe on the Third Front of the Balkans. The position has certainly been made delicate by the fact that Yugoslavia, Russia and Britain are allies; but the same fact should surely offer ways and means for finding a solution of this problem.

As regards the "Quisling" Government of General Neditch in Serbia, it is of very little account. The army and gendarmerie permitted it by the Occupying Powers do not amount to much, especially as members of these forces are continuously deserting and joining the patriot forces of Mihailovitch. It is also a significant fact that when the Germans offered to release Serbian officer prisoners of war on condition they would pledge themselves to fight for Neditch against Mihailovitch, out of several hundreds only fourteen could be found ready to avail themselves of the offer.

Except for the small Serbian Fascist group—a mere handful of political adventurers—and an equally small group of opportunist politicians and officials—the Neditch Government has no support amongst the Serbian people, the overwhelming majority of whom are for Mihailovitch, while some support the "Partisans." The Neditch Government itself is fully aware of this. Thus, when recently the Germans made proposals to Neditch, offering to convert Serbia from "occupied territory" into an "independent" state, along the lines of the so-called "Croatian Independent State," on condition that Serbia would join the Tripartite Pact and collaborate militarily with the Axis, the proposals were rejected. For the puppet government in Belgrade realized that, even if it wanted to agree to this proposal, it could not do so in the face of the opposition of the people.

I have not any whitewash to spare for General Neditch. He is at best a sort of Balkan "Pétain." His policy of accommodation with the invaders is contrary to the Serbian tradition of eternal resistance. And he will cut a sorry figure in Serbian history. Nevertheless it would not be fair to bracket him with the Croatian "Quisling" Pavelitch and must leave it at that. For there are degrees even in "Quislingism." Neditch had at least fought the invaders. He became a "collaborationist" in much the same way as Pétain had done; from pessimism, belief in the inevitability of German victory, and a mistaken, but according to his lights, honest conviction that he might by these means save his people from further horrors. Pavelitch, on the other hand, had been a hireling of the Axis Powers, a Fifth Columnist; he had organized the murder of King Alexander at Marseilles; and when he entered Croatia and set up his puppet government in Zagreb at the time of the Yugoslav collapse, he was on Mussolini's pay roll. Pavelitch is a positive collaborationist, Neditch only a negative one.

In Croatia the situation differs considerably from that in Serbia. Whereas in Serbia the main patriotic resistance comes from the *bourgeois* and peasant elements, in Croatia it comes mainly from the Left-wing elements. Hence it is the Croatian "Partisans" (communist guerrillas) who are putting up the most active resistance to Pavelitch and his Axis masters. The Croatian "Partisans" regard the Germans and Italians as enemies in a double sense—that is, as the national enemies of their country and the ideological enemies of their political creed.

This is not to say that there is not resistance on the part of the *bourgeoisie* and peasantry. There is. But it is understandable that the main effort should come from the Left, because the bulk of the *bourgeoisie* is either supporting Pavelitch or inactive one way or the other; and the peasants, although they are opposed to the Pavelitch régime, are without a definite lead. Dr. Matchek, the leader of the one-time Croat Peasant Party, is still regarded by the mass of the Croatian peasantry as their leader. He has refused several offers to collaborate with the Pavelitch government. The Germans have tried both persuasion and intimidation without effect. And he is said

to have declined to take any active part in Croatian political life so long as Axis soldiers remain in occupation of his country. On the other hand, it cannot be said that he is the leader of any positive movement of resistance. Thus a state of affairs obtains which is not conducive to widespread and organized peasant revolt.

The hard core of Croatian support of Pavelitch is to be found amongst the "Ustachi," the Croatian equivalent of the Nazi storm troopers, a gang of armed desperadoes, some of them nationalist fanatics, others professional gunmen and criminals. The majority of the Croatian people detest the "Ustachi." Nevertheless I am afraid that one of the unpleasant realities to be faced is the fact that a certain proportion of the *bourgeoisie* in Croatia has become impregnated with the Fascist idea, and that with this idea is associated a nationalist hatred of the Serbs. Thus nationalism and ideology meet and the result is a more widespread support of the present régime in Zagreb than is generally supposed to be the case. Pavelitch's supporters are a minority, but a not inconsiderable one.

There are of course internal stresses and strains. These include rivalry between the Germans and Italians, and between the various groups of Croat politicians. Right-wing *bourgeois*, industrialist and intellectual elements who, before the breakup of Yugoslavia, supported the Raditch and Matchek movements for Croatian autonomy, have no love lost for the radical "Ustachi." Their attitude is probably much the same as that of the Conservative circles in Germany who dislike the more radical Nazis. But many of these people would probably support the present Croatian régime provided somebody more respectable than Pavelitch were at its head. Their view might perhaps be summed up as "the present Croatia, but without Pavelitch."

Amongst the diverse elements in Croatia supporting the Pavelitch régime are: the "Ustachi"; certain right-wing ex-members of the "Zastita," (the para-military organization of the one-time Croat Peasant Party); and the remnants of the "Frankovtsi," the one-time Austrophils who became pro-Nazi. There are both Germanophil and Italophil sections of opinion. Pavelitch was originally in Mussolini's employ and is still considered to be Italy's man. But although the Italians are officially in occupation of Croatia, the real power is steadily passing into the hands of the Germans. Many of the older generation of Germanophils are really Austrophils at heart. They still cleave to the old "*Kaiserliche und Koenigliche*" tradition. But the Habsburgs have been outlawed by Hitler. There is no longer an Austria. But there is a Germany—a Greater Germany. That, in a nutshell, is the situation.

It was because the Germans realized that these internal disagreements were a source of weakness in the work of consolidating the Croatian puppet state, that recently they demanded of Pavelitch that he should sacrifice the more Radical "Ustachi" members of his administration in order to gain the support of the one-time Right-wing nationalists. This is how a

certain proportion of the Right-wing members of the "Zastita" came to reinforce the "Ustachi." And it provides also the real reason for the dismissal by Pavelitch of the two Kvaterniks, father and son. The younger Kvaternik had been associated with Pavelitch in the murder of King Alexander, was a violent pro-Nazi, and, as Police Chief, responsible for organizing the mass murders of the Serbs and Jews in Croatia. The elder Kvaternik, "Marshal" of the Croatian Army, was an old Austrophil who had become a pro-Nazi. Their sacrifice by Pavelitch was a sort of bloodless parallel with Hitler's action when he sacrificed Roehm and other Radical S.A. leaders at the instance of the *Reichswehr* chiefs.

The "consolidation" thus brought about by Pavelitch, at the instance of his German masters proved to be the prelude—a sort of preliminary closing of the ranks—to a new drive against the Serbs in Croatia. There are (or, rather, were) some 2,500,000 such Serbs. The word had gone forth that they must be exterminated. The deliberate encouragement by the Germans of this violent anti-Serbian feeling in Croatia is, of course, but another facet of Hitler's policy of "divide and rule." At the same time that Hitler whips up anti-Serbian feeling amongst the Croats, and dangles before their eyes the prospects of obtaining yet further territory from Serbia, he makes projects to the Serbs at the expense of the Croats. His aim is to sow the seeds of dissention between Serbs and Croats in the hope of preventing the two coming together in united action against the Axis invaders.

To such lengths did the murder campaign against the Serbs go during the closing months of 1942 that Dr. Krnjevitich, the Croat Vice-Premier of the Yugoslav Government in London, broadcast from the B.B.C. to the Croats condemning in the strongest terms—and on both Croatian and Catholic grounds—the fratricidal war against the Serbs. Dr. Krnjevitich was for many years an ardent Croatian nationalist. His broadcast should therefore have a considerable effect for good. For the Croats now have been given a definite line on this matter by an authoritative Croatian political personality.

In Slovenia the situation is different again. In the first place, Slovenia is divided up between Germany and Italy. It is not "occupied" territory like Serbia, or a "puppet" state like Croatia. It is "annexed" territory. In Slovenia opposition to the Axis comes both from the communists and the Catholics. The Catholic Church and the Slovene national idea have ever been closely associated. Hence in Slovenia the Germans have gone to every length to try and obliterate the Catholic culture and exterminate the Catholic clergy.

The various alignments both on the pro-Fascist and on the anti-Fascist sides, described above, make it clear that after the war there will be a situation in Yugoslavia very different from that which obtained before the war. The descent of the Nazi avalanche upon the Balkans has destroyed much that cannot be rebuilt as it once was. Hitler has been unable to construct anything real in its place. For Nazidom is essentially nihilistic. It cannot build. But it can effectively destroy. In the course of this destruction many

illusions have been dispelled and many realities discovered. And it will have to be upon the basis of these realities, and not just an artificial return to the *status quo ante bellum* that the work of post war reconstruction in these parts will have to be carried out.

For there is no reason why the party and sectional ideas which obtained before the breakup of Yugoslavia should be the basis of the political thought of the country after its reconstruction. A new situation will call for new ideas.

Such a solution would surely best be found along the lines of a Yugoslav federation within the framework of a wider Balkan federation. In such a Yugoslav federation the various sections—Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian—would all be autonomous. In the case of Serbia, there would have to be a reuniting of the "Serbian Lands," including Montenegro, and the purely Serbian parts of the present "Croatian Independent State," such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia should be composed of Croatian territory. Slovenia must be reunited and it should have added to it those Slovenian territories which were given to Italy and Austria respectively after the last war. It is to be hoped that by some such means as these it will be possible to build up a true Yugoslav democracy and eliminate the destructive effects of the Fascist virus. But of course any such solution of the Yugoslav problem—and especially any such Yugoslav solution within the larger Balkan framework—would presuppose an agreement on general lines between London and Moscow.

A strong and united and democratic Yugoslavia would be the best guarantee against further attempts on the part of predatory Great Powers to pursue again a policy of expansion and disruption in South Eastern Europe. It would also be in the interests of Britain, because Britain is and will continue to be a Mediterranean Power.

The other Danubian countries are also being influenced by the repercussions of the general war situation upon the local situation. Thus, in the case of Hungary, there are now discernible for the first time two points of view as to the likely outcome of the war. The first flush of complete faith in an Axis victory has now given place to second thoughts that perhaps after all the United Nations might win the war. The present Hungarian régime, with its Imperialistic ambitions, is, of course, dependent upon an Axis victory. At the same time, whilst continuing to hope for a Hitlerian triumph such as would enable Hungary not only to keep her present territorial gains but also to obtain a further share in the loot, Horthy and the men around him are also beginning to think in terms of a policy of re-insurance in case of an Allied victory.

Thus Hungary endeavours to avoid sending too many troops to the Russian front. She wants to keep as big an army as possible intact for after the war. For she believes that while the British, Americans and Russians will be mainly occupied with the major problems of how to deal with Germany and Japan

after the cessation of hostilities, they might not perhaps have the energy to take so much notice of the minor problems of the Danube and the Balkans. In the view of Hungary's present rulers, it might be possible for Hungary to make a *fait accompli* in the form of hanging on to at least some of her ill-gotten gains, which she obtained with Germany's assistance. For this purpose she will need an army, and so she does not want all her soldiers to end in the "Russian graveyard."

The Germans, of course, are fully aware of this and are constantly pressing Hungary for a greater military contribution. Germany is also scheming to bring about the internal Nazification of Hungary, in order to extract this greater military contribution and also to be better able to exploit the country politically and economically. These are the real reasons behind Germany's present intrigue to secure one of her own nominees for the succession to the Regentship in the event of the death of Admiral Horthy. The Nazis are backing Count Esterhazy. Arch-Duke Albrecht of Habsburg is a second string. Internally the Nazis count on the support of the Hungarian Nazis and also of the group led by Bela Imredy (whose Jewish antecedents do not seem to be an obstacle). These two groups are opposed to each other as rivals. But they are both pro-Nazi.

Admiral Horthy and the big land-owning nobility are opposed to these German schemes. They are willing enough to be Hitler's allies, with a view to obtaining German backing for their own territorial ambitions. But they have no wish to submit to internal Nazification. For one thing, it would subordinate Hungarian interests to German interests, instead of making use of German backing for Hungarian interests. For another, it would probably lead to some kind of land reform—for the Hungarian Nazis have made much of their intention to break up the big estates, and this would not suit the book of the big landed interests supporting Horthy. Lastly, it would prevent Hungary playing the card of "Hungarian liberalism"—that facade of democracy which the Horthy régime still keeps up—to placate the British and the Americans in the event of an Allied victory. Hence, the present régime is supporting the candidature of Horthy's son. Ribbentrop and von Papen are moving heaven and earth to prevent his adoption.

Hungary, whose record in the part of Yugoslavia she has occupied, lacks for nothing in savagery, even by Nazi and German standards, has been trying to explain away her brutalities by attributing them to undisciplined action on the part of local administrators. But there is ample evidence that the atrocities committed by the Hungarians in Yugoslavia have been as much part of a definite policy of Magyarization as the German atrocities have been part of a definite policy of Germanization.

Hungary also hopes to obtain the whole of Transylvania from Roumania. This is why the Roumanian Dictator, General Antonescu, has recently been trying to retain at least a few troops at home. He wants to defend what is left to Roumania of Transylvania, and he also cherishes the hope of one day

recovering the part already lost to Hungary. But Antonescu has been less fortunate than Horthy in his dealings with Hitler. He has been compelled to send practically every soldier he possesses to the Russian front, and his prospects of defending the Roumanian part of Transylvania, let alone recovering the other part from Hungary, are meagre in the extreme. Hitler has practically squeezed Antonescu dry. The Roumanian "Quisling" has nothing more to offering or to bargain with, and Hitler invariably loses interest in those who can no longer be of use to him. Sometimes Antonescu makes feeble attempts to regain hold on his own people by resisting Nazi demands. But whenever he does this Germans soon put him in his place by reminding him that they can always use the Iron Guard against him. Already they are disregarding him in many ways, and ostentatiously showing favour to the younger Antonescu, Michael.

Bulgaria, of all the "Quisling" States in the Balkans, has so far been able to pay the smallest price for territorial gains obtained by grace of Hitler. King Boris has avoided sending troops to the Russian front on the plea that this would lead to a popular revolt on the part of a Russophil population. Actually, it would not lead to any such revolt. It is true that there is a traditionally Russophil sentiment amongst the Bulgarian people. But it is nothing like so strong as the outside world has been led to believe. Certainly not strong enough to cause a revolution should the King, the Government and the General Staff decide to march against Russia. Boris's real reasons are quite different. They have something in common with Horthy's disinclination to increase the number of Hungarian divisions on the Russian front. Boris wants to keep a substantial Bulgarian army intact for after the war, when the Bulgarians hope that they might perhaps be able to retain some of the ill-gotten territorial gains they have made during the war, with Germany's help, at the expense of Greece and Yugoslavia. Hence, the Bulgarians are employing their army for the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia, and the fact that this releases German divisions for the Russian front is regarded in Sofia as Bulgaria's contribution to the German war effort.

The Bulgarians have indulged in less actual atrocities in Yugoslavia and Greece than they did in the last war. This is not because they have since become more civilized. It is merely a policy of re-insurance in case the United Nations should win. Their main method of Bulgarization has been the expulsion of Greek and Yugoslav populations. They have not indulged in mass executions on the same scale as the Germans and Hungarians have done. But they have not been lacking in brutality on a smaller scale, especially in Macedonia, where runs the writ of Mihailov, the chief of the Terrorist I.M.R.O. Mihailov, by the way, is a frequent visitor to Zagreb, where he counsels Pavelitch, in the capacity of an old assassin giving advice to a younger one.

The rôle of Italy in the Balkans is a complicated one. On the whole Italian rule has been less harsh than that of Germany. The Italians, with an eye to

the possibility of a German defeat, try, from time to time, to create the impression that they "are not so bad as the Germans." They also have the additional motive of rivalry with Germans in the Balkans. There is no need, however, to sentimentalize over the Italians. The best that can be said is that they are kindly and brutal in spasms, whereas the Germans are continuously brutal.

In conclusion: any subjective survey of the situation in South Eastern Europe brings one back to the postulate I made at the beginning of this article: that is, that in these parts there is to be found in its most acute form the dual nature of this war—the association of the ideological and the national in the battle. Thus Bulgarian nationalism is associated with a form of Fascism. Hungarian nationalism and Imperialism are associated both with Fascism and with Feudalism. Croatian nationalism, in the more extreme forms exemplified by the Pavelitch régime, is a mixture of Nazi-Fascism, Croatian Separatism, and a one-time (and still, in some cases, nostalgic) "Austrianism" which at present finds its place in pro-Germanism.

Opposed to these forces are the Democratic Serbian *Bourgeoisie* and peasantry; the Croatian Left-Wing elements; both the Catholic and communist elements in Slovenia; the mass of the Greeks; what is left of the sounder elements in Roumania. Similar elements may perhaps be found amongst the Bulgarian Agrarians and communists, but these elements are not sufficiently strong or numerous to be of much account, and can hardly be included in any list of the Balkan groups working effectively on our side. To this list may be added the elements in Albania which continue to resist the Italians.

It will be the task of the United Nations and the Balkan peoples themselves after the war, to rally all the national and ideological elements which have resisted the invaders and their puppets, in the task of sinking their differences and co-operating in the building up of a league of free Balkan peoples, composed of individually free units, but all putting something into a common pool. By these means it should be possible to realize at long last the old Gladstonian ideal of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples."

LEADERSHIP FOR YOUTH

BY LORD ABERDARE

THE failure of our age is a failure to create a team spirit internationally and to build a community of nations with a democratic ideal and a democratic technique.

But before one can speak in terms of international affairs one must be quite certain that our national life is a satisfactory one. Our international relationships must be founded on the relationships which exist within our own society and to talk of international democracy implies that we understand something of domestic democracy and the spirit of community which is at once its foundation and its flower.

The efforts required to create in this country as a whole the team spirit necessary for the winning of the war—a spirit which was slow in emerging—are an indication that our shortcomings have been marked ones. If we are to preserve and enlarge the sense of co-operation which we are only now achieving we must be clear as to the reasons for our failure and we must be determined to apply the remedy.

Our failure appears to have been an educational one. The success of any community is to some extent dependent on the quality of leadership which it receives and an educational scheme which is silent on the whole idea of leadership cannot be expected to understand its qualities and far less to educate leaders.

As a nation we have not been without leaders but their proportion has been small and their appearance the result rather of emergency situations and an education privileged environmentally, if not instructionally, which has enabled them to actualize the potentialities inherent in their characters. The first failure of our national scheme of education—and one must call it a scheme rather than a system since it is the least systematic programme in our national policy—has been its inability to recognize that the number of leaders required in a real community must be legion; the second—which is the result of the first—its lack of interest in the training of leaders.

In a team every individual is to some extent a leader. In so far as he realizes that the team is only so strong as its weakest member he knows that even if he has to obey for a great part of the time he will have to lead at other moments if not in words at least in action.

For many years past education has been taking more and more account of the needs of the very young child and for this the credit due to educationists is great. But many have failed to realize that an extension of educational facilities for young children is inadequate without a corresponding expansion

at the other end of the scale. To-day education has the aid of the psychologist and even we who are parents are able to bring up our children according to the dictates of the experts. But one thing which must have occurred to the average parent time and again would seem to have escaped the educationist. Watching one's own children grow one is struck by the fact that in adolescence many of the problems of childhood recur and the adolescent is faced again with many of the problems of adjustment which beset him in his earlier years—problems with which education is intended to help him. If this is true then the cutting short of a child's school life at the age of 14 is as unfortunate as if he were to have no schooling at all. The psychologist tells us that the school provides among other things the background of security which is essential for full development and yet for the average child this background of security is removed at a time when development is not only incomplete but is entering on what is probably its most important phase.

The adolescent of 14 is as dangerously self-centred as the very young child and the reasons for this are obvious. The sudden break from school life and the onset of the wage-earning period leave the adolescent floundering in a sea of adult values of which he has no understanding but to which he is expected to conform. His immediate reaction is one of withdrawal into himself. The very young child is self-contained and it is the function of education to turn his interest outwards to the people and things around him. The educational scheme has trained the boy in certain essential skills which will help him to earn a living—it has trained his senses to become an efficient mechanism for furnishing him with the material for the experience of the beautiful but it has failed completely to teach him that the essence of all beauty lies in sharing and he is denied the happiness which is derived from the beauty of sharing. Education has betrayed those entrusted to it.

About the middle of the nineteenth century men with a sense of social responsibility became deeply concerned about the spiritual, mental and physical welfare of working boys. It was abundantly clear to them that "for the average boy the one possible club was the street gang and the one practical continuation school the street corner—and both of these were well attended." They realized the street corner was not a place of choice but a place of necessity and an alternative had to be found. Working on the thesis that the gang is a natural social unit they saw that their aim must be to direct the spirit of the gang towards a constructive and socially useful end. And so they used the gang spirit to build up the Boys' Club where they saw that the gang spirit, because it was expressed instead of being repressed, could become a social force of the first importance. And thus from a negative beginning they moved to an essentially positive and constructive policy.

Many of us forget that adjustment is a process, which means among other things that it consists in a series of events and also that it takes time. Our forgetfulness of this fact was responsible for most of the difficulties concerned with evacuation. We expected children and adults to adjust themselves to

new persons and new conditions almost in moments. Had we arranged for a graded approach to new people and new circumstances our problems would have been simple and our returning evacuees fewer. The sponsors of the Boys' Club Movement were alive to this difficulty. It was one of the realizations that made the need for their work even more urgent. As they saw it, the boy leaving school must have the opportunity for adjusting himself to a new set of standards and for acquiring his own values and he must have also the opportunity for adjusting himself to adults. It is unfair to expect a boy to live according to standards of which he has little knowledge and no understanding. Any adult who is translated from one sphere of activity to another realizes the adjustments which are necessary even if the change is an internal one from district to district within his native country. Speech is different, customs and traditions vary, and standards are of different levels. The change is much more ruthless if he moves from one society with its distinctive pattern of living to another society with an equally distinct culture.

The adolescent's change from the world of childhood to the world of adulthood is even more ruthless because in addition to changes of standards, speech and customs he has removed from him that sense of security with which the school has provided him and it is replaced by an actual fear of insecurity resulting from his realizing for probably the first time the urgency of his economic situation.

If he is to learn a correct technique of living in harmony with others—if he is to learn membership of a community and fit himself for citizenship—a background of security is needed because such a background is necessary for all learning and for all right development. The Boys' Club aimed at providing this by giving the boy a place where he belonged—an anchorage to which he could return to recover from the storms and stresses of the daily voyage into seas of human relationships on which he was forced to embark before he could yet control his craft. The technique of the club was a technique of friendship. Men from every walk in life—from the universities, from the workshops, from the offices and the public schools—sacrificed leisure and personal interests to throw themselves into a work which had captured both their imagination and their reason—their imagination because it gave them an ideal and their reason because they saw a job which needed doing was being done supremely well.

These people provided one of the essential constituents of the Club—they were the leaders in the sense that they were understanding adults prepared to remain in the background and against whom the boy could learn to adjust himself to adults in general. If one considers that the average 14 year-old boy has an experience of adults limited to his parents and to his school teachers the importance of the Leader and his helpers in the Club can be estimated. A man of background and culture himself, the leader can bring into the Club men of all types where the boy meets them under ideal conditions night after night. All our attitudes to life are developed through persons—we achieve

our standards and our sentiments in this way. It is the interaction of personality upon personality that helps us build our attitudes to persons, things and conditions in our environment.

To the young person community as a whole is something abstract and therefore outside his comprehension. He tends to live his life in small concrete groups of which an essential part is the helpful and understanding adult. The club provided such a group and the requisite personnel.

For many years Clubs continued their work in the towns and villages of this country realizing more and more that their function was becoming a positive one and that their task was largely educational. They felt their objective should be to safeguard the boy's welfare and to train him as an individual, a worker and as a member of the community. This meant he had to be trained in individual responsibility, he had to be encouraged to undertake further vocational study possibly by attendance at evening institutes, and his leisure had to be provided for. If the Club were to fulfil its obligations to the boy he had to be taught to realize the value of his citizenship and to fit himself for his responsibilities.

In a democracy the finest equipment for citizenship is the understanding heart which brings with it the ability to recognize and respect the point of view of others. It brings with it too that breadth of mind, that generosity of interpretation which makes for happiness in the group or community.

We are fighting a war to-day because of our inability to acquire correct human relationships. The smaller the world becomes the more urgent our problem appears and it is evident that unless we can learn to live together in the fullest sense of the term we can never build the peace we plan.

The Club helped the boy to acquire correct personal relationships and the reason for its success is clear. It succeeded because it followed a logical process of development. It took account of the boy's situation and helped him to achieve an ambition. It started with the boy where he was and led him whither he wanted to go. We so often forget that growth is a normal upward process and that unless we start by planting roots we can never hope to see fruit. Our tendency to-day is to manufacture an artificial fruit, place it on view and expect it in some miraculous way to develop roots. In other words we are in danger of imposing ideals on the youth of our country and expecting them to produce the roots which will make the ideal a lasting force for good. It's a cross between a get-rich-quick policy and a policy of mass production.

During the war of 1914-18 the need for a national body to co-ordinate the vast amount of work which was being done with boys up and down the country was urgently felt. It was not however until 1924 that as the result of the efforts of the stalwarts a National Association of Boys' Clubs was formed. From this time the Club Movement developed rapidly till to-day, even after blitzing and the calling-up of thousands of club boys, 2,000 Clubs in this country are working with 200,000 boys mostly of the 14-18 age group.

And now at last the plea which the Club Movement has been making for years seems likely to be heard. No group of persons in the country has been more vociferous in demanding the raising of the school-leaving age than the men of the Club Movement who have known the working-boy so intimately over a long period of years. The interest in education which this war like every other war has created makes it appear possible that this step will be taken. But periods of reaction are always periods of danger and the support of every man and woman in the country will be needed to guarantee the speedy implementation of promises made when the inevitable reaction comes after the war is won. The State has admitted its responsibility to adolescence as a whole and its Service of Youth policy is its attempt to fulfil its newly recognized obligations.

The Government's policy in this connection, however, raises two main questions, the first of which is whether the welfare of adolescents is a field in which the State shall have complete control. This question can of course best be answered in the light of what has already been accomplished by the voluntary agencies. These organizations with their accumulation of knowledge and their years of practical experience are in a position which is uniquely authoritative. Even with all the help which the voluntary agencies so gladly give it will be a very long time before the statutory bodies are in a position to do more than experimental work and this on a basis which must for many different reasons be largely one of trial and error.

Were the Welfare of Youth to become the province of the statutory bodies at the cost of destroying the voluntary organizations a valuable factor in our national life would be lost. Each of these organizations has its appeal to a section of our adolescent population. If life is to be made stimulating for a boy—if that spirit of adventure is to be infused into the boy—if he is to be encouraged to 'live dangerously'—if he is to learn what democracy really means—then the richest possible variety is essential. The whole art of democracy consists in the integration of varieties without loss of efficiency to the whole. The joy of democracy surely lies in the fact that the members of a democratic society can live in their own congeniality groups and yet form an integrated whole. At all costs we must avoid uniformity of pattern. Uniformity and lack of variety are two of the causes of much of the frustration we experience. The good teacher constantly seeks new methods of presentation because novelty and originality are the best stimulants.

Of its very nature democracy demands that each person living within the democratic society shall be regarded as an individual human personality which implies that each shall have the fullest possible opportunity for developing his personal tastes and qualities. The dominating parent and the dominating teacher are very real dangers to the child. It would be regrettable were the State to become the dominating factor in the life of the adolescent. Domination is a sin against democracy and our aim must be unity without uniformity.

The second main question which is in the minds of many to-day is that of

compulsion. The feeling is abroad and the hope has been expressed that after the war some form of compulsory membership of a youth organization will be demanded of every boy and girl. The tragedy of such a happening would be incalculable. When compulsion enters training value ceases. The compulsion entailed in State education is compulsion aimed at the parent not at the child. To introduce compulsion is to destroy such things as training in evaluation, training in the making of balanced judgments as well as training in the realm of critical and constructive thinking.

There is a danger too in that compulsion would lead to a state of affairs in which organization would be the supreme end, and that a boy would be expected to adapt himself to an organization instead of the organization being fluid enough to fit the boy. One of the most valuable factors in the principle of voluntary membership of an organization is that it encourages experiment on the part of the boy. He has no fear of failure because he knows when he tries an experiment that if he fails he will receive understanding and help and not destructive criticism. But much more important than that is the fact that he knows that he can leave the organization of which he is a voluntary member at any moment he wishes. It is the knowledge that they are tied for life to a given set of conditions and a given circle of persons that makes so many people to-day afraid to experiment in their lives because they know that should they fail and although the effects of their failure be of intolerable embarrassment they will have to face up to them without hope of release.

A truly great future lies before the Youth of Britain if a real co-operation can be achieved between the agencies, statutory and voluntary, which are concerned with Youth Welfare. The old principle *nemo dat quod non habet* is essentially applicable in this connection. If we cannot build a real team spirit among the various bodies dedicated to the Service of Youth then we can never hope to achieve a team spirit in our young people or in our community. One has to train for membership of the team and our youth is the period of our training. To-day the young people of the country are asking for opportunity to train—we have got to see to it that the fullest opportunity is given them and that the plan we offer them and the programme of training is rich and luscious.

At all costs we must fit the youth of our society to take their place in that international democracy which we seek to establish. We can only do this by broadening youth's sympathies and widening its interests and thus helping it to acquire the understanding heart which real community demands.

We must ensure that the Youth of Britain has the chance which is the right of every boy and girl the world over but which unfortunately is denied to so many boys and girls in the Europe of to-day—the chance to be men and women.

COASTAL TRADE AND FLOTILLA WARFARE

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE coastal trade of a nation with a long seaboard is always an element of high economic interest. In peace it performs a part of the service of the distributive system of the country, the other parts being those inland transport systems of the railways, the roads, the rivers and the canals. In the present war the use of the coastal routes has become of exceptionally high importance to the enemy. The heavy troop movements in vassal Europe, the carriage of supplies to the armies in the occupied and invaded countries, have placed a severe strain upon all the inland means of transport; and that strain has been increased by the deterioration in the rolling stock and permanent ways from want of repairs, and from the damage done to railway centres, docks of the inland water system, and other parts of the transport facilities by bombing from the air. The use of the coastal routes to supply the land, sea and air forces that are dispersed throughout the North and West of France, in Holland and in the Baltic is therefore of considerable importance. The transport of the bulky goods such as fuel for the vessels and aircraft operating in the Channel and from the Biscay ports can only be effected adequately and economically by ship-borne means; while the maintenance of the German army, air and sea forces in northern Norway, essential as it is to the Axis for interrupting the supplies sent by the Allies to North Russia, depends to a very high extent, if not indeed entirely, on the safety of the coastal route.

The function of sea power is to control the sea routes. These coastal routes are the branch lines of a sea transport system of which the ocean routes are the trunk lines. They are secondary only in importance to them; but the word "secondary" must not be interpreted in the sense of "unimportant." The interruption of these lines of communication is capable of producing results of primary importance. An illustration from the past deserves attention in the British operations against the coastal traffic of France in the old wars. A French naval historian some years ago pointed out how seriously France was affected by the British flotilla attacks on her coastal trade.* This "cabotage" he said not only provided a relief needed because of the insufficiency of the land transport—the difficulty now being experienced by the Germans and let us hope soon to be experienced by the Italians also:—it was by its means that the naval ports and their dockyards were supplied with their needs in munitions, in the bulky raw materials of

ship building and ship repair such as timber, spars, metals of all kinds and their ores, hemp and salt provisions, part of which reached them from the Baltic and Norway, part from Spain and the interior of France by way of the Loire and the Garonne. "It was it alone [the cabotage] which enabled Brest to maintain squadrons of great ships, and in consequence it played an important part in the maintenance of our naval Power: its suppression under the Empire had the effect of killing that port as a base of naval operations." Against this coastal trade the British flotillas of all types, from privateers to gun-brigs, cutters and the boats of the fleet, waged an incessant and relentless warfare, penetrating into the estuaries and cutting out vessels in the ports, ravaging the inshore routes where the larger ships of the line and frigates could not navigate with safety. They made the trade between Havre and Brest nearly impossible, hovering off the approaches of the river mouths and hunting out all the waters where the coasting vessels might be found. "The losses which this guerrilla warfare (*petite guerre*) inflicted on us, the inconveniences to our armed forces which resulted from it, were such that after 1778 it became necessary to find some remedy and to establish the security of the navigation between the ports." Convoys were therefore organized, and ships of war had to be diverted from other services to the defence of the coastal trade. But this, though it mitigated the evil, did not remove it altogether. There were always stragglers to be picked up by the "pitiless pillagers" who hung on the skirts of the convoys, and occasionally concentrated flotillas attacked the convoys as well. Attempts to evade these unwelcome attentions by following routes further out to sea, and thus removed from the narrow channels where the small craft were so effective, were frustrated by the presence of larger vessels and more powerful formations.

All of this is being repeated to-day. The same process is at work with the modern instruments of sea warfare—the small surface flotilla craft of the destroyer and torpedo boat types, the motor gun- and torpedo-boats, the submarines, the bomb and torpedo carrying aircraft and the minelayers, surface and aerial. Few weeks pass in which we do not hear that the aircraft of the Coastal Command have entered a Norwegian fjord and set on fire or sunk a supply ship or attacked vessels creeping along the coasts of Norway, Holland or Belgium: or that a force of motor boats has attacked a convoy somewhere between the Texel and Brest and sunk or damaged one or more munition or supply ships bound to the occupied ports, or attacked enemy motor torpedo boats employed in the attack of our own convoys, or minesweepers endeavouring to remove the mines laid by our minelayers. Thus, during the thirteen weeks of the August-October quarter no less than fifteen engagements were reported, and it may be assumed with safety that these are not all that took place*

* *Revue Maritime*, June, 1922, pp. 759 et seq.

* Of these thirteen, ten were made by motor gun- and torpedo-boats, two by submarines and three by aircraft of the Coastal Command. In addition 10,000 mines were laid by aircraft.

In these operations small surface craft are under the command of officers of both the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. It is in such work as this that the latter force can play a most important and valuable part and it is most deeply to be desired that this will be borne in mind when the time comes to organize the naval defence of the Empire after the war, and to provide means whereby to develop and employ all the natural talent of the young men in civil life who need no more than encouragement and training in peace to fit themselves to become an invaluable Reserve in war. This is a matter that has been most seriously neglected in recent years. No attempt was made, for instance, until the last few months to provide any training for the young men at the many Universities, men of the most intelligent type and capable of learning the rudiments of naval work quicker than any others in the country. The performances of the young R.N.V.R. officers have shown their capacity, just as the American Universities in the last war provided a handsome and efficient reserve to the destroyer flotillas which came over to operate in the Western Approaches and at Gibraltar.

This however is not all. The work done in the coastal warfare is essentially the work of sea power: for the function of sea power is the control of the sea. Its naval character, and the need for unity of direction, are recognized in the fact that all the vessels and craft engaged in it operate under the direction of the Navy, including the aircraft of the Coastal Command; as those other aircraft of the Coastal Command engaged in the operations in the Western Approaches and the Bay were transferred to the naval command after some months in the early part of the war. Though this compromise has been adopted, and though it may be made to work with some degree of success during the present war, it is a system that is illogical and wrong in principle. Unity of command is a fundamental principle and unity in administration is no less fundamental. The preparations which have to be made in peace cover a wide area from the material best adapted to a particular service to the personnel trained to its use; and by no means least the building up of knowledge in co-operation of all the arms employed. A common outlook, a common strategical and tactical doctrine, are essential if that full efficiency that we are entitled to expect in our fighting services is to be attained. It is no exaggeration to say that, if the work of the various arms employed in the operations of the attack and defence of communications at sea are unco-ordinated the results will fall very far short of the possibilities of the weapons. So it was in the early days of the war when the waste of effort owing to lack of co-ordination of the air and sea forces in the Western Approaches was extreme. From this it follows that all the coastal work now carried out by the separate organizations—the Navy and the Air Force—should in future be carried out by one only.

This principle of unity extends beyond the branch lines of the coastal trade of the outer Empire. The coastwise traffic of Australia, South Africa and

India are integral and important parts of the distributive systems of those Dominions. The responsibility for the organization and the control of all the traffic routes, the methods by which they are to be defended, the needs of the fighting forces appropriate to those methods, must rest with one authority. It cannot be vested in two with the smallest expectation of efficiency or economy. Though it is certain that a growing volume of traffic, in particular passenger traffic and the carriage of light goods, will be carried in the future in the air, and that every possible effort should be made to foster that form of transport, as the shipping in the past was wisely fostered for five centuries by our more far-seeing ancestors, the needs of the country in the bulky raw materials of our food and industry—wheat and cereals, fuel oils, coal, timber, wool, cotton, machinery and heavy manufactured goods—must continue to be carried in surface travelling merchantmen; and troops, in the large numbers needed for major campaigns, and their munitions and transport and mechanical fighting instruments will, for many years to come, move in ships on the surface. The methods by which shipping is protected are well known: cruising and convoy. Which of these, or what combination of these, is the more appropriate, and what forms of fighting force, or what combinations of different types of sea fighting units, are to be used in putting those methods into use, have to be determined. They will vary, as they always have varied throughout the ages. It is only by vesting the responsibility for the preparation of the defence and the calculation of the resulting needs in one authority, that any system of efficient defence can be established. That authority must possess the powers to decide the types of vessels of all kinds and their armaments and the numbers needed; it must distribute and train the forces. It is as indispensable for the efficiency of a system of trade defence that the air components shall be an integral part of the navy as the submarines, the motor boats and the other types of fighting craft at sea. Let anyone, for example, read how Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby described the needs of a trade defence in 1888 in a speech to the Chambers of Commerce and the manner in which he reached his conclusions as to what those needs were, and it will be seen how totally impossible it would have been to define the needs of the service if certain of the elements—the second class cruisers for instance—had been outside the jurisdiction of the responsible authority.

We must move with the times. Archaic ideas which regard aircraft as something separate from the other types of naval craft must disappear. Sea Power must be interpreted in its true and traditional sense—the power to control the sea; not in the narrow material sense of a selection of the weapons engaged in the exercise of control. We have the lesson in its simplest form in the operations of defence of the coastal trade. Let our rulers take that lesson to heart and act upon it as soon as possible.

THE INITIATIVE PASSES

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

IN recent numbers of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* I suggested that both Germany and Japan had reached a point at which they would be forced to adopt a defensive strategy. So far it cannot be said that the Allies have opened offensive operations against Japan, though the counter-attacks delivered in the Solomons and New Guinea may, in addition to their defensive purpose, be taken as steps to secure bases for offensive action in the fullest sense. There can be no doubt, however, that November marked the beginning of the offensive against Germany—the passing of the initiative. Results achieved were extraordinarily encouraging, perhaps so much so that inevitable checks and delays in exploiting initial successes have led to a feeling of disappointment. It could not of course be expected that a power as strong and as competent as Germany would be thrown completely off her balance by initial reverses, however serious. She most obviously has not been knocked out in the first round, and there will certainly be many rounds to come. The incidents of the first round and their probable effect on the fighting in the next round is therefore all that need be considered at present.

To take the first incident—General Alexander's victory at El Alamein. There is a tendency to suggest that the damage it caused was not so great as at first believed. There is, however, I think, no reason to question the statistics or estimates given, though perhaps we were all inclined to forget the elusiveness of mechanized forces, and their ability to escape from the tightest corners if they are prepared, as Rommel was, to leave the rest of the Army in the lurch. How much material Rommel held in base depôts in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania could of course not be estimated with any accuracy, but no one who tried to take stock of his position could doubt that he would receive reinforcements of personnel by air, and that substantial replacements of material would reach him by sea, in spite of the utmost exertions of the Navy and R.A.F. The extent of Rommel's defeat is best proved by his decision not to attempt to stand at Halfaya. That decision must have added to his losses of material and transport vehicles, and it involved the abandonment of the Cyrenaica airfields; although, apart from their immense permanent strategic value to the Allies, their retention even for a comparatively short period would have greatly facilitated the despatch of reinforcements from Italy or Crete.

General Alexander's pursuit was astonishingly rapid and well sustained, but it could not reasonably be expected that it would be continued indefinitely

without a pause; and it would have been the height of rashness to attempt an attack on the strong El Agheila position with advanced troops which had out-run supply services, and which must have been feeling the effects of their exertions both on men and material.

Naturally the longer the pause continued, and it was initially lengthened by bad weather, the stronger Rommel's position became, that in turn necessitated further delays to ensure that the attack, when delivered, should be at full strength. Furthermore if, as seemed quite probable, Rommel when seriously threatened declined decisive action and retreated to a position closer to his base in Tripolitania, it was of the first importance that the 8th Army should be in a condition to resume pursuit in force. On the whole there seems no reason to be disappointed at the progress of the pursuit, and the most surprising feature of the first round in Libya is the extent of the sacrifices Rommel was prepared to make in order to effect his immediate escape. Whether in the second round the sacrifices will be justified remains to be seen.

The allied landing in North Africa, followed by the early collapse of such resistance as the French offered, was so unexpected an event and one of such obvious strategic significance that it awakened exaggerated expectation of further immediate results, in turn to be followed by some disappointment at apparent delay in gathering the fruit of initial success. Yet here again there has been little reason for disappointment or criticism; and disappointment must be largely due to a widespread lack of appreciation of the problem of deploying a large army overseas with all the equipment and reserves of stores it requires for sustained operations. The difficulties of finding shipping for a large force, of convoying it on its voyage and of effecting an initial landing in the face of opposition, are probably fairly well understood, but the widespread demand for the opening of a second front in Europe showed a lack of appreciation of the further difficulties to be encountered, and of the time factor involved. In this case, since the sea service carried out its share of the undertaking to the admiration of all, and since the initial landing met with little opposition and for a short time only, expectation of rapid developments naturally ran high. Bizerta and Tunis were clearly the first prizes to be secured, but was the problem of taking them generally understood? It must have been obvious that they could not be taken by a landing operation. Our experiences in Norway and the experiences of Malta convoys in the Sicilian Channel gave sufficient proof of that, even if no opposition from shore defences was to be expected. A race for the ports was therefore inevitable and the Allies were heavily handicapped. It was a comparatively easy matter for them to land and set in motion a small, lightly armed force of considerable mobility, but, even from the nearest port that could be used for disembarkation, long distances through mountainous country had to be traversed, with the enemy well placed to harass the march from the air. He had numerous

fully equipped air bases within easy range ready for immediate action. The Allies, on the other hand, were for a considerable time unable to give fighter protection. The initial landing had been covered by the Fleet Air Arm, but it could not be used to protect an advance eastwards, it was required to protect the long processes of disembarkation of the main bodies, the ports, the transports and the naval covering forces. For these tasks it was not only numerically inadequate, but obviously it was essential to relieve it as soon as possible for its more normal duties. Before that could be done the R.A.F. aircraft had to be disembarked in their crates, moved to aerodromes, assembled and their ground establishments and equipment brought into operation—a gradual process. Presumably the first units ready were required for the relief of the Fleet Air Arm and for the protection of the Army's base. By that time the advanced force had moved out of range of fighters at the base, and new aerodromes had to be equipped from which co-operation with the spearhead of the Army could be established and protection for the movements of the main bodies provided.

Meanwhile the advanced force had to march and fight under grave disadvantages and delays were inevitable, which not only meant losing the race but exposed the leading troops to counter-attack. The unavoidable delays in developing air power were perhaps the most serious handicap, but it must also be realized that the disembarkation of the main body with its masses of transport, base establishments and reserves of munitions and supplies of all sorts, was a laborious process. The discharge of ships even in the best equipped ports takes time, and all ships cannot discharge simultaneously for lack of berths. The enemy was immensely better placed for rapid initial deployment. He presumably had a considerable force immediately available which could quickly be reinforced; he had, or was able to secure at once, well-equipped airfields on both sides of the Sicilian Channel which enabled him to make full use of air transport; and for the short sea passage he could provide ample air protection and maintain a shuttle service of ships of all sizes. The Navy and Middle East airforce, operating especially from Malta, were able to take a heavy toll on such movements, but of course not on a prohibitive scale.

It is easy to see that under these circumstances the best that the Allies could hope to accomplish was to pen the enemy into a confined area pending the full development of their own strength. If that could be achieved the enemy would be faced by the risks of maintaining an army with a line of communications steadily becoming more precarious; and with the prospect of losing protection of short-range fighter aircraft, when the limited number of air bases they can operate effectively becomes subjected to intensified attack. Obviously if the position eventually became untenable evacuation of the army which has been committed might become impracticable with a resulting disaster of considerable magnitude.

By now the difficulties with which the Allies were faced, and the reasons for the apparently slow—some may have thought disappointing—development of their operations, must be fairly generally understood; but I have thought it justifiable to recapitulate some of the main factors in view of their bearing on the problem of opening a second front in Europe. There opposition to initial landing would certainly be much greater than it was in North Africa, and the chances of capturing well-equipped ports for the disembarkation of the main army at an early stage would be less. The enemy would be even better placed in the matter of air bases than he has been in Africa, and his line of communications more secure.

The difficulty of effecting the initial landing might be to some extent overcome in view of the short sea passage and the possibility of developing great numerical air superiority, but the problem of deploying the Army with all its essential stores and equipment before the enemy could concentrate his forces for a counter-stroke remains insoluble so long as he has the forces available to bring to the threatened point.

Meanwhile in Africa, though the process of deploying the Allies' main forces may be slow it cannot seriously be interrupted by counter-attack; and once air superiority can be established over the Sicilian Channel the enemy's forces in Africa, the disadvantages of being cooped into a confined space with precarious communications must tell against the enemy. He is, however, probably capable of prolonged resistance, and it would be unwise to expect anything else. The main immediate results achieved are that the Germans are faced with increased commitments, and that Italy's position can be made intolerable and her value to the Axis greatly diminished. But those who sanguinely expected the early re-opening of the Mediterranean route or immediate sensational victories are, I fear, likely to be disappointed.

Less was perhaps expected of the Russian offensive, and its remarkable initial success is perhaps too often regarded as a flash in the pan because progress has slowed down. Yet progress has been maintained despite the formidable nature of the German defences, their unsparing use of reserves in counter-attacks, and the difficulties of maintaining the striking power of advancing forces under winter conditions. That progress has been maintained is a wonderful proof of the offensive power of the Soviet Army which the Germans, perhaps misled by their own extravagant claims, apparently imagined they had finally broken. Hoth's army at Stalingrad is still in danger of annihilation, but elsewhere it can hardly be expected that in a winter campaign the Red Army will be able to break through German defences or recover much territory. That it will impose an immense strain on Germany's resources, deny her opportunities of recuperation and further undermine the morale of her troops, is as much as can reasonably be hoped.

ULYSSES, BOUND TO THE MAST

BY LORD DUNSANY

1

TURN landward! If I said a while ago
 "Heed not my orders," I was ignorant then.
 I had not heard this song, and could not know.
 I spoke at random. Heed me now, my men.
 Take out the wax I sealed your ears with when
 I played that jest on you, for 'twas no more.
 I brought you from the Cyclops' dreadful den.
 Turn landward: let us lie upon that shore
 While days like happy dreams drift by us evermore

2

You hear me, all! Why, I remember how
 You heard me when the winds of Aeolus
 Were up against us; and you hear me now.
 Unbind these chains, I say. More chains! Why thus
 Obey you thoughtless words, things frivolous
 I uttered when I knew not what their song,
 Nor that their golden words were all for us?
 The idle world has judged these singers wrong.
 Turn for the shore, my friends, where we will listen long.

3

It is not as we thought. How often we
 Have found things strange. How far from aught we planned
 Have been our ways upon the roaring sea,
 And what strange chances came in many a land.
 How often at the Thunderer's command
 Have we on isles undreamed by us been blown;
 How strange the lotus-eaters by the sand;
 How strange the Cyclops with one eye alone
 Sunk in his forehead. Now once more a shore unknown.

4

It is not as we thought. Turn landward, friends.
 The world has judged them wrong, in the world's way,
 Who sing to us. I tell you, to no ends
 Drift most men's lives: day follows empty day
 Down to the darkness, till as shades they stray
 As listlessly by Lethe: but the tune
 Of rivers running, and the whispering spray
 Of small waves falling underneath the moon,
 And all the blended notes of every bird of June,

5

And lovers' voices in the night alone,
 Not loud enough to scare the nightingale,
 And solitary cliffs of gleaming stone
 That watch the dawn above some sleeping vale,
 And peaks of mountains that no climbers scale,
 And solemn sunsets, such as doomed men see
 Holding lost ramparts where their foes prevail;
 And all lost things, whose lovely essence we
 See only as they go (Oh hark. But hark to me);

6

All these things, and the note of flutes afar
 Blown on the hills at evening unseen,
 And the first coming out of that sweet star
 That is the gentle light of Heaven's Queen;
 All lovely songs that long ago have been,
 Whose echoes our hearts keep when lost to air.
 Among old memories from far serene
 Midsummer evenings, all these have share
 In that immortal song that they are singing there.

7

But listen, for I know you hear my words.
 All these things that are blended thus, along
 With weary hopes of men, and notes of birds
 Happy and idle, and the solemn strong
 Thoughts of the mountains, and the mighty throng
 Of rocks and dreams with which the gods made earth,
 Are shaped into one purpose by this song.
 Down aimless paths that wander the world's girth,
 By passions blind as us guided, we strayed from birth.

8

But now, but now. Oh, hear me. I said chains,
 I know, but only jested. There's a goal!
 There's something to be done at last! Our gains
 Till now were mostly ruin; in the roll
 Of smoke that we saw suddenly control
 The towers of Troy we thought we saw some glory.
 Ten years we wrought for ruin, and the whole
 Of what we gained was smoke. As transitory
 Our names as it, unless saved by some singer's story.

9

All is clear now. All things, I say, are one.
 This song has gathered all things, and our days
 Are not an empty space between the sun
 And the eternal darkness, through which strays
 A chance-led wind-blown race down endless ways.
 This song has taught me we have part in all:
 Nothing is aimless; every bird that sways
 On branch unheeded, idly musical,
 Could guide us on our way if we would heed its call.

10

And that same message to us sings the sea,
 And the white cataract upon the steep,
 And winds that softly run from tree to tree
 At evening, and the mighty ones that sweep
 Down angrily when storm is on the deep,
 And the white spray that dances with our spars,
 And shapes that talk in unknown tongues through sleep.
 And sunsets have a sign for us, and stars,
 And strange things seen and lost amid the smoke of wars.

11

How can we gather all these things alone,
 Each for himself? It is a maze's plan.
 Of all the signs about us none are known.
 We cannot guess the message meant for man.
 We cannot choose a path to tread, nor can
 We know the end of any; but this song
 Tells all, and I would hear it through the span
 Of years that to my lot may yet belong.
 Oh, hear me, hear me, men. You do me bitter wrong.

12

If you would wander down the aimless ways
 Of life unguided, go; I hinder none.
 But I, who have had speech in other days
 With goddesses, I will no further run
 By lost men's paths, as I have lately done,
 As a child strays; henceforth I go the road
 Of mountains, planets, swallows and the sun.
 Row landward now to this divine abode
 At once, at my command, as you have always rowed.

13

No. You will not. 'Tis nothing to you, then,
 That from the lotus-eaters' deadly dream
 I saved you all. And you forget, my men,
 That, were't not for the cunning of my scheme,
 You had been eaten by foul Polypheme.
 Or every man of you would have been swallowed
 In Laestrigonia. You did I redeem
 From Circe's sties, up to whose doors I followed,
 Guided by Hermes there, and found you where you wallowed.

14

And later; but you hearken not to me.
 This voice above the storm you oft-times heard.
 Will it not pass by wax? It does, I see.
 And yet you will not hearken to one word,
 Nor heed me more than you would heed a bird
 That twitters as it passes. One more chain!
 Why! I am covered with them in absurd
 Webs and festoons. And still that sweet refrain
 Divinely sung for you; and sung, oh fools, in vain.

15

And now, and now, the isle is fallen astern!
 Fainter the voices on the waste of waves,
 Fainter like stars that near the morning burn;
 And, like a mariner whom no man saves,
 Swimming alone against a tide that raves
 Out to the deep, the singing dies away,
 And earth is nothing but a place of graves,
 A waste of weedy mounds at end of day
 After the sun has set and all the sky gone gray.

16

Yes, loose me now. Yes, you were right to pile
 The chains. They would have slaughtered me. 'Tis true.
 But leave me now, for I would rest awhile.
 There were some deeds that I had hoped to do,
 Whose glories but this moment glimmered through
 The shadows of oblivion. All is lost.
 All is gone now, and there comes back the blue
 And barren sea on which our ship is tossed,
 And faint shores far away like some unhappy ghost.

17

There was a purpose in each earthly thing.
 But it is gone and they asunder fall.
 Leave me awhile. Henceforth let no man sing,
 As often at the end of day we all
 Would sing together. And, if from the wall
 Of some fair city men should line the shore
 To welcome us with song and festival,
 Say I am sick, say that my heart is sore,
 And that no songs of men can touch it any more.

THE FILM AS AN ART FORM

PART I. BACKGROUND

BY C. A. LEJEUNE

AN attempt to trace the development of the cinema might start with the Confucian shadow-plays, or the frescoes on the pillars of the Egyptian temples; with Aristotle, who observed that the sun shining through a square hole in a shutter cast a circular spot of light on a darkened wall, or with that contemporary of his who remarked that the whirling stone of the slinger, or the light of a rapidly swung torch, presented an apparently unbroken circle to the eye. It might start in the Middle Ages with the great Leonardo, who not only evolved the *camera obscura*, but anticipated the needs of emotional film stars by having an orchestra play to his lady sitters. Or it might start in 1640 with that Athanasius Kircher, whose preview of the first magic lantern performance—starring the Devil—was attended by all the nobility and intelligentsia of Rome.

It will be simpler, however, to start in 1896, the year in which Edison's Vitascope was the novelty of New York; Paul's Theatrograph was drawing the crowds to the London music hall, and Lumière's Cinématographe had carried the new thrill of the Paris boulevards as far afield as Budapest and Vienna.

There are several advantages in choosing this date as a starting point. For one thing, it is a very logical starting-point, being the first year in which large numbers of people could enjoy the new wonder-photographed and projected pictures that gave the illusion of movement. For another thing, it obviates the necessity of discussing who really "invented" the cinema. This is admirable, since the point has never been satisfactorily decided anyway. Taking our stand firmly on the year 1896, we can turn our backs on generations of litigation and experiment; on traumatrope, stroboscope, fantascop, dædalum, zoetrope, kinematoscope, phasmatrope, zoopraxoscope, and other heathenish titles. We need not seek to determine how far the course of the cinema was affected by a millionaire's bet that a horse, when running, takes all its feet off the ground together. Most satisfactory of all, we shall not be involved in any disputes over national priority. It is all one to us whether Edison got in first, or Lumière or Latham or Paul or Muybridge, or whether, as is so persistently claimed by his adherents, Friese-Greene got in ahead of all of them. So far as we are concerned, the honour may go to the United States, to France, or to England.

Let us start then, with 1896, and see how the film had developed from those first flickering, two-minute reels to the four-hour marathon *Gone With the Wind*. Let us create, for our guidance, an exceptionally gifted observer, whose memory not only serves him accurately for the details of forty years ago, but whose judgment is at no time impaired by the enthusiasm of youth

and novelty. I, for example, should be useless as an observer of this type. All my early memories of the cinema are so coloured by excitement that I can barely see them for rosy shimmer. Some part of my mind is still convinced that Mary Pickford was the greatest actress in the world, that God never created a more handsome man than John Barrymore in his youth, and that a certain pulsating drama in two reels, *The Heart of a Child*, was as long and rewarding as a Eugene O'Neill play. Our appointed observer will have no delusions of this sort. Swayed neither by youth nor age, he will see things constantly as they are. His province is simply to record. And for the moment, it will be convenient to let him record facts, to trace the course of the cinema as an aspect of 20th century public life, without lingering too long over the significant moments, or scrutinizing it too closely as an art form.

For nearly seven years our observer would have had to content himself with short trick films, incidents and newsreels; trips to the moon and men sawn in half by auto-cars; a train arriving in a station: the view from a travelling observation car; pictorial puns like "How Bridget Served the Salad Undressed"; domestic crises such as "The Pretty Stenographer, or Caught in the Act."

By 1903 he might well be wondering, along with a number of his contemporaries, whether this new fad of moving pictures were going to last. It had been conclusively demonstrated by this time that still photographs, taken and projected at the rate of sixteen pictures a second, give the illusion of movement on the screen. Nobody doubted it any more. The novelty of the trick had worn off. Few people now screamed when an engine seemed to rush out at them from the screen. In Paris, one writer tells us, "the estate of the cinema was so low at the time that movies were shown free at little cafes as an inducement to the patrons to sit longer and drink more." In England and America the "bioscope" had sunk to the position of last turn in the music-hall bills. In many variety programmes the film was deliberately used as a "chaser", to drive out the audience and clear the house before the next show.

Our observer, being a man of good sense, must have asked himself, about this time: Has the cinematograph now done all it is able to do? Having photographed events so that they looked "real", and played tricks with facts so that they looked "magical", has it fulfilled and exhausted its possibilities as a medium? And just as he was entertaining these thoughts, along came the answer. It was called *The Great Train Robbery*, and although it ran for less than ten minutes, it changed the whole trend of criticism and ensured the future of the cinema. It is an absurd work by modern standards. It is as obsolete as the first bi-plane, as funny as the first locomotive. But it set the course of the motion picture for the next twenty-five years. It had a complete story and suddenly, in a whirl of excitement, the public became aware of the possibilities of the camera as a yarn-spinner. To the discerning it became obvious for the first time that the camera could select and emphasize,

that it could present drama with greater freedom than the theatre, and point a story with a vividness independent of the spoken word.

True, the "topical" survived, though the trick film gradually dwindled, but the great majority of films took the short story form, had a fictitious romance, and resorted, whenever they could, to the chase motif. Round about 1906, the observer might have seen his first crude colour film, and for several years after that colour pieces, of a sort, were a frequent item in the programmes.

The cinema was definitely out of the chaser class now. It was a new cult, and it had its own temples. By 1911 there were 4,000 "picture palaces" in England. Quite respectable people were known to go to the films, not just the young, and those who skylarked on bicycles. Such distinguished actors as Sir Herbert Tree, Mr. H. B. Irving, Mr. Frank Benson and Mme. Réjane agreed to entrust a few moments of their art to what they ironically considered to be imperishable celluloid. Mme. Sarah Bernhardt was advertised as saying of her three-reel *Dame Aux Camélias* "I rely upon these films to make me immortal."

"Those who are not familiar with the picture theatres may hardly believe it," writes one of the first film "critics" at about this period, "but the spectators in those places have their 'stars' just as the playgoers at the fashionable London theatres have." There was G. M. Anderson, the "Western" who had never, it is said, sat a horse before he went into cowboy pictures; cowgirl Alice Joyce; romantic Florence Lawrence; funny Max Linder; Arthur Johnson ("the Lewis Waller of the Picture Palaces"), the English Tilly Girls, Alma Taylor and Chrissie White; two-gun Bill Hart; golden Mary Pickford, newly-emerged from her anonymity as the Biograph Girl; these favourites and others won our adoration. Some of them, it was rumoured, earned as much as £50 a week for doing just this.

I promised that our observer would be impartial, yet already I note in him a regrettable tendency to linger over these early days. This will not do at all. Events are moving fast, and we shall have to hurry to keep up with them. For some years, long historical pictures—fabulous films that take an hour, or an hour and a half to show—have been coming across the Channel from France and Italy. The great d'Annunzio himself has written film scenarios. Now the fashion for longer films has caught on in Hollywood, that mushroom estate of California to which the industry, driven west, some say, by patent troubles, has flitted. Fired by the Bernhardt *Queen Elizabeth* Hollywood has conceived the idea of presenting Famous Players in Famous Plays. A company has even been formed to incorporate that idea.

The year 1912 may be taken as the starting-point of the "feature" film. From that time on, no programme was complete without its full-length drama. The slapstick comedies, the topicals, the new-fashioned serials, added relish to the bill. Just round the corner, less than a year off, with the irony that has attended the whole course of the cinema, was the greatest genius for pocket comedy—the little fellow with the baggy trousers and the Derby hat—

that the screen has ever known. But the "big film" had become the *pièce de résistance*, and has remained so from that day.

Came the War, as the sub-titles would have had it in black letters on a white ground, or, more artistically, in flaming letters on a black ground. Came four years of resolute escapist entertainment. Pasteboard effigies of Charlie flirted a gay cane outside the picture palaces. Signed photographs of Mary Pickford, the World's Sweetheart, smiled down from the walls of countless dugouts. The serial *Exploits of Elaine* and *The Perils of Pauline* succeeded *The Adventures of Kathlyn* and drew us weekly to the cinemas. An athletic young man named Douglas Fairbanks horrified the producers, and delighted the public, by his tendency to flout the script by leaping from walls and vaulting fences. A conscientious young woman named Theodosia Goodman appeared in a film called *A Fool There Was*, adopted the pseudonym of Theda Bara and obligingly posed for still photographers cross-legged, tearing her hair, above a skull and crossbones. The adolescent world thrilled in delicious horror to the advent of the first vamp.

These films were easy to take, but one tougher figure emerged from the war years. That was the director, D. W. Griffith, who startled the world in 1916 with *The Birth of a Nation*, and a year later with the unwieldy, unpredictable, unprecedented *Intolerance*. This fellow not only made longer films than anyone else, films so long and ambitious that they had to be shown at special performances, but he played tricks with narrative style that had not been rivalled in impudence since *The Great Train Robbery*. He thrust close-ups under people's noses. His pictorial chords jarred as Scriabin's music was to jar on a later generation. He broke up his story into parallel plots, and declared that he got the idea from Dickens. In more ways than one, he played the Dickens with routine.

We have brought our observer to the end of the war, and the next years were prosperous and eventful ones. The cinema, as a social institution, was settled in. Super-luxury palaces, neon lights and Mighty Wurlitzers added comfort, if not always distinction, to the filmgoer's lot. An orgy of affluence pervaded the Hollywood scene. Cecil de Mille indulged in his bath-tub epics. Eleanor Glyn endorsed it. A young dancer from the Argentine named Valentino made a film called *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse* and the world had found its Dream Lover.

Flaherty discovered the Eskimos with *Nanook of the North*, and James Cruze discovered the golden west with *The Covered Wagon*. Erich von Stroheim, *The Man You Love to Hate*, shocked a delighted public with *Foolish Wives*. Fairbanks anticipated Tarzan with his Robin Hood. Danton rode cowboy saddle to the rescue of the Orphans of the Storm.

Meanwhile continental Europe, too, was on the verge of a screen renaissance. First Sweden, comparatively untouched by war, began to send its charming, cultured pictures over-seas. It was not long before the best Swedish directors and players followed their films. Victor Sjöström made

The Secret of the Monastery, *My Soul Shall Bear Witness*, *A Lover in Pawn*, *The Dawn of Love*, and *Love's Crucible*, and went to Hollywood. Mauritz Stiller made *The Atonement of Gösta Berling* and went to Hollywood too. So did Lars Hanson, the star of *Gösta Berling* and a young girl in the cast, a certain Greta Garbo. Miss Garbo's chances were considered less promising than those of the other three, but it was hoped that her good looks, combined with a certain acting ability, would ensure her a reasonable career.

With the exodus of her best film-minds, Sweden's short day seemed over. But now Germany, turning hungrily to art for refreshment and rebirth, was making film after film that teased, and enchanted, and held the imagination. It was the golden age of legend, history, and fantasy. A list of the German films of the early and middle twenties is as rich as a list of Elizabethan literature. Let our observer, if he has cultivated the useful habit of making notes, turn up his diary for 1923, for example. He will find that in that year he saw *The Loves of Pharaoh*, *Danton*, *The Golem*, *Sumurun*, *Caligari*, *Dr. Mabuse* and *Destiny*. With justification he might call it the German year.

Events pressed close on one another in the middle twenties. No sooner had the German film come up, than the French film followed. Indeed, the dates overlap here to a certain extent. Even before the great German films were on their way across the Channel, a Belgian director, Jacques Feyder, working in France, had startled us with a film called *L'Atlantide*. Feyder had followed this up with *Crainquebille*, Poirier and L'Herbier had experimented with the new expressionism, Ivan Mosjoukine had appeared in *Kean*, before the year 1925, when a fantasy called *The Crazy Ray* introduced the name of René Clair to London. Our observer, being a smart man, will have noted this name at once, and scribbled it down in his diary.

Since he is also, we assume, a typical Briton, and not in the habit of flitting over to Moscow for his summer holidays, our observer is unlikely to have been aware of another significant film that was made in the year 1925—a work called *Potemkin* by the Soviet director Pudovkin. He could not observe what he might not see, and it is almost certain that the panic policy of our censorship kept him ignorant for several years of the tremendous events that were taking place in the studios of the U.S.S.R. It was quite late in the twenties before the first Soviet films began to creep into this country by devious ways. And by that time our observer had other things to think about, for the talkies had come from Hollywood, and the film industry was changed overnight.

So hazy is memory for the events of fifteen years ago, and so many wild guesses are made as to the priority of early sound-films, that a few dates might be in order here. Talkies of a sort, of course, had always been with us. Way back in the last century Edison had designed his peepshow kinetoscope as an adjunct to the phonograph. All through the history of silent films, inventors had played periodically with the idea of films that talked. We were invited to demonstrations of this startling patent and that revolutionary device. We saw men stand up on the screen and heard them utter recogniz-

able sounds. But it was not until the end of the first quarter of a century, not indeed, until the force of post-war American production had spent itself, and the producers needed some novelty to hold the waning enthusiasm of the public, that experiment with sound was taken seriously.

In the summer of 1926, the first full-length film with a synchronized sound and music score was shown in New York. It was *Don Juan*, with John Barrymore. Early in 1928 the sound-track, recording a song of Al Jolson's in the largely silent *Jazz Singer*, picked up by accident a phrase of impromptu dialogue. The producers, excited, left it in the finished picture. To *The Jazz Singer*, therefore, must go the credit of being the first film with a dialogue sequence. Later in the same year came the first feature-length, all-talking picture. The star was Helene Costello, and the film *The Lights of New York*.

In England *The Lights of New York* missed being the pioneer talkie by about a fortnight. A dialogue version of Edgar Wallace's thriller, *The Terror*, got across the Atlantic first, or at least got first into the cinemas. The date was October, 1928. Down at Savoy Hill the B.B.C. engineers were trying out the first broadcasts of television pictures. Al Smith was opposing Herbert Hoover in the forthcoming American Presidential elections. The transatlantic cable had been disturbed by an aurora borealis. Smart women were wearing coal-scuttle hats and waists round the hips.

Leading members of the film trade and prominent intellectuals united for the first time in greeting this Thing, the talk-film, with contumely. The film folk said it was a fad that wouldn't last. The highbrows, who were but lately denouncing the cinema as something in its infancy, insisted that sound had destroyed the international art of pantomime. They too, hoped it wouldn't last. But it did last. Within a few weeks *The Terror* was followed by *The Lights of New York*, *The Melody of Love*, and Al Jolson's phenomenally successful "weepie," *The Singing Fool*. Our observer, if he were the type to adopt such homely metaphors, must have felt as though he were watching steam escape from a nearly-boiling kettle. Every minute the jet grew stronger. Nothing could stop it. The whole industry was coming to the boil.

Painful though it was, studios all over the world had to scrap their existent machinery and instal sound-proof floors and recording apparatus. Theatres were reluctantly but inevitably equipped with sound. Sometimes the sound was awful, as we can recall. Silent films in production were junked, or brought up to date with dialogue sequences. Stars who couldn't talk went out, and actors who could talk, or at least talk better, came in. In their zeal to show off the new medium, everyone talked far too much. But even when the novelty wore off, the medium stuck. By 1930 the silent film was practically obsolete.

To the generation just grown up, the word "film" and the word "talkie" have always been synonymous, but to our observer, the twelve years of sound form only a short watch in the long survey of the cinema. These last twelve years—uneasy, threatening years—on the whole have brought the

cinema curiously little change. There have been technical improvements, naturally; refinements of sound, a marked development in the use of Technicolor, and various individual talents; but little that is comparable in historical importance with the formulæ of D. W. Griffith, the European renaissance of the twenties, and the actual change-over from silent films to talkies. Once the fact of talk was established, the form of the talkie for the next decade was indicated.

The language barrier has, no doubt, to a certain extent, conditioned the national interchange of films. No device yet discovered, neither superimposed titles nor dubbing, has made a film recorded in one tongue entirely acceptable to people of another. But the market for continental films in this country was always specialized, and even the silent French and German films of the twenties had only a limited British distribution. More marked, perhaps, is the effect of politics on modern film programmes. It is not hard to understand, for instance, why we have seen few German films since the first gay musicals. The war, not the language, has put a period to the intelligent product of the French studios. The war, too, has given official status to the Soviet talkie, and imposed on the British documentary an importance that is sometimes beyond its modest powers.

But our observer, paying his weekly visit to the pictures, is not likely to have been troubled much by these considerations. What he has seen, in peace and war, is twelve years of technically-improving talkies; influenced in setting by the affairs and fads of the world outside, but changing very little in essential story-content. He has watched the rise of Disney, from his first black-and-white cartoon in 1928—*Steamboat Willie*—to the Technicolor triumph of his *Fantasia*. He has noted the revival of British films, and dated it, approximately, from Korda's *Private Life of Henry VIII* in the middle thirties. He has seen cycle after cycle of films run their course from America—the gangster cycle, the back-stage cycle, the crazy comedy cycle, the biographical cycle, the Civil War cycle, the cycle of the Young Man Who Can't Take Discipline. He has followed the course of the stars from Al Jolson to Dorothy Lamour. He has joined in talk about John Ford and Preston Sturges, Orson Welles and Noel Coward, and undoubtedly had his say about *Gone With the Wind* and *Mrs. Miniver*. He has seen film stars mobbed by admiring crowds, and heard them speak their little pieces on the air. He has watched the screen, which has glorified show-girls, pioneers, marines, football stars and Men in White, spring with an equal zest to the glorification of democracy. To-day, on the eve of 1943, he is just a little weary, perhaps, of films about the war. But he is aware, for he is a wise observer and has seen a great many changes in his time, that this is only a passing phase, a mere paragraph to the historian of the 1960's. His study must stop here, on a moment of transition, for he is not prescient. But his long survey would be of but little avail if he were not acutely aware, under the surface, of great things stirring, of a new challenge to the cinema in any post-war plan.

A JOURNEY TO THE WESTERN ISLES

By RENÉ RAYMOND

I CANNOT remember the first time I heard the sinister phrase *You will be posted to the Outer Hebrides!* It occurs monotonously during one's training period. Flight Sergeants like to use it to galvanize non-weight-pulling airmen into activity. It seldom fails to have the right effect. When I had completed my initial training I and several hundred other recruits waited in the vast ball-room of a requisitioned hotel to be posted to various R.A.F. stations in the British Isles. At the far end of the room, a Warrant Officer stood on a chair, a long list of names in his hand. Small groups of airmen came forward timidly as their names were called. They were marched away to an unknown destination. A hushed whisper ran round the room. *That lot are going to the Outer Hebrides.* I well remember the pitying looks that followed them. No doubt, they finally arrived at Little Muddle-on-the-Dither, hundreds of miles from the Western Isles. But they achieved the distinction of being the first of our consignment to be posted, by rumour, to the Outer Hebrides. When my name was called the writing on the wall was clear. However, twelve hours later, I arrived at a station within twenty miles of my home and for the following two weeks, I regained much of my lost confidence. Then rumours began again. Someone had been into the Flight Office. The Corporal was making up a list of names. "Oh, yes, I believe your name *was* on it." This meant a furtive visit to the Flight Office. My name was *not* on the list. Further the place was not the Outer Hebrides at all, but Sunnybourne-on-the-Tann.

During the rest of my time in the ranks, the fear of this posting was ever present. Even when I obtained a Commission and the yellow walls of Air Ministry closed about me, I would stiffen and look nervously to right and left when the place was mentioned.

Then one day, it was suggested that I should visit the Western Isles. At first, I thought it was a gentle attempt to break the news that I was being posted there. It took quite a while to convince me that the trip was to be for only two days. It took me even longer to recover from the shock. I was told that I would travel to a North country town by train and then fly to the Western Isles by Bomber.

I had never flown before.

When I grasped the fact that I was to take a three-hour journey by air, my first reaction was of pleasure but the journey to the Northern town by train was long, tedious, and foodless. While in the train, I had pondered for several hours on the subject of flying. The more I thought about it the less

I liked the immediate outlook. P. was waiting for me at the terminus. He was the P.R.O. who was to accompany me on the trip to the Western Isles. He greeted me breezily. "There's a gale warning," he said, shaking hands, "I don't suppose we'll get off to-day. Anyway, we have plenty of time. We'll have lunch and then go over to the 'drome and see what's happening." I assured him that there was absolutely no rush as far as I was concerned. "In fact," I told him earnestly, "it's all right by me if I don't go at all." P. seemed quite surprised. "You're going to enjoy this trip," he said, "You'll see some of the finest scenery in Scotland. It's terrific! I've done the trip three times now and I like it better every time I go there."

I was not quite sure whether he was shooting a line or not. However, I hoped that the gale would stick it out for several days. It seemed to be rather a mysterious kind of gale. I could see absolutely no sign of it. The sun shone, the sky was without a cloud and the air was balmy. There was no wind at all. Yet everyone was going around shaking their heads. Had I been really anxious to fly to the Western Isles, I would have become distinctly nettled. P., who seemed to know everything, explained that the gale was raging a few miles off the islands. He went to some trouble to tell me about the work of the Met. people. He found out that our aircraft would take off at 18.30 hrs. if, by that time, the gale had thrown in the towel.

We spent the four hours looking round the aerodrome and wandering about the town and then P. suggested that we should go over to the Duty Pilot's hut and see what was happening. We found a Wing Commander, and four Sergeant Pilots who made up the crew, waiting impatiently to get off. We climbed into a motor van which was waiting outside the Duty Pilot's hut. We soon arrived near a large aircraft, whose propellers were ticking over.

After a few confusing minutes, P. and I managed to find a small space in the aircraft to ourselves. Three of the Sergeant Pilots disappeared into the nose and the fourth hid himself in the tail. There was apparently nowhere for us to sit except on the floor, which was sprinkled with oil and sand. After hesitating, and wondering when I would be able to get myself a new great-coat, I sat on the oil and sand. P. sat on a parachute pack. Then we took off. There was considerable noise and even more movement. But there was no appreciable sensation when we became airborne. I enjoyed the first two hours immensely. Then, as we flew over some place which must not be named, we ran into a bump.

I have read about rough trips in aircraft. This bump, however, has been a lesson to me. When we sit before a fire in a comfortable armchair reading about the activities of other people, we are apt to become impatient if nothing extraordinary happens to them. "This fellow is a dull dog," we think. "Why doesn't he have adventures that hold our attention? Why doesn't his wretched plane burst into flames? He just yaps about his rough passages."

I shall not take this attitude in the future.

When we ran into the first bump, I was just beginning to feel cramped. I shifted my person to a more comfortable spot, when the spot was snatched from under me. I sat down heavily on three feet of air. Having no substance, the air couldn't be bothered with me, so I came to the floor with a bang that jarred my teeth loose. P. grinned cheerfully at me and shouted, "Bumpy!" Perhaps he thought that I was unaware that the aircraft had fallen about fifty feet and then snapped back like a catapult; or perhaps it was just his way of showing how completely at home he was in this kind of situation.

Before I could think of something sarcastic to shout back, we ran into another bump that was really something. P. disappeared behind the parachute pack, with his legs in the air. I bounced twice across the floor of the aircraft and came to rest with considerable violence on a metal ammunition container. P.'s head appeared over the parachute pack. His eyes were a trifle glassy. The aircraft zoomed up sharply, forcing my inside into the top of my cap. It then settled on its course again. "That certainly was a bump," P. shouted, climbing to his seat. "You all right?" "At the moment," I shouted back to him, "I don't know. My back's broken and I think I have a rupture. Where do you think I can get a truss?" He didn't seem to hear, or else he revealed a callousness that I had not previously suspected. At that moment, one of the Sergeants looked in. "Okay?" he wanted to know. "Some bump!" I told him about my broken back and he nodded. "About another half an hour," he said in my ear, so I don't suppose he heard either. Then he went away.

This bump had unsettled me. Up to now, my inside had ignored the determined efforts of the aircraft to undermine it. The sinking and lifting motion, the rocking motion, the banking motion had left it indifferent, but this proved a little too much. I began to feel unwell. I have a horror of being unwell in the presence of other people and became exceedingly depressed.

The remaining half hour resulted in a tremendous psychological battle between my stomach and myself. I assured it that it was *not* feeling unwell. I pointed out that this trip would do it a world of good and that it would be a stronger and better stomach after it was over. Its reply was unprintable. I even promised it a double whisky if it behaved itself. But it just snarled at me.

The last five minutes were touch and go. In fact, I became completely indifferent. I didn't care if the slipstream took the top of my head off. I thought that in the circumstances it might be the best thing that could happen. One of the Sergeants reappeared. He asked me to sit in the end of the aircraft as we were landing. I went there without protest. If he had asked me to jump out, I would have done so, willingly. I crawled into the tail of the machine and squashed myself into the entrance of the rear-gunner's turret. The Sergeant squashed himself down beside me. He probably guessed that I was not quite myself. But his attempt to foster friendship was not appreciated. He produced from his pocket a loathsome looking

piece of squashed chocolate and offered it to me with friendly signs. Even my stomach shut its eyes. At that moment, we touched down. I was not expecting it. The noise of the wheels as they bounced on the tarmac, the sudden violent jolting of the aircraft, brought the trip to a dramatic end. Someone pulled the door open and a cold blast rushed into the aircraft. My inside drew a deep breath of relief. Slowly and stiffly I climbed out. The full force of a sixty mile an hour gale, loaded with knives and razor blades, swept through me.

P. beamed on me. "Welcome to the Outer Hebrides," he said. I stared at the wild, bleak desolation which spread out before me. It was engulfed by a squall of rain. I felt that this was indeed the end. "When do we go back?" I asked, turning up my coat collar, "I'm frozen!" P. gaped at me. "Why, this is summer!" he pointed out, emphatically. I thanked him. At least, I had something to be grateful for. Winter in this spot must be terribly bracing.

Together, we set out for the distant mess. My one consoling thought was that I had only to spend two days in this place. I said as much to P. He looked quite furtive. "I wouldn't let 'em hear you say so, old boy," he said. "They all like this place no end." I found out later that he was not shooting a line. They really did like it. At the door of the Officers' Mess, I paused and looked back at the Camp, spread out against the grey sky and rain mists that drifted across the green and brown landscape. The scene was bleak, desolate and wild. The wind, coming in from the Atlantic, found no obstructions to break up its force. Hangars, low wooden buildings and camouflaged Nissen huts built up a picture which depressed me.

P. drew a quart of cold, violent air down his gizzard. "What a place!" he exclaimed enthusiastically, "I'd give all my clothing coupons to be here permanently. Look at the scenery. Isn't it terrific?" I was in no mood for such enthusiasm. In fact, I thought it was hardly in the best taste. But since I was going to spend two days in P's company, I thought it would be a bad beginning to tell him so.

We went into the Mess, which was deserted. It was a low, wooden affair, somewhat draughty and definitely cold. However, the service was remarkably efficient. A plate of ham and eggs was set before me. My morale soared. P. noticed my approval and said, "You've got to go a long way to beat the food on this station. You'll get a tremendous appetite after being here for a day or so." "I have no objection at all," I replied, busy with my food, "but tell me, are you really serious when you say that this place is popular?" P. nodded: "Yes. Everyone loves it. At first, I couldn't understand why, but after a while, I found it grew on me. I've known blokes do their damndest to stay on when their time's up.

Frankly, I didn't believe him. I looked out of the rain-swept window at the scattered buildings and the mud. My spirits declined like a cold soufflé. I said, "Where are we sleeping?" "It's just down the road," P. said. "If

you've finished, we'll go." I struggled into my overcoat. "I see it's still raining," I said gloomily. "No one takes any notice of the rain up here," P. said, opening the Mess door and letting the gale in. "You get hardened to it in a very short time." I was getting a little cheased with this line of propaganda. "Certainly," I said tartly. "One can get used to anything if one tries long enough. Look at the bloke in the Bible who had boils."

We stepped into the gale and rain.

The one person I love more than any other is the just-round-the-corner wallah. I expect you have met this type at one time or another. You have been tramping about the countryside for hours looking for a pub. It is either pouring with rain or else broiling in sunshine. You approach a rustic and ask to be directed to the nearest pub. He is usually supporting himself on a rake and looks like a native of the Lost Horizon. He smiles at you encouragingly. "Down the road, mister," he says. "It ain't far; jest round the corner." And you, poor fool, believe him. Delighted you set off. Your dusty larynx perks up at the thought of a pint so close at hand. You reach the corner and then find yourself faced with a long road that stretches without a bend as far as your eye can see. The pub just doesn't exist. So, when we left the Mess and after we had tramped down a broken road, full of puddles, pot holes, granite rock and mud for five minutes, I began to suspect P. "I should be glad," I said to him politely, "if you would be perfectly frank about this. Have we to trudge eight miles or so before we reach our beds? Don't think that I am binding, but I would prefer to know where I stand." P. shook his head. "It's not far," he said cheerfully. "It's only just round the corner."

That phrase again! Dejected, cold, wet and fatalistic, I plodded on by his side. At a rough calculation, the site was a quarter of a mile away. On a warm sunny evening it would have been a pleasant walk. On a night like this it was a blue-pencilled disaster.

We arrived eventually at the site. Some twenty Nissen huts were dotted about the landscape, joined together by a small, snakelike path. "Do the officers sleep in - er - these things?" I asked, staring in awe. This was my first encounter with the Nissen hut. "Rather," P. said lightly. "You'll find them lots of fun." I was rapidly becoming suspicious of P. For a P.R.O. he was showing unexpected pioneer ambitions. I thought with gloom that his forefathers must have been settlers or something else equally vital.

We entered one of the huts which P. assured me had been reserved for us. I regarded the field washing set, the drain pipe stove (unlit) and the grim looking bed with misgivings. The hut was as comfortable and as hospitable as a Nazi concentration camp. I dumped my bag on the bed. "This," I said bitterly, "is the end." "It'll be all right tomorrow," P. said, beginning to undress. "We'll see the Adjutant and get a more comfortable billet. I don't suppose he knew we were coming."

I suppose there are quite a number of people who have never been in a Nissen hut. For the benefit of those who haven't, let me give a brief descrip-

tion. The hut is made of corrugated iron with wooden window frames and a wooden door let in somehow or other. It is shaped like a barrel which has been split in two. The corrugated iron walls acted as a sounding board. The noise of the wind as it wailed round the hut made me think of *Wuthering Heights*. I sat on a bed and yawned. P's. Spartan example, although impressing me, did not galvanize me into action. The last thing I wished was to undress. "Do you think," I ventured, "that it would be a bad thing if we summoned a batman and got a fire going?" P. wrapped himself in a pair of surrealist pyjamas. "Batman?" he repeated, "they don't have batmen on this station, old boy. Everyone mucks in." "You mean there'll be no cup of tea in the morning. No buttons polished and perhaps no hot water?" I felt I might just as well know the worst. "No tea, no polished buttons and certainly no hot water," P. returned cheerfully, climbing into bed. "After all this is the Outer Hebrides."

I sniffed at the cold air. Then my guardian angel, who up to now, had been lying down on his job, got weaving and began to put things right. A knock sounded on the door and the Station Adjutant looked in. "There you are," he said, closing the door, "nippy in here; we'll get a fire going." Obviously here was a man after my own heart. He took a box of matches from his pocket, opened the stove and tossed the lighted match in. The stove began to roar like a ship's furnace. Opening the top he peered inside, stirred the blazing coal with a poker and then heaped handfuls of coke on it. "I'll be right back," he said. "That'll be a decent fire very soon," and he took himself off.

Already the air was warming up. I felt that I could safely remove my greatcoat.

"He's definitely a good type," I remarked to P. "But it rather shakes me to see a Squadron Leader messing about with coke." P., looking extremely comfortable in his bed, grinned. "I think you're going to be shaken even more by the time you've been on this station a few days. You see, after all, the standards of life here are primitive. Unless everyone is ready to muck in and rough it, things could be sticky. I've been to other stations on the Western Isles. They are all the same. One has to shake off one's usual mode of life, which is, you must admit, a little too civilized. One must get back to the pioneer life. When a man is left to his own devices to provide for his comforts, he adapts himself very quickly. You know, it isn't half a bad sort of life."

Before I could think up a reply to this eulogy, the Adjutant returned. He carried several tins and three mugs. "Now we'll have some cocoa and a talk," he said, sitting in the easy chair opposite me. "Reach me the water jug, will you please?" Silently, I passed it over and he half filled an empty tin which he set on the stove. Then he began to mix the cocoa and condensed milk in the mugs. While he did so, he talked. It was good talk. The warmth from the stove filled the hut. The sound of the wind took on a more friendly

note. When the cocoa was made, we sat back and toasted our toes before the stove. I suddenly felt differently about this place. Listening to the Adjutant, seeing P. lolling back on his elbow in bed, watching the flickering shadows thrown by the paraffin lamp, and listening to the roar of the wind, produced an atmosphere which caught my imagination. It was a pleasant, friendly, male atmosphere.

The Adjutant talked about the Western Isles. He knew them well. "The natives here have no sense of time," he said. "In some places the cows are not milked before ten in the morning. You know, I rather admire their attitude. At least, time is their servant." The steam from the cocoa thawed my nose. "I have only just arrived," I said. "The place looks grim. I suppose you hate it." The Adjutant's eyes opened. "When I come to London," he said, "I look round at the crowded streets. I try to see the horizon, but the buildings obstruct my view. I sniff petrol fumes and shudder at the queues forming for 'buses. I scramble back to the Hebrides as fast as I can. I wonder how anyone in their right minds can live in London! This isle is one of the grandest spots in the world. It is untrampled by flat-footed tourists. You can get out on the moors and you can look out across the Atlantic and there's nothing between you and the American coastline. We are happy here. This is a happy station. We are living like men, not like cucumbers in a glasshouse. If you were here any length of time, you'd think the same, unless you have no blood in your veins."

I felt that the last word on the subject had been said. After all, when a man feels as strongly as this, and when he is your superior officer, it is as well to throw in the towel. I threw in the laundry basket to be on the safe side.

"I suppose you're up here to see the workings of Coastal Command?" he went on. I said I was. "It's a fine branch of the service." He added a little more hot water to his cocoa. "Not a showy job. Sometimes nothing happens for days. Sometimes nothing happens for weeks. But when it does happen, it's usually something to shout about. It was our group who captured the German submarine you read about in the newspapers a while ago. We had something to do with the sinking of the *Bismarck*. Yes, you'll find it interesting here." He finished his cocoa regretfully. "Well, I suppose I'd better be going."

I glanced at my watch. It was one-thirty. Time had stood still in the small hut while we had talked. I saw him to the door. The wind whistled round me.

CORRESPONDENCE

FRENCH AND SPANISH

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

In his reply in the November FORTNIGHTLY to my article, "The Tyranny of French,"* Professor D. W. Brogan misrepresents me in two particulars.

First, he says that my "real case is not for more German, but for some Spanish and Italian in the schools." This is doubly incorrect. I do most certainly advocate more German in the schools, as is clearly implied on pp. 174 and 176. And the "real case" in my article is not for the teaching of any particular language at all, but—as is stated on p. 169 and again twice on p. 174—for a new and unbiassed enquiry into the whole question of the modern languages taught in schools. "This article. . . is no more than a plea that the matter should be given an impartial re-examination." Surely that is sufficiently plain.

Secondly, Professor Brogan accuses me of using the "chicken" episode as an "argument" against what he euphemistically terms the "quasi-monopoly" of French. But that is just what I do not do. My words were: "I do not for a moment suggest that this is in itself a reason for dropping or curtailing French studies." The point is that, whereas in 1918 it was impossible for political reasons, to get an unprejudiced hearing for languages other than French, those same reasons have now made it possible and therefore it ought to be attempted.

As for Professor Brogan's attempt to support (if I understand him aright) the present system, by which practically all secondary-school children, and many others, are compelled to study French, the weakness of his arguments seems to me to corroborate the belief that the real strength of the "case for French" lies in our national disinclination for changing well-established customs. Those arguments I hope to discuss in due course elsewhere. But, with regard to the comparison which he makes between Spanish and French, I would suggest to him that almost all teachers of Spanish have also studied and taught French and are therefore well qualified to compare the two, where-

* THE FORTNIGHTLY. September, 1942.

as a critic who, however profound his knowledge of French, is unacquainted with Spanish is not. That is the difficulty with most of the advocates of "French everywhere": they have neither taught, nor as a rule have they more than a superficial knowledge of, any Italian, or Spanish, or Russian, and merely assume that the language they do know must necessarily be superior to any other. Let the cases for the various languages then be thoroughly examined by an impartial tribunal and the supporters of the claims of the four languages which are pressing for some of the time given in schools to French will not fear the result.

Yours faithfully,

E. ALLISON PEERS.

The University of Liverpool.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By STEPHEN GWYNN

IT is only proper to begin with the senior service, when two Admirals of the Fleet present each his review of a lifetime spent in the navy. Lord Chatfield and Lord Cork appear to have been born in the same year and to have entered the *Britannia* thirteen years later—about 1886. But the chances of war never brought them together; in Lord Cork's book (*My Naval Life*, Hutchinson, 18s.) there is only one passing mention of Sir Ernle Chatfield, then, in 1933, First Sea Lord. In Lord Chatfield's *The Navy and Defence* (Heinemann, 15s.) Lord Cork does not appear. That is natural enough; Lord Chatfield writes of naval policy during his life time, how it was shaped, and who shaped it; Lord Cork's book is the book of one ready to take things as he found them, accepting the adventures, the humours and the disappointments of the life as they came along. Such men keep the service going; they maintain the tradition, they do not alter it; and we have here the autobiography of a successful and obviously popular seaman who took care that his experience should make him familiar with all types of vessel. What he is concerned to tell us is only what amused or interested him in the far-ranging phases of his seafaring; and there results a book full of good stories and of sidelights on history: but unhappily very few of us can remember enough of the history to appreciate the sidelights; Lord Cork really ought to have pages upon pages of explanatory detail, dealing with such matters as the siege of the Legation, in Peking, or the action at the Taku forts. Indeed so much too much has happened in the forty-five years during which he served that an active seaman cannot tell intelligently the story of his life within any reasonable compass. But one thing does stand out—the extraordinary range and variety of the control which has to be carried out through that most English of all institutions, the British Navy—international by function, but by character insular to the last degree. Both these exceedingly successful seamen admit that they never could cope with foreign languages.

Lord Chatfield has a much clearer idea than his contemporary of what a book can hold, and he deliberately limits himself to showing how the navy has adapted itself to the extraordinary changes imposed by the growth of modern science. It is really a treatise on education—on the way in which men must be trained to live in the closest contact, a thousand of them boxed up together, and all ready at any moment to react swiftly on a challenge that may mean life or death. At the same time it shows how officers must shape their experience so as to fit themselves for what may fairly be called appalling responsibilities. A man so placed must have his mind always busy thinking ahead, yet at the same time must have control of imagination, for that could destroy nerve and the power of instant decision. Between them, these Admirals go far to enlighten us as to the means by which Great Britain won

and maintains her rank in the world. They are complementary to each other in many ways; for instance, Lord Chatfield tells us a great deal about Lord Beatty's qualities as a leader and the thoroughness of forethought which lay behind his dashing decisions; while Lord Cork sees in Sir Roger Keyes, whom Lord Chatfield scarcely mentions, the "Nelson of the fleet" in his day.

* * * * *

Yet there is something more completely and distinctly British than the navy; for however essential it may be, still it lies quite apart and distinct from the country's normal life. That must be true of all navies, and the British navy probably differs less from them than the country itself from other countries. To take an extreme case—French naval service and British naval service have probably more in common than the general life of England and of France. But there is another British institution not less closely bound up with our conception of Britain than the navy and that is the British parliament. Neither Lord Chatfield nor Lord Cork would hesitate to put their service first of all navies; yet Lord Wedgwood would claim even more outstanding superiority for the House of which he writes with such devotion. *Testament to Democracy* (Hutchinson, 8s. 6d.) is a delightful book. Reviewers are sometimes expected to be impartial, which I think unreasonable; it is enough if they are fair. At all events nobody who was in the House of Commons with Josiah Wedgwood can pretend to impartiality about what comes from him; he was too much alive not to create a lively liking or possibly (though I never knew of it) aversion. So I say plainly that it has been a delight to find this book even better—even a great deal better—than I had expected. I had not credited the man with so much knowledge, still less with so much wisdom. He knows in the fullest detail all in English history that relates to the development of parliament, and it is all live knowledge to him. Parliament as we have it now, parliament shaped by the people at large and responsible to the people, was not an early growth; it is the creation of independent forces, among whom Lord Wedgwood's own forbears were active—Quakers, nonconformists, conscientious objectors of various blends, but all in the last resort, he holds, forces making for righteousness. The value of this book—and I should put its value very high indeed—is that a perfectly manly man holds up the standard for many points of view which it was the fashion to think womanish. Hitler and company have done a good deal to discredit that fashion; still, it is good to hear this gentleman (a pacifist who has twice held a commission in the army, and twice in the navy) insisting that the real purpose of parliament is not to make laws but to redress grievances—in short to prevent injustice being done; and that the concern of parliament for justice is not limited by the boundaries of British rule but by the extension of British power. Where injustice can be shown to exist, it is the business of members of parliament to show it—and to urge upon the government, which is a part of parliament, the need for steps to prevent it.

What Lord Wedgwood describes is chiefly the House of Commons in which he sat for thirty-six years from 1906 onwards—for most of the time unopposed; and he makes it plain that the discipline of the place is self-imposed by the tradition of a club of gentlemen. The Irish party to which I belonged, though it held aloof from much in the House's ideals and purposes, accepted

absolutely the unwritten law which forbade public reference to anything said in the smokingrooms or across a dinner table.

Whoever reads this book will learn a great deal of modern English history in its most vital phases, but he will also learn a deal about human nature, generously and courageously interpreted. Here is a man who holds it essential that people should be trained to think, not told what to think. He has no liking for even the best intentioned coercion, and would prefer (once profits are reasonably distributed) that the poor shall be free to educate or not educate their children, as the rich are. There is not space here to discuss what he proposes or anticipates for the post-war world; but I note the admiration for the Prime Minister which is implied rather than expressed throughout the whole book—a tribute on which even Mr. Churchill has a right to pride himself. Lord Wedgwood, the lover of parliament, is a hater of party, which he regards as democracy's besetting danger. In a characteristic phrase he describes Sir Stafford Cripps as "a good son of parliament"—true to the real institution. He has kind words too about the House of Lords—to whose proceedings he will add an unquenched spirit of revolt against whatever, on whatever pretext, in the name of church or of state, seeks to curtail human freedom.

* * * * *

While Lord Wedgwood issues his *Testament to Democracy*—a name not everywhere in favour, Mr. Charles Morgan, even more defiant of augury, publishes an *Ode to France* (Macmillan bring out one form of it for a shilling, another on superior paper for half-a-crown). There is no mistaking the sincerity of Mr. Morgan's homage, which comes in so dark an hour, and we may thank him for recording in words of so dignified a beauty scenes that call up the very essence of France; such as barges on the Seine that lie anchored at Vernon, and next day

will unmoor and go
By Monet's garden through the early dusk
To Mantes, to Paris.

Does he recall how Clemenceau, the old Tiger, haunted that garden which his friend made immortal? This poet is not one to forget such a link; he is of the true believers and cries to his beloved—

Be one, be only France.
Though heaven fall.
If thou but teach thyself
Thou teachest all.

and again—

Thou art the wisdom, O France, within all knowledge
The salt of all delight.

Assurance of resurrection may best be found in remembering how many of us, and how many of the best among us, instinctively feel so towards the lovely land and the lovelier cities which are to-day dishonoured and humiliated. It is well that a voice of such distinction should have spoken so plain.

* * * * *

For those who wish to know what really happened in these terrible years since "that first night of June, the first of many months poisoned and made

**Breton
Islanders**

barren," I would commend warmly a little book which tells the story in miniature. *Rock of France* (published by Lindsay Drummond at 8s. 6d.) is an American woman's account of what she saw in a little island off the Breton coast, where usually the islanders eked out their earnings from the sea by catering in summer for tourists. Ida Treat turned aside on her way to Carnac to cross the five miles of narrow water and visit a friend whom she had known in Paris. That was about fourteen years ago. Making her way across the island from the south shore, where tourists have villas, to the north where is the lighthouse and the fishing port, she saw a derelict house, granite built and strong; it offered shelter from a squall of rain and as she sheltered, one of the island women asked if she would not buy it. That settled her. Later, we are not told how, she married a French captain of the merchant marine. In July, 1939, he was away at sea while the reservists were being called up. Already too, the island, like France itself, was torn by parties;—there were the people and there were those who had been the Cagoulards and whom they called the Gangulars. Seamen reported that all the naval officers were either out and out monarchists, or for de la Rocque and the Fascists. Meanwhile, soldiers were quartered on the island and there were all the discomforts; but it was still a *drôle de guerre*—and the Maginot Line was to do everything. But one thing after another went wrong: Norway was a bitter disappointment, for seamen had trusted to the navies; and then came refugees—and the bombing from the air. So at last, on the wireless, news of surrender, and the Republic down in the mud. A fortnight after the armistice "Nazi boots were clumping over our island paths." One of the French soldiers who had put off his uniform and stayed grew more and more uneasy. The women on this island said "he can't do enough." One of the women, a widow, said her husband's boat was still there; so one morning "the Parisian" disappeared—on his way to de Gaulle. There remained four hundred Germans—only too friendly. There were complications because one of them offered a bottle of salad oil "organized" from somewhere. Marie-Anaïk, the woman who was France itself to the American, was for taking it; it was French oil, and better used by French people. Still, they got a bad name by taking it, and were sorry.

The island was much disturbed by news of England's shelling the French fleet at Merset Kebir. But even then, Marie-Anaïk insisted that the British must have had good reason for doing it. And when the Germans on the island began to train for the invasion of Britain and boasted of what they would do, the seafaring folk only asked how they were going to land their tanks, etc. Their American comrade was grieved to leave them; a chance offered itself and her captain was still at large on the seas. To meet him, she must turn her back on "the Rock of France," and the house that had been heart's anchorage. She makes me feel that Marie-Anaïk and her man Alain were the very salt of France. I have known such people among Catholics of the Donegal seaboard. Yet none of them was like Alain, a craftsman born, working in his native granite. French civilization spreads everywhere in France.

PUNDITS AND ELEPHANTS, by The Earl of Lytton. *Peter Davies*. 15s.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY FOR INDIA, by N. Gangulee. *George Allen & Unwin*. 16s.

INDIA'S FATEFUL HOUR, by Sir William Barton. *John Murray*. 5s.

INDIA, by T. A. Raman. *Oxford University Press*. 3s. 6d.

Lord Lytton went to Bengal as Governor, in 1922, to work the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in that Province, taking to the task the mind that is revealed in his quoted arrival addresses to various Indian bodies, as it is in the other pages of this record, made many years after. He went with dreams. He had been born in India; he had "a traditional interest" in the country of his birth; he had been "infected by Mr. Montagu's enthusiasm for the cause of Indian Nationalism." The Reforms, with their provision for transference of power and responsibility to Indian shoulders, were a long step forward on the road to building a nation out of many races and peoples. There was now a bridge, he said in one of his first speeches in Calcutta, not a perfect bridge perhaps, but it led to the other side. He hoped that British and Indians would cross it together in mutual help, understanding and friendship. How soon they would reach the other side depended on how much time was squandered by those who clamoured for a different bridge. A prophetic speech. Lord Lytton had to face the non-co-operative Swarajist movement, the refusal of the majority party to accept "the pin of responsibility" through their bodies, the failure of his efforts for personal contacts with unofficial Indians; finally, when the Swarajist party would neither take office nor vote salaries for other Ministers, he had to suspend the Reforms and govern with-

out Ministers. Through most of the time he had to contend with the terrorist campaign which, supported by the Swarajists, then swept Bengal. But one remembers of Lord Lytton's book not the heartbreaks, but his pages full of knowledge and love of India. His experiences in the villages; his visits to the jails and to one terrorist leader prisoner—all illuminated by an exceptionally sympathetic, humane and penetrating vision; his tributes to such Indians as the Hindu Minister, Mr. S. N. Mullick "the finest type of Indian Nationalist whom it was my privilege to work with." It is impossible to review this book adequately in a short space. One would like to quote again and again a passage shining in the clarity it throws on the present situation in India. The illustrations are beautiful, as are the descriptions of country scenes. Lord Lytton is an interpreter between British and Indians—with his own gentle patience for them both. He has built a bridge with this book, if enough of both sides will cross it with him.

After Lord Lytton's deep penetration of the human story that makes India, Professor Gangulee writes of the forms of Government. He makes, from much research and with considerable skill a survey of Constituent Assemblies in Europe and America, as a preparation of his case for India. A chapter on "The Irish Struggle for Constitutional Freedom," of special interest to an Irish reviewer, suggests an assembling of quotations to prove a point rather than a careful personal study and balancing of facts. A statement that the concession of customs control under the Irish Treaty "did not seriously endanger the essential economic and strategic interests of Britain," does not convey the truth—that these concessions were, in fact, a considerable sacrifice for

British economy. Again, that "the governing classes of Britain" were determined not to end their domination of Ireland with the Treaty, is misleading. It has never been suggested that the Treaty was not kept on the British side and all subsequent alterations were to Irish advantage. These and several similar confusions, somewhat impair the reader's confidence in Professor Gangulee's presentation of other Constituent Assemblies, on which, by the construction of his book, his case is largely built.

Sir William Barton writes in answer to the misconceptions of India, and particularly of British rule in India, widely prevalent, not only in America but also in Britain where many people, unacquainted with that vast divided country, imagine a simple issue of "a nation struggling for freedom against the iron rule of British imperialism." This book, packed with clear information on many aspects of Indian life and of British rule in India, is a good answer. There has been excellent publicity and a sympathetic audience for Congress criticism of that rule and one hopes that there will be an equally wide audience for the other side which Sir William Barton presents. He writes from long and varied administrative experience of India, and the very directness of his approach disperses some of the mists which the politician-mystic Mr. Gandhi has woven about his policy; if perhaps the contrast between the directness and the mists indicates some British-Indian difficulties of understanding. The illumination with regard to political and communal divisions is clear and valuable; but the author gives an immense amount of information about the lives and problems, economic and otherwise of Indians of different classes, that lie behind

the political issue. He writes of the splendid war effort of India's young men of different communities and ends with a hope for India's future from that comradeship of the air and the battlefields; a comradeship that must surely bring young Britain and young India closer too in understanding. The illustrations are exceptionally fine and well chosen. This book will perhaps arouse some criticism for its vigorous style and directness from those of opposing view to the author's. It is written frankly from a British point of view and so much has been said from the other side that it is time that that was done. It should be read by all concerned with India; most of all by those who have made or accepted the case against British rule.

Lastly, Mr. Raman has written an excellent and timely book which tells with admirable fairness, conciseness and absence of political absorption, a brief story of India. Mr. Raman is a clear and delightful guide, telling something of India's history; her customs and beliefs; how her people live, eat, amuse themselves, marry; about her industries; moving across that vast changing continent, making the picture plain. It is not a criticism, if one reader would have liked in the historical chapter, a word about the great humanitarian services of such men as Cavendish-Bentinck—indicated in the reference to the abolition of *Suttee*—and the Lawrence brothers, and, in a later chapter, more space given to the all-important question for India, of India's women. The chapters on "India and the War" and "The Cripps Mission and After," with their enlightenment about the Indian parties and leaders, now in the news, end on a hopeful note. There are seven excellent illustrations.

PAMELA HINKSON.

GERMAN KULTUR, by Otto Zarek. *Hutchinson*. 12s. 6d.

WHAT THE GERMAN NEEDS, by E. O. Lorimer. *George Allen & Unwin*. 5s.

THE TOTALITARIAN WAR AND AFTER, by Count Carlo Sforza. *George Allen & Unwin*. 3s. 6d.

Long before the war the German enigma provided a great many authors, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, with a subject of more than ordinary interest. It was attacked from every possible angle, but nevertheless a satisfactory answer has not been found so far to the fateful question: How is it possible that the people of Leibnitz, Goethe and Beethoven can produce such a monster as Adolf Hitler? All these more or less qualified authors were unable to find the solution, because they overlooked the fact that not Hitler but the whole German people was the problem. The German author Mr. Otto Zarek, a playwright of importance in pre-Hitler-Germany, has recognized this and therefore comes in *German Kultur* much nearer to the final solution than any other before him. Being neither a politician nor a historian, he tries to solve the enigma by a profound analysis of what the Germans are fond of calling *German Kultur*, a particular brand of culture, absolutely different from that of the West. It is predominately nationalist, while the culture of the West is more or less founded on the international relationship between the people of Western Europe, Italy included. Mr. Zarek sets out to show—although not always in faultless consistence—that at the beginning of their history the Germans divided into two parts which had developed differently in their political and cultural formation. The Romans did this by erecting the Limes, the long wall of protection against the Teutonic

tribes in North Germany. The Germans south of the Limes surrendered to Roman culture and became Christians. Their brothers north of it remained savage heathens until the German emperors conquered them with sword and cross.

This split in the German people and its soul found its supreme expression in the "Faustic" element, that abyss which separates the ideals of the *inner* man from the actions of the *outer* man. Goethe gave sublime form to this phenomenon and thus provided the Germans with an explanation and an excuse at the same time. They knew that their culture possessed an immeasurable treasure of Beauty, but they also knew that this Beauty was not the mirror of Reality as it was represented in the ambitions and deeds of the outer man, of the lust for power and conquest—the Prussian style, as Mr. Zarek says. Can Germany be saved from this Prussianism? That is the question which he develops at the end of his book. He believes that the cure against the evil of Prussianism can be found. After driving it back behind the river Elbe—why not behind the river Oder?—the other Germany, Cis-Limes-Germany, could be brought back to Western culture by re-education. It must be led back to the time of the *Klassik*—the time of Schiller of Mozart, of Kant—the time when the fight for the liberation of the soul and body of man began in Germany too.

The German enigma is also thoroughly dealt with in the little book *What the German Needs* by Mr. E. O. Lorimer. The English author does not delve so far back as the German. He begins his research with the appearance of the Knights of the Teutonic Order in the Baltic countries where by treachery and brutal force they laid the foundations upon which later

the Hohenzollerns erected their Prussian Kingdom. Like Mr. Zarek, Mr. Lorimer points out the deep historical antagonism between this Prussianized German *Kultur* and the Western culture. It is Prussianism which is responsible for that arrogant slogan: *Am. Deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen*. By "Germanity"—there is no other translation of *Deutsches Wesen*—the world is to recover. Hitler is the modern realization of this dictum.

The English author asks the same question as the German: Is there a cure for this evil? and then proceeds to prescribe the various remedies for the German disease which he thinks to be of an exclusively psychological character. There is the foremost cure against it, as prescribed by the great German patriot, Professor F. W. Förster, who said that "Germany cannot be reconciled with Europe till she is reconciled with Truth." But how is it to be done? First of all the Germans must be forced to recognize once and for all that they have lost this second war too. Every town and village and hamlet must see the Allied troops march through with flying colours. All greater centres must be occupied for a certain period. It would lead too far to enumerate the various political, financial, social and cultural measures which in Mr. Lorimer's opinion the German needs—it suffices to repeat his warning that not before Prussianism and its "still viler offspring" Nazism has died with the present generation will the "German reared in Truth and Justice" be able to take his share in helping his fellow men.

The book of Count Sforza, the Italian, *The Totalitarian War and After* fittingly joins ranks with those of the Englishman and the German. It goes less deeply into historical and cultural causes and conse-

quences; Sforza, Italy's last foreign minister before Mussolini, gives a more personal account of the events which led from the first World War to the second. He passes hard but just judgment on many of the European statesmen whose incompetence, greed, bad faith and blindness were responsible for the events. But in spite of his rather pessimistic arguments, he concludes with the optimistic view that authoritarianism (in which he, the high aristocrat, includes Soviet Russia) and its wars are nothing but the birth-pangs of a safer and better organized world. His ideas about this new and better world are not very original—as for instance those on the re-organization of the Danube Basin—but they acquire real importance by the authority with which this author is entitled to put them forward.

ERNST KLEIN.

THE RIGHT TO LIVE, by Max Plowman. *Dakers*. 7s. 6d.

Max Plowman was a subaltern in a Yorkshire regiment during the last great struggle; after passing through the Somme battle he walked out of the army and renounced war. It was an act dictated by his conscience, but he was recovering from concussion and shell-shock and these may have played their part in his decision; great upheavals in all worlds, from mineral to man, have recognizable reactions. Promptly he set out the new faith that held him in a pamphlet called "The Right to Live"; this gives the title to a truly remarkable volume of essays now published more than a year after his death, and introduced by his friend Mr. John Middleton Murry.

I met Max Plowman in the last months of his life, when he was Warden of the Adelphi Centre at

Langham on the Essex-Suffolk border, a frail arresting figure with a task beyond his strength. For the Centre was striving not only to establish a land-settlement colony, but to provide a convalescent home or resthouse for old folk who had been bombed out of the East End of London. It was matter for regret but not of surprise when he died within a year of taking up the heavy burden. He had published some volumes of verse and an Introduction to the Study of Blake but this posthumous book of essays will go beyond them in establishing his reputation.

Happily it is not necessary to agree with his opinions in order to admire their deep sincerity. He was well read but overlooked two statements that might have helped him. The first was made by Horace who said that you cannot drive nature out with a pitchfork. The second was made by Oliver Cromwell who said: "Gentlemen, I beseech you for the love of God to believe that you may be sometimes wrong."

Max Plowman writes as one would neither make allowances for the natural man nor submit to contradiction. His alert sensitive mind came to conclusions and those conclusions were sacrosanct. In short this Pacifist was a determined fighter, but always on the side of the Angels. So early as 1917 he charged Western civilization with substituting the ideal of national wealth for the ideal of national happiness. To-day, leaders of thought admit that this substitution is responsible for much of the world's agony, but diagnosis remains easier than cure.

Scattered through his essays which range over a wide field, from life to death, from religion to drama, from Shakespeare to Donne and

Blake, from an appeal to stop indiscriminate bombing to praise of scythe swinging on warm summer days, the reader finds many an arresting thought; this reader marked sixty in little over 300 pages. Here are a few:—

"Every state which does not consistently follow the laws of general happiness is doomed." "Has our use of scientific discovery been in the direction of happiness, or has it been made to serve, almost exclusively, the ends of materialism?" "Our fierce concentration upon facts has during the past hundred years, dulled our capacity for perceptive consciousness." "The affect of bereavement is according to the measure of love." "This war is the Nemesis of competitive industrialism." "Man has forgotten wisdom in his pursuit of knowledge." "Love is life, and there is no life apart from love."

The most significant of these essays were born of shock and war. There is a Chinese proverb that tells us a man is more like the age he lives in than he is like his father and mother and this is singularly true of Max Plowman. Doubtless many thousands thought, and still think as he did, but it is given to few to express emotions and faith with such passionate intensity. He was consumed by his beliefs, they wore him out, but he has left a lasting memorial. I believe that thinkers will find a corner on their shelves for *The Right to Live* that they will turn to it again and again for refreshment and the renewal of their strength in a struggle that will not end in our time. The cry for a happier, saner, cleaner world is never made in vain and Plowman pleaded for what all men of good intent desire—not for themselves alone.

S. L. BENSUSAN.

JAVANESE PANORAMA, by H. W. Ponder. *Seeley Service*. 21s.

THE TATRA MOUNTAINS, by V. A. Firsoff. *Lindsay Drummond*. 10s. 6d.

BRITAIN'S MOUNTAIN HERITAGE, by Arthur Gardner. *Batsford*. 12s. 6d.

Here are three books that deal with picturesque parts of the world, two of which are for the moment being defiled. No doubt Java is faring much worse than the Tatra region, the sole attraction of this latter for our enemies being the various spas to which they can send their wounded and otherwise stricken men. Java, on the other hand, will be afflicted by the Japanese co-prosperity swindle, so that those charming natives are certainly pinning for the days when they and their Dutch fellow-subjects lived in such real prosperity and happiness together.

The authoress of this interesting book is not on the same literary level as the late Elinor Mordaunt, whose two books on the Dutch East Indies are so delightful. Miss Ponder is less adventurous, at any rate in this volume, for she remains in the safe island of Java instead of striking out, as her predecessor did, to remote ones where the population may consist of convicted murderers with one or two Dutchmen to supervise them. She had no contact with those murderous gentlemen who were so affable when Elinor Mordaunt was in their midst, but she tells us of an aged retainer of a Dutch family who was often entrusted with the care of their young daughters among the mountains and for years he proved to be the most excellent chaperon; then it was discovered that in his early days he had done time for having assassinated someone. But as a rule the Javanese are most gentle and Miss Ponder paints a very attractive picture of

them. The servants in a hotel never miss an opportunity of confiding their high opinion of their master or of singing the praises of the hotel itself, where—this will make many mouths water in this country—they frequently stay for twenty or more years. There is no servant problem in Java. 'Enak di sini,' (it is pleasant here) murmurs your waiter as he pours out the morning coffee, and you naturally agree. There was a certain amount of political opposition to the paternal administration before the war, but on the day when Holland was invaded, as Miss Ponder will be glad to hear, the man who more or less had there the position of Gandhi declared that he stood with the utmost loyalty behind Queen Wilhelmina. It is with matters of irrigation that the natives sometimes abandon for a while their amiability, for the water supply is for them of the greatest importance. The water tribunal reminds one of that which has for centuries been functioning in Valencia, their sessions conducted in the open air behind the cathedral. It is grievous that the horrors of modern war should invade an island where the fathers and grandfathers fly their kites with as much enthusiasm as the children and where a train is called 'fire-carriage,' while an express is 'proud fire-carriage' which disdains to stop at many of the stations.

Mr. Firsoff has for years—how one envies him!—lived in the Tatras and there is nothing about that magnificent district of which he is ignorant. The Polish and Slovak shepherds lived well indeed in the years of peace, they and their great white sheep-dogs. When such a dog grows up and is placid instead of being irritable he is less valued; sometimes a shepherd has even to teach his dog to bark. The Polish and Czechoslovak Governments

were teaching the world how a frontier among the mountains can be turned to the best use, for the Tatras were being turned into an international park and this project will, of course, be carried out in due course. Meanwhile the wise person will acquire this beautiful book and map out his future holiday.

Mr. Gardner's purpose is not to enchant us with mountain photographs, although, as one would expect from a Batsford book, those here presented are most beautiful. He wishes to follow the example of Wordsworth who even in those days had to protest against certain innovations deleterious to the grandeur of this region. Mr. Gardner suggests that the Lake District should be placed under the jurisdiction of a new body, instead of remaining under the three counties which are now in charge of its fortunes; this new body should have, he thinks, local representatives, members nominated by such associations as the National Trust, the Alpine Club, the Universities and the Royal Academy. That may be a good plan, but the counties are at present doing pretty well. Mr. Gardner is severe on the subject of Thirlmere and no doubt the trees planted between the lake and the main road by the Manchester Corporation should have been more varied, but the lake has not been filched from the public, seeing that they have access in normal times to the western road, which is appreciatively described in *Baddeley's Guide*, for which book Mr. Gardiner has nothing but praise. When he comes to Scotland he remarks that the amenities of Glen Affric, with which I happen to be familiar, are threatened by the Grampian Electricity Bill, but surely this bill was defeated by Parliament. Of course it is largely through the efforts of enthusiasts like Mr. Gardner, who influence M.P.s. and the

general public, that good work is done in preserving these parts of the country and his book should be read by all who have such matters at heart.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

BEAUTY FOR ASHES, by Morwenna Donnelly. *Routledge*. 2s. 6d.

THE UNTRIED SOLDIER, by Emanuel Litvinoff. *Routledge*. 2s. 6d.

A WREATH FOR THE LIVING, by Alex Comfort. *Routledge*. 2s. 6d.

THE BOMBED HAPPINESS, by J. F. Hendry. *Routledge*. 2s. 6d.

THE MIDDLE OF A WAR, by Roy Fuller. *The New Hogarth Library* Vol. VIII. *The Hogarth Press*. 3s. 6d.

SELECTED VERSE POEMS OF ARTHUR RIMBAUD, Translated by Norman Cameron. *The New Hogarth Library* Vol. VII. *The Hogarth Press*. 3s. 6d.

In the four fresh titles to the *Routledge New Poets* it is interesting to contrast how these newcomers differently react to the catastrophe of the war. Whether or not Coleridge believed what he said about the impossibility of an undevout poet, Miss Morwenna Donnelly in *Beauty For Ashes* has written a long devout poem of exceptional beauty. This is a romantic allegory of the age-old struggle in the soul between good and evil, which soars to a lyrical close in a vision of "a Phoenix of the spirit, rising out of the ashes." If her original, long-lined metre is somewhat loose, there is keen visual perception and nobility in the language, biblical at times, not uninfluenced by the later Eliot. She believes in the necessity of suffering as the road to ultimate peace.

For peace is a state of the spirit,
And its creed is a dreaming stillness,
poised
Within grief or tumult, or on any agony.

A poet to watch.

Mr. Emanuel Litvinoff is devout too; but he is more concerned with "the common muck o' the world" and draws realistically the pain, the more sordid agonies of separation, the sexual frustration of the inactive young soldier. The first impact of his poems is primarily emotional, heartrending, for he writes passionately out of grief and frustration. But he possesses a gift for strong phrase, biblical imagery, tribal prophecy, and in the poem, "Transition," there is hope. He transcends his pain:

There will be a crown of thorns on my head, my face will
Shine softly as the morning star and
you and the world and I
Will know one another instantly; we
will say:
Ah, brother! your face is shining in the
new dawn,
Your eyes kiss the morning, my darling.
It will be as sweetly simple as that.

Mr. Alex Comfort has been praised for his novels, and too much of *A Wreath For The Living* struck me as the impressionist work of a novelist—prose in strips, though with arresting objective vision. His verse in general is defective musically, and sometimes over clever with its cross connections and conceits:

After the polished winter, after the
snowfall
The puddles frosted like a blind dog's
eye.

In "Lizard" he is scientifically wrong:

I saw the dry wall-lizard turning
on the inverted world
a bitter lidless eye—

A lizard's eye is not lidless, although a snake's is; nor am I comfortable about the epithet "bitter" for an eye essentially bright and bird-like or sleepy. Some of the poems, however, mirror well war-time moods, notably "Plow Monday."

The last poet in this series, Mr. J. F. Hendry, offers us rather worried verse to a worried, jangling music. His "Churchillian Ode," though vigorous, lacks the essential Churchillian simplicity. He gives too often the impression of straining after effect, with far-fetched conceits or the obscurely mystagogic. But "Cornwall," "The Dead Larch" and the apocalyptic "The White Horseman" are strong poems.

Mr. Roy Fuller, now serving in the Fleet Air Arm, towards the end of his book justifies the confidence of his publishers. *The Middle Of A War* begins with rather sophisticated, bitter-witty verses, but in the latter half his present experience has enabled him to find his real voice. Poems such as "Defending The Harbour," "Royal Naval Air Station," "Good-Bye For A Long Time," "On The High Seas" and "Troopship" not only embody the moving work of a good craftsman, but convey the size and pain of the world conflict in terms visual and psychological.

Finally, Mr. Norman Cameron has had a thankless task in translating some of the verse poems of Rimbaud. As in other instances

The angelus is no more tolled
And Nature shows her ravages

disappoints as a rendering of

Les longs angelus se sont tus
Sur la nature défleurie.

If the music of the original eludes him he is hardly to be blamed, for here Rimbaud is probably untranslatable. Yet readers with no French must be grateful for this glimpse into the mind of an important poet and extraordinary man. It is possible, however, that indifference to the musical qualities of verse is too common a defect in contemporary poetry.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

GOOD NEIGHBOURS, by Walter Rose. *Cambridge University Press.* 10s. 6d.

APPLE ACRE, by Adrian Bell. *The Bodley Head.* 7s. 6d.

Looking back over fifty years of village life, Mr. Rose says that, although each improvement as it came along made life easier, he is not so sure it also made life happier:

I am conscious of a serenity (then) that does not seem to exist today; an ability to see delight in natural surroundings that is not so evident now.

Mr. Bell makes much the same observation:

They (the working countrymen of to-day) have cheerfulness and skill, but not that exuberance which overflows into the limbs. The fact that they do not dance and do not sing, but cover their innate reverence of soul with a bit of cheap tin New-Worldliness against the weather of life, shows that the circuit of true living has been broken by this civilization.

But it is not the direct purpose of these two writers either to diagnose our present ill or to suggest a remedy. Mr. Rose, as readers of *The Village Carpenter* will already know, is a craftsman born and bred, and his concern in this book is to give us a glimpse, clear and convincing, of the country communal life which he shared and served. With what his publishers rightly call "a blend of affection and realism" he brings to mind the time when seven years was not considered too long an apprenticeship for a carpenter; when carters so cared for their horses that they would pick the granary lock and help themselves to an extra ration of corn; when the cottager's pig, though it swallowed up more than half the man's earnings, was a liability none would forego; and when every village had its malthouse and every farm its brewing copper. There is, however, another aspect of the rural picture of those days, and Mr. Rose has not shirked to include it. "It is well to remember (he says) that the daily

work of these men was cultivating the land of others, on a large parish of over three thousand acres, yet never before or since was so much food produced from the soil and the producers so hungry." When the village was enclosed (in 1830), and the land redistributed, no provision whatever was made for allotments to be let to the poor; with the consequence that, some forty years after, "the cottagers could not get even a plot on which to grow their own vegetables." Or again: consumption was so rife, and the fear of it so steeped in ignorance, that the furtive remedies resorted to in the village include the swallowing of live garden snails and frogs.

Many rural wrongs have been righted since those days and a new balance struck; but the balance is still on the debit side. To-day the cottager may have his allotment but his pig-sty stands empty; and the malthouse has been tastefully converted into a dwelling-place. He may not be so ignorant in matters of health (or at least he need not be) but where is the lasting satisfaction in a healthy body if the mind is consumed with increasing boredom and its owner has lost interest in his job? Mr. Bell's book, therefore, though it is concerned with a Suffolk village of to-day, where there are still good neighbours and where humour is still the saving grace, is not without its regrets. A "madness of materialism" has affected the village as well as the town, and inertia has "paralysed the country in all its workings." What is the cure? The great merit of Mr. Bell's writing is its perceptiveness and the ability with which he grasps the significance of the ordinary act. "There is enough meaning in the ordinary acts of country life (he says) to get the soul to heaven" and we may well be satisfied if he continues to spend his talent in their interpretation. Nevertheless, *Apple Acre* has its hints and

gleams suggesting a way out of our present impasse. Briefly (and particularly in connection with the land) his hope is in the peasant proprietor, the small farmer, the "unregarded but persistent local life that goes on" (like small creatures living in the crannies beneath a heavy stone) "under the weight of mass-legislation." For here he finds the true circuit of life unbroken by civilization and in these "the repose in alertness which is the country genius" can still detect the false from the true, can still remember that the English tradition is a continuing one and must not be snapped.

Wait and you will see this green England reborn, waking in the cool of the morning with dew upon it; the sails will stir, the plough and the chisel go forward; every man in his own sanctuary of spirit, holding steadily to the whole through the detail. In every village there is a monument to the skill and faith of the past. This is the power-house of the future, whence men will draw practical vision and integration for what they do. They will rediscover worship.

C. HENRY WARREN.

I SAY REJOICE—a memoir of Christopher Benn, by His Brother. *Faber & Faber. 6s.*

I did not know Christopher Benn well at Cambridge: yet like so many who claimed his casual acquaintance I carried the memory of his unusually pleasant face throughout the intervening years. Something then of his brother's love for and pride in Christopher's character and achievements I can readily understand. I can sympathize, too, with his desire to make the most of his all too short career, the speeches at the Union, the musical criticism and the good start at the Bar. In fact Christopher's life, naturally enough, was full of high promise not yet of fulfilment. Captain Christopher Benn

was killed in the Middle East in November, 1941, shot down when flying to a distant unit with Wing-Commander Bowman. His death was one more of those terrible sacrifices which are demanded from a country as the price of war. Alas I could name many of Christopher's contemporaries whose lives have been given in the same cause.

It is for this reason that I question the value of this portrait as it is written. Christopher Benn's life would, I think, have been better recorded anonymously, as a tribute not only to Christopher but to all those, beloved by many, who have faced death for big ideals. All will be missed. None must be forgotten. They must be a constant inspiration to our endeavours and the pricking spur to our determination to see that the world they died for is not again a youthful dream.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

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POVERTY AND THE BEVERIDGE PLAN

BY B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE

BEFORE the war Britain was the richest country in Europe, and yet half of the working-class people spent some years of their lives in poverty.

In his Report on Social Insurance, Sir William Beveridge says that "abolition of want just before the war was easily within the economic resources of the community; want was a needless scandal due to not taking the trouble to prevent it."

I propose in this article to give evidence in support of both these statements.

First we must define "poverty," and if we are to carry conviction when speaking of the amount of poverty in a country we must not entertain extravagant ideas of the standard of life which people must enjoy before they can be regarded as living above the poverty line. When I refer to poverty in this article I refer to a living standard below that which is possible to a family of five with an available income of 43s. 6d. a week at 1936 prices (59s. 7d. to-day) after paying rent. If this sum is guaranteed for 52 weeks in the year and if it is spent with the utmost economy and if the dietary is selected with full regard to the dietetic value of different food-stuffs, it will provide for the bare necessities of physical efficiency and leave over a margin of 4s. 11d. a week for all else. Out of that sum must come all expenditure on recreation, all luxuries, such as sweets, beer and tobacco, all travelling by 'bus or train except that of the breadwinner to and from work, all savings for holidays—indeed every item of expenditure not absolutely required to maintain the family in physical health, and there is no allowance for contingencies. I am convinced that my standard cannot be successfully attacked as being too high. Rather is it open to criticism as being too low.

So much then for my definition of the word "poverty." Now for my statement that before the war half the working class spent a considerable part of their lives in poverty. I base this statement on facts disclosed by a social survey I made in York in 1936 in the course of which every working-class family was visited and information obtained from the books of employers regarding the earnings

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of 60 per cent. of the wage earners. Information was obtained from Trade Unions and many other sources regarding the earnings of the other families, which, combined with my own knowledge of wage standards in York where I had been engaged in business for nearly 50 years, enabled me to arrive at an estimate of their earnings with a considerable degree of accuracy.

My house-to-house investigation showed that 31.1 per cent. of all the workers, and 43 per cent. of the children under 14 were living below the poverty line, and that 52.5 per cent. of the working-class children born during the year in which I was making my investigation were born into families which were in poverty. I calculated that 47 per cent. of *all* the working-class children born would probably remain in poverty for 5 years or more, and 31.5 per cent. of them for 10 years or more. More than a quarter of them would be in poverty when they, in their turn, had children of their own, and this means that more than a quarter of the women would be in poverty during the time they are bearing children. 47.5 per cent. of the workers of 65 years and over were in poverty. Social surveys made by others point clearly to the view that conditions are no better in other cities, and before the war they certainly were not better in country districts.

This then is my evidence regarding the extent of poverty before the war. Now let me say why I agree with Sir William Beveridge that the problem of poverty is capable of solution. Before going further I want to make it quite plain that when I speak of solving the poverty problem I refer, as does Sir William Beveridge, only to what he calls "*involuntary*" poverty, that is poverty due to lack of income according to an extremely stringent standard such as I have described above.

In addition to this poverty an unknown, but considerable number of people go short of the things necessary for physical health, because money is spent on other objects—some useful, some wasteful. For instance, before the war working-class families spent on the average about 7s. a week, equal to approximately 10 per cent. of their income, on drink, and although I have no statistics to prove it I should be surprised if they spent less than 2s. 6d. a week on tobacco, and 2s. 6d. on gambling. Expenditure on the latter has grown enormously since football pools became the rage. Some people may be inclined to blame the workers whose incomes are below or only a very little above the poverty line for spending money on things which they cannot afford without going short of other things necessary for physical fitness. But they, no less than those who are better off, crave for relaxation and recreation; they are not prepared to live just on a fodder basis. To expect them to

do so is to expect of them a standard of self control far beyond that found among those with higher incomes. Clearly there is a sharp distinction between the steps necessary to abolish "*involuntary*" poverty and those needed to abolish poverty due to the causes just referred to. The former can be abolished by administrative action, the latter only by education and personal persuasion.

Before we proceed to examine the proposals contained in the Beveridge plan for abolishing poverty, let us follow the method of a physician and first diagnose the immediate causes of the disease it is designed to cure. My social survey in York showed that the poverty in that city was due to the following causes:

	per cent.
Inadequate Wages of Chief Wage Earner	32.8
Inadequate Earnings of casual workers and those working on their own account	9.5
Unemployment of Chief Wage Earner	28.6
Old Age	14.7
Death of Husband	7.8
Illness	4.1
Miscellaneous	2.5

The proportion of poverty due to the different causes will vary from town to town and from time to time according to the state of trade and for other reasons, but these variations will not affect the character of the steps to be taken if poverty is to be abolished.

It will be noted that in 1936 in York 42.3 per cent. of the poverty was due to the inadequate earnings of people who were working and 57.7 per cent. to interruption of earnings. Sir William Beveridge was not directed by his terms of reference to investigate the poverty problem as a whole, but only that part of it which is due to interruption of earnings, and the question we are here considering is whether the insurance benefits proposed are adequate to provide the needs of physical subsistence for those entirely dependent on them. As a member of a small committee appointed by Sir William to consider with him the cost of providing the physical needs of subsistence for the different categories of insured persons—young and old men and women, and children of different ages, I can testify to the immense pains he took to arrive at the right figures, and the committee unanimously agreed upon those which he finally decided to adopt in respect of all items other than rent, to which I shall refer later. The only class of insured persons for whom the proposed benefits will not *at once* provide the needs of physical subsistence are the old age pensioners. It is proposed to give pensions from the start of the scheme which are more liberal

than those given at present but which fall short of the full needs of physical subsistence, and to raise the statutory pension during a period of twenty years until it reaches the full figure. During the interval supplementary pensions will be given in case of need and subject to a means test, as they are now. This course of action is entirely justifiable. There is much evidence to show that even before the supplementary pension scheme which came into force recently, not more than about one third of old age pensioners were in poverty, and to give full subsistence pensions from the first day of the Plan for Social Security to people who have neither contributed for such pensions nor are in need of them, would place an unjustifiably heavy burden on the Exchequer.

I now come to the fundamentally important question of the allowance to be included in the insurance benefits to cover liability in respect of rent.

Clearly if the insurance benefits to cover everything other than rent only leave over a narrow margin after providing the essential needs of physical subsistence, then if poverty is to be abolished, which is the be-all and end-all of the Beveridge plan, the liability for rent must be fully met. It is comparatively easy to arrive at an estimate, based on ascertained facts and sound reasoning, of the cost of physical subsistence for individuals or for differently constituted families for everything other than rent, because the necessary cost of providing these things need not vary to any significant extent from family to family in the same locality and only within narrow limits from locality to locality. But this is not true of rent. Not only do rents for equivalent accommodation vary enormously between town and town and between town and country, but they also vary enormously within the same localities.

There are only three ways of dealing with the question of the sums to be included in the Social Insurance Benefits in respect of rent—a flat rate of benefit irrespective of rents actually paid, rates varying locally or occupationally, and rates adjusted to the rents actually paid by individuals.* Let us look at the pros and cons of these three methods. The most equitable *flat* rate to adopt would probably be 10s. but, to quote the Beveridge report (paragraph 202) “neither 10s. nor any other single figure can fit the true requirements even reasonably well. An allowance of 10s. a week for rent in 1938 would have been anything from 2s. 6d. to 7s. 6d. too much for more than two-thirds of the Scottish households and anything from 2s. 6d. to 10s. and upwards too little for half the London

* There should be an upper limit for rent benefit of say 15s. in the provinces and 20s. in London.

households. In no part of the country would it have been within 2s. 6d. of the actual rent for as many as half the households. It would have been at least twice as much as was needed for more than half the agricultural households. With the present variety of rents, it is not possible to fix any uniform rate of insurance benefit as meeting subsistence requirements with any accuracy.” These figures point clearly to the fact that if a flat rate of benefit for rent is adopted the Beveridge plan will not abolish poverty. Of course it would be possible, as Sir William points out, to make supplementary grants *based on a means test* to those paying high rents, but a basic principle of the Beveridge scheme is to do away with means tests.

What then about varying the benefits in respect of rents regionally or occupationally and varying the insurance contributions correspondingly? According to the investigation made by the Ministry of Labour in 1937-8 the rents paid by “industrial households” averaged 15.7 shillings in London as compared with 10.8 shillings in England generally and with 4.8 shillings paid by agricultural households. But these are only *average* figures. Within each region rents vary enormously. For instance in York the average rent of working-class houses in 1936 was 9s. 4d. 2,425 families paid less than 7s. rent; 7,109 paid between 7s. and 10s. 11d. and 3,891 paid 11s. or more. What flat rate of benefit would meet this situation, which is typical of the conditions to be found in every town in England?

The third method of dealing with the question of the allowance to be made in respect of rent is to adjust this in every case to the rent actually paid without varying the amount of contribution. *This is the only way to overcome the difficulty created by the immense differences in the rents paid by working-class people.* Sir William Beveridge admits the great difficulty of deciding on the right course to adopt in connection with rent allowances, and although he does not definitely declare in favour of any one of the possible alternative methods of dealing with the problem, he “provisionally” rejects the proposal to adjust benefit according to the rent actually paid by the individuals, although he says that “if, contrary to the provisional view taken here, it should be decided that adjustment is desirable and practicable” this course could be adopted without affecting the main structure of his plan. Why does he “provisionally” reject the proposal? Clearly his principal reason is that he considers that “a high rent is, to some extent at least, the sign of a larger income; it is paid not for subsistence but as part of a standard of living above the minimum,” and therefore it would be wrong to differentiate rent benefits without varying

contributions correspondingly. He considers that though the man with greater liabilities for rent should be insured against this, this ought to be by voluntary insurance. But quite apart from the question of whether or no this is the right view to take, what Insurance Company will insure a man against the risk of unemployment, which, after old age, is the most serious risk of "interruption of earnings" to which working men are exposed? Moreover, how far is it true that broadly speaking high rents are paid by well-to-do householders and low rents by poorer ones? With a view to throwing light on this question I have just examined a random sample of 1,500 schedules, equal to 14 per cent. of those collected in the course of my social survey of York made in 1936, and I find that 52.6 per cent. of the householders earning less than 65s. paid less than 10s. rent and 47.4 per cent. paid more, and that of those earning more than 65s. 42.6 per cent. paid less than 10s. and 57.4 per cent. paid more. If these figures may be taken as approximately applying to provincial cities generally, which I think they may, then I submit that they so largely disprove the theory that broadly speaking the poorer workers pay low rents and the richer ones pay high rents that it may be disregarded.

Equally I think we may disregard any suggestion that it is unfair that householders in London, where rents are much higher than in other cities, should receive benefits sufficient to cover their rents without paying any additional contribution. It cannot be said that the standard of living of the workers in London is higher, on the whole, than that of workers in other cities. What, for instance, about those in the East End? And if it is not higher why should they be penalized under a nation-wide insurance scheme by having to pay a larger contribution just because their liability for rent is greater? Had it not been for the great advance in the wages of agricultural workers which has taken place recently, a case might perhaps have been made out for differentiating contributions between town and country on account of the much lower benefits agricultural workers will receive for rent than townspeople, but no substantial case for such differentiation can be made now. Moreover, if it is held that rates of contribution should be varied with the benefits receivable as between one region and another, then it follows logically that they should vary with the risk of unemployment in different industries, and for that matter, in different places of business within the different industries. It makes no matter whether a worker who is paying a low rent is charged a slightly higher contribution than he would otherwise have to pay because the flat rate of contribution has to cover the liability for rent in the case of men paying higher rents than he does, or whether he is pay-

ing a slightly higher contribution because the flat rate contribution has to cover the liability of workers in industries where there is a greater risk of unemployment than in the one in which he is engaged.

A further reason which prompts Sir William provisionally to reject the policy of differentiating rent benefits without differentiating contributions is that in his opinion "difficulty would arise in determining the amount of the rent for which the applicant was responsible, in cases in which he was not the only earner in the house—where for instance he was one of an earning group, or was a householder with independent lodgers or a lodger himself." I see no difficulty here at all. The householder pays the rent and he is the only person who will receive a rent allowance. Sir William fails to take cognizance of the fact that the vast majority—I should say not less than 90 per cent.—of single men and women are lodging with families and paying a composite sum for board and lodgings. That sum covers food, the service rendered by the housewife, and a contribution to the whole of the overhead expenses of the household, including rent, light, heat and household sundries. If the object is to give unemployed single persons a benefit sufficient for subsistence, this should be based upon the sum that they have to pay for board and lodgings. This need not be the sum that they normally pay, but a flat rate of benefit should be fixed, sufficient to enable them to make a payment for board and lodgings high enough to prevent them from being turned out and to give a minimum margin for personal expenses. I agree with Sir William Beveridge that, for the reasons which he gives, a flat rate of rent benefit will be suitable in the case of Old Age Pensioners.

I now pass to another matter which is of great importance. By his terms of reference Sir William was directed to undertake a survey of schemes of national insurance and to make recommendations, but in paragraph 444 of his report he says that: "The aim of the Plan for Social Security is to abolish want by ensuring that every citizen willing to serve according to his powers has at all times an income sufficient to meet his responsibilities."

In paragraph 447 he says that the rising wages and general prosperity during the present century had diminished want but had not reduced it to insignificance. "The moral is," he says, "that new measures to spread prosperity are needed. The Plan for Social Security is designed to meet this need; to establish a national minimum above which prosperity can grow with want abolished."

I have stated above that my social survey of York showed that 31.1 per cent. of the population were in poverty and that 42.3 per cent. of the poverty was due to inadequate earnings of those in

work. Had the Beveridge plan been in operation when I made my survey, the children's allowances which form part of it, and which constitute the only part of the plan which affects those who are working, would almost have halved the number of those in poverty due to low earnings. But 3,769 persons, equal to nearly 7 per cent of the working-class population of the city, would still have been in poverty. York is not a low-wage city and I have no reason to suppose that figures in other towns would on the average have shown more favourable results. If that be so then it is clear that if *all* involuntary poverty is to be abolished we need not only the Beveridge plan but also a statutory national minimum wage. A wage of 45s. at 1936 prices (61s. 6d. to-day), plus the family allowances, would have abolished half the remaining poverty due to low wages, and a wage of 50s. (68s. 6d. to-day) would have abolished practically all of it. A minimum wage would be of some benefit to casual labourers, though just how much would of course depend on the number of hours they worked in a week. It would be of little or no benefit to those working on their own account. In 1936 the latter accounted for about one-eighth of the total number of persons in poverty due to inadequate earnings. The fact that the Beveridge plan will not lead to the abolition of the large amount of poverty due to inadequate earnings is no reflection on the plan—it was not designed to do so. But the figures quoted above lead quite clearly to the need for a national minimum wage.

Limitation of space prevents me from discussing whether we can afford the plan. I do not think that we need have any fear under this head. The people of this country are determined to have it and they are willing to pay for it because they realize the inestimable good that it will do.

POST-WAR AVIATION

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

NO one who has thought on the matter needs to be reminded that war is a fierce improver, all that wits and science can devise going to the sharpening of weapons wherewith the struggle is maintained. Seldom, however, does it happen that such products of inventive minds are transformable to the usages of peace. The tank is not adaptable to agriculture; the submarine affords no aid to fishery; the discharge of heavy ordnance does not put an end to drought. But to this barrenness of real utility for the creative processes set up by war there is a notable exception. In the realm of aviation lies a rosy promise for a future world at peace, a prospect which is all the better assured for the reason that in no other of war's departments is there keener competition for the discovery of means by which one side may be set beyond the other in the air. At present the rival merits of the Allied and Axis aircraft are delicately in balance, no more than a gentle see-saw motion being discernible to distinguish which is up or which is down. But air force seniors and flying men are well aware that, on both sides, 'back-room' brains are hard at work improving types, producing fresh designs, and striving, above all, for the richest prize of all, some suddenly discovered scientific means in flight whereby the present working principles are all at once outclassed. Suppose, as an imaginative instance, that some genius invented a process of deriving power from atmospheric electricity, thus enabling aircraft to dispense with liquid fuel. If the inventor were an Axis national it is in the highest degree probable that Allied air power would very soon be overborne. The more delicate the balance, as described above, the more shattering the result should it be overthrown, and it is this carking anxiety lest the opponent should steal a march in aviation's progress that creates so fierce a competition and so rapid a development. Weapon improvement in the naval, or the military, field of armament is not comparable with the changing situation in the air. In respect of either service the possibilities of new discovery approach exhaustion, or counter-measures, as witness our prompt reply to the magnetic mine, can be effectively applied.

In consequence of this intense absorption on improvement the aircraft types in use on either side are in a constant flux, such changes being sometimes in result of a new development in air tactics, but more often are brought about by the mere desire, or the plain necessity, of worsting an opponent through the medium of superior equipment. This continual stepping-up of

efficiency, as it might be called, covers the whole wide field of wartime aviation, being indeed particularly concerned with armament, protection, inter-communication methods, navigational device and the production of high grade petrol. For the most part, however, it is the power-unit and the airframe that compel the principle attention of inventors and improvers, the end they strive for being, in the case of fighters, enhanced speed, rate of climb, and an ever higher ceiling, and, in that of bombers, increased carrying capacity and air endurance, with due regard to speed. A curious factor in this rivalry for betterment is that both sides are working in the dark. For even in time of war a long process is involved before the product of the drawing-office is translated into fact, and a longer period must ensue ere the new design is seen in hundreds in the sky. It may therefore happen, and in fact it often does, that a new type on which great hope is founded, and to the mass production of which much manufacturing energy has been devoted, is outmoded by a rival product as soon as it appears in the air. The first Spitfire flew in 1936, and before that its prototype won for us the Schneider trophy in 1931, but even so it outclassed the Messerschmitt, with which the enemy intended to sweep us from the sky, when the real time of testing came.

• Our own bomber developments make an interesting record of progress in accordance with the demands of an entirely changed strategical situation. At the beginning it was naturally expected that our bombing offensive against Germany could be conducted from the soil of France, and we were even hopeful, if all went well with our arms, of establishing ourselves on German airfields, thus to bring her remotest areas of industry within the range of air attack. But with the fall of France that hope was disappointed, and in consequence the Battles and Wellesleys, single-engined bombers with a light carrying capacity and of moderate speed, which formed the most of our equipment at the outbreak of the war were dropped perforce from first-line service in Western Europe the very moment that replacement was obtainable. In their place twin-engined Blenheims, Whitleys, Hampdens and Wellingtons, were substituted, types possessing greater speed and a four-fold carrying capacity which were fortunately already in production, but of which the output did not at first fulfil requirement. Until the spring of 1941 these types alone were used for night attack on Germany's industrial and shipping centres, and on her communication by rail and inland waterway. Losses were too often heavy, and casualties among trained personnel considerable, but the offensive was sustained. It was, moreover, doubtful from the first whether the damage inflicted on the enemy's war industry was, taking it by and large, sufficient to compensate for the heavy cost of such attacks considering the number and variety of objectives, the intermissions on account of weather, and the sprinkling effect of bombs so widely scattered. Bigger and better bombers were required the effects from which would represent a more concentrated effort, and which, at the same time, would be less vulnerable to the ground and air

defences of the enemy, more capable of self-defence, and economize on air crews, ground staffs and other valuable personnel.

For a long time active minds had been at work considering the problem, and the lessons of the 'blitz' on Britain had been studiously digested. First results of these anxious cogitations appeared in the spring of 1941 when the four-engined Stirling arrived as precursor of a noble string of super-bombers, equal to nine Blenheims in carrying capacity, speedy, economical to operate, and easy to manoeuvre with a full weight up. In August of that year came the Halifax from Mr. Handley Page's works, also with four engines, weighing 60,000lb. when fully loaded, with an armament of eight Browning machine-guns, and an excellent turn of speed. In November the Avro Manchester appeared on the scene, a twin-engined job on this occasion but a giant aircraft none the less, with nose, tail and dorsal turrets, a full-up weight of approximately 25 tons, and a range of about 2,000 miles. Early in 1942 the Lancaster, also an Avro product, put in an appearance to complete, for the time being, this superb British bomber team. With this mammoth aircraft we reached a top rung in the ladder of design. It has a speed of 300 m.p.h., a low gear and a high gear supercharger, four Rolls Royce Merlin XX engines, four turrets, 10 machine guns, and a bomb compartment, 33ft. long, which can house a bomb-load of approximately eight tons and accommodate the biggest air projectile yet devised. This Royal Air Force four-in-hand, composed of most highly complex fighting units, by no means came off the production line in the manner of a conjurer extracting a rabbit from a hat. The prototype, for instance, of the Halifax was flying in the summer of 1939, while the Manchester was taking shape on Mr. Chadwick's drawing-board as far back as 1937. Only in the case of the Lancaster was something in the nature of a miracle accomplished. Drawings were started on it in February, 1941; the prototype was flying in September; the first batch of operational machines was delivered as the year went out. With bigger and better bombers went bigger and better bombs in geometrical progress. The 250lb. bomb was our high explosive mainstay at the beginning of the war; we are now able to drop one weighing no less than 8,000 pounds with proportional effect. Our methods of procedure also underwent a change, for new and powerful instruments must immediately be put to the best possible use in time of war.

The fresh idea was, broadly stated, to pound the objective to destruction, so that its industrial activity might never be renewed, rather than rest content, as in the past, with the infliction of remediable damage. Doubtless it was an ideal, with the aim a little high, but none the less it amounted to a sound conception which, but for the string of new-type bombers, would have remained beyond our reach. The method of this tactical innovation was a heavy concentration of bomber power over the objective, or the area, selected for attack within as short a space of time as its nature, and the size of the offensive force, permitted. In such a way the ground defence was saturated,

so to speak, by the downpour from above, either for the plain reason that casualties were incurred that put a stop to firing, that the aim was confused owing to the multitude of targets in the air, or that sense was stunned by the awful uproar as the heavy bombs exploded, the lurid glare of flames lit up the sky and the dust of debris obscured the view. The first places to receive the impact of this concentrated method of assault were Rostock, Lubeck, Cologne, Hamburg, Bremen, and thereafter it became the general rule, aerial photographs taken on a subsequent reconnaissance showing unmistakably the value of the system.

A further development in the Allied bombing offensive over Western Europe was gradually introduced as soon as the bomber units of the United States Army Air Corps, which had been taking station on home airfields during the summer of 1942, were in force enough to operate. Over there, while yet America was merely benevolently neutral, the lessons of the war had been continually imbibed and design, on purely national lines, had kept abreast of the necessities disclosed. In particular two types of heavy bomber had been included in the programme of production, the Liberator and the Flying Fortress, the former constructed by the Consolidated, and the latter by the Boeing, Aircraft Corporations. It is not needful to describe these giant aircraft with great particularity; suffice it to say that both mounted four engines, carried a bomb-weight of about four tons, were fast enough, of great air endurance and were liberally supplied with turrets and blisters from which a devastating stream of lead could be directed for the provision of an all-round defence. The expression 'devastating' has been used advisedly, for the machine-gun battery which formed the armament of these colossal bombers fired bullets of a half-inch calibre, as opposed to the British .303, a hard hitting and a long-range form of fire which, coupled with a great intensity of fire-power, put them on something approaching an equality with their natural enemy, the German fighter. They opened up, in fact, a vista of day bombing, a method of incalculable value and naturally more effective than night bombing when great accuracy is demanded, provided always that the loss incurred does not outweigh the achieved result.

Day bombing is very far from being an unknown practice to the R.A.F. in the European theatre of the war. Against a vitally important target of a fleeting nature it is unavoidable no matter what the cost. It has been thus employed on many an occasion since the commencement of the war, though seldom without severe loss. It can be effective on a short-range sortie when an element of surprise enters into the project, as witness the bombing of the Renault works, the Le Creusot armament factory and other occasions of the sort. In April, 1942, our Lancasters reached out to Augsburg, flying a round 1,000 miles in doing so, but of the twelve embarking on that heroic enterprise no more than five got back. The fate of German bombers in the Battle of Britain shows what can happen at the hands of fighters when invading aircraft are not specially adapted to their task of self-defence. These facts

were all well-known to the U.S. Air Command, and we may presume that our own senior Air Officers did not fail to point the moral. In spite of such discouragement, however, but confident in the slugging quality of their half-inch bullets, the Americans persisted in their belief that Fortresses and Liberators could bomb by day and were determined to evolve a new technique. The first essays gave promising results, and soon it was established that this bomber pair could well hold their own against Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt attack, not alone in tight formation with hostile fighters swarming all around, but even, on occasion, when singly outnumbered. A peak of bold performance was reached on October 9, last year, when a force of these bombers attacked Lille in the biggest daylight operation of the war. For a loss of six U.S. aircraft 48 enemy fighters were shot down, 38 were probably destroyed, and 19 others suffered damage. Conformably with structural development new tactics had been successfully introduced; a fine example of the adaptation of means to purpose in the midst of war.

Meanwhile the R.A.F. had also been evolving a new technique for day bombing of quite a different order, the outcome also of advance in aircraft design. The deHavilland Mosquito, twin-engined and the fastest bomber in the world, of wooden construction and carrying about a ton of high explosive, came off the line in the autumn of 1942. It was at once put in service for low-level attack on special targets, trusting to its speed and zero height for reasonable immunity against ground and air defence. In such manner were the Gestapo headquarters in Oslo, and the Philips radio works at Eindhoven, in Holland, successfully bombed in broad daylight. Low level speed raiding is being actively developed as a means of stiffening our bombing offensive, Douglas Bostons and Lockheed Vega Venturas being joined to the Mosquitos in this highly specialized endeavour.

Space does not admit of a review of progress, and of the tactical changes accompanying it, in the case of fighters and other aircraft types, such as dive-bombers, flying-boats, co-operation types and so on. Nor indeed would it be strictly pertinent to the purpose of this article. At its commencement passing reference was made to the fact that, alone of war's machine-made and mechanical contrivances, aviation can be adapted to the arts of peace. That reference concerned commercial aircraft of the post-war period, and the bomber was intended as a vehicle of adaptation.

The present writer, at that time British air attaché at our Embassy in Washington, once listened to a remarkable utterance on the occasion of a dinner given in New York by the aircraft manufacturers of America. The speaker was Mr. Glen Martin, who was then, in 1919, the designer and constructor of the Martin Bomber, an aircraft, even as long ago as that, which showed a striking boldness of conception. Mr. Martin looked into the future, and foresaw the day when machines compared to which his existing bomber was a midget would cleave the stratosphere at speeds beyond belief, carrying

freight and human cargoes to the uttermost ends of the earth on non-stop journeys.

Who shall say that the bold prophecy, which appeared visionary then, is not to-day within measurable distance of fulfilment? And who can deny but that the heavy bomber, its growth matured in the forcing-house of war, will be the instrument of its achievement? For all that war requires of the ideal giant aircraft, speed, power, weight-carrying capacity and steadiness in flight, saving only the extraneous matter of machine-gun armament, post-war commercial aviation will demand. Thus, and thus only, war plays into the hands of peace, affording some slight compensation for the misery it involves. In another way as well, linked closely to the former, the two are hand in glove together. Aviation routes that seam the earth's circumference are pioneered in time of war, a direct contribution to the development of commercial airways. Atlantic flight is no more than a ferry passage in the air to-day. Only a little time ago one of our Imperial Airways pilots flew across that watery expanse a dozen times within a fortnight. Pacific islands, thousands of miles apart, are no more than stepping-stones in the air-transit of that vast Ocean. All Africa is over-laid with air lines, and a similar transformation is taking place everywhere in the Far East. The scientific progress that has made such journeys possible and opened up the air to world-wide travel is, it is true, a mere accident of war, the offshoot of a fierce endeavour to perfect the means of aerial destruction. None the less it prepares the paths of peace, and that this is being fully recognized, even to the extent of a day's debate in Parliament, is a significant and healthy portent for the future in a world at war.

In that debate, which took place on December 17 last, some anxiety was expressed least the U.S.A. air transport services, notably developed since the commencement of the war, should be left in practical command of that field of enterprise to the detriment of British endeavour in the same respect. Our own compelling need has been the production of service aircraft of all types, but America was not so situated. In that country the development of air transport has always been greatly considered as an adjunct to travel by road and rail, and design has kept pace with the demand for high performance. Since her entry into the war, moreover, the air co-operation of the United States has taken the shape of rendering aid in places far afield from home, situations being thus created which have continually required the mediation of air transport services. She will be, therefore, strongly placed to occupy the field at the cessation of hostilities, to the exclusion, perhaps, of competition, and it was uneasiness on this score that stirred the House. All misgiving was allayed, however, by the Under-Secretary of State for Air's assurance that with the termination of the war the *status quo* would be restored.

But it would be a backward step if civil aviation were to revert to a narrow nationalism. The outlook should be wider, and the hope rests, rather, on

some form of international organization, some pooling of resources, such as the United Nations, in face of present need, have arranged among themselves. The New World, for instance, will no longer tolerate the absurd conception, so hampering to progress in the past, that the ownership of space on earth includes an absolute proprietary right to the sky extending overhead. No more than mid-ocean space should the air be hedged around with frontiers. All such travel should be conducted on the principle of through-journeys as far as scientific means allow. It is towards progress and improvement such as this that peace policy should be directed, in accordance with the real air age which the fierce spirit of war is hastening. A vast aircraft industry has been built up to meet the needs of war; an innumerable personnel has been trained to serve it; the globe is festooned with chains of airfields; aeronautical science is progressing by leaps and bounds. It would be a sin against civilization itself if this huge accumulation of skill, energy and material were to be dispersed, as on the last occasion, as soon as the armed struggle came to a full stop. If post-war civil aviation can be firmly established on an international basis the present generation may see a development of flying to which no limit can be put, using aircraft of such size and power, and so safe in passage, that it will become a friendly rival of the older forms of transport by land and sea. It may indeed become the senior in that partnership of three. So, in some sort, can the war be turned to good advantage, and such should be the aim of the peace policy which the victors will be in a position to impose.

THE NEW COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

BY GEORGE CATLIN

MR. WENDELL WILLKIE, in a recent interview in the *Christian Advocate*, voiced a demand for a clearer definition of what is meant by the term 'United Nations.' It was high time for such a demand to be made. "We must make sure that these people know what they are fighting for, and we must make sure that we are all fighting for essentially the same thing." The question at issue is something very much more than a statement of ideals. Mr. Roosevelt, in his speech of September 3, 1942, said: "Victory is essential; but victory is not enough for you—or us. We must be sure when you have won victory that you will not have to tell your children that you fought in vain." "It would be the height of folly," says Mr. Wallace, "not to prepare for peace." "Unity," says Lord Halifax, "after the war may be more difficult to ensure." The easy going opportunism of the Foreign Office, based on infinite reserve power, must, the *London Times* suggests, be abandoned. In very concrete terms, in another field, Sir William Beveridge has pointed out that the whole success of his widely acclaimed Social Security Scheme depends upon certain conditions; that the maintenance of a good average level of employment is one of those conditions; and that this depends, in turn, upon a stable and satisfactory international order. We shall, however, do well to bear in mind Mr. Churchill's shrewd statement that we don't want some pledge about war aims which will set all the Allies quarrelling. To proceed forward through a verbal fog would be better than that. What emerges here is the desirability of such exploration and illumination by unofficial discussion now as will reveal and clarify the public mind and facilitate official declarations when the right moment has come.

Senator Taft has recently, in the words of Mr. Agar, "done a service," reinforced by Senator Vandenberg, by reminding us that the President of the United States cannot bind Congress by his declarations, even in the limited sense in which a British Prime Minister in foreign policy can bind Parliament. Senators Taft and Vandenberg reminded those who would hear that, unlike the Lease-Lend Acts (but like the League Covenant and the Fourteen Points), the Atlantic Charter and the Statement on the Four Freedoms were so-called declarations of Presidential policy. The Wilsonian tactic of writing these declarations of principle into formal and binding treaties has not yet been begun. The Atlantic Charter should be confirmed by Congress; but in the Senate the Democrats alone no longer have the required two-third control. Again, Turkish journals, as reported in the *London Daily Express*, in discuss-

ing Mr. Eden's speech of December 2, point out that Russia has given no assurances of adherence to the Atlantic Charter, even although this Charter itself omits reference both to the League and to two of the Four Freedoms.

As for the phrase 'United Nations' it appears to have been culled from a list, including quotations from the poet Byron, prepared for Mr. Roosevelt and, according to Mr. Ernest Lindley, approved by Mr. Churchill when arising from the lather of his bath like Aphrodite from the sea's foam. The phrase is an admirable one, suggesting by association the United States or United Kingdom. It may yet prove only too like the 'blessed word Mesopotamia.' The meaning of the phrase is obscure. It must not remain obscure. The moral enthusiasm of large sections of humanity, once concentrated on 'the League' or 'Federal Union' can be aroused, and in America has been aroused, on its behalf. The moral reaction and disillusionment will be politically disastrous if the phrase is detected as mere *flatus vocis*, words without meaning. There is in America a tradition of political rhetoric that has sometimes had bad consequences. Already, in Mrs. Pearl Buck's recent speech before the Nobel Prize-winners, there are signs of that disillusionment.

Nevertheless, the outline of a post-war scheme, sketched in the speeches of American statesmen, more vaguely of British statesmen and, with a difference, of M. Stalin, appears fairly clearly. Its most precise clauses are the economic, financial and technical ones. The Lease-Lend agreements (concluded also between the United States and the U.S.S.R., as well as other countries) provide the basis. These agreements, said the Hon. Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, "open the way—and about the only way—in which these wants of every man and every woman in every country can be more than wishes." The whole scheme intimately affects Britain which, after the war, will be in more urgent need than ever of export markets, at least on the short range, if the standard of 'life under the Beveridge Plan' is to be maintained, let alone improved. These markets, nevertheless, will be harder to obtain; if sought for in intensive competition, Britain as the weaker competitor will be borne down and overcome; there will then assuredly be no 'land fit for heroes.' Britain's only realistic prospects are along the lines of United Nations planned co-operation. This will involve Britain—as sharply distinct from the British Commonwealth, which anyhow has a great future—giving up much that we shall not wish to give up. With a population, which in sixty years may have declined by 20 millions, and a position increasingly similar to that of France in 1918, this will be inevitable. The United Nations in the Twentieth Century—or at least Anglo-Saxony as an entity, in the Nineteenth—must step into the position which Britain in the Nineteenth Century had the population to sustain alone. What matters is to decide upon the vital things that we in Britain must keep, in their order of priority; and to keep them. There may be free trade within certain economic regions of similar standards, with a Russian system of control as touching the relations between these regions. It cannot be supposed, on the evidence, that the

U.S.S.R. itself would adopt any other system. Within these free trade areas a common agricultural and nutrition policy could be pursued in a balanced manner.

As touching the British-American section of this area, Dr. Raymond Buell, Mr. Willkie's foreign adviser, wrote, in the *Fortune* supplement (May, 1942) *Relations with Britain*: "To the generation nourished by the neo-mercantilism of the thirties, this proposal for the creation of an Americo-British free area may seem both quixotic and futile. . . . Admittedly the difficulties will be great, but they are not insuperable If the U.S. and the British Commonwealth adopt a common military policy after the war, the creation of a free market area will be facilitated."

The political scheme has been sketched by the statesmen less firmly than the technical and economic one. Mr. Sumner Welles has told us that "the organization through which the United Nations are to carry on their co-operation should surely be formed so far as practicable before the fires of war which are welding them together have cooled" "There must be agreement upon the objectives to be attained; machinery for carrying out the agreed action of the United Nations." Vital though an organized system embracing all Europe may be, it will only be maintained by power coming from outside Europe. The proposal for the international control of the Saar-Ruhr-Luxembourg triangle and of Silesia, both crucial in European industry, has been quite inadequately considered in public statements. At present, however, there can be no United Nations trusteeship, for example in northern Africa, because there is no 'United Nations' as a legal entity. It is not even the case that 'war is indivisible' and that there is a united strategy, since Russia is still not China's and Australia's military ally against Japan.

Over against totalitarian proposals for the effective unification of the continent of Europe, if not of the world, and also over against the lack in some quarters of any systematic proposals at all, stands the scheme of the United Nations, including Russia, China and Europe in its plan. The assumption is that we have here a scheme, not for mere military alliance in this war, but for peace-time civil collaboration, not temporary but integral. The four centuries' old essentially isolationist policy of balance of power, however masqueraded under the name of 'freedom'—a policy which arouses intense resentment in continental Europe—must be discarded.

In a recent article Mr. F. Voigt took to task with a certain brusqueness, not only Professor E. H. Carr for his proposals, but also the federal unionists (within whose ranks the late Lord Lothian, Sir William Beveridge, Professor Lionel Robbins and Mr. Lionel Curtis can be included). The only comment I would make here is that Mr. Voigt's view of Germany after seven years of war is sharply different from the Duke of Wellington's view of France after approximately a century of trouble. On consideration, I agree with the Duke. I believe in the organization of power outside the *Reich*, so powerful that Germany in man-power can never hope to equal it. As Germany in offence

and Russia in defence had, for years before 1939, been organized for war—and therefore are effective now—so the United Nations, after the Peace Treaty, must be organized for at least a generation for, and against, war, with *guns before* butter, if history is at last to be changed and peace to be maintained (instead of endemic war) by the route of, not pacifism, but organized force. When we choose the ends we must accept the means, and we must honestly count the cost. I agree, however, with Mr. Voigt that some of the realism which characterized Professor Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* deserted him in his *Conditions of Peace*. It has led this eminent writer to follow the approved official line of putting all his eggs in the basket of economic and technical collaboration—vital and hopeful though this is—to the relative neglect of political guarantees. It is, however, practically out of the question that Carr's 'European Planning Authority' could remain for long 'outside politics' and purely technical. The legislatures of the States concerned would not allow it. It has, nevertheless, to be recognized that there is a school of thought which, for tactical reasons connected with the cursed imbroglio of nationalism, prefers to avoid political issues. Anyone acquainted with the difficulties cannot but feel sympathy with them. Nevertheless Hitler and M. Stalin have both given their political answers to the conundrum. What is ours?

I will go further than agreeing with Mr. Voigt. Professor R. G. Collingwood seems to me to be right in asserting that the logic of Thomas Hobbes, transferred from the domestic to the international field, is incontrovertible. The problem that Hobbes confronted, in the limited sphere of the new post-feudal Nation-States and of the Civil Wars of France and England, is the problem, in a larger field, that we have to-day if the plague of war is to be overcome. Weak power, as Hobbes said, is a provocation of anarchy and uproar. The *pax Britannica* must be replaced by an even more authoritative *pax* of the United Nations. The Two Power standard, as minimum, must be resumed. Just as, domestically, if we want an end of civil war, so internationally if we want peace we must have a sovereign authority or Leviathan, although the nature of that authority may be matter for discussion. The views of Dante, Hobbes, Leibnitz and Kant will differ about that nature, but not about the importance, of this unified authority. We must speak, with Pius XII in his Christmas allocation, of "the heresy of the national state which subordinates all to human law." (*Evening Standard*, December 24). It is open to anyone to say that, if we are taking seriously peace, international order and its derivative prosperity, then we must have a Dictatorship of the United Nations over against enemies or threatened enemies. The phrase is a harsh one which I use as a challenge, but subject to three reservations. First, a dictatorship in relation to others is not inconsistent with a democratic or federal structure of the United Nations themselves. We are always having it dinned into our ears that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Russia in relation to the class enemy is not inconsistent with a 'wider and fuller

democracy' than any seen yet. External action, against threatened enemies and aggressors, and internal governmental form are quite different attributes of a political system. Secondly, the executive authority of the United Nations is not inconsistent with the association, *under that Leviathan*, of other nations with the United Nations; or collaboration (as the London Trades Council urges against Lord Vansittart) with Germans on this condition; or the selection of a German Talleyrand to perform for his country the work so excellently performed at Vienna by the French original. Thirdly, I am not deluded by the belief that many of the problems of the harmony of peoples can be solved *at all* on the level of power, dictatorship or Leviathan. Just so far the pacifist argument is entirely sound. They are problems of good-will, peace-mindedness and of right education, where, as Kant said, nothing is good save good-will. I am only here making the orthodox assumption that, whereas the law is kept domestically because most men are law-abiding but, nevertheless, a police force is still required, so internationally, if peace is to be maintained by force, this must be not only by the peaceful conduct of men of good-will but also by the world organization of crushing power on the Soviet model, complete with guns, battleships and airplanes, against men without that good-will and law-abidingness. Secession from that organization must itself be *casus belli*. Imperilling it by private imperialism must be condignly punished.

Mr. Voigt is afraid that a federal system in Europe of moderate and minor Powers must be weak; and that, in any European union of peoples, Germany will be left again potentially the strongest power (although, in the long run it is Asia that will, again and finally, take control of the world, having combined numbers with technology). It is the birthrate that matters more for the ultimate fate of countries than the war death-rate and the battles. There is indeed a very definite danger that America may approve of some 'plan for Europe' that might repeat the mistakes of Wilsonism even more emphatically. It is easy for an American politician—anxious to escape trouble and seeing that his constituents of Polish, Scottish, Yugoslav and Italian ancestry can, as American citizens, be held amicably together in a liberal and democratic system, based on discussion and committees rather than on force—to suppose that a similar easy-going liberal plan would be successful with Pole, German, Yugoslav and Italian in their native lands inside Europe, affected by a thousand memories of traditional loathing. Such a dream, attractive as a matter of wishful thinking and an easy way out of direct responsibility, is bound to end in disillusionment. Here only omnipotent Leviathan can be effective. Despite Mr. Voigt, however, I affirm my belief that such a Leviathan will be regarded as intolerable by the smaller—and by many of the great—nations as a threat to their cultural autonomy, unless it is a 'federal' beast, just as Blackstone's New Leviathan was a 'parliamentary' beast. That is why I myself prefer not to talk of 'dictatorship,' but to use Wendell Willkie's good phrase 'a World Commonwealth of Free Nations' with a United Nations

Common Council'—always provided, however, that it is a sovereign and powerful Commonwealth. It is a far better phrase, anyhow, than Kant's clumsy "cosmopolitical institution."

Hitherto, for the last four hundred years, we have lived in the West in the equivalent period to that known in Chinese history as 'the War between the States.' If we evade this issue of building Leviathan we shall relapse back into the international anarchy and the tribal "sword will have place again." Wars will continue which, endemic, destroy all substance in liberty or in economic justice. The personal and pacifist argument will logically occupy the field, the organization of force having been abandoned in despair and total disillusionment with the prospect of this organization taking charge. How then do we propose to organize Leviathan as an alternative to letting Hitler—or M. Stalin—do so; or of relapsing into international anarchy, tempered by pacifism and a general flight from politics? Even in order to enlist the support of small nations and their little armies, we shall be unwise to dicker with a romantic anarchism.

Mr. Sumner Welles said, in a speech of last June: "Peace—freedom from fear—cannot be assured until the nations of the world, particularly the great Powers, recognize that the threat of war anywhere throughout the globe threatens their own security, and until they are jointly willing to exercise the police powers necessary to prevent such threats from materializing into armed conflict." This speech Mr. Eden selected for especial commendation. On December 6, Mr. Welles added: "Do we realize that an association of the free peoples of the United Nations when the war is won is just as essential to the future security of this country?" Following the analogy of Sir Stafford Cripps' speech, some kind of Permanent Executive Council of the United Nations, or of such as will come in, appears to be required. For practical purposes a regional division of powers may be necessary, which would leave Russia as the determinative Power in Eastern Europe. This still means that the collaboration of Anglo-Saxony* with Russia and China is *sine qua non* of peace; and this, in turn, may mean that the capitalist West may have to go 'half way to Moscow' in social policy and that dictatorial Russia may have to establish for her citizens more personal freedom of speech and worship, and freedom for a constitutional opposition and from political police. Mr. Willkie has made his position clear to the point of brutality on this matter of collaboration and reform. In de Gaullist quarters it is generally believed that a restored France would demand, as the most effective of all securities, the implementing of Mr. Churchill's promise of June, 1940. The foreign minister of Norway, Hr. Lie, has indicated that Norway might welcome a similar association with the Atlantic Powers. So might Belgium.

* I speak of Anglo-Saxony—the community of "blood, laws, religion and liberties" (Edward Pierrepont) and, let us add, of language and tradition. The ethnological argument, favoured in Marxist quarters to-day, which would prove that Americans are 'foreigners' would also prove that the inhabitants of the Dominions are morally the same. This seems to me to be a form of treason.

Mr. Eden said (December 15), "so far as we were concerned we should continue . . . to encourage smaller States to weld themselves into larger though not exclusive groupings." How far Europe or the Balkans—or even the Yugoslavs within their own Triune Kingdom, with Reds and the others at loggerheads—will in fact adopt this policy, except under *force majeure*, is another matter. This definition of policy, good enough for the 'smaller States,' should also be right for us in the West. Mr. Paul Appleby, American Under-Secretary of Agriculture, referring to the British Commonwealth and the United States, has said: "These two peoples, then constitute the most immediate and most feasible unity within that broadest unity which is humanity itself. It is toward that broadest unity that we aspire." The announced policy of the Canadian Conservative-Progressive Party is relevant here; so also is Dr. Buell's article *Relations with Britain*, in the May issue of *Fortune*. Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, on October 15, 1942, supplements Mr. Appleby's remark. "Our relationship with Britain rests on something more solid than cousinly sentiment . . . Year after year we have come to work together in all essential matters . . . Another great Power which has habitually joined with the United States is Russia, and since the appearance of the Far East in Western affairs we have had a historic friendship for China and she for us."

What is the minimum that can be demanded of these United Nations as a warrant that their association is substantial and their joint executive action assured? In the U.S.S.R. it is a criminal offence to stir up race animosity between those in the Union. If the idea of the United Nations is to have any substance, and not to be merely a pious notion, we must have the "huge international economic system" to which Mr. Berle refers (including transport, power supply, and a bureau of standards), with its appropriate organization and compulsive force. Within its ambit there must be no discrimination between nations, but its operation must in part be determined by the respective standards of living of diverse areas. As a consequence it is likely in certain of its functions, for example, those of the I.L.O., to have a world range and, in certain, to act regionally. We should begin to discuss what those regions should be. Does 'Pan-America' include Canada? Does the British Commonwealth include Britain? But, further, unless it is to dissolve, under the immense stresses of national economic competition, we must have institutions to stabilize this system. We need a Judicial Court (and, if so, a law-making body), and, even more, an Executive Council of the United Nations, or what Mr. Wallace, too expansively, calls a 'World Council.' We require the mixing together of the military services of the United Nations, and not less of their civil services. We require a joint military and demobilization policy, a pooling of bases, and a joint population resettlement policy (Buell-Willkie). Finally we require a public opinion that will repudiate the notion that any human beings, within the United Nations or the countries nuclear thereto, are or can be considered foreigners; and we require legis-

lations that will give juristic recognition to this situation. Lord Halifax speaks (January 5) of a "citizenship" of the United Nations; and we must not permit this to remain pious words instead of legal fact. "No frontiers: no men accounted strangers inside the borders—no foreigners," must be the watchword of the Union. Those alone will remain, after this war, members of the Union who are like-minded.

Shall we see even this? I do not know. The stages will be hard and perhaps they will be accomplished region by region. We must resign ourselves to beginning with limited nuclei of union, and to immense international jealousies. The Union will be built out of the experience of common action. If we do not see our goal, then in America there will be a return to isolationism, fluctuating in its alliances between pacifist-progressivism and imperialism. Isolationists, liberals, 'do nothings' and imperialists will come together. In Europe an unreserved totalitarianism will dominate, or an anarchy which will bring this totalitarianism as its nemesis after the next world war. To achieve this goal, combining the pursuit of peace with the organization of power, is indeed the last, best hope of earth. Only so may we, in Vice-President Wallace's words, prevent "the coming peace from being just another interval in a long series of wars" (December 19, 1942). Perhaps this hope will be disappointed. It depends on us, and upon whether the ancient jealousies of states will permit this development of power which can still defend free democracy, at least in the West.

EAST PRUSSIA?

BY ROBERT MACHRAY

VERY little is known, speaking generally, by the British or American public of East Prussia. It may thus appear to be strange, though it is none the less true, to say that the deep troubles that darken and bedevil Europe, and indeed the world in the present terribly sombre phase of its history, find a significant share of their beginnings in that comparatively small tract of land on the southern Baltic. To follow this article and understand it clearly it will be well to look at a map of Europe, dated before September, 1939, which shows the exact geographical situation of East Prussia, particularly with reference to Poland, Germany and Lithuania, as they were then. No one who looks at that map can fail to see the difficulty of Poland's position between Germany on one side and Soviet Russia on the other, but Russia lies outside the scope of my present subject. The map will show that though East Prussia is relatively small in area, it is by no means insignificant in itself. It covers an area of 14,284 square miles; that is about two and a half times the size of Yorkshire. It includes nearly eight per cent. of the total area of Germany. The province is comparatively thinly populated; according to the official German census of 1933 it had 2,333,301 inhabitants, thus constituting less than four per cent. of the entire population of the *Reich*: the German Yearbook for 1935 gave nearly 56 per cent. of its people as engaged in agriculture and forestry, 19 per cent. in industry and handicrafts, and some 13 per cent. as officials or professional men. It will be seen that it is mainly a farming country; the soil is not excessively rich by nature, but the Junkers were and are splendid agriculturists and get good crops. Yet for various reasons (some of which will be presented later) it has not been and is not self-supporting; in fact, it has been maintained at great expense by the rest of Germany, because it is what it is—Germany's bastion thrust forth into the East and a great sally-port of Germanism. Is it to continue to have that character? It may be questioned whether any more important problem will or can be submitted for consideration and solution at the Peace Conference, which must assemble after the conclusion of the Second World War. At any rate in the case of East Prussia a happy solution of this special problem is not only possible but can be shown to be as practicable as it is desirable for the future peace of the world. East Prussia should and must be assigned to Poland, the Lithuanian parts in the north excepted, these should go to Lithuania.

With respect to Poland East Prussia occupies a key position, as was proved conclusively by what occurred when the war started in September, 1939; the Poles were already defeated strategically before a shot was fired. How was it that their country was in this unfortunate position? Well, it is a long and complicated story, but may be summarized. For dim centuries of which not much is known the southern Baltic was one vast battlefield of tribes rather than nations in almost constant conflict, but nations finally emerged and took part in the struggle—"Old Prussians" (*Borussi*), Prussians, Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Danes, and so on; some were Christian, others Pagan. To pass on quickly: all the territory included in East Prussia was subject, either directly or indirectly, after, say, 1410, to the political influence of Poland up to the seventeenth century, but she had seriously compromised that influence by making, though with the best intentions, a grave political blunder as early as the thirteenth century. On her initiative, with the object of bringing Christianity to its heathen inhabitants, the German Knights of the Cross, a military, aggressive and mercenary Order much more than a missionary organization, settled in that country during that period, and as a result of their conquests founded a great German State, which at one time extended from Polish Pomerania (later tendentiously called the "Polish Corridor" by German propagandists) to the Gulf of Finland. The method usually employed by the Knights in propagating Christianity among the native tribes was ruthless extermination or as ruthless enslavement, the former preferred. How true to type is their posterity! These Knights were bound to come into conflict with Poland, and for some time the issue was doubtful, but in 1410 the Poles aided by the Lithuanians and some Czechs defeated them in the Battle of Grunwald so completely that their power speedily declined. Part of East Prussia was integrally incorporated in the Polish State in 1466, the rest, which included Königsberg, became a fief of Poland; in 1525 it ceased to belong to the Order and was a secular duchy.

Here comes into the picture one of the outstanding figures of history, particularly in that of Germany. Known as the Great Elector, Frederick William of Hohenzollern, Elector of the thoroughly and aggressively German State of Brandenburg, inherited the vassal duchy of (East) Prussia, and in 1641 paid homage to the Polish King Ladislas IV as his vassal. But he had no mind to remain a vassal, and after years of fighting and intrigue, marked by the conclusion in his favour of the Peace of Wehlau in 1657 and the Peace of Oliva in 1660, he procured the independence of his duchy from Poland, compelled to agree to the loss of her political rights in that quarter. Yet practically all the inhabitants of the duchy as represented by the "Prussian Estates," a sort of parliament, protested against its being removed from under the Polish Crown, but in vain. In their unwillingness to do homage to Frederick William's son and successor the Estates appealed to Poland for aid, but she had to refuse it, as she was too heavily engaged in one of her wars with the Turks. In 1701 this prince, also named Frederick, had himself crowned

as King Frederick I; legal considerations decided him to be crowned not in Brandenburg as King of Brandenburg, that State being a fief of the Emperor, but in Königsberg in independent East Prussia, and to adopt the title of "King in Prussia"—the term *King of Prussia* was a later development. The bulk of the population of East Prussia submitted only slowly to the Hohenzollerns and their ideology of plunder, oppression and absolutism, but the way had been prepared by the Teutonic Knights, whose ideology was identical with theirs. The union of East Prussia with Brandenburg led, through the Three Partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, to the creation of the powerful Kingdom of Prussia, accompanied by the grim unfolding gradually of the "Prussian Spirit," and the rise of the Pan-German cult, resulting later in the more powerful Second *Reich*, with its Berlin-Baghdad programme, and, later again, in the still more powerful Third *Reich*, with the domination of the world as its open and avowed aim. Never was there anything planned so grandiose, so apparently daft, yet it has to be admitted that the first three years of the present war saw quite marked progress toward achievement, at all events so far as Europe was (and still is) concerned. Is there not an unmistakable warning there?

Nowadays it seems otiose to say that the situation in Europe brought about by the Peace Treaties of 1919-20 and the policy subsequently pursued, if that is not too strong a word, by the Great Powers, was a failure. Why it was so has been explained succinctly in a recent brochure (printed, however, only for private circulation) by a Polish statesman, naturally deeply interested in the post-war reconstruction of Europe:

The essential consequences were not drawn from the fact that in the very centre of Europe there lives a nation, the German nation, endowed with outstanding organizing and technical ability, which for many centuries has been dominated by an urge to annex the lands of its neighbours, and for at least several generations past has been educated in the idea of lordship over the world. The tendencies which distinguish the German nation from any other are the chief danger to peace.

Historically East Prussia has been the source of continual international complications, and the centre of sanguinary German expansion at the cost of Germany's neighbours. Were the *status quo* retained it would or rather will remain synonymous with the "German Mission in the East," will continue to be the headquarters of the worship of aggression generally, a strong base for *Reich* hegemony over the Baltic, as also for fresh German attempts to conquer Europe and an instrument whereby Poland and other adjacent countries will be condemned to military impotence. The first and greatest specific argument for the transfer from Germany to Poland of East Prussia is that this territory (always the Lithuanian parts excepted) is a prerequisite—an absolute *sine qua non*—for the very existence of Poland—a matter of life and death as regards her defence against attack. As the upshot of the successful campaigns of the United Nations Germany will doubtless be struck down, but she may and probably will rise again in the course of time and be dangerous once more. Poland has to make her account with that probability.

It is plain that if Poland is exposed to assault from East Prussia she has not and cannot have sufficient strength to beat it off; she is condemned in advance to being cut off from the sea and to military encirclement, thus paralysing the very centre and operational basis of all her counter-action. The Germans are of course well aware of this; it has been very clear to them all along. As far back as 1803 the German historian Arndt in a work entitled *Germanien und Europa*, published at Altona, wrote with unblushing candour: "Poland failed to recognize that it was her duty as a nation above all to defend her maritime frontiers and to drive the Teutonic Knights from those frontiers that is of East Prussia). *This negligence was the death of Poland* (my italics). Without the sea . . . it was impossible for her ever to become anything; she must disappear sooner or later." She has no desire to commit suicide a second time, and thus every Pole, no matter what political party he belongs to, is inflexibly resolved on the separation of the province from the *Reich*. And no matter what Government Poland may have she is bound to put forward this demand at the Peace Conference. She will never forget what took place in that dreadful month of September, 1939, when she was overrun.

The Germans flung 38 large infantry units and 14 panzer units against her; at a later stage the figures increased to 59 infantry units and 16 panzer divisions. Of that tremendous force ten big infantry units, forming the Third Army, under General Kuechler, attacked from East Prussia, and working with the Fourth Army, under General Kluge, from Pomerania, had a total strength of 17 infantry and five panzer divisions. Poland lost Pomerania and was swiftly cut off from the sea. Part of the Third Army struck south and threatened Warsaw, which lies hardly 75 miles from the East Prussian frontier. East of Warsaw a daring manoeuvre across the rivers Bug and Narev outflanked the main Polish armies, and finally the Third Army attempted to cut off those armies by a far flung movement beyond the Bug, so as to render impossible the use of the reserves of man-power and material in the eastern provinces which cover half of the country. And these successful land operations were complemented by strong German air forces based on East Prussia; the airmen thoroughly exploited the advantages of developing their activities on adjacent territory. The Germans got the full benefit of the geographical situation of East Prussia; it constituted an ideal terrain to drive into the very heart of Poland. For it flanked the eastern border of the narrow strip of Polish Pomerania; it overhung Warsaw, made possible the envelopment of the capital from the east, and laid open Poland's eastern area to attack. And all achieved fairly easily, for there was a minimum of "natural obstacles"; no great distances had to be traversed in terms of modern transport, nor did the terrain present any considerable difficulties.

At the moment there is much talk among us and elsewhere of a political union, though perhaps in two closely joined sections, of the States of Central and South Eastern Europe, the vast region, with a population of a hundred millions, lying between Germany and Soviet Russia. Poland is often put at

the head of the groups, but it must be asked what use will that headship be if her security is essentially compromised and indeed negated by the German retention of East Prussia? Then, also from the international point of view, there is the question of the freedom of the Baltic; Poland is vitally interested in a satisfactory settlement. By 1939 Germany had established her complete hegemony over that sea, owing to her possession of the Kiel Canal, her military might in that area, and her hold on the coast from Lithuania to the North Sea, Gdynia alone excepted. In this article I shall say little about Danzig; years ago I discussed this subject several times in *THE FORTNIGHTLY*; suffice it now to say that in 1939 before the war the famous Free City was *de facto* German. When East Prussia becomes Polish Danzig will cease to be a problem. Her situation at the mouth of the Vistula, Poland's main natural artery, and her historical traditions and economic links with her Polish hinterland are so beyond challenge that it would never have occurred to anyone at the Paris Peace Conference after the last war to propose the segregation, so to speak, of Danzig as a free city but for the contiguity of East Prussia. When Danzig becomes Polish once more the question of the Baltic will be further straightened out. Given Poland possession of East Prussia, she will obtain a broad and secure access to the sea, parallel with her entire ethnographic extent, instead of the almost derisory bit of coast assigned to her in 1919-20.

• Passing now to consider East Prussia's internal conditions it may be stated without fear of contradiction that German publications have always painted them from the economic standpoint in the most sombre colours. "The Need (or Distress) of the East" (*Die Ostnot*) and "The unbelievable Tragedy of Germanism in the East" (*Die ungeheure Tragik des deutschen Volkstums in Osten*),—in depressing terms such as these did the Germans regularly refer to the province. If the colours were laid on too thickly, none the less it is true that the economic standards of East Prussia were always—before 1914 as well as after 1918—much lower than those of other German provinces. In truth East Prussia had long had a sick economy, which necessitated for survival continual injections in the shape of special reliefs and prodigious subsidies. This arose partly from natural causes such as its comparatively poor climate, and partly from both political and economic causes, such as its association with the relatively distant *Reich* instead of with Poland, its obvious hinterland, as well as its really small industrialization, that is, apart from agriculture. Its successful farming, however, involved the help of outside workers in considerable numbers, for example, 13,600 in 1910 and 22,700 in 1925, according to Dr. R. Lawin in his book *Die Bevölkerung in Ostpreussen*, published at Königsberg in 1930. Practically all these imported workers were Poles. The whole area lacks big industrial minerals, but does produce some peat, brown coal and amber. After 1918 the timber industry suffered a shortage of raw material and declined considerably. For many years *Reich* economic policy gave intense study to the problem of East Prussia's distance

from markets (*Marktförne*). As already noted, Warsaw is only 75 miles from its frontier, but its nearest point to Berlin is 230 miles away, and over 500 miles from the Rhineland industrial area—whereas the Polish central industrial area is only 190 miles. Of course these distances implied heavy transportation costs. The problem can be solved solely by the incorporation of the district in Poland, its natural hinterland—an expression covering so decisive an economic fact that no apology is needed for its repetition, but to drive this point home, it may be added that the Germans themselves realized East Prussia's economic bonds with the Polish economic area. After September, 1939, part of the Polish lands incorporated in the *Reich* and lying north of the Vistula was included, both administratively and from the economic point of view, and to-day is made an integral portion of the province. 69647

Exact figures cannot be given—they are not to be had—of the extent of the financial assistance given by the *Reich* to East Prussia chiefly for relief of agriculture, but the sums involved ran into thousands of million marks. In the years 1922-31 the Weimar Republic provided some 2,000 million marks alone for openly-announced special programmes for the "East," namely, the *Ostpreussenprogramm* in 1922, the *Sofortprogramm* in 1926, the *Ostpreussenhilfegesetz* in 1929, and in 1931 again a *Sofortprogramm*. Since Hitler came to power these programmes have been enlarged beyond all measure, and in addition to open *Osthilfe* programmes and funds which flowed secretly into the province through various channels, the *Reich* paid out vast sums for the area's benefit in the form of a highly developed system of special transport rates, reduced taxes, and priorities for factories as regarded Government supplies, despite their prices being higher than elsewhere in Germany. The "East Programme" promoted three types of assistance, namely, the conversion of agricultural indebtedness, sums for colonization purposes, and credits for public works. The first type was in effect a subsidy to the Junkers, the second did achieve certain results but they were small in relation to cost, and the third was carried out on a large scale, the object being to raise the material level of the province and bring psychological influences to bear on the population in order to prevent it from migrating wholesale to an area better organized and providing a higher standard of life. Here a striking fact appears. During the hundred years from 1840 to 1939 upwards of 1,100,000 people migrated from East Prussia to the centre and west of Germany, a process not restrained by legislation designed to tie the peasant to the soil or by policy of reliefs, subsidies and so forth. This migration reduced what would have been the natural increase of the province by two-thirds or rather more, the remainder being under half a million. As a remedial measure the Nazis proclaimed a radical agrarian reform, for the benefit not so much of the rural as of the "worker" elements, the intention being to industrialize all East Prussia, each worker receiving a small allotment of land; one and a half million Germans were to be settled in East Prussia. But the reform—a parcellation of the land—was realized only in part because of the

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resistance of the big landowners and of West German industry, to say nothing of the old trouble of the distance of East Prussia from the markets of the central and western areas of the *Reich*. Associated with Poland, a country extending the bases of its industry, as is sure to be the case after the war, East Prussia will have an equal start with other Polish areas as regards industrialization, and be placed in a position entirely different from that existing hitherto.

Poland produced a mighty reservoir of inadequately-employed labour-power, suggesting first-class colonizing material. Her peasants possess a fanatical attachment to the soil, ability to work hard in difficult climatic conditions, and a temperament which knows how to be satisfied with little. The low density of population in East Prussia and the still large proportion of land there in big estates (which can be parcelled out) indicate a perfectly natural outlet for over-populated Poland, especially as over-population in that country is found in the very areas which have the same kind of agricultural production. Ever since 1700 the province has been closed to Polish colonization as the result of German restrictions, but if the artificial barriers disappeared it would be possible to create 100,000 new settlements and place over half a million people in them within a very short time. The settlements would be healthy economically as the area would be linked economically with its natural hinterland; the Polish peasants would need no everlasting financial assistance or abandon the land once they had acquired it; they would not haste away to other parts. It is very difficult to say exactly how many Poles and Lithuanians live in the province as none of the official German censuses is trustworthy, but Polish statisticians estimated that before the war the Poles numbered about 450,000, of whom slightly fewer than 350,000 were in the district of Allenstein (Olsztyn). Not so very long ago the proportion of Poles to Germans in the province was much higher, but systematic Germanizing activities led to the loss of Polish political consciousness in some quarters, but it seems safe to say that the German and Germanized population was under the two million figure. When East Prussia is incorporated in Poland a large part of that population will, it may be expected, voluntarily and hurriedly quit the province, just as happened after the First World War with respect to the provinces returned to Poland—several hundred thousand Germans voluntarily and quickly migrated to the interior of the *Reich*.

To all the numerous arguments in favour of East Prussia being closely bound legally and politically to Poland the Germans can oppose only one, namely, the *will* of the German population living in the province to remain there, but this plea is more than counterbalanced by the other considerations. The Germans will have to go, but to a very considerable extent the migration will take the form of an exchange of population, the Poles returning to their own land from western Germany, Berlin and other parts of the *Reich*; there were well over a million Poles in Germany in 1939. Hitler himself has sanctioned this process of liquidation. If for political reasons the *Reich* has

organized the compulsory exodus of its nationals from outside it is impossible for ostensibly humanitarian reasons to deny Germany's opponents the right to follow that example with a view to no less weighty results. In any case the Germans have lost all moral right to object, to insist on the principle of self-determination. From the ethical point of view this is the most important result of all their conduct since the beginning of the Second World War. It is one of the ways in which they must be made to realize their responsibility for violating the human conscience and international morality. Who but the Germans incorporated 36,000 square miles of Poland, with nearly eleven million inhabitants, in Germany against the will of those inhabitants? Who condemned these unfortunate millions not only to immediate, enforced migration from their homes and native areas, but also to the loss of all their possessions and the very means of existence? The nation which did such things has surely forfeited all right to any benefits from the principle of the self-determination of nations. This issue must be raised definitely as a postulate of historical justice. Nor must the transference of the German population to the *Reich* be regarded as persecution of that population. Those migrants, especially if connected with agriculture, will find a livelihood, for example, in the thinly populated eastern area of Germany proper and in the depopulated German countryside generally. As a consequence the *Reich* will have no need to import millions of labourers from abroad for agriculture or industry as hitherto.

THE BRITISH CONSCIENCE IN INDIA

BY PAMELA HINKSON

I ASKED two questions in different parts of India. What had British rule given to the people of India, since it developed, without intention, from a trading Company? And what did they want in the villages, which are India, holding 89 per cent. of the vast population? I asked the first on a spring day in bright green rice fields below an agricultural village built within a fortified wall, broken in places by the Northern invaders of another century; and was told: security and peace in which to till their fields and herd their flocks; help in agricultural development, irrigation—hence these green fields—later hospitals and ideas of welfare work, however inadequate before India's size and need, a seed at least from which plants would grow and spread. To the second question an Indian woman social worker answered that the villages wanted: doctors, nurses—above all women doctors and midwives for the *purdah* women—schools.

That was 1938 when India's social and economic problems held the most prominent place. Congress Ministries ruled in eight out of eleven Provinces, with control of social services. In that flowering time of co-operation between the two races, a visitor interested mainly in people and their lives could study welfare efforts, talk with Indian and British workers, politicians and officials, and carry away little memory of political discussions and divisions. The urgency of social problems, more vital to India's future than the forms of Government: the poverty of the mass of the population, the drain on the country's life of the system of *purdah*, child marriage and Hindu widowhood, the abolition of caste barriers and untouchability—these, by their very immensity and by the complications facing the workers, had provided both a meeting ground and a simplification of the differences between British and Indian minds. British officials giving loyal service and co-operation to the new India, generously acknowledged by those who received it, and Congress Ministers, shouldering an immense burden and talking frankly of the problems confronting them, were alike impressive to a visitor; as they were mutually impressed by each other during their too short period of co-operation.

It might be declared a triumph of "a nation of shopkeepers" that out of a trading company, its agents "often of dubious character, but always daring, persistent and keen men of business," according to the Oxford History of India, there should have grown an administrative body of integrity and quality of service without parallel in the world. These were followed surprisingly

soon by a genuine British "conscience" and by another factor, which was to provide the army of devoted non-official British servants of India—the natural English gift for social service. The British people's history contributed to that formation of conscience. Responsible for centuries for their own lives and their countrymen's welfare, the habit of responsibility was strengthened with its extension over other races. It is interesting for an Irish observer who saw the conscience in action, to trace its development through much unplanned and often muddled administration, since it first stirred out of the early confusion and corruption.

The Company's armed forces, which were to bring some peace and security to the people of its territories, were formed first to protect the trading posts from European rivals and internal attack in the chaotic period following the collapse of the Mogul Empire. Later such men as the Lawrences and Nicholson were to officer the regiments. "God forbid," Warren Hastings was writing to the Directors in 1773, "that the Government of this fine country should continue to be a mere chair for a succession of indigent adventurers to sit and hatch private fortunes in." Despite the distance and length of communication between Britain and India, the conscience at home was awake, to produce Parliamentary debates and the Committee on India of 1766 and the following Regulating Act of 1773, transforming the Company into an organized Government and forming the basis of the Anglo-Indian Constitution. Warren Hastings became Governor General "with full powers" to reform the Company's affairs; he proposed to found British rule in Bengal on the country's own laws and customs, established a legal system based on Hindu and Mahommedan law, and the Calcutta Mahommedan College 'to qualify the sons of Mahommedan gentlemen for responsible and lucrative offices of the State'; an attempt to equalize the educational disparity between Hindus and Moslems which still exists. With the great humanitarian and religious movement of the later eighteenth century, the home conscience became active. Burke proclaimed his famous principle of "trusteeship" and such men as Wilberforce, then fighting the Slave trade, thought also of British responsibility in India. The combination of motives for accepting it, with State supervision of the Company, indicated by the younger Pitt in 1784, reveal the union of British advantage and conscience that sought peace and prosperity in British India: "to confirm and enlarge the advantages derived by this country from its connection with India," and "to render that connection a blessing to the native Indians." Critics of "British Imperialism" may smile at the last and similar pronouncements. But in fact, the only alternatives being internal wars and oppression, or another foreign rule, the connection brought to the people some assurance of the peace that they desired. The unofficial British administrator had advantages which remained with his official successors. He was free of the caste and communal complications and superstitions of India. His very position as a foreigner gave him the impartiality, recognized by Indians since, not only in the villages, but in the

towns where of recent years, opponents of British rule have turned to the British official's peace-making influence in a time of communal disturbance. The Indian Civil Service was not established officially until 1861. But at the Calcutta College founded by Lord Wellesley, who became Governor General in 1798, for the cadets of the Company, they were taught Oriental languages and Indian laws and customs and that they were no longer the "agents of a commercial concern" but "the ministers and officers of a powerful Sovereign," with "sacred trusts" for "the good Government" of British India and "the prosperity and happiness" of its peoples. That there were already Company servants conscious of this "trusteeship" is proved by the unbiased testimony of the famous French Abbé Dubois, who went to the Pondicherry Mission in 1792 and later wrote of the Government which had now "freed" the Indian people "from the iron yoke of a long series of arbitrary rulers, under whose oppression they had groaned through so many centuries," that:

The justice and prudence which the present rulers display in endeavouring to make these people less unhappy than they have been hitherto; the anxiety they manifest in increasing their material comfort . . . the protection they afford to the weak as well as to the strong . . . have contributed more to the consolidation of their power than even their victories and conquests.

And of the Company's officers:

For uprightness of character, education and ability, it would be hard to find a body of public servants better capable of filling with zeal and distinction the offices . . . entrusted to them.

Of India:

It is the poverty of the country which in my opinion gives most cause for apprehension—a poverty which is accompanied by the most extraordinary supineness on the part of the people themselves.

The subject of Indian education has already been dealt with in *THE FORT-NIGHTLY*.* Certain aspects of it are interesting, linked with India's present needs. In the 1830's, William Duff, the missionary, was crying for women's education and suggesting that Englishwomen should come out as teachers. In 1815, a Minute of Lord Hastings' regarded the 'humble but valuable class of village schoolmasters' as claiming first place in his discussion. The first Administrative Report (1849-1851) of the Punjab Administration Board under the leadership of Henry and John Lawrence, noted that: "Female education is to be met with in all parts of the Punjab. The number is not large but the existence of such an education, almost unknown in other parts of India, is an encouraging circumstance." Later John Lawrence stated the policy of the Administration: "so that at length there shall be no village throughout the land in which the children do not attend some rudimentary school."

The formation of a Government educational policy, the admission of the previously discouraged British missionaries in 1813 and their use for education, strengthened the most penetrating Western influence on Indian life

* Cecil Northcott. September, 1942.

and thought, already working through the non-British missionaries established earlier in India. The Christian missionaries brought organized social service to India and they, more free even than the British official, of Indian handicaps, went to the very depths of Indian life, carrying in their limitless service to humanity the proof of the doctrine they preached. One of the remarkable aspects of British rule that I saw in India was the free fusing under it of the different races left by European rivals and of the Christian missionaries of various religions and countries into public service. No one who has seen the Christian missionaries at work, their hospitals and schools where education is given with no thought of conversion, will wonder at their influence on Indian life and idealism, revealed in the educational ideas of such men as Rammohan Ray, the founder of the Brahmo sect, and the great Mahommedan Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. A large proportion of the nurses of India come from the Christian and Anglo-Indian communities. I saw their value in a village Health Centre where an Indian Christian worked against difficulties with a Rajput assistant who would not do "demeaning" work.

In 1829 Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, conscious of "the dreadful responsibility hanging over his head in this world and the next," prohibited *suttee* in British India, against the advice, on expediency grounds, of Rammohan Ray, who had fought the horror since he had seen his young sister-in-law burnt unwillingly on her husband's pyre. A petition against the interference with the religious rite was carried to the Privy Council in London. Successive Governments and administrators pushed the reform, which was generally effective, although isolated cases have occurred up to recent years. Certain other efforts were made for Indian women, in vain. Hindu widow remarriage was legalized before the Mutiny. The Indian Penal Code of 1860 forbade a man under heavy penalty to consummate a marriage with a wife under ten years old. In 1891 the Age of Consent within and without marriage was raised to twelve, against violent opposition on religious and political grounds from orthodox Hindus. Mr. B. G. Tilak, later leader of the Congress Party, took a prominent part in the agitation, in Bombay. An appeal was made to the pledge of non-interference with religious rights in the Queen's Proclamation, and answered by the Viceroy himself and the Act passed, to become, generally, a dead letter. Recent efforts have come from Indian social reformers, the only power that can carry reform. Yet the Sarda Act of 1929, prohibiting child marriage, failed for want of public opinion and education.

The abolition of *suttee*, Edward Thompson says in his book, *Suttee*, was the beginning of a new social conscience in the Government of India, "and the next thirty years saw them warring against female infanticide, *thuggee*, human sacrifice, slavery, *suttee*, and all forms of indigenous barbarity." Henry and John Lawrence carried the prohibition of *suttee* and female infanticide through the Punjab and, by his personal influence, that intensely personal administrator, Henry Lawrence, persuaded Gulab Singh, the ruler

of Kashmir, to prohibit them in that State. Later Lawrence was stamping them out and reforming the jails in Rajputana.

Cavendish Bentinck founded the Calcutta Medical School in 1835, with success, in spite of those who had prophesied failure since for twenty centuries Hindus had regarded contact with a dead body a mortal pollution. High caste Hindus flocked to the College and showed the enthusiasm and aptitude for acquiring knowledge that were to produce the skill of Indian doctors. But the first dissection of a human body by a Hindu in January, 1836, was a historical event, honoured by a salute of guns from Fort William. Medical Colleges followed in Bombay and Madras. A century later I saw at the Lady Hardinge Medical School in Delhi, Indian girls studying medicine under British and Indian women doctors, some fresh from *purdah* and breaking other traditions as in the dissecting of animals, bravely, the pioneers in India's most urgent crusade.

The Indian Medical Service, originally attached to the Company, has produced great scientists and served the poor of India, teaching the early Indian students, serving as Civil Surgeons in the Districts and running hospitals. In 1932 the Civil Medical Departments held 200 Europeans out of 6,000 doctors, proving the progress of Indian medicine. In a burning Indian State I met an Irish I.M.S. doctor running the State Hospital, living for his work and for his patients, working in a perfect partnership with a Scottish matron. In the Zenana hospital an English matron had served without change of climate for twelve years, which had taken the life from her hair and the colour from her face, but left spirit and heart flowering.

The conscience was clear in the first half of the eighteenth century. Slavery was abolished in India in 1843. Dalhousie, a sick man during his eight years in India which saw the growth of education and irrigation, the creation of the Public Works Department, the opening of railways and of the Grand Trunk Road, declared his maxim "to fear God and to have no other fear . . ." In the Punjab the rugged Ulster Lawrences and John Nicholson and the rest of that great group were conducting their intensely personal rule with success, guided by the rigid principle of their puritanical Bible-reading religion, and, in a country where personality and personal touch are so important—forming a tradition which lives to-day. "We wish to make the basis of our rule a light and agreeable assessment," wrote Henry Lawrence, who had opposed the Punjab annexation and had sympathy with the conquered. They were stamping out *suttee*, infanticide, building canals, roads, planting trees, establishing schools. "I am very anxious to extend vernacular education and educate Punjabis for the public service, and for engineering and medical and surgical offices." Henry Lawrence thought: "We cannot expect to hold India for ever," but with wisdom India might be England's "noble ally, enlightened and brought into the scale of nations under our guidance and fostering care." The life which attracted men of this quality was to attract the flower of England to Indian service for several

generations after. The official's duties, extended from the first collection of revenue, came to cover the whole field of social service and the District Officer to be the "father and mother" of his people as they called him.

Someone of much knowledge speaking to me lately of the high standard of integrity of the I.C.S. said that the members of it went to India young, at the age when a man has dreams untouched by the disillusion and corruption of the world, and in an atmosphere which called for a high sense of personal responsibility. Since the young District Officer was the British Government to thousands of simple people depending on him, the integrity was naturally developed and preserved. This is not to suggest a wholly perfect picture of British rule. But the Indian recognition of the integrity is implicit in the reception of a British officer in an Indian village to-day.

British irrigation in India began in the early nineteenth century, and there is no story of British service more appealing to those who have seen the thirsty Indian plains than that one of water-carrying. "For God has said from water all things are made," said Akbar, announcing his irrigation plan. British irrigation efforts, extended under Dalhousie, were intensified after disastrous famines, such as that of 1865-66 when old John Lawrence, the Viceroy, his heart particularly with the Indian peasants, was writing to Whitehall stressing the first importance of it. To-day 32 million acres of British India are watered by Government works and behind them lies a story of brown deserts turned to green, of poverty-stricken districts made prosperous, of thousands of peasants in the Punjab settled in the fertile Canal Colonies. No one can change the climate of India, but irrigation and the railways, bringing cultivation and a good market for the peasants' produce, have lifted too the greatest terror of famine. Now to unirrigated districts when the rains fail, the railways carry food for the people and fodder for the cattle.

These modern miracles have produced their dangers and heavy responsibility. Millions of people are dependent for their lives on the canals and their efficient working. Damage or dislocation of the headworks or any part of the canal system, caused by flood, neglect, or internal disorder would mean the proportionate imperilling of those millions. Life in India is held delicately against the eternal menace of the climate and natural conditions. And her need of peace and her peril from any disruptive movement are great accordingly.

Early in this century came important movements to help the country dweller and towards solving the problem of his permanent indebtedness to the *Bania* (moneylender). The Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 debarred a non-agriculturist from holding a mortgage for more than twenty years. It was the habit of the non-agriculturist *Bania*, not desiring land, to take his payment in grain at high interest. The Co-operative Credit and Co-operative Societies Acts that followed the Land Act were the most significant symbols of self government and self help; sowing a plant to be pushed up from the Indian earth, although fostered by British and Indian gardeners; and the

group of men, still living, responsible for rural effort and construction in the Punjab, must be remembered in the history of India. In 1932 there were 100,000 Co-operative Societies in India.

Space forbids a mention of many efforts. We read that under a Governor or Viceroy a reform was carried, irrigation improved, a hospital established. And behind the report are the men and women who do the work silently. Lord Curzon's tribute to the British officials who died at their posts in the famine of 1896: "These men did not die on the battlefield. They simply and silently laid down their lives, broken to pieces in the service of the poor and suffering among the Indian people," applies to many unofficial workers too. Driving through Indian country, I passed a Lepers' Home which bore the name of the English Foundress.

Recent achievements have come from British and Indian co-operation. The pre-war figures of the British Administration are telling. The I.C.S. numbered approximately 1,200 men, about half British and half Indian. The Army was 200,000 strong including 50,000 British troops. These ruled a population of 400,000,000 people.

British and Indian engineers, administrators and agricultural experts have worked together; British and Indian doctors have fought the eternal pain of India together; British and Indian teachers have trained the new India in a united service; medical missionaries, British, American and from European countries, have trained Indian doctors and nurses to spread their mercy. The roads that have brought peace to troubled Frontier districts and have carried agricultural development and other blessings of peace, have been made, like the railways, by British and Indian work. The same factor that made Indian service attract the best of the British Isles, the concern with life and the power of doing good to many lives, meant also the forging of a tie, even an emotional one in a race that does not speak of emotions, with the country they served. The hospitals, staffed by British doctors and nurses and holding the devoted service of Indians learning from them, the plains watered by British engineers, the fields through which the District Officer rode as part of his pleasant duty in spring, looking at the crops which meant life for his people, the villages where he heard the story of joys, needs and sorrows, hold and must hold surely something always of the service poured into them and the love of the country and the people that grew with it. A glimpse of this service made clear the ties between Britain and India, so vividly revealed in that time when social effort held the main place in Indian affairs; and showed the spiritual stake of Britain in India, that, more than a hundred years after Burke's declaration of "trusteeship," makes British indifference to India's future an impossibility.

MARSHAL ZHUKOV'S OFFENSIVE

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

RUSSIA has again astonished the world, not least Hitler and his General Staff, by her power of recovery. Clearly the counter-stroke this year has much more weight behind it than last, and has already much greater achievement to its credit. Last year's counter-offensive was essentially the exploitation of the opportunity afforded by Hitler's rash challenge to the Russian winter with an army unequipped for the season. The blow was struck against troops exhausted and already in retreat. It began as a pursuit. Every credit was of course due to the Russians for the promptness with which the opportunity was seized, and for having held specialized troops in readiness to seize it if it occurred. The opportunity may to some extent have been foreseen, but the circumstances did not permit of the deliberate preparation and masterly planning which has marked the operations for which this year we are told Marshal Zhukov is mainly responsible. Yet behind the most skilled planning there must have been nerves of steel which we may credit especially to M. Stalin, and a high level of general efficiency which his régime has produced.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Russian strategy has been the patience displayed. With the great reserves available the temptation to strike prematurely when Stalingrad was in extreme danger must have been great. But the relief army which was in contact with Bock's northern defences never appears to have attempted more than to apply pressure which would to some extent afford relief to the city by increasing the drain on German resources. The very last ounce was extracted from the power of defence to gain time for the full development of plans. This display of patience may have encouraged the Germans in their over-confident belief that Russia had lost all offensive power, and have induced them to retain their obviously dangerous strategical position. Von Bock and Halder, it is rumoured, appreciated the danger but how far Hitler's insistence on continuing offensive operations received support from other generals we may never learn. Hitler himself has accepted full responsibility, and Goering has been at pains to confirm the statement.

Marshal Zhukov's initial offensive which encircled the 6th Army was an amazing coup, but if it had stood alone the Germans might, by well prepared relief operations, have retrieved the situation. Relief was attempted from the direction that was expected, that is from the south whence a crossing of the Don would be avoided and where the Russians might have been expected to

be weakest, owing to the distance from the bases of the main encircling prong. The relief force had undoubtedly considerable penetrative power, consisting as it did of three Panzer and three motorized divisions, but it lacked the backing of a force to protect the sides of the corridor it was to open. It succeeded in driving a wedge deep into the Russian front, but its flanks were overlapped. The thrust was not merely held, it was heavily defeated and pursued with surprising vigour. Kotelnikov, the hedgehog base from which the attempt started, was captured, failing completely to check the pursuit. This victory was all the more remarkable for it was practically the first occasion when a German offensive thrust was not merely held up but was heavily defeated in a battle of manoeuvre; although it was in some ways reminiscent of the defeat of the first German attempt to capture Rostov in December, 1941. The relief attempt seems to have been made not only in insufficient strength but prematurely, for it can hardly be doubted that, given more time, the weight of the striking force could have been considerably increased. Railway communications and accumulated material were available to maintain a much larger force; and snow conditions evidently did not yet limit the use of mechanical transport. It must have been obvious that every precaution should have been taken to make the attempt a success, for failure was bound to worsen the position of the 6th Army by setting back the time at which further attempts at relief could be made. Was the supply situation of the 6th Army so critical that the attempt had to be made without delay? The great sacrifice of air transport accepted in rushing up supplies suggests that this may have been the reason. It can hardly have been fear that the 6th Army in other respects might be incapable of holding its defences for long. If it is short of supplies its situation must now be practically hopeless. There may of course have been other reasons for premature attack. Hitler may have again insisted on immediate action to recover prestige, or Russian strength may still have been underrated. In any case it is interesting to compare the patience with which the Russians waited before launching their counter-attack to relieve Stalingrad, with the apparent lack of patience shown by the Germans.

While the battle for the relief of the 6th Army was still in progress came the great break through on the middle Don, so devastatingly swift and decisive. Here again the German High Command appears to have been at fault, probably again through underrating Russian strength. They had been aware for some time of a threatening Russian concentration, and had despatched divisions to reinforce their front. But the step was belated; the blow fell before the divisions arrived, and when on their way they were caught in the rout they were unable to check. The delay may have been due to a belief that the Don was not yet frozen solidly enough to permit of a heavy attack, or to unavoidable difficulties in bringing up reserve divisions from distant points where they had settled into winter quarters. But I imagine the fundamental mistake was an under-estimate of Russian strength and of its

new found capacity to exploit success rapidly, which has been such an outstanding feature of this winter's counter-offensive.

To what can this development be ascribed? Primarily, I think, to appreciation of the weaknesses of the German system of hedgehog defence. The hedgehogs have great defensive but practically no offensive strength. The system is therefore rigid and lacks mobility, either for counter-offensive action or orderly delaying retreat. The Russians therefore have adopted the plan of by-passing hedgehog strongpoints, leaving them as innocuous blocks to be liquidated in due course. Their plight then has the further disadvantage that it may entail piecemeal counter-attacks to effect their rescue which absorb reserves and militate against the consolidation of a new front or fully organized counter-offensive operations.

To carry out their by-passing tactics it was essential for the Russians to provide themselves with armament possessing both power and mobility under snow conditions. This they appear to have done with amazing success. The Germans speak of Russian tanks heavily armoured and with very wide tracks; also of obsolete tanks towing armoured trailers and with extra armour added on certain parts. This suggests that the Russian tanks possess the greater mobility, and that the German tanks are unable to manoeuvre in order to bring fire to bear against the lightly armoured parts of those Russian vehicles which have restricted power of manoeuvre. How the Russians, lacking railway communications, have solved the problem of maintaining and distributing supplies under snow conditions, we have not yet been told. That they must have to a great extent done so is proved, not only by the speed of their advance, but by the distances over which it has been maintained. No doubt their advance will be checked or slowed down where German resistance stiffens, as it has already done in the neighbourhood of the Donetz where the network of railways west of the river offers great facilities for the deployment of reserves. Whether the Russians will be able when snowfall is heavier to retain their tactical mobility and to maintain without adequate railway communications the supply services necessary for intensive operations, remains to be seen. The Germans, in possession of good railway communications, will certainly have many advantages.

On the other hand, Russian by-passing tactics have been remarkably successful in their progress down the Stalingrad-Likhaya and Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk railways. The advance down these railways at the time of writing is still proceeding, and the towns by-passed have proved incapable of prolonged resistance—possibly no large garrisons were left to defend them in view of the urgent necessity of forming a stabilized front to cover the approaches to Rostov, probably on the lines of the Donetz and Manych rivers. It is not premature to conclude that Rostov itself is in danger of capture; if the Manych line can be forced the railways leading south and east from it, which must form the main supply lines for the army of the Middle Caucasus, would almost certainly be cut. That army is in a precarious position. It is

probable that its retreat from Mozdok and Nalchik was ordered with a view to taking up a less exposed position on the line of the Kuma where there are lateral railways to facilitate supply, and good shelter for the winter in the Spa region west of the river. But the decision to retreat was evidently belated, and involved a withdrawal in most unfavourable weather. Rearguards had to fight hard to cover the withdrawal and were roughly handled by the pursuing Russians. Now the amazing rapid and probably unexpected advance of the Russians across the Kalmuck steppes has turned the Kuma position, and a further German retreat has become necessary, probably to the line of the upper Kuban and the Divnoe-Voroshilovsk railway. A retreat will present great difficulties, especially as the Russian Kalmuck force being largely composed of cavalry and armoured vehicles is well fitted to harass a retreating army.

Should the communications of the army of the Caucasus with Rostov be interrupted it could still to some extent be supplied through the Sea of Azov ports, but, with the difficulties of transshipment and the liability of the ports to be bombed, the amount of traffic that could be handled might hardly reach requirements. Novorossisk might perhaps also be available, but the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian force which still apparently is holding out in the outskirts of the town, may have made the port unusable. Any attempt the Germans might make to shorten their front and to concentrate their armies by withdrawing on the Tuapse front would certainly prove difficult and be fiercely pursued, for the Russians there have always been active in defence.

Meanwhile the capture of Veliki Luki makes it all the more impossible for the Germans to transfer reserves from either the centre or north to the south. What other fluid reserves they may have or of what quality, it is impossible to estimate; though it is probable that a number of divisions have been withdrawn for reorganization and recuperation after exhausting experiences, their capacity for winter operations is not likely to be high.

How much more Marshal Zhukov has reasonable prospects of accomplishing it would be rash to attempt to forecast. The Russian winter may yet deprive him of the amazing mobility and striking power he has so far developed. Nor should one underrate the toughness of the German soldier, nor the ability of German commanders to deal with a complicated and critical situation when it actually arises however much over-confidence may have blinded them to its approach.

It is all important for Marshal Zhukov to get railway communications. The 6th Army still closes railway communications through Stalingrad. If he can open these lines the prospects of his being able to maintain pressure through the worst of the winter would be greatly improved. The latest available information suggests that he is taking steps with that object. On few parts of their immense front can the Germans now feel secure.

THE PRIMARY OBJECT

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

WHAT is the primary object in the war at the present moment, and what are the means by which it is to be attained? Unless our policy is clear upon this matter we shall either fail in our endeavours or at the best have our success deferred, with results that will prejudice the allied nations in the future. The answer is plain. The primary object should be to gain the command of the sea and it is upon that our efforts should be concentrated. Until we do this, and until we recognize the nature of sea war and shake ourselves clear of the incorrect material interpretations of the expression "Sea Power" we shall continue to suffer heavy losses and to be unable to prepare the way for the decisive stroke, the attack on Hitler's "Citadel of Europe."

There are now four main theatres of the war—the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, Russia and the Eastern Seas from the African coast to the Pacific seaboard. The several fighting forces in all these are interdependent. In the Atlantic, while the predominant need is control of the sea, that control is affected by the enemy's military occupation of western Europe and by the Allies' recent military invasion of French North-West Africa. In the Mediterranean, the interdependence of the operations on land and at sea between Gibraltar and Suez is too obvious to need comment: the fleet and the air forces working with it could not remain in the Mediterranean for a week if the army were forced out of North Africa, the army could not hold the territory it now holds, defend the East African colonies, nor drive the enemy from Tunis and prevent his occupation of the Atlantic coast from the Straits of Gibraltar to the West Coast Colonies if the command of the sea were to fall into the enemy's hands and he were able to pour his hordes, of which he still has plenty, and their supplies, into North Africa. In Russia the decision rests with the forces fighting between the Baltic and the Black Sea; but those forces are largely nourished by the substantial supplies sent by sea from Britain and America by way of the Atlantic and the Arctic Oceans, and the Russian command of the Black Sea and the interruption the Russian sea forces effect in the German communications in the northern seas are important elements in the campaign. Finally, in the East, the whole range of the present operations, with the exception of those in China and the Burmese frontier, is amphibious. The enemy's easy occupation of the British and Dutch possessions was due to his command of the sea, and when that command is broken, and not till then, will he be unable to hold what he seized.

Thus it is the capacity of the Allies to use the sea and to deprive the enemy of its use that is the true foundation stone upon which the edifice of victory must and can only be raised. The possession of that capacity has for years

been called "sea power" and there is no reason to alter or to distort that meaning to-day, as some desire to do. What is essential is to establish that capacity where it is in danger and to restore it where it has been lost. There seems to be reason to think that this truth is beginning to receive attention. The public is apparently at long last beginning to see that the sea communications are in real danger and to realize that far more strenuous efforts are needed at sea. Though figures of our shipping losses are still concealed on the assumption that publication would be of benefit to the enemy, two things are open to no doubt. First, that the tonnage sunk by the enemy is very great and even if the ships can be replaced by new construction the losses of shipping, of cargoes and of seamen constitute a great hindrance, to put it at its lowest terms, to the Allied military effort and an indefinite prolongation of the war. Second, the enemy's submarine fleet increases faster than it is destroyed. A recent formal statement has been made in the United States the truth of which is not to be doubted to the effect that no less than one hundred submarines are at sea at the present time, which means the possession of something like four times that number; thereby indicating the ineffectual character of those attempts to cut down building by bombing the so-called "centres of production" and the inadequacy of the forces employed at sea to combat the submarines.

The struggle for the use of the sea has always taken place in two forms. There have been the operations at sea, directly concerned with destroying and disabling the fighting forces of the enemy which dispute the use of the sea, and with stopping the movements of enemy transport, of all kinds, across those water spaces which separate nations from the objects of their desires. Generally speaking, the destruction of the several masses of the enemy fighting forces does, by itself, stop the flow of all major transport; for shipping in large quantities cannot sail unprotected: but no destruction or disablement has ever been so complete as to bring an end to all movements across short stretches of sea, or by night, or to eliminate the numerous smaller craft which can at all times prey upon shipping. Therefore, the first part of this struggle for command and control consists in those direct operations of fighting forces at sea aimed at the destruction of the corresponding enemy forces and his transport vessels of all kinds. The second part of the task lies on land. Sea fighting forces, whether they are moved by the wind or by engines dependent on fuel have a limited endurance. They must have bases. To acquire bases for one's own sea forces, to hold those one possesses and to deprive the enemy of his has at all times formed a primary duty in the major strategy of a maritime nation. We have only to look back at our old campaigns for ample confirmation of this, stretching from the days of Queen Elizabeth to those of this very month in which we now stand. The chain of bases along our ocean routes is the visible result of this strategy. To-day we see the same policy applied in Iceland, in Madagascar and in North Africa.

The "direct" operations at sea are wholly distinct from those aimed at

the bases. The force which carries them out is one body. It acts continuously and unceasingly in pursuit of the single object of brushing the sea clear of the enemy. The argument that the flexibility of air forces is destroyed if they form an integral part of a naval force and that they cannot, as they otherwise could, be transferred to other functions, has no foundation, for those air units thus employed are in no case available to be "switched" over at long or short notice from the campaign at sea to some other campaign. Shipping must sail day in and day out or neither the nation, its allies or its armies can be supplied with their needs. The sea, Lord Selborne once said, is all one. That is a truism and it is no less a truism that the operations at sea are all one, in their object, one in their direction, and one in the constitution of the forces engaged in them. No better evidence of the singleness of the purpose and the naval character of the operations themselves is needed than the excellent pamphlet just published on the *Coastal Command*.*

The writer of this states a truth when he says that if the weapons of the Command are somewhat new and the craft themselves navigated in the air instead of the water, the object it intends to achieve is the same as that which the ships of the navy have aimed at achieving for centuries. In other words the Coastal Command is as much a branch of the navy as the coastal motor boats and every other form of fighting craft engaged on the direct attack on the enemy at sea and the acquisition of control so that we have the use of the sea and the enemy has not.

The other part of the struggle for command—the capture or holding of bases for the forces that conduct the direct operations at sea—is not the task of a single service. Conjoint operations are necessary in this and these have always been a prominent element in British strategy. The expeditions have sometimes succeeded, sometimes failed. Their success or failure may generally be traced to the degree to which the preparations have been carried. A capacity to extemporize is a military virtue; a dependence on extemporization is a military vice.

Both before and during this war we have been extemporizing in the matter of the direct operations at sea and it has cost us dearly. The coastal area of the Royal Air Force was established as long ago as 1919 when it was intended, we are told, to study and develop co-operation in sea warfare. But that there was no study worthy of the name is shown by the fact that when war came in 1939 the co-operation was conspicuous by its absence. Theoretically, the sea and air forces acting in defence of shipping to the westward were in co-operation: in practice they were separate commands, pursuing different methods and not even exchanging information. It was necessary to alter this deplorable state of affairs and all coastal command aircraft were placed, in the early part of 1940, under the operational direction of the navy. Still, things did not go well, largely because the air forces allotted to the operations at sea were inadequate and many of them of obsolete types. Sinkings reached

* H.M. Stationery Office. 2s.

such formidable figures that it was plain that something was wrong and the Prime Minister formed a "Battle of the Atlantic Committee" in February, 1941, to "focus and emphasize the need for supreme exertion and to make sure that there was proper concert between all authorities." The Committee seems to have treated its task somewhat lightly as we are told that only eighteen meetings were held during 1941 and 1942. In October the Committee was reconstituted under the title of the "Anti-U Boat Warfare Committee"; for we are great believers it seems in names. Sir Stafford Cripps was its vice-chairman with an imposing body consisting of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for Air, the Minister of War Transport, the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff as its members but without a single representative with practical experience of the recent war at sea. Within limitations committees are useful bodies, but war, as all experience tells us, cannot be conducted by committees. What is needed is a clear definition of policy and it is this that is lacking and has been lacking throughout the war. *Tot homines tot sententiae*, has been our lot. We see a mass of conflicting policies being advocated, all with great fervour and assuredness. Within the last few days a view has been resurrected which was prevalent some years ago but which it had been hoped was now dead, to the effect that air war is a separate war: a definite contradiction to the established and proved doctrine of liaison of all arms. We have had those who demand that every effort shall be concentrated on the bombing of Germany, even to the exclusion of other things, in the belief that it is possible to stop the output of the war material from the factories; and who deplore and oppose any diminution of Bomber Command's efforts by calls from Coastal Command and the Middle East. Those bombers now used against submarines and in North Africa should, according to this view, be used for operational training for the bombing of Germany. The fact that the tankers which carry the oil, the ships which carry the food which maintains the life of the people and the supplies needed by the armies all over the world (if the services of the Coastal Command are of the importance attributed to them by the pamphlet referred to) would lose an essential part of their protection if this were done, is treated as unimportant. Another very vocal school demands that the whole business of protecting the sea communications should be transferred to the air, which, if it were relieved from the duty of screening the fighting ships, would be able to do the work alone—the surface ship, in the eyes of these "experts" is an out of date anachronism.

In the situation in which we now are with everything depending on whether or not we master the submarine what is necessary is a definite policy, clearly defined and adhered to: and that policy should be that the primary object is to obtain command of the sea. Let priority be assigned to the ships and aircraft required; and let it be recognized that all those aircraft engaged in the direct operations of the war at sea are units of the Navy.

THE MONSTROUS REGIMENT

BY HONOR TRACY

IT is a very hard thing to write about the women's services. The initials by which they are known themselves are cold and forbidding: we see them starting up from newspapers and hoardings in the underground: they have not gathered to them any of the poetry which hangs, for instance, about the letters R.A.F. or the word "Navy." Even the Army, for which we long felt only the awful tenderness of a mother for her idiot child, has lately taken on the colour of romance. But W.R.N.S. or W.A.A.F. or A.T.S. does not look beautiful or significant at the head of a page. We write them down and feel discouraged, as if we were writing an official report. And when we come to speak of the thing itself, of what it means, of what it has brought into the lives of women, both of harsh and of splendid, we hesitate again lest we seem to be one of that huge modern army whose patron saint, whatever their dogma, is Josef Goebbels.

Yet a little propaganda there must be in a wartime article, even as there has to be turnip in wartime raspberry jam. We cannot say if uniformed women are a good thing in any absolute sense but we may say they have succeeded in their task: and, after all, the drab morality of the present day asks nothing more. They began before the war, drilling at the weekend in cold and dusty halls. All kinds of people were there but the backbone of the movement, it may be assumed, were ex-service women. The plan for them was that when war broke out they should perform the menial tasks and set free men for active service. Two were allotted to release one man, or three to release two. In three years this has been completely changed. One woman releases one man, or in some cases, two men. They are no longer simply nurses, clerks, orderlies and clerks, but short of appearing on the battlefield in person, they take part in every kind of military and naval duty. They have a reputation for good work and courage in bad times.

That is all soon and easily said. To make a list of achievements is not hard. To be honest—and if we are not honest we are nothing—and admit shortcomings is not difficult either. Women are awkward in authority, apt to take the easy way out, fond of pleasure, intent upon their emotional problems, and of discipline they have, in their raw condition, not the faintest idea. Women do not—and we write these words with pride—enjoy standing in rows, clicking their heels or saluting. It is nearly impossible to make them do as they

are told unless they understand and approve. To those of us who have struggled with turbulent recruits from dawn till dusk at the great depots, it is clear that the tradition of woman groaning in bondage down the centuries is a fairy tale: there is nothing the vindictive among us would like more than to see St. Paul posted to such a depot, to subdue them not by means of a Letter from a safe distance but face to face on a freezing parade ground.

We can say all this and still touch on nothing of real importance. We could point out that never before in the history of the world have women taken the part in warfare that they do to-day and we might discourse profoundly upon the effect this may have in shaping the postwar civilization: but every day all over the globe people are doing and saying new things, undreamed of things: only the politicians continue to utter the things they always uttered, and with the same assurance: and we do not know what postwar civilization will look like, if we are lucky enough to have any.

^{e. clear} An individual can only write of what she herself has found, what she likes, ^{thr.} what she does not like and what she believes. A Committee of eminent men ^{ma} and women have been busy for over six months and have spent more than a thousand pounds trying to discover the truth about the Monstrous Regiment: but while they make dozens of helpful suggestions and scores of useful criticisms in a report which runs to many, many pages, and while they completely reassure the public mind as to the standards of sexual morality that prevail, they do not touch on any of the fundamentals. Perhaps to have done so would have been, as the Committee put it, beyond the terms of their reference; but if all these women in uniform would only decide for themselves what sort of contribution they want to make and if they could learn at last to distinguish between the important and the trivial, how much better and shorter a pamphlet could be written: for human aims and endeavours will always be more interesting than welfare and rates of pay.

While I was still at the training depot, I once met a happy example of that intelligent quality which may be described as a feeling for life. I ran into a writer whose work I much admired, a person who could draw beautifully and who had been persuaded to join the mapping department. Those with service knowledge will not be surprised to hear that she had got lost on the way and been sent to this depot where, holding the lowest possible rank, she was in charge of bedding and fuel. She saw to it that every week hundreds of cold and tired newcomers (this was in the winter of 1941 when the great half-built camps were frozen wastes of mud and snow) found their beds made and aired, and fires burning in their hut.

There is a lot of talk about human wastage in the service. Feminine mediocrities have assured me over and over again with a perfectly straight face that their experience and qualifications, their seventy words of German, their correspondence course in psychology, were all being wasted: their minds were decaying, they said: they were withering away in servitude. But this

woman did not see her work in such a light. The difference between caring for human beings and being "someone" at Whitehall was only in esteem, in pay, in position, but not in importance. Anyone who argued merely had a pile of blankets thrust into her arms and was invited to get on with it. This was reasonable and proper. War itself is the grand waste, the stultifier and the blight, and to struggle for honours in it is to proclaim oneself a fool, or a traitor.

But we were trying to say what we ourselves had found to like and dislike in the Service. Chiefly, there is the sense of being alone, of distance from fellow men and of communion with them at the same time. There is the generosity and the large commonsense of service discipline. There is the discovery that privation and discomfort mean nothing at all; they neither add to life nor take from it. It is worth joining simply to make this discovery nowadays, when a large part of the bourgeoisie sits paralyzed, like a rabbit in front of a snake, before a future of less money, less food, fewer clothes and no trips to the Riviera, or sits about in the smart hotels drinking itself to death and clutching at the past with greedy old hands. There are the changes, the constantly shifting scene, the different emphasis on everyday matters, the variety of people and of experience, all seen from a distance hard to achieve in normal life.

There is also the slackness, the inefficiency, the complacency: the tendency to regard as a German agent anyone who criticizes these things, and the reluctance to appoint to officer rank anyone of normal intelligence or more. There is an utter indifference to beautiful and serious things and an intellectual standard which would disgrace a village school. Where education is concerned, the women have fallen down.

There is, further, the huge detestable body of hockey-playing Girl Guides, with their monocles and their cigarette-holders, whose conversation is a mixture of pep-slogan and schoolroom cliché, who believe implicitly in themselves as the cream and the flower of the service and whose one fear is that they may not be able to carry off the rôle of inferior men which they have taken up. It is they who bring the auxiliaries into ridicule and destroy their opportunity; for whatever there is of value and excellence, whatever is permanent and not merely a wartime makeshift will come from the women who are content to be themselves. Certainly men are very nice creatures and the masculine virtues are very splendid: but, gazing round at the destruction all over the face of the globe and at the ever-deepening sadness into which the world has sunk, who will deny that they can be overdone?

Women would do well to look upon themselves as civilians in uniform and not as warriors of the second-class, however unorthodox this may sound and however displeasing to the Girl Guides. Into their service duties they should bring all they can of what is humanizing and fruitful, all they can, in short, of their homes. Above all, they would be wise to look upon their service life

as abnormal and interruptive, and keep their eyes always on the future. The war is not going to last for ever and we must see that the wilderness it leaves behind does not overflow into the heart. We fervently pray that women from the services will have better things to do in the postwar world than to go all over the place, as the Markham Commission suggests, helping in the work of occupation and reorganization. As those selected for such duties would inevitably be of "the right type," that is, the wrong type, their appearance in a shattered Europe would be little short of a disaster. Finally, let us bear in mind that had we entered into the duties of womanhood with the same zest as the Victorians, or as the female enemy, we should not now be forced to make monkeys of ourselves in trappings and in postures which are not truly ours: and therefore let us, when all is over, perform these neglected duties with diligence and with fortitude.

TRIPTYCH

By JOSEPH BRADDOCK

I

TIME like a split ring opened now for me
 That I might hang my thought on like a key
 To turn in locks of future, present, past.
 Of what I saw the future shall be last.

Lying in pain, my body muted, low,
 I see, beyond a rose, October's glow
 Glisten among the gold and purple heads
 Of blooms that butterflies make feeding-beds,
 Peacock, red admiral, local comma too
 Which here falls leaf-like. All I ever knew
 Of art and nature and biology
 These insects trained my seeing eye to see,
 Fixed with intent almost fanatical;
 Their colour harmonies majestic
 Would move me till like radium they could burn
 Rich at the core of ill. No need to turn
 For other consolations at this time.
 Such, with birds, leaves and flowers made up my clime.
 But then, clear-eyed, with patient tenderness
 She came who wore her beauty like a dress
 To clothe her soul; her body so was rare
 That like twin stars we throbbed through love's high air;
 And in love's microcosm, our new birth,
 Was held the macrocosm of the earth.
 What now I learned of humans, of fresh thought,
 Seemed perfect dreaming I from her had caught.
 She watched each perilous experiment,
 Each stab of fortune whose low tricks had bent
 A feebler spirit, while I tried to prove
 Relationships of man to God, to love.
 Feuds, politics of hard-hived social man
 Fell not within the compass of my plan.

Nature's delights grew double in my rhyme;
 By mountains, seas, we searched the spoils of Time.
 To garner wisdom from the envisioned past,
 To catch youth's vision full hours ticked too fast,
 Watching peaks prick the night, great snows that cling;
 Or silver water-buttercups of spring;
 A wisp of cloud against a mottled sky;
 Half-hidden bird with vigilant bright eye;
 Pearl gulls, dark daws passing on changing seas;
 Rooks, black slow ashes floating over trees.

II

Turn, key of thought, reveal our shame to-day
 When world skies shrink to piteous livid grey;
 World cities gutted where the blood shed flows,
 Charred dripping petals from war's scarlet rose;
 Passion, wailing, surpassing that of Styx.
 Nailed is each soul to make a crucifix;
 Shattered the health that could be in each heart
 When all in total battle share some part.
 Lightness, material greed, dishonest thought,
 Hideous Perdition have on people brought
 Who sowed in apathy, reap for their pains
 Crops of armed men, guns, tanks and bombing planes.
 Yet history on her page indelible
 Records that nation first responsible
 For crimes prepared, premeditated sin.
 Apollyon's standards brand anew Berlin,
 When prostrate countries' million martyrs cry:
 "Where Teutons live, others must burn and die.
 Forget not, Freedom's future raw recruit,
 Where Germans walk a shadow stalks, the brute."
 How in this whirlwind of a global war,
 This holocaust that sears the planet's floor,
 When individual lives are gripped like leaves
 To toss and crackle, grieve for all that grieves,
 A mother mourning for her only son
 Who died on icy convoy at his gun;
 An unknown soldier tortured in the sand,
 Dying beyond his home, his cool green land?
 The earth's in jeopardy. I seek in vain
 Homeric epithet to tell such pain:
 The Iliad reads, a schoolboy's flashing dream;

But flames of Stalingrad dull Troy's gold gleam.
 She comes clear-eyed, sane, full of tenderness.
 "Ah, love, this hour our loving's in duress.
 We have suffered wars, whose spirit-home is peace
 To fashion wonders found in studious ease.
 Thousands endure loss. Comfort you from this—
 I write it on the meaning of your kiss,—
 While aeroplanes manoeuvre, birds fly too;
 A thrush will sing the loud bombardment through.
 If men make wars, perverted and unwise,
 Spring celandines must open their wide eyes;
 Gulls, with the convoys, still cross over seas;
 Starlings hold concerts in the friendly trees."

III

The last key turns, the door moves slow ajar:
 My mind's eye would be seer, so peer afar.
 Now Time's with child; apocalyptic waits
 That image. Do you hear the whispering Fates?
 Discern in future distance Zion's towers,
 Guess, past this tainted rose, unfading flowers?
 But not for us, dear heart, that certain spring
 Which will a different race of poets bring,
 Sing hope for lovers. When these tears are dry,
 Unchanged by England's coasts white terns will cry;
 Tailed lambs bleat on the northern fells; round fruit
 Redden in southern orchards, past far bruit
 And rumoured acts of war, where peacefully,
 Confederate forces policing earth, air, sea,
 The brother countries wake, work, sleep. For then
 Truly must folk be comrades, men be men
 Where none need hunger in a landscape great,
 Back-to-back hovels banished from the state;
 In place of dirty chaos, bred disease,
 Lakes, boulevards and spaces tall with trees.
 Cities shall shine with glory; London lie
 A monumental vision proud to vie
 With once more honoured Paris, rivalling
 Rome, Leningrad, Chicago or Peking.
 To liberate the piercing spirit's wealth
 May plays teach courage for each nation's health;
 Drama and poetry hear each other's call;
 With music's temple open unto all.

The people's power will break the final fence
Of pride and ugly privilege. Good sense
With wise humility return to prayer;
Of one tremendous Architect aware.

Lying in bed, my body muted, low,
Still do I gaze and watch October's glow
Mellow among the gold and purple heads
Of blooms that butterflies make feeding-beds.
Beak-stricken yewberries fallen in wet grass
Exude their crystal death. Fleet squirrels pass.
Jays wing white patches low across the fields.
I love the ripeness that old Autumn yields,
Will ever yield when war's rose drops to naught;
When I no longer use the keys of thought.

THE FILM AS AN ART FORM

PART II. IN THE MAKING

BY C. A. LEJEUNE

IN the last article we mapped out the objective trend of the cinema since its beginnings, showed what a typical observer in this country would have observed, about its conditions, its social status, and its technical development at any given moment of time. Fifty years ago, as we have seen, the motion picture was just an idea in the minds of a few scientists. To-day it is the world's most popular entertainment. It ranks fifth in importance amongst America's industries. It is unquestionably one of the most powerful forms of propaganda. How is it as an art?

The amazing thing about the cinema is that it should have any art at all. Making a film is not like writing a book, where all a man needs is paper and pen, an informed use of language, and something he wants to say. It is not like painting or sculpture, where all an artist requires is his conception and his media and the use of his hands. It is more like music, in that the composer's work has to be interpreted by other artists before it attains complete fulfillment. And yet it is not wholly like music either, for the discerning ear and the educated eye can read the shape of music from an unplayed score.

Consider what happens when a film is made. A man has an idea that he wishes to see expressed, not in a book, nor a painting, nor a play, nor in music, but by means of the screen. He has the idea. Good. But has he a hundred thousand pounds or so to spend on it? No. He has to get finance. He finds somebody willing to back his idea. Good again. But the man who puts down the money is naturally anxious to have some say in the way it is spent. They rent studio space. A unit is formed. There must be a producer, a director, a scenario-writer or writers, an art director and a camera expert. Our original man with the idea may be one or more of these, but he cannot be all of them. A cast is engaged, and the stars are also likely to have a say in the picture. The film goes on the floor, and now the chief electrician, the chief carpenter, the sound engineers, and half a dozen other experts assume their share of responsibility. To shoot a single scene involves the combined efforts of—excluding actors—a crew of some twenty or thirty people, after which the film has still to be processed, cut and synchronized.

And that is not the end. Before we can say that the original idea has been successfully interpreted, it has to pass the censors; the distributors have got to handle it, and the exhibitors to book it. In the last instance, the public has still to be persuaded to see it; a public with a mental age generally assessed at fourteen years; a public that rarely reads, seldom goes to the theatre,

never attends art galleries and is often enthusiastic but generally un-informed about music. These are the final arbiters, for these are the buyers the people who must pay back in hard cash that hundred thousand, and a little bit over, that somebody put down in the first place to make that film.

One may well wonder how any work of art can emerge from such conditions. And yet it does. For some reason or other, whether of writing direction, acting, or a combination of all three, quite a number of films that can give pleasure to discerning people have managed to thrust their way through the mass of twaddle. The proportion, admittedly, is not high. There are probably more completely rubbishy films *pro rata*, rubbishy from the artist's viewpoint, than there are books, or paintings, or—possibly—musical compositions. But when you consider that an art that is not fifty years old yet has discovered Chaplin and Disney, Pudovkin and Welles, Griffith and Eisenstein, Murnau and Clair, Ford and Feyder and Lubitsch and Duvivier the prospect does not look so unfavourable. There are not many arts that could produce even one great man per decade of their first fifty years, or attain at the end of half a century to the standard of excellence reached by the few really imaginative works of the screen.

What are these high moments of the cinema, and to what degree have they affected the development of films generally? With this point in mind, let us look at our survey again. Let us pretend for the moment that all the other hundreds of thousands of films do not exist. Let us forget the vamps and the Great Lovers, the sweater girls and the skylarks. Let us pass over the films that are made to sell the British Empire, and the greater number that are made to sell the American Idea. Let us ignore, for the moment, the average films the goodish films, the million-dollar epics, and *Gone With the Wind*. Let us even, reluctantly, forget the films that have comfortably entertained us; the pleasant, easy comedies, the engaging story films that have passed so many dull evenings for us. Let us adopt our observer's good habit of eschewing post-knowledge, and consider the few films that have seemed at their time of making an expression of the cinema as an art *form*, whether or not they have added anything to the cinema as an art *series*.

We shall have to skip nearly twenty years of early history, come right up to the beginning of the last war, before we find any accomplishment that can really be termed art in the cinema. The dream of an art must have been there in d'Annunzio's mind when he wrote his scripts for the first Italian pictures; it may have been in Mr. H. G. Wells's mind when he talked of films, as we know he did, with inventor Robert Paul at the end of the last century; but it remained a dream. The early films were little more than successive experiments with a new toy. Their function was to provide novelty, and secure for the salesman pioneer an ever-widening market. They had the appeal of a talking horse, a lighter-than-air machine, or a successful conjuring trick. Anything so dangerous and abstruse as an art might have ruined their sale.

The coming of the longer films from France and Italy brought "class" into the cinema and a certain bulky impressiveness, but certainly not art, as I remember them. They were the first films to use big sets and big crowds, and even, in those days of heroic physique, big actors. There was always a sense of theatre about them—of cortèges and palms, greenrooms and wigs and draperies. Their dusty influence hung round the continental studios for a long time, but was quickly adapted in America to something less formal, something more suited to the quick public taste. The American films drew little from theatre tradition. Compared with the continental dramas, they seemed haphazard and naïve. In their own way, I suppose, they were groping towards an art, in so far as the film-makers felt instinctively, as early as *The Great Train Robbery*, that they could make their own rules for storytelling, that their medium was fresh and unfettered. In the years just before the war, the films, while they were not getting to be art, were certainly getting to be fun. The delightful Mary Pickford stories, the westerns, and the Keystone comedies with their fantastic and inevitable chase, are among our pleasantest memories of those years. Of these the Keystone comedies are the most significant, because they gave us Mr. Chaplin.

It is almost certainly fortuitous that the first artist we should encounter chronologically in the story of the screen, should also be the greatest artist the screen has ever had. It was not just in contrast to the work of his contemporaries that Chaplin was great. You can watch his old films now—as we did a few months ago in the revised version of *The Gold Rush*—and sit amazed before the warmth and perception and completeness of his talent.

No other artist that the cinema has discovered yet has known as surely as Chaplin how to fill that blank rectangle of the screen with the picture of man's hopes and trepidations, his futilities and triumphs, his absurd image and his immortal soul. Others abide our question, he is free. Clown, philosopher, and master precisian, his method is the old, honourable one of the *Commedia dell'Arte*, adapted with an exquisite instinct to the screen and camera. Chaplin, I have always felt, must be the complete extrovert and visualizer. Always, in his mind's eye, he must see that empty screen and the figure of the clown—the "little fellow," the other Chaplin, Charlie Everyman—crossing and re-crossing and filling every corner of it with images.

Of all cinema comedians, Chaplin is the most independent of external aids to laughter. Harold Lloyd, himself a pleasant but negative comedian, derived his effects from the ingenuity of his gagmen, the ludicrous exhilaration of his plot-settings. Buster Keaton appealed to us as a desperate, sad-faced mite caught up in the cogs of a vast Heath Robinson machine. The Marx Brothers make us laugh—those whom they do make laugh—with their hysterical pace and the rich irrelevance of their properties. But Chaplin makes us laugh simply because he is Chaplin. With no plot to speak of, no hurry, few properties other than his hat and stick, his eloquent eyebrows and his epic feet, he shuffles down the centre of his films, touching here a flower, there a roll of

bread, more often empty-handed save for the ritual cane. And everything he touches springs to momentary life. Every step he takes, brings him, with a delusive appearance of aimlessness, nearer to a well-defined end. It is not odd really that his comedy, so delicate and personal, has had very little influence on the later film-makers, except to some extent on the work of Clair. It is a manifestation, an episode, complete in itself, and in itself enough to justify fifty years of cinema.

If Chaplin, in the early war-years, was an isolated phenomenon, we had not long to wait for a more infectious influence. Within a year from Chaplin's first film appeared a work that affected the whole course of the cinema, both in Europe and America—D. W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*. We have mentioned the free mood induced by *The Great Train Robbery* among American directors. Now Griffith cut the last string that held the motion picture to the Eights. He gave the film its media. He established, once and for all, the use of the close-up, the parallel action, and the flash-back. He justified the creative power of cutting. He suggested, for the first time, that a film was a selection of unit shots, which could be separated and arranged, like bricks in a child's toy-box, to form different combinations.

Most of Griffith's theories of film art are to be found in *The Birth of a Nation*, although he elaborated and added to them later in *Intolerance*, *Way Down East*, *Broken Blossoms*, and *Orphans of the Storm*. His way was so obviously the right way, the liberation of a mature cinema, that it was naturally taken up by other directors, in Hollywood and abroad. Even in Russia, the great Soviet directors have made no secret of the debt they owe to the *bourgeois* films of Griffith. Curiously enough, Griffith, who introduced the Gish sisters, Mae Marsh and Wallace Reid, the Talmadges, and, in earlier days, Mary Pickford herself to the public, is generally known as the star-maker. What he actually made was the fundamental shape of the film.

The next significant date in our survey is 1919, when the Sturm group of artists from the German theatre produced *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* as an experiment in the then new expressionism. This unique film which, incidentally, introduced Conrad Veidt to the screen, is an adventure in itself. Stimulating, startling and unforgettable, with its twisted houses, its walls leaning together and crushing the breath out of you, its violent angles and haunting sense of evil, it is obviously impossible of repetition. Conceived in that way for that idea—the story of a madman's vision, his distorted reading of humanity—it is one of the first, if not the first, example of strictly functional film-making. The effect of "Caligari" in England and America, where its showing was grudging, limited, and long-delayed, was not considerable. It was merely an irritant, a prodder, something we sensed but did not understand, something that vaguely bothered and unsettled us. But its expressionist, psycho-analytical style had a marked effect on the film work of its own country. It influenced, to some extent, the coming generation of *cinéastes* in France, such as Abel Gance and Marcel l'Herbier. And even those who did

not like "Caligari," did not understand it, did not want to copy it, nor even to show it, were bracingly shaken out of their complacency by it. After this glimpse of the unorthodox, the cinema could never be quite the same again.

We must pass on to 1920, and Robert Flaherty's *Nanook of the North*. "Nanook", in describing which John Grierson for the first time introduced the word "documentary" into film criticism, is a significant event that we shall come back to later. It is a good, not a great film, that opened the way for other good, not great films, in a field of cinema which is becoming of the first importance. The historical value of "Nanook" can scarcely be over-estimated. Its artistic value, which can readily be, and has been, over-rated, lies in its dramatic integrity. It is the first film to take pure factual drama, the impersonal drama of the elements and of elemental peoples, and present it without fuss or sentiment. It deals with people created by life, not by the script-writer. It deals with them *as they are*. It never occurred to Flaherty, whose whole big, boyish heart was in this northern adventure, that his Eskimo friends might seem dull to the sort of people who put on "little cinema frocks" and go to the pictures in parties after dinner. The dinner and the party would be the dull thing to Flaherty. His Eskimos are the real companions. This is life, not down there in the *loges*, but up there in the igloos. And so firmly does he believe in it that his enthusiasm communicates itself to the film.

The incidence of the Swedish film, in the early nineteen twenties, is a brief, bitter-sweet memory that stands apart from the train of world-events and has no sequel. It would seem to have nothing to do with the evolution of the film in other countries. One may think of it as a short, stately pavane in the middle of a play. We watch the pavane with admiration, forget it, and get on with the drama. We only saw the Swedish films for three or four years at most, and there were few of them. Of the few, most were good, but only one director's work—Victor Sjöström's—had the touch of greatness. Sjöström, as we have already observed, went later to Hollywood, where his films retained little of the old quality but the relics of a certain magical lighting. But with the films he made in Sweden—*Thy Soul Shall Bear Witness*, *A Lover in Pawn*, *Love's Crucible* and others—he gave us something the screen had not yet produced, a sense of austere beauty. There was texture in them, the texture of inanimate things; the feel of velvet, and old beams, and stone. There was a presence of elemental things; wind, wood and water were beings, sunlight and darkness had power over the soul. This characteristic, indeed, all the Swedish films had in some measure. It is something they shared with the work of Swedish writers, like Sigrid Undset and Selma Lagerlöf. We find it again in the Swedish architecture, its design and decoration. Greta Garbo has the touch of it in her playing, and the younger actress, Ingrid Bergman, too.

The Swedish film was a gracious episode while it lasted. But it couldn't last long. There was no room in the new, post-war world for the contemplative, leisurely way of life these northern films embodied. The memory of

Sjöström was quickly swept away by the flood of German story-films, the rich, exciting, overflowing abundance of the German film of the twenties. No observer of cinema art could study the golden age of *Destiny*, *The Street*, *Warning Shadows*, *The Golem*, *The Nibelungs*, and the hundred and one other enchantments, and go away unrewarded. He will find traces of art everywhere, in the acting of Conrad Veidt and Emil Jannings and Paul Wegener; in the direction of Lubitsch, Lang, Pabst and Galeen, Grüne and Murnau; often in the production of Erich Pommer; again and again in lighting and camera-work, in architecture and in art direction. Should he demand a focal point for his studies, an epitome of all that was wise and exciting and fertile in the German work of this period, I recommend *The Last Laugh* to his attention. This quiet film, which told a gentle tale of the fall and rise of an old hotel porter—nothing more dramatic than that—was in its own way as startling as "Caligari." For it, too, evolved a new narrative method. It relied on the camera to tell the story. It had no sub-titles, in a day, you must remember, when all films were linked together by sub-titles. It used few close-ups and few cuts, did indeed few of the things Griffith had taught all film-makers to do. It simply let the camera unfold the plot in its own time, and let the audience follow along behind the camera. The result was something quite new in visual narrative—a smooth and logically continuous flow.

At about the same time as the German studios were producing this prodigality of riches, a small *avant-garde* in Paris was trying with some passion to pull the French cinema out of its doldrums. René Clair made his first fantasies. Louis Delluc, the best critic the cinema has ever had, was writing his intense reviews. Feyder made *L'Atlantide*, *Crainquebille*, and the superb *Thérèse Raquin*. The Russian actor Mosjoukine appeared in that wild study of genius in disorder, *Kean*.

There was a very real perception of cinema art stirring in Paris in those days. But it was also a very limited perception. Whereas the German lighting and the German camera-work were influencing film production everywhere—it is the bitter complaint of our modern realists that the tradition still dies hard—the French pictures made little mark even in their own country. It was the time when the fashion for America and all things American stood high. The American films were *chic*. Even the French *avant-garde* admired and tried to copy them. Not Feyder, whose Belgian soul remained firmly rooted on French terrain. Seldom Clair, save when his enthusiasm for Chaplin and the Keystone comedies carried him away. But other intelligent young Frenchmen who should have known better followed blindly after Ince and deMille. With a few exceptions, this passion for the new cinema remained an intellectual whim in the Paris of the twenties.

There is one more high spot to consider before that accidental sentence of Al Jolson's changed the whole direction of the cinema overnight, and that is, as our observer will recall, the Soviet film. In point of date, *Potemkin*, the first of the great Russian films, belongs to the same year as Clair's *Crazy Ray*

and Murnau's *Last Laugh*. But it so shocked the western world that the Soviets should make films at all, or at any rate, make films like this, that we were not allowed to see *Potemkin* until many years later, when the new talkies were already the burning topic of conversation. I, like many other British people interested in such things, actually saw the first wicked Soviet films in Berlin, where they received much applause. The working classes of Germany took *Potemkin* to their hearts. In fact, it was quite a long time before we realized that its title was not originally "Der Panzerkreuzer Potemkin."

It is one of the movie's ironies that the Soviet film should have blossomed at a time when the coming of sound made it temporarily fruitless. These last years of the twenties, make no doubt of it, were not only the great days of the Soviet film, but some of the greatest days we have ever experienced in the art of the cinema. Silent film-making was the Russian genius, and although, with the realistic viewpoint of the Soviet worker, they have accepted sound and even welcomed it, there has been none of the same sure mastery of a medium in recent pictures.

The Soviet talent was to build with single images, just as Griffith did. They learnt much from Griffith and adapted it. Everything they did was purposive. These were films almost with a religion. Their directors had the inspiration of a tremendous message, which they had rigorously schooled themselves to deliver. They set themselves to learn all there was to know about their medium. They took it to pieces down to the unit of the single frame, so that they could put it together in such a way as to carry the message with the greatest possible effectiveness. Fortunately for the art of the cinema, the Soviet film fell into the hands of men who realized that the finest propaganda was plain truth, simply presented. Put your pin-point where you like in the list of Soviet directors—Pudowkin, Eisenstein, Room, Turin, Dovjenko, the Traubergs—and you will stab an artist. Many people, even those who cannot share in the Soviet way of thinking, are persuaded to this day that *Potemkin* or *October* or *The End of St. Petersburg* is the greatest film that was ever presented.

A diet of Soviet films would doubtless pall on western audiences after a time. Like the German films, they have one great weakness in our eyes—the lack of a recognizable sense of humour. Even the gay Alexandrov with his talkies cannot quite make us laugh in the English and American way. You cannot dwell on collective endeavour all the while. Arms and the man as a theme gets as wearisome in time as tractors and the girl. These Soviet films are not consistently great art, because in great art you should never be conscious of anything missing. In these films you are frequently reminded that humour is missing. But at the time that sound arrived to change the whole course of the cinema, Soviet Russia, of all countries, had probably produced a national film-form most closely approximating to an art.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

NEARLY all the work which I deal with this month has appeared before in some other form. This is far indeed from a disparagement; if essays get collected into a book form, if passages from several sources brought together for an anthology, if what came out originally in a volume of ordinary size and price goes into one of the sixpenny editions, at least an important step towards survival has been taken.

France through Russian Eyes

But most decisive of all is when a work appears in a new language, for then unmistakably a frontier has been crossed. *The Fall of Paris*, which Hutchinson publish at 10s. 6d., has been translated by Gerard Shelley from the Russian of Ilya Ehrenburg, described on its wrapper as "the famous Soviet author." Since his novel won the Stalin Prize in 1942, it comes to us impressively recommended; most of us would take off our hats at that name. Heaven knows too, the subject is of no ordinary interest; and on the whole, if Paris is to be interpreted by a foreigner, a Russian is the likeliest man to do it well.

Yet, frankly, all lovers of France will find this book painful reading. It is an indictment of all who from the period of Hitler's emergence were in charge of France. Not an indictment of France; France is what was betrayed among them by vanities, by ambitions, by intolerances and in some measure by covetous corruption; in short, by all that was unworthy of France.

Russian novel-writing has always been on a vast scale and Ilya Ehrenburg, faithful to the tradition, sets out to make us see the interlocked aspects of that community on which war came disastrously. He does not limit himself to study of those who helped to bring about the catastrophe, but is equally concerned to show how the guiltless and the thoughtless were affected by it. Oddly enough, one of the most sympathetic personages in his long list of characters is a capitalist with vast money resources, largely employed in armament making; Desser's money is power, but not only his money; he differs from the equivalent in England or in America first because he knows where to bring his friends to dine in little eating-houses frequented by wine-growers and cattle merchants, who insist on getting the best of their produce, and secondly because he has a genuine feeling for modern work in paint; in short, he is French by his culture—and so fully French by his feelings that when defeat is irrevocable, he blows out his brains. The taste for such dinners as he gave is passionately shared by another leading character, Tessa, the eloquent lawyer who becomes a deputy and then a minister, and wavers between the Popular Front and a natural propensity to be afraid of bolshevism. Tessa does not shoot himself; he takes what comfort he can get under the Germans.

But to write of this book would take more than all my space. I note only that for this author democratic France's failure to back democracy in Spain against Franco was more fatal than the letting down of the Czechs—Poland is hardly discussed—perhaps it was an awkward theme for a Russian writer. There is nothing said against England; all the allusions are respectful. But essentially here is a book from which an ordinary reader would conclude that

democracy must always go under in contests of the nations, unless it can be a democracy that accepts discipline and direction—not only in time of war.

* * * * *

Another book, richly worth reading, yet less easily readable than could be wished, is Alfred North Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas*. This gentleman, being a Fellow of Trinity College in the University of Cambridge and Professor of Philosophy in Harvard, has a right to be considered widely read, and everything in this volume (which appeared originally in 1933 but is now republished in Pelican Books for ninepence) shows a most interesting and original approach to knowledge. Yet enjoyment of it is impeded by too many sentences cluttered up with professionally professorial words—as for instance: "The first part of this book is occupied with the most general aspect of the sociological functions arising from, and issuing with, ideas concerning race." Yet on the page facing this are two sentences which have the quality of epigram that cuts deep:

The progress of religion is defined by the denunciation of gods. The keynote of idolatry is contentment with the prevalent gods.

Since Professor Whitehead himself observes that *Adventures of Ideas* might be taken as a synonym for the "History of the Human Race," adequate review here cannot be expected. But let me outline his analysis of the idea that we call freedom. Between the civilization of to-day and that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, a deep divergence exists. "In a thousand years of the classical civilization to be civilized was to be a slave owner." It was assumed that many necessary functions could not be performed by the civilized man. To-day the test of civilization's completeness is the degree to which it abolishes servitude. Among the forces which shook the acceptance of slavery as a necessary part of life, the advent of Christianity ranks high; and Mr. Whitehead in an interesting passage shows how favourably placed the Galilean peasantry was to be the nursing ground for such a religion. There was, of course, no sudden revolution—which indeed would have destroyed the whole of European civilization, and the foundations of social order. But gradually there emerged an idea of man's essential dignity—the Rights of Man. Here France contributed largely, even by its anti-Christian teachers like Voltaire; but in the English-speaking world "the Wesleyan Protestant revival specially stirred mankind. Methodism did not argue; it appealed to instinct; singularly devoid of new ideas, and singularly rich in vivid feelings . . . made the conception of the brotherhood of man and of the importance of men, a vivid reality." So in 1808 the slave trade was finally abolished; in 1833 all slaves in the British dominions were freed by a general purchase, which cost twenty millions at a time of financial stress. What followed was the development of machinery which enabled civilization to dispense with the slave labour on which it had relied.

I am shocked by the baldness of this *resumé*; but let me add that Mr. Whitehead always keeps us in touch with living detail—as by his emphasis on the part played not merely by the Quakers but by one Quaker in particular, John Woodman. If I have given at least some sample of what the book offers, it may induce readers to provide themselves with a rich store-house of thought at the modest ransom of ninepence.

* * * * *

Another tempting ninepenny-worth (this time at the sign of Penguin, not Pelican), is *Portrait of England, an Anthology*. Mr. Christian Mawson, who arranged it has evidently enjoyed himself; but, indeed, how else should any man go about this kind of flower-gathering? On the whole I am most attracted by the opening section, which is in praise of English countrysides—and of the surrounding sea. Here are things that everybody knows, like Rupert Brooke's "Grantchester"; Or again, there is old Hardy's "Song of Weathers"—more quintessentially Shakespearian than even some of the passages quoted from Shakespeare:

This is the weather the cuckoo likes
And so do I.

Good to be reminded of these, but better still to make acquaintance with R. C. K. Ensor's passage about hedges in the South of England—the like of which can hardly be found elsewhere in Europe. It seems that Casar knew and noted them; anyhow, there they still are in rich development of diversity; along with hawthorn and blackthorn, "bramble and wild rose, honeysuckle and bryony lace and tangle their growth"—maple, too, he might have added—and elder only too often. Elsewhere, in other beds of this garden, are passages moralizing rather than descriptive—none more beautiful than Bunyan's words on "the Valley of Humiliation where nobody walks but them that love a pilgrim's life. Yet I must tell you that in former times men have met with angels here, have found pearls here, and have in this place found the words of life." But nothing in the book pleased me so well as to meet in the pages about Battle, the sonnet called "Testament" by T. M. Kettle—of whom it is clear that Mr. Mawson knows little. He was a young Irishman who sat in the House of Commons with the Nationalist party for some years before the war, and there, as wherever else he showed his talent, was accounted among the most eloquent. Then when Redmond called on Irishmen to support the cause of European freedom, Kettle was one of those who answered—and of those who fell. Here are the closing lines of what he left, to be given to his baby daughter, telling, if the need came,

why I abandoned you, my own
And the dear breast that was your baby's throne . . .
Know that we fools, now with the foolish dead,
Died not for Flag nor King nor Emperor
But for a dream, born in a herdsman's shed,
And for the secret scripture of the poor.

His death left Ireland the poorer; I only wish his example had enriched her—as it might have done.

* * * * *

One more Penguin is on my list. In *The Book of Talbot* Mrs. Talbot Clifton writes of her husband, most venturesome of explorers. His Arctic journeying and huntings were behind him when he and she first met. There had been other travel of his, in India, in Tibet, in Burma, and on the edge of the Russo-Japanese war; but none of this is recorded here, and he was always too eager for some new adventure to stay and record what he had seen and done. But it seems that he kept always a diary and from his notes she has created a vivid picture of what life means among the people who are in constant danger of being frozen to death. Among the Eskimos he hunted, and among the Tungas, making it his special purpose to secure specimens of animals which the climate protects—the musk ox or the polar sheep. No man could have had a more vivid feeling for the beauty of what he slew—as is common enough among

An Insatiable
Wanderer

such killers. But he was not less sensitive to all the appeals of nature, and especially one passage is remarkable which describes the urgency of growth when three months is all the time given for the plant to blossom and fruit.

What followed on Clifton's first meeting with his wife is treated as different in quality. Violet Beauclerk, daughter of a diplomat, met him first in the Andes. She had lived in Hungary before she went with her father to Peru; and after marriage with Clifton she accompanied this insatiable wanderer on many pilgrimages—notably in Sumatra; but of these she has written in another book. Then there was Lytham Hall, the great house of which he was the squire, and here they lived mainly till in 1914 war called them out. After various changes, he was sent with his little yacht to help in patrolling the West Coast of Ireland; and here he became tenant of another great house, Kylemore. The wild country pleased them both and talk reached me in those days of this surprising couple, in stature and in beauty far beyond the ordinary run. They made good friends, including Gogarty the wit and poet, and Martin McDonogh, Galway merchant, the best man in Connaught. But from 1921 onward, Ireland was a place of savageries. Their stay in it was broken by their excursion to Celebes, but coming back they came to trouble; he had to fly the country. As a consequence he changed his abode to the other Gældom; his last home was in Islay. Yet the unknown tempted him still; and he left the Hebrides for Africa. She was with him on the last journey which started from Dakar, reached the Niger, and finally Bamakon in the French Soudan. There mysterious illness struck him, and they went back to Dakar, from there sailed to another hospital at Santa Cruz. Here the end came; it was only his body that came back to the Green Hill at Islay. So *Poses* a book full of beauty and romance.

* * * * *

I wish to write briefly of a new venture that has been started in the part of Ireland which does not call itself Eire. Richard Rowley has long been known as an Ulster poet, who under another name ranked among those whom in Ulster we call linen-lords. But now he must add another activity; and has started at Newcastle in County Down the Mourne Press; whose aim is "cultural not commercial," and seeks "to give encouragement to the younger writers of Ulster." I am glad to note that those from whom work is promised include Lynn Doyle, who, if not among the youngest, is one of Ireland's wittiest writers and speakers; a man who contrives to be no less an Irishman because he comes from North of the Boyne. And indeed the same is true of Richard Rowley who contributes two little volumes to the opening batch of four; and in *One Cure for Sorrow*, his little group of comedies, is throughout Gaelic by inspiration. The other, *Sonnets to Felicity*, is more typical of his work as I have known it; good straightforward verse with nothing in the sixty and odd sonnets that flies in the face of the tradition in which he—and many of us—were reared. Mr. Forrest Reid whose *Notes and Impressions* comprise half-a-dozen essays, can be no stranger to the English public, for all of them have appeared in some outstanding weekly. I liked specially his "Note on Caliban," who in his judgment is "as free from vulgarity as a faun and has a nature as deeply rooted in the earth"—and should therefore not be presented, as he often is, like a "gibbering slobbering ape." Mr. George Galway (whose little book of stories, *Sparrows round my Brow*, costs four shillings like the others in this group) has also contributed to the London press. I find his humour too often of the sort which depends on phonetic spelling. And there is rather too much of the alcoholic motive—in spite of wartime difficulties.

Ulster
Writers

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, by T. E. Jessop. *Thomas Nelson & Sons.* 5s.

VERSAILLES TWENTY YEARS AFTER, by Paul Birdsall. *George Allen & Unwin.* 15s.

"The muddle and confusion in liberal and democratic communities about the real character of Versailles," writes Professor Birdsall in the concluding chapter of his book, "contributed to the stupidity of Allied policy from Versailles to Armageddon." He also censures "the guilt-complex about the whole Treaty of Versailles which, among other factors, paralyzed English foreign policy from Versailles to Munich."

Between them, the British philosopher, Professor Jessop, and the American historian, Professor Birdsall, have done good work to dispel this complex. For that matter, the moral appraisal by the philosopher is, in its conciseness, even more forceful than Professor Birdsall's somewhat lengthier historical account.

In his preface, Professor Jessop analyses the British guilt complex and reduces it to two essential elements. Its first is the tendency to be just to Germany alone and to forget her victims. Somehow, I was reminded of the title of a novel read some twenty years ago. It was an early work by the Prague author, Franz Werfel, and he called it somewhat clumsily: *Not the murderer, the victim is guilty*. Pro-Germans went one better. They represented the case, as yet unheard of, of the victim that *pleads* guilty. The second element of the complex is the belief that the louder you shout your complaints, the more just they must be.

Making excellent use of existing historical literature (though curiously not of Professor Birdsall's book, published some months before

his own), Professor Jessop examines one by one the various grievances which Germany laid against the Treaty. In passing sentence, he takes the only sensible line by drawing a clear distinction between the legal issue of justice and the moral issue of rightness. On the first, he admits that the Treaty, in certain of its features (the Reparation clauses in particular) violated the legal contract entered into by both sides during the pre-Armistice negotiations. By contrast, on the much more important moral issue, he rejects uncompromisingly the German thesis. Having cleared away the deliberate confusion created by German propaganda, he shows that there is little left on which to feed a guilt complex. I am afraid, though, that Professor Jessop's swallow does not yet make a summer. Ignorant sentimentalists regardless of party allegiance will no doubt go on blaming Versailles and the peace-makers for "a peace made to end peace."

Professor Birdsall teaches history at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, and is an authority on the history of the Paris Peace Conference. He has produced an intensely interesting and very readable account of the Paris negotiations. Perhaps its best feature is the emphasis he lays on the impersonal elements in the attitude of the various peace delegations, which derive from physical factors such as geography, population and economics, and from spiritual factors such as historic traditions and public opinion. While far from blind to the human side in peace making (in particular the characters of the chief negotiators) his narrative shows how rarely and to what limited extent any of them, even at the height of their authority, were able to influence these overriding factors.

Professor Birdsall, apparently,

has more of a quarrel with the peace-makers than with the peace itself. Of President Wilson, he writes that "with all his mistakes he emerges as the only man of real stature in Paris." And there is a lot, though not quite enough, in his narrative to bear out this contention. Yet it would have been both more graceful and more accurate to recognize the grandeur of style in the human failings and errors of both Lloyd George and Clemenceau as in those of the President. If anything, events have given more strength to Clemenceau's views on what any settlement with Germany should be like. In looking towards the future, Professor Birdsall seems to show some sympathy with the ideas of the late Robert Dell, for many years Geneva correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. In 1939, Dell, who knew Germany well, wrote: "I was opposed to the French demand in 1919, but experience has taught me that the French were right." And he favoured, for the next peace settlement, a split-up of Germany into a loose federation without, this time, a repetition of the economic errors of Versailles.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

FRANCE, by Pierre Maillaud. The World To-day series. *Oxford University Press.* 3s. 6d.

SPAIN, by Salvador de Madariaga. *Cape.* 25s.

Denigration of France and the French of our time is all too common these days in this country, and the accounts of the collapse of 1940, penny plain and twopence coloured, that have appeared have contributed not a little to the prevailing estimate. A fine frenzy of impatience with this attitude is the inspiration behind M. Maillaud's admirable study in an admirable series. The author stoutly maintains that recent happenings indicate but an episode

in the march of events reflecting Europe's pattern of power. He believes in his country's historic mission: to be a permanent bulwark of Western civilization against the disruptive force of tribal migrations from beyond the Rhine. And he contends that only a conjunction of British and French qualities can preserve the common heritage against the German flood.

The pith and marrow of the French crisis, as Maillaud says, is the demographic factor. Every French man or woman realizes that the national being is conditioned by the impact of German expansionism. French policy in the inter-war period was founded thereon, on a clear consciousness that the body politic had never recovered from the fearful blood-letting of 1914-18; Hitler's Germany timed her assault accordingly; the while "England had acted upon a conception of balance of power which ignored the demographic weight of Germany and only considered her accidental inferiority . . ."

This demographic weakness is shown here as the shadow behind the lustre of post-Revolutionary France. (M. Maillaud is not concerned to explain its causes—which is perhaps a pity—but he provides a masterly portrayal of its effects). Nowhere were the refinements of life, material and spiritual, more in evidence or more widely spread. But "the French are, above all, a product of history"—and history, inevitably, leaves behind it many conflicts. Moreover, while the French nation is deep-rooted and ancient, democracy as a form of government is to them a recent institution dearly bought. And so those very assets which conferred on France the status of second country of all civilized men were in fact to prove heavy liabilities in the hour of crisis. The result of a care-

ful fostering of a peasant economy, for instance, as Professor Brogan says in a brief Preface, in the contemporary "iron age" was military weakness not to be offset by the achievement of the much-abused Third Republic in rebuilding French military strength and in colonial expansion.

M. Maillaud is particularly good on the subjects of the dawning Empire-consciousness, which Lyautey expressed so well in his "France is a nation of a hundred million inhabitants"; it is indeed a remarkable fact that the loyalty of the native populations has survived the military defeat. In a brilliant chapter "Under the German Heel" the author shows that, on a superficial view, there is a great deal to be said for the collaborationist thesis. It has been repudiated by what Michelet called 'the intuitive wisdom of the people.' But its final rejection depends in fact on awareness by English men and women of the responsibilities of trusteeship.

Whether we islanders will be equal to it remains to be seen. The force of gravity of the British Commonwealth, unfortunately, may well be a powerful pull in the other direction. It is characteristic of French insularism that M. Maillaud does not see beyond Europe; he appears to leave America out of account. Not so Señor Madariaga, who descants persuasively on a future Atlantic system, strongly based on the quadrilateral of power, Great Britain — U.S.A. — South America — Spain (and Portugal), "which would easily absorb France and most of Africa": involving a permanent alliance of England and Spain, within a framework of world unity, such as could restore Gibraltar to its Spanish destiny while enabling this country to have the use of all Spanish ports and islands. This pleasing phantasy occupies little

more than a couple of pages in the author's brilliant, but, it should be said, essentially personal, interpretation of the Spanish scene. All the first part, published in 1930, is beyond cavil. But when this "middle of the way Spaniard" comes to deal with recent history, it is a very different kettle of fish.

On the national psychology, which causes the ship of State to founder on the twin reefs of dictatorship and separatism, Señor Madariaga talks sound sense, and his chastening of the Left, in regard to the civil war, rather than the forces of the Right because they are "of no permanent importance," is justifiable enough. But, unfortunately, the many instances of acute perception are mixed up with statements based on nothing more than malicious gossip (or the evidence of an American journalist, Louis Fischer) which are unworthy of the author. To suggest that Dr. Negrin was ever the willing instrument of the Soviet Union—or contrived to transfer the gold of the Bank of Spain to Moscow—is to retail fairy tales which should have no place in a book of this kind. Similarly, on the question of foreign aid for the two sides, Señor Madariaga is obstinately inaccurate—as the present reviewer is in a position to know. Nevertheless, as a full-length study of Spain the book is important and should be read by any student of the land and its people—but read with caution.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

RUFUS ISAACS, FIRST MARQUESS OF READING, by His Son. *Hutchinson*. 15s.

Sent to sea as ship's boy on his sixteenth birthday, 'hammered' after four years on the Stock Exchange (he subsequently paid every debt), Rufus Isaacs was called to the Bar in his 28th year. Few have entered upon a more apparently

hopeless task. When he died he had been Lord Chief Justice of England, British Ambassador at Washington, and Viceroy of India. What qualities enabled him to achieve such dazzling successes? This first part of his life, admirably written by his son, is profoundly interesting and answers the question.

Rufus, born in London in 1860 of Jewish parents, never severed his connection with Judaism, and desired for his funeral "a simple Jewish service." He was not an Orthodox Jew and only entered a synagogue on special occasions, but was attracted by the teachings of Spinoza. He left University College School at fourteen and often regretted he had not been to the University. To improve his vocabulary he read the English Classics. A month after his call to the Bar he married Alice Cohen. Like other great men, he owed much of his success to a devoted wife and happy home. Making £519 his first twelve months, his income as a junior reached £7,000 a year. He took Silk in under eleven years. In 1904 his fees totalled £28,000, but immersed in other people's affairs he had no time for his own, and early savings were lost by hasty and injudicious investments.

His services were in constant demand; over forty of his cases are described by his son. His great rival was Carson, to whom with some hesitation the palm of advocacy must be awarded. Carson was a Titan. Rufus an artist. It is not to be inferred that Carson was always superior. In heavy commercial cases Rufus was ahead of all his competitors. His prosecutions of Whitaker Wright and Seddon, and defence of Sievier are still remembered. Trade Union cases like *Men v. Flood* and the Yorkshire Miners' litigation, showed his skill in dialectic. He read his briefs in the early morning and could snatch

a few minutes sleep anywhere at any time. Physically small, in spite of his 5ft. 10ins., he was calm and collected in Court, never ruffled by an inquisitive Judge, never losing his temper with a hostile witness. He had a handsome face, often a mask to conceal his feelings, and a pleasant voice. His cross examinations, conducted in a quiet almost conversational tone, were deadly.

Simple in his tastes and habits, food and drink made no appeal to him and he was entirely free from ostentation.

In 1904 he was returned as Liberal M.P. for Reading, but never achieved in Parliament the success which attended him at the Law Courts. He became Solicitor and Attorney General. During this period a Select Committee of the Commons was appointed to examine his dealings in the Marconi Company's shares. The enquiry and the subsequent debate proceeded on party lines. Political feeling ran high, but the result showed that there was no stain on his honour and that any suggestion to the contrary was wholly false. He admitted an error in judgment.

In October, 1913, he was appointed Lord Chief Justice. He was not a profound lawyer for his was not the type of brain of which Law Lords are made. He had the mind of a Judge joined to the temperament of a diplomat. He would find the facts, satisfy himself on the law, but always considered the possible effects of his decisions.

The qualities which led to his success are illustrated by an anecdote in the Foreword. Once when approaching a formidable bunker at golf his caddie handed him an iron with the advice: "You had better not go for the carry, my Lord; take this and play short." "Not go the carry," said Rufus, "I have gone for the carry all my life. Give me a spoon."

His contemporaries at the Bar knew him as a fair and courteous opponent and a generous leader. His colleagues on the Bench found him a loyal chief with whom to sit was a pleasure and a satisfaction.

The second volume of his life by his son will be eagerly awaited.

SANKEY.

CHANNEL PACKET, by Raymond Mortimer. *Hogarth Press*. 12s. 6d.

It is not often that book reviews, when warmed-up, make good reading. Mr. Mortimer, however, has made a precise art of this branch of journalism, and what he has to say about literary figures and problems in France and England is valuable because of its wisdom and of the exact language in which that wisdom is expressed. He is a writer in the truest technical sense of the word. I have not found in this collection of essays one phrase loosely constructed. He uses words with a consciousness of their growth, their history; while to this scientific precision he adds a musical sense. His prose is lucid, quick, and firm; yet it moves with a dignity and frequently with a gesture that has an almost old-fashioned gravity, like the motions of the minuet. The book as a whole, after one has read it with delight in its detail, begins to have a second quality in recollection; and that quality is beauty, a rare distilled beauty as much of the spirit as of the mind. One finishes with the impression of a personality in the work, a figure somewhat aloof, almost cold by choice rather than temperament, but with a ready welcome for good sense and honesty of thought.

How enjoyable that is, in these days of emotional swamping. Mr. Mortimer says that "literature is a very impure art," basing his statement in a rather Lessing-like way on a comparison with the plastic

arts. What small practice he has made in literature, however (for this is, I believe, his first book) has been designed to remove that impurity. Other practitioners will recognize the large self-discipline involved in that effort.

Mr. Mortimer's affiliation is to France, and to those writers in English who most support the French way of life and manner of expressing it. That is to say he is anti-hysterical, an enemy of vagueness and grandiloquence. For his palate, the wine of life is 'sec.' But this native tendency is not allowed too free a hand. Though he is most at home in an age of reason, he will not allow reason to be an autocrat. He admits—it may be with a certain reluctance—that human life, in the individual and more especially in society, allows strange, unaccountable and terrifying elements into its government. The choice of subjects in these essays is proof of that. He is interested in both General Booth and Landor, in A. E. Housman and Mr. Gladstone, in André Gide and Archbishop Randall. While he believes Proust to be "incomparably the greatest writer who has flourished in my lifetime," he can find that author to be a morbid inventor of monsters, and can turn to Balzac with an even greater sympathy, and in an opening paragraph at once place that giant in the category of literary values. "But acutely as I admire Stendhal," (how one longs to invite him to enlarge on that phrase!), "I believe Balzac to be a far greater writer, just as I believe Shakespeare to be a far greater writer than Dryden." The condensation of thought, aesthetic and personal experience, and emotional directions into that passage is characteristic of Mr. Mortimer's writing. His work needs to be taken phrase by phrase and savoured upon the imagination, as good wine upon the tongue.

Having this interest in the eccentric and the orthodox, he is led to induce a standard of values in life and literature whose scope is remarkably wide. Within that standard, the two worlds are related by this first principle; "The only valid laws in the arts, are those that summarize experience."

With this critic, the quickness of his imagination makes reading as full-blooded an experience as the events of everyday life, and this without Villiers de l'Isle Adams's affectation. Who "left living to his servants." The people Mr. Mortimer meets in books are perhaps slightly larger than those he meets in life. His Mme. Geoffrin, and her unpleasing daughter; the poet Mallarmé (subject of one of the most beautiful essays in the book); Queen Victoria and Mrs. Thrale (he has an attraction towards women of strong idiosyncrasy); Archbishop Magee and George Herbert; he discusses them all and with each evokes a new vitality and a more subtle articulation of the bones of biography. Yet with all these resting-points of interest, which bring him down from his deliberate detachment, he persists in keeping his enthusiasm under a wary control, knowing that "there is a particular sadness in learning that a person whom once you loved is dead: comparing what now you feel with what once you would have felt, you consider how liquid is the personality of man, how fugacious and inconsequent his most profound emotions."

In that awareness, a pessimistic one, Mr. Mortimer gives the impression of not allowing himself to be caught in the grief-doomed possibility of a whole-hearted passion, or even purpose. Accordingly he has sharpened his critical habit of scrutinizing aspects of character which people normally accept without question. Thus, he says of Mme.

Geoffrin's pious daughter that she "possessed the complacent unscrupulousness that characterizes persons who are religious but not good."

The reader accepts that saying as being acute. Later, having read the whole book, and pondered upon the personality behind it, one returns to that saying and suspects it to be profound.

RICHARD CHURCH.

A NEW ORDER IN ENGLISH EDUCATION, by H. C. Dent. *University of London Press*. 3s. 6d.

Mr. Dent's 'new Order' in English education is firmly rooted in democracy. He states at the very beginning of his book: "The decision this country has to make—and quickly—is whether or not it desires to have an educational system that will truly educate for democracy . . . without education for democracy we need not look for democracy." Mr. Dent believes that there is an intense and universal desire for a democratic order of society working side by side with a widespread reluctance to accept the logical conclusion of such a wish. It means, he says, "a complete re-orientation of our attitude towards the whole idea of living in community."

We talk of our 'educational system' but there is no such thing: there are instead seven or eight systems aiming at different goals and interested to all practical purposes only in that section of society which they seek to serve. But it is one educational system that we need and we must convince those who take a narrower view that the many are suffering for the few. In Mr. Dent's opinion the Public Schools, perhaps the only schools to have a clearly defined and inspiring ideal, by refusing to co-operate with the new secondary schools of the 20th century and by extending their range

to cover 2 per cent. of the school population, improved their own position up to the outbreak of war while rendering "a tragic disservice to the nation." The new secondary schools, with less excuse, shunned an honourable relationship with the State system and thought to ape the Public School by being more interested in the boy who could afford to pay than the boy with ability and brains. The Church clung selfishly to its own schools undeterred by the fact that it was unable to provide or maintain buildings which reached the required standard. Industry kept its eye on the supply of cheap juvenile labour and was not worried when thousands were precipitated out of the classroom into the workshop without preparation.

Mr. Dent believes that the main reforms so far proposed are good as far as they go but they do not make a whole. They are 'limited objectives' and he is not sympathetic towards limited objectives because they are tender to vested interests while accepting the existing structure as a suitable edifice on which to build. Our first step should be to enquire what is our philosophy of education. If we do, and a full democracy is our aim, we shall know that it is not enough to advocate:

- (a) greatly increased provision for children under 6;
- (b) the raising of the age of compulsory full-time attendance at school to 15 or 16;
- (c) a common form of education for all children at the primary stage;
- (d) a common code of regulations for all types of post-primary education;
- (e) transfer of all children at a given age from the primary to post-primary (that is, secondary) stage, with allocation according to ability, selection by examination alone being discontinued;
- (f) a system of part-time continued education in working hours for all

young employees up to the age of 18;

- (g) a better system of recruitment and training of teachers;
- (h) much improved amenities, health services and equipment.

It is very arguable that a given situation which is bad can only be remedied by a complete rethinking of the position and a consequent blowing-up of any existing structure. It has, to put it mildly, been a favourite contention on the continent of Europe during recent years. But with the bad inevitably goes a great deal of good, and unless an educational revolution is brought about by the enthusiasm and lasting energy of a majority of those concerned (and I believe that vested interest is stronger than that) I am inclined to support with more favour than Mr. Dent a policy of limited objectives. For I think he is wrong in believing that a limited objective necessarily leaves the main structure intact. Once gained the limited objective is likely to make some alteration in the structure essential and it will certainly help in bringing about the reorientation of views. In this sense limited objectives in education are like the preliminary barrage of gunfire in war, the heralds of attack.

The vigour of Mr. Dent's assault on the old order and his enthusiasm and wide vision of the future stamps this book with the same energy and purpose that mark his direction of the *Educational Supplement of The Times*. Mr. Dent knows what he wants, the details are in his book, for the proper education of the community, and his aim is a full democratic society. His enemies will be found less among the ranks of true educationists than among those who do not, deep down, share his ultimate ideal.

JOHN ARMITAGE.


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THE JEWS AND THEIR FUTURE

BY THE MARCHIONESS OF READING



IN attempting to write of the conditions of the Jews in Europe to-day one is baffled at the outset as to how to present, in an orderly and tempered manner, the indescribable chaos and horror that represents the real "conditions" under which they live. To use an old Jewish phrase—"it is a life which is no life." They are outlaws of the Continent, no man may shelter or succour them save at the risk of his own life, no law protects them; at any moment of the day or night the German police or Storm troops may round them up for deportation and certain death. They walk the streets bearing the yellow badge that all may see and shun them, they may not sit on public benches or frequent any but certain eating houses, they may not be served in shops save at certain specified times, every hour of every day they are reminded that they are Jews, singled out for humiliation, destined to die at the hand of the executioner. "A life that is no life." All this takes place to-day in lands which have known little or no anti-semitism, lands of liberty and liberal traditions, such as France, Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark.

Variations of the infamous "Nuremburg Laws" relegating Jews to virtual outlawry now run in every country occupied by the Germans, all Jewish property has long since been confiscated, all professions closed to them and nearly all trades. Economically continental Jewry is bankrupt. But this is not enough to satisfy the implacable hatred of Hitler; he has vowed the utter physical extermination of the Jews, and with German thoroughness and complete inhumanity he is accomplishing his design. The German text of the order to concentrate all Jews in 53 towns of Poland was received by the Polish Government here: it states that no Jew may be found outside the Jewish residential areas on pain of death after December 1, 1942. Hitler has designated these 53 towns as Jewish towns, and in these, which include the ghettos he has established in Warsaw, Lublin, etc., day by day deportations of Jews to Western Europe take place and, day by day they are systematically emptied by those sent to execution. It would be impossible to believe the truth of this cold-blooded massacre if it were not substantiated by unquestionable evidence from German sources them-

GLII

selves, and the responsible heads of the Governments of the countries concerned. To quote but a few instances: A short time ago I had cause to visit a high official of the Yugoslav Government to enquire if anything could be done to rescue the Jews from that country—"There are no Jews in Yugoslavia," he replied. "They have all been deported, even the old lady reputed to be 102, and put in concentration camps in Italy; from there, I regret to say, they are being handed over to the Germans."

M. Darquier de Pellepoix, French High Commissioner for Jewish Affairs announced on the Paris Radio, on December 19, legislation for the deprivation of all civil rights of Jews in France, special schools for Jewish children only, the rescinding of all naturalization since August, 1926, and the confining of all foreign Jews in Labour camps. The French frontier correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* immediately after this announcement reported that Jews trying to enter Switzerland had been arrested by German troops and custom officials and many arrests had been made of Frenchmen and women who helped or hid escaping Jews. The Belgian National News Agency reported on December 19 that German gendarmes had been called out to clear the streets when 1,000 people in Antwerp demonstrated while Jews were being deported. Reports from the Inter-Allied Information Bureau state that in Belgium, according to a German newspaper report, 25,000 out of the 52,000 Jews living in Belgium had been deported, men, women and children being arbitrarily separated. In Norway all males over 16 were arrested during October and in November the remaining women and children and the aged; they were driven to the docks at Oslo and deported. The manner of deportation and execution are horrible beyond all imagining; packed in cattle trucks, many die through lack of food and ventilation en route; all who resist are shot at once, specially trained German squads are in charge of the mass executions and mass burials. The German Government has presented the Slovak Government with a bill for 70,000,000 crowns representing "the cost of deporting 65,000 Jews and assigning them to Eastern Poland."

Many other reports could be quoted, but these are sufficient to show what is happening on the Continent to-day, as foreshadowed by Alfred Rosenberg in March, 1941, when he announced that all Jews would be removed from Europe, and, by the order given by Himmler that Polish Jewry was to be reduced by 50 per cent. by the end of 1942. At the Polish National Council on November 27, the Vice-Premier stated that during the last three months 260,000 Jews had been liquidated in the Warsaw ghetto and mass murders were progressing over the whole country.

The Jew in Europe lives under a terror the like of which has not been paralleled in history. He ekes out a miserable existence, haunted by the dread of the fate that may descend on him at any moment, on his wife, his children, his mother—his only hope, his only pre-occupation being how to escape to a neutral country. The frontiers are closed, he has no papers, the fatigues and perils of the journey are immense; yet some do manage to cross the Alps into Switzerland, or the Pyrenees into Spain, or the Black Sea to Turkey. One hears fantastic stories of pregnant women with children in their arms struggling across the passes of the Pyrenees: the Spanish and the Swiss authorities do what they can. Those that are penniless, as are nearly all, are placed in camps, but there is a limit to the number that can be taken in and fed under the blockade conditions of the Continent. If they could pass them on, the congestion would be relieved and more could be succoured. Some have relatives in the U.S.A., England or South America, who are ready and able to care for them, but the gates are closed, visas are rare and though they have escaped the mortal danger, yet they must still be denied the comfort of their own kith and kin. Then there are those who escape to Turkey and are refused certificates to enter Palestine and threatened with deportation back into the hell from which they have escaped; no sanctuary for them in the Holy Land; nowhere in all the world have they a place to lay their heads. I sometimes ask myself, is it possible that the world can be so cruel; if it were my child or my mother, how should I remain sane?

This then is the picture of the conditions of the Jews in Europe, it is a picture of such utter despair and unrelieved gloom that one must turn away and look to the future, to reach for any faint ray of light. Man cannot live without hope, and "while there is life there is hope." That is all that the Jews have to support them in their present unutterable suffering, a hope for an Allied victory—and may it come speedily while some are still alive—a hope of escape for some very few, a hope for the return of tolerance towards and equality for all mankind in a post-war world, a hope for the Promised Land.

The beacon light of Palestine is for very many the only "light that shines in the darkness." Vast numbers have lost literally all they possess, their social and economic position, their home, their land, their every valuable, quite possibly also their nationality. They have been moved from one internment camp to another, men, women and even children separated from each other. How are they to start life afresh? Where will it be worth while to try again? Where can they find social security? To many the answer is quite simple: "only in our own land under the administration

of our own people, when for the first time since the great dispersal we will no longer be a minority." The fallacy of "minority rights" established so hopefully after the 1914-1918 war has been completely exploded. Such "rights" are artificial and are disregarded as soon as they become in any way irksome to the nation which accords them. There is no manner by which the weaker can be protected against the stronger, if the stronger turn bully or murderer. It had been thought to be axiomatic that in the twentieth century racial or religious persecution was a thing of the past among nations with any pretensions to civilization. Either that is not true, or the German nation is not civilized. Be that as it may, the Jews of the continent have seen their status vanish as it were overnight, have found the gates of all countries closed to all but a comparative few, and themselves in the grip of a persecution as savage as any their ancestors endured before them.

The task of the rehabilitation of Europe after victory is won will be no easy task and no quick one. It is impossible to tell how long it may take before industry functions in the production of consumer goods for which there will be a colossal demand. The demand for labour, the need for civilian services, etc., will ultimately determine the pace at which re-absorption of the disjointed elements on the continent will take place. Few will have jobs or homes to go to, none any capital with which to re-commence their lives. There are doubtless many, especially from Western Europe who will wish to return to the countries from which they have been driven, and there are no free Governments who have not voiced their readiness to take responsibility for their Jewish, as for all their other nationals, and have not promised equality of status and freedom of religion to all their subjects. For these Jews the problem of re-absorption will be on a par with the general problem of their co-nationals, but for the Jews of Axis countries and Axis controlled countries the problem will be different. They are mostly stateless having been deprived of their own nationality by German decree, or having had their naturalization in France or Italy rescinded; hundreds are refugees in Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. What future can be offered them? From 1933 to 1939 determined efforts were made to find places of refuge for a comparatively small number. Some 60,000 came to this country, some 150,000 went to the U.S.A., some 121,000 to South American countries, but nowhere could a land be found for mass colonization. The American Government explored the possibilities of Alaska, the British of New Guinea, the French of Madagascar; the League of Nations appointed a High Commissioner for refugees but his request for places of settlement was met by refusals from all sides. The Freeland Movement con-

ducted lengthy negotiations with the Australian Government which proved abortive. The San Dominican Republic alone offered facilities but the American Committee charged with the administration demanded only hand picked young men and women with agricultural experience, able to withstand the harsh conditions of the climate. Palestine absorbed more refugees than all the other countries of the world put together, and Palestine remains the only concrete proposition for the future. Millions of pounds have been expended on the essential pioneer work needed in any sparsely developed country; roads have been built, swamps drained, forests planted, towns and villages built, industry commenced, agriculture established. Schools, clinics, hospitals and the University are in being; 500,000 Jewish pioneers have established themselves, and they have built not for themselves but for the people of Israel. They need additional man power for their growing industry, for the continued reclamation of waste land, for their ultimate security. They have mobilized all their resources for the cause of the United Nations: their young men are serving in the British army, their young women in the A.T.S. Their needs and the needs of their fellow Jews on the continent coalesce; they are often literally their brothers, sisters or near relations; they long to offer, and they can offer, the happiness of a home in which the aged can find comfort, the adult renew his struggle and the children be secure. Perhaps this little story conveys most vividly what life in Palestine means to the Jews, haunted, tormented, humiliated in Europe. There is a Jewish play called "It is hard to be a Jew" and a Palestinian Jewish boy seeing the announcement on the hoarding was heard saying to his schoolmate: "What does that mean, how is it hard to be a Jew?" "I do not know," replied the other, "it has never seemed hard to me."

The point of view of the Palestinian Arabs cannot, of course, be overlooked. Although the country was under-populated, as are also the neighbouring Arab lands of Transjordan and Iraq, and very largely derelict, they have opposed the Jewish influx since the Balfour Declaration. How much that opposition has been fanned by Axis propaganda and maintained by Axis funds it is difficult to judge. The leader and focal point of the Arab opposition, the Mufti of Jerusalem, has fled to Rome and Berlin since the declaration of war. His influence was very powerful and his control of all the mosques and their clergy enabled him to whip up the fanaticism of the ignorant peasant to commit acts of terrorism when he so desired. The Arab peasant has not personally suffered but benefited from the Jewish colonization; his standard of living has been raised until it has become the highest of that in the Middle East,

his birth rate has gone up and his death rate decreased, and the increase in the population has been remarkable. He is learning modern methods of agriculture at an Agricultural College established for the Arabs by a Jewish philanthropist, and through imitation of the Jewish colonists. He has sold his land for vast sums of money, and with the capital has been enabled to farm his remaining land far more profitably. There are a number who appreciate the new prosperity brought to the country and there are many individual friendships between Arabs and Jews. Up to date the voice of the opponents has been louder than of the friends, but that may well be changed after the war when Axis influence is no more.

The Jews have always maintained that they desire neither to dominate nor be dominated and wish for complete religious and civil equality for all the inhabitants of Palestine. But they are determined not to remain a minority, for they know only too well the inherent perils of a minority position. Some people maintain that Palestine is too small a country to hold all the Jews who may wish to go there, but only the development of a country can determine the size of the population it can support. It is curious to note that in general the smaller the land the larger the population; the Dominions support, for instance, much smaller populations than Great Britain itself. First let Palestine develop to its full capacity; that alone will absorb all the strength and resources of this generation. It is ready now to take in refugees; this is the immediate practical proposition and the tragic situation of the Jews now and in the post-war period calls for immediate action. Many might be saved even now if the United Nations would take all steps that lie in their power. They would relieve the congestion in neutral countries—by granting certificates to Palestine for those escaping to Turkey, a more generous allowance of visas to their own countries for those in Spain and Portugal, and relief, financial and in kind to neutral countries.

The services of the International Red Cross should be utilized, for its experience and assistance would be invaluable. As each day passes more victims are claimed by the terror. Help must come speedily, or it will come too late.

THE REGISTRATION OF YOUTH

BY KENNETH LINDSAY, M.P.

IN December, 1941, the Prime Minister, in opening a debate preparatory to the National Service Bill, announced that it was proposed to register boys and girls between the ages of 16 and 18. He said, "we must be careful that our boys do not run loose during this time of stress. Their education, their well-being, their discipline and the service they can render must all be carefully supervised We have to think of future citizens as well as the business of carrying on the defence of the country. Those who are not already members of some organization doing useful work of some kind will be encouraged to join one or other of the organizations through which they can obtain the training required to fit them for National Service." He then instanced a variety of pre-service and civil organizations and concluded, "however, in all these fields the well-being and training of the boys will be the prime consideration."

On December 4 a memorandum on man-power was presented by the Minister of Labour and National Service which, among other measures, included the reduction of the age of recruitment to 18½. The last clause of the memorandum read as follows:

Boys and girls between the ages of 16 and 18 will be required to register and will be interviewed by the Youth Service Committee of the Education Authority with a view to their being encouraged to join appropriate organizations. The minimum age of entry into the Home Guard will be reduced to 16 for certain duties.

It would seem that this clause was framed by the Ministry of Labour, because in fact there is no such title as "Youth Service Committees." No discussion was allowed during passage of the subsequent National Service Bill, and to this day the subject has never been debated in the House of Commons. The whole scheme was carried out under Defence Regulations; its origin was National Service and it was designed primarily to interest young persons in pre-service training. In a word, the policy was an extension downwards by the Ministry of Labour and the Service Departments, not a follow-up of the Board of Education. The logical approach from the point of view of education would have been to attack the problem of those between 14 and 18, and to see that proper provision was made for those leaving school.

Circulars were issued in England and Scotland just before Christmas explaining the objects and methods of the policy. The fact that organizations, leaders and premises did not then exist to meet the potential demand daunted no one. It is true to say, however, that the registration coincided with a large increase in facilities for Army and Sea cadets, and later for girls with the

formation of the Girls' Training Corps. Boys and girls still at school over the age of 16 were equally encouraged to undertake some form of service, but the main object was to reach those who were no longer under educational supervision and discipline. No obligation was laid on anyone to do anything except register; compulsion was ruled out from the start.

Registration was carried out either at the Juvenile Branches of Labour Exchanges, or at Juvenile Employment Bureaux in those places where Education Authorities wisely exercise equivalent powers. Once more it has been demonstrated how important it is that *all* Education Authorities should exercise these powers. Indeed, in some places the Ministry of Labour officials were unaware of the existence or names of many voluntary organizations.

Interviews were undertaken by Local Youth Committees. Each area compiled a rota from a panel of teachers, clergymen, club leaders and officials. Several thousand citizens were thus brought into direct contact with the young people of their neighbourhood. In Birmingham alone there were no less than 1,100 voluntary helpers enrolled. One area broke the regulations by undertaking an "encouragement" interview at the same time as registration in picturesque and well-advertized surroundings. In some places interviewers appeared in uniform, in others this step was expressly forbidden. I know of large cities where no less than four invitations to attend for interview were issued and those who failed were visited by welfare officers; elsewhere there was no effective follow-up and the figures of those who promised to join organizations must be treated with great caution. Coventry adopted a novel and interesting policy by interviewing many boys and girls at the factories in working hours. One advantage was that a 95 per cent. attendance was secured against 45 per cent. for those who attended in the evening; moreover, hours of work could be checked on the spot, thus saving endless enquiries. Most important of all, the interviewers saw the actual conditions of work and made valuable contacts with the factories and the welfare officers. Much may be learned from this procedure when working out a more permanent post-war policy, especially if all young people are to come within the purview of the Education Authority.

Local Education Authorities were asked to send returns within one month of registration and subsequent returns at monthly intervals. This involved a new burden on depleted staffs, but it has been manfully shouldered. Once the first registration was complete, it was decided in future to hold one registration every six months, as boys and girls reached the age of 16. A simplified return was requested. Thus particulars are now available relating to the numbers registering, numbers in full-time or part-time education, in pre-service and other youth organizations. A second group of figures shows how many were invited to the interview, how many responded and finally how many were prevented from joining, due to long hours of work, physical disability or other reasons.

Few people can realize how much extra labour was entailed by the arrang-

ing of interviews, the sorting of cards, the preparation of returns, the following-up of those who failed to appear at four successive interviews. The public is therefore entitled to know whether the figures are reliable and, secondly, whether any increase in membership is directly due to the registration.

In Scotland the scheme was received with mixed feelings, especially when it was officially described as the first move in a nation-wide effort to mobilize the youth of the country for "worth-while leisure." How, for example, it was asked, can you compare the training in the Boys' Brigade with that in the Home Guard? If all youth over 16 is expected to undertake pre-service training in connection with war, why not say so? In England the phrase "approved activity" was used, but what is approved, and by whom? This is precisely the difficulty which met the ill-starred report on Youth, issued by the Conservative Party. In the case of pre-service units the training is precisely laid down by Service Departments; in no other case is any course approved, except perhaps in an Evening Institute.

One correspondent wrote a vehement letter to a well-known weekly paper complaining that once more the Government had underrated the capacity of sacrifice in the country; he described the appeal as "the lowest common denominator of the lily-livered." "The 17 year old manhood of England registered for service to the British Empire in its desperate hour—an obligation which can apparently be met by attending a weekly class in ballroom dancing or listening to an occasional exhortation with or without a cup of tea."

Mr. Henriques, writing with experience from East London, said that the registration scheme was a farce from the point of view of those not belonging to any recognized organization. And after the completion of registration the Blackpool authorities reported that for the fifty per cent. who require waking up to the fact that they have social duties and obligations, the Government scheme must be considered a failure; they added "from the start emphasis was laid on the please-yourself attitude already such a marked feature of our social system."

The Government, under some pressure, has now promised to produce a White Paper and the full results of the registration must await its arrival. Meanwhile in the dossiers of some 200 local education authorities and in the experience of several thousand interviewers there lies a wealth of human stories, grave and gay, inspiring and at times disquieting. If this country cared about social and educational research, it would have demanded this important social document as a guide to all those engaged in the Service of Youth. But we are notoriously reluctant to trust surveys or put much faith in figures.

What then is the general picture as revealed by the survey and what are the figures? It would be broadly true of the whole country to say that about 50 per cent. of boys and about 20 per cent. of the girls belong to some organization. There are, of course, variations between town and country and

smaller variations between different types of urban communities. On closer analysis it is clear that without the Home Guard and pre-service units, particularly the Air Training Corps, the figure for boys would be nearer 20 per cent. than 50. It will be convenient to consider the girls separately in a later section. Of the boys there are at the moment, excluding school units, 175,000 in the A.T.C., 175,000 in the Army Cadet Force, and about 50,000 in the Sea Cadet Corps, but these figures are apt to confuse the reader, because the age-group for the A.T.C. is 15½ to 18 or even 19 and the age-groups for the other two services are 14-17. Moreover, the quotas are fixed for each Corps and it is well-known that the Sea Cadets could double their numbers if officers and facilities were available. Indeed, one striking discovery was the large number of boys who want to join the Navy or Merchant Service. There is no definite promise that a boy will enter the Service in which he has received preliminary training. It is arguable that the units would have been filled without any registration. In Sunderland, for example, which has always had an excellent record for Youth organization, the registration failed to attract newcomers. The seventeen year old boy did not feel it worth while, when he was so near to being called up; and the boys of sixteen who joined have since attended only for short periods. These facts make it doubtful whether a boy will build up new allegiances after the age of 16.

What then are the facts? The Air Training Corps, which was given Government priority, found no difficulty in reaching its limit. The Army and Sea Cadets once they were properly organized, which was after the registration, have exceeded their quotas. In Civil Defence, messenger units had enrolled all over the country and in Liverpool a significant experiment had taken place. Due to the enthusiasm of Professor Channon a magnificently trained Civil Defence Cadet Corps was in being and had performed valuable service during the blitz on Liverpool. I am not aware that registration has added large numbers to these units, nor indeed has official Government policy given them any encouragement. Local Education Authorities have since 1940 been establishing Youth Centres. Lancashire, for example, has over ninety such centres, and its youth sub-committee reports that there has already been a remarkable improvement in the standard of individual conduct and sense of responsibility. Manchester has opened twenty-two centres, with 7,000 members, many of whom belong also to pre-service units. Here the sexes meet freely and easily and purely recreational activities have gradually made way for a wide variety of occupations and studies. Manchester has strained the space of every school building and the time of every leader to cope with the increased interest, and attributes some of the wide development to the fact of registration itself. Efforts have been through such devices as the Certificate T (technical) for Army Cadets to link pre-service training with evening institutes; other plans are being made to provide club life for pre-service units. Scouts have been stimulated to develop their own Sea and Air branches which appeal to the later years of adolescence.

In the countryside Youth Service squads had already proved a marked success in East Suffolk, due to the genius and leadership of Miss Patience Bland, but this example was not followed in many other counties. Again, Young Farmers' Clubs have improved their organization and been given further financial support, but increased enrolment has been due to those solid facts and of course to the increased importance of agriculture. It is questionable whether either of these rural movements has been affected by registration.

In general the registration has proved beyond any doubt that most voluntary organizations have little appeal to young people over the age of 16; they wish to be treated as "young adults" not as "old scholars." They are looking forward to a training which will prepare them for service or for occupation.

In the case of girls, very few organizations existed, especially in the countryside, hence the importance of the East Suffolk experiment, which catered not only for both sexes, but for boys and girls between 14 and 18. Indeed, junior leaders were being discovered in the later age-groups. The Women's Junior Air corps had enrolled over 50,000 girls, only to be disowned by the Air Ministry—after registration. There is now one comprehensive Girls' Training Corps for girls, sponsored by the Board of Education itself. Only the initiated can explain how Girls' Clubs, Rangers and Red Cross Youth detachments make their peace with this larger corps. But as there are 750,000 girls between the ages of 16 and 18 and less than 20 per cent. belong to any social or training organization, there is room for experiment. One has only to read Miss Jephcott's vivid analysis *Girls Growing Up** and Miss Violet Markham's report on The Women's Services to realize the neglected physical and mental life of the ordinary working girl. It was interesting to discover that a proportion are married; in Manchester there were thirty-seven, three of whom were only 16. But domestic duties and long hours of work prevent thousands of girls from considering any form of outside community life. The Board of Education have laid down the basis of both general and specific training which may be given; the main difficulty is a tragic shortage of leaders and facilities.

Although the facts were known to individual authorities the registration has emphasized the wide disparity of higher education. Unless the figures include evacuees and boarding-schools—and without them the facts are sufficiently eloquent—what possible justification can there be for Manchester and Sheffield having about five per cent. in full-time education, while Surrey and Hertfordshire have fourteen per cent. Nor do Wales and Scotland show much variation from the general average of under ten per cent., for in Glamorgan the figure is nine and in Ayrshire seven.

Though the hours of work stated have often included overtime and travelling, there is enough truth in the many criticisms made by Authorities to cause disquiet. Middlesex found that many boys and girls spent an average of 12 hours in daily discharge of their occupations, Smethwick reported that young people were working excessive hours to the detriment of their health,

* Faber & Faber, 1942.

Coventry showed that building was the worst offender for boys' and catering for girls. Wallasey speaks of long hours in ship-building, engineering, cinemas, laundries and canteens. Particularly noticeable were the long hours in family businesses and the additional evening employment in cinemas, cafés and fried fish-shops. Apparently this latter practice is not contrary to any existing legislation. It is clear that some general limitation of hours should now be conceded and that at least a fortnight's holiday should be given during the coming summer, and that whenever possible the maximum use should be made of forestry and recreational camps.

I think it may be fairly concluded that while the compulsory registration and voluntary interview have almost by accident thrown light on such questions as hours of work, and while they have focussed attention on the broad picture, they have not materially increased the numbers in the various youth organizations. That at any rate is the considered opinion of the youth organizations in the important city of Birmingham and in many other places. The spirit of the times and the growth of new units were mainly responsible for new members, once the need was made manifest. Of course, there is a proportion, varyingly estimated at between three and six per cent., who were apathetic and even recalcitrant, some indeed of very low intelligence. These need personal and in some cases medical care. But it was just this group which failed to appear at a voluntary interview.

It is the widespread feeling of those engaged in the interviews that the quality of most of the young people is beyond question. Their frankness was disarming. Little or no resentment was ever shown by the boys and girls themselves, though many had no idea what was the purpose of the registration.

If it had been possible to offer a fairly immediate entry into the Services, particularly the Navy, they would have seized the opportunity as an escape from boring work and a limited environment. There is little need to doubt the "toughness" of the great majority. Wages are not universally high and work plus travelling absorbs much of their time—and surely that is "national service" itself. Industry is too often an impersonal organization and tends to make young people old before they have enjoyed the gaiety and seriousness of youth. How often during interviews a personal interest in the ordinary problems of "growing-up" revealed a touching display of confidence and sometimes opened out brand-new possibilities for overworked and hopelessly neglected boys and girls.

The attitude of youth to politics and religion has received some public comment, but I am not in the least surprised at the widespread disillusion with politicians and pastors. What have either of them done (with a few exceptions) to earn the respect of the younger generation? What attempt has been made to build up a healthy interest in the modern world or to answer their natural doubts on religion? I could quote scores of examples to show their pathetic ignorance about common questions of citizenship or theology, but I could also quote shrewd observations on current affairs which really

affect their limited lives. For twenty years we have turned out four-fifths of the nation's children at the age of 14 and given them the vote at 21. The claims of work, much of it completely monotonous, have always come first. This does not predispose boys and girls to formal evening instruction; moreover the appeal of a comfortable cinema or well-lit ball-room is superior to that of a dingy mission hall or old-fashioned school building.

Alas, no existing provision begins to meet the needs of modern youth; but whatever the premises, two factors are essential, purpose and friendliness. Where there is point or purpose in the studies, mathematics for a pilot, navigation for a sailor, first-aid for a nurse, interest is quickly kindled. In one technical institution in Scotland voluntary classes in Mathematics and Mechanics showed an attendance of 150 per cent. above pre-war figures, due to the "Services" stipulation of technical competence in these subjects. An atmosphere of friendliness, coupled with inspiring adult leadership is the second requisite. Most boys and girls want to equip themselves for a known occupation, they want a goal and a star, but they also want to feel that they are wanted by their friends and by the community. Discipline is not resented, uniforms obviously attract, but the main needs are the simple and natural ones, purpose and friendliness. Exhortations are relatively useless unless practical projects and concrete schemes can be offered. The limitations of war make this long-term problem difficult to grasp. If a vacuum is left, it will be filled by windy doctrine, regimentation or a return to the listlessness of pre-war days.

But I doubt the wisdom of continuing with registration, especially as boys are now called up at 18 and may join the Army Reserve at 17 and enter the Y scheme of the Navy at 16½. Would it not be better for the Board of Education to concentrate all their efforts and those of Local Education Authorities and voluntary societies on building up a wide variety of continued education and social training from the age of 14? If the Services can work out carefully prepared schemes for those over 16, there will be no difficulty in filling pre-service units. If in addition hours of work are limited and medical and dental attention are provided, we shall be laying the right foundations. The fundamental social unit is still the family-home; everyone knows that many homes are broken up to-day. But nothing is gained by not stressing the supreme importance of parental responsibility. Youth still needs to be dealt with on an individual basis and not on mass lines. Therefore until the school-leaving age can be raised, there is a heavy obligation falling on parents, teachers and above all on voluntary organizations and education authorities to build up the Service of Youth from the school-leaving age, if not before it. With forty per cent. of male teachers and many fathers away in the Forces, this is the supreme and still the neglected problem. This should be the first lesson of the Registration of Youth, or, in the Prime Minister's own words, "we have to think of future citizens as well as carrying on the defence of the country."

THE CHURCH AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE*

BY THE BISHOP OF CHICHESTER

IT is about the character of the future of Europe that the United Nations are engaged in this war against the Nazis, and I believe that the Church has a very direct relevance to a right conception of that future. And I mean not the Roman Catholic Church only, or the Orthodox Church or the Anglican or other separate communions, but the Church Universal, that is, the body of all baptized Christians.

I do not propose to attempt any analysis of the causes of the war. There are many men far better equipped who have done that admirably. Some lay emphasis on economic causes, some on the ingrained nationalism of peoples in every nation, some on the crisis in modern democracy. But however much such factors may contribute, it is in my belief impossible to avoid the conclusion that the principal cause of our present calamities is moral and spiritual. The world has crashed because it has gone awhoring after strange gods.

I believe in the essential unity of Europe. This unity was once fundamentally spiritual in character, that is to say it had spiritual sanctions and was recognized as deriving its power from spiritual sources. Many elements have gone to the making of Europe including Greek and Latin, Moslem and Christian. But when civilization was low it was the Church which kept the light of the Christian Faith still shining in the North and the West, as well as in Rome, that overcame barbarism and guarded the life and preserved the culture of Europe. At the very moment of the fall of the Empire in the West, it was a Christian monk, an African Saint Augustine, who in his great book, *Of the City of God*, to quote Christopher Dawson, "set forth a programme which was to inspire the ideals of a new age. He viewed all history as the evolution of two opposite principles embodied in two hostile societies, the heavenly and the earthly cities, Sion and Babylon, the Church and the World."† It was another Christian monk, an Englishman, Saint Boniface of Crediton, the Apostle of Germany, who brought Germany into the range of European civilization in the Eighth Century and, to quote Mr. Dawson again, had "a deeper influence on the history of Europe than any Englishman who has ever lived." I believe that the Church has a mission at the present time, if God will, once again to save Europe from barbarism, and how it the secret of unity.

*The substance of a paper read to the Austrian Democratic Union in London, January 1, 1943.

†*The Making of Europe*, p. 192. *Ibid*, p. 211.

It is indeed a new age of the barbarians in which we are called to live, or is it rather a new wave of barbarian invasion against which we have to battle? One mark of barbarism is the worship of force and the spurning of law. Another mark is the worship of the tribe, or the cult of blood. "The men I want round me," says Adolf Hitler, "are those who like myself see in force the motive element in history, and who act accordingly." "To-day," says Rosenberg, "a new belief arises: the myth of blood, the belief that in defending blood we defend the divine nature of man." Against all such idolatry the Church sets the commandment of God, "I am the Lord thy God: thou shalt have none other gods but me." It proclaims law and justice, freedom and love, the universal Fatherhood of God. It also proclaims redemption and forgiveness, and the reconciliation of men and nations in Christ.

The Church has given witness to these truths in the present struggle with barbarism in unmistakable terms. It gave witness before the war in Germany. When Adolf Hitler and the Nazis inaugurated the totalitarian state and began to destroy all freedom, it was not the Universities or the Courts, the men of letters or the Trade Unions that resisted the tyranny, but the Church. It was the Catholic Church and the Evangelical or Confessional Church that denounced the aggressor and his new paganism and national programme. There were brave leaders in both: Cardinal Faulhaber, Count von Galen, Otto Dibelius, Martin Niemöller and many more. All denounced the de-Christianization of Germany by the Nazi leaders, and the new religion of blood. It is specially to be observed that at Whitsuntide, 1936, the Evangelical appeal to the Fuehrer by the Confessional Church leaders, raised the issue not simply of religious freedom, but of the concentration camps, the persecution of the Jews, and the annihilation of all law by the Gestapo.

The Church gave witness before the war internationally as well. Protests were made by the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work representing the Protestant and Orthodox and non-Roman Christianity in 1933, and at Fano in 1934; and by the Oecumenical Conference at Oxford in 1937. But the outstanding remonstrance which stirred the whole world was the letter of Pope Pius XI to the German people in 1937 (*Mit Brennender Sorge*), in which, besides denouncing the open war on the Church, the attacks on its schools, and the systematic attempts to alienate the German people from all Christian influences, he recalled men to a recognition of what is usually called the Natural Law. (Romans ii, 14, etc.) "By this standard we must judge also the fundamental principle: 'Right is what is advantageous to the people.'"

The Church has also given witness since the outbreak of war, both in particular nations occupied by the Nazis, and internationally. There have been very remarkable utterances by individual Bishops, both Catholic and Evangelical, in Germany, particularly by the Catholic Bishop von Galen of Münster, and the Evangelical Bishop Wurm of Württemberg. And here again it must be observed that the Bishops and others in this crisis have not confined themselves to ecclesiastical interests, but have championed the

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natural rights of mankind. The Conference of Catholic Bishops at Fulda stated this in great detail last year.

There have been similar remarkable utterances against the Nazi tyranny and racial programme by leaders of the Church in other nations; in Holland, where Catholics and Protestants have spoken together, in Belgium, in France. Nor must we forget the eloquent action of the Orthodox Church in inspiring resistance to the Nazis in Greece and Yugoslavia. And above all I would place the voice and action of the Church of Norway, the leaders of which simultaneously with the teachers, have so magnificently repudiated the Quisling Government and all its works, under the fine leadership of Bishop Berggrav.

Once again the Church has given witness internationally since the war; and while we must not forget the activities of the World Council of the Churches (in process of formation) for prisoners of war and for refugees, the greatest real opportunity so far permitted in this time of war for Oecumenical utterance is that open to and used by the Pope. It may be that he is sometimes more guarded than we should like, and that there are silences which are hard to understand. But there can be little doubt that for those with eyes to read between the lines, we see in his successive utterances a reinforcement of the principles of order and charity, a re-assertion of the principles of the Natural Law, and a growing desire for an association between Catholics and non-Catholics in the preservation of order. In his first Christmas Eve Allocution of 1939, the Pope stated with reference to the start of the war:

We have been forced to witness a series of acts irreconcilable alike with the precepts of positive international law and those of the law of nature, as well as with the elementary sentiments of humanity; acts which show in what a vicious circle the juridical sense becomes involved when it is led simply by considerations of expediency.

And in his latest Christmas Eve Allocution of 1942, he declared the absolute necessity of obedience to the Law of God.

The Church does not intend to take sides for either of the particular systems in which the different peoples and States strive to solve the gigantic problems of domestic order or international collaboration, as long as these forms conform to the law of God. But on the other hand, as a pillar and foundation of truth and guardian, by the will of God and the Mandate of Christ, of the natural and supernatural order, the Church cannot renounce her rights to proclaim to her sons and to the whole world, the unchanging basic laws, shielding them from every perversion or frustration and corruption, every false interpretation and error.

I shall be told that my argument means the entry of the Church into politics. But how can that be avoided without a betrayal of the Church's faith? The Gospel is relevant to the whole of human conduct. Christianity requires action, which has to be taken in the conditions of actual life. The standard by which action has to be judged, according to the Prophets in the Old Testament, and according to the whole corpus of the New Testament, is the Law of God. It is from the Church's standpoint false to say that religion has only

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to do with the next world and the State with this, or that religion is a purely individual and personal affair. The claim of Christianity to rule the whole of life is nowhere more convincingly stated than in the Coronation of the English Sovereign, in particular when the Archbishop of Canterbury, in delivering the Orb to the King, says:

When you see this Orb thus set under the Cross, remember that the whole world is subject to the power and empire of Christ our Redeemer.

I have said that the real causes of the calamities which are upon us are moral and spiritual. I believe that many will agree with me here who do not call themselves Christians. And in facing the need for a moral and spiritual remedy for our condition, I do not wish to make an exclusive claim for Christianity. In these barbarous and savage times, men and women of all religions which still recognize God as Creator of heaven and earth and absolute Lord of all things, and all those who seek to build the life of men and nations on the immovable and immutable rock of the moral law, must stand together. But the Church, just because it is an organized society with a history and an authority independent of party politics, has perhaps, even from the secular point of view, a rather special advantage for declaring the moral law. The Church will therefore emphasize the character of this common ground, and state the principles to which it is essential that men and nations should hold fast, if true order is to be achieved and maintained, and if the disasters which come through the repudiation of order are to be avoided. It will point to the fact that States of all kinds continually do appeal to the law of justice, as a sign that a desire for justice, and a belief in justice as a reality, lie deep in the human soul. And, since nowhere is the moral foundation so necessary as in international law, which is not supported by any higher exterior authority, it will declare that no international legal system, however carefully framed, however widely supported, can be permanently maintained without a common ethos, without a body of common, concrete convictions, which all the members accept.

I propose to lay special stress on the task of the Church in relation to the common ethos. But I want first to speak of the Church's rôle as teacher of justice. The Church should proclaim war, as an instrument of settling disputes, to be a crime. It should denounce the aggressor, declare justice and rally all those who believe in justice against an unscrupulous and immoral foe. But there is another aspect of its duty which is less popular. The Church should not fear to warn the Government of its own country, when that Government, because of indolence, or cowardice, or love of gain, or love of power, becomes the aggressor itself, or condones offences against a conquered foe, or isolates itself economically or politically from the Commonwealth of Nations, or refuses a rightful share of the raw materials and natural resources within its Empire to countries less amply supplied, or fails at a crisis to give the expected help to a weaker nation. We ought not to be very critical of what the Church has failed to do in the Axis countries unless we are prepared

to repent of what it has failed to do in our own. And in the very midst of war, let us in this country remember that the Church has still a special duty to be a watchman for humanity, and to plead the cause of the suffering, whether Gentile or Jew.

The Church should certainly look to the future in a broadly political fashion. Work of considerable value is already going on in this field. The Five Peace Points of the Pope, of Christmas, 1939, provided the first broad outline of principles under which peace may be achieved, Points which a year later were accepted by the English religious leaders in a letter to *The Times*. The British Council of Churches (non-Roman Catholic)—published an important statement in 1942 on The Christian Church and World Order. In the United States a conference, under the auspices of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (non-Roman Catholic) meeting at Delaware, Ohio, March, 1942, on The Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, laid down nine guiding principles which in their judgment Christians and non-Christians alike could accept. All these pronouncements, reveal, as was to be expected, a large amount of common ground.

All affirm that there is a moral order which is fundamental and eternal, and which is relevant to the corporate life of man, and the ordering of human society. All affirm that the principle of co-operation implicit in the moral order calls for a true community of nations. All affirm that the just demands of nations and populations and of racial minorities must be met, and that economic security, nationally and internationally, involves among other things the use of material resources and the tools of production to raise the general standard of living. All affirm that effective machinery for administering and exercising justice among the nations should be established, with the power, in cases of recognized need, of revising and correcting existing treaties. All affirm that the control of armaments is essential, if mankind is to have energy and resources for the worthier ends of life.

But, sound as sound affirmations are in themselves, the most important element in these pronouncements is the emphasis laid on the moral factor; what I may call a recognition of the necessity of a common moral ethos. And the principal elements in this common moral ethos are justice and love.

As to this let me state quite briefly:

1. The problems of peace and war are problems of persons. We are apt to treat these high questions of policy as the affair only of the leaders, statesmen, diplomats and commanders. But they depend in the end on the spiritual response of individual human beings, and their attitude to one another on both sides of the frontier. We are too little alive to this, and so the spiritual atmosphere which determines policy is wrong. Like secular optimistic or utilitarian reformers, the Church itself far too often begins with the circumference of external organization, instead of with the centre, the conversion of the individual.

2. Everyone of us is an individual human soul, and everyone, whoever he be, is responsible for the whole of his conduct to God. It makes all the difference if a man goes through life as one who is conscious of his relation to God, his call to obey the will of God, and his answerability to God for his relationship with other human beings. It makes all the difference to a man's attitude to men of other nations if he believes that God is the Father of the whole human family, and that God has a purpose in the fulfilment of which all nations play their proper part.

3. The Church will constantly teach the centrality of justice. As Saint Augustine says, when justice is removed, what are states but bodies of brigands? It is justice, or order, which is the foundation of peace. And justice within a greater community must always keep in view not only the individuals and their rights and duties, but also the community as a whole.

4. Yet justice by itself is not enough. It must lead on to, and be transcended by, love. It is the special task of the Church, with its Gospel of the Cross, to proclaim the sovereignty of love. It will assert that love is really at the heart of all life, and that the perfect fellowship of men, and the fellowship of peoples and races is the good to which, whatever pain and agony are suffered on the way, all are being led by God. The Church will teach how the Divine command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" embraces neighbours across the frontiers, and will ask that as one presupposition of love each one of us shall try to understand those belonging to another nation, even though unfriendly to our own nation. And since to it is committed the Gospel of the Cross to be preached to all nations, the Church must preach redemption and reconciliation and forgiveness.

I have stated, very briefly, some of the implications of this common moral ethos; and it will be observed that my emphasis is laid on ethos rather than on the framing of a new Table of Commandments. I am prepared to agree that the making of a Table of Commandments for the relationship of Nations might well be of service. But I am quite sure that it is the ethical or rather the religious spirit behind, which is the supremely important thing.

I have been speaking of the Church and the future of Europe, not as a member of the Church of England, but as a member of the Universal Church. I am of course aware that in this Universal Church there are many divisions. The divisions are grave. But I maintain that in spite of the divisions, there is a spiritual unity which actually exists. It is a unity which gathers within it men of all races, classes and nations. I also maintain not only that a more concrete expression of that spiritual unity is deeply to be desired, but that given courage and a clear sight, it can be had without embarrassment now. The Orthodox Church in Constantinople made an appeal to all Christians for just such a fellowship 23 years ago. The Oecumenical Conferences at Stockholm (1925), Lausanne (1927), Oxford and Edinburgh (1937) were landmarks in Christian fellowship for those belonging to the Orthodox and Evangelical Christian communions. And the World Council of the Churches (in process

of formation) with its headquarters at Geneva has gathered, and is steadily gathering, strength. Again, once we agree to leave all questions of credal doctrine and Church order on one side, the unity of which I speak can be had between Roman Catholics and other Christian communions on the basis of Natural Law. The Pope has spoken with great emphasis of the necessity of this kind of collaboration or Christian co-operation between Roman Catholics and all those who have faith in God and in Jesus Christ. And the method of this collaboration is being worked out in this country by two movements known as "Religion and Life," representing the Church of England and the Free Churches, and the "Sword of the Spirit," representing the Roman Catholics, with the help of a joint committee of Anglicans, Roman Catholics and Freechurchmen.

I do not lay particular stress upon organization. I believe in persons, and I hope much more from the intimacy of personal relations than from ecclesiastical machinery. But the making of these personal relations between Christians in each nation and of all nations is very urgent. There is one thing I should like to see as a first step in Europe, and I see that also in terms of persons. When fighting ceases between the United Nations and the Axis powers in Europe, let a Conference of Christian leaders, Catholic and Protestant, from both sides and from neutral countries, be immediately summoned in some neutral city. Let them meet as the symbol of the Universal Church in the midst of warring nations. Let theirs be the first voice sounding a universal note. Let them meet before any treaty negotiations are commenced, in order to make a declaration of Christian unity proceeding from the Gospel, to witness to men of their Father and Creator and of Jesus Christ the Saviour of the world, and to make plain that Christ has not been conquered.

When we think of the monstrous crimes committed by the agents of the Axis powers against noble peoples of Europe, when we think of the bitter sufferings of the persecuted, Gentiles and Jews, and of the terrible flood of hatred surging everywhere against the Nazis, it is surely the duty of Christian believers in all countries to give their witness against force and race worship and in spite of everything to try and build up a rampart of love.

I insist once again on the significance of persons. It is on the creation of the common ethos that the future of Europe depends. This can only come about by the conversion of individual human beings. And it must be everywhere, among the victor as well as the vanquished peoples. Nothing can do more for justice and peace in Europe than a crusade of conversion; the filling of millions of souls with the hunger for justice and the spirit of love. Nothing can do more to save mankind from barbarism than the preaching and acceptance of the Cross as the salvation of the world.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE DISABLED

BY SIR IAN FRASER, M.P.

MEN and women who have less than average physical fitness should be studied and treated from the point of view of their employability rather than their disability. All who are handicapped whether they are soldiers, sailors or airmen wounded in battle, or civil defence workers or ordinary workmen wounded in air-raids, or any persons hurt by industrial accidents or rendered unfit by disease whether acquired or inherited, should be treated alike. Save in the most serious cases there is useful work that they can do and the community ought, on humanitarian as well as economic grounds, to go out of its way to give them the finest medical treatment and appliances to rehabilitate them and train them and find them suitable employment. These are I think the outstanding features of the Tomlinson Report* which has just been presented to Parliament.

Mr. George Tomlinson was Chairman of this Departmental Committee. He is Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, an able and likeable parliamentarian, a member of the Labour Party, and one who has spent the greater part of his life in the Trade Union movement. The other ten members of the Committee are Civil Servants representing the various departments of State, such as the Ministries of Labour, Health, and Pensions, the Home Office, the Board of Education, Department of Health for Scotland, the Treasury, and Offices of the War Cabinet, which have some responsibility for medical or industrial matters.

All down the pages of our history there have been men who in spite of severe handicaps or disabilities have made a notable contribution to their time, or, have at any rate led active and vigorous lives. Nelson won immortal fame and perhaps changed history when he had but one arm and one eye. It is said that his blind eye was the more useful because it enabled him to give a tolerable or at any rate a dramatic excuse for taking what most men would have regarded as an undue risk, but which brought him victory at the battle of Copenhagen. Milton wrote his greatest works after he was blind; and in modern times Fawcett, the Postmaster General, and Delius, both blind, have won contemporary, and in the latter case perhaps, lasting fame.

In humbler stations there have been many who because they had strong personality or particular gifts have made a place for themselves in spite of severe disabilities, and there are many individual employers who take pride in the fact that they find a job for those who are disabled in their employment.

* Report of Inter-departmental Committee on the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Disabled Persons. H.M. Stationery Office. 9d.

During and after the last war some very successful work was done by voluntary bodies, such as the King's Roll National Council, the British Legion St. Dunstan's, and Lord Roberts' Workshops, to secure employment for the disabled. Now perhaps for the first time in a State document, the proposal is made that the State itself shall cover the whole of the field.

The Tomlinson Committee was set up by the Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin Minister of Labour, lifelong Trade Unionist and Trade Union leader, presided over by Mr. Tomlinson whose background was similar, and composed of Civil Servants. Truth is many-sided and men see things when they are searching for the truth from points of view which vary with their own experience and background and with their lifelong beliefs and perhaps I may say without being misunderstood, prejudices. You might therefore have expected the Report to emphasize the importance and power of the State and to minimize the efficacy of voluntary effort. I certainly discern a tendency this way, but it is only fair to say that the Committee are generous in their praise of voluntary enterprise and wish to see it retained in some cases. Nevertheless there are proposals in the Report which substitute controlled State action for voluntary effort and they should be closely examined.

A few years after the last war the German Government introduced a law under which an employer who had more than fifty or perhaps it was one hundred workmen in his factory was compelled to employ not less than two or three per cent. of war disabled or blind persons. Theoretically such a scheme should absorb all the war disabled and blind who are capable of employment and find suitable places for them. In a small factory with two or three hundred men you might place your four or six or ten disabled persons in various jobs without much difficulty. In a very big company or group of companies you might take another course. In fact the Siemens Electrical Industries centred near Berlin, who employed many scores of thousands of workmen, chose to establish a special factory for the disabled where the appropriate percentage would be employed together—thus carrying out their obligation under conditions which they thought economic and satisfactory. I went to see it myself sometime in the 1920's and though I was impressed with the effort to find work for these disabled men I did not think it an economic proposition and was not surprised at the news which came some years later that it had closed down. As regards the general compulsory employment of a small percentage of the disabled I do not know whether this was a success in Germany, but certainly so far as the blind were concerned I found when I visited Germany again many years later that the scheme had not succeeded in finding them work in ordinary industry.

The passing of this German law, however, and the fact that many disabled from the Great War were unemployed in Britain, led to a Select Committee being set up "on Training and Employment of Disabled Men." The Committee visited Germany and reported in August, 1922. They recommended a voluntary scheme, but said in effect that the problem was so urgent that in

their opinion their proposals should be carried into effect forthwith, and that should undue unemployment continue, then by May 1, 1923, compulsion should be considered. In fact the voluntary scheme known as the King's Roll National Council has continued until the present day with marked success and no serious representations for a compulsory scheme have been found necessary, or have been made.

The Tomlinson Committee take up this theme and propose two measures which are of a compulsory nature. First of all they say that certain particular jobs should be set aside for the disabled. One-armed men for example can operate a lift, therefore all lift operators should be one-armed men until they are all absorbed. There are other similar examples. The proposed method of enforcing this is that the employer shall only be able to get his employees through the Labour Exchange and when he applies for a lift operator he will be bound to take a one-armed man so long as there is one available. He may not employ a two-armed man except by leave of the local Labour Exchange.

The other proposal which involves the principle of compulsion recommends that each employer should be required to take a certain quota of disabled men and utilizes the same Labour Exchange machinery, that is to say, an employer who has *not* employed his quota will not be able to obtain any additional labour from the Labour Exchange or from any other quarter unless he first makes up his quota of disabled men or gets a licence from the Labour Exchange to allow him to fill his vacancies with fit men. Owing to the necessities of war, employers have accepted a very large degree of control over all aspects of their affairs and in particular they may not employ or dismiss labour without reference to the Labour Exchanges, and it is likely I suppose that a considerable measure of control will have to be continued for sometime after the war. It may therefore be argued for the Tomlinson Report proposal that labour will be regulated to such an extent in general that employers will not be particularly upset by the small amount of regulation required to ensure the employment of a small quota of disabled men. This may well prove to be the case if all industry is booming and profits are being made. But no private enterprise can carry on for more than a limited period at a loss, nor can the country as a whole, whether its industry be private enterprise or state enterprise, or a mixture of the two, unless it is efficient and can compete in the world markets. This is particularly the case in Britain where we cannot feed ourselves and must import.

I know, of course, that proposals are being discussed for international agreements to avoid competition in world markets. I along with many others would welcome these if they could be secured. But there are many difficulties and I am cautious about relying upon any solution of this kind proving successful at the moment of armistice when millions of men will be wanting to get home to their jobs. I ask myself whether this compulsory method will not create a good deal of difficulty in firms struggling to get back their trade or just managing to keep their heads above water. With the best will

in the world they may not be able to accept any additional burdens and survive. In my view it is no solution to say simply, nationalize the lot and then without the profit motive you will be able to solve all your difficulties. This is not practical politics for I do not think the country would vote for such a degree of nationalization immediately after the war. There is some indication that leading members of the Labour Party do not think so either. In the recent important statement by Mr. Morrison, the new Member of the War Cabinet, he said in effect that while certain great industries should in his opinion be nationalized the vast number of small private and public companies, which together make such an enormous contribution to our wealth and to our employment, should remain under private enterprise.

Let us look at the alternative which was operated in respect of the disabled men of the last war. The King's Roll National Council was formally established on the initiative of the Minister of Labour and with his support. This was a Council of distinguished and trusted ex-Servicemen who made a national appeal to all employers to employ a certain quota, normally 5 per cent. of disabled men in their works. If an employer undertook this obligation he would receive a badge which he might place on his notepaper which gave him some little distinction and which appealed to his patriotism, and as a practical inducement Government departments and Local Authorities were invited only to give contracts to firms who were on the King's Roll. During the years 1922 to 1941 well over 300,000 disabled men were employed under this scheme. In no year during the whole of that period did the percentage of disabled men out of employment rise as high as the average unemployment percentage of the whole registered population. This proves that the voluntary scheme did provide a very definite preference for the disabled man, and it may be presumed since the scheme was voluntary that the employment was congenial and the relationship between employers and old soldier a happy one.

Under the proposals of the Tomlinson Report not only disabled soldiers but disabled air-raid victims and all disabled civilians as well as those who through ordinary sickness or disease are below average physical fitness are to be included in the quota for compulsory employment. The two or three per cent. which was supposed to suffice theoretically in Germany for a limited class may be raised to five, six or even ten per cent. here in Britain when all handicapped people are included. Incidentally, the Tomlinson Report gives no estimate of the number involved.

I wonder whether the scheme would be fair to the old soldier and to the new ex-Serviceman. No old soldier wants to be mean or ungenerous about the employment of others but the man who is disabled in fighting for his country has hitherto been given this voluntary preference. He is now to be treated on a level with all others who are unfit and to be part of a scheme which because of its very magnitude may not work. I cannot help thinking Parliament should examine this very closely and hesitate before it commits itself to such a scheme. If the voluntary method fails then compulsion must

be tried, and it might be tried in respect of the disabled soldiers, sailors and airmen first to see how it operated, before an obligation to find employment for everybody was made compulsory. It may well be that the general standard of living in Britain may depend upon the ease and speed with which we regain our export trade and rebuild our shattered country. It may well be that the general well-being of the whole community would be impaired if one burden after another is placed upon all industries without regard to their capacity to revive and bear them. It is hard to commit yourself to a choice as to who shall enjoy employment and who shall suffer unemployment and it is my earnest hope that the Government and the country will do everything that lies in their power, whatever the sacrifice of rights or privileges of any class, taxpayer or Trades Unionist, to facilitate full employment for all. But I am not one of those who expect such an ideal to be easily realized in a few months during the very difficult period of transition from war to peace, and during that period I feel that if there is any special obligation which the country owes it is to the men who served in distant and dangerous theatres of war, or in the Royal Air Force or the Royal Navy. They suffered the hazard and the danger, they took the much greater risk of disablement and if they come back shattered in body or mind the first obligation I feel must be to them.

There is a wider thought not connected with the Tomlinson Report and the disabled which follows from the considerations I have just mentioned, namely, the duty of the community to the fit fighting man who returns from a distant theatre of war or from hazardous service in the Air Force or Navy. What should be our duty to him? Undoubtedly the Trade Unions who are so strong in their organization and who are so well represented in the Cabinet and in my guess will be equally strongly represented in the National Government that will be elected after the war, will take the view that so far as their members are concerned they should go back to the same rights as they enjoyed before the war. Indeed there is an Act of Parliament which purports to guarantee this. What then we may ask about the soldier, who having been away from his home and from his industry for two, three, four or five years, comes back to these islands, and wants a job. From the point of view of equity, the man who stayed at home, even if he was compelled to do so because he was in a key job, or belonged to an essential trade, had the easier time. He suffered less danger of being killed or mutilated and he had wages which, in some instances, were a very considerable advance upon his pre-war earnings. I am well aware that pre-war he may have suffered long periods of unemployment and I have the greatest sympathy for him in his desire to do better at a time when his services are in such great demand. But the fact remains that he has done his war service at home under much more congenial conditions than those who served in the fighting forces. Our first obligation is towards the men who fought in distant theatres of war, or in the Navy, or Air Force at home. They must have a preference for employment.

All these problems should be solved first before we embark upon a scheme to benefit the whole civil community, however desirable that may be.

As to the main contention of the Tomlinson Report that we should look to the employability of handicapped persons rather than to their disability and consider each case from that point of view, I am cordially in agreement. All my experience with disabled ex-Servicemen tells me that given proper training and given the right spirit there is a great deal of active work that they can do. A man who has lost an arm or a leg or two legs or both his eyes is handicapped in the selection of the work he can do. He is not a jack-of-all-trades; he is not even able perhaps to go back to his own trade or an analogous trade; something has got to be selected for him which suits his disability. But provided that trouble is taken he can very often earn a full wage on level terms with his fit competitor.

Through St. Dunstan's and with the goodwill of many leading employers we have already placed over a hundred men who were blinded in the last war, and a score or so of young men who were blinded in this war in the munition and aircraft and other industries where they are working on level terms with sighted men and are earning good money. They enjoy the society of the workers of whom they are a part, and they are happy useful citizens. I know that it has been easier to place them now because of the scarcity of labour than it would be in peacetime, but I hope very much that those we have placed in various factories where there are hundreds or even thousands of sighted workmen may retain their jobs. It is a good thing for the State to recognize that people who have been wounded or hurt or who have suffered some disease or accident, can with proper training undertake useful work. It is happier for them that they should be fully employed, and it is better for the State. And if we are to take into account the prognostications of the statisticians to which Sir William Beveridge makes such apt reference, that in a few years we shall become an older and older community unable to provide enough workers to sustain a high standard of living, then it becomes all the more important that the disabled should take their places in industry.

For these reasons I welcome the Tomlinson Report, and subject to the safeguards I have mentioned for the ex-Servicemen and for the general recovery of industry after the war, I should like to see it given a sympathetic reception by Parliament. And I should like to see the necessary machinery set up immediately to deal with the ex-Servicemen, unfit as well as fit, so as to ensure that they are properly placed.

There will remain a group of very severely disabled men who cannot be absorbed into ordinary industry, but who can do some useful work if they are placed in sheltered or special workshops designed for them. They will not be 100 per cent. efficient, and a subsidy will be needed to keep them employed. Notable examples of good work of this kind are provided by the British Legion Poppy Factory and Lord Roberts' Workshops, and the Tomlinson Report goes further and suggests that the Government itself

should set up sheltered workshops for the disabled. If all the disabled including those from ordinary industry and ordinary disease are to be included, then I do not doubt that Government action on a large scale will be required. This is a humane and desirable proposal. But again we must ask ourselves the question whether the immediate post-war period of disorganization and difficulty is the right time to start such an enterprise. I would not like to see the proposal to care for all who are handicapped abandoned, but I would counsel caution in trying to operate so widespread and vast a scheme.

The Workmen's Compensation is wrongly based. It inhibits work on the part of the disabled man, for the more he works the more compensation he loses, and he therefore tends to lose the incentive to try and do his best. This I think should be changed as proposed by Sir William Beveridge or in some other way. It should be a moral obligation, and if this fails it might have to be a legal obligation upon an employer to do everything that lies in his power to find work for his employee disabled in his own factory. The perfection of artificial limbs, the training of even severely disabled men, as at St. Dunstan's and other places, and the experience of employers during this war, have shown that even considerable disability does not prevent a man from earning a reasonable living and doing a normal quota of work.

Let us hope that the post-war period will be one of prosperity, and increasing activity and employment. Let us hope that the period of difficulty in turning over from war to peace will be short. I personally believe it will be a good deal shorter than some people imagine. And let us hope that an enlightened view of their responsibilities may lead employers to take a kindly and practical view about the employment of their own disabled. But let us hesitate before we compel all employers to do what they would like to do, but what during the transition period they may find it impossible to do.

It is certainly clear to me that there can be no jam for anybody until all have their bread and butter. I want to be sure that the machinery of British industry and production and exchange is given time to adapt itself to the new conditions and to produce the bread and butter before it is compelled to carry a standard of social well-being which it may not be able to afford.

Let me end this article on a note of hope and encouragement. I believe that as a result of this war mankind has learned a great deal about the control and use of money and about the distribution of goods. I believe that a great many people have a more enlightened view of their duty towards their neighbour and a great many employers a much more sympathetic view about their duty towards their employees. I believe that we can succeed in avoiding the terrible slumps and booms which were such a bad feature of the last twenty years, and I believe that we are all willing to make sacrifices of our privileges and rights to see that everybody has a fair living and a fair chance. I believe that if we do not expect too much too soon, and that if neither owners nor managements nor workers are too selfish we may well build a better Britain.

WHAT VICHY HAS DONE FOR FRANCE

BY A BRITISH SUBJECT LATELY IN FRANCE

THERE are few Frenchmen to-day who would wish to see the survival of the Vichy administration after an allied victory. Yet, prior to the total occupation of France in November, 1942, the Government of Marshal Pétain had a larger degree of popular support than might be supposed. In June, 1940, the people of France were dismayed when they were told an armistice had been asked for, but two months later almost without exception Frenchmen were satisfied that Marshal Pétain had saved their country from a terrible fate and that he had been right in demanding an armistice. During 1941 and 1942 until the occupation of the former unoccupied zone the policy and personalities of the Vichy Government often roused resentment and opposition, but the popular belief remained, that in the circumstances the Vichy form of Government was the best that defeated France could hope for.

This support of their Government was more than a mere personal confidence in Marshal Pétain. There was no desire to see the establishment of a French Government overseas. For the people at least the political situation was dominated by the question of the two million prisoners of war and the fate of the French Empire seemed to them to be of less importance. They believed that their Government was sincere in its efforts on behalf of the prisoners and in fact it did achieve a considerable measure of success, even if to us the price which had to be paid seems heavy. By November 11, 1942, about three quarters of a million prisoners had been released, including those repatriated on account of ill health.

The Vichy Government born of the Armistice of 1940 has now virtually disappeared. It was often referred to as a Quisling one. It was not so regarded by Frenchmen themselves even among those who despised it, yet could not be aware of the subtle and unexpected resistance to the Germans which came from official sources. This was so, both in the occupied and the unoccupied zones, and it was known that in a number of cases the Germans had taken reprisals against prominent collaborators whom they had found to be, in fact, working against them. It is well to remember that too much weight should not be given to public statements by prominent Frenchmen who remain in France, as they are often intended for enemy consumption.

Up to the time of the total occupation, France had sent fewer workers to Germany than either Holland or Belgium, notwithstanding the greater induce-

ment to do so. The presence of a French Government in unoccupied France did much to prevent Germany from exploiting her victory in the way she was able to do in occupied countries with refugee Governments. The *attentiste* policy of the Vichy Government, whatever may have been the motives, has paved the way for the Allied mastery of the Mediterranean. With the acquiescence, if not the active assistance, of their Government the French resisted collaboration more than might be supposed, but they are a logical race and they knew that refusal to collaborate must mean complete German control and requisition of production. It seemed to them to be the obvious thing to collaborate, if by doing so the Germans received less than would be the case by useless resistance.

By the buying and selling of vast quantities of commodities in the Black Market France has found yet another most effective method of resisting the Germans. Thus it was officially admitted in 1942 that Black Market supplies of butter arriving in Paris were equal to twice the amount required for providing the official ration.

The assassination of Admiral Darlan has done nothing to dispel the mystery of his career since the defeat of France. The French people thought very highly of Darlan as the real founder of their Navy in modern times. They expected a great deal of him when he became almost Dictator of France in January, 1941. They were disappointed, because of his apparent enthusiasm for the policy of collaboration.

From January, 1941, to the reassumption of power by Laval in April, 1942, opinions in France about Admiral Darlan were divided between those who believed he was successfully carrying out an *attentiste* policy in the hope of an eventual Allied victory and those who could see in Darlan's actions only the policy of an ambitious opportunist. It may be that both views of Darlan's policy were correct, but Frenchmen could not bring themselves to believe that the Admiral had sold himself to the Germans.

Of Deat and Doriot there was never any question where their sympathies lay. They were always in opposition to the Vichy Government for its failure to clasp with both hands the German offer of partnership in the European New Order. Their influence on French public opinion has been negligible as they were recognized to be semi-official mouthpieces of the occupation authorities.

Laval has the minimum of popular support and is hated by the great majority of his fellow countrymen whose only satisfaction in seeing him at the head of their Government is the belief that perhaps he alone is capable of depriving the Germans of the fruits of their victory.

At heart every Frenchman hates the traditional enemy and it is as true to-day as at any time in French history. The number of Frenchmen who sincerely wish to see a German victory and who are prepared to assist in the achievement of it must be very small indeed. It does not follow that the people of France are all enthusiastic for the Allied cause. There is a minority

of French opinion probably not exceeding twenty per cent. of the population who are anti-British and who do not wish to see either an Allied or German victory, and who at one time optimistically believed that an exhausted Britain and Germany would ask France to negotiate an armistice. This section of French opinion is drawn from the traditionally anti-British Naval Officer class and from the old fashioned reactionaries as well as from among the intelligentsia. They are active supporters of the Vichy Government. At the opposite extreme there is to be found a slightly larger but much less influential section of the population, who are unreservedly pro-British. They represent about one-fourth of the total. They have withstood the massed attacks of propaganda from every direction against their idol, England, and now they rejoice, because they are satisfied an Allied victory is only a question of time. This group is and always has been anti-Vichy and draws its support largely from among the working classes in the industrial districts, and included in this group are those who are wholeheartedly supporters of General de Gaulle.

There remains more than half the population who, illogical though it may seem, are pro-British and yet until the total occupation of France last November accepted without enthusiasm the Vichy Government for better or worse, as the only possible Government under the Armistice.

From the political point of view the total occupation of France can only have beneficial results. Between the peoples of the North and South there is a latent natural antipathy to one another which was accentuated by the creation of the two zones. This was no accident as result of the terms of the armistice but a cunningly thought out German plan to divide French opinion and it largely succeeded. The two zones inevitably had conflicting interests which created distrust and mutual recrimination. This was often erroneously interpreted by foreigners to be a pro-German tendency in the unoccupied zone as compared with the pronounced anti-German feelings of the occupied zone. In actual fact geographically the respective groups of French opinion were fairly evenly divided between the two zones, but the pressure of the enemy in the occupied zone tended to make its inhabitants intolerant towards their more fortunate fellow-countrymen in the unoccupied territory. The internal life of the whole country will benefit from the total occupation. All France is now tied by a common brand of mutual hatred of the invader. With the total occupation all Frenchmen suffer alike from the miseries of ever present German troops and, while it is perhaps too much to hope for political unity, the virtual disappearance of the Vichy administration leaves the way clear for the re-establishment of a democratic Government after an Allied victory has freed France from the German yoke.

INDIA'S PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

BY SIR WILLIAM P. BARTON

THE adaptability of the existing political units in India to a scheme of federation; whether a revision of boundaries, and possibly in some cases a transfer of population, would improve their quality from the federal standpoint—these are questions that will impress themselves on the attention of Indian statesmen when they shoulder the task of building the new India. Interconnected with these issues are the Muslim claim to set up political entities of their own, and the urgent necessity of working the Indian States into the federal chess-board if the unity of India is to be preserved.

The opinion is widely held in India that the existing provincial pattern leaves much to be desired, both from the federal and administrative standpoint. Apart from the North West Frontier province and the recently formed provinces of Orissa and Sind no recognized principles have inspired the formation of the others.

Madras is perhaps the worst example of this lack of method. Geographically it is anything but homogeneous, including as it does vast stretches of alluvial plain watered by great rivers, arid upland country on the central plateau, the great mountain mass of the Nilgiris, a section of the mountain range of the Western Ghats, and beyond these mountains the hilly districts of Malabar and south Kanara. Four distinct races, Tamil, Kanarese, Andhras, and Malayalis, divide the province between them, each with a country of its own. They differ, not only in language, but in culture and traditions; the strongest link is Hinduism. Historically the province is made up of British annexations from Mysore on the defeat of Tipu Sultan in 1799, cessions of territory by the Nizam of Hyderabad in return for a military guarantee, and earlier acquisitions in the south.

Bombay province similarly was built up on no logical principle. It owes its origin to a series of annexations and cessions, mainly at the expense of the Maratha confederacy at the end of the 18th century. It includes a long stretch of the central plateau beyond the Western Ghats, inhabited in the north by the Marathas, in the south by a group of the Kanarese; there is a narrow strip of plain country between the Ghats and the Arabian Sea, expanding in the north into the broad stretch of alluvial plain known as Gujarat. Three major languages are spoken, Gujarati, Marathi and Kanarese.

For several centuries Gujarat was at times a province of the Muslim empire of Delhi; at times an independent Muslim Kingdom. Two centuries ago the Maratha Military Confederacy drove out the Muslims and, ignoring their

common Hinduism, bled the unwarlike Gujarati white. Under British rule the latter, with his quicker brain and business instinct, has been in a position to retaliate against his former oppressor. This explains the insistence of the Bombay Marathas at the Round Table Conference of 1930-32 on the assignment to them of separate representation in the Bombay Legislative Assembly. In the upshot they were given seven seats, a curious comment on the claim of political Hinduism to the complete conversion of India to democracy of the British type.

As an example of the haphazard formation of the Indian provinces the case of Sind is worth notice. It is situated at a distance of several hundreds of miles from Bombay by sea; the vast majority of its people are Muslim; its traditions link it with Afghanistan rather than with India; yet for nearly a century, till the Muslim Delegation at the Round Table Conference insisted on its being given separate status as a condition to their agreement to an Indian federation, it had been an uncomfortable satellite of the predominantly Hindu province of Bombay.

In 1855 Lord Dalhousie, applying the doctrine of lapse, annexed the Maratha Kingdom of Nagpur, and from it and adjacent territory formed the Central Provinces. Ethnologically this territorial unit is divided between the Hindi-speaking peoples on the eastern side and those whose language is Marathi on the west. The former are in the majority; they differ, not only in speech, tradition and culture from their rivals and former oppressors. The result is an incompatibility of political temperament which makes the cohesion so essential in a federal unit extremely unlikely.

Like other big provinces the Panjab lacks homogeneity. The Sikhs, though barely a fourth of the Muslim majority, are nevertheless, by reason of their strong position in the Indian army and traditions of rule, an outstanding factor in the political life of the province. They are strongly opposed to Muslim domination and are not prepared to sink their identity in a Muslim country standing outside the Indian federation, as might be the case if the Muslim claim to self-determination is ultimately conceded. It may be noted that the country east of the Sutlej which contains a predominantly Hindu population was added to the Panjab on its annexation in 1849.

The United Provinces are another example of the amorphous growth of British administrative units in India. They are for the greater part composed of cessions by the Mughal emperor and the King of Oudh more than a century and a half ago, by annexations from Maratha princes, and finally by the annexation of the Kingdom of Oudh itself in 1853 on the ground of the gross misrule of the then sovereign. As an administrative unit with a population exceeding 50 millions it is unwieldy, to say the least of it.

The province of Bengal, as originally constituted under British rule, would now hold a population of over 100 millions. Bihar and Orissa, carved out of its earlier bulk, have respectively 36 and 9 millions. Part of Orissa, it may be noted, was originally included in Madras.

As compared with the British provinces the Indian States, especially the larger and more important, are more or less homogeneous in race, language and traditions. Many of them, for example, Travancore, Cochin, the Rajput States of Rajputana, of Central India and the outer Himalayas have existed for several hundred years, some for over a thousand.

The attitude of Gandhi and Congress is that the States are utterly unfit to be admitted into a democratic federation such as is envisaged by political India. The object of the Princes is, the Congress holds, to preserve their autocratic rule; their influence in a federal government, through their nominees, would be a drag on the progress of the country. On the other hand the Muslims of India regard the association of the Princes in the central government as a threat to their interests, since the majority are Hindu, and might ally themselves with the Hindu Congress.

For their part the Princes are prepared to accede to a federation, but only if their identity is adequately safeguarded. The States which would send the majority of representatives to the federal government are progressive; in many of them the people are closely associated with the administration; in some, for instance, Mysore, Cochin, Travancore and Baroda, the legislative assemblies have popular ministers. Moderate opinion in India would not exclude the Princes from taking part in building up the new constitution and, whatever the attitude of Congress, they cannot be shut out from the political arena.

The composition of the human element in the States stands in the way of the complete re-adjustment of the provinces on an ethical basis. For example, two of the great peoples of the south, the Kanarese and Andhra, and the Marathas of the middle Deccan, form the bulk of the population of Hyderabad; Mysore has a predominant Kanarese element; Baroda is carved out of Gujarat and is mainly peopled by Gujaratis.

A necessary reform in the States before federation is the grouping of the minute members for administrative purposes. As regards the selection of States representatives for the federal assemblies, it is not unlikely that the more progressive States governments—they are in the majority—would be ready to allow the people some influence in the process. A gesture of the kind would weaken the opposition of extreme Congress elements to the Princes playing a part in the new India.

At this stage we may examine the attitude of political India to the re-adjustment of the provinces. To begin with it may be noted that both at Delhi and Whitehall official opinion is unfavourable, mainly on the ground that the smaller units that would emerge from a re-distribution of country on linguistic and racial lines would not be able to provide an up-to-date administration, including social services and expensive High Courts.

The argument from finance may be pushed too far. The position has not been fully examined and it seems to have been forgotten that the provinces in a self-governing India will not be so expensively administered as is to-day

the case. Salaries, for example, will probably be reduced to something approaching the scale found adequate in the best administered States, which is much lower than in British India.

Dravidian India, which absorbs most of the southern half of the peninsula, has of late shown signs of impatience with what it regards as the domination in Congress of the Indo-Aryan element, largely Brahmin, of the north. The Gandhian ukase, imposing Hindi as the All-Indian language, with its compulsory study in the schools, caused a good deal of irritation in Madras and did much to restore the non-Brahmin (Hindu) party to vigorous life.

While still in office the Madras Congress government accepted in principle the sub-division of the province into its component parts, Andhra, Tamil, Kanarese and Malayalam. The Andhra people, in particular, pressed their right to self-determination very strongly; they have, it should be noted, recently set up a university of their own. The Congress High Command did not frown on the proposition; in fact Gandhi told the Maharaja of Vizianagram, who had led the agitation for setting up an Andhra province, that he had been instrumental in inducing Congress to recognize the redistribution of the provinces on a linguistic basis, and that he had always agitated with Government for the acceptance of the principle. The Madras Government went so far as to submit a proposal to form an Andhra province shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was, however, negatived by Whitehall.

Apparently Congress associated itself with Mr. Gandhi's attitude. The Bombay Congress government on its own initiative adopted the policy of dividing the province among the three racial groups, the Kanarese, Marathas and Gujaratis. Whether Congress would consider the breaking up of the United Provinces is not clear. It would probably welcome the establishment of a Sikh province in the eastern Panjab.

The question of the separation of the Tamil and Andhra country is simple enough. The delimitation of the Kanarese province is more complicated in view of the fact that Kanarese country is included partly in Hyderabad, Bombay, Madras and Mysore. The best solution of the problem would be to absorb the Kanarese districts of Madras and of South Bombay into the Mysore State. The small province of Courg would doubtless accede; the scheme would extend Mysore jurisdiction to the sea and give it a seaport, which would further stimulate the policy of economic development to which the Mysore government is committed. It is believed that there is support for a proposition of the kind in British India. As noted already Mysore has progressed very far in the direction of constitutional government, and it might be expected that the present system, with possibly further modifications, would meet the aspirations, for the time being at least, of the Kanarese rural majority. Their assent would of course be necessary.

Malabar and the States of Cochin and Travancore were originally included in the ancient kingdom of Kerala. The growth of a tendency towards

regionalism in the south is illustrated by a recent movement to link up these three political units in a confederation. In any case Malabar itself would form a compact province and should be self-supporting.

In Bombay the Kanarese districts might, as suggested, be included in Mysore; or, if the Mysore proposition is rejected, they could be linked in a separate bloc with the Kanarese districts of Madras. To the north is Maharashtra, the country of the great Maratha clan, the only people of real military importance in South India. Part of Maharashtra, as already noted, is in the Central Provinces, part is taken up by the Kolhapor State; the remainder is included in the Hyderabad State. The most suitable arrangement would be to combine the two blocs of Maratha territory in Bombay and the Central Provinces into a single province with Bombay as its capital. If the Maharaja of Kolhapor, who is regarded as the head of the Maratha clan by reason of his descent from Shivaji founder of the Maratha empire, could be induced to accept the rôle of hereditary president of the Maratha people on terms similar to those suggested for Mysore, it would probably be welcomed by the Marathas generally.

Gujarat was, as already observed, overrun by the Marathas early in the 18th century when the Baroda State was set up. It originally included the whole of Gujarat as well as the semi-independent principalities of Kathiawar. British Gujarat consists of cessions of territory made by the Baroda Ruler in return for a British military guarantee, curiously enough against his own overlord, the Peshwa, head of the Maratha empire.

As already observed, Baroda is progressive; home rule in Gujarat might very well take the form of constitutional monarchy under the Baroda Maharaja. Maratha and Gujarati, it is true, are not on the best of terms, but a joint government under a progressive Ruler should overcome the difficulty. In any case the British districts of Gujarat would form a self-supporting province with the big manufacturing town of Ahmadabad as its capital.

The Muslim League claim the Panjab as part of their scheme of a separate Muslim confederation or republic (Pakistan). It is not surprising that the Sikhs strongly oppose a measure which would place them permanently under Muslim rule. The Muslims would find it difficult to oppose the Sikh claim to a separate enclave or province. It would be possible to form such a province from part of the eastern tracts of the Punjab. If the Sikhs of British India could conclude an agreement with the Ruler of the Sikh State of Patial, by which these districts would be combined with the State, the Sikh position in a federation would be greatly strengthened. The eastern districts of the Panjab, which are mainly Hindu, might be grouped with the small Delhi province. The majority of the people are Hindu Jats, akin to the Jats beyond the Jamna of the districts of Moradabad and Meerut of the United Provinces, which might conveniently be added to the suggested Delhi province. Here it may be noted that the Jat tribes have recently shown a tendency to combine as a

political unit; they would probably welcome the setting up of a mainly Jat province.

A re-arrangement of the territories included in the United Provinces is unquestionably desirable, at least from the administrative point of view. The two western districts, as observed in the preceding paragraph, really belong ethnographically to the eastern Panjab; Agra and Oudh might constitute a separate province. On the east three or four districts, Azamgarh and Gorakhpur might go to Bihar, to which they belong both from the point of view of race and language. The Hindi-speaking districts of the Central Provinces would form a separate unit with possibly a segment of the Hindi-speaking Chhota Nagpur.

A redistribution of the territories comprised in Bengal and Assam, such as would give a separate status to the predominantly Hindu districts, might relieve the tension between the two great communities in Muslim-ruled Bengal. Assam might be broken up, the predominantly Muslim districts (Sylhet, etc.) being absorbed in Muslim Bengal; the rest of the province might be worked into a new Hindu province with the western districts of Bengal, which are mainly Hindu, and possibly part of eastern Bihar, if that province is enlarged, as suggested, by the addition of a bloc of the districts of the United Provinces.

This concludes the survey. Critics will object that a problem of such complexity can hardly be solved as a prelude to the building up of a new constitution, and that if it is to be approached at all it must be deferred till Indian self-government is an accomplished fact. As against this it may be argued that representatives of provinces with a strongly-marked individuality would be far more likely to evolve a constitution that would be generally acceptable than would nominees of the provincial assemblies established by the Act of 1935. It should be possible during the war to do most of the ground-work, covering the main points of ethnography and delimitation, with findings adequate in scope to enable the Constituent Assembly to settle provincial boundaries, provisionally at least. In some cases new representatives might have to be selected after this preliminary work had been done.

It hardly needs demonstration that a federation based on the principles discussed in this article is more likely to work smoothly than would be the case if it depended on the heterogeneous masses of people included in the provincial scheme of to-day. Redistribution effectively achieved would do much to lessen friction between Hindu and Muslim, not only in provincial administration but at the Centre. And, finally, if Muslim separation is accepted in principle by the Constituent Assembly the necessary plebiscites in the Muslim centres would not only be greatly facilitated but should be more representative of public opinion among the Muslim community than would be the case under the existing system.

U-BOATS AND AUXILIARY CRUISERS

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE Prime Minister's statement on February 4 that "the U-Boat warfare takes the first place in our thoughts" was welcome. It has been long delayed but it marks a definite step forward from the indeterminate attitude of the Government last August, as expressed by the Lord Chancellor when, in reply to Lord Hankey's question "Whether the Government assent to the proposition that the first and principal object of a Maritime Power or group of Powers is to obtain and maintain command of the seas," he said that "the principles appeared unexceptionable but the application is, of course, governed by circumstances, values and proportions." We have now, it is to be supposed, a definite, in place of this indefinite, acceptance of this elementary and traditional principle. It is at last realized that "the losses at sea hamper us and delay our operations, prevent us from coming into action with our full strength and thus prolong the war with its certain waste and loss and all its unknowable hazards." It is most sincerely to be hoped that this pronouncement will now be translated in terms of effective and consistent action; and that besides giving the U-Boat warfare "the first place in our thoughts" those who direct our major strategy will see that it also takes first place in our action, in the production of adequate and proper instruments employed in sea warfare and their correct use. Those instruments are not confined to the light craft and aircraft which escort the convoys and search the danger areas. They include all those other types of fighting vessel which play a part both directly and indirectly, in the defeat of the savage campaign against the sea communications of the civilized Powers. Convoys, well covered by surface and air craft, have proved the surest form of protection to shipping and the most effective means of inflicting losses upon the U-Boats themselves, but our difficulty so far has lain in the provision of these two types of naval warfare in numbers adequate to the needs. One reason for the shortage is the slowness with which the primary character of the security of sea communications has penetrated into the minds of the directors of our strategy, and another, related to this, the devotion of a large proportion of our resources to other purposes; that is to say, to producing instruments for the purpose of a different strategy. To pursue two aims simultaneously with means inadequate to the successful performance of one is not a mark of wisdom.

The need for rapidly increasing the numbers of the fighting craft at sea is accentuated not only by the losses but also by the present situation on land.

Assurances are given that the Allies will undertake, at the earliest moment, an invasion in Europe. The earliest moment is, it is to be supposed, that of the completion of the business in North Africa. It is plain that Time is, as it always is, a factor of the highest importance if the strokes struck by the Soviet army are to achieve their full result. But the conduct of the vast amphibious operation foreshadowed from Casablanca, at whatever point in the periphery of Hitler's "fortress" from Narvik to the Levant it may be directed, will make heavy demands on transport tonnage to carry the armies and fighting craft to defend them on their passages and to support the land forces in their landings and afterwards. At the same time the need for security of all those other sea communications not directly connected with the invasion will remain: food, raw materials, military supplies to other theatres must still be delivered at their destinations, and forces at sea which at present are barely holding their own, in spite of the prodigious output of the building yards of this country and the United States, will be faced with the added task of protecting this new undertaking. The recent Allied expedition to North Africa illustrates this. To carry and protect the armies from this country and the United States, shipping to the extent of 500 transports and fighting craft numbering 350 were needed. So large a quantity of ships of both categories could only be massed at the expense of other services, for there is no illimitable pool from whence they can be drawn when required. Either, therefore, other branches of transport must be reduced or, if maintained, must proceed under reduced protection and suffer in consequence greater losses. It may well be that the increased losses during those last months of the year were related to the reductions in the available escorting forces.

Hitler has made it plain that he is counting on the U-Boat campaign to beat the Allies. The output of submarines continues on a rising scale. But it is not upon these craft alone that he and his naval advisers place their trust. Admiral Lutzow speaking recently of the U-Boat war (*The Times*, February 4) said that Germany stakes her hopes of victory on co-operation between the boats and the auxiliary cruisers. "Our auxiliary cruisers," he remarked, "are dovetailing into one another and the whole of their activity benefits the U-Boat warfare against enemy shipping. This is the secret of our future victory." These vessels, operating in the Pacific, were able to reach those waters by way of the Northern Arctic Ocean "along the narrow straits between Siberia and the ice zone" instead of attempting to run the gauntlet between Scotland and Greenland—a tribute to the efficacy of the watch at sea by the Allies' naval squadrons in the northern seas. The vessels themselves are fast motor ships, of great endurance by virtue of their internal combustion engines and the very large supplies of fuel they can carry in their underwater spaces and of provisions. According to the Admiral they are capable of keeping at sea for prolonged periods—he made mention of one which had remained out for over a year—for they can replenish their fuel

from tankers which either accompany them or meet them at prearranged rendezvous. Since Japan came into the war this has been made easy as they can make use of the ports of Japan and the many islands now in her occupation. They are furnished with the means of altering their appearances so as to resemble the different types of merchantman of any country, enemy or neutral. What their contribution to the losses we have suffered has been during the war and the extent to which they are now affecting our tonnage is known only to the authorities and it is proper that it should not be made known to the enemy, but it is obvious that they effect a sensible diversion of our cruiser strength that was so unwisely reduced by the Treaty of London; and that diversion reacts upon the sea campaign against Japan.

While therefore it is the U-Boat which must take the first place in our thoughts at this moment since it is she that inflicts the greatest proportion of our losses, provision cannot be neglected of the vessels needed to deal with this auxiliary and interlocked force of surface raiding ships; that is, of ocean going cruisers. We have seen the use of raiders of several types during this war—the armoured cruisers *Graf Spee* and *Deutschland*, the battlecruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, the battleship *Bismarck* as well as the armed vessel; and, in the narrow seas, of the "E" Boat and the light surface craft. We may see any of these or a variety of them once again.

The Prime Minister further announced the decision "to throw emphasis rather more on the production of escort vessels" than on transport tonnage for the reason that a ship not sunk is better than a new ship. The reason is sound and in its interpretation in terms of types it should include all which are called upon to take part in the defence. All the experience of convoy attack and defence shows a process of alternate increases on either side. In the last war, the attacks on convoys in the North Sea began with submarines, and were met by torpedo craft escorting the convoys. The attacking forces were then strengthened with destroyers and answered by stronger destroyer escorts. Then light cruisers sallied out to the attack and were answered by cruisers, and, finally by squadrons of battlecruisers and battleships in anticipation of a sally by the High Sea Fleet—a sally which was actually made in April, 1918. The winner in this contest is he who is one move ahead of the enemy. We may be well assured that Admiral Doenitz is aware of this.

There seems still to be a spirit of uncertainty in the strategical Olympus in the matter of the need for increasing the speed of the merchant ships and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there has been too little foresight and enterprise on the part of those responsible for the supply of shipping tonnage. In the first days of the war when an immediate increase in the shortest time of tonnage was called for, the decision to begin construction with slow ships may have been correct, though there were those who even then desired to lay down faster ships but were forbidden to do so. The first anticipation of the Ministry of Shipping in the winter of 1939 seems to have been that the war would be won by the slow tramp, but there does not seem

to have been a realization of the probability that the speed of the submarine would be increased or that tactics might be developed which would call for a revision of the view that slow convoys could be effectively protected against massed attack by faster craft. While the enemy developed the speed and increased the numbers of his submarines we seem to have gone on as though the situation was unchanged thereby. The slow ship policy is defined on the score that the faster ship takes longer to build and carries less cargo besides calling for more skilled labour for the construction of the engines. The First Lord of the Admiralty appears to have no settled convictions on the matter. While denying that no fast ships are being built he is reported to have asserted that "if we did replace all the slow ships with faster ones we should not gain in net import. Indeed we should have about 18 or 19 per cent less of import." As the losses of fast and slow ships are, he said, in about the same percentage, the substitution would result in an actual loss of imports. But no information was given about the conditions in which the faster ships were sailed and the presumption is that they either sailed in convoy with slow ships, in which case their speed is useless, or they sailed without escort, in which condition they were unprotected and had no other defence than the slightly higher speed, an advantage set off by the increased speed of the new submarines; hence the assumption carries no conviction. The Prime Minister has told us that the most careful calculations are made and frequently revised as between having fewer fast or more slow ships, but with a recollection of some previous controversies of a like nature this assurance leaves us unmoved. Official opinion resolutely opposed the tank and the convoy system in the last war; there were objections of what were said to be an insuperable character to both. The tendency to see all the difficulties is innate and looms larger than the will to overcome them. If, three years ago we had begun to build faster ships as we might easily have done there is little if any doubt that by now we should possess a large number, that the means of continuing to produce them would be in full swing, and that so many tons of good ships and their cargoes would not now be lying at the bottom of the sea; and many a good seaman would be alive to carry on the essential services of the nation's transport. If, as the speech of the First Lord indicates, the maintenance and increase of our shipping is essential to the success of the war it is hard to distinguish what are the "even more urgent needs" to which the production of the ships has had to give way.

MARSHAL ZHUKOV'S OFFENSIVE CONTINUES

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

WHEN I wrote last month the Russian offensive had already great achievements to its credit, and it was clear that it was of a very different order from that of last winter. It was also evident that the German High Command and its intelligence staff must have grossly underestimated and ignored the offensive capacity of the Soviet armies. Yet it seemed then extremely doubtful whether the amazing offensive power so far displayed could be maintained. Magnificent as had been the Russian administrative achievement in organizing transport to meet the requirements of great armies advancing rapidly over long distances under snow conditions, obviously the achievement must have its limits; and it was even more important to restore Russian railway communications than to interrupt those of the Germans. The early annihilation of von Paulus' army was necessary to restore communications through Stalingrad quite as much as it was to release the armies and weapons which were gripping him.

The Voronezh-Rostov line had also to be opened, for a section of it some 70 miles south of Voronezh was still in German hands. The extension northward of the middle Don offensive to Svoboda on January 17 achieved this; and a few days later, by capturing Valuiki, not only interrupted another railway of importance to the Germans for lateral communication, but also opened the Svoboda-Valuiki railway which was to prove of great value in the further advance to Kupiansk and Kharkov. About the same date Millerovo, which had blocked the Voronezh-Rostov railway in the south, was captured. The Germans, clinging to their foothold across the Don at Voronezh, were now in a dangerous position and appear to have commenced, on January 28, a deliberate withdrawal; but as on the Mozdok front in the Caucasus, they were overwhelmed by the vigour of Russian pursuit which developed into a major offensive. Kastornaya, where the Valuiki-Elets line crosses that from Voronezh to Kursk, was captured on the 29th thus removing a block on two railways required for the development of the offensive. It will be therefore seen that during the last half of January the Russians had not only interrupted railways of great importance to the Germans, but had also along the whole front secured railways which were bound to prove invaluable for maintaining the impetus of the offensive. The strategic vista had therefore widened immensely.

Meanwhile, in spite of lack of railway communications, the offensive had made remarkable progress. On the Caucasus front German rearguards had

been unable to check the pursuit, though it is not clear where the Germans had hoped to make a stand. It seems probable that they had intended to hold Armavir and Voroshilovsk in order to cover communications to Maikop, for they showed no sign of abandoning the oilfields or the town of Maikop until their railway communications were cut at Armavir, leaving them with only a difficult line of retreat by indifferent roads to Krasnodar. Before it reached Armavir a new danger threatened the retreating Mozdok army. The Russians who, after defeating the attempt to relieve von Paulus, were advancing along the railway to Salsk, had broken through the position the Germans had attempted to hold on the Manych river, had captured Salsk and were advancing along the direct railway to Rostov and by the line leading to the important railway junction at Tikhorensk. The whole army of the Caucasus was therefore threatened with losing all railway communications with Rostov, the only line of retreat by which they could hope to save the bulk of their forces and equipment. Retreat was therefore continued, and probably a considerable portion of the army escaped before, at the end of January, Tikhorensk was taken by the Russians advancing from Salsk. About the time that Armavir was taken the Germans who had been operating against Tuapse retreated towards Maikop hotly pursued, and it was the defenders of Tuapse who recaptured the Maikop oilfields. Whether it was with the object of covering the retreat from Tuapse and Maikop or in the hopes of ultimately retreating through Rostov, the Germans have held on to Krasnodar and Novorossisk, though in what strength is still uncertain. It is clear, however, that they had hoped to retain a bridgehead east and south of Rostov, through which railway communication might be maintained with Krasnodar and with troops retreating from Tikhoretsk. The Germans in fact at this time appear to have employed most of their reserve divisions in strengthening their defensive front on the lower Donetz, and in establishing a bridgehead through which the Caucasus armies could escape. Characteristically their defence was active, and many counter-attacks were made. They were, however, apparently delivered in piecemeal fashion and had little or no success. They were probably an uneconomical expenditure of force. Russian pressure continued to increase, undoubtedly aided by reinforcements released from Stalingrad once von Paulus' army was reduced to small fragments.

By the end of the first week in February the bridgehead at Rostov had been broken, and such parts of the Caucasus armies as had not escaped through Rostov had only the doubtful possibility of retreat across the Sea of Azov or the Kerch straits. By the middle of the month all the ports on the Azov coast served by railways were in Russian hands, and for all practical purposes the campaign in the Caucasus has ended. It only remains to learn what the extent of the German disaster here has been. Whatever its extent those that have escaped are not likely to be of much military value for a long time.

While the processes of completing the annihilation of von Paulus' army and of hunting the Germans out of the Caucasus were in progress it became

evident that Marshal Zhukov's offensive aimed at much more than the achievements of those objects or the recapture of Rostov. His right wing was rapidly assuming increased importance, and it was there especially, where the opening of railway communication gave promise that the impetus and scope of the offensive might increase rather than diminish. The drive from the Don on the Svoboda-Boguchar front which had started about January 17 and had captured Valuiki by the 19th, at first extended its hold northwards on the Eletz line and south-westwards along the Svoboda railway leading to Kupiansk. Then on the 28th came the Voronezh drive, which not only helped to clear the Eletz line but protected the right flank of the Svoboda thrust, the weight of which was then directed south-west. By February 4 Kupiansk, Svatovo and Krazny Liman had been captured, cutting the main railway communication between Kharkov and the Donetz basin. It then became evident that the thrust aimed at encircling the whole of the German forces in the Basin, cutting their lines of communication and retreat. By the 10th the line of the Upper Donetz had been crossed and the railway from Poltava to Gorlovka and Stalino captured between Barvenkovo and Kramatorskaya. This advance involved the capture of Izyum and the fighting was again in the region which formed the base of von Bock's counter-stroke against the flank of Timoshenko's forestalling offensive in the spring of 1942. The situation became still more critical when the Russian drive extended westward to capture Lozavaya, for not only had the communications between the Donetz basin with Kharkov and the northern armies been severed, but the line of retreat from it to the Dneiper was clearly in danger. The thrust at all costs had to be stopped and if possible thrown back. It was a daring manoeuvre and normally it would have invited a crushing counter-stroke. It was, however, evident that the Germans had no reserves with which to stage a counter-stroke in force. Those that had been available in the earlier stages of the Russian offensive had been used up in the efforts to relieve Stalingrad, and to establish defences covering Rostov and the lower Donetz. Within the Donetz salient, which was under heavy pressure at its apex as well as being threatened at its base, there was certainly no large number of reserves, and the counter-attacks which were delivered were piecemeal in character and evidently intended merely to check rather than to defeat the Russian threat. Any large scale counter-stroke would therefore have to come from the north, and Kharkov, with communication still open to the west, provided an obvious base for a counter-offensive. But Kharkov itself was under pressure and its position had been rendered critical by the rapid progress of the Voronezh offensive, which had captured Kursk and threatened to isolate Orel. It was in fact the existence of this powerful extreme right wing that had made the encircling drive across the front of Kharkov strategically practicable. The rapid fall of Kursk is, moreover, clear indication that the German armies of the centre and north, themselves under heavy pressure, have few or no reserves available to send south. The position of the army in the Donetz

basin is therefore critical in the extreme, and the alternative open to it would seem, either, at the risk of complete encirclement and annihilation, to fight desperately to hold its ground in the hopes that the Russian offensive will exhaust itself or be held back till spring thaw reduces its mobility, or immediate retreat through a rapidly narrowing corridor and under difficult conditions. Neither alternative offers escape from serious disaster, but retreat would seem to be the lesser risk and will, I think, be the course adopted unless Hitler again intervenes.

It is of course possible that the preliminary stages of withdrawal have for some time been in progress—such as the withdrawal of material and of non-combatants who have been engaged in developing the resources of this great industrial area—but it seems more probable that the German High Command have again been surprised through underestimating Russian offensive capacity and that if decision to withdraw has been taken it is belated.

At the best retreat would be a desperate undertaking, for pressure from the east is very heavy and large forces would be required for rearguards to check direct pursuit, as well as to meet attacks from the flanks. The garrison of the Crimea, which may include some portion of the Caucasus army, would also have to be withdrawn if it is to avoid isolation.

The danger which threatens the Donetz army is the most immediate, but it is far from being the only one that the German High Command has to meet. The fall of Kursk and the rapid advance of the Voronezh offensive would seem to indicate great weakness on this sector of the front. Moreover it is a front on which railway communications enable Russian reserves to be brought rapidly into action to maintain the impetus of the offensive. Something in the nature of a gap may develop in the German front which would be difficult to close, and which eventually may lead to the disruption of any shorter defence line which the German High Command may hope to establish. The danger is all the greater because the Russian offensive at Veliki Luki, which at present seems to be suspended, may flare up again, and the relief of Leningrad adds to the complication of the situation.

Russian strategy and administrative capacity, whoever is responsible for them, have been so amazingly brilliant and efficient that it is hard to place a limit to their achievements. It has been remarked that Russian strategy has followed the example set by Foch in 1918, by the successive opening of new fronts of attack. That is in a sense true, but Foch's plans were essentially a development of the war of attrition and designed steadily to wear down German reserves. He had neither the instruments nor the opportunity to carry through manœuvres to isolate and annihilate large elements of the enemy's army. His army lacked the penetrative power and mobility to exploit such strategy. Marshal Zhukov, on the other hand, has been able to combine the processes of attrition with encircling manœuvre on a devastating scale. He has had an instrument of amazing power and mobility, and has shown a brilliancy in using it which has seldom been equalled.

THE BOY IN THE MINE

By B. L. COOMBES

BEFORE each working shift I watch a number of 'buses arriving with boys from the areas of Merthyr, Aberdare, Port Talbot and from the outlying parts of this Vale of Neath. Probably these boys did not go eagerly to school last year or the year before that; and it is not hard to understand why they go even less willingly to work in the strange world of the underground. As a miners' Committee Man I get close to the problem of these boys and I have a sixteen year old son who goes under the earth to his work each day. The problems of youth attract me and I realize that what these boys feel and think is going to be important in the after war period; and will have a special concern for the mining industry because boy labour is already scarce in the mines and their numbers are dwindling every year.

In bodily development I notice that they show little sign of the lean years that have come to mining areas and I am sure they are taller than the previous generation. It is in their mental attitude and in the way they re-act to the working conditions that I see what the long depression has done. The boys from the smaller mining towns and villages were fortunate because they lived nearer the mines and were able to get what work was going. On the whole they are quieter and easier to control. Those from the larger towns seem intolerant of any sort of discipline. They have no respect for the advice or opinion of more experienced miners and the institutions of the mining communities—such as the Miners' Federation. Welfare halls and parks, and places of worship—seem only worth while to them as long as some immediate benefit is shown.

The middle-aged men know that long years of intense struggle went into the founding and creating of these institutions and they realize what mining must have been like without them. The youngsters have no such respect and we have found Welfare doors holed by the sharp points of mandrels, cushions ripped open, chairs damaged, bath sprays snapped, books destroyed and senseless damage being done continually. When we catch the offenders the excuse seldom varies from "Well, it's our place, isn't it? We pays to keep it going." They do, just a few coppers weekly.

Apparently, on a wet morning they take any coat they see hanging in the baths and when they reach the colliery mouth they throw the coat down and leave it. If they need better boots and a pair is available they just take them. The same mentality operates inside the workings where the lockings of expensive tools are smashed and the tools used. The groups are very loyal to

each other and will all swear to the same story so they must be caught in the act before any case can be proved and the darkness of the mine or the rush of hundreds of men going to work usually help to cover up all these actions.

It seems that the years when they, with their fathers and brothers, shivered about the street corners or watched each hopeless day recede before the misery of the next have left an imprint on their minds which will be very difficult to erase. Yet nearly all have some good qualities when one gets intimate with them. Always they are loyal and often very good natured. They work hard and many are keen and most eager to learn—if the right kind of teacher comes forward. They distrust intensely anything that even whispers of officialdom. A few of us have experimented with rough and simple talks as we go into work with them and have gradually coaxed them into an interest in serious books. Usually we have found it very worth while. To them it seems that the old political parties and religions have failed completely; they are waiting for something new that they can trust.

Mining methods, with the increase of machinery to fill coal has affected them also. These boys are just what the sub-contractors who take on lengths of the coal face want. No skill is needed to turn loose coal on to a moving conveyor belt; the little boy can do it on his first day underground. His small size is also an asset where room is limited. He does not realize the danger of roof crushing or industrial disease from inhaling dust. He just digs his short-handled shovel into the pile of coal, learns to shout and swear like the other boys, and hurries out blackfaced at the end of the shift like one who has come from a great adventure.

Probably he gets a couple of shillings pocket money extra beyond his wage and things go along boisterously, with occasional increases in wages until he is eighteen or older. Then he finds things getting awkward as a smaller boy could do his shovelling on the conveyor and his wage is getting too high for the contractor. The next step should be to become a collier but he has not learned what is needed. He has not been taught the cutting of coal, the timbering of the roof, or the ripping and repair of roadways so he is still unskilled. Probably four years of his life has gone and nothing of the craft of mining has been taught to him. In other days his father, or some collier, would have been teaching him some little thing each working day. He would have learned how to loosen coal slips, measure and set posts at the right angle, detect the different types of roof and their strength, and to bore holes and assess the amount of powder needed for ripping. At twenty the youth would be a fairly skilled miner, able to look after himself amongst the underground problems that would confront him each day.

That is the problem of the conveyor boy, left at early manhood with slight knowledge of his craft and having learnt little more than the boy who tightens a nut every minute of his working time at a factory. There is the other section of boys—those who do work with a man and learn more about mining. Often the man needs a different outlook, for, although usually a bitter fighter

against any exploitation of his own person he is quite eager to make a profit from the frail strength of the boy. This outlook frequently amazes me. The collier works at so much a ton and the more coal he fills the higher his wages. If by his efforts, aided by the boy, he earns, say, thirty shillings a week more than the minimum wage he usually thinks he is being generous if the boy is given an extra half-crown a week pocket money. I think this unfair and have often spoken against it. Out of that thirty shillings—which I set as an example—the boy should have a proportion; I suggest one third. This refusal to give an increasing share to the boy, although it has been the accepted custom in the past, must soon be abandoned and the boys are themselves beginning an agitation toward that end.

One day I was able to watch a small boy at work with a collier and tried to assess the amount of energy he must use during that shift. I was shovelling stones, but the boy was filling coal. Much of this he had to turn back nearer the tram, thus making double work. It seemed to be taking all his strength to lift the loaded shovel over the tram edge and let the coal slide in. I used two hundred and seventy shovelful to fill my tram—with a large shovel. With a smaller shovel the boy would need more efforts and I found that he filled four trams that day. Say four times two hundred and seventy, that would be about the number of times that boy lifted his loaded shovel during that shift, and he had other work to do. I think, too, that the long journey from his home and the crawl back and fore to his work was quite hard enough to count as a day's work for a boy.

Their bodies are slight, yet they must be getting blows from stone or coal, more or less severe, every working day. I feel that some effect of this battering must remain with them all their life. Accident numbers are not easy to trace during war-time but I recall that during ten years (1928-1937) the record of boys under twenty killed or disabled by injury or disease in the British mines exceeded a quarter of a million. Already we have them at twenty-one and twenty-two, completely disabled by dust diseases and this makes me wonder are they more easily affected than the older men—have their fathers passed a chest weakness on to the sons? Anyway, they often seem to be affected whilst the more mature men show little signs of the dust.

I do not think the boys worry a great deal about the accident or disease risk. In fact I believe the danger of mining attracts them as they feel they are going to be adventurers and see an unknown land with risks hidden from ordinary folk but, very surely, the miserly treatment of their injured fathers and brothers does tend to keep them from mining. There is need to assure them of more security both of employment and of a reasonable life when injured. There is also need to teach them their craft and to instil a pride in that craft.

Another thing that should be taught is that they are not pariahs—of lower intelligence and value because they do work that is hard and dirty. This is a creed that has gained a firm following—the cult of the clean clothes job. It

seems that everyone is warning and persuading his son that he must be on the look out for a clean job and leave the dirty work to the "mugs." This is a disastrous doctrine and it must be countered. In peace, as in war, the importance of the manual worker must be recognized and stressed. Boys must be made proud of the ability to do hard work, not to be ashamed of it.

The wastage of man power in mining—rather a cruel term—is nearing 30,000 a year and must be on the increase: whilst the recruiting is not much more than half that figure and will steadily decrease unless some solution is found. Even with the coming of peace and a probable lessening of the demand for coal there can be little doubt that the working of the mines will soon become a problem. The industry must be kept going both for our sake and that of the country. Already there is a scarcity of skilled men to do the more difficult repairing jobs—to which the middle-aged men used to graduate after some years as colliers. We want to keep our sons near us, to hand on to them the skill and experience we have gained and, in most instances they would like to remain in their native area for the love of home is deep-rooted in those brought up amongst mining valleys; but it must be shown that their future can be secure and that cutting coal will give them at least as good a life as will labouring in a factory.

I think we have some advantages that should be stressed. Our work is sheltered from wintry weather and coal is usually supplied at a cheap rate. The youth who seeks danger and adventure can find plenty in the daily battle with nature and the wresting from the inside of the earth its hidden treasure. There is plenty of variety in the work and it can hardly ever become monotonous.

In the mines can be found the finest comradeship of men and a keen, intelligent outlook, sharpened by the conditions of working. The men show no servility and usually the newest labourer is addressed with as much respect as the manager. I have never yet heard anyone called "Sir" in the mine workings. Life is essentially democratic in control and every decision on the workers' side is open to discussion by general meeting whilst all customs are guarded by the Federation Committee which is elected yearly by the men.

I want to see a place for boys on these committees so that they can state their problems and gain a knowledge of Trade Union work. Many of our leaders need to adapt themselves to the outlook and ideas of the younger members. I want to see the Boys' Club movement enlarged and extended but in this I feel that a more adult atmosphere needs to be created and the members treated more like young men than children.

The Miners' Welfare Commission deserves praise for what it has done in making Pit Head Baths, Institutes, and Parks available where such facilities were unknown before. It seems slow and complicated in its control—I know from experience as a men's representative—but its work has been of immense value. There is urgent need for a better library service and I wonder why the travelling library idea is not adopted for isolated places.

One thing must be avoided by all teachers or lecturers to our mining boys—the tendency to act in a superior manner. Once a man starts to exhibit his learning a gap opens between his audience and himself and nothing done afterwards will bridge this gap. With this danger in sight I suggest a different type of teacher; one who has lived the life and knows the conditions; and is accepted by the folk as one of themselves. Some preliminary training for the young boys is helpful but the real preparation must be done underground because nothing outside can be adapted to replace it. Some geology should be included, also the care and handling of tools. Gas testing should be taught and a good grounding in first aid and the healthy care of the body. I see no reason why a certificate of proficiency should not be granted with more advanced stages for the older boys. They should be put in the care of selected workmen; chosen for their experience, carefulness, and decent behaviour.

Then you must decide what you are going to offer the young miner when he is competent. Official posts will absorb only a small section and to the youth with some influence that road is already open as all officials must spend a period in the coal workings before they can qualify. Another section, mechanically minded, could have special training for fitters and mechanics or engine drivers underground as most collieries employ a considerable staff of these.

Yet still the largest proportion, possibly three parts, will be needed for cutting coal and the attendant operations. It cannot be conceived that boys will be brought from outside to be trained in mining whilst the native boys, reared in a mining atmosphere, will travel from home to other work, so the problem is reduced to its earliest solution. The industry must offer a fair and sure wage and security of work with adequate compensation for its disabled and be again given the status of an honourable craft. Then the experienced miner will willingly take his son underground with him once more and the boy will learn the craft with surety that he is going to do a man's work and something that the country counts as of some value.

THE FILM AS AN ART FORM

PART III. THE ROAD AHEAD

BY C. A. LEJEUNE

WE spoke in our last article of the successive milestones on which we could hang our wreaths up to the coming of talkies. Now we shall have to take our discerning observer at a very rapid pace through the last thirteen years of pictures, and leave him, breathless, but we hope not unimpressed by the cinema's achievements, at a point where his own vision can map out the road ahead.

But first, we must make quite sure that our observer is sound on the subject of talkies—that is, of course, that he thinks the same way as we do. There is still a school of opinion that deplores the talkie, holding that the introduction of sound debased the pure mimic art of the cinema. This seems to us wasted grief. It is true that after the talkie became popular there were no more silent pictures, and that the loss of the silent pictures involved, too, the loss of much that was fine and stimulating. It is true, and it is a pity. But we cannot hold the *fact* of the talking picture to blame; we can only hold the *fact* of its commercial popularity.

The majority of people, it is clear, prefer talking films to silent ones. Nevertheless, it is probable that we should still have a minority product of silent films for special customers, were it not that the whole mass-production machine is now geared for the making and projection of talkies. A point frequently overlooked by the people who clamour for revivals of old films is that the modern theatre projector is set to run films at the rate of 24 frames a second, the speed at which talkies are photographed. The silent films were taken and projected at the rate of 16 frames a second, and only by the very delicate operation of "stretching"—that is to say, inserting frames into the celluloid to make up the required 24—can these old films be satisfactorily run through a modern sound projector.

It is this stern commercial factor, along with the practical disruption of studio work that would arise should a producer try to make a silent film in these days, that our minority have chiefly to blame for the loss of their pantomime. A further point, I think, should be considered. You can no more speak of the talkies as "debasing" the silent film than you can speak of golf as debasing cricket. The two things are different arts; different pastimes, if you prefer it, different accomplishments. The one is no "better" than the other, except in so far as it is better performed.

The talkie revolution of 1928 was not just a grafting of dialogue on to silent pictures. It was the beginning of an entirely new medium of expression. By adding a new property—sound—to the film-maker's materials, it gave new opportunities; it compelled him to work in a new way, to strike a new set of proportions; and strive towards a new sort of product. The stupid film-makers, of course, never thought of this. They tried to shape the old product with the new tools. That is why we have so many bad talkies. But the wise film-makers did think of it, and tried, each with his special sort of skill, to act on it. That is why, in the comparatively short period of talkies, we are able to recall quite a number of distinguished and imaginative films.

What are these films, and who are the men that made them? First, and most happily remembered, there is Mr. Disney. First in chronology, as well as in stature, for the talkies were only a few months old when he produced his first synchronized Mickey Mouse film, after a couple of silent cartoons that no one would accept.

Does it seem odd that Walt Disney, whose art is primarily that of the draughtsman, should have had to wait until the coming of sound before his work could achieve its full expression? It is not odd, really, for all rhythm is one, and all his effect is based on rhythm. He is one of those happy people who can both "see" and "hear" the shape of movement, if he does not actually apprehend it with a sixth sense that is denied to others. To him, the addition of sound to the camera was a liberation. It made him free of the dual medium in which his imagination was already roaming. To many artists of the silent screen, Mr. Chaplin among them, sound appeared to cramp visual expression. To Mr. Disney it both invoked it, and was evoked by it. In his special world of cartoon, design has always grown out of music, and music out of design, in an unbroken rhythmic flow, whether the music be the great majestic measures of *Fantasy* or the little tripping tunes that patter through his lighter frolics.

To the children of to-day it must seem that there never was a time without Disney. A whole generation has grown up with him. Mickey and Donald and Dumbo, Dopey and Bambi, and Pluto, are the loved familiars of the age, as dear and personal as were Winnie the Pooh, the Bastable family, the Cuckoo Clock and the Little Snow Maiden to the children of earlier generations. If Disney had no other claim to fame, he should be remembered as the man who brought more happiness to people than any other artist working in the cinema. This is no small thing, but he has added to it what is perhaps a subtler achievement. While making us happy, he has also made us painlessly aware of the simple elements of rhythmic art.

The Disney cartoons are the most important single output of the talkies, just as the Chaplin comedies were the most important single output of the silent cinema. After these, the pre-war pictures of the French school, the work of a few American directors such as Ford, Sturges, and Welles, some

documentaries, and a vigorous British film or two, beginning with Korda and ending with Coward, are the various events on which we pin our medals.

What shall we say of the magnificent and regretted cinema of Clair and Duvivier, Feyder and Guitry and Renoir; the cinema that gave us *Kermesse Heroique* and *Un Carnet de Bal*, *Le Million* and *Mayerling*, *Pépé le Moko* and *Le Roman d'un Tricheur*; the cinema that introduced us to the acting of Jean Gabin and Louis Jouvét, Fernandel and Raimu? Forced by the shortage of money to work with their brains, impelled by the coming of dialogue into a nationalism that would make their cinema self-supporting, these people paradoxically produced for the first time films that the English-speaking world admired and understood. We found in them the wit that we had missed in other continental cinemas, plus culture, drama, and acute film sense. The best of them were works of fine art; the worst—or the worst that were shown here in England—were elegant and smart. Ten years later, the French cinema of the 'thirties represented the full flowering of that visual imagination which the critic Delluc had once thought to detect and foster in Gance, Germaine Dulac, and l'Herbier.

One point, however, might be noted here. It may be argument after the fact, but to us it seems that the germ of the French decay was already evident in her golden harvest of films. They were great films, but they were mainly films without hope. Even the wit was mordant. Melancholy, or the acceptance of melancholy, was the prevailing mood. There was none of the constructive ardour of the Soviet's more vigorous work; they had not the pride of country of the noisy, virile Hollywood movies; they were not even phlegmatically confident, like our own films. They were, or so it seems to us now, the films of an uncertain and divided people, not daring to plan for the future lest there be no future, not striking their roots deep into the earth, lest the earth itself be scorched.

The American talkie, although it has given us many good, entertaining films—films to make us merry, and quite a few to make us think—has never produced any proportionate body of pictures with the distinction of the French cinema. It has suffered—poor-little-rich-film!—from too much prosperity. Since it has never had to lack for anything, it has rarely stirred itself to look for much.

The Hollywood talkie has achieved a gloss, a finish, a technical perfection, not yet equalled in any other country. Its best photography is superb. Its films have pace. Its dialogue, while infrequently attaining wit, is rarely without some sign of sparkle. Its small parts are meticulously cast, and its stars are gauged to their work like fine-set machines.

This is very well, this is fine, but as you so rightly observe, it is not art. Where, in all the vast turnover of American talkies, will our observer be able to detect the trace of an artist at work? Here and there, I think, in the direction of William Wyler, William Dieterle, Frank Capra and Garson Kanin. Every now and then in the acting of Paul Muni, James Cagney, Bette Davis

and a few others. In a rare film of a rare play like *Green Pastures* and *Our Town*. Sometimes in the fruity monologues of W. C. Fields. In the John Ford films, frequently. In the Preston Sturges films, always. And emphatically in *Citizen Kane*, Orson Welles' initial challenge to the cinema.

Mr. John Ford is a Hollywood Irishman who has been making good films since the early 'twenties, but has only comparatively recently made great ones. As an artist, he has matured late. To the discerning eye the qualities of drama and imagery that were later to blossom out in that remarkable series—*The Informer*, *Stage Coach*, *The Grapes of Wrath* and *The Long Voyage Home*—were already apparent in *The Iron Horse*, a silent film of nearly twenty years ago. They were implicit, but they were still undeveloped. Indeed, it can be argued that only with *The Long Voyage Home*, that beautiful and moving film based on Eugene O'Neill's sea trilogy, Ford reached the fulfilment of his power.

Mr. Preston Sturges is a screen writer who one day presented his employers with the odd thesis that the man who wrote the script of a film should also be the man to direct it. Such a duplication of jobs is becoming common enough in these days, but it was rare at the date when Sturges asked for, and got, the direction of his own story, *Down Went McGinty*. "McGinty," a satire on American municipal politics, was a cheap little film that scored an amazing success. That is to say, it amazed the producers, by not only winning prestige but making money.

Since just before the war, Sturges has been Hollywood's most ingenious, most consistent, and most felicitous director. *Christmas in July*, *The Lady Eve*, *Sullivan's Travels* and *Palm Beach Story* have brought him increasingly to the notice of the connoisseurs. His work, mainly light in tone, but with an odd, underlying note of human pity, is in some ways reminiscent of the early René Clair pictures. He is an experimenter with narrative. He adores camera tricks. He isn't above using the wildest slapstick for his ends, and moves with complete freedom about his medium.

Mr. Orson Welles has probably created a more profound global disturbance with one film than any director since Wiene made "Caligari." *Citizen Kane* was a deliberate revolutionary effort on Welles's part. He came to Hollywood from the New York stage and radio with a high reputation as an original and a rebel. He could not afford, he knew, to make a film that was like any other film that had ever been made. So he made *Citizen Kane*. He wrote it, produced it, directed it, and acted in it. Its narrative and photographic technique was so startling that producers on both sides of the Atlantic are still running round in circles trying to catch up with it. It made no concessions to the cobwebbed brain, truckled to nobody, was in many ways ugly and hard, and was not a popular success. But in stimulating anger, controversy, and question it did its job. *Citizen Kane* set technicians in every studio re-examining and revising their technique. Like "Caligari" it postu-

lated new conditions for the cinema. Even a world that did not understand it was violently stirred by it.

The only other wartime film that has approached *Citizen Kane* in significant influence seems likely to be Mr. Noel Coward's *In Which We Serve*. Arguing rather closely on the event; writing, in fact, while the film is still in the theatres, I am persuaded that the multifold individuality of this piece, its close texture, its almost bewilderingly simple humanity, will leave a trail that other directors will be hot to follow. Mr. Coward has done nothing revolutionary in *In Which We Serve*. His film, unlike Mr. Orson Welles's, is for the groping many, and not for the educated few. He has simply co-ordinated in one work the warmest responses of his own nature, and the precise, almost mathematical showmanship acquired from studying audience psychology in all parts of the world. What he has done, in fact, is to set a premium on craftsmanship, with a bonus of heart thrown in for good measure.

Of all the films made in this country, *In Which We Serve* seems to me the one most worthy of our observer's attention. He will, of course, recall other British works with pleasure; that generous, cultivated series of Korda's, beginning with *The Private Life of Henry VIII*, and including *The Ghost Goes West*, *Things to Come*, and *Rembrandt*; Hitchcock's macabre and distinguished thrillers; the tonic wit of the show films; *Pygmalion* and *Major Barbara*; a sample of Carol Reed's work; the imaginative *Thunder Rock*, and above all, perhaps, our increasingly good and authoritative documentaries. But the single film that will stand out from the others in retrospect, the individual work that will be visible in the longest perspective, should be, so far as we have progressed at the moment of writing, Noel Coward's fine, brave story of ships and sea-faring men.

We have touched on documentaries, and in this connection there is one film that demands, I think, a special glance in passing. It was called *The River*, and it was made, before the war, by Pare Lorentz, for the Washington Department of Agriculture. *The River* was quite a short film, was seen by comparatively few people in this country, and was purely functional in character. But no one who did see it is likely to have forgotten it.

I should perhaps, use the word "hear" rather than "see," for the memorable feature of *The River* was its commentary. For the first time since sound came into the movies a pattern of word-images was deliberately matched with the visual pattern of the camera. Lorenz's description of the Mississippi and its tributaries, his epic story of drought and irrigation and man's new labour defeating man's old rapacity, was in effect a prose poem. Every word, every syllable of each word, was chosen and set in its place with a Biblical richness and simplicity. With the exception of the Disney cartoons, I can recall no other picture that stood so completely for sound-cinema fulfilled.

Well, we have brought our observer at last to the end of his survey. So much for the past. What of the future? It is a question frequently asked a reviewer—as if he should know any more than the clapper-boy or the aunt

of the star's agent—"How is the film going to develop?" In view of the fact that anything may happen in the film industry overnight, just as it happened in 1928, this is a question that a wise reviewer will not answer. The cinema, being a synthetic medium, is essentially fluid. Its limits have never been fixed, since its implements, with the advance of science, are constantly changing. The object photographed, the strip of film, the motion picture camera, and the projectors together add up to one form of cinema. Introduce the microphone and the sound-track, and the whole thing adds up to quite a different form of cinema. At any moment natural colour, or stereoscopy, or even—heaven save us!—smell, might set still another sum for the picture-maker to tackle.

I am not prepared to say how the film is going to develop. I don't mind hazarding a guess as to how it is *likely* to develop. Colour, I think, will replace black-and-white photography in time, and I should not be surprised to see this generally introduced as a rush measure to combat the threat of television. Whatever temporary measures are taken, I expect to see television and the cinema eventually elide. Documentary films, I think, will play a very large part in the post-war construction of the world. Documentaries, including animated cartoons, should be widely used in technical training, and in the curriculum of schools. Musicians, too, may well find in the new cinema a new field for their work. I look forward to a time when the best musicians will regularly compose music for the screen as they might for opera or the concert stage. And along with these developments in the film I expect to see a development in the audience too. Already, I think, there is a desire among people taught by the war, by the profound social revolution of the day, by the better aspects of the radio programmes, by the modern mixing of classes and nations, for a greater sincerity in what they see and hear. The entertainment public of to-day, I fancy, has no longer the mentality of a fourteen-year-old child. The standard has gone up appreciably—say all the way from fourteen to fifteen.

CORRESPONDENCE

BALKAN REALITIES

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

In his article "Balkan Realities,"* Mr. Cecil F. Melville has attempted to give a general survey of political conditions in occupied Yugoslavia. Notwithstanding his well-known objectivity in dealing with political events in the Balkans, Mr. Melville has interpreted certain facts in a way which does not correspond to the actual situation in occupied Yugoslavia. I therefore beg to point out his main errors:

Mr. Melville asserts that, in Croatia, it is mainly the partisans who are fighting against the aggressors, while in Serbia, it is the peasants and the *bourgeoisie* who are offering armed resistance to the invaders. He goes on to say that, in Slovenia, Catholics and Communists are fighting against the enemy. All those who are acquainted with political conditions in Croatia, know that the Croatian Peasant Party, led since 1928 by Dr. Macek who is now interned, has always been supported by the majority of the Croat people. This fact has been demonstrated at every election for the Skupstina (Parliament), even in times when secret voting was abolished under the Governments Jevtic and Stojadinovic (in 1935 and 1938), when 80-95 per cent. of the Croat people voted for the Croatian Peasant Party. The Communist Party has never had any importance in Croatia. Dr. Macek, having been interned from the very beginning of the occupation in consequence of his hostile attitude regarding the Axis, and the Croat people being aware of this fact, it is obvious that the majority of the insurgents in Croatia have come from the ranks of the Peasant Party. The fact that Communists are also fighting in Croatia does not signify that the former members of the Peasant Party have become Communists. It simply goes to prove that, in Croatia, nearly the whole of the Croat people are fighting against the aggressors and their quisling Pavelic; and that the Croat people are not fooled by the anti-Communist slogans used by Nedic and his volunteers for the purpose of excusing their army and police collaboration with the German troops and civil authorities.

Dr. Macek is guarded, by day and night, by 54 Ustashis. He can neither speak freely nor write. Nevertheless, his supporters know perfectly well what he thinks and desires: that is why they are putting up such fierce resistance against the invaders and Pavelic.

* January, 1943.

During the dictatorship of King Alexander, Dr. Macek was kept in prison in Mitrovica for three years owing to his resistance against dictatorship. At that time also, he was not allowed to speak or write freely; yet his supporters knew that it was their duty to carry on the struggle against the régime which had robbed the Croat people of their freedom. The Croat people who have been trained to fight against oppression and dictatorship are never in doubt as to the political attitude they should take up against tyranny. Mr. Melville should be acquainted with the fact that, during the period of dictatorship in Yugoslavia, the underground political propaganda was of much greater importance and influence in Croatia than the controlled and directed Press. This applies in a still greater measure to present conditions, since the people know perfectly well that, to-day, the entire Croat legal Press is controlled and directed by the Germans. Accordingly, it is clear that Dr. Macek's political attitude towards the invaders and Pavelic points the way to the Croat people; and, since the latter are resisting so violently it is evident that they are aware of the fact that this resistance fully corresponds to the intentions of Dr. Macek, who is the only legal representative of the Croat people in occupied Yugoslavia.

Mr. Melville's assertion that, in Slovenia, only the Catholics and the Communists are fighting, is not according to facts. All Slovenes are fighting; and the Slovene Liberals and Slovene Nationalists have particularly distinguished themselves in the struggle. The Slovene Liberal Party is next in importance only to the Slovene Popular Party; and its leaders have never consented to collaborate in any way with the forces of occupation. One may say that this party probably has the highest percentage of victims.

Notwithstanding a certain conventional discrimination, Mr. Melville has attempted to extenuate the guilt of ex-General Nedic towards Yugoslavia and the Serb people. The fact that when war broke out he was Commander of the most important Yugoslav Army aggravates his case and does not mitigate it. This is exactly why the Yugoslav Government in London has deposed him as a General. Mr. Melville affirms that Nedic is a "negative collaborationist." Unfortunately he is a very active collaborationist, for, having formed a Serb Government in Belgrade together with several other Serb generals, he has agreed and still agrees to the partition of Yugoslavia, the country in which he has been Minister of War and Commander of an Army in this war. Worse still, he has set up voluntary formations making war upon the Serb patriots who are resisting the forces of occupation in Serbia. Nedic is waging this war against so-called "Communist gangs." But, since the members of these "gangs" are Serbs fighting against the aggressors, Nedic has, by virtue of this fact, become the ally of the German forces of occupation against his own people. If Nedic had remained loyal to his King and to Yugoslavia, according to his oath of allegiance as an officer, he would now be with General Mihajlovic in the mountains of Yugoslavia or in a German military Concentration Camp, together with many other Yugoslav

officers. In his broadcasts from Belgrade, Nedic attacks Great Britain and the Yugoslav Government in London as the only culprits responsible for the ruin of Yugoslavia. He also attacks General Mihajlovic and has recently issued an order to his police commanding them to arrest and proscribe all those who are in sympathy with General Mihajlovic in Serbia. Does Mr. Melville really believe that, in spite of all these facts, Nedic is not an active collaborationist?

Mr. Melville declares himself in favour of a federated Yugoslavia and makes definite proposals for her federal frontiers. He considers Bosnia and Hercegovina to be purely Serbian countries, without attempting to prove this assertion or making any observation on the opinion of the majority of the people living in these provinces. If Mr. Melville were acquainted with the exact ethnographical ratio of population in Bosnia and Hercegovina, he would not have ventured on this unconsidered affirmation. The problem of Bosnia and Hercegovina represents the stumbling block in Serbo-Croat relations. It is a well-known fact, that, in the main, the Moslem population is the decisive factor in this region. Neither the executive power, nor any traditional right to which Croats or Serbs may lay claim, can prevail against this decisive fact.

The past bitter experiences of Yugoslavia, which was organized and administered contrary to the desires of the majority of her component peoples, have taught us a lesson. They do not allow us to renew these mistakes, if we wish to create a Yugoslavia representing a strong, healthy and united State, serving the cause of peace and progress in Europe.

Yours faithfully,

MIRO RAJKOVIC.

61, Kingston House,
Princes Gate, S.W.7.

Mr. Cecil F. Melville writes:

In reply to Mr. Miro Rajkovic:—

(1) *General Neditch*: I am sorry if I conveyed the impression that Neditch is anything other than a "Quisling" and therefore a despicable enemy. Re-reading my article it seems clear to me that I emphasized Neditch's "Quislingism" beyond doubt. It was no extenuation of his political shadiness to say, as I did, and as I repeat, that there are degrees even in "Quislingism," and that of the two sorry specimens Pavelitch is worse than Neditch, inasmuch as while the latter became a "Quisling" *after the fact*, the former had been a "Quisling" *both before and after the fact*.

(2) *The Slovenes*: I did not say that only the Communists and Popularists (that is Clericals) were fighting the Axis. I said the Catholics and the Com-

munists. As the adherence to the Roman Catholic Faith in Slovenia is not confined to the Popular Party, my term "Catholic" naturally included *all* the various political parties mentioned by Mr. Rajkovic.

(3) *Croatia*: I expressly stated in my article that there is resistance from the peasant and bourgeois elements; I did not say it was confined to the Communists. What I did say was that the main *active* resistance came from left-wing elements and Communists amongst the guerrillas, which is surely a fact. I expressly stated that Dr. Macek had refused co-operation with the Axis and the "Quisling" administration at Zagreb; and that his followers, and, indeed, most Croats, are opposed to Pavelitch and his Axis masters. The only thing I said otherwise about Mr. Macek was that he could not be regarded as the leader of an *active* movement of resistance. My strictures on those elements amongst the Croatian bourgeoisie who have been giving active or passive support to the present régime at Zagreb were accurate enough, and I see no reason to modify them, but they have nothing to do with what I wrote about Dr. Macek, to whose refusal to be a "Quisling" I had paid full tribute.

(4) *Future Internal Frontiers and Bosnia-Herzegovina*: I have always supported the idea of a federalistic solution of the Yugoslav internal question, but this does not mean that Pavelitch's Croatia should be the territorial blue print of the Croatia which should form an autonomous unit of the new federated Yugoslavia. Especially in view of the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina is mainly Serbian. I have not been attempting to suggest the actual internal frontiers. That is a matter of detail which the Yugoslavs themselves must settle after the war. I have only stated the general principle that the Serbian lands should be brought together in the new Serbia, while Croatia should be Croatian and Slovenia Slovenian. I do not see how any reasonable person could quarrel with that. (As regards the Moslems, as they are a religion and not a race, I cannot see how they could be a deciding factor in any racial demarcation). My authorities for saying these provinces are mainly Serbian are (1) statements by Dr. Seton Watson, that eminent authority on Yugoslavia whose friendship for the Croats is beyond doubt (in his standard work *The South Slav Question*); a statement by Gladstone; a statement by Strossmayer, himself a great figure in Croatian history; and Kallay, who, as Austro-Hungarian Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1882 until 1903, was hardly likely to err in favour of the Serbs. If to-day there are less Serbs in these provinces than formerly, this would be due to the way in which Pavelitch's Croat "Ustachi" have been murdering thousands of Serbs.

As regards Mr. Rajkovic's concluding paragraph: I can only say that I have always deplored the internal differences which were a source of disunity and weakness in the past, and if continued, could but be a similar source of weakness during the present and in the future. I hope I may be considered an old and active friend of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs, whether the latter be Serbs, Croats or Slovenes. I have always objected to my fellow countrymen taking up partisan attitudes in regard to Yugoslav internal affairs. If, in my

article, I made a point about the re-uniting of the Serbian lands, it was because this is an aspect of the situation which merits consideration, along with the various other aspects, but which to date had not received any exposition in the British press, and therefore had its rightful place, amongst other things, in an article covering the Yugoslav situation, such as the one I wrote in *THE FORTNIGHTLY*.

For the rest I can only add that my one aim is to try and help, to the best of my modest ability, our gallant Yugoslav allies to find a new unity and a happier future, and that in trying to do this I have endeavoured to put the common good of Yugoslavia before and above sectional political interests and differences. Can every Yugoslav political emigré here lay his hand on his heart and say the same of himself?

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

EVEN a reviewer who likes his job inclines at moments to talk rather about what he does not read for the first time, and just lately I have been impressed by the fact that enjoyment from re-reading varies greatly in kind. For instance, in half a dozen plays by Shakespeare I turned deliberately to some because they were less familiar than the rest; and here the main interest was to recognize passages where one got either the authentic or the fully developed Shakespeare—who certainly is not present all the time in the three parts of *Henry VI*—nor perhaps throughout the *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. But in *Richard II* what a difference! page after page came alive and seemed to have been always latent in memory. From *Richard II* I went on to *Henry IV*, where perhaps Shakespeare is more absolutely Shakespeare than anywhere else; whether it is Prince Hal, or Hotspur, or Falstaff, we get from this English poet something unique in literature. Here, new or old, the spell is always working; the verbal felicities, even when remembered, renew the shock of delight.

When I took down Miss Helen Waddell's *Peter Abelard*, I was held perhaps even more than at the first encounter by that singular combination of learning, poetry and passion. I cannot think of any modern work where the desire of woman for man and of man for woman is more powerfully portrayed than here—where it is all mixed up with theological and philosophic controversies some eight centuries old. The truth is that when a book is good enough the second reading is better than the first. Here I had forgotten so much that I read first of all to get the story; I could gladly read again, having all the story in my mind, to be at leisure to dwell on the beauty, which is of many kinds. Yet for another reader, the appeal might be even more to intellectual curiosity.

* * * * *

But to pass to new books—that same curiosity should attract many to a book by one near of kin to me. In *The Second Spring** Denis Gwynn, known as a Catholic publicist, writes of the revival in which Wiseman and Newman were the figures about whom the movement seems to centre. Of the two Wiseman shows himself the more humanly attractive. Catholicism comes easier to an Irishman than to the English, and Wiseman though English born and bred, was of Irish stock. But as in all movements there were secondary personages hardly less essential than the leaders; and this account of all the groups concerned, written from a Catholic standpoint is in essence the book of a minority in Great Britain—a small minority of intellectual distinction which has behind it, in not very sympathetic alliance, considerable democratic masses brought over by economic considerations from Ireland. Dr. Gwynn's book will interest powerfully all those for whom the Catholic revival really was a 'Second

* Burns, Oates & Washbourne. 9s.

Spring' and are more concerned with the facts of its renaissance, than with the searching of heart, which made Newman's transfer of allegiance so dramatic. This assuredly means only a limited section of the British public; but within its area the book will have a sure welcome.

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There should be no such limitation in the appeal of the book to which I pass; for *Destination Chungking* (Cape, 12s. 6d.) brings us into intimate contact with all that is most significant in Chinese life; and already we all see that if there is to be a new world-order, China must be a full partner. After reading this book that seems not only more possible but more desirable. Han Suyin describes to us the fortunes of two young people who are at once exceptional and profoundly typical. They knew each other first as children playing together in Peking where Pao, the boy, was son of a rich house; Suyin's folk, also of the official world, were less surrounded by the splendour and beauty from which Japanese possession banishes free China. Separated by Chinese custom, while they were growing up, each went to Europe for training. Pao was one of three chosen out of three thousand to be sent to Sandhurst. Suyin also insisted on completing what the Chinese University had done for her and instinctive choice would have led her to purely literary study; but her generation was infected with the desire to serve—"with test-tube and microscope and dynamo, in the hope to eradicate misery and disease." So her choice was for midwifery, where Chinese life was still in the grip of ignorant and dirty superstitions; she "laid aside books she loved, poetry and plays and novels." Yet this lady has in this nothing to regret. Using an acquired language, she can render impressions either of beauty or of horror in a way that it would be hard to surpass.

She and her former playfellow met in England as students without recognizing each other. Both had put aside the idea of marriage arranged on the old Chinese lines of suitability; and when they met in a foreign land as free comrades they did not at first think of it. It was only when Japan made war on China, and both determined to go back and share the suffering, that marriage was proposed—and agreed to; though they preferred to wait until they had reached China to begin this new life. The rest of the book describes many things but everywhere it conveys centrally one impression—that of two young people passionately and profoundly in love. They are, and we are made to understand it, at once hampered and helped by the complications of Chinese custom; "the Big Family" is inescapable. At the same time, one must feel that these younger folk, in revolt against many of the old presuppositions, are nearer to us by their revolt. All their generation is dominated by Chiang-Kai-shek, the Generalissimo, in whom we are made to see an embodiment of the ideal of service; and it is of great interest to be shown that his wife, a Chinese lady, American-bred, has an influence everywhere felt in other ways of service. These leaders and their followers accept the teaching of Sun-Yat-Sen; they deliberately turn their backs on the old order where Chinese aristocracy left all the hardships to be borne by the coolies—human cattle. The last page in this book sketches a symbol of hope. In the street, one of these "uncounted millions, slowly with a grunt eases his load to the ground and stands panting. Then he crosses the road. There is a newspaper pasted on the wall. With his finger he follows the

Young
China

columns of characters. Slowly, painfully, he reads. I, who watch, am suddenly happy and confident of the future, because I see you, in the mist of dawn, lift your finger to read."

Even from this fragmentary reproduction it will be seen how remarkable a writer is in this book; and her skill is equally available to describe either the tranquil beauty of Peking in old days or the bombing of Chungking—Japan's contribution to China's development. It is long since I read a book which told me so much and so admirably. Pearl Buck's wonderful story, *The Good Earth* brings us intimately into touch with the laborious skilful workers to whom reading is an unknown art; but in this book we meet the class in China with whom Europe must collaborate to bring about what Europe, even more than China, needs. And we are told the story not by any gifted foreigner artist but by native Chinese skill. The difference is to be felt.

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Admiral's Widow (Hogarth Press, 12s. 6d.) is "The Life and Letters of the Hon. Mrs. Edward Boscawen from 1761 to 1803," compiled by Brigadier-General Cecil Aspinall-Oglander." General Oglander makes proper allowance for the limitation of ordinary knowledge, and for example sets down very fully the story of Bunker's Hill, though no doubt some version of it is driven into the memory of every American schoolboy. It had to be told here, because Mrs. Boscawen, who had been the wife of Pitt's favourite admiral, had in 1775 (fifteen years after the Admiral's death) a son and a nephew engaged in the attempt to put down revolt in America. Indeed this lady who belonged to a "Big Family," almost Chinese in its well-placed ramifications, was connected in some such way with most public happenings in the latter half of her long life. Still the book's interest is chiefly in the very pleasant pictures it gives of a figure in the "Blue Stocking" circle—one whom Boswell praised as having more charm of manner and more gift of conversation than any other woman he ever met. The Blue Stocking Parties, it seems, got their name because people were asked to come in their ordinary day clothes, and Stillingfleet the botanist used to wear stockings of blue worsted. But the main point of the gatherings was that people attending them got talk instead of whist—"that foe to human society."

We cannot judge of Mrs. Boscawen's talk except by hearsay; but her fame as a letter-writer was such that people called her "*la Sévigné de l'Angleterre*." Hannah More says that both ladies had the same gift of "some seemingly random stroke that shows the hand of a master, but only a master sketching for his amusement and not finishing for the public." Hannah, whom we all know by name and very few of us know otherwise, reveals herself in this book as one of the most engaging among Johnson's contemporaries. The "Great Cham of letters" himself appears of course frequently; Mrs. Boscawen once at least stood up to him valiantly; and she has preserved some lines on his death sent her by Soame Jenyns who she thought had probably written them. Here are a few of them—

Reader have a care,
Tread lightly, lest you rouse a sleeping bear . . .
Ill-bred and overbearing in dispute,
A scholar and a Christian, yet a brute.

And here is a sample of the English de Sévigné—

All the fields are adorned with haycocks, which look as if they had had their fullshare of wet, and wanted to get dry and go home. The morning bower is very sweet just now,

with a fine orange tree in full bloom, and a jewel of a blackbird has fixed his station pretty near it, so that it wants only the mower whetting his scythe, and the milkmaid, turned haymaker, singing blythe.

Mrs. Boscawen was a great gardener and a true lover of trees; in 1779 when a Franco-Spanish fleet of a hundred sail appeared off Plymouth, Mount Edgecumb had to furnish an *abatis*. "I lament them most piteously," she writes, "the finest beeches, the loveliest old oaks, that had seen Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh." Here is a glimpse of provincial life in 1793—

I think the Pelican at Newbury is one of the best Inns that can be, and I'm sure we had the best supper . . . But we were not so lucky in *rest*, for it was ball night in the town, and when I would have slept, all the coaches were rolling away to fetch their ladies home.

They sleep quieter now in Newbury, I think. That letter was written from Badminton which was a second home to Mr. Boscawen. The Duke of Beaufort at twenty-one married her eldest daughter and by her had fourteen children—never lessening in welcome to his mother-in-law. Unlucky in too long life, she survived this model son-in-law—and indeed most of her friends; but there were always young lives coming on that pleased her—I thank General Aspinall Oglander for making the lady known to me.

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Sir Henry Slesser (late Lord Justice of Appeal) by his book entitled *The Judicial Office and Other Matters* (Hutchinson, 15s.) presents grave difficulties to the present reviewer. Here is an man immensely erudite and passionately in earnest who sets out his inmost thought, on subjects of the highest concern. What he has to say about the Judicial Office, although the title emphasizes this, occupies less than fifty pages in a total of over two hundred and fifty; and like the rest it is not easy reading. He never avoids technicality in choice of words, and his general exposition often assumes a knowledge which the ordinary reader (even the ordinary educated reader) cannot be assumed to possess. Still in this part a reviewer might be well content to note that English judges, when asked to decide whether a case might be more conveniently tried in Germany or England, learnt that in Germany the plaintiff could not have a right to be heard because he had not full German citizenship, and concluded that a tribunal which would not hear both sides impartially was, according to civilized notions, not a court at all. It is interesting also to note that he dislikes the system (or lack of system) by which Judges of Appeal and the Law Lords are chosen by the Prime Minister "a man often untrained in law and necessarily unacquainted with the capacity of its practitioners for judicial office, while Records in boroughs and stipendiary magistrates "owe their office to the Home Secretary"—of whom the same is true. Sir Henry would like to see all selection left to the Lord Chancellor, who already appoints the High Court and County Court judges, but he suggests that there should be assistance from an Advisory Board, consisting of high legal functionaries.

But the book's concern is with matters of much wider significance. The judges used to defend individual freedom; but under new conditions much has been surrendered to the State; and "law may have to adapt itself to a corporate state, considering the rights not of the workmen but of the Union." "Now that many people no longer believe in the soul," he says, "we hear much talk of the souls of Nations . . . Does a nation so regarded, like a community of bees, have any need for laws other than those of command . . . May judges

in future have no duty beyond the construing of Acts of Parliament or of orders issued under these Acts?"

Yet even a careless reader will perceive Sir Henry Slesser's preoccupation with things that go deeper even than the pride in his profession. The first part of his book is concerned with politics; but politics to him mean the question whether mankind is or is not still attempting to establish the City of God on earth. He sees in the classical culture an effort to create a *Civitas* of world-wide extent, offering protection in some measure to all; St. Augustine in his judgment more than any man turned Europe to the pursuit of an ideal whose purpose was not limited to this earth. From this ideal the world lapsed after ten centuries to a simply "acquisitive civilization" until world-wide war has delivered the world from content with this aim. In all these speculations, which at every point show deep thought and profound reading, I have no competence to follow him; still less through the second part of the work, in which an "Essay on Christian Metaphysic" is followed by discussion of "The Place of St. Thomas Aquinas in Christian Philosophy." In the presence of such work, sent out by a man who has been trusted with one of the highest offices in the State, I prefer to salute respectfully, and say there is this reading for those who seek it. I note only that Sir Henry Slesser never condescends to attempt popularizing; and I think that his purpose in writing would be better served if he avoided such locutions as "agapetic love" or "soteriological themes."

ON HITLER'S DOORSTEP, by Denis Weaver. *Hodder & Stoughton*. 8s. 6d.

IS TOMORROW HITLER'S? by H. R. Knickerbocker. *Penguin*. 9d.

Mr. Denis Weaver was sent by his paper, the *News Chronicle*, to Stockholm to "cover" Hitler's war against Russia. It is always a most interesting enterprise to follow historical events from a neutral observer post. You step from the blackout of your own country, from the front line, to an "idyllic island of peace where the war is hardly a common topic of conversation." That is what Mr. Weaver thought at first, but he soon found out that when he came to neutral Sweden, in October, 1941, the front line in Russia was nearer to Stockholm than to Kuibishev. "One could al-

most hear the thunder of the guns round Moscow and the whistle of Nazi bombs falling at the approaches of Leningrad." The danger that the war, in spite of all their frantic efforts to remain outside, would invade their country was always hanging over the heads of the Swedes. Then there were a lot of economic worries which made life in neutral Sweden not too easy. As trade with most of the world was cut off, it was natural that trade with Germany should be clung to, however bad the terms. Trade with Russia had never been considerable, if it had existed at all. A Russian victory therefore would mean loss of trade, loss of money, loss of security—at least so feared certain businessmen who sweated every time Timoshenko took another village.

But at the time when Mr. Weaver arrived in Stockholm Timoshenko had not yet started taking villages. It was autumn, 1941, and the German *blitzkrieg* against the Red army was in full swing. The Ukraine and the Donetz Basin were overrun, Moscow and Leningrad threatened. The special correspondent of the *News Chronicle* had therefore "to let Sweden and its problems dip into his system bit by bit" and concentrate on his immediate task of describing the Russian war. Sitting so to speak at a window overlooking Hitler's doorstep he follows the development of Hitler's war against Stalin from the first round in 1941 until the beginning of the mad offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus. When he finished his report, the second Russian offensive had not yet begun, but Mr. Weaver is already able to state that "according to authentic German sources in Stockholm the hostility of the German people against the continuance of the war steadily mounts. The price for the victories was too high. Russia is unconquerable": that is the note on which Mr. Weaver concludes his book. Seldom has a writer had the satisfaction of seeing his prophecy fulfilled so soon by the events themselves.

The other author, the American colleague of Mr. Weaver, is Mr. H. R. Knickerbocker who as far back as 1933 gave the world a nasty shock by his book *Will War Come to Europe?* In his newest publication he condenses all his experiences of these last ten years into 115 questions, "on the Battle of Mankind," dealing with the peoples fighting this battle and with the men leading them. He tries to explain the events of our days by digging deeply into the psychological underground out of which the ambitions of those leaders and the feelings of the peoples led grew into active fulfilment.

He provides us with some excellent characterizations, such as Great Britain's Mr. Churchill. Interesting is his description of Hitler, the "medicine man who is the mirror of every German's unconscious." More than merely interesting, extraordinarily instructive is what Mr. Knickerbocker has to tell us about the fall of France. He openly accuses French high officers, of whom Pétain was the leader, of treason. They conspired to overthrow the republic which they hated so fanatically that they became an easy prey for the promises of Hitler. This particular chapter sounds in some parts nearly fantastic, but the events in the last few months have proved that the American journalist is never far from the tragic truth.

Mr. Knickerbocker's book was written before Pearl Harbour and the entry of his country into the war. He wrote it for no other reason than to convince the people of the United States that "the world will never be safe for them to live in until Nazi Germany is defeated. It will require the total war effort of the United States and Britain and Russia to defeat Germany," says Mr. Knickerbocker. Well the Japanese have helped him to prove to his countrymen that he was right from the first to the last of his 115 questions. With one exception: the chapter on Russia. Although Mr. Knickerbocker declares that he does not agree with Hoover's capitalism, his description of Soviet Russia is full of prejudice and injustice. To point out only one thing: Stalin has taught the Russians not only to fight, but also to know what they are fighting for. He has filled them with an enthusiasm of which Mr. Knickerbocker apparently has not the least understanding. Here events disagree with the otherwise so clear-sighted author.

ERNST KLEIN.

VICTORY PRODUCTION! by J. T. Murphy. *John Lane, The Bodley Head.* 6s.

The title of Mr. Murphy's latest book is perhaps intended to be sarcastic. The general conclusion to be drawn is that if production goes on in the present way, Victory will be reached more by good luck than by good judgment. The book is very easy and interesting reading and is probably the first to be written by one who has actually worked in factories during this war, Mr. Murphy's long and varied experience has enabled him to see and bring out clearly the basic causes of many much talked of happenings.

A chapter on Air Raid Shelters shows how easily sticking to a principle can completely mask the real principle of maximum production. Mr. Murphy's experience with the "shelter problem" is not unique. The men who sat through an E.N.S.A. concert during an "Alert" and then went to shelter instead of back to work, really believed that they were upholding the very proper principle that better shelters must be provided—not one of them was intentionally holding up production. In their minds this conflict of principles just did not arise.

In the same way the persons who Mr. Murphy calls "the class-war romantics" of the People's Convention were not trying to prevent Victory, but had rather failed to see that without speedy and unhindered Victory their ideas for a new and better world could have no chance of success.

The Englishman's inherent conservatism and the fear of having his vested interests disturbed is shown to apply equally to all sections of the industrial community, even if the hackneyed accusations of "muddling through" are hardly confirmed by present events in North Africa.

There is much vivid description of

problems that arose and were handled with varying degrees of skill and understanding (or misunderstanding)—the dilution of labour, the introduction of women, the formation of Shop Stewards' Committees, the setting up of the machinery of negotiation between workers and Management, and finally the initial operation of Joint Production Committees. These, as Mr. Murphy points out, are frequently composed of untrained and untried people. This in itself need not be a cause of stagnation but, where committee members are of the type who do not mind being elected rather than of the type who have a burning desire to produce results, the rather placid effect described by Mr. Murphy is bound to follow.

One common theme runs through all these problems, and in fact through the whole of *Victory Production!* and Mr. Murphy put it thus:—

Nevertheless, when all the pros and cons have been considered it must be remembered that it is one thing to create machinery and another to get the human material in the factories to use it with a will and purpose.

Since the human material seems incapable of coming up to the required standard of its own free will, Mr. Murphy proposes to put the whole country—including Industry—on the same footing as the Armed Forces. This seems to be based on the belief that "Man cannot serve two masters"—The State and his own particular Vested Interest—but surely the two are, or should be one. If in fact Victory Production can only be achieved by Mr. Murphy's methods it postulates the existence of a very poor standard of social unity of purpose. Although in their more pessimistic moments many will have agreed with Mr. Murphy, it is to be hoped that events in 1943 will prove him wrong, W. J. N. SOWELS,

GOD & EVIL, by C. E. M. Joad.
Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.

If sheer honesty alone determined the worth of a book, and if a keen critical faculty, a sharp eye for logical flaws, wide knowledge and an admirable gift of lucid statement were equipment enough to make a philosopher, then this would be an unusually timely and valuable book by a real philosopher. *God and Evil* has a brave candour about it, indeed, it is so candid that Dr. Joad will not wholly escape the charge that in it he has chiefly staged a Byronic parade of his abraded mind.

O horrid sight! On public road
Stripped to the buff, sans even woad
And prodded hard by evil's goad
Sways Dr. Joad.

That would, however, be a wrong reading of the situation. Not only Dr. Joad's head but his heart are barely half across that vaguely drawn but exciting frontier on which agnostic philosophy and religion meet, and the apparent exhibitionism should be read—so this book would suggest—as hints of a deep-seated clash between sentiments proper to the humanist and those inseparable from religion. Not yet has Dr. Joad fully learned the depth and range of meaning involved in both repentance and humility, and they are clearly at odds with the old humanistic complacency. Of the religious interpretation of life to which he feels he is being driven he would seem unconsciously to feel '*Odi et amo*,' and the divided heart is no less apparent in this book than the divided mind.

The book is essentially a philosophical "*Tale from the Border*" and on its avowed subject, its testimony has exactly the value, no more and no less, attachable to all reports from a frontier which one has only partly crossed, and that for the first time. It is a kind of intellectual *Pilgrim's Progress* written, not from

the Celestial City, but from the farther bank of the Slough of Despond. From that location there is not and cannot be much accurate reporting of anything save the reasons which have made Dr. Joad pull up his stakes and the pilgrim's own hopes and fears for his journey. The sum total of what Dr. Joad says about God and evil is that by using the appropriate religious discipline, he hopes he may come to an experience of a personal God able to deal with the elemental and mounting evil in the world and in Joad. It is all to the good that Dr. Joad has insisted so emphatically on evil as a reality and as a practical problem, and has confessed man's impotence to deal with it, but how profitless, and indeed, how almost platitudinous a conclusion after 359 pages of close print professing to deal with the problem of God and evil. "O monstrous! but one half-pennyworth of bread to this intolerable deal of sack."

What is disturbing is that the book arouses the suspicion that even on the philosophic side, Dr. Joad is by nature a philosophic critic rather than a philosopher in the full sense of the term. He can appraise, criticize and expound, but he seems to lack that creative and architectonic quality of mind which is the mark of your genuine thinker. He reflects too much the mind of his age, and does not see things "*subspecie aeternitatis*." Two illustrations only will suffice. In his summary of the evil that has driven him from his agnostic position, without more ado, he includes pain and suffering on the ground that it makes men bitter. But Dr. Joad has already insisted that value is a constituent element in the universe, and the moment you talk of values you have to speak of the possible relationships of any event to these values. Now it is clear that whilst some men are made better by

suffering, in the case of others, pain is causally related to the very highest values we know. In other words, the problem of pain and its relationship to both good and evil is far more complicated than Dr. Joad even glimpses. He does not, for example, even look at the fact, so far as I can recollect, that a world without pain would be a lethal chamber, a shambles.

How revealing too, are the first two paragraphs of Dr. Joad's summary of his argument on page 358. What they really amount to is that Dr. Joad's original philosophy was formed with a bland blindness to the experiences which we know in a personal way more directly and intimately than we know any others, to wit, our experience of persons and our moral experience. That is not philosophizing; it is not a cool, rational attempt to deal with the whole of experience; it is simply the man in the street explicating his own uncriticized assumptions. It may be a hard saying, but I fear that Dr. Joad's reputation as a philosopher will be hard put to it to survive this book.

The upshot . . . ? This, that if the reader expects light on the problem of evil, he will find very little illumination here save the assurance that agnosticism cannot deal with it, but, that if he is interested in intellectual autobiography as a portent of our modern times, he will find this volume of curious, even absorbing interest.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

WHAT THE CHURCH TEACHES,
by the Bishop of Bradford. *Penguin Special. 9d.*

This little book will cost the Bishop none of his reputation for courage. Any attempt to compress into fewer than ninety small pages the essentials of Christian doctrine,

life and worship for the general reader is brave enough in itself; and the writer has, moreover, the foreknowledge that the "general" reader, so-called, is a compound of a diversity of very "particular" readers each of whom will judge that the booklet is lacking in what he himself deems to be some first essential. Thus, the Churchman reader can easily say the book is nowhere near sufficiently "definite Church teaching" to justify its title, whilst many an uninstructed seeker will complain that he asked for the bread of religion and was given the stone of "dogma". Yet the fact remains that the Bishop has written a little book which can teach much to the average regular Churchgoer whilst the honest but confused seeker (for whom it is especially intended) may be helped to realize that if he is not content to accept life unthinkingly but wants some explanation of and guidance in it he *must* accept some postulates, some "dogma". This truth is often unpalatable; but it is a truth. There is no escape from "dogma"; the only question is which of a wide variety offered him a man will accept, and he should approach the task with thankfulness that he is still free to choose for himself.

Here is an exposition, brief and necessarily undetailed, of the Christian standpoint. It begins, as it should, not from man but from God and goes on to treat of man, of the relation between the two, of sin, of God at work through the Incarnation and the Spirit and of the Church in action and at worship in the world. The whole is closely knit and straightly stated, always with a clear eye as to what are the fundamentals for which alone room can be found and always without compromise, though perhaps not invariably in terms the theologically uninstructed will find quite plain at first reading.

The general tone of the book is a return (and perhaps a timely return) to the form of exposition which largely stresses the element of reason and is known as Apologetics. Little of this has been seen in recent years, though middle-aged readers will remember that in their youth great importance was attached to demonstrating that although Christianity is, of course, a faith, it is a faith which has nothing to fear from Reason. Perhaps the most famous and certainly the most widely read of such books was Lieut-Colonel Turton's *The Truth of Christianity* which ran into very many editions at the turn of the century. It is open to question whether the neo-Georgian is as impressed by the necessity for Reason as was his late-Victorian or Edwardian grandfather; although he will, in the abstract, ascribe to Science a universality of authority the modern scientist does not claim for it, he does in practice accept many ideas, and join various "movements" which are not always conspicuously based on Reason. True, the type of "intellectual" who sneers at Christianity because it is the sort of thing no man of brain could possibly believe in is still with us, and he gets no quarter from the Bishop; but it is very doubtful whether it is the influence of these "intellectuals" which stands between the average man and a full acceptance of Christian allegiance and Church membership. It may be, therefore, that this book with its steady stress on reason is not the most appealing line of first approach to the outsider, who is to-day more impressed with the "how" a thing works than with the "why"; but it is none the less a valuable and necessary statement, in brief and simple terms, of the reasons which underlie the faith of the Church.

JOHN HALET.

A PREFACE TO PARADISE LOST, by C. S. Lewis. *Oxford University Press.* 7s. 6d.

Mr. Charles Williams, to whom the above book is dedicated, remarks in his short but pregnant Preface to Milton (*The World's Classics*, 1940) that we are fortunate enough to live at a time when the reputation of John Milton has been seriously attacked; and Mr. C. S. Lewis in his introductory, warm tribute to Mr. Williams' important essay praises it for "the recovery of a true critical tradition after more than a hundred years of laborious misunderstanding." Further, referring to a lecture on *Comus* given by Mr. Williams at Oxford, Mr. Lewis says that he "watched 'the yonge fresshe folkes, he or she,' who filled the benches listening first with incredulity, then with toleration, and finally with delight, to something so strange and new in their experience as the praise of chastity." He adds that "when the old poets made some virtue their theme they were not teaching but adoring, and that what we take for the didactic is often the enchanted." This is well said, and certainly Milton, the poet, was in love with virtue. He had not *l'âme basse* to recall Anatole France's dictum about great artists, and when we set Milton's splendour against some recent disillusioned literary whimpering it is arguable that much adverse criticism of Milton's is itself a criticism of our age. It is therefore to be hoped in the interest of the future that as many "yonge fresshe folkes" as possible who care for literature and who have not *l'âme basse* will acquire this book and thoroughly digest it. In his *A Preface To Paradise Lost* Mr. Lewis has written a scholarly, profound, wise and timely contribution to our criticism, and a sufficient answer to the Cambridge critics and those others such as the egregious, unscholarly

Mr. Ezra Pound, or Mr. Eliot, who have sought either by direct attack or by skilful verbal sniping to dethrone Milton.

On the full content of this book I have only space to touch briefly, since this concerns in detail both the form and matter of *Paradise Lost*. Mr. Lewis begins with a discussion of the position of the poem in the history of epic, the place of ritual in epic poetry, and demonstrates Milton's love "of hierarchy, of what Shakespeare calls 'degree.'" He traces a quality in epic poetry which hinges upon our understanding of the Middle English word *solempne*, "the festal which is also the stately and the ceremonial, the proper occasion for *pomp*," without the austerity and suggestion of gloom in our word *solemn*, that takes us "away from the solitary, private and armchair associations which the word 'poetry' has for a modern." It is a proper defence of the objective view of poetry. And then, answering Dr. I. A. Richards, he shows how stock responses and stock phrases are decorous and part of the stock-in-trade of epic poetry. "We need most urgently to recover the lost poetic art of enriching a response without making it eccentric, and of being normal without being vulgar." Touching the diction of *Paradise Lost* I differ from Mr. Lewis in one respect only—while rightly emphasizing the importance of the subordination of the line to the paragraph and the paragraph to the Book in reading epic poetry, it is surely true that *Paradise Lost* can be, and is, appreciated by many readers also for its wealth of outstanding single lines.

As regards the matter Mr. Lewis writes as a Christian, but this is an advantage for "what would you not give to have a real, live Epicurean at your elbow while reading Lucretius?" He analyses the characters

of Satan and Satan's followers, and shows how Eve fell through pride and Adam through uxoriousness so that we feel "thus, and not otherwise, does the mind turn to embrace evil." But in daring to represent Paradisal sexuality Mr. Lewis doubts whether Milton was wise, for here was a dilemma that perhaps only Dante might have solved. But the purpose of the lectures on which this book is founded was mainly "to hinder hindrances" to the appreciation of *Paradise Lost*, and in this, for any open mind it will surely admirably succeed. "As long as we live in merry middle earth" we have need of the eagles and the trumpets of Milton's poetry. It has almost been forgotten that poetry should teach by delighting. "Decorum is the grand masterpiece."

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

THE BRIDGE OF HEAVEN, by S. I. Hsiung with a prefatory poem by John Masefield. *Peter Davies.* 10s. 6d.

Future historians of literature will certainly pay special attention to the Chinese novelists, masters of a style that many Englishmen might envy, who are now addressing themselves expressly to Western readers. Mr. Hsiao Ch'ien, in his attractive little book *Etching of a Tormented Age*, shows how Japanese aggression has produced a large school of authors and artists depicting life with an entirely new realism and vigour. But these men are only concerned to rouse their countrymen. Mr. Hsiung and Dr. Lin Yutang seem to have said to themselves: "Our people have hitherto been presented to the West only as a political problem or a psychological curiosity. We will show you what they really are in their homes, their loves and hatreds, their births, marriages and deaths, their family

festivals, the food they eat, the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think." The result is not only something altogether new and entrancing; it is of the highest importance at a time when China and the West are entering on new relationships, by enabling millions of readers to know the Chinese as they never could in any other way.

Mr. Hsiung is, of course, already well known as translator of that delicious comedy *Lady Precious Stream* and the classic drama *The Western Chamber*. In *The Bridge of Heaven* he presents to us a typical middle-class Chinese family—a first-rate story, abounding in vivid scenes and finely drawn characters. It is closely interwoven with the history of the revolution, from "the Hundred Days" of the unhappy Emperor Kuang Hsü and the Empress Dowager's *coup d'état* in 1898 to the outbreak at Hankow in 1911 (which is shown to have been a much more sanguinary affair than most Europeans realized). The book introduces a number of historical personages and a graphic description of underground revolutionary activities. But well as all this is done, it is the romance which chiefly appeals and puts *The Bridge of Heaven* in a very high class—the intimate picture of the households of Li Ming, the wealthy skinflint, and his deplorably wasteful but warm-hearted brother Li Kang; the growing-up of Li Ming's two sons, Shiao Ming his own, and Ta Tung his adopted son; and especially the love story of Ta Tung and Lotus Fragrance, who (like Precious Stream) follows the dictates of her heart and elopes with

the penniless Ta Tung to Peking—Ta Tung, a perpetual reminder to his adopted father of a gratuitous waste of good money, has been finally cast off—where she cooks and contrives and mothers her dreamy husband in desperate poverty and with unflinching cheerfulness. The description of the young couple's life in Peking is as lovely as anything one can recall. It is curious that China, where until recent years women held a very subordinate place, has produced three such charming heroines, so brave and wise, so gay and comfortable, as Precious Stream, Dr. Lin Yu-tang's Mulan, and Mr. Hsiung's Lotus Fragrance.

Mr. Hsiung has an impish humour and a brilliant faculty for drawing character. The description of the miserly Li Ming and his infinite parsimonies is irresistible; and there is a remorseless sketch of a type of missionary mercifully less common now than formerly, Mr. Ma the schoolmaster, ardently bent on "saving the souls of the heathen," but arrogantly unsympathetic with Chinese life and civilization.

The "happy ending" is perhaps slightly mechanical, but that for most readers will be a virtue. Just as Stevenson found the ending of *Richard Feverel* to be monstrously cruel and unnecessary, it would have been intolerable if Mr. Hsiung had left Ta Tung and Lotus Fragrance otherwise than reunited after their long separation imposed by the revolution, and with a fair future before them.

O. M. GREEN.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

APRIL, 1943

IS FREEDOM POSSIBLE?

BY JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

"THIS war," says Mr. Peter Drucker in the opening sentence of his new book, *The Future of Industrial Man*,* "is being fought for the structure of industrial society—its basic principles, its purposes, and its institutions. It has one issue, only one: the social and political order of the entirely new physical reality which Western Man has created as his habitat since James Watt invented the steam-engine." Mr. Drucker's English, though remarkably good, is not yet perfect. And what he means is something rather different from what he says here. He means that in the process of the war will be decided the structure of industrial society; and in the decision will be found the main historical significance of the war.

Thus interpreted, Mr. Drucker's proposition seems true. We have, perhaps largely without knowing what we were doing, rejected the Nazi attempt to create an industrial society that functions, because the Nazi attempt was based on the deliberate organization of the industrial society for war. It was also based on the suppression of freedom; but that was not the reason why we opposed it. To accept an industrial society without freedom, even if decorated with the attractive but ambiguous name of socialism, would be to abandon what is best in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. To create an industrial society that functions and is free is our problem. And though it is true that the consciousness that the problem lies there is increasing, it is not gaining ground quickly enough.

But, it may be said, why have we to create an industrial society that functions and is free? Have we not such a society already? We have not. We have what Mr. Drucker calls a mercantile society, in the sense that our effective social ethos is that of a mercantile society: but it no longer corresponds to the industrial reality. Though the mercantile society was threatened by the industrial developments of the last war, there was a concerted effort to return to the 19th century system, in which the tendency to centralized political control was counterpoised by economic liberty, expressed in the autonomy of the free market and the gold

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standard. That effort to maintain the checks and balances of a mercantile society, during a period in which the new industrialism of mass-production was feverishly developed, was the main cause of the between-war frustration and catastrophe.

Roughly speaking, the great development of liberty in Britain and America during the 19th century—a development which supplied at once an ideal inspiration and a practical safety-valve to Europe—was due to the separation of political from economic control. All through the between-war period it was the fashion to release frustration by denouncing capitalism root and branch; nevertheless, under capitalism the Anglo-Saxon countries developed a free society. By and large, people were satisfied and fulfilled in it. The ethical purist might say that in both Britain and America the social rewards went to wealth. That is true; but it is equally true that the overwhelming majority of ordinary folk in either country believed that they ought to go to wealth. The capacity to accumulate wealth seemed to them the best practical test of social capacity and effective citizenship. All that was generally asked was that the political government should interfere as little as possible in the field of free economic opportunity. Whereas in the 18th century the possession of landed property was universally approved as conferring a legitimate title to social power, in the 19th the possession of mercantile and industrial wealth was added, with general approval, as a second legitimate title to social power. That sense of legitimacy depended on freedom of economic opportunity. The freedom was not universal; but the field of freedom was large enough to satisfy the ordinary man's expectation of the justice that is possible in an earthly society.

This society has dissolved. It creaked and groaned from 1919 till the slump of 1931; but from that time onward until the outbreak of war, it was more and more evident that the world of international trade, on which economic autonomy and freedom of economic opportunity depended, was shrinking, and that the industrial system could be made to function only by a steady increase of Government expenditure on preparation for war. The slump brought Hitler to power with his deliberate plan of overcoming mass-unemployment by deliberate preparation for war, and that gave us the chance to increase employment by counter-preparation.

Economically, in the last analysis, the position was simple enough. The machinery of the new industrialism produced so much that the products could not be bought, unless there was a vast increase of purchasing power in the community at large. The community at large exists under two aspects as the holder of purchasing power: it is the aggregate of individual consumers, and

it is the State. To give adequate purchasing power direct to the individual consumer was quite incompatible with the wage-system and would certainly have produced chaos by temporarily destroying all economic incentive. Though abstractly possible, it was never a serious political proposal, for the good reason that compulsion to work would have been the necessary corollary. The alternative, therefore, was necessarily chosen. More and more the State became the purchaser of the product of industry; and since the number of things on which the State can spend vast sums of money with general approval is severely limited, and national defence is the only one which commands universal assent, re-armament was the chief means of keeping the wheels of industry moving.

So, it is beginning to penetrate the general mind that peace, if and when it comes, will not bring back the former freedom. At any rate it is now generally understood that for a long "transition-period" much of the war-regimentation will have to be maintained. The continuance of rationing of necessities, is by now perhaps universally accepted: not yet the continuance of the compulsion to work. But that can hardly be avoided.

How, and in what form, in such a society is effective freedom to be restored? The problem is tremendous; and in the main it is ignored by those who are enthusiastic for "planning." Planning, in the minds of most who present it as a panacea, means simply a vast and intolerable extension of central political control over the economic sphere, which is the traditional sphere of British liberty. The one thing that really needs to be planned is the resumption of freedom. But the very phrase is delusive. A great deal of our traditional freedom cannot be resumed. The resumption of all the old liberty in the economic sphere, even at the end of a prolonged "transition-period," is verily impossible. It was doomed even before the war; during the war much of it has become stone-dead.

At this point we may return to Mr. Drucker's formulation of the significance of the war. He says there is "one issue, only one: the social and political order of the entirely new physical reality which Western Man has created as his habitat since James Watt invented the steam-engine." And, if we are honest, we must admit that so far the evidence is that the new industrial reality is not compatible with a society of freedom. Whereas in Germany and Russia a free society has been deliberately abolished—under the inspiration of very different ideals in the two countries—Britain and U.S.A. have entered into a twilight condition which is perhaps the more dangerous because it bears the ethically attractive but rather mystical title of "surrendering freedom in order to defend it." So

long as we understand that the industrial reality, of which this war is the outcome and in a sense the manifestation, will not admit that the freedoms we have surrendered can be taken back in the form in which we surrendered them, there is a real chance that we may be able to achieve new and relevant freedoms as precious in the 20th century as the old ones were in the 19th. But we must recognize that nowhere has this actually been done. There is no pattern existing of the new freedoms in the new society. All that we can see is that the two national societies, which have undergone a social and political revolution in order to adjust their principles, their purposes and their institutions to the new industrial reality, have become dictatorial and totalitarian.

Neither is it sufficient to rely on a kind of blind faith that Britain will remain a democracy, and that democracy is a solid safeguard against totalitarianism. Whether it is, or not, depends entirely upon what is meant by democracy. If democracy means merely majority rule, it affords no safeguard at all against either totalitarianism or dictatorship. Plato maintained that dictatorship was the inevitable outcome of majoritarian democracy; and the example of Germany confirms his belief. Moreover, majoritarian democracy is itself a form of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, in Britain we have the habit of using "democracy" as a generalized description of our own peculiar free society, and imagining that that is what democracy means and is. But for most Europeans the ideology of democracy stems from Rousseau and the French Revolution and has no connection whatever with the conservative constitutionalism of British "democracy," but is much rather radically opposed to it. Hence—to take an example of immediate concern—the political difficulties created by the criticism of the French administration in North Africa for being undemocratic.

One of the chief causes of perplexity, and of the futility of much contemporary political discussion, is that the familiar political concepts, the habitual categories of our political thinking, have little relevance to the problem we are required to solve. Just as democracy is ambiguous, so constitutionalism is misleading. The industrial reality of mechanical mass-production which must be the skeleton of the free society we have to create, is not easily reconcilable with the spirit of true democracy (which is surely based on the Christian principle that every person is worthy of due respect, and is denied by mere majoritarianism); likewise, it is outside the scope of traditional British constitutionalism, which was effective precisely because one of its main purposes was to secure the independence of the economic sphere. By the British constitutional tradition, the independence of the economic sphere is safeguarded

because it is regarded as included within the rightful liberties of the citizen, which themselves are regarded as intimately dependent on the property-right of the individual. The fundamental maxim of the free British society of the past has been that a man may do what he will with his own, subject only to the necessary provision that his use of his own property must not do harm to his neighbour.

But that is no longer a practicable basis for a free society. The reality of property itself has undergone a revolutionary change. The form of property characteristic of modern industrial society carries with it no responsibility: it is a share-holding in some great industrial enterprise, over which the average shareholder not only exercises no control but (as Mr. Drucker rightly insists) positively desires to exercise none. Such social responsibility as attaches to the typical modern form of property is passive; it consists in surrendering much of the wages of property in taxation to the State, which performs the social duties which were once directly attached to the chief form of property: the land. The positive control of a modern industrial enterprise belongs neither to the owners nor the State; it is in the hands of financial and technical experts.

Concomitant with this revolutionary change in the nature of property, there have arisen new and equally revolutionary conceptions of the rights of the citizen. Twenty years ago, the novelty was that the State must help to insure him against unemployment; to-day, the social dangers of mere insurance against unemployment are recognized, and it is becoming gradually accepted that the citizen has a right to actual employment, under social conditions (wages, educational and health facilities), which make the exercise of responsible freedom possible. These are regarded as the elementary rights of the member of our society to-day. Justly enough; but it is necessary to remember that it has involved a revolutionary break with the mercantile conception of society, and that these revolutionary novelties have been accepted, in the main, because the mercantile society was no longer efficient. Obedience to its axioms was demonstrably no longer adequate to enable the new industrial society to function. The ethical, legal and political principles of our tradition no longer corresponded to the economic reality.

The war has incredibly accelerated the process of revolutionary change. By and large it may be truly said that the British citizen to-day controls neither his property, nor his person. Not only this, but he does not really expect to resume the control of either that he had before the war. Naturally, he expects to resume some freedom. The war would be a mere nightmare of insanity if he did not. But much of the old freedom he dreads. The farmer and the

agricultural labourer (who, though no longer typical of British society, are yet a vital element in it) dread the resumption of free competition, and the consequent lowering of agricultural prices to a level at which good farming cannot pay. The enviable freedom of *laissez-faire*—which the nemesis of total war enables us to appreciate better than we did—is gone for good. A controlled economy is inevitable. But who is to control it, and by what principles, and on what plan? On that question depends the nature of the freedoms we may hope to regain or to achieve.

On that question the mind of the nation appears at present to be not so much profoundly divided, as profoundly indeterminate. And there are very good reasons for this attitude of deep indecision. The economic position of Britain after the war is quite uncertain, and the elements in it of which we are fairly certain—the diminution of our export markets, and the disappearance of our foreign investments—are not reassuring. Is any kind of centrally controlled world-economic organization practically conceivable? If not, what are the new economic units to be? In such a perspective the economic position of Britain, compared with that of America, or even of Russia, appears precarious indeed. They can rely on an actual or potential self-sufficiency on a scale large enough to permit the steady increase of their standards of life. We cannot do the same.

In this basic uncertainty, and with the concentration required by the actual war-effort, it is difficult for Britain to put the right questions to herself, much more to find an answer to them. Nevertheless, the right questions must be asked; and they are all variations on the elemental question: What *kind* of society do we desire Britain to be? Probably we should all agree that we wanted it to be a healthy, wealthy, and a free society. The difficulty arises when we try, first, to define what those epithets mean, and second to decide whether they are wholly compatible with one another, and if not, which is to have the priority.

For myself, I have no doubt that the health and freedom of a society take precedence over its wealth. And by the health of a society I mean much more than the physical well-being of its members: to find sustaining interest in one's work apart from its monetary reward, to be free from economic anxiety on the one hand and the necessity of acquisitiveness on the other. It seems to me that only in some such condition are men capable of being free, that is, of exercising responsibly whatever formal freedoms they may have. If the pursuit of national wealth be carried to a point at which it impedes the satisfaction of these prime necessities, the society becomes both unhealthy and unfree. I cannot, for exam-

ple, believe that the recapture of our export trade is so much a matter of life and death to the nation that it should take precedence over the moral necessity of maintaining the land and the agriculturists of Britain in good heart and modest prosperity. If indeed it is reckoned by the nation as a whole to be right and natural that agriculture should be sacrificed and the land neglected in order that the purely material standard of life of the urban population should increase by 5 per cent., then I should conclude that the moral sense of the nation is vitiated, and that it cannot escape the doom pronounced by Goldsmith:

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey
Where wealth accumulates and men decay.

It is value-judgments of this simple and fundamental kind that we are required to make when we put to ourselves the question: What kind of society do we desire?

In trying to answer it we must realize the kind of society we are in danger of getting if we do nothing about it. We are in danger of getting a society in which the failure of the once beneficent separation of political Government from the economic sphere will be simply and drastically remedied by bringing the industrial sphere under the political government. This is what is generally meant by Socialism; it leads inevitably to totalitarianism. Indeed, it is totalitarianism. It is a matter of indifference whether the expropriators are expropriated, as in Russia, or formal ownership remains with individuals as in Germany. It is the control that matters; and if the detailed control of the nation's economy passes into the hands of the political government you have totalitarianism. It may desire to be beneficent; but in a very short time it is bound to become malignant. "Power always corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely." An omnipotent bureaucracy will quickly destroy the remnants of responsible freedom. And majoritarian democracy will do nothing to prevent it.

On the other hand, it is futile to dream of going back to the autonomy of the economic sphere. That was justified by the fact that it was based on the rights of individual property. Industrial autonomy to-day means control not by individual and responsible property-owners, but by great corporations, with colossal power but no social sanction for their power. It is this huge apparatus of industry that has to be made responsible to society at large. And society at large, the community as a whole, is not identical with the political State. That identification is the heresy of totalitarianism.

Equally, there is no going back to pre-industrialism. The most romantic advocate of an agricultural economy and the revival of

handicrafts, if he puts his romanticism to the test of practice, will discover that he cannot dispense with the machine except at the cost of an insufferable degradation of living. He takes advantage of the machine wherever he can. He cannot subsist at a human level otherwise. The difference between him and the blind devotee of the machine is that he is continually conscious of the necessity of finding a *via media*, and of refusing to allow the machine to destroy the instinctive bases of human life. Mass-production and individual fulfilment have to be reconciled. But mass-production has come to stay.

The kind of society we desire is therefore one in which the new industrialism is brought under real social control, by groups of men exercising responsible freedom, not under the specious social control of the centralized political state. Is anarchism then the answer? Surely not, unless in a world of angels. Central control there must be. The main lines of the national policy as a whole must be centrally decided: the question, for example, whether the well-being of the nation is to be subordinated to the drive for export trade has in itself an absolute good. A positive and concrete conception of the good life, or the best life possible, for the members of the nation, in the existing circumstances of reality, is absolutely necessary. At present we are a society living without any positive ethical concept. The supremacy of the economic ideal—wealth-accumulation by maximum production through individual and responsible enterprise at one's own risk—once universally accepted as a right and proper social dynamic, has been overthrown: it has lapsed simply because it no longer works. For the moment national defence, sacrifice for victory, has come to fill the vacuum. But defence against the external enemy is, by its very nature, only a temporary dynamic: a violent drug which may well leave lethargy behind.

What is to be the motive for the individual in the new society, now that the economic motive is gone? War, and the dignity of soldier-service, says Hitler; and that is why we are fighting him. If defence against war becomes our motive, we shall have merely "become what we beheld." Peace and the dignity of citizen-service should be our positive reply. But in those terms it is formal and equivocal. What do we mean by the dignity of citizen-service? Assuredly not the regimented service of a totalitarian state, even though it professes peace. We must mean the loyal and loving service of a society whose conscious purpose it is to develop, by the creation of opportunity for the exercise of responsible freedom, persons capable of exercising that freedom, for a valid individual and social end: the end being the creation and maintenance of a

society in which the individual is vitally concerned, because it is vitally concerned for the individual, as a full man.

The economic motive has served its turn. It has brought into being an apparatus capable of maintaining all men at a level of subsistence at which full manhood is possible for the many without heroic sacrifice. Now we have to avoid becoming slaves to the industrial mechanism we have constructed and to the State which will administer it "on our behalf," unless we create institutions which will give us responsible control of it. Decentralization, local and responsible autonomy within broad limits assigned by the political government, the increasing assumption of direct and real responsibility instead of the fictitious responsibility exercised through State-officials—these are the guiding lines of our development, if we wish to achieve a society which will give status and dignity to the ordinary man.

It is the main theme of Mr. Drucker's remarkable book that social status for the average man is the one thing needful: it is not given by the assurance of economic security. Economic security will be established, if necessary, simply to prevent the immediate disintegration of post-war society. But economic security alone will merely create the slave-state. Economic security plus employment: still only the slave-state. Work that has inherent dignity because it calls for the exercise of responsible freedom—that is the essential. Can you have responsible freedom at the conveyor belt? That is the crux. Some deny it altogether. Some maintain that though it must be in abeyance there, it can be developed elsewhere if workers are no longer exhausted by their work. Mr. Drucker gives us only hints; but from those hints I deduce that he believes it is possible, by the decentralization and autonomy of the industrial plant—that is to say, by the formation of veritable communities in all branches of industry—to combine the necessities of mass-production with the even greater necessities of individual responsibility and social consciousness. I agree.

THE VATICAN AND THE WORLD TO-DAY

BY MICHAEL DE LA BEDOYERE

THE Holy See is to-day recognized as a great and highly important moral Power in a sceptical and faithless world of States. To understand why one must briefly recall that the twenty-year armistice was a period of struggle between a number of ideas or ideologies competing for the mastery, each making its own claim to be able to produce a more perfect world. Liberalism (the nineteenth-century ideology which had apparently defeated the Church's pretensions to any authority except over the private consciences of individuals) was fighting a losing battle against Communism, Socialism and Fascism. And these rising creeds were contending with one another. The word 'creed' is justified, for ever since the rejection of orthodox Christianity as providing a standard of personal and social conduct and an order of values for man and society, the Western world has sought for a substitute.

Each of the contending political religions curiously reflected one aspect of Christian philosophy. The idea of personal freedom and restriction of the power of the State in Liberalism was derived from the Christian teaching about the value of the human soul. The importance in Fascism of social discipline and order, together with the need to suppress what is immoral or dangerous, responded to the Christian teaching about God's authority and the fall of man with a consequent blurring of his reason. And lastly the claim of Socialism to produce a society of brothers helping one another in frugal comfort with none too rich and none too poor most obviously responded in many ways to the teaching of Christ and corresponded with Christianity's increased sensitiveness to the importance of the social question in an industrial world.

Thus the way was prepared for side-glances towards Christianity, if not direct appeals, on the part of the new political religions in their struggle for mastery, even though each of them was a rival of Christianity and each thought itself to have finally overcome that particular source of opposition.

It would be too much to claim that there was any conscious realization of the fact that the substitutes for Christianity, in rejecting it, also set it on a new pedestal above them, but this certainly was implied in the position, and the result was that men, movements and States were all the time disposed to look towards the Holy See both for help in supporting their own views and for aid in hav-

moral authority. This state of mind (universal outside the frontiers where Bolshevism held sway, for Bolshevism involved so open and avowed an opposition to religion that there could be no question of deceiving itself with this particular pretence) naturally created an international atmosphere that tended very greatly to strengthen the moral status of the Vatican. The fact was that the contending political faiths, however much they might denounce the claims of the Church, actually derived their strongest spiritual element from the inheritance which the Church still guarded.

Mussolini's Fascism for accidental reasons made the most open use of the help of the Holy See, and in order to do this it played its part in restoring the full status of the Papacy by enabling the Pope to recover complete sovereign independence—and yet to do so with a minimum of political commitments.

From the time of the Lateran Treaty the Holy See, strengthened by reforms within the Church and by a world environment which, while still deeply sceptical of Christian claims, was disposed to see in it an increasingly valuable moral authority amid the ideological strife and confusion of beliefs, entered upon a new phase in the long story of the relations between God and Cæsar. But it could not be an easy phase—and for the very same reasons as nevertheless made it, from the Church's point of view, a hopeful phase. It still remained a fact that the world was very sceptical of Christian dogma and moral authority and hence extremely liable to misunderstand the motives and actions of the Holy See, while the very fact that the different ideologies looked to the Holy See for moral support involved their embitterment against it in so far as their pretensions were denied.

Such difficulties were not successfully overcome in the case of the Spanish Civil War which itself was generally felt to be an incident in the struggle for power as between Fascism and anti-Fascism. Anti-Fascism, largely misunderstanding the motives of the Holy See, felt that the cause of freedom and justice had been betrayed by the Church, which consequently suffered considerably in prestige in the democracies. All the old accusations of reactionary political Catholicism were revived, though it was noticeable that many people tried to distinguish between the true spirit of Catholicism and the 'Fascists' in and around the Vatican—another testimony to the new status of the Church. On the other hand the increasingly vigorous condemnation of Nazism by Pius XI in the light of the betrayal of the original Concordat between Nazi Germany and the Holy See made Fascism equally suspicious of the Papacy. Despite these difficulties, however, the death of Pius XI and the accession of the diplomat-Pope, Pius XII, in the glare of the modern publicity afforded by cinema and wireless, seemed to mark a new high point in Papal pre-eminence. There seemed to be a general feeling that a new, younger and widely-experienced Pope would at last play a resounding part in the increasingly embittered struggle between Fascism and anti-Fascism. And each camp naturally expected that the resounding part would

No doubt by this date the Nazis, like the Bolsheviks, had drifted too far away from anything approaching Christianity to bother greatly about Papal favour but there was a widely-shared hope that the Holy See might strengthen the moral position of the moderate authoritarians in Italy, Spain, Portugal and South America, and thus provide something of a middle Christian bloc that would receive support in France and other democracies, alienate the German Catholics from their Führer, and perhaps save Europe from the war that was only too clearly impending. Such a policy might have been feasible a few years earlier, but Pius XII came to the Papal throne too late to enable him to do anything of a constructive political nature to prevent the war which in fact broke out six months after his accession.

The outbreak of war would, one might think, have converted the Holy See from being an international Power of strong, though vague, moral authority that might prove useful to one or other of contending parties, to being the one Power that could without difficulty mediate between the belligerents and bring the war to an end. Modern ideological wars, however, are not easily brought to an end by negotiation, and up to date the Pope has played a less important part in seeking by positive means to end the war than did Benedict XV in the last war. The Allies, who have had much the worst of the war so far, have no intention of making any moves towards a peace that under the circumstances could not but be unfavourable to them. Hence they have never sought to avail themselves of the services of the Holy See. War, moreover, in putting everything to the test of the sword, naturally diminished the force of an authority dedicated to moral persuasion. It is probable, however, that Germany has made a number of unofficial attempts to enlist the aid of the Vatican in support of peace terms that would leave her in possession of her conquests and virtual suzerain of Europe under a 'new order.' Despite the Holy Father's intense and often-reiterated desire that the war should end, there can be no doubt that he would refuse his support for a method of ending it that would in fact be tantamount to confirming Germany's victory. One reason for this is that it would seem an unneutral act, the only peace that the Pope would sponsor being a peace that substantially maintained the pre-war status with such improvements as might be reasonably said to do away with the grosser injustices and obvious sources of friction according to the various points which he has given to the world in his speeches. A further reason is that the Holy See is by no means unaware of the dangers to civilization and to the Church that must arise in the event of victory by an anti-Christian régime which has not scrupled to carve its way towards victory by blatantly aggressive and immoral means.

It does not however follow from this that the Holy See accepts the Allied thesis in regard to the war. Indeed the endeavour of the United Nations, and more especially the United States whose President undoubtedly holds the present Supreme Pontiff in very high regard, has been throughout to persuade the Pope that the interests of the world are bound up with an Allied victory

and therefore to obtain the Pope's openly-expressed moral approbation of the Allied cause—or at least the Pope's open condemnation of the Axis cause. It also appears to have sought the Pope's concrete help in furthering an Allied victory by, for example, paving the way towards detaching Catholic Italy from Germany. These efforts have failed, and there are many in Britain and America who feel keenly that the Holy See is failing in its religious and moral duty by maintaining neutrality between what is good and right on the one side and evil and wrong on the other.

It is of the utmost importance, in view of the power for international good that resides in the supra-national Papacy to which more and more people are looking in a time of grave moral anxiety and the ruin of so many moral hopes, that the Holy See's attitude to the war should be better understood. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that when peace does at length come, through the utter defeat of Hitler, the chances of rapidly re-establishing order and liberty in Europe will depend upon whether the United Nations will be prepared to allow the Holy See to exercise a full influence on the peoples of Germany, Italy, France, Poland, and the Danubian countries in all of which taken together the number of Catholics cannot fall far short of the number of non-Catholics, and where, moreover, Christianity has come to symbolize opposition both to extreme forms of totalitarianism and to the kind of anti-clerical and masonic—in the continental anti-religious sense of masonry—liberalism that has surely failed these countries in the past and is more likely than ever to fail them in the rough times ahead. But the Vatican will not be allowed to exercise its peace-making influence if the leading United Nations are unable to appreciate the point of view which the Holy See is now taking.

Let it, first, be clearly understood that the Pope does not think that both sides are at an equal moral (or immoral) level. The Pope and the spokesmen of the Vatican Radio have constantly denied that the Vatican is morally neutral. And its moral views have been made clear, for example, in a long series of carefully-written articles in the *Osservatore Romano* expounding what is implied in the Papal peace points. These articles defend a kind of international order that is totally incompatible with Nazism in theory and in practice, but they are compatible with the principles of the Atlantic Charter which itself—save in the last point—is not very different from the Papal peace points. But to be substantially in the right morally is not necessarily—strange as it may seem—a passport to full favour from the point of view of the Holy See. The Papacy is the oldest surviving institution in the West, and it inherits a very long experience of the motives of men and nations. That experience has made it somewhat cynical of moral claims. The human being, with the help of God's Grace, can rise to levels of conduct that touch the Divine, and the human being, tempted by the world, the flesh and the devil, can sink lower than the beasts. The Church seeks to encourage the first, and is never surprised at the second. Its expectation, however, is that

human beings generally, and still more nations, professedly concerned with utilitarian ends, are much of a muchness, rarely rising very much above the mean. The Papacy therefore, while it acknowledges and praises the moral rectitude of a nation and sympathizes with its professed intentions of creating a better and happier order of things, concentrates rather more sharply on all the factors which are likely to determine the future, and seeks within that complex sequence of rigid cause and effect to carve out as wide a space as possible for the liberties upon which it sets the greatest store, namely the liberty to serve God and obey God's law as it applies to personal and social life.

And when it views the present situation from that angle, it sees many things that are hidden from the average Englishman or American who concentrates on the destruction of the evil of Hitlerism in the faith that order, justice, freedom and wealth will emerge with a little good-will and a little common-sense. The Holy See, for example, would note that in the plan to re-order Europe under the leadership of Britain, the United States and Russia, there is a good chance of the United States cutting itself off from European political troubles and of Britain proving unwilling or unable to do very much else than talk. What is left? Soviet Russia. And the Holy See may be pardoned for feeling that from its point of view there is not very much to choose between Russia and Germany, except that Germany is part of Western Europe and does maintain in however distorted and distressing a fashion some continuity with the European tradition. Or again, the Holy See with its intimate experience of the real forces at work in Latin countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and even France may think that abstract principles of justice and model liberal or liberal-socialist régimes imposed largely from without are not likely to bring peace and contentment in an atmosphere of which we may a little appreciate the nature in the present divisions between Frenchmen. Or, looking at France itself, the Holy See may feel that the true interests of a country whose strength and morale were dissipated in an era of religious decay are not necessarily to be found in the restoration of the old order even after the conquest of the old enemy, but rather in the slow and patient building-up from within and upon a new moral basis which may be said to have been the aim of a leader like Pétain.

These are only examples of the realistic issues that may strike the Holy See as important in a situation like the present one. They do not involve any denial of the justice and aims of the United Nations; they only suggest that the story did not begin and will not end with that justice and with those aims. And it is the end, envisaged in the light of the real beginning, with which the Holy See is chiefly concerned. And that precisely is the subject with which the Pope's Encyclical in 1939 and his subsequent speeches, not least his latest, are chiefly concerned. If you are going to judge rigorously, and that means in terms of falling away from God's teaching in order to set up earthly idols, then you have to go much further back than either belligerent is willing to go. Under such a judgment little will be left justified in the

actions of nations during the last hundred years. But in fact the world must go on, rather better or worse than in the past, and in order that the best of an inevitably bad business may be made, shrewd and realistic judgments, based on human nature as it is and on practical conditions as we shall find them, are preferable to dogmatic moral judgments and idealistic political schemes, that, in any case, fall very short of the way in which God sees things.

When then the Holy See considers the moral clash between the Allies and the Nazis, it readily accepts the moral gap that divides blatant totalitarianism from the Christian-based liberalism of Britain and the United States. It surely condemns the Nazi aggression, persecution and brutality, and approves the legitimate self-defence of the democracies and the Soviet together with the democratic hopes that more liberal times may follow (hopes, it may be said, that might have been realized at less cost to the world had the economic problems, say, of Italy and Japan been more sympathetically considered); but its more immediate concern in a sense is, first, to put an end to the miseries of the war, if possible, and, second, to help towards creating conditions that give hope of the rapid realization of order and individual welfare when the war does end. But if the Holy See has its doubts about the ability of the leading United Nations, each of them dependent upon a public opinion that it may consider ignorant and superficial, to restore order and human welfare on the Continent, it must follow that the Holy See, instead of accepting the clear-cut moral dichotomy between the United Nations and the Axis will look rather for some mediating force that can help to ease the situation in the case of the complete triumph of either side. And just as to the Germans any such mediating force will appear like an offshoot of pluto-democracy, so to us it would appear as another school of Fascism. And so when the Holy See fails to condemn the Axis roundly, but gives the impression rather of offering sympathy to elements at least in Fascist Italy, to pro-German Spain, to defeatist Vichy, we in this country are apt to be scandalized. The truth, however is that the Papacy is solely concerned with a preservation of the good in countries which may prove to have an important influence in saving Europe from anarchy later on. And just as the creation of a moderately authoritarian bloc in good time *might* have prevented the war from breaking out, so the nursing, so to say, of the same elements at the present time may help to stabilize a very dangerous and difficult situation after the war.

Much the same considerations have prompted the Pope to lay great emphasis during the war on the breakdown of personal and family morality, leading to a loss of a sense of personal responsibility; on the increasing assumption of moral authority over the individual by political power whose ends are purely utilitarian—an assumption that in Germany has reached the stage of the open denial of any rule of law above the will of the dictator—; and on the great importance of assuring to every person that degree of economic liberty and security as is necessary for the exercise of responsibility and free-choice. Much of the Pope's speech last Christmas was devoted to

this latter question, and it is in the possession by all of a sufficiency of private property that he sees the best guarantee of such economic conditions of human freedom. It will be readily seen that in emphasizing these points the Holy See is once again seeking to safeguard and develop the kind of moral stability that will be needed as a cushion to offset the sharp and dangerous pressures that are likely to make themselves felt in a war-torn and uncertain Europe that will be emancipated in the name of conflicting political gospels of various shades of what on the Continent is deemed the "Left." The justice of the Allied cause in the war cannot be taken as a guarantee against disastrous mistakes after victory, and it is only natural that the Papacy should be more concerned than we belligerents are with this aspect of the whole problem.

Let it not, however, be thought that what is here described in the language of politics is thought out as a conscious policy by the Holy See. The mission of the Vatican is spiritual, and it is in part because the spiritual has been emphasized during the last hundred years by the Popes that the prestige of the Papacy has been restored. No doubt conscious politics plays its part—and, in the best sense, it must even play its part in the judgment of the Pope—who, however spiritual his aim, cannot but think also in temporal categories. But the prime motive is always the same, namely to seek to preserve what is good and to eliminate what is bad, considered from the point of view of the individual soul. But if one tries to do that, one does in fact reach the kind of policy outlined above. Even in Germany there is good and evil. Certainly there is much good in Italy, Spain, Vichy France and elsewhere. And there is some evil in Britain and the United States. In such a situation and from such a point of view, clear-cut moral judgments about nations and about political régimes are impossible. However much one may condemn the evil, the tendency will always be to seek to re-unite good with good in the hope that the evil will be gradually weakened in its force. Such an outlook may be incompatible with the waging of war, but this is emphatically not the business of the Holy See. It is certainly not incompatible with realizing a peace worth the name—"the tranquility of order," as Aquinas calls it—and this emphatically is the business of a great supra-national moral and spiritual Power which, whatever men may think of its full claims, at least will be recognized as having the duty of working for that charity and love between man and man who are brothers in Christ and sons of God. In fully recognizing the moral authority and unique experience of a spiritual Power whose political importance has been steadily growing, and in seeking to understand its point of view, the United Nations will greatly help themselves and help the world in the universal quest for fuller and deeper human happiness.

(Mr. de la Bedoyere is the Editor of the Catholic Herald.)

FRENCH DEMOCRACY—PAST AND PRESENT

By LOUIS LÉVY

FROM the way many of my Anglo-Saxon friends speak, I have often gained the impression that they do not realize the true intensity of the democratic spirit in France. Quite a number of them fail to understand how deeply the idea of democracy has penetrated French consciousness. Above all, they lose sight of one essential fact: the French Revolution has taken root in the soil of France. The peasant owes everything to it. No doubt the *bourgeoisie*, as the ruling class, has become more and more conservative during the nineteenth century and tends to move away from its original conception. But the overwhelming majority of the French people remains passionately devoted to the ideas of 1789-93 and wish to see them carried to their logical fulfilment. Now and again the peasants and the *petits bourgeois* may have allowed themselves to be scared by the socialist bogey. Sometimes the workers may have tolerated the sight of a strutting dictator with some satisfaction. But these delusions never last long. The flood-tide of democracy soon rises again, for the republican spirit is deep-rooted.

I have not the space here to trace the history of the French people throughout the nineteenth century. I will confine myself to a few remarks about the main points. The French, bled white by Napoleon, looked on in silence at the downfall of the Empire. But the excesses of the Restoration immediately turned the people against the Bourbons. When Napoleon returned from Elba, he was acclaimed with enthusiasm, for he was careful to play the Jacobin game and adopt the old revolutionary jargon of his youth. The prefects, in their official reports, spoke of the revolutionary spirit raging with "frenzy." Then came the second Restoration. This was marked by the bitter struggle of the liberal elements, supported by an ardent public opinion. Parliamentary life began to come into being. At the same time, risings and conspiracies took place throughout the country . . . 1830 was the year of the three days of July, the "*Trois Glorieuses*." Charles X, having violated the liberties of the Charter, was deposed. The people of Paris rose in rebellion. They demanded the proclamation of the Republic. But the upper *bourgeoisie*, fearing that a Republic would only open the way to "disorder," set up the *bourgeois* monarchy of the Orléans. Louis-Philippe, however, was never popular with the people, who could never forget that they had been duped. The reign of the *bourgeois* monarchy was marked by bloody riots.

After attempts at personal autocracy, which ended by alarming the upper *bourgeoisie* itself, the people revolted in 1848, and this time the proclamation of the Republic could no longer be resisted. We know how the provisional government of 1848 fell, and how, in the *Journées de Juin*, repression by General Cavaignac turned the working classes away from the Republic and precipitated the Cæsarean reaction. What is not so well known is that Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte's *coup d'état* of December 2 found its chief opponents in the rural districts. The peasants rose. There were insurrections in all parts, in Var, the Basses-Alpes, Nièvre, Hérault. They were punished by banishment, and even executions. Thus the French peasant demonstrated the fervour of his republican sentiments.

After that came the Second Empire, during which the alliance between the *bourgeoisie*, the peasants, the intellectuals, and the workers for the overthrow of the dictatorship was formed in every part of the country. And indeed, following the defeat of Sedan on September 4, 1870, the imperial régime fell like rotten fruit. We know how the Commune of 1871 came into existence. We know that it was largely a patriotic insurrection against capitulation; but it was also a republican revolt of the workers and the lower middle classes of Paris who were justly suspicious of the monarchist sentiments of Versailles and wanted the Republic. I will not dwell on the atrocious repression of Thiers. What I wish to emphasize is that the upper *bourgeoisie* used the Commune to terrify the small peasants and the lower middle classes and keep them within the ranks of the existing social order. Their success was short-lived. In July, 1871, elections took place in 46 departments. And in 39 of them there was a Republican majority.

Since then Republican sentiment has continued to expand and grow ever stronger. The evolution of democracy proceeded steadily for the next seventy years, interrupted by only four crises. The first of these took place on May 16, 1877. Marshal MacMahon—a forerunner of Pétain—attempted to introduce a personal dictatorship. It was destroyed by universal suffrage. Ten years later came Boulangism, a curious movement not unlike Fascism. Boulanger, like all fascist leaders, made use of conflicting formulas. He complained of the insufficiently democratic character of the constitution and at the same time of the weakness of parliamentary government. What he demanded was "the Republic consolidated, authority restored, liberty guaranteed." Boulanger—again like all fascist leaders—succeeded in winning to his side the most diverse elements: royalists, Bonapartists, even radicals and socialists. One section of the Parisian working class allowed itself to be taken in. However, democratic common sense from the country districts finally succeeded in winning it over. And the election of 1889 brought about the crushing defeat of Boulangism. There followed the Dreyfus affair, the Nationalist crisis. Here again, the alliance of the working class with the peasants and the lower middle class got the better of Cæsarean intrigues. The Republic was never in danger again till 1934. The war of 1914 strengthened it. Joffre, in his

order of the day at the Marne, declared that the Republic might well be proud of the army which it had given to France.

It was not till the coming of international fascism that democracy once again found itself in peril. On February 6, 1934, the *Action Française*, the *Solidarité Française*, the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, and the *Croix de Feu* of Colonel de la Rocque and M. Charles Vallin attempted to seize power by force. The reaction of the people was immediate and spontaneous, and resulted in the Popular Front elections. It was thus impossible to introduce fascism except as the result of defeat and capitulation. And it was precisely in order to overthrow the Republic that certain Vichy leaders helped to bring about defeat and worked painstakingly for capitulation.

This is but a brief historical survey, but I think it provides conclusive evidence. If we examined the question from the geographical point of view, the results would be no less conclusive. I could take each of the French Departments in turn and show that Republican blocs have existed for over a hundred years in cantons of widely differing types. Even in Departments usually reckoned as reactionary or conservative one comes across every now and again veritable strongholds of democracy. I need not mention that the Departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais have had socialist majorities over a long period; that the suburbs of Paris are either socialist or communist; that the South-East has seen bitter struggles between the "whites" and the "reds," resulting in a victory for the latter; that the entire valley of the Garonne is Republican; that Touraine and Central France have strong democratic traditions. But if space permitted I could show how even in certain reputedly conservative districts there is deep-seated republican feeling. I might mention, for example, that in Alsace, where the whole problem has been side-tracked since 1918 by the clerical movement for autonomy, there is a robust republican tradition dating from the French Revolution, and that Alsatian patriotism makes no distinction between France and democracy. I could prove equally well that Lorraine and the Vosges only yielded to the conservatives through fear of their German neighbours and because one man like Poincaré, of extremely touchy patriotism but a republican and democrat, reflected their state of mind to perfection. I might point out that the West, the most conservative part of France, is slowly but surely veering towards democracy, that even in the Vendée, the country of the Chouans, there are still to be found old republican centres. Above all, I could show that Brittany, contrary to certain beliefs, is in no sense reactionary, that by an amusing paradox the most democratic region of all—nay, the most revolutionary—is Lower Brittany, the extreme west of the peninsula, the land of costumes and legends.

It must always be remembered that France is a country of small holdings, that 40 per cent. of the population is rural, and that out of a total of 8 million peasants only about 2 million are wage-earners as against 6 million small property-owners. The French peasant, I repeat, is attached to the Revolution

as to his own soil. To-day, moreover, he no longer fears a socialism which has given him the "*Office du blé*" (Wheat Marketing Board) and he has grown used to certain collective systems such as agricultural associations and co-operative societies. As for the lower middle classes, the small shop-keeper, the clerk, the minor civil servant, these make common cause, in an emergency, with the workers, as do large numbers of the intellectuals, especially those of the University. So the alliance of the Popular Front was by no means an artificial one. This coalition of the ordinary people is representative of the real France. At the elections of May, 1936, it carried two-thirds of the votes (in round figures 400 Deputies of the Left against 200 of the Right). This was no accident. It may truly be said that when the moment of choice came two-thirds of the French people declared themselves in favour of democracy being carried to its logical conclusion. This fact cannot be too strongly emphasized.

I know many foreigners who have a sincere affection for France, who speak with emotion of Paris, the Carrousel, the Champs-Élysées, Montparnasse and Montmartre, who wax lyrical over Barbizon, the Ile-de-France, Touraine and the Côte d'Azur, who enjoy Beaujolais and Camembert cheese, who praise the intelligence of our poodles and the sheepdogs of Brie and Beauce, who go into raptures over the "chic" of Parisian women, who quote Anatole France and Marcel Proust and worship Claude Debussy. I am most grateful to them for showing such understanding. But I do wish they would turn their thoughts a little to the glaring political realities that I try to set before them.

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After the foregoing remarks, it is not surprising if French resistance to-day is intensely republican. In the first place, it comes from the people. The workers in the occupied zone have been resisting since September, 1940. In the unoccupied zone one of the first big demonstrations of resistance was that of the syndicalists in May, 1941. The existence of a few traitors must not be allowed to deceive us. The local directors of the C.G.T. have remained, with a few exceptions, loyal to their traditions. Their leader, Léon Jouhaux, has been imprisoned. And the catholic syndicalists are no less resolute than their comrades of the C.G.T. with whom they march side by side.

The vast majority of the French workers are resisting. Thanks to them the Labour Charter is a complete failure. All the English newspapers have reported the wonderful resistance of the miners of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and of those of Saint-Etienne and Central France. There is no need to recall the attitude of the metal-workers in their fight against deportation to Germany. Their determination compelled Laval to give way. And the workers' strike in the Lyons district round about October 16 is still fresh in the memory.

The resistance of the postal workers and the railwaymen must also be mentioned. It should be particularly noted that the lower middle classes, who were the workers' allies in past struggles, are still their allies in the

present resistance. The countryman helps the townsman by resisting Nazi demands. The intellectuals, particularly those of the University, are putting up a great fight. And the elementary school teachers, roused from their bleating pacifism, are at the head of the movement. In short, the collaboration party is recruited chiefly from the upper *bourgeoisie*. It is among the big business men that Hitler finds his best accomplices.

A brief glance at the clandestine papers is enough to reveal the strongly republican nature of this popular resistance. Expressions used at the time of the Revolution spring naturally to the French mind. One secret paper is called *Quatre-vingt-treize*, another *Père Duchesne*. These act as constant reminders of the democratic tradition and the appeals of the Jacobins. In June, 1942, *Quatre-vingt-treize* published a manifesto entitled "Heads up, Republicans!" in which it was stated quite frankly that "France is a Republic or nothing."

And here is a piece of impartial testimony to the republican and democratic character of French resistance. In the autumn of 1942 the newspaper *France*, published in London, reproduced an article from a Swiss paper in Freiburg, of Catholic and conservative sympathies, called *La Liberté*. In it appeared the following lines: "The growing demands of the occupation authorities have brought them into disrepute with the Vichy government and with Marshal Pétain. If an election were held in France to-day it would result in a victory for the Left. In many districts this would mean the triumph of people like Blum and Herriot."

The French, of course, as old Republicans, know that democracy means organized parties. The organizations of resistance to-day occupy the front of the stage. But the great majority of their members know that they must disappear when the Nazis are gone. All the evidence coming out of France is agreed on one point: in the villages the radicals remain radicals, the socialists socialists, and the communists communists. As a whole the French people think only of the return of free institutions. They are longing for the chance to vote. The incoherence and chaos of Vichy make them regret the past in spite of its imperfections.

The socialist party was reconstituted in 1941. To-day it is in full function. It has taken the title of *Comité d'Action Socialiste*. Its London representative is M. Felix Guin, deputy for Bouches-du-Rhône, a former president of the *Groupe Parlementaire* and defender of M. Léon Blum at the Riom trial. Without giving details of the secret organization of the Socialist Party, it is possible to state that it is completely purged of traitors and semi-traitors and that during the resistance it has become imbued with a new spirit. It has its martyrs, chief among whom must be mentioned Marx Dormoy, former Minister of the Interior, murdered by the Cagoule. It may be added that the veritable indictment pronounced at Riom by its chief, M. Léon Blum, served only to enhance its reputation. According to the latest reports, the

party appears to be the strongest organized party in the Nord, the Pas-de-Calais, and a large part of the former unoccupied territory.

The communist party is also carrying on the battle of resistance, and in a particularly dangerous fashion. Its particular type of organization lends itself very well to underground warfare. The Nazis hunt its members down pitilessly and shoot them. Vichy guillotines them. Their courage is the admiration of all. They have an incontestable majority among the workers in the Paris district.

The proletarian parties, however, are not the only ones to be organized. It has now been learned that the radical party has also been reconstituted. In spite of its mistakes, it is certain that the defence of M. Daladier at Riom restored its prestige. But it is chiefly owing to the splendid stand of its leader, Edouard Herriot, that it has gained sympathy on all sides. To-day it may well be said that by his noble defiance of Pétain, followed by his imprisonment, the President of the Chamber has become one of the symbols of resistance.

Other parties are in course of reconstruction, notably the Catholic party known as the "*democrate populaire*," whose leader, M. Champetier de Ribes, has been imprisoned by Vichy. All this may surprise some people, but only those who do not know Vichy. People who talk about suppressing all parties or creating a single party are preaching Fascism without realizing it, just as one breathes oxygen without being aware of it.

Naturally these resisting Republicans are concerned with the government of to-morrow. They are "gaullistes," that is to say they look upon General de Gaulle as the symbol of resistance to the enemy. An article in the *Coq Enchaîné*, an organ of resistance, dated April 22, 1942, probably indicates the position of the majority of the resisters at that time:

France then must have a government . . . other than that of Laval. De Gaulle, you say at once. Of course. But de Gaulle and who? The General, who has saved the honour of the French army, will march at our head beneath the Arc de Triomphe on the day of victory. That is simple justice. But in 1918, when Foch, Joffre, and—unfortunately for us—Pétain marched past, Clemenceau was at the helm and Poincaré was constitutional president of the Republic.

Who will be our Clemenceau? Who will be the Poincaré of 1942? We do not know, but from now onwards the people of France must see to it that they are truly men of the people. Trustworthy and strong. And from what we know of the military men this cannot be said of a single one of them. We ask you to think about this matter. For on it hangs your fate for many years to come.

The situation has changed since then. In the spring of 1942, the resistance-groups, *Libération*, *Combat*, *Franc-Tireur*, as well as the *Comité d'Action Socialiste*, which plays a leading part in the resistance movement, agreed to the idea of a provisional government by General de Gaulle from the time of the landing and up to the convocation of the National Assembly. I may add that the lamentable policy pursued in North Africa during the last few months has done no more than strengthen political "gaullism." Even those

Frenchmen who were suspicious of the secret intentions of the General and of certain of his collaborators prefer the man of June 20, 1940, to M. Peyrouton!

One thing is certain, and that is that the resisting French who accept a de Gaulle government do so only because they have been told that the General is a staunch democrat. All the same, one feels that they are wary and taking all precautions. One may quote the March, 1942, issue of *Franc-Tireur*, in which, after extolling the patriotism of General de Gaulle, the writer adds that they have no intention of "exchanging the dictatorship of defeat for the dictatorship of victory, or the worship of one man for the worship of another." And in another number of the same paper, that of June, 1942, appears the following: ". . . Once we have obtained our liberty, we shall oppose him if, contrary to what he has always affirmed, he contemplates a dictatorship, for we shall no more tolerate one from a general than we endured one from a marshal."

I could continue in this vein indefinitely. All I have set out to show is that the French people remain the same, that they are Republicans and democrats. Some of my British and American friends have sometimes expressed their misgivings to me. "After the liberation," they say, "surely there will be many acts of violence, even civil war?" My reply is always a very simple one. There are bound to be acts of violence. The traitors and their accomplices will be punished; that much is necessary. As for civil war, it is very difficult to foresee the outcome of this matter. But one thing may be said with certainty: if anyone attempts to impose upon the French democracy a government contrary to its wishes, then he risks letting loose the most frightful civil war imaginable.

DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM AND EDUCATION

BY SIR CYRIL NORWOOD

IF we were asked for what purpose we are waging war, our reply would be that it is for the preservation of democracy and freedom, and most of us would mean what we said. But it begins to seem to be possible that we may win the war, and find that we have lost, or are in the way of losing, the very objects for which we fought. Democracy means or has hitherto meant, the rule of the majority, combined with respect for minorities, in the sense that consciences shall not be forced, and that minorities may exercise full rights of persuasion within the body politic. Freedom has meant freedom of thought, belief, and creed, and freedom of speech: to these we have recently added freedom from want, and freedom from fear, which are different sorts of freedom, though admirable in themselves, if only they can be achieved. There are ominous signs that the old freedoms are to be sacrificed to the new, and that, if some have their way, minorities are to be strictly controlled: to borrow Rousseau's words, they are to be 'forced to be free' in the right way, the majority's way. There are indications that the youth of to-day, which has never known any restriction on thought or speech, thinks lightly of this hard-won gain of the past. When Dr. Gilbert Murray addressed six hundred boys and girls from public and secondary schools who were assembled in what was called a Parliament of Youth, it is reported that there was an undercurrent of disagreement when he appeared to condemn Communism with Fascism as equally undesirable "isms." The reason was that their minds were fixed on want and fear and not in the least on freedom of thought and of speech. There has been formed a "Council of Clergy and Ministers for Common Ownership," of which the Bishop of Bradford is President, and the members presumably young. In their first pamphlet they say: "Is it not obvious that if we are to have socialism—real and permanent socialism—all the fundamental opposition must be 'liquidated' (that is rendered politically inactive by disfranchisement, and if necessary by imprisonment)?" This is said to be "revolutionary action in the sense of the Magnificat." It is to "reconcile Christianity in part with Marxism." But it is obvious which is the dominant partner in this strange collocation, and it is clear that the old freedoms have no meaning or value whatever for these enthusiasts.

It would be wiser perhaps not to feel too much alarm at these signs of the times, but there are other people, more numerous, less simple-minded and

less crude, who think that all can be put right by education. Many of them harbour what I believe to be an illusion that there is a great mass of high ability in the nation which is being kept down and never getting its chance. That a great mass of children of both sexes are not getting the sort of education in quality and length which they ought to have is true. But original genius and high ability always come through, and never more easily than to-day, if only they are there. There was a wonderful flowering-time of English genius in the reign of Queen Anne: it has nothing to do with the educational system, which was '*pour rire*.' There was another efflorescence in the early Victorian age, which again had nothing to do with education. After Elementary Education began it came to a stop, and men of equal calibre ceased to appear. The two phenomena are not connected. What Education has done in the last fifty years, is to open the door progressively to talent, wherever found, but talent is not the same thing as high ability, still less as genius. The other services which Education has rendered are not so beneficial. It has enabled a very large population of both sexes to read, but has not taught them to think. It made possible the success of *Tit-bits*, *Answers*, the Northcliffe Press, and all that has followed therefrom. It has made possible the standards of the present-day cinema. It has produced fodder for broadcasting, raw material for propaganda. But there is no going back: like Macbeth, but in a nobler cause, we are 'stept in so far that, should we wade no more, returning were as tedious as go o'er.' We have to go on, and strive to produce an educated democracy, to teach the men and women of this country not only to read but to think, to honour true knowledge, to value true judgment, to respect the freedom of themselves and of their neighbours. It can only be done by a better and a longer education, and this is generally agreed.

It is so generally agreed that the air has become thick with flying blue-prints of the new Educational Order, and through the dust of controversy it has become clear that there are two parties in array, who have apparently no intention of compromising with each other. It is in the hope of preventing a disastrous battle that this article is written. For, as in most human quarrels, there is right and wrong on both sides. The Local Education Authorities are conscious and rightly proud of the great work which they have accomplished during this century. They have in their service some Directors of outstanding ability: they have made some excellent schools: they have developed some promising experiments. Forgetting the Board of Education, the Inspectorate, and Parliament, in a very human way they think that they have done it all themselves, and now, backed by the Trades Union Congress, the Workers' Education Association and the Socialist and Communist parties they feel themselves conscious of great strength and able to impose their will. They are determined to have a real equality of opportunity, and a genuine parity of esteem between school and school: they desire to build on the basis of a common curriculum for all in early years, to abolish

all fees, and to bring all schools under their control. Wherever there is privilege, there, they say, is the enemy: public school, preparatory school, private school—if not abolished, they must be left to die by starvation. It is pointed out on the other side that, great as have been the services of the Authorities, they are distrusted by the overwhelming majority of Secondary Headmasters and Headmistresses who feel that they circumscribe freedom, that they are not even in sight of finding either the teachers or the buildings which will enable them to carry out their ambitious plans with even tolerable success, that they will inevitably level down, and not level up, that they will create an administrative, but not an educational, paradise, in which the reality of parental choice will disappear, and that they will destroy in the process much in education that is racy of English soil, schools which are in some cases of unique value, a system which has largely helped to make this country what it is. It is further argued with weight that an education such as this, coupled with the Beveridge Plan, would not and could not produce democracy and freedom, but quite inevitably and in course of time a totalitarian system of the Left.

The opposition to the Local Authorities' claims comes from the Public Schools, the preparatory schools, from the Direct Grant Schools, and from the private venture schools of all types. It is obvious that this is a very diversified field, and it is just because it offers so much diversity in freedom that critics who place education first, and politics second, see a special value in it. The Public Schools and the Direct Grant Schools are not as a whole conducted for private profit; but the preparatory and private schools as a whole are, and it must be admitted that they have not many friends, though there are instances in both categories of schools which are good, and sometimes they have conducted valuable experiments. The Public Schools are in general educational opinion the outstanding contribution which this country has made to educational practice, and no fair judge can deny the services which they have rendered: some of the Direct Grant Schools are the representatives of a long tradition, have for centuries proved themselves the parents of sound learning and sound living, and usually serve more than one Local Authority Area. It is not surprising that those who care for freedom and educational values should be in arms.

There are, however, weaknesses in their case. The Public Schools are for the well-to-do, and in the main for them only: even their scholarships have not gone to the poor. The Direct Grant School in a great city sets an inferiority badge on all the other secondary schools of the Local Authority. Both types together work for the production of leaders: all the other schools feel that they are set to produce those who will be led. They speak of their willingness to co-operate in the national system, so long as their freedoms are untouched. But until the effects of the economic 'slump,' the declining birthrate, and the war, were felt, they betrayed no sense of such an obligation, though they had at least two opportunities to do so. They have not yet

propounded a practical plan of co-operation, which is admittedly a problem of great difficulty. They do not seem to realize fully that the intensity of the hostility which they have aroused is due to the fact that they can so easily be perverted to serve a Fascist ideology, and that they were the model from which Hitler drew his ideas for training leaders in the residential schools which he founded (*National-politische Erziehungsanstalten* and *Adolf-Hitler-schulen*). They do not realize it because they are utterly innocent of any such intention. But they must face the world as it is and, as Professor Clarke has written in his recent little book *The Study of Education in England*, "the sharp division between the education of the directing minority and that of the directed majority is passing away." But "much depends upon the manner of its passing. Nothing much worse could happen than a complete victory of one 'system' over the other in a head-on clash. That way totalitarianism lies, whichever were the victor."

Head-on collisions are no mark of statesmanship, and the recent refusal of the London County Council Education Committee to co-operate with the Fleming Committee is an instance of political unwisdom. For what all men of good will in this educational field ought to be searching for is that third way which runs clear of the "—isms", and at the same time offers a prospect of a national system which will bring us together and keep us together. Such a way can surely be found, if we start from what exists, and seek to preserve in the Public Schools what is of value in their admittedly great contribution, while ending their exclusiveness by opening their doors more liberally. Such a national system one can picture maintained by a joint partnership of the Board of Education and the Local Education Authorities, a partnership for which there are two sound practical reasons. The first is that part of our schools are non-local, and always must be: the second is that the teaching profession as a whole, and all the most important schools, have a much livelier faith in the Board of Education than they have in the Local Authorities. Such a state of feeling does not arise without cause, even though some of the Authorities are broadminded and efficient.

I suggest therefore that there be established an Independent or Non-Local Schools Branch of the Board of Education on the analogy of the University Grants Commission which awards public money to the Universities without impairing their freedom. It should have authority over all public schools, Direct Grant Schools, preparatory schools, and private schools, though, where private schools are purely local, they should be dealt with by the Local Authority. Every school would be licensed, and would have to show that its premises were healthy and adequate, that the teaching was satisfactory, and that the teachers were properly paid. Admittedly this would destroy a considerable number of the private and preparatory schools, but educational efficiency would gain. On the basis of a full inspection held every five years, which would include an examination of the finances, a grant would be made to the school for that period on condition that 25 per cent. of special places

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arded, of which some proportion should be free places. They would be open to those whose parents wished them to come, who were deemed worthy but were prevented from coming by lack of means, and it would make no difference whether they came from elementary schools or private or secondary schools. Every public school in the country would be open to come in, and there would be no exceptions. It would be idle to insist on the exclusiveness of the majority of the boarding-schools, if the others were left to become super-exclusive.

Further conditions should be laid down. There should be a broadly based curriculum in all schools from the ages of 11 to 13, and there should be a period of six months' national service, to be carried out in the nineteenth century in the forces or in the engineering shops, or in agriculture, by all alike, whatever the school from which they might have come, public or private, day or grammar school equally with technical and part-time continued education. Some such step as this is probably inevitable on grounds of national security: on educational grounds it is even more desirable.

It should not be a hard and fast system. It would for instance be possible for local Authorities to establish their own boarding-schools, or to take over some of the independent branch. It would be possible for Directly Maintained schools to become fully maintained, and for the reverse process to take place here local schools spread their sources of supply beyond the local area. It is possible indeed that there will be an increased demand for boarding-schools after the war at a reasonable cost. Already young people feel that they have gained something from the common life imposed on them by the war, and that they do not wish to surrender; already the increased numbers of workers in the North are reflected in growing entries to boarding-schools.

On a broad outline, the details of which cannot be filled in without exceeding the limits of an article. I claim that it widens educational opportunity without destroying educational values. It does not set class against class, but leaves it to the process of time and the national development of the country to work out an increasing unity. There is no evidence of any weight of opinion in the nation as a whole desires to be regimented into a compulsory society, in which freedom and democracy must steadily wither. What the nation cares intensely about is that there should be a career open to all, and that none should be prevented by his "birth's invidious bar" from enjoying the full service, and living the full life, for which he is fitted. Liberty, and education all hang together, and it would be a thousand pities if through the mistaken equalitarian enthusiasm of the moment we were to use education to undermine the primary values for which we are fighting this war.

CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION

BY ERIC HARRISON

CANADA has waded deep into the welter of the Second World War. Since her independent declaration on September 9, 1939, she has mustered her people's strength, grimly aware that if the struggle in which she has engaged herself were to go awry, it might turn out to be her last venture as a free nation. Surveying her resources as they stand mobilized in this year of 1943, one can say that she has excelled even the most optimistic estimates of what might be possible for her in such a situation.

Looking back from the perspective of 1943, the contemporary historian can measure the immense progress made since the days of indecision and unpreparedness. The process has been a somewhat slower one than that which has made such inroads into the every-day activities of the people of Britain. Yet under the pressure of war, haste and speed have tended to be more closely related than in times less abnormal. There has been much improvisation. Execution has rarely waited on experience. Plans have been approved in operation rather than by trial and experiment. New skills have been acquired within periods so curtailed as gravely to offend against the canons of peace-time craftsmanship. Management has been confronted with problems which might otherwise have come to be solved only by cumulative adjustment spread over decades. Government has enormously expanded its functions and given scope to many newcomers from business and the universities.

The individual citizen has been variously affected as tax-payer, tradesman, industrialist, farmer, housewife, student and worker, or as member of one of the fighting services. On most people in Canada the impact of change has not yet been felt with the same violence as it has in the island fortress itself. We have not yet been physically hurt. The shock of urgency is still buffered by distance. The unawareness of the past left behind it an opiate of indifference to the world at large. There are still too many for whom the terrible march of events so far remote from barn and pasture, shop and office, has small significance. Speaking, for example, of the inhabitants of rural Quebec, that stronghold of the anti-conscriptionist, a writer in a recent issue of the *Queen's Quarterly* makes the following observation:

Ignorant of world affairs, and of Canada's place among the nations of the world, simple minds are puzzled and bewildered by the tumult and the shouting of a world at war. It is perhaps understandable that radios should be switched off in the homes of such simple folk when war news is announced; it is certain that this is done, and thus the vicious circle goes on unbroken.

This is not to cast any aspersion on the loyalty or on the willing co-operation of the Province of Quebec in sustaining the efforts of the country as a whole. There are many Quebecois serving as volunteers. English people will be familiar with the French-speaking soldiers from Canada. Some of the most important war industries are situated within the Province of Quebec, as at Arvida, where the aluminium plant is the largest of its kind in the world.

Yet the fact remains that when the Government appealed to the country by means of a plebiscite in April, 1942, for a release from its commitment not to introduce conscription for overseas service, it was the Province of Quebec which alone refused. It would be incorrect to conclude that this decision was merely the bitter fruit of a mishandling of the question in the last war. It touches some of the most cherished conceptions of that highly sensitive and very self-conscious minority. The first loyalty of the French Canadian anti-conscriptionist is to his native land. Rooted in North American soil, seeing himself as the original Canadian, the true nationalist, he is apt to despise his English-speaking compatriots for harbouring what to him is a divided loyalty, a continuing colonialism, in seeking to preserve the sentimental ties with Britain. To go to war for England is to him a betrayal of Canadianism. He cannot see the war in any other terms. He is inclined to dismiss it as merely another clash of rival imperialist systems with little to choose between them. The Catholic hierarchy has done its best to explain the war in a truer light, but on the issue of conscription, it has not ventured to pronounce. Hitherto the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, has maintained his electoral support in the Province by reassuring declarations. The Province is now determined to hold him to them. By inducing Quebec to put its trust in the Liberal Party, Mr. King neglected that Province's education in matters of wider political significance. The present impasse is, in part, one of Mr. King's own making. The deadlock remains, with Canadians conscriptible only for home defence.

Meanwhile some of those drafted for service at home have expressed their willingness to go overseas. Anti-conscriptionists smell coercion here, but such charges are easier to make than to prove. The actual figures for free enlistment and compulsion, as recently given out by the Department of National Defence, are an interesting commentary. As voluntary recruits for service anywhere, the Army received 411,882 men during the first 38 months of the war, that is, to October 31, 1942. Like figures of the Navy were 46,374, and for the Air Force 158,342. These add up to the not discouraging total of 616,598, of whom 29,132 were enlisted compulsorily under the National Resources Mobilization Act and later volunteered for service overseas. The number raised under the Act was 94,149. Adding the volunteers to those who are at present available only for home defence, we have a grand total of 681,615. This means that just over 30 per cent. of the male population of Canada between the ages of 19 and 45 were in uniform by the end of October,

1942. The proportion of that group who enlisted for service anywhere was 27.8 per cent.

The Government's policy will be seen to have produced an army of sizable dimensions without driving Quebec into the wilderness and destroying national unity. Now that weapons and equipment are becoming available in sufficient quantities, however, and with man-power a cardinal factor in the war, the question arises as to the adequacy of the present arrangements. It has been estimated that the armed forces will require a total of 20,000 men a month during the present year, while the ever-expanding war industries will absorb about twice that number of new workers. How Ottawa proposed to meet the threatening crisis was a matter of some anxious speculation.

It would be unfair, however, to diminish the administrative triumphs with which the Government of Mr. Mackenzie King defends its record. Under his perennial, if uninspiring direction, the nation has girded itself for war. The part played by the Dominion in the vast co-operative enterprise of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan is not unworthy of commendation. The bomb-free air stations spread securely over Canada's uninhabited spaces have already sent tens of thousands of trained airmen to the theatres of war. This may be set down as a major contribution, a departure of broad significance in the air strategy of the Empire. It may be added that there are twenty-five R.C.A.F. squadrons in Britain and in the Middle and Far East. The majority of Canadian airmen overseas, however, are attached to units of the R.A.F.

While young Canadians have shown a brilliant aptitude as flyers, they have taken with equal relish to the sea. The expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy is something of which Canadians are justly proud. Before the war the actual fighting strength of the R.C.N., apart from a few auxiliary vessels, comprised only six destroyers. At present there are some 500 ships in commission, including 13 destroyers, over 80 corvettes, 3 auxiliary cruisers, and a swarm of minesweepers, sub-chasers, patrol vessels, and other smaller craft. Being a small power, Canada has specialized in small craft designed to beat the U-boats in an unceasing vigil over the bleak wastes of the North Atlantic. We are building fighting ships in numbers which are making maritime history. The present establishment of officers and ratings is rising to about half of the peace-time strength of the Royal Navy.

In addition to building large numbers of war vessels, Canadian yards are turning out an unprecedented tonnage of cargo ships. During a nine-month period in 1942 no fewer than fifty-one 10,000 ton freighters were delivered. This is part of a programme for the construction of nearly 300 such ships of which, at the time of writing, 70 have already been delivered. While the total tonnage of merchant vessels built last year was about 900,000, the goal this year is a million and a half. Since the war began Canada has launched some 300 warships of various types and about 1,100 smaller craft. This bustling activity has called for a great expansion of the shipbuilding industry. Early in the war there were only 14 shipyards in the Dominion, employing

4,000 workers. There are now 79 yards, both large and small, in which some 40,000 workers are busy.

A word might be added here concerning the growth in Canada's aircraft industry from an employment of fewer than 1,000 workers to one of 55,000 men and women, who turn out 400 planes of all types every month. These include Hurricanes, Bolingbrokes, Curtiss naval dive-bombers, and Catalina flying boats. In 1943 the huge Lancaster bombers are coming into production along with the new Mosquito bomber, recently off the secret list.

As a supplement to these great developments in mass-production, Canadians are applying newly acquired skills to produce precision instruments which were either not made in Canada before the war or had not been invented. The secrets of radio-locators, for example, are handled in Canada with dexterity and discretion. Canadian craftsmen are now turning out navigating instruments for 'planes and ships, intricate fire-control mechanisms for the Royal Navy, range-finders for the guns, and optical instruments of all kinds. A new machine-tool industry has sprung up, already able to supply half of a vastly enlarged demand, and with a small margin even for export.

A most creditable effort has also been made to fill the bottomless pit of war's requirements of chemicals and explosives. Here we come to one of Canada's most important industrial contributions. The workers involved number more than 50,000. Capital expenditures have been undertaken of \$125,000,000. The productivity of this great industry has reached impressive proportions. Over 2,000,000 rounds of heavy ammunition are produced in Canada every month. The Dominion's lethal harvest includes aerial bombs, trench-mortar bombs, grenades and land-mines. This is in addition to an annual fifteen-hundred million rounds of such small-arms ammunitions as rifles and machine-gun bullets. In 1943 this output will be doubled. The most powerful explosive used in the war is being made in Canada by a process developed by Canadian scientists. Canadian experts have revolutionized the manufacture of armour-piercing projectiles. They are now making a shell of low-grade alloy steel, costing only a quarter as much as an earlier type, and being more effective. The Canadian armaments industry is now turning out twelve types of cannon, and ten of small-arms. These categories include 25-pounders, anti-tank guns, Bofors and 3.7 anti-aircraft guns, 4-inch and 12-pounder naval guns. Early this year Bren machine-guns and Sten machine-carbines will be turned out by the several thousand a month.

The Canadian automotive industry, already highly developed before the outbreak of hostilities, has been harnessed to the war-machine. "The armies of the Empire all over the world," declared the Minister of Munitions the other day, "are almost entirely dependent on mechanized vehicles from Canada." Nor have Canadian engineers been deterred by the infinite complications of the tank. Shipments of Valentine tanks have been made to Russia, while the Ram tank is being manufactured in a plant which, according

to an official claim, is the second largest tank arsenal on the American continent.

Expressing all this Vulcan's ardour and ingeniousness in terms of expenditure, we can say that it represents the substantial figure of \$2,600,000,000 for the year 1942. In the current year the annual rate of production will bring the sum up to \$3,700,000,000. This is not an inclusive assessment. It leaves out the value of the metals, foodstuffs and other products exported to the United States, Great Britain and other Empire countries. The total for these items in 1943 will be over \$850,000,000. There is an additional total to cover the pay and allowances of the armed forces, and freight charges both inland and overseas. It may be permissible to mention the gift of \$1,000,000,000 made to Great Britain, a gesture to be accounted as at least one of enlightened self-interest. Canadians have long been aware of the evil legacy of the War Debts between Britain and America. As members of the Commonwealth and as friends and neighbours of the United States, they have had ample opportunity of hearing both sides of the case. They have come to the conclusion that wealth spent in a common cause is better not haggled over, and that repayment by the debtor in goods is held to prejudice the creditor's economy. From the point of view of many a Canadian tax-payer, however, the writing-off was a salute to the heroism of the British people.

The Canadian tax-payer, in fact, has been a heavy contributor to the cause. In the past his lot has been a lighter one than that of his brother in England. But the financing of this war has fairly equated the rates of income-tax paid in both countries. As in Britain, these payments include a proportion of compulsory savings as a supplement to the great sums raised by voluntary War Savings and Loans. The Third Victory Loan which closed in November of last year was evidence that all classes of Canadians are determined that the war effort shall not lag through an insufficiency of funds. The total raised exceeded \$970,000,000, with individual subscriptions numbering approximately 1,900,000. Apart from earlier War Loans, and after making allowance for conversions, the Canadians in the three Victory Loans have lent over \$2,500,000,000. As the population of Canada is less than a quarter of that of Great Britain, this is no mean achievement.

It is not to be supposed that such vast expenditures could be without their inflationary effects. The Government, however, has taken measures to safeguard the situation. It is in meeting this problem that the Government can claim to have followed a course of positive and determined statesmanship. During the first two years of the war the cost of living had risen about 16 per cent, and was still rising in the late summer and early autumn of 1941. The Government then introduced a system of general control over prices, wages and rents. As it has been administered by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, the system has worked very well. With certain exceptions, the prices of all goods and services are limited to those charged during the period from September 15 to October 11, 1941. This ruling does not, however, affect

prices for agricultural products. In this case a maximum price is fixed by the Board to apply throughout the country. Where imported goods have risen in price the difference is paid by the Government. The exceptions touching wages and salaries apply only in special cases where rates were already comparatively low, or where promotion or increased responsibility justify a rise. It was also made possible to adjust wages according to a specified scale to offset increases in the cost of living, a principle now applied for the benefit of soldiers' dependents. More recently, the W.P.T.B. has been empowered to curtail or prohibit all activities deemed unessential.

As indicative of the trend towards increased regimentation, there may be cited the recent order by which all coal-workers and workers in the primary iron and steel plants, and those in the majority of the base metal mines, are not allowed to leave their present employment. Rationing of foodstuffs and of travel is bringing the war home to every Canadian household, while thousands of women have been recruited into both the factories and the services.

Much more will need to be done, and Canadians will be glad of further opportunities to grin and bear it. The British have set them a noble example and there is no stint of admiration for them in Canada. Meanwhile this granary and arsenal and air base is putting forth its strength, pouring the treasure of field and forest, mine and factory, manhood and womanhood, into the common pool.

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WHITHER NORTHEAST CHINA?

By C. Y. W. MENG

TUNG Pei, meaning Northeast China, comprising the four Northeastern Provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, is now one of the lost territories. The Chinese people never forget September 18, 1931, when this vast land was forcibly occupied by the enemy without the slightest justification. The conflagration of aggression now sweeping the whole world first broke out in Northeast China and was not put out by the "International Fire Brigade." The Chinese remember what a German Minister said to the Japanese representative at Geneva after the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations: "We don't think you are right, but we thank you for your kind example." The present Chinese national policy is: "Recovery of the lost territories begins with the recovery of the Northeast." With the outbreak of the Pacific War in December, 1941, and the change of military strategy by the Allies, the Chinese believe that the "Battle of Mukden" and the "Fight to the Yulu River" will take place earlier than was expected.

After eleven years of forcible occupation and rule, has the invader conquered Northeast China? I shall prefer to let facts speak for themselves. A young man by the name of Tien Min from Liaoyang (about 100 kilometers from the City of Mukden), said to me:

I have just come from the Northeast. Life back home is far different from that of ten years ago. For a decade our people lived, not under the puppet Henry Pu Yi, nor the pretensions of Chinese traitors or Japanese adventurers, but under the bayonets of the Japanese Kwangtung Army. With them, the Japanese have suppressed the armed resistance of the Northeastern people, have carried out their bloody misrule, and have robbed the Northeasterners of everything. To strengthen this bayonet misrule, the Japanese military has devoted the time to military preparations, such as the establishment of barracks and garrison, the construction of aerodromes and arsenals, and the building of defence lines. Of course, the purpose of these measures is not limited to the suppression of the Northeastern people, but is to further Japan's intentions against Soviet Siberia.

I can illustrate conditions with examples around my home town. A new aerodrome was built north of Shoushan, occupying more than 1,000 *mow* (170 acres). The field was built with conscript labour, and the land taken forcibly from the local farmers. Many farmers lost their lives by going

too close to the field where they were either shot by Japanese sentries or attacked by police dogs. Pillboxes and forts were constructed along the Chienshan range, with heavily garrisoned posts at strategic points. These measures were for the purpose of defending the South Manchurian Railway.

Education in the Northeast is entirely slave education. The same condition exists in the political organizations. Public functionaries are appointed after an examination held for the purpose of testing their 'thoughts.' After passing the examination, they are given three months' training to make them more loyal servants of the Japanese. Nevertheless, they remain under the strict surveillance of the Japanese police, which is next in authority to the Japanese army in the Northeast.

The 'thoughts' and actions of the people, the rationing of materials, the regulation of commodity prices, and all other activities are under the control of the police. There is no freedom of speech, residence, travel, meeting and writing to speak of. Every public functionary must carry with him his certificate, and each citizen his 'Good Citizen's Pass.' Permits must be obtained for travelling in the Northeast, and special permits are required for leaving the country. On such certificates and permits are written the name, age, profession, native place, etc., of the holders, with their photographs and fingerprints.

A conscription system has been introduced in the Northeast in recent years to supplement Japan's man-power in her aggressive acts. Men of nineteen, after a physical examination, are subject to three years' military service. Most of them are sons of the upper classes whom the Japanese believe to be safe. Nevertheless, there are many cases of disappointment. In 1941 air force cadets in Harbin revolted and burnt some thirty Japanese planes. A number of them were killed, and a few escaped. They were all sons and brothers of high puppet officials.

Livelihood becomes harder than ever in the Northeast as Japanese misrule continues. For the protection of railways and highways, no plantation of *kaoliang*, Northeast's chief food crop, is allowed within one kilometer of both sides of the roads. Thus, acreage in the cultivation is greatly reduced. Conscript labour for building roads and aerodromes means to local farmers constant wasting of time and energy. The crops must be sold to the Japanese at official quotations which could hardly pay production costs. On the other hand, the skyrocketing prices of goods have forced the agrarian population to buy less and less necessary articles. All Northeastern farmers are now forced to mortgage their farms and crops with the Japanese money-lending organizations at extortionate interest rates.

There is also a great shortage of materials. Soy bean, a Northeastern speciality, is monopolized by the Japanese and exported to her allies (meaning Germany) in exchange for war materials. Most of the native soy bean oil cracking plants are thus forced to close down. Cotton is diverted to the

manufacture of gun powder, and there are not enough clothes. For two or three years, I have not tasted wheat flour, for it has become a luxury.

Such a life is certainly unbearable. Nevertheless, the Chinese Volunteers in the Northeast can still recruit enough fighters from the local populace and get their supplies and provisions from native farmers. The people in the Northeast look on the guerrillas as the immediate hope of righting the wrongs they suffer. And they look to the National Government for the eventual liberation which they know will be theirs in due time. In all these years of suffering the Northeasterners have not lost their hope of liberation. And with this hope, the national spirit among the Northeasterners is high.

Under the supreme authority of the ambassador to "Manchukuo," the Japanese have tried for the last eleven years to make the Chinese in the Northeast a part of the Japanese Empire. For the control of the "thoughts" of the Northeasterners, the Kwangtung Army established a *Hsuen Ho Hui* or Cosmopolitan Association. At an annual expense of \$50,000,000, it has now recruited no less than 1,400,000 members. Its officials are mostly officials of the puppet government. During its annual meeting, the association hears reports from the puppet government and offers suggestions to the members. The association has some resemblance to a political party, but it is organized and controlled by the Kwangtung Army.

Has the invader succeeded in controlling and regulating the "thoughts" of the people? Another authentic account of an instance will perhaps answer the question far more explicitly than many pages of analysis. The manager of a firm in Shanghai dealing in some special products of the Northeast made one of his regular business trips to Mukden in the autumn of 1939. Riding on a rickshaw one day, he was engaged in conversation with the puller, Chang Jen-sheng, who took him to his home. There he (Chang Jen-sheng) produced \$47.04 representing his one year's savings, and asked his "guest" to remit the money to Chungking as his response and humble contribution to the Winter-Garment Fund's Drive for the Chinese soldiers fighting at the front. With the help of his neighbour, Wang, he wrote the following letter:

My Dear Brothers and Sisters,

I, Chang Jen-sheng, am a native of Mukden of Liaoning Province, and am now thirty-one years of age. I am a rickshaw puller to earn my livelihood and support my family of four persons.

Although I am poverty-stricken, I am patriotic by nature. What a great pity for us! My native place has been under the oppression of the invader for the past eight years. You can easily imagine our present miserable condition in these regions.

Our War of Resistance which broke out on July 7, 1937, could not but greatly inspire me. I am hoping that our Government will soon recover the lost territory and release us from the oppression of the aggressor.

It is a privilege for you to answer the call and to be soldiers and defenders of the Nation, a privilege which is now denied to us.

Allow me to urge all people in Free China to do their ultimate best for the Nation, and to fight for the Final Victory under the direction of the Generalissimo. The people in the Northeast admire your heroic fights, and hope that you will fight to the last.

I am now living in the Lost Land, and I could not do much for the Nation, much as I would like. My family is poor, and I don't have much to contribute. However, every day I do my best to save ten or twenty cents. Beginning from August, 1938, I have saved a sum of \$47.04.

I was very fortunate to meet my guest who told me that he would return to the interior of China. I was indeed very happy to learn this news, as this is an opportunity for my money to go to Chungking. I am now requesting my guest to be kind enough to bring my small contribution to the authorities concerned.

I hope that you will not mind this small sum. If I save more I will present the same to the Government. I am now praying day and night for victory to come when we can drive out the invader from our land.

(Written by) WANG.

(Signed by) CHANG JEN-SHENG.

Rickshaw pullers are generally classified as the most ignorant and miserable people in China. They are "Human Dynamo-Vehicles" and are a typical example of the "exploitation of human beings by human beings." In the past, Chinese socialists have made repeated appeals to the public for the prohibition of rickshaw riding. Kwangsi Province, one of the most economically backward provinces in South China, humbled the cosmopolitan City of Shanghai by being the first to prohibit rickshaw riding. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, however, these pullers as well as giving their hard earned money to swell the government war chest, go directly to the conscription stations to offer themselves to be recruited and sent to the barricades for training.

These patriotic acts represent a living example of the rapid growth of the national consciousness among the Chinese masses; and convince the whole civilized world that after eleven years of forcible occupation and high-handed oppression, Japan has *not* yet conquered Northeast China, and is far from having subdued the Chinese there. The 30,000,000 Chinese throughout the Northeast are simply waiting for the most opportune moment to rise and fight, and they believe that time is now not far off. Therefore, what is going on in the Northeast is another verification that China is unconquerable.

(Mr. Meng's article was written in Chungking in December, 1942.)

DEATH IN APRIL

BY G. ROSTREVOR HAMILTON

AH, you that lean over the piled-up pillows,
Look up at last!

Out of the window see
Light upon earth, leaf upon the tree,
And this year's April fair as every other.

Look up at last! See golden on the willows
The catkin sway.

Now is the time for tears,
When April, cruellest month, her trousseau wears,
And the farm fields with cries of lambs are ringing.

Look up! look up! For now no more he needs you
And your clear eyes.

Unharassed lies the bed,
Nor any moan comes from the well-loved head.
None shall take harm now from your well-earned weeping.

No more the pleased and busy sunlight heeds you
Than the quiet room:

Whose progeny indeed
From deathly winter grew without your heed
Up into spring; while you, each lusty morning,

Watched in the sickroom; to a whisper lowered
Your natural voice;

With careful curtains framed
The filtering light, and all exuberance tamed
To assist you moving on your ministrations.

Last year the snowdrop and the crocus flowered,
And this year too:

 Last year your loved one felt
 The lengthening days, the illumination spelt
In white and blue and gold of earth's renewal.

This year no more: the one long night of sleeping
Drew on apace,

 From which the sun can bring,
 His glow no life, his warmth no wakening;
Nor any difference; nor any season.

And you, meantime, the shadows closer creeping,
Listened and watched;

 Rewarded by a smile,
 Were in his company still; another while
Were leagues away from him, so far he wandered—

Without a guide wandered through network mazes
Of fitful years.

 Ah! could you step with him,
 Unravel the confused and light the dim
Pathways to you familiar, calm the uneasy

Excited breathing, loosen the fixed gazes,
Link hand in hand!

 Alas, he must alone
 Walk, a bewildered stranger, through his own
Old memories that crowd and cross and darken.

Darkness; thick darkness; yet the darkness never
Could claim him quite.

 Still was the spirit whole;
 Nor were you mocked by that winged aureole,
Utter serene of peace, joy beatific

That, through discomfiture of flesh, through fever
Of the whirled brain,

 One westering hour had shone.—
 Now from the height the Alpine light was gone,
Gone too the pained perplexity: the body

Lay in his likeness there, a mute deceiver.
Not *this* had been

 Partner in lively sense,
 Far-ranging thought, godlike experience,
Ambassador of an unseen world's dominion.

So much of him, and yet so less than nothing:
So real, unreal!

 The very Spring in spate
 Held more of him, each creature for its mate
In merest bodily pride itself adorning.

And you? Look up! Lovely is April's clothing
On hill and vale.

 For you she spreads her wealth,
 And breathes her perfume, cruel for your health
In bland indifference this Easter morning.

A POET'S DESIGN FOR LIVING

BY RICHARD CHURCH

TO-DAY, more acutely than ever since the beginning of the machine-age, the problem arises of how the individual shall adapt himself to the demands of society. The question is unanswerable because it is infinite; as infinite as the oddities of personality and character which distinguish one man or woman from another. With each, the problem is posed afresh. There is no common starting-point, in spite of what Marxian materialists may say—if there are any such doctrinaires left untouched by the Fire which is still raging around us.

Many people, perhaps most, especially the younger ones, are optimistic. They foresee a world purged by war of politicians and the out-of-date Machiavellian web which is entangling the works of what should be a scientific machine, the machine of world government, created to run as smoothly as the engine of an aeroplane, a radio transmitter, or any other symbol within the range of their enthusiastic field of reality. It is a clean and well-tilled field, without hedges, and artificially manured. It should inspire confidence, and a sense of social security.

But other considerations persist in darkening that confidence; old, unhappy, far-off prides and fastidiousnesses; relics of princely manners and modes of living and thinking; revulsions from the threatened increase in gregariousness and community-taste. Highbrowism lifts its head once more, and shudders as Villiers de Lisle Adam would have shuddered had he been shown a prospectus of an American University course, or the programme of an English Holiday Camp near any of our seaside towns. It is all very reprehensible from the democratic point of view. But it is human. And to judge from the development of the minds and taste of the more out-standing men and women of the human race, it is inevitable.

It is those people tuned to a higher pitch who will hate the new modes of life potential in a democratic tomorrow, although it may bring something of a millennium to the majority of good-humoured folk. We are forced to hope that for them the post-war world, with its Beveridge Plan, swift travel, and labour-saving devices, will surely arrive, and that they will not be cheated out of it, as they were after the last war. But if that world comes, it will bring with it a lot of leisure. Unless one is a cynic, one will expect that leisure to ferment latent riches in the minds of many people; qualities which economic circumstances such as we have hitherto known would have prevented from

emerging. Those people will learn fastidiousness. They will begin to crave to be alone, to escape from the obvious, perhaps over-hearty team-pleasures of their neighbours. Yearnings for an aristocracy of taste will appear. And how will that affect the new articulation of society? Will there be a sort of Satanic revolt of the Leisure-bred poets, scientists, philosophers, and even the psychologists? Will there be another revolt in Heaven-on-earth?

These sceptical thoughts come from reading the lives of the great, and recalling the idiosyncrasies of the mighty ones. I have just read Joseph Hone's life of William Butler Yeats,* and this finely mature book, with its background of sophisticated irony and insight, has set me thinking of the difficulties which lie in wait for the proud in spirit, and also for those who have travelled so far in the adventure of the mind that they have discovered a humility equally as disdainful in its rejections of popular taste. Will the orchestra of man become so proficient, under the new dispensation of democracy, that these virtuosi can at last perform with it? But even so, they will still be soloists.

I think of Leonardo leaning against a pillar in the Duomo at Florence, listening yet half-listening to the demagogy pouring from the lips of Savonarola the Leveller, and detachedly sketching the passions roused in the faces of the congregation. I recall the heart-felt phrase in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, where he speaks of the mob "throwing up its sweaty nightcaps." And now in this detailed account of the growth and spiral development of Yeats' temperament, I see the same element of increasing disgust for the everyday satisfactions and sense of values. The story of his seventy-two years of mental and spiritual adventure rises almost without any asides to the statement made in his old age: "Like Balzac, I see increasing commonness everywhere, and like Balzac I know no one who shares the premises from which I work." The same emotion as that is expressed in the last quartettes of Beethoven, the angry old Republican; and the same aloofness is found in *The Satin Slipper* by Paul Claudel, although its author's fine arrogance of temper is disciplined by the anonymizing Roman Catholic faith. It might be argued by a matter-of-fact sociologist that this sort of isolation of mind and emotion is bound to happen to anybody who specializes in one thing or another. An individual has only, by the labour of predilection, to know a little more than the average man about a subject, and he grows more nervously tuned whenever that note is sounded in public. It is like an expert musician listening to a heavy-handed band of amateurs.

But Yeats, especially as he developed his philosophy along esoteric lines, permitted no such direct explanation of the hermetic position of the poet. He moved about amongst the oriental religions, and in the groves of the philosophers (the crooked ones of Swedenborg and the regimented ones of Hegel) to find authority for his increasing sense of difference from his fellow-

* Macmillan. 25s.

men, and his detestation of democracy (which he persisted in calling Whiggery and Liberalism). But the principles so clearly and savagely enunciated in his later life were already latent in the prejudices of his youth. He was always hieratic, and from the beginning he stated a romantic claim for the poet's position in society. Dante, the Catholic, Milton the Protestant, and Shelley the Atheist had already set that claim high, making the poet the "unacknowledged legislator of the world," a priestly intermediary between Heaven, Hell and Man. It is possible that Yeats is the last great poet who without pose can look upon that claim as legitimate. The development of society after the war may make all hero-worship a misdemeanour, punishable by a term of observed detention in a clinic.

Yeats foresaw this end to an attitude which, to him so real and significant of spiritual verities, will be to a Fabianized world utterly repugnant. In a poem written in 1931 he said:

We were the last romantics—chose for theme
Traditional sanctity and loveliness;
Whatever's written in what poets name
The book of the people; whatever most can bless
The mind of man or elevate a rhyme;
But all is changed, that high horse riderless,
Though mounted in that saddle Homer rode
Where the swan drifts upon a darkening flood.

Yes, there will be no riding the high horse in the world of tomorrow, with its standardized education, model villages, and the tallyman laying down the law to the prophet. The swan (Yeats' lifelong held symbol of the singing poet) is indeed riding upon a darkening flood. The forthcoming event seems to have touched the imagination of the last two generations of poets, at least in western Europe where the fine flower of the Greek-born civilization is probably fading. The work of Valery, Eliot, Masefield (for this 'popular' poet has some surprising arrogances of soul in his attitude to affairs) and Bridges is full of premonitory glooms, touches of *gotterdammerung* with the hierarchs making a proud but pitiful exeunt, to a fanfare of statistics. Yeats has a little verse which he called *Statistics*.

"Those Platonists are a curse," he said,
"God's fire upon the wane,
A diagram hung there instead,
More women born than men."

That too, is an expression of views formed in old age.

But how did he come to this pessimism, this conviction that the finer growth of knowledge and wisdom is incompatible with social ease and companionship in a society which is developing towards the elimination of all aristocratic gesture? Does not history contradict him? Does not the picture of Dante in exile from his native City-state, of Milton turned savage pamphleteer, of Goethe depressed and frustrated at Weimar running away to Italy to write the *Roman Elegies*, of Orpheus away back in mythical times

being torn to pieces by a women's club; does not all this evidence suggest that the crowd has always lagged behind the seer, and that the price paid to the prophet for his hard-won insight is a stone thrown from behind him?

Mr. Hone's carefully built up life-story of the poet is the answer to these questions. He handles his material with an appearance of detachment through which gleams a cross-light of devotion to the poet's genius and a humorous realization of his foibles and affectations. Among these last one suspects that Mr. Hone includes the dealings with occultism, oriental religious systems, spiritualism, and all other dogmatizations upon the fact that the human mind always interprets circumstances as being symbols of a larger purpose behind them. What Yeats did, in using every moment of his life as a feature in a universal ritual, is acceptable, especially in a poet who has to find an image to express reality. What is criticized by Mr. Hone's latent irony is the material which Yeats, in the course of his experimental life, picked up from time to time and tried to use as a short-circuiting agent to induce one spark of poetry.

It was a doubly dangerous procedure. It led the poet to a sectarian choice of image; and it led the man to a sectarian arrogance in relation to the crowd, especially a crowd developing (though painfully slowly) in an opposite direction, the direction of science and reasoned method. 'For though modern society is still largely barbarian and superstitious, it is definitely groping towards a calmly reasoned system of ethics. The illuminant must always be impatient of that method. That is why, when in times of social upheaval such as war, he is given administrative jobs, he fits so impatiently into the office machinery and frequently disrupts it. There is something to be said, after all, for the dull official, who gets his own back on the poet by labelling him as irresponsible, a bad party member. That is why, when the antinomy is carried to extremes, the illuminant (which includes the poet) is crucified in one way or another. But in the long run it is his vitality, and not that of the administrative man, which goes furthest and has the most influence upon mankind. His irrationality is found to be part of a larger rationality. And that discovery is not long delayed, as we see now from a contemplation of Yeats' lifework. Although his part in the affairs of the Irish cultural movement, and particularly in the running of the Abbey Theatre, was to keep everything in a state of ferment, his death has removed the light from it all, and the so-called free Ireland has sunk into a squalor of servitude under the heel of a Censorship too contemptible to be discussed.

Yeats tried again and again to bridge the gap. The Hon. Mrs. Edith Whittleton has recorded how he comforted her once when she was complaining of the weariness of her round of social duties. "Whenever I have to do something," he declared, "like a bit of dull routine business, or enduring the talk of a bore, I always say to myself 'Remember, this is an occupation which acquires great skill.'" And to the poet, a creature of infinite patience and meticulousness so long as he is leading the way with his lamp, the doing of a

routine job is always equivalent to "enduring the talk of a bore." Yeats wrote in his Journal: "I often wonder if my talent will ever recover from the heterogeneous labour of these last few years. I cry out for liberty and have ever less and less inner life. Evil comes to us men of imagination wearing as its mask all the virtues." That last sentence is of profound importance. It contains the revolt against the obvious duties, the social submissions which most people willingly accept. It is another way of saying what Christ said to his mother: "Woman, what have I to do with thee? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" It is a horrifying saying to the dutiful man or woman of the world, the stabilizer of society. It led to the Crucifixion, and it will always do so. It makes such an egoistic claim that even the claimant is uneasy about it, and endeavours to soften the arrogance of it. "One has to agree with the clown or be silent," said Yeats, "for he has in him the strength and confidence of the multitudes."

Gradually he evolved a process by which he could define a relationship between these apparently contradictory ways of life. He saw that the two ways must run parallel, and never be confused the one into the other. "All literature created out of a conscious political aim in the long run creates weakness by creating a habit of unthinking obedience. Literature created for its own sake, for some eternal spiritual need, can be used for politics. Dante is said to have unified Italy. The more unconscious the creation the more powerful. A great statesman, let us say, should keep his conscious purpose for practical things but he should have grown up to find about him always, most perhaps in the minds of women, the nobleness of emotion, created and associated with his country by its great poets."

In this belief, hammered out upon a long life of labour both in the study and in affairs, he built up a practical form of the Platonism that underlay all his thought and his temperament. I think it is always the poet's way; the way of synthesizing events into a master-event which has never taken place and will never take place, yet is a key to set the whole articulation of history working. And the key takes the form of an image, the poet's image of words. There is no administrative way of seeing life whole. It can only be symbolized; and to create a symbol is the poet's task in society. A symbol and not a law: an image and not a moral argument. For as Yeats discovered at the end of his life, "Man can embody truth but he cannot know it."

It is for science, which includes administration, to come after, as Elisha came after Elijah, and Paul after Christ, and analyse the image and the symbol, to make their inner force a driving energy for society. "Science is the criticism of myths," said Yeats in a letter to Sturge Moore ten years before his death. "There would be no Darwin had there been no Book of Genesis, no electrons but for the Greek atomic myth, and when the criticism is finished there is not even a drift of ashes upon the pyre."

SPRING IN RUSSIA

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

WITHOUT attempting to prophesy what course of events in Russia will be in the spring and summer this year, it is permissible to examine the factors likely to affect developments, and to compare the present situation with that of a year ago. The main questions which one naturally asks, but to which it is impossible to give a definite answer are: can the Russians maintain their offensive during the spring and summer? Will the Germans adopt a purely defensive policy, or will they, behind a defensive screen, stage another great offensive campaign? Let us first consider the situation a year ago. The Germans had in their final offensive of 1941 exposed their troops to unbearable hardships and exhausted them. Withdrawal from the most advanced and exposed positions they had reached became inevitable. With amazing promptitude and vigour the withdrawal of the exhausted Germans was pursued, and undoubtedly they were forced to retire much further than had been intended. But the retreat was halted where the Germans had time to consolidate defences too strong for the lightly armed Russian winter troops to penetrate. The defensive front established covered not only the main lateral railways but also the militarized area in which preparation for the final offensive had been made, and which therefore presumably had many well-stocked depots. The German Army had suffered heavily, mainly from terrible weather, but few if any formations had been completely annihilated. On much of the front where shelter was available and retreat short the casualties were probably not very high, and loss of material even less. It is not surprising, therefore, that the German Army was left with great possibilities of recuperation when, in warmer weather, men had recovered from winter hardships, and ranks had been refilled with new recruits and returned wounded of the summer and autumn campaign. Replenishment of material was the less difficult because of existing stocks behind the front.

The Russians, on the other hand, had not only suffered from their winter exertions but their reserve armies were still inexperienced, insufficiently trained, and not yet fully equipped. Timoshenko's spring-forestalling offensive presumably was the utmost that could be done to delay and interfere with German recuperation, and to gain time for the completion of the training and equipment of the new armies. German recovery was, however, never complete, and sufficed only to provide the armies required for the offensive

in the south. Thus the defensive attitude adopted in the centre and north gave Stalin the chance of husbanding the reserves of which he has made such wonderful use this winter.

To turn now to the present situation. After a spring and summer campaign in which their losses were undoubtedly heavy, the Germans have had to meet a Russian counter-offensive incomparably greater than that of last year. Their defensive system has been broken through at many points, and they have been forced to retreat over great distances, especially on the front where they had been conducting an offensive campaign. Owing to better clothing and an unusually mild winter the physical condition of their troops has probably not deteriorated to anything like the extent it did last year, but they have lost a number of complete formations and in others battle casualties have been very high. They have been forced to throw every reserve formation of their army in Russia into the fight—as was probably not the case last year when it is believed many divisions were withdrawn to reserve long before the winter was over—and in addition have had to draw on reserves from the west. This great expenditure of man power, which still continues without the respite that occurred at the end of last winter, might in itself be considered prohibitive to offensive operations on a decisive scale in the coming summer, especially in view of commitments in other theatres. Material losses may to an even greater extent affect German prospects. They must have been enormous, for the territory which the Germans have been forced to abandon is just that in which the greatest reserves of material would have been accumulated—to supply the offensive in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, and for the newly formed defensive front between Stalingrad and Voronezh.

It is reasonable therefore to suppose that the southern front must largely depend on current deliveries from Germany; and with active operations still in progress there would be little chance of building up fresh reserves required for offensive operations. As an indication that depots left far in rear when the offensive front advanced were probably denuded of large reserve supplies, it may be noted that though the Germans, even at the risk of encirclement, have clung to forward defensive centres, such as Orel, Rzhev and Staraya Russa, they have offered only temporary resistance at such centres as Kursk, Kupiansk and Kharkov. Was that because they were insufficiently stocked to maintain isolated resistance, or because of shortage of troops to provide adequate garrisons? It may be argued that in the matter of accumulated reserves the Germans would be in no worse position than during the later stage of their advance in 1941 when their communications had lengthened immensely and they were constantly breaking new ground. Conditions have, however, greatly changed. Then the offensive started from a fully prepared base, every unit was at full strength and completely equipped. The season gave scope for the employment of masses of mechanized transport, collected with full appreciation of the problems to be faced. It was a *blitzkrieg* campaign in which the problem was to maintain the impetus of the attack by

mobility rather than by immense expenditure of munitions. Yet even then when resistance stiffened pauses were necessary to build up material reserves. The great October offensive towards Moscow took months to prepare, though there was less loss of equipment and less expenditure of material to make good then. Last spring also, though the front from which the offensive started was well stocked and organized, preparations were not completed till midsummer. This year with the probability that Russian pressure will be maintained on a scale exceeding that of Timoshenko's forestalling offensive, it is difficult to see how, even if the Germans have sufficient troops available, they could mount an offensive on a great scale. That they will attempt counter-offensives with limited objectives whenever opportunity offers may, however, be expected.

The loss of some of their main lines of lateral communication is another and important factor in the worsening of the German position since last year. It may also be noted that so far the front has not been shortened as compared with its length when last summer's offensive was launched, and that the offensive reserve then available has been largely expended.

On the whole, therefore, even if the Germans have no new commitments to meet, the possibility of their renewing their offensive in Russia seems small, unless the Russians show unmistakable signs of having exhausted themselves in the winter campaign. We do not of course know how Russia stands in the matter of reserves of either men or material. No doubt they have been expended lavishly, but there is as yet no sign of their exhaustion. In any case in successful operations expenditure can hardly have been comparable to losses inflicted on the enemy. Moreover, we have the hard fact that in spite of the losses suffered during last summer, reserves of men and munitions accumulated on a sufficient scale to provide for the amazing winter campaign. Russian war industries are still producing, and assistance from allied resources is increasing, while as regards man power Russia, unlike the enemy, is engaged on one front only. It is true she maintains a strong force in the east, but that may be in some respects a reserve and training establishment from which on a *roulement* system fresh formations can be supplied to the active front. In view of what has already been accomplished there seems little reason to expect that the Russian effort will lose its momentum from sheer exhaustion, though it may of course be brought to a standstill by the strength of German defences. The offensive has in a surprising way overcome the immense disadvantage of lack of railway communication, but when recaptured lines have been restored to their original gauge even that disadvantage may be largely eliminated.

It is very generally assumed that in summer German tactical and strategical superiority will reassert itself, and that German troops will display superiority under more mobile conditions. Is that assumption likely to prove correct? This winter, in spite of holding the advantage of good railways, and of climatic conditions which certainly did not greatly hamper mobility in retreat, the

Germans strategically and tactically have been out-manceuvred. May it not be that the Russians have acquired a skill in manœuvre which will place them on equality with the Germans, even under summer conditions? There is the possibility, too, that losses of equipment and transport, and the difficulties of their replacement may affect the undeniable former efficiency of German armies.

So long as they held the initiative and were thus able to exploit preconceived plans and tactics the Germans made few mistakes. But since they lost the initiative they have been outwitted time and again. Can they, as they did last year, recover the initiative? The Kharkov counter-offensive in progress as I write may have that object, but on the other hand it may have the limited object of relieving a precarious situation at the price of expending much of their available reserves. Unless it achieves an outstanding success it may not in the long run materially improve the German situation, except so far as it has staved off disaster.

THE WAR AT SEA

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE anxiety expressed by speakers from all parts of the House in the debates on the Navy Estimates was not without justification, nor can it be said that the speeches made by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Financial Secretary were calculated to dispel it. A great growth in the output of shipping both in this country and the United States, where eight million tons have been put into the water, has resulted in a net gain over the losses of no more than one and a quarter million tons. No one can close his eyes to the plain fact that this is serious and distressing in the highest degree, showing as it does that the protection the Allies are now giving to their sea communications is inadequate to the urgent needs of the situation. So too, in cruisers the incredible folly of the London Treaty is brought home to us. In that treaty the two great principles which had hitherto governed our cruiser strength were thrown to the winds. Those principles were that the number of cruisers we need is not absolute but relative and that over and above the precise calculated number to meet the needs of the several services they are called on to perform there must be a margin to allow for the losses which, under the conditions in which our sea forces are bound to work, must be expected to occur. Thus Goschen, when First Lord in 1896, said that the Admiralty's programme of cruisers was "based not upon a comparison of cruisers other nations have, because their conditions are entirely different from ours, but upon the question what we have to defend, what services have to be performed, in what direction the food supply will have to be protected, and what resources we have."* Sir Frederick Richards, as First Sea Lord, pointed out the need for allowance being made "for the waste of war which for the British Fleet must be out of all proportion to that of the enemy who may choose to remain in port and try to wear out our Fleet by constant harassment and torpedo-boat attacks." Ignoring these principles the cruiser forces were reduced to a figure relative to that of another Power, and to numbers wholly inadequate to the duties, and, consequently without the "margin" called for by Richards. To-day, in spite of strenuous building, all that can be said by the First Lord is that after three and a half years of war "replacements have very nearly equalled losses." Little wonder if Admirals Lützw and Doenitz hope to give a measure of effective support to the submarines by the use of surface ships in the coming year!

* Hansard, 2 March, 1896, Vol. xxxvii, p. 1520.

Certainly the situation is somewhat less unsatisfactory in the categories of the destroyer and the submarine in both of which we are told we now have "a good many more than we had when the war started." But the satisfaction that we may derive from this is tempered by the knowledge that in both classes, and in that of the destroyer in particular, the numbers when we began the war were hopelessly inadequate, thanks to the Treaty of London; and that even with the increased number we cannot give the convoys the protection by fast craft which is essential to a successful campaign in defence of our vital communications at sea. So too the tale of the delays in providing the Navy with the aircraft of its needs gave little sign of a realization of the fact that the first and fundamental need of this country and the maritime Empire as a whole is the command of the sea. The Coastal Command, which is that branch of the Royal Air Force directly concerned with the defence and attack of sea communications, is, so the writer of a recent book describing its activities tells us, the Cinderella of the great Service. That this should have been accepted as a matter of policy in Imperial Defence and of the conduct of the present war shows how little the principles which, in earlier times, had informed our policy and strategy, have received acceptance during recent years; and this gives weight to the desire of the Navy not to be dependent upon the whims and theories of others for the provision of all the fighting forces with which warfare at sea is conducted. A display of the ignorance of these matters which is to be found among men who have even held high office was given by Lord Brabazon when he said that "we must be careful that we do not think of its (the Coastal Command) work really as naval operations." It should be obvious to any one possessing even the merest inkling of knowledge of war that operations conducted at sea, for the purpose of command and control of the sea and under the operational control of the Navy, are "naval operations" and can be nothing else.

A very important point was made by two speakers, Lieut-Commander Brabner and Vice-Admiral Taylor, in the debate on the Navy Estimates. The former officer, in urging the importance of speed in the fighter aircraft in use in the aircraft carriers, expressed the opinion that "we have concentrated too much upon the defensive" and not thought enough about the offensive—the destruction of the attacker. One of the great difficulties of trade protection is to locate and get close touch with an elusive enemy. Searching for him in the open sea, and even in comparatively narrow waters, is a futile proceeding; but when the trade is sailing in convoys, the enemy, if he is to effect anything, must come to the convoy; whether he attacks in a surface ship, a submarine or an aircraft this is the same. By so doing he is located and the opportunity is thereby afforded for his destruction. But that opportunity will be missed if the defending craft lack the speed to overtake him. To think only in terms of beating off the attack is a great error. It tends to produce two results. In the sphere of material it may lead to the production of nothing but slow craft, craft fast enough, perhaps, to guard a convoy and beat off an

assault on it, though not necessarily even fast enough for that; but too slow to follow up and effect the destruction of the attacker. (Of such slow ships an old Admiral of the past once grumbled "It is like setting a cow to catch a hare.") In the sphere of tactics, it tends to lead to the assumption that the whole function of the escort has been fulfilled when the attack has been driven off; not when he has been destroyed. This very matter arose during the submarine campaign in the last war when it was impressed upon commanders that the first duty of the escort, to which every thing else must be subordinated, was the defence of the convoy. To leave a convoy, even for a short time in order to "depth-charge" a submarine whose presence was known, was discouraged, if not forbidden. This doctrine was challenged by some officers, notably by Admiral Sims of the United States Navy, who gave wider and more offensively conceived instructions to the effect that every use was to be made of the opportunity to destroy an enemy who, if he escaped, might inflict many more losses than the one or two ships which might be torpedoed through the absence for the time from the escort. This instruction was, in actual fact, in direct descent from the tactical measures used by our captains at sea in the palmy days of the old wars, of which records exist of engagements in which the escorting frigates left their convoys for even days in succession, pursuing the enemy so long as there was the smallest chance of coming up with and destroying him. So, while it is correct to lay down that the function of the commander of the escort is to deliver the ships under his charge safely in the harbour of their destination, it is no less essential that he should remember that the destruction of the attacker, whether battleship, cruiser, submarine or aircraft, is a major measure of defence of the trade and shipping as a whole. If this ideal is to be attained, the aircraft of the escort must, as Lieut-Commander Brabner most rightly remarked, be as fast as possible, for otherwise the enemy aircraft will be able to regain the shelter of their ports; and the threat of a dip in the cold Arctic seas is, as he said, a deterrent. As to the submarine, Admiral Taylor urged the same principle. Since it is impossible that there can be enough fast surface craft to provide the whole of the escort, and since very large numbers are needed and can only be built in time if the speed is comparatively low, so every convoy should have a dual form of defence composed of the many slow vessels—sloops, corvettes and the like—for the specifically defensive function of direct protection, and a quota of fast surface craft which can be detached from the convoy to follow up the action in a sustained counter attack, rejoining the convoy when that has been done as completely as circumstances permit. The success of the convoy system in the last war was due not merely to the fact that the escorts defended the shipping, but to the other fact that they also destroyed the attacking submarines in respectable numbers so soon as the limitations on their behaviour were removed.

In the Eastern seas the value of command of the sea has been well shown by the total destruction of the Japanese convoy in the Bismarck Sea. An army,

estimated to number some 15,000 troops but possibly more (for the Japanese put more men per ton into their transports than we) carried in twelve large ships and defended by three cruisers, seven destroyers and about 150 fighter aircraft was obliterated in a three days' battle. All the ships, both fighting and transport, were sunk, and 102 of the aircraft were destroyed or put out of action, 62 of them definitely brought down and the other 40 damaged. So an army which would have constituted a most serious addition to the forces already in the island and whose presence would have imposed a correspondingly serious delay in the process of ejecting the enemy, has been disposed of completely in its attempt to defy precedent and execute an invasion across an uncommanded sea. Over-confidence, as a result of continued success, may have been at the bottom of this movement. We cannot however regard the success as more than a temporary check; the enemy is persistent and has ample reserves of men, and though 90,000 tons of shipping is a large loss, he still owns large quantities even if, as it has been calculated, he has lost about half of the tonnage of large ocean going ships with which he started the war. Nor are ships of the largest types essential to him, since he possesses a quantity of smaller coastal craft which he can employ in the short stretches between the stepping stones of the chain of islands in his present occupation. But the victory is a welcome and important one and it does not seem unreasonable to hope that Japan's difficulties will increase as a result of the activities of United States submarines and, before long, of surface vessels as well when the Navy has been reinforced by the aircraft carriers which are under construction. In the meantime it is not open to doubt that the Atlantic remains the principal theatre of the sea war and that the Eastern seas must wait for a full offensive strategy until matters have been cleared up in the West.

CORRESPONDENCE

A MONSTROUS REGIMENT

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Dear Sir,

It is unusual to find in the middle of a War for Freedom, whose main object is the overthrow of the Nazi ideals, quite such outspoken support for our enemies as is contained in the article in the February FORTNIGHTLY entitled "The Monstrous Regiment."

The title suggests scorn, as well as dislike (and possibly fear) of the three services, W.R.N.S., W.A.A.F.S. and A.T.S., which the author begins by rather half-heartedly upholding.

She states that the initials "W.R.N.S., W.A.A.F.S. or A.T.S. do not look beautiful or significant at the head of a page" compared to the letters R.A.F. or the word Navy, but would the R.A.F. or the Navy—or indeed any fair-minded citizen of Great Britain agree with her?

Strings of initials are never "beautiful" in themselves wherever they are to be found on a page—but they gain beauty from their significance; and when we remember the courage, the endurance and the self-sacrifice of the 'Regiment of Women' we are distressed that one of themselves (as from the context of the article we believe Honor Tracy to be) can speak so disparagingly of her magnificent sisterhood.

Certainly the women's services of Great Britain are without the same length of tradition as their brothers' in the Forces and they would be the last to claim the chronic dangers of active campaigning. They are "auxiliaries" not principals in action. No doubt individually they have many faults common to the human race; and particularly common to untrained members of it. But is it only women who are "awkward in authority, apt to take the easy way out, fond of pleasure, intent upon their emotional problems, and of discipline they have in their raw condition, not the faintest idea"? Have male recruits 'in their raw condition' a high standard of discipline? Ask Colonels, Group Captains and Commanders! It is not exclusively male or female to dislike "standing in rows, clicking heels or saluting"; it is in this country still, thank God, highly normal to dislike all these things.

The author claims that "an individual can only write of what she herself has found, what she likes, what she does not like and what she believes," but she should surely take a little more trouble to understand what she finds—

Her deplorable attack upon the Girl Guides, whom she calls "the huge detestable body of hockey-playing girl guides, with their monocles and cigarette holders, whose conversation is a mixture of pep slogan and school-room cliché," reads like pure personal spite. If there is one thing to be noticed about Girl Guide officers it is that they are unobtrusive, except in emergencies, when their training and discipline usually make the emergencies themselves unobtrusive. After all the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Why have the three chief services chosen seventy per cent. of their officers from those who have had Girl Guide training? Obviously because they are the best persons, with the most natural and disciplined aptitude, to deal with difficult situations. Is this the real cause of Miss Tracy's dislike? I have travelled, as a lecturer, a good deal over these Islands since war began, but I have never yet seen an officer drawn from the Girl Guide ranks with a monocle, or a cigarette-holder—let alone a hockey stick. Nor has it occurred to me that these devoted hard-working girls looked at all like 'inferior men'—they seemed to me to look like a very good type of human being.

Moreover as a resident in various other countries, not all naturally devoted to Great Britain, there is only one of our products that I have heard enthusiastically applauded, and envied to the point sometimes of imitation—and that is our Boy Scouts and Girl Guides.

I should suggest before Honor Tracy writes about her "likes," "dislikes" and "beliefs" she should study a few facts. Let her ask farmers, A.R.P. Wardens or Home Guards, which they would rather employ, girls and boys with, or without, Scout training? Miss Tracy is doing herself and her fellow-workers a very great wrong by such a silly and ill-natured attack upon a service that has again and again, during the last few years, proved its splendid mettle.

What better work in the world can a man or woman do, *if they are trained* to it, than provide first aid, cooking, cleaning, practical thinking in emergency—and warm-hearted active help for the sufferers in broken and enslaved Europe the moment the door is opened? If no one makes themselves ready for these duties to humanity, what will be the fate of our world to-morrow?

Miss Tracy should read over rather carefully the last strange sentence of her own article, in which she suggests that had English women "entered into the duties of womanhood with the same zest as the Victorians or *our female enemies*, we should not now be forced to make monkeys of ourselves in trappings and in postures which are not truly ours." The italics are *my own*. Does Miss Tracy believe the German women have escaped war service, because they were forced into the three K's by their Nazi Masters? She is mistaken if she does; I lived in Germany between the two wars and talked with my 'female enemies' when they were not enemies but sisters. I can assure Miss Tracy that they were not so fond, as she seems to think, of the degrading servitude thrust upon them by Hitler.

The male children it was their one duty to produce have now been taken from them to perish in the snows of Russia; but that has not saved these women from being forced into every kind of male work that can be pushed upon their shoulders! Only they are untrained; their spirits are fundamentally discouraged—they work without hope! They are told at the last moment of the dread emergency forced on them by a purely man-made and man-run régime. That upon *them* depends the fate of their Fatherland.

Do we desire a like fate for our own Fatherland or such a down-trodden sisterhood to depend on? If not, do not let us attempt to disparage half of the human race; or to distinguish by anything other than merit any form of human endeavour. Above all let us remember that our ideals are not those of the Nazis, that we are believers and should be practisers of a Christian standard. For us who are "the envy of unhappier lands" there can be "no bond nor free, no Jew nor gentile, no male nor female—for all are one."

Yours faithfully,

PHYLLIS BOTTOME.

Red Willows,
St. Ives, Cornwall.

Miss Honor Tracy writes:

The propagandist lives in a world of his own; it is a spacious and sunlit world but there are no people in it. Miss Bottome has gained her experience of women in uniform by lecturing to them, whereas the abominable Tracy was there before Miss Bottome's car drew up at the guard-room and after it drove away. Knowledge acquired in such different ways is bound to be a different kind of knowledge. I am going to ask her to forgive me if I decline to discuss the matter under so serious a handicap.

As regards the other points in her letter:—Miss Bottome is sentimental when she writes about German women. Hitler came to power by constitutional means and he did so with feminine support and with a feminine vote. If she has spent as much time in Germany as I have, I feel certain she will agree that there is no Nazi like a female Nazi. German women allowed themselves to be bamboozled into thinking that the things German men care for, war, conquest, domination, were the things that really mattered and that it was their duty to help them. That was a dangerous illusion, and it has brought terrible consequences. (I do not deny that women in Germany are made to work, incidentally: but no German woman has spent three and a half years as a uniformed soldier).

The disparagement of women is implied in asking them to be themselves: nor am I a Nazi because I mention the desirability of their having children. I cannot withdraw my remarks about a certain type of service-woman, but if Miss Bottome is a Girl Guide herself I am ready to apologize for any pain they caused her.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

IN the National Gallery there is a collection of pictures dealing with wartime subjects: skies lit with fantastic flares and streamers; warships looking, as their way is, uncomfortably rigid, though impressively efficient; and so on, down to portraits of military and naval personages—also efficient and rather stiff. But on the whole it is a show in which two things are never suggested—leisure and pleasure; and as if to mark the contrast, in the adjoining room Constable's Hay Wain is on view, so happy in its atmosphere, so leisurely (those wheels, a little bulged and bent, could never hurry) and so utterly normally English. If I turned from the parcel of books which now lies on my table to something of Hardy's, or to Izaak Walton, or even to a good Trollope, I should in the same way realize my discontent with what is of its essence temporary, and of a bad time. The one volume out of which I derived at least some aesthetic satisfaction has been the illustrated *Air Force Anthology*, a 'Batsford Book' costing 12s. 6d., to which its editor Mr. F. Alan Walbank gives the title *Wings of War*. Since this is the military field in which my ignorance is greatest, I have found the selection most informing, especially in the opening extracts which recall the pioneer experiments of not quite fifty years ago. The illustrations in this book—52 of them—are all photographic and of solely technical interest. Writers are free of such bondage and the poet, Mr. Day Lewis, shows how a narrative of strictly dated fact, strung into modern verse, may have a quality not usual in poetry, and yet completely different from anything attainable in prose. What he recounts is the adventure of two Australian lieutenants who decided to fly home across the world in such a craft as they could afford—a condemned machine, "sold for a song." But this does not lend itself to quotation; and most of the other verse affects me like the pictures, with a feeling of something inhuman. I only get what my mind responds to when Sylvia Lynd writes of "the squadron flying home, at midnight high among the stars—"

Instead of Bear, or Wain, or Plough,
Splendid to see in Night's great dome,
Give to those stars a new name now;
Call them 'the Squadron Flying Home.'

As for the prose stuff: here we have the Battle of Britain, told in part by the fighters; here are extracts from that man of many victories, Captain McCudden who "hates to shoot a Hun down without his seeing me, for although this method is in accordance with my doctrine it is quite against what little sporting instinct I have left." Yet he had enough left to chronicle (on page 39) the deeds of "the bravest German airman whom it has been my privilege to see fight." Such reactions have nothing modern or mechanical about them; they are as old as the oldest chivalry.

* * * * *

Sea Power in the Second World War by Lord Strabolgi (Hutchinson, 12s. 6d.) is certainly not a book to which I could imagine myself turning back for pleasure; yet I have read it with real enjoyment. The writer is an able man, so passionately interested in his subject that his enthusiasm to some degree communicates itself.

The Key to Victory

It is not likely that the governing powers will be grateful to Lord Strabolgi, who has always been critical, whether in his new sphere or when he was Commander Kenworthy in the Commons; but the ordinary educated man will find in this volume a singularly readable and suggestive review of the world war. The governing point of view is suggested by a quotation from Admiral Mahan. "Communications dominate war . . . In its control over them lies the pre-eminence of sea-power." To take one instance, Lord Strabolgi brings out with admirable clearness how great a triumph it was for sea-power when 500 transports carrying 140,000 soldiers, British and American, with their supplies, and escorted by 350 warships, made their landing unexpectedly with perfect timing—and lost only one ship torpedoed, and even the troops of that on board made their disembarkation by barges. Yet elsewhere in the book the limiting factor is pointed out. If the Allies by sea-power could transport huge masses of men and material, Germany without it, but having developed powerfully communications by air, was able to throw almost at a day's notice some thirty thousand men with heavy armament into Tunisia. Again and again Lord Strabolgi insists that sea power no longer suffices unless there is adequate support from the air. To make it complete, mastery must be established in both the elements where men can travel without roads.

Speaking for one reader at least, nothing in the book has been so surprising as the revelation of the extent to which Germany has been able to replace man-power by machinery. "The German General Staff conquered Poland, Holland, Belgium and France with a striking force of about 120,000 men. These men were highly mobile because they rode in petrol-driven vehicles—tanks, armoured cars and lorries . . . A few mechanized divisions with their armour and fast moving artillery defeated large masses of slow-marching infantry." That is a general view; but look at this small one. Crete was defended by British troops under General Freyberg who had his New Zealanders with him and a strong force of Royal Marines. Fighting quality could not be higher. "Yet Crete was taken, after parachute troops had prepared the way, by 650 troop-carrying aeroplanes with 20 to 30 men in each . . . The invaders were fewer in number and, if anything, inferior in weapons to the defender. They had however complete ascendancy in the air . . . The defenders were defeated "by the greater mobility of the air-borne invaders, who could concentrate on the vital areas in superior numbers." After reading that, I am disposed to attend seriously to Lord Strabolgi's plea for a great extension of airborne transport. Admitting that Americans can raise ten million soldiers, "there are," he says, "not ships enough in the world to carry such numbers overseas; but enough picked fighting men can be flown to the combat areas to win battle. Sea power will clear the way to the enemy's stronghold, air-borne armies will unlock the door . . . This is the key to victory." I have only to add a word of appreciation for the appendices, one of which discusses elaborately the resources in oil or oil substitutes open to the Axis, and the proportion which they bear to wartime requirements. Lord Strabolgi has spared no pains in informing himself, and has given us notable assistance to check his view. How the book may be rated by experts in the art of war, it is useless to speculate; but to the ordinary educated man it will at least provide much of vivid interest and ample food for thought.

Mr. Pethick Lawrence is very disarming. On first approaching this autobiography which he calls *Fate has been Kind* (Hutchinson, 15s.) many readers will incline to say: "This is the rather dull story of a conscientious crank," and indeed in a life which has now passed the allotted three-score years and ten probably more people have laughed at Mr. Pethick Lawrence than with him. The ordinary Philistine regarded it as comic that a man, marrying an active suffragette should pay tribute to her sense of independence by joining the two names instead of suppressing the lady's. But one thing emerges indisputably; when Mr. Frederick Lawrence married Miss Emmeline Pethick he secured a wife who was all to him that any man could have hoped. And as to being laughed at, when she was for the first time sent to gaol (because she would not pledge herself "to keep the peace"), her husband publicly promised to contribute ten pounds to the suffrage funds for every day of her imprisonment. Naturally, all the world laughed, as the common view was that a suffragette wife was no domestic comfort and the gentleman's offer could be represented as a thankoffering. But Mr. Lawrence says that he was soon able to enjoy the joke, and for the moment "did not care whether he had become notorious or ridiculous." That was characteristic of a man, whom it is impossible not to like the better, the more one sees into his mind. Crank or not, he never ceased to be a human being; well on in the fifties, he retained his passion for billiards and for lawn tennis—with a modest pride in his considerable proficiency. Also, he has a real talent for telling his readers about things which most writers quite wrongly assume to be generally known. One of these is the way of life at Eton—where he attained to be captain of the Oppidans. It was not a beginning to life which pointed towards a leading position in the Labour Party; but Mr. Lawrence never went back on Eton, or thought he might have had a better education elsewhere.

Another institution even more characteristically English than Eton is the House of Commons. Mr. Lawrence had aspired to membership for most of his adult life; yet he was turned fifty when he got there. It did not disappoint him, and he goes almost voluptuously into description of its methods—realizing that what he sets down would be news to nine people in ten. What he has to say of it is shrewd and (if I may speak from experience) enlightening even to those who spent several years there. Still, this detail though it may be informing cannot compare for interest with the sidelights we get on personalities. He made a sensational entry having beaten no less a person than Mr. Churchill, at Leicester, in a three-cornered fight. When an At Home for the Labour Members was given at Buckingham Palace, King George asked him whether he did not think, "in spite of all, that Churchill was a man who ought to be in the House of Commons." To this there was only "a somewhat grudging acquiescence." Nowadays, Mr. Lawrence like the rest of us thanks God for the Prime Minister; and of course in his experience of Parliament he had frequent occasion to admire—if not to fear—Mr. Churchill's talent. Mr. Lloyd George too comes alive many times in these pages. But I prefer to quote this view of Mr. Baldwin: "A most likeable man whose geniality made him deservedly popular in the House. Never in my recollection did he try to score off an opponent in debate by misrepresenting his argument." Nevertheless, he thinks Mr. Baldwin paid too dear for peace. Mr. Lawrence himself was not only a pacifist, but in his day a conscientious objector, sentenced at one time to work on the land as a farm labourer; and he had a strong sympathy with the German people; but Hitler

and Mussolini together succeeded in convincing him that peace was not to be accepted at the price of allowing international crime; and he inclined to think that Mr. Baldwin and his successor had gone far in that direction. However, to discuss this book fully would mean reviewing the history of the century; and to do it completely one should be expert in finance; from childhood up, Mr. Lawrence was, like Cassio in the play, "a great arithmetician". I note that particularly in his account of the Spanish Revolution and of the dealings with Mussolini about Abyssinia, he is admirably clear. Yet nothing in the book is better than his story of the General Strike which was in fact "a class war—carried to its close without violence or loss of life." He may well say that "in no other country could it have been conducted as it was."

* * * * *

But in all that Mr. Lawrence records, no part played by any woman is more notable than that which Miss Lily Montagu brings to our notice in her little book *The Faith of a Jewish Woman* (Allen and Unwin, 3s. 6d.).

Liberal Judaism

Of all communities the Jews were perhaps strictest in the denial to women of any public leadership; and she was the devoted daughter of one whose Jewishness went deep—the first Lord Swaythling. In spite of all his public commitments, it was, she says, "the central fact in his life," and yet loving and admiring him, she felt herself constrained to attempt a reform of the religion by which his life was shaped. It would seem that as she grew up in a world where many, if not most, of her associates were Christian, she became aware that they expected and perhaps got something from their religion which Judaism did not give. She began to realize this when impulse had made her start clubs for Jewish children and so to organize services for them. Gradually she found that these girls did not consciously let their religion shape their conduct; it was a matter of external observance. So from one step to another, guided by that much loved human being Claude Montefiore, she set herself to "vitalize" Judaism by such a reform movement as was already on foot in Germany and the United States. She had to face the disappointment of many—but above all of her father. Her part was very largely that of a preacher (how unlike all the Rabbinical tradition!) and when the organization of Liberal Judaism sent a deputation to a Conference in Berlin she preached in the Reform Synagogue—"being the first woman, I am told, to occupy a pulpit in Germany."

Her conception of Judaism repudiates the idea of a Jewish nationality; Israel for her is a "spiritual brotherhood, not a political unity." What she has to say of Palestine makes it clear that if Jews cling to the idea of a racial home there, it is only because of the terrible dangers surrounding them. It is astonishing that such a book, published now, makes no allusion to the organized massacre of the Jewish race; yet, after all, silence perhaps is the best way of letting it be known that Israel trusts in the God of Israel to defeat this persecution as so many others have been defeated in the past. Miss Montagu makes it clear that her belief in a God who is a God of love postulates immortality. "It would seem to me that God had mocked me if my beloved (her sister and closest comrade) could be withdrawn for ever when I give her a devotion which can never be broken by any physical change." The same reasoning would apply to the ancient and much afflicted race, of which she has become so valiantly a banner-bearer.

THE UNITED STATES, by E. A. Benians. *Cambridge University Press.* 3s. 6d.

In scholarship, as in other branches of life, the law of supply and demand plays a leading part. Occasionally a scholar may spend his life on a subject in which he alone is interested, but such pure devotion to learning is rare and is not always of value. There is therefore no surer sign of the interest that has recently developed in this country in all things American than the number of first-rate books that have been written in the past few years by English authors on the history, politics and literature of the United States. It is only necessary to mention here the works of Professor Laski and of Professor Brogan, both of whom have made outstanding original contributions in this field. Mr. Benians' historical sketch is of a more modest character than their major books, but it is none the less welcome for he has been able to describe in terse and vivid language the more important events of the past one hundred and fifty years. Moreover, as an Englishman, he has succeeded in emphasizing those parts which are of particular interest for the English reader.

In the first chapter which is entitled "The New Nation" Mr. Benians describes the making of the United States Constitution, followed by the formative twelve years under Washington and Adams, and then the dramatic change to democracy illustrated by Thomas Jefferson's presidency. These were the critical years during which the future of the new nation seemed so uncertain, and when many people believed that the States would not be able to unite. Mr. Benians rightly emphasizes the practical character of the men who were the members of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 in contrast with those who attended the French

convention at Versailles two years later when "the Rights of Man" were declared but no constitution was adopted. Perhaps he might have pointed out that the majority of the members of the American Convention were lawyers who were trained in the solid, concrete ideas of the common law. We are glad to see that he has rejected the economic interpretation of the Constitution which Professor Beard has attempted to establish in his books. As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his letters to Sir Frederick Pollock, the founders of the Constitution were primarily anxious to create a stable government and not merely to protect their private property.

In this chapter Mr. Benians says that "Jay's treaty was very unpopular in America, where British diplomacy acquired more credit than it usually receives in England." This view that the English diplomats are Machiavellian and are always successful in outwitting the less astute Americans has persisted ever since: it has been expressed in the Senate within the past few weeks. The Master of St. John's, Cambridge, would be performing a valuable service to Anglo-American relations if he would write an article showing that this is not true.

The second chapter is entitled "Western Settlement." In handling its western lands the federal government adopted the wise course of opening them up to genuine settlers and preventing the land companies from getting control. It was during this period that the interest of the United States became concentrated on expansion to the West, with the result that its European ties became progressively weaker. The Monroe Doctrine was an expression of this feeling.

Chapter III. deals with the long drawn-out conflict between the

North and the South. This is the part of American history which is least interesting for English readers, for the debate on the Missouri Compromise, the Dred Scott decision, etc., concern an issue which can never rise again. Perhaps Mr. Benians could have put more emphasis here on the decisive part played by the Middle West. A physical division between the northern and southern Atlantic States would have been possible, but not between the States bordering on the Mississippi river, for they depended in large part on this outlet to the sea. Abraham Lincoln, as a Westerner, realized that this unity could not be torn apart.

Chapter IV. on "Industrial Greatness" covers the history of the United States from 1865 to the election of President Wilson in 1912. This is a valuable corrective to the popular view, largely fostered by the "movies," that the American "business barons" were always wicked and destructive. The author makes it clear that the great railwaymen and industrialists who built up the country during this period made an essential contribution to American life. Unfortunately the whole modern emphasis has been placed on the occasional misuse of their power.

The final chapter "The New World and the Old" deals with the foreign relations of the United States from 1890 to the present day. It was Theodore Roosevelt, more than any other man, who first brought America into close touch with European politics, for he mediated between Russia and Japan in 1905, participated in the Algeiras Conference (1906), and sent a battle fleet round the world in 1907. Thereafter America's part in world affairs steadily increased until it culminated in the Great War and the Versailles Conference. Mr. Benians is particularly happy in his description

of how the tide receded after 1920, until it reached the isolationism of the Neutrality Acts. He is careful not to make any predictions for the future, but the tone of his conclusion is optimistic. "There can be," he says, "no New World apart from the Old World, nor any new world at all that is not the whole world." The only difficulty in attaining this unity is that so many people, not only in the United States but also in Europe, fail to realize that international peace can only be assured if they are prepared to sacrifice their own selfish interests. Such books as Mr. Benians' will do much to promote this essential understanding.

A. L. GOODHART.

ASIA AND DEMOCRACY, by Pearl S. Buck. *Macmillan.* 4s. 6d.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, by Eric A. Walker. *Oxford University Press.* 12s. 6d.

A great deal of nonsense has been talked about empire during the last few decades—and a growing amount of good sense. The British Empire has been under almost continuous fire from left wing critics, both in this country and the United States, but every year more people are coming to realize that in spite of our sins, more particularly sins of omission, there is something to be said in defence of the Empire as it is in process of development. And by comparison with the alternative offered by Hitler's New Order, our colonial administrators appear almost as angels of light.

Miss Pearl Buck is a good example of the critical school. Her development during recent years has taken her well to the left, and she pleads eloquently for the depressed classes in the East, not forgetting those of her own country. In the main, *Asia and Democracy* is a collection of addresses delivered by her in the United States soon after Pearl

Harbour. Inevitably they date a little because of the confusion which then reigned, but she is dealing with problems which still await their solution and her message remains a call to action.

When Miss Buck discusses China she speaks with authority, and we are equally moved by what she says about the colour problem in the United States. On India however she is dependent on others for her information, and there is no great reason to regard it as reliable. Following her heart rather than her head, she is often sure where other people find the issues confused. Her vision sees a problem in the light of ideals, without too much regard for the practical difficulties which may be involved. Freedom, in particular, is conceived primarily in political terms, a simplification which greatly increases her confidence. Yet the book is one to read. At times it will irritate, but there are good things which should not be missed.

Professor Walker's *The British Empire* is in a different class. For one thing it is issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs—in itself an indication of sound scholarship and the judicial mind. The author's aim is to describe the spirit and structure of the Empire, and to that end he traces its history from the beginning. To attempt this in 237 pages betrays no lack of ambition, and it follows that his pages are crowded with facts. But the story is well told and the comment strictly to the point, so that one is always conscious of the wood as well as the many trees.

Fully two-fifths of the book deals with the period since 1914, "not because the story of the earlier years lacks interest and importance, but because the spirit and structure that we know have been shaped most

directly for us by the events of these more recent years." A valuable feature is the way in which developments within the Empire are related to changes in world affairs. The discussion of the Ottawa Conference, for instance, really illuminates the subject, setting it against the world background and drawing an effective contrast between high hopes and unexpected consequences. Similarly, the connection between our own rapidly changing social and economic history and that of the Empire is always borne in mind.

But it is the new spirit of empire, and the extent to which it is being translated into structure, which is Professor Walker's main theme, and rightly he emphasizes the great progress which has been made in this respect in recent years. Even in the midst of a world-war, time has been found to arrange for a substantial advance in colonial matters. The evidence of this new spirit is too impressive to be ignored, from the work of Lord Hailey and other reformers to the recent Report by Sir Frank Stockdale on "Development and Welfare in the West Indies." Many problems have of course still to be tackled, but the necessary good will in this country is accumulating rapidly. The work of the critic is essential and has played a noble part in bettering conditions in the colonies. But Professor Walker's book is a very desirable reminder of the extent of the contra account.

H. E. A. CONDON.

CAN OUR CITIES SURVIVE? by J. L. Sert. *Harvard University Press.* \$5. *Oxford University Press.* 21s.

The *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* which was founded in 1928 is an association of architects drawn from most of the countries of Europe and America.

Congresses have been held at various centres and at each a definite programme of discussion on an architectural problem was undertaken. Mr. Sert's work is the result of the discussions on the "Functional City" at the last two Congresses in 1933 and 1937, and the detailed "Town Planning Chart" which was drafted at the 1933 Congress has served as a basis for his book.

Mr. Sert's book can be divided into three main portions. The first is a statement of the problems confronting the town planner. The history of the haphazard growth and the resulting inconvenience, stagnation and over-crowding of our modern towns is expounded in a clear and direct manner. A fair proportion of the blame for the bad location of industry and the blight of slums surrounding it is traced to the private ownership of land, and the resulting system of artificial land values. The dwelling problem in cities is more than a slum problem, and for this reason there is particular reference to the "Expanding Suburb," and the appropriation of open spaces for development. The modern city is such an unwieldy conglomeration of badly-related units, that the inhabitants have to escape into the open air and sunlight at the weekend. Because the very pattern of the streets is based on horse-drawn traffic, industry itself becomes baffled by the chaos and is forced to move away. Our cities cannot survive—they are throttling themselves.

The central portion of the book deals with the general measures necessary for replanning our cities and towns. For residential areas a new structure is suggested, based on the Neighbourhood Unit, composed of say six thousand inhabitants, and having its own elementary school, day-nursery, shopping centre, community centre and branch

library. Each group of Neighbourhood Units forms a Borough Unit, having a civic centre, administrative offices, secondary schools, central library, cinemas and other community equipment whose efficient operation requires larger populations. The whole plan of the residential areas ought then to be based on the proper grouping of these units with a minimum open space for recreation of one acre per hundred inhabitants. For industry the same unit principle is applicable. A thorough plan for the zoning of industries is essential and here the town planner and economist must co-operate. Industrial areas and those planned for other uses should be separated by open spaces. Residential districts should enjoy favourable communication with both business and industrial zones, and streets must be classified according to their functions as residential, industrial or through-traffic streets.

Finally Mr. Sert considers the relationship of the city to the region that surrounds it. This relationship has been considerably intensified in recent times due to the network of communications that have sprung up following the development of the railway and the motor car. The radius of direct influence of a metropolis can now be traced with comparative accuracy, and if the city is to function efficiently, this area must be planned as a composite region. It follows also that there is an economical maximum size for a city when considered against the background of its region, and that the first step towards the reconstruction of the city of to-day, should take place on the regional scale, bearing in mind the fact that the regions themselves have been shaped by national and international factors. To sum up, the replanning of our cities cannot be undertaken by private enterprise, nor is it a

task for local governments. It is a national undertaking.

This book will appeal to the professional planner because of the thorough and competent manner in which Mr. Sert's analysis is presented. For the layman it should be easy to read and there are some hundreds of illustrations many of which are new. It is a valuable contribution to a subject which is of topical, and must remain of permanent interest, if the present opportunity of creating a new order of society on the ruins of the old is to be seized.

ARTHUR M. FOYLE.

THE HERITAGE OF SYMBOLISM, by C. M. Bowra. *Macmillan*. 15s.

Between the Inhabitant of the Ivory Tower and the Proletarian Poet there is a gulf which at first sight seems unbridgeable. What is there in common between the Symbolist poet, hating the 'public,' delighting to flout and mystify the *bourgeois*, proclaiming the necessary isolation of the poet as *vates*, and the post-Eliot school, exulting in the collective, insisting that poetry is inseparable from the 'people' and hymning mechanization and mobs as enthusiastically, if not as rhythmically, as their predecessors in the Nineties praised Beauty?

It is one of the values of Mr. Bowra's book that he has indicated what is, both chronologically and aesthetically, the link—the Post-Symbolists, who inherited the main ideas of Symbolism but so modified them that the 'moderns' can be regarded, along one line of development, as their heirs.

The Symbolists, of whom Mallarmé was the High-Priest, were ultimately unable to resolve a contradiction inherent in their position. The essence of Symbolism, as Mr. Bowra has well defined it, was "its

insistence of a world ^{events of} and its conviction that ^{A va} which de through art. The ^{ec} are religion claims for the through prayer and contemplation are claimed by the Symbolist for the poet through the exercise of his craft." But, in practice, the poet was driven into greater and greater isolation and was unable adequately to communicate his vision.

The Post-Symbolists, without forsaking the ideal, modified the 'magical' view of poetry. For Mallarmé, incantation was first and mere meaning a very poor second. The Post-Symbolists "have increased the amount of intelligible matter in their verse and have even condescended to argue and explain." They have done this, however from a motive no less lofty than that of their predecessors. The vision of Beauty was still their quest, but they added to it the belief that it is this spirit which is to change the world and to mould new societies. They have gone down into the market place, but they have made the journey convinced that their function is to give what no one else there can give. Their individualism and their pride in their high calling are as intense as those of the Symbolists.

They see, finally, that it is only by a self-revelation following on a self-knowledge that they can fulfil their task. Thus, as against both Classical and 'modern,' they insist on the worth of the poet's personality, even when it is expressed in objective symbols. And their self-revelation is essentially different from the egotistical self-dramatization of the Romantics.

Their achievement is analysed by Mr. Bowra by a detailed examination of five poets, of whom one Paul Valéry, is still alive and the others, Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan George, Alexander Blok and W.B. Yeats, not very long dead. The

author finds in Rilke's theory of death and transformation, George's cult of the beautiful youth Maximin, Blok's 'Spirit of Music,' Yeats' spiritualism, vindications of the unique function of the poet in so far as they are all attempts to make a religion out of the creative process which lies behind poetry. And the expression of personality by objective symbolism can be seen in Yeats' private mythology of friendship and George's addresses to his intimates, in which he made them see themselves as important cases in the history of man. Valéry typifies in his own conflicts the general and never-ceasing struggle between mind and body, between intellect and emotion.

A study of the school—for, in spite of the differences in nationality and idiom, it is revealed as a coherent 'school'—is valuable not only in itself, but because it helps to a better understanding of what has come after. It puts both the symbolists and the 'moderns' in perspective. Mr. Bowra is to be congratulated on this, but his book might have been of even greater service, had he included T. S. Eliot, especially in view of Mr. Eliot's early debt to Corbière and Laforgue, the precursors of Symbolism and of his four latest poems which, in some respects, might surely be considered the crown of the Post-Symbolist movement.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON.

RACE AND RACISM, by Ruth Benedict. *Routledge*. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Benedict, well-known American anthropologist, has performed a valuable service in producing this little study on ethnology and on that exploitation of ethnology for propaganda ends, in disregard of the scientific facts, which she calls 'racism'. Like many psychologists to-day the latter perversion she sees

as but one phase of an age-long tendency in the human animal beset by original sin—the tendency to persecute those not of the herd. She has the courage to refer to the race question in the South. Actually, as Turberville shows, the records of the Holy Inquisition of Toulouse show fewer executed over twenty years than were lynched, quite as horribly, in the United States a few years ago—not now—in one year. (There are one or two historical errors in Dr. Benedict's description of the mediæval period).

Dr. Benedict concentrates on showing that there is no scientific evidence for asserting the superiority of certain races or nations as such to others. For one thing none of these races or nations is ethnologically pure. For another intelligence tests do not bear out the hypothesis of racial superiority and, where they appear to do so, the superiority is explicable in cultural or environmental terms. She does not, however, direct much attention to the issue on which I commented recently in THE FORTNIGHTLY when reviewing Dr. Mess' little textbook that there is probably no inheritance of acquired (that is socially derived) characteristics but that quality of intelligence and certain abilities may have a hereditary basis. If so, not the Nazi racists, but the ancestor-worshipping Chinese who attend to family, not race, may be wise. I am not here referring to the family inheritance of certain disadvantages—hæmophilia, tubercular tendencies and the like. It appears probable that musical ability runs in certain family strains. Just as civilization of the white race may well be inferior culturally in many respects to that of China, which has so long maintained peace and good manners, so the white, not indeed in terms of race but of particular family, will on the average probably

be of inferior musical ability in singing to the average negro. It would be democratically more satisfactory to think that we were all equal. But would it be scientifically correct? As touching the particular talent is not the negro likely to be of superior family? The only scientific description of Equality would appear to be Freedom of opportunity for each and Fraternity for all. As Pope St. Gregory the Great said: "The doctrine of inequality springs from the fount of pride," that is, non-fraternity.

The trouble is that the medal of community which has its obverse in fraternity has its reverse in herd-persecution. This is the issue of our time with which Dr. Benedict seeks to wrestle, discussing persecution from the Wars of Religion to the present Islamic wars of political religion that characterize our century. She notes—what is extremely relevant to Lord Vansittart's theory of culturally inherited predestination to damnation of a people—that a people, such as the Germans, which develops an inferiority complex is inclined to become a people that re-establishes its self-esteem by persecuting any other people weaker than itself. When there is no one left to persecute they take to lying and defensive forms of chicane or develop a theory of toleration. Thus it is the poor whites in the South, not the rich, who show their racial superiority by lynching negroes. The negro sometimes turns to re-

ligion and sometimes to violence. To the psychologist and political scientist this is perhaps the most important comment in the book. Crusades don't pay. The trouble lies in the original sin of man uncontrolled by grace, reason and impartial law. The cure would seem to be by grace of restoring to each man his self-respect, not by the vengeance of more and more persecution. Dr. Benedict, however, goes further. She looks with favour on the intermarriage of races which takes place in Brazil. It may be that the only effective remedy would be some kind of large-scale Cook's Tour for international interbreeding. I do not see, however, the British looking on this with favour with their fellow-subjects in India or, for that matter, white Americans giving it legal recognition with their coloured fellow-citizens in the South. However in the eyes of Nature, it may well be that legal recognition is unimportant. More difficult is the case of those nations which, for whatever reasons religious or otherwise, do not want to mix. The task will be to convert them from what, as Dr. Benedict in this very topical volume points out, is their mistaken belief in their pure blood and in the importance of whether it is pure or otherwise. A new education here is required, alike of Jew and Gentile, German and Anglo-Saxon, to which anthropologists and psychologists can make their contribution.

GEORGE CATLIN.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

MAY, 1943

THE FUTURE OF ENGLAND

BY W. R. INGE

A PRUDENT man might shrink from joining the crowd of minor prophets whose dreams find expression under such titles as 'A New World.' That man, says Thomas Fuller, will catch a bad cold who has no clothes except the skin of a bear not yet killed. This article deals only with movements which the war has accelerated rather than initiated. But it must involve assumptions which the near future may prove to be erroneous.

The Thirty Years War which began in 1914 and will probably end in 1944, only interrupted by a truce of preparation which lasted twenty years, was made by the Germans in order to give effect to changes in the balance of power which they conceived to have taken place to their advantage since their last victorious war in 1870. They were nearly successful, but they made certain miscalculations. They underrated the resistance of France in 1914, of Britain in 1939. But their greatest blunder was in supposing that the poor fight of Tzarist Russia against Japan in 1905, of disintegrating Russia against themselves in 1917, and of Soviet Russia against Poles and Finns, was a measure of the strength the Russians were likely to put forth in defending their own country. They were confident of an easy victory in the East. 'If,' said Hitler in 1936, 'the Urals with their immeasurable wealth of raw materials, Siberia with its rich forests, and the Ukraine with its rich corn fields, lay within Germany, the country under National Socialist leadership would swim in plenty. Every German would have more than enough to live on.' But Russia is indestructible. It has survived two ghastly experiences, a revolution which cost the lives of several millions by massacre and starvation, and a barbarian invasion far more cruel and destructive than the ravages of the Tartars in the middle ages. I shall assume that the German attempt to conquer the world will fail; that a long peace of exhaustion, disturbed no doubt by intestine troubles, will follow the war; and that Russia, whose ascendancy in two continents will become more and more indisputable, will have no ambition to conquer the West. If I am right, domestic affairs will occupy us.

The nineteenth century has been called the century of hope, and the prevailing temper throughout the reign of Queen Victoria was

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optimistic. But it should be remembered that the aristocracy was alarmed by the growth of the mercantile middle class, that before 1850 there was much discontent among the wage-earners, and that many statesmen and men of letters were pessimistic while the country seemed most prosperous. I have elsewhere collected a chorus of gloomy prophecies by Wilberforce, Shaftesbury, Wellington, Disraeli, Carlyle and Ruskin. Now there is profound pessimism among the upper and upper-middle classes, except in cliques of young intellectuals who hope for revolution. In the early twenties one is on the side of any party that will attack. The wage-earners, who are now becoming the privileged class, do not yet realize that the destruction of private property may react unfavourably on their own standards of living.

Optimism was natural enough during the extraordinary episode in our history which for a hundred years made our small island the mistress of the seas and the workshop of the world. It was one of those historical episodes which depend on a combination of circumstances—the most favourable geographical position, a ready supply of the most essential raw materials such as coal and iron, an abundance of cheap labour, and an absence of severe competition. Industrially we had a long start of other nations, and we made a full use of it. Most of the technical inventions were made on this island. An unparalleled growth of population kept pace with the increase in wealth. After 1815 the population of the chief western countries was:

France	30.4 millions	
Germany	21	" (the lands of the later empire)
Great Britain	14	" (without Ireland)
United States	9.8	"

In 1880 the figures were: United States 50.1 millions; Germany 45.2; France 37.6; United Kingdom 35.2; Italy 28.4.

Foreign trade, in millions, is given by Mulhall:

	1870	1880	1889
United Kingdom	547	698	740
France	227	339	311
Germany	212	294	387
U.S.A.	165	308	320

In 1890 the population of the United States had grown to 62 millions; that of Germany to 49; of Great Britain to 33; of France to 38; of Italy to 30. Ten years later the United Kingdom had passed France, and Germany numbered 56.3. In 1911, U.S.A. numbered 92 millions; Germany 65; the United Kingdom 45; France 40; Italy 35.

In 1933 or 1934 the estimated population was: Great Britain 45.4; France 41.9; Germany 65.3; Italy 42.2; U.S.A. 126.

These figures tell their own tale, and trade statistics correspond closely with changes in population. What we are in the habit of calling progress has not ceased in Britain; but we are losing our lead; other nations are catching us up or have already passed us. Our prosperity really culminated in the seventies; the first setback was the ruin of British agriculture which became apparent about 1878, a date which coincided with the Bradlaugh-Besant trial and the advent of birth-control. Real wages, which had advanced rapidly in the last century, were almost stationary in the fifteen years before the Great War. Although the recovery after the war, till the great depression in 1929, was far greater than was expected, we were in no position to stand a second stroke. We have long ceased to be the workshop of the world. Our labour is very dear and only moderately efficient. We have lent vast sums to foreign nations, to equip their manufactures against our own. The interest on these loans helped us to maintain some kind of balance; but these loans have now been called in, and we can only supply our swollen population with food by exporting our irreplaceable mineral wealth and such of our manufactures as can still bear the brunt of hostile tariffs. Apart from economic nationalism in other countries, our foreign trade is crippled by high costs of production and overwhelming public burdens; it will also be a long time before our former customers recover their purchasing power. Can we maintain our present population, brought into existence by unique conditions which no longer exist, without lowering our standard of living, not only for the well-to-do, who have been extinguished by war-taxation, but for the masses, who never envisage such a possibility?

'There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death.' Every institution carries the seeds of its own dissolution. Not only do internal contradictions, masked during its period of general acceptance, become apparent, but after producing all the fruits which it was capable of bearing, it becomes a cumberer of the ground. During the last century the British invention of parliamentary democracy was so brilliantly successful that it looked almost like a panacea for all human ills. It was copied all over the world, and almost everywhere, except in the English-speaking countries, it proved a lamentable failure. It was perhaps hardly realized that we were really living under a mixed constitution, in which democracy was tempered by aristocratic and plutocratic elements, and by a strong national tradition. The superiority of a mixed constitution has been argued by Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Burke and Lecky, to mention only a few conspicuous names. The dominant element in England

was the middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, which in the opinion of Euripides is always the class which saves the country. But real democracy is a factitious equality of unequals, in which votes are not weighed but counted. Democratic politics inevitably ends as an auction of the worldly goods of the unrepresented minority, conducted by rival groups of politicians who instead of bribing, immorally perhaps but innocuously, with their own money, fleece the taxpayer for the benefit of the electorate. In 1927 a parliamentary committee gave the following estimate of the cost per head of five 'social services' in the chief industrial countries of Europe.

Great Britain	£3	8	6
Germany	£1	17	6
France		13	0
Italy		3	6

The climax was reached in the Beveridge Report, the most gigantic offer of blackmail ever made by a frightened government. Its chief feature is a heavy bribe to the slum-dwellers to have large families. The consequences would be most disastrous; for not only would the extra mouths be a burden on the community, and (as we know now) a deadly danger in time of war, but our slum population, who already have the highest birth-rate, are a very poor type both physically and intellectually. Artificial dysgenic selection has never been carried so far. Our politicians and journalists must know the truth; but with their ears to the ground they hear only the million-hooved stampede of the Gadarene swine. 'They who kept them fled,' and will do nothing to warn their charges of the cold bath which awaits them at the bottom of the hill.

Before the second world war the real wages of a British workman were said to be 30 per cent. above those of a German or French workman, and three times those of an Italian. It is childish to suppose that this state of things can continue in a country which, with its present numbers, can only exist by foreign trade.

The results of recent legislation, which is often honestly defended on humanitarian grounds, have never been better summed up than by the emperor Tiberius, in Tacitus. 'Industry will languish, idleness will increase, if men have nothing to fear and nothing to hope from themselves. Everyone will indolently expect help from outside, useless to themselves and a burden to the State.' Even more significant at the present day is the declaration of Mr. Stalin: 'The principle of communism is: To every man according to his needs; the principle of socialism is: To every man according to the value of his work. We have chosen the second.'

The danger of dysgenic selection, which thirty years ago filled all books on eugenics, is now an unpopular theme, and not entirely

without reason. There are laws of heredity, but they are more complicated and obscure than Galton believed. Families like the Bachs and Darwins, in which ability persists for more than two generations, are rare. The world would have lost nothing if Augustus, Marcus Aurelius, Shakespeare, Milton, Cromwell, Napoleon, and Goethe had died childless. Some American writers made the Nordic theory ridiculous; the Germans have made it odious. But the reaction has gone too far. Insurance Companies are not mistaken in asking questions about the health and longevity of an applicant's family; it would not be profitable to buy carthorse colts and train them for the Derby. Nor can it be seriously maintained that the Hottentot or the Australian blackfellow is potentially the equal of the European. From the eugenic point of view it would not do the country much harm to tax our old families out of existence, though on other grounds I should regret it; but to encourage the dregs of the population to multiply is madness, and we may regret the tendency to draft the ablest sons of the working man into the sterile professional class. But the professional class need not always be sterile, and in fact is becoming rather less so.

In the early part of the nineteenth century economists urged that the unchecked fecundity of the lower orders neutralized all efforts to improve their condition. Mill exclaimed fiercely: 'Little improvement can be expected in morality until the producing of large families is regarded with the same feelings as drunkenness or any other physical excess.' Some expressed a fear that at last there would hardly be standing room on the earth. The arguments of those who disliked Malthus were not such as to convince intelligent people. Godwin declared that 'myriads of centuries of still increasing population may pass away, and the earth be still found sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants.' 'Malthus,' said Sydney Smith, 'took the trouble of refuting him, and we hear no more of Mr. Godwin.' Appeals to religion were equally ineffective. God had bidden our ancestors (when there were only two of them) to increase and multiply. Where He sends mouths He sends meat. Or, as a Romanist divine suggested more recently, when the earth is full the Almighty will create a new planet, for prolific Catholics.

In this most important subject both sides seem to take leave of their wits. We are now suffering from a violent depopulation scare. The human race, we are told, or at least the white race, is committing suicide. By extending lines and curves into the future, we can calculate at what date there will be only a few of us left. (As a matter of fact, the rate, except in France, has been rising slowly for several years). Continental nations have taken the alarm, and by threats, bribes, and propaganda are trying to

secure the cannon-fodder they require. That their efforts have not been very successful only makes the prospect more alarming to our scaremongers. We are informed by students of the subject who surely ought to know better that there is no such thing as an optimum population, that overpopulation does not cause unemployment, that emigration does not reduce the numbers of the country which sends the emigrants, and that 'we cannot allow' a man with £800 a year to have a motor-car instead of a large family.

All this is pitiful nonsense. Population is determined by economic laws. Mr. Michael Roberts, in his interesting book *The Recovery of the West*, claims to have proved that the population of Great Britain has always been directly proportional to the average value of real income per person in the previous twenty years. As this calculation is, I believe, quite original, I may be excused for giving his figures.

	1860-70	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920-30
Rise in real income %	10.0	14.5	12.7	11.9	10.1	5.1	4.3
Increase in population	10.2	14.2	11.1	12.1	10.3	4.9	4.6

I will also venture to quote from Lord Keynes, whose authority will not be gainsaid.

The essential facts of the situation are expressed simply. Europe consists of the densest aggregation of population in the history of the world. This population is accustomed to a relatively high standard of life, in which even now some sections of it anticipate improvement rather than deterioration. Europe is not self-sufficient; it cannot feed itself. The danger confronting us therefore is the rapid depression of the standard of life of the European populations to a point which will mean actual starvation for some. Men will not always die quietly. Some of the catastrophes of past history, which have thrown back human progress for centuries, have been due to the reactions following on the sudden termination, whether in the course of nature or by the act of man, of temporarily favourable conditions which have permitted the growth of population beyond what could be provided for when the favourable conditions were at an end.

This is exactly the point which I am trying to make. And I would add that some of the worst political blunders in history have been the work of rulers who have tried to rectify by force changes which have been brought about by causes quite beyond their control. The East Roman Empire never recovered from Justinian's wars to reconquer the West. The Crusades were futile attempts to stem the tide of Mohammedan conquest. Louis XIV and Napoleon went on gambling till they lost. Bismarck stands almost alone as a statesman who knew when to stop. The French, after escaping annihilation in 1918 by the help of allies, most foolishly tried to prevent the recovery of Germany, and encircled their enemy with a ring of small Powers pledged to help France in war, Powers which proved quite useless when the storm burst.

Can we ease the plethora by emigration? There is plenty of

room in our Dominions, and the Australians, who have had a terrible fright, may be willing to open their doors. But they will open them only to our best workers, those whom we can least afford to spare. They will not take our misfits, and our misfits would not go, for there is no country in which the idler and bungler are made more comfortable than in England. We can hardly be expected to bear the expense of training capable workers, and then exporting them free of charge. Nevertheless, unless we can fill up the Dominions which a unique chance has thrown into our lap, we shall lose them and deserve to lose them.

Our Empire is now a Commonwealth of free and independent nations, which may or may not remain predominantly British in blood and sympathies. It is not impossible that all the English-speaking nations will form a league; but in such a league the United States would be the predominant partner.

This leads me to the last and the most important question that I wish to raise. Does the future belong to the nations with few wants, or to the nations with many wants? Can a nation with a high standard of living do without imported cheap labour? The Americans in self-protection have severely restricted immigration; but there are now in the United States 11 million negroes, a million and a half Mexicans, and a large number of simply living French Canadians. The French at home are abandoning heavy work to foreigners, who already number millions, not only Italians, Belgians, and Spaniards, but Russians, Poles, and native Africans. Glasgow and Liverpool do not love the Irish, but they cannot dispense with them. As for the Asiatics, Indians, Chinese and Japanese, wherever they are not kept out by force they swarm in and take the bread out of the mouths of the whites.

What are the countries where the population increases most rapidly? Palestine, Syria, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Haiti, South Africa, Peru, Turkey, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Dutch East Indies, Siam, Salvador, Russia. If we leave out a few new countries which are known to be underpopulated, these are all low standard nations. India, China and Japan are already saturated with population. These nations, if any, have a claim to *Lebensraum*.

May we not state it as a law, that nothing fails like success? Ruling races rule themselves out. North America is no longer Anglo-Saxon; France would hardly be French if she had not a great power of assimilating her aliens. But when a nation which is accustomed to a high standard is threatened with a reduction in that standard, it is more likely to reduce its numbers than its scale of comfort. A loss of confidence is generally followed by a fall in the birth-rate. This was strongly exemplified in Germany and Austria after the Great War.

As regards our own country, everything seems to me to point in one direction. The episode which we call industrialism has definitely closed, and with it our position as one of the Great Powers of Europe. In the course of the next hundred years we shall go back to the England before the industrial revolution. We shall be a self-supporting country with a stable population of perhaps twenty millions, for there will be improvements in agriculture. It will consist mainly of farmers, shopkeepers, and professional families. The two classes which will have disappeared will be the rich, who can never recover from the present war, and the trade unions, who have not much survival value. I do not think the change need be regretted. We shall be a happier and healthier people than we are now, and there need be very little poverty or unemployment. Spain, Holland, and Sweden have gone through the same change of fortune, and while Spain is the mother of great nations, Holland and Sweden are normally two of the happiest and most civilized nations in Europe.

It is indeed strange to reflect how almost all the great benefits conferred on humanity have been the work of small nations. Palestine, Greece, mediæval Italy, Elizabethan England, eighteenth century Germany, none of the great empires can compare with them. If England in the twenty-first century can produce another Shakespeare, Milton, or Newton, we need not regret that we shall no longer police the seven seas.

But can we reasonably expect a great future for our country? Are we to any extent degenerate? There are croakers who think that we are; but there have always been croakers—in ancient Greece from Hesiod downwards, at Rome in the time of Horace, in Elizabethan England, and during the Napoleonic war, when Wordsworth lamented that plain living and high thinking are no more. In politics perhaps we must not hope for much. Our new masters, organized Labour, will abuse their power as much as the oligarchs did in the eighteenth century and the plutocrats in the nineteenth. Power, as Lord Acton says, is always abused. But the English are politically the most mature race in the world. They almost instinctively prefer a deal, a compromise, to violence. They are not cruel, and they have a real respect for fair play. I do not think that even for the survivors of the old order conditions will be intolerable. And when we consider the character of our people, especially as shown in danger and anxiety, the verdict of other nations is that we have proved that we have, as the Americans say, plenty of guts. I am sure that we may reject Spengler's theory that nations grow old and die like individuals. Biologically the theory lacks support. Historically it is no doubt true that civilizations have decayed, not always from the same causes. But they

do not die a natural death, and some of them, like Egypt and China, have had very long lives. The nineteenth century was one of the most glorious in our annals, and though just at present there is perhaps a dearth of first-class ability, there is a great deal of good work being done, except perhaps in the fine arts. If we compare our present conduct with our performance in the war with Napoleon we shall find more incompetence, more blundering, and even less steady patriotism, then than now.

I write of course as a Christian, and believe that our true welfare is bound up with our devotion to spiritual goods. But under the influence of democratism we have often misunderstood the part which the religion of Christ is to play in human society, and have in consequence taken far too pessimistic a view of the state of religion among us. We know on the authority of our Founder that only a few in each generation will find the narrow gate that leadeth unto life; that in the world his disciples will have tribulation; that woe is pronounced upon us when all men shall speak well of us; and that the prince of this world hath nothing in Christ. Nothing can be further from the spirit of the Gospel than the question how we are to win the masses. Power politics in every form are renounced absolutely; the popular and successful churchman must search his heart diligently to make sure that he has not gained his reputation on false pretences. Social reform is not the primary interest of Christians, whose first duty is to cleanse the inside of the cup; but unquestionably any society which adopted whole-heartedly the Christian standard of values would find its social problems solved. From within outwards; from the individual to society; from the single heart to the single head—that is the Christian method. The falling off in Church attendance need not be a very serious matter, for with the majority Church-going was mainly a matter of custom. The repudiation of Christian ethics is a much more serious thing; but it is difficult to say whether there was less vice and crime in the so-called ages of faith than there is now. I believe people behaved quite as badly, indeed worse. In the Victorian age sexual morality was certainly higher than it is now, higher, I am inclined to think, than at any other period; but the tone was then set by the middle class, which blamed the disreputable vices more severely than Christ seems to have done, and possibly was too lenient to faults that are not disreputable. License and Puritanism often alternate; the freedom of the war years may be followed by strictness.

On the whole, I look forward to the future with some hopefulness, though I fear that the period of transition may be a painful one. But if we cannot check dishonest demagoguery, democracy will be bankrupt in its last refuge.

SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS

By H. FOSTER ANDERSON

IT is probable that the more recent origin of the strained relations between the Soviet and the Polish governments can be traced to the Munich Agreement. One repercussion in the U.S.S.R. of this act of British policy was the appointment of M. Molotov in place of M. Litvinov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The appearance of the new commissar had a dual significance. His appointment indicated a re-orientation in Soviet foreign policy and it also revealed that the U.S.S.R. was still subject to the traditional lines of thought which had exerted their influence under the Tzars. Throughout Russian history there have been two distinct schools of policy and the difference between them has been of a more profound nature than that which has separated Whigs from Tories or Conservatives from Labour in this country. One group has maintained that Russia is a part of Europe or at least the child of European civilization and that its further growth is so intimately linked to that of the parent body that it must continue to live in close contact with Europe. The other school has been not merely isolationist and nationalist in the sense of 'Russia for the Russians.' It has held the view that the Russian way of life is the finest achievement of the human spirit and that imitation of the European is detrimental to the free development of this highest form of the personality.

In its early days the Communist Party was mainly in the hands of leaders who had spent a large part of their lives under western civilization and thus were accustomed to think of communism in terms of world politics. Yet visitors to the U.S.S.R. could scarcely have failed to note that the newly awakened masses had a belief in themselves and in their way of life which one attributes to the poise of a ruling class. Some observers took this phenomenon to be the inevitable result of a communist system. Doubtless the revolution had ploughed up the virgin soil of the illiterate and oppressed masses but in releasing the huge reserves of talent it had not given 'man-in-the-abstract' the opportunity of expression. It was still a Russian 'self' whose talent was now given a field of action. Stalin showed his great quality as a statesman by recognizing at an early date the dominant Russian character of the Revolution. It was on this issue that he defeated Trotsky in the contest for the leadership of the Party. His idea of making Russia the first Socialist State as against Trotsky's wish to use the country as a spring-board for World Revolution was the communist equivalent of the traditional opposition of the two lines of policy in the days of the Tzars. 'The destiny

of Russia lies in her own way of life' gained ascendancy in the Party over 'The future of Russia is linked to Europe.'

The implications of Stalin's point of view were not immediately apparent. On the contrary it seemed as if the policy of confining socialism to Russia would make for collaboration with other powers where the menacing doctrine of world revolution has kept the U.S.S.R. isolated. Moreover the new socialist state had urgent need of foreign aid in almost every form and its very groundwork demanded foreign technicians, foreign machines and foreign designs. Collaboration with scientific societies was encouraged and the U.S.S.R. became the Mecca of the scientist, the architect and the engineer. But while such specialists were living in the Golden Age of technology, the Kremlin was aware that the change from being an agricultural to becoming an industrial country was a revolution that placed the U.S.S.R. during the period of transition in a position of extreme weakness in face of attack. The Russian Foreign Office was given the military objective of warding off attack during the period of transition. M. Litvinov saw to it that the U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations, that treaties were concluded with foreign powers and that 'Collective Security' became an almost universal slogan.

With the Munich Agreement went all hope of collective security. The Russian Foreign Office had failed in its military task of building up a defensive system by diplomatic methods. At this point it would scarcely be true to say that the Military party took control of the Kremlin. But a phrase used by Stalin last November on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Communist Revolution is not without significance in any attempt to follow Russian policy. On that occasion he said, 'The strongest of all logics is the logic of events.' The events in the U.S.S.R. from 1928 to 1941 were the steps in the transformation of many millions of peasants with their peasant mentality into an immense proletariat with the outlook and aspirations of the factory worker. The logic of these events was that the body-politic was undergoing the great strain of psychical as well as economic adjustment and thus was in a condition which could scarcely withstand further dislocation such as a war would involve. A protective covering of the body-politic had to be made of more than ordinary resilience. Defence was the primary consideration and the Red Army has shown to the world that the logic of the events of the Stalin Revolution had been anticipated. One can reasonably assume that the military leaders, who in the last resort would be responsible for the defence of the U.S.S.R., were continually consulted throughout the critical period of transition.

While M. Litvinov was building up a defence system in the sphere of international politics, the military leaders had no need to direct diplomatic affairs. For the moment their work was confined to training and equipping the Red Army. But the Munich Agreement displayed the failure of the diplomat to undertake the military operation of a defence system. British policy may have saved a defenceless country from attack but in doing so it hoisted the

signal, 'Every country must fend for itself.' Russia reacted promptly. The traditional view of the destiny of Russia as developing her own way of life gained strength and true to tradition this view had its strongest support in army circles. Thus the events in international politics led to the ascendancy in the Kremlin of the 'Russian' group within the Soviet ruling class even if previously it had not held this position. The Red Army and the 'Russian' group if not identical have much in common. So the internal structure of the U.S.S.R. and the external bankruptcy of 'Collective Security' united to place the military leaders of Russia in a position if not to dictate foreign policy at least to insist that it should be co-ordinated to the strategic needs of their defence plans.

The 'logic of events' of the Stalin Revolution had now reached its conclusion. The aim had been to make the U.S.S.R. the first Socialist State. The result has been to make Russia a great military power. The German-Soviet Pact of August, 1939, was the first indication of the lines of its influence on Soviet foreign policy. It solved the major problem of Russian strategy. The problem to be solved was how to arrange matters so that when the inevitable clash with Germany occurred, the U.S.S.R. would not find herself fighting alone. In normal times the solution could have been by means of a military alliance but the British distress signal at Munich was a clear enough warning against this type of security. Moreover after Munich there arose an impression in international circles that Germany would not be seriously hindered were she to go East. The Kremlin had to find any possible means to ensure that Germany went West before she turned East. And it was Hitler who solved for the Russians their problem and to their advantage. He proposed a German-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression. Hitler intended to win yet another war without fighting. He had won a war against Austria without fighting; he had won a war against Czechoslovakia without fighting and now he was going to win a war against Poland without fighting. Munich, evidently, had convinced him that Great Britain and France would not fight without Russian aid. On this assumption, and at the time it was not a wholly unreasonable assumption, he had merely to eliminate all possible hope of Russian help and the British and the French would withdraw their support of Poland. Finding herself completely abandoned Poland would, so Hitler believed, yield to the German demands and another war would be won without fighting.

In this first encounter between the Russians and the Germans Stalin showed greater talent than did Hitler in his appreciation of the military situation. He, in all probability, was aware that the Poles would fight in any event rather than yield to the German demands which, though ostensibly moderate, aimed at the subjection of Poland to German control. And there is little doubt that the reports of M. Maisky showed a sounder appreciation of the temper of the British people than did the views on the same subject which Herr Ribbentrop tendered to his Fuehrer. The crux of the military problem

was the correct answer to the question whether England without Russian aid would fight were Poland attacked. The German-Soviet Pact was signed. Hitler imagined it meant peace with conquest. Stalin knew that he had won the first round in the coming struggle. By means of this Pact the military leaders had gained three major advantages in the strategic position of Russia. It turned the German armies West thus forcing England and France to become fighting allies in case Germany attacked Russia. It gained space, that pre-requisite of all Russian strategy, by the annexation of a large part of Poland. And it gained time to improve the training and equipment of the Red Army.

Once Germany was committed to war in the West, the Russian military leaders exploited to the maximum the opportunity afforded by the declared aim of Hitler not to wage war on two fronts. The Baltic States were requested to allow the Red Army to occupy strategic positions in their respective countries. They acceded. A similar request was made to Finland but a war was needed to gain the required improvement of the strategic frontier of the U.S.S.R. As the military situation in the West deteriorated towards the summer of 1940 the Russians annexed the Baltic States to gain space for their plan of defence. Zones in the annexed countries were cleared of their inhabitants who were transported to such places east of the Urals where the new industries needed labour for war production.

In the autumn of 1940 the writer was given the opportunity of discussing in Moscow with a representative of the Soviet government the position of the Poles who had been transported to Siberia. The attitude of the Russian authorities was concise and logical. The U.S.S.R. did not recognize nationality as a power uniting people in a common way of life. Only the State had such power. Since the Polish State had ceased to exist, there were no such persons as Polish subjects. There were Polish-speaking Soviet citizens and the U.S.S.R., like any other sovereign power, would scarcely tolerate foreign interference in the lives of its subjects.

Thus the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941, had one consequence of a unique character. It recognized the existence of the Polish State and in doing so it turned some millions of Polish-speaking Soviet citizens into Polish subjects, having the right to be protected by their government. Moreover as the Soviet government did not recognize nationality but only the State, it could not recognize the nationality of Ukrainians or White Russians. There were no such persons as Ukrainian subjects or White Russians subjects. There were Ukrainian-speaking and White Russian speaking Soviet subjects. And there were also Ukrainian-speaking and White Russian-speaking Polish subjects and Poland, like any other sovereign power, could scarcely tolerate foreign interference in the lives of its subjects.

It is not so much in the Soviet-Polish Agreement itself as in the significance which each of the respective parties attach to it that the cause of the recent strained relations between the two governments can be found. For the

Polish government the signing of the Agreement was a political act with political consequences. It annulled the German-Soviet treaties of 1939 dealing with the territorial changes in Poland and further it annulled all unilateral acts of the Soviet government concerning the territories of the Polish State occupied by her as a result of the partition of the Polish State agreed upon by the Soviet government and Germany. For the Russians, however, the signing of the Agreement, like every other act of the Soviet government since Munich, was a military not a political operation. The political consequences of the Agreement would be accepted by the Russians only in so far as they helped to win the war. If any such consequence, in their opinion, interfered with the war effort, it would be ignored.

The difference of opinion between the Soviet and the Polish governments is not a dispute in the accepted sense of the term. It is a divergence between a Russian view of a situation and a European attitude to things. The Russians have a capacity for concentrating thought and action on a single aim which the European way of life with its manifold and concurrent interests precludes. That we can allow strikes to take place during a war is something completely beyond the range of a Russian's imagination and our interest in post-war reconstruction no doubt strikes him as a form of escapism. After Munich the Kremlin has concentrated thought and action on ultimate survival in the war with Germany. We may talk about a 'life or death struggle' but for us it is mere rhetoric. For the Russians the war fills the whole of reality. Nothing else has significance.

The military significance of the Soviet-Polish Agreement is strikingly illustrated by the varying attitude of the Soviet government to the Poles since the signing of the Agreement. This varying attitude has been almost a barometer of the military situation in the U.S.S.R. Recent events can be taken as an example. The Russian advance during the past winter has brought the Ukraine within the possibility of being recovered. The immediate military need is to inspire the Ukrainians in the German occupied parts to the maximum of sabotage and partisan action. For the time being Ukrainian interests take predominance and if the encouragement of a Ukrainian national movement at the expense of Poland will increase the war efforts of the inhabitants in areas immediately behind the German lines, it justifies itself in the eyes of the Russian High Command. But this is a military not a political move.

The Kremlin, however, would not be elated by any British political acquiescence in their purely military actions of annexing the Baltic States and part of Poland. What the Soviet government wants from the British is not political recognition of their acts but military action. A Second Front is incomparably more important to Russia than any recognition of the area of the Soviet Union in a future Europe. Politics belong to a post-war world. Such a world is for the Russians outside the realm of reality. There is only one reality at present. It is war.

Until the German armies are defeated the Russians have only one aim and only one standard by which to test any action. But the Poles, being European like the British, can and do think of post-war reconstruction without detriment to their war effort. And they can and do maintain that the Soviet-Polish Agreement was a political act with political consequences, without in any way allowing such an attitude to impede their strong support of the U.S.S.R. in prosecuting the war on Germany. Polish destroyers still guard the convoys to Russia and there is no slackening of Polish resistance to German occupation. The Russians are not alone in keeping to the one supreme aim of winning the war. But they differ from the Europeans in their capacity to restrict the significance of life to one idea. It is this which makes Russia a most formidable force.

When the war is won, the U.S.S.R. will be in a position unique in its history. It will be freed from pre-occupation with the problem of survival. Since its beginning under Lenin the Soviet Union has had to consider defence out of all proportion to the other interests of a nation at peace and the Stalin Revolution of 1928 only accentuated the necessity of defence being the major consideration of the U.S.S.R. But no one doubts now the capacity of Russia to survive nor that its place in the world is assured. But habits of mind are not changed in a day even though that day be the day of peace. The view that 'The destiny of Russia lies in her own way of life' will have won the war for the Soviet Union so in all probability it will continue to exert its influence at the conference table. The history of Russia, however, has shown that there is also a traditional view of Russia developing in collaboration with Europe. With its survival secured and its future assured the Soviet Union may offer the opportunity for this view to gain general support. Should this happen then politics divorced from strategy can be the means of friendly and free co-operation between nations.

But the present reality is war. If by our actions we can show the Russians that our way of prosecuting war is equally as formidable to Germany as is theirs, we shall have laid the only sure foundation to future collaboration. Our weakness at the time of Munich accentuated the necessity of the U.S.S.R. of relying wholly upon herself and with ruthless logic the Soviet government followed the course set. Politics became strategy and will continue to be so until the war has been won. Politics became strategy because England had neither the military strength nor the political will to face the logic of events started by Hitler coming to power. And we cannot turn strategy into politics by giving political recognition to the purely military acts of the U.S.S.R.

(Mr. H. Foster Anderson made long and frequent visits to Russia from 1914 to the end of 1940.)

SIAMESE IMPERIALISM AND THE PAN-THAI MOVEMENT

BY SIR JOSIAH CROSBY

THE growth of a Pan-Siamese movement or, as it will more properly be called, a Pan-Thai movement has been a notable feature of the new Siam created by the successful *coup d'état* of June, 1932, which put an end to the absolute monarchy and set up a constitutional régime in its place. The promoters of the *coup d'état* doubtless regarded themselves primarily as political reformers whose object it was to provide their country with a system of government based upon the principle of democracy, and the still recent experiment in China along the same lines must have acted as a powerful stimulant upon them. But as in the case of China, so also in that of Siam, it was natural and inevitable that the awakening of the national consciousness in matters of internal policy should have been accompanied by an increased degree of self-assertiveness in the country's foreign relations. There was a vigorous demand for the revision of Siam's treaties with the Foreign Powers, so as to confer upon her complete tariff autonomy, freedom from the last lingering vestiges of extraterritoriality and a status of full equality with the various other peoples composing the family of nations. Not that there was anything particularly novel about this demand, for in the latter days of the absolute monarchy an agitation for the revision of the treaties had been prosecuted with considerable energy, but it was only in 1937 that the goal was finally reached and Siam was able to conclude fresh agreements in the desired sense with practically all of the Powers concerned. What was newer—though here again, it was not entirely new—was the avowed wish to extend the frontiers of the Siamese Kingdom by including within them all those adjacent, or nearly adjacent, territories which are inhabited by a population of Thai race.

It is scarcely necessary to explain here that the Siamese themselves belong to that race and that the form of speech which they employ belongs to the Thai group of languages. The Siamese call themselves, indeed, "Thais" and the usual name given by them in the vernacular to their country is "Muang Thai" or "Prathet Thai," that is "Thailand," the word "Siam" being of foreign (perhaps Sanskrit) origin, though it has passed into the language and

former Kings of Siam have made use of it when affixing their signature to documents. The different peoples of Thai stock, all of them speaking one variety or another of the same original language and virtually all of them professing the Buddhist faith, are not only to be found in the Kingdom of Siam; they include the population of the so-called Laos* region of French Indo-China, as well as that of the Shan States, some of which are orientated towards Burma and are placed under the aegis of Great Britain whilst others are comprised within the frontiers of the Republic of China. The Thais have in the course of centuries migrated southwards from their first home in South-Western China and no reliable figures are available to show how numerous they are at the present time. It has been estimated, however, that they number between twenty and thirty millions in all, of whom about one half are inhabitants of Siam.

The important Lao* State of Vien-Tiane (Wieng Chan) was conquered in 1828 by the Siamese, who also claimed jurisdiction over Luang Prabang, lying further to the North, which is yet another Lao State situated on the banks of the Mekong. It is a matter of history that in 1893 Siam was obliged to resign in favour of France all her claims to territory on the left bank of that river; subsequently, in 1904, she ceded to France that portion of the State of Luang Prabang which lay on its right bank, whilst in 1907 she gave over to the French the provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap and Sissiphon, which lay on her Eastern frontier and which were thereafter re-incorporated in the French-protected Kingdom of Cambodia.

There can be no question that the Siamese have all along resented the compulsion exercised upon them by France in order to secure the surrender of the above-mentioned territories, and to that extent irredentist feeling can be said to have existed among them ever since the year 1893. But up to the close of the period of absolute monarchy in 1932, there was nothing resembling an organized movement aiming at the recovery of these "lost provinces"; the Siamese Government continued to abide loyally by its treaty engagements with the French, its relations with whom gradually became more friendly and ended by being cordial. A change came over the scene, however, with the *coup d'état*; it was not immediately apparent, as the earlier constitutional governments, under Phya Mano and afterwards under Phya Phahol, were occupied chiefly with the task of remodelling the administration and with bringing about a revision of the country's foreign treaties. But a tendency to national self-assertiveness amounting to nothing less than chauvinism was soon observed to be a characteristic of the government set up by Field-Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram at the end of 1938, when Phya Phahol resigned the office of Prime Minister and retired from active participation in

* The word "Lao" originally meant no more than "person," but the term is now used more specifically as a name for the inhabitants both of the French Laos region and of the Northern and Eastern provinces of present-day Siam.

public life. Until then successive Cabinets formed under the constitutional *régime* (all of them, except the first, under the leadership of Phya Phahol) had consisted of what was tantamount to a coalition between the liberals, who had been the intellectual authors of the *coup d'état*, upon the one hand and, upon the other, the military faction by whose armed support its success had been made possible. Luang Pibul had come to be regarded as the chief of that faction and, when he became Prime Minister, it was speedily made evident that he was bent upon depriving the liberals of any real authority and upon concentrating all effective power in the hands of the Army and Navy—or, rather, in his own hands, in order that he might play the part of a virtual dictator. Such is, in fact, the position of affairs in Siam to-day; the Constitution, to which lip service is still paid, has been turned into a travesty of what it was intended to be; the People's Assembly is still allowed to meet, but its members know better than to resist upon any material issue the will of Luang Pibul, who in his capacity of Prime Minister is now all-powerful; he poses as the "Führer" of the Siamese people and he has even carried things to the point of ordering that all members of the public, when saluting one another, shall preface their greeting with the words "Pibul Sawat," which being interpreted mean "Heil Pibul"! It can be no cause for surprise that, under a military dictatorship such as I have here described, the latent irredentist feeling against France should have been worked up and developed into an agitation more far-reaching in its aspirations than anything hitherto known. Luang Pibul has accordingly sponsored openly that Pan-Thai movement to which I have already referred and which has for its object the bringing under Siamese domination not merely of the territories which Siam has been compelled to yield up to France, but also of those other regions with populations of Thai race which are subject to the control of Britain or of China. In short, Luang Pibul and his followers have evinced a desire to rob the British and the Chinese hen-roosts no less than the French one and, well before Siam's entry into the present war on the side of Japan, they had already incorporated this ambition into a campaign of propaganda inaugurated for the purpose of educating the people at large in the principles and ideals of nationalism. With this end in view, the public was continually being exhorted by means of wireless broadcasts, through the press and in other ways to be one hundred per cent. "Thai," by which was obviously meant not simply "Siamese" but "Thai" in the widest sense of the term. Propaganda on the same lines was conducted among the students of the two Universities at Bangkok and in the schools, through the agency of the official "Youth Organization," which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence. The chief exponent and high-priest of this Pan-Thai agitation is, singularly enough, not a soldier but a civilian; his name is Luang Vichitr Vadhakarn and he held for some time the position of Director-General of the Department of Fine Arts; to-day he fills the important post of Minister of Foreign

Affairs and he is a prime favourite with Luang Pibul.* This man is a composer of popular songs and plays by means of which he endeavours to whip up enthusiasm for the Pan-Thai ideal; he professes to be a scholar as well as an artist, but his claim to distinction in the former sphere is disproved by his contention that Siam is entitled to the possession of the whole of Cambodia, on the ground that the Cambodians are themselves of Thai stock. As a matter of fact, they are of a different race and speak a different language from the Siamese, with whom, however, they have in common the Buddhist religion which they follow and the general culture with which they are imbued.

The chauvinism of Luang Pibul's government has manifested itself in another aspect which was kept in the background before the overrunning of Siam by the Japanese, which is as much as to say so long as Luang Pibul and his Cabinet were anxious to maintain good relations with Great Britain. Yet even in those days signs were not wanting that the more aggressive among the Siamese nationalists dreamt of Britain being dispossessed in their favour not only of the British Shan States, but of certain territories in the Malay Peninsula and in Lower Burma as well.

The territories in the Peninsula here in question include the four Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, the suzerainty over which was transferred by Siam to Britain under the terms of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, under an arrangement which, in return, provided for a substantial abandonment of our extraterritorial rights in the former country and for a loan from ourselves to the Siamese for the construction by them of a railway in their Southern provinces which was ultimately to link up Bangkok with Singapore. This arrangement was concluded voluntarily by the Siamese Government without any suggestion of compulsion from our side; it was a common-sense step, for the moment had arrived when it had become necessary for the administration of the States to be refashioned along modern and progressive lines; manifestly, this task would be better undertaken under the supervision of Britain, which had already executed a similar mission in the adjacent Federated Malay States, rather than under that of Siam, which was still busily engaged in setting her own house in order. These four Malay States were inhabited by a population differing entirely from the Siamese in race, in religion and in language, and had never formed an integral part of the Kingdom of Siam. Their rulers, it is true, had been obliged to acknowledge the overlordship of Bangkok and to despatch symbolic tribute periodically to the monarch reigning there, but they had never been more than remote and nominal dependencies and had never constituted provinces of Siam in

* A year or two ago Luang Pibul's Government saw fit—on the initiative, it is said, of Luang Vichitr Vadhakarn—to ordain that in future the official designation of Siam in English should be changed to "Thailand" and that the word "Thai" should similarly be substituted for "Siamese." This change was recognized by the Foreign Powers but, since the entry of Siam into the war against us, British official circles have reverted to the use of the time-honoured terms "Siam" and "Siamese."

any effective way. Their "restoration" to her would thus not merely be unjustified but could not fail to work to the detriment of the States themselves.

With respect to Lower Burma, the "claims" of the Siamese chauvinists have to do with the Division of Tenasserim, and more particularly with the districts of Merguy and Tavoy. Admittedly, this part of Burma was at one time incorporated in the Siamese dominions and the trade route between India and Ayuthia, the old capital of Siam, used to cross the Malay Peninsula by way of Tenasserim. This region was, however, ceded by Siam to Burma in the closing years of the eighteenth century and it was subsequently acquired by ourselves from the Burmese. It has thus been out of Siamese possession for about one hundred and fifty years and its associations with Siam must by this time have become very tenuous.

But we must revert to Malaya in order to bring out the full measure of the soaring aspirations of the Siamese chauvinists. These gentlemen dream not only of the "recovery" of Kedah, but also of the "restoration" to Siam of the island of Penang, on account of its connection with that State in the distant past. Those who are familiar with the history of the British Empire will be aware that Penang was formerly under the rule of the Sultan of Kedah, who, in 1791, leased the island in perpetuity to the East India Company in return for an annual monetary payment; the adjacent district known as Province Wellesley was purchased from Kedah by the East India Company seven years later. Up to the Japanese occupation of Malaya in 1941-42 these territories had thus been in British possession without interruption for a century and a half, but your Siamese chauvinist is very thorough-going; he wants Kedah back, lock, stock and barrel, complete with Penang and Province Wellesley!

Siamese aspirations for the "recovery" of territory in Malaya and Lower Burma did not receive the same prominence as did the demand for the retrocession of the regions given up to France. But that the military faction, at least, dreamt of such a recovery is proved by the circumstance that Luang Pibul, at the time when he held the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet of Phya Phahol, authorized the issue of a special map of Siam, with legend attached, showing the different territories purporting to have been comprised at one time or another within her borders. Copies of the map were displayed in Government offices and schools and, when its invidious implications were pointed out to Luang Pibul, he offered the specious excuse that its purpose was purely educational and that it was designed with the object of making the average Siamese better acquainted with the history of his native land.

This second aspect of Siamese irredentism is not based on the argument of a common race or of history; it is founded in sheer "Imperialism," in that very same aggressive tendency which all Oriental countries, not excepting Siam, are imputing as a sin to most of the Western Powers to-day. Care-

less of logic, the extreme Siamese nationalists have passed from the Pan-Thai ideal of a political union of all the Thai-speaking peoples to a vain-glorious one of re-acquiring for Siam the frontiers established by her armies, precariously and temporarily, at one period or another in the remote past, regardless of the circumstance that this would mean imposing the rule of Bangkok upon whole populations which have nothing at all in common with the Thais. In this category may be classed the unfounded claim for the annexation of the Kingdom of Cambodia, which is likewise included in the programme.

The other aspect of Siamese irredentism, the Pan-Thai, deserves more careful attention. Not that the historical argument is here particularly strong, for the grip of Bangkok on the Lao States situated upon the left bank of the Mekong was never very effective. The suzerainty of the Kings of Siam may have been acknowledged by these States, but they were far distant from Bangkok, means of communication were imperfect and the administration was to all practical intents and purposes in the hands of local chiefs, or "Kings" as they were sometimes called. (The same thing applied not so very long ago to what are the Northern provinces of Siam at the present day; such petty Lao States as those of Chiangmai, Lampoon, Lampang and Nan used to have chiefs of their own and the time is almost, if not actually, within living memory when the Chief of Chiangmai still exercised the power of life and death within the territory under his jurisdiction. The Chief of Lampoon was still alive in 1941, but elsewhere these hereditary chieftains have been suppressed even in name). As regards the provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap and Sissophon, the population of these border districts includes both Thai and Cambodian elements, but I understand that it is the latter which predominate to-day. They were taken from Cambodia and annexed to Siam at the end of the eighteenth century but were given up again, nominally to Cambodia but effectively to France, in 1907. With respect to the Shan States, the Pan-Thai enthusiasts are, historically speaking, without weapons in their armoury, for the Shans have for the most part been independent of Bangkok. However, other arguments can be adduced to the common factors of race, language, religion and general culture, on the strength of which it is possible to make out at least a theoretical case for a union of the Thai peoples, which form a homogeneous group occupying territories contiguous with one another and which are, therefore, capable hypothetically of being formed into a compact geographical and political whole. The claims of the Siamese to ascendancy in any such union, if it were ever achieved, would be paramount, for not only do they, alone among Thai-speaking peoples, enjoy political independence at this time, but Bangkok is the only city which can advance any pretensions to being a centre of Thai learning and culture.

Whilst there is thus something to be said upon idealistic grounds for the creation of a unified Pan-Thai State having the present Kingdom of Siam for

its corner-stone, there are, nevertheless, certain practical considerations to be taken into account which must detract very greatly from its feasibility. For one thing, it is scarcely likely—in view of Siam's recent declaration of war upon two of the United Nations it is, in fact, extremely unlikely—that the other Powers concerned, namely, Britain, China and France, would think of renouncing, from motives of abstract racial idealism, their claims to the Thai-speaking territories which are now under their control and for the welfare of whose inhabitants they have become responsible. A common race, a common religion and a common language and culture do not necessarily imply a desire for political union on the part of all those who possess them. The Spanish-speaking republics of South America furnish a case in point, for with them the tendency has been to break away from the mother-country and to sever the bonds of union which formerly existed with her. In the case of the Thai-speaking peoples of South-Eastern Asia it has yet to be shewn that there is any movement for union afoot among them outside Siam itself. On the contrary, those members of the ruling families in the British Shan States with whom I have myself come into contact have expressed to me their disapproval of the Pan-Thai agitation in so far as relates to their own territories, which enjoyed a great deal more liberty under their respective Treaties with the British Crown than they could hope to do if ever they came under the domination of a government centralized at Bangkok. A French authority told me some time since that the "King" of the French-protected State of Luang Prabang held a similar view, though my informant added that, as a result of propaganda from the Siamese side, Pan-Thai feeling was making some progress among the younger generation in that area. There is reason to suppose that the Pan-Thai agitation is confined to the Siamese and that even in their case it is being encouraged artificially by means of official propaganda.

A further argument against the Pan-Thai movement is that even to-day Siam is still too much occupied with developing her own administration and social services along progressive lines to be justified in accepting responsibility for the government and development of any territories beyond her existing frontiers, which are already sufficiently wide to tax her resources to the utmost. Not long ago a Siamese liberal remarked to me very sensibly: "Why should we seek to extend our frontiers? We have not enough doctors, or engineers or other technical experts to minister to the needs of our population as it is now. What right should we have to make ourselves responsible for the well-being of the inhabitants of other regions, when we are still finding it difficult to satisfy the requirements of our own?" In fairness to this gentleman and to others like him, it should be recognized that Siamese imperialism, including the prosecution of the Pan-Thai agitation, is chiefly confined to the military party and to those members of the Civil Service who are "yes men" of the government of the day and will follow its every behest in order to maintain or to improve their official position.

To sum up, Siamese imperialism, in so far as the claims to territory in Malaya and Lower Burma are concerned, is a manifestation of national vain-glory so preposterous as to call for no serious attempt at refutation. As regards the Pan-Thai agitation, that, too, has its imperialistic side, in the sense that it is based upon a distant ideal whose attainment will not merit consideration unless and until it appears that there is a genuine demand for union on the part of all the peoples affected and, furthermore, that Siam herself is competent to assume worthily the leadership in any confederation into which they may ever be willing to enter. That day is likely to be long deferred and, until it has arrived, the Pan-Thai movement must continue to be far removed from the sphere of practical politics.

As a postscript to what I have here written, I may add that Japan, for her own selfish reasons, has been at pains to encourage Siamese aspirations to acquire possession of territories in British or French control. In the event Siam has suffered the experience of other dupes and has had to learn the bitter lesson that he who sups with the Japanese devil must use a very long spoon. For her the deception began with the award of the Japanese mediators in the matter of the territorial dispute with French Indo-China in 1941. That award gave considerably less to Luang Pibul and his fellow chauvinists than they had hoped for and they were greatly disappointed in consequence. Yet very soon afterwards they allowed themselves to fall into the same trap again, for Luang Pibul has himself sought to justify the declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States in January, 1942, by a promise received from Japan that she would "restore" to Siam the territories of which the latter was supposed to have been deprived by ourselves. When the time came for fulfilling this promise, however, it was not Merguy or Tavoy, it was not Penang or any fertile region in the Malay Peninsula which Siam received as her guerdon for having betrayed her best friends. All that was given to her was permission to march her soldiers into the Southern Shan States and to occupy the sparsely populated and relatively unproductive territory of Keng Tung. Decidedly, so far as concerns the relations of Siam with Japan, there has not been honour among thieves.

(Sir Josiah Crosby was formerly British Minister in Siam).

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR

BY W. T. WELLS

"It is inevitable," writes Mr. Alexander Werth,* "that Britain should have felt bitter about France during the past two years." It is equally true that this feeling has been reciprocated. How could it be otherwise? In 1940 the French nation suffered the most crushing military defeat, on the part of a great power, in modern history. In such circumstances, the French would have been more than human if they had not sought a scapegoat; and it is not in the French temperament to be exceptionally slow to exclaim *nous sommes trahis*. But the surrender of France was never complete or unconditional, and the bitterness on each side, however real, was probably less acute and less widespread than might have been expected. Many Frenchmen continued to look to Britain for salvation; a few continued actively and heroically to help our war effort. To-day, General Giraud has repudiated the Armistice, affirmed his faith in the institutions of the Third Republic, and proclaimed the unity of all Frenchmen in face of the enemy; at the moment of writing, while the fighting French are bearing part in the Eighth Army's attack on Rommel in Southern Tunisia, French troops, who were former adherents of Vichy, are, with the American Fifth Army, pressing upon him from the West. From the misty twilight of Vichy is emerging a brilliant revival of the France of Valmy and Verdun.

From the reaction to the events of 1940 there has been, among Englishmen, a further reaction. The seed has been planted by the underground opposition in France and by the steadfastness in disaster of General de Gaulle and his followers; it has been watered by English writers, and writers in English, who have been witnesses of the fall of France and of the fundamental loyalty of most Frenchmen to their own political ideals and traditional way of life. Some instances will show the way in which the current is flowing.

Mr. Charles Morgan and Mr. Neville Lytton confine themselves, on this topic, to general statements, based with the former writer on appreciation of France's contribution to European culture, and, with the latter, on a profound love for the country, one of whose daughters he married, and on observation of the conduct of private Frenchmen in their country's darkest hour.

"Anyhow," says Mr. Morgan's Corporal Flower,† "there is one thing about it: no one can say this time that we fought to the last Frenchman."

"No," said Richard, "that at least is true."

"And what isn't, Mr. Cannock?"

* In the Epilogue to *The Twilight of France*.

† In *The Empty Room*.

"What you implied—that we are well rid of France. We may win the war without her, which will be good for our pride; but if we try to make a peace without her, Europe will be like a University that has turned itself into a technical training college."

Mr. Morgan puts into the mouths of his characters two perfectly objective sets of statements. Mr. Lytton makes himself counsel for the prosecution against Britain and the U.S.A. for their treatment of France*

In the last war she lost half a million more men than we did and fourteen departments were entirely destroyed . . . This . . . explains the war-weariness of France at the outbreak of this war. After such colossal losses, it seems incredible that the English speaking democracies should not have guaranteed the security of France; for the frontiers of France are not only the frontiers of Britain, they are the frontiers of the whole civilized world. The failure to guarantee France's security was a political crime for which we are now paying very dearly.

These, perhaps, are the words of an artist rather than of a student of politics. If France was too war-weary to defend herself, if we had incurred casualties that crippled the life of the next generation in helping to defend her in 1914-18, if, as events have since shown, her preservation was not essential to our own survival, then it was not a political crime, but obvious political wisdom to refrain from perpetuating a commitment which was likely to prove more rather than less costly than in the past; and from this point of view the pity was that we went as far as we did in repeating the policy and the strategy of 1914. Mr. Lytton has not, in his departure from the rôle of observer, which he plays so admirably, to that political critic, stated all the facts, and although his conclusion may be sound, the arguments that he has selected do not appear to support it.

Mr. Peter de Polnay, whose *Death and To-morrow* is enjoying so brilliant and well-deserved a success, has committed himself much more definitely than either the novelist or the artist. As to the author of another famous best-seller, political illumination came to Mr. de Polnay in the darkness of a prison cell.

The future, there from the palliasse, appeared to have but one solution: a complete fusion between England and France. Just because their characters are so different it becomes a necessity. And they need one another. Each has something the other lacks, and without having it near at hand the other is miserable. It had been a great English fallacy, or call it tragedy, that England thought she wasn't a great Continental power, that the affairs of the continent had nothing to do with her . . . after this war, England will have to say good-bye to the pompous idea of being splendidly isolated from the affairs of the Continent, yet at the same time having to fight for life or death on the Continent more often than necessary. On that new road she'll need a strong France: without France she cannot walk it.

The same idea, that of a fusion between the two countries, had suggested itself to another eminent political thinker a few months before Mr. de Polnay's unfortunate encounter with an *agent provocateur* in a café in the slums of

* In *Life in Unoccupied France*.

Marseilles. But the circumstances of Mr. Churchill's offer to the French Government and of Mr. de Polnay's prison inspiration were different. There was every reason for trying to prevent France's collapse: apart from any wider considerations, it was quite impossible to foresee precisely how dangerous her fall would be to this country. There was good reason to hope, but no means of knowing, that the Navy and R.A.F. together would be able to avert invasion. When Mr. de Polnay was in prison, the Third Republic had collapsed, and the Battle of Britain had been won. It was then more difficult than ever to assess the true degree of attachment of the French people to the democratic ideals for which, amongst other things, Britain was fighting. It was more difficult than ever to assess the precise value, for the purposes of Britain's security, of the fusion with her of a revived and resurgent France.

The great events of history cannot be ignored, or explained away. Twice within seventy years has France been defeated by Germany in a whirlwind campaign. It is all very well for Mr. Alexander Werth to proclaim that "the future of Europe needs. . . a free, strong and happy France." It is possible for the United Nations to ensure that France shall be free; but it is quite beyond their capacity to guarantee that she shall be either strong or happy. Her strength and her happiness will depend on her own efforts, and on them alone. Will France after the war be sufficiently at unity, have enough singleness of purpose in the essentials of her welfare and her security, to achieve them? There is a tendency to criticize General Giraud and General de Gaulle for their apparent slowness in attaining complete French unity of effort in the immediate tasks that lie to hand. It has to be realized that these two soldiers—they are not statesmen trained in the give-and-take of party politics—are the heirs to a *damnosa haereditas* of division and discord that has threatened to paralyse their efforts to promote a national revival, just as it paralysed the efforts of men more experienced in public affairs to avert a national disaster.

There is no need to quarrel with Mr. Morgan's definition of France's place in the intellectual life of Europe; though the question might perhaps be asked whether there has not been a certain tendency to stereotype intellectual activities, and whether English education, with all its shortcomings, has not done more in the last century to promote that freedom of enquiry which is the breath of intellectual life. But there is a distinction between intellectual and political leadership, and, as Professor D. W. Brogan points out in his introduction to *The Twilight of France*, "in the France of the last twenty years, the difference between the achievements of the French nation and the French state was even more striking than usual." Many Englishmen have a somewhat sentimental and protective feeling towards France, arising in part from the great variations in national temperament—the attraction of a sprightly Marianne for a stolid John Bull—and in part from the recollection of the warmth and graciousness with which so many young English people, among them the writer, have been welcomed into French households. Further,

alliance with France has been the keystone of our foreign policy in the two greatest crises of modern history; and the fact that it failed us so lamentably in the latter of them may not suffice to overcome the political conservatism of our nation if, as is to be hoped and as it may well happen, France plays a leading part in the coming liberation of Europe. It would be fatal to both countries if admiration, sentiment, or conservatism were to blind us to political actualities; for it would involve our asking more of France than she would be able to give, and consequently further disillusionment for both parties.

The Armistice of June, 1940, was a historical fact arising from deep historical causes. A political system which amounted to sheer negation, a military organization which perpetuated, in the sphere of tactics, a system of rigid linear defence discarded by the other armies of Western Europe in 1917, to be operated with equipment of fundamentally the same type as was used in 1918, by officers who had attained considerable seniority in that year, were merely symptoms of the paralysis that had overtaken French institutions. This paralysis arose from conservatism of the narrowest kind—the conservatism of the man with the one talent: "What I have I hold": that sentiment was the ruling idea of France between the wars. It was not the first time that such a paralysis had seized the political life of the country, which, since the Revolution, has oscillated between extreme activity and extreme inertia. Admittedly the paralysis had never before been so complete, the hold of the peasant mentality, with its concentration on immediate private interest and its failure to formulate or act on conceptions of the public weal, never so strong. The France of Bazaine had been the France of Gambetta, whereas the France of 1940 was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the class struggle. The Armistice was actively supported by a minority and passively approved, probably, by a majority of Frenchmen. A substantial measure of unity among Frenchmen is now being established on questions connected with the conduct of the war; but there is no evidence that this extends to the conduct of the peace, or that the fundamental cleavages of 1934-1940 have been abated. Before France has learnt to live at unity in itself talk of a strong France, or of Anglo-French fusion, is utterly misconceived.

It should not be thought, however, that there is no choice for Britain except between dependence upon a strong France and a lofty detachment from Europe. Leaving aside rhetoric about the frontiers of France being the frontiers of Britain, it is yet the obvious truth that Britain cannot detach herself from the affairs of Western Europe. Indeed, while it is no doubt true that large numbers of Englishmen have often taken comfort in the reflection that disturbances on the Continent could not affect their lives, it is difficult to find a single instance of a responsible English statesman who has taken such a view. Certainly Lord Salisbury, one of the prime managers of the intricate negotiations at the Berlin Congress of 1878, can be regarded as a prophet of "splendid isolation" only in the sense that to try to find stability

in the Europe of Bismarck's "Reinsurance Treaties" was like trying to cast anchor in a bottomless sea. The fundamental dilemma of British European policy between 1870 and 1904 was that it was impossible to establish relations with the Germans and valueless to establish them with anybody else. That condition should not, and need not, obtain in post-war Europe; and it is an essential task of statesmanship to prevent it from recurring.

It is still impossible to forecast the shape of post-war international relationships. Two factors have become obvious: that there can be no regional stability without world peace; and that without the co-operation of Soviet Russia, a European power in spite of her vast Asiatic territories, there can be no world peace. Unless British and American statesmanship prove singularly wanting, or Dr. Goebbels's propaganda about the "Bolshevist menace" strikingly effective, a Russia bent on prodigious tasks of internal reconstruction and development will be the predominant state in Europe. The Entente, on the other hand, was the product of a desperate effort to prevent German predominance from growing into German domination. The Entente, in fact, derived from the theory of the balance of power, a policy which postulated that the leading powers were in conflict. In a world ruled by the expressed purposes of the United Nations, carried into effect, however partially, by such instruments as the Anglo-Russian Treaty, there would be no need for it.

Such conditions would place Anglo-French relationships in an entirely different setting, and on a new basis, without which there seems to be little prospect of mutual trust. It would no longer be a question of what Britain required of France, or of how many British divisions the French General Staff felt itself called upon to demand before addressing its energies to its proper task, the protection of France. The maintenance of the life of each nation being guaranteed by other measures, it would become rather a question of what each country could and would contribute to the other to make both their lives worth living: of what part each country could play in the work of European reconstruction. This question would call for fresh and objective consideration both of the links that unite and of the barriers that divide the two nations.

It is sometimes said that the best foundation for a happy marriage is that the partners should have like tastes but different temperaments. If Mr. de Polnay's prognosis, that the two states should be fused, is unsound, his diagnosis, that "each has something the other lacks," is clearly correct. The main psychological difficulty of Anglo-French relationships is for each party to make the other aware that it requires the qualities the other has to offer. There are, fortunately, no wide or deep cleavages of economic interest that divide the two countries. Apart from this factor, the barriers that separate them are questions of temperament and geography, the bonds that draw them together are intellectual and spiritual. Freedom of enquiry, insistence on the sanctity of certain rights of individuals and families as against the claims of

the state, agreement that the state is for man, and not man for the state—these are essential points in the common philosophy. But it is difficult for states, as for the men and women who compose them, to live their lives on such high intellectual planes that considerations of this kind are foremost. At normal times, too, men tend to emphasize, and be interested in, points of difference rather than of similarity. Hence arise, on the one hand, the common saying in England—common at least before the war—that "we're more like the Germans than the French," and, on the other, the tendency to think in terms of a "Latin bloc." In other words, we are willing to malign ourselves because of characteristics that are mainly physical and all superficial, whilst they, or at least the Pétains among them, would ally themselves with Italy, whose political tradition is that of the city autocracy and whose intellectual life has been mediocre since Galileo, and with Spain, the last fortress of obscurantism. So can the pettiness of life obscure its greatness. The fact that we live by the sea, and can be conquered only from the sea, whilst the French live by the land, and in imminent peril of conquest from the land, and the fact that we have not the same roots in the culture of Roman Europe, have often counted for more than our common Christian, but liberal civilization.

It is true that Britain is a European power, but the conditions of European life if freed from the perpetual menace of Germany will be very different from those that have marked the phase inaugurated by Bismarck's solution of the problem of Schleswig-Holstein. But, granted that Anglo-French relations will cease to be a question of "*Sacrés anglais*, will you or won't you come over in the next war?"* and that this change will be a great improvement, of itself it will not be enough; it will merely be driving out the seven devils, and unless some other influence takes their place, the seven worse devils born of the bitterness and disillusionment of the present conflict will enter in. There will then be no prosperity in Western Europe, which will be not, as it ought to be, the inspiration of the world's intellectual life, but a mere tourist centre of antiquarian interest, as remote from the formative movements of our time as Stonehenge or the Pyramids. Without Anglo-French co-operation, there can be little future for liberal culture.

Since men cannot live perpetually on a high level of contemplation, how is Anglo-French co-operation in any future "Council of Europe," such as that envisaged by Mr. Churchill in his broadcast speech of March 21, to be brought about? It can be achieved only by the same processes as will be necessary to restore a reasonable measure of harmony in France's internal politics: by concentration, in the first place, on practical measures of relief and reconstruction. We, and the Americans, will have to tell the French, and the other countries of Occupied Europe, what foods can be allocated and transported to them, and all will have to work out together the priority in which different needs can be met. French agriculture will have to be rehabilitated by help

* *The Twilight of France*. Chapter XIV.

with seeds and livestock. It will have to be determined what contribution French industry can make to the general work of reconstruction, and any help, mechanical, technical, or financial, needed for this purpose, will have to be arranged. Even in discussing such tasks as these, the voice of discord can, and probably will make itself heard. But if it be possible, in any circumstances at all, to bury the quarrels of the past, it must be in the inspiration of meeting common needs. If France has any future as a first-class power, a measure of unity will be achieved at this stage in re-organizing the country, and if the men then at the head of French affairs are able to bury recrimination between themselves, they may be able to repress it against us. For us, too, there will be the task, much easier than for the French, of seeing the past in perspective, of appreciating how difficult it must have been for any Frenchman to keep his balance while his divided country was threatened by German invasion for the third time in seventy years, and how cruel was the dilemma in which the French Government found itself in 1940: either to abandon its allies or, for the time being, the capacity to protect its own people. If Queen Wilhelmina, and others, were great enough to make the heroic but cruel decision, many of the men who made the other decision will be found to merit sympathy rather than contempt.

In his Preface to *Saint Joan*, Mr. Shaw calls the philosophy of *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner* "the devil's sentimentality." We shall have need to understand the peculiar difficulties of France before, during, and after the war, and we are entitled to ask for a genuine attempt to comprehend our own problems, but each must see the limitations to the other's powers. Speaking the language of pre-war Europe, dominated by the fear of war, which will be the language of post-war Europe too if statesmanship fails in its task, we must recognize that the France of the future is unlikely to have either the will or the power to be an effective ally in maintaining the peace; and experience has shown that in war we can survive, with however much of cost and pain, without her help. Speaking the language of the new era in international co-operation that the United Nations must seek to create, France will have the opportunity of playing a leading part in the counsels of Europe, making economic, military, and, above all, intellectual contributions of inestimable and, in the last respect, unique value. In either event, the Entente, like the guarantees under the Treaty of Locarno, is as dead as the dodo, and the time for the fusion of the British and French states has passed, never to return.

THE SMALL NATIONS

By VICTOR BODSON

IT is very difficult to ascertain where a nation ceases to be a small one and takes its place amongst the Great Powers. Mr. Churchill's definition in his broadcast leaves a gap between the small nations and the Great Powers when he says:

What is to happen to the large number of small nations whose rights and interests must be safeguarded? What would be thought of an army that consisted only of battalions and brigades and which never formed any of the larger and higher organizations like an army corps?

When war broke out, Belgium sent into the field more than 600,000 men, over 40 divisions. Nevertheless, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, Denmark, and of course Luxembourg, are small nations. So are Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Even with all their armies—and they fought most gallantly—none of the overrun countries was able to resist the invader longer than a few weeks, because they were taken one by one, and their defences were soon overwhelmed and the life of their whole country paralysed.

Mr. Churchill once again recognized the right of existence of the small nations when he sponsored the idea of a Council of Europe, a really effective League of Nations having as its foundation the lofty conception of freedom, law and morality; with all the strongest forces concerned woven in its texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes and with a "policeman" to enforce these decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.

It seems to me, and I think to all who actually belong to any overrun country, that the most important task is to prevent renewed aggression. Few in this country realize what it means for Europe to have a France of 32 to 35 millions of Frenchmen instead of 42 millions in 1939, to have a Poland of 20 millions instead of 33, and to have the population of all the other countries diminished by 15 to 20 per cent. whilst confronted with a defeated Germany where the illegitimate child has been as welcome as the legitimate one and where all has been done, with great success, to raise the birthrate. If there is to be starvation in Europe, it is not the German people who will go hungry, said Goering some months ago, and he meant it.

The war may be at an end in one year or two. From the start it has been the policy of Germany's rulers to cut down the population of all other countries

of the continent, so as to create living-space for their own people if they win the war, and to weaken the continent for the next generation should they lose it. Since they have realized that the tables are definitely turned, and this they have done for some months past, the killing of the non-German Continental peoples has been going on at a much accelerated pace. The longer the war lasts and the nearer victory comes in sight for the Allies, the more the populations of the overrun countries will lose at the hands of their oppressors. The obligation to prevent a renewed aggression must therefore become the foremost duty of all nations.

How can this be achieved? More than this war the war of the future will be a war of weapons, of steel, of petrol, and of rubber. And here lies the crux of the problem and its solution. Germany has a small output of iron ore, varying from three to five million tons a year. Broadly speaking, this would be enough for her home requirements. Control of the output and exportation of finished products only is needed. In 1918, German industry was left in the hands of the Germans in its entirety and in full working condition, and it has since grown to huge proportions. After this war, its activities will have to be curtailed and its production power cut down and left just enough scope to cover her own non-military needs. Works like the Herman-Goering-Werke in Salzgittern, which produce a steel whose cost of production is twice that of the world market price and which is produced solely for armament purposes, must be erased. The whole steel industry of Germany should be concentrated, if possible, on the left side of the Rhine or at least not farther inland than Bochum, so as to remain under the control and range of the aviation of the Council of Europe. Synthetic petrol and rubber need big plants. Those of Germany which produce petrol and rubber at prices far higher than those of the world market, must disappear likewise, and the import of petrol and rubber should only be allowed in such limited quantities as to prevent any large stocks. Planes must make regular reconnaissance flights over Germany to discover any new constructions, thus helping in the supervision of the ground. Only through these and similar means will it be possible to prevent the growing population of Germany from attacking in a not too distant future their peaceful, but ghastly decimated neighbours.

That the control of Germany must be adequate goes without saying, but it is equally in the common interest that it should not call for a body of millions of soldiers who would have to be constantly on their guard and ready to strike at an hour's notice. This would put too heavy a burden upon the shoulders of each member of the Council of Europe, and within a short time demands would arise for a decrease in the numbers of the international police force. If such demands were mutually agreed to, their practical application would result in a relaxation of our control, leading Europe to the same slippery road on which she struggled from 1926 onwards. A development on similar lines would be unavoidable, for such is human nature. Our children are inclined

to forget what we have suffered, as we have forgotten the sufferings of our parents.

Plans to avoid this must be drawn up now in readiness for the day of surrender, and no time should be wasted in carrying them out, even at the risk of depriving our debtor—and what a debtor!—of part of his production capacity. It is my belief that it is preferable to get nothing at all out of Germany rather than receive instalments representing a lesser value than the amount of money poured into her through loans enabling German industry to prepare for another and this time victorious war.

What will be the economic life of the small nations? There is hardly anyone who does not long for a break-away from the pre-war economic situation. Rising customs duties, export at dumping prices, and all the other features of continental isolationism should be considered as belonging to the past. Before America entered the war, or rather was drawn into it, much had been said about American isolationism. But was it not the same as the famous "neutrality" of all nations, big and small, in the years from 1931 to 1941?

There has been much talk about the Europe of tomorrow. Some want the smaller States to disappear altogether in order to avoid dangerous appetites, as they call it. Others are eager to forge various States together into economic unions. Both ideas may be contested. The amalgamation of different small nations in one big State would threaten, if not actually destroy, the traditions and characteristics of the smaller nations and create "minorities" where none have been before. We may likewise anticipate that a change of that kind would mean "carrying coal to Newcastle" and add new difficulties to the existing ones. As to welding economic blocks by force under pressure of the Great Powers, this seems an equally shortsighted policy and would certainly affect adversely the prospects of a future peace by bringing those together who have no desire to be linked in an economic union.

To my mind, the best possible solution is to leave it to the small nations themselves to choose the partners with whom they wish to form a union. If, on the other hand, the Great Powers did not take an interest in the formation of these unions and did nothing to help their birth, difficulties would arise.

There are signs of the formation of three blocks: The Central European block, towards which Czechoslovakia and Poland have already made a very cautious beginning; the Balkan block with, as a start, an agreement on a few principles between Greece and Yugoslavia; and the Western European or Atlantic block, covering Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Up to now the only existing economic federation in Europe is the Economic Union between Belgium and Luxembourg, but it has had, and still has, such good results for both that neither partner wishes to relinquish it. It is outside the scope of this article to examine all the aspects of this union, but it is worthwhile to point out its lasting success and to stress that its main

principle has always been to take care not to overrule the weaker partner, but to find a mutual solution for all arising difficulties.

An economic union cannot be created without preliminary work. It has to be carefully prepared with the full knowledge of the producing capacity of the partners. We lack this knowledge for the time being and we shall know no more at the end of the war which has brought havoc to so many factories. That is why the outline of economic collaboration can only be drafted. It is up to those at the helm of the European States after the war—and they will comprise mostly those who have suffered and are so valiantly resisting—to tackle the details of collaboration between States.

The two blocks of Central Europe and the Balkans have to build up their industrial production. Raw materials are plentiful in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Other countries likely to join, as for instance Rumania, are in control of almost all the European petrol. It will be their task to create new industries with the purpose of providing work for their populations, which were growing so fast before the war, and for securing their independence from German industrial production.

Their first aim will be to pool their resources and to construct complementary industries in the different countries. These two blocks will sooner or later melt into one, having then a territory and a population by far exceeding that of Germany before the annexation of Austria. Even those politicians who might still be clinging to the idea of equilibrium in Europe, may be satisfied with this prospect. It is obvious that every country will have to give up part of its sovereignty, if sovereignty is divisible, and here I have in mind national customs barriers, special currency or special exchange rates, protective measures for one or another kind of production, etc. The result, however, will be worth the sacrifices and will be, in every respect, most gratifying: wages will rise, the standard of education will go up, and consumption will be raised for the benefit of the free peoples.

The Atlantic block would have as a nucleus the so-called Low Countries, comprising Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. In the North it would link up with Norway and possibly Denmark, whilst in the West an economic agreement with a revived France would be of inestimable value. All these countries have an outlet to the Atlantic and will, no doubt, be joined sooner or later by Switzerland. The difficulties in coming to an agreement of such proportions are, however, numerous and there are probably too many of them to allow hope for the creation of an Atlantic economic block with the full collaboration of Great Britain and her dominions within a short time.

Many factors may later weigh in the balance which cannot even be foreseen at present. If it is theoretically possible to plan on broad lines and even to draft the lay-out of such an important economic union, practically and technically it is impossible to draw up suitable plans in advance. This does not imply that the first square mile of the continent reconquered by the Allies

can be left without attention until the war is over and an all-round scheme is minutely elaborated. Practical solutions must be applied from the first moment to prepare the ground for a wider agreement.

The situation which the Allies will have to face in Europe, is much the same in every country. Everywhere oppression is ruthless and bloody, mass deportations are taking place up and down Europe, the whole Continent is not only deprived of its man-power for the benefit of Germany, but also of its wealth, its industries, and its agriculture, let alone the pilfering of museums and shops. Did not Mr. Eden say a short time ago, during his visit to America, that England entered the war because she wants to see treaties observed? The war will be won and its contribution towards the growing-up of mankind will be the hammering home of the sanctity of the pledged word freely given, of agreements freely contracted, that is, the restoration of Justice and Right. If we achieve this—and no doubt we shall—we have scored a great victory for the moral values in the world. This is realized by the oppressed peoples in Europe, and for them it means victory for everything they believe in and cherish. Thus the moral background has been created for a good understanding with all our neighbours who have suffered and fought for the same cause. Brothers in arms, friends in peace, is the watchword that renders negotiations less difficult and offers a better chance of success.

I have already mentioned that economic blocks cannot be created all at once, but must be carefully prepared by those interested in their existence. This means all the United Nations. On the morrow of the cessation of hostilities, there will be three nations holding all the power in their hands, all the power required for making a just and lasting peace. America, Great Britain, and Russia, with the collaboration of China, will shape the peace to come.

Let us hope that in their strength they will not forget the smaller powers, by which I mean all the other nations. There is solid ground for hope that the claim of the smaller States to have their say in the shaping of peace will not be by-passed.

Quite recently Mr. van Kleffens, the Dutch Foreign Secretary, observed that democracy consists in granting the same rights to rich and poor alike and it would, therefore, not be very democratic to refuse the small nations the right to raise their voice at the international conference table, especially as they will quite rightly be called upon, and have already agreed, to take their share in the duties that will arise. During twenty years at Geneva, and more than three years in London, Washington and elsewhere, the Great Powers have been sitting next to the smaller Powers at conference tables, but the day has yet to come when the representative of a small nation will be found guilty of impeding the conference in its work. The leading idea should therefore be to secure a place for the small nations at every round-table conference.

I venture to say that the first step in the economic realm must be the stabilization of currency. Early in April two plans were put forward, the American one, called the White Plan, and the English one, called the Keynes Plan. These two plans show undoubtedly that the Americans and the British are seriously and honestly working towards putting before the United Nations a financial scheme to stabilize currencies and to create a solid basis for international trade and exchange.

The next step that suggests itself is the comparative study of the two schemes by financial experts. It would be their task to work out detailed proposals which, backed by America, Great Britain, Russia and China, would be submitted for discussion to the other Allied Nations.

If an agreement is reached on this point, as it probably will be, then provision for the organization of post-war trade must be broached. Why did the pre-war system, if ever there was one, fail? Surely because it did not provide for the distribution of the agricultural and industrial products of the world in a satisfactory manner. Whilst man-power and capital were unproductive and wasted alike, people at some places were in dire need of vital commodities. There has never been a worldwide plan of production and distribution. The national plans of all countries, even the greater ones, have utterly failed, despite the fact that certain nations believed that they could carry on on an entirely autarchic basis.

At present the resources of the whole world are mobilized and are used in the fight against the common foe. The right weapons in the right number must be in the right hands at the right time. This has been achieved hitherto, and will be done again. Has this problem been more difficult than that which we have to tackle after the war—the distribution of goods? It is, however, a world problem and must be solved by the organization of trade. The fight for markets must be over when the fight for freedom is won, because it would mean an even more cruel and reckless economic war than the present is a military one.

The next step to avoid economic chaos leads to the organization of production and the fixation of prices not only on a national, but on an international basis. One of the most important factors here will be the man-power problem, the worker. Social security must be guaranteed for him, as well as a fair living. It will be one of the main tasks of the International Labour Office, the International Trade Unions, and the national Labour Unions to prepare, together with all Governments, the organization of production and to carry out the measures agreed upon for establishing a better world and securing the four freedoms.

Conferences have already been held to solve the problems of the immediate post-war period. The U.S.A. have taken the initiative in convoking a very important inter-allied meeting for the beginning of May, which is to deal with the organization of post-war agriculture, probably the most important problem of production. The goodwill to find a solution exists, and we hope

that the conference will be a success. Others will follow about steel, petrol, rubber, coal, etc. All these meetings are milestones on the long, narrow and painful road uphill to international understanding and the creation of great economic blocks in Europe.

What will be the place of defeated Germany and Italy in all these schemes? There will always be the right for the vanquished to share in the raw materials of the world. But their part will only be distributed to them for immediate consumption and in such reduced quantities as to prevent any storing away for future mischief.

150 years of ill-directed education in Germany cannot be undone in a few years. It will take generations to get rid of the Nazi poison which is now in the souls of at least 90 per cent. of the Germans. Some people hope that through education many Germans can be turned into decent human beings almost overnight. Doubt is justified however that small success will be apparent before 30 years. Let us therefore never disarm mentally. Let us work hand in glove with all the Allied Nations, our friends for many, many years, and build up the future peace and our new economic system. The resources and energies mustered in the war, combined with the goodwill and the spirit of sacrifice of all have prepared the United Nations for collaboration after the war. All will work with the same confidence as they are working now. The prize will be the winning of the peace; this fight calls for devotion, courage and endurance, and a watchful guard must be maintained on the ramparts.

There will be no new order, because there has been no old one. It will be the duty of the United Nations to create Order and to stand by, all together, to make it last.

(M. Bodson is Minister of Justice for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.)

EL ALAMEIN TO THE WADI AKARIT

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

THE capture of Tripoli practically marked the end of the reconstituted 8th Army's Libyan campaign, but though thenceforward the pressure exerted by the British and American armies in Tunisia tended to divert part of Rommel's force, it is fair to consider that its campaign as an independent undertaking did not close till contact was made with the 2nd American Corps after the battle of the Wadi Akarit. Henceforth, though the tasks of the 8th Army will be no less important, its co-operation with the other constituents of General Alexander's group of armies will be much closer, and some of its independence will be lost, although we may be sure that its characteristics will be maintained.

The primary factors which brought success were evidently:—the admirable co-operation in spirit and in action between the three fighting Services and between the various arms—from the days of Wavell's campaign this has been a distinguishing feature of our Middle East forces, but it has been steadily developed. If there were unrecorded rivalries or jealousies, and they generally exist in military forces, they can have done no more than stimulate healthy competition. The "drive" displayed by the higher command was exceptional, and it clearly infected all subordinate commanders, producing speed in action. The perfection of the Administrative Services was beyond praise and, as is not always the case, they adapted themselves to the requirements of strategical conditions without any signs of a *non possumus* attitude. The co-operation of the Navy and air Services in the administrative side of the campaign was invaluable. Versatility, promptness of decision and readiness to adapt methods to the situation as it developed were displayed by the higher command.

Although statistics are not available it is probable that the 8th Army possessed numerical superiority over Rommel's force—almost certainly it did in artillery and in its co-operating air force. Such initial superiority as existed was of course greatly increased when Rommel had lost half his army at El Alamein; and when in the later stages of the campaign, although he had been reinforced he was compelled to use part of his army to meet the threat to his line of retreat in Tunisia. It was, however, only in these later stages that numerical disparity contributed in any considerable degree to his defeat. The character of the terrain and the length and nature of lines of communication imposed drastic limitation on the size of the forces either side could employ effectively.

As regards quality of equipment, except in the air, neither side seems to have had any marked advantage. Perhaps the greatest advantage Montgomery held was that, El Alamein, being near to a well stocked base, he was able to make lavish use of munitions, whereas with his long line of communi-

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cation, made precarious by naval and air action, Rommel had anxiety for the maintenance of supplies, particularly of petrol and artillery ammunition. Whatever advantage in this respect Montgomery initially held he tended to lose as the distance from his base rapidly increased during Rommel's retreat. It was only by pausing in his pursuit and by the extraordinary efficiency of his supply services that he ensured that the advantage did not pass to his opponent. This question of supply may have affected considerably the tactics employed by the opposing generals. Rommel appears, for offensive action, to have relied mainly on his armour and on the infantry specially trained and equipped to work with it; and he husbanded his air power for special occasions. Montgomery, on the other hand, made the fullest use of all the weapons in his armoury, and perhaps in particular of his artillery—he was less of a tactical specialist and he certainly had not lost faith in the offensive capacity of infantry who were called to do much more than occupy ground won by artillery and armoured action. It was perhaps due to his specialist outlook that throughout the campaign Rommel was consistently out-manceuvred and out-fought. Twice (if we include his forestalling counter attack at Mareth) he was defeated when he attacked, and three times when he was occupying defensive positions. At the outset of the campaign he certainly showed no signs of lack of confidence or apprehensions that his numerical strength and quality of equipment were inadequate. When he attacked in September at Alamein, there was no limit to his ambitions and Mussolini was summoned to share his triumph. That his attack was timed to forestall the arrival of important allied reinforcements was not a sign of weakness but an obvious seizure of a favourable opportunity. In the event he fell into the trap Alexander and Montgomery had laid for the specialist in armoured tactics, and he made astonishingly little use of his Italian infantry, which with their goal in sight and with confidence inspired by recent success might have proved formidable. Rommel extricated himself on that occasion with skill and he probably was disappointed that his opponents did not seriously attempt to deliver an immediate counter-stroke. That he remained confident that he would be able to meet attack in his carefully prepared position, and would be able to bring off a decisive counter-stroke, is evident; for if he had apprehensions he would have had little difficulty in withdrawing to a safer distance. El Alamein was of course the decisive battle of the campaign. The enemy was compelled to fritter away his armoured reserve on which he had relied for a decisive counter-stroke. By the co-operative action of every instrument of force his defences were worn down, opening the way for the final break through. The enemy's traps were avoided and the battle was fought, not as Rommel had wished, but as the British commanders had planned. Not less remarkable than the battle itself was the promptitude and vigour of pursuit. We know the sacrifice of his allies and material Rommel had to make in order to save even a portion of force. But, having decided

ruthlessly to cut his losses, and having a good intact road to travel on, the flight of the remnant could not be prevented. Mines and demolitions restricted the pace of pursuit on the road and a break in the weather hindered cross-country movement. He suffered heavily from air pursuit, and in particular lost much of his aircraft on airfields overrun before they could be evacuated. Eventually, however, he out-distanced pursuit by short-range aircraft, for after the first attacks air pursuit was regulated by the advance of the ground troops.

Rommel's halt at Agheila may have been intended only to delay pursuit and for reorganization after absorbing personnel and material he had picked up at his bases during his flight. He may, however, have hoped for opportunities for a counter-stroke if Montgomery had attacked with the leading troops of his strung-out army. Wisely Montgomery made no such attempt, but paused to close up his army while the Navy was re-opening the harbours of Tobruk and Benghazi, which had become essential for the maintenance of supply during the next round. Rommel it may be admitted, though again aided by the weather, timed his retreat from El Agheila accurately when he realized Montgomery was ready to strike in force; and he evaded the latter's encircling manoeuvre. Much the same thing happened at the Wadi Zem Zem, though there a sharp encounter with Rommel's rearguards took place. The outstanding point, however, is that the pursuit was so rapid and vigorous that Rommel had no time to receive reinforcements which might have enabled him to make a real stand against the 8th Army, operating as it was at the end of an immensely long line of communication. Abandoning Tripoli Rommel continued his retreat to the Mareth line employing his usual delaying tactics. There he not only had a position of exceptional strength, but was much better placed to receive reinforcements. Before Montgomery could hope to engage him seriously again he was bound to pause till Tripoli could be developed as an advanced base possessing adequate reserves for major operations. The Navy did an amazing job of work in re-opening the harbour, but the delay was inevitable. During the pause Rommel showed by his attack on the Americans, and by his attempt to forestall the 8th Army's attack, how formidable his force had become, fully justifying the element of caution Montgomery had introduced into the vigour of his pursuit. Although not so decisive a victory as Alamein the Mareth battle was no less remarkable. It was a battle of manoeuvre rather than a set piece attack, and it required prompt decision and rapid, drastic modification of plans to bring it to fruition. The outflanking movement on El Hamma, involving a long and difficult march with the risk of defeat in detail of widely separated forces, was in itself an audacious manoeuvre. But Rommel was again out-generalled and though he succeeded, by using his armoured reserves in counter-attack, in throwing Montgomery's frontal attack, he left his line of retreat exposed. Swift to seize the opportunity Montgomery, while maintaining his frontal pressure,

shifted the weight of his attack to the flank, and Rommel had no alternative but to retreat with heavy losses.

Again he stood on the very strong position on the Wadi Akarit and evidently he expected to hold that line long enough to allow him to strike another blow at the 2nd American Corps which threatened his line of retreat. But again he was out-generalled and out-fought. Montgomery staged his new attack more rapidly than Rommel anticipated, and no doubt he owed much to having a well stocked and well organized base at Tripoli, otherwise he could hardly have had ammunition reserves sufficient for two major engagements at such short interval—the long pause had justified itself. The outstanding feature of the Wadi Akarit battle was, however, the delivery of the crucial attack in complete darkness. A daring stroke for which there is almost no precedent; for it was a generally accepted belief that attacks in complete darkness were only practicable for small parties against well defined objectives. It was certainly a proof of Montgomery's willingness to take risks, of his versatility, and above all of his confidence in his troops. Rommel, though surprised, probably saved himself from complete disaster by launching a strong counter-attack to cover his withdrawal, but he had again to sacrifice his Italian allies and much equipment. No doubt at Mareth and at Akarit the 8th Army were greatly assisted indirectly by the pressure of the 2nd American Corps, to meet which Rommel was compelled to divert some of his force, but the two battles had to be won without direct assistance.

It is difficult to criticize adversely any features of such an amazingly successful campaign carried out in face of immense difficulties, and in which both the troops and their leaders had acquitted themselves so admirably. Perhaps that is why the critics have been reduced to cavilling at the tone of General Montgomery's messages to his Army. They have been termed bombastic and undignified by some. General Montgomery has his mannerisms, but no one who knows him would, I think, accuse him of being bombastic, and in these days dignity is somewhat out-moded. To me it seems that the messages were well designed to effect their object. They were appeals to every man in the Army, easily understood and clearly expressing, not only what were the commander's intentions, but what he expected of his men. It was a method of communicating to the Army the instructions Mr. Churchill had given to General Alexander—none the worse for touching the men's sense of humour. The troops may not have needed exhortations, but they might have been affected by public opinion in Egypt which, prior to Alamein, was gravely alarmed and more concerned about the defence of the country than any question of driving Rommel out of Africa. Troops, and especially modern troops, like a clear lead. Lack of it probably accounted for the distressingly lackadaisical proceedings which followed the landing at Suvla, where even senior officers had no idea what the landing was intended to achieve. One of Montgomery's messages might have produced vastly different results.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

WHILE eventual and final victory depends on the action of the armies in Russia, in North Africa, in Burma and China, in the islands of the Eastern Seas, and on that of those armies which will, when the stage is set, land in Europe, the success of those armies themselves depends upon the command of the sea. It is by the sea routes, whether they are crossed and covered by water or by air, that the armies are supplied with men, munitions and their needs of all kinds; it is by those same routes that the people of this island are fed with food for their bodies and raw materials for their war industries. The volume of the supplies of tanks, lorries, aircraft and Red Cross material that has been sent to Russia is far from insignificant or without its influence on the great theatre of war between the Baltic and the Black Sea, and it has all reached her by sea and could do so in no other way, either by the northern route or the long road round the Cape to the Persian Gulf. Little imagination is needed to discern what the effects would have been if the command of the Mediterranean had been in the hands of the enemy for the last three years. Armies and their needs, in quantities vastly exceeding those of the Army of the Nile, as it was in the beginning, would have poured across the sea from the ports of Italy and Greece, Palestine, Iraq and the Persian oil fields, and the pipe line bringing the oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean, would have been in the enemy's hands—there would have been no need to seek the oil of the Caucasus, and the defeat of Russia could have been postponed till the Middle East had come under the sway of the Axis when it could have been effected at a far lesser cost and a far greater certainty. The command of the Red Sea and of the route to the Persian Gulf would have followed, and the East African colonies would have lain open to attack by forces greatly superior to whatever Britain could have sent thither. The forces of the Axis and Japan could have effected their junction and India would have felt the result at once. On the other side of Africa, the ports of Morocco and French West Africa would have been occupied with ease. Dakar, instead of being as it now is in our hands would have been in those of Germany, and Gibraltar, under air bombardment from the North African coast, would have become as untenable for great ships as Malta has been. In such a situation even the Italian fleet might have felt there was no great danger in providing the protection of a seaborne expedition for the capture of Sierra Leone. Hard as the defence of the Atlantic trade routes has been it would have been harder still, to the point indeed of impossibility, to conduct it in such conditions.

We shall not be able to say that we have command of the Mediterranean until we can send our shipping through from Gibraltar to Suez instead of round the Cape by the long sea route which absorbs so great a tonnage of merchant ships and of fighting ships to protect them. What we can now say is that the victories of the armies in North Africa have most effectively deprived the enemy of the partial command which has enabled him to supply his army in Africa, owing to his possession of the whole coastline from Tripoli to the doorstep of Egypt. Our own line of communications to the East is still not yet secure, or, to put it otherwise, to use the Mediterranean route would absorb an undue proportion of our available sea and air forces in the effort. When the hard struggle which appears to be ahead of our combined fighting force is over it may prove possible to make a greater use of the Inner Sea route, but shipping will still be under attack from Sardinia, Sicily and Crete; and, ineffectual and unenterprising as the Italian Navy has shown itself throughout the war, it cannot be left out of our calculations so long as it remains in existence. Its submarine and small surface craft, which are its most efficient and active units, backed as they certainly will be by German submarines operating from the newly developed base at Toulon as well as from the many harbours in enemy occupation, will not be greatly hampered, though our own ability to protect them with our light craft and aircraft will be increased to a considerable degree by the possession of bases flanking the entire route. But they will have behind them the larger Italian ships, and these have their powers until they are disposed of. On the lowest estimate they effect a diversion of our own heavy ships for, notwithstanding the proved efficacy of aircraft of which we have had so much evidence during the last fifteen months, and the deterrent effect which the presence of shore based aircraft in large formations is bound to constitute, it would be the height of rashness to assume that the safety of convoys, even if they are passed close along the African coast within reach of shore based bombers and fighters, could be confided solely to the light craft and air craft. There could be no certainty that an adequate air flotilla could appear in time to defend a convoy attacked by heavy surface craft. It is *time* that governs the situation. Moreover, in order to make provision for a defence in such a form it would be necessary to lock up a very considerable number of these important fighting units, distributed at intervals along the stretch of coast from Tunisia to Egypt, a diversion of air strength which would be highly detrimental to the conduct of the war in other regions. Thus the destruction or disablement of the heavy ships of the Italian Navy is an object to be aimed at, and it may well be that it is with this in mind that the High Command in Rome is so unwilling to take any risks with the main body of the fleet.

The interdependence of all the theatres of war, and the interdependence of the three fighting services, are most strongly brought out by these facts. The Mediterranean campaign by land and sea depends on the Atlantic com-

munications; the Atlantic communications themselves depend on the command of the Mediterranean. The Fleet and Air Forces acting at sea in the Mediterranean depend on the army's power to hold the bases from which they operate and to deprive the enemy of the bases from which his sea and air forces strike their blows. The supplies which reach the Eastern theatre will do so in greater quantities, faster and with a smaller use of shipping tonnage, both mercantile and naval, when the Mediterranean route has been made available for use. We have at the same time a vast task in the Pacific, as yet hardly begun except in the realm of defence. There, the Japanese have enjoyed the command of the sea. For many months this was practically undisputed, and because it was undisputed they were able to project their armies rapidly and in wide dispersion over the whole area from Burma to New Ireland. It was when Japan's command of the sea was successfully disputed in the engagements in the Coral Sea, off Hawaii, off the Solomons and in the Bismarck sea, that a halt was called to the flood tide of conquest. That halt is only to be regarded as temporary. Japan's resources are great and her shipping, though it has suffered losses, is still fully adequate to the tasks it has to perform. So far all that it has been possible to do has been, strategically speaking, to conduct a defensive. Before an offensive can be launched fighting vessels and merchant tonnage must be made available, and of the fighting vessels air craft must play a prominent part, particularly in the first stages. "The Japanese," General MacArthur has said,* "have complete control of the sea-lanes in the Western Pacific and of the outer approaches to Australia. The control of such sea-lanes no longer depends solely, or even perhaps primarily, on naval power, but on air power operating from land bases held by ground troops or supported by naval power The range of our air force over the surrounding waters marks the stretch of 'no-man's sea' which is the measure of our safety. With control of the air the enemy's naval units can at once bring forward convoys of ground forces to continue his attack to the south, to a limit imposed only by the effective range of his land based air support." This is a situation which will undergo a considerable modification if and when the command of the Mediterranean is effectively established. When the offensive does begin it will have to be launched with an overwhelming superiority of force in order to offset the marked advantages of position possessed by Japan as the result of her occupation of the long chain of islands from Malaya to New Guinea.

If the "positive" aim of victory depends upon the result of the struggle for the command of the sea so too does the "negative" (if it may so be contrasted with the other) aim of averting defeat. The Germans see this clearly. In their "all-out" attack upon shipping, with its complete disregard of all that has been called "international law," they see the one means by which the Allies may be defeated. Starvation of this country is the principal

**The Times*, April 15.

desire; but only on a slightly lower scale is the stoppage of the supplies of men and munitions to the armies whereby the heralded invasion of the continent would be rendered impossible. If that should be effected, the wretched victims of their aggression would have no hopes of release; and submission would follow disappointment. But even if this full measure of success should not be attained the lesser success of postponing the Allied offensive by the reduction of the shipping tonnage would represent a marked advantage to the Axis, giving time for strengthening, as we see them daily strengthening, the defences of the coast of Europe, and for creating the delusion that an Axis victory is a victory for the freedom of the smaller Powers.

Thus, looking at the situation in the broadest way, the truth of the doctrine that the command of the sea must be the first object of the Allied strategy is plain. What is not less plain is that this command is not to be achieved solely by the destruction of the fighting ships of the enemy, essential though that is. Command of the sea, it cannot be too often repeated, means command of the passages across the sea by whatever vehicles those routes are crossed and by whatever instruments of warfare the vehicles are protected. "Sea Power" is the form of power by means of which that command is exercised, but, as we see both in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific, it is itself dependent on land power; on the power to obtain possession of the territory from which those sea and air forces controlling the routes conduct their operations. The great ship, the small ship, the submarine, the bomber and fighter in the air can only operate in areas which they can reach and in which they can remain for a sufficient time. In the present phase of the struggle the ejection of the enemy from positions from which his sea and air forces sally to injure our communications is an immediate and over-riding necessity. The strengthening of the forces both on the sea and in the air which are engaged in the direct operations against the marauding U-boats and their associate surface vessels is the other immediate task. Colonel Knox has recently told us that March was a worse month than February, and though, as the Prime Minister said, the losses fluctuate, it will only be when there is a steady and continuous decline that the end will be in sight. More escorting and protecting vessels are the essential needs, both sea and air. The hopes built upon breaking submarine attack by destruction of the centres of production have not materialized: the numbers of submarines have continued to increase in spite of the heavy bombings, hard and destructive as these certainly have been. It is to the sinking of the submarine in the open waters where she can be encountered, and the destruction of the crews which man her, that we must pay our principal attention in this branch of the struggle. That, and the clearing of the coasts of the Mediterranean and the "liquidation" of the remaining Italian sea forces are the pressing needs of to-day. They constitute the foundation of the two great efforts that we require to begin as soon as possible in Europe and in the Pacific.

AFRICA SINCE LIVINGSTONE

BY CECIL NORTHCOTT

SEVENTY years ago on May 1, 1873, David Livingstone died at Chitambo's village in what is now Northern Rhodesia where he was found at daybreak kneeling in prayer by his camp bed. His faithful "boys" removed his heart and buried it under a large mulva tree and then began their 1,500 miles march with the body, encased in sailcloth, to the eastern coast from where it was brought home to Westminster Abbey. The British people have rarely been more moved at the death of a great man than they were at Livingstone's, and his fame remains undiminished and his lustre untarnished.

The constant presence of Africa in world affairs and the urgent question-mark the great continent still forms on the map are pregnant reminders of Livingstone and his story. "Great as his work and results have been," says Field-Marshal Smuts, "the man himself is greater still. His heroic figure looms over the continent showing to Dark Africa the true character and shining example of a Christian gentleman." He compelled the world to look at Africa and the African, and although much has happened in Africa since his death which would sadden Livingstone there is much over which he would rejoice.

Although he discovered many thousands of square miles of territory in Africa Livingstone's greatest discovery was the African himself, and after seventy years it is possible to look broadly at some of the changes which have happened during this time in African life, and make some assessment of debit and credit as they appear in the human balance sheet.

An important study has recently been issued in America entitled *The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint* (Phelps-Stokes Fund, New York City) which sums up the present African situation:—

The major assets are clear. Speaking generally, there have come the formal abolition of the slave trade; public order; more personal and social security; the opening of roads; new means of transportation resulting in decreasing the burdens and evils of hand portage, for whose commercial development Europeans had earlier been largely responsible; the cessation of tribal wars and of many cruel customs; increase in markets for native products; larger opportunities for productive labour; improved education and agriculture; higher standards of justice; the control of many pests; the manufacture or importation of many useful objects and products; better health conditions; release from the ill-effects of certain fears and superstitions; and the spiritual, educational, and social benefits of the Christian religion when interpreted and applied in the spirit of Christ.

The liabilities are equally clear. They include—in addition to the early development of the slave trade—the break-up in many cases, although often unwittingly, of tribal solidarity and family life, without providing adequate new safeguards; the weakening of some old taboos which had an ethical significance; the loss of extensive areas for farming, ranging cattle, and hunting; the evils of urbanization and industrialization in European centres, especially through the disturbances brought about by the introduction of the modern system of industry with wages on a low level and poor working conditions; the greater consciousness of racial differences; the introduction in some sections of gin and other intoxicating liquors, in spite of mandate regulations and the 1919 Convention relating to the Liquor Traffic in Africa; the spread of certain diseases not known before; and the dragging of Africa into the maelstrom of European military events which have resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of African soldiers and members of labour battalions accompanying them.

While it is impossible to generalize about Africa, for the territories differ greatly, yet Africa since Livingstone has experienced the increasing break-up of tribal solidarity and the dislocation of family life, due to the widespread loss of native land, the industrialization of certain areas, the drawing of labour from the rural districts and the system of taxation which bears heavily on the African.

The old order of the tribe settled on its ancestral lands is passing in Africa. In his great African survey Lord Hailey says, "Except in the regions where minerals are of predominant importance, the wealth of the African people can be derived only from the soil. If the soil fails then the ideas of African advancement must fail too." Africa is not, however, a rich agricultural continent, and the wastage of the soil is a vital problem for the African governments to tackle. But in Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa the finest tracts of land are reserved exclusively for Europeans. Out of the "good lands" of Kenya 16,700 square miles are for Europeans and 43,000 square miles for Africans. On the European lands there are 1,600 landholders with their families and 120,000 African employees. But the African reserves (only three quarters of which are "good land") have to support nearly 3,000,000 Africans, so that the habitable parts are already congested. In Northern Rhodesia the Land Commissions have made genuine attempts to allow for the needs of the tribes, but it was admitted as long ago as 1930 that some of the Reserves were already over-populated, which results in soil deterioration; yet there are large areas kept exclusively for the use of Europeans which remain vacant and undeveloped. The new land laws of Northern Rhodesia provide that all land not yet alienated and which proves *unsuitable for non-native settlement* and contains no valuable mineral deposit will be made available for native occupation. Living room is granted to the African in his own country after the European has looked at it and rejected it. In Southern Rhodesia the land situation for the African is far worse. Seventy-four thousand square miles have been set aside for Europeans and 46,000 square miles for the Africans. This on a population basis of 60,000 Europeans and 1,500,000 Africans means forty-one times more provision for the European. It may be granted that the European needs more land for his

standard of living, but must the African be depressed to a one-fortieth standard? Even the Union of South Africa, with its recent repressive legislation, is beginning to recognize that Africans must have more land. Seven per cent of the land in the Union is now available for native occupation for an African rural population of 5,448,000 as against a European one of 696,000. The native reserves and townships contain some of the worst slums in the world with appalling moral conditions.

The attractiveness of work in the industrial and mining regions of Africa has drawn young Africa from the villages very powerfully since Livingstone's days. The Belgian Government has estimated, according to Margaret Wrong's *Five Points for Africa*, that if more than 10 per cent. of the able-bodied men are away from the village there is deterioration of village life and agriculture. Tribal life and family life wither. In Northern Rhodesia and Kenya fifty per cent. of the men of a district are often away. Many do not return to the villages and those who do often bring back the worst evils from urban and mining areas. In Nyasaland this disruptive emigration Miss Wrong summarizes as follows: "The great exodus of able-bodied men debars women from marriage and motherhood and causes depopulation, the breakdown of marriage and increasing unfaithfulness. The absence of fathers has an adverse effect on the training of children. Financial support from absentees becomes irregular or ceases and so women have not the money for the tax or for other financial liabilities, and wives and old people are in difficulties because able-bodied relations who would normally provide for them are away. Houses are not repaired and food supplies are depleted because women and old men cannot do all the work. Elders find it difficult to maintain the prestige of the family and to preserve its social and moral integrity in the absence of the men, who normally would represent it in the local court or deal with matters arising from birth, marriage and death. In the words of an African woman: 'The household is broken.'"

Direct taxation in money has also contributed to the break-up of African life forcing the African to work away from his ancestral lands in order to provide his taxes. The poll tax, or hut-tax, levied on all adult African males over eighteen, ranges from 6s. in Nyasaland to 20s. in Southern Rhodesia. These are large amounts for Africans as they represent usually one month's wages for unskilled labour, and to get the money to pay the African may have to go five hundred miles away. He often tries to earn enough to pay the tax for others in his family so that they may not leave home. Racial discrimination also enters into the taxation system. There was no income tax at all in Kenya until 1937 when it was fixed at 1s. in the pound on the first £700, and in Southern Rhodesia (1938) no European paid income tax unless he had an income of £360 or more for single men and £800 for married men which meant that a married man with one child and an income of £1,000 paid less than £3 10s. Od. a year in tax, which could hardly be called burdensome compared with the African's poll tax of a month's wages.

Racial bitterness has increased in Africa since Livingstone's day. Within the Union of South Africa the official segregation policies in land, economic and social affairs have created two nations living side by side but officially not on "speaking terms." The war has revealed the inequity of this position for the future of the Union, and Field-Marshal Smuts in a speech in Cape-town in January, 1942, had many doubts about it. "South Africa had failed," he said, "in many respects. She had tried segregation, but segregation had failed. Native health, housing and nutrition have been shamefully deficient . . . we want to take a holiday from old ideas which have brought nothing but bitterness and strife to our country, and try to the best of our ability to fashion a variegated but harmonious race pattern in South Africa." This new expression of "liberal opinion" on race in South Africa is probably not representative of South African opinion as a whole—that is still committed to what Field-Marshal Smuts called "European top-dogism" although there are signs "that slowly South Africa is beginning to align itself with the democracies on the question of social justice for all its inhabitants."

Livingstone's great ideal of "commerce and Christianity" brought many commercial undertakings of genuine idealism into the African field. But in the course of the years it cannot be said that modern industry in Africa has been conducted mainly with a view to African welfare. The profits of African mines go very largely to companies and shareholders overseas. The only dividend the African can expect is a reasonable wage and such amenities as education, medical service and transport facilities. Most of the mining companies provide welfare services and are eager to keep their "labour supply" in a healthy condition. But in Northern Rhodesia men's wages range from £7 to £14 a year with housing and food, while the average European yearly salary is £500 with allowances in addition. This means that a higher standard of life for the African—which he increasingly desires—is impossible. He cannot as a wage earner rise above a "boss boy" in the mines, or, in British Africa, to an engine driver. This industrial colour bar (or "civilized labour policy" as it is known in Southern Africa) exists to protect the European from African competition and permits no African to be a member of a white trade union. In the latest study of African industrial conditions Mr. Julius Lewin* asks for the establishment of a trade union for African miners, the limitation of European immigration as Africans are trained to the skilled work, the appointment of a wage board and increased political representation for Africans on the legislative council.

These are some of the entries on the debit side of the African balance sheet. But the impartial observer of African affairs since Livingstone would agree that the white man and his civilization have done a great deal for Africa and the African. Africa is a poor and backward continent, and since the war the British Government have realized that afresh in the estab-

**Colour Bar in the Copper Belt*, 1941.

ishment of the new Colonial Development Fund, much of which will be spent in Africa.

Tribalism in any case is breaking up in Africa altogether apart from outside pressure, and all over the continent Africans are claiming liberty from the old restrictions. The great long-range quest for Africa is to find an adequate substitute for the old sanctions which have built up its life in the past.

One of the great factors in African progress at the present time is the demand for education. Africa is leaping the centuries from primitive illiteracy to modern European standards. Only a few Africans do this at present, but rapidity of development will become more widespread as the techniques of mass education which have been practised in Russia and China are adapted to African conditions. This educational awakening is primarily the contribution of Christian missions to Africa. They led the way and they still bear nine-tenths of the burden, and their pioneering work in adapting educational methods to an African environment has been notable. But the supply of schools and colleges, however, does not meet the need. In many parts of Africa there is still nothing but elementary education, and the amount of money spent per head by some of the colonial governments is very small. In 1936 in Southern Rhodesia £30 13s. 9d. was spent per head on European children's education and 13s. 9d. on African children. In Kenta the figures were £26 7s. 5d. and 16s. Africans are beginning to demand compulsory education and also to see some relationship between adequate educational provision and the taxes they bear. But a "school-literary" education alone will not satisfy Africa. It must be related to the community and be centred in the peoples' life. To quote Miss Wrong:—

In many parts of Africa, teachers in elementary schools are working with the children to make things needed in the community. Distempers from local earths, brushes, brooms, furniture and many other things are produced; looms of an improved pattern are made and used. In a number of districts friezes and designs are being painted on walls. The schools can be a link in the development of local industries and in restoring the craftsman to a place of honour in the new society. For instance, at a central school at Shagamu, Southern Nigeria, a Benin carver teaches the craft for which his people are famous, and the school building has fine carved doors. At Uzuakoli College, South-Eastern Nigeria, a skilled blacksmith has set up very fine wrought iron gates in order to develop understanding of craftsmanship among the students. These are examples of widespread efforts in schools and colleges to encourage pupils to honour craftsmen and to foster desire for further training.

At the other end of the educational scale there are promising beginnings in African universities, notably at Achimota on the Gold Coast and Makerere in Uganda, both of which are great gifts of British far-sightedness to African education.

One of the direct effects of Livingstone's self-sacrifice was the establishment of vigorous medical missionary work in Africa, which in the hands of

Christian missionaries has won the confidence of Africa in a remarkable way. Government and medical missions are in most African territories co-ordinated into a comprehensive medical system the most advanced of which is in Uganda, in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. A distinctive feature in both Uganda and Nigeria is the number of qualified African medical assistants who do the routine medical work. Rural dispensaries and itinerant medical orderlies have been greatly developed in Uganda—there were ninety-three of them in 1936 and the attendances of out-patients were over three millions. Most of the cost of these was met from native treasuries, a significant recognition by chiefs and people of the place of modern medicine. Uganda too is famous for the outstanding work of Sir Albert and Lady Cook in the Church Missionary Society's hospital at Mengo which trains African nurses and midwives. Attached to the hospital are twenty-four maternity and child-welfare centres which deal with 150,000 cases annually, and this sustained service has reduced infant mortality and is building a healthier race. The government medical expenditure in 1938 was £190,121 out of a total government expenditure of £2,179,659. In the Nigeria and Cameroons (British Mandate) medical service there are 14 African medical officers, all qualified in Europe, and holding appointments similar to those of Europeans, and the assistant staff includes dispensers, nurses, midwives, sanitary inspectors and vaccinators. The Rockefeller Foundation has established Yellow Fever laboratories at Yaba, and there is now a well organized campaign against sleeping sickness.

But with all the devoted medical service now being given to Africa from the great Albert Schweitzer at Lambarene down to the humblest African medical orderly the majority of Africans are, says Lord Hailey, "still beyond the reach of medical and health services in the ordinary sense." Livingstone's "open sore" of slavery has been healed, but Africa is still in bondage to medical superstition, insanitation, malnutrition, bad diet, malaria, leprosy, silicosis, tuberculosis and venereal diseases. There is enough warfare here for all the nations who have African responsibilities for many years to come.

But is the African capable of taking a place amongst the nations of the world? That is the vital question, as the problems of Africa become increasingly world problems, for the great continent provides a practical debating ground for many of the issues now facing mankind. The old theory that African peoples were all children who would always remain children is not tenable. Mr. Joyce Cary in his book, *The Case of African Freedom*, has summed up this point:—

That the African is capable of equal education and responsibility with Europeans, is beyond argument, to anyone who deals with realities, that is, who has known real Africans. The Mahomedan judge, subtle and learned, the great chief with his political shrewdness, the hospital assistant, the village headman, the lorry driver, the sergeant-major; put any of them into a white skin and they would take their place, in the same rank of European society, on equal terms. They would appear like the rest, the lawyer

among lawyers, the chief among statesmen, the government clerk among officials; the sergeant-major among that natural aristocracy of the soldiers of career—the non-commissioned officers.

Racial differences may be deep but no race exists, except perhaps a few remnants of the primitive bushmen, which is not capable of that degree of education and responsibility necessary to carry on the modern state.

It is one of the judgments on British policy in Africa that we have been slow to give positions of authority to Africans—no African has attained in colonial services the eminence of General Eboué, now Governor of French Equatorial Africa. On the Gold Coast the first beginnings have now been made in giving Africans positions in the colonial, political and administrative departments which would have rejoiced the heart of Livingstone who always treated his African colleagues with respect and courtesy and thereby acknowledged their partnership with himself. As the war goes on and Africans play important parts in it, questions about the future are being asked throughout the continent. Must the tragic discrimination between "black and white" go on for ever in African life? Will places be found in increasing numbers on legislatures and councils for Africans? Will African territories be treated as "modern states" instead of burdensome dependencies? In other words, can the ideal of "partnership" be made an actual fact in African social and political life? These are questions which Britain must take a large share in answering.

LAURENCE BINYON

BY ROBERT SENCOURT

BORN in a Lancaster Rectory on August 10, 1869, Laurence Binyon went from St. Paul's School to Oxford, where he won the Newdigate in 1890. Three years later he entered the British Museum, to work first in the Library under Richard Garnett. But after two years he was transferred to the Department of Prints and Drawings, then under Sidney Colvin. Here he spent forty years, rising finally to be the head of it.

Binyon spent many years in cataloguing first English water-colour drawings, and later those of China and Japan. Since his twenties, he had been admired also a poet. After he retired in 1934, he intended to spend much time in completing his translation of the *Divina Commedia*. But after lecturing in Egypt in 1935 and visiting the Levant, he did much work for the newly formed British Council, and at the end of his life finished his course as Byron Professor of English at Athens, when the war drove him violently home. He died, after an operation, in Reading, in March, 1943, and is buried in Aldworth Churchyard near his last home at Westridge on the Berkshire upland above Streatley and Goring.

His career has a double cogency: on the one side literature; on the other the study of art. These two interests not only alternated, but intermingled. Those who work among pictures not only train their eyes, but they learn a new fineness of description. To a precise and sympathetic observation, they need to add a knowledge of temper and intention. This training developed and intensified Binyon's poetic art, though some thought he might have written still greater things had he been able to give his whole time to literature. But so fine is our tradition of artistic criticism that his work on pictures drew from him a subtle, melodious and beautiful prose. And not least precious among his works are those which combine the artist in words with the connoisseur of pictures. This twofold approach through pictures and poetry made him an extraordinarily finished and unusual lecturer. For to him the lecture also was a work of art: and the British Council did well to invite him to act as an ambassador of culture.

Though he published no solid work of criticism, he had a gift of insight and interpretation joined to a memory which cherished the rarity of phrases, the savourous fact and the finely humorous observation. All this power was put forth in his lectures, combined with a ringing enunciation and powerful personality. He spoke both in phrase and tone movingly, tellingly: and for

some years before his death he was not only vital and authoritative beyond other lecturers, but he was, in the opinion of the Poet Laureate, on the two central subjects of his interest "fundamentally the most certain and the most instantaneous critic in England."

Mr. Masfield also admires in Laurence Binyon the poetic playwright—a man with in some plays simple pathos, in others, the splendour and trample of armies. The two worked together in the Oxford festivals of spoken poetry, to ensure that all the voice could do should be done to draw forth for poetry notes vibrating, from the depths of the reader's being, and working to a choral fullness.

When he came up to Trinity College over fifty years ago "Q" had already left it: but its Newman was still alive, a prince of writers and prelates. The Poet Laureate was Tennyson; the elaborated prose in which Ruskin and Pater set down their enthusiasm for masterpieces was fervently admired. Browning was still producing poetry. George Meredith had swum but lately into acclamation. Binyon came to be a friend of the young poets of his time: Mr. Masfield, Mr. de la Mare, Mr. Sturge Mobre—with Yeats in the background. A little impatient at times of their own Poet Laureate—for even in those days a prosperous old man in a cloak who was much approved by a stout, able, staid and imperious Queen, seemed too much established to satisfy romantic young men—they looked in other directions: to Browning, or beyond to the hero of Browning's own youth, Shelley.

Binyon, though impregnated with tradition, was gifted from the first with a freshness, a rhythm, and a workmanship distinctly his own. His phrases were intricately interwoven, at the same time as his feeling was acute. The result is a work consistently high, and sincere, with the finish of scholarship about it. If he had never lived luxuriously neither had he Mr. Masfield's close experience of the common man: and his work never had obvious or universal appeal. Only those who are intimate with poetry can feel its poignancy. But for those that can, especially in the two great odes, *The Sirens* and *The Idols*, his intensity, especially in their fervent close, is clear and ardent as flame itself.

The first volume of poems in 1895 showed taste, finish, originality, sincerity, and keenness of bliss: but not yet power, nor thought, nor flashing surprise. Charm, beauty, freshness mark almost every stanza.

Winds, that with moving light
Wash heaven and drive the showers!
Ferns, uncurling free,
Wet heads of nodding flowers!
O' clouds, loftily bright,
That build your domes in the blue,
Is the world new made for me?
Is it I that am born anew?

But in the longer poem called *The Threshold*, he traced already that dedi-

cation to the Eternal Spirit which he guarded when the traditions and forms of the Church of England failed to inspire him. At first there was an oppression and a doubt. But early he felt his spirit freed and nourished with sweet zest: for the strong confidence of peace had fortified his being for soaring flights.

The enduring themes of Binyon's poetry were already there: the delight of love, the tenderness of human feeling, the mystery of sensation and the spirit's wild quest for the distant, infinite world, now dim and cold, now intensely luminous and alluring, where eternity flew among and beyond the stars.

The first he never put better than when in *The Sirens* he wrote stanzas which echo the free verse and the pulsing vitality of Walt Whitman:

They marvel to be born in a new element,
To meet like streams as they go chiming to the sea,
To move like flames that touch and tremble: and marvelling
They look back on the voided shell they quit.

Dawn within dawn, light within light, unfold for them
The secret of the world that, flowing, overflows
The sun and the moon and the farthest of the stars,
And it abounds in them, and they in it.

"A poem," he said, "should grow up from its roots in the heart, free as a flower," and already his own verses did as a poet's should: but there was little of the lyric cry in them, and the heart's poignancy was veiled. Only once or twice is the subtly woven mesh of the veil drawn aside for us to look through his windows to quivering tenderness of feeling. But the feeling was there, and never more poignant than through the whole poem he called *A Woman*. He saw a woman lonely in London:

In all this city, I think, so charged with pain,
None suffers more, desiring what you do
With insupportable longing, and still in vain
Desiring, still condemned to accept and rue

A moment, ev'n now, he was near you; invisible wings
Brushed by you, and infinite longing to follow, to find
That vision truth, overcame you—the heart's sad things
To tell in a trusted ear, on a bosom kind.

When Binyon brought out his *London Visions* in the twenties, he was accepted as indeed a poet.

But meanwhile he was busy with his pictures. And among the prints and drawings he found the work of another poet. Captured by the Spiritual, but determined that it should come to the imagination with the shock of strangeness, and call from sleep for adventure, Binyon naturally was fascinated with Blake. He felt that here art spoke the pure things of spirit. This new poet sought those everywhere. For him the traditional of the Church phrases had

become stifling. All his life Binyon was loyal to the spirit of that early teaching: but he was resolute that it must come through symbols, fresh, beautiful and personal: the quest of spirit took its observations from the bright stars of romance, ardour, strangeness, wonder and surprise. Genius, glamour and grandeur sentinel the enchanted land, and he took each picture and each poem as a whole for what, in its body and spirit, it told him of the interacting, complex wonder of life. Blake's sentences haunted him:—"I should be sorry I had any earthly fame, for what in natural glory a man has is so much detracted from his spiritual glory. I wish to do nothing for profit. I want nothing. I am quite happy." "Painting exists and exults in immortal thoughts." "Art is a means of conversing with Paradise." He remembered how Blake died singing hymns of joy.

"Art is a means of conversing with Paradise." That short phrase, Binyon believed, directs us to the meaning and core of art. For "poetry," he said himself, "is at its best a kind of heavenly speech." He insisted that to concentrate on design, or pure aesthetic values, may be a harmless game for critics, but sterilizes a creator. It is just as much a mistake to think that form can be separated from matter as to tear from art a moral teaching us how to behave. "The peculiar delight, the physical thrill we get from felicity in art springs from a sense of being brought into communion with the secret of life itself, of being for the moment in harmony with the inscrutable purpose of the universal life. We surrender ourselves as a sail to the wind that fills it. We are released from chances and impediments and from all temporary moralities, obeying a law that moves both us and the world outside ourselves."*

"The meaning of a poem is not the idea or emotion we extract from it: it is nothing less than the poem itself in its achieved form It is all, surely, a question of fusion. When a poem appeals merely or mainly to the intelligence, it is a proof that there is an inspired element in it and by so much it fails to be poetry. The appeal, in my view, is not to any single sensibility but to the whole being, the full experience of the poet." Here Binyon was arguing against Housman, who said: It is not *what* is said, but *the way it is said* that matters.

It was Binyon himself who edited the *Golden Treasury of Modern Lyrics*, and it was for him a series of communions of joy with dead and living friends. There were his personal friends, Newbolt, Bridges, De le Mare, Sturge Moore, Masfield at their best, and there the young men his appraising, enterprising, sure, swift judgment had encouraged, Brooke, Blunden, Robert Nichols, Aldington. And there, too, the high names of his predecessors, Meredith, Tennyson, the Brownings, Matthew Arnold, Swinburne: with others like Darley with whom he began and Cory, and even T. E. Brown. They ended with the poem which Binyon thought, and with good reason, the finest written in his lifetime: the poem which he said harmonized nature and

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man who, the most conscious part of nature, was endowed with faculties which transcend nature. This poem is Ralph Hodgson's *Song of Honour*.

Binyon's own contribution was not unworthy of that high company! *Initiation* tells the story of a gleam of experience when his senses were sharpened and sweetened by the purity of spring smells till his own heart was changed into a mystery: he felt the presence of the spirit, which moves in all that is instinct with love and life.

Who seeks me? What shy love whose approach
Makes spiritual the white flowers on the thorn?
Who seems to breathe up round me—perfumes strange—
June and its bloom unborn?
Shy as a virgin passion in the spring!
I could have time cease now, so then should live
This blossom in the stillness of my heart—
Earth's earth, yet immaterial as a sense
Enriched to understand, love, hope, forgive.

How sweet it was in youth's shy giving time
Finding the sudden friend, whose thoughts ran out
With yours in natural chime;
Who knew before speech, what the lips would tell!
No need to excuse, to hide or to defend
From him, in whom your dearest thought shone new
And not a fancy stirred for him in vain.
So was it, as with a so perfect friend
In that rare moment I have lost again.

But lo! a whiteness risen beyond the hill.
The moon dawn! A late bird sings somewhere; hark
The long, low, loitering trill!
Like water drops it falls into the dark.
The earth-sweetness holds me in its fragrant mesh.
*Oh, though I know that I am bound afar,
Yet, where the grass is, there I also grew.
Blood knows more than the brain. Am I perhaps
Most true to earth when I am most untrue?*

There, in the combination of fine feelings, of shy and exquisite sensibilities, of the close, individual observation these made possible, and in finding in the elusive and yet illuminating sense that in the finest perceptions of earth through nerves and flesh there was the secret of the soul's quest—voiced so poignantly in *Sursum Cor*—we have the elixir of Laurence Binyon's life. If indeed we want to listen to his "Song of Honour" let us read *Initiation*. It is through the senses, he said, that the soul becomes spontaneously aware of the soul of nature.

Through the art of Japan and China, he moved into the world of *Kubla Khan*. "I am often reminded of that poem," he wrote, "when I unroll some old Chinese makimono with its green and gold forests, its fantastic mountains,

its torrents, its pavilions on the edge of lakes that widen to the misty horizon." But it was not only the magical, musical world of *Kubla Khan*: he found in the teaching of Zen, the same taste for wildness, space and loneliness that he enjoyed in Wordsworth. From the English poets and the English artists he drew that power of using symbols for direct communion with the spirit which fascinated him again when he came to it in China and Japan. He did not go so far as to regard the outward world as Maya, but when he heard of the patriarch Daruma appearing before the Emperor of China, and telling the Emperor that neither by building monasteries, nor by copying the Sutras, nor by giving of fortunes in charity had the Emperor acquired merit, then he recognized the spirit of his beloved Blake. For when the Emperor asked how does one acquire merit, the Daruma answered: by discovering the unreality of the world through contemplating the absolute knowledge within.

From Blake long since Binyon had learnt to look through nature to the power which was both within it and beyond it. He found the same spirit in the Japanese Korin. But Dante's idea of nature drawing the senses through colour, light and air, to something finer and more impalpable than the things of sense and so suggesting the realm of the ideal, this he found alike in Turner and in Shelley.

Shelley could identify himself with the wind and the cloud: he loved with a personal love autumn evenings, waves, storms and the outburst of spring; and Binyon felt that Turner exerted a very similar power of communion when by close watching he impregnated memory with the changing form of water, the changing colours of clouds. Both poet and artist received exaltation from all that was deep, vast, splendid in the movement of mighty waters, in the glories of light playing on moistened air. The comparison was in itself a new and most stimulating essay in criticism, but Binyon was not content, till he had related this dual affinity to Hokusai, or to Sesshu. For the subtle complexity of man enabled him as he observed nature to relate it to what he shared with it in his own spirit: and this shows itself not only in the rhythm of the poet but in the drawing and brush-work of the artist. "The great masters of landscape then communicate a sense of the great order of things, the equilibrium of nature. They communicate a sense of freedom and infinity. They communicate a sense of energy and joy shared by the life of men with the life of nature. In the greatest artists these are all present together with a deep persuasion of the hidden harmonies of the world, of the continuity of life throughout the universe from the meanest to the mightiest of living things." This discovery drew together those who painted landscape in Japan with those who painted it in England.

In discussing Dante in 1921, Binyon insisted that, though fine lines are an index to genius, it is a heresy that high poetry cannot be maintained. Rhythm is a profound element in style, and to be duly felt must be sustained, as in *Paradise Lost* and the *Divina Commedia*. "All a poet's emotional experience—

what he feels, what he thinks, what he hates, what he desires—passes into his verse and moulds its rhythm with infinite subtleties and minute reverberations, so that its beauty is irrevocably implicated in the richness and depth of the poet's spirit and wins thereby a living glow and changeful texture impossible to the most accomplished metrician who is a virtuoso and nothing more." This judgment reveals the tension at which Binyon both lived and wrote himself.

He admired Rossetti's translation of Dante's minor poems, but thought there was no adequate poetic translation of the *Divina Commedia*, and doubted if there ever would be. Nevertheless it was to filling in the gap that he consecrated many hours, especially in the last years of his life. Did he succeed? Bridges thought him "by so much the best" of the translators: but opinions will differ; and it may be questioned whether all his work on Dante reaches the highest level of his prose.

To the general public he became known in 1914 through his war poems, and especially through one of them. But that one is not typical of his peculiar fineness of work. What in fact is more remarkable is that when at the age of 65 he was released from his prints and drawings to a life of comparative leisure, he proved that he was a poet as fine, as fresh, as passionate, as enterprising as in his youth. His genius was not wearied but intensified by the course of the years.

At the age of 70, in fact, Binyon produced a final volume: *The North Star*. The poem from which it was named suggested the temper in which he faced the end of his life. He received a new and deeper initiation. He describes how, suddenly, from the kind, warm silence of the fireside, he became aware of a doubt, which was a menace: restless he walked from the fire into the night, and there above the mist and the pines he saw the North Star shining: he remembered what that star had meant to old sailors in the unclouded Mediterranean night, to whom each star was a legendary presence: he knew that still

unfaltering, over seas invisible

ships in blinded motion still steered straight by North Star and compass: and yet certitude escaped him, and path, and direction, and the sense of home. But still he hailed the ancient star:

privately I take
A courage for thy sake,
Because thou hast thy place and I have mine,
Because I still need thee;
Because thou need'st not me.

A year later, the new war came, echoing the war which, since it harrowed him, had spread his fame twenty-five years before. He felt that the air was fouled by a

Vile fume that would corrupt eternal things
Were they corruptible,

but splendour still survived for him in the way that men were knit together in the case of resisting assault and guarding their traditions.

This little volume of sixty pages shows how keen was the poet's spirit, how he had in no way relaxed his delicate, strong touch, how the wedded love that had solved the secret of existence when he was thirty-three kept for him at sixty-six an unwithered blissful freshness.

In these pages too there is a record of the journeys he took to give his triumphant lectures. Egypt and the Levant, Japan, Ankora alternate with vivid experiences in England. None, however, is marked with more fiery intensity than his poem "Chartres."

Nor was this all: he left behind him at his death unpublished poems as noble as any he had written. Were these brought out, not only with those few that are the finest in his earlier volumes, but with neglected but hardly less precious prose, the Empire should join with America in gratitude to see that in our age of bludgeoning machinery there had been reserved for the soul a damascened lance with robes rare as the glistening fragrance of the hyacinth.

Laurence Binyon was kind and wise in action and in judgment. But though his features were delicate and his eyes grey, there was about him, especially when he spoke on art and poetry, a massive impressiveness which told us that the beauty which he worshipped had terror in it and august. With it was the well of life and in its light he saw light, a kindly light, but searching; and, above it his poetry drew opening eyes up to see where

high in a stainless
Solitude of the East
Ineffable colour ascends like a spirit awaking.

He left, we say, the traditional habits of worship, but in doing so he did what few else can. He kept his spirit alive, ardent and intense to pierce to the secret of joy in love, in painting, in patterned words. He wove this secret into a glinting and embroidered satin of verse and prose. He cherished and renewed in poetry its own qualities: intangible, elusive, exquisite, surprising, complex, lustrous and passionate.

If many cultured people are still unaware of what he has bequeathed, let them rest assured in the judgment of the Poet Laureate, that here shone, until the last, "a bright visionary spirit—in genius and power the youngest of the young until he died, and with a hope that many young men have alas! let go."

(Mr. Sencourt wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. John Masefield, who read and commented on this article.)

CORRESPONDENCE

THE WAR AT SEA

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.
Sir,

In Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's article on "The War at Sea" in the April number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* there is much sense and serious criticism of naval policy of recent years, with which he is no doubt entirely competent to deal. In one particular passage, however, in which—as do so many old-world admirals—he wishes to "bag" the whole of Coastal Command, he gives me a severe chastisement for "displaying ignorance" and not "possessing even the merest inkling of knowledge of war." Hard pounding indeed. I do not remember actually the words supposedly spoken by myself, but they seem sound sense and I am prepared to stand by them.

The point the Admiral makes with such quarter deck force is that if Coastal Command help us to command the seas under the operational control of the Navy, then it is a "naval operation" and not, I presume, an "Air Force operation." Command and control of the seas means amongst other things taking on fighter planes and destroying long range bombers. In such work what difference does it make whether this is done above the sea or over land? It is an Air Force job and consequently an Air Force operation. In the dropping of bombs, surely the technique required is accuracy. How does the technique differ between hitting a ship at sea or a railway station on land? It is an Air Force operation in either case.

Take the question of Army co-operation. Here a large part of the Air Force is put under Army operational control, and right nobly do they help, but does the Admiral pretend this is an Army operation? Certainly not; it is an Air Force operation.

If a sailor alone is to bomb ships and a soldier alone to bomb land forces, then I suppose only a Frenchman can bomb Paris. It sounds very foolish put that way.

It is sometimes wise to carry the war into the enemy's camp; therefore I put forward to be pondered over the thought that no longer can the Navy with surface ships control the sea at all. It must eventually be done entirely from and by air power. Even to-day capital ships want for their protection from the air such an aerial armada, that one asks indeed what can the battleship do, after all the fuss, that the aircraft cannot do themselves . . . aircraft cannot defend themselves. In the great battle of Midway Island twenty-two ships were sunk, yet the opposing fleets were never nearer than sixty miles!

Purely tactical work, ship to ship, is already the function of the Fleet Air Arm, and to this might indeed be added the torpedo dropper based on land,

were it not for the fact that torpedo dropping is only one of the functions that can be performed by suitable machines.

Similarly the long range bomber, the long planned Air Force machine, to-day scours the Atlantic for submarines, drops bombs on Berlin, bombs on the Germany Army, and lays mines in German waters. Never can we have enough, yet, according to the Admiral, only the Navy can do the naval operation of laying mines and scouring the seas, only soldiers can bomb the German Army, and I suppose he will leave by implication Berlin to the Air Force. We are grateful.

By all means let the Admiral talk about the sea. I am not qualified to judge if he is right but on air matters he seems to me, to put it mildly, uninstructed.

Yours faithfully,

BRABAZON OF TARA.

70, Pall Mall,
London, S.W.1.

* * * * *

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond writes:

Lord Brabazon will find an answer to the greater part of his remarks in the FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW of February, 1942, so I will not occupy your valuable space with a repetition of the simple strategical facts involved. The profundity of his thought, and his dialectical method, are well shown in his fourth paragraph; and his lack of acquaintance with the conditions of war at sea to-day in his fifth, wherein he expresses the belief that shipping could proceed in safety along our many routes, to Murmansk, round the Cape to the Persian Gulf and the Indies under the protection of aircraft alone, when enemy surface ships, large and small, were at large.

The fact that it is immaterial whether the instruments with which the object of war at sea is attained move in one or another medium has been recognized by the other great maritime Powers, The United States, Japan and France; all of which have made the aircraft employed in the operations of sea warfare integral units of their navies. As Lord Brabazon dislikes a voice from the quarter-deck perhaps he will take no exception to one from the White House. On May 26, 1940, Mr. Roosevelt said: "We cannot have adequate naval defence for all American waters without ships—ships that sail on the surface of the ocean, ships that move under the surface and ships that move through the air In sea operations the airplane is just as much an integral part of the unity of operations as the submarine, the destroyer and the battleship The air forces should continue to be a part of the Navy."

I do not think myself unjustified in saying that those who do not know this elementary fact are ignorant of the principles of war.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By STEPHEN GWYNN

ALL literature is the art of verbal utterance, whether through prose or verse, written or spoken, in a studied arrangement of words and thoughts; and when the medium of utterance is speech, not writing, one must assume a record, either kept or prepared in advance. The Prime Minister as an orator has the great gift of conveying that words come to him as he says them. He can of course improvise, no one better, but such a performance as his broadcast to the nation had in the nature of things to be considered paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence. Yet such was the art that Mr. Churchill seemed always to have his audience before him and to be on easy, friendly and familiar terms with it. Never lacking in dignity or in precision, he is sure enough of himself to slip now and then into slang, which for English hearers gives life to the whole; as for instance, when sketching out plans for education, he looked forward to "a Britain so big that she will need to draw new leaders from every type and wearing every kind of tie." Certainly this modern magic of wireless goes far to make democratic rule a reality; a leader can now make direct contact with his people at their own firesides. They receive the effect which is produced by the very sound of his voice, and by his entering, as here, into their own little jokes that pass current among them. He is not so impressive as Mr. Gladstone was to those who actually heard him; who could imagine Mr. G. using such a term as "pub-crawler" for which Mr. Churchill found occasion? But our man to-day establishes with us an intimacy of communication which flatters the public, and by flattering convinces.

He is no more afraid of the public than they are of him, and he can anticipate their response, just because they have their own recognized means to make it audible. Hitler can put his personality into utterance; but he cannot feel the response as our man does. There needs no apology for bringing this into a review of current literature. What book published in these days can look forward to being read, and re-read, five years, fifty years, from now as that contribution of Mr. Churchill's to war-time literature must be and will be?

* * * * *

A few words also about publications which are not books proper. One is the reprint of Mr. Theodore Cooke Taylor's address to the annual meeting of his firm's employees at Batley last January. It gives account of the profit-sharing scheme which he introduced rather more than fifty years ago, and under which employees numbering generally about 1,600 have received close on £1,600,000. One of his observations is that "if all employers would share their profits with their workers, the practice of workers in some trades of doing as little work as possible would be given up." But that is by no means all that Mr. Cooke Taylor has to say. For the first eighteen years of this

Two
Pamphlets

century he was in the House of Commons, and though he is now some years over ninety, he reviews world affairs for the benefit of his associates with a most sympathetic wisdom, as derived from seventy-six years of business in the woollen trade—during which time he has three times known a period when, instead of the sellers being thankful to find buyers, it was the other way. (The first of those experiences was after the Franco-Prussian war). This old Liberal while he accepts wartime control as necessary holds strongly that British trade was built up by "the genius not of committees but of individuals," and that in his own business "management by a public body would be grotesque." He insists too that after the war banks will be "essential for world recovery," so it will be "just as well for some people to stop abusing them." The workers of Batley are lucky and I don't wonder that they expressed a hope that Mr. Taylor would live to be a hundred.

My other scrap of miscellaneous literature, in a reprint from the Horticultural Society's Journal, is a study of one of "The Founders"—James Dickson. He was that impressive thing, the self-made Scot; a gardener's boy who found his way to London and established himself as a seedsman in Covent Garden. But the main interest about him is that, having made the acquaintance of that enterprising person, Sir Joseph Banks, he was able to produce a suitable Scot when Banks and others were looking for someone to explore the Niger. The Scot he produced was his brother-in-law, Mungo Park, a young doctor, who disappeared up the Gambia and after two years was given up for lost. But on the Christmas morning of 1797 Mungo, having landed in Falmouth, reached London so early that he thought it indecent to rouse any home, and so strolled about what were then the gardens of the British Museum, of which Dickson had charge. So it happened that the faithful gardener, having gone down to see that his greenhouses were properly heated, found himself confronted with a brother-in-law whom he had counted as dead. All the world knows Mungo Park's name; they may not know that he added to our vocabulary the word "mumbo jumbo" (whose proper meaning is not so widely known). Botanists may know that there is a genus Dicksoni including the very finest tree ferns. But probably his memory, in so far as it survives, will survive through that encounter in the half-light at Christmas morning—a century and a half ago.

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There should be welcome for a book which tells us what we all ought to want to know—how things came to be what they are to-day in Russia—and, for that matter, what they really are like. *Behind the Urals* (Secker and Warburg, 7s. 6d.) is by Mr. John Scott who emerged in 1932 from the University of Wisconsin with a desire to see the world; and what he heard about the Soviet Union tempted him. As a first step he learnt a trade and did not leave America until he had qualified to serve as a welder in an electric plant. In Germany where he spent some weeks, thousands of able-bodied men were unemployed; in Moscow all was different and welders were in demand. So he made his way by four days in the train to Magnitogorsk on the eastern slope of the Urals. It had been a village established by earlier people than the Russians; and a village it had only just ceased to be, although its workers were counted by the hundred thousand. All about was a region, some 500 miles square, singularly rich in minerals; and Stalin had decided to make his chief centre of machine production here; outside the range of possible bombers. Mr.

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Scott put in five years there, from January, 1933, on; one of his early experiences was going out to work and finding a riveter frozen dead on top of the building which was to house the biggest blast furnace in Europe or Asia. He found a community living under what we know as wartime conditions, short of food even when its pockets were full of money, and queueing up everywhere. All sorts of languages were spoken, and all sorts of people worked together, about 50,000 of them under police supervision; half being ex-Kulaks, swept under by the Revolution, and the other half—"thieves, prostitutes, embezzlers." Working usually underground, they dug foundations, wheeled concrete, shovelled slag and did other heavy, unskilled labour. But there were other elements. One day a brigade passed—"forty or fifty orthodox priests and bishops wearing dirty ragged black robes and their black mitre-like hats." They also were hard at work with pick and shovel. There used to be a church in the old village but it was made into a clubroom, and finally disappeared, submerged in a lake made for water supply. Magnitogorsk was "one of the few cities, perhaps the only one in the world, with a quarter of a million inhabitants and no place of worship." Yet nobody interfered with peasants newly arrived who were seen to cross themselves in "the old fashion." Still, "they were all laughed and smiled at by the population as a whole, and a relentless campaign of atheist propaganda was carried on in the press and the schools." Schools were legion; nearly all workers went in for some teaching after hours of strenuous work; many wanted the very beginnings. Mr. Scott married the daughter of two illiterates; she however had been educated, and the marriage appears to have been most happy. He has on the whole keen admiration for the Russian people but does not disguise ugly strains of corruption. Yet what he reports is a story of astonishing technical progress in the realities of civilization. At the same time, many readers, if they share my reactions, will thank providence not to have been born into Russia. None the less, here is a book of the utmost interest, full of generous and sympathetic observation; it accounts for much that we are thankful for, when we read the Russian news.

* * * * *

Professor Seton Watson is a man of real learning who has not disdained to put his knowledge at the disposal of those much abused folk, the politicians; and he has had his reward in the friendship of as truly great a man as Europe produced in this eventful half-century. *Czechoslovakia's First President Masaryk in England*, which the Cambridge University Press publishes at 7s. 6d. opens with a moving study of the Czechoslovakian Republic's first President; and it is astounding how much Professor Seton Watson has got into some thirty pages. Then follows a long chapter bringing together the details of activity during the two years (opening 1915) which the Czech leader spent in England. Following this are appended two confidential memoranda and a lecture, written in this period by Masaryk himself. Here, obviously, is stuff on record for the future historian—stuff by no means so fully digested as the opening chapter. But it is a book to keep and refer to; as the film of events unrolls itself, assuredly we shall better understand new situations by looking back to see, with Professor Seton Watson's guidance, what Masaryk anticipated. Staffed by professors—Masaryk, Benés and Stefanik—democracy does not often arrive so introduced and officered.

Mr. Blood-Ryan's book, *The Great German Conspiracy* (published by Lindsay Drummond at 12s. 6d.) is certainly important and deserves careful reading—but is difficult to read. He has lived long in Germany and studied all the politics of Central Europe—apparently with special knowledge of Poland and the Polish language. Few things in his 275 closely printed pages are more suggestive than the closing chapter which is headed "Pilsudski, Beck, and Poland." But his main theme is the German military caste. We have a detailed account of the Great General Staff, known in England as the German High Command. In 1918 it controlled army, naval and airforce operations. It does so at the present moment, with the logical consequences that all three services work to a common plan In addition to being the creator of all technical and strategical plans of the German armed forces, it is also a skilled body of politically minded individuals. No serving officer can become a member unless he is expert in one profession outside soldiering, and he must have gained a wide knowledge from actual experience of banking, economics, engineering, national and municipal management and industrial control Without two foreign languages he would stand no chance of securing even a nomination to the staff." That is a good example of the staggering things Mr. Blood-Ryan has to tell us. As an illustration of what he can produce from German sources, take the translation of an extract from *Deutsche Wehr*, the official organ of the General Staff, dated June 13, 1935:

In such a war there would no longer be victors and vanquished, but survivors and those whose name is stricken from the list of nations Fifty million trembling fellaheen are not more difficult to bring into subjection than five, for many million times nought is still nought. A nation will no longer want something from its opponent but will put an end to its opponent, once and for all.

These soldiers are "the real politicians of the *Reich*. They were the makers of policy, even in the days of the Weimar Republic." Hitler is not their master but their creation. They have had the intelligence to use him, and his Nazi organization. The present military Governor of Occupied France, von Stulpnagel, "is no Nazi. It is useless to say that he acts under Nazi orders. The military to-day, as always, give orders in Germany, not Hitler. He is the embodiment of the bestial German military spirit that has beaten down, not only the best in all overrun countries, but the flower of decent German life itself."

Mr. Blood-Ryan's power to drive home what is evidently passionately an obsession with him is lessened by a constant failure in simplicity. If only he would write like Professor Seton-Watson! though indeed such an end is not attained simply by wishing. But one fact he could and should have realized—that since 1914 events have been so crowded that memory is choked and cannot function. Things that at a saner period would have stood out like landmarks are now swept into a general litter of oblivion. Again and again one is struck by the need for a little simple recapitulation of facts.

However let us take what we can get—and there is a deal of vivid stuff about Ribbentrop for instance; and some shrewd general observations. Thus, in the account of German "Labour Front," the "Strength through Joy" movement is said to be "the Nazi equivalent of the Roman Circus." Instead of "*panem et Circenses*", the German workers are offered security of employment and trips to pleasant holiday resorts—Altogether this is an unpleasant work on an unpleasant subject, but certainly one to be studied.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONS, by Christopher Dawson. Sheed & Ward. 8s. 6d.

"This book, small as it is," says Mr. Dawson, "has cost me greater labour and thought than any book I have written." So sustained an effort by a thinker of Mr. Dawson's calibre would be expected to produce a result more impressive. What has gone amiss? I hazard the guess that the longer Mr. Dawson contemplated the world-situation, the more perplexing he found it. It is not so difficult to take a long view of it, on the scale of Professor Toynbee's *Christianity and Civilization*. But to come down from these heights to the middle region: to forsake detachment and try to find an answer to the question, What shall we do? is far harder.

So it is that the early chapters of *The Judgment of the Nations*, which handle the large perspectives, are much more satisfying than the later ones, which point the remedy for our discomfiture. The opening sentences set the proportions truly.

The last hundred years have changed human life more completely than any period in the history of the world But the change has been too sudden for men to adapt themselves to the new conditions. Human nature changes slowly and the men who have conquered time and space and acquired almost unlimited power are no more super-men than were their grandfathers of 1840. Yet they have been made super-men in spite of themselves.

There is the root-cause of our fearful predicament: an incredible increase in man's power, without the advance in morality necessary to control it. Ordinary, unregenerate man has been suddenly magnified, and revealed for what he is. The present anarchy—the unmitigated civil war in what was once Christian civilization—is the reality of man: a condition in which, as Mr. Dawson says, "Liberty and

reason are being destroyed by the powers that they created and humanity is slipping blindly and helplessly towards the abyss."

But when Mr. Dawson goes on to say that for the last hundred years—during which the crucial transformation occurred—the Church has continually borne witness to the underlying truth of the situation, I demur. He is referring, primarily, to the teaching of Papal Encyclicals: and he may justly claim that during the last fifty years the Popes have made some memorable pronouncements, which touched fairly near to the root of the disease. But to include Pio Nono in this succession of social prophets at the Vatican is to make too big a draft on human credulity. The truth, surely, is that, even when the most enlightened pronouncements of the latter-day Popes have been taken fully into the reckoning, the witness of the Catholic Church has been throughout this crucial period quite ambiguous.

Not that the other section of the Church have done any better. Probably all the Churches alike can point to a few leaders who have uttered their warnings: Maurice and Gore, for example, in England. But they have been voices crying in the wilderness, as ineffective in influencing the actions of their Church members as have been the best of the Papal Encyclicals. The truth is in Mr. R. H. Tawney's words: "The Churches of the 19th century acquiesced in the popular assumption that the acquisition of riches was the main end of man and confined themselves to preaching such personal virtues as did not conflict with its achievement."

If indeed the Church had consistently warned man, even though her voice went unregarded, our present condition would be much better than it is. Men would be saying to themselves: The Church was always

warning us against this, and there would be a great wave of revulsion and repentance. But, unfortunately, that is not the record of the Church. And it is a grave mistake to attempt to bowdlerize that record. It creates illusion in the minds of those who attempt it, without creating any illusion in the minds they seek to convince.

Thus, I am unable to share Mr. Dawson's hope of a spiritual rebirth of institutional Christianity as a remedy for the disease he diagnoses. A real rebirth of Christianity is not impossible; but a rebirth of the kind required would be revolutionary, and (I fear) pretty devastating to the actual Church. Christian idealists like Mr. Dawson, because of their despair, are prone to exaggerate the potential power of the Church. To conceive the present struggle as one between the Christian Church and totalitarianism is to see the proportions awry. The significant happening to-day is that Russia, the most explicitly opposed to institutional Christianity of the great totalitarian states, alone has the power to check and probably to defeat the most dreadful of all forms of totalitarianism—Nazism.

What consequences that will have for the institutional Church, who can prophesy? They will certainly be grave. Mr. Dawson may say that his hopes are not set on the empirical Church at all, but "on the existence of a spiritual nucleus of believers who are bearers of the seed of unity." Believers in what? In traditional Christianity? That would be a strange reversal of the process of history. Traditional Christianity was unable and unworthy to prevent the fragmentation and anarchy of Europe. It will need to suffer a sea-change to become the inspiration of its reborn unity.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY.

THE PLANNING OF FREE SOCIETIES, by Ferdynand Zweig. *Secker & Warburg*. 12s. 6d.

Fittingly, this important book on planning has itself a plan. Construction and thought are strikingly logical. Not so the title. For, analytical and descriptive sections apart, the author's main object is to examine whether and how planning, given experience so far acquired, can co-exist with the democratic pattern of non-authoritarian societies. The title thus becomes a *petitio principii* in that it anticipates co-existence as possible. From structure and contents of the book, the title should read "Planning and Free Societies."

But it would be unfair to dwell on such minor criticism. In all essentials, the author's precise, well-balanced, and always fair argument will win him wide approval, except perhaps from members of the Society of Individualists to whom the whole subject must be anathema.

Outside that narrow circle, planning is more and more viewed not as a passing phenomenon, but as the natural outgrowth of a decaying economic liberalism which it has come to supersede. If ever the free and self-adjusting market of *laissez-faire* days existed anywhere outside of economic text books, then tariffs, monopolistic trends of both capital and labour, and new technological factors in production have long killed it. And there is no way back because the belief in the primacy of economic values, the very premise of economic liberalism, is dead or dying. Other values have taken their place: nationalism or racialism in Germany, Japan and Italy; social equality in Soviet Russia; and social security in Britain and the U.S.A., the former strongholds of economic liberalism.

For different reasons and in varying degrees, these key powers have

all, within the last twenty-five years, moved towards planned economy, hence also towards planned society. The question therefore is no longer to plan or not to plan, but how to plan and for what? Even the *laissez-faire*-minded can no longer believe that planning in Britain and the U.S.A. is merely a war-time measure. For he, too, remembers two dates which, long before this war, marked outwardly the demise of planless, or at least unplanned, economy: September 21, 1931, when sterling became a managed currency, and March 6, 1933, when the dollar was devalued and New Deal legislation inaugurated.

Professor Zweig analyses luminously the interaction between these economic trends and the social and psychological changes they produced. He classifies the aims of planning into five main categories, planning for (1) power (Germany, Italy); (2) the development of backward areas (Tennessee Valley, U.S.A., Central Industrial Area in Poland, 1936-39); (3) full employment, and (4) social and economic security (New Deal; the Blum experiment in France); (5) social equality (Soviet Russia). To each of these samples of planning he devotes a special note. Both success and failure are duly appraised.

But the author does not only deal with his subject as an economist. He does not neglect the psychological and educational aspects of planning. Thus, the author emphasizes the different conditions that would apply to planning in free, as opposed to authoritarian societies, also the difficulties that arise when important sectors of national economy are subject to world-market influences (p.e. importance of foreign trade in British economy). Hence the necessity for a compromise. Such a society can no longer remain wholly unplanned nor must it be

completely straight-jacketed if it is to remain free.

For the author, planning is no panacea. With uncomfortable logic he shows that societies planned on wholly national lines might still make war on each other, in fact with greater ease than before. And even if national egoism could be overcome by international planning, there is still the danger that the large "haves" might plan for their own benefit to the detriment of the small "have-nots." Wherefrom he concludes that peace depends on the spirit behind the planning.

Economists rarely spoil their readers by clear language or fluent style. Even on that score, the author, a Polish professor of Political Economy, writing in an unfamiliar idiom, has done well if one excepts such horrors as "autarchic."

R. P. SCHWARZ.

ROOTS OF STRATEGY, edited by Major T. R. Phillips. *John Lane*. 10s. 6d.

MODERN WARFARE, by General Sikorski. *Hutchinson*. 8s. 6d.

Major Phillips has chosen a good title for his collection of military classics, for his authorities do not deal so much with the planning of campaigns or strategical manoeuvre, as with the fashioning of the instrument used in warfare—its organization, equipment, training, well-being, maintenance and conduct under various circumstances.

These are still the foundations of successful war and if neglected the most skilful strategical conceptions are likely to break down or to fail in the tactical climax. We are given the views of five authorities all, except in the case of Vegetius, based on immense personal experience.

Sun Tzu, who wrote on the art of war in 500 B.C.

Vegetius, who in 390 A.D. wrote to persuade his Emperor to become

a military reformer and, in a period of decadence, to restore the former amazing efficiency of the Roman legion whose organization and training he describes.

Marshal Saxe, whose "Reveries" have, I suggest, been misinterpreted by those who claim him as an opponent of the generally accepted view that the destruction of the enemy's main forces should be the object, because he wrote "I do not favour pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skilful general could make war all his life without being forced into one." There is nothing in the rest of his "Reveries" to indicate that Saxe did not believe in offensive action, but like most famous generals I suppose he preferred to defeat his enemy in detail rather than stake all on one decisive encounter, where the result might be uncertain and the cost unduly high.

Then we have Frederick the Great's "Military Instructions for the Generals," and Napoleon's "Maxims" too well known to call for comment. The influence of Frederick's instructions on the German Army can still be clearly recognized, and there can be few generals who have not read the Maxims.

It may be that Vegetius' analysis of the Roman military greatness and the causes of its decline might prove the most suggestive to the modern military reformer, but it should be noted what stress all the writers lay on the training and toughening of the soldier, and care for his welfare. In particular Vegetius would have approved General Paget's training methods, which are doing so much to counteract the softening effects of modern civilization.

General Sikorski's book differs essentially from the works of the old masters in that it was not retrospective but an attempt, and an

amazingly successful one, to look into the future. It was the business of many soldiers after the last war to try to find an answer to the question: "What will armies of the future be like?" For it was abundantly evident that the war had taken place at a time when science was producing a transition period both in weapons and in means of locomotion; and that therefore no positive conclusions could be drawn from its experiences. Financial and political conditions, however, forbade, in most cases, the completion of the experiments which had begun in the course of the war, and much remained a matter of pure speculation. In 1934, when the scientific outlook had become a little clearer, General Sikorski gave his answer to the question in this book, now for the first time translated into English. For clarity of judgment, completeness with which all relevant factors were examined, and freedom from dogmatism, it would be hard to equal. No doubt General Sikorski's answer was influenced by von Seeckt and by military preparations in Russia, but in the main it depended on careful analysis. The same question will have to be answered after this war, and this book should prove an invaluable guide to the methods of approach to the problems which will arise when the composition and organization of military forces come up for review.

It is impossible in a short notice to give an adequate account of General Sikorski's conclusions, but it may be recorded that he kept completely clear of many popular misconceptions—such as the belief that modern weapons had permanently established the mastery of defence over attack, or that it was possible to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons. He recognized the possibility that wars might be of either short or long duration, and while insisting on the necessity

of industrial mobilization realized that financial considerations imposed limitations on peacetime preparations. Not least remarkable was his appreciation of the part which the older arms would play in a future war.

CHARLES GWYNN.

THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM, by Forrest Davis. *Allen & Unwin*. 15s.

FOUNDED UPON THE SEAS, by Walter Oakeshott. *Cambridge University Press*. 12s. 6d.

On a theme which might have proved very tiresome indeed, Mr. Forrest Davis has written an important book. It provides, within the limits of diplomacy, the historical background of the Atlantic Charter. It traces, with fairness and precision, the growth of Anglo-American accord. Only at the end, after dispassionate comment on countless causes of friction, does the author speak with bitterness of the isolationists. And even then he seeks to be just.

The story begins in 1890, the year when the United States Navy was restored to life and the year in which Mahan published his first great work on Sea Power. That last decade of the 19th Century seems now curiously remote; a period during which Americans looked uneasily at the undefined Canadian boundary, at the British West Indies, at Panama; a period when British encirclement was dreaded. Very nearly at war over Venezuela in 1895, the two countries suddenly drew together in 1898. It was in the Spanish-American War that the United States first found British support. It was when confronted by the German Naval Estimates that Britain felt her own need of allies. American friendship was thenceforward to be had, but at a price.

That price was the British withdrawal from the Caribbean. When the vogue of British Imperialism was noisiest, in 1899, a British Government quietly dropped all claim to a share in the Panama Canal. Only in 1940, with the lease of the West Indian Naval Bases, was that stealthy withdrawal made complete.

No sentimentalist, Mr. Forrest Davis is careful to point out that the entry of the United States into the two German wars was solely a matter of self-interest. The unrestricted U-boat campaign of 1917 was doubly a threat to the United States. In the first place Americans realized that the British control of the Atlantic, momentarily shaken, was essential to their own safety. In the second place they realized, rather abruptly, that they were themselves blockaded. A chaos of idle shipping, overflowing warehouses and dislocated trade, together with a railway system clogged from the Coast to Pittsburgh and Buffalo, served to drive the lesson home. The American reaction was prompt and vigorous.

As regards the present war, the author (writing before the Japanese repeated at Pearl Harbour the opening gambit first tried at Port Arthur in 1904) traces the American entry to the fall of France. American safety from European attack was found to depend on British sea-power blocking the exits of the North Sea, the Channel and Gibraltar. The threat to these outposts started an American move eastwards, to Greenland, to Iceland, and ultimately to North Africa. Actual entry into the war was from that time more or less inevitable and waited only on the Axis counter-move.

Ending his story with the famous Atlantic meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt (with the ghost of Mahan

as a third) Mr. Forrest Davis concludes that Europe is dead. "Only from the Atlantic world, from the Americas and the British Commonwealth, from that half of the white race which has learned to live in peace, can regeneration spring." It may be so. But as the war goes on, and with it our discussion as to whether to rule the world from Washington or London, other alternatives may obtrude. And neither Moscow nor Chungking may be so easy to ignore.

Mr. Forrest Davis begins his story just before Britain withdrew from the Caribbean. Mr. Oakeshott's story begins just before the British arrival there. In *Founded Upon The Seas* he has written a readable book, founded upon the principle of telling the public what it knows already. Writing with a slight geographical bias on such themes as Drake, the Armada, the foundation of Virginia and the last fight of the Revenge, he leaves each character and episode very much where he found it. He writes, however, with enthusiasm, and his comments are sometimes shrewd. He notes, for instance, the elaborate care with which Drake planned his expeditions; the prolonged reconnaissance, the attention to matters of equipment, the forethought in matters of supply. He remarks, again, that Drake was the only Elizabethan seaman to have thoroughly mastered the military art. This is probably true. Reading with attention what is known about Drake's attack on Nombre de Dios, one can see all the elements of military technique embodied in a pincer movement worthy of the School of Infantry. The synchronization of fire and movement was excellent; as perhaps it needs to be when seventy-four men set out to attack a major Colonial Empire.

In re-telling the story of the

Armada, Mr. Oakeshott makes another penetrating comment. 'The serious defect,' he writes, 'in the Spanish fleet . . . was not its squadronal dispositions, which could hardly have been bettered, if we may judge by the course of the fighting. Rather it was the lack of a feasible plan of campaign.' In thus attributing the disaster neither to weather nor to English gunnery, but to Philip's indecision, the author probably brings out the most valuable lesson to be learnt from the campaign. This book is extremely well illustrated, more especially in contemporary maps; and the author has skilfully avoided the use of footnotes. If not of great importance, the book is pleasant to handle and read.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

CLIMATE AND THE ENERGY OF NATIONS, by S. F. Markham. *Oxford University Press.* 10s. 6d.

Why do civilizations rise and fall? Why are the pages of history strewn with the wreckage of great power and high purpose, why can we discern in the mists that shroud a dim and distant past the shadowy form of Empires that have followed one after another into oblivion? What are the conditions that lead nations to extinction, what forces assure them a measure of survival? Here are questions that concern every one of us and Mr. S. F. Markham, M.P., thinker, scholar and traveller, has essayed to answer them in a small volume packed with facts and deductions that make excellent and easy reading. Books written to set out new and startling theories tend to err in the direction of excessive length but in *Climate and the Energy of Nations* we find a wise economy of exposition coupled with skilled marshalling of salient facts. In the end the layman is left con-

vinced that a good case has been made out; he may even be hopeful that it will not be upset, because there is an element of simplicity in the theory that must appeal to all, who are intelligent without being erudite.

Climate, Mr. Markham tells us, holds the key to the mystery of progress. Maritime countries with a mean temperature of 70 degrees tend to prosper. An examination of history will show that prior to 600 B.C. civilizations developed only in the fertile areas along the 70 degrees isotherm, that is in the Southern Mediterranean and in areas with a comparable climate. Change and extension of world benefits came with superior heating systems, when the brazier and the open hearth yielded to more effective aids such as the hypocaust.

"The nation which has lead the world, leads the world, and will lead, is the nation which lives in a climate, indoor and outdoor, nearest to the ideal and the ideal climate is one in which men neither shiver nor perspire when at rest." Here is the argument in a sentence. The Romans controlled the temperature of their houses by the aid of furnaces and terra-cotta tubes; real grates were used in Pompeii. With the decay of the heating systems of Greece and Rome power passed to warmer countries, says Mr. Markham. Aztecs and Incas were helped by climate; the chief cities of the Maya Area were in the 70 degrees isotherm. To-day the chimney and the grate, coal and architectural development supplementing or modifying nature's effort, have changed the history of mankind.

Coal used in this country for over a thousand years is a secret of our national greatness, for the nation that can control its climate can con-

trol its destiny. The climate of Japan is very favourable to growth of population. Mr. Markham's figures in this direction are the most disquieting in the book, for Japan has adopted the methods of the West. Given control of climate the nation best endowed with specialists, business men, and competent statesmen (so Mr. Markham calls the politicians) will extend its share of world markets in every direction. New Zealand is named as the outstanding example of a country with a climate very near to the ideal and perfectly controlled. Industry follows climate and even in England, a comparatively small country, its effect upon unemployment may be noted. Elsewhere the deplorable condition of the poor whites in South Africa is attributed by the author to lack of indoor heating, lack of protection against the sun, and the lack of such cooling arrangements as solid buildings provide.

It is worth noting that air-conditioning plant is now being used in American factories, to the exclusion both of cold air and traffic noises, and the author suggests that Russia could control life and industry over vast areas if she would take the necessary steps to conquer climatic difficulties.

Mr. Markham has written a book that provides thought and keeps interest stimulated from first page to last. What men of science and the historians who deal with past civilizations will say by way of criticism may decide the ultimate value of the contentions set out, but their appeal to the general reader will hardly be affected. In any event the theory is the result of deep thought and close reasoning while the presentation of the case for climate as the main source of national energy is admirable.

S. L. BENSUSAN.

THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE, by A. D. Lindsay, Vol. I. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.

It is not easy for the historian to assess adequately the value of a work on Political Theory. Yet it is eminently desirable that he should essay the task, for, as I have consistently maintained in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* and elsewhere, some study of Political Philosophy is indispensable to the historian, if history is to be anything more than a bare chronicle of isolated events. Consequently, I have been at pains to grapple with the argument of Mr. Lindsay's noteworthy treatise on *The Modern Democratic State*.

Mr. Lindsay is an eminent philosopher, a man of deep religious convictions (as some of his broadcasts have abundantly proved), and an ardent social reformer. He is then faithful to the Balliol tradition not only of Jowett and Caird, but of Thomas Hill Green and Arnold Toynbee.

People are apt to think of a 'philosopher' as something more or less than human. But philosopher though he be, the outstanding characteristic of Mr. Lindsay's book is its broad humanity, its complete absence of pomposity, and a certain lightness of touch which does not disdain to draw illustrations from poetry, drama and fiction. Thus we have frequent reference not only to the dramatists from Shakespeare to Mr. Shaw, but to Mr. H. G. Wells and many other novelists. Thus Mr. Lindsay will summarize an erudite argument about the relations between Theory and Practice in different forms of 'associations' by adopting the language of Charley Lomax in Mr. Bernard Shaw's *Major Barbara* when he says that there is a certain amount of tosh about the Salvation Army. "There is," comments Mr. Lindsay, "a certain amount of tosh about all institutions

as there is about the law, about Churches, and about the State." In the more eloquent words of St. Paul (whom Mr. Lindsay is particularly fond of quoting): "We have this treasure in earthen vessels."

To *Major Barbara* Mr. Lindsay again goes to illustrate how Society is controlled much more by 'big business' than by Parliament, albeit he admits that Undershaft, the munitions manufacturer is guilty of some exaggeration when he says: "I am the government of your country: I and Lazarus. Do you suppose that you and half a dozen amateurs like you sitting in a row in that foolish gabble-shop can govern Undershaft and Lazarus? No, my friend: you will do what pays us." *Major Barbara* is clearly dated: Undershaft would have a very different story to tell had he lived into the days of war 'controls'!

But that is by the way. That a Political Theorist who draws so largely for illustration upon concrete facts, political and economic, should utilize Dickens, Mrs. Gaskell, Winston Churchill (the American) and Disraeli is natural, but a reference to *The Fairchild Family* is (albeit refreshing) unexpected. Not so the frequent references to the romance—evidently dear to a fellow-Scot—of R. L. Stevenson. Other evidence of the Scottish inspiration of this work are, by the way, to be found in Mr. Lindsay's references to the position of Ulster (for example, p. 162), and to Mr. De Valera (p. 210) respectively.

Mr. Lindsay is not merely the philosopher of the cloister, but an experienced teacher. The essential qualification of the teacher is lucidity, and by its exemplary lucidity not less than by its broad humanity this book is distinguished. I should, however, advise any student who wishes to derive the maximum advantage from its pages to formulate

a series of questions to which he hopes for answers from its perusal. Here are a few of the sort I have in mind:

- (i) How does Political Theory differ from the inductive study of Political Institutions—Comparative Politics?
- (ii) What does the modern Democratic State owe to
 - (a) The Greek City State;
 - (b) The Roman Empire;
 - (c) Christianity—The Medieval Church;
 - (d) Protestantism;
 - (e) The French Revolution;
 - (f) The Industrial Revolution;
- (iii) What are the basic principles of a modern democratic society;
- (iv) What is the true relation between the State and its citizens?

These are some of the questions which Mr. Lindsay sets out to answer, and which, by intelligent anticipation a reader might have asked.

There are few small points of criticism, which, chiefly in relation to style, suggest themselves. In his laudable efforts to avoid pomposity, Mr. Lindsay occasionally allows himself the use of the vernacular, almost suggesting thereby a certain poverty of vocabulary. But as against the outstanding merits of a work remarkable as a whole for its sanity, sobriety, impartiality and detachment these things are of little account. Nor do I dwell upon a certain tendency to dogmatism (for example pp. 219 and 229) which, though rarely indulged, and almost unavoidable in a teacher, is apt to jar upon readers who have not sat at his feet. I note also some exaggeration in reference to the decay of craftsmanship among English workers which is less serious in general than the onlooker at repetitive processes is prone to assume.

But such points are purely incidental and do not impair the value of a book which, as a whole, is too good for them to count.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

SPIRIT OF FLAME, by E. Allison Peers. S.C.M. 6s.

We are already indebted to Professor Allison Peers, of Liverpool University, for his complete edition in English of the works of St. John of the Cross. Now he has given us this short study, designed for the ordinary reader, of the life and work of the saint. He has done his work well, quoting freely from the works of John of the Cross, and he has given us a vivid picture of one who was a great saint and a great mystic. John was born in Spain just over four hundred years ago. He was a Carmelite friar of the reformed order founded by St. Teresa, one of the most remarkable women that have ever lived. St. Teresa soon appreciated his worth. "He was so good a man," she wrote, "that I, at least, could have learned much more from him than he from me." They became fast friends. Her 'little Seneca' she would sometimes playfully call him. Unfortunately John became involved, entirely against his will, in quarrels within the order, and at one point in his career was imprisoned by monks of the rival order, escaping after nine months. It was while he was in prison, suffering terrible hardships and barbarous treatment that he began to write, composing some of the poems that have made him known and loved throughout the world.

John of the Cross had a great gift as a poet. Professor Peers declares that he was also a 'poet in his prose.' His three great poems are 'The Spiritual Canticle,' and the 'Two Songs of the Soul,' which are known by their first lines 'Dark night,' and

'Living flame of love.' It was on these poems that John wrote extensive commentaries, such as 'The ascent of Mt. Carmel,' expounding and explaining them and drawing out their significance.

Great as is the beauty of the poems it is for their mystical meaning and teaching that they will always be studied. The works of John of the Cross will be found in the library of every contemplative. The mystic is one who seems very remote from the modern world. "A mystic is a person who has fallen in love with God," says Professor Peers, and he goes on: "We are not afraid of lovers—no, indeed: 'all the world loves a lover.' They attract us by their ardour, their single-mindedness, their yearning to be one with the object of their love. It was in just that way that St. John of the Cross thought about God and strove after God, longing too, that others should do the same." If the teaching of the mystics sounds strange in our ears is this not a sign that we have not grasped fully the implications of Christ's teaching? He has told us that the first commandment is that we should love God.

Professor Peers deals carefully with some common misunderstandings of the teaching of John of the Cross. There are those who think that the mystic is a selfish person,

simply concerned with his own soul, and not bothering about the welfare of his neighbours. What John does emphasize in his teaching is that no earthly affection or person must stand in the way of what must be the supreme object of our affection—God. It is said of John that in private conversation he constantly emphasized the Christian's duty to his neighbour, and the concern he ought to have for his welfare. This side of the saint's teaching is exemplified in his own life and we are told, for example, of his care and consideration for the sick. Love and the practice of love was the mainspring of his life. This is clearly seen in a sentence he wrote in one of his letters—".... And where there is no love, put love in and you will draw love out."

Another difficulty many find in the teaching of John is its seeming austerity and hardness. "Strive always to choose, not that which is easiest, but that which is most difficult"—is a typical saying of the great saint. Yet after all he is only pointing us back to the teaching of Christ who has shown us that the King's highway is the way of the Cross. Perhaps, as Professor Peers seems to think, this teaching will strike a more responsive chord in days such as these when stern sacrifice is demanded of all.

O. R. CLARKE.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JUNE, 1943

THE CHALLENGE TO ALLIED EDUCATION

BY KENNETH LINDSAY, M.P.

THE recent report of a Joint Commission on the place of education in post-war reconstruction, the presence of so many distinguished Allied professors in our midst, the practical encouragement given by the British Council to cultural co-operation among the Allies, the conferences of Allied Ministers of Education called by Mr. Butler, the large number of Anglo-American education meetings and exchange of specialist lectures, the evident desire to know more of the Russian system of education—all these and many other signs conspire and compel us to reconsider the function of education in national and international policy.

To a greater or less degree all countries use education as an instrument of national policy, at least to promote patriotism, though it was Goethe who said 'patriotism corrupts history.' It is true that the Board of Education, contrary to its accepted practice of not prescribing ideas, has in the past urged teachers to give practical instruction in the League of Nations. The cynic might add that for England and France the League of Nations was an instrument of national policy. But the action of the Board was only one of many efforts made between the wars, to cultivate better relations between the youth, the schools, the teachers and universities of the different nations.

We are inclined to forget the extent of youth travel and the interchange of students which took place between this country and Europe in the years before the war. It is estimated that from Britain alone some 50,000 young people each year took part in foreign travel, organized through a wide variety of agencies and engaged on a variety of projects. But the central aims were surprisingly unanimous. They can best be summarized from a document issued by the London Headmasters Committee:—

1. To establish a cultural link between the European capitals through interchange of secondary school boys.
2. To develop by this means a system of personal and public relations in a sufficiently intimate manner and for a sufficient length of time to enable real friendship to take root.
3. To stimulate the study of the language, literature and culture of other European countries by providing a field for practice in the living language as spoken by educated contemporaries.

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4. To cultivate a taste for travel as a means of education and recreation.
5. To provide a field under reasonable surveillance for the mutual education of young Europeans.

This admirable statement emanates from the teachers themselves and expresses the spirit which animated all the various agencies which took part. The London Evening Institutes from 1932 onwards arranged for parties of 3,000 students a year to visit every part of Europe and stay in specially arranged guest houses; the School Journey Association took 15,000 children abroad in school groups: the Workers' Travel Association (born at Toynbee Hall after the last war) catered for forty schools a year; World Friendship Tours, Ltd. had a typical scheme by which in 1938 a thousand British pupils visited Holland for a week, staying with Dutch pupils in their homes. Some Local Education Authorities instituted schemes, notably London, Bradford, Sheffield and West Riding, where various towns such as Bingley and Keighley adopted the French towns of Cambrai and Peronne. London provided sixty modern language scholarships for secondary school pupils, who spent three months with a foreign family and received a grant of £50 each. But apart from these and many other schemes, hundreds of individual schools and small parties, both of boys, students and teachers participated in mutual schemes, camps and summer schools.

Reception facilities in this country were rudimentary. The notable exception was provided by the Youth Hostel Association which had bookings for 7,000 bed-nights for foreign students, in London Regional hostels alone, in the year before the war. It is true that the number of vacation courses, mostly for teachers, was growing and in 1939 the British Council published a select list. But there is little doubt that a great opportunity was missed, especially in connection with Germany. Long before Hitler arrived on the scene, Germany was the most active and best prepared country for this task. German hostels were successful international centres for young people of every nation in Europe. There was no corresponding machinery in this country and what co-operation took place was with private individuals such as Mr. Beresford Ingram, then in charge of London Evening Institutes. Actually the German Academic Exchange Service was set up in 1924, 'to repair the breach in cultural relations with neighbouring nations.' This was organized on a vast scale with characteristic thoroughness and with foreign branches in most European countries. But as in the case of the hostels it was captured by Hitler. It is worth remarking that in 1938 this Exchange Service

had six German Directors in England, dealing with such matters as education, books, hospitality and language courses.

In 1936 the Swedish Foreign Office, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, appointed a committee to handle the question of scholastic interchange and make mutual arrangements with appropriate authorities abroad. Once again there was no authority in this country with whom to co-operate, until Mr. Raymond King, an unrecognized pioneer in this field, arranged for 120 South London boys to visit the magnificent Folk High School at Lillsved, where an Anglo-Swedish Youth Camp was held.

In France, the *Office National des Universités* arranged over a thousand pupil exchanges annually including 850 with Britain and over 330 with Germany. M. Duclos, Director of the *Maison Britannique, Cité Universitaire Paris*, had arranged just before the war that a large school at Rouen should be put at the disposal of two hundred British pupils and staff for two months each summer, with a number of French staff and pupils in attendance. At the same time I remember the successful course arranged by Mr. Granville Barker at the British Institute in Paris, in conjunction with our own Board of Education, for 150 modern language teachers from British secondary schools.

In comparison with the efforts made on the Continent our own isolated attempts were few and far between. Mr. Maurice Jacks at Mill Hill held a three weeks summer school and took boys aged 16-20 from Denmark, Germany and France; the idea of international work camps was introduced into England by a Swiss, Pierre Ceresole, who in 1931 started work in a distressed area at Brynmawr and by 1937 there were some 300 work camp teams: one International Centre for school children was established at Ipswich. Of course periodic Scout Jamborees were held.

This brief survey reveals that a considerable volume of travel and interchange was growing before the war, that facilities in this country were few and that some control and co-ordinating direction was necessary. Almost every European country had provided some central machinery. But what emerges most clearly is the need for some international foundation, representative of the various national bodies, to take hold of this sensitive and growing movement. Mr. B. Vancura, of Czechoslovakia, boldly advocates that educational attachés should be established at all Allied Legations.

Yet it remains true that progress in international understanding was lamentably slow and often shallow, not for want of good intentions but for want of a common purpose. The Treaty of Versailles re-emphasized the nation-state at the same time as it

created the League of Nations. As Sir Alfred Zimmern in 1932 truly said:

We are constantly being told—and with truth—that the future of the world depends upon the younger generation; for upon the influences which mould men's minds in youth depend the actions that they undertake and the policies they espouse in the future years. It follows, therefore, that since at the time when the present generation of statesmen and voters was at school few or no influences directed towards international co-operation were brought to bear upon them, it would be little short of a miracle if the peoples and their Governments were prepared in this generation to take a long step towards the international goal. The League of Nations was founded practically without intellectual preparation.

These are strong words from an acknowledged authority, one who was a member of the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, who founded the school of International Studies at Geneva (1924-1939) and who is now Professor of International Relations at Oxford.

Firstly, then, there was the absence of a common purpose. Secondly, there was an absence of intellectual preparation, and thirdly, I suggest, there was the absence of adequate machinery. If education can be used as a potent instrument of national policy—and we now know it can be as important as an Air Force—the time has come to examine the comparative educational structures of different countries, to prepare model charters and, above all, to set up an International Education Office with status and powers comparable to the International Labour Office.

It is first necessary to convince the several nations that education systems matter. It matters where control resides, the nature of the text books, how teachers are trained (teachers matter more than text books), the emphasis placed on physical education, how much technical and agricultural training is available, the degree of illiteracy, the number of unemployed students. As in judging a country one must select general criteria such as the independence of its courts, the quality of its civil service, the acceptability of its local government, the place of women, so in judging education structures one must select pivotal points. I suggest, for example, the freedom of the teacher, the attitude towards youth, the extent of equality of opportunity, the place of religion, the freedom of the university, the nature and numbers of university students. Doubtless there are other equally important subjects because to-day social agencies, such as broadcasting and the press, impinge on the work of schools and help to mould public opinion.

The special problems created by totalitarian countries, where the Army and not the university is the crown of the education system and where the entire structure from the nursery to the university

has been systematically organized under military control, raise the general problem even more acutely. The democracies are compelled to put on some totalitarian clothes to defeat the enemy, hence the 600,000 boys and girls in pre-service units, the general call to arms and the suppression of most Arts Courses in the universities. True, there are six months cultural courses for Service Cadets at the universities, three hours a week compulsory education in the Army and A.B.C.A.; but these and similar efforts are directed to leavening militarism with manliness and to preserving the faith of the fighting man in the cause of freedom.

The recent report of the Conservative Party on Education, so shrewdly analysed by Professor Ernest Barker in an earlier number,* has been hastily condemned as a Fascist document. In spite of some excellent sentiments and subtle reasoning, the report has left many of us with the uneasy impression that it advocates as a primary duty the need to inculcate loyalty to a mystical, continuing organism called the State. Yet later it makes clear that this same State must keep its hands off a self-selected group of Public Schools which are to remain as reservoirs for leadership and must not become "a mere part of the State system." On the other hand reports from the Trade Union Congress, the Labour Party and the Workers' Educational Association advocate large extensions of State activity through the whole field of education. Both approaches, from the Right and from the Left, ignore the larger crisis, the moral and technological revolution which has overtaken the twentieth century and of which two major wars are symptoms. Drastic changes in outlook will be forced on this country by the loss of our island security; already universal national service has become a concrete fact. Does anyone doubt that the liberated nations will wish to imbue their children with the strongest possible sense of national obligation? The recent reaction of the Dutch and Polish Governments in London against the policy of *The Times* and against an infelicitous phrase used by that journal when it described ancient European nations as those 'twenty separate and jarring military and economic sovereignties,' provides us with a foretaste of the future. Perhaps the words of the Prime Minister more nearly state the purpose: "It is my earnest hope . . . that we shall achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient and historic races." This integration is primarily, an educational matter.

* *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, October, 1942.

At the present moment the British Council is sponsoring a considerable experiment on British soil. Some 2,000 Belgian, 1,000 Czech, 400 French, as well as Polish, Dutch and Norwegian pupils are attending either 'national' or English schools in this country: in addition there are 500 Allied teachers. A number of Allied students and professors are attending British universities, some Allied women are receiving training in welfare work and numerous joint training schemes on specialist subjects are also being held. These efforts, together with the 'National Houses' in London and the Allied House (with National rooms) in Liverpool are all assisted by the British Council. To this extent the Council has become the education section of the Foreign Office or perhaps it might be more suitably described as the foreign department of the Board of Education. The interdependence of domestic and foreign policy, due in large measure to the encroachment of the State on so many of the ordinary activities of the community, including education, brings the whole life of a nation, economic, social and cultural, close up against that of other nations. This mutual impact may make for increased friction or greater friendship: everything depends on understanding and this can no longer be left to chance or to peace ballots. Diplomacy has become less important than a whole series of new relations between the various nation-states.

The recent debate, held in both Houses of Parliament, on the reform of the Foreign Service threw some further light on the British attitude. While it was accepted that politics and economics are now inextricably mixed and while several members of the House of Lords, notably Lord Perth and Lord Tyrrell, wished to see enlargements made in the functions of the Foreign Office itself, only one speaker, Lord Hankey, touched the problem of education in international affairs. He suggested that language training might begin at an earlier age and that interchange with students of Foreign Universities would be a convenient method. Even more important he revealed a suggestion he had made at the last Peace Conference, namely that nations should be persuaded to send all their diplomatic cadets to a League of Nations University. No speaker mentioned the existence of the British Council.

Sir Alfred Zimmern has been one of the few to recognize that special training is required for those whose careers involve regular co-operation with foreigners. The Foreign Service, the British Council, and a variety of business careers come within this category. In his annual School at Geneva Sir Alfred Zimmern set out to create 'a social milieu of vigorous intellectual activity.' The syllabus and organization were carefully devised to produce a 'cross-fertili-

zation between intellectual disciplines as well as between national outlooks.' He did not aim at making his students 'shed previous ideas and loyalties but rather at a sort of enlargement of their personalities.'

But the growth of international co-operation involves not only a two-way traffic, not only conferences and the training of specialists, not only joint administrative tasks, but an emerging common purpose. Japan, in her educational policy, constantly talks of her 'historic mission,' Hitler officially sets out 'to incorporate German Youth in Home, Folk and State by awakening sound racial forces and cultivating them with a conscious political aim.' We know that it is possible to indoctrinate a generation with perverted ideas by exposing them to a set of experiences and a hot-house atmosphere of books and pamphlets. It might be possible to generate a liberal and humane culture by according to all schools, universities, broadcasting and the Press, the maximum freedom from State interference. But as it has been shown above, the tide is flowing in the opposite direction. The task then is for democracies to capture their own States and consciously to promote the growth of the international idea. But this must become a conscious and deliberate operation. Moreover, it makes all the more necessary the establishment of an International Office of Education to lay down standards, to make public comparative methods, to compare text-books, to promote cultural friendship in its widest and most humane sense. Because this is a most serious job any such Office must be accorded status and round it there must be gathered those international voluntary bodies, which are essential to any pioneer educational venture. Among such bodies there should be included an International Section to promote and co-ordinate the exchange of pupils, students and teachers.

Within a democratic framework and with proper safeguards I can see the emergence of a great moral purpose opening out to the youth of Europe, in which this country once more—perhaps for the last time—has a unique opportunity of leadership. During the war and for the first time there has grown up in this country a Youth Movement which is showing considerable interest in international affairs. Far-reaching reforms, possibly including a period of national service, are being contemplated by the Government. Anyone with vision can see the enormous possibilities and opportunities that lie ahead.

We shall need less to be convinced about a 'historic mission' than about a truth recently re-stated by Professor Mannheim. "Youth," he says, "belongs to those latent resources which every society has at its disposal and on the mobilization of which its

vitality depends." There never was a better opportunity for realizing the truth of this statement than in the present war-time situation, when the survival of countries depends on the mobilization of their latent resources.

The young people of Germany, whose childhood was spent under conditions of humiliation, disillusionment, starvation and serious unemployment were not only offered a place in the scheme of things, but were given a real job to do—were given a new hope and faith in a leader whom they followed with self-sacrifice and devotion. The response surprised even the leaders of that State. It was exploited for false purposes and the faith was a faith in false gods. The problem of youth in this country—and the Allied countries—is not one of providing leisure or uniforms or even a Beveridge security, but of giving them a place in society, a real job to do and faith in a true God. Neither a regimented national youth service nor a mass of pre-service units and youth centres, integrated into a Conservative plan for youth, will fill the vacuum left over by the stimulus of war.

Mankind is on the march in more ways than one. Europe is in chains and is permitted only forced marches: the European mind is imprisoned. Universities have been closed and hundreds of professors and teachers have been murdered. Books with any pretence at humanitarian and liberal culture have virtually ceased to exist. Young people over the age of sixteen are becoming interested in the direction which the march of mankind is taking: they are beginning to discover that they will have to find their place and purpose in a totally new world.

They want a real job to do, which demands service and sacrifice, which is pioneer and constructive. Some recent experience with work-camps in this country has convinced me that a large mass of secondary school-boys and working boys and girls have not only seen little of their own country but have little resources and individual initiative. But a week in a work-camp produces curiosity and even a fortnight produces physical and mental changes. The camp which has a purpose—whether it be forestry, pre-service training, harvesting, bracken-cutting or shell-sorting—has a distinctive advantage.

I am therefore encouraged to think that any interchange of students that may take place in the immediate post-war should be permeated by an international purpose. It is suggested that in every school of secondary type and in every youth organization there shall be formed a body of boys and girls who are training to equip themselves for foreign or international service. Firstly, they must be hardy, able to discipline their bodies, do first-aid, camp and

improvise quarters, cook and do running repairs—able to bear themselves worthily and speak one foreign language. Secondly, they must be imbued with a missionary zeal, based on the realization that many countries and regions of the world will need skilled assistance of many kinds and degrees. If young adults know that the subjects they are studying and the training they are undergoing has a direct relation to some piece of adult service, the training becomes alive and the subjects assume a new importance.

This implies directly a pre-international service movement, but it is a one-way traffic. It is not for us to say what our Allied friends should, or should not do, but we should leave room in all our schools and youth organizations for young people of other countries freely to mix; and the body of British youth, referred to above, would bear a special responsibility for making such arrangements. A beginning can be made now with those younger members of the United Nations on British soil. Above all there is the chance of putting before our own young people the adventure of re-building a hungry, diseased and broken world.

Any lesser aim misses the whole meaning of 'mankind on the march.' The university field offers an even greater challenge to Britain. University trained men and women will be more and more engaged in performing international administrative tasks, financial and industrial, medical and social, as well as editing text books and fighting, as and when occupied areas are liberated and backward areas can be developed.

Such a policy, at home and abroad, demands leaders of a high order. But among the twenty thousand teachers in the fighting forces and among many at home who have caught a new vision, there must be a reservoir of untapped ability. Indeed the war itself has served to disclose how much latent leadership lay unused in our pre-war routine civilization.

Here then is a purpose and some beginnings of machinery to match it. Perhaps we should hear less of the dual system and the public school problem if we thought more of the young people themselves and *their* future in the hour of crisis.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION IN THE PACIFIC

By G. W. KEETON

AS the war in the Far East progresses, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the problems which will require solution in the Pacific exceed in magnitude those which exist in Europe. The fall of Singapore marked the end of that colonial system which had steadily spread to the Far East since the conclusion of Napoleonic Wars, and whilst it may be true that no considerable changes in the nominal political status of those Pacific areas which at present form the colonial possessions of members of the United Nations may be expected immediately to follow the defeat of Japan, nevertheless it is apparent that thoughtful persons, both in this country and the United States, are already seriously concerned with the problems of the ultimate objectives of western policy in the Far East, and of the possibilities of maintaining any peace system in this vast area. It is beyond question that any Far Eastern peace system will require the active co-operation of the four major members of the United Nations—the United States, the British Commonwealth, U.S.S.R. and China—but an investigation of international affairs in the Far East in the recent past makes it plain that the interests of the Soviet and China are primarily continental, whilst those of the British Commonwealth and the United States, as well as those of the Netherlands, are primarily oceanic, and this will necessarily affect the degree of support that they can render to any Far Eastern peace system. A further point of first importance is that the policy of the United States, the British Dominions, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the Far East should as far as circumstances permit be a joint one, for the absence of such a joint policy in the past has been an important factor in producing the present situation.

An examination of Anglo-American relations with China and other Far Eastern Powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that these two states have consistently upheld the theory of commercial equality of opportunity and that wherever possible, they sought to preserve the territorial integrity of the Far Eastern states. Both states clearly appreciated that a policy of territorial expansion in the Far East would simply extend European political rivalries in an acute form to an immensely important area, and they offered as an alternative the possibility of commercial competition. Such an outlook was the natural product of laissez-faire economics and of political liberalism. It may not have been a policy dominated by lofty idealism, but it was practical, and it afforded opportunities for the peaceful development of these areas. The unquestioned supremacy of the British Navy

guaranteed that such a policy would be generally accepted, and it is obvious that such a policy was more to the advantage of those Western Powers which were most developed industrially and commercially. Until the industrialization of Germany and Japan, these Powers were Great Britain and the United States.

It would be quite wrong to assume that Great Britain and the United States ever reached an accord upon such a policy, whether formally or informally. Upon specific points of Far Eastern intercourse, British and American interests might coincide, so that their Ministers might act jointly, but the achievement of a common policy was found to be impossible over a long period, partly because of America's traditional disinclination to enter into alliance with anyone, partly because of American suspicions of British "imperialism," partly because successive American Governments made it quite clear to their Far Eastern representatives that they could not expect to see their diplomacy backed by force, and partly because the British trade was so much greater than the American trade until the end of the nineteenth century, that the United States had the comfortable feeling that if action was necessary, Great Britain would certainly take it. Detailed examination of Far Eastern affairs in the nineteenth century would show that this American attitude was productive of difficulties even then; for example, the Koreans were erroneously under the impression that the United States would intervene to protect their independence. On the two occasions when the United States used force, to support its Far Eastern policy, it was when outrages too grave to be overlooked had been suffered by American subjects—in China during the Boxer Rebellion, and in Japan in the years immediately preceding Commodore Perry's expedition, the sufferers being shipwrecked sailors, whom the Japanese had barbarously murdered.

The consequence of this attitude on the part of the United States was that Great Britain assumed the initiative in all matters affecting the maritime Powers with interests in China. In waging the first Anglo-Chinese War, the British Government took the earliest possible opportunity of urging that it sought no exclusive privileges, and in fact privileges identical with those conceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Nanking were obtained by the United States and other leading foreign Powers with interests in China immediately after the war. This would have been quite impossible had it not been for the British initiative. Similarly, after the Anglo-French expeditions of 1856-58 the other treaty Powers were again successful in obtaining revised treaties. The smaller treaty Powers throughout the century consistently followed the Anglo-American lead, and it is significant that the attitude of Great Britain and the United States was decisive in preventing the break-up and partition of China after the Boxer Rebellion.

On the other hand Tzarist Russia consistently followed an expansionist policy at China's expense, first in Manchuria, and then in Korea and North China. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Germany adopted a similar

policy in Shantung, and Japan, coming last among the principal Powers with interests in China, followed suit. Although the interests of Japan and Russia in Manchuria and Korea directly clashed, and the clash was responsible for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the two Powers co-operated in the following ten years, for the purpose of excluding other Powers from Manchuria. This was the direct consequence of the commercial inferiority of Russia and Japan to Great Britain and the United States, leading the former two Powers to follow a policy of political expansion, for the purpose of excluding stronger commercial rivals. The destruction of Germany's interests in China during the war of 1914-18, closely followed by the Russian Revolution, left Japan as the only State still pursuing a policy aiming at the creation of an exclusive sphere of political and economic domination in China. How great those ambitions were is shown by the Twenty-One Demands imposed by Japan on China in 1915, when every other treaty Power was pre-occupied with the first World War. These Demands clearly showed that Japan aimed at nothing less than the subjugation of the whole of China, and it is one of the misfortunes of modern history that their full implications were either ignored, or underestimated by every Power other than the United States and, of course, China herself.

It was to counter these excessive ambitions, and to provide a workable Far Eastern system, that the United States took the initiative in convening the Washington Conference in 1922. Japan's political isolation was emphasized by the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and at the Conference Japan was compelled not only to relinquish a number of the rights in China that she had gained by the Twenty-One Demands, but was also compelled to reaffirm the Anglo-American policy of commercial equality of opportunity and the maintenance of China's territorial integrity. Even after 1922, however, it was still plain that the United States was not prepared to support its policies in the Far East in extremity by force, and the assumption that the initiative in emergency still rested with Great Britain received its last illustration in the despatch of the Shanghai Defence Force in 1927. Had the League of Nations proved an effective instrument of international government, and had the affairs of Europe achieved stability in the period following the first World War, it is possible that Great Britain would have continued to discharge the responsibilities which had fallen to her during the nineteenth century, and that in course of time British initiative might have been replaced by League action. The manifest weakness of the League, the persistence of insecurity in Europe, and the swiftness of the Japanese advance in Eastern Asia after 1931, all combined to make such a development impossible. Thus it came about that Great Britain ceased to be in a position to act as trustee for the treaty Powers as she had so often done in the nineteenth century, whilst the United States was as yet unready to assume such a responsibility, and the possibilities of a joint assumption of responsibility by the two Powers were invariably thwarted by Isolationist pressure in the United States, when-

ever Great Britain made tentative overtures. This was all the more disastrous because Japan was a greater menace than Tzarist Russia, or even Germany in the Far East had ever been. Even after Japan's renewed attack upon China in 1937, at a time when Great Britain and the League were increasingly preoccupied with the complexities of the European situation, common action on the part of Great Britain and the United States proved to be impossible. Thus it came about that when the Japanese sank the United States warship *Panay* and attacked the British warship *Ladybird*, the United States Administration was unable to accept an offer of joint action by the British Foreign Secretary for fear of acting in advance of American opinion. At this point, although it was not recognized at the time, the system of Far Eastern politics as it had existed since the Treaty of Nanking, had dissolved, and the two Western democracies had been unable to produce a workable substitute. Great Britain was no longer able to act alone, and the United States as a whole, in spite of the warnings of the Administration, was as yet unconvinced that force was the only way of repelling the growing menace of Japanese expansion.

In no small part, therefore, the weaknesses of western diplomacy in meeting a Japanese advance, and also the striking successes which have been achieved on land by the Japanese since their renewed Asiatic expansion in 1931, have been due to the fact that whilst Great Britain and the United States had a similar outlook upon the Far Eastern question, it was found impossible to achieve a joint foreign policy which would be supported by combined action in case of necessity with the resources that each controlled and from the bases that were at their command. It was only after Germany had overrun Holland, Belgium and France in 1940, and the menace of Japanese aggression in respect of Indo-China, Malaya and Netherlands India had made it clear to all sections of American opinion that the Japanese threat was a direct one to American security that joint conversations for mutual defence became possible, and that the United States Administration was able to take a progressively stronger line in dealing with the Japanese claims. Whatever joint conversations took place before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, however, they were of an emergency nature only, and they proved insufficient to stem the Japanese onrush. If after the present war American opinion should return even temporarily to the support of policies of isolation it is difficult to see how adequate machinery can be established for the stable development of the Far Eastern nations, and for the solution of some of the extremely complex problems which confront us in the Pacific. It should also be borne in mind that the most difficult problem of all, that of the future of the Japanese people, is insoluble except as part of a general settlement of the Far East. What follows, therefore, is based upon the assumption that the people of the United States as well as the peoples of Great Britain and the British Dominions will adequately appreciate the necessity of permanent arrangements for dealing with the Pacific area. •

The decisions reached at the Washington Conference providing for mutual consultation in the event of a threat to the peace of the Pacific region being made represented the most that could be achieved in 1922, and it proved quite inadequate to stop Japanese aggression. Moreover, the events of the present Far Eastern War have shown that the future of the twenty-thousand odd islands of the Pacific is in the hands of that Power or group of Powers which possesses naval superiority there. In view of the fact that on some of the largest of these islands, as well as in the Malayan Peninsula, there are to be found those raw materials which are not only of vital importance for war purposes, but which are necessary elements in the industrial life of first-class nations, and particularly of Great Britain and the United States, it may be assumed that in future adequate naval superiority over any potential disturber of the Far Eastern peace will be maintained by the United States, Great Britain, Netherlands and the British Dominions in association. For such a joint navy to operate effectively in its work of policing the Pacific it is necessary that the nations primarily concerned should build and equip and defend an adequate chain of bases. Among the potential bases which occur most readily to the mind are Singapore, Hong Kong, Saigon and Camranh Bay, Manila and Cavite, Soerabaya and Amboyna, Pearl Harbour with the outlying islands of Guam, Midway and Wake Islands, Darwin, Auckland and the Fijis. It would seem that the cost of maintenance of these bases ought to be borne jointly by the various Powers charged with the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and that the nature of the bases and also the nature of the armed forces that use them should be a matter of agreement between the same Powers, embodied in treaty provisions. It is not overlooked that similar joint arrangements and provisions for the mutual use of bases may also be extended in the North Pacific to embrace Russian bases in the maritime province and also the Aleutian Islands. For the Northern Pacific therefore the Soviet is an essential partner in joint defence plans.

Moreover, by the time the present war is ended the whole of the islands of the Pacific will have fallen under the control of the United Nations, and it would seem that the peculiar problems of the development which these islands of widely varying size, population and resources present, can only be solved by the establishment of a Pacific control board upon which each of the United Nations should be represented. Such a Pacific control board, by applying mandate principles, might well carry further the work of enlightened administration, which had recently been carried on in some of the islands of the Pacific. Such a board would have to consider the problems of the availability of raw materials, preservation of local cultures, the provision of efficient administrations and the migration of populations. To it might also be committed the difficult problem of education in the islands of the Pacific as well as the problem of the re-education of the Japanese people. It is suggested that the correct development of adult education amongst the peoples of South-Eastern Asia and of the Pacific supplies an important clue to their

eventual peaceful development. It would seem that recent research into this problem has tended to emphasize the fact that education along western lines to satisfy an economic need created by the expansion of western enterprise in the Pacific will tend to produce a class which is peculiarly susceptible to political experiment, and that it therefore in the long run may be the source of instability. Experiments such as the Chinese nationalists are at present undertaking in their Mass Education movement and allied activities are therefore worthy of extended consideration in dealing with this problem.

Such a joint Pacific control might well prove the means for reconciling divergent views which at the present time are apt to appear in sharp conflict. In the first place, it is only such an international board which can possibly face the difficult problems of migration which will inevitably arise in the Far East after this war. For example, when Japan is defeated, the problem of its rapidly increasing population will remain. There are also economic problems of extreme complexity. Thus, under Japanese rule, the exports of Korea have been a Japanese monopoly. After the war, if Korea is independent, Japan will no longer have the ability or the desire to absorb so great a volume of Korean products. Again, countries such as Korea, Siam, and the Philippines cannot expect to maintain an effective independence within a system of power-politics. These problems and many others suggest the necessity of long-term planning in the Far East, by a body which will have sufficient authority at its command to enforce its decisions. This can no longer be a single Power, even were such a development desirable. On the other hand, no one has yet been sufficiently adventurous to suggest that a federation of Far Eastern nations, either alone or as part of some world organization, is either practicable or desirable, and it is immensely complicated by the spread of the interests of non-Asiatic Powers through this area. An International Board, applying principles of enlightened trusteeship would provide the framework in which the social revolution now in progress in the Far East could be controlled and guided, and which might avert from the Pacific the evils of rabid nationalism and racialism as they have recently been apparent in the West. The Washington Conference was a timid step in this direction. It failed to guarantee the peaceful development of the Far East, because it did not embody the recognition that the ultimate sanction of a progressive policy is the command of sufficient force to deter a Power which seeks independent profit at the expense of the common good. On the other hand the failure of the League of Nations to deal effectively with the Far Eastern problem, though partly due as has been suggested to the preoccupation of the major League Powers with European rivalries, was due also to the fact that the League at that time included a number of Powers with no substantial interest in Far Eastern affairs, and it did not include some Powers whose interests in the Far East were considerable. Whatever may be the extent of the interest of the United States in the development of Europe after the war, it is now clear that her interest in the Far East, which has always been extensive, now

implies a realization that in the future its Far Eastern policies, which are an inseparable consequence of America's geographical position, must henceforth be supported by adequate force used, not as an instrument of national policies, but in the service of some general plan of Far Eastern progress. The principles upon which such a plan must be based are to be found in the Atlantic Charter. The methods by which they are to be achieved must be worked out by a Pacific Control Board, on which all the Powers with interests in the Far East would necessarily be represented, as well as the principal Far Eastern nations. Representation would obviously be governmental, and much of the work of the Control Board on particular questions, for example, migration and education, might be discharged by special committees. Inasmuch, however, as the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific region would devolve primarily upon the major Powers, it would be natural to anticipate that the Defence Committee would include chiefly the representatives of those Powers, more especially as its decisions would require to be considered and co-ordinated with the commitments which those Powers had assumed in respect of other regions, and more especially in respect of Europe.

One question of particular complexity which the Board would be called upon to consider would be that of the future status of the colonial possessions of European Powers in the Far East. This is one of extreme difficulty in view of the present rise of nationalism, and in some cases of racialism, in these areas in recent years. They are more peculiarly complex in view of the richness of their resources (for example, Malaya and Netherlands Indies), more especially when, as is the case with Netherlands Indies, the colonial possessions form such a large part of the total territory of a state. Under modern conditions there can be little question that the ultimate goal with regard to these possessions is complete self-government, though the achievement of this does not necessarily imply that links with the mother country either should be or could be severed. This has been declared to be the goal of British colonial policy, and the Dutch have similar views of colonial development. Even before the Japanese occupied Netherlands India, very considerable progress had been made towards self-government, and it would seem that this process will be completed shortly after the war. More difficult problems arise in the case of an area such as Malaya where no less than three races, excluding Europeans, participate in the development of the country on a substantially equal footing. Here too, the problem is complicated by the fact that some areas are full British colonies, others form part of the Federation of Malay States, and others again (less developed in their resources and political organization) are Unfederated Malay States. Moreover, some parts of this area are more developed, politically and economically, than others. The main value of an International Board would be, however, that it could gradually evolve more uniform standards than have previously existed and its existence would be a guarantee that old-fashioned theories of colonial exploitation were dead.

Finally it is probably unnecessary to stress the fact that the smallness of the populations of Australia and New Zealand have not only been a source of weakness to Great Britain and her Far Eastern policy in the recent past, but that they have also provided one important pretext for Japan's policy of aggression. The present attitude of New Zealand and Australia in this question suggests that the lessons of the past ten years have not been lost upon them, and that when the war is over energetic steps will be taken to place in both dominions populations more adequate to their needs. The recent Australian pronouncements on this question are therefore particularly welcome. To some extent the same is also true of Canada, though for her the problems of defence against renewed aggression in the Pacific are not so acute, because of the possibility of unimpeded British and American assistance. The problem of migration within the British Commonwealth is one which requires fuller study than it has yet received, for whilst it is recognized that the three British Dominions may welcome settlers from a wide variety of states, it is certain that the bulk of them for some time to come will be furnished by Europe and the United States. Under modern conditions of totalitarian warfare, populations have an even greater significance from the point of view of defence than they have had before, and in view of the responsibilities that the three British Dominions may in future be called to assume in the Pacific, the necessity for substantial increase over a comparatively short period of time is apparent. There can be little question that if Australia for example is to play the part in Pacific affairs which her position, resources and outlook indicate she will, it will be necessary for her to maintain substantial armed forces, and rapidly to increase her naval power. What is true of Australia is true to some extent also of New Zealand and Canada. Any post-war Pacific system must necessarily contemplate the rapid progress of the three British dominions towards full development of their resources by greater populations than they possess at present; but that in turn emphasizes the urgency of establishing a system in which the United States, Great Britain and the Dominions support a common policy and have clearer, more extensive and more co-ordinated obligations in the sphere of defence than they have previously had.

(Professor Keeton here develops more fully the ideas expressed in the last chapter of his recent book, "China, the Far East and the Future" (Cape).)

THE EARTH RE-MAPPED FOR BRITISH SUPPLIES

BY ROSITA FORBES

IN three years the world has been re-mapped. For this is a war of supplies. Oil, water, rubber, strip steel, materials generally unfamiliar such as wolfram, tungsten, manganese and bauxite play as great a part in strategy as the guns and tanks on which the fronts depend. Never in history have transport systems been so extended. Skies and seas have been harnessed to serve armies "astronomically" distant from their bases. Virgin forests, bogs of the sub-Arctic frozen since the ice-age, mountains geographically impregnable, jungle, tropical swamp and desert have been turned into the highways of fighting democracy.

In all this pioneering, mental as well as mechanical, Britain and the British Commonwealth have taken the lead. Between the Arctic, the Atlantic and the Southern Pacific, we hold open well over a hundred thousand miles of supply ways. The significance of this figure is emphasized by comparison with Nazi achievements. For at no time has Hitler been fighting on land more than 1,800 miles from Berlin or from a major industrial and military base. When he imagined his armies held Stalingrad, his munitions were coming not fifteen thousand miles, which is the length of the British supply road to Russia—round Africa and Arabia, across Persia and the Caspian to the Volga—but some tenth of that distance by new railways built by German engineers in the rear of their advancing forces.

In Tunisia, Rommel's and Von Arnim's armies were in close touch with their European bases. The shortest crossings of the Mediterranean—184 miles from Palermo in Sicily, 320 from Naples, and 120 from Pantelleria, the Fascist Gibraltar—have kept them supplied. There is no water problem within the Tunisian coastal amphitheatre protected by tiers of low hills fortified with cactus. Established wells and pipe-lines proved as useful to the Nazis with their backs to the Mediterranean as the salt marshes narrowing the seaboard plains, and the quicksand clay of the wadis. But the Eighth Army had to build up a water system only comparable—as a task—to the electrification of a whole state. The human body loses about a quart of water for every seven and a half miles it marches under normal conditions. A force of 100,000 men needs 50,000 gallons of water each day for drinking alone. These are the figures of European civilization which have not varied since the Romans built their underground cisterns in North Africa—granary of their Empire. When I travelled across the same deserts in Arab disguise, we allowed ourselves one pint per head per day for all purposes. But the

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Bedouin 'girba,' a goatskin treated with oil and tar to prevent leakage and carried two on each side of a baggage camel averaging one and a half miles an hour, has given way to water-trains, to convoys of water-lorries, to fleets of water-barges, to 'parks' of tanks, to storage vehicles where the water is chlorinated before being piped along to advance positions.

When the Eighth Army was in front of the Mareth Line, it depended largely on a host of heavy lighters bearing thousands of water-barrels along the coast. It was fed from Egypt, more than 1,500 miles away. The bulk of its war material came from England round the Cape and up the Red Sea—across some twelve thousand miles of hostile ocean. At the other end of the African battle line, the First Army struggling across the razor rocks of Tunisia, had covered 1,100 miles over marsh, shifting sand and cactus-covered ridges only known to wild boar, after leaving Marshal Lyautey's modern road system based on Casablanca.

Ibrahim Musa—leader of the Arab armies which in the eighth century swarmed from Mecca to Granada—burned his boats when he landed in Spain for the first conquest of Europe from Africa. Since that 1,200 year old advance, defeating space as Nazi Germany seeks to overcome time, there has been no military venture to equal in dramatic importance the arrival of the First Army in N.W. Africa. Its convoys had steamed 1,200 miles from British to Algerian ports. The American forces were being supplied over 3,250 miles of stormy winter ocean from their own country, or across a 1,600 mile stretch of Southern Atlantic from Dakar, Brazil's great naval and air base guarding the shortest way from one hemisphere to another.

A secondary supply line was provided by the military airway recently created from Takoradi, a small port on the Gold Coast trading in cocoa and manganese, to the British Sudan and Egypt.

From Lagos to Khartoum, 2050 miles apart, linking Nigeria and Holy Chad—where legend says the Ark of the Covenant rested for two days before floating off to Sinai—with the battle lines reaching from Bizerta to the Caucasus, runs our new skyway. Sixteen modern aerodromes, strung over French Equatorial Africa and the Southern Sahara service the huge transports which, stripped of their passenger seats, bring munitions across the Atlantic. So the slave-markets of twenty years ago have been turned into concrete runways. Sacred cities like Kufra, capital of the Senussi tariq, forbidden to the infidel, have become repair depots for the fantastic mechanical material which, man-directed, makes war on a hemispheric scale.

In 1936, Imperial Airways started a civil route from West Africa to Egypt. In July, 1940, after Italy's invasion of France, an advance party of the R.A.F. arrived at Takoradi—with an "open cheque-book." A base for un-shipping, un-crating, re-assembly and despatch had to be created as a first necessity.

A ruthless, surf-bound coast, malaria and dysentery, the burping Harmattan—an East wind blowing for weeks on end and raising dust-fog up to ten thousand feet—impenetrable forest prohibiting forced landings, the Habub

(devil-wind of the Sudan) and the Khamsin (forty days blistering sandstorm in Egypt), tropical rain and mosquitoes in the swamps, dunes shifting in the season of gales like a landscape in the first days of Genesis, quicksand and salt-pan, the dread desert where the heat cracks the hoofs of meat convoys . . . these were some of the difficulties overcome. The first six Blenheims and an equal number of Hurricanes arrived on September 5, less than two months after the sites of the first technical buildings were marked on the plans of the first military aerodrome. A fortnight later the first convoy of fighters, led by a bomber with navigation and radio equipment, flew over the "Reinforcement Route." A pool of ferry-pilots was created for the 4,000 mile journey from the Gold Coast to Alexandria. They average the distance in four days. Last month, in one afternoon, eighty big transports landed on Kano Aerodrome, refuelled in a matter of minutes, and took off again for the Mediterranean.

Not less remarkable is Canada's 1,500 mile air-highway from Edmonton on the trans-continental railway lines to White Horse, capital of the sub-Arctic in the Yukon. Completed in the winter of 1940-41, it enabled U.S.A. fighters to fly in four and a half hours from their own frontier to the Alaskan bases threatening—and threatened by—Japan, instead of being shipped by sea, eight days from Seattle to Fairbanks. It turned small fur-trading posts, question-marks in the middle of three quarter million square miles of ice-bound forest and bog, into modern townships with stores, inns, quick lunch counters, modern aerodromes, wireless towers and directional radio.

This year the corresponding military highway has been completed by agreement between Canada and the U.S.A. It runs for 1,671 miles from North of the American frontier to Fairbanks, capital of Alaska and probable centre of post-war polar airlines linking Europe and the Americas by the shortest routes across the Arctic circle. This twenty-four foot wide road breaking uncharted and untracked ground—where forest belonged to grizzly bear, frozen muskeg swamp to herds of caribou and the glaciers of the coastal range to rare golden eagle—was completed in just over six months by 10,000 American soldiers working night and day with 2,000 civilian labourers. Most spectacular achievement of the Alcan Highway was the building of the bridge across the Sikanni Chief River. The story will rank with the tales of '98. For the exploits of the incomparable Royal Mounted who police half a continent, some of it un-mapped, and of the Hudson Bay Company's Gentlemen Adventurers have been matched—at last—by American negro soldiers who spanned the Sikanni Chief in eighty-four hours. From the snows of the Canadian Rockies, a glacial torrent thrusts at ten miles an hour. In the Arctic summer, 166 men who had wagered their monthly salaries on beating the engineers' time estimate, worked the clock round waist deep in the icy flood, they drove in spruce piles and hammered down the pine planks. Their selection and treatment of timber had to be exact for bridges on the Alcan highway must stand the strain of ice-floes in the

crush before the spring break. The men worked, ate, worked some more. They did not sleep. Stringers, carpenters, spikers, achieved thirty-hour shifts. At midnight cooks crept out on to the piling with hot coffee. On the fourth day, instead of the fifteenth predicted by technical experts, the first load was driven across the bridge. The negro soldiers went on to another stage of the Canada-Alaska highway which feeds and arms the Allied bases, nearest to the Soviet Union.

Two thousand additional miles have just been added to the original plans. Canadians and Americans working together have completed four new sections opening up the Yukon, between the Rockies and the Mackenzie River Valley.

With Canada's original skyway (Edmonton to White Horse and Fairbanks) shortening the distance between Chicago and Shanghai by 3,000 miles, the Alcan road system will supply some of the biggest forces operating against Japan. If Russia should make a Second Front against civilization's enemy in the Pacific, this highway will provide the first stage along which guns and tanks will stream to Alaska and the twenty-two miles of the Behring Straits linking America with our Allies in Siberia and China.

All over the world, such new supply ways are being thrust across mountains, hitherto legendary, and deserts defended since the dawn of history, by their complete lack of water. Our own constantly developing supply system has maintained fronts in action from Morocco to Madagascar; from Malta to Syria, Iraq and Persia; from Britain to Australia, East Africa, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland; from Britain, once more, through the Arctic to the help of Russia by Murmansk and Archangel; yet again from Britain across half the world to India and Burma, over the Himalayas to China and the 'roof of the earth' to Soviet Central Asia.

Probably the most remarkable of all these tentacles spreading like an octopus across the new war maps without regard to geographical, mechanical, or human probabilities, are the five Persian roads by which supplies go to the Caucasus and the Volga or Donetz fronts. From an English port to Bandar Shahpur on the Persian Gulf or to the newly created docks at Kharrum Shahr is more than 13,000 miles by convoy route. So the food, military clothing and boots, munitions of war including guns, tanks, raw materials and spare parts which maintained our Ninth Army in the hills North of Tehran guarding the oil of Central Asia and ready at any moment to accept a Soviet invitation to help force the Germans out of Southern Russia, travel nearly 15,000 miles before—by way of the Aras River, boundary of Persia and Russian Armenia—they reach the armies defending the Kuban.

Four main ways have been driven across the mountains of Persia and Turkestan. They also cross the edges of those fabulous Persian deserts called the Sea of Salt and the Sea of Sand. The most important are, (1) the main highway from India to Central Asia—by rail Quetta to Duzdab (Thieves' Water), now Zahidan, in Persian Baluchistan, then by new highway to the

Holy City of Meshed and along the "Golden Road" of legend to the Soviet Republics. East of the Caspian, (2) the enlarged and re-organized Persian railway joining the Gulf and the Iraq rivers to Tehran and the Caspian, with a road branching West through Persian Tabriz to the Aras and Erivan in Russian Armenia, which has one of the largest synthetic rubber plants in the world.

The other ways consist of the road linking Mosul through the mighty Rowanduz gorge with Kurdistan and the Assyrian-settled plains of Persian Urméya, thence northward to the Russian frontier, or the equally venturesome transport system starting from Baghdad and crossing the Persian ranges by Shiraz and Isfahan. From Baghdad also there is a route to Tabriz. The railway goes to Kirkuk, key to the Iraq oil fields and the pipe-line to the Mediterranean. From Khanikin on this line, a road branches into Persia. It is reported that 2,000 trucks already operate over the 600 miles to Tabriz, working in conjunction with a Soviet Company in Russian Armenia. All this transport system is connected with the Iraq railway from Basra, via Mosul to Aleppo in Syria. Here is Turkey's back door to the East and if we invade the Balkans, it may be another side door to the Caucasus. So the Bridge of Asia, between Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, is brought into the evolutionary design which covers the world-known to Cyrus and Xenophon's Ten Thousand. The India of Alexander and the kingdom Ahasuerus shared with Jewish Esther are bases for the supply of British, Russian and Chinese fronts against the enemies which—it is well to remember—are common to us and America but not to our major Allies. For China is not at war with Germany nor Russia with Japan.

It is by Persian road No. 2, that India sends a growing volume of supplies to Russian Turkestan. At Zahidan, 50 miles from the Indian frontier, a host of battered trucks take war-material in six days across 750 miles of desert, with tortuous "hairpin" stretches in the mountains near Birjand or North of Meshed. The pilgrim 'road' to this holy city was considered the hardest in Asia. By it, I once travelled on a three-quarter-ton truck, averaging not more than twenty miles a day. We were loaded with pilgrims as a hive with a new swarm. We also carried prayer-carpets and water-pipes, opium to relieve the tedium of the journey, food and all the paraphernalia of Shia tea-making, dung for fuel, and clean clothes for the ceremonial homage to Sherif Ali under the Golden Dome of Meshed. All that has been pushed aside with the leisured life of centuries. To-day there is a real road created by 5,000 Hindu, Armenian and Baluchi labourers. Indian trucks and drivers shuttle back and forth between rail-head at Zahidan and Firuze on the Persian-Russian frontier, where a branch railway connects with Ashabad on the main line to the Caspian port Krasnovodsk. Incidentally, it is by this newly created highway that we clothed, armed and supplied the Polish troops which had made their way across Russia to the appointed meeting-place at Ashkabad.

The most important source of supplies to the Soviet Union is still the rail-

way which was the last Shah's favourite toy. Unfortunately the Southern terminal was at Bandar Shahpur where the harbour is shallow and could only accommodate two ships at a time. Landing facilities have been rapidly improved, but it was necessary to construct a new port at Kharrum Shahr where the Karun River, oil-highway from the Fields at Suleiman Mazjid, runs into the combination of Tigris and Euphrates known as the Shatt el Arab. Thence seventy miles of new line have been constructed in the shortest possible time to Akhwaz. This small town devoted to the ledgers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a republic in itself, and to the storks who yearly build on the flat mud roofs, has thus become a junction on the two pronged railway North to Tehran. It is estimated that some 3,000 tons of war material and supplies go over the reconstructed system every day.

It is 808 miles from Bandar Shahpur through Tehran to the port of Pahlevi on the Caspian. This inland sea is said to harbour a third of Russia's total merchant fleet. The Soviet Union is responsible for Mazanderan, richest province of Persia, for they have occupied the country North of Tehran. But their officials co-operate with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation whose trucks unload at Pahlevi. Photographs of King George and the Russian President Kalenin decorate the dock Commandant's office.

International indeed was the first conception of the Iran railway. It was surveyed by U.S.A. engineers—for Reza Shah Pahlevi—in 1926. Work began next year, with Germans building the Southern section and Americans the Northern. But the first 'editions' were not satisfactory. After a season of tremendous storms the river beds overflowed, landslides followed and embankments gave way. During the summer heat, with a temperature of 130° Fahrenheit, sleepers split and rails buckled. When the Shah formally opened the railway, travelling in a pram-like car, the train followed its usual habit of de-railing and subsequently caught fire.

Swedish and American experts were then consulted. They gave way to a Danish syndicate. Finally, almost every nationality was represented. For, on this startling construction, linking the fire-worshippers of Khuzistan with the frontiers of Soviet industrialization, the history of Elamite and Sassanian, mighty conquerors, with that being written to-day by Stalin, fifty thousand workmen were employed. It was a labourers' League of Nations, consisting of British, American and Russian engineers, of Australian, Belgian, Swedish, French, German, Czech, Greek and Italian artisans, backed by Persians, Syrians, Eurasians, Hindus and Iraqis.

In the matter of changing the earth's surface—it was an eighth day of Genesis. For before the engineers could reach the scene of their first activities, they had to swim a river, liable to a twenty foot rise in a couple of hours. The ravines, slit between limestone rock, were ovens. Citizens of Tehran invented the tale of a Bakhtiari workman accidentally killed by blast who found hell so cold after the gorges where the rocks at mid-day radiate

the heat of a crucible, that the devil, bored with his continual shivering, sent him back to Luristan.

In one section of the line, all of which has been modernized and to a certain extent reconstructed in the last two years, there are 150 tunnels in less than 40 miles and in another the gradient is so steep that the permanent way spirals over 41 miles to cover half that distance as the crow flies. Four hundred and fifty bridges and culverts with the addition of tunnel linings, accounted for 10,000 tons of cement a month and at least 100 tons of dynamite and gelignite to blast the cliffs which are part of Central Asia's limestone dome, the lid of an unlimited natural oil cistern. All this heavy material had to be brought across one of the hottest regions in the world, where the tracks are axle deep in sand.

The old road, leaving the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's comparatively autonomous state, an expression of complete modernity based on Abadan with its Refinery and Cracking Plant, or the Fields at Suleiman Mazjid, went straight into the Middle Ages at Dizful, city of the Blind. Before the war, civilization was represented by the telegraph wires on which thousands of bee-birds sat waiting for their breakfast of locusts to swarm confidently across the desert, and modern enterprise by the exceedingly courteous Arabs who, having removed an essential if primitive bridge, waited beside the resulting chasm to earn their living by pushing lorries out of the mud. At Shush, there were miles of yellow thistles, punctuated by crops of black, camels' hair tents and a colossal modern castle built by the French Government for its antiquarians excavating Susa or Shushinak, first capital of the independent Elamites. These fought against Babylonia and Assyria in 2000 B.C. under Khudar Lagamar. Thirteen hundred and three years later Sennacherib's invasion was halted by the snows which played havoc with von Bock's armies in the Caucasus. But in B.C. 645 Assurbanipal, foreshadowing Hitler's rape of Russia, carried off from conquered Shushan grain, cattle, labourers and 32 statues of alabaster, gold and silver. In totalitarian fashion he destroyed the god whose face no man might look upon in the Holy of Holies, burned the historic city and levelled its Great Tower. A century later Darius rebuilt it and here Daniel saw his visions and—according to local legend—was suspended in a glass coffin from a bridge in mid river so that no district could claim his grave. Susa was on the Royal road from Sardis along which the march of Xenophon and his famous ten thousand can be compared to the equally spectacular advance of Montgomery's desert columns. The Achæmenian rulers feasted under the famous frieze of the Archers representing warriors of the Great King's bodyguard, known as the Immortals. All this splendour was destroyed by Alexander the Great who, like Hitler, dreamed of a new world, but he wanted to unite Asia and Europe by blood. His soldiers left blue-eyed descendants right across the Pamirs and along the banks of the Oxus river, frontier to-day of Soviet industrialization and the religious feudalism of Afghanistan.

For centuries storks garrisoned Dijful, city of perpetual twilight, whose builder, the great Sasanian warrior, Shapur, captured Rome's Emperor Valerian in 260 B.C. Now trucks of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, hauling supplies for Russia across new mountain roads on a sixty-hour journey northward without pause, tunnel through the labyrinth of high walled mud houses, while local fanatics, superstitious and indolent, shake the dust of progress from their earth-coloured robes, muttering that "all change is sin."

Through Dijful went the most fateful road in history and through it goes the new railway. Unconquered by Medes or Persians, by Alexander or Antiochus, but temporarily defeated by the Afghans in 1722, the tribesmen of Khuzistan raided camel caravan as they now raid motorized convoys. They worshipped Baal in the High Places of Luristan and still to-day, when a tribesman dies, a blaze is kindled on his grave. Still when anyone enters a nomad tent or the huts of a railway gang, torch in hand, every man rises to salute the fire. Yet these people have been nominally Moslem for 800 years.

In Dijful, before Britain took over the railway and developed it for the needs of the Soviet Union and of the Ninth Army based in the mountains near Tehran, the rate of living was about five shillings a week. In the earth-built houses piled one on top of another, three or four generations huddled together and had perhaps half a dozen seeing eyes between them. To-day the tap-tapping of blind men's sticks on the cobbles accompanies the clamour of the new work-shops and the change of gears as 100 trucks at a time raise a fog of dust on their long journey north.

Eye-disease still reigns in Dijful with a diet of onions, bread thin as sheets of brown paper, goats' cheese and curdled milk called 'Dogh' of which the Persians say: 'Each glass contains an extra year of life.' But £10,000,000 sterling of Australian rolling stock has gone through the ancient capital of "the bad lands," with engines from India and Hong-Kong. Machinery, tin, rubber, munitions, food, army clothing, rifles and big guns go over the railway to Caspian Pahlevi.

The Northern section, 250 miles across the Elburz mountains and the thickly cultivated plains of Mazanderan, links Tehran with Russia's inland Sea. Pahlevi, where Soviet ships are loaded with British, American and Indian supplies, is the goal not only of the Iranian railway, but of most of the ten thousand trucks operated by the U.K.C.C. This company was formed to fight in Asia on the economic front against the Axis. It was part of Britain's effort to support the indomitable Russian defence of the Caucasus and the Volga, which turned into a successful offensive. Developing into a comprehensive supply system, its lorries raise synthetic sandstorms as far East as the Sea of Sand and the Sea of Salt, considered impassable. Their endless convoys are fed by paddle-steamers from the Indian rivers, transported to the Tigris and Euphrates. So the legendary Garden of Eden, patrolled by Eureka invasion craft, is included in the crucible of our civilization.

Before the war Andimeshk, ninety miles north of A-hwaz and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's modern offices, consisted of three earthen hovels and a tomb. Now it resembles a mining town in the Gold Rush. Huts made out of packing cases and flattened tins, tents of canvas or woven goats' hair spread over the flat ground. Saloons sprout like mushrooms. Enormous assembly plants put together the six-wheel lorries which crawl across ancient Persia. Baluchi slave traders have become artisans. Holy cities are transmuted into garages and repair shops, caravansaries into hangars, and waste ground—where, during Haramein, Shias slash their heads with axes, mourning the death of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohamed—into aerodromes.

Again there is a League of Nations effect. For, as drivers, mechanics, engineers and stevedores, as guides in the "High Places" once sacred to Baal and in the sands of the dreaded Shurgaz—negotiable on caterpillar tracks or skid boards at an average of two or three miles an hour—Britons, Americans, Russians, African negroes, Persians, Indians and Arabs work together to feed the guns of Soviet Russia. So the tide of victory rolling West is maintained by way of Sacred Kum with its 400 imamzades—blue-domed tombs of the faithful—where a dozen kings and half a thousand saints are buried under spring peach blossom.

The ghosts of Alexander's successful generals, who feasted in the Hall of a Hundred Columns at Persepolis after the conquest of the *known world*, can watch munitions hurried to an equally ambitious front. Cyrus the Great, buried near the great motor way North to last winter's battle grounds, may be shaken by the U.K.C.C. trucks. This is his prayer to the strangers whom he knew would come—"Oh man, I am Kurush . . . who founded the greatness of Asia and ruled Persia, grudge me not this monument" . . . and this small space on earth.

THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC CORPORATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

BY W. FRIEDMANN

SOME of the many ideas for international post-war reconstruction are becoming sufficiently defined to justify and, indeed, demand a concrete study of ways and means. The utter futility of any plans of political reorganization and development without corresponding economic planning is now more and more widely recognized. If the United Nations, or Mr. Churchill's European Council wish, for example, to encourage regional associations of the smaller nations of Europe, in order to lessen their weakness in regard to Germany, such plans are doomed to fail, unless the dependence of these nations on market crops for export and their industrial and agricultural under-development are mitigated, by transport development and power generation, among other things, in the Balkans and the Danube valley. A second fact, now beyond doubt, is that the state of devastation and disorganization, over the whole of Europe, will be such that the less afflicted of the United Nations will have to provide speedy and large scale assistance, in the restoration of land fertility and livestock, the reconstruction of devastated areas, the pooling of raw materials, and cash loans for international credits.

It is for such long term tasks of reconstruction that the International Public Corporation (IPC) is likely to be used. Mr. Morrison has suggested an International Investment Corporation on the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and a Republican Representative in Congress has proposed the creation of a World Bank to administer and transform Lend-Lease after the War. More recently still, the American and British Governments have simultaneously published proposals for international financial institutions, designed to regulate and stabilize international currency. Such an international organization—whether it be called a Clearing Union (British proposal) or a Stabilization Fund (American proposal) would most likely be constituted in the form of an International Public Corporation. There are two reasons, in particular, why the IPC is likely to play an important part in international post-war collaboration. One is the need to overcome the diversity between different political and social systems to devise international organizations which will, as Mr. Morrison put it in his Guildhall speech, enable centrally planned and liberal systems and mixtures of the two to co-operate. These divergencies will make themselves increasingly felt as economic and social matters pass from private enterprise to public responsibility and planning. The International Labour Organization has been greatly

handicapped by the many discrepancies in social organization and labour standards, among its members. The other reason is the need to organize long term international development in a form which will avoid, on the one hand, one-sided charity and, on the other, enable different sections of public opinion to keep a check on expenditure. Lend-Lease, inaugurated by a far-sighted statesman, in a situation of great emergency, is now being subjected to detailed scrutiny by Congress Committees. In the flush of victory, Allied governments and Parliaments might well make generous grants for the assistance of the stricken peoples of Europe. A year or two later, their successors may think differently, taxpayers or exporters may grumble, and far-reaching schemes might well be ruined by a single day's vote or political manoeuvre.

The IPC would overcome these dangers to a large extent. In the national life of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, it has been developed to transfer the administration of vital public utilities from private competition and control to public responsibility, in a form which preserves the advantages of financial and managerial independence and encourages enterprise. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has created the State Trusts as undertakings with separate personality, management, budgets, in order to keep a check on efficiency and rentability and to encourage a sense of personal responsibility.

The IPC thus constitutes a middle ground, on which different economic systems could meet. Once created by the concurrent purposes of different nations and supported and staffed on an international basis, it can work as a separate unit with a specific purpose, while its development, commitments, rentability, and management can be checked. Such a form of international enterprise is obviously suitable only for a particular type of reconstruction work, broadly speaking for long-term economic development of a kind which it is reasonable to organize on commercial lines, and which can be expected, in due course, to show financially measurable returns, though this does not necessarily mean the distribution of profits. This would seem to exclude such immediate relief measures as the distribution of all food and medical supplies to relieve distress. A nucleus for the organization of such measures already exists in the various Inter-Allied Committees set up by the Conference at St. James' Palace (September, 1941). A more open question is the use of the IPC for non-economic purposes, such as international education schemes and other cultural and scientific co-operation. Whatever the position in national life, in international affairs matters of such grave political importance as re-education or broadcasting are probably better left to direct inter-governmental agreement, while more neutral cultural and scientific objects could be dealt with by the strengthening of existing International Unions. Long term economic reconstruction work will be the paramount field of activity for the IPC. Once tested in that field, it may well play an important part in the development of permanent international services, such as Raw Material Pools and Air Transport.

Existing projects have been predominantly concerned with International Finance and Investment Corporations, to direct international economic development. While a well functioning international society is likely to have such institutions, it is doubtful whether, in a period of transition and experimenting, economic development should be made dependent on their establishment. The main criticism directed against the British and American proposals for international currency stabilization has been that they seem to put the cart before the horse, since the primary task must be the international reconstruction and development of production and trade. Such criticism would be even more justified against the institution of a World Investment Bank. The delicate problems of capital and political control in such a Corporation might well retard and even frustrate urgent tasks. A recent proposal, in Congress, suggested the creation of a World Bank, with 51 per cent. of the shares to be held by the U.S.A. and 49 per cent. by the other United Nations. National and social resistance to such a slightly disguised form of One-State control would combine with the now widespread aversion against subversion of construction and production to finance. The United States Government seems to be well aware of the grave dangers of such schemes. The bold Draft for an Inter-American Bank (1940) designed to promote Inter-American trade and economic development provides for a minimum vote of 50 per cent. to be held by any one participating Government, regardless of the amount of stock held, and the recent plan for an International Stabilization Fund limits the voting power of any member Government to 25 per cent. of the total votes.

How far and how quickly such plans will materialize, remains to be seen. But for psychological as much as for technical reasons, it will probably be easier to reach agreement on specific tasks, by the formation of Corporations—such as a Danube Valley Authority, a European Livestock Corporation, a Balkan Transport Board, whose powers would include the financing of necessary developments within their sphere of activity.

One of the greatest problems of the National Public Corporation has been how to reconcile financial and managerial independence, necessary for steady development and personal initiative, with the need for accountability to the public. Experience has taught, in the judgment of most observers, the need for long-term appropriations, which enable the Corporation to stand on its own feet and plan boldly, while standing Parliamentary or other Committees exercise periodical supervision, official control departments check costing and accounts, and ultimate legislative control rests, of course, with the various organs of Government.

The same principle of blending independence with responsibility must govern the IPC. But some further, specifically international problems confront it. In an international society still dominated by national sovereignty, the IPC must become an agent of international government, the embodiment of joint enterprise, in which different nations participate as

active partners. This means that indirect control by one state, or a group of interests, must be avoided. Since capital and material resources are likely to be largely concentrated in the hands of a few powers, it further means that voting and controlling power cannot be automatically determined by the amount of capital or other supplies provided. The IPC cannot be constituted on the lines of a joint stock company, for its commercial functions will be part of a wider political framework. The Lend-Lease problem of measuring dollars or pounds against blood, will arise again, on a wider scale. It would be a tragic and irreparable blunder to treat the nations in Europe, which have suffered in a common cause beyond measuring, as objects of capitalist development rather than as partners in a common enterprise, to which—quite apart from material contributions in the form of land, labour, skill—they have contributed by sacrifice. Any other treatment of inevitably impoverished countries would provoke violent reactions of national and social revolt and possibly lead to a form of continental unity which would be hostile to foreign interference and create new tension.

Organization and control of the IPC must seek to blend three paramount principles: a genuinely international character of the IPC; sufficient independence to stimulate vigorous enterprise; responsibility to the international community. The following is a brief outline of some aspects of organization, in the light of these principles.

I. *Constitution.* Each IPC will derive its existence from a Convention between the participating States, which will determine general policy and define the objects, functions and powers of the IPC. These will be specified by the Bye-Laws. It is a necessary and overdue advance in international co-operation to constitute the IPC as a genuinely international corporate body, independent from any national charter. It follows that the Board and Staff must, in regard to selection, rights, duties and supervision, be servants of the international community formed by the Convention, and not of any particular State. This is largely a psychological matter, dependent on right selection; but it must be safeguarded by putting the administrative and judicial supervision in the hands of international organs. On the other hand, the IPC as a commercial corporation, which owns land and stock, employs workmen, buys, sells and rents, must, in regard to the exercise of its commercial functions, be in the position of an ordinary trading corporation. The interesting legal problems arising from this dual status cannot be pursued here. One consequence is that neither the IPC nor its staff can claim the full privileges and immunities of international government institutions, such as the League of Nations or the ILO.

II. *Finance.* Previous international organizations have been fatally weakened by lack of financial independence. The power of the purse enabled participating States to wreck much constructive work, by cancelling contributions, threatening withdrawal or making continuation dependent on

fettering conditions. The need is for definite financial obligations to be undertaken by the participating States, for a period sufficient to give the enterprise a chance to develop. The method of financing will vary according to the nature of the enterprise. A Livestock Board will require little capital but much organization and expert work. Here the necessary capital can be provided by simple government contributions. Others, like a Danube Power scheme, will require much capital for initial plant and constructional work. Here the alternative is between the issue of dividend-bearing shares and interest-bearing debentures. Where share capital has been issued, as in the case of the Bank for International Settlements, it has been necessary to avoid control by one State or group of banks, by restricting the transfer of voting shares, while the American Drafts for an Inter-American Bank (1941) and for an International Stabilization Fund (1943) limit the number of votes to be held by any one State, in the way described earlier. In all these cases, the distribution of profits has been made dependent on conditions which practically exclude such distribution. It is essential to realize, first, that in an international public enterprise, capital participation and control cannot be automatically linked, and second that the constitution of the IPC as a business corporation has the principal purpose not of making profits but of ensuring good financial and managerial conduct and of stimulating a sense of personal initiative and responsibility. The paramount purpose of developing international utilities and services, in the interest of an international society which realizes its essential community of interest, will be defeated by pressure from shareholders—public or private—for speedy profits. Much is to be said, therefore, for the issue of debentures, with fixed rates of interest. This would also make it possible to open subscription to the general public and thus to stimulate direct interest without the danger of private and diffuse control. Supplementary State guarantees will, in most cases, be necessary, since, for a period of development, earnings of most IPC's will not be adequate to meet all obligations. A very important aspect of such international financing is the need for international co-operation in the adjustment of currency rates and exchange restrictions. Here, as in other respects, the IPC might well be the forerunner of a wider system of international co-operation.

III. *Public Control.* Autonomy was certainly carried too far with the Bank of International Settlements, whose Board of Bank Presidents transferred Czech gold to the German Government as "Protector," while governments and public opinion were powerless. Any future IPC must be responsible to a Permanent Committee appointed by the participating governments, selected for competence and experience, and representing different social classes and interests. Any direct representation of economic interests and social classes, as attempted in the ILO, would meet with grave difficulties. Firstly, it would be likely to favour well organized groups, such as Banking, Commerce, Industry, Trade Unions, at the expense of the general public and

consumer. Secondly, it would stir up again the problems arising from national differences in social and economic organization.

The principal functions of the Permanent Committee would be: to act as link between the IPC and the participating States; to report on the work of the IPC; to act as superior administrative authority (supplemented by a tribunal for adjudication of disputes).

This brief outline might be illustrated by picturing a future IPC at work—the European Livestock Corporation. Its object is the restoration and development of livestock resources on the Continent, primarily in the devastated areas, by scientific, technical and financial assistance. Its powers include the distribution of pedigree stock, the organization of artificial insemination, the running of experimental stock farms, scientific research, instruction, the formation of an international veterinary service and the granting of loans. Its Governing Board consists of agricultural scientists and economists, administrators with international experience, farming, financial and legal experts (chosen not by national quotas, but according to personal qualifications). Regional Boards administer specific areas, and on these boards the governments and communities directly affected are represented. The Regional Boards report to the Central Board, and the Central Board reports annually to the Control Committee set up by the Contracting Powers. The Governing Board decides by simple majority, except in a number of specified cases of fundamental importance, when a qualified majority is required. Such provisions are contained in the American Government Drafts for an Inter-American Bank and an International Stabilization Fund. The Corporation is created for a period of ten years, after which a new Conference is held.

In the vast process of remoulding the structure of international society, the IPC would, to a large extent, give expression to the transfer of international economic relations from the private to the public sphere, which is an inevitable consequence of the way in which economic and political development are interlocked. But past disillusionments necessitate a word of caution. New needs demand new institutions, and these will work if they are administered in the spirit of the new, and not of the old ideas. The League of Nations was a new idea administered largely with the methods and ideas of the society which it was meant to replace. If International Public Corporations are to be but another device not of solving but of concealing the need for a clear alternative to the political and economic nationalism and sectionalism of the past, they will add one more frustrated hope to the long list. Four factors may perhaps be singled out as particularly vital to success. Firstly, the right men must be put in charge, men who will consider themselves as servants and pioneers in an international cause, not as representative of any nation, class or economic interest. Secondly, any nations assisted by international economic enterprise must be considered as active partners in a joint undertaking, not as objects of foreign tutelage and

capitalist investment. Thirdly, the fate and progress of the International Public Corporation is inevitably linked with that of international government in general. Without the development of international administrative and judicial organs, they would become the playball of rival State policies and economic interests. Finally, this, like, any attempt at international reconstruction, is doomed to failure if constitutional reservations, unanimity rules and other well-known devices of national sovereignty once more impede international progress. To quote the words of the legal adviser to the ILO in a recent lecture to the Grotius Society:

If existing national constitutional arrangements, rules of law and budgetary methods are to be taken as granted, and new international developments are to be required to be consistent with a host of divergent and frequent conflicting national practices and prejudices, there can be no substantial change in the present structure of international society, and the international anarchy must continue unabated.

The language of the British Chancellor's Proposals for an International Learning Union is more cautious in form, but no less emphatic in substance:

A greater readiness to accept super-national arrangements must be required in the post-war world . . . It is an advantage, and not a disadvantage, of the scheme that it invites the member States to abandon that licence to promote indiscipline, disorder, and bad-neighbourliness which, to the general disadvantage, they have been free to exercise hitherto.

THE R.A.F. BETWEEN THE WARS

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

TWENTY-FIVE years ago the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, after having had their heads knocked well together, combined to produce the Royal Air Force. To-day the product of that union, surmounting all the aches and pains, and the annual starvation budgets, of a chequered infancy and adolescence, has become the mighty, conquering force we know it now. In this anniversary year of 1943, as at the time of the amalgamation a quarter of a century ago, British air power has reached, or is about to reach, a culminating point amid the stress of world-wide war, having entered on the fight on this occasion, as on that, from very small beginnings. In either case, moreover, the peaks both of production and of high achievement in the air were arrived at after the wars had been in progress a matter, roughly, of four years. There is a similarity about these two phases of development which makes it tempting to compare the then and now; to discover the vital difference, if any, between the present methods of wielding air power and those of long ago; and to see in what way, if at all, the enemy has crept up on us in this respect, or we on him. Broadly considered both presentments bear a strong resemblance to one another. In the 1914-18 War, within the limits of the air equipment available at the time, the two sides were not unevenly matched. At the present date, notwithstanding the astounding progress made in aeronautical science during the passing years, neither opponent has contrived to steal a long march over the other in respect of its equipment, with the result that they are still, on the whole, matched evenly. The measure of air supremacy undoubtedly attained by us at the close of the last war, and the predominance, amounting to local mastery in certain areas, which we are now steadily asserting in a universal sense, cannot therefore be related to superior flying power, but must be due to a more skilful disposition of our forces in the fields of strategy and tactics, added to which we can justly lay claim to a training system than which there is none better in the world, and to a human element, comprising airmen of all categories, who have turned that training to superlative advantage. These have been the ingredients of our success, each in their degree; but in what follows only the first, the high direction of the war above, will be considered.

Although, in these days of incessant air activity, the general public can do no more than loosely estimate the total number of aircraft in service, and is in equal ignorance concerning the figures of production, yet the publication of our losses, the patent fact that our continuous sorties are maintained at a

constantly increasing strength, and the general atmosphere of cheerfulness that pervades pronouncements on the subject, combine to make it more than certain that we need not fear to speak of many thousands. It is not well remembered at this late date to what a pitch of output we had climbed at the close of the 1914-18 War. Commencing with a first-line strength of 113 aeroplanes and seaplanes, fairly equally divided between the military and naval wings, no less than thirty times that number were in operational use when the armistice was signed. But that is only half the tale. In service, in reserve, in transit, and for training purposes, our total strength at the cessation of hostilities was, in airframes, 22,171, and, in engines, 37,702; while the rate of production during the concluding months averaged 90 per day of the former, and 60 per day of the latter. None of these, it is true, were comparable in efficiency or cost with aircraft in use to-day, but they were of intricate construction, requiring seasoned wood, flax-spun fabric, and much drawn wire, employing a labour force of close on 350,000 men, women and boys for production and assembly.

By far the greater part of this formidable array of air power was directly or indirectly employed on the service of air co-operation with the Expeditionary Force in France, other fronts and eastern stations absorbing, in a distinctly scattered manner, considerably less than half. During hours of daylight practically all our air activities were centred round the lumbering, overburdened army co-operation machine as it pursued its humdrum tasks of spotting for the guns and photographic reconnaissance. It had been so to an increasing extent ever since the opposing trench systems had immobilized the armies on either side, while the continuous improvement in wireless apparatus and camera design served to accentuate the importance of these cinderella offices. At the outset of hostilities, before any form of specialization had set in, the sole duty of the pilot was reconnaissance, either of a general nature or for a particular purpose, and the idea of combat in the air was as yet unborn. Small, but not ineffective, bombs were then produced, normally to be dropped over the enemy lines as the aircraft wended home. A fixed position for the camera, and its incorporation in fuselage design, was the next step forward in equipment, and with this went a rapid development in wireless technique. The stage was now set for a really efficient system of co-operation with the army, more especially with its ordnance, and thereafter, until the very end of things, the corps reconnaissance machine lorded it up and down the Western Front, every form of fighter activity being subservient to the purpose of its protection while at work. The assumption underlying this method of procedure was, however, that the safety of co-operation aircraft, flying for the most part over no-man's land, should be secured, not by a close escort of fighters, but by seeking out the enemy over his aerodromes and bases so as to bring the fight to him. Such fighter flights were based on the spirit of attack and were officially known as offensive patrols.

It is easy to see how naturally the system arose. Counter-battery work and artillery observation became all-important in the circumstances of trench warfare, the services of the corps reconnaissance machines, so well able to ensure shelling accuracy, being always at a premium. Their valuable aid, thus rendered to the guns, caused them to become the constant prey of fighters from the other side. These, in turn, could only be kept off, or shot down, by fighters of our own. But the corps reconnaissance machines could not continue to direct the guns if fighter combat were eternally going on in their immediate vicinity. Thus was devised the system of offensive patrol, and thus also it came about that the whole fighter structure of that day, all the hurly-burly in the air, with its incessant drain of loss, its stories of high courage, and its disproportion in the casualties on either side, was erected round the corps reconnaissance machine, which served exclusively the forces on the ground below. This might indeed have become in course of time an exaggerated conception of the actual position of affairs, and it is true that the fighter rivalry became a war within a war; but it remains a basic fact that elbow-room for the corps reconnaissance machines was the mainspring of the incessant fighter day activity. Army co-operation was the be-all and the end-all of our flying and our fighting in the air.

Costly as the process was, on the whole it justified itself. Crippled aircraft were obliged to struggle home against an adverse wind; the enemy could mass his forces in expectation of our strictly routine appearance over his back areas; all casualties thus encountered became dead loss; the perpetual offensive imposed a heavy strain on the morale of squadrons. Nevertheless the guns continued to be well served and photograph mosaics were kept well up-to-date. And more than this resulted; the combative spirit thus aroused in the breasts of British airmen did not die with a return to peace conditions, but became a fixed tradition which is no less apparent at the present day. One inexplicable omission remains for mention. The airmen of those days were not supplied with parachutes!

This must always be a black spot against the name, or names, of those responsible, for parachutes were readily available and were commonly in use by the balloon observers. It was thought, apparently, that an undue use might be made of this means of escape from a perilous predicament, and would weaken the spirit of attack. If so it argues ill for the judgment of those concerned with the restriction, and casts a poor reflection on the courage and self-sacrifice of countless youths who ventured their lives twice and thrice daily, for months on end, without hope of safety should they, or the aircraft that they flew, become crippled beyond the further power of flight.

As already mentioned, the air tactics described above were the necessary outcome of the condition imposed by trench warfare, and for that obvious reason have no counterpart to-day. Fighter still meets fighter and the head-long struggle up above has abated none in violence, but the element of thralldom to a fixed idea has disappeared. Within the limits of their range

and air endurance they accompany their bombers in the rôle of escort, attack those of the enemy, and fight pitched battles on their own. The service they perform is no longer of a routine nature, but is rendered for a special need or purpose, and with emancipation they have truly come into their own.

To the picture of the last war's main air activities, thus presented in the very broadest outline, may now be added some lesser strokes bearing a stronger relation, though in the sense of presage only, to the proceedings of to-day. The low-flying attack, for instance, was more and more resorted to in its latter stages for the stemming of the enemy's too precipitate advance, or for assisting his retreat. Then, as now in Libya and North Africa, our fighters would at times forsake the upper air to apply their whole attention to the situation on the ground, bombing and machine-gunning troops and transport at zero height. There was tank co-operation also in those days from the air, No. 8 Squadron with its Armstrong-Whitworth tractor biplanes having been specially detailed for this duty of communicating the position of likely targets. Similarly No. 73 Squadron, equipped with Sopwith Camels, was charged with the protection of tanks against their natural enemy, the anti-tank gun, a service which it carried out by the method of low-flying attack. Even parachuting from aircraft, though to a very limited extent, was carried out, secret service agents being introduced into the heart of enemy territory by this means. Night-flying fighters performed successfully against the night-bomber. Above all, the bomber by night became more and more intrusive and effective, so much so in fact that a grandiose plan for the bombing of Berlin from the Norfolk coast was hastening towards completion when the armistice occurred.

Not all these seeds of air force enterprise, sown developmentally during the last war, germinated in the ensuing years of peace. Some came to nothing and others lay dormant until the soil in which they rested was stirred again by a resumption of hostilities; a few only sprouted lustily with a growth that kept pace with future needs. Among these latter none was so strongly rooted, or so well nurtured, as the conception of a bomber offensive as an independent aid to victory. Successive members of Air Council and Chiefs of Air Staff clung tenaciously to the belief, founded on the growing power of the bomber and further inspired by the unrealized design for the destruction of Berlin, that bombing, and more especially the night variety, could clear a path to victory in any future war, and neither were they altogether blind to its repercussions on the naval power of an enemy. The armistice had intervened to prevent the matter being put to final proof, but the conception had been born, the instrument was ready, and, above all, a determination had been aroused that where the last war had left off the next one should begin. It is to these considerations that we owe to-day our heavy-weight preponderance in the air, whose mighty and oft-repeated blows, delivered sometimes half-way across Europe, have changed the very face of war, wrecking ports and cities, causing industry to emigrate, making a rubbish

heap of large munition areas, bearing large assistance to our naval forces, and striking at the moral resolution of our enemies by which their will to war is fortified. All that is being thus accomplished, and all that remains to be done, can be logically traced to the impulse of the last war in its concluding stages, when the Rhineland cities were being bombed by the Independent Air Force, and when the super-Handley Page, type V/1500, a product from the same works as the Halifax, was ear-marked for the bombing of Berlin. This prototype of the mammoths of to-day was a remarkable advance on previous construction. Including its four Rolls Royce Eagle VIIIs it cost just under £20,000 and was manned by a crew of six; its military load was 8,000lb. and its bomb-load thirty 250 pounders; at a speed of 100 m.p.h. it possessed an air endurance of 14 hours; it could climb to 6,500ft. in ten minutes. When the armistice was signed 255 of these machines were on order.

Our bomber policy, inaugurated in the former war, marched on progressively during the interval of peace and was finally fashioned into the strong strategic arm we wield to-day, the aim constantly in view being the manufacture of a weapon by which the heart of enemy territory might be attained. It was an ordered progress unswervingly directed towards a single object. Our fighter programmes of construction also succeeded one another with a steady, though not startling, improvement in design, and the interceptor aircraft, originally produced to oppose itself to bomb attack, duly took its place in line. It was foreseen that the next would be a mobile war, and that, in consequence, the former routine concept of fighter performance must vanish from the scene. With the enlargement of its scope the modern fighter proved itself in several ways as a tactical weapon of offence, some of which were shown in the former war while others blazed a new trail in the air. As a bomber-killer, by night as well as day, it became a supreme success; as a close escort to its own bombers it has preserved them largely from destruction; equipped with bombs, as also were its antecedents in the last war, it sweeps over France and the Low Countries in forays which leave a train of ruin in their wake; similarly fitted it has harried the desert enemy in retreat or obstructed his advance; carrying a 40mm gun beneath each wing, that fire a 2½lb. shell, it has taken on tank-busting to the confusion of the enemy in Tunis; there has been evolved for it a method of dive-bombing which, in some respects, is no less effective than that of the Junkers 88; with bombs and machine-gun bullets in combination it has been used with high success to put enemy airfields out of action in close connection with the tactical plan below; it has been adapted for deck-flying; it can be catapulted from a ship at sea. With such a many-sidedness and variety of performance it can notably assist the separate air war and, equally, act in the closest co-operation with our forces of the land and sea. In the desert, indeed, and latterly in Tunisia, our air forces working with the Eighth Army have been wrought into an instrument that is truly a component of the military machine. In

concert with medium and light bombers the fighter helps to form, out there, a flying artillery by the use of which, as a preliminary to attack, the enemy can be bombarded in his tender spots beyond the range of field pieces; and in this way, on various occasions, enemy airfields have suffered such heavy visitation that our advancing troops have been largely spared the risks and losses inseparable from the brisk activities of hostile aircraft. In the desert and North Africa our air power has come to full fruition as a partner of the forces on the ground. The two have been welded into a whole that in effectiveness, and for battle purposes, exceeds the combination of the German armies and air forces in the Low Countries and France when they had the terror and distress of a civil population, fleeing panic-stricken in advance, to assist the military endeavour.

It would be fruitful in a further article to examine German air development since the last war, although, as distinct from us, it cannot be directly traced to the effects on the growth of air power in that former strife. Whereas British air power subsequently dwindled, that of Germany became extinct, and it was not until 1934, the year of Hitler's assumption of office, that it was reborn. Germany erected her edifice of military power according to a strict time-table and with the one considered aim of again challenging her former foes, and in the process her air forces took shape in consonance with that comprehensive plan. She played for a swift, decisive victory, and very nearly achieved it. Her failure, however, counted against her more than ordinary defeat, for her military machine, together with its air component, had necessarily to be built on rigid lines and was not able quickly to readapt itself to circumstances when confronted with an unexpected change of situation. In this way her air power was particularly affected, and to this inelasticity and lack of suppleness must mainly be attributed its slow but sure retreat before the massed array of Allied air force, not built on the hard and fast lines of preconceived design.

THE TUNISIAN DEBACLE

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

IT is hard to realize that the war in Africa is over. A month ago it seemed possible that it might drag on, however great our confidence might be in the ultimate result. Reasons for the sudden and sensational ending of the final encounter are not hard to find. Sea power enabled the Allies to build up a force that sooner or later was bound to be overwhelming. Brilliant generalship, team work of the highest order and the magnificent fighting qualities of the troops ensured that once concentrated the force would be used effectively.

Perhaps the most remarkable achievement was the welding of the diverse elements of the force into, military speaking, a homogeneous body. For that no doubt President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were primarily responsible, with General Eisenhower as their chief agent. There was none of the bargaining and friction which in the last war marred the development of plans of the higher command, and which, too often in exaggerated form, affected the mentality of subordinates. The problem of command of an allied army was evidently successfully solved, though success may have been due as much to the individual characters of Generals Eisenhower and Alexander as to the solution adopted. How far General Eisenhower retained responsibility for approving General Alexander's plans we do not yet know, but evidently the latter was given a free hand in assigning tasks to the various elements of his group of armies irrespective of nationality. Co-operation between the three fighting Services reached the highest pitch of perfection and as at Alamein every weapon was brought into play. As at Alamein too the crust of the enemy resistance had to be worn through by infantry, artillery and air attack before a gap was formed for the decisive armoured thrust. As at Alamein minefields and anti-tank guns made the attrition of the crust a slow and deliberate process, but in Tunisia the nature of the terrain must have made the task much more formidable. It was all the more necessary therefore to mislead the enemy, and to induce him to expend and disperse his reserves. The earlier attacks on the Medjez front in the directions of Tebourba and Pont du Fahs although they failed to break the crust helped to mislead the enemy and caused him to exhaust a large part of his reserves; and his violent counter-attacks during the last week of April, though they had some success and may have delayed the delivery of Alexander's decisive attack, contributed to his undoing by still further exhausting his reserves. It was, however, I suggest, the 8th Army's preliminary attack on the Enfidaville position, followed by

signs of preparations for renewal of attack, that chiefly mislead General von Arnim. The reputation Montgomery's army had gained may well have helped to convince him that it was his most dangerous antagonist, and that he could safely employ part of his reserves in blocking the First Army's progress so long as he retained his best troops and their reserves to meet the 8th Army's attack. The success of his counter-attacks was probably sufficient to give him false confidence and he apparently had no great anxiety about his northern defences. When, therefore, the 2nd American Corps appeared in the north after their brilliant cross-country march he may have believed that Alexander had given them, as his least experienced troops, a defensive or subsidiary rôle in a re-grouping of his forces designed to concentrate the weight of his attack in the south. It is also possible that General von Arnim may have transferred his northern reserves to the centre to give weight to his counter-attacks.

Weak in the north, with reserves exhausted from their exertions in the centre and with his greatest strength tied to the south by a threat which never materialized, his dispositions were thoroughly unsuitable to meet the blow that was to fall on him, and laid him open to surprise as regards the direction from which the blow would fall and its weight. When the Americans far from adopting a defensive attitude almost at once vigorously attacked from their new positions, the element of surprise seems to have been introduced, otherwise it is hard to account for the unexpected Axis retreat to Mateur. The fierce American attack supported by a great weight of artillery and, assisted by the splendid advance of the Moroccan troops on their left, fell on troops already exhausted by a prolonged period of fighting with British troops, and their morale rapidly deteriorated. It was a situation which called for the intervention of fresh reserves, but none seem to have been available. Presumably General von Arnim sanctioned the retreat; for although it involved the abandonment of Mateur and exposed the right of his positions in the centre it was deliberately carried out, and not as the result of a break-through. It has been argued that General von Arnim all along intended to abandon Bizerta if his outer defences were broken, and to hold Cape Bon and the hill region south of Tunis as his final defensive position. In view of the fact that the retreat of his right was towards the Bizerta defences and not towards the flank of his Tebourba position it seems more probable, however, that his intention was to hold the Bizerta fortress, even should it become isolated from his main concentration in the south. Investment of the fortress would have compelled the Allies to make a detachment from the armies attacking his main position, and it was obviously important to deny them the use of the harbour and Sidi Ahmed airfield. Whatever General von Arnim's intentions were the speed and energy of the American pursuit completed the demoralization of the retreating troops. He must however be held responsible for leaving his right without adequate support.

The collapse of the northern front, though it tended to accelerate the

final débâcle, did not place him in an immediately hopeless position. But he remained hypnotized by the 8th Army's reputation and made no attempt to strengthen his centre. General Alexander's decision to transfer divisions from the 8th to the 1st Army, made after the failure to effect a break-through at Pont du Fahs, was a brilliant modification of original plans and took General von Arnim completely by surprise. It not only gave added weight to the decisive thrust through Massicault towards Tunis, but provided ample forces for the immediate and devastating exploitation of the break-through.

General Alexander has given us a classic example of concentration of force and the correct utilization of reserve power at the decisive time and place, of relentless pursuit and indeed of practically all that marks generalship of genius. In contrast his opponent appears as a general of very limited capacity, but what are we to think of the higher command, which placed him in a position that invited ultimate disaster, deserted him when disaster threatened, and made no provision for the escape of even part of his army? If the Tunisian disaster had been an isolated episode we might perhaps assume that the High Command had been willing to make a sacrifice in order to achieve a specific important strategic object, and blame for failure to conduct a protracted defence might be attributed to General von Arnim's individual incompetence. But following on the Stalingrad and Alamein disasters, the defeat of General Rommel in his attempts to stop the advance of the 8th Army, and the narrow escape from disaster in the Caucasus front and in the Donetz Basin, due mainly to exceptionally favourable weather conditions, the competence of German generalship and the military doctrines of the German General Staff fall under suspicion. The more so because until demoralization set in at Tunis there was nothing to show that the troops were responsible for failure. No doubt Hitler himself was responsible for some of the grosser mistakes of the High Command, but I think it is possible to overstress Hitler's responsibility in seeking reasons for successive disasters.

Tentatively I suggest that German military doctrines are equally responsible. Speaking generally the doctrines are sound, they have been elaborated with German thoroughness and been accepted without dissent—the army has therefore the undeniable advantage of a common doctrine. What then is wrong? My suggestion is that the theories on which the doctrine is based have been carried to such exaggerated extremes that they dangerously tend to obscure individual judgment. Cult of the belief in German invincibility, in the doctrine of ruthlessness and the infallibility of the General Staff carried to exaggerated extremes also tend to make determination degenerate into sheer obstinacy. Few would now assert that German belief in offensive action is mistaken, or that when defensive action is necessary it should be active. But blind belief in offensive action untempered with judgment and combined with readiness to make ruthless sacrifices has obvious dangers. In defence especially, although counter-offensive action is of the utmost importance, it must be used with discretion if exhaustion of troops and rapid dis-

sipation of reserves is to be avoided. Counter-attacks that fail are very expensive, and, it may often be better to give ground than to achieve temporary success at the sacrifice of men and of ability to secure more worth while results at a later stage. As example General von Arnim would seem to have carried counter-attacking policy to excess. In Russia during the winter retreat after Stalingrad there were constant reports of counter-attacks that failed. The Kotelnikov counter-offensive which so disastrously failed to relieve the 6th Army was an operation of a different order, but there is a suspicion that excessive belief in offensive action led to its delivery prematurely and with inadequate force. General Rommel's offensive policy brought him a large measure of success, but he also can be suspected too of carrying it to excess when on the defensive. His counter-attacks at Alamein exhausted his reserves before General Montgomery's decisive attack was launched. Again at Medinini his attempt to forestall General Montgomery's attack on the Mareth position was a disastrous failure.

But perhaps it is Hitler himself who has more than anyone else absorbed the General Staff doctrines and carried them to exaggerated extremes. Particularly the doctrine of ruthlessness. His ruthless demand that the last remains of the 6th Army should be sacrificed to gain a few more days may strategically have been justified, and it met with a large measure of response, but in Tunisia there was practically no response to his final appeals. Had he from the first contemplated a ruthless sacrifice or was it overweening confidence in German invincibility that led the High Command to court disaster? German propaganda at different times has given an affirmative reply to both questions but the main point is that which ever reply is correct there was a gross error of judgment.

Granted that the attempt to hold northern Tunisia as measured in days delayed the development of the Allied plans; but has it, as the Germans claim, delayed strategic developments? Such delay as has been caused is certainly much less than the six months that have passed since the original landing in Algiers, for in any case a considerable time would have been needed for complete disembarkation, and for the processes of organization of the force and its bases. Such delay as has been caused is in itself more than offset by the extent of the German disaster, and more important, German policy has gratuitously provided the Allied Army with opportunities to shake itself together and to gain the experience, lack of which might have seriously jeopardized enterprises still to come. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the German High Command for that, even if their strategic policy has not damaged the morale of their army and shaken its beliefs in its own invincibility and competence of its commanders.

TUNISIA AND AFTER.

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

THE total expulsion of the enemy's armed forces on land, at sea and in the air from Africa opens a new chapter in the war. It marks a definite point of transition in the strategy. Until now we have been compelled to confine our efforts to defence; defending ourselves against invasion in these islands, against invasion of our African interest and colonies, invasions of India and Australia; and against the strenuous attempts to cut our vital sea communications on which everything else depends. Our offensive, in major strategy, has been necessarily limited to attack of the enemies' communications and sources of supply, shutting them off from the other world and its materials by the sea blockade, reducing their powers of producing the armaments they need by the bombing of their factories, and injuring the internal system of distribution on rail, canal and river. None of these, however, can in themselves produce a decision. The enemy in Europe has far too great resources at his disposal in the occupied countries to be susceptible to blockade: he may suffer privation, but not vital privation which will force surrender on him as a siege forces surrender on a completely beleaguered garrison. It is not the destruction of the factories producing war material that will force the enemy to hoist the white flag, even if that destruction could be far more complete than we can expect it to become. It is the result of the destruction, in the depriving his fighting forces of the arms, munitions and transport of their needs, that constitutes the importance and value of these two offensive measures. They are both means to the end; they cannot themselves produce a decision. Even the brilliant campaigns in East Africa and Abyssinia were, strategically speaking, defensive. They served to defend the seaborne commerce and military lines of communication, by depriving the enemy of the positions on the African and Red Sea coasts from which the sea forces could operate, and the sea forces themselves. So, too, in North Africa the strategical essence of the campaigns which have swayed from Syria to the Atlantic coast down to Senegal, is defensive. The loss of all that territory does not bring any direct pressure on either of the Axis Powers, except in the small degree that Tunis and Algeria furnished him with certain useful raw materials and that he will suffer a definite inconvenience from the loss and from the leakage in the blockade through Marseilles. Those campaigns have defended Egypt, Palestine, Syria; they have prevented the enemy from getting the oil supplies he so greatly desired in Iraq and Persia; and, in the final

consummation, have ejected him from the favourable positions he held, and those he temporarily succeeded in occupying and greatly desired to hold, on the North coast of Africa through which he could maintain his armies and cut into our lines of military supply.

It has been a long wait and an unpleasant one; but it has been unavoidable. Nor is the defensive yet at an end, for we still have to master the attack on our sea lines of communication and to hold India and Australia. But those two defensive needs are assisted by this new situation, for with a shortening of the route to the East the war supplies needed there will be able to reach the armies, fleets and air forces more rapidly, and some relief will be afforded to the intense pressure on our shipping tonnage that has been caused by the substitution of the Cape route for the Mediterranean route. We should not however set our expectations too high, and assume that the Mediterranean is henceforward an available route for commerce, and that an immediate easing of the situation in the East will follow. Whether any large proportion of the shipping that now has to make the 14,000 mile voyage round Africa to reach the Near and Middle East theatres and the markets in those parts, will be transferable to the Mediterranean depends upon the protection that can be given to it, and that depends upon the amount of the requisite types of fighting force that can be spared from other demands. The needs of the Atlantic for increased numbers of long range bombers and for escort vessels is still pressing; the eight days' battle with a succession of U-boats shows that we still have a long way to go before the menace on the ocean is disposed of. And while, on the one hand, the use of the shorter route through the Mediterranean would effect, it would seem possible, a saving in escort craft, it is also possible that it would be followed by a greater concentration of submarines there, which in turn would demand a strengthening of the escort craft of all types, surface and air. The possession of the North African ports does not deprive the enemy of the power to attack shipping. His air attacks have indeed not been launched from those ports but from Sicily, Sardinia and Pantellaria; and his submarines can operate from ports at a greater distance—those in the north of Italy, in the Adriatic, and from Toulon, where, according to recent accounts, he has been feverishly increasing the facilities for naval operations; but they strengthen the power of defence to so high a degree that it may prove that there will be a complete mastery along the narrow route by means of small surface and air craft. Whether however it will be possible to devote the necessary numbers of these protective forces when the full offensive against the Continent begins, and large armies have to be carried in safety across the sea in, we may not unreasonably expect, more places than one, remains to be seen. The "invasion" will demand the most complete command of the sea passages that it is humanly possible to give. First, the actual passage across the waters must be effectively shielded, in the two forms of direct cover against the lighter forces of the enemy and distant cover against any form of intervention that may be attempted by the larger ships—the rôle

which the Italian writers on naval strategy have attributed to the fleet. Captain Sechi, for instance, stresses the part which the "fleet in being" should play in defence against invasion. For that ultimate purpose it must be preserved; and then it "constitutes a grave danger for the convoying shipping and also for the fighting forces if they imprudently approach the coasts or divide." It should also conduct "vigorous action against the coasts and commerce of the enemy The fleet which too often, or worse, always avoids tactical action, does not exercise a real or effective threat: it may save its ships, but undoubtedly it abandons the command of the sea to the enemy, and may count itself beaten without having fought." It remains to be seen whether the persistent avoidance of battle, even in those months when the sea and air forces in the Mediterranean greatly outnumbered the British, has produced this disintegration of the morale of the Italian navy: but doubtless the smaller craft, surface, submarine and air, will do all in their power to interrupt the passage of the armies, their landing and, what is of no less importance as the campaign in Tunis has reminded us, the maintenance of the forces until their task is completed. What the enemy attempted in his African adventure was the conquest of territory over sea without command of the sea. It may certainly have appeared to him that, with his shorter lines of supply, his favourable position, the immense time it must take the British forces to arrive in Egypt, he would have time to capture the bases of the navy and air forces in Egypt before the reinforcement to the armies could arrive; and, when the whole situation is surveyed, this would not have been an unreasonable assumption. But the attempt failed and the British command of the sea being unbroken—though severely disputed by the lesser enemy arms—and the British land forces, brilliantly handled and fought, being able to hold their own against his superior numbers and equipment, the Sea Power was able to assemble superior force on land and drive him out of Africa. We may be sure that we shall avoid the error of beginning an overseas invasion in defiance of the lessons of experience; but to ensure the retention of the undisputed command will call for all our efforts and it may well be that when that operation begins we shall be obliged to maintain much of our communications by way of the Cape. No one outside the Admiralty however is in a position to judge the respective expenditure of effort and to say whether the saving of tonnage and protection arising from the use of the shorter route would enable the shipping going to the East to be sent through the Mediterranean when major military operations of such a magnitude have begun; and there must be no disappointment if the expectations of a complete return to the Mediterranean route should be not fulfilled—for a time.

RETURNED PRISONERS OF WAR

A SUGGESTED SCHEME FOR REHABILITATION

BY GEORGE F. COLLIE

A MAN who has been for any considerable period a prisoner of war becomes to a greater or less degree an abnormal person. Captivity affects men in many different ways. Frequently the man himself does not realize in what way and to what extent he has ceased to be a normal being. In addition to the strain of the experiences which he has been through, on his return to his country he has to face the psychological difficulties of returning to his family and home from which he may have been absent for anything up to three years. During these years of absence he has had only the most limited contacts with his family, contacts which are necessarily much more restricted than in the case of the serving man, and which tend to make his re-entry into family life a period of considerable emotional and mental strain.

The returned prisoner is highly sensitive, and many things which the normal man would think nothing of, are to him matters of great importance. If these are not dealt with in a sympathetic manner, it may adversely affect his outlook on life and consequently his ability to adjust himself to the changed conditions which he finds on his return to his country. It is feared the fact is little appreciated that prisoners of war spend a great part of their captivity both in active conversation about, and mental contemplation of, their home, their pre-war business and pleasures, and other aspects of life as they knew it. This is one of the most difficult problems of the returning prisoner because, that which he has spent long years in contemplating, and in anticipating pleasure in returning to, no longer exists. The prisoner knows little of Britain of 1943, and there is nothing in his existence which enables him to learn of this new Britain, or of the Peace aims of this country. How many prisoners, one wonders, have even heard of the Beveridge Report, or of the many other contemplated post-war developments which are a commonplace even to the serving man overseas. It is therefore not so surprising that he lives in a dreamland of 1939, and it is difficult to envisage, without the active co-operation of the enemy, how any practical steps can be taken to counter the bad effects of over-contemplation of his pre-war existence.

These are some of the general reasons which render a prisoner of war to a greater or less degree unfit for immediate return to civilian life. To the general reasons must be added the particular ones. They are probably even

more important in their effects on the individual prisoner. It may be a case of finding on his return that his family is completely different from what he expected. It may be financial trouble. It may be in many cases that because of the necessities of war the old home no longer exists. It may be the knowledge that he has no job awaiting him, and the consequent fear that he may not be able to find employment. It may be psychological difficulties between husband and wife. Whatever the cause may be, the average returned prisoner of war is not fit to return to civilian life, even after a period of leave because, although he may not be aware of it, he is incapable mentally of adjusting himself to the problem of his homecoming and to the sudden and complete change in his environment. If the many thousands who are now in enemy hands are to make good future citizens, then for their own sakes as well as for the good of the community, it is important that the question of their treatment should be considered on scientific lines to enable them to return to normal life.

When an armistice in Europe is signed, there will be about 150,000 prisoners to be repatriated. It may be, however, that in certain circumstances large numbers of prisoners will be repatriated before the signing of an armistice, and for this and other reasons it would seem expedient that the general scheme for the treatment of returned prisoners of war should now be drawn up. It is proposed here to make some suggestions for such a scheme.

It should not be overlooked that the returning prisoner of war is very sensitive, and everything possible should be done to make him feel, not only welcome to his own country, but that in the stress of war he, who through no fault of his own became a prisoner, has not been forgotten. It is to be hoped that it will be possible for the authorities to make their treatment of the returned prisoner of war a sympathetic one, and one which will show some understanding of the special requirements of those who have suffered long periods of enforced captivity. It is, however, appreciated that the problem has difficulties and that the authorities have to consider many points of view, not least that the returning prisoners of war must not be given privileges which are denied to the serving soldier. Nevertheless, there is room for considerable improvement in the present attitude to the returned prisoner. It is essential that efficient arrangements are made for him on arrival in this country, and that he should be in a position to go to his home with the minimum of delay. When the returned prisoner goes on leave to his home he should be free from financial worries. From the psychological aspect this is important. The then Chairman of the Advisory After-Care Committee for British Prisoners of War wrote to *The Times* on February 6, 1919 (by that date over 150,000 prisoners had been repatriated and sent to their homes) stating that prisoners often did not receive their current pay and ration money except after repeated applications, and that in the nervous state of mind of most returned prisoners this was unsatisfactory. It is essential not only that the prisoner should be provided with adequate immediate finance

but that he should be speedily informed as to the amount of his credits, and how the figure has been arrived at. At present it can be said that neither of these essential conditions are in operation. Until quite recently the returned prisoner of war was sent to his home with an advance on his accumulated credits of the handsome sum of £2, and with no certainty as to when further finance would become available.

The sympathetic treatment of prisoners on their return can, at best, only avoid any sense of bitterness: it cannot cure the prisoner of his malady as a result of his captivity. What then should be done? It is suggested that there should be drawn up a comprehensive scheme for the psychological treatment of the prisoner.

On his return to this country, after having passed through the necessary formalities as quickly as possible, the returned prisoner should be sent on leave to his home for a period of three weeks. On the expiry of his leave he would, as a matter of military discipline, report to a special rest centre where he would be housed under comfortable and congenial conditions. It is an essential feature of the scheme that it is absolutely obligatory on the part of the prisoner to report to the rest centre on the expiry of his leave. On arrival at the centre he would be examined by a psychologist who would make a report on his case. In some cases it would be found that the returned prisoner was completely normal and could be discharged or returned to military duty as the case may be. In most cases, however, the returned prisoner would require treatment of some kind, and a psychiatrist would take the man in hand, and after careful examination prescribe the necessary treatment.

Most of the returned prisoners will be suffering from minor mental abnormality, and experience has shown that in dealing with such cases a psychiatrist can by the use of the most simple equipment in a very short time effect a complete and lasting cure. It is just such treatment which the returned prisoner requires, and in the great majority of cases it will take only a few weeks. It will be found that the time taken to effect a cure will vary greatly in two apparently similar cases, and therefore no hard and fast rules should be laid down, but even in the most difficult cases, it is believed that three months will be found sufficient to complete the rehabilitation for returning to a normal life. In such a scheme it would be an essential feature of the treatment that no prisoner would be allowed to be discharged from the rest centre without the consent of the psychiatrist looking after his case.

If it is possible, and there is no real reason why it should not be, to put into operation such a scheme, one can foresee far reaching developments in the scientific placement in industry of those being discharged from the rest centres. As an extension of the plan, it might be practicable in special cases to provide the necessary training for placement in industry. At the very least it would be possible to provide authoritative and useful statements for the Ministry of Labour as to the condition of those about to be discharged,

and as to the types of work for which they would be suitable. In this connection useful guidance could be given to the individual enabling him to seek employment in those spheres in which his ability and temperament were best suited.

Psychologically, the most dangerous period for the prisoner is the period immediately following his return home during his three weeks' leave. If the co-operation of the medical profession and the prisoner could be obtained, it would be helpful if the medical profession could be officially informed of the return of the prisoner to his home and under financial arrangements made by the State the medical practitioner would visit the prisoner during the period of his initial return to family life with a view to alleviating the psychological difficulties which unfortunately are bound to arise, both with the returned prisoner and with his family. This suggestion, it is appreciated, is an ideal one, and it is doubtful if it is practicable, or if the average medical practitioner would have the time or the qualifications for putting it into effect.

The returned prisoner, while undergoing treatment at the rest centre, would be able to rehabilitate his mind in knowledge of events which have happened during his captivity and of which he is ignorant. This is an important aspect of the problem for the returned prisoner. For reasons which have already been explained, the prisoner of war lives in a dreamland of pre-war conditions, and is in complete ignorance of the most everyday events which have occurred since he became a prisoner. The many thousands who were taken prisoner in the fall of France have no conception of life in Britain to-day or of the changes in the outlook for the future. To take what is perhaps a fatuous example; many prisoners have never heard of the B.B.C. Brains Trust. In parenthesis it may be added that the reply to the question: "How would the Brains Trust spend their time if they were prisoners of war?" showed how highly intelligent men like Dr. Joad are incapable of appreciating the mental anguish suffered by prisoners of war. These blanks in the knowledge of events are a serious matter for the prisoner of war, both for his own peace of mind and for his ability to compete on equal terms in the labour market with his more fortunate comrades. On his being exchanged and repatriated to this country, the writer underwent an intensive course of re-education. Nevertheless, some time later while in a military hospital he acquired the nick-name of "Rip Van Winkle."

The rest centre would provide the ideal opportunity for re-educating the prisoner and the filling in of the mental blanks resulting from his captivity. By means of the many excellent films, both official and otherwise, which have been produced during the war much could be done to make the prisoner's stay at the rest centre enjoyable, while at the same time fulfilling its essential purposes. Lectures, debating societies and permanent exhibitions would be useful additions to the re-education programme. There would be available a complete library of H.M. Stationery Office's beautifully produced accounts of the various campaigns and incidents of the war, together with

other books which have been published on the war and on post-war conditions.

The rest centre should not over-concentrate on the war, and naturally much time would be spent on games and other normal activities. A carefully chosen and ample diet would help to build up the strength of the returned prisoner after the under-nourishment of camp existence.

In consideration of such a scheme two questions arise. First the cost of the scheme, and second the ability to recruit the necessary trained personnel to put it into operation.

It is fortunate that the equipment required for psychiatry treatment is so simple that there need be no hesitation on the grounds of expense. There would be the cost of the provision of the personnel required and the maintenance of the prisoners while at the rest centre, but this would not be greater than equivalent hospital treatment, and if the objectives of the scheme were achieved the benefits to the community would be well worth the expenditure.

Nor does the provision of the trained personnel present any insurmountable problems. There exists at the present time a considerable and highly trained staff of Army psychiatrists who have been doing remarkable but little publicized work since the outbreak of the war. The key men are already in the Army, and with adequate medical and hospital staff, the putting into operation of a scheme on the lines which have been indicated could be done without undue difficulty, provided the necessary organization is established at a date in the not too distant future.

It may well be asked why should the benefits of such a scheme be restricted to prisoners of war? There will be many equally difficult re-adjustments to civilian life among serving men when they come to be discharged. It is essential first to get the scheme into operation, and the returning prisoners of war provide the ideal material for judging the results of the large scale handling of the problems of rehabilitation of service men for civilian life in a modern and scientific manner. Later it might be found possible to make the scheme of general application when the millions now in the Army come to be demobilized.

In conclusion, the disabilities from which the returning prisoner of war suffers have been acquired in the service of his country, and it seems logical that the State should use its best endeavours to rehabilitate him for his successful return to civilian life, so that he may again become a useful member of the community. What has been suggested here is not intended to be anything but a tentative proposal. It is put forward in the hope that the necessity for having some such scheme may be appreciated in sufficient time to be put into practice on the return of the prisoners of war.

(Captain Collie was a Prisoner of War from 1940 to 1942.)

A PARSON'S "NEW ORDER"

BY JOHN HALET

THE longer the war goes on and the heavier the price we have to pay, the more deeply is it brought home to us that here is indeed a "war of ideas," a conflict for the very soul of man. This is no high-sounding but empty phrase, for in the soul of man (however one may conceive of "soul") are formed his values and from his values derive his ideas of the purpose of life and his aim in it, determining his whole attitude to his neighbour whether near or distant, and thereby his whole scheme of life, government and action. Our enemies proclaim with no less sincerity than ourselves that they also seek military victory not as an end in itself, but as an essential preliminary to the establishment amongst mankind "for a thousand years" of a New Order of ideas with the practical order, political, social and economic, which derives from the new ideology. They have planned it all and with modern means of compelling the bodies, minds and souls of men into a pattern of conformity he would be rash indeed who would maintain that their New Order is incapable of being put into practice, if not for Hitler's "thousand years" then, at any rate, for a good deal longer and with more appalling consequences than most of us care to contemplate.

We still tend to refer to our enemies as the "gangster nations." This term, however gratifying we may find its use, is dangerously misleading. Gangsters are individuals or small groups who, for their own selfish ends, rebel against the commonly accepted law; in their hearts they either accept the necessity for such law (upon the continuance of which they depend for their "success") or else they are utterly careless of it; they are not revolutionaries with an alternative programme for the society on which they batten, and confronted with a demand to put forward an alternative order of society, would be utterly at a loss. This would be no sort of accurate description of the Nazis and their sympathizers; true, a "gangster" violence and a ruthless disregard of all law as we have hitherto known it is of the essence of their principles and thereby of their methods; but not for a moment do they admit they are breaking any *valid* law; and asked to produce an alternative to the order of society they are trying to disrupt, they are only too ready to do so, explaining that it is precisely with the intention of supplanting the old order with their new one that they are violently trying to destroy the old. We have got to realize fully that to attempt what the Nazis are attempting is only "wrong" to those who do not believe, as do the Nazis, that the old ideas of right and wrong are out-moded and done with. To invade helpless neigh-

bours and bring them into bondage, to exterminate Jews and Poles, to measure truth not by facts nor by any abstract standard but by what best serves at any given moment the interests of those trying to further the New Order is not wrong to our enemies; it is lawful and right to do these things.

For long centuries Europe has accepted and recognized certain ultimate and fundamental standards of right and wrong; however much or often some nation or group might offend against them, they still knew that were *offending*; but to-day there is no longer an agreed standard and what we quite honestly think and call right our enemies as honestly think and call wrong. So this is indeed a "war of ideas," of two irreconcilable ideas of right and wrong, one of which will prevail and continue long after the guns are silent.

How has Europe come to this state of utter division, and consequent civil war, upon the very fundamentals of the life of man? She has not come there suddenly; we are to-day witnesses of and sharers in the fearful climax of a process which has been at work in Europe for at least four centuries and the seeds of which are ever in the heart of man. There is no truer story, whether taken literally or allegorically, than that of how the Devil planted in the heart of man the disastrous illusion of his own self-sufficiency and gave him the idea he needed no help from God in the management of his own affairs; and the hell of Europe to-day is the logical sequel to that early episode in the Garden of Eden. We are all familiar in our personal lives with the idea that we can get along without God, go our own way and work out our own salvation without Him; and, in the last four hundred years this delusion of our own self-sufficiency has slowly spread from individuals to whole groups of people and to mankind at large.

With the Renaissance, there came into the world a fresh zest for learning, for culture and for research which has steadily grown and has achieved some very remarkable results. All this would be very good indeed on one condition; that man recognized his skill and knowledge as God-given, and therefore used them to extend God's rule on earth; that is, used material means in accordance with God's spiritual law. A very simple and adequate summary of this law is to be found, as the Prayer Book reminds us, in the Creed, the Lord's Prayer and the Ten Commandments; these should govern all human intentions and activity. But, in fact, the fatal mistake, or rather sin, of the Garden of Eden has been repeated and perpetuated on a gigantic scale: man has put his faith in himself, in his own skill and knowledge, not in God. God has for a long time been relegated more and more to the category of Optional Subjects. And that cannot be done; or rather, it can, but only with catastrophic results. Even those who would maintain that God does not exist have got to recognize the fact that our civilization was built upon a belief that He does and that we have knowledge of and access to Him through Christ. It is precisely this fundamental of our civilization which has in recent centuries been not so much openly rebelled against (until quite

modern times, on the Continent) as quietly and increasingly ignored and set aside as unnecessary and irrelevant to a mankind more and more aware of its own intellectual achievements and more and more impressed by its own increasingly marvellous harnessing of the physical forces around it. But who dismisses God dismisses his laws also; what God lays down as right and wrong in the outlook of men obviously ceases to be operative for those who regard God as irrelevant or redundant in the affairs of men; and the only possible alternative to accepting the moral law of God is for men to set up their own. This is precisely and inevitably what has happened; just as inevitably, men have set up not one standard but many, and these often irreconcilable one with another as we now know to our bitter cost.

This process of disintegration has not moved at an even pace in all parts of our civilization. We have had, in this country, a particularly long and strong Christian tradition, and we still cling to many elements in it; the Nazi, with a less solid background, has acted more swiftly and logically and, as he puts it, "dynamically" in the substitution of man for God. But basically and ultimately the difference between us is one of degree and of speed rather than radical differentiation. We happen to have inherited a peculiarly strong Christian tradition; that is, we have upheld (whatever our own failures) that at the back of all things is the moral purpose of God, made known to us through Christ; but this belief and tradition, like any other, is a form of capital which, if not maintained and replenished, will totally dry up and disappear sooner or later. If this capital of faith in God through Christ disappears, the interest we derive from it will disappear also. We cannot have "Christian principles" or "Christian ethics" which are the interest, unless we maintain the Christian belief and Christian worship which are the capital; and to substitute "western" for "Christian" principles and ethics gets us nowhere for, however labelled, the fundamentals of our civilization are clearly derived from Christian sources.

To profess to believe we can in this matter any more than in any other have the interest without the capital, the effect without the cause, is pure delusion; as is a purblind attitude that "it can't happen here," "it" being the perfectly logical and indeed scientifically justified result of substituting man for God as the moral arbiter of the world. If we allow the cause to take full root, the effect will follow, here as elsewhere. Even now our grip on "Christian principles" is less firm than it was; else would our record in the years between the wars, both at home and abroad, make less disturbing reading.

There is no doubt that our new order, as embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms is definitely Christian in portent and outline. We owe them largely to Franklin Roosevelt, a man of uncompromising Christian belief and practice; and of our general good intentions to give them effect we are well assured. But can we actually do it?

It is interesting to note that this query does not arise for our enemies.

Man-made standards have, in the long run, disastrous consequences; but they are much more easily put into immediate practice than God-given standards, for man sets his standards fairly near what he wants them to be and then, if necessary, elaborates theories and a "philosophy" to justify them. Thus, the Nazi will in fact exterminate the Jews, enslave his neighbours and re-mould all things nearer to his heart's desire because his own standards say it is "right" he should do these things, and Rosenberg can, if need be, prove it "scientifically."

Our new order, on the other hand, involves us in taking our neighbour not at our own valuation but at God's; and that means we shall have to treat all men equally well and make considerable sacrifices for all of them; not only for our own people and the Empire which stood by us, but for the French who "let us down," the Belgians whose sudden surrender would have brought us to utter disaster but for the "miracle" of Dunkirk, those who run our black market, the Southern Irish whose stubborn neutrality nearly lost for us the battle of the Atlantic and all those who, despite Kipling's elegant warning about "lesser breeds without the law," are still not uncommonly referred to as niggers, wops, dagoes, and the like . . .

So the question of whether we can put our new order into effect is not, as for the Nazi, simply a question of whether we have the material means to do it, but much more of whether we have the moral force and drive to overcome the prejudices and accept the enormous efforts and sacrifices it will entail.

The plain fact is that our New Order isn't "natural" as that word is usually understood; it demands those standards of right and wrong, of duty and of human fellowship which Europe has long derived from a belief that the moral purpose of God is the reality at the back of all things, that Christ is its manifestation in our midst and that man can only conform to it by the power of God through Christ.

This is barely realized by most of our contemporaries. A plan, an intention, an act are usually called Christian if they are deemed to be in accordance with the teaching of Christ; and this is high praise, for Christ is still regarded as the greatest of all teachers and one who, moreover, lived what He taught. So far, so good; but it isn't far enough; to accept Christ as the greatest teacher who ever lived, and no more; is a grave fallacy. It implies that Christ, however great, was none the less no more than an outstanding product of the "natural" historical and evolutionary process—just a very great man—and that therefore mankind can aspire, in the due course of that same process, to bring about what Christ taught; whereas Christianity has to assert without compromise that Christ was not a product of the "natural" historical and evolutionary process but a deliberate, special impinging upon that process, from outside it, by God. That is what is conveyed by the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. Words are at best inadequate means of conveying the things of infinite God; and that doctrine, so worded, is felt by many to be difficult of acceptance and by many more to be an irrelevant and unnecessary "dogma,"

as indeed it would be if Christ were no more than a great man; but the doctrine stands for the profound and essential truth that Christ was not a product, however outstanding, of the "natural" process but a direct intervention in it by God Himself as the revelation of His moral purpose and the means of reconciling fallen man to it. Christ is therefore much more than a teacher, however great; and to conform to Christ, to attain to the truly Christian; we have to do much more than measure our plans and intentions by His teaching; we have to accept that His teaching points to a goal only attainable by those who have the same mind as His: the mind which puts God His Father first, as the reality behind all things, seeks first and foremost His Kingdom and His righteousness, has no confidence these can be attained, or even approached, except by the grace and power of God which can lift "human nature" above its "natural" self and which will no more shrink from paying the cost than did Christ Himself. To Christ, God His Father was the first and most "natural" of all things in the world; through Christ history takes on a new meaning and purpose (if, indeed it has any without Him); and in a life, personal or corporate, approached through Him, our whole conception of such things as "possible," "human nature," "progress," etc. take on a new significance which alters our whole outlook.

So approached, our New Order will be capable of practical realization; but without this, we shall fail. Good intentions are not enough; indeed it would seem that already now our good intentions, formulated in the darkest hours of our national danger, are not as strong or as undivided as they then were. Good intentions are not to be lightly dismissed, and no Christian will be guilty of this; but—and it is one of his first duties to face facts and be a realist—even as he does not believe Christ was a purely human product, so he cannot believe the ends of Christ can be attained by human nature unaided by the means of Christ.

That the Christian is acutely and painfully aware of his own failures, that he realizes fully the many failures of the Church (not always the same and certainly not as unrelieved as is copiously alleged without, often, much close study or knowledge) does not alter the strength of this conviction. There are times at which it is his duty to declare it quite plainly.

CIRCE

A Translation from Jean-Baptiste Rousseau

BY W. R. LATHAM

ON a lone rock, grim, savage, desolate,
Whose barren summit seemed to touch the skies,
Pale Circe, brooding, death within her eyes,
Bemoaned her cruel fate.
Her eyes yet searched the seas,
Believing in her heart that she could trace
The ship, the form, of fickle Ulysses,
And that illusion soothing her disgrace,
Thus she renewed her pleas,
Through tears and sobs which spoke her agonies.

Oh cruel author of my grief and shame,
Stay, stay thy flight! Do not all pity spurn!
Turn to this island, where with love I burn,
And if thou canst not share my passion's flame,
At least to bring me speedier death return.

This mournful heart, to thee a slave, no less,
Still cherishes thy tyrant love foresworn.
Fatal the love from which thy hate is born!
Oh can it be a crime, this tenderness,
To merit such infinity of scorn?

Oh cruel author of my grief and shame,
Stay, stay thy flight! Do not all pity spurn!
Turn to this island, where with love I burn,
And if thou canst not share my passion's flame,
At least to bring me speedier death return.

Thus having wailed her sorrow to the skies,
The fair enchantress sought with magic aids
To call her lover back and from the shades
The gods of darkness summoned with loud cries,
Fell Hecate, Alecto hideous,
The Parcae, Nemesis and Cerberus.
The blood-stained altar burned with dreadful flame;
Swiftly destroying it the lightning came;
Black rising vapours darkened heaven's zone;

The stars of night, astounded, checked their course;
The startled rivers mounted to their source;
And even Pluto trembled on his throne.

The sound of her voice
Sent a shudder through hell;
The fiends of the air
Cried out at her spell;
The shadow of doom
On the universe fell.
To the depth of her being
Earth trembled, afraid;
The fury of ocean
Could not be allayed;
Blood red was the moon,
And all heaven dismayed.

Now to death's heart her black enchantment flies,
To trouble quiet graves;
The ghosts affrighted from their tombs arise,
The air resounding with their doleful cries;
The winds, escaping from their sombre caves,
Add to the clamour with their shrieks and sighs.
Vain thy endeavours! lover desolate.
A mightier god than thou decrees thy fate.
Though earth may tremble where thy footsteps go,
Though all the fires of hell thy wrath unchain,
Still thy fury cannot do
What thy love could not attain.

Love with striving never comes;
Love is jealous of his powers;
Where he summons, we must go;
His the choice, it is not ours;
We admit his law supreme;
A God above the law he towers.

In the barren Winter fields
Flora will resume her reign;
Storm will follow after calm,
Calm succeed to storm again;
But the love that we have lost
We recall in vain, in vain.

MINORITY REPORT

By JAMES HANLEY

THAT particular human area wherein Mr. Donkin had his being was well shut out. Captain Conrad's dodger was big enough, and safe enough to keep it out of sight. Hauteur, arrogance, stubborn indifference were woven into the more humble canvas. Somewhere for'ard Donkin and Co. swore and went on with their jobs, whilst Captain Conrad wrestled with Lord Jim, tossed and turned with his Heysts on his martyr's bed. The beating of the Donkin heart seemed little more than the tick of a clock. The clock had a face it is true, but this was as hazy as any face can be in thick fog, especially if you are looking down at it from a respectable height. For Captain Conrad the bridge was respectable height. To have got a little closer to the Donkin heart, even to the machinery of the Donkin mind would have involved a stoop, and a pretty low one at that, to have tried to understand him would have involved a risky leap to deck level. When his creator had to decide the particular Donkin level, he thought anything below scupper level would be all right. There Mr. Donkin found himself with others of his tribe, and as they moved about their strictly prescribed areas Mr. Conrad and Company were able, by putting the glasses to their eyes to discern and watch the antics of the Donkin tribe.

It was not for 'the grumbler,' the scupperly little man to inform his creator that in keeping himself within the safe boundaries, he was shutting out valuable areas of information. Captain Conrad liked to be talked to from certain very defined positions; Captain Conrad very strongly objected to being asked questions. From which Mr. Donkin may have assumed that that right belonged only to romantic mates and captains, black or white, even though some of these might tend to confuse one of his strictly mental capacities. *Let* them go on asking their questions, *let* them go on trying to solve the riddle of the universe, *let* their Lord Jims and their Heysts go on stewing in their own juices, but what about his questions? After all they were very simple, very near to the bone; they *were* the bone. They were elemental. Yet how to approach, how to get round that dodger, that was the question. But suppose that Captain Conrad should prove to be right in his contentions, that no man for'ard of, or abaft the bridge had the right to ask questions. Suppose you dared. "I might inform you," announces Mr. Conrad, in a mixture of excellent English and Polish swagger, "that when people ask questions in Poland, especially people like you, Donkin, they feel a touch of

the knout." At which Mr. Donkin may perhaps have smiled, revealing in so doing his incredibly dirty, and somewhat broken teeth.

But Conrad went further than this. With his eye to the glass he took another look at Donkin. He searched for virtues and found none, though the vices were ebullient. Asking questions, and being curious, grumbling at indifference and being suspicious, these were some of the Donkin vices. Donkin was beyond the pale. Captain Conrad hated him, in his autocratic way, in his full-blooded authoritarian way. Donkin seen through the glass was no more than a bad reflection in 'the mirror of the sea.' And there the limitations were revealed, there the psychological ignorance of the British sailor was set out for all to see. The areas beyond the bridge, outside the safety of the dodger, were countries in which he did not plough, he hadn't the right blade, the right touch. He was hopelessly lost. Behind the dodger the planetary heart struggled and wrestled with riddles. And then it ceased to beat. The dodger was down and the sea rushed in, and Mr. Donkin came in on the flood of the first wave. His heart was beating, it wasn't after all merely the tick of a clock. That tick was only an odd sound heard somewhere in the area twixt bridge and clouds. Mr. Donkin's heart was full of blood. And moreover he had not changed, physically or mentally. And he still asked the same questions.

What were the questions this broken-toothed little man asked? Did Conrad tell us all? He told us nothing. What he did do however was to create a whole outlook in the minds of the large drawing-room audiences who awaited each new work 'from Mr. Conrad.' Mr. Donkin was a priceless joke, fortunate for the audience perhaps, unfortunate for Mr. Donkin himself. Mr. Donkin had the temerity to ask questions concerning the food (curry and rice, rice and curry, salt beef, wormy bread, salty tea), about the extra hours he worked for nothing, about the absurd rules that hedged his life around at sea. He asked for an improvement in his sleeping quarters (a change from the bare boards and the donkey's breakfast). Why did Conrad loathe him? Because he asked these questions, because he had a pernicious habit of looking rather too closely at the ship's articles, and when on occasion Captain Conrad proceeded so far as to forget them himself, was forthwith reminded, word for word, from memory. What was the motive behind the insatiable Donkin curiosity? What may we now ask is the motive behind the seething curiosities of all the Mr. Donkins at sea to-day?

It is nothing less than a supreme effort to tear down all the dodgers ever erected against them, and to get their just deserts. No more and no less than that.

Donkin was a tradition, long before a Polish gentleman decided to take his ticket, and from that moment warm the heart of all the people within their safe boundaries, who thought Mr. Donkin was a funny little man, and in particular areas a bloody little squirt. As much a tradition, yes, and older than Nelson's blind eye, and Collingwood's superb seamanship. It must have

come as astonishing to Mr. Conrad that a broken-toothed, grumbling little squirt named Donkin could ask questions but it may not have been apparent to the gentleman that this is one of the rights that sailors have, especially British sailors, just as Captain Conrad and all the other captains in the British merchant fleet had the inalienable right of refusing to answer them.

Every British ship that has ever sailed the seas has carried, and will continue to carry its 'sea lawyer,' and that precisely was what Mr. Donkin was, 'the man who knows too much' (Mr. Conrad speaking). The average British sailor, unlike Mr. Conrad, and certain other gentlemen who get the smell of the sea by proxy, saw something more than the perpetual grumbler in Donkin. Up to a point he heartily agrees with the 'sea lawyer,' but only up to a point. After that he laughs at him, something Captain Conrad could never have done, for he was entirely without a sense of humour. The look, the very shape of the brow, scorned it off. Grumbling, or grouching if you like, whether under or over the hand is not an acquired habit, but an instinct, moving about in large areas, mowing back hundreds of years in British maritime history. There is meaning behind it. Out of the long sociological history of British ships and seamen has come the sailor's right to suspect, to mistrust, to growl, to refuse to believe. This is not an opinion, a mere habit of mind, it is a right.

To-day Mr. Donkin's children and grandchildren are asking questions that would have staggered the Polish Captain, no less than the large audiences who read him behind their own specially drawn up dodgers.

Mr. Donkin's children are beginning to show a mathematical interest and desire to know the correct answer to the Ellerman and Houston millions. This Conrad would call grumbling, a good English word which must have often felt uncomfortable on the Polish tongue.

Since Donkin's return on the flood tide, with the signals down and no precise directions to be followed, there have been some boomerang reactions.

One of these has been to suppose that the Donkin questions could be answered from behind a dodger which hadn't even the faint smell of the sea. The eye behind the glass got the same focus, but not the same view. Where Conrad saw nothing but vices and the other eye saw nothing but virtues. The middle course, the sense of proportion wasn't discernible. From an area that smelt more of books than the sea came the information that if only Mr. Donkin would take up certain defined positions, the solution of all his problems was at hand. From the area where the sea was shut out, and Mr. Donkin's experiences were had by proxy the questions could be answered.

But as Donkin had disappointed his Polish Captain, so too did he disappoint his new saviours. He completely ignored them, even though their magnanimity had endowed him with more virtues and grievances than he ever possessed. Informed that he was capable of soaring, that it was only another species that possessed the capacities for swift and inglorious descent, he stood stock still and would not move. Was this just stubbornness on the gentle-

man's part? Or was it an impish capacity for wilfully misunderstanding the obvious? Why would he not make a gesture, give a sign, acknowledge the effort to help. Was he still suspicious, *even* of his friends? In the hour of his promised deliverance another great friend sold him at Geneva-like Judas of old. Was he still right in being suspicious, the grumbler, the bloody little squirt, behind his pale face and black eyes, behind his dirty broken teeth?

The area where no sea flowed had its own virtues, too, and patience was one of these. Mr. Donkin would change, he would get into the right position. Patience, that was the thing. Clouds of literature began to descend upon Mr. Donkin's head. To have read some of it would have been an historic act, without a doubt. The cumulative effect of this downpouring from the clouds was that it did effect his physical position. He turned his back on the clouds. The eye behind the glass saddened. Mr. Donkin was impossible, almost beyond hope.

If only he had done something, carried out the historic gesture, which might mean sticking your fist skywards, or your backside stern on to Mr. Conrad's audience, if only he would try to read a portion of what descended from heaven. But Donkin could not read, the words were confused, some of them were too long, sounded strange in his ears, some were *so* long that they tired his eyes. Unable to speak with anything but his own tongue, that moved bat-like and unwary behind his broken teeth, he required at least the necessary responses, for those on paper were quite beyond him.

To-day, under a cloud of bombs, and the sea raging under him, Mr. Donkin still asks his questions, and those who came to save have suddenly vanished. The clouds of literature have floated away, the eye that watched has closed, and Mr. Donkin is back again in the area for'ard of, and abaft the bridge.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

PROFESSOR JAKOB BURCKHARDT, a Swiss philosopher and historian, was lecturing for the University of Basel between 1868 and 1871. He was already the author of several books but in his own opinion "his true medium was the spoken word"; and he never published his lectures.

A Lecturer's Notes

What we are given now in a book called *Reflections on History* (published by Allen and Unwin at 12s. 6d.) is a translation from his manuscript notes for them, made by Mr. M. D. Hottinger with such spirit that one seems all the time to be reading an original. This professor is the kind of man that George Meredith might have invented; his ideas are full of sap; as for instance when he says that, "only barbarians have no history, and it is because they have no history that they are barbarians. . . They possess such things as tribal lays, and a sense of contrast between themselves and their enemies; these might be called the beginnings of history and ethnography." Everywhere through these pages, striking thoughts meet us. "Whatever the origin of a State may have been, it will only prove its viability if force is transformed into strength." There is a likable imperiousness in this professor's dogmatism. Discussing the first of the "Three Powers" which to his mind dominate history—the State, Religion and Culture) he suggests that we should like to know what the beginnings of the State were, for instance among the lake dwellers—from whom the Swiss might consider themselves descended. Study of still primitive peoples will not help. "To draw deductions from negroes and Red Indians is of as little use as to draw deductions from negro religions to throw light on religion. The white and yellow races must have gone different ways from the beginning and the black races cast no light of authority on that beginning." One finds in his prose hints which might be of use to a poet; as when he says that "visible institutions may preserve the outward life of a religion indefinitely, just as old trees, completely decayed within, can subsist on their bark and foliage, and still look great." Or again, in his discourse upon "the Great Men of History," listen to this. "All the evils that Napoleon brought down upon France are outweighed by his incalculable value to her as a national possession." In short, there is much of the poet in this philosopher; and I wish I could have attended his lectures. But, in honesty, I am bound to agree with him that notes from lectures, even the most stimulating notes, do not really make a book.

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It is the part of wisdom not to try putting into a volume more than it can hold; and Professor Entwistle with his collaborator Mr. Eric Gillett seems to have forgotten this when they embarked on "a survey of British Literature from its beginnings to the present day"—all to go into some 290 pages and to be published by Longmans for 7s. 6d. as "The Literature of England: A.D. 500 to 1942."

A Pint
Pot

What is more they give the widest possible sense to the word Literature. House-painting is painting no doubt, but it is not generally included in a history of painting. Now Mungo Park, to give an instance, was a gentleman in whose written record I took much interest, but I never expected to see his book discussed in a study of English literature. Again, a great many authors are mentioned who could have been omitted; the study of Walter Scott is followed by a paragraph about James Morier—of whose work I feel no shame in confessing ignorance, after a long life chiefly spent in reading.

The obvious danger in such a case is that the book may become a catalogue rather than a history; and, to be plain, much of it falls under that condemnation. There are notable exceptions; Scott gets good treatment; so among authors of to-day does Shaw; Boswell is praised with real insight. But the way in which Burns is dealt with will infuriate not only all Scotsmen, but everyone who knows how rare is the combination of supreme lyric power with the biting lash of a satirist. The truth is that hardly any writer ever rendered more service to his nation than this Ayrshire ploughman.

I looked with serious anticipation for light upon the modern developments in poetry, but cannot say that I found it. And I was shocked by one paragraph of seriously false estimate. Two poets in the last fifty years stood out from the rest, though here I admit willingly and even gladly that A. E. Housman has given to many of us more pleasure than either, and that Hardy in his old age was perhaps more impressive. But on the whole Yeats whom I knew well since he was a boy achieved an eminence which now after his death these critics do not dispute, and I have no quarrel with the handling of him. Yet I say deliberately that Stephen Phillips of whose work they well say, "very little is now heard," reached at his best a poetry worth more to the world than any which ever came from Yeats. For it is impossible to overrate the worth of real poetry that can find general acceptance: and Yeats was too remote from the ordinary man to achieve this—even in Ireland. Phillips was only too near the ordinary Englishman in his pleasures and his temptations and he gave the English of his day a poetry which they could enjoy. The authors of this book should read (what I am pretty sure they never looked at) the third act of *Herod*, which I should produce for the best of Phillips; and in addition the poem called "A Poet's Prayer" in his collected work. There they will find a man uttering the consciousness of his own inspired power, and of his own deadly danger in a way that I think will make them wish to cancel a paragraph which, as it stands, discredits their volume.

* * * * *

Mr. Hector Bolitho is not among the scores of contemporary authors of whom Professor Entwistle takes account; but he has a deal to say for himself, having seen much more of the world than most men. **Squadron-Leader John** Before he met (in 1934) the subject of his latest volume, he had spent three winters in Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan where he came to know a good many flying men, and the traditions of their service. All this has helped in the making of a live book which happily, though a flying man's biography, is about a live man. *Combat Report* (published by Batsford at 8s. 6d.) is described in a sub-title as "The Story of a Fighter Pilot." The pilot in question, though we trace his career up to the time when he got a bar to his D.F.G. is known to us only as "John"—and a very likable person. The last thing one would think of in connection

with him is a string of scalps at his belt; nevertheless a string there is—thirteen planes shot down for certain in the two years during which he was a fighter pilot. Mr. Bolitho, who assuredly knows his job, presents John to us as he was when the two first met—on the way home from Australia where he had tried his luck as a jackaroo on a sheep run. That country and its way of life disgusted him, and two or three pages let us know why. He had no fixed notion where to go next, but when the steamer was approaching Suez two silver aircraft flew overhead towards the Sinai desert, so John said, "You know, that's what I'll do when I get back to England. I'll fly."

His new friend was the very man to help him: already at Port Said half a dozen pilots turned up to give Mr. Bolitho a welcome; and that was John's first introduction to the society in which he was to shine. He was accepted for the Service in 1935 and we have a cheerful sketch of the training period up to October, 1936, when he joined a famous squadron, 43. With it he served till December, 1940, when he was sent to take command as squadron leader of another formation in Northern Ireland. There he remained until last year when much to his disgust he was posted to the "comparative rest of a staff job."

* * * * *

Lady Listowel is wholeheartedly a journalist and in reading *Things I have Seen* (Faber, 12s. 6d.) one sometimes wishes that she had not studied so much of what is written for American consumption. Fastidious she is not; but she has the talent for getting information and for giving it. Her advantages were extraordinary and she added to them by solid equipment. The daughter of an ultra-conservative Hungarian aristocrat, she showed from the very first a determination to break away from routine, and in 1918 when the Bolshevik revolution began with looting, she insisted on joining the household guard and, rifle in hand, took her turn of duty at the age of fourteen. Then came some Red Cross work; but in 1920 her father was appointed Counsellor of the Hungarian Legation in Rome. Incidentally this gave her a fifth language; she already knew English and French over and above the German which is almost obligatory for an educated Magyar. From Hungary a scholarship took her to the London School of Economics; there she spent three years, and met a young Irish peer who had gone Socialist to the horror of his family. But the marriage with Lord Listowel did not take place till she had been all over Central Europe, partly on visits of friendship, partly in chase after 'copy.' By this time she was feeling launched as a journalist and it is plain enough that she had acquired also a deal of admiration. But from October, 1933 on, her home was in London and she learnt to think of herself as an Englishwoman. (Ireland, to which Lord Listowel really belonged, seems to have had no existence for her). It takes her some 250 pages to tell the story of what she saw happening in the years when Hitler and Mussolini were rising into view. England won her admiration; America where she went repeatedly on lecturing tours, came to be full of friends; but to say truth I do not find any special value in her study of the English-speaking world—except that occasionally she writes with real insight, about Mr. Baldwin for instance. But for what she has to tell us about Czechoslovakia and Poland and her own native country, I do not think it would be easy to overpraise her, all the more because she so plainly indicates where Czechs and Poles, each in their separate way, not only suffered injustice but inflicted

it. In regard to Hungary, her insistence on the eastern strain in its people is of interest; and for a single episode nothing could be more moving than the description of Count Teleki's suicide—and all that led up to it. Of Russia which she and her husband saw in the autumn of 1936 during a stay of three months, she gives a vivid and not attractive picture. Bolshevism was never to her liking; but she knows enough of a history which few English speakers have read, to be aware that Russia has been rich in heroines. The country which commands her unstinted admiration is Switzerland, where a free people can afford to be neutral because they have never relaxed their preparations to defend freedom. To give some idea of her intimacy of approach I turn to her interview with Count Ciano whom she had known when he was a "gay young journalist." Her first word, when he as Foreign Minister gave her an interview, was: "When we first met I was a successful debutante and you a budding journalist. Now you are a successful foreign minister—the youngest in the world—while I am a budding journalist."

But one could quote indefinitely. Her settled view is that "peace can only be had on spiritual as well as material security." It must bring a way of life in which people can respect themselves;—work that will not only keep them alive, but seem worth doing.

A message from

MR WINSTON CHURCHILL

"Books in all their variety offer the means whereby civilization may be carried triumphantly forward" [1941]

and another from

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

"Through books we have appraised our enemies and have discovered our Allies

A war of ideas can no more be won without books than a naval war can be won without ships" [1942]

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THE NATIONAL BOOK COUNCIL

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 1833-1935; INDIAN POLITICS 1936-1942, by Professor R. Coupland. *Oxford University Press*. 6s. and 7s. 6d.

The careful and comprehensive study of Indian politics during the past century by Professor R. Coupland now published under the auspices of Nuffield College, should have a wide appeal in Britain, in the Dominions and America, to people interested in the Indian problem.

The first volume of Professor Coupland's work is a historical survey of the development of Indian self-government from 1833 down to the Act of 1935. The second gives a sketch of Indian politics to the present time. In the third the possibilities of an ultimate settlement will be examined. It should be noted that the author studied conditions on the spot for six months last winter.

"The nearer India has drawn to freedom the sharper have become the divisions in her ranks," Sir Stafford Cripps has told us. Professor Coupland's examination of the problem confirms this view. Their growing distrust of the Congress politician explains the insistence of the Muslims and the Princes at the Round Table Conference in 1930-31 that the Central government should be a federation with the minimum power of interference in the States and provinces, as against a strong unitary government, based on majority rule, which was, and is, the objective of Mr. Gandhi, the Congress and the Mahasabha.

From 1937 to the outbreak of the war Congress was ruling the greater part of India under the Act of 1935. Gandhi had won the elections for the party. "Vote for Gandhi and the yellow box" was the election slogan. Not 40 per cent. of the voters knew the name of the candidate. As Professor Coupland remarks Congress realized that the masses were unfit

for responsible government and accordingly through the High Command, dominated by Gandhi, they assumed autocratic powers. The result was that provincial autonomy was nullified wherever Congress rule prevailed. Young Congressmen in the villages lorded it over their neighbours, made it clear that they were the ruling class. They interfered with the administration, especially with the Police. The corruption of Congress camp followers, especially in rural areas, is notorious.

Professor Coupland is more generous in assessing the merits of Congress administration during their two and a half years of power than are Hindu Liberal Nationalists, such, for example, as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, and Sir Jwala Srivastava. He believes they wanted to be fair to minorities.

But were they fair to the Muslims? The new constitution assumed that representative Muslims would be associated with Congress Hindu ministries as Hindus were in the Muslim provinces of Bengal, the Panjab and Sind. Congress took no such action. If they had conciliated the Muslims would Muslims threaten revolt if Congress returned to office? Who is mainly responsible for the fact, as Professor Coupland puts it, that the constitutional issue has become inseparably interwoven with the communal issue? If Congress had shown sympathy with the 50 million outcasts would their leaders implore Britain not to abandon them to the caste Hindu? Was it wise policy to endeavour to force the Princes to adopt democratic principles which Congress had itself overridden? With blots such as these on the escutcheon of the party one hesitates to endorse Professor Coupland's encomium that Congress ministries showed a high sense of public duty.

On the other hand Non-Congress

ministries, apart from the Panjab, have not greatly commended themselves to the people. Muslim rule proved uncongenial both in Sind and Bengal to the Hindu minority; there were outbreaks of savage rioting in the provinces between the two communities. In the Panjab the powerful Hindu community charges the government with favouritizing the countryside as against the Hindus of the urban centres.

Professor Coupland's work should prove a strong antidote to the subtle propaganda which represents the British as exploiting India and refusing to concede power because to do so, would mean loosening their economic grip. Congressmen themselves admit that supreme power was handed over to them in the provinces. And one may hope that unprejudiced observers examining the impartial record of the activities of Gandhi and the Congress put before them in the volumes we are considering will come to the conclusion that the Indian Government would have repudiated its responsibility to India and to the United Nations had it given way to the Congress claim to the immediate transfer to it of control of the central authority.

W. P. BARTON.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR, by Carl von Clausewitz. Translated and edited with an Introduction by Hans W. Gatzke. *John Lane, The Bodley Head.* 3s. 6d.

Clausewitz wrote this memorandum for the guidance of the Crown Prince of Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars, and, as the editor points out in his introduction, completed it in 1812 when on his way to Russia to join Alexander I's army against Napoleon. Whilst some of the detail is ephemeral, the main body of the document is a concise statement of essential principles of eternal appli-

cation. Concentration at the decisive point, surprise, the avoidance of an over-centralization that cramps initiative, that forces must not be brought into play haphazardly, but that "a decisive mass" must be conserved for "the critical moment," that the aim of the defensive, equally as of the offensive, is the destruction of the enemy army: these fundamentals are older than Clausewitz, and no event since the retreat from Moscow has diminished their relevance.

"The principles of the art of war," as Clausewitz says, "are in themselves extremely simple and quite within the reach of sound common sense," but "the great difficulty is . . . to remain faithful throughout to the principles we have laid down for ourselves." This treatise, short though it is, suffices to bring out Clausewitz's essential quality as a military writer. This emerges most clearly in his analysis of the causes of the friction that leads to mistakes, and of the firmness of mind necessary for the making of sound decisions: "We must tell ourselves that nothing is accomplished in warfare without daring; that the nature of war certainly does not let us see at all times where we are going; that what is probable will always be probable though at the moment it may not seem so; and finally, that we cannot be readily ruined by a single error, if we have made reasonable preparations." The art of war, in this definition, lies in the application of simple principles to complex circumstances; and the great merit of the memorandum is in the skill with which Clausewitz develops this point.

The editor's introduction and notes, respectively, give a summary of Clausewitz's career and amplify his historical illustrations. Both are well done, and enhance the value of the book.

W. T. WELLS.

TWENTIETH CENTURY PSALTER, by Richard Church. *Dent.* 5s.

Many poets who went through the last war and have maintained their creative impulse through the intervening years, inevitably found the flow of their inspiration stemmed by the disaster of a new war of even greater magnitude and ferocity. But great events do not kill poetic inspiration, and many poets in their middle years are finding the need to justify the ways of God to man. A sense of guilt, which leads to self-examination and public confession, seems to be shared alike by those who reluctantly accept the necessity of the war and those who uneasily reject it. Younger poets, engaged in active service as soldiers, sailors and airmen, are unlikely to find leisure, even if the impulse were there, for that concentration and quiet recollection which are essential to the writing of lasting poetry: their contribution to the tragic story of mankind's inadequacy will be made later. But this war, much more than the last, has imposed its physical reality upon civilians as well as upon service men; the Battle of Britain is Everyman's battle in a sense in which the Battle of the Marne never was, and poets do not need to leave their own homes and gardens to share in the common experience.

Richard Church has lived the war in his native London and in Kent, and his *Twentieth Century Psalter* is an expression of the phases of despair leading to quiet faith through which he has passed. His poem-sequence consists of a prelude and a poem for the morning and the evening of every day of a month of thirty days. The poems are not, like the psalms of David, the gushing forth of an exultant belief in God; they do not reveal the un-

shakable sense of righteousness which could lead David to cry:

But Thou, O Lord, art a shield for me;
My glory, and the lifter up of mine head.
I cried unto the Lord with my voice,
And He heard me out of His Holy hill.
I laid me down and slept;
I awaked; for the Lord sustained me.
I will not be afraid of ten thousand of
people
That have set themselves against me
round about.
Arise, O Lord; save me, O God:
For thou has smitten all mine enemies
upon the cheek bone.

If Mr. Church believes in God, it is only tentatively and undogmatically. God is to him a symbol of the unknown rather than a vividly realized Presence. His psalms are psalms of grief and hope wrung from suffering, and faith drawn from the contemplation of heroism and fine living in the midst of destruction, bestiality and betrayal; and above all from the assurance gained by observing the slow inevitable march of nature, with its capacity for infinite renewal. He planted a quince tree and a willow beside a pond in his Kentish garden, and these two trees, striking their roots and growing during the war, provide a sort of symbolical ritournelle that recurs again and again in the Psalter.

Here is a good beginning;
To plant beside a pond
A quince tree and a willow;
Both thought upon and planned
Through an inspired waking
When the small night hours see
With intensity of sight
Denied to rational daylight,
So that the planting of a tree
Becomes the aspect of a need
Such as men, from time to time,
Crave to perform, a simple deed
More eloquent than words to prove
How midnight horrors grow sublime
And adequate with love.

This, the poem of the first morning of the first day, is the key to Mr. Church's scheme and adumbrates the course of the whole sequence. Trees that seem to have

been killed by the frost of winter, "the willow, the ironic quince, the Mind's deep-rooted tree," rise again year after year, to confound the doubter and awaken faith.

Mr. Church's technical equipment is impressive, and the variety of moods, manner and forms (often of the strictest) which he uses without disturbing the essential unity of the whole, shows an uncommon resourcefulness. He is no voluptuary of words; there is indeed a certain dryness and lack of warmth of colour in the texture of his work that is only partly due to the austerity of his theme. But within the range of his subdued palette there is almost endless variety, and the careful reader will rejoice in the subtlety of assonances, concealed internal rhymes, and other unobtrusive technical devices. Like his younger contemporaries Mr. Church is not averse from incorporating into his poems words and phrases which once were regarded as sacred to prose, and as a rule the transmutation is satisfactory. Not always. Such phrases as "the difference between usury and a healthy self-interest" scarcely belong to poetry.

This *Twentieth Century Psalter* should be read through once at a sitting, as a faithful record of a spiritual experience through which a sensitive man of our times has passed unembittered; and afterwards, the better to savour it, it should be read over a sequence of thirty days as intended, so that the reader may share the poet's exultation on the morning of the last day when he sings:

Yes, here, where disaster has been,
And a day's events remove
What men have laboured for so long,
I will look beyond the frail
Ruins of a century's betrayal:
I will sing a new song.

HERMON OULD.

THE CRISIS OF THE MODERN WORLD, by René Guénon. *Luzac*. 6s.

AGENDA FOR A POST-WAR WORLD, by J. B. Condliffe. *Allen & Unwin*. 7s. 6d.

M. René Guénon's books have been widely read on the Continent, but are not yet known to a sufficiently large number of readers in this country. The appearance of a translation of *The Crisis of the Modern World* so soon after that of *East and West* is to be hailed with gratitude by those who seek something more significant than the naked materialism and feverish agitation of the modern world.

Mr. Guénon in this book reiterates much of the teaching of *East and West* in which he showed how the study of the eastern doctrines brings out the falsity of so many modern Western ideas and how the West, if it is not already too late, can save itself only by a return to a traditional civilization, "that is one where the intellectual realm dominates all the others."

Few could deny that we are in the midst of a period of disequilibrium, of mental unrest, obscurity and disorder, which has rapidly increased, and there is a vague feeling among many that "the end" is approaching. The Crisis, using 'crisis' in its true sense of judgment, precedes immediately the solution, and it may well happen that what we know as Western Civilization may disappear with its "dispersion in multiplicity": it is no privileged civilization, and civilizations have perished before. To those who believe in the endless progress of the modern world and cannot see beyond such thoughts, this may well seem the supreme disaster.

But these, though the great majority, are not all: there are some spirits that can no longer be content with the negation that constitutes

modern life and these see the only solution of the crisis in a return to tradition. It would of course be useless to return to a tradition not suited to any of the conditions in which we live, and if it is to be a Western tradition "it is only in Christianity, and still more definitely only in Catholicism that such remnants of a traditional spirit as still exist in the West are to be found."

This will prove a very controversial and alien view to the majority of the writer's contemporaries, but there is no expectation that there will be more than a few elect who might be able to attempt the restoration of "something comparable to what existed in the Middle Ages, with the differences demanded by modifications in the circumstances."

The correct words to describe a book so searching as this have lost half their meaning in an age of purposeless superlatives, and in the space of a short review it is not possible to do more than hint at the depth of thought, the force, the scholarship and the lucidity of writing which bring this book and its predecessor into the ranks of the very few modern books of original thinking of real importance available in English. Its particular appeal is for those (and there are more than might be believed) who are still unwilling "to put material things and the preoccupations arising out of them in the first place," who will also eagerly look for translations of his other books.

In a very different book Dr. J. B. Condliffe, now Professor of Economics at the University of California and formerly on the staff of the League of Nations and London School of Economics, tries to set out some of the difficulties that will face us when the war is won, so far as economic questions are concerned. He does not omit to discuss past failures, nor in an age of planning is

he blind to the dangers of regulating trade. His discussion of the dilemma involved in economic policy in seeking the balance between freedom and order is revealing, and his treatment both of the disposal of agricultural surpluses and the question of debts and reparations is thorough and skilful.

J. F. BURNET.

BETWEEN TWO WARS, by J. A. Spender. *Cassell*. 8s. 6d.

All who have attempted to interpret human life and history, whether through philosophy or science or the simple accumulation of facts, have sooner or later reached the conclusion that the clue lies beyond the life of man or generations of men, and is to be found only in a chain of being of which each end is also a beginning. At the end of life it is the vision of man stretching hands to the farther shore which abides.

With these words—evidently inspired by one of the best known and noblest passages in Burke—and under the circumstances deeply pathetic, Mr. Spender closes one of the latest chapters of a book which was finished only within a few days of his death. They may be fitly taken as the farewell message of one who being neither prophet nor parliamentarian, neither parson nor professor, was one of the real statesmen and most effective teachers of his generation. A great journalist who made the *Westminster Gazette* (despite, I suppose, a limited circulation) one of the most influential organs of the day, Spender was also for thirty years or more, though never himself in Parliament, one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, the *fidus Achates* of Mr. Asquith (like himself a pupil of Jowett's), and the singularly acute commentator on liberal policy.

Yet never did Spender give up to a party what was meant for mankind. A loyal and staunch Liberal he had the philosophical and historical

background against which he could view contemporary events with a detachment rare among party politicians. It is the detachment, combined with the mellow wisdom which ripper years bring to those whose youth has not been mis-spent, that gives its particular flavour and value to this fine book.

Not that all parts of it are of equal value. I had read nearly half of it before I made up my mind that Spender had not wasted his time in writing it. For the earlier chapters retread well-trodden ground. There is no lack of books—some of them of high excellence—which tell the story of the two decades between 1919 and 1939. And I confess that I found that part of Spender's book if not actually tiresome distinctly banal. The shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles; the grievous results of the failure of America to implement her President's promises; the widening rift between English and French policy; the dangerously decorated façade of the League of Nations; the flaws in its constitution, and its hopeless inefficiency when confronted with a crisis which one of the Great Powers—Japan or Italy for instance—had provoked. All this had become the commonplace of historical commentary on the inter-war period.

69647 More interesting and more truly instructive is Spender's perfectly frank yet not acrimonious analysis of British opinion. He refrains from imputing guilt to Baldwin for his failure to escape from a dilemma which was in truth inescapable: Baldwin accurately appreciated the fact that the British electorate was fanatically devoted to peace, and determined upon even unilateral disarmament, coincident with his knowledge that we had carried that policy beyond the limits of national safety. No doubt a really great statesman would, abandoning all

concern for the fortunes of his own party, have thrown the sins on the back of the Socialists, and bade them carry their policy to its logical conclusion. Doubtless this would have involved grave risks, but it is just possible that the Socialists might have been able to persuade the country (though it would have been very difficult) to lay aside its suspicions of Soviet Russia and have induced France to conclude a military convention with the Soviet and ourselves. Looking back we can see that that was the only chance of saving Czechoslovakia and Poland, and, perhaps also of preserving the peace of Europe. But in order to judge the statesmen of that day fairly, we have to throw our minds back, as Spender would say and realize the mood of the country at that time. We had, in truth, every reason to mistrust the authors of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917; we could not forget that the Third International was doing its utmost to provoke world revolution; there was, until after the collapse of the General Strike, grave unrest among certain sections of the British wage-earners. On the other hand we had no knowledge of the change in the internal policy of the Russian Communists, nor could we realize that Stalin and Litvinov were genuinely anxious to co-operate in the preservation of the peace of Europe.

It is noteworthy that Spender should again and again go out of his way to vindicate the policy of Neville Chamberlain. What would have happened to us in 1940 if "Munich" had not secured us a year's respite does not bear thinking of. Mr. Spender appreciates this truth to the full. But, indeed, his book is replete with the generous discrimination and mellow wisdom of a truly great publicist.

J. A. R. MARRIOT